NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DANNY G., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.G., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0001 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 533843

The Honorable Cassie Bray Woo, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 6-2-2022
DANNY G. v. DCS, J.G.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Danny G. (Father) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his minor child, Josh.

1 Finding that the 

court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Ashley S. (Mother)2 are the biological parents3 of 

Josh, born in November of 2020. Due to Mother’s substance use while 

pregnant, Josh was born substance-exposed, and he tested positive for 

amphetamine and methamphetamine. Josh began to suffer withdrawal 

symptoms and was admitted to the newborn intensive care unit, where he 

stayed for 12 days. Father visited Josh once in the hospital, but due to 

COVID restrictions and concerns about Father’s substance abuse, he was 

not allowed to visit again.

¶3 Two days after Josh was born, Mother stopped 

communicating with the Department of Child Safety (DCS). DCS 

unsuccessfully attempted to locate Father. Because DCS could not locate or 

contact Josh’s parents, it concluded that an in-home dependency was not 

possible. DCS also determined that two of Josh’s paternal aunts were not

adequate placements because one could not pass a background check and 

the other had medical impairments that would interfere with her ability to 

care for Josh. When Josh was discharged from the hospital, he was placed 

in the care of a licensed foster family. 

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the child’s identity. 

2 The superior court terminated both Mother and Father’s parental 

rights. Mother is not a party to this appeal. 

3 Paternity of the child has not been established. Father testified that 

he was certain that he is the biological father. 
DANNY G. v. DCS, J.G.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 In December 2020, DCS filed a Dependency Petition and 

Petition for Paternity and/or Child Support, alleging that Josh was 

dependent because of neglect by both Mother and Father. DCS specifically

alleged that Father did not provide parental care for Josh and could not 

provide proper care because of his substance-abuse issues. Following a 

hearing in March 2021, the court found Josh dependent regarding both 

Mother and Father. The court found that Father neglected Josh because he 

had not established paternity, had not parented Josh, and was unable to 

provide parental care due to his substance abuse. The court determined 

foster care remained necessary for Josh’s welfare.

¶5 Initially, the case plan was family reunification. In April, 

however, the Foster Care Review Board (the Board) recommended 

changing the case plan to severance and adoption because Mother and 

Father failed to resolve the issues causing Josh to be placed with his foster 

family. The Board found that neither parent attended visits with Josh, both 

avoided communicating with DCS, neither engaged in services, both failed 

to submit or provide negative drug tests, and neither had obtained 

treatment for their substance-abuse issues. Additionally, Father was 

arrested in May and was later sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. At 

DCS’s request, and over Mother and Father’s objection, the court changed 

the plan to severance and adoption. 

¶6 DCS moved to terminate the parent child relationship

regarding both parents, arguing that Father abandoned Josh, had no contact 

with him, and was incarcerated for a period of five years. Mother moved 

for two home-study referrals for two step-relatives: Randi N., the mother of 

Josh’s half-sister, and Rhonda T., Josh’s step-grandmother. The court 

denied Mother’s motion for a home-study referral for Randi because she 

was ineligible for a fingerprint card. Although she was also ineligible for a 

fingerprint card, the court granted the motion allowing a home study for 

Rhonda because she could petition for a good-cause exception. At the time 

of the termination hearing, the home study for Rhonda was still pending,

and a DCS specialist testified that DCS would consider placing Josh with 

his step-grandmother “in good faith.” 

¶7 Following a contested termination hearing during which both 

parents and a DCS case worker testified, the superior court terminated

Mother and Father’s parental rights. The court found two grounds in A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B) were established to terminate Father’s parental rights. See 

§ 8-533(B)(1) (abandonment); (B)(4) (length of incarceration for a felony 

conviction). The court also found that terminating Father’s parental rights 
DANNY G. v. DCS, J.G.

Decision of the Court

4

was in Josh’s best interests because severance would benefit Josh and

“[m]aintaining the parent-child relationship would be detrimental” to him. 

¶8 Father timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶9 The superior court has “substantial discretion when placing 

dependent children because the court’s primary consideration . . . is the best 

interests of the child.” Antonio P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 402, 

404, ¶ 8 (App. 2008). “We review the placement orders of dependent 

children for an abuse of that discretion.” Id. We review legal issues de novo. 

Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 10 (2021).

¶10 Before the superior court terminates a parent’s rights, it must 

find that termination is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of 

the evidence. See A.R.S. § 8–533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz 279, 281–

82, 288, ¶¶ 7–8, 41 (2005). The focus of the court’s best interests analysis is 

“the child’s interest in stability and security.” Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 583, ¶ 27 

(quotations and citations omitted). The court considers “the totality of the 

circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, including 

the child’s adoptability.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, 

¶ 1 (2018). “Among the factors that the court may consider . . . are whether: 

1) an adoptive placement is immediately available; 2) the existing 

placement is meeting the needs of the child[]; and (3) the [child is] 

adoptable.” Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 583, ¶ 27 (quotations and citations 

omitted). 

¶11 The superior court’s best interests analysis “is separate from 

and preliminary to its determination of placement after severance.” Antonio 

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 222 Ariz. 369, 370–71, ¶ 2 (App. 2009) (citations 

omitted). Once a parent’s rights are terminated, a parent does not have 

standing to challenge a child’s placement, unless the court’s placement 

determination is “inextricably intertwined with the issue of [the child’s] 

best interests to terminate [the parent’s] rights.” See id. ¶¶ 2–3. 

¶12 Father argues that the superior court’s adoption plan is 

“inextricably intertwined with the best interests analysis.” He contends the

court abused its discretion because it deviated from the “placement-
DANNY G. v. DCS, J.G.

Decision of the Court

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preference” outlined in A.R.S. § 8-514(B) without sufficient justification.4

We disagree with Father’s framing of the court’s analysis. 

¶13 Here, the superior court recognized that Josh’s foster family 

was “an adoptive placement.” The court found that Josh had been with his 

foster family since birth, the family was meeting all of his needs, and they

had a “significant relationship” with him. The court determined that 

termination would benefit Josh because he would have a “safe and stable 

home, with appropriate supervision, free from substance abuse.” And the 

court did not make any final placement determinations, nor did it rule out 

the possibility that Josh could be placed with his step-grandmother. In fact, 

the court acknowledged that DCS was investigating a “prospective family 

placement” and a referral for a home study for Josh’s relative was pending. 

¶14 Moreover, the superior court found that maintaining the 

parent-child relationship would be detrimental to Josh for reasons related 

to Father’s conduct as outlined during the severance proceedings. The court 

found that Father did not maintain regular contact with Josh or develop a 

bond with him. Throughout much of the case, DCS could not locate him,

and he did not engage in the recommended services. Additionally, Father 

began a five-year sentence in July 2021, during which time Father cannot 

parent Josh, nor can Josh reside with him. While Josh’s foster family and 

the possibility of his adoption factored into the court’s analysis, they were 

not the only considerations underlying the court’s conclusion that 

termination was in Josh’s best interest. Because the court’s best interests 

analysis was not inextricably intertwined with any placement decision, 

Father does not have standing to challenge Josh’s placement with his foster 

family.

4 Father also contends the adoption plan creates a risk of a lack of 

sibling contact with Josh’s half-sister. Because we find that Father lacks 

standing to challenge where Josh lives and who ultimately adopts him, we 

need not address this argument. 
DANNY G. v. DCS, J.G.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm the superior court’s order terminating Father’s 

parental rights.