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THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN FOR ARMY ENGINEERS March 1997 

""I3 . 

-* 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 


PB 5-97-1 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

By Major General Clair F: Gill 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

-

he topographer of the past wore buckskin and had a 

transit over his shoulder, a wom book of trigonometry 

tables and a sketch pad in his pouch, and a flintlock 

rifle in his hand. He opened the American wilderness with 

exploration and mapping. As the military terrain expert, he 

assimilated the terrain effects to advise commanders how 

to defeat the enemies of the 19th century. As we look to the 

future, the topographer will collect, develop, manage, analyze, and distribute digital data and products. His analyses 

and products will provide an accurate digital view of the battlefield and facilitate the assimilation of terrain effects to 

defeat enemies of the future. In both scenarios, topographers fulfill the same functions with different tools to accomplish the task at hand. They are the "terrain experts." 

lnformation technology and digitization have revolutionized how the U.S. Army trains and fights. Nowhere is 

this more evident than in the field of terrain information 

and analysis. As the Army progresses toward Force XXI, 

there is a steady migration from paper maps and products 

to digital information and analyses. Digital data directly 

feeds battle command and fighting systems. With few 

exceptions, our new combat systems have embedded digital terrain requirements that far exceed the data available. 

Engineers must provide the needed digital data to the 

force. As Commandant, I have direct responsibility to 

ensure that we meet this challenge. 

In the summer of 1996, 1 was charged by TRADOC to 

gain control over the development of terrain databases 

within the Army's modeling and simulations (M & S) community. The primary purpose of the study was to reduce 

duplication of efforts in the production of digital terrain databases and increase the accuracy of the data portrayed. 

We quickly realized that the problem of defining terrain 

requirements, acquiring the data, and getting the information to the soldier extends beyond the M & S community. 

The quest for digitization and increased situational awareness make paper maps and associated terrain-analysis 

products less desirable. Furthermore, too many agencies 

are defining terrain data requirements and building unique 

databases. To remedy that situation, TRADOC established the Program Integration Office for Terrain Data 

(TPIO-TD) at Fort Leonard Wood. The TPIO-TD will function as a unifying agent in the digital terrain-data field. 

The initial mission for the TPIO-TD was to "coordinate 

and synchronize all Army digital terrain data requirements 

for current operations (including distribution), combat 

developments, training, and models and simulation." That 

mission has expanded to include responsibility for the terrain analysis and evaluation functions that must be 

embedded in the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). 

To accomplish the expanded mission, the TPIO-TD 

developed four separate, though related, objectives: 

H 	Establish the Army requirements document for all topographic data. Requirements include imagery, maps, digital terrain elevation data, and terrain feature data 

(roads, bridges, etc.) When the end-state requirements 

are established, the TPIO-TD will ensure that they are 

integrated with those of other services in a joint requirements document for the National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency (formerly the Defense Mapping Agency). 

H 	 Identify the critical capabilities that must reside within 

the various models, simulations, fire-control systems, 

and maneuver-control systems to facilitate the terrainvisualization process. These capabilities establish the 

requirements for the Common Terrain Operating Environment (CTOE). The CTOE will ensure interoperability within ABCS and the joint environment. 

H 	Bring each individual system into compliance with the 

CTOE. This objective will become a continuing engineer mission to ensure that the acquired interoperability does not diminish over time. 

Define how digital topographic data distribution will 

occur within the combat force. The distribution concept 

also will define the process for database updates and 

enrichment. 

These objectives will result in significant impacts for the 

engineer community across all DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers) domains. 

The first director of the TPIO-TD will be selected in FY 

98 and should arrive at Fort Leonard Wood in the fall of 

1997. 1 designated Colonel Ed Amold, deputy director of 

the newly activated Maneuver Support Battle Lab, as the 

interim chief of the TPIO-TD. He is already working to complete the four objectives. Prior to formal funding approval by 

TRADOC, the Engineer School's Directorate of Combat 

Developments and USACE's Topographic Engineer Center 

at Fort Belvoir are providing much-needed manpower and 

technical support to jump-start the process. 

Clearly, engineers are the masters of terrain. The 

requirement to provide accurate, useful digital terrain data 

will take on additional significance as we move toward the 

lnformation Age. I expect the TPIO-TD to map the path to 

Force XXI, although it is a formidable task with many 

obstacles. With engineers leading the way, I am confident 

that we will meet this challenge. 
March 1997 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 27 PB 5-97-1 -- - - - - - - - - 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND FEATUP E.5 

FORT LEONARD WOOD -- 2 LOGCAP: Providing Vital Services to Soldiers 

COMMANDEWCOMMANDANT I By Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Kolar, Jr. 

Major General Clair F: Gill 

7 Engineers Support the United Nations in Macedonia 

MANAGING EDITOR By Major Richard Hook and Patrick Siska 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Shirley Bridges 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer Morgan 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

DENNIS J. REIMER 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

Y 

JOEL B. HUDSON 

Acting Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

12 Environmental Actions in the Former Republic of 

Yugoslavia 

By Major Charles Litzelman 

17 Road Building 101 

By Captain Thomas S. Bowers 

2h A New Way of Doing Business 

By Major General Clair F: Gill and Vern Lowrey 

26 Captains as S3s: What's the Scoop? 

By Captain Mike Brobeck 

1 27 The Engineer Intelligence Process 1 By Captain Cynthia A. Glenister and Major John E. Richerson i 

I 

32 German Engineer Officer Advanced Course 

By First Lieutenant Brinton H. Rosenberry 

Front Cover: The Army's LOGCAP contract 

provides engineering and logistics services for 

U.S. troops deployed to contingency operations. Here, a worker with Brown & Root 

Services Corporation constructs a facility 

during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. 

Photo courtesy Brown & Root. 

Back Cover: Many facets of the Fort Leonard 

Wood community are shown in this afghan 

design by Beverly Dunn of the Fort Leonard 

Wood Officers, Civilians, & Women's Club. 

B EPA R TlVFWTS 

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

22 Personal Viewpoint 

34 Engineer Update 

37 Bridge the Gap 

ENGINEER (ISSN 0046-19890) is prepared quarterly by the U.S. Army Engineer 

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DISCLAIMER: ENGINEER presents professional information designed to keep 

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March 1997 Engineer I 
By Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Kolar, Jr. 

ontracting for supplies and services by the U.S. mili- 

, tary during times of crisis is not new. The practice has 

a long history dating back to the American Revolutionary War. The military's use of civilian contractors in theaters 

of war has steadily expanded during all subsequent conflicts. 

Operations in support of the Vietnam War particularly highlighted the need for civilian contractor capabilities to augment combat support and combat service support forces. 

However, it wasn't until nearly a decade after Vietnam that 

the concept for preplanning for civilian contractor support in 

a wartime theater began to take shape. In 1985, the Army formalized the concept as the Logistics Civil Augmentation 

Program (LOGCAP) under the proponency of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). 

History 

removal, stevedoring, transportation, and mortuary services. 

These early independent activities provided the genesis of 

the current program. In 1992, LOGCAP was restructured to 

incorporate a single, worldwide services contract to preplan 

for theater facilities and logistics support services during war 

and contingency operations. Because of previous LOGCAP 

expertise, the DCSLOG designated the USACE Transatlantic 

Division (now the Transatlantic Programs Center) as contract 

administrator. 

In August 1992, a one-year contract with four one-year 

renewal options was competitively awarded to a major 

worldwide civilian contractor, the Houston-based Brown & 

Root Services Corporation. The contract value at award was 

$3.9 million. At that time, it was not envisioned that LOGCAP would ultimately become such an integral part of our 

force projection strategy. No one (including the contractor) 

would have guessed that the contract would soar to its curI nitially, Army major commands (MACOMs) individually rent level of more than $750 million. identified and contracted for their supply and service 

requirements. In 1988, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers The guiding principle is preplan for the 

(USACE) became directly involved when Third U.S. Amy use of global corporate resources as an alternative in support 

(the Army component of the U.S. Central Command) and augment support 

requested assistance in contracting for a management plan to and combat service support force structures when identified 

construct and maintain two petroleum pipelines in Southwest exist- LOGCAP's goals are toAsia to support contingency operations. The Corps was also Plan during peacetime for the effective integration of 

preparing similar contracts for dredging and obstacle contractor support during times of crisis. 

2 Engineer March 1997 
Leverage existing global and regional corporate 

resources as facility and logistics support multipliers. 

Provide a quick-reaction capability to contingency or crisis requirements. 

Provide an alternative capability to meet facility and 

logistics services requirements. 

The contractor plans support in five broad categories: 

Facilities 

Supplies 

Services 

Maintenance 

Transportation 

This seemingly simple scope of work for planning-to 

provide basic life-support and logistics services to our soldiers-has proven to be complex in execution. At the heart 

of the complexity are two critical elements: where the services are to be performed (often in harsh, desolate environments with little usable infrastructure) and the speed at which 

the services must be provided (normally concurrent with the 

first wave of troop deployment). 

During the last five years, LOGCAP has supported six 

contingency operations, referred to as events, and no two 

were the same. From the contract's first contingency activation in December 1992 for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia through its current effort to provide a full range of 

engineering and logistics services in support of Operation 

Joint Endeavor in the Balkans, the contractor and the Corps 

have successfully met the Army's needs despite numerous 

difficulties. 

The Contract 

he expectation of uncertainty was the driving factor in 

selecting the type of contract used for LOGCAP. Each 

contingency operation is created from a different set of 

conditions. Because it is impossible to write a firm, detailed 

scope of work that will support the full spectrum of potential 

militaxy involvement, the Corps settled on a contracting 

mechanism that allows maximum flexibility for accomplishing any Army mission. 

A cost-reimbursement contract is used, with a base and 

award fee structure that determines the amount of profit the 

contractor should receive. This type of contract is commonly 

called Cost-Plus Award Fee. Under the LOGCAP contract, a 

scope of work and an estimated cost of performing the work 

are negotiated for each event. The contractor is reimbursed for 

all costs that are reasonable, allowable, and allocable under the 

contract terms. The contractor is assured of a one percent base 

fee in both planning and event execution. The award fee plan 

centers around three focus areas: performance; cost control; 

and coordination, flexibility, and responsiveness. The contractor can earn an award fee up to five percent of the contract 

amount for planning and up to nine percent for event 

it. 

Modular units were provided as housing in the roughest terrains in Bosnia, as shown here at 

Camp Linda. 

March 1997 Engineer 3 
execution, depending on the accomplishments in each focus 

area. The percentage of award fee is based on the estimated 

cost for both planning and the event. The contractor does not 

earn an additional fee if the actual cost of performance exceeds 

the estimated cost. 

Concept of Operations 

n initial planning requirement was for Brown & Root 

to develop a worldwide plan and 13 country-specific 

plans that were designated and prioritized by the supported MACOMs. The contractor also was required to 

develop and maintain a worldwide database of available supplies and services. A follow-on requirement reflected the 

Army's difficulty in predicting the location of contingencies; 

it broadened the planning from 13 specific countries to 13 

regions. All planning efforts are coordinated with the Corps 

and the appropriate MACOM. Under the operational concept, the contractor has a country or regional plan prepared 

when it is activated to support a contingency event. Brown & 

Root is required to respond quickly, relying on their corporate worldwide presence and pre-established contacts to provide immediate services. 

Under the generic contingency scenario used in the initial 

contract, Brown & Root is required to set up sea and aerial 

ports of debarkation for deployed personnel. Soldiers are 

transported to a rear-area support base before being further 

deployed to forward-area base camps. In this scenario, the 

contractor is required to begin receiving 1,300 soldiers per day 

with less than three weeks of notification and is responsible for 

providing a full range of facilities and life-support services. 

This scenario calls for support to 20,000 troops, with possible 

increases to 50,000. The contractor is also required to maintain the capability of supporting two events concurrently. 

A salient contract condition is that contractor personnel 

are provided security by the deployed U.S. forces. While this 

appears to be a simple provision, it has proven difficult to 

execute, especially at the beginning and end of events. 

Therefore, the operational commander now has an additional 

security requirement to consider in his planning. Since services are required up to the last soldier's departure, close 

coordination between units and the contractor is required. 

Security also parallels a provision that directs the contractor to assume that all work to be accomplished during an 

event will take place in a hostile environment. This assumption has often become a reality: 

In Somalia, banditry and warlord hostilities were pervasive. Despite the contractor's best efforts, a contractor 

employee was injured by small-arms fire. 

In Haiti, impoverished conditions created their own dangers. Something as simple as transporting trash to the 

dump became dangerous when hoards of poor Haitians 

tried to climb on or stop the trucks to seize the "treasures" 

on board. 

4 In Bosnia, the proliferation of mines and a tenuous peace 

have created a unique set of force protection and security 

concerns. It is a credit to the security provided by the 

U.S. commanders and the contractor's excellent security 

judgment that no contractor personnel have died due to 

hostile activity. 

Events over the past five years have confirmed that contingency planning can never be an exact science. The generic 

operational concept in the original contract was generally 

used, but rarely did all the pieces fit precisely. Because of 

this, contractual and contractor flexibility are critical to the 

program's success, as the following examples show: 

The program was envisioned to support the Army but is 

available to other service components (the Navy and Air 

Force). It is also used by the United Nations to support 

multinational peacekeeping forces. 

No country plan was developed for Operation Restore 

Hope in Somalia. This operation required an expedited 

planning and deployment process. 

In some contingencies, such as those in Zaire (Operation 

Support Hope) and Southwest Asia (Operation Vigilant 

Warrior), LOGCAP provided only minimal levels of 

logistics support to the military operations. In other 

cases, such as Bosnia, LOGCAP was a primary logistics 

service supplier. - - 

4 Some events were supported concurrently (Operations 

Uphold Democracy in Haiti and Vigilant Warrior):During this same time period, the contractor also was called 

on to retrograde military equipment left in Somalia for 

U.N. use under Operation Restore Hope. 

During Operation Deny Flight in Italy, LOGCAP provided only facilities support. 

LOGCAP was sometimes used (as in Haiti and Somalia) to 

supplement logistics support provided to U.S. forces deployed 

under United Nations peacekeeping missions following the 

conclusion of U.S. operations. Under these conditions, the 

U.N. contract provisions were below the quality-of-life standards for our deployed forces. For example, the U.N. food services contract only provides a basic ration of meat, vegetables, 

and rice or other starch per person on the deployed team. Individual country support organizations must budget for cooking 

the rations and additional items (such as dairy products, desserts, and special meal provisions). 

What did these differences in execution mean to the 

Transatlantic Programs Center as contract administrator? 

The keys to success were flexibility and good staff coordination. Our contracting officers and primary staff were familiar 

with the contract terms and often were the first to educate the 

customer about the appropriate use of the contract. Each 

event required extensive coordination with the Army DCSLOG staff, the MACOM staffs, host-nation officials, the 

Corps team in theater, and the Defense Contract Management Districtflnternational (DCMDI). 

A memorandum of understanding between DCMDI and 

the Transatlantic Programs Center provides field contract 

administrative services for other than facility construction 

support during the execution of LOGCAP events. In this 

4 Engineer March 1997 
capacity, DCMDI provides administrative contracting offi- Provide flooring materials for the Army, Navy, and Air 

cers, cost and price analysts, quality assurance representa- Force engineer units charged with setting up all other 

tives, and industrial property management specialists to camps. 

ensure proper oversight of the contractor and protect the gov- Upgrade all camps to meet the Army,s sustaining base 

ernment's interests. During operations where no logistics standards by replacing soft-side, canvas tents with hardservices were involved (Operation Deny Flight), support back tents or modular buildings (in areas with the harshfrom DCMDI was not necessary. est conditions). In addition to project management and contract administration coordination, managing L~~~Ap requires signifi- Provide all basic life-support services, such as food sercant legal review and financial management services. vices, laundry, water delivery, garbage collection, and 

shower and sanitary facilities. 

Operation Joint Endeavor Provide other logistics services, such as transportation 

S upporting operations in the Balkans for Operation Joint 

Endeavor would have required a much more robust 

combat support and combat service support military 

organization had it not been for the use of LOGCAP. From 

the very start of this operation, LOGCAP has provided most 

of the critical logistics and engineering services, with costs 

exceeding $460 million for the first year's effort. Use of 

LOGCAP allowed the deployed combat units to focus on 

critical operational missions and the deployed engineering 

units to focus on horizontal construction. 

On 26 November 1995, Brown & Root was activated to 

provide an intermediate staging base at Kaposvar and Taszar, 

Hungary. There was no opportunity for a reconnaissance or 

advance facilities placement or services. On 1 December, the 

contractor entered the theater concurrent with the military 

units. Although mobilized in Kaposvar, the contractor was 

unable to begin operations and award subcontracts until 5 

December, when negotiations between the U.S. Army and 

the Hungarian government were concluded. The initial work 

focused on renovating old communist barracks to bring them 

to minimum standards for use by U.S. soldiers. Then, working with the soldiers, the contractor's staff braved the same 

harsh weather and site conditions to provide warm tents, hot 

food, and adequate sanitary facilities during the start-up of 

operations throughout the theater. 

After establishing the intermediate staging base, the contractor was tasked to support the 1st Armored Division's 

Task Force Eagle by setting up and operating camps in 

Croatia and Bosnia. The original deployment plan envisioned one camp in Croatia and 12 camps in Bosnia. During 

execution, the number of camps in Bosnia grew to 24 main 

camps and several smaller locations, because the rough terrain did not accommodate large camps. These life-support 

areas were set up in abandoned factories and war-damaged 

buildings; on parking lots, farmlands, and fields; and in U.N. 

camps taken over by the United States. All sites required significant upgrades. 

In order to complete all the Bosnia camps by March 1996, 

Brown & Root was integrated with other Army engineer 

units, Navy Seabees, and Air Force Red Horse engineers on a 

fast-tracked scenario. Specifically, Brown & Root's tasks 

were tom Set up 12 camps. 

and cargo handling, vehicle maintenance and washing, 

port operations, road repair and maintenance, and storage yards. 

The work was executed under the supervision of a Corps 

team led by the Transatlantic Programs Center, Europe, 

headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany. The center established a cell to support the forward element of the U.S. Army 

Europe's Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering. Besides 

LOGCAP support, the Corps cell provided engineering and 

environmental services and real estate assistance to lease 

areas used for base camps and to support other military operations. Additionally, the center helped coordinate the activities of other USACE elements supporting operations in the 

Balkans. 

The force deployed for Task Force Eagle was the largest 

combat force deployed outside a war zone since World War 

11. To facilitate the development and sustainment of the 

array of bases required in Bosnia, a new organization 

named the Base Camp Coordination Agency (BCCA) was 

created. This organization is still operating and is a nondoctrinal hybrid Directorate of Public Works and USACE resident office organization. The speed at which the BCCA was 

formed and its composition truly reflect the engineers' 

motto- "One Corps, One Regiment, One Fight." (An article 

describing the BCAA will be published in the April issue of 

En gineet) 

In December 1996, the peacekeeping mission transferred 

from the 1st Armored Division to the 1st Infantry Division, 

and the name of the operation changed to Joint Guard. The 

Corps presence ensured a seamless transfer of responsibility 

and training of new leaders on camp operations. While initially intended to last only a year (until 26 November 1996), 

LOGCAP-type services are now expected to continue for an 

additional 18 months. 

At the peak of Operation Joint Endeavor, the Corps had 

60 military and civilian personnel operating in the Balkans; 

Brown & Root had approximately 6,000 workers, most of 

whom were hired locally. 

As the Corps and the Army staffs have worked together 

on LOGCAP operations, they have identified the following 

program strengths: 

Provides responsive contractor support during early 

deployment. 

March 1997 Engineer 5 
Temporary facilities were built in Haiti to support Operation Uphold Democracy. These buildings 

typically housed dining areas, showers, latrines, and recreational areas such as libraries. 

Exploits civilian resources, supplies, and transportation, 

and does not compete with strategic lift. 


Improves peacetime planning for contingency 


operations. 


Ensures contract and government team continuity 


because of greater exposure during planning, military 


exercises, and contingency operations. 


Frees military manpower for use in combat and other 


critical tasks. 


Satisfies early entry, sustainrnent, and redeployment 


requirements. The program's flexibility allows for the 


rapid addition or deletion of logistics requirements. 


Costs less than if the military had performed the tasks 


without LOGCAP assistance, according to a report pre- 


pared by the Logistics Management Institute. 


Lessons Learned 

Each LOGCAP event has produced a unique set of lessons learned. But each event had the same synchronization challenges: defining the contract's scope of work 

(in conjunction with the user) and funding the work. 

The following lessons can be applied toward making 

LOGCAP more effective in meeting the needs of our forces 

during contingency scenarios: 

W 	 Train the leaders who will use LOGCAP services. They 

must clearly understand what services can be provided 

and the mechanisms for getting them, including the cost. 

The is a member of the deploying force and 

should be treated accordingly. His senior managers must 

He must attend the commander's meetings 

with the government's contracting officer. 

The government must better identify governmentfurnished equipment and materials that will be available 

for the contractor's use. 

6 Engineer 

w 	 Incremental funding of an operation where costs and 

duration are known poses administrative problems that 

could be avoided for the contracting entity. 

Quality-of-life standards are changing. For a lengthy 

peacekeeping deployment, such as Operation Joint 

Endeavor, commanders want their soldiers to have an 

acceptable living standard that includes good food, a 

warm place to sleep, and some forms of recreation. 

Looking Ahead 

s LOGCAP evolved over the past five years, logistics 

services dominated the military's needs under the con- 

' tract. In April 1996, the Army designated that the 

logistics umbrella contract should be under a logistics command, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC). 

USAMC assumed program management responsibilities on 1 

October 1996, although the Corps retains responsibility for 

the existing contract through August 1997 and for close-out 

activities of the current contract. The two organizations 

developed a memorandum of agreement for the transition 

period to ensure that essential LOGCAP services are provided during planning and contingency operations. USAMC 

awarded a new contract on 30 January 1997. 

After five years of managing this contract on behalf of the 

Department of the Army, the Corps of Engineers is proud to 

have participated in this important program. It has provided 

critical services to our deployed service members. 

Lil 


Lieutenant Colonel Kolar is deputy commandet; Transatlantic 

Programs Cente~ Winchester; Virginia, where he oversees administration of LOGCAF! He previously served as facilities plans oj'icet; 

Facilities Engineering Division. Logistics/Security Assistance Directorate, for the Commander in Chiej U.S. Pacific Command. LTC 

Kolar is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and 

has three master's degrees. He has been awarded the deFleury medal 

from the Sociep of American Military Engineers. 

March 1997 
Engineers Support the 

By Major Richard Hook and Patrick Siska 

S ince July 1993, the United Nations has conducted 

peacekeeping operations in the Former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). A 500-soldier U.S. 

battalion supports the mission from Camp Able Sentry and 

12 outlying observation posts along the northern and northeastern borders of Macedonia and Serbia. A Nordic battalion 

shares the U.N. mission within its sector west and southwest 

of the U.S. battalion (see figure, page 8). 

U.N. Mission 

he "Macedonian Command" operation was originally 

called the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In March 1995, the operation was changed by 

U.N. resolutions and renamed United Nations Preventive 

Deployment (UNPREDEP). Their peacekeeping mission is 

toMaintain a U.N. presence at borders with Albania and the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 

to monitor border areas. 

Strengthen mutual understanding and dialogue among its 

political, social, and ethnic forces and groups. 

Assist in advancing social progress and development. 

Promote multicultural and multiethnic cooperation. 

U.S. Mission 

ight U.S. infantry, cavalry, and armor units have 

served six-month tours in Macedonia as Task Force 

Able Sentry. Their mission is to conduct peacekeeping operations in support of the UNPREDEP Force. The 

U.S. battalion currently there is the 1-63rd Armor, 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The supporting engineer platoon (1st Platoon, B Company, 46th Engineer Battalion) 

provides carpentry, earthmoving, electrical, mechanical, 

and plumbing support at the base camp and observation 

posts (OPs). 

Task Force Able Sentry accomplishes its mission with 

four companies that rotate from the base camp to the OPs 

every three weeks. In the western sector, B and D companies 

control five border OPs and one company OP. In the eastern 

sector, A and C companies also control five border OPs and 

one company OP (see figure, page 8). While in sector, the 

companies maintain the OPs with ten soldiers. Patrols monitor the situation along the border 24 hours daily-on foot or 

by vehicle or helicopter. 

During the task force's mission in sector, engineers at the 

base camp receive work orders from the company OPs to 

make repairs at the border OPs. 1st Platoon deploys a "quickfix team," which stays at the site until repairs are completed-usually one to three days, depending on the difficulty of the work and the weather. Additionally, 1st Platoon's 

heavy equipment squad repairs the vehicle fighting positions 

and maintains the roads in sector. 

While two of the four companies maintain the OPs in the 

task force sector, the third company remains at the base camp 

as the Force Protection Company. The fourth company provides the Quick Reaction Force (the security element) and 

rotates its tank crews through the Mobile Conduct-of-Fire 

Trainer (MCOFT). This equipment allows the tank crews 

from the 1-63rd Armor to maintain basic tank gunnery skills. 

The task force engineer, the platoon leader, and the platoon sergeant operate from the base camp. The task force 

engineer works with the commander and executive officer to 

prioritize, budget, and coordinate projects. In addition to 

managing the platoon, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant share the task force engineer's workload. They also 

brief high-level civilian and military dignitaries who visit the 

area. Some of the projects engineers manage at Camp Able 

Sentry and the OPs are shown on page 8. 

Engineer Support 

lthough the United Nations approves its mandate to 

Macedonia every six months, the engineer assets available to engineers supporting Task Force Able Sentry 

are limited (see figure, page 8). The original allocation of 15 

engineers per rotation in 1993 gradually increased to 32 by 

1996. But the continual, daily "breakdown maintenance" program was beyond the capabilities of the engineer platoon. 

March 1997 Engineer 7 
Task Force Able Sentry Engineer Opera tions 

U54 Retaining wall 

Guard tower 

Base Camp Projects Road maintenance 

Facilities maintenance 

7 Observation post road upgrades 

Electrical upgrade 

Heatinglwater upgrade 

Protective barrier Heavy Equipment Squad 

2 M920 trailers 

Additional tower 

Perimeter lighting 1 Bucket loader 

Legend: 

A Border Observat~on Post (10 personnel) 

p company Observat~on Post (20 personnel) 

0 Base Camp Able Sentry (360 personnel) 

USBAT - U S battallon 

NORBAT - Nord~c battakon 
The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineers 

(ODCSENG) and the 1st Infantry Division completed several studies to determine how to improve base camp facilities 

and upgrade roads leading to the OPs. Because of significant 

resource constraints, the UNPREDEP Engineer Services 

Section could not help upgrade Camp Able Sentry. In April 

1996, as part of a major initiative to improve a quickly deteriorating situation, the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) commander approved the allocation of $3.2 million to improve 

the base camp and seven OP roads. Since the task force staff 

could not manage all of these projects, both the Facility 

Engineer Division and the Military Engineering and Topography Office of ODCSENG, HQ, USAREUR, supervised 

project management. Started in July 1996, the road upgrades 

were completed in November. The first phase of base camp 

improvements was finished in December; the second phase 

should be completed by the end of March 1997. 

As with all engineer operations and projects, numerous 

lessons were learned that can benefit many in the Corps of 

Engineers. The following lessons are provided to assist engineers on future deployments to Task Force Able Sentry or 

similar U.N. operations. 

Echelons Above Corps Lessons Learned 

(ODCSENG, HQ, USAREUR) 

Coordination With Local Contractors 

Discussion: Most host nations welcome U.N. operations. 

Developing countries are very hospitable and want to establish a strong market economy with close western ties. Their 

desire to be friendly and avoid problems may challenge the 

interpersonal skills of any engineer. Meetings with local 

contractors must occur at least once a week and on the same 

day of each week. The goals of the meetings must be outlined prior to the meeting. After the meeting, providing the 

contractor with a summary of what was agreed (or disagreed) upon will help if issues resurface two or three 

months later. Workers in Macedonia are not well paid, so it 

is not in their best interest to complete a project on time. The 

daily work hours are short (0900 to 1500 hours) and the 

workers' productivity is low. The contracting officer's representative must always be visible so the contractor can ask 

questions and workers can see that someone is pushing the 

project to completion. 

Recommendation: Develop a comprehensive contractor 

assessment plan for the duration of the contract. Consider 

incentives such as award-type contracts so contractors will 

provide quality and timely performance. 

Coordination With the Host Nation Ministry of Defense 

Discussion: The civilian engineer staff found that having 

a "green suiter" present when coordinating with the Macedonian Ministry of Defense helped develop a successful 

working relationship. For example, on a water line project 

outside of the base camp, the Ministry of Defense wanted to 

control the project, so they awarded the contract. When the 

contractor had financial problems, another company was 

contracted to furnish pipeline materials. This was a difficult 

project to manage and often required that UNPREDEP military leaders apply appropriate political pressure to resolve 

problems and keep the project moving. 

Recommendation: Deploying units should coordinate 

closely with civil affairs units or military liaison teams in the 

host country. These elements can provide accurate information on departments or personnel to support the planning process. They can also assist with complicated political 

contractual agreements. 

Project Scheduling and Quality Control/Assessment 

Discussion: In many parts of the world, the democratic process is still in its infancy. The work ethic in these countries differs significantly from what we expect from contractors in the 

U.S. or NATO countries. Engineers must be realistic in developing project time lines. Extended research on how contractors in the host nation work will save a lot of headaches. For 

example, examine projects a contractor has completed or 

review recommendations from other sources when selecting a 

contractor. The project manager must set goals based on 

known capabilities of the host nation's managers and workers. 

Finally, question the contractor on other projects that it is conducting. You may find that trucks bringing gravel to your 

roads actually belong at another project site! 

Recommendation: The project manager must quickly 

learn the capabilities of potential contractors. Identify companies with potential money problems or corruption due to 

many layers of "management." Question contractors in detail 

about their quality-control measures. 

Project Status Reports 

Discussion: Develop status reports for ongoing projects. 

The reporting officer must ensure that coordination occurs 

with budget, intelligence, logistics, and operations staffs to 

avoid confusion over ongoing or completed actions. Most 

headquarters will want reports two or three times a week. 

Continuous coordination with all staffs on the reporting format ensures that the project manager does not allow a 

reported problem to get out of control. Checking with the 

various staffs on incoming and outgoing personnel helps 

ensure that new personnel understand the reports. 

Recommendation: When developing project reports, 

ensure that all staff agencies agree with the format. Have 

them provide telephone, fax, and e-mail numbers/addresses. 

Resolve any misunderstandings on reported items. 

March 1997 Engineer 9 
Snowplow lkaining for Winter Operations 

Discussion: After spending $2.4 million on seven observation post roads, the ODCSENG staff realized the need for 

classes on snowplow equipment operation and maintenance 

so that the roads would not be destroyed during one winter. 

The staff coordinated with the Directorate of Logistics, in 

Baumholder, and the Cold Regions Research Engineer Laboratory (CRREL) for classes. Conducted in October 1996, the 

training helped engineer soldiers understand the operational 

and maintenance requirements of the four German-made 

Schmidt plows assigned to the task force. The CRREL representative also provided an assessment of additional snowplow equipment the unit needed. 

Recommendation: Before deploying to an area with a 

potential for winter operations, request soldier and unit training packages from CRREL. The laboratory staff is very 

responsive to requests for training materials. 

Unit-Level Lessons Learned 

(1st Platoon, B Company, 46th Engineer Battalion) 

Predeployment Training and Turnover of Engineer 

Responsibilities 

Discussion: Engineers supporting Task Force Able Sentry 

faced two challenges: deploying from the continental United 

States and conducting home station training compatible with 

the USAREUR designated training tasks to validate the unit 

entering the theater. The previous engineer unit (N94th 

Engineer Battalion) rotated two platoons through two rotations at Task Force Able Sentry and was familiar with the 

USAREUR predeployment training and validation requirements. Task force personnel sent a training package to B/ 

46th Engineers, who completed the tasks at Fort Rucker, 

A Baumholder DEH 

employee teaches 

engineers from B 

Company, 46th Engineer 

Battalion, how to operate 

and maintain a 

snowplow. 

neers spent a week with the task force engineer, the platoon 

leader, and the platoon sergeant from B/46th Engineers to 

explain the engineer missions and the status of projects. The 

most important aspect of the turnover was that the early coordination between the two units allowed B Company to 

quickly take over the Task Force Able Sentry engineer mission. Later, the task force engineer and the platoon leader 

developed a training plan for the follow-on engineer unit, 

which deployed to Macedonia in March 1997. 

Recommendation: Units deployed to support any U.N. 

operation should develop a "smart book" or "scrapbook" of 

coordinated actions, points of contact, and other information 

that may help follow-on units as they assume the same 

duties. Develop detailed checklists on work orders and 

project management to assist engineer leaders in briefing 

their follow-on counterparts. 

Engineer Equipment Under U.N. Control 

Discussion: Another important aspect of early coordination between the outgoing and incoming engineer units is 

understanding the types and quantities of equipment on hand. 

Units must bring a robust prescribed load list (PLL) to sup 

port the U.N. engineer equipment already there. The figure 

on page 8 shows the engineer equipment allocated for Task 

Force Able Sentry. 

Recommendation: Before deployment, request a PLL 

from the current engineer unit, with suggestions on items that 

might be most critical during the rotation. The logistics assistance officer can notify units if certain parts must be purchased locally or special ordered from the United States. 

Engineer Personnel 

Discussion: The task force cannot change the allocation of 

engineer personnel above the 32 currently designated. The 

Alabama. Once in Macedonia, a sergeant from N94th Engi- two most important skills required for supporting Task Force 

I0 Engineer March 1997 
The Facilities Engineer Division staff checks the concrete work on the Camp Able Sentry water tank. 

Able Sentry are those of the electricians and plumbers. The 

engineer equipment mechanic has the next most critical skill. 

The two mechanics allocated to the previous task forces 

could not keep up with the intense repair requirements of the 

low-density engineer equipment. 

Recommendation: Engineers deploying on engineer missions must assess the types of horizontal and vertical tasks 

required in the area of operations. Engineer equipment is 

used often and takes a beating on job sites. Engineer platoons 

deploying to Macedonia need three mechanics. 

Repairing Electrical/Mechanical Equipment 

Discussion: Engineers must often repair electrical and 

mechanical equipment that is critical for the task force to sustain operations. For example, engineers in Macedonia 

repaired water, sump, and condensation pumps; dining facility equipment; and components for heating and water systems. Many of these repairs were on equipment that is 

considered outdated in the United States. 

Recommendation: Engineers should receive more training 

on electrical and mechanical components and systems during 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) 

courses. Additionally, units deploying to countries with older 

engineer equipment and systems should work with the Civil 

Affairs personnel to identify local firms with knowledge of 

plumbing, and water requirements at all of the OPs. Unfortunately, things continue to break on the four buildings that 

serve as headquarters and living quarters at the base camp as 

well. The task force engineer, platoon leader, and platoon 

sergeant must find supplies on the local economy to repair 

items at the OPs and the base camp. 

Recommendation: Engineers deploying to fixed sites, 

such as Camp Able Sentry, need the capability to organize a 

base operations contract. This capability would allow the 

task force engineer to contract locally for a building maintenance contractor who would report daily for emergency and 

routine electrical, plumbing, sewer, and water repairs. Such a 

contract would allow task force engineers to focus more 

attention on repairs at outlying OPs. 

Conclusion 

A s with all engineer operations, the lists of lessons 

learned from Macedonia are long and varied. This 

article provides some of the most beneficial lessons 

to assist engineers on future deployments to Task Force Able 

Sentry or to similar U.N. operations. Many civilian and military members of the U.S. Corps of Engineers contributed to 

the success of the Task Force Able Sentry deployments. To 

them, we say "Essayons!" 

Lil 

that particular equipment or machinery. 

Major Hook is an engineer staff officer in the Military 

Establishing a Base Operations Contract Engineering and Topography Office, ODCSENG, HeadDiscussion: The greatest management challenge for engi- quarters, USAREUR. He was previously assigned 

neers supporting a task force in Macedonia is balancing the LANDSOUTHEAST in Izmir; Turkey. 

work orders for the 12 outlying OPs with the facility mainte- MI: Siska is chief of the Facility Engineer Division, 

nance requirements of Camp Able Sentry. The task force ODCSENG, Headquarters, USAREUR. He is a registered 

commander's priority is to maintain the carpentry, electrical, professional engineer in Virginia. 

March 1997 Engineer I1 
Environmental actions in the 


dormer zepublic of yigoslavia 


By Major Charles Litzelman 

s U.S. forces deployed with the Implementation Force 

(IFOR) in support of the Dayton Peace Accords, it became 

apparent that the Army's environmental program would 

encounter a monumental task. The high degree of urgency and 

command emphasis on force protection and basic quality-of-life 

issues would force environmental initiatives, which had been successfully integrated into the culture of the armed services during 

the past 10 years, to take a back seat. This could adversely affect 

the soldiers' health and eventually have financial consequences if 

a strong program wasn't implemented and enforced. 

The goal of the environmental program for the area impacted 

by Operation Joint Endeavor was straightforward and synchronized with guidelines in Army Regulation 200-1, Environmental 

Protection and Enhancement: "To plan, initiate, and carry out all 

actions and programs to avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts without impairing the Army's mission." 

Background 

One of the greatest challenges in ensuring an environmentally sound program was the extensive area of operations. 

12 Engineer 

Technically, U.S. operations during Joint Endeavor fell under the 

7th Corps, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), major command 

(MACOM). The theater of operations included Hungary (the 

intermediate staging base [ISB]), Croatia, and Bosnia-with each 

country having separate and diverse environmental regulations, 

policies, and problems. The operation included 20,000+ troops 

(division [+I) and covered more than 28 base camps, forward 

operating sites, and major staging areas. 

For NATO countries, U.S. policy centers on the Overseas 

Environmental Baseline Guidance with specific standards 

developed for the final governing standards. Since comprehensive environmental standards were not defined during this 

deployment, forces in the ISB focused on the stringent standards 

practiced in Germany. Policy for points further south (Croatia 

and Bosnia) were more relaxed, since no existing regulations 

governed non-NATO countries or countries new to the international community. In addition to enforcing environmental standards, the Army must comply with force-protection requirements. Since Croatia and Bosnia were classified as hostile 

areas, less stringent environmental standards were applied than 

would have during peacetime. The task of the environmental 

March 1997 
program was to ensure compliance with these standards, clean 

up spills, and if necessary, remediate contaminated sites. 

By December 1996, U.S. forces had generated the following 

waste materials: 

2,709 drums (55-gallon) of mixed petroleum, oils, and 

lubricants (POLS) 

334 drums (55-gallon) of antifreeze 

w 96 drums (55-gallon) of nonhalogen solvents 

738 drums (55-gallon) plus 180 cubic yards of contaminated soil 

30 kegs (15-gallon) plus 37 containers (5-gallon) of 

battery acid 

575 empty metal containers (55-gallon) 

18,946 empty metal containers (5-gallon) 

795 empty metal containers (I-gallon) 

79 drums (55-gallon) plus 1,690 bulk gallons of wastewater and fuels 

20 asbestos brake pads 

7,475 lead acid batteries 

Disposal methods ranged from recycling to trucking wastes 

to approved disposal sites in Germany or Bosnia. The Tuzla City 

(Bosnia) power plant burned mixed POL wastes, while some 

contaminated wastes (antifreeze, lithium batteries, and oil filters) and contaminated soil were disposed of in-country when 

conditions permitted. 

More than 25 spills, ranging from 25 to 9,000 gallons, contaminated the soil. The average spill was 200 gallons. The most 

common cause was traffic accidents, some involving fuel tankers. The largest spill occurred at the Lukavac fuel bladder farm 

when a liner was installed improperly. Remediation of that spill 

consisted of two phases: extraction of fuel that collected three 

feet below ground in the water table and disposal of the contaminated soil. 

Command Structure 

T o understand the complexity of Operation Joint Endeavor 

and the environmental problems it generated, it is necessary to understand the key commands. MACOMs 

included USAREUR, which oversaw the environmental operation, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineers 

(ODCSENG), a major contributor of manpower and dollars. 

These two MACOMs were supported by a forward element 

located in Taszar, Hungary. 

The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, or C-Support, was a multinational command that oversaw U.N. wastes. The Implementation Force was comprised of all allied forces and included Task 

Force Eagle and the 1st Armored Division. The Base Camp 

Coordinating Agency (BCCA) was an ad hoc engineer-staffed 

office formed to assist and support all aspects of the division's 

base camps. This office was located with the division rear. 

A soldier in protective gear deposits waste oil into a 55- 

gallon container. An overhead cover prevents rain from 

washing leaks and residue from the container onto the 

ground. 

During the first months of the operation, the staff consisted 

mostly of USAREUR and ODCSENG environmental personnel. 

Later, personnel were recruited from the Reserve Components 

and Corps of Engineer districts. An average of two environmental cadre worked in the ODCSENG forward office and two 

worked in the Lukavac Coke Plant in Bosnia, affectionately 

called "Gotham City" by the soldiers. To assist redeployment, 

the division rear moved operations to Slavonski Brod, Croatia. 

Brown & Root Services Corporation provided cleanup support 

and supplies and constructed hazardous waste sheds. 

Environmental Program Tenants 

T he environmental program supporting Task Force Eagle 

incorporated four areas: 

Environmental surveys 

An assessment program 

A closure team 

w A cleanup and remediation program 

Environmental Surveys. To ensure a sound base, the environmental program concentrated first on baseline surveys to 

measure existing pollution. These surveys documented remediation actions required to protect our soldiers and avoid U.S. liability later. These initial surveys included base camps and 

March 1997 Engineer 13 
facilities used for billets and office space. Documentation 

described water source conditions, soil, natural resources 

(including endangered and threatened species), and air quality. 

Final surveys measured suspected environmental damage resulting from Operation Joint Endeavor by comparing current conditions with those recorded on the baseline surveys. 

The Corps of Engineers contracted Brown & Root to complete the baseline and final surveys, which were somewhat constrained because the time of year did not permit an accurate 

picture of land and facilities. In many cases, previously contaminated areas were discovered only after the spring thaw. 

Assessment Program. Because all environmental programs 

rely heavily on prevention, site inspection was critical. All unit 

hazardous waste collection sites in Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia 

were inspected. The Base Camp Assessment Team (BCAT), an 

arm of the BCCA, assessed and monitored base camps during 

both sustainment and closure phases. The sustainment mission 

included visits to all base camps and forward operating points 

south of the Sava River (the border of Croatia and Bosnia) at least 

once each month. At the close of the visits, base camp mayors 

(appointed officers who coordinated all base camp activities) 

received a completed assessment checklist. The checklists graded 

areas such as the hazardous waste collection point, the POL transfer point, hazardous waste management, spill prevention, and the 

base camp's overall environmental program. 

The standards for the hazardous waste collection points 

required that units provide overhead cover and secondary containment for liquid wastes, label all containers, and indicate the availability of material safety data sheets and hazardous waste 

inventory sheets. As with all successful programs, command 

emphasis was very important. Since the Army recycles waste oil, 

it was necessary to segregate wastes at unit level before turn-in. 

For the most part, soldiers were environmentally conscientious, 

but some neglected to read hazardous waste drum labels. Invariably, some used oil filters ended up in the oily rag or used oil container, requiring additional resources to re-sort the wastes. Spill 

reaction teams were monitored during assessments to determine 

the time they needed to clean up spills rapidly. 

Since major spills of hazardous substances can generate 

complex technical, legal, and public relations problems for U.S. 

forces, fast response procedures to report, respond to, and control accidental discharges of POL products and other hazardous 

substances were stressed to the units. POL spills (JP8 Get petroleum] fuel) normally posed the chief environmental risk for U.S. 

forces. Most soil, ground-water, and surface-water contamination from POL and BTEX (primarily consisting of benzene) 

occurred at fuel transfer facilities when gas tanks were overfilled or nozzles were dropped while filling the tanks. 

departed base camps, real estate personnel as they closed leases, 

and claims personnel as they addressed damage claims to property used by U.S. forces. 

As an assessment tool, base camps were assigned colorcoded status slides depicting their readiness assessments. 

These assessments were featured at the 1st Armored Division's 

daily battle update brief. 

Closure Team. To facilitate clearing base camps in a timely 

manner with minimal environmental impact on the mission, the 

BCAT team provided sustainment assistance and closure information. Base camps prepared an environmental condition report 

and a list of possible contaminated sites and identified the engineer requirements needed to repair and restore maneuver damage. This information was later used by real estate and claims 

personnel during claims processes. A final checklist signed by a 

representative from the environmental office and tenant leaders 

cleared the unit of further responsibility. 

Cleanup and Remediation. Cleanup and remediation of 

contaminated sites were performed to the extent possible under 

the operation's constraints. The primary concerns were to reduce 

immediate threats to human health and the environment, determine legal responsibilities, and maintain the good name of the 

U.S. Army. Based on the preliminary assessments and site characterization, the ODCSENG forward element determined if 

remediation was required. Decisions to remediate were based on 

several variables: 

If the site posed an imminent, substantial health threat to 

U.S. military forces. 

If remediation reduced the liability of the United States. 

If remediation was required by international agreement. 

Environmental contractors hired by the Corps or the Defense 

Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) determined appropriate remediation techniques and the action process schedule. 

Natural attenuation with no anthropologic control was the 

desired course of action. If remediation was attempted, two 

treatment goals were considered: 

5,000 milligrams of TRPWkilogram of soil, as measured 

by the Environmental Protection Agency Method 41 8.1 

5,000 milligrams of POLIkilogram of soil, as measured 

by Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants - Mineral Hydrocarbons (DIN 38 409, H18) 

A question that often arose during base camp cleanup was 

whether to clean up hazardous wastes left by previous tenants, 

such as the United Nations. This problem surfaced at several 

places, including Camp Pleso, Croatia, and Camp Rumbaugh, 

Bosnia. 

Base camps were required to have appropriate spill response Lessons Learned 

materials on hand and to clean up spills within their capability. 

Spills larger than 25 gallons required contractor help from T he following environmental lessons learned during OperBrown & Root. The BCCA maintained a database of spills ation Joint Endeavor may assist units deploying to similar 

exceeding 25 gallons. That information assisted units as they missions: 

14 Engineer March 1997 
Secondarv containment for liquid wastes protects the environment if the primary container leaks. The sandbags 

and plastic shown here ensure that no waste fuel will leach into the ground if the drum leaks. 

Environmental Surveys 

Problem: Incomplete surveys. Because of the urgency to 

deploy, many base camps had incomplete environmental baseline surveys. Since deployments occurred during winter, most 

base camps were under several inches of snow and ice. The 

harsh conditions made surveys difficult to complete, so some 

included inaccurate data. 

Recommendation: To facilitate rapid deployment, begin baseline environmental surveys immediately (preferably by a designated contractor) and treat them as "working documents." The 

base camp mayor should document sites as accurately as possible. 

Video and still photographs are the best tools for corroboration. 

Historical data is also important and should be available for most 

government buildings and factories. 

Prevention Program 

contingency purposes. 

Problem: Washrack discharge. Too often, because of expediency and lack of real estate, washracks were built near creeks. 

As a result, discharge ran directly or indirectly into streams. 

But this wasn't the extent of the pollution; the main damage 

was from vehicle runoff sludge, which included heavy metals 

(cadmium). 

Recommendation: Base camps may lack sufficient land and 

must make-do with the space provided. If no suitable alternative 

site is available, environmental controls (such as absorbent pillows and booms) should be placed at the washrack. Unit personnel should periodically deposit sediment in containers stored at 

the site to prevent heavy metals from polluting nearby streams. 

Base camps should test the sediment to ensure that heavy metals 

have not contaminated areas downstream. 

Problem: Lack of spill materials. Units brought spill materi- Base Camp Closure als to the theater, but only as an afterthought. Spill materials Problem: Clearing base camps. Successful base camp closure were usually the last items to be shipped. Generally speaking, was very important to the overall mission of Joint Endeavor. they are not the most important items when going to war. Units Recurring problems cropped up during the first wave of clo- eventually rushed to order these materials, only to find that sures. Often, base camp leaders were unaware of solutions for delivery required weeks or months. The BCAT team finally maneuver damage, such as dismantling hesco bastions (prefabri- ordered absorbent materials for the entire division. To supple- cated metallcardboard shells filled with soil), disposing of 

ment the shortage, the Corps of Engineers used its Rapid gravel, and clearing firing ranges and burn pits. Response Contract to purchase additional absorbent materials, 

which were distributed to all base camps. Also, some supplies Recommendation: Key personnel, including representatives 

that were originally misplaced were found in various base camp from real estate and the environmental contractor, should visit a 

warehouses throughout the theater. base camp at least six weeks prior to closure. They should idenRecommendation: Units need to transport a basic load of tify specific remediation responsibilities during this visit. 

environmental cleanup and storage supplies during deployment. Assessment personnel must conduct follow-UP inspections durOnce deployed, they should order and track additional supplies. ing the last two closure visits to ensure that the remediation 

The Corps should coordinate preexisting contractor support for actions have been accomplished. 

March 1997 Engineer 15 
Cleanup and Remediation 

Problem: Transportation of hazardous wastes. Because of the 

sensitivity of hazardous wastes, some countries imposed strict 

limits on the transportation of these wastes through their area. 

Normally, the Army's environmental policy calls for the DRMO 

to transport all hazardous wastes from a central collection point 

to remediation sites. A problem occurred when Croatian officials refused permits to DRMO's subcontractor to transport 

wastes from Croatia to Germany, effectively bottling up the disposal system. At one point, Implementation Force vehicles 

transported the hazardous wastes, although this action was not 

entirely within the letter of the agreement. The problem was 

eventually elevated to the highest level of the command structure, but no satisfactory solution was reached. 

Recommendation: During deployment operations, Army staff 

must coordinate with host country officials as early as possible. 

Although constrained diplomatically, the United States must 

firmly set operating limits with the respective country. If this 

fails, the staff must aggressively search for in-country disposal 

sites that meet our standards. To preclude this problem, the staff 

may prepare agreements with cooperative countries authorizing 

the collection of hazardous wastes and the transportation of 

wastes out of the country. 

Problem: Leakage from containers. Aniving MILVANs (military-owned demountable containers) and CONEXes (container 

expresses) often leaked at the ISB. Some hazardous waste materials were improperly transported from Bosnia through Hungary 

for turn-in to Germany. For example, one shipment of hazardous 

materials contained undrained batteries. Operation Plan 

(OPLAN) 4243 specifically describes shipping standards for 

hazardous wastes. 

Recommendation: Transporting hazardous materials without taking proper precautions (such as draining battery acid) 

and transporting hazardous wastes are prohibited. Transport 

personnel must be briefed on the hazardous materials 

included in any shipment, including health risks of exposure 

and the physical hazards of the material. The chain of command must continually train soldiers to properly load and 

secure CONEXes. 

Problem: U.N. hazardous wastes. The disposition of hazardous wastes left by former U.N. agencies and countries at sites 

occupied by U.S. forces created potentially embarrassing problems. Several base camps contained large quantities of used 

POL products left by previous tenants. Fortunately, most of the 

hazardous wastes were left in segregated areas in motor pools 

and out of harm's way. The U.S. policy regarding wastes generated by other than our forces is simple: We will not clean up 

other than U.S. wastes unless there is an immediate threat to our 

soldiers' health 

Recommendation: Continue to enforce the policy that the 

United States will not add to, transport, or touch hazardous 

wastes generated by other countries unless they present an 

immediate health risk to our soldiers. Unit leaders must immediately coordinate with base camp mayors and the camp's multinational component to safely remove all wastes. 

Personnel 

Problem: Recruitment of personnel. Although environmental 

personnel performed superbly during the year-long operation, 

there were some difficult periods when staffing fell short. Additionally, the frequent changes in civilian personnel caused continuity problems. Originally, personnel were recruited from only 

one source-the ODCSENG office in Wiesbaden. This restriction 

made it difficult to fill positions. 

Recommendation: To ensure an adequate number of personnel, 

the U.S. Army should not limit recruitment to a single source. 

Engineer districts and other governmental agencies are excellent 

sources of qualified employees. To ensure continuity, civilians 

should be assigned on a temporary status for a period of not less 

than 90 days. This will allow 60 days on station, including travel 

and one week of training in Hohenfels. (This training is mandatory for all personnel deployed to the ISBIBosnia.) 

Conclusion 

T he Army's superb effort during Operation Joint Endeavor 

resulted in the fewest nonbattle injuries of any deployment in U.S. history. Some of this credit can be attributed 

to a successful environmental program. A result of this program 

is improved quality-of-life for soldiers. This includes reduced 

health risks as well as additional comforts during extended 

deployments-bought with money saved on site remediation. 

To ensure continued environmental success in the field, 

units must keep accurate records on their baseline through 

final environmental surveys. Units must initiate a sound prevention program with a working assessment process and 

immediately clean up all spills. If site remediation is required, 

units must use the best techniques possible within their mlssion constraints. 

Command interest is key to a successful environmental program in the field. Commanders must continually emphasize the 

importance of accomplishing the Amy's mission without 

adversely impacting the environment. With this emphasis, the 

Army will be a national leader in environmental stewardship for 

present and future generations. w 

Major Litzelman is assigned to the TRADOC Environmental 

OfJice as an individual military augmentee, U.S. Army Reserves. 

He was an environmental project officer with the Base Camp 

Coordinating Agency, Balkans Om, in support of Operation 

Joint Endeavol: MAJ Litzelman is a graduate of the Command 

and General StafS College and the Airborne and Ranger 

Schools. A civilian environmental contractor, he provides 

support to the Army Environmental Programs Ofice. 

16 Engineer March 1997 
Road Building 1 

By Captain Thomas S. Bowers 

F or Marine Corps combat engineers, road-building missions 

generally consist of constructing 

combat roads and trails to enhance the 

mobility of our forces. This construction involves clearing trees and other 

obstacles, rough grading the surface, 

and possibly compacting the surface. 

Depending on the time available, drainage ditches may be added. By doctrine, 

road building for Marine combat engineers is not very complex. 

This article describes how the Engineer Operations Division constructed 

Ordnance Point Road at the Marine 

Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North 

Carolina. This project was more than a 

simple combat road. Because of its 

location, it had to meet Department of 

Transportation specifications. 

For the sake of simplicity, I break 

the construction project into seven 

phases and discuss the techniques used 

in each. My intent is to highlight how 

we resolved some of the problems 

encountered. 

Mission and Design 

T he mission was to construct 

an 1,800-foot improved-surface 

road to connect two ammunition 

supply magazines so that ammunition 

could be moved within the storage areas 

without having to exit onto a main road. 

The completed road required appropriate drainage and erosion-control measures to limit environmental impacts on 

the surrounding area. 

The design called for the first 1,100 

feet of the road to be straight and the 

next 300 feet to include a superelevated S-curve. Coming out of the 

banked curve, the last 400 feet would 

be straight. The curve would be located 

over the main culvert to help ensure 

proper drainage. The road was to be a 

series of cuts and fills. The first 1,100 

feet would have cuts from 2 to 6 feet 

deep, which would provide the fill 

required to bring the rest of the road up 

to grade. The only problem we encountered with the design was that it 

changed many times during construction. The initial time line for this 

project was three months, but because 

of all the changes, it took nine months 

to complete. 

Clearing Operations 

I n the planning phase, clearing the 

roadway seemed to be a simple 

task, but many problems surfaced. 

The area was a dense forest with most 

of the trees more than 100 feet tall, and 

their removal was difficult. My first 

concern was for unit safety. We cleared 

the area with D7G Dozers and chain 

saws and used various types of heavy 

equipment to load and haul timber to 

the landfill. 

About this time, station environmental protection representatives informed 

us that we were operating in an environmentally sensitive area and could 

not continue clearing. Even though 

we had the required permits and were 

March 1997 Engineer 17 
Marine engineers dig a trench to emplace a 150-foot culvert. 

constructing a base-approved project, 

work was delayed. No endangered species were in the work area, but it 

was considered environmentally sensitive because of a small stream that ran 

across the site. From this point on, 

environmental constraints impacted 

every phase of the project. 

Culvert Emplacement 

he most difficult part of the 

project was emplacing 150 feet 

of 6-foot-diameter culvert in the 

70-foot-wide by 20-foot-deep natural 

swale. All water in the surrounding 

area filtered down to this swale and 

into a stream that ran across the middle 

of the road. After surveyors staked out 

the culvert location, we diverted the 

stream to one side of the swale. The 

stream was not a problem, but the 

swale was a mud pit. We tried using 

both wheeled and tracked equipment to 

get down the embankments to dig out 

the culvert trench, but we only succeeded in getting the equipment stuck. 

Then the S3 Operations Officer, the 

only Marine in the squadron with roadbuilding experience, suggested building a series of three steps down the 

embankment to serve as platforms from 

18 Engineer 

which the equipment could work. 

The area was covered with about 

three feet of muddy topsoil on top of a 

sand and clay base. As we scraped off 

the topsoil, subsurface groundwater 

percolated to the surface and degraded 

trafficability. Eventually we cut steps 

into the embankment, but we could not 

excavate the culvert trench from them 

because the heavy equipment sank into 

the mud. We used rolls of fiberglass 

reinforcing mat, called Momatting, 

from our rapid runway repair kit to stabilize the surface. Covering the steps 

with the mat allowed the vehicle's 

weight to spread over a larger area. 

An excavator with a ditching bucket 

was used to dig a trench 150 feet long 

by 8 feet wide by 4 feet deep. This 

took about two days because the excavator could dig only a small section 

before it had to be moved. The culvert's base was a 3-foot bed of gravel, 

which trucks dumped into the trench 

and combat engineers spread with 

shovels. A high-speed, high-mobility 

crane emplaced each 50-foot section 

of culvert, and we sealed and bolted 

them together. To backfill the trench, 

we emplaced a 1-foot lift of gravel and 

five I-foot lifts of suitable fill. 

Between each lift, we compacted the 

fill. The operation was slowed because 

only two mechanical compactors were 

available. In addition, rain filled the 

trench with water, which hindered 

compaction. 

Fill for the swale was supposed to 

come from the first section of the road, 

but due to inclement weather and poor 

drainage, none could be generated. 

There were no stockpiles on the base; 

however, two runways were being 

resurfaced on the other side of the base, 

and the old asphalt was being stockpiled for removal by a contractor. The 

Environmental Affairs Section determined that we could use the asphalt as 

fill without adversely impacting the 

environment. 

The five dump trucks in our squadron could not haul enough asphalt to 

support the backfill operations, so we 

borrowed trucks from other squadrons. 

The area around the culvert required 

21 feet of fill to bring it up to the 

required subgrade. Again, each I-foot 

lift was emplaced and compacted 

before the next lift was added. 

Although this was time consuming, it 

enhanced the California Bearing Ratio 

(CBR) of the road. 

The two major problems in this 

phase of construction were terrain and 

March 1997 
\ 

Turnout 

weather. Poor trafficability of the existing soil and frequent rains caused this 

phase of the project to take almost two 

months. 

Preparation of the Road 

Surface 

he temporary drainage ditches 

eliminated flooding on the existing road surface. We began 

working on the "big end" (St. 13+50- 

St. 18+00), which was mainly a fill 

area. After shaping and leveling the 

ground, we layered crushed asphalt to 

bring the road surface up to the 

required subgrade and cut in the shoulders and rough ditching. 

As work on the big end neared completion, surveyors marked the cut and 

fill locations on the "little end" (St. 

0+00- St. 11+50). Since this part of the 

project would generate a surplus of fill, 

we suggested to the facilities engineer 

that we not make all of the cuts but just 

level the 1,150 feet and improve the 

lper elevat~ 

curve 

su 

"Little End" + &&B,gE "d9* ,<+ * f 

St. 18 \ St. 11 + 50 St.O+i 

A 

DOW~S~~PUIII 

end 

Ordr 

MCA 

drainage. This plan would not 

adversely affect trafficability or the 

CBR of the road and would speed up 

the operation. The idea was rejected 

because new ammunition bunkers were 

being constructed in another part of the 

Main culvl 

I 

Shoulde 

storage area and the fill to cover them 

would have to be purchased. If we 

could generate the required fill, it 

would save the Marine Corps Air Station thousands of dollars. 

After attempting to make the cuts 

with D7G and 1150E Dozers, then 

pushing the fill into a pile and moving 

it with our TRAM scoop loaders to the 

stockpile site adjacent to the road, we 

realized that this operation could take 

months. We needed a piece of heavy 

lance Poi 

,S Cherry 

nt 

, Point 

equipment that could both cut and 

move large amounts of fill. The 621B 

Scraper can do this, but in 1993 the 

Marine Corps decided that Marine 

Wing Support Squadrons did not need 

such equipment, so they removed our 

two scrapers. The 8th Engineer Support 

Battalion at Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina, loaned us one for the duration 

of the project. 

The bowl of the 621B Scraper has a 

capacity of 18 cubic yards. We used the 

.- .- ---.----.-.. .. -=- ---- - - 

Excavation continues. 

March 1997 Engineer 19 
Erosion-control measures included lining the ditches with riprap. 

push-loading method: a D7G Dozer 

pushed the scraper to fill the bowl, 

since the scraper lacked the power to 

make cuts in the muddy terrain. Two 

passes with the scraper equal about 

four passes with a dozer. 

Drainage 

he drainage plan included adding ditches along each side of 

the road, installing several culverts, and constructing two swales to 

channel water flowing out of the 

ditches and into the surrounding forest. 

Since a small stream is channeled 

through the 150-foot culvert we 

installed, extensive erosion-control 

measures were required. The 3-foot 

bed of gravel that the culvert rests on 

prevents the ground from eroding 

away, which would cause the culvert to 

shift or sag and the road to fail prematurely. The gravel bed also ensures that 

groundwater below the streambed is 

released before it filters up to the road 

subgrade. In theory, once the ground is 

tightly compacted, groundwater will 

filter upward. By providing a relatively 

uncompacted layer of stone below the 

surface, water moves on the horizontal 

axis and exits at the end of the culvert. 

To ensure that the gravel bed would not 

become as compacted as the surrounding soil, we placed a layer of synthetic 

geotextile fabric in the trench before 

laying the gravel. The multilayer.weave 

of the fabric allows water to pass 

through it and keeps sand and silt from 

building up on the gravel. This fabric is 

the primary erosion-control measure 

under the entire road surface, and it 

lines the drainage ditches and swales. 

When the road was at subgrade, we 

added two 1 &inch-diameter culverts 3 to 

4 feet below the surface. One is at St. 

17+90; it is a control measure to ensure 

that excess water from the upstream side 

of the road can flow under the road and 

into existing ditches. We emplaced the 

other culvert at St. 6+50 so that ditches on 

the upstream side of the road can drain 

before reaching the main culvert. 

The ditches for this road are trapezoidal. A shallow "V" ditch would have 

silted up too quickly, and a deep "V" 

ditch would have been more difficult to 

emplace and tie into the existing terrain. The trapezoidal ditches have a 

front and back slope ratio of approximately 3:1, with the slopes meeting 

at the flat bottom of the ditch. We 

lined the ditches with riprap (5- to 7- 

inch pieces of coral), another erosioncontrol measure, which also slows the 

accumulation of silt throughout the 

length of the ditch. 

Low areas in the surrounding terrain 

made ideal locations for constructing 

two swales, which allow the ditching 

away from the main culvert to empty 

back into the woods and help prevent 

overflow during severe storms. We 

used an 1150E Dozer to widen, flatten, 

and extend each natural swale and then 

covered them with riprap. 

Our drainage and erosion-control 

plan may seem extreme, but since the 

road was constructed in an environmentally sensitive area, the potential effects 

of excessive silt runoff on a nearby lake 

were a major concern. We know that 

our drainage system works well, 

because during construction it rained 

almost every day. We could see potential problems and correct them before 

the project was completed. 

20 Engineer March 1997 
Final Grade and Surfacing I Completion 

T he last construction phase 

involved bringing the entire 

road surface up to the final 

grade by adding additional lifts of 

"crush and run," which consists of 

crushed stone and small 1- to 2-inch 

stone. Even though we simultaneously 

spread it on the little end with the 621 

Scraper and on the big end with dump 

trucks and a 130G Grader, completing 

the task was an extremely slow process. The area to be covered was 1,800 

feet long by 23 feet wide. Each pass 

with the scraper covered about 40 feet. 

Then the scraper moved to the crushand-run stockpile where it was loaded 

by a scoop loader. The dump truck and 

grader combination was no faster. As a 

I-foot lift was completed at each end, a 

smooth-drum compactor made approximately 10 passes to ensure that the 

crushed stone was well-compacted. 

Some areas only required one lift, 

while others required two or three. At 

this point, rainy weather helped us in 

two ways: 

w It controlled the dust from the 

stone and kept it from obscuring 

the operator's view. 

W It facilitated the compaction 

process. 

The last section of the road to be 

brought up to final grade was the main 

culvert area. We shaped the superelevated curve over the main culvert 

with the last two crushed-asphalt lifts. 

Asphalt provides an excellent base 

material for the curve, since it 

increases resistance to the shearing 

effects of heavy loads. Asphalt is also 

easier to shape than crushed stone. 

The main problem we had in this 

section of road was trying to spread 

stone with the grader while maintaining the super elevation. Once we 

spread the stone, the compactor had to 

roll the area without flattening the 

slope. When compacting was finished, 

we identified high and low spots and 

filled or cut them using a grader. 

D uring the nine months spent on 

the project, the surrounding area 

had been scraped and plowed 

and had tire ruts everywhere. As we 

cleared more and more area for ditching 

and runoff, we stockpiled the fill and 

debris off to the side. Each of these 

piles had to be moved and consolidated 

into one large pile for the bunker 

project. Large tree stumps dug out during construction had to be hauled away, 

and damaged trees had to be cut down 

and removed. We also removed the silt 

fencing used to protect the stream during construction and cleared and graded 

approximately 40 feet on each side of 

the road. 

In open areas, we sowed grass seed 

and covered it with straw. Where there 

were trees and bare topsoil, we added 

mulch for erosion protection. We placed 

riprap in the ditches and around the main 

culvert. A fencing contractor had 

installed gates at each end of the road 

about one foot above the final grade. 

From a security standpoint, the gates 

could be easily breached; in addition, 

they were not aesthetically pleasing. We 

pulled the corner posts, reset the gates to 

an appropriate height, and anchored 

them with new concrete. At last we were 

ready for a final inspection by the facilities maintenance engineers. 

In the main portion of the inspection, the engineers compared the asbuilt plans with the original plans to 

ensure that changes made during construction were authorized by the design 

engineers. Once they were satisfied that 

the road was properly constructed, the 

engineers conducted a walk-through 

that emphasized the drainage and erosion-control measures. They were satisfied with the end product but added 

two more tasks: 

W Dig out the silt buildup at the 

downstream end of the main culvert. 

Remove a small concrete culvert 

that restricted the flow of water 

upstream. 

After completing these tasks, the 

road was officially finished, and it was 

time for the ribbon-cutting ceremony. 

The entire squadron witnessed the ribbon cutting and road dedication. The 

Marine Corps Air Station commanding 

general presented five Navy Achievement Medals for the hard work and 

dedication that went into this project. 

Lessons Learned 

I learned many valuable lessons 

from this project. 

Do not overestimate the capabilities of your unit. The squadron 

commander committed the engineer division to the project knowing that we lacked adequate 

training or experience. The positive effect was that the project 

allowed the equipment operators to 

become thoroughly trained. Some 

of these Marines had only a few 

hours of operating time on various 

pieces of heavy equipment when 

this project began. By the time we 

were finished, each operator had 

attained a high level of proficiency 

on several pieces of equipment. 

Learn to cope with various command relationships. Throughout the 

project it seemed that everyone on 

base was directing the project, 

including facilities engineers, environmental representatives, design 

engineers, and my supervisors. 

This was a case where using the 

chain of command was crucial. If 

someone outside of my chain of 

command wanted to change something, they first had to convince my 

commander. This allowed me to 

build the road as it was designed 

and retain control of what happened at the work site. 

When you are in charge of a 

project, manage your resources 

wisely. Adjust the time line to meet 

changing demands. Keep your unit 

informed about all aspects of the 

(Continued on page 23) 

March 1997 Engineer 21 
BJ Colonel Edtvin Arnold 

7-n 1995, the Commandant of the 

, U.S. Army Engineer School i L directed the merger of the Topographic Engineer Officer specialty 

(21C) with the Combat Engineer 

Officer specialty (21B). Nearly coincident with this decision, the Commandant began delivering the 

message that engineer officers, regardless of specialty, are the terrain 

visualization experts for the oganizations in which they serve. These two 

pronouncements have met some 

resistance within the engineer community-from captains in the Engineer Officers Advanced Course, who 

believe instruction on topographic 

products and terrain visualization 

processes may be a waste of their 

time, to topographic engineer warrant 

officers, who see as a move to 

take [heir jobs, L~~me tdea fell, 

minutes of your time to explain my 

twist on this issue. 

First, you need to understand that I 

am not some "topo guyw trying to sell 

his career pursuits. I once attended 

the Charting and 

Officers Course, but that was many 

Years ago and I have never served in 

a assignment. I am a 

engineer with more than 

eight years of service in three divisions, both in the United States and in 

as a field grade Officer- My 

On the subject of being a 

terrain have 

their in that and 

the combat engineer education and 

experiences that preceded those 

assignments. 

"Maneuver commanders 

must know they can turn 

with 'Onfidence to their 

to assist them 

in the critical function of 

~ViSualiZing~ the terrain." 

Why Me? 

s being he terrain visualization 

, expert within your organization d 
b. 

important to you as an engineer, 

and should cvely engineer officer be 

: able to perform that role'? I strongly 

1 believe the answer to that question 

today is "yes." I also believe that the 

1 answer becomes a more emphatic 1 "yes" as we move the Army into the 

1 	 21st century. But, before I progress 

too far in that discussion, let me clarify some that partially address 

the warrant officers, concerns that we 

commjssioned officers xireout to steal 

their jobs. 

In this short discussion I am talk-

! 	 ing about terrain visun[ization, not 

terrain ana[ysis. There is a difference. ~~~~~i~ visualization is the process through which a commander 

sees the terrain and understands its 

impacts on the operation in whch he 

! 	 is involved, both on friendly and 

' 	 enemy elements. It includes the identification and understanding of those 

aspects of the terrain that can be 

exploited by the friendly commander 

to gain advantage over the enemy as 

well as those aspects most likely to be 

the enemy It is asubjective evaluation of the physical 

attributes of the terrain as well as the 

physical capabilities of the vehicles. 

equipment, and people that must 

cross over or occupy the terrain. Terrziin visualization is closer to militaty 

art than to military science. 

Terrain analysis, on the other hand, 

is military science. It is the study of 

the properties of terrain and how 

those properties change over time 

with use and changing weather. TerI 

i rain analysis is the basic science of 

I the study of terrain. It starts with the 

collection, verification, processing. j

1 	 revision and, in some cases, the actual 

building of available source data. In 

short, terrain analysis turns basic data , into usable information. Terrain ana- l lysts then synthesize the data to pro- i 

! 	 duce products that portray the effects 

of terrain. These products are basic 

tools that facilitate the terrain-visualiZation process- Terrain is a 

very technical process and requires 

the expertise that topographic warrant 

officers possess. 

Terrain Experts 

with that clarification, let's 

return to the basic discussion-the importance of 

! being a terrain visualization expert. 

! 	 We, the engineers, are the mobility 

and countermobility experts for the 

Army. We do other things also, but 

our role as members of the combined 

arms team is largely comprised of 

I 	 mobility and countermobility operations. 

22 Engineer 	 March 1997 
ther of 

?rehen- 

. . 

We cannot 

these functic 

sive understana~ng or now terrain 

affects the movement of friendly and 

enemy forces. In our beginning education as young engineer lieutenants, 

we are taught how to site obstacles 

for the greatest effect. You could call 

this 'Terrain Appreciation 101." No 

other member of the combined arms 

team receives such education. They 

may receive the basics in how to 

identify key and decisive terrain, but 

the nuances of how terrain affects the 

movement to and from that decisive 

terrain is taught only to engineers. 

In reality, we practice our terrain 

visualization expertise every day, 

generally without giving it a second 

thought. Every time we advise a commander on the correct placement of 

an obstacle or obstacle belt to achieve 

the desired effect, or recommend 

shifting a battle position to achieve 

better engagement area coverage or 

gain increased survivability, we are 

using our terrain evaluation skills to 

assist the supported commander in 

"visualizing" terrain effects. In support of the offense, we help define 

where the enemy might set defenses 

based on the limiting effects of the 

terrain, or where he might emplace 

obstacles to create advantage from 

the opportunities afforded by the terrain. We do this throughout our 

careers at every level of command 

and staff. As a division engineer, 

both as a battalion commander and 

later as a brigade commander, the 

division commander expected me to 

study the area of operations and to 

advise him of the opportunities it 

offered for us to gain advantage over 

the enemy. 

So, the idea of being the "Terrain 

Visualization Experts" for the Army 

is really nothing new. It is something 

that we, as well-trained engineers 

supporting our maneuver commanders, have always done, and it is an 

important contribution to countless 

successes on the combined arms batMarch 1997 

tlefield 

21st Cf 

- - 

. As the oves to 1 

bution u *. 

Army m 

iis contri . ~ 

the 

 ill 

grow in importance as aispersed, 

noncontiguous operations and greater 

reliance on increased mobility 

expand the battlespace and increased 

tempo reduces the time available to 

see and understand battlespace 

effects. Maneuver commanders must 

know they can turn with confidence 

to their engineers to assist them in the 

critical function of "visualizing" the 

terrain. As the tempo of operations 

increases, our ability to modify the 

terrain to our advantage decreases. 

Moving Ahead 

n future battlefields, we will 

be forced to rely heavily on 

wielding terrain as it already 

exists as a combat multiplier. We can 

do this if we clearly understand the 

terrain and its effects on the men and 

machines that move on it. 

The transition to digital topographic data and the increasing capability of our terrain-analysis tools 

will permit the technical experts (the 

topographic engineer warrant officers) to provide increasingly complex 

analysis products. These products 

will increase our understanding of the 

terrain and its effects. When coupled 

with our knowledge of friendly and 

enemy capabilities and intentions, 

these products will help us identify 

the terrain effects to be exploited. 

Then we must impart this knowledge 

to the commanders we support. We 

must help them visualize the terrain 

early in the planning process so our 

forces can exploit its effects to our 

advantage. That is the engineers' 

role. After all, we (the topographic 

engineer warrant officers and the 

combat engineers) are the experts! 

COL Arrwld, currently assigned to 

Fort Leonard Wood, serves as Director of 

Battle Lab Support in charge of the 

Maneuver Support Battle Lab. He is also 

the interim TRADOC Program Integration weer for Terrain Data (TPIO-TD). 

(Continued from page 21.) 

project, and ensure that they understand why something is done a certain way. When you must work on 

weekends to maintain the time line, 

be creative in your efforts to keep 

up morale. These are a leader's 

obligations. 

w When planning a project, try to 

anticipate events or factors that 

may impede progress. Weather 

and terrain may influence construction projects dramatically. Building 

a road during the cold, rainy winter 

in North Carolina is not a good 

idea. The ground may be solid and 

dry during the summer, but it is 

muddy and flooded in winter. Be 

aware of training and deployment 

schedules. It would not be wise to 

begin a project and then lose half 

of the unit to a deployment. 

As a leader you must set the example. You must do anything that you 

ask your unit to do. You must be a 

teacher, a counselor, and a role 

model. You must earn their trust 

and confidence. 

No one can control all of the factors 

that affect a construction schedule. During the construction of Ordnance Point 

Road, I had daily operations meetings 

to attend, formations and inspections to 

conduct, and concurrent projects to 

oversee. There will always be some 

resource constraints in any construction 

project. Personnel, time, and equipment 

are your most valuable resources. The 

success or failure of the project depends 

on how well you use these resources. 

w 

Captain Bowers serves with the 8th 

Engineer Support Battalion, Camp 

Lejeune, North Carolina. He previously served as the Engineer Operations Division OIC, MWSS-274, 

MWSG-27, 2d MAW Cherry Point, 

North Carolina. CAPT Bowers is a 

graduate of the Engineer Oflcer 

Advanced Course, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri. 

Engineer 23 
By Major General Clair E Gill and Vern Lowrey 

he U.S. Army constantly upgrades and changes the 

way it fights to maintain battlefield superiority over all 

potential adversaries and to achieve complementary 

capabilities with other services and nations. In that effort, 

the Army is changing from what we called CBRS (Concepts Based Requirements System) to a new requirements determination process. The CBRS had distinct 

stages in research and concept development that focused 

primarily on the manufacturing and fielding of equipment 

to counter a single, well-defined threat. The new requirements determination system is a fluid, integrated, experimentation-based process that addresses an expanded 

global threat and the full spectrum of Army operations and 

functions. 

The new process began in March 1996 with publication 

of TRADOC's Black Book number 3, "Requirements 

Determination." General Reimer, Chief of Staff of the 

Army, appointed the TRADOC Commander as the Army's 

approval authority for all warfighting requirements. A 

soon-to-be-published TRADOC Pamphlet 71 -XX, Requirements Determination Guide, will describe implementation 

methods. It will provide process details needed by action 

officers throughout the Army to determine, document, and 

process concepts, future operational capabilities, and 

DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leader de-velopment, organization, materiel, and soldiers) requirements. To implement 

this process at the Engineer School, we now conceptualize, experiment with, and invest in future warfighting capabilities for the engineer force. 

Conceptualization began with development of Army 

Vision 2010. This vision is being refined into an overarching warfighting concept that links the Army vision with the 

National Military Strategy, the joint vision, and the Army 

plan. The overarching warfighting concept guides all other 

Army concept development activities, including additional 

functional and branch concepts. 

The Engineer School has developed an overarching 

vision for engineer operations and three branch concepts 

in the areas of terrain visualization, maneuver engineering, and force support engineering. They are now staffed 

to the field for comments. 

We have created several integrated concept teams 

(ICTs) to support the engineer concept areas. They are 

chartered to provide horizontal integration and detailed 

coordination between Army agencies, units, labs (USACE 

and AMC), joint services, contractors, and civilian industries. The lCTs develop concept details, assess the state 

of current technologies, develop modernization strategies 

and experimentation plans, and draft investment strategies for engineer DTLOMS improvements. The lCTs presently sponsored by the Engineer School include: 

W Countermine 

Terrain Visualization 

Construction 

Unmanned Terrain Domination 

Engineer Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers and Intelligence 

Armored Engineering 

In turn, the vision and warfighting concepts are used to 

develop future operational capabilities (FOC). The FOCs 

are structured statements of enduring operational capabilities required by the Army to achieve the ideas articulated 

in the approved warfighting concepts. Science and technology research, experimentation, and schoolhouse 

investments are all tied to accomplishment of an FOC. 

The Engineer School has developed 30 FOCs, which are 

integrated with other proponent FOCs at TRADOC. 

Warfighting Experimentation and analysis are key 

to the requirements determination process. When properly planned and executed, warfighting experiments provide the means to recommend future warfighting 

DTLOMS investments. The Engineer School is decisively 

engaged with the 4th Infantry Division, which serves as 

the Army's Experimentation Force (EXFOR). They perform experiments to identify future engineer DTLOMS 

requirements. In March and November 1997, the EXFOR 

will conduct advanced warfighting experiments at the 

National Training Center and Fort Hood, Texas. Army 

leaders will examine several engineer-related issues, 

including terrain visualization support, Hornet wide-area 

munitions, intelligent minefields, the digital reconnaissance system, and the future heavy engineer force 

structure. 

Observations from train-ups to both experiments show 

that engineers are a critical component to the digitized 

combined arms team. Digital command and control systems require intensive operator and leader training. Mastery of basic combat engineer skills, such as obstacle 

breaching, obstacle emplacement, and survivability, are 

still essential for combined arms success. Providing a 

heavy division engineer battalion in habitual support to a 

brigade task force continues to be tactically correct. The 

24 Engineer March 1997 
"From Concept to Metal" 

Overarching Branch and 

Concept Functional Operational Science & Requirements 

Concepts Capabilities Technology Leading to 

Solutions 

most critical deficiency identified during recent experiments is the need for accurate digital terrain displays in 

digitized command posts and combat vehicles. Army 

decision-makers are painfully aware of the lack of standardization in the way we acquire, analyze, transmit, store, 

and display digital terrain data. Therefore, TRADOC has 

tasked the Engineer School to lead the attack on this problem through a TRADOC Program Integration Office (TPIO) 

for Terrain Data, located at Fort Leonard Wood. Colonel Ed 

Arnold's Personal Viewpoint (page 22) describes the many 

challenges we face in standardizing the ways digital terrain 

data are used. 

In addition to EXFOR experimentation, we have established the Maneuver Support Battle Lab at Fort Leonard 

Wood. This newest Army Battle Lab is charged to conduct 

experiments in all aspects of maneuver support. It is the 

advance guard of the Military Police and Chemical Schools' 

move to Fort Leonard Wood in 1999 to form the Maneuver 

Support Center (Engineer; December 1996, page 40). 

Proper Investment in the appropriate DTLOMS 

areas to achieve future operational capabilities is the final 

payoff of the new requirements determination process. 

Most of the Army's requirement efforts will continue to 

center around developing the "M" in DTLOMS-materiel. 

Because materiel solutions are the most time consuming 

and expensive to develop and acquire, we engineers are 

challenged to find new and better ways to write doctrine, 

conduct training and leader development, build organizations, and "grow" our soldiers. The engineer equipment 

and technologies we develop and exploit now will focus 

on those few systems that will give us the most bang for 

the buck. Some key items under development are the 

Grizzly, the Wolverine, the Hornet, and the IMF (soon to 

be renamed Raptor Intelligent Combat Outpost). 

The new requirements determination process may look 

similar to CBRS and previous Army requirements processes. But it recognizes the engineer community's need 

to continually conceptualize, experiment with, and realistically invest in those critical engineer warfighting capabilities that will provide the U.S. Army with overwhelming 

dominance over any foe. 

1YI 

Major General Gill has served as Commandant, US. 

Army Engineer School and Commanding General, U.S. 

Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 

since June 1995, 

Mr. Lowrey serves as technical director of the Maneuver 

Support Battle Lab at Fort Leonard Wood. He is 

commander of the 1138th Engineer Battalion (First 

Missouri), Missouri Army National Guard. 

March 1997 Engineer 25 
HAT'S THE SCOOP. 3 

By Captain Mike Brobeck 

f you haven't heard discussions about captains (promotable [PI) or captains serving as battalion S3s (Operations 

and Training Officers) yet, you may. It isn't a program, 

it's an exception. There are currently more requirements for 

majors than there are majors available. This is true Armywide, not just in the engineer branch. 

This is not the first time the Army has found itself in a 

position to place captains in S3 positions. It also happened in 

the early 1980s. 

Ground Rules 

nticipating that it may be necessary to place captains(P) or captains in S3 positions, the U.S. Army 

'Personnel Command (PERSCOM) is ready to guarantee 12-month stabilization for these officers. However, some 

conditions must be met before exceptions are made: 

w There are no majors in the brigade or division or on an 

installation, regardless of military education level (MEL4) status, who can fill the position. 

organization. Due to the shortage of majors this fiscal year, 

many organizations have a higher priority of fill than do 

troop units. This translates into fewer opportunities for 

majors to be assigned to troop unit installations during the 

fiscal year. 

As a major, how do I get to be an S3 or execrttive officer 

(XO)? There are two ways to position yourself on or near a 

troop installation to increase your chances of getting into the 

queue for an S3 or XO position: 

W Seek a short-tour assignment with a follow-on assignment back to a troop installation. 

Seek an assignment to a major command or field operating 

agency that is collocated on a troop installation (such as the 

Intelligence and Security Command, Army Materiel Command, Forces Command Active ComponentIReserve 

Component, or Operational Test and Evaluation Command). Once there, contact the senior engineer commander 

at the installation and your assignment officer at PERSCOM to express your desire to serve as an S3 or XO. 

W Prior coordination is accomplished with the Engineer I'm a major who walked right into a branch qualifying 

Branch of PERSCOM. job. Will I be reassigned once I have served for 12 months 

as an S3 or XO and have 12 months on station? This is a 

Branch Qualification possibility, based on other requirements for engineer officers. 

However, the Engineer Branch will make every effort not to 

A concurrent issue is branch qualification. While TRA- move a major and his,her family after one ear on station. 

DOC determines what constitutes branch qualification, PERSCOM's assignment policy will be to follow 

these guides: Conclusion 

w Captains (P) who serve as an S3 for a minimum of one 

year will be considered as having served their duty with 

soldiers as a major; they will not be routinely considered 

for additional duty with soldiers as a junior major. Some 

may serve again in their senior years as a major. 

Captains who serve in these positions will not be considered 

fully developed. During their early years as a major, they 

will be returned to troop units for further development. 

T he key to success is communications! The Engineer 

Branch will continue to strive for that ultimate "winwin" assignment for the officer, the unit, and the Army. 

For information or assistance, contact Major Scott Dias, 

Engineer Majors Assignment Officer, at (703) 325-5697 or 

e-mail diass@hoffman-emhl.army.mil; or Lieutenant Colonel Dave Ridenour, Engineer Branch Chief, at (703) 325- 

5693 or e-mail ridenoud@hoffman-emhl .army.mil. 

L1 

Implications Captain Brobeck is the Future Readiness/Professional 

ere is such a shortage, why can't I get to a troop Development Oficer; Engineer Branch, PERSCOM. Previous 

unit? The Army's leadership determines the relative pri- assignments include Advanced Civil Schooling Program Man- If th ority of personnel filling an organization. This translates ager; PERSCOM; Cornmandet C/307th Engineer Battalion, 

into an officer distribution plan that stipulates the number of 82d Airborne Division; USASOC DCSENG Plans Oficer; 

officers by grade and specialty who can be assigned to an and PUXO, 16th Engineer Battalion, 1st AmoredDivision. 

26 Engineer March 1997 
By Captain Cynthia A. Glenister and Major John E. Richerson 

'S 2...S2!? What do you mean I'm going to be an S2? 

I'm an engineel; not an MI ojicel:" More than a 

few engineer officers have found themselves 

repeating those or similar words. With the shortage of MI 

officers in the Army today, the chances of a young engineer 

captain being assigned as an S2 of a combat engineer unit 

probably are very good. By sharing some knowledge gained 

while assigned to engineer units, we hope to provide those of 

the "non-MI" persuasion who find themselves in an intelligence position with information that will make the job an 

easy one. We will briefly discuss some general intelligence 

production requirements and then describe some engineerspecific intelligence products and presentation techniques. 

Intelligence Requirements 

I n any Army unit, the focus of intelligence efforts always 

depends on MET'-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, 

and time available). The situation, driven by METI'-T, 

influences the commander and the S2 in determining the 

intelligence support required for mission success. 

How does one determine the kinds of intelligence support 

required? Several factors are important, but perhaps the most 

important one is the "type of operation." In today's post-Cold 

War environment, an operation may range from war to one of 

the many environments covered by operations other than war 

(OOTW). Whatever the type or scale of the operation, it is 

almost certain to include some engineer requirements and, 

thus, a need for engineer intelligence. 

Other significant contributing factors are the unit's mission, the assets available to the engineer commander, and the 

threat. During the Cold War, the threat was clear and easily 

definable. Not so today. Besides a "typical" military threat 

(which still exists), the nature of the threat has changed over 

the past decade. Units today must not only contend with possible military opponents, but they are also frequently faced 

with the threats associated with the OOTW environment: 

insurgencies, internal civil disturbances, ethnic and religious 

tensions, humanitarian and disaster assistance, and terrorism. 

While these threats drive the need for intelligence requirements for all S2s, they pose some additional requirements for 

the engineer S2 because engineers have a critical role in performing a wide variety of stability and support operations. 

To be successful, all S2s must be well acquainted 

with the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process, which is the cornerstone of fulfilling intelligence 

March 1997 Engineer 27 
L I 

.a- ' # 

The MDKP is a common combat engineer ditching system from the former Soviet Union. This vehicle, now 

being replaced by the MDK-3, is used to excavate full-width vehicle fighting positions and antitank ditches. 

requirements. Most engineer officers are familiar with the 

IPB process, but they normally focus primarily on the terrain 

analysis portion (the first two steps). And with good reason: 

Who knows the terrain better than those who move it, shape 

it, and modify it? However, an S2 must apply all four steps of 

the IPB process: 

1. Define the battlefield environment 

2. Describe the battlefield effects 

3. Evaluate the threat 

4. Determine threat courses of action 

In any type of unit or environment, an S2 must apply each 

step of the IPB process in as much or as little detail as 

required to support the commander and his mission. After 

these steps are integrated and applied to the situation, the S2 

develops and produces some standard IPB products. These 

products include modified combined obstacle overlays, various enemy situation overlays, and weather analysis matrices. 

The entire IPB process is taught during the Engineer Officers Advanced Course (EOAC) at Fort Leonard Wood. There, 

EOAC students receive training in IPB, intelligence and electronic warfare, and threat doctrine and tactics. During a culminating Warfighter 111 exercise, they are provided an 

opportunity to "play" the part of an S2 (see photo, page 27). 

Providing appropriate intelligence support for diverse engineer missions and performing engineer-specific IPB is a challenge for both engineer and MI officers. Because the book 

solution often does not work, the S2 must tailor his intelligence support to align with the commander's needs, the unit's 

assets and capabilities, and the mission. In providing this support, the engineer S2 will prepare some additional IPB products that are especially germane to the engineer mission. 

Performing an Engineer IPB 

E ngineer-specific IPB products are developed as the S2 

anticipates the commander's needs. These products 

include bridging and fording site analyses and matrices, line of communication (LOC) overlays, hydrolo,' ~IC overlays, various obstacle lists and overlays, and lists of enemy 

engineer assets and capabilities. 

Bridge and Fording Site Analysis. If the S2 is part of an 

engineer unit with a mission to perform bridging and fording 

operations, a thorough analysis of the rivers is required. LOC 

and hydrologic overlays are available for many regions of the 

world and can be obtained from the local topographic unit. 

These overlays, used in conjunction with 1:25,000- or 

1:50,000-scale maps and friendly force maneuver graphics, 

assist the S2 conducting the analysis. 

"Tunnel vision" has caused the downfall of many good 

S2s. While primary bridging and crossing sites must be identified, don't fixate on the obvious. Rivers are not the only 

areas that may require bridging. S2s must carefully analyze 

all the terrain for possible alternative routes as well as less 

obvious "waddies," ditches, or other gaps that may impede 

troop movement. 

Bridging Matrix. Since the quantity of information 

acquired in a reconnaissance can get overwhelming, it is 

helpful to develop a bridging matrix. By listing all of the 

bridges along the main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate 

supply routes (ASRs) and their critical characteristics, the S2 

develops a quick reference for each potential route. This 

matrix also facilitates analysis of the information, as shown 

in Table 1, page 29. 

Lines of Communication Overlay. The LOC overlay 

28 Engineer March 1997 
Table 1 

ridge Status Data: As of 200001 May 99 

Main Supply Route Blanda 

Reference No. Location MLC Width Length Bypass Remarks Status 

1 FG 015 015 60 6 12 Impassable PL Tin - PL Gold Destroyed 

2 FG 025 025 90 8 18 Easy PL Tin - PL Gold Unknown 

3 FG 020 080 60 6 24 Difficult PL Tin - PL Gold Intact 

shows the locations of bridges and fording sites and the 

known length, width, military load class, and bypass conditions of the bridges. By identifying the MSRs and ASRs that 

the maneuver units are most likely to use, the S2 can determine which bridges and fording sites may require engineer 

assistance to facilitate troop movement. Through the LOC 

overlay, the S2 provides the engineer commander and staff 

with a graphic picture ofBridges designated impassable or dificult bypass. 

Bridge spans greater than the capability of the bridging 

assets currently designated for the area of operation. 

Destroyed bridges along specific LOC. 

These factors can significantly impact the maneuver unit's 

mission and will drive the engineer commander's potential 

mission in supporting the maneuver unit. 

Hydrologic Overlay. The LOC overlay showing the 

destroyed, impassable, and difficult bypass bridges is used in 

conjunction with the hydrologic overlay to assist the S2 in analyzing river characteristics. The hydrologic overlay provides 

information on a river's width, depth, velocity (meters per second), bottom composition, and bank slopes. It allows the S2 to 

recommend to the engineer commander potential sites for concentrating the unit's bridging and/or fording efforts. The initial 

map reconnaissance allows the unit to focus on a general area 

of bridging operations. Once tasked, the unit will conduct a 

ground reconnaissance to find suitable crossing sites. 

Obstacle List Matrix. The S2 closely tracks the location 

and status of threat-emplaced mines, obstacle belts, and 

bridges prepped with demolitions or destroyed. As information regarding obstacles flows in from the battlefield, the S2 

assigns a reference number to each of them. Breaking the 

matrix into separate operation phases (for example, Phase 

Line Tin to Phase Line Gold), the S2 records the following 

information on the matrix (see Table 2): 

Obstacle location 

Obstacle type 

Date-time group discovered 

Source of information 

Obstacle dimensions 

Whether by passed or cleared 

Units must inform the engineer S2 when the status of an 

obstacle changes. 

The S2 disseminates obstacle information to both engineer and maneuver units. At a minimum, the S2 disseminates 

the obstacle list matrix every 12 hours and when significant 

changes are reported. Obstacles also are posted on the engineer intelligence sirnation overlay, using the assigned reference number to assist with tracking them. 

Engineer Intelligence Situation Overlay. The engineer 

S2 collects and analyzes the activities of threat engineer units 

and tracks the threat on the intelligence situation overlay. In 

addition to posting roads and bridges on this overlay, the S2 

may also record such pertinent data asConstruction materials 

Water supply points 

Threat depotsldumps 

Airfield capabilities 

Threat minefields 

Barriers 

Table 2 

Obstacle List Matrix: As of 200001 May 

Phase Line Tin - Phase Line Gold 

Reference Location Type Date-Time Group1 Remarks 

No. Reported By 

1 FG 01 5 01 5 APIAT minefield 190800 May11 Ith Cavalry 100 x 300 meters 

2 FG 025 025 Blown bridge 190900 Maylllth Cavalry Easy bypass 

3 FG 020 080 Road crater 190900 May11 lth Cavatry Breached 

Mar-clz 1997 Engineer 29 
Table 3 


Threat Engineer Assets 


Units Obstacle - Clearing 

Vehicles 

Mine 

Layers 

Mine 

Plows 

Dozers Excavators Bridging 

Assets 

I 50th ID* 13 6 3 1 

National*** 	 3 19 4. 61 

50th ID Total 13 10 5 27 6 90 

(*) 80 percent strength. 


(**) 80 percent strength with 30 percent allocation to 50th ID. 


(***) 100 percent strength with 20 percent allocation to 50th ID. 


Pits and quarries 	 Automation and Engineer Intelligence 

V 

W Host nation engineer assets 

arious databases can track events on the battlefield To avoid overcrowding information, it may be necessary and expedite the transfer of information between

to prepare separate overlays. The overlays are disseminated units if adequate signal support is available. Autoto the engineer commander and the support unit's S2, G2, or mated data-processing systems, such as the All-Source Anal- 52, depending on the level and type of operation. ysis System-Warrior (ASAS-W), enhance intelligence Templated Obstacle Overlay. When the situation warrants, capabilities significantly. the engineer S2 may develop a separate overlay showing sus- The ASAS-W is used to transfer database intelligence pected or possible threat-emplaced minefields and obstacles. estimates, graphic and written intelligence summaries, Sys- A templated obstacle overlay helps the unit anticipate possible teme Probatoire d'observation de la Terre (SPOT) reports, enemy courses of action and allows the commander to plan 

accordingly. It helps eliminate "surprise" enemy activities. and imagery products to like systems. Output from ASAS-W 

can be customized to help the S2 manage large quantities of However, posting templated obstacles with known, reported information and analyze data. obstacles may lead to confusion and is not advised. 

Threat Engineer Assets and Capabilities. A list of the Predeployment. Before deployment, engineer units 

should upload applicable digital topographic elevation data specific capabilities of threat engineer assets opposing the 

raster maps, databases, and operations graphics on their com- supported maneuver units may be required. The list for each 

puter systems. The information uploaded is driven by the threat engineer unit includes equipment organic to it, such as division or corps G2 analysis and control element and can be minelayers, bridging assets, rafts, and trenching assets (see tailored to the unit's specific mission. photos, pages 28 and 31). Numerous references, both classi- Customized Queries. Analysts use the ASAS-W to query fied and unclassified, provide information about engineer by fields, such as time, unit, parent unit, and equipment. The equipment capabilities. For example, the Military Vehicles key is knowing which fields to access. For example, queries and Logistics yearbook, published by Jane's Information for dozers or other engineer-specific equipment may be made Group, Inc., includes comprehensive descriptions of most from imagery intelligence (IMINT) databases. It is essential engineer equipment used by armed forces around the world. 

to know exactly how the information was input into the data- The S2 then develops a matrix showing the types and base since various nomenclatures, abbreviations, and terms quantities of engineer equipment within each threat division, 

may be used for similar equipment. including assets estimated to be pushed down from higher Operator Training. The downside to automation is the echelons (Table 3). Finally, based on the threat strength, the 

S2 calculates the daily capabilities of threat assets and devel- amount of training required to operate the systems. Once 

ops an estimate of the amount of mobility, countermobility, 	 basic proficiency is reached, units must allocate time for soldiers to maintain their computer skills. and survivability work that threat engineer units have completed, as well as how much additional work they may perform using these assets. The S2 provides an estimate of Presentation 

threat engineer capabilities to the engineer commander and 

should disseminate this matrix to applicable subordinate S2s. After all information is collected and analyzed, the 

Information gathered during the reconnaissance confirms final step is to present the results. The S2 must clearly 

or denies the templated data on the previously described convey the information to the commander and his 

overlays and matrices. staff or his time and efforts were wasted. Matrices, slides, 

30 Engineer 	 March 1997 
and special products highlight critical data and help the S2 

present information clearly. Often, however, there is insufficient time to produce the "perfect" product. The S2 must 

carefully weigh the impact each product will have on the 

section's resources (especially personnel) against its usefulness. If a presentation product takes time away from that 

needed to perform a required in-depth analysis (the basis of 

useful intelligence support), we recommend reducing the 

quality of the presentation product. Presenting the required 

information and analysis results is more important than presenting a "pretty" overlay or slide. 

Conclusion 

he engineer S2 must ensure that engineer intelligence 

needs are identified and integrated into all reconnaissance and collection plans, information requirements, 

and priority information requirements. Working closely with 

the S3, the engineer S2 also determines the data-collection 

activities that subordinate elements must perform, such as 

determining the status of MSRs, bridging capabilities, fording site reconnaissance, and confirming the types and locations of mines and obstacles. After data collection and 

analysis, the S2 tailors the IPB products and procedures 

described in this article to the unit's specific mission. Not all 

of the products pertain to every task or unit. Our intent is to 

present some options to help the engineer S2 provide the 

commander and his staff with intelligence information they 

can use to plan, fight, and win the battle. 

m 

The MTU-20 is one of 

several common tanklaunched bridges from 

the former Soviet 

Union used to cross 

gaps less than 20 

meters wide. Many are 

being modernized and 

offered for sale around 

the world. 

Captain Glenister is Commandel; I Corps Military 

Intelligence Support Element, Fort Lewis, Washington. 

Previous positions include S2, 555th Engineer Group, Fort 

Lewis; and Chief, All-Source Analysis and Production 

Section, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion. CPT Glenister 

holds a bachelor 's degree from the University of Wisconsin. 

Major Richersoa serves as Chief, Office of Intelligence 

and Security, U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard 

Wood. Previous assignments include S2 with the 4th 

Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, Budingen, Germany; and 

brigade S2 with the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, 3rd 

Armored Division, Hanau, Germany. MAJ Richerson holds a 

master's degree in strategic intelligence from the Joint 

Military Intelligence College, Bolling Air Force Base, 

Washington, D.C. 

"Must have" references for the engineer S2: 

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 

FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization 

Planning 

FM 5-1 14, Engineer Operations Short of War 

FM 5-100, Engineer Operations 

March 1997 Engineer 31 
German Eng~=neer Officer 

Advance'ci- Course 

By First Lieutenant Brinton H. Rosenberry 

ow would you feel if you were 

the first-the test pilot or the 

guinea pig? For example, would 

you be intimidated or apprehensive if 

the U.S. Army asked you to attend and 

evaluate a school of an allied nation 

whose language you haven't spoken for 

some time? 

When asked to attend the German 

Engineer Officer Advanced Course 

(GEOAC), or Pionierkompaniecheflehrgang, I felt those emotions. But I 

accepted the challenge, and it was an 

opportunity I will never forget. The 

GEOAC is a month-long course 

designed to hone experienced lieutenants and captains for company command. The 22 course participants 

include an officer from five allied 

countries-France, Argentina, Poland, 

Uganda, and the United States. The 

course is taught entirely in German, so 

only officers with above average listening and speaking skills in the German 

language (particularly concerning military terminology) should consider 

attending. 

The billets, classrooms, lecture 

halls, physical-fitness facility, and 

Officer's Mess are in Prinz Eugen 

Kaserne, Munich; however, terrain 

walks, defensive and offensive practical exercises, and outings are conducted throughout Germany. Subjects 

(in order of emphasis) include mechanized tactics, logistics, military justice, 

supply, maintenance, environmental 

issues, career management, and projected force and equipment modifications. Leadership techniques and experiences are discussed throughout the 

course. 

The course dates were 2 - 26 July 

1996, so I arrived on 27 June to settle 

in-verify my syllabus, conduct an area 

and transportation reconnaissance, and 

ensure that I had the necessary equipment (I didn't). The course coordinator 

(Hoersaal1eiter)-the equivalent of a 

U.S. Army lieutenant colonel-and the 

course operations sergeant (Hoersaalfeldwebe1)-the equivalent of our staff 

sergeantdiscussed course objectives 

and German military and civilian customs and courtesies. I was impressed 

by their professional, yet extremely 

friendly, demeanor. They assured me 

that I would not be excluded from anything. 

I made a conscious effort to speak 

German, even when addressed in 

English. Some of the allied students 

spoke German as a second language. 

others had studied German in school 

I and knew about their GEOAC assignment far enough in advance to complete 

refresher training. I believe that refresher language training should be 

mandatory for everyone attending the 

Students from GEOAC rest after climbing Brannenberg's higest mountain 

peak. Class terrain walks were conducted thoughout Germany. 

course. As a visitor to an allied country, 

it is a courtesy to have a good grasp of 

the language. No one wants to be like 

that foreign student we've all knownthe one who sits in class, smiles a lot, 

and nods "yes" to every question. 

I was billeted in a single-occupancy 

room furnished with chairs, wall lockers, 

a desk, a bed, a sink, and a mirrored 

medicine cabinet. There is one community shower and latrine per floor. There 

are no females in the engineer branch of 

the German Army, so there are no 

accommodations for females. The only 

military occupational specialty or branch 

offered to females is medical related. 

32 Engineer March 1997 
Visiting officers ate in a private 

room in the Soldiers' Mess, although 

the menu was the same for everyone. 

The cost for daily meals was very low; 

however, I ate most dinners and weekend meals in the Officers' Mess (Offizierheim or OHG) or on the economy. 

The Offizierheim prices reflect the 

actual cost of the food and labor for 

preparation, so the price is at least 50 

percent less than at off-post establishments. 

The breadth of the course was on 

target, but the depth of study was seriously limited by time. We adhered 

strictly to the well-planned syllabus 

due to the compact nature of the 

course. The class was divided into five 

groups and students remained in these 

groups for the entire course. For a 

group to be successful, camaraderie 

and class participation were necessary. 

I was expected to answer questions and 

follow the flow of information just like 

every other student. Out-of-class 

projects were no exception. 

My air-assault knowledge was of 

particular interest because there are 

very few airborne units and no airassault units in the German Army. The 

course coordinator was an outstanding 

facilitator who sparked discussions 

involving personal experiences, ideas, 

Class photo of the 1996 GEOAC participants. 

and techniques. He often asked 'Why 

do you do that?" 

We spent many evenings socializing 

and attending piano and band "Biergarten" concerts. The curriculum also included day trips to historic and architectural sites, white-water rafting, and a 

weekend of mountaineering. Formal 

physical training was conducted three 

times a week and ranged from indoor 

soccer to water polo to weight training. 

The facilities were excellent. Each 

evening I ran with the French officer 

and a German officer. 

I am extremely appreciative of the 

staff of ENTEC (Euro Training Engineer Center) for their support. The deputy commandant of this NATO warfare 

school (supported by Great Britain, 

Germany, Belgium, France, Australia, 

and Canada) and two of its sergeants 

are the only U.S. soldiers stationed in 

Munich. They supplied the military 

equipment I needed and introduced me 

to the instructors and school translator 

at ENTEC. These three soldiers were 

always willing to lend a hand and were 

available when I wanted to speak or 

hear English. 

The GEOAC was an outstanding 

opportunity for me. The experience of 

assembling, talking, and comparing 

notes with six different NATO forces 

was like no other--especially at the 

mission-execution level. My eyes were 

opened to entirely different systems of 

troop acquisition and training, equipment, governmental controls, and military customs that support the same end 

state-defense of a nation. 

The GEOAC does not replace the 

U.S. Army Engineer Officer Advanced 

Course but is an excellent addition to it. 

An understanding of our allies' capabilities and tactics (and vice versa) can 

only enhance an existing, solid, multinational relationship. 

Probably most reassuring for me 

was that I found engineer officersregardless of nationality-to be quite 

similar. They are mentally and physically tough leaders whose intellect and 

flexibility are unmatched both on and 

off the battlefield. If you are offered an 

opportunity to attend the German Engineer Officer Advanced Course, I 

encourage you to accept. It is an 

extremely rewarding experience. 

Lil 

First Lieutenant Rosenberry is currently the executive officer of B Company, 326th Engineer Battalion (Air 

Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He 

received German language training at 

the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California. 

March 1997 Engineer 33 
I ENGINEER UPDATE 

Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted. 

ENFORCE XXI-97. The theme for this year's conference is "Engineers-Shaping the 21st Century Battlespace." Scheduled for the 

week of 29 April through 2 May, the conference will include presentations by LTG Joe Ballard, the Chief of Engineers, and EXFOR and 

corps commanders. Numerous breakout sessions, virtual and tactical 

demonstrations, and dynamic displays will complement the agenda. 

Registration information will be mailed in March. POC is CPT Mark 

Maciel, -4038. 

Department of Training and Paper or Plastic? We need your input! As budgets shrink, we are 

Doctrine Development (DDD) exploring alternative ways of disseminating Engineer, with a goal of 

reducing or eliminating paper copies. We will continue to provide a 

forum for two-way communication with military and civilian engineers 

throughout the Army and our sister services as best we can. Possible 

alternatives include Internet and disc-copy distribution only. How 

would the lack of paper magazines affect you and your unit's mission? 

Request vignettes documenting the relevancy of Engineerto your jobs 

and careers as well as your requirement for paper versus electronic 

distribution. Include specific ways you use the magazine and topics 

most beneficial to you. Service to our customers remains our primary 

concern. Mail comments to: Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer 

School, ATTN: ATSE-TD-D-EB, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-6650. 

The e-mail address is: eubankscQwood-vines.army.mil. POC is Cathy 

Eubanks, -41 04. 

Doctrine Products. The Engineer School is transitioning to electronic distribution of draft doctrine publications. In the near future, you 

will receive draft products for review via disc or electronic mail. 

Microsoft Office will be the platform used to produce draft publications. 

Reviewers should continue to use DA Form 2028 to record recommended changes. Units are asked to review their e-mail addresses in 

the Engineer Unit Directory for accuracy. Send changes via e-mail to: 

bakern 8 wood-vines.army.mil. 

As another cost-cutting measure, we have drastically reduced distribution address lists. We will continue to publish in Engineer information on draft publications currently staffed for review. If you do not 

receive a particular publication and would like to, call Lucius Warrick, 

-4115. 

Draft Publications. The initial draft of FM 5-250, Explosives and 

Demolitions, is being distributed via paper and electronic media. This 

draft publication combines the current FM 5-250 and TC 5-250, Demolition Effects Simulators, as well as information on the modernized 

demolition initiators. The suspense for field comments is 15 May 1997. 

34 Engineer March 1997 
Drafts of FM 5-1 70, Engineer Reconnaissance, and FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, are scheduled for distribution about 1 April. POC is 

Lucius Warrick, -411 5. 

CMF 12 Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). 

TRADOC approved consolidation of the separate 12B and 12F 

BNCOCs on 17 July 1996. The new 9-week course includes those 

tasks identified as critical for the 128 squad leader. A new program of 

instruction (POI) based on TRADOC Regulation 350-70 and Training 

Support Packages (TSP) are being developed in the Total Army Training System (TATS) format. Trials will be conducted at Fort Leonard 

Wood and a Total Army School System engineer battalion during 

FY97. Once validated, this course will be instructed using one POI for 

both Active and Reserve Component soldiers. 

The consolidated course increases the class length from 7 weeks 

and 4 days for 128 BNCOC and 7 weeks for 12F BNCOC to a single 

9-week course. Content includes: 

In addition to the above technical tasks, the POI includes 85 hours 

of common leader training required by the U.S. Sergeants Major 

Academy. 

Effective 1 October 1996, only promotable sergeants are permitted 

to attend. Nonpromotable sergeants who report for training will be 

returned to their units at the unit's expense. 

Class dates scheduled at Fort Leonard Wood for FY97 are: 6 January through 11 March, 17 March through 16 May, 22 May through 25 

August, and 1 August through 3 October. POC is MSG Lawrence 

Marks, -41 25. 

Training 

Demolitions 

Reconnaissance 

Mine Warfare 

Combat Construction 

Field Training Exercise 

Call ForIAdjust Fire 

Total Army School System (TASS). The TASS Division will conduct preaccreditation visits during FY97 to all seven regions in conjunction with active and inactive duty training. Validation of the 12B, 

12C, and 122 courses at Camp Grafton, South Dakota, is scheduled 

for April-July. Contracts are underway for the 51BlH and 62ElN 

Hours - 

28.0 

38.0 

33.6 

72.0 

16.0 

March 1997 Engineer 35 
courseware, with completion scheduled for December. Classes for the 

Reserve Component Configured Courseware (RC3) will be updated 

before the end of April. Course information, instructor certification, and 

accreditation will be briefed 1 May during the ENFORCE Conference. 

POC is MAJ Sue Myers, -4106. 

Department of Tactics, Leader- New Director. We welcomed LTC James Koch, our new director, in 

ship, and Engineering (DTLE) December 1996. He previously served as Commander, 536th Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy), in Panama. LTC Koch may be 

reached at -4119. 

Organization Changes. Beginning 3 March 1997, the Leadership, 

Combined Arms, and Combat Engineer Branches of DTLE are consolidated into the Common Leader Training Division. This move replaces 

the Tactics Division and is a precursor to the FY99 reorganization proposed for the Maneuver Support Center. The current Environmental 

Branch will mature into an Environmental Division. POC is Penny 

Moats, -41 19. 

Engineer Officer Basic Course (EOBC). Before leaving the commissioning source to attend EOBC, students should receive a welcome packet that contains information critical for a smooth transition 

to the school. Students who do not receive a mailed copy can access 

the packet on the Internet at [http://l55.9.32.3/EOBC/main.htm]. POC 

is CPT Donald Petrich, Jr., (573) 596-0793. 

Engineer Officer Advanced Course (EOAC). We are revising 

officer training programs to meet TRADOC-mandated time constraints. Request your suggested improvements to the EOAC course 

content now to include in a revised program of instruction. The new 

EOAC, scheduled to begin 1 October 1998, will have 18 weeks of 

course work at Fort Leonard Wood. It will be immediately followed by 

6 weeks of course work at the Combined Arms Service Staff School 

(CAS3) at Fort Leavenworth. POC is MAJ Darren Naumann, -4130. 

Countermine Training Support Center (CTSC). Created in 1996, 

the CTSC provides training and information on demining, countermine, booby traps, and unexploded ordnance to U.S. military forces. 

CTSC personnel also monitor the use of mines by U.S. and foreign 

countries and extract mine data from multiple sources, including tactics, techniques, and procedures. A recently approved Humanitarian 

Demining Operations cell will begin operations this summer. It will 

have a mobile training team to support units in the field and eventually 

will supply training aides. To request support for your unit, call MAJ 

John Smale, -4134, or Greg Bier, (573) 596-0131, ext. 3-5518. 

36 Engineer March 1997 
BRIDGE THE GAP 

By Command Sergeant Major Julius B. Nutter 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

Be Ethical! 

hat each member of the Engineer Regiment 

does in the next year is critically important to 

the nation, the Army, and the press. In a 

time of instant global news coverage, the actions of 

individual soldiers and the decisions made by military leaders often take on strategic importance. 

Army ethics and our nation's expectation that soldiers must adhere to strict ethical standards will 

become increasingly important as we move into the 

information age. 

Ethics are the principles of "right" or good conduct. They are the rules and standards, including 

moral principles and values, that govern the conduct of the members of a profession. Ethical 

issues abound in our complex society, and we are 

called upon daily to make decisions in which the 

right or good choice is not always obvious or easy 

to perceive. 

Why does the Army have policies and establish 

procedures on ethics? Isn't just plain, old-fashioned 

honesty in practice anymore? I regret to say that the 

answer is "No"-and it hasn't been in practice universally for quite some time. As James Callaghan, 

British Prime Minister, stated in a speech in 1976, "A 

lie can be half-way round the world before the truth 

has got its boots on.'' 

But besides an inner code of morality, there's a 

bottom-line reason for Army ethics. In the experience of most leaders who voice their experience to 

others, unethical behavior sparks a failure mode that 

runs throughout an entire organization. Given 

enough time, it runs all the way to the bottom line. 

In our lifetime, we have drifted to some fuzzy 

thinking where ethics are concerned. The philosophy 

of some political officials in our country today seems 

to be, "Do whatever you have to, just don't tell me 

about it." With this message, these leaders have 

removed themselves from responsibility should the 

questionable conduct be discovered. This is buryyour-head-in-the-sand or wastebasket leadership. 

The U.S. Army does not want soldiers to have 

their heads in the sand or the wastebasket. We 

ask that soldiers make individual decisions involving ethical matters based on general policies. 

When a soldier is in a situation that he or she feels 

needs clarification, he should ask. Don't keep 

quiet. What we as an institution don't know will hurt 

us eventually. 

The Army has written policies that dictate ethical 

behavior. Their intent, for the Army as a whole, is 

that ethical behavior will be the norm. But each individual soldier writes the final line on ethics in the 

Army. In the general public's eye, soldiers are the 

Army's credentials. 

In short, the Engineer Regiment does not want 

you to bend the rules; we want you to embrace them. 

Mark Twain once said, "Always do right. This will 

gratify some people and astonish the rest." ' Either 

way, we win. 

Speech, Greenpoint Presbyterian Church, 1901. 

March 1997 Engineer 37 
PIN: 075309-000 

-. ~