OMB Control No.: 3150-0012

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555

August 21, 2003

NRC BULLETIN 2003-02: LEAKAGE FROM REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL LOWER

HEAD PENETRATIONS AND REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE

BOUNDARY INTEGRITY

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for pressurized-water nuclear power reactors (PWRs) with

penetrations in the lower head of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), except those who have

permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed

from the reactor pressure vessel. 

All other holders of operating licenses for nuclear power plants will receive a copy of this bulletin

for information.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to:

(1) advise PWR addressees that current methods of inspecting the RPV lower heads may

need to be supplemented with additional measures (e.g., bare-metal visual inspections)

to detect reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) leakage, 

(2) request PWR addressees to provide the NRC with information related to inspections

that have been or will be performed to verify the integrity of the RPV lower head

penetrations, and 

(3) require PWR addresses to provide a written response to the NRC in accordance with

the provisions of Section 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR 50.54(f)).

Background

PWR RPV upper heads have a number of penetrations, including penetrations for control rod

drive mechanisms (CRDMs). These penetrations are typically made of nickel-based Inconel

Alloy 600. The penetrations are welded to the inside of the RPV head with nickel-based Inconel

Alloy 82/182 materials. Most PWRs also have penetrations in the RPV lower heads for in-core

nuclear instrumentation. The same Inconel materials are typically used in the lower head

penetrations and welds. The primary coolant water and the operating conditions of PWR plants

have caused cracking of nickel-based alloys in upper head penetrations through a process

called primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). 

ML032320153
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As part of the response to issues associated with degradation of the RPV upper head at the

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, the NRC issued Bulletin 2002-01, “Reactor Pressure

Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,” dated

March 18, 2002. This bulletin requested information about the condition and inspections of

RPV upper heads and about licensee’s boric acid corrosion control (BACC) programs. The

NRC subsequently issued Bulletin 2002-02, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head

Penetration Nozzle Inspection Programs,” dated August 9, 2002. This bulletin was issued to

address staff concerns regarding the adequacy of visual examinations as a primary inspection

method for the RPV upper head and RPV upper head penetrations. By NRC Order EA-03-009,

dated February 11, 2003, the NRC required specific inspections of RPV upper heads, CRDM

penetrations, and associated welds in addition to the inspections required by Section XI of the

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code). 

After evaluating the responses received in response to Bulletin 2002-01, the NRC staff issued

requests for additional information (RAIs) to PWR licensees in order to obtain more detailed

information regarding licensee BACC programs. The NRC staff summarized its review of the

responses to Bulletin 2002-01 and the associated RAIs in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS)

2003-13, “NRC Review of Responses to Bulletin 2002-01, ‘Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,’” dated July 29, 2003. The

NRC noted in RIS 2003-13 that most licensees do not perform inspections of Alloy 600/82/182

materials beyond those required by Section XI of the ASME Code to identify potential cracked

and leaking components. For the RPV lower head, the ASME Code specifies that a visual

examination, called a VT-2 examination, be performed during system pressure testing. 

Licensees may meet the ASME Code requirement for a VT-2 inspection by performing an

inspection of the RPV lower head without removing insulation from around the head and

penetrations. It is the NRC staff’s understanding that many licensees perform the ASME

Code-required inspections without removing insulation and, therefore, may not be able to detect

the amounts of through-wall leakage expected from potential flaws due to PWSCC or other

cracking mechanisms.

The lower head and bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) penetrations of the South Texas

Project Unit 1 (STP Unit 1) RPV were visually inspected on April 12, 2003, as a routine part of

the unit’s refueling outage. The lower head of the reactor is surrounded by an insulating box

structure with no insulation directly in contact with the lower head. The inspection was

accomplished by removing three of the insulation panels forming the insulating box. Three

different vantage points were used to inspect all 58 BMI penetrations in the vessel lower head. 

The inspection found small amounts of white residue around two of the 58 BMI penetrations

(numbers 1 and 46) at the junction where the penetrations met the lower reactor vessel head. 

The residue at penetrations 1 and 46 was collected for laboratory analysis to determine the

source of the residue material. Approximately 150 milligrams and 3 milligrams were collected

from penetrations 1 and 46, respectively. The analysis of the sample for lithium demonstrated

that the lithium was approximately 99.9 percent lithium-7, which indicated that the reactor

coolant system was the source of the residue. The analysis of the sample for cesium indicated

that the average age of the residue collected was between 3 and 5 years. The licensee for

STP Unit 1 indicated that these residues were not visible during the previous inspection on

November 20, 2002. 
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Ultrasonic inspections (using circumferential, axial, and zero degree probes) of 57 BMI

penetration tubes at STP Unit 1 were completed in May 2003, along with the visual inspections

of the surfaces of the 58 J-groove welds which attach the BMI penetration tubes to the RPV

lower head. In addition, eddy current testing (ECT) was used to examine the J-groove weld

and inside diameter surfaces of some BMI penetration tubes. Axial cracks were found in

penetration tubes 1 and 46. The largest of these cracks was entirely through-wall and extended

above and below the J-groove weld. No evidence of cracking was found in any other

penetration. BMI penetrations 1 and 46 have been repaired. The licensee is continuing to

investigate the cause of the cracks. The investigation has not, to date, identified any

manufacturing practice or operating condition that is unique to the affected penetrations or to

the RPV at STP Unit 1. The design of the area beneath the RPV at STP Unit 1 and the

inspection methods used by the licensee enabled the discovery of the leaking penetrations. 

From the NRC staff reviews described in RIS 2003-13, the NRC staff concluded that leakage

such as that observed at STP Unit 1 would likely not have been detected during inspections

performed at many other PWRs.

Discussion

The RPV and its head penetrations are an integral part of the RCPB, and their integrity is

important to the safe operation of the plant. The recent identification of cracking and leakage

from two BMI penetrations at STP Unit 1 raises questions about potential degradation

mechanisms which may be active in this area. In addition, licensee responses to the Bulletin

2002-01 followup RAIs raised questions about the adequacy of inspections performed by

licensees to detect leakage from RPV lower head penetrations.

As indicated above, the investigation of the degradation mechanism involved in the cracking of

the two penetrations at STP Unit 1 is continuing. However, an evaluation of the available

information leads to several observations. First, although the root cause of the cracking

experienced at STP Unit 1 is not yet understood, the investigation to date has not identified

potential root causes which would be unique to the affected penetrations at STP Unit 1. 

Second, the licensee for STP Unit 1 uses a method of inspecting the RPV lower head

penetrations that permits visual examination of the external metal surfaces of the vessel lower

head and its penetrations, unimpeded by the surrounding insulation. In comparison to the

previously discussed VT-2 examinations specified in Section XI of the ASME Code, which do

not require the removal of insulation and must be performed at normal operating pressure

conditions once each refueling outage, the inspections conducted by the STP Unit 1 licensee

are superior for the purpose of finding evidence of leakage like that observed at STP Unit 1. In

fact, the NRC staff has concluded that the VT-2 examinations required by Section XI of the

ASME Code would not be effective at finding deposits like those discovered at STP Unit 1. 

Third, the circumstances of the STP Unit 1 findings indicate that the cracking and the onset of

leakage may have occurred several years prior to the discovery of leakage. The licensee’s 

prior inspections of STP Unit 1 lower head were capable of finding the deposits observed in

April 2003. However, no evidence of leakage had been noted as the result of any inspections

conducted prior to April 2003. Therefore, a one-time inspection of an RPV lower head area

may not provide adequate assurance that degradation is not occurring similar to that observed

in the BMI penetrations at STP Unit 1.
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The small amount of leakage from the cracks discovered at STP Unit 1 did not represent an

immediate safety problem due to the size and orientation of the cracks. In addition, safety

systems included in plant designs and required to be available during plant operation would be

able to mitigate the effects of more significant leaks, including a gross rupture of an RPV lower

head penetration. Although unlikely, a significant leak from an RPV lower head penetration

could introduce operational and safety concerns since it would require operation of safety

systems for an extended period and complicate longer term efforts to stabilize the plant. To

maintain the overall defense-in-depth philosophy incorporated into the design and operation of

nuclear power plants, licensees should take appropriate actions to ensure the integrity of the

RPV lower head penetrations.

The NRC staff believes it is appropriate for licensees to assess their current inspection

practices to periodically ensure that there are no leaks from RPV lower head penetrations. This

conclusion is based on the safety concerns associated with a significant leak from the RPV

lower head and the uncertainties associated with the ability of some current inspection practices

to identify cracks and resultant small leaks from RPV lower head penetrations.

Inspections capable of detecting through-wall leakage from any RPV lower head penetration,

beginning at the next refueling outage, would provide additional confidence in the integrity of

the RPV lower head penetrations. If visual inspections are performed to detect evidence of

possible leakage, such inspections should include an inspection of 100% of the circumference

of each penetration as it enters the RPV lower head. 

The industry’s Materials Reliability Program (MRP) has made recommendations for

PWR licensees to perform bare-metal visual inspections of RPV lower head penetrations during

the current or next refueling outage. The recommendations were included in a letter from

Leslie Hartz, MRP Senior Representative, dated June 23, 2003 (Agencywide Documents

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML031920395). The MRP is an

industry program, coordinated by EPRI, to address material-related issues associated with

PWRs. 

The NRC is aware that preexisting conditions at some facilities may prevent licensees from

performing bare-metal visual inspections of some RPV lower head penetrations during their

next refueling outage. For these plants, such inspections of the RPV lower head penetrations

may not be possible, for example, until after plant modifications, cleaning, and completion of

other tasks provide access and a clean surface for baseline and future inspections. For the

plants unable to perform inspections as recommended above, additional confidence in the

integrity of the RPV lower head penetrations may be obtained by licensees (1) developing an

inspection plan to examine as many of the RPV lower head penetrations as is practical, and

(2) taking the necessary steps to enable the performance of inspections as above for each

penetration during subsequent refueling outages. In conducting inspections or other activities

on the RPV lower head, licensees should recognize that entry into and work in cavities under

PWR reactor vessels present very high radiation hazards. Access controls to these areas

should require, among other things, close communication between plant operations and

radiation protection staff on the status of the highly activated components (e.g., thimble

retraction from the core into the reactor cavity) so that required reactor cavity access controls

and oversight can be fully implemented before very high radiation levels are created. More 

information on these under-vessel hazards is provided in Appendix B of Regulatory Guide 8.38,

“Control Of Access To High And Very High Radiation Areas In Nuclear Power Plants.”
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The NRC staff is working with the industry and other stakeholders to revise the ASME Code

and NRC regulations to address inspection of RCPB locations susceptible to cracking, including

RPV penetrations. These activities will not be completed for several years, so the NRC is

issuing this bulletin to address the immediate concerns identified following the reviews of the

responses to Bulletin 2002-01 and followup RAIs and the discovery of leaks from BMI

penetrations at STP Unit 1. The NRC has posted and will continue to post information about

these subjects on its Web site (www.nrc.gov).

Applicable Regulatory Requirements

The NRC has acknowledged that the existing regulatory requirements may need to be

supplemented in order to ensure required inspections of RPV lower head penetrations are

adequate to identify potential penetration leakage. However, several provisions of the

NRC regulations and plant operating licenses (technical specifications) pertain to RCPB

integrity and the issues addressed by this bulletin. The general design criteria (GDC) for

nuclear power plants (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50), or, as appropriate, similar requirements

in the licensing basis for a reactor facility, the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a, and the quality

assurance criteria of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 provide the bases and requirements for

NRC staff assessment of the potential for, and consequences of, degradation of the RCPB.

The applicable GDCs include GDC 14 (Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary), GDC 31 (Fracture

Prevention of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary), and GDC 32 (Inspection of Reactor

Coolant Pressure Boundary). GDC 14 specifies that the RCPB be designed, fabricated,

erected, and tested so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly

propagating failure, and of gross rupture. GDC 31 specifies that the probability of rapidly

propagating fracture of the RCPB be minimized. GDC 32 specifies that components which are

part of the RCPB have the capability of being periodically inspected to assess their structural

and leaktight integrity. 

NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.55a state that ASME Class 1 components (which includes the

RCPB) must meet the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code. Various portions of the

ASME Code address RCPB inspection. For example, Table IWB-2500-1 of Section XI of the

ASME Code provides examination requirements during system leakage testing of all

pressure-retaining components of the RCPB and references IWB-3522 for acceptance

standards. IWB-3522.1(c) and (e) specify that conditions requiring correction include the

detection of leakage from insulated components and discoloration or accumulated residues on

the surfaces of components, insulation, or floor areas that may be evidence of borated water

leakage, with leakage defined as the through-wall leakage that penetrates the pressure

retaining membrane. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.55a, by reference to the ASME Code, does not

permit through-wall degradation of the RPV lower head penetrations. For through-wall leakage

identified by visual examinations in accordance with the ASME Code, acceptance standards for

the identified degradation are provided in IWB-3142. Specifically, supplemental examination

(by surface or volumetric examination), corrective measures or repairs, analytical evaluation,

and replacement provide methods for determining the acceptability of degraded components. 

Criterion V (Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings) of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 states

that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or

drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance

with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Criterion V further states that instructions, 
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procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria

for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Visual and

volumetric examinations of the RCPB are activities that should be documented in accordance

with these requirements.

Criterion IX (Control of Special Processes) of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 states that special

processes, including nondestructive testing, shall be controlled and accomplished by qualified

personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards,

specifications, criteria, and other special requirements.

Criterion XVI (Corrective Action) of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 states that measures shall be

established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.

For significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures taken shall include root cause

determination and corrective action to preclude repetition of the adverse conditions. For

degradation of the RCPB, the root cause determination is important for understanding the

nature of the degradation present and the required actions to mitigate future degradation. 

These actions could include proactive inspections and repair of degraded portions of the RCPB. 

Plant technical specifications (TS) pertain to this issue insofar as they do not allow operation

with through-wall reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage.

Requested Information

(1) All subject PWR addressees are requested to provide the following information. The

responses for facilities that will enter refueling outages before December 31, 2003,

should be provided within 30 days of the date of this bulletin. All other responses should

be provided within 90 days of the date of this bulletin.

(a) A description of the RPV lower head penetration inspection program that has

been implemented at your plant. The description should include when the

inspections were performed, the extent of the inspections with respect to the

areas and penetrations inspected, inspection methods used, the process used to

resolve the source of findings of any boric acid deposits, the quality of the

documentation of the inspections (e.g., written report, video record,

photographs), and the basis for concluding that your plant satisfies applicable

regulatory requirements related to the integrity of the RPV lower head

penetrations.

(b) A description of the RPV lower head penetration inspection program that will be

implemented at your plant during the next and subsequent refueling outages. 

The description should include the extent of the inspections which will be

conducted with respect to the areas and penetrations to be inspected, inspection

methods to be used, qualification standards for the inspection methods, the 

process used to resolve the source of findings of boric acid deposits or

corrosion, the inspection documentation to be generated, and the basis for

concluding that your plant will satisfy applicable regulatory requirements related

to the structural and leakage integrity of the RPV lower head penetrations. 
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(c) If you are unable to perform a bare-metal visual inspection of each penetration

during the next refueling outage because of the inability to perform the

necessary planning, engineering, procurement of materials, and implementation,

are you planning to perform bare-metal visual inspections during subsequent

refueling outages? If so, provide a description of the actions that are planned to

enable a bare-metal visual inspection of each penetration during subsequent

refueling outages. Also, provide a description of any penetration inspections you

plan to perform during the next refueling outage. The description should address

the applicable items in paragraph (b).

(d) If you do not plan to perform either a bare-metal visual inspection or non-visual

(e.g., volumetric or surface) examination of the RPV lower head penetrations at

the next or subsequent refueling outages, provide the basis for concluding that

the inspections performed will assure applicable regulatory requirements are and

will continue to be met.

(2) Within 60 days of plant restart following the next inspection of the RPV lower head

penetrations, the subject PWR addressees should submit to the NRC a summary of the

inspections performed, the extent of the inspections, the methods used, a description of

the as-found condition of the lower head, any findings of relevant indications of

through-wall leakage, and a summary of the disposition of any findings of boric acid

deposits and any corrective actions taken as a result of indications found.

Required Response

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f), the subject PWR addressees are required to submit

written responses to this bulletin. This information is sought to verify licensees’ compliance with

the current licensing basis for the subject PWR addressees. The addressees have two options: 

(1) addressees may choose to submit written responses providing the information

requested above within the requested time periods, or

(2) addressees who choose not to provide the information requested or cannot meet the

requested completion dates are required to submit written responses within 15 days of

the date of this bulletin. The responses must address any alternative course of action

proposed, including the basis for the acceptability of the proposed alternative course of

action.

The required written responses should be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852,

under oath or affirmation under the provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f). In addition, a copy of a response should be

submitted to the appropriate regional administrator.

Reasons for Information Request

NRC regulatory requirements and plant TS requirements preclude operation with through-wall 

leakage from the RCPB. Requirements in the ASME Code, NRC regulations, and plant TS are

intended to make licensees perform inspections to maintain an extremely low probability of

abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating failure, and of gross rupture. The current inspection 
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techniques used at many PWRs may not detect small leaks such as those discovered at 

STP Unit 1. Uncertainty exists about the root cause of the cracking and resultant leakage at

STP Unit 1, and whether other PWRs with RPV lower head penetrations could have similar

problems. A detailed assessment of the risks associated with this issue is hampered by the

uncertainties associated with the degradation mechanisms which may be active in RPV lower

head penetrations, plant conditions (especially for those plants that have not performed the

recommended inspections), and the course of events given a significant leak from the lower

head. Improved inspections of the RPV lower head penetrations will resolve some of these

uncertainties and could identify and allow correction of conditions before they become a

significant safety concern. 

This information request is necessary to permit the NRC staff to verify compliance with existing

regulations and plant-specific licensing bases. The information being requested by this bulletin

focuses on RPV lower head penetrations in more detail than previous generic communications

and, therefore, is not currently available to the NRC staff. The NRC staff will use the

information to assess the acceptability of current licensee lower vessel head inspection

programs to identify BMI penetration leakage, and to determine the need for, and guide the

development of, any additional regulatory actions (e.g., generic communications, orders, or

rulemaking) to address the integrity of the RCPB. Such regulatory actions could include

regulatory requirements for augmented inspection programs under 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii). 

The NRC staff will review the responses to this bulletin to determine whether the PWR

addressees’ inspections provide reasonable assurance that existing applicable regulations are

met. If concerns are identified, the NRC staff will contact each affected addressee.

Related Generic Communications

Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-13, “NRC Review of Responses to Bulletin 2002-01, ‘Reactor

Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,’

July 29, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032100653)

Information Notice 2003-11 “Leakage Found on Bottom-Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles,”

August 13, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032250135)

Bulletin 2002-02, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle

Inspection Programs,” August 9, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022200494)

Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure

Boundary Integrity,” March 18, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020770497)

Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary

Components in PWR Plants," March 17, 1988 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031130424)

Backfit Discussion

Under the provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and

10 CFR 50.54(f), this bulletin transmits an information request for the purpose of verifying

compliance with existing applicable regulatory requirements (see the Applicable Regulatory

Requirements section of this bulletin). Specifically, the required information will enable the 

NRC staff to determine whether current inspection and maintenance practices for the detection

of degradation of the RCPB at reactor facilities (similar to the degradation observed at STP 
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Unit 1) provide reasonable assurance that RCPB integrity is being maintained. No backfit is

either intended or approved by the issuance of this bulletin, and the staff has not performed a

backfit analysis.

Federal Register Notification

A notice of opportunity for public comment on this bulletin was not published in the

Federal Register because the NRC staff is requesting information from power reactor licensees

on an expedited basis for the purpose of assessing compliance with existing applicable

regulatory requirements and the need for subsequent regulatory action. This bulletin was

prompted by the discovery of leaks from BMI penetrations at STP Unit 1 and by the NRC staff’s

assessment of responses to Bulletin 2002-01. As the resolution of this matter progresses, the

opportunity for public involvement will be provided. Nevertheless, comments on the actions

requested and the technical issues addressed by this bulletin may be sent to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

The NRC has determined that this action is not subject to the Small Business Regulatory

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This bulletin contains an information collection that is subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of

1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). This information collection was approved by the Office of

Management and Budget, clearance no. 3150-0012, which expires August 31, 2006. The

burden to the public for this mandatory information collection is estimated to average 110 hours

per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,

gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the information

collection. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this

information collection, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Records

Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV; and to the

Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0012), Office of

Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. 

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an

information collection unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control

number.
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If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the persons listed below or

the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager. 

/RA/

Bruce A. Boger, Director

Division of Inspection Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact: Edmund Sullivan

301-415-2796

E-mail: ejs@nrc.gov

Lead Project Manager: Stephen R. Monarque

301-415-1544

E-mail: srm2@nrc.gov
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If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the persons listed below or

the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager. 

/RA/

Bruce A. Boger, Director

Division of Inspection Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact: Edmund Sullivan

301-415-2796

E-mail: ejs@nrc.gov

Lead Project Manager: Stephen R. Monarque

301-415-1544

E-mail: srm2@nrc.gov

DISTRIBUTION:

ADAMS

Bulletin File

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\MyFiles\Copies\SP03-0136Atch.wpd

Adams Accession No.: ML032320153

OFFICE EMCB:DE Tech Editor PD-2:DLPM OES:IROB:DIPM

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DATE 08/20/2003 08/20/2003 08/20/2003 08/20/2003

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DATE 08/20/2003 08/20/2003 08/21/2003

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY