## **SUBJECT:� CIA Activities in Chile**

### **September 18, 2000**

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**Summary of Sources/Methodology**

**Summary of Response to Questions**

**Discussion**

> **Overview of Covert Actions.Support for Coup in 1970Awareness of Coup Plotting in 1973Knowledge of Human Rights ViolationsLiaison with Chilean Security ServicesPropaganda in Support of Pinochet RegimeKnowledge of “Operation Condor.”Internal QualmsHistorical Context**

**SUPPORTING MATERIAL**

**The “Assassination” of President Salvador     Allende**

> **The Schneider Assassination****Early Allende Presidency****US Business Involvement**

**Accession of General Augusto Pinochet to     the Presidency**

**Violations of Human Rights Committed by Officers     or Covert Agents and Employees of the CIA**

> **Relationship with Contreras****Intelligence Reporting****Death/Disappearance of US Citizens**

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### Summary of Sources/Methodology

To respond to Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal     Year 2000 (referred to hereafter as the Hinchey Amendment), the Intelligence     Community (IC), led by the National Intelligence Council, reviewed relevant     CIA records of the period predominantly from recent document searches; studied     extensive Congressional reports regarding US activities in Chile in the 1960s     and 1970s; read the memoirs of key figures, including Richard Nixon and Henry     Kissinger; reviewed CIA’s oral history collection at the Center for the Study     of Intelligence; and consulted with retired intelligence officers who were     directly involved.

This broad information base has given us high confidence in our responses     to the three questions, which are answered directly below.� The body of the     report, however, provides much greater detail in an effort to tell the story     of CIA involvement and put the answers into their proper historical context.�     The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence     Activities—the Church Committee—conducted in 1975 a thorough document     review and interviews, and produced a report that still stands as a comprehensive     analysis of CIA actions in Chile during the period from 1963 to 1973.

CIA’s response to the Hinchey amendment should be viewed as a good-faith     effort to respond in an unclassified format to the three questions, not as     a definitive history of US activities in Chile over the past 30 years.****

### **Summary of Response to Questions**

-  **Q.**All activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of       all elements of the Intelligence Community � with respect to the assassination       of President Salvador Allende in September 1973.  **A.** We find no information—nor did the Church Committee—that       CIA or the Intelligence Community was involved in the death of Chilean President       Salvador Allende.� He is believed to have committed suicide as the coup       leaders closed in on him.� The major CIA effort against Allende came earlier       in 1970 in the failed attempt to block his election and accession to the       Presidency.� Nonetheless, the US Administration’s long-standing hostility       to Allende and its past encouragement of a military coup against him were       well known among Chilean coup plotters who eventually took action on their       own to oust him. 
-  **Q.**All activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of       all elements of the Intelligence Community with respect to the accession       of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of the Republic of Chile.  **A.**CIA actively supported the military Junta after the overthrow       of Allende but did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency.� In fact,       many CIA officers shared broader US reservations about Pinochet’s single-minded       pursuit of power. 
-  **Q.**All activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of       all elements of the Intelligence Community with respect to violations of       human rights committed by officers or agents of former President Pinochet.  **A.**Many of Pinochet’s officers were involved in systematic and       widespread human rights abuses following Allende’s ouster.� Some of these       were contacts or agents of the CIA or US military.� The IC followed then-current       guidance for reporting such abuses and admonished its Chilean agents against       such behavior.� Today’s much stricter reporting standards were not in force       and, if they were, we suspect many agents would have been dropped. 

Discussion

In the 1960s and the early 1970s, as part of the US Government policy to     try to influence events in Chile, the CIA undertook specific covert action     projects in Chile.� Those hereby acknowledged are described below.� The overwhelming     objective—firmly rooted in the policy of the period—was to discredit Marxist-leaning     political leaders, especially Dr. Salvador Allende, and to strengthen     and encourage their civilian and military opponents to prevent them from assuming     power.

**Overview of Covert Actions.**�     At the direction of the White House and interagency policy coordination committees,     CIA undertook the covert activities described below.� There were sustained     propaganda efforts, including financial support for major news media, against     Allende and other Marxists. Political action projects supported selected parties     before and after the 1964 elections and after Allende’s 1970 election. 

-  In April 1962, the “5412 Panel Special Group”—a sub-cabinet body charged       with reviewing proposed covert actions—approved a proposal to carry out       a program of covert financial assistance to the Christian Democratic Party       (PDC) to support the 1964 Presidential candidacy of Eduardo Frei.Also in 1962, the CIA began supporting a civic action group that undertook       various propaganda activities, including distributing posters and� leaflets.
In December 1963, the 5412 Group agreed to provide a one-time payment       to the Democratic Front, a coalition of three moderate to conservative parties,       in support of the Front’s Presidential campaign.In April 1964, the 5412 Group approved a propaganda and political action       program for the upcoming September 1964 Presidential election.In May 1964, following the dissolution of the Democratic Front, the “303       Committee,” successor to the 5412 Group, agreed to give the Radical Party       additional covert assistance.In February 1965, the 303 Committee approved a proposal to give covert       assistance to selected candidates in upcoming Congressional elections.In 1967, the CIA set up a propaganda mechanism for making placements       in radio and news media.In July 1968, the 303 Committee approved a political action program to       support individual moderate candidates running in the 1969 Congressional       elections.As a result of 1968 propaganda activities, in 1969 the “40 Committee”       (successor to the 303 Committee) approved the establishment of a propaganda       workshop.In the runup to the 1970 Presidential elections, the 40 Committee directed       CIA to carry out “spoiling operations” to prevent an Allende victory. As part of a “Track I” strategy to block Allende from taking office       after the 4 September election, CIA sought to influence a Congressional       run-off vote required by the Constitution because Allende did not win an       absolute majority.As part of a “Track II” strategy, CIA was directed to seek to instigate       a coup to prevent Allende from taking office (see discussion below). 
While Allende was in office, the 40 Committee approved the redirection       of “Track I” operations that—combined with a renewed effort to support       the PDC in 1971 and a project to provide support to the National Party and       Democratic Radical Party in 1972—funneled millions of dollars to strengthen       opposition political parties.� CIA also provided assistance to militant       right-wing groups to undermine the President and create a tense environment.��       

**Support for Coup in 1970.**�     Under “Track II” of the strategy, CIA sought to instigate a coup to prevent     Allende from taking office after he won a plurality in the 4 September     election and before, as Constitutionally required because he did not win an     absolute majority, the Chilean Congress reaffirmed his victory.� CIA was working     with three different groups of plotters.� All three groups made it clear that     any coup would require the kidnapping of Army Commander Rene Schneider, who     felt deeply that the Constitution required that the Army allow Allende to     assume power.� CIA agreed with that assessment.� Although CIA provided weapons     to one of the groups, we have found no information that the plotters’ or CIA’s     intention was for the general to be killed.� Contact with one group of plotters     was dropped early on because of its extremist tendencies.� CIA provided tear     gas, submachine-guns and ammunition to the second group.� The third group     attempted to kidnap Schneider, mortally wounding him in the attack.� CIA had     previously encouraged this group to launch a coup but withdrew support four     days before the attack because, in CIA’s assessment, the group could not carry     it out successfully.

**Awareness of Coup Plotting in 1973.**�     Although CIA did not instigate the coup that ended Allende’s government on     11 September 1973, it was aware of coup-plotting by the military, had     ongoing intelligence collection relationships with some plotters, and—because     CIA did not discourage the takeover and had sought to instigate a coup in     1970—probably appeared to condone it.� There was no way that anyone,     including CIA, could have known that Allende would refuse the putchists’ offer     of safe passage out of the country and that instead—with *La Moneda*     Palace under bombardment from tanks and airplanes and in flames—would     take his own life.

**Knowledge of Human Rights Violations.**�     CIA officers were aware of and reported to analysts and policymakers in 1973     that General Pinochet and the forces that overthrew the Allende Government     were conducting a severe campaign against leftists and perceived political     enemies in the early months after the coup.� Activities of some security services     portended a long-term effort to suppress opponents.� In January 1974, CIA     officers and assets were tasked to report on human rights violations by the     Chilean government.

**Liaison with Chilean Security Services.**�     The CIA had liaison relationships in Chile with the primary purpose of securing     assistance in gathering intelligence on external targets.� The CIA offered     these services assistance in internal organization and training to combat     subversion and terrorism from abroad, not in combating internal opponents     of the government.� The CIA also used these relationships to admonish these     services concerning human rights abuses in Chile.� The policy community and     CIA recognized that the relationships opened the CIA to possible identification     with the liaison services’ internal operations involving human rights abuses     but determined that the contact was necessary for CIA’s mission. 

**Propaganda in Support of Pinochet     Regime.**� After the coup in September 1973, CIA suspended new covert     action funding but continued some ongoing propaganda projects, including support     for news media committed to creating a positive image for the military Junta.�     Chilean individuals who had collaborated with the CIA but were not acting     at CIA direction assisted in the preparation of the “White Book,” a document     intended to justify overthrowing Allende.� It contained an allegation that     leftists had a secret “Plan Z” to murder the high command in the months     before the coup, which CIA believed was probably disinformation by the Junta.

**Knowledge of “Operation Condor.”**�     Within a year after the coup, the CIA and other US Government agencies were     aware of bilateral cooperation among regional intelligence services to track     the activities of and, in at least a few cases, kill political opponents.�     This was the precursor to Operation Condor, an intelligence-sharing arrangement     among Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay established in 1975.�   
**Internal Qualms**
Some CIA officers expressed reservations about certain activities during     this period.� The Intelligence Community’s analytic assessment of the prospects     for a coup in 1970, for example, was that “military action is impossible”     because the Army was too deeply committed to the Constitution and unwilling     to oust the civilian government.� The DCI stated that the Agency was being     asked to do the impossible.� A senior CIA officer said the idea of undermining     an Allende victory was “unrealistic.”� National Intelligence Estimates produced     between 1969 and 1973 reflected declining confidence over time that Allende     would be able to subvert Chile’s constitutional order.� In addition, in the     period preceding the successful coup against Allende, CIA officers were concerned     about the blurring of lines between monitoring coup-plotting—collecting intelligence     on such activities but not directing or influencing them—and supporting a     coup at least implicitly.
**Historical Context**
The historical backdrop sheds important light on the policies, practices,     and perceived urgency prevalent at that time.� The Cuban revolution and emergence     of Communist parties in Latin America had brought the Cold War to the Western     Hemisphere.� Thousands of Chilean military officers came to the United States     for training, which included presentations on the impact of global communism     on their own country.� After Allende won a plurality in the Presidential election     on 4 September 1970, the consensus at the highest levels of the US Government     was that an Allende Presidency would seriously hurt US national interests.

Efforts by the United States to support anti-Communist forces in Chile date     back to the late 1950s and reflect the rivalry between the United States and     the Soviet Union for influence throughout the Third World.� The growing strength     of the Chilean left, along with continuing fragmentation by conservative and     moderate political forces, became increasing concerns through the 1960 70s     to the United States, which wanted to avoid the emergence of “another Cuba”     in the Western Hemisphere.� 

According to the Church Committee report, in their meeting with CIA Director     Richard Helms and Attorney General John Mitchell on 15 September 1970 President     Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, directed the CIA     to prevent Allende from taking power.� They were “not concerned [about the]     risks involved,” according to Helms’ notes.� In addition to political action,     Nixon and Kissinger, according to Helms’s notes, ordered steps to “make the     economy scream.”

These Cold War attitudes persisted into the Pinochet era.� After Pinochet     came to power, senior policymakers appeared reluctant to criticize human rights     violations, taking to task US diplomats urging greater attention to the problem.�     US military assistance and sales grew significantly during the years of greatest     human rights abuses.� According to a previously released Memorandum of Conversation,     Kissinger in June 1976 indicated to Pinochet that the US Government was sympathetic     to his regime, although Kissinger advised some progress on human rights in     order to improve Chile’s image in the US Congress.
**SUPPORTING MATERIAL****The “Assassination” of President Salvador     Allende**
In 1962 the CIA received authority to carry out covert action projects in     support of the Chilean Radical Party and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).�     These programs were designed primarily to assist the parties in attracting     larger followings, improve their organization and effectiveness, and influence     their political orientation to support US objectives in the region.� A secondary     purpose of these programs was to support efforts to split the Socialist Party.�     At the request of the US Ambassador in Chile, with the support of the Department     of State, in 1963 the 5412 Group approved a one-time payment to the Democratic     Front.� Propaganda efforts to support public media consisted primarily of     funding and guidance to recruited assets within selected Chilean radio stations     and newspapers.� 

In preparation for the 1964 elections, a political action campaign was approved     on 2 April 1964 by the 303 Committee.� The goal of the campaign was to     prevent Dr. Salvador Allende, the leftist candidate for President, from     winning.� Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party was the principal     beneficiary of these efforts.� The campaign built on the covert action previously     approved in 1962, adding an element of support for a militant women’s group.�     In the same timeframe, the CIA was tasked to support continued unilateral     placements of propaganda in the mass media to influence public opinion against     leftist parties and candidates.� By the time of the election, the 303 Committee     had approved a total of $3 million to keep Allende from winning.� Frei’s     victory on 4 September 1964 was a milestone in the CIA’s Chilean election     effort.******

On 5 February 1965, the 303 Committee approved a new covert action     campaign intended to support selected candidates for Congressional elections     on 7 March.� This campaign—drafted and carried out in cooperation with     the US Ambassador in Chile—authorized the CIA, working through its established     infrastructure, to support selected candidates for Congress.� The operation     was considered a success and was terminated on 30 June.� In 1965-66, previous     propaganda efforts were merged, and the CIA established a covert action project     to support the placement of propaganda in Chilean mass media.� This project     was to influence public opinion against leftist parties and candidates.� The     scope of CIA’s propaganda activities in Chile was further expanded in 1967,     to promote “anti-Communist” themes, specifically against the Soviet Bloc presence     in the country.

Nonetheless, the Chilean left made political gains during the Frei Administration.�     As a result, CIA was given approval in 1968-69 to undertake additional propaganda     operations intended to influence Chilean mass media.� This included establishing     a propaganda workshop and other mechanisms for press placements.� Propaganda     topics included the threat posed by the Soviet Bloc to Chile’s democratic     tradition, the danger local leftist fronts posed to the country, and promoting     pro-democratic leadership in Chile.� In July 1968, the 303 Committee approved     a modest covert action program, proposed by the US Ambassador, to influence     the composition of the Chilean Congress by supporting moderate candidates     in the March 1969 Congressional elections.� While the results were considered     an operational success, both the far right and far left gained seats, and     the Chilean political scene was further polarized.� Frei and his moderate     PDC candidates were the losers.� This CIA program was terminated at the conclusion     of the Congressional elections.******

As the 1970 Presidential election drew near, Allende emerged as a leading     candidate; various leftist parties continued to strengthen the Popular Unity     (UP) coalition.� The Station used some of the covert actions mentioned above     to carry out a variety of political action and propaganda operations aimed     at discrediting the left.� The 40 Committee told the CIA to confine itself     to attacking the UP coalition and not support any particular Presidential     candidate.� The objective was to divide the left and create conditions for     a non-Marxist candidate to win the election.� On 27 June 1970 the Station     was directed to focus the “spoiling operation” more directly against Allende’s     candidacy.� The plan was to alert the Chilean people to the dangers of a Marxist     regime under Allende.

In spite of increased funding as directed by the 40 Committee, by August     1970 it was clear that the spoiling operation was not succeeding and that     Allende and the UP had garnered such support that Allende was clearly the     leading candidate.� High-level concern in the Nixon Administration resulted     in development of a more aggressive covert action initiative.� This initiative     considered both political action (Track I) and a military coup (Track II)     to prevent an Allende presidency.� Both Track I and Track II initiatives     ran simultaneously until Congress elected Allende on 24 October.

The political action program under consideration called for the Embassy and     Station to influence the Chilean Congress as it took up the matter.� This     involved encouraging Congress**to vote for Alessandri for President     in spite of the fact Allende received a slightly higher popular vote.� (Allende     won 36.3 percent of the vote on 4 September—a plurality, not the     majority required by the Constitution to avoid Congressional reaffirmation     of the victory.)� The Station and the Embassy, working through intermediaries,     urged Frei to use his influence with Congress to convince non-leftist forces     to vote for Alessandri.� The scenario was to have Congress elect Alessandri     as President; he would then resign, thereby allowing Frei to run as a candidate     against Allende in a new election. 

The Track II initiative called upon CIA to plan for the possibility     of arranging Chilean military intervention.� On 9 September the Station     received guidance from Headquarters directing it to establish direct contact     with Chilean military officers to evaluate the possibilities of stimulating     a military coup if a decision were to be made to do so. 

On 15 September President Nixon informed the DCI that an Allende regime in     Chile would not be acceptable to the United States.� He instructed the CIA     to prevent Allende from coming to power or unseat him and authorized $10 million     for this purpose.� The President specifically directed that this action be     carried out by the CIA without advising the Departments of State or Defense     or the U.S. Ambassador in Chile.� In response to Nixon’s direction, CIA took     a variety of actions, including making overtures to the military of a foreign     government to request its insights, forwarding worldwide propaganda information     for placement in local media, initiating efforts to promote public opposition     to Allende among leading newspapers such as *El Mercurio*, and contacting     a Catholic layman who was in touch with Church leaders in Chile to influence     their attitudes toward Allende.� Station officers increased contacts with     Chilean military officers.� Frei was also encouraged to use his influence     with the military and encourage officers to consider forming a new government     before Congress elected Allende President.� By late September it was clear     that Frei was unlikely to act in this manner.

Track II planning was intensified once it became clear that Frei would     not act.� Between 5-20 October the Station orchestrated numerous contacts     with key Chilean military and *Carabinero* (national police) officers     to convince them to carry out a coup.� The U.S. Embassy’s Army Attach� was     placed under operational control of the CIA Station and relayed similar messages     to his military contacts.� Four CIA officers were dispatched under non-official     cover to meet with the most sensitive of these Chilean military officers,     who were actively involved in coup plotting.� 

The Track II initiative failed, however, after the assassination of     Army Commander-in-Chief Schneider, whose death provoked a strong reaction     in Chile. 
**The Schneider Assassination**
The US Government and the CIA were aware of and agreed with Chilean officers’     assessment that that the abduction of General Rene Schneider, the Chilean     Army’s Commander in September 1970, was an essential step in any coup plan.�     We have found no information, however, that the coup plotters’ or CIA’s intention     was that the general be killed in any abduction effort.� Schneider was a strong     supporter of the Chilean Constitution and a major stumbling block for military     officers seeking to carry out a coup to prevent Allende from being inaugurated.�     

Retired Army General Roberto Viaux was a major coup plotter with support     from non-commissioned and junior officers; he also headed several right-wing     civilian groups.� After CIA was directed to explore prospects for a coup to     prevent Allende from taking office, a CIA officer established contact with     Viaux on 9 October 1970.� A second meeting with Viaux resulted in the     Station forwarding a request to Washington from Viaux for weapons, tear gas     and other supplies as well as a life insurance policy for himself.� In reviewing     Viaux’s proposal, CIA Headquarters determined that his group had no chance     of carrying off a successful coup.� Headquarters advised the Station, and     during meetings on 17 18 October a CIA officer told a member of the     Viaux group, that CIA would not entertain their request for support.� The     officer warned them that any coup action on their part would be premature.�     The Viaux representative said the coup was planned for 21-22 October,     and the first step would be to kidnap General Schneider.� The Station doubted     the plan because CIA had no corroborative intelligence and Viaux’s group had     a record of false starts.

On 22 October the Viaux group, acting independently of the CIA at that time,     carried out an attempted abduction against General Schneider that resulted     in his death.� Schneider‘s death shocked the armed forces and civilian proponents     of a coup, and plans for military action were shelved.

In addition to Viaux, CIA had established contact with other coup-plotters,     including General Camilo Valenzuela.� Valenzuela’s group was well known by     the Station and was judged to have the capability to carry out a successful     coup.� CIA provided this group—which also saw the abduction of General Schneider     as essential to any coup—three submachine guns, ammunition, and 8 to 10 tear     gas grenades on 22 October.� (These weapons were later returned unused     to the Station.)� Valenzuela’s representative insisted his group had nothing     to do with Schneider’s killing and that Viaux acted on his own.

In November 1970 a member of the Viaux group who avoided capture recontacted     the Agency and requested financial assistance on behalf of the group.� Although     the Agency had no obligation to the group because it acted on its own, in     an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the good will of the     group, and for humanitarian reasons, $35,000 was passed.
**Early Allende Presidency**
 The Congress approved Allende’s election victory by a wide margin—153 to     35—on 24 October. In the wake of Allende’s inauguration on 3 November     1970, the US Government’s long-term objective was to keep the opposition active     in the hope that it could defeat Allende in the 1976 election.� The CIA’s     role in Chile was primarily to provide funds and influence opposition political     parties.� In 1971, a new covert action was approved to renew support to the     PDC.� In 1972, a new covert action project was authorized to provide support     to the National Party and the Democratic Radical Party.� CIA’s continuing     financial support to the propaganda mechanisms described above was intended     to continue media placements in support of opposition parties and against     the Allende regime.� The CIA was instructed to put the US Government in a     position to take future advantage of either a political or military solution     to the Chilean dilemma, depending on how developments unfolded. 

The CIA continued to collect intelligence on Chilean military     officers actively opposed to the Allende government, but no effort was made     to assist them in any way.� Some CIA assets and contacts were in direct contact     with coup plotters; CIA guidance was that the purpose of these contacts was     only to collect intelligence.� As coup rumors and planning escalated by the     end of 1972, CIA exercised extreme care in all dealings with Chilean military     officers and continued to monitor their activities but under no circumstances     attempted to influence them.� By October 1972 the consensus within the US     government was that the military intended to launch a coup at some point,     that it did not need US support for a successful coup, and that US intervention     or assistance in a coup should be avoided.� 

On 21 August 1973 the 40 Committee approved a $1 million supplemental     budget to increase support for opposition political parties, bringing the     total amount of covert funding spent during the Allende period to approximately     $6.5 million*.*� In late August the Station requested authorization     to provide maximum support for the opposition’s efforts to encourage the entrance     of the Chilean military into the Allende cabinet.� The resignation of Army     Commander General Carlos Prats (whose actions were strongly constitutionalist)     and his replacement by General Augusto Pinochet (not a coup plotter, but apparently     willing to concede to a coup) appeared to further unify the Armed Forces and     strengthened the institution as a political pressure group.� The UP Government     appeared to fear a possible military coup and was unsure how to react to such     a development.� 

The Station realized that the opposition’s objectives had evolved to a point     inconsistent with current US policy and sought authorization from Washington     to support such an aggressive approach.� Although the US Ambassador in Chile     agreed with the need for Washington to evaluate its current policy, he did     not concur in the Station’s proposal, fearing that it could lead to a de facto     US commitment to a coup.� In response, CIA Headquarters reaffirmed to the     Station that there was to be no involvement with the military in any covert     action initiative; there was no support for instigating a military coup. 

On 10 September 1973—the day before the coup that ended the Allende     Government—a Chilean military officer reported to a CIA officer that a coup     was being planned and asked for US Government assistance.� He was told that     the US Government would not provide any assistance because this was strictly     an internal Chilean matter.� The Station officer also told him that his request     would be forwarded to Washington.� CIA learned of the exact date of the coup     shortly before it took place.� During the attack on the Presidential Palace     and its immediate aftermath, the Station’s activities were limited to providing     intelligence and situation reports.

Allende’s death occurred after the President refused an offer from the military     to take him and his family out of the country.� Available evidence indicates     that President Allende committed suicide as putchist troops entered his offices.�     A credible source on Allende’s death was Dr. Patricio Guijon, a physician     who served on the President’s medical staff.� Guijon was in the Presidential     Palace, *La Moneda*, with Allende during the assault and claimed that     he witnessed Allende shoot himself with a rifle.� The Chilean National Commission     on Truth and Reconciliation in 1991 also concluded that Allende took his own     life.� There is no information to indicate that the CIA was involved in Allende’s     death.
**US Business Involvement**
As early as the 1964 Chilean Presidential election, American businessmen     with interests in Chile had offered to provide the CIA with funds to prevent     Allende from being elected.� All of these early offers were rejected.

In early 1970 a Station officer was contacted by a United States businessman     employed by International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) urging the US government     to provide financial support to one of Allende’s opponents, Jorge Alessandri.�     The Station provided the businessman the name of an individual who could securely     funnel ITT funds to Alessandri.� 

Several months later another ITT representative approached the CIA in Washington     to probe whether CIA would accept funds from his company and channel them     to the Alessandri campaign.� He was told that CIA could not receive and transfer     funds to Alessandri on behalf of a private firm.� The CIA also told him that,     although the US Government was most anxious about a possible Allende victory,     it was not supporting any specific candidate in the election.� As occurred     several months earlier, however, the Station provided this businessman advice     on how to funnel ITT funds securely to Alessandri.� 

After Allende’s election and before his inauguration, the CIA, under 40 Committee     direction, made an effort—in coordination with the Embassy in Santiago—to     encourage Chilean businesses to carry out a program of economic disruption.
**Accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the     Presidency**
Chile‘s new military Junta—Army General Augusto Pinochet, Air Force General     Gustavo Leigh, Navy Admiral Jose Merino, and *Carabinero* Chief General     Caesar Mendoza—was sworn in on the evening of 11 September 1973.� The     next day, the four drafted an official document constituting the Junta as     Chile’s supreme power.� Pinochet was designated as its first President, and     the four verbally agreed to rotate the office.� Shortly after, the Junta established     an advisory committee, which Pinochet was successful in staffing with Army     officers loyal to himself.� One of their first recommendations was to discard     the idea of a rotating Presidency, arguing it would create too many administrative     problems and lead to confusion.� 

In March 1974, on the six-month anniversary of the Junta’s establishment,     Pinochet verbally attacked the Christian Democratic Party and stated that     there was no set timetable for the return to civilian rule.� On 18 December     1974 Pinochet was declared Supreme Leader of the nation.��� 

During this period, CIA, in coordination with the Department of State, determined     that no new or expanded covert action activities were to be carried out until     the 40 Committee provided new authorization.� Although covert action     spending was authorized for previously obligated expenditures and commitments     in programs described above, no new initiatives were authorized.� By June     1974 CIA covert action plans for Chile had been officially terminated, and     payments ceased.

Although some of these residual propaganda operations may have benefited     Pinochet and the putchists indirectly, officers of the CIA and the Intelligence     Community were not involved in facilitating Pinochet’s accession to President     nor the consolidation of his power as Supreme Leader.� For most of the period,     CIA had no covert action authority for Chile.� While the CIA had liaison relationships     with various security services over the years, there is no indication that     any service asked for, or that the CIA offered, any assistance to promote     Pinochet to the Presidency.� 
**Violations of Human Rights Committed by Officers     or Covert Agents and Employees of the CIA******
In January 1974 CIA issued a directive to all CIA staff to collect clandestine     information on torture in Chile; this message directed CIA staff to work through     all available agents and channels of influence to induce the Chilean Government     to modify repressive measures, particularly to eliminate torture.� CIA actively     used its contacts, especially with members of services notorious for human     rights abuses, to emphasize that human rights abuses were detrimental to the     government’s credibility within their own country, damaging to their international     reputation, and unacceptable to the US Government.� In some cases, such contacts     enabled the CIA to obtain intelligence on human rights abuses that would not     have otherwise been available.� 

Given the wide variety and nature of CIA contacts in Chile, the issue of     human rights was handled in various ways over the years.� Some examples:
-  Before the 1973 coup, the issue of human rights was not addressed in       liaison contacts and intelligence reporting.One CIA contact was known to be involved in an abortive coup attempt       on 29 June 1973, and another was involved in the successful 11 September       1973 coup.In October 1973, the CIA had credible information that a high-level contact       was involved in specific human rights abuses; contact was severed.Although the CIA had information indicating that a high-level contact       was a hard-liner and therefore more likely to commit abuses, contact with       him was allowed to continue in the absence of concrete information about       human rights abuses.CIA maintained indirect contact with a source in close contact with human       rights violators.� There was no evidence that the source engaged in abuses,       but he almost certainly knew about the practice.� The intelligence value       of the contact was sufficiently important that the contact was not dropped.In the case of an individual about whom the CIA had information concerning       a corruption issue that may have been related to human rights issues, a       decision was made to seek contact given his position and potential intelligence       value.�� In more than one case, in light of the contacts’ service affiliation       and position, it seemed likely that they were involved in, knew about or       covered up human rights abuses.� However, because such contacts allowed       the CIA to accomplish its intelligence reporting mission and maintain a       channel through which to voice concerns about human rights abuses, contact       was continued.In a few cases, although the CIA had knowledge that the contact represented       a service with a known history of human rights abuses, contact was continued       because refusing such contact would have had a negative impact on the CIA       intelligence collection mission. In some cases careful checks of contacts’ human rights records were not       conducted, and a deliberate risk-versus-gain decision was not made.� In       such cases, if a contact was deemed to have intelligence value, continuing       contact was authorized. Information concerning human rights abuses of then current and former       CIA contacts was disseminated to the intelligence and policy communities.�       
**Relationship with Contreras******
During a period between 1974 and 1977, CIA maintained contact with Manuel     Contreras Sepulveda, who later became notorious for his involvement in human     rights abuses.� The US Government policy community approved CIA’s contact     with Contreras, given his position as chief of the primary intelligence organization     in Chile, as necessary to accomplish the CIA’s mission, in spite of concerns     that this relationship might lay the CIA open to charges of aiding internal     political repression.� From the start, the CIA made it clear to Contreras     was that it would not support any of his activities or activities of his service     which might be construed as “internal political repression.”� In its contacts     with Contreras, the CIA urged him to adhere to a 17 January 1974 circular,     issued by the Chilean Ministry of Defense, spelling out guidelines for handling     prisoners in a manner consistent with the 1949 Geneva Convention. 

The relationship, while correct, was not cordial and smooth, particularly     as evidence of Contreras’ role in human rights abuses emerged.� In December     1974, the CIA concluded that**Contreras was not going to improve his     human rights performance.� However, Contreras’ assistance in the first quarter     of 1975 in gaining the release of some PDC members who had been arrested and     mistreated by another Chilean security service offered small hope that he     would use his influence to end abuses.� In retrospect, however, Contreras’     role in this effort probably reflected interservice rivalry and Contreras’     personal efforts to control the entire Chilean intelligence apparatus.

By April 1975, intelligence reporting showed that Contreras was the principal     obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta, but an interagency     committee directed the CIA to continue its relationship with Contreras.� The     US Ambassador to Chile urged Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Walters     to receive Contreras in Washington in the interest of maintaining good relations     with Pinochet.� In August 1975, with interagency approval, this meeting took     place.

In May and June 1975, elements within the CIA recommended establishing a     paid relationship with Contreras to obtain intelligence based on his unique     position and access to Pinochet.� This proposal was overruled, citing the     US Government policy on clandestine relations with the head of an intelligence     service notorious for human rights abuses.� However, given miscommunications     in the timing of this exchange, a one-time payment was given to Contreras.     

In addition to information concerning external threats, CIA sought from Contreras     information regarding evidence that emerged in 1975 of a formal Southern Cone     cooperative intelligence effort—“Operation Condor”—building on informal     cooperation in tracking and, in at least a few cases, killing political opponents.�     By October 1976 there was sufficient information that the CIA decided to approach     Contreras on the matter.� Contreras confirmed Condor’s existence as an intelligence-sharing     network but denied that it had a role in extra-judicial killings.

Former Allende cabinet member and Ambassador to Washington Orlando Letelier     and his American assistant, Ronni Moffit, were killed in a carbombing in Washington     on 21 September, 1976.� Almost immediately after the assassination, rumors     began circulating that the Chilean government was responsible.� CIA’s first     intelligence report containing this allegation was dated 6 October 1976.�     During October 1976, the Department of Justice and the CIA worked out how     the CIA would support the foreign intelligence (FI) aspects of the legal investigation.�     At that time, Contreras’ possible role in the Letelier assassination became     an issue.**

By the end of 1976, contacts with Contreras were very infrequent.� During     1977, CIA met with Contreras about half a dozen times; three of those contacts     were to request information on the Letelier assassination.� On 3 November     1977, Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence so     CIA severed all contact with him.*�*

Nonetheless, CIA intelligence reporting continued to follow Contreras’ activities     closely.� After a short struggle to retain power, Contreras resigned from     the Army in 1978.� In the interim, CIA gathered specific, detailed intelligence     reporting concerning Contreras’ involvement in ordering the Letelier assassination.�     While some of this material has been released, some remains classified and     another portion has been withheld at the request of the Department of Justice,     which continues to pursue the investigation.**
**Intelligence Reporting**
 Throughout the post-coup period, the CIA collected and disseminated to the     intelligence and policy communities extensive reporting concerning human rights     issues in Chile.� Some of this information came from contacts with mixed reputations.�     The intelligence included a wide variety of information, including:
-  Debates in 1973-88 within the Chilean military and security services       about the appropriate level of force to be used in confronting what they       viewed as the subversive threat posed by leftist political groups and splinter       terrorist organizations; 
-  The identities and activities of sub-units within the Chilean security       forces charged with conducting special political activities or activities       against the left, and whose association with extremist groups with violent       tendencies made them most prone to systemic abuses;  
-  Debates within leftist political groups and splinter terrorist organizations       concerning the use of violence in confronting the government; and 
-  Training, capabilities, readiness and deployment of the various “self-defense”       groups within the Socialist and Communist Parties of Chile and splinter       terrorist organizations of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Manuel       Rodriguez Patriotic Front and the Lautaro Youth and Worker/Peasant factions       of the United Popular Action Movement. 

In the days and months immediately following the 1973 coup, the CIA provided     extensive reporting on what the government characterized as activities necessary     to restore order.� There were widely varying reports on the numbers of persons     killed and arrested.� CIA reporting confirmed that the military was deliberately     not disclosing accurate figures and detailed the differing opinions within     the military Junta regarding whether to summarily execute extremists and subversives     or allow them trials and sentencing.� There was also extensive reporting on:
-  Application of “military justice” to civilian detainees and the types       of punishment they were likely to face; 
-  Prison camp locations and the names of specific persons being held in       them, including the fact that some of these locations were secret; 
-  Efforts of leftists to flee the country or gain asylum in foreign embassies;       and 
-  Assessments of the effect government repression was having on the left’s       capabilities and efforts to regroup.  

CIA also received information on “Plan Z”—purportedly drawn up by Allende’s     Popular Unity coalition in the late period of the Allende Government to assassinate     important political and military persons opposed to its leftist agenda.� When     allegations of the existence of “Plan Z” first surfaced, the CIA noted     that it probably was disinformation manipulated by the Junta to improve its     image and to provide justification for its activities.� Allegations that reports     about “Plan Z” were part of a joint CIA-Chilean operation are inaccurate,     although military officers with whom the CIA had contact prior to the 1973     coup were involved in the drafting the “White Book,” in which allegations     of “Plan Z” were a main feature.

The CIA first reported human rights abuses by the Junta on 15 September     1973, just days after the coup.� CIA reported that the Chilean security interrogation     units were dealing with suspected opponents in an extremely rigorous manner.�     A 22 September report noted that prisoners at the National Stadium were     harshly treated in the first days after the coup.� On 28 September, CIA     reported that 27 cadavers, some showing signs of torture and mutilation, had     been recovered from the Mapocho River.� On 9 October, the CIA reported     that Soviet non-diplomatic technicians in Chile had been repeatedly threatened     and verbally abused; some of those later tried were beaten or injured.� On     25 October, CIA reported that General Sergio Arellano Stark had given     instructions resulting in the summary execution of 21 political prisoners.�     On 3 November, the CIA reported that, despite a government decree to end summary     executions, 20 bodies were found shot in the San Carlos Canal.� On 12 November,     the CIA reported concerns within the PDC about human rights abuses.� On 18 January     1974, CIA reported that Chilean politicians across the political spectrum     were weighing the possibility of bringing the issue of government human rights     abuses to the attention of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.     

It was apparent that the 17 January 1974 Chilean government circular     prohibiting torture and providing instructions for the handling of prisoners     was a public relations ruse.� CIA reporting indicated that the Chilean security     forces did not, and probably would not, observe the stated policy.� Although     the State Department and Embassy had the primary role in human rights reporting,     the clandestine nature of Chilean security services’ human rights practices     required CIA collection efforts.� In late January 1974, the CIA directed that     all appropriate CIA officers task their clandestine assets to report on torture     in Chile.

Over the next 17 years, the CIA reported information available from its contacts     concerning human rights abuses in Chile.� As the left later regained strength,     intelligence reporting included the plans, intentions, capabilities and terrorist     acts of the left.� During the transition from military to civilian rule, intelligence     reporting followed the political issue of how human rights investigations     and prosecutions would be handled.

A review of CIA’s files has uncovered no evidence that CIA officers and employees     were engaged in human rights abuses or in covering up any human rights abuses     in Chile.
**Death/Disappearance of US Citizens**
Allegations of CIA complicity in the death of American citizen Charles Horman, Jr.—an     expatriate who supported Allende and was murdered in the aftermath of the     coup in 1973—are unfounded.� Similarly, CIA had no prior knowledge of the     circumstances leading to the death in Chile of US citizen Frank Teruggi in     1973 or the disappearance of US citizen Boris Weisfeiler in 1985.

Nevertheless, some clandestine contacts of the CIA were involved in human     rights abuses.� The CIA, at the direction of and with the full concurrence     of senior US policymakers, maintained official contacts with various security     services.� At the same time, the CIA maintained clandestine contacts with     selected members of the Chilean military, intelligence and security forces,     both to collect intelligence and carry out the covert actions described above.�     There is no doubt that some CIA contacts were actively engaged in committing     and covering up serious human rights abuses.

As a result of lessons learned in Chile, Central America and elsewhere, the     CIA now carefully reviews all contacts for potential involvement in human     rights abuses and makes a deliberate decision balancing the nature and severity     of the human rights abuse against the potential intelligence value of continuing     the relationship.� These standards, established in the mid-1990s, would likely     have altered the amount of contact we had with perpetrators of human rights     violators in Chile had they been in effect at that time. 

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