List of Missing Contracts

We reviewed data obtained from the Joint Contracting Command — Iraq, Contract Management

Information System, provided to us on March 4, 2005, to identify instances in which

Development Fund for Iraq contracts were reported as awarded after June 28, 2004. The
contract numbers for the 21 contracts that could not be located by Joint Contracting Command —

Iraq are shown below.

CRErIAnRwYYE

DABVO01-03-D-1008
DABV01-03-M-0054
DABVO01-04-1-0015
DABVO01-04-1-0016
DABVO1-04-1-0018
DABVO1-04-1-0019
DABVO01-04-1-0020
DABVOI-04-1-0021
DABV01-04-1-3009

. DABV01-04-C-0076
- DABV01-04-C-3546
. DABVO01-04-C-3582
. DABV01-04-M-8226
. DABV01-04-M-8240
. SKWO1A-03-C-0008
. W914NS-04-C-0121

. W914NS-04-D-0116

. W914NS-04-M-2375
. W914NS-04-M-2383
. W914NS-05-M-9025
. CPA GRANT 0001

Attachment


SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

July 8, 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND - IRAQ

SUBJECT: Reconciliation of Reporting Differences of the Source of Funds Used on Contracts
After June 28, 2004 (Report No. 05-009)

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit in
accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which
mandates the independent and objective conduct of audits relating to the programs and
operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund. Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that we provide for the
independent and objective leadership and coordination of and recommendations on policies
designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such
programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse.

This report discusses the accuracy and support of data for contracts identified as funded by the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).

The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether contracts awarded after June 28,
2004, and identified as funded by the DFI, were actually funded by the DFI or were instead
funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). A secondary objective was to report
to the fund managers the necessary actions that may be needed to correct the obligation amounts,
the current data files, and other actions as appropriate.

However, during the course of our audit, we found we could not fully address the overall
objective because not all contracts could be located by government officials.

We conducted this performance audit from May through July 2005, in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

On June 15, 2004, in a memorandum to the Director, Project Management Office (PMO),
“Administration of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)-Funded Contracts,” the Iraqi Interim
Government Minister of Finance designated the Director of the PMO with the responsibility to
monitor and confirm performance, certify and/or make payments, and otherwise administer
contracts or grants that “. . . were awarded on or before June 30, 2004, by the CPA [Coalition
Provisional Authority] or the MNF-I [Multi-National Force-Iraq] in accordance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 and implementing regulations . . .””. The memorandum
outlined the specific roles and responsibilities for the administration of DFI-funded contracts by
the PMO. However, because the CPA (which included the PMO) was dissolved on June 28,
2004, the requirements of the memorandum were subsequently applied to the Project and
Contracting Office.

400 Army Navy Drive « Arlington, Virginia 22202


We reviewed data obtained from the Joint Contracting Command — Iraq, (JCC-I) Contract
Management Information System provided to us on March 4, 2005, to identify instances in which
DFI contracts were reported as awarded after June 28, 2004. Our review identified 69 of these
contracts totaling $106.2 million. Except for the 21 contracts that could not be located, we
compared the reported JCC-I Contract Management Information System contract award data for
the remaining 48 contracts with supporting documentation in the contract award files to
determine whether contracts were awarded with DFI funds after the cut-off date. Contracts
funded with DFI funds after June 28, 2004, would constitute a potential liability to the United
States.

The following table summarizes the results of our review.

Results of Reconciliation of Reporting Differences of the Source of Funds Used on
Contracts After June 28, 2004
Percent of
Number of Total Obligated Percent of

Category of Data Contracts Contracts Amount Obligated Total
Entry Errors
Award Date -
Incorrect 39 57 $44,226,213 42
Multi-National 6 9 $12,835,964 12
Corps-Iraq Funded
IRRF Funded 3 4 $7,221,240 7
Subtotal
Data Entry Errors 48 70 $64,283,417 61
Contract Missing 21 30 $41,905,747 39
(See Attachment)
Totals 69 100 $106,189,164 100

We concluded that the 48 contracts reviewed disclosed no instances of incorrect obligations of
DFI funds. In 39 contracts, the obligations of DFI occurred before June 28, 2004. Obligations
for the remaining 9 contracts did not cite DFI funds but rather U.S. funds appropriated by the
Congress. The obligation documents for the 6 contracts identified as the Multi-National Corps-
Iraq cited Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds and the other 3 contracts cited the
TRRF as the source of the funding.

We also concluded that the JCC-I current contract data files were not accurate and not adequately
supported. Our review showed that 48 of the 69 contracts contained data entry errors in
documenting the date of the contract award or the source of the funding.

The contract numbers for the 21 contacts that could not be located by JCC-I officials are shown
in the Attachment. The JCC-I officials stated that these contracts may have been destroyed by a
rocket that struck the Presidential Palace in January 2005 or that some of these contracts were

turned over to Iraqi ministry officials after contract completion and final review by contracting
officials. However, JCC-I had no records to support these conjectures.

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During the audit, JCC-I corrected the Contract Management Information System reporting errors
identified by the audit. We believe these actions sufficiently corrected the identified
deficiencies. We did not make any recommendations in this report because we previously made
recommendations to the JCC-I to improve contract file data management.’

This report does not contain recommendations; therefore no written response to this report is
required. We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this
report, please contact Mr. Mickey McDermott at (703) 343-9440 or Mr. James Carrera at

(703) 343-9231.
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Inspector General

Attachment:
As stated

‘Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Report Number 05-007, “Administration of Iraq
Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contract Files.” April 30, 2005

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Report Number 05-008, “Administration of
Contracts Funded by the Development Fund for Iraq,” April 30, 2005

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