A Marriage of Convenience 125

discovered what a useful and flexible tool Marine air

control was.413

For the British the war began in much the same

way as it had for I MEF headquarters. On 20 March,

one of the incoming Iraqi theater ballistic missiles

flew directly over the division headquarters, certainly

capturing the attention of the staff. With British understatement, and humor, General Brims commented

at the evening update brief that the "Iraqis were

showing that they too had a vote" in how the war

would run.414 By the afternoon of 21 March, 3 Commando Brigade, the Royal Marine formation, had successfully deployed into the Al Faw Peninsula, despite

"blackened skies from burning oil infrastructure" and

a deadly crash of a U.S. Marine helicopter carrying

Royal Marines.'

In the meantime, 15th MEU (SOC) took the port of

Umm Qasr, encountering some stiff resistance, particularly from Saddam Fedayeen, but not enough to

prevent it from making "excellent progress."4'5 The

next day, 3 Commando Brigade reported Umm Qasr

"clear though 15 MEU continued to have sporadic

contacts," while 7 Armored Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade each carried out a relief in place with

the 5th and 7th Regimental Combat Teams, respectively, in the Rumaylah oil fields. There was some

friction, a blue-on-blue "friendly fire" incident with

no casualties between 15th MEU and 7 Armored

Brigade on 21 March, and some confusion "due to

' The value of the Marine contribution is suggested by the House

of Commons report on the war, which stated that the British forces

needed more practice and training when it came to close air support. To the same effect, Capt Arnold M. Kiefer of 1st ANGLIC0,

found that the British did not have as much experience with combined arms as did the Marine Corps and tended to view the employment of supporting arms in a sequential way. They did not use

and deconflict all of their supporting arms options. Capt Kiefer

added the comment that their light infantry skills were otherwise

world-class. (House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, Vol. 1, p. 63;

Capt Arnold M. Kiefer intvw, 17Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA)

**42 Commando's insertion started badly in appalling visibility,

made worse by blowing sand and smoke from fires started the

previous day. Tragically, the Marine Ch-46 "Sea Knight" helicopter carrying the headquarters of the Brigade Reconnaissance Force

crashed. . . . With the cloud base dropping still further, the insertion was aborted, forcing the Brigade HQ rapidly to identify other

aviation assets and plan a new insertion for 42 Commando at

dawn, using RAF Chinook and Puma helicopters. Although the

landing took place six hours late, Onto insecure landing sites, and

in some case miles away from those originally intended, all objectives were secured." There was apparently some bad blood over

the U.S. Marine Corps' decision to abort, which may explain why

the British decided to use their own assets. (Cmdr 1 (UK) Armored

Division's Diary, entry for 21Mar03 [Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA]; Ministry of Defence, Operations in

Iraq: Lessons for the Future [London, UK: 11Dec03], p. 12)

the large volume of Coalition traffic" when the British

division relieved the American division in the oil

fields, not surprising considering the volume of

friendly forces passing through the area.416 But overall, the first days of the war went very well, and the

British were pleased with the situation.

The 15th MEU (SOC), which was to chop back to

U.S. control on 25 March after being relieved in Urnm

Qasr on 24 March, had meshed almost seamlessly

with the British brigade. The Marine unit commander,

Colonel Thomas D. Waldhauser, found it to be a

great experience "by design and by default." He Commented that even though the expeditionary unit's

ground combat element had more organic combat

power, there was a lot of congruence in the way both

sides were organized. The Royal Marines were true to

their doctrine, giving the U.S. Marines mission orders

and then giving them the leeway to execute those

orders, which were fourfold: to annihilate the enemy

who fought; to accommodate the enemy who capitulated; not to destroy the infrastructure of the city;

and not to get bogged down within city limits. Given

the opportunity to make a contribution under unusual circumstances—this was not your normal

cruise, the Marines of the 15th MEU (which, Waldhauser noted, had never carried out an exercise but

only real-world operations) accomplished the mission with gusto."

Overall, the British were on plan and the Iraqis

were not; in particular, the British had been able to

seize petroleum and shipping infrastructure before

the Iraqis could do much harm to it. While it would

prove impossible to get the oil flowing again quickly,

it was soon possible to get ocean-going ships into

Umm Qasr, especially to unload large quantities of

supplies for the expected humanitarian crisis. The

Royal Fleet Auxillery Sir Galahad (L3005), the first

ship with a humanitarian load, began to unload on 28

March. Considering the overall situation, the Ministry

of Defense postwar study concluded that:

Four days into the campaign the Iraqi 51st Division had been removed from its defence of

the oil fields. The 3 Commando Brigade held

critical oil infrastructure at Al Faw and the port

of Umm Qasr. The 16 Air Assault Brigade held

"Col Thomas Waldhauser also noted the 15thMEU's air combat element was detached while the unit was in Iraq. He would have

preferred to keep his own aviation combat element, but apart from

that had no complaints about air support. This tracks with Task

Force Tarawa's experience; its aviation combat element had also

been stripped away when it landed in Kuwait. (Col Thomas D.

Waldhauser intvw, 14Apr03 tMCHC, Quantico, VAI)
126 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

DVIC DM-SD-04-01657

Fire and smoke from a damaged oil and gas separation plant is visible in the background as elements of

the 1 (UK) Armored Division move into southern Iraq.

the vital oilfield at Rumaylah and threatened

Iraq's 6th Armoured Division to the north of

Basrah to such an extent that it could not interfere with Coalition operations. The 7 Armoured Brigade held the bridges over the

Shatt-al-Basrah waterway to the west of Basrah

[a canal that ran from Basrah to Umm Qasr to

the sea, paralleling the much larger Shatt-alArab to the east]. . . . [T]his was the most cmcia! ground to hold in order to achieve the

overall plan of protecting the right flank of the

U.S. advance to isolate Baghdad.417

Like their American allies to the west, the British

were finding that the regular Iraqi Army was not as

much of a threat as had been feared but that there

might be more of an irregular threat than had been

predicted. On the evening of 23 March, General

Brims spoke with 7 Armored Brigade about "the

changing nature of our understanding of the conflict.

• There was not to be a solely conventional battle,

rather resistance especially focused on urban areas,

and troops either bypassed or deliberately inserted

behind the forward line of our own troops."418

The issue confronting the British was what to do

next. Ultimately they would have to occupy Basrah,

Iraq's second city and that was not up for discussion.

As Genera! Brims commented: "to remove a regime

you cannot leave [it] . . . in control of an urban

area."419 So it became a matter of timing and method.

As for timing, CFLCC did not want the British to get

ahead of the rest of the force; General McKiernan

had directed them not to occupy Basrah proper until

he gave the word. He told General Brims that he

wanted the fight for Basrah to wait until the Coalition had isolated Baghdad, because he did not want

to risk a dramatic urban fight in the south that could

drive Iraqis into the arms of the regime and make the

overall mission that much more difficult.42° General

Conway's guidance was similar hut keyed to I MEF's

scheme of maneuver; he directed Brims simply to

make sure that whatever he chose to do in Basrah,

he should remember the paramount goal of protecting I MEF's flank.421

What Generals McKiernan and Conway wanted

was the reverse of what the Ba'athist strongman in

Basrah wanted. He was Saddam Hussein's cousin, Ali

Hassan Al-Majid, commonly known as "Chemical Mi"

for his murderous suppression of the Kurds in 1988

with chemical weapons. He had been equally brutal

in his dealings with the Shia in the south in the 1990s

after the Gulf War, and was one of the prime movers

in the draining of the swampland north of Basrah,

the ancestral home of the "Marsh Arabs" and their

distinctive culture, in order to eliminate it as a haven

for potential or actual rebels. The result was an ecological and economic disaster. Since Basrah's approximately 1.25 million citizens were predominantly

Shia, he was feared far more than respected. At the

beginning of the war, he presided over a mix of unreliable regular army units and more reliable hut not

particularly skilled irregulars like the Saddam Fedayeen. To the extent that he had a strategy, it appears to have been one of trying to draw the British

into a drawn-out fight within the city limits of Basrah,

with the attendant collateral damage to cultural and

religious sites, and of course civilian casualties, the

kind of thing that hurts the Coalition when it appears

on the front page of an Arab daily, not to mention

The Washington Post or Le Monde. British intelligence

reports suggested just how basic the Iraqi plan for

Basrah was: "Whenever the British intercepted

enemy communications, Saddam's henchmen were

merely urging loyalists to fight, fight, fight, without

specifying how."422

This was exactly what the British were determined

not to do, whatever the timing of the attack. British

officers commented repeatedly that they were always

determined to avoid the kind of hitter, costly, houseto-house, street-to-street fighting that had recently occurred in Chechnya, where the Russian army had

become bogged down in its fight with rebels, or like

the Eastern Front in World War II. "We were determined," Brims commented after the war, "not to have
any sort of Grozny or Stalingrad scenes."423

Over the period between 25 March and 6 April,

through a process of thinking and experimentation,

almost like a Warfighting Laboratory evolution, the

British came up with the alternative approach that fit

the situation. The preliminary experiment took place

in the much smaller city of Az Zubayr, population

about 100,000, to the southwest of Basrah in 7 Armored Brigade's zone of action. The soldiers of 7 Armored, who wore the "Desert Rats" patch their

predecessors had worn at the battle of El Alamein in

World War II, found themselves taking heavy machine gun and rocket fire from irregulars every time

they came near the city. The 7 Armored had the combat power to enter and reduce the city, but exercised

restraint, starting out small with a raid into the city by

1 Black Watch battalion on 25 March. On 26 March,

7 Armored proceeded to isolate the city, which was

not the same as besieging it but rather a matter of

controlling ingress and egress or, just as important,

demonstrating its ability to do so.424

General Brims tells the Basrah story in a very English way as if he and his subordinate, Brigadier Binns,

had "casually" solved the problem in the same way

As Gen James Mattis had demonstrated outside Al Kut, I MEF was

very much aware of the legal implications of besieging a city,

which both the Marine and the British divisions wanted to avoid.

a Londoner might "casually" solve the wickedly convoluted Times of London crossword puzzle, when in

fact it was their lifelong devotion to the art of war

that was manifesting itself:

I talked to the Brigade Commander. . . about

four or five days into the thing. . . and he said,

"I am going to work out how we are going to

take Az Zubayr," and I said, "Good, I will go

away and consider Basrah." And he said, "I

have got the most powerful armoured brigade

the British Army's ever put in the field, and I

will back-brief you on my bit, of Az Zubayr, tomorrow morning." I arranged to see him first

thing . . . and he asked me to come aside of

him for a short time, and he said to me, "I have

worked out, we cannot go into Az Zubayr

because that is what the regime want; we will

inflict undue casualties, we will take undue casualties, we will hurt the civilians . . . that is

what he is after. We have got to do it in a more

cunning way." I said to him, "Well, that's funny,

because I have worked out precisely the same

thing for Basrah."425

On 26 March, General Brims convened a commander's conference at Brigadier Binns' headquarters, where they discussed the issue among

A Marriage of Convenience 127

JCCC 030328-N-3783H-479

Royal Fleet Auxiliary Landing Ship Logistic, Sir Galahad (L 3005), arrives at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr to deliver the first shipment of humanitarian aid from Coalition forces.
128 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

themselves. Brims took the opportunity to announce

the decision to make Basrah a divisional responsibility rather than delegating it to one of the brigades, as

British commanders were more likely to do. The UK

division would hope to foment popular unrest by

conducting "deep operations" through the destruction of key targets while at the same time providing

an opportunity for the people to receive humanitarian aid.426

What came next, in both Az Zubayr and Basrah,

was a series of carefully orchestrated events, aimed

as much at the enemy's mind as at his body. One of

the prerequisites was the collection of the kind of citizen-by-citizen, neighborhood-by-neighborhood intelligence that can seem more like police work than

part of a military operation. This was apparently

something that the British government in southern

Iraq had been pursuing for years. It was also a skill

that the British Army had learned in Northern Ireland

and the Balkans. By working with recruited agents,

some of whom were reporting by cell phone, and by

simply networking, the British were able to create a

detailed picture of the life of the city, from the bottom up.427 Next came a round of carefully calculated

raids, sometimes synchronized with raids by joint direct attack munitions, or smart bombs, or other precision munitions, which could lead to sniping or to

"lodgements," something like the establishment of

patrol bases that ranged in size up to the battalion

level. For example, a British unit might stage a nighttime raid and then, when withdrawing, leave a sniper

team behind to observe the neighborhood for a few

days, or to snipe at Ba'ath and Fedayeen leaders.428

At the same time, information operations worked on

the minds of the citizenry, by means of leaflets,

broadcasts, or even targeted mobile telephone calls

by General Brims himself. Then there might be a

carefully planned air or artillery raid against a pinpoint target, whose effects the division could observe

on the live feed from the "Phoenix," the British unmanned aerial vehicle. "The way we did it," General

Brims reported to the House of Commons, "was to

build up an intelligence picture, focused raids,

ground raids, air raids, mind raids . . . [the peoplel

wanted to be freed but they could not do it them-

'Murray and Scales make a comment to the effect that the British

Intelligence Service had established a network in Basrah in the

decade after the Gulf War, which if accurate suggests amazing foresight on the part of the British. (Williamson Murray , MajGen

Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War [cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003], p. 145)

According to Murray and Scales, the regime loyalists were the

ones with the cell phones; if you had a cell phone, you could be

a target for a British sniper. (Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 149)

UvIc DM-SD-04-01770

In Pinzguaer reconnaissance vehicles, British Army

soldiers assigned to 2/1 Battery, 16th Air Assault

Brigade, move out on patrol in southern Iraq.

selves, they needed our support, and therefore actually we had them helping us, and they were feeding

us . . . accurate intelligence, worthy targets . . . and

we were able to conduct these raids, and they had a

very significant effect."429

General Brims made it clear he wanted some operations to occur simultaneously even though the

focus of main effort would shift. Initially it would be

on 7 Armored Brigade and Az Zubayr. After Az

Zubayr was determined to have fallen on 4 April

(there was of course no formal surrender ceremony)

the lighter 3 Commando Brigade took over in Az

Zubayr and 7 Armored moved on to augment the effort against Basrah, which remained a division-level

operation. Resistance was becoming progressively

lighter, while the population seemed to become more

welcoming of the British.430 As time went on and the

British became more successful, they received more

information from the citizens of Basrah. On 5 April

they received a tip about the whereabouts of Chemical Ali, and the Coalition launched a smart bomb attack on the building where he was believed to be

hiding. Although unsuccessful, it was believed to

have been successful at the time and, at the least, a

potent demonstration of Coalition power for all on

the Iraqi side to see. Chemical Ali was not in fact captured until the summer. 431

By now the U.S. Army and Marines were launching probes into Baghdad, and there was little chance

that anything that happened in Basrah could disrupt

operations in the north. The most recent raids having

been deemed "very successful," General Brims ordered his division to execute "Operation Sinbad," the

final push against Basrah, which was to come from a

number of directions. It met with "a minimum of resistance from individuals with small arms" who were
A Marriage of Convenience 129

apparently either Ba'athist Party members or Fedayeen.432 One objective after another, the sewage plant,

the party headquarters, the governor's palace, fell

without heavy fighting, something of which Brims

was justifiably proud. Each success created the next

opportunity, which Brims exploited; he commented

later that his intent was to seek the right opportunity

to execute each phase of the plan. By twilight on 6

April, most of Basrah was in Coalition hands, if not

secure.433

Murray and Scales recount a story about the next

day that speaks volumes about the British Army's

work in Iraq. On 7 April, the division committed

paratroopers to the "old town" quarter of Basrah to

finish off any lingering resistance. But the paratroopers found there was little for them to do and began

to withdraw: "As the paras withdraw, Shia crowds

began throwing rocks at British tanks and armored

personnel carriers. One of the battle group commanders immediately sensed what was happening.

He ordered his . . . crews, as well as the infantry, to

get Out of their vehicles, take off their helmets, stow

most of their weapons, and walk out into the agitated

crowd. Immediately the rock throwing ended and

members of the crowd again smiled and clapped

hands for the British troops."434

This remarkable story, which begins by reflecting

Shia fears of abandonment by the Coalition, conveys

something of the British sense for how to handle the

transition to Phase IV, post combat operations. With

his experience in Northern Ireland and the Balkans,

the average British soldier may be one of the world's

foremost experts on the three-block war. He could

fight a conventional battle, defend himself against a

guerrilla or paramilitary threat, and conduct humanitarian operations. He excelled at most of these tasks

in southeastern Iraq. As early as 1 April, in Az Zubayr,

British soldiers started to shed their helmets and patrol in berets. In Az Zubayr, Basrah, and, later, in

According to Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, "the initial plan of

attack was to punch deep into the city and pull back out at night.

[But] the operation on this 'terribly long day' was going so successfully that Major General Brims decided to finish off the Iraqis

with a final stroke." To similar effect, the British liaison officer to

I MEF, Maj Simon Plummer, stated that what started out as a probe

became a four-pronged, final assault when it became clear there

was only minimal Iraqi resistance. While both sources are certainly

consistent with the British practice of exploiting opportunities, as

opposed to "fighting the plan," the firsthand sources suggest a

slightly more deliberate, planned approach. As Gen Brims commented on 10 May, the division had developed a plan and waited

for the right opportunity to execute it, as opposed to simply reacting to events. (Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p.151; Sudarsan

Raghavan, "British Take Most of Basra," MiamiHerald.com, 6Apr03;

MajGen Robin V. Brims intvw, 10May03 [MCHC, Quantico, VA])

Photo courtesy of Field History Branch

As British troops, supported by tanks and armored

personnel carriers, moved into Basrah, they encountered minimum resistance and the city fell without

heavy fighting or loss of 4fe.

Maysan province to the north, the same kind of bottom-up intelligence gathering that served the British

well in combat was very useful in the transition period. Nevertheless, there was only so much this small

force could do among a population of millions.

Like their American counterparts, the British did

not have a definitive plan for Phase IV other than to

be ready to handle a humanitarian crisis which did

not develop anywhere in Iraq, and to hand off to the

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which had focused much of its planning toward the same end. The British government as a

whole and the British military in particular were in

step with the rest of the Coalition in assuming that

"post conflict.., there might be humanitarian or environmental disasters of various sorts, refugee flows,

shortage of food . . . and those kinds of issues. . . ORHA was really designed, as far as we [British]

could see, to prepare mainly for humanitarian issues."435 Another similarity was their response to the

looting that occurred in their zone. Like the Amen-
130 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

cans, the British expected there would be some residual Iraqi police or army structure with which they

could cooperate, and they had considered the possibility that there might be some looting, but they were

taken aback by its scope and breadth.436

As in most other areas in Iraq, once the fighting

stopped virtually all levels of Iraqi government in

and around Basrah simply ceased to exist. The looters stepped into the resulting power vacuum and

went to work with a vengeance in southeast Iraq,

"they ransacked schools, hospitals and took away

things . . beds, chairs, and so on, or they just

wrecked things."437 The House of Commons Defence

Committee judged that "the impact of this looting on

the task of post-conflict reconstruction has been

enormous," in terms of testing the goodwill of the

people, making it difficult for them to return to work

or school, get health care, or even accomplish the

mundane tasks that local government performs for

its citizens.438 They were not prepared to cope with

it; even if they had had the will to do so, they clearly

lacked the numbers and, except in a few dramatic

cases, did not intervene. The I MEF situation report

for 7 April contained the laconic comment about

Basrah: "looting ongoing, looters are only engaged if

looting arms depots."439 The committee concluded

that the scale and shape of the force provided were

A soldier from the Royal Logistics Service Battalion,

10th General Service Regiment, aids local Iraqis in

the distribution of water. Elements of the battalion

made daily water and food runs to Basrah and surrounding villages from the port of Umm Qasr.

jccc 030415-D-1517P-002

best suited to achieving the Coalition's desired effects in the combat phase, but not to carrying those

effects through into the post conflict phase.440'

In the spring of 2003, the situation in southeast

Iraq did not seem as bad as the House of Commons

and others would later say it had been. The forces

on the ground were generally upbeat and believed

they were making good progress. Examples from the

division commander's diary include, on 9 April, the

observation that "the mood in the city is still jubilant

and . . . the buses continue to run"; on 12 April the

report that 16 Air Assault Brigade was able to proceed north to Al An1arah in Maysan province for the

relief in place with Task Force Tarawa without incident; on 13 April the fact that "joint patrolling with

the local police force commenced. . . in Basrah"; and

the conclusion on 21 April that "the local population

are becoming increasingly committed to policing

themselves and preserving their own resources."

Shortly thereafter, on 22 April the United Nations declared the British zone permissive, a few days before

President Bush made his declaration that major combat operations had ended. For the British this was the

end of the combat phase; parts of the division, to include General Brims, made preparations to rotate

home, with a sense of having accomplished their

mission.

One of this British general's last official acts before leaving Iraq was to host a farewell reception for

I MEF commanders and staff at his headquarters in

Basrah International Airport on 10 May to celebrate

not just success on the battlefield, but also the bond

between the Marine and his division. Feelings that

went beyond the usual routine expressions of official goodwill were on display. Senior Marines took

the trouble to fly in from other parts of Iraq on KC130s and went into the reception area in the airport's

"VIP" quarters, which were opulent beyond belief or

good taste, with gilded trimmings, high ceilings, marble floors, and thick carpets, but no working plumbing. Apart from the ultramodern Marine pattern

desert digital utility uniforms, and the unusual British

desert camouflage uniforms, it could have been a

scene from the movie Patton, as white-coated stewards served gin and tonics to tired but happy officers

who felt they had something to celebrate. The division band, very British and old-school, beat retreat

as the sun went down, as if trying to close a chapter

in history.

This led into a somewhat philosophical discussion of whether the

division's actions and effects desired by the division were really in

sync. The point was that the division had won the war, but was

anyone on the British side set up to win the peace?
Chapter 11

Postlude to Combat: Marines and Occupation of Iraq, 2003

Occupation was not a mission that Lieutenant

General James T. Conway relished. He wanted his

Marines to fight the war and then to "recock," to get

ready for the next war. This was the pattern that

came naturally to him and to many other Marines;

the idea was to assault the beaches, seize the objective, and then move on to prepare for the next assault, leaving the occupation duties to others. When

he discussed the issue with a journalist before the

war, General Conway enumerated some of the issues

that an occupier would face in Iraq, including some

no-win choices, such as whether to intervene when

Iraqis turned on one another after Saddam's fall. He

concluded: "If I had a vote, I'would say let us get [I

MEFI Out of here." But he was quick to add that the

Marines would probably have no choice but to involve themselves in the postwar occupation of Iraq in

some form.44'

There followed the decision for I MEF's future Operations and plans officers to think about Phase IV

and to draft an operations plan, even before the

shooting war started. One of their starting points was

liaison with Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) planners and their counterparts at 1

(UK) Armored Division. By design or default, CentCorn had left much of the responsibility for Phase IV

planning to CFLCC, a dramatic change from its approach to Phases I-Ill. The I Marine Expeditionary

Force turned to the British because they had some recent experience, as well as a useful staff study on the

restoration of law and order after combat. The State

Department's comprehensive 'Future of Iraq" study,

which laid out many of the challenges the United

States would face in Phase IV, was considered taboo

for military planners, because it was not compatible

with Pentagon policy-makers' vision of postwar Iraq.

Retired US. Army LtGen Jay M. Garner head 0/the Office 0/Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

greets arriving delegates to the Iraqi Interim Authority Conference in Baghdad. The authority was to govern

Iraq until formal elections could be held. JCCC 030428-F-5918G-016
Coalition Forces Land Component Command also had

a loosely defined relationship with a group known as

Combined Joint Task Force IV (CJTF-IV), so poorly

funded that its members had had to attend trade

shows to obtain office supplies, and with what was,

in effect, CJTF-IV's successor organization, the Office

of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Both

organizations were more or less under the tactical

control of Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan,

but it was no secret that office's chief, retired Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, had direct lines of his

own to the Pentagon.442*

Coalition Forces Land Component Command

came to assign nine governates (roughly equivalent

to provinces) in southern Iraq to I MEF, covering a

territory three times the size of Virginia with a population of 9 to 10 million people, and eventually issued a formal plan known as "Eclipse II" to guide its

subordinates in Phase IV. ("Eclipse I" had been the

plan for the occupation of Germany after World War

II.) Land Component Command focused on security

and emergency repairs to the infrastructure. The assumption was that parts of the Iraqi government

would still be in working order when the shooting

Gen Tommy Franks wrote that he left it to the Pentagon to plan

and run post combat operations and noted that Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance lacked the resources it

needed to do its job. Franks' decision was later criticized. (Franks,

American Soldier, pp. 441, 524, 526)

stopped, able to maintain the infrastructure and that

the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance would be able to step in to take on many

tasks, especially those dealing with humanitarian assistance. As General McKierrian's special assistant,

Terry Moran, commented, CFLCC planned to "leverage the Iraqi Army and. . . the [Iraqi] bureaucracy."'3

The Pentagon's original assumption was that even reconstruction and humanitarian assistance office

would not have to conduct operations for more than

a few months in Iraq, and that after a relatively brief

occupation the Coalition could turn the country over

to an Iraqi government.

Within the framework of Eclipse II, I MEF had a

considerable amount of leeway, and its planners developed their own approach to the matter. First they

did an "intelligence preparation of the battlefield,"

looking at the tribes in the various regions, their infrastructure, and the various threats Marines were

likely to face. They came up with two assumptions:

that the first 6 to 12 weeks would be critical, this was

when precedents would be set, and that it was important not to try to do too much. The Marines had

to keep from involving themselves too deeply in

local affairs and to let the Iraqis solve as many of

their own problems as they could. One of the future

operations officers, Lieutenant Colonel Brian K. McCrary, remembered the many and varied unknowns

that he and his counterparts discussed: how to vet

132 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

DvIc I)F-S1)-05-04667

US. Navy UT1 Chyne Greek, left, from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7, US. Army LtCol Matthew Gapinski, of the 358th Civil Affairs Battalion, and Maj Robert V. Cart-, Civil Affairs team leader with the 15th Marine Ez-peditionary Unit, assess damage to the water treatment facility located at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.
Postlude to Combat 133

Photo courtesy of CFLCC

BGen Richard F. Natonski, commanding general of

Task Force Tarawa, examines an Al Samut missile

that was found at the Amara Soccer Stadium.

and pay local police; how to provide routine municipal services (power and water); how to find, secure,

and exploit suspected weapons of mass destruction

sites; how to secure the many weapons caches from

looting; how to secure and process mass grave sites

of victims of the regime; even how to run prisons.444

This list did not include searching for Saddam Hussein and his sons, along with other prominent members of the regime; such high-priority tasks were

taken for granted.

The interim result of the planners' work was a

scheme for dividing the various responsibilities

among the 1st Marine Division, Task Force Tarawa,

and the British division, which declared it did not

need much U.S. assistance with Phase IV. During a

briefing to General Conway in early March, the planners provided him with options for "transitioning the

force" and "enabling" the subordinate commands, especially by way of groups that would be known as

"governate support teams," small teams of experts

that could deploy to a locality. As plans officer, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Smith, remembered thinking, it was a good beginning; I MEF had defined the

problem. But, he felt, the planners had only been

able to point in the general direction of a solution

hut not to lay one out in detail.445

General Conway announced on 15 April that it

would soon take up its postwar stance in southern

Iraq. The announcement contained the Marines'

trademark tinge of remorse about even having to

conduct Phase IV operations. Lieutenant Colonel

Smith, who doubled as the I MEF spokesman, explained to the press: "It is a tremendous responsibility and it's very complex. We focus the majority of

our efforts on war-fighting. That is what we do. And

so post-hostilities introduce a whole new spectrum

of challenges. . . . We see that [fighting remnants of

the Fedayeen] . .

. as the number one threat. . . . We

are going to aggressively hunt these guys down and

destroy them."446

The next day, General Franks convened a meeting

of his senior commanders at Saddam Hussein's Abu

Ghraib Palace in Baghdad, "an extravagant amalgam

of marble, tile, gold fittings and massive chandeliers,

all surrounded by an azure moat," to seal the Coalition's victory over the dictator and to ratify the plans

for securing the country.447 The Marine expeditionary

force apparently held its commander's conference on

Phase IV on the same day, and division followed suit

shortly thereafter.448

With input from the Army's 358th Civil Affairs

Brigade, which remained a welcome adjunct to the

Marines during the occupation phase, I MEF published its order for Phase IV four days later. The planners' assumptions and the Marines' preference for

keeping the occupation short and looking to the future after leaving Iraq, are clear from the text:

On order, I MEF transitions to security/stability

operations—establishes military authority, defeats remaining Iraqi combatants, maintains

Iraqi territorial integrity, secures WMD

[weapons of mass destruction] in sectors, and

supports humanitarian assistance [and] the

restoration of Iraqi civilian administration/infrastructure JOT [in order to] . . . enable a rapid

transition to follow-on Coalition forces. . . A guiding constant, to "enable," will be the basis

for all that we do. We must enable IOs/NGOs

[international organizations/nongovernmental

organizations] and follow-on Coalition partners

to support the Iraqi people. . . . We must enable the Iraqi people to support and govern
themselves. . . . Our overarching focus will be

establishment of a secure environment as we

disarm remaining Iraqi forces, . . [re-create]

local police forces . . . and develop . . [a small

new] Iraqi military.

We must clearly communicate to the Iraqi people the temporary nature of our mission and

our desire to quickly transition to Iraqi self-determination. . . While accomplishing. . Phase

IV, I MEF must also look "deep" toward the requirement of reconstitution, regeneration and

redeployment [of the forcel.449*

As planned, there had been a blurred transition to

Phase IV. Task Force Tarawa and the British and

American divisions were conducting Phase IV operations before the force published its order, in

Nasiriyah, Basrah, Baghdad, and many localities in

"I MEF Fires helped to prepare the order; once the need for planning deep fires had passed, both I MEF and CFLCC used their skills

as planners of "effects-based operations" for planning and assessing Phase IV operations.

between. This was partly by design, and partly the result of chance. The rolling transition from Phase III to

Phase IV was expected, but the speed and suddenness of the regime's collapse had been breathtaking.

The shift was perhaps clearest for the wing. From

one day to the next, without a great deal of warning,

the kill boxes (the targeting control measure in the air

war) were simply "closed." This apparently happened on 11 April. There would still be calls for air

support of various sorts, but it would no longer he a

routine occurrence, and the wing could start thinking

about drawing down in theater. On the ground, the

violence also tapered off throughout the country, especially in the Marine area of operations in southern

Iraq, although the change for an infantryman or the

driver of a light armored vehicle was a little less dramatic. He still went out Ofl patrol, with his weapons

loaded, and had to be prepared for a fight at any

time.45°

While the British division ran its own occupation,

with some success, by all accounts, General James

Mattis' division set the pace for the occupation in the

Marine governates. He already had a distinct vision

134 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

jccc 030511-M-9792P-018

LtCol Daniel O'Donohue, commanding 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, speaks with local officials of An Samawah

about what can be provided to rebuild the town.
Postlude to Combat 135

I MEF and the Law ofWar: How MarinesTreated Iraqis

Before I MEF crossed the line of departure into

Iraq on 20 March, every Marine received clear

guidance: the enemy was the Iraqi regime, not the

Iraqi people. Starting with General Conway, commanders went to considerable lengths to disseminate,

down to the frontline Marine, the rules of engagement

and the CentCom mandate to limit collateral damage,

along with their own views on avoiding "ttiumphalism" or disrespect for the people and customs of Iraq.

Marines were to be liberators, not conquerors, and

they were to obey the Law of War. This was not an

afterthought, an addendum to other kinds of tt-aining,

but a theme that ran throughout the expeditionary

force's preparations for war. It was especially true for

1st Maline Division, the major subordinate command

most likely to encounter the enemy face-to-face.*

The force's legal office spent the months before

the war working up the rules of engagement and then

preparing and disseminating presentations for the

major subordinate commands. FollOWing I MEF's

lead, General Mattis issued wlitten, detailed guidance

on the Law of War on at least two occasions, in addition to continuously repeating and explaining the division's motto, "No better fliend, no worse enemy." In

one prewar memorandum, he predicted that Marine

"discipline will be severely tested by an unscrupulously led enemy who is likely to commit Law of War

violations," and went on to outline 11 corrunonsense

Law of War "ptinciples."** To the same effect, in late

2002 as he sensed the approach of war, he urged his

commanders to prepare their Marines for the probability of asymmettic attacks and, at the same time, reminded them that "both decisive force and chivalry

will be clitical to freeing Iraq."***

To drive the message home, General Mattis had his

staffjudge advocate, Lieutenant Colonel]ohn R. Ewers,

and his deputy, MajorJoseph A. Lore, deliver classes on

the Law of War and Rules of Engagement to division

units both before and duting the deployment; the general wanted the message to come from an independent expert on the subject, not the unit commander.

Mattis went so far as to have Ewers create a team to

travel around the battlefield and investigate allegations

of wrongdoing before the smoke had cleared. The investigation involved a report that a media vehicle had

been hit by fire from the 1st Tank Battalion. Riding in

a soft-skinned humvee, Ewers was doing just that

when he was wounded on 23 March 2003 near- the

town of A:z. Zubayr in southeastern Iraq.  

It is fair to ask whether the Marines followed this

guidance before and after combat. At this stage, the

evidence, recorded in situation reports and through

contact with Marine lawyers, is lar-gely anecdotal and

may never progress much beyond that. It appears

that by and large most Marines did as they were told,

sometimes even going the extra mile for Iraqis, but

some Marines occasionally departed from the spirit

or the letter of the law.

Perhaps the best-known example of "triumphalism," which was nipped in the bud, was the incident

at Firdos Square in which Corporal Edward Chin

placed an American flag over Saddam's statue, but

quickly replaced it with an Iraqi flag and left it to the

citizens of Baghdad to complete the work of destroying that symbol of the regime. Other, less wellknown examples have to do with the care many

Marines took not to kill civilians, even when there

were legitimate targets nearby. In one case on 2

Aptil, which illustrates the dilerruuas that conscientious Marines faced in Iraq, Major Peter S. Blake, an

AV-8B Harrier pilot, waited for a gap in the civilian

traffic, which had, maddeningly, continued to flow in

and around the battlefield all over the country, before launching his attack against an Iraqi multiple

rocket launcher with a "guided" bomb. Within the

next few seconds, a civilian truck came into view,

and Blake decided to "slew" (or misguide) the bomb

into the Tigris River to save innocent lives. He waited

again for a break in the traffic before launching a

second, and final, attack. Even though at the last moment another civilian truck appeared, he felt this

time he had no choice, since 5th Marines was almost

literally around the comer.** *** There are numerous

other such examples, like the one in early April

when Marines held their fire until they knew

whether an approaching school bus was filled with

enemy fighters or innocent civilians, which turned

out to be the case.****** In another, more personal

example, on 29 March members of the 1st Force

Service Support Group took the trouble to bury a

two-year-old Iraqi boy who had stepped on a landmine and been evacuated to Charlie Surgical Support Company, Health Services Battalion, then in the

vicinity ofJalibah, where doctors ttied in vain to save

his life. The boy had come to the field hospital without identification or relatives, and the Matines and

sailors who were present decided to give him a

proper Muslim butial. They researched the subject

carefully, and then found three Muslims to perform

the ceremony in the prescribed tradition, which in-
136 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

cluded wrapping the body in a shroud and placing

it in a grave with the child's face toward Mecca. The

chief of staff of the force service support group,

Colonel Dan-ell L. Moore, took time out of his busy

day to assist in the ceremony. This small act was one

of decency, pure and simple; no journalists or anglY

townspeople were present to demand that the

Marines "do the right thing."*******

On the other side of the ledger, a few sources

record cases where Marines overstepped the bounds

of fire discipline or military law. In December 2003,

the Marine Corps Times repOlted on the case of eight

Marines charged in the death of a 52-year-old Iraqi

detainee who was found dead in his cell in An

Nasiriyah in the spring of 2003. The charges included

"willfully failing to properly safeguard the health" of

those in custody, as well as assault and making false

official statements.******** According to the deputy

staff judge advocate of 1st Marine Division, Major

Lore, this was one of a handful of similar incidents

that was investigated and resulted either in nonjudicial punishment or cOUlt-maltial. In their book The

March Up, Major General Ray L. Smith and Bing West

tell a st01Y about the time when Brigadier General

John F. Kelly, the assistant commander of 1st Marine

Division, admonished an unnamed battalion commander on 26 March for letting his troops needlessly

shoot at approaching civilians. The Marines had a legitimate concern about suicide bombers in civilian

vehicles, but that did not mean every heedless civilian who came within half a mile of a Marine position

had to be stopped with deadly force. Although West

and Smith go on to discuss their impression that

most Marines agonized over the decision to fire or

not to fire, two journalists who spent time with different units during the combat phase of the war,

Evan Wright and Peter Maas, convey the impression

that some young Marines were all too ready to fire

at civilians, and that their officers and noncommissioned officers did not always do a good job of restraining them. This was especially true after Marines

learned about the fighting at An Nasiriyah, where the

enemy had worn civilian clothes and Marine casualties were heavy. At that point, the enemy for many,

if not most, Marines became any Iraqi with a

gun.*********

It is important to note that at least five such cases

resulted in some form of disciplinary proceedings

against the perpetrators. According to Major Lore,

these proceedings ran the gamut from nonjudicial

punishment to general court-martial. With the passage of time, there will be more clarity on these

events. As of this writing, even basic statistics are difficult to come by. The I MEF staff judge advocate's

command chronology for the first half of 2003 states

that during Phase III of Operation Iraqi Freedom its

primary focus wasrepOlting and investigating violations of the laws of armed conflict. The same document shows that the I MEF staff judge advocate was

involved in some way in one general court-martial,

eight special courts-mmtial, and one summary coultmartial, but without delving into the individual cases

it is difficult to interpret the significance of these statistics.

The bottom line? The I MEF commander and his

subordinates did the right thing. They told vutually

evelY Marine what they expected, and they did so in

some detail. During the war, the Marine leadership

took measures to enforce the standards it had set.

Most Marines appear to have met those standards,

while a handful fell short and were disciplined when

a case could be made against them.

'For basic data on I MEF-level staff judge advocates, see I MEF

SJA ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA). See also Gen Conway's talks on the rules of engagement in Chapter 3 and Col

William D. Durrett inrvws, llFeb03, 9Jun03 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA).

"MajGen James . Mattis, "Commanding General's Guidance

on Law of War," u.d. (2002?) (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers,

MCHC, Quantico, VA). It is interesting to note that one of the six

books on Gen Mattis' reading list for his subordinate commanders was Son Tbang: An Ame-rican War Crime, by Galy

Solis, which was about how the 1st Marine Division handled a

war crime in Vietnam.

'''MajGen James N. Mattis, "Memorandum for All Commanders," 20Dec02 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). The division staff judge advocate, LtColJohn R. Ewers,

remembers having "a number of conversations with both Gen

Mattis and Gen Kelly [the assistant division commander] ..

about law of war ... and the challenges posed in ... asymmetric warfare with a foe who was expected to . . . break the

rules." LtColJohn R. Ewers, e-mails to author, 6, 7Apr04 (Copies

in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

....Ibid.; Maj Joseph Lore, e-mails to author, 5Apr04 (Copies in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

•....Maj Peter S. Blake inrvw, 15Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

......Col Randall W. Holm inrvw, 31May03 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA).

·······Maj Melissa D. Kuo, "Field History Journal," entry for

29Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

..······Gidget Fuentes, "Hearing SCnItinizes Reservists' Handling

of Prisoners in Iraq," Marine Corps Times, Dec03, p. 10.

·········Evan Wright, "The Killer Elite," Rolling Stone, 13Jun03,

24Jul03; Peter Maas, "Good Kills," The New York Times Magazine, 20Apr03. Wright's articles pull few punches and tell the

StOlY of a slice of the war from the corporals and sergeants perspective. They were subsequently expanded into the book

Generation Kill (New York, NY: Putnam, 2004), which, while it

is well written, has had mixed reviews from Marines.
Postlude to Combat 137

for the way he wanted to implement the force order.

Like I MEF, 1st Marine Division would issue general

guidelines. Each of its governates would be run by a

reinforced infantry battalion. The reinforcements

might consist of a governate support team, a psychological operations team, a human intelligence exploitation team, civil affairs elements, and sometimes

engineer or naval construction elements. The battalion commander would have a great deal of autonomy, but given the small size of his force, he would

have no choice but to rely heavily on the international and nongovernmental organizations as well as

whatever Iraqis he could mobilize. Interestingly, he

would work not for his regiment but for division itself; General Mattis' plan was for the regimental staffs

to focus on the retrograde and on preparations for

the next contingency, the "recocking" that figured in

so many plans and talks, This would enable him to

satisfy the twin mandates in the I MEF order, not to

mention the spirit of the order.

It was a dramatic move. General Mattis began the

occupation by sending about 15,000 of his 23,000

Marines home, along with all of his tanks and assault

amphibious vehicles, his armored personnel carriers,

but not his light armored vehicles, which remained

very useful. This was one way to reinforce his message about how to occupy a country, both to his

Marines and to the Iraqis. He still intended for the

Marines to patrol on foot and for the two groups to

become intimately familiar with each other, even to

trust each other. But he did not want "a heavy boot

print" or the "sense of oppression" that could come

if "everywhere you looked you saw a Marine. If we

needed more people . . . I wanted to enlist the Iraqis

[forl . . . our common cause."45'

The 1st Marine Division had three basic policies.

The first was "Do no harm," expressed in the kind of

Mattis aphorism that all Marines could understand:

"If someone needs shooting, shoot him. If someone

does not need shooting, protect him." The second

was to win heart and minds through good works.

The third and final was to be ready at all times to win

the 10-second gunfight.452 The general's statements

of policy branched into specific guidance. Because

he wanted the Marines and the Iraqis to trust each

other, he literally wanted them to look each other in

Cpl Michael C. Brown of the 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion patrols the streets of Al Kut with a

member of the localpolice force. The purpose of the joint foot patrols was to let the residents see the Marines and

police working together in order to put a stop to the looting after the previous government was abolished.

Photo courtesy of CFLCC
138 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

the eye; in fact, one of his directives was for Marines

to remove their sunglasses when speaking to Iraqis.

Another piece of guidance followed from his cornmonsense observation that the Iraqis would cooperate more readily if the Marines helped their children,

and he sent units into the local schools to clean them

up and get them running again.

Again like the force, division began its work in

each province with a survey, with a view to developing a campaign plan tailored to the needs of each

province. Generally speaking, the routine was similar to the one that division had followed in Baghdad

before I MEF had published its order for Phase IV.

Reestablishing security was paramount. Marines

themselves did some of that work, but wanted to vet

and train Iraqi police to take over from them as

quickly as possible. The Iraqis joined Marine-led patrols with a view to gradually switching roles.

The division's various locations included Al

Muthanna (2d Battalion, 5th Marines); Karbala (3d

Battalion, 7th Marines); Al Qadisiyah (3d Battalion,

5th Marines); An Najaf (1st Battalion, 7th Marines);

and Babil (1st Battalion, 4th Marines). The provinces

of Wasit and Dhi Qar were added when 2d Battalion, 25th Marines; 3d Battalion, 23d Marines; and the

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion came

over to division from Task Force Tarawa, which was

rotating home at the end of May.

The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was blessed with

an unusual Iraqi partner who became the local police

chief, Brigadier General Fuad Hani Fans. A wounded

veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, he was said to be critical of Saddam and appears to have been one of the

many Iraqi soldiers who simply wrote their own

travel orders when the war began. Fans moved himself from Hillah, where he had been assigned, to Ad

Diwaniyah, where his wife's family lived. When the

postwar looting began, he organized Iraqi soldiers

into guard forces and protected some of the factories, ammunition supply points, and government

buildings in the city until the U.S. Army appeared.

He happily agreed to help rebuild the area and transferred his loyalties to the Marines when they replaced

the Army in Ad Diwaniyah.453

The experiences of the Weapons Company, 3d

Battalion, 5th Marines, in Ad Diwaniyah in early May

illustrate what it was like for junior Marines charged

with policing a city. The company was quartered in

town in a villa that had belonged to a recently departed strongman. Set in a large, pleasant, walled

compound next to a stream and including a vegetable garden and a more formal garden, the airy,

two-story villa had been looted in early April,

stripped even of doorframes and floor tiles. The

Marines had to begin by cleaning it up and restoring

it. The idea was to turn it into a police station, complete with armory and holding cells. Next the company put out the word that it would be paying local

policemen, which quickly attracted them to the small

base and allowed the Marines to begin the process of

vetting, organizing, training, and equipping them. In

the words of one observer:

This afternoon the Marines were going to pay

the Iraqi [policemeni—and issue weapons.

The Marines frisked the Iraqis as they came in

[to the compound], confiscated (temporarily)

their AK-47s (the small version with the folding

stock . . .) but let them keep their pistols if they

were unloaded. Marines in HMMWVs overwatched the process and armed Marines stood

near the Iraqis as they formed themselves up.

There were traffic police—dressed in white, with

[peaked] hats like those worn by police all over

the world—and security police—dressed in green

outfits with the [black] Iraqi berets—all worn in

different styles from the pillbox (which looks

ridiculous) to the usual Iraqi mushroom shape

(which is not that snappy either). No one

looked hungry—unlike some of the people on

the streets. A couple of the. . . [policemen] bordered on obesity. There were a few officers

among them—[men with more braid who

looked like] they were used to being in charge

and leading (manipulating?) others. I watched

one of them work his wiles on one of the translators used by the Marines. By and large, it

seemed like a good-natured crowd. A few of

them . . . [were] a little nervous as I took photographs—but most smiled and waved at me.44

In the meantime Marines continued to patrol the

streets, apprehend looters, and hold them for a day

or two in a makeshift outdoor prison, performing various kinds of less than pleasant tasks around the

compound, such as filling sandbags or burning waste

in the latrines. Whether the looters learned their lesson was doubtful. One of the looters claimed he was

innocent because he had been hired to loot, saying

the man the Marines should arrest was his employer.

One thing the Marines learned was that no OflC

wanted to be a policeman in Ad Diwaniyah without

a weapon, no one seemed to like policemen, who

bore the double stigma of having worked for the former regime and now of collaborating with the occupiers, and so they quickly decided to allow the Iraqis
Postlude to Combat 139

Base 802668A1 (R0067) 12-99

to carry sidearms and AK-47 rifles.

While some Marines addressed security, others

worked on the infrastructure. At the battalion command post, located on the grounds of a modern but

unfinished medical school campus, there was a thriving Civil Affairs section and a chart showing the lines

of operation, which included such entries as

"Water/Sewage, Electrical, Medical, Education and

Law, Fire, Public Transportation, Food and Distribution." An officer's name was written in next to each

entry. For example, Second Lieutenant Glen J. Bayliff,

whose main qualification for the ob was that he was
140 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

the logistics officer, was responsible for transportation, which meant conducting surveys, remaining

abreast of developments, and helping to coordinate

indigenous efforts with those of international or nOngovernmental organizations. Sometimes Marine Reservists, described as the Corps' "hidden asset" by

one grateful battalion commander, came to the rescue with their civilian skill sets as policemen, lawyers,

or city managers. Many Marines found that neither

the Office of Reconstmction and Humanitarian Assistance nor the organization that replaced it, the

Coalition Provisional Authority, had enough resources to weigh in at the day-to-day, working level.

For the most part, they were left to their own devices. 455

Some national events took place that did have

repercussions on the local level. Before the war, President Bush is said to have approved a plan that

would have put "several hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers On the U.S. payroll and kept them available" for

various tasks from providing security to repairing

roads. But in a surprise move on 23 May, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional

Authority, issued a decree disbanding the army and

canceling pensions.456 Some three weeks later, on 15

June, CFLCC turned over responsibility for the occupation of Iraq to V Corps, while keeping its responsibilities for supporting the force. This was the last

day of the amnesty period under the Coalition decree, which limited the number and types of

weapons Iraqis could possess. The predictable result

of both policies was an upswing in violence against

Coalition forces, especially in the area west of Baghdad around Ar Ramadi and Fallujah, two names that

would become all too familiar to Marines in 2004.

This was not part of I MEF's area of operations,

but it was contiguous to it. Army convoys traveling

from Kuwait to Ar Ramadi and Fallujah had to pass

through northern Babil Province, which did fall

under I MEF. The Marines' future operations staff

"began studying and planning to defeat this threat."

The result was a plan to set up an armored task force

to patrol the area. 457

Built around the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, under the spirited command of Lieutenant

Colonel Andrew Pappas, the task force took the

name "Scorpion" and was clearly undeterred either

by the challenge or the marginal liVing conditions it

faced. A visiting journalist, Pamela Hess of United

Press International, captured the spirit of Camp Scorpion:

Mad Max would turn up his nose.... There is

nothing but garbage and dirt and sand as far as

the eye can see. Marines live and sleep in the

open air of a gravel parking lot, except for the

few one-story concrete buildings that are airconditioned on the rare occasions the generators can be coaxed to work. They have no

chow hall ... and until ... recently ... [sanitary] facilities were a plywood bench with four

holes.... Powerful winds sweep the ground'l,

kicking up massive dust clouds that coat everything in dull brown powder several times a day.

The Marine

I

n April and May 2003, there was almost universal

praise for the young eoli ted Marines who served

in Kuwait and Iraq. The hi torians who deployed

from Washington, D.C., to the field to conduct interviews during and after the war heard story after

story praising the spirit, ingenuity, and "stick-toitiveness" of the individual Marine, and they often

experienced it themselves. It was the small acts that

stood out, whether it was the Marines who sensed,

rightly, that spare parts would be in short supply

up the road in Iraq and topped to strip them from

wrecked vehicles as they moved north, or the amphibious assault vehicle mechanics who repaired

vehicles while they were moving under tow, or the

Marines performing the lonely work of unwinding

the hose reel in the desert, or the determination "to

get there" of the driver of a seven-ton truck making

his way through the sand at night, or caring for children under fire. Whatever his assigned task, each of

these Marines wa al 0 prepared to fight as a rifleman, revalidating one of the basic tenets of the Marine credo. What truck many officers after the war

was how well combat infantrymen adapted to the

demands of occupation duty, SWitching from a

"weapons free" to a "weapons tight" frame of mind.

They marveled at the restraint that these young men

and women were now howing. The praise for the

enlisted Marine sometimes contrasted with what

Marine officer aid about one another, with the

friction that often come from having too many senior officers with trong personalities gathered in one

command or staff.
Postlude to Combat 141

General Conway Sums Up

During the turnover to the multinational diviion at Camp Babylon on 3 eptember, General Conway summed up the past five months in a

few words: "[A]s we headed south out of Baghdad

for the e provinces, we did so with a certain

amount of trepidation. Marines do not traditionally

do nation-building or ecurity operations. We have

no doctrine for it. We were not sure where the resources would come from. And we were not sure

how we would be received by the people ofsouthern Iraq, who had seen An1erican troop attack up

through their governate .... [But] in some regards,

"This is the best we have had it!" laughs Master

Gunnery Sergeant Paul D. Clark from Austin,

the battalion's operations chief,458

The Marines used their imagination to defeat the

enemy. They adopted a Trojan-horse approach, disguising their vehicles as Army supply trucks and then

counter-ambushing the locals who had apparently

been paid by Ba'athists to take potshots at the convoys. They experimented with various other ways to

escOrt the convoys, training the Army truck drivers

in convoy operations and molding Marines and soldiers into one team. Forced to seek cover some distance from the highway, the insurgents took to using

increasingly sophisticated "improvised explosive devices," the small but often deadly bombs that could

be rigged to detonate when vehicles passed by. The

1st Marine Division resisted advice to reply to attacks

with heavy firepower, which its leaders felt might be

counterproductive. Instead they decided to go to the

source, that is trying to neutralize the perpetrators before they struck. This they did by collecting intelligence about them and conducting raids, often on the

compounds of the relatively wealthy. It was possible

to leverage the various civil affairs initiatives to get information; locals grateful for a month or two of electricity or clean water might give the Marines tips

about potential insurgents, and the result might be a

productive raid at dawn, a time chosen by the division to minimize the risk of harm to bystanders. Success reinforced success. When locals saw the Marines

arrest and remove one perpetrator, other Iraqis were

emboldened to pass on a tip that would lead to the

next raid. Lieutenant Colonel Pappas commented that

even if one of the attackers got away after an ambush, often the locals would approach his Marines

a negative can become a positive. A lack of doctrine allowed us to pass some very simple rules to

our Marines and soldiers. They were-treat others a

you would like to be treated. Deal with the people

with fairness and firmness and dignity. And among

other things, we emphasized the children. They are

the future of this country. It is hard to be angry

with someone when he is doing good things for

your children."*

*Sgt Colin Wyers, "I MEF Transfers Authority for Southern Iraq

to Polish-led Division," dtd 3Sep03 (Story No. 200395144422

po ted on MarineLink).

later on and tell them where to find him. 459 Colonel

Pappas' intelligence officer, Major Steven B. Manber,

added that even though the task force was rich in

technical collection assets, 90 percent of its successful operations stemmed from local contacts.460

Similar approaches were applied to more exotic

locales: guarding the border with Iran in desert forts

that looked like the set for a modern-day movie

about the French Foreign Legion; defusing tensions in

the holy Shia cities of Najaf and Karbala; uncovering

and processing mass graves that were filled with the

victims of the Saddam regime; patrolling the border

with Saudi Arabia. Looking for weapons of mass destruction remained high on the Marines' agenda, and

on that of other Coalition forces. The results were as

frustrating as they were unexpected. General Conway commented that "in terms of ... the weapons,

we . . . certainly had our best guess . . . [based on

what] the intelligence folks were giving us. We were

simply wrong.... It remains a surprise to me now

that we have not uncovered weapons.... It is not for

lack of trying. We have been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border

and Baghdad, and they are simply not there."·61

By early summer, Babylon was the scene of

turnover preparations. The location encompassed

both the ancient city and the site of another sumptuous modern palace built by Saddam, on an artificial

hill, where Marines could camp out. There being little electricity and no running water, but lots of big

rooms with high ceilings and marble floors, it was a

relatively cool and clean place to pitch a tent. There

was a certain satisfaction to it; Marines were now in

Saddam's bedroom and ballroom. Both force and division had their headquarters in Babylon, which was

not far from CFLCC's forward headquarters in Bagh-
142 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

DVIC DM-SD-05-11033

Marines of Company K, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, carrying their M16A2 rifles and gear, board a KC-130 11crcules aircraft at Blair Field in Al Kut, Iraq, for the trip home. By November 2003, all Marines and every piece

of their equipment had been withdrawn.

dad. It was here that in late June they received the

various parts of the Polish-led multinational division,

which pitched their tents among the Marine units.

There now began a process of turnovers, the first beginning in early July. Six more reliefs occurred in

fairly rapid succession, not always smoothly. General

Kelly reported that it was "an understatement to say

that the multinational soldiers were shocked at the

unexpected level of danger . . . in [their] zones," to

say nothing of the Spartan living conditions and the

130-degree heat in midsummer, all of which the

Marines sometimes seemed to revel in, even though

there can be little doubt that many, if not most, were

also ready to go home after months, and in a few

cases two or three years, in theater.462 There has always been a strange dynamic in Marine deployments.

On the one hand, most Marines want very badly to

march to the sound of the guns. No one wants to be

left behind when the unit goes to war. But as soon as

the fight is over, everyone wants to go home.

With the exception of the city of An Najaf, General

Conway was able to turn over responsibility for the

zone to the commander of the multinational division

in a ceremony at Babylon on 3 September and send

his troops south. After the turnovers, there was a

general sense of satisfaction among senior Marines

with the force and division's accomplishments. Although some civilian experts noted persistent problems, particularly unemployment and inability to

communicate with Iraqis, there were some undeniable statistics. For example, the number of attacks on

convoys in northern Babil Province was dramatically

"Najaf was the site of a powerful car bomb attack on 29 August.

This postponed the turnover, as did a number of issues that the

Spanish Brigade raised. The turnover finally occurred in early October. Reflecting his general frustration with the process, one I MEF

officer cracked that the turnover with the multinational division

was like "stuffing cats into a seabag," while another found that

many of the foreign soldiers seemed professional and ready to (It)

their job.
lower, and there were no Marines killed in action

during the occupation phase, although some were

wounded and, tragically, others killed in various accidents. General Mattis made the claim that since

early summer the Iraqis had been "running the things

that are most important to people. Are the street

lights on? Is the neighborhood safe? These kinds of

things are already in their hands with the Marines

very much in the background."463

What was left for the dwindling number of

Marines in Iraq and Kuwait was to complete the retrograde process. Through most of the summer, 1st

Force Service Support Group Forward conducted redeployment operations from Kuwait while exercising

command and control over Combat Service Support

Group 11, which continued to support division. Until

mid-October, I MEF Rear was still at Camp Commando, and CFLCC continued to lend its resources

to support the Marines. With the assistance of the

377th Theater Support Command, Marines went

through washdown and the loading onto various

kinds of shipping and aircraft. The two amphibious

task forces had preceded them, both setting sail in

late May with heavy loads of troops and equipment,

each going in a different direction. (Amphibious Task

Force West had taken the more exotic route, stopping for liberty in Australia on the way.) Before flying home, other units left heavy equipment with the

1st Force Service Support Group's "Regeneration

Control Element," which in turn consolidated its

holdings for turn-in to the special purpose Marine airground task force. By 31 October, I MEF was completely gone from theater.464

The Marine Logistics Command morphed into the

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force under

the new commanding general of 2d Force Service

Support Group, Brigadier General Ronald S. Coleman, who came to Kuwait in June to replace

Brigadier General Michael R. Lehnert, who was

bound for a new job at Southern Command. General

Coleman took up residence in the bleak expanses of

Tactical Assembly Area Fox. His original charter was

to repatriate and repair the Maritime Prepositioning

Force equipment that had been used in Iraq, and the

plan was for him to get it done by the spring of 2004.

(Maritime Prepositioning Force equipment was the

Marine equipment that had been prepositioned on

chartered ships that made up the maritime prepositioning force.) But Coleman found a way to get the

job done much faster. One of the threshold issues

was whether it made more sense to do the maintenance and repairs in Kuwait and then reload the

shipping, or to ship the gear first to the United States

and then have it repaired at home. Various factors, inPostlude to Combat 143

DVIC DM-SD-05-1 1370

A multi-national delegation, including LtGen James T Conway, second from right, and LtGen Ricardo S.

Sanchez USA, third from left, Commandei Combined and Joint Task Force 7, participate in the relief-in-place

ceremony at Camp Babylon, Iraq, as Marines assigned to IMarine Expeditionary Force relinquished authority to Polish-led Coalition forces.
144 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

cluding cost and temperatures so high that much of

the time his Marines were literally unable to touch

anything that was made of metal, made it advisable

to choose the second option, and General Coleman

was able to get every piece of Marine equipment out

of Kuwait, and his Marines home, in time for the Marine Corps Birthday in November.465

General Coleman left Tactical Assembly Area Fox

more or less as it had been a year earlier. Now it

was almost as if the Marines had never passed

through Kuwait on their way to Iraq. But there were

already inklings that they would return to theater.

After his work was done, General Coleman remembered a meeting with General Mattis in the summer

of 2003. The division commander was concerned

about the gear that was now in the Special Purpose

Marine Air-Ground Task Force's charge, because he

thought he would need it again shortly.466 lie

seemed to know there would not be much rest for

his Marines.
Chapter 1

Notes

1. Col John A. Tempone, e-mail to author, 16Jan04

(Reynolds Working Papers, Marine Corps Historical

Center [MCHCI, Quantico, VA).

2. See, for example, Jay E. Hines, "Operation Enduring Freedom," 21st Century Defense: US. Joint

Command (Clearwater, FL: Belmont International,

2002), pp. 38-46. This is an excellent overview of the

operation from the CentCom point of view by that

command's historian.

3. For a discussion of the historical context, see

Williamson Murray and MajGen Robert H. Scales, Jr.,

The Iraq War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 2003), pp. 48-59.

4. BGen Christian B. Cowdrey intvw, 26Apr03

(MCHC, Quantico, VA). For a snapshot of Marine operations on and after 11 September, see U.S. Marine

Corps, Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team Summary Report (Quantico, VA: Marine

Corps Combat Development Command, 2003), pp.

47-50, hereafter MCCDC, OEF Summary Report. This

report, by Marines assigned to MCCDC's Studies and

Analysis Division, is a very useful all-around source,

as are the thousands of documents and interviews

that they collected.

5. Gen James L. Jones, Jr. intvw, 14Jun04 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

6. There are numerous sources on the history of

C/JTF-CM. The Cowdrey interview is a good firsthand description of the first few months of its existence. C/JTF-CM also filed an excellent set of

command chronologies.

7. Task Force 58 ComdCs, 27Oct01, 26Feb02 (GRC,

Quantico, VA), p. 4; hereafter TF 58 ComdC. Although it contains some idiosyncrasies, this is an unusually well-written command chronology and gives

the reader an excellent picture of Marine Corps operations against the Taliban.

8. MajGen James M. Mattis, "The Professional Edge,"

Marine Corps Gazette, Feb04, p. 19; Bruce Catton,

Grant Takes Command (Boston, MA: Little, Brown,

1969).

9. See, for example, Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p.

1 16f.

10. MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 62.

11. TF 58 ComdC, p. 14.

12. Ibid., p. 9.

13. Ibid., p. 10.

14. Ibid., pp. 9-16.

15. Ibid.

16. LtCoI Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR, "The U.S. Marine Corps in Review," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May02, p. 84. Other articles about this

operation include BGen Michael E. Ennis, "A New

Operating Environment," Marine Corps Gazette,

Aug02, p. 46f, and Capt Jay M. Holtermann, "The

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's Seizure of Camp

Rhino," Marine Corps Gazette, Jun02, pp. 41-43.

17. BGen James N. Mattis intvw, 20Jan02 (Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC); hereafter Mattis

intvw no. 1. For background, see U.S. Marine Corps,

"Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps

Gazette, Feb02, pp. A-i through A-b. "Seabasing

enables forces to move directly from ship to objectives deep inland and represents a significant advance from traditional, phased amphibious

operations."

18. Col Timothy C. Wells intvw, 27Feb03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA). See also MarForPac ComdC, JulDec01 (GRC, Quantico, VA).

19. MarForPac ComdC, Jul-DecOl (GRC, Quantico,

VA).

20. LtGen Earl B. Hailston intvw, 19May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA); Wells intvw.

21. Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, "OIF Field History

Journal," 2003 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for

10Apr03; hereafter Reynolds, Journal.

22. TF 58 ComdC, p. 32.

23. For a discussion of this topic, see Charles J. Quilter II, With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in

Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.:

History and Museums Division, 1993), pp. 8-11. See,

also Jones intvw.

24. Zinni intvw.

25. Col Stephen W. Baird intvw, 31May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

26. See LtCol Jeffrey Acosta, "OIF Field History Journal," 2003 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for 31Mar03,

hereafter Acosta, Journal. See also Wells and Hailston intvws.

27. LtGen James 1. Conway intvw, 7Dec03 (MCHC,
146 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Quantico, VA).

28. See, for example, MCCDC, OEF Summary Report,

p. 63. Such comments were made to the author by

various Marines during a visit to Tampa in December

2001.

29. MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 57.

30. See, for example, MCCDC, OEF Summary Report,

pp. 9-15, which argues that the operation did not

fully validate expeditionary maneuver warfare but

showed the utility of some of its tenets.

31. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 30Jun03 (U.S.

Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 4. To cite other examples: Gen Hailston also commented on his good

relations with Gen Franks; Gen Mattis repeatedly

stressed the value of establishing good relations with

neighboring commanders of all Services, both joint

and combined. (Hailston intvw; Mattis intvw no. 1;

TF 58 ComdC) See also Reynolds, Journal, entry for

10Nov03, describing a talk by Williamson Murray

and MajGen Robert H. Scales, Jr., during which they

contrasted the personalities, and their relationships,

in the two wars.

32. See, for example, Zinni intvw.

33. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 47f.

34. See, for example, Bing West and MajGen Ray L.

Smith, USMC (Ret.), The March U (New York, NY:

Putnam, 2003), p. 221, hereafter West and Smith,

March U. The current edition of FMFM 1 is known

as MCDP 1. The original edition appeared in 1989.

35. McKiernan intvw no. 4.

36. Ibid. Franks described himself as a maverick.

Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York, NY:

Regan Books, 2004), p. 367. For a critical appraisal

of Gen Franks, see Andrew Bacevich, "A Modern

Major General," New Left Review, Sept-OctO4, pp.

123-134.

37. Zinni intvw.

38. Acosta, Journal.

39. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 60.

40. Kevin Peraino, "Low-Key Leader/LtGen David

McKiernan Is the Soft-spoken Soldier with the Hard

Job of Commanding U.S. Ground Forces in Iraq,"

Newsweek web exclusive, 19Mar03.

41. Conway intvw.

42. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 65.

43. See, for example, Col Christopher G. Wright

intvw, 4Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

44. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 10May03.

45. Conway intvw.

46. Maj Theodore R. McKeldin, III, "OIF Field History

Journal," 2003, entry for 2 April 2003; hereafter McKeldin, Journal.

Chapter 2

47. For a history of the war based largely on reporting by the New York Times and including coverage of

political events, see, for example, Todd S. Purdum,

A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq

(New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2003), p. 20. Two other,

somewhat more controversial books that cover the

political background to the war are Bob Woodward,

Plan of Attack (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster,

2004) and Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies

(New York, NY: Free Press, 2004). Franks, American Soldier, esp. p. 315 and pp. 328-33, describes

the initial taskings and briefings in late 2001.

48. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn,

On Point: The US. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute

Press, 2004), p. 31. This is a very useful and detailed

early work on the conflict. On directives in 2001 to

prepare for a possible war with Iraq, see, for example, Purdum, Time of Our Choosing, p. 20. For the

point of view of a Marine planner at Headquarters

Marine Corps in 2001, see, for example, LtCol James

L. Western intvw, 30Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA),

hereafter Western intvw.

49. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO2 (GRC, Quantico, VA),

Sec 2, p. 16.

50. Ibid., pp. 28-29, 59.

51. LtCol George W. Smith, Jr. intvw, 8Jun04 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA), hereafter G.W. Smith intvw no. 2. For

general background on the planning process, see

also Col Christopher J. Gunther intvw, 24-25May03

(MCHC, Quantico, VA), and LtCol Gregory M. Douquet, 29Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Although he

did not become the I MEF planner until the middle

of 2002, Col Gunther describes how the planning for

Iraq evolved from February 2002 onward. LtCol

Douquet was the senior 3d MAW planner, serving

with I MEF future operations from February 2002 to

April 2003.

52. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 92.

53. Zinni intvw.

54. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 54.

55. Ibid.

56. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. Franks, American Soldier, pp. 382-43 1, describes the evolution of the various plans in 2002 from his point of view, especially

his broad-brush briefings to the president and the

secretary of defense, which led to general guidance

for the planners.

57. LtCol G.W. Smith intvw, 18Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA.), hereafter G. W. Smith intvw no. 1.

58. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
Notes 147

59. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04, based on a

conversation with former PP&O current operations

officer Col Ronald J. Johnson.

60. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

61. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; I MEF ComdC, Jan-JulO2

(GRC, Quantico, VA).

62. MCCDC, OFF Summary Report, p. 54; Fontenot,

et al., On Point, p. 42.

63. McKiernan intvw no. 4.

64. Conway intvw; Hailston intvw.

65. See, for example, MajGen Robert R. Blackman

intvw, 31May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); G. W. Smith

intvw no. 2. On Gen McKiernan's approach to joint

operations from a Marine point of view, see Col

Marc A. Workman intvw, 30Nov02 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

66. McKiernan intvw no. 4.

67. See, for example, the comment on this subject

in Zinni intvw.

68. Fontenot, et a!., On Point, p. 45. This conclusion

assumes that the subordinate commands had the

requisite clearances to access highly classified files.

69. Tom Clancy with Gen Anthony Zinni (Ret) and

Tony Koltz, Battle Ready (New York, NY: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), p. 315.

70. Zinni intvw.

71.MCCDC, Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Assessment Team Summary Report, spring 2004 (Studies and Analysis Division, Working Draft), p. 40,

hereafter MCCDC, OIF Summary Report.

72. There was a complicated set of agreements about

this, which are examined in detail in LtCol LeRoy D.

Stearns, The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Marine

Corps History and Museums Division, 1999), pp. 45-

49, hereafter Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. See

also Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor,

The Generals' War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1995),

p. 311. This is a basic source on Desert Shield/Desert

Storm.

73. MajGen James F. Amos intvw, 16May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA); Hailston intvw.

74. Stearns, 3dMarineAircraft Wing, p. 47.

75. See G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; Reynolds, Journal,

entry for 29Jul03, describing a postwar briefing by

the general officers who commanded I MEF's major

subordinate commands. Capt Ryan M. Walker intvw,

22Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). By and large, once

the war started, the system worked. See MCCDC,

OIF Summary Report, p. 40.

76. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p 13.

77. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 154-183. For a

comment on Iraqi exiles in general, see, for example, Clancy, Battle Ready, p. 345.

78. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

79. The issue of synchronicity is addressed in,

among other sources, LtCol Richard T. Johnson

intvw, 26Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); McKeldin

Journal, entry for 28Feb03; and LtCol Paul J.

Kennedy intvw, 6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). See,

for example, G. W. Smith intvw no. 2, and Douquet

intvw.

80. There are numerous sources on this topic. G. W.

Smith intvw no. 2 contains details of meetings on the

subject, including a meeting between Gens McKiernan and Conway on 29 January 2003 when they discussed, and agreed on, this subject.

81. Quoted in House of Commons Defence Committee, Lessons of Iraq (London, UK: Stationery Office, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 34-35. This is a useful source

with many lengthy, and candid, quotations by British

officers. It appears to be more candid than the Ministry of Defence's "lessons learned" publications on

the war.

82. Fontenot, et al. On Point, pp. 93-94; Terry Moran

intvw, 23Aug03 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.); Col Reed R. Bonadonna,

"Notes from Address by LtGen Conway, CG I MEF to

Officers of Task Force Tarawa," 1Mar03 (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); I

MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), "FutOps" (Documents), "I MEF ROC Drill, 10Mar03."

83. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; see also Gunther intvw.

84. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 74.

85. G. W. Smith intvw no. 1.

86. Maj Evan A. Huelfer intvw, 16Mar03 (U.S. Army

Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.); G. W.

Smith intvw no 2; Fontenot, et a!., On Point, p. 45.

87. On the neoconservative movement, see James

Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War

Cabinet (New York, NY: Viking, 2004). On some of

the neoconservative plans that were presented to

Franks, see Franks, American Soldier, p. 373. For a

general source on the planning process, see Woodward, Plan of Attack. Although Woodward and

Franks cover much of the same ground, Woodward

describes a slightly different dynamic from Franks,

suggesting that the Pentagon, and not CentCom,

generally took the lead in proposing various plans.

For a more critical view of the development of the

administration's policy on Iraq, see W. Patrick Lang,

"Drinking the Kool-Aid," Middle East Policy, summer

2004, pp. 39-60.

88. Although Franks said he had a productive relationship with Donald Rumsfeld and liked working

with the Secretary of Defense, he also expressed
148 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

reservations about his "centralized management

style." See Franks, American Soldier, pp. 313, 333,

362, 373, and 545. Col Kevin Benson, the senior

CFLCC planner, reported similar frustrations with the

Pentagon during the planning stage. Colonel Kevin

Benson, "Brief at Naval War College," 25Aug04

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq

War. Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2003), p. 150, and questions

about "alleged meddling ... by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense—especially in the planning

process" down to the CFLCC/MEF level, in U.S.

Naval Institute, "Interview: LtGen James T. Conway,

USMC," US. Naval Institute Proceedings (November

2003). Some have suggested that war planning for

Iraq needs to be understood in the context of relations between the secretary and the military starting

in 2000. See, for example, Elaine M. Grossman, "To

Understand Insurgency in Iraq: Read Something Old,

Something New," Insider, 2Dec04, containing a comment by LtGen Gregory Newbold, who retired in

2002 from a senior position in the J-3 at the Pentagon, that a cautionary tale about the Pentagon during the Vietnam years "contains remarkable parallels

with today's environment." The book is H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York, NY: Harper

Collins, 1997). It will be a number of years before

the sources are available for anyone to analyze the

Iraq War in the same way.

89. Zinni intvw; Jones intvw.

90. See, for example, LtCol Ronald J. Brown, With

Marines in Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq (Washington, D.C.:

History and Museums Division, 1995); Gordon and

Trainor, The Generals' War, p. 459.

91. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; Huelfer intvw; Moran

intvw. Moran, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, was

General McKiernan's special assistant, privy to a

great deal of information about the plan for the war.

92. Huelfer intvw; Benson, "Brief at Naval War College." Benson and Huelfer cover much the same

ground.

93. Huelfer intvw.

94. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

95. There is an excellent discussion of this topic in

Fontenot, et a!., On Point, pp. 44-47. Once again,

Huelfer and Smith also offer excellent descriptions of

the process from the planner's perspective. Huelfer

intvw; G. W. Smith intvws nos. 1 and 2.

96. Huelfer intvw; G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

97. Huelfer intvw.

98. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

99. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

100. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; intvw with LtCol Yanni

Marok, Royal Marines, 14Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA). Marok joined I MEF future operations staff in

September and developed an excellent relationship

with other planners, including Smith. His interview

is particularly useful for the data it contains Ofl Al

Faw.

101. Marok intvw. This occurred in the 12-13 I)ecember time frame at a conference in Bahrain. Cc)!

Gunther was acting with the knowledge and approval of his superiors.

102. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2: Franks, American Soldier, p. 396, contains his schematic of the various

lines of operation.

103. I MEF ComdC, Jul-DecO2 (GRC, Quantico, VA);

Col George F. Mi!burn intvw, 1Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); P. J. Kennedy intvw.

104. Reynolds Journal, entry for 19Jul04, quoting

from journal kept by one of the officers present.

105. Reynolds Journal, entry for 18Jul04.

106. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 20Jun03 (U.S.

Army Center of Military History, Washington, I).C.),

hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 3. See also Blackman

intvw, Workman intvw, and the television documentary about CFLCC by CNN Presents, "Inside the

War Room" (Atlanta, GA: CNN, 2003), hereafter CNN,

"The War Room."

107. There are numerous sources about this approach, defined as "a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations . . . to attain the

effects required to achieve desired ... outcomes."

Edward C. Mann Ill, Gary Endersby, Thomas R.

Searle, Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology

forJoint Operations (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air

University Press, 2002), p. 2.

108. Col Gregory J. Plush intvw, 15Apr03 (MCIIC,

Quantico, VA); Workman intvw.

109. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 43; Blackman

intvw; CNN, "The War Room."

110. Col Patrick J. Burger intvw, 16Apr03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA). There were approximately 12 Marine

liaison officers at CFLCC.

111. See MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 11, reporting its finding that providing adequate numbers

of staff officers for such components was a challenge

for the Marine Corps.

112. Blackman intvw. See also Workman and Cowdrey intvws. BGen Cowdrey was one of the "January" augmentees. In February 2003 there were some

1,300 members of the CFFLC staff. LtCol Terrance J.

Johns and Maj Robert F. McTague II intvw, 22Feb03

(CFLCC Military History Group intvw, 322-332).
Notes 149

113. Huelfer intvw.

114. See, for example, Fontenot, et a!., On Point, p.

41.

115. Jones intvw.

116. Blackman intvw. This tracks with the comments

by Gen McKiernan and Moran with respect to the

plans that were under discussion in the fall of 2003,

but diverges somewhat from two of the lead planners' comments. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; R. T. Johnson intvw; I MEF ComdC, Jul-Aug02 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2 narrative summaries for G-3 Future Operations and G-5 Plans. For a more general discussion

of planning issues at this time, see Cordesman, Iraq

War, pp. 149-159.

117. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 19Dec02

(U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington,

DC), hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 1. See also R. T.

Johnson intvw.

118. Intvw with LtGen David D. McKiernan, 1May03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 2. This was

a group interview with officers representing both the

Military History Group at Camp Doha and various

Army lessons-learned initiatives. Much of the same

ground is also covered in McKiernan intvw no. 1.

119. Huelfer intvw.

120. Moran intvw.

121. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA),

"command element," p. 41; Blackman intvw.

122. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04.

123. Zinni intvw.

124. I MEF ComdC, lJanO3-30Jun03 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), Future Operations Folder, "Chg I to I MEF

OPLAN 1003V," 16Mar03.

125. McKiernan intvw no. 4; G. W. Smith intvw no.

2.

126. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

127. Ibid.

128. BGen Richard F. Natonski intvw, 26Mar04

(MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Natonski intvw no.

2.

129. See, for example, Huelfer intvw.

130. McKiernan intvw no. 1.

131. Ibid. The phases are nicely laid out in Fontenot,

et a!., On Point, p. xxiii.

132. G. W. Smith intvw no. 1; P. J. Kennedy intvw.

The Conway quote is from a 7 August 2003 interview published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 2003), which also appeared on the

internet at www.usni.org/proceedings/articles03. See

also Reynolds Journal, entry for 1 July 2004.

133. LtCol Jim Hutton intvw, Royal Marines, 4May03

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

134. Col George F. Milburn intvw, 3Aug03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA); hereafter Milburn intvw no. 2. This

is another great topic for a paper, if not a dissertation. The researcher could compare Marine, Army,

and British plans and orders in this conflict and consider questions like: Had the British adapted to the

information age, or were they simply applying lesSons long since learned? How has American planning adapted to the information age? In a war of

"shock and awe," when do planners reach the point

of diminishing returns?

135. Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers (New

York, NY: Henry Holt, 2004), p. 26. This is, in my

view, one of the best books about the war by an embedded journalist, or by anyone else. Atkinson does

an excellent job of portraying the frame of mind of

the staff of the 101st Airborne Division and of putting its accomplishments in context.

136. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen

Conway."

137. McKiernan intvw no. 4.

138. Huelfer intvw.

139. See, for example, Atkinson, In the Company of

Soldiers, p. 107.

140. McKiernan intvw no. 2, 1May03 (group interview at Camp Doha, KU, copy at MCHC, Washington, DC). Fontenot, et al., On Point, pp. 99,102,

offers a summary of the enemy order of battle as it

appeared before the campaign. See also I MEF

ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), especially

Future Operations folder containing "Chg 1 to MEF

OPLAN 1003V," dated 16Mar03, and containing an

assessment of enemy capabilities.

141. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04.

142. MajGen James N. Mattis intvw, 23Jan04 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA); Wright intvw.

143. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen

Conway."

144. Steve Col, "Hussein Was Sure of Own Survival:

Aide Says Confusion Reigned on Eve of War," The

Washington Post, 3 Nov03, p. A-i. This would certainly not have been out of character for Saddam

Hussein, many of whose past decisions were not

thought through, to put it mildly. See also Franks,

American Soldier, p. 558, for a comment on the

work of a Joint Forces Command lessons-learned

team that debriefed Iraqi officers after the war. The

team found that while some Iraqi units were well

prepared, Iraqi command and control, especially at

senior levels, was next to nonexistent. Finally, see

various sources on a CIA report made public in 2004,

including Douglas Jehl, "Inspector's Report Says

Hussein Expected Guerrilla War," The New York
150 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Times, 8Oct04, p. A-6.

145. These issues surfaced repeatedly in oral history

interviews. See for example, Blackman intvw;

Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04; G. W. Smith

intvw no. 2; Zinni intvw; and Clancy, Battle Ready,

pp. 19-20.

Chapter 3

146. Conway intvw.

147. Capt tara A. Bennett, et al., No Better Friend,

No Worse Enemy (Camp Pendleton, CA: 1st Marine

Division, 2004), pp. 6-8. This book has pictures and

text about the division in Operation Iraqi Freedom

and was distributed by the Marine Corps Association.

148. Wright intvw; Col John A. Toolan intvw,

10Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

149. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Ju103 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 3, p. 21. There are numerous other

sources on the division's preparations for war, including Toolan intvw; Wright intvw; and Col Joseph

F. Dunford intvw, 2May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

150. Jones intvw.

151. BGen Edward G. Usher III intvw, 19Mar03

(MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Usher intvw no. 1;

the Commanders and Staff of 1st FSSG, "Brute Force

Logistics," Marine Corps Gazette, Aug03, pp. 34-39.

A field historian was attached to 1st Force Service

Support Group during Operation Iraqi Freedom. She

was Maj Melissa D. Kuo, who is preparing a monograph on combat service support in OIF I. I am indebted to her for reviewing my remarks on logistics

and making suggestions.

152. Hailston intvw; Usher intvw no. 1; LtCol

Michael. D. Visconage, "OIF Field History Journal,"

2003 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for 15Mar03,

hereafter Visconage, Journal; BGen Michael R. Lehnert intvw, 8May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). One of the

Marine field historians assigned to cover OIF I,

CWO-2 William E. Hutson, conducted numerous interviews at the Marine Logistics Command that are

available at the MCHC.

153. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29Jul03. This entry

contains detailed notes on a set of briefings given

by the OIF commanders, including Generals Conway, Mattis, and Amos, at Quantico. The author

worked for General Amos at The Basic School.

154. This is a topic that the U.S. Air Force has explored over the years. See, for example, Robert P.

Givens, Turning the Vertical Flank (Maxwell Air

Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002). Col

Givens outlines the criteria for thinking of air as a

maneuver force, able to exert influence over enemy

units and terrain on its own.

155. These topics are addressed in two excellent interviews with the 3d MAW G-3, Col Jonathan G. Miclot, on 2OMarO3-l9AprO3 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

156. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-JulO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, p. 6.

157. See ibid., and, for a discussion of FARPs, LtCol

David P. Lobik intvw, 24Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA).

158. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-Ju103 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, "G-5 Plans and Exercises."

159. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29Jul03.

160. MCCDC, OIF Summaiy Report, p. 18. This is a

quote from a video teleconference; members of the

Combat Assessment Team routinely attended these

VTCs and made shorthand notes.

161. R. T. Johnson intvw; I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3

(GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, p. 6.

162. See, for example, MCCDC, OIF Summary Report, pp. 20-21.

163. LtCol James W. Western intvw, 20Dec03 (MCI IC,

Quantico, VA).

164. Peraino, "Low-Key Leader." There are other representative discussions of this issue in Mattis intvw

no. 1; Lehnert intvw; and Moran intvw.

165. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 3, "Significant Events."

166. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 2, p. 28.

167. The offload took about 16 days, a few days less

than the allotted time. MCCDC, OIF Summary Report, p. 55.

168. Ibid., p. 20. See also Milburn intvw no. 2 for

comments by the I MEF G-5 on the process.

169. For a discussion of this topic, see Plush intvw.

170. Maj Grant A. Williams, "A Marine's Eye View of

Kuwait," Milinet (an internet service provider that

posted news about the military on the web),

27Feb03. This excerpt is from a report originally

dated 19Feb03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers,

MCHC, Quantico, VA).

171. Peter Baker, "In War, Plans Yield to Improvisation," The Washington Post, 24Mar03, p. A-16.

172. Ibid.

173. Col Steven A. Hummer intvw, 13Feb04 (MCI IC,

Quantico, VA). See also McKeldin Journal, entry for

7Feb03.

174. BGen Cornell A. Wilson intvws, 6Mar03,

3Apr03, 17May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). MCIIC

holds a number of other interviews on Consequence

Management, along with the task force's command

chronology.
Notes 151

175. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 8Apr03.

176. Gen James N. Mattis, "Memorandum for All

Commanders," 20Dec02 (Copy in Reynolds Working

Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

177. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 7Feb03.

178. For additional details see, I MEF ComdC, JanJun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, "FutOps Narrative

Summary"; McKeldin, Journal; CWO-2 William E.

Hutson, "OIF Field History Journal," (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for 4 Feb. 2003, hereafter 1-lutson,

Journal. There is a discussion of this phase in the

intvw of the I MEF's current operations officer, who

pointed out all of the work involved in bringing the

I MEF staff together and producing the plan. Col

Dennis Judge intvws, 11Aug03 and 4Nov03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA), hereafter Judge intvws no. 1 and no.

2.

179. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA),

Future Operations Folder, "I MEF ROC Drill, 10 Mar

03"; McKeldin, Journal, entries for 27Feb03 and

10Mar03. For Task Force Tarawa, see Col Reed R.

Bonadonna, "Field Historian Journal" (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entries for 2 and 10Mar03, hereafter

Bonadonna, Journal. This journal is very well written

and gives the reader a good sense of what it was

like to participate in OIF as a member of Task Force

Tarawa. I recommend it highly both to the general

reader and the reader who wants to learn more

about Task Force Tarawa. In the run-up to combat

operations, subordinate commanders down to the

division level would use the terrain model at Doha

again to brief General McKiernan and his staff on

their plans. MajGen James D. Thurman intvw,

27May03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

180. Mattis intvw no. 1; Hutson Journal, entry for

27Feb03. See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3

(GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, "Narrative Summary,"

chap 3. The division has written an unusually comprehensive narrative summary from its point of view.

181. Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 1Mar03; Conway

intvw.

182. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen

Conway."

183. Mark Mazetti, "Fighting Words: A Marine Commander Readies His Troops for Combat," U.S. News

and World Report web exclusive, 17Mar03; McKeldin

Journal, entry for 16Mar03.

184. Conway intvw; Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p.

65.

185. Conway intvw; Nick Parker, "Countdown to

Conflict," The Mirror, 15Mar03, pp. 6-7; Vanessa

Allen, "Great to Have You Aboard' U.S. General

Tells Brits," The Press Association (web-based wire

service), 14Mar03.

186. Hutson, Journal, entry for 27Feb03.

187, Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 27Feb03.

188. Bennett, et al. No Better Friend, p. 5.

189. Mattis intvw no. 1.

190. Visconage, Journal, entry for 4Mar03.

191. MajGen James F. Amos, e-mail to multiple addressees, "Message from the Wing CG," 20Mar03

(Col Charles J. Quilter II CD-ROM, Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See, for example,

Bonadonna Journal, and Maj Melissa D. Kuo, "Field

History Journal" (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for

18Mar03; hereafter Kuo, Journal.

192. Sarah Oliver, "Not the Beginning, It's the End—

The Words of LtCol Tim Collins," Mail on Sunday,

16Mar03, pp. 6-7.

193. Representative of other articles in the British

press about the affair are Jack Grimston and John Elliott, "First Picture of Man Who Denounced Tim

Collins," Sunday Times (London), 25Ma03, p. 1; and

"Col Tim: The Making of a Modern Hero," Independent on Sunday (London), 25May03, Features

Section. Even though somewhat condescending to

Americans and reservists, the last article is a thoughtful analysis of Collins' participation in the war, from

his prewar speech through the investigation.

194. "The Smearing of Col Tim; The Eve of Battle

Speech," Daily Mail (London), 22May03, p. 9.

195. See, for example, McKeldin, Journal, entries for

5-6MarO3, and Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1 July

2004, reporting on a talk with the G-3 of Task Force

Tarawa.

196. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 18Mar03.

Chapter 4

197. McKiernan intvw no. 1.

198. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen

Conway."

199. Ibid.

200. I MEF Sitrep 181800Z to 191759ZMar03 (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

201. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 93; I MEF Sitrep

171800Z to 181759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); McKeldin Journal,

entry for 18 March 2003; I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3

(GRC, Quantico, VA), command element, sec 2, Current Operations Narrative.

202. See, for examples, Maj Phillip N. Frietze intvw,

14May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), and Maj Daniel E.

Longwell intvw, 1May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); I

MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), Future
152 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Operations, sec 2.

203. I MEF Sitrep 181800Z to 1981759ZMar03 (Copy

in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

204. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

205. See, for example, Kuo, Journal, entry for

20Mar03.

206. Col John C. Coleman intvw, 11Dec03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

207. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 20Mar03; Kuo,

Journal, entry for 20Mar03. Another description of

the day can be found in Peter Baker, "Overtaken by

Events, the Battle Plans Are Tossed Aside," The

Washington Post, 21Mar03, p. A-20.

208. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA);

McKeldin, Journal, entry for 20Mar03.

209. Dunford intvw.

210. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA);

General Mattis' comment is in the 20-2 1Mar03 Sitrep.

211. I MEF Sitrep l8l800ZMarO3 to 191759Mar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers at MCHC, Quantico, VA). On the issue of synchronicity, see lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2,

chap 2, p. 12, and chap 3, p. 6.

212. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-JunO3, sec 3, "Sequential

Listing of Significant Events." See also Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03, containing an excellent

overview of the war from the standpoint of the I

MEF G-3, Col Larry Brown.

213. See, for example, 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-JunO3

(GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, p. 6; Lobik intvw.

214. GySgt Melba L. Garza intvw, 26May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

215. LtCol Gary Smythe, USA, "1st Marine Division

Fire Support Coordination during Operation Iraqi

Freedom," Marine Corps Gazette, Jun04, p. 31.

216. I MEF Sitrep 201800Z to 211759ZMar03 (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

217. I MEF sitreps 201800Z20Mar03 to

21 1759ZMar03, 21 l800ZMarO3 to 22 1759ZMar03,

and 221800ZMar03 to 231759ZMar03 (Copies in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 4.

Chapter 5

218. Christopher Cooper, "How a Marine Lost His

Command in the Race to Baghdad," Wall St reet Journal Online.

219. Capt Daniel J. Wittnam intvw, 1May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA); Bonadonna, Journal, entries for 2 and

10Mar03; 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2.

220. Maj Daniel T. Canfield intvw, 12Dec03; LtCol

Rickey L. Grabowski intvw, 6Apr03; LtCol Royal P.

Mortenson intvw, 7Nov03; Col Ronald L. Bailey

intvw, 8May03, hereafter Bailey intvw (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

221. I MEF Sitrep 2ll800ZMarO3 to 221759ZMar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), p. 125.

222. I MEF Sitrep 221800ZMar03 to 231759ZMar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

223. See West and Smith, March Lp, pp. 41, 59; Company Commanders, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, "The

Battle of An Nasiriyah," Marine Corps Gazette,

Sep03, pp. 40, 46, hereafter Company Commanders,

"Battle of An Nasiriyah." This is a good general

source on the battle.

224. Bailey intvw.

225. See 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2.

226. Natonski intvw no. 2; BGen Richard F. Natonski

intvw, 25Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Natonski intvw no. 1; Bailey intvw.

227. See Maj Walker M. Field, "Marine Artillery in the

Battle of An Nasiriyah," Marine Corps Gazette, Jun04,

pp. 26, 30; Natonski intvw no. 2. The Bonadonna

journal entries for 31 March 2003 and 30 April 2003

discuss his conclusion that the "big problems" were

scant intelligence and fire support. See also Gary Livingston, An Nasiriyah: The Fight for the Bridges (Vernon, NY: Caisson Press, 2004), pp. 172-173, hereafter

Livingston, An Nasiriyah. This is a useful book with

a number of oral histories.

228. Bailey intvw. Col Bailey elaborated on this interview in a conversation with Col Bonadonna,

which was subsequently relayed to the author.

229. Livingston, An Nasiriyah, p. 70.

230. Company Commanders, "Battle of An

Nasiriyah"; Bonadonna Journal, entry for 30Apr03.

231. SSgt Lonnie 0. Parker intvw, 29Mar03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

232. Livingston, An Nasiriyah, p. 91; Wittnam intvw;

Natonski intvw no. 2; Parker intvw.

233. lstLt Michael S. Seely intvw, 3May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

234. Wittnam intvw.

235. Ibid.

236. Livingston, An Nasiriyah, p. 101.

237. Parker intvw.

238. Col Reed R. Bonadonna, "A Short History of
Notes 153

Task Force Tarawa," unpublished manuscript included with Task Force Tarawa ComdC, Jan-JunO3

(GRC, Quantico, VA).

239. Natonski intvw no. 2. See, for example, 'Interview: Lieutenant General James T. Conway, USMC,"

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov 2003).

240. I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03 to 25175ZMar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

241. See, for example, Reynolds, Journal, entries for

1Apr03, 3Apr03; Cordesman, Iraq War, p. 390, quoting a report: "Nasiriyah saw the culmination of this

confusion over MOUT [military operations in urban

terrain]. Commanders were not prepared to go in

and clear a town no bigger than Victorville"; Helene

Cooper, "U.S. Troops Bypass Cities to Avoid Urban

Warfare," Wall Street Journal, 28Mar03; Bonadonna,

Journal, entries for 28Mar03, 31Mar03.

242. Natonski intvw no. 2; Maj [first name unknown]

Bierman, "Summary of Comments Made by Col

Johnson, G-3 Task Force Tarawa," as posted on

CFLCC J-2 website 3Apr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

243. McKiernan intvw no. 4. See also West and

Smith, March U, pp. 35, 41, 48, and C. Cooper,

"How a Marine Lost His Command." Cooper discusses Dowdy's thought process.

244. Natonski intvw no. 2; Reynolds Journal, entry

for 1Apr03; Wittnam intvw; CentCom, "News Release

04-03-51—A-b Friendly Fire Investigation Completed," 29Mar03, hereafter CentCom News Release.

See also Hector Becerra, Robert J. Lopez, and Rich

Connell, "Report Details 'Friendly Fire' Casualties in

Deadly Battle," Los Angeles Times, 28Mar03. The report itself was placed online by Globalsecurity.org.

Its title is M.S. Central Command, "Investigation of

Suspected Friendly Fire Incident Near An Nasiriyah,

Iraq, 23 March 03," dtd 6Mar03. For a thoughtful

overview of friendly fire incidents during OIF-I, see

Peter Pae, "Friendly Fire' Still a Problem," Los Angeles Times, 16May03.

245. Bonadonna, "Short History"; Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 23-24Mar03; West and Smith, March

up, pp. 47, 52.

246. CentCom News Release.

247. West and Smith, March Up, p. 47; LtCol Willard

A. Buhl intvw, 4Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

248. Conway intvw; BuhI intvw; Natonski intvw no.

2; West and Smith, March U, p. 45.

249. Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 23Mar03. For additional impressions of an officer in theater, see Kuo,

Journal, entries for 23-24Mar03. For a relatively mild

example of press commentary, see Peter Baker, "In

War, Plans Lead to Improvisation," The Washington

Post, 24Mar03, p. A-16.

250. McKiernan intvw no. 4.

251. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 23Mar03.

252. McKiernan intvw no. 4.

253. Quoted in Bennett, et al., No Better Friend, p.

51. What appears to be the original quote appears in

Peter Baker, "Arab Volunteers Draw U.S. Scrutiny;

Marine Commander Outraged by Willingness to

Hide Behind Women'," The Washington Post,

9Apr03, p. A-31.

254. Amos intvw.

255. Mattis intvw no. 1; I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03

to 251759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

256. BGen Edward G. Usher III intvw, 11May03

(MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Usher intvw no. 2.

257. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3, sec 2, chap 5.

258. Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 25Mar03.

259. Hummer intvw.

260. Judge intvw no. 1.

261. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 26Mar03; I MEF

Sitrep 261800ZMar03 to 271759ZMar03 (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA),

which contains a reference to the suspension of air

operations at the Jalibah airfield until 0300Z on that

day. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, reports

that the skies finally cleared on the morning of 27

March.

262. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 171-

172.

263. McKiernan intvw no. 3.

Chapter 6

264. Text of Navy Cross citation, approximate date

March 2004. See Cpl Jeremy Vought, "Rochester,

N.Y., Marine Receives Navy Cross," 6May04. Available at

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/look

upstoryref/200456162723. See also lstLt Brian R.

Chontosh intvw, 4May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

265. Mattis intvw no. 1.

266. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, executive summary, p. 2.

267. Kuo, Journal, entry for 24Mar03.

268. Usher intvw no. 2; I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03

to 251759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

269. BGen Michael R. Lehnert and Col John E.

Wissler, "Marine Logistics Command, Sustaining

Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield," Marine

Corps Gazette, Aug03, pp. 30, 33.
154 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

270. BGen Michael R. Lehnert, 7May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA). The division G-3 commented on

shortages from his perspective in interview with

LtCol Clarke R. Lethin, 6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA). For a frank discussion of the MLC and praise

for General Lehnert's innovative leadership, see Hutson, Journal, entry for 25Apr03.

271. Usher intvw no. 2.

272. Commanders and Staff of 1st FSSG, "Brute Force

Combat Service Support: 1st Force Service Support

Group in Operation Iraqi Freedom," Marine Coi7's

Gazette, Aug03, p. 37.

273. Mattis intvw no. 1. The stop order is reported in

I MEF Sitrep 261800ZMar03 to 271759ZMar03 (Copy

in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

274. See, for example, comments by the I MEF G-3,

Larry K. Brown, in Acosta, Journal, entry for

20May03 (describing a postwar symposium in

Bahrain and Brown's comment to the effect that the

Army had wanted a 30-day pause), and G. W. Smith

intvw no. 2. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers,

pp. 168, 171, 177, offers a good reflection of thinking by some senior army officers. They had a combination of concerns over supply shortages and the

Fedayeen, leading to a natural inclination to wait on

reinforcements.

275. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA),

future operations folder, "CG Guidance/discussion

with OPT 25 March 03." See also Elaine Grossman,

"Marine General: Iraq War Pause 'Could Not Have

Come at Worse Time'," Inside the Pentagon, 2Oct03;

Conway intvw.

276. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 245, relies on two

basic kinds of sources, Army note takers who were

present at the meeting, and his interview with General McKiernan on 8Dec03. The note takers' records

are the only firsthand, contemporary, and currently

available, source on the meeting.

277. Quoted in Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 245; see

also Conway intvw.

278. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 28Mar03. The

source for the "several days" quote is "CFLCC Update, 26 Mar 03" (OIF CD No. 65, GRC, Quantico,

VA).

279. I MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

280. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 29Mar03.

281. "Lt GenJ Conway Holds Defense News Briefing

via Teleconference from Iraq," Federal Document

Clearing House Political Transcript of Interview,

30May03, hereafter "Lt Gen J Conway Holds Defense

News Briefing."

282. 1 MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

283. I MEF Sitrep 281800ZMar03 to 291759ZMar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

284. "Lt Gen J Conway Holds Defense News Briefing."

285. I MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3

(GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6.

286. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA).

287. Mattis intvw no. 1.

288. Col Charles J. Quilter II, e-mail to author,

19Feb04 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC,

Quantico, VA). See also I MEF Sitrep 3Ol800ZMarO3

to 311759Z Mar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), containing a brief account of the Amos-Mattis meeting: "True to form, 3rd

MAW pledged its utmost support to the I)iv's

planned scheme of maneuver against the Baghdad

Div, to include addressing critical resupply needs."

289. Col Charles J. Quilter II, e-mail to author,

21Feb04 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC,

Quantico, VA); Stu Saffer, "Col Charlie Quilter, USMC,

The Oldest Marine in Iraq," Laguna Life and People

(Laguna Beach, CA: Mar04), p. 18.

290. The concept of operations is clearly outlined in

I MEF Sitrep Ol800ZMarO3 to 311759ZMar03 (Copy

in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (MCIIC,

Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 5.

291. Mattis intvw no. 1.

292. Ibid.; Toolan intvw; Conway intvw. It was reported in the press at the time. See, for example,

Tony Perry, "Marine Commander Relieved of I)uties," Los Angeles Times, 5Apr03, p. A-15. A later article offered a comprehensive picture of the affair:

C. Cooper, "How a Marine Lost His Command." The

History and Museums Division conducted an interview with Col Dowdy in December 2003.

chapter 7

293. Fontenot, et al., On Point, pp. 49-50, provides

an excellent discussion of this topic, which is the

basis for this paragraph.

294. See Blackman intvw; lstMarDiv ComdC, JanJun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 3.

295. McKiernan intvw no. 1. For further discussion,

see for example, lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC,
Notes 155

Quantico, VA), chap 3, p. 13; and Atkinson, In the

Company ofSoldiers, p. 26, quoting Army Brig. General Benjamin C. Freakley, the assistant division commander for operations of the 101st Airborne

Division; West and Smith, March Up, p. 186, also discuss urban tactics.

296. See Reynolds, Journal, entries for 3-4AprO3; Col

Thomas C. Latsko intvw, 22Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA).

297. Paul Martin, "British Tactics in Basra Praised,"

Washington Times, 3Apr03, p. 1; Peter Baker, "Tactics Turn Unconventional; Commanders Draw Lessons of Belfast in Countering Attacks," The

Washington Post, 20Mar03, p. A-23.

298. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 3, pp. 19-20. For information on

Urban Warrior, see Randolph Gangle intvw, 18Oct02

(MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Gangle intvw.

299. Gangle intvw.

300. Mattis intvw no. 1.

301. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6; West and Smith, March U, p.

207.

302. McKiernan intvws no. 1 and no. 4; Capt

Matthew H. Bazarian intvw, 12Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), containing the comment that during Internal Look, General McKiernan made it clear he did

not want to have two commands splitting Baghdad.

303. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA),

sec 2, future operations command chronology and

future operations folder, "CG Guidance/discussion

with OPT 25 Mar 03"; Buhl intvw.

304. McKiernan intvw no. 4.

305. McKiernan intvw no. 1. For a slightly different

view, see Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03, reporting a briefing by the I MEF G-3 and his statement that "about a week before the war began,

COMCFLCC gave I MEF the mission to secure eastern Baghdad." This is probably a slightly garbled reference to the branch plan.

306. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA)

sec 2, future operations; Fontenot, et al., On Point,

p. 331. Fontenot makes the point that flexibility was

intentionally built into the plan.

307. "CFLCC Update for 3 Apr 03" (Disk 65, OIF-I

Document Collection, GRC, Quantico, VA); CFLCC

Briefings (Disks 55 and 56, OIF-I Document Collection, GRC, Quantico, VA), entries for 3-4AprO3.

308. Amos intvw.

309. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6.

310. The "digital divide" is explored in some detail in

MCCDC, OIF Summary Report.

311. Milburn intvw no. 2.

312. For an excellent discussion of the BUA, see Maj

Robert K. Casey intvw, 27Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA). There is an equally good description of how

the CFLCC staff worked in R. T. Johnson intvw. The

author attended numerous BUAs in March and April

2003 and heard Generals McKiernan and Blackman

talk about how they wanted them to work. See also

Blackman intvw.

313. Judge intvws no. 1 and 2.

314. There are already numerous books and articles

that address the subject of embedding. An excellent

example is Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers. On

the Marine Corps side, there is Capt Dan McSweeney, "Clowns to the Left of Me," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov03, pp. 46-48

315. I MEF Sitrep O5l800ZAprO3 to 061759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

316. West and Smith, March U, p. 207. This was certainly consistent with General McKiernan's command style, which was to tell commanders what he

wanted them to do and then leave the rest up to

them.

317. McKiernan intvw no. 4; Fontenot, et al., On

Point, chapter 6 offers a detailed discussion of the

Army's movements.

318. P. J. Kennedy intvw.

319. I MEF Sitrep O5l800ZAprO3 to 061759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

320. I MEF Sitrep O6l800ZAprO3 to 071759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

321. I MEF Sitrep O7l800ZAprO3 to 081759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

322. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 41.

323. Ibid.

324. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 6Apr03; Judge

intvw no. 1; Hummer intvw.

325. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 49; I MEF Sitrep O6l800ZAprO3

to 071759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

326. I MEF Sitrep O7l800ZAprO3 to 081759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

327. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 51.

328. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 9Apr03.

329. Peter Baker, "Marines' Orders: Ready, Set,
156 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Switch," The Washington Post, 10Apr03, p. A-35,

hereafter Baker, "Marines' Orders." Baker's report

tracks closely with the I MEF sitrep for the same time

period.

330. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 9Apr03.

331. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 50.

332. Capt Brian B. Smalley intvw, 3May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

333. Quoted in Mark Mazzetti, "Lt General James

Conway, Commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force," US. News and World Report web exclusive, 9Apr03, p. 1.

334. Baker, "Marines' Orders."

335. Ibid.; Conway intvw; West and Smith, March

Up, pp. 226-227, 233-234.

336. I MEF Sitrep O8l800ZAprO3 to 091759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); Hummer intvw.

337. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 53; McKeldin, Journal, entry

for 9Apr03; Fontenot, et a!., On Point, pp. 337-338,

quotes a good firsthand account.

338. Reynolds journal, entry for 9Apr03.

339. Dunford intvw; lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3

(GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6.

340. McKiernan intvw no. 4. See also G. W. Smith

intvw no. 1, especially the comment that the Coalition spent a lot of time and effort working Out how

it would break things but not a lot on how it would

put things back together.

341. Mazetti, "Lt General James Conway." See also

Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, p. 287.

342. William Branigin and Anthony Shadid, "Authority Melts in Baghdad," The Washington Post, 9Apr03,

p. A-i.

343. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 10Apr03; I MEF

Sitrep O9l800ZAprO3 to iOl759ZAprO3 (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

344. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 65.

345. I MEF Sitrep O9l800ZAprO3 to 101759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

346. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 65.

347. See, for example, Jehl, "Inspector's Report Says

Hussein Expected Guerrilla War." This does not

mean a guerrilla war was carefully planned.

348. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2; Text of Cmdr, MarForPac, "I MEF (Rein)

Unit Award Recommendation for Presidential Unit

Citation," covering the period 2lMar-24Apr03.

chapter 8

349. Mazetti, "Lt General James Conway." See also

Conway intvw for a report of his discussions with

CFLCC on the north. For an excellent discussion of

the strategic dimension, see McKiernan intvw no. 1.

350. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 14Apr03.

351. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 10Apr03; I MEF

Sitreps O8l800ZAprO3 to 091759ZApr03 and

O9l800ZAprO3 to 101759ZApr03 (Copies in Reynolds

Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

352. I MEF Sitrep 071800ZApr03 to 081759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

353. West and Smith, March U, p. 247, report that in

September 2002, General Mattis ordered a contingency plan for a quick-moving task force to assist

the Kurds if Turkey did not agree to open a northern front.

354. I MEF Sitrep O9l800ZAprO3 to 101759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCIIC, Quantico, VA); lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 7. Except where indicated, the

rest of this chapter is based on these two sources.

The oral histories at MCHC offer additional detail,

such as that of Capt Brian B. Smalley on 3 May 2003,

who provides a vivid description of this operation

from a company commander's point of view.

355. Amos intvw.

356. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 12Apr03; Conway

intvw.

357. I MEF Sitrep l2l800ZAprO3 to 131759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

358. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 7, p. 21.

359. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 12Apr03.

360. I MEF Sitreps l2l800ZAprO3 to 131759ZApr03,

l4l800ZAprO3 to 151759ZApr03 (Copies in Reynolds

Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

361. I MEF Sitrep l8l800ZAprO3 to 191759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCFIC, Quantico, VA).

362. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 8, pp. 4, 6, discuss this phase of the

operation.

363. Ibid.; and Reynolds, Journal, entry for 4May03.

Col Christopher C. Conlin came to much the same

conclusion in his article, "What do you do for an encore?" Marine Corps Gazette, Sep04, pp. 74, 80.

364. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec 2, chap 8, p. 6.

365. Taken from the I MEF Casualty Report as of
Notes 157

14May03, reported in Acosta, Journal, entry for

20May03. These statistics include the casualties from

the British division (20 KIA, 36 WIA). For the other

MSCs, the breakdown was lstMarDiv (22 KIA, 188

WIA); 1st FSSG (2 KIA, 2 WIA); 3d MAW (11 KIA, 8

WIA); Task Force Tarawa (19 KIA, 58 WIA).

Chapter 9

366. Karl Vick and Daniel Williams, "U.S. Troops Arrive in Kurd Area to Open Front," The Washington

Post, 24Mar03, p. A-15.

367. MajGen Henry P. Osman intvw, 19Nov03

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

368. Ibid. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 186, 195,

is an excellent potted history of this campaign within

a campaign. For information on Provide Comfort, as

well as general background, see LtCol Ronald J.

Brown, Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq,

1991: With Marines in Operation Provide Comfort

(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division,

1995).

369. Jones intvw.

370. Col Robert L. Hayes III intvw, 19Nov03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA); Osman intvw; Zinni intvw.

371. Hayes intvw; LtCol James E. Bacchus intvw,

20Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Bacchus

intvw.

372. David Josar, "Marines, Army to Coordinate Humanitarian Aid," European Stars and Stripes,

30Mar03.

373. Bacchus intvw; Notes on meeting with Col Keith

A. Lawless, 25Nov03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Lawless notes.

For the MCLC, reach back worked well, validating a

21st century model for staffing.

374. Lawless notes.

375. Gen H. P. Osman sitrep to Gen J. P. Abizaid,

7Apr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

376. Bacchus intvw.

377. Osman sitrep for 24Mar03.

378. Dan Williams and Philip P. Pan, "U.S. Plans to

Create Military Command in Northern Iraq," The

Washington Post, 25Mar03, p. 20.

379. Lawless notes.

380. Osman intvw.

381. Osman sitreps for 12, 13Apr03.

382. See Col John P. Holden intvw, 9Jun03 (Naval

Historical Center, Washington, DC). At the time, Col

Holden was serving as the deputy chief of staff for

plans for the Sixth Fleet.

383. Col Andrew P. Frick intvw, 12Sep03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

384. Capt Arnaldo L. Colon, ed., "U.S. Marines in

North Iraq, A Certain Force," n.d. (filed with 26th

MEU ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA).

385. Frick intvw. Colon, "A Certain Force," describes

the command arrangement in some detail and is

generally a very good source like a command

chronology narrative. It tracks closely with my other

basic source on 26th MEU, the narrative summary in

the command chronology, lJanO3-30Jun03, but includes more detail.

386. lstLt Sunny-James M. Risler intvw, 15Oct03

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

387. Sgt Bryan L. Gilstrap intvw, 16Oct03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

388. For a general reference with mentions of the incident, the allegations, and the general mood of the

city, see David Rohde, "Deadly Unrest Leaves a

Town Bitter at U.S.," The New York Times, 20Apr03,

p. A-i.

389. Colon, "A Certain Force."

390. Frick intvw.

391. Osman sitrep for 22Apr03.

392. Jones intvw.

Chapter 10

393. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, p. 45.

As noted, this is a great source, full of direct quotations, without the "happy" feel of many British and

American lessons-learned reports.

394. McKiernan intvw no. 1. See Huelfer intvw for

evidence of early consideration of this option by

CFLCC planners.

395. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v, 1, p.

45.

396. R. T. Johnson intvw; Col Jeremy M. F. Robbins

RM, intvw, 16Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Murray

and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 135-136. Murray and Scales

place the relationship between the British and the

Americans in the Gulf in a larger context, discussing

developments over the preceding decade. A recent

arrival on the bookshelves, John Keegan's The Iraq

War (New York, NY: Knopf, 2004) is said to contain

useful data on the British division. Excerpts from the

book on I MEF, however, contain inaccuracies and

add little to the literature.

397. "Major General R. V. Brims CBE,"

www.nato.int/sfor/comssfor/commndsw/t000121a.htm

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico,

VA).

398. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 22Apr03.

399. GOC Directive 1, 3Feb03 (Copy in Reynolds
158 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Working Papers, (MCHC, Quantico, VA). House of

Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, p. 195, describes the

British "manoeuverist" approach in much the same

terms as FMFM 1: "long at the heart of British defense doctrine it is 'one in which shattering the

enemy's cohesion and will to fight, rather than his

materiel, is paramount."

400. See, for examples, G. W. Smith intvw no. 2 and

Hummer intvw.

401. Cmdr 1(UK) Armd Div's Diary, entry for 7Mar03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Commander's Diary.

402. Conway intvw; Ministry of Defence, Operations

in Iraq: First Reflections (London, UK: 7Jul03), p. 8.

403. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, p. 92.

404. Ibid., p. 93.

405. Ibid., p. 94.

406. MajGen Robin V. Brims intvw, 10May03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA). To be sure, there were one or two

instances of friction between British and American

officers.

407. For an excellent discussion of this topic from

the British point of view, see House of Commons,

Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, pp. 193, 195. This report points

out that the distance from being a maneuverist to espousing effects-based planning is not far, they are

certainly consistent.

408. See, for example, Capt Tracey A. Morris intvw,

30Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

409. Latsko intvw; LtCol Edward C. Quinonez intvw,

12May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also Ministry of

Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future

(London, UK: 11Dec03), p. 34: "the implications of

maintaining contact and congruence with US technological and doctrinal advances should continue to

be assessed."

410. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 22Apr03.

411. Jones intvw.

412. Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, "Brief by Maj Chris

Parker," 11May03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

413. Ibid.; Walker intvw; Maj. CaiyJ. Schorsch, "UK

ASE Chronology," n.d. (lOMay 03?) (Copy in

Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

414. Commander's Diary, entry for 20Mar03. The implication was that the Iraqi missiles were fired in retaliation for the U.S. missile strikes against Baghdad

the night before.

415. Ministry of Defense, Lessons for the Future, p.

12.

416. Commander's Diary, entry for 22Mar03.

417. Ministry of Defence, Lessons for the Future, p.

25.

418. Commander's Diary, entry for 23Mar03.

419. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 97.

420. Ibid.

421. Latsko intvw.

422. Max Hastings, "The real story is how we won,"

Sunday Telegraph (London), 7Sep03, p. 4; Murray

and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 144, 153, gives a good

overview of the situation in Basrah.

423. Hastings, "The real story."

424. Ibid.; Commander's Diary, entry for 26Mar03

425. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 99.

426. Commander's Diary, entry for 26Mar03.

427. LtCol I)onald C. Wilson intvw, 22Apr03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA), described the working of British intelligence.

428. See also Latsko intvw.

429. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 98.

430. Commander's Diary, entry for 4Apr03.

431. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 150-151; Commander's Diary, entry for 5Apr03. See K. L. Vantran,

"CentCom Officials Announce Capture of 'Chemical

Ali'," Armed Forces Information Service, 21Aug03.

432. Commander's Diary, entry for 6Apr03. See also

I MEF sitrep O6l800ZAprO3 to 071759ZApr03 (Copy

in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

433. Brims intvw; Latsko intvw.

434. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 152.

435. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, pp. 149-

150.

436. Ibid., p. 62.

437. Ibid., p. 153.

438. Ibid.

439. I MEF sitrep 061800ZApr03 to 071759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

440. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 156. This

led into a somewhat philosophical discussion of

whether the division's actions and effects desired by

the division were really in sync. The point was that

the division had won the war, but was anyone on

the British side set up to win the peace?

Chapter 11

441. Peter Baker, "Top Officers Fear Wide Civil Unrest; Bloodshed among Iraqis Could Create Challenge for Invading Troops," The Washington Post,

19Mar03, p. A-18.

442. Benson, "Brief at Naval War College." Benson

was the senior planner at CFCCC. See, for example,

Bacevich, "Modern Major General," p. 129.

443. Moran intvw. See also G. W. Smith intvw no. 2;

BGen Stephen Hawkins, USA (CG of CJTF-IV) intvw,
Notes 159

14Mar03 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC); Benson, "Brief at Naval War College."

444. LtCol Brian K. McCrary intvw, 6Nov03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

445. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

446. Peter Baker, "U.S. Forces Will Redeploy into 3

Zones," The Washington Post, 16Apr03, p. A-31.

447. Michael R. Gordon and John Kifner, "U.S. Generals Meet in Palace, Sealing Victory," The New York

Times, 17Apr03.

448. I MEF sitrep l4l800ZAprO3 to 151759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), announcing the upcoming meeting.

449. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA)

"I MEF Sequel ("Post Hostility Operations" to I MEF

OpOrd 1003V "Basic Order" and "FutOps Command

Chronology," Jan-JunO3.

450. I MEF sitrep lll800ZAprO3 to i21759ZApr03

(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

451. Margaret Warner, "A Marine's View," Public

Broadcasting System Online News Hour, 26Sep03.

Good sources on the division during this period are

lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA),

sec 2, chap 8; BGen John F. Kelly, "Tikrit, South to

Babylon," Marine Corps Gazette, Feb-AprO4.

452. Max Boot, "Reconstructing Iraq," Weekly Standard, 15Sep03.

453. LtCol Patrick J. Malay intvw, 23Aug03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

454. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 4May03.

455. See, for example, 2dLt Glen J. Bayliff intvw,

4May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol Christopher C.

Conlin intvw, 24Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol

Andrew Pappas intvw, 20Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA); Maj Joseph A. Cabell intvw, 28Aug03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA). LtCol Conlin, "mayor" of An Najaf,

described his experiences in that city, while LtCol

Pappas, head of a counter-insurgency task force, expressed considerable frustration at the lack of support from CPA in restoring the infrastructure.

Criticism of ORHA and CPA was almost universal

among Marines interviewed by field historians. See,

for additional examples, Maj David P. Holahan intvw,

6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol Robert 0. Sinclair intvw, 7Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Both

LtCol Conlin and Maj Cabell commented on how

useful the reservists' skills, and temperament, were.

456. For a balanced discussion of this policy, see

Peter Slevin, "Wrong Turn at a Postwar Crossroads?"

The Washington Post, 20Nov03, p. A-i. This was a

Pentagon decision, opposed by many in the field,

including General Franks. Franks, American Soldier,

p. 441.

457. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA),

sec 2, "FutOps Command Chronology."

458. Pamela Hess, "Raid in Iraq's 'Indian Country',"

5Aug03, United Press International. Journalist Max

Boot visited the same unit shortly after Ms. Hess. See

Boot, "Reconstructing Iraq." LtCol Pappas has described his experiences in a comprehensive interview. Pappas intvw.

459. Pappas intvw.

460. Maj Steven B. Manber intvw, 21Aug03 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

461. Pamela Hess, "General: Iraq Chem-Bio Arms

Intel Wrong," United Press International, 30May03.

462. BGen John F. Kelly, "Part III: Tikrit, South to

Babylon," Marine Coips Gazette, Apr04, p. 46.

463. M. Warner, "Marine's View." See also Kelly, "Part

III: Tikrit," p. 43, who notes: "[O]ur efforts with the

local population assisted us in all but eliminating violence by midsummer." Max Boot shared this view.

Boot, "Reconstructing Iraq." For the dissenting civilian view, see Neil MacFarquhar, "In Najaf, A Sudden

Anti-U.S. Storm," The New York Times, 21Jul03, who

notes: "The lack of Iraqis involved in the reconstruction at all levels, widespread unemployment,

and woefully inadequate means of communicating

[with U.S. forcesi. .

. have combined to fuel an everhigher level of frustration and anger about the American presence."

464. 1st FSSG ComdC, Jul-DecO3 (GRC, Quantico,

VA), sec. 2, "Current Ops Narrative Summary"; I MEF

ComdC, Jul-DecO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec. 2, "S-3

Operations and Training Narrative Summary"; Sgt

Matthew Miller, "1st FSSG Goes Home," 1Oct03

(Story No. 20031015350, posted on MarineLink).

465. BGen Ronald S. Coleman intvw, 20Apr04

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

466. Ibid.

Appendix A

Data Collection and Lessons Learned Process

Although history is not about lessons learned,

even an overview of the first phase of the Iraq War

would be incomplete without a few words about data

collection. Not only did various teams collect a great

deal of material that may be of use to future historians, but the process itself has an interesting development, not to mention some of the lessons learned

themselves.

There was a time, especially after the combat

phase, when it seemed that not enough tent space

and computer terminals existed for all of the lessonslearned teams in theater. The senior lessons-learned

team was from Joint Forces Command in Norfolk,

tasked by the Pentagon to produce the official joint

report. The Army had at least two lessons-learned

groups in theater, including one whose officers produced the admirable preliminary Army history of operation Iraqi Freedom, titled On Point (published by

the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth in

2004). The Marine Corps had the combat assessment

team from the Marine Corps Combat Development

Command at Quantico, Virginia. Then there were the

various groups of field historians, embedded with

"supported" commands. Once deployed, Marine historians worked closely with historians from other

branches, especially their counterparts from the Army

and the joint history staffs, as well as the Marine assessors and, to a lesser extent, other Services. Though

there was a distinct pecking order among these various groups, with historians generally coming from

organizations with relatively little bureaucratic clout,

most got along well. Data was usually shared freely

across the board. There has probably never been so

much available, retrievable, and useful historical

data.1

The recent history of the Marine assessors goes

back to Desert Storm, when battle assessment teams

deployed from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to theater to conduct interviews and

generally gather data to drive postwar analyses and

complement the young Marine Corps Lessons

Learned System, described as "a passive system,"

which relied on units to report their observations.

Most of their interviews were anonymous, which limited their usefulness to historians. Their reports

tended to go into established "channels," that is, they

did not necessarily turn into front-burner action

items. Today, more than 250 four-inch binders of

Desert Storm material sit quietly on the shelves of the

Gray Research Center at Quantico, and Marine Corps

Lessons Learned System is largely unknown to many

parts of the Marine Corps public. After 11 September, Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, Jr., commanding Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, ordered the creation of a combat assessment team that deployed to theater for Afghanistan to

conduct data during, not after, combat operations

and to turn it around quickly, in useful form, to the

advocates, that is, representatives of the various communities of operators in the Marine Corps.

Afghanistan was a useful opportunity to discover

good and bad ways to learn lessons, and the result,

less than a year later, was a sophisticated operation

for the Iraq War led by Colonel Philip J. Exner, a dynamic thinker and operator out of the Combat Development Command's Studies and Analysis Division.

He began by surveying the process:

We . . . looked at past "lessons learned" efforts.

Both authors and audiences were somewhat

skeptical of the value of traditional approaches,

which usually involved publication of a large

tome or collection of documents. . . . One of

the other services published an after action for

a more recent operations that consisted of a

5,000-page main report with an 800-page executive summary and nearly 100,000 pages of appendices. Such monumental efforts often miss

the very change agents who are essential to

converting lessons into lessons learned because

the action officers and decision-makers are

often overwhelmed with information and

chronically short of time.2

With the support of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Exner worked to embed his assessors in

the operating forces for the duration, in much the

same way that journalists and historians were embedded, so that they could develop better access and

understanding and collect better data. The data, in

the form of interviews and surveys, went into a massive database in Quantico that was searchable and, to
162 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

some extent, linked with data collected by historians

working alongside the assessors. The assessment

teams gave briefings to general officers, posted their

findings on Web sites, and produced timely, readerfriendly reports for the advocates. For the more general Marine Corps public, Combat Development

Command published the teams' findings in mercifully

brief summary reports that initially were limited to official use but will no doubt find their ways into libraries and research centers before long.

This is not to say that the operators themselves

neglected the after-action process. What was probably the first comprehensive "hot wash" took place in

Bahrain at MarCent headquarters on 20 May 2003.

The highlight was a blow-by-blow, chronological review of the operation by the I MEF operations officer,

Colonel Larry K. Brown.3 The next major evolution

was sponsored by the Marine Corps Association at

Quantico on 29 July 2003 and featured briefings by

Generals James Conway, James Mattis, James Amos,

and Richard Natonski.4 General Conway's brief was

a very good "executive summary" of the operation.

Some of the specific objectives learned, covered on

that day, were:

The utility of the medical surgical units at the

front; the use of SAPI, or small arms protective

inserts, for the flak jackets; the positive impact

of the embedded media; the concept of combat

maintenance being performed with units on the

fly; and the merit in organizing large, flexible

combat battalions. . . . Challenges [that is, problem areas] included . . . [having two] Marine

Corps supply systems (ATLASS I and ATLASS

II), integration with special operations forces,

casualty reporting, combat identification to prevent fratricide, and the need to sharpen Coalition intelligence sharing.5

A few weeks later, on 4 September 2003 there was

another conference along the same lines, the Marine

Corps Association and U.S. Naval Institute Forum

2003, which featured talks by General Mattis and retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who was not

afraid to strike out on his own and offer some pithy

comments about how he saw the situation in Iraq.

On 4 September, and then again in May 2004, Zinni

criticized the Bush Administration's policy in language a drill instructor might have used; he said he

remembered the official "garbage and lies" during the

Vietnam era and asked if it was happening again.

Zinni also offered a thoughtful analysis of what had

gone wrong, the "10 mistakes" that "history is going

to record." He attacked the reasons for going to war,

arguing that the United States had successfully contained Saddam and that it needed first to resolve the

conflict between Israel and Palestine. "I could not believe what I was hearing about the benefits of this

strategic move. That the road to Jerusalem led

through Baghdad, when just the opposite is true." lie

went on to make a number of points about Phase IV,

citing the inadequate planning at both the Pentagon

and CentCom levels, the inadequate number of

troops for occupation duties, and the, to him amazing, decision to disband the Iraqi Army.6

Marines are likely to remember the observations

about Phase III that emerged from these sessions.

The first had to do with maneuver warfare and the

Marine air-ground task force concept. There was general agreement that the Iraq War had revalidated Marine doctrine in at least two respects, speed and

organization. The I Marine Expeditionary Force was

organized and equipped for speed. It had moved

much faster than the enemy; the enemy never had

time to visualize the outlines of our "observation/orientation/decision/action" loop, let alone get inside it.

The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing had remarkable new

precision technologies (and new doctrines to go with

them) to enable it to fight with unprecedented effectiveness. The wing and the 1st Force Service Support

Group had not just supported division, which was itself organized into mobile, independent combat

teams; they also had been maneuver elements in

their own right, integrated into the overall scheme of

maneuver. With the Marine Logistics Command's and

the 1st Force Service Support Group's contributions,

and the wing's willingness to switch from the deep

battle to close air support to cargo missions on short

notice, the division had been able to go the distance,

to project Marine power on the ground far from saltwater. This was another way of saying that Operation Iraqi Freedom had revalidated the concept of the

"MEF single battle." The I Marine Expeditionary Force

had demonstrated, yet again, that the whole was

greater than the sum of its parts, whether the issue

was deep fires, rear area security, or keeping the supplies flowing to the front.7

Conclusions about Phase IV were more cautious.

No one contradicted General Zinni and claimed there

had been elaborate preparations for Phase IV.

Nowhere in CentCom or Coalition Forces Land Con3-

ponent Command had there been a plan for Phase IV

that was like the plan for Phase III, let alone all of the

preparations that accompanied it, including the cross

talk during its development, the many rehearsal of

concept drills, and the exchange of liaison officers.
Appendix A 163

There were the arguments, like General Zinni's, for

bringing many more American troops to theater for

occupation service. He wanted them to be on hand

before anyone crossed the line of departure, available to stabilize the country as soon as the fighting

ended. A corollary advanced by some was that the

Coalition could have moved more slowly from

Kuwait to Baghdad in order to secure the objectives

that had just been seized. Still, General Mattis repeated his assertion that he had had the right force

mix on the ground in the summer of 2003: a battalion for each province, some aviation, and not much

by way of mechanized assets. It was not necessarily

how many troops there were on the ground, but

what their skills were and what they were being told

to do. That was why he had sent his mechanized

Marines home in May. The mostly infantry Marines

who stayed through the summer quickly proved their

ability to shift and learn on the fly, and they did a

more than creditable job as interim occupiers in the

southern half of Iraq during the relatively brief period between the end of combat operations and their

return home. Like General Mattis, at least one other

senior I MEF officer stressed that one of the keys to

success was getting the timing right, the longer the

occupiers stayed, the greater the challenges would

become. The implication was that the Marines succeeded in the short term but that any occupier would

face problems in the medium and long term.8

Generals Earl Hailston, James Conway, James Mattis, and Anthony Zinni made one overarching point

that will find favor with historians. It was that since

the Iraqi military was comparatively weak, and since

every contingency is unique in its own way, it is dangerous to over generalize from the Iraq War, to imagine that the next war will necessarily be like the last.

1. Two excellent sources about the overall lessons-learned process

are James Jay Carafano, "After Iraq: Learning the War's Lessons,"

Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1664, 3Jul03, and Col

Mark Cancian, "Learning the Lessons of War," 2004, unpublished

article (copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

On the Marines in particular, see LtGen Edward Hanlon, Jr., "Leaning Into the 21st Century," Marine Corps Gazette, Oct03, pp. 15, 17.

2. MccDc, OJF Summary Report, p. 5. For further information, see

MCCDC, "Memorandum for the Commandant of the Marine

corps/Battle Assessment Proposal," 19Jan91, and Officer-incharge, MarCent Assessment Team, "Letter of Instruction (Draft),"

3Dec01 (Copies in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico,

VA).

3. Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03.

4. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29Jul03; Col John P. Glasgow, Jr.,

(Ret), "Editorial," Marine Corps Gazette, Sep03, p. 2.

5. Glasgow, "Editorial."

6. Thomas E. Ricks, "Ex-Envoy Criticizes Bush's Postwar Policy,"

The Washin.gton Post, 5Sep03, p. A-13; Reynolds, Journal, entry for

5Sep03. For a more comprehensive look at lessons learned by Gen

Zinni, see Anthony Zinni, "Ten Mistakes History Will Record about

War in Iraq," Def en.se Monitor, v. XXXIII, No. 3 (May/JunO4), p. 1.

7. The focus here is on Marine lessons learned. The report of the

Joint Forces Command's Joint Center for Lessons Learned highlighted achievements in the joint arena and, except for the issue

of fratricide, was generally complimentary about the "jointness" of

OIF. See, for example, Vernon Loeb, "Pentagon Credits Success in

Iraq War to Joint Operations," The Washington Post, 3Oct03, p. A15.

8. This is not necessarily an argument against medium- or longterm occupations. See, for example, Gunther intvw. With respect

to troop strengths, some lessons-learned analysts disagreed with

Gen Mattis' point of view and argued that especially for Phase IV

the force had to be much heavier than it had been; the Army Chief

of Staff, Gen Eric Shinseki, made the famous comment that it

would take some 400,000 troops to occupy Iraq, and that it would

have been better to sacrifice some speed in order to have deployed more force. A slower, heavier force might have gotten the

job done better than the fast, light force that conquered Iraq in 21

days; the argument, which is generally inconsistent with current

Marine thinking about how to fight the Marine air-ground task

force, is that since the Iraqis were unable to put up much of a

fight, it would have been better to proceed more methodically, securing and occupying terrain as the Coalition moved forward. This

is one of the general implications of Fontenot, et al., On Point,

and of the 3d Infantry Division's after-action report. See, for example, John L. Lumpkin and Dafna Linzer, "Army: Plan for Iraq

Flawed," Hartford Journal, 28Nov03, p. A-i. Two thoughtful articles that explore the background to Phase IV in more depth are

George Packer, "Letter from Baghdad: War after the War; What

Washington Doesn't See in Iraq," New Yorker, 24Nov03, pp. 59,

85; Tom Donnelly and Gary Schmitt, "The Right Fight Now," The

Washington Post, 26Oct03, p. B-i. Packer's article addresses the

general topic of postwar reconstructions in the 21st century, and

concludes that (a) it is lengthy process, (b) it is better when internationalized, and (c) the foundation of success is security. He then

goes on to discuss the Pentagon's initial decision not to plan for a

long-term occupation. Donnelly and Schmitt highlight the Marines'

Small Wars Manual, which they say is as good a guide as any to

postwar reconstruction.

Appendix B

Command List

U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command

March—November 2003*

Commanding General: LtGen Earl B. Hailston

Chief of Staff: Col Peter T. Miller

G-1: Col Richard B. Harris

G-2: Col William E. Rizzio

G-3: Col Timothy C. Wells

G-4: Col Philip N. Yff

G-5: Col Timothy L. Hunter

G-6: Col Kevin B. Jordan

SJA: LtCol Robert E. Pinder

Comptroller: Col Robert J. Herkenham

Combined/Joint Task Force-Consequence Management

Commanding General: BGen Cornell A. Wilson

Marine Logistics Command

Commanding General: BGen Michael R. Lehnert

Special Purpose MAGTF

Commanding General: BGen Ronald S. Coleman

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced)

Commanding General: LtGen James T. Conway

Deputy: MajGen Keith J. Stalder

Chief of Staff: Cal John C. Coleman

G-1: Cal William J. Hartig

G-2: Col Alan R. Baldwin

Col James R. Howcroft

G-3: Col Larry K. Brown

G-4: Col Matthew W. Blackledge

G-5: Col Christopher J. Gunther

Col Anthony L. Jackson

G-6: Col George J. Allen (to 15 June)

Col Marshall I. Considine (after 30 June)

SJA: Col William D. Durrett

Surgeon: Captain Joel A. Lees, USN

Chaplain: Captain John S. Gwudz, USN

I MEF Headquarters Group: Col John T. Cunnings

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)

Commanding Officer: Col Thomas D. Waidhauser

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)

Commanding Officer: Col Richard P. Mills (to 6 June)

Col Ronald J. Johnson (after 6 June)

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Element (-)
166 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Commanding Officer: Col Anthony M. Haslam

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Reinforced)

Commanding General: MajGen James N. Mattis

Assistant Division Commander: BGen John F. Kelly

Chief of Staff: Col Bennett W. Saylor

Cot Joseph F. Dunford

1st Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 1)

Commanding Officer: Col Joseph D. Dowdy (to 4 April)

Col John A. Toolan (after 4 April)

5th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 5)

Commanding Officer: Col Joseph F. Dunford (to 23 May)

Col R. Stewart Navarre (after 23 May)

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)

Commanding Officer: Col Steven A. Hummer

11th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Michael P. Marletto

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa)

Commanding General: BGen Richard F. Natonski

Chief of Staff: Col James W. Smoot

2d Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 2)

Commanding Officer: Col Ronald L. Bailey

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Commanding General: MajGen James F. Amos

Assistant Wing Commander: BGen Terry G. Robling

Chief of Staff: Cot Gerald A. Yingling, Jr.

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Randolph D. Alles

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Cal Mark R. Saverese

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Cal Stuart L. Knoll

Marine Aircraft Group 29 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Cal Robert E. Milstead, Jr.

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Cal Michael C. Anderson

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Ronnell R. McFarland
Appendix B 167

Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-)(Reinforced

Commanding Officer: Col Richard W. Spender

Col Kenneth P. Gardiner

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group

Commanding General: BGen Edward G. Usher III

BGen Richard S. Kramlich

Deputy Commander: Col John L. Sweeney, Jr.

Chief of Staff: Col Darrell L. Moore

Combat Service Support Group 16 (Headquarters Elements)

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael J. Taylor

Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group G 1)

Commanding Officer: Col John J. Pomfret

Col Charles L. Hudson

Combat Service Support Battalion 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion)

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael D. Malone

Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion)

Commanding Officer: Col John T. Larson

Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion)

Commanding Officer: Col Bruce E. Bissett

Transportation Support Group

Commanding Officer: Col David G. Reist

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group

Commanding Officer: RAdm (UH) Charles R. Kubic, USN

United Kingdom Forces

1 Armoured Division (UK) (-)(Reinforced)

Commanding General: MajGen Robin V. Brims

Chief of Staff: Col Patrick Marriott

7 Armored Brigade (British Army)

Commanding Officer: Brig Graham Binns

16 Air Assault Brigade (British Army)

Commanding Officer: Brig Jacko Page

3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-)

Commanding Officer: Brig Jim Dutton

Inc1udes billets in units which served in theater for part but not all of the period covered. Basic sources are MarAdmin 507/03, various

versions, Oct-DecO3, with 'Modifications to the J MEF Presidential Unit Citation Unit Listing," and unit command chronologies.

Appendix C:

Unit List

U.S. Marines In Operation Iraqi Freedom

March-November 2003*

U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command [USMarCent]

Command Element

Combined Joint Task Force-Consequence Management [CJTF-CMI

Marine Corps Logistics Command [MarLogComl

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force [SPMAGTFI

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced) [I MEF]

Command Element

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [15th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 2/11

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (Reinforced) [HMM-1611

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 15 [MSSG-151

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [24th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 2/2]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (Reinforced) [HMIvI-2631

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24 [MSSG-241

Task Force Yankee [TF Yankee]

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Element (-) Filth MEU, CmdElel

2d Battalion, 6th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 6th Marl

Sensitive Site Team Number 3, U.S. Army [SenSiteTm #3, USA]

75th Exploitation Task Force, U.S. Army [75th ExpTF, USA]

Company C, 478th Engineer Battalion, U.S. Army [Co C, 478th EngrBn, USAI

I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [I MEF HqGru]

6th Communications Battalion (-) [6th CommBnl

9th Communications Battalion (-) [9th CommBnl

1st Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st RadBn]

1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st IntelBnl

1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ForReconCol

I Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Element [I MEF LsnEle]

3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [3d ANGLICO]

4th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [4th ANGLICO]

3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAGI

4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAGI
170 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Reinforced) [1st MarDiv]

Headquarters Battalion [HqBn]

1st Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 1 [1st Mar/RCT-1l

Headquarters Company [HqCo]

3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Marl

1st Battalion, 4th Marines [1st Bn, 1st Marl

2d Battalion, 23d Marines [2d Bn, 23d Mar]

2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [2d LARBn]

5th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 5 [5th Mar/RCT-51

Headquarters Company [HqCo]

1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Marl

2d Battalion, 5th Marines [2d Bn, 5th Marl

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Marl

2d Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d TkBn]

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [1st LAIRBn]

Company C, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion [Co C, 4th CbtEngrBnl

7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 7 [7th Mar/RCT-7]

Headquarters Company [HqCo]

1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Marl

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Marl

3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Marl

1st Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st TkBn]

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, (-) (Reinforced) [3d LARBn]

11th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [11th Marl

Headquarters Battery (-) [HqBtiy]

Detachment, Headquarters Battery, 10th Marines [Det, HqBtry, 10th Mar]

1st Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [1st Bn, 11th Marl

2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [2d Bn, 11th Marl

3d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [3d Bn, 11th Mar]

5th Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [5th Bn, 11th Marl

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CbtEngrBn]

2d Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d CbtEngrBnl

1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st ReconBn]

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d AABnI

3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [3d AABn]

4th Assault Amphibian Battalion [4th AABn]

2d Radio Battalion [2d RadBn]

Military Police Company, 4th Marine Division [MPCo, 4th MarDivl

Communications Company, 4th Marine Division [CommCo, 4th MarDivl

Battery I, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry I, 3d Bn, 10th Mar]

Battery R, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines FBtry R, 5th Bn, 10th Mar]
Appendix C 171

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa) [2d MEB TF Tarawa]

Command Element

Detachment, II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [Det, II MEF HqGrul

II Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Element [II MEF LsnElel

2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Originally with Task Force Yankee) [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

Company C, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion [Co C, 4th ReconBnl

2d Force Reconnaissance Company [2d ForReconCol

2d Intelligence Battalion (-) [2d IntelBnl

2d Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 2 [2d Mar/RCT-2]

Headquarters Company [HqCol

1st Battalion, 2d Marines List Bn, 2d Marl

3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Marl

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Marl

1st Battalion, 10th Marines [1st Bn, 10th Marl

Battery F, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry F, 2d Bn, 10th Marl

Company A, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion [Co A, 2d CbtEngrBnl

Company A, 8th Tank Battalion [Co A, 8th TkBnl

Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [Co C, 2d LARBn]

Company A, 2d Assault Amphibious Battalion [Co A, 2d AABnI

Company A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Reinforced) [Co A, 2d ReconBn]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing [3d MAW]

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 [MWHS-3]

Detachment, Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 [Det, MWI-IS-2]

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-i 11

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 11 (-) (Reinforced) LMALS-1 11

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14 (-) [MALS-14l

Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 31 IDet, MALS-31]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) (Reinforced) [VMGR-352l

Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234 [Det, VMGR-2341

Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 452 [Det, VMGR-452l

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 [VMFA-2321

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 [VMFA-25 11

Marine AU Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 [VMFA(AW)-121l

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 225 [VMFA(AW)-2251

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 [VMFA(AW)-5331

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1l

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 [VMAQ-21

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-131

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 (-) [MALS-131

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (-) [VMA-2111

Marine Attack Squadron 214 [VMA-2 141

Marine Attack Squadron 223 (-) [VMA-2231
172 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311l

Marine Attack Squadron 542 [VMA-5421

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-161

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (-) [MALS-161

Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 [Det, MALS-26]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 [HMM-1631

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [I-IMH-4621

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 [HMH-4651

Marine Aircraft Group 29 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-291

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 29 (-) [MALS-29]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 [HIvIM-1621

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (-) [HMM-3651

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 [1-1MH-4641

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 [I-IMLA-269]

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-371

Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 [MWSS-2711

Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 [MWSS-2721

Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 [MWSS-3711

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 [MWSS-3721

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-3731

Company C, 1st Battalion, 24th Marines [Co C, 1st Bn, 24th Marl

Detachment, Military Police, 4th Marine Air Wing [Det, MP, 4th MAW]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced) [MACG-381

Air Traffic Control Detachment B, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 [ATCDet B,

MTACS-2]

Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (Reinforced) [MACS-il

Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 2 [Det, MACS-2]

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28 (-) [MWCS-28}

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (Reinforced) [MWCS-381

Detachment, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 28 [Det, MTACS-28]

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 38 (Reinforced) [MTACS-381

Detachment, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 48 [Det, MTACS-481

Marine Air Support Squadron 1 [MASS-lI

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (Reinforced) [MASS-31

Battery B, 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [Btry B, 2d LAADBnI

3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [3d LAADBn]

Detachments, Marine Air Support Squadron 6 [CA, MA Dets, MASS-61

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1I

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 EVMU-21

Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-39I

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39 (-) [MALS-39]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-1691

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 [HMLA-267]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 [HMM-2681
Appendix C 173

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 [HMM-3641

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [I-IMLA-3691

Atlantic Ordnance, Command Expeditionary Force [LantOrd, CmdExpedForl

Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Corps Air Station,

Miramar [Det, HHS, MCAS Miramarl

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group [1st FSSGJ**

Detachment, Headquarters and Service Battalion [Det, H&SBnl

Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group 1) [CSSG 111

Headquarters [Hql

Combat Service Support Battalion 10 (Combat Service Support Group 1) [CSSB 101

Combat Service Support Company ill [CSSC 1111

Combat Service Support Company 115 [CSSC 1151

Combat Service Support Company 117 [CSSC 1171

Combat Service Support Group 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion) [CSSG 131

Headquarters, 4th Landing Support Battalion [Hq, 4th LdgSptBnl

Combat Service Support Company 133 [CSSC 1331

Combat Service Support Company 134 [CSSC 1341

Combat Service Support Company 135 [CSSC 1351

Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion) [CSSG 141

4th Supply Battalion (-) [4th SupBn}

Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion) [CSSG 151

1st Supply Battalion (-) [1st SupBn]

Combat Service Support Battalion 12 (1st Maintenance Battalion) [CSSB 121

Combat Service Support Battalion 18 (Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force

Service Support Group) [CSSB 181

Combat Service Support Battalion 22 [CSSB 221

Combat Service Support Company 151 [CSSC 1511

Transportation Support Group [TransSuptGrul

1st Transportation Support Battalion (-) [1st TSptBnI

6th Motor Transport Battalion [6th MTBn}

7th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [7th EngrSptBn]

6th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [6th EngrSptBn]

8th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [8th EngrSptBnl

Communications Company, 4th Force Service Support Group [CommCo, 4th FSSG]

Mortuary Affairs Company, 4th Force Service Support Group [MortAffairsCo, 4th FSSGI

Company A, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co A, MP, 4th FSSGI

Company B, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co B, MP, 4th FSSGI

Company C, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co C, MP, 4th FSSGI

Combat Service Support Battalion 16 (Combat Service Support Detachment 16) [CSSB 161

Combat Service Support Battalion 19 (Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group-il)

[CSSB 191
174 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

1st Dental Battalion (-) list DentBnl

Fleet Hospital Three, U.S. Navy [FH 3, USNI

Fleet Hospital Fifteen, U.S. Navy [FH 15, USN]

Preventive Medicine Unit, Navy Environmental Health Center [PM-MMART-5]

Preventive Medicine Unit, Navy Environmental Health Center [PM-MMART-21

Health Services Battalion (1st Medical Battalion) [Health ServBnllst MedBn]

Company A [Co A]

Company B [Co B]

Company C [Co C]

Company E [Co E]

Company F [Co F]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group [I MEFEngrGru]

Command Element:

30th Naval Construction Regiment [30th NCR]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 ENMCB 51

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 [NMCB 7]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 [NMCB 741

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 [NMCB 133]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4 [NMCB 4]

Naval Construction Force Support Unit 2 (-) [NCFSU 2]

Air Detachment, Underwater Construction Team 2 [AirDet, UCT 2]

22d Naval Construction Regiment [22d NCR]

Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 15 [AirDet, NMCB 15]

Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 21 [AirDet, NMCB 21]

Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 25 [AirDet, NMCB 25]

Detachment, Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 303 [Det, CBMU 303]

United Kingdom (UK) Forces

1 Armoured Division (UK) (-) (Reinforced) [1 ArmdDiv (UK)1

7 Armoured Brigade (UK) [7 ArmdBde (UK)]

1st Battalion, The Black Watch [1st Bn, BlackWatch]

1st Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers [1st Bn, RoyalFusiliers]

The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards [RoyalScotsDragoons]

2d Royal Tank Regiment [2d Royal TkRegt]

3d Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery [3d Regt, RoyalHorseArtyl

32 Engineer Regiment [32 EngrRegtl

16 Air Assault Brigade (UK) [16 AirAsltBde (UK)]

1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment [1st Bn, ParaRegt]

3d Battalion, The Parachute Regiment [3d Bn, ParaRegtl

1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment [1st Bn, RoyallrishRgt]

7th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (Parachute) [7th Regt, RoyalHorseArty (Para)]

3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-) [3 CdoBde, RM]

40 Commando Group [40 Cdo, RMI

42 Commando Group [42 Cdo, RM]

29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery [29 Cdo, RoyalArty]

U.S. Army Reinforcing Units

Detachment, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion [Det, 9th PsyOpsBn]
Appendix C 175

354th Public Affairs Detachment [354th PADet]

Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 468th Chemical Battalion

[Det, HHCo, 468th ChemBnl

U.S. Army Space Support Team [USASpaceSptTml

86th Signal Battalion [86th SigBnl

208th Signal Company [208th SigCo]

Company C, 40th Signal Battalion [Co C, 40th SigBnl

3d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery [3d Bn, 27th FIdArtyl

1st Field Artillery Detachment [1st FldArtyDetl

498th Medical Company [498th MedCoI

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade [HHBtry,

108th AirDefArtyBdel

2d Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery [2d Bn, 43d AirDefArtyl

3d Battalion, 124th Infantry [3d Bn, 124th InfI

555th Maintenance Company [555th MaintCo]

Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 378th Support Battalion

[Det, HHCo, 378th SptBnl

777th Maintenance Company [777th MaintCol

727th Transportation Company [727th TransCol

3 19th Transportation Company [3 19th TransCol

319th Transportation Detachment [319th TransDetl

299th Engineer Company [299th EngrCol

459th Engineer Company [459th EngrCol

Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Co., 716th Military Police Battalion

[Det, HHCo, 716th MPBnI

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 265th Engineer Group [HHCo, 265th EngrGrul

130th Engineer Battalion [130th EngrBnl

478th Engineer Battalion [478th EngrBn]

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade

[HHCo, 358th CABdeI

304th Civil Affairs Brigade [304th CABdeI

402d Civil Affairs Brigade [402d CABde)

432d Civil Affairs Battalion [432d CABn]

367th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment [367th MOPADetI

305th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [305th TacPsyOpsCol

307th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [307th TacPsyOpsCol

312th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [312th TacPsyOpsCol

1092d Engineer Battalion [1092d EngrBn]

Marine Follow-on Forces

3d Battalion, 23d Marines [3d Bn, 23d Marl

4th Combat Engineer Battalion (-) [4th CbtEngrBnl

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [4th LARBn]

2d Battalion 25th Marines [2d Bn, 25th Marl

Truck Company, 4th Marine Division [TkCo, 4th MarDivl

Marine Forces with Fifth and Sixth Fleets

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [26th MEU (SOC)l

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 8th Marines [BLT 1/81

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 [HMM-2641

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 26 [MSSG 261
176 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (USS Harry S. Truman CVN 75) [VMFA-1 151

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312 (USS Enterprise CVN 65) [VMFA-3121

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (USS Constellation CV 64) [VMFA-323]

*Unit list based on I Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Award Recommendation, 7Aug03; MarAdmin 507/03,various

versions, Oct-DecO3; "Modifications to the I MEF Presidential Unit citation Unit Listing," with additions and/or corrections provided by

Ms. Annette Amerman, Historian, Reference Branch; and Col Nicholas E. Reynolds' troop list of Oct04. Unit abbreviations are provided

in brackets.

"1st Force Service Support Group reorganized shortly before deployment; previous unit designations are shown in parentheses after the

unit's designation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 1st Force Service Support Group's headquarters elements were reorganized into

Combat Service Support Group 16 [CSSG 16] in April 2003.
Appendix D

Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AA—Assault Amphibian

AAA—Antiaircraft Artillery

AAOE—Arrival and Assembly Operations Echelon

AAV—Amphibious Assault Vehicle

ACE—Aviation Combat Element

ADC—Assistant Division Commander

ADOCS—Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

APOD-Air Port of Debarkation

APOE—Air Port of Embarkation

ASLT—Air Support Liaison Team

ASOC—Air Support Operations Center

ASP—Ammunition Supply Point

ATARS—Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System

ATO—Air Tasking Order

BCL—Battlefield Coordination Line

BCT—Brigade Combat Team

BDA—Battle Damage Assessment

BFT—Blue Force Tracker

BSSG—Brigade Service Support Group

C2PC—Command and Control Personal Computer

CBR—Counter Battery Radar

CE—Command Element

CEB—Combat Engineering Battalion

CENTCOM—U.S. Central Command

CFACC—Coalition Forces Air Component Commander

CFLCC—Coalition Forces Land Component Commander

CG—Commanding General

CGS—Common Ground Station

CIP—Combat Identification Panel

Class Il—Batteries

Class Vill—Medical Supplies

Class TX—Repair Parts

CMOC—Civil-Military Operations Center

CPAO—Consolidated Public Affairs Office

CP-Command Post

CPX—Command Post Exercise

CRAF—Civil Reserve Air Fleet

CSS—Combat Service Support

CSSB—Combat Service Support Battalion
178 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

CSSC-Combat Service Support Company

CONPLAN-Contingency Plan

CONUS-Continental United States

COP-Common Operational Picture

DA-Dispersal Area

DAC-Division Administration Center

DASC-Direct Air Support Center

DIA-Defense Intelligence Agency

DOC-Deployment Operations Center

DS-Direct Support

DSA-Division Support Area

EMCON-Emissions Control

EOD-Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPW-Enemy Prisoner of War

FAC-Forward Air Controller

FAD-Field Artillery Detachment

FARP-Forward Arming and Refueling Point

FOB-Forward Operating Base

FOE-Follow on Echelon

FPOL-Forward Passage of Lines

FRAGO-Fragmented Order

FRSS-Forward Resuscitative Surgery System

FSCC-Fire Support Coordination Center

FSS-Fast Sealift Ships

FSSG-Force Service Support Group

GBS-Global Broadcasting System

GCE-Ground Combat Element

GOSP-Gas-Oil Separation Plant

HDR-Humanitarian Daily Ration

HET-Human Exploitation Team

HF-High Frequency

HHA-Hand Held Assay

HUMINT-Human Intelligence

IC-Intelligence Community

IMINT-Image Intelligence

IMO-Information Management Officer

IO-Information Officer

IPSA-Intermediate Pumping Stations

]DAM-]oint Direct Attack Munition

]MEM-]oint Munitions Effectiveness Manual

]STARS-]oint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

KAF-Kuwaiti Armed Forces

KI-Killbox Interdiction

KLF-Kuwaiti Land Forces

KMOD-Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense
Appendix D 179

LAR-Light Armored Reconnaissance

LASER-Light Amplification through Stimulated Emission of Radiation

LAV-Light Armored Vehicle

LD-Line of Departure

LOC-Line of Communication

LSA-Life Support Area; Logistical Support Area

LTO-Logistics Tasking Order

LZ-Landing Zone

MACCS-Marine Air Command and Control Squadron

MAG-Marine Air Group

MAGTF-Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MANPAD-Man-Portable Air Defense

MARCORSYSCOM-Marine Corps Systems Command

MAW-Marine Aircraft Wing

MCIA-Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MCRE-Marine Corps Readiness Evaluation

MCWL-Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

MDACT-Mobile Data Automated Communication Terminal

MEB-Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF-Marine Expeditionary Force

MEFEX-Marine Expeditionary Force Exercise

MEG-MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) Engineer Group

MEWSS-Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System

MLC-Marine Logistics Command

MOD-Ministry of Defense (Kuwait)

MOl-Ministry of the Interior (Kuwait)

MOPP-Mission Oriented Protective Posture

MOS-Military Occupational Specialty

MOUT-Military Operations on Urban Terrain

MP-Military Policy

MPF-Maritime Prepositional Force

MPSRON-Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron

MRLS-Multiply Rocket Launcher System

MSC-Major Subordinate Command

MSTP-MAGTF Staff Training Program

MWSG-Marine Wing Support Squadron

MWSS-Marine Wing Support Squadron

NBC-Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

NBCRS-Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System

OCD-Obstacle Clearing Detachment

OMC-K Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait

OPCON-Operation Control

OPLAN-Operations Plan

Opp-offload Preparation Party

OPT-Operational Planning Team
180 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

ORCON—Originator Controlled

OSW—Operation Southern Watch

PA—Public Affairs

PALT—Public Affairs Liaison Team

PIR—Priority Intelligence Requirement

PU—Position Location Information

POL—Passage of Lines

POW—Prisoner of War

PRR—Personal Role Radio

QRF—Quick Reaction Force

RA—Regular Army

RCT—Regimental Combat Team

RFF—Requested for Forces

RG—Republican Guard

RGFC—Republican Guard Forces Command

RIP—Relief in Place

ROC—Rehearsal of Concept

ROZ—Restrical Operation Zone

RRP—Refueling and Replenishment Point

RSO&I—Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration

RUC—Reporting Unit Code

SAPOE—Sea and Aerial Ports of Embarkation

SAM—Surface-to-Air-Missile

SASO—Security and Stabilization Operations

SIGINT—Signal Intelligence

SIPRNET—Secret Internet Protocol Routed Network

SLTLP—Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party

SMART-T—Secure Mobile Antijam Reliable Tactcal Terminal

SOP—Standing Operating Procedure

SRG—Special Republican Guard

SPINS—Special Instructions

SPOD—Sea Port of Debarkation

SPOE—Sea Port of Embarkation

SSE—Sensitive Site Exploitation

SSM—Surface-to-Surface Missile

TAA—Tactical Assembly Areas

TACON—Tactical Control

T/E—Table of Equipment

TEWr—Tactical Exercise Without Troops

110—Target Information Officer

TIP—Thermal Identification Officer

T/O—Table of Organization

TPC—Target Procesing Center

TPFDD—Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
Appendix E

Chronology of Events

2001

11 September Al Qaeda terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon.

25 November Marines of Task Force 58 land in Afghanistan as part of

operations to deprive Al Qaeda of its base in that country.

2002

January Marine Forces, Pacific, orders I Marine Expeditionary Force

(I MEF) to focus on preparing for contingencies in the U.S. CentCom

theater; I MEF planners begin more than a year of work on plans to

invade Iraq.

2 August MajGen James N. Mattis becomes Commanding General,

1st Marine Division, and puts the division on a virtual war footing.

11 October The Pentagon orders I MEF to deploy its headquarters staff to

Kuwait for service with Coalition Forces Land Component

Command (CFLCC) under U.S. Army LtGen David D. McKiernan.

15 November I MEF headquarters deploys to Kuwait; newly appointed I MEF

commander LtGen James T. Conway deploys with his

headquarters.

16 November 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW) forward command post, under

MajGen James F. Amos, arrives in Kuwait.

18 November 1st Marine Division forward command post arrives in Kuwait.

24 November CFLCC exercise to test command and control links with I MEF

and other commands, "Lucky Warrior 03-1 ," begins.

9 December CentCom exercise "Internal Look," based on the current version

of the plan for the invasion of Iraq, begins.

2003

January Intense preparations to integrate 1st Armoured Division (UK)

into I MEF occur; this division assumes responsibility for

securing southeast Iraq.

2 January Pentagon issues Deployment Order 177A, soon to be followed

by 177B, which orders the wholesale deployment of I MEF forces

to theater.
182 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

6 January Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill occurs at 3d MAW in Miramar,

California; many ROC drills at various levels follow in the

coming weeks.

13 January Gen Michael W. Hagee becomes the 33d Commandant of the

Marine Corps.

15 January Amphibious Task Force (ATF) East departs Morehead City,

North Carolina, for Kuwait with 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB).

17 January Amphibious Task Force (ATE) West departs San Diego,

California, for Kuwait carrying elements of I MEF.

8 February With I MEF, participation, CFLCC exercise "Lucky Warrior

03-2," labeled "a dress rehearsal" for war, begins.

16 February 2d MEB begins to go ashore in Kuwait to reinforce

I MEF; its aviation elements transfer to 3d MAW control and

the ground elements are redesignated Task Force Tarawa.

24 February Amphibious Task Force West begins offloading its West Coast Marine units in

Kuwait; most other Marines follow by air.

9 March First leaflets dropped on Baghdad urging noninterference with

Coalition operations and soliciting support from Iraqi people.

17 March President Bush issues an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave

Iraq within 48 hours.

18 March Operation Southern Watch aircraft conduct air strikes against

Iraqi early warning radars and command-and-control capabilities; Marine forces are ordered to staging areas.

Night of 19-20 March U.S. Air Force aircraft and Navy vessels conduct unplanned

attack against Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leadership targets

in what becomes popularly known as the "decapitation strike,"

which does not succeed but does initiate hostilities

20 March Iraq retaliates by firing surface-to-surface missiles against

Coalition troops in Kuwait; ground combat operations begin at

night; I MEF is supporting attack to Army's V Corps;

Regimental Combat Team (RCT 5) is leading Marine unit.

21 March Marines capture the Rumaylah oil fields, a key CentCom

objective; Marines and British forces secure the port of Umm

Qasr before moving on the city of Basrah, the most important

British objective.

23 March Task Force Tarawa begins to secure the city of An Nasiriyah and

its key bridges over the Euphrates River and the Saddam Canal;

heavy fighting ensues; friendly fire incident occurs at bridge over

canal; II Marine Expeditionary Force commander MGen Henry P. Osman

deploys to northern Iraq to establish the Military Coordination and Liaison
AppendixE 183

Command (MCLC) under operational control of CentCom in

order to maintain political stability.

Night of 24—25 March "Mother of all sandstorms" begins, slowing operations' tempo

for approximately two days.

24—27 March 1st Marine Division continues to advance up Routes 1 and 7

towards Baghdad.

27 March Operational pause begins to consolidate supply lines and

address threats by irregular Iraqi formations on the ground;

3d MAW air offensive continues unimpeded, rendering many Iraqi

units combat ineffective.

1 April 1st Marine Division resumes progress towards Baghdad; 1st Force Service

Support Group performs herculean feats of resupply with cooperation

of wing and Marine Logistics Command.

3 April U.S. Army troops move on Saddam International Airport, key

terrain outside Baghdad.

5 April U.S. Army conducts first "Thunder Run," armored raid, into Baghdad.

6 April Most of Basrah, Iraq's "second city," is in British hands.

7 April Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT 7) crosses the Diyala River and moves

on outskirts of Baghdad from the east; U.S. Army conducts second "Thunder

Run" into capital.

9 April Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, part of RCT 7,

assist Iraqi civilians in toppling a large statue of Saddam Hussein

in Firdos Square in Marine area of operations, eastern Baghdad.

10 April RCT 5 engaged in heavy fighting at Al Azimilyah Palace and

Abu Hanifah mosque in Baghdad; looting begins as fighting

tapers off; Marines begin post-combat operations.

11—12 April After the collapse of Iraqi authority in northern cities of Mosul

and Kirkuk, Kurdish forces fill the resulting power vacuum,

followed by U.S. forces over succeeding days, including Marines

from 26th MEU (SOC).

13-14 April Task Force Tripoli, out of 1st Marine Division, takes control of

Tiksit, Saddam Hussein's hometown.

20 April The relief in place with U.S. Army in eastern Baghdad is

complete; I MEF redeploys its forces to the southern third of Iraq;

mission is now security, humanitarian assistance, and

reconstruction; focus of effort is seven infantry battalions from

1st Marine Division in seven governates or districts.

22 April 24th MEU (SOC), which had supported Task Force Tarawa, begins
184 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

redeploying to its ships; other Marine units soon follow suit

as part of drawn-down to reduced manning levels that are

maintained throughout the summer.

1 May Under a banner reading "Mission Accomplished," President George

W. Bush announces that major combat operations are over; 26th

MEU (SOC) departs Mosul and returns to its ships in the

Mediterranean.

12 May Ambassador L. Paul Bremer takes over as civil administrator in

Iraq, replacing Jay M. Garner; Bremer's Coalition Provisional

Authority soon replaces Garner's Office of Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance.

22 July Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay are killed in firefight

with U.S. Army in Mosul.

19 August A truck bomb explodes at the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad,

killing 20 people, including the U.N. High Commissioner for

Human Rights.

3 September In Babylon, I MEF conducts a transfer of authority to a Polish-led

international Coalition force; most remaining Marines return to

Continental United States.

10 November Marines of Special Purpose MAGTF celebrate the Marine Corps

birthday in Continental United States after completing the work of repatriating all

Marine Corps equipment from theater.
Appendix F

Presidential Unit Citation

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance in

action against enemy forces in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

from 21 March to 24 April 2003. During this period, I Marine

Expeditionary Force (MEF) (REIN) conducted the 1onest sequence

of coordinated combined arms overland attacks in the history of

the Marine Corps. From the border between Kuwait and Iraq, to the

culmination of hostilities north of Baghdad, I NEF advanced

nearly 800 kilometers under sustained and heavy combat. Utilizing

the devastating combat power of organic aviation assets, coupled

with the awesome power resident in the ground combat elements,

and maintaining momentum through the herculean efforts of combat

service support elements, I MEF destroyed nine Iraqi Divisions.

This awesome display of combat power was accomplished while

simultaneously freeing the Iraqi people from more than 30 years

of oppression and reestablishing basic infrastructure in the

country. During the 33 days of combat, to the transition to

civil-military operations, I NEF sustained a tempo of operations

never before seen on the modern battlefield, conducting four

major river crossings, maintaining the initiative, and sustaining forces. The ferocity and duration of the campaign was made

possible through the skills and determination of the Soldiers,

Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coalition Partners comprising I MEF

at all levels, all echelons, and in all occupational fields. By

their outstanding courage, aggressive fighting spirit, and

untiring devotion to duty, the officers and enlisted personnel of

I Marine Expeditionary Force (REIN) reflected great credit upon

themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps

and the United States Naval Service.

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

For

Secretary Navy

Index

Abizaid, General John P., 115

Abu Ghraib Palace, 133

Acosta, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey, 12

Ad Diwaniyah, 79-81, 86, 106, 112, 138

Afghanistan, 1, 3-4, 7-8, 10-11, 15, 25, 43

Aircraft,

Bell AR-lW Super Cobra, 43

Bell UH-1H Huey, 43

Boeing CH-46E Sea Knight, 43, 86

Fairchild-Republic A-b Warthog, 72

Lockheed KC-130 Hercules, 43, 87, 107, 118, 120

Lockheed P-3 Orions, 71, 86, 125

McDonnell Douglas AV-8 Harrier, 43

McDonnell Douglas FA-18 Hornet, 43

Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion, 44

Air Forces, Central Command, 9

Al Amarah, 38, 80, 85-86, 106, 123, 130

Al Aziziyah, 94

A] Faw, 63, 121-122

Al Faw Peninsula, 57, 123, 125

Al Hamsha, 106

Al Hayy, 106

Al Jaber, 47-48, 58

Al Kut, 26, 38, 57-58, 65, 77, 86-89, 94, 100, 106, 123

Al Muthanna, 138

Al Nida, 39, 77

Al Qadisiyah, 138

Al Qaeda, 1, 3, 5, 15, 43

Al-Majid, Au Hassan, 126

Al-Zibari, General Babekir, 115-116

Ali Al Salem Air Base, 47, 58

Almilyah Palace, 102

Ambush Alley, 70, 75-76

Amos, Major General James F., 20-22, 30, 43, 52, 55, 58,

63, 77, 86-87, 93, 107, 150

Amphibious Task Force West, 46, 143

Amphibious Task Force East, 46

An Najaf, 138, 142

An Nasiriyah, 27, 36-38, 64-69, 73-74, 76-77, 80, 84, 86-87,

90, 106, 109, 134, 136

An Numaniyah, 96, 106, 112

An Numaniyah, Airfield 82

Ar Ramadi, 140

Army Forces, Central Command, 9, 12

Army Units,

V Corps, 18-20, 26-27, 34-35, 78, 81, 83-84, 89, 92-93,

99, 114, 140

3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 28, 33, 65, 67, 90,

92, 94, 98, 111-112

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 32, 92, 107, 111-

113, 120-121

82d Airborne Division, 112

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 94, 120

108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 49

358th Civil Affairs Brigade, 112, 133

377th Theater Support Command, 42-43, 81, 143

507th Maintenance Company, 67, 72-73

Army Special Forces, 119, 120

Operational Detachment-Alpha, 106

As Samawah, 38, 94

Ash Shatrah, 106

Ashmore, Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas D., 124

Atlantic Command, 17

Atkinson, Rick, 38

Az Zubayr, 127-129, 135

Ba'ath Party, 39, 106, 119

Babil Province, 138, 140, 142

Babylon, 141-142

Bacchus, Lieutenant Colonel James E., 116

Baghdad, 26, 28, 32-36, 38-39, 41, 44, 50, 54, 57-58, 61,

64, 78-80, 83-84, 86-87, 89-94, 96-100, 103, 105-107, 109-

114, 126, 134

Baghdad International Airport, 94

Bahrain, 3-4, 7-8, 47

Bailey, Colonel Ronald L., 67-68

Baird, Colonel Stephen W., 10

Baker, Peter, 84, 100, 150, 152-153, 155, 158-159

Barzani, Massoud, 117

Basrah, 28, 33-37, 47, 57, 84, 90, 117, 121-122, 126-130,

134

Basrah International Airport, 28, 130

Bataan (LHD 5), 5, 55

Bayliff, Second Lieutenant Glen J., 139

Bedard, Lieutenant General Emil R., 18-19

Bell, Major Bruce, 71

Benson, Colonel Kevin, 23, 89

Berndt, Lieutenant General Martin R., 114

Bin Laden, Osama, 1

Binns, Brigadier Graham J., 123, 127

Blackman, Major General Robert L., Jr., 31-32, 94, 97

Blair, British Prime Minister Tony, 121

Blake, Major Peter 5., 135

Blume, Captain Charles J., 71

Boaz, First Lieutenant Nathan M., 109

Bonadonna, Colonel Reed R., 55

Boomer, Lieutenant General Walter E., 10

Bremer, Ambassador L. Paul, 140

Brims, Major General Robin V., 52, 122-123, 125-130
188 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Babylon, 141

Commando, 28-30, 46-49, 59, 61, 95, 143

Doha, 2, 8, 19, 29, 48, 51-52, 82, 94, 114

Camp H.M. Smith, I

Lejeune, 27, 33, 45, 113-114

Matilda, 49-50

Pendleton, 3, 20, 26, 30, 41

Ryan, 53

Scorpion, 140

British Units,

1 Armored Division (United Kingdom), 35, 47, 122,

131

3 Commando Brigade, 122, 125, 128

7 Armored Brigade, 54, 122-128

16 Air Assault Brigade, 54, 122, 125, 130

1st Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, 56

Black Watch, 54, 127

Royal Marines, 28, 37, 50, 121, 123

Brown, Colonel Larry K., Jr., 46

Burger, Colonel Patrick J., 31

Bush, President George H.W., 114

Bush, President George W., 1, 28, 53, 56, 58, 130, 140,

182

Camps,

Conway, General James T., 10, 12-14, 19-21, 23, 27, 29,

33-34, 37-39, 41, 43-45, 48, 52-55, 57-59, 61, 68, 76-77, 81,

83-88, 92, 95-96, 100-101, 104, 107, 109, 121-123, 126,

131, 133, 135, 141-142, 150, 153, 156, 162

Crawford, Danny J., 34

Czech Republic, 3

Davis, Richard Harding, 7

Diyala River, 98-99, 100, 107

Dora Farms, 61

Dowdy, Colonel Joseph D., 19, 74-76, 84

Dunford, Colonel Joseph F., 61, 95, 103

Edney, Admiral Leon A., 17

El Alamein, 127

Euphrates River, 34, 37, 47, 65

European Command, 32, 114-115

Ewers, Lieutenant Colonel John R., 135

Exercises,

Bright Star, 3

Internal Look 03, 32

Lucky Sentinel, 16-17

Lucky Warrior 03-1, 32

Lucky Warrior 03-2, 52

Fallujah, 140

Fans, Brigadier General Fuad Hani, 138

Fedayeen, Saddam, 39, 71, 76-78, 80, 83, 94, 101, 110,

125-126, 128-129

Firdos Square, 101, 135

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1: Warfighting, 12

Fort Campbell, 28

Fort Leavenworth, 20, 23-24

Forward Operating Base Rhino, 7

Franks, Frederick M., Jr., 17

Franks, General Tommy R., 1, 8-9, 12, 15, 18, 23, 25, 28,

32-33, 38, 45, 102, 116, 133, 159

Frick, Colonel Andrew P., 117-120

Gardner, Brigadier General Emerson N., Jr., 8

Garner, Lieutenant General Jay M., 120, 132

Garza, Gunnery Sergeant Melba L., 63

Germany, 3

Gilstrap, Sergeant Bryan L., 119

Grabowski, Lieutenant Colonel Ricky L., 67-70

Gray, General Alfred M., 12-13

Guantanamo Bay, 43

Gunther, Colonel Christopher J., 28-29

Hagee, Lieutenant General Michael W., 2, 4, 17, 19-21

Hailston, Lieutenant General Earl B., 7, 9-10, 12, 14-15,

17-18, 20-21, 33, 42

Hantush, 80, 83, 87

Hayes, Colonel Robert L. III, 115

Headquarters Marine Corps, 27, 31

Hess, Pamela, 140, 159

Highways,

Highway 1, 65, 67, 86, 106

Highway 2, 99

Highway 7, 65, 67, 77, 80, 84, 86, 106

Highway 17, 80

Highway 27, 80, 87

Hillah, 36, 138

CARE, 112

Castellaw, Brigadier General John G., 3

Central Command, 1, 3, 7, 12, 15, 17, 21-22, 24-29, 32-33,

35, 57-58, 61, 74-75, 89, 113-114, 117, 121-122, 135

Center for Naval Analyses, 43

Central Washington State College, 4

Charlie Surgical Support Company, Health Services Battalion, 135

Chalabi, Ahmed, 22, 24

Chechnya, 126

Chemical Mi, 128

Childers, Second Lieutenant Therrel S., 64

Chin, Corporal Edward, 101, 135

Chontosh, First Lieutenant Brian R., 79-80

Clardy, Lieutenant Colonel Herman S. III, 71, 109

Clark, Master Gunnery Sergeant Paul D., 141

Cleveland, Colonel Charles T., 113, 116, 118

Coalition Forces Air Component Command, 9, 15, 20-23,

44, 47, 63, 95, 108, 113

Coalition Forces Land Component Command, 8-12, 15,

19-20, 22, 25-29, 31-35, 38-39, 49, 52, 57-59, 61, 64, 74,

82-83, 85, 89-90, 92-96, 98, 107, 109, 112-114, 121-122,

126, 131, 140-141, 143

Coalition Forces Maritime Component Command, 9, 15

Coalition Forces Special Operations Command, 8, 15, 113

Coalition Provisional Authority, 140

Coleman, Brigadier General Ronald S., 143-144

Coleman, Colonel John C., 48

Collins, Lieutenant Colonel Tim, 56

Colon, Captain Arnaldo L., 118-119

Combined/Joint Task Force-Consequence Management, 2,

4, 10, 49-51, 82

Combined Joint Task Force W, 132

Conlin, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C., 103
Index 189

Homer, General Charles A., 17

Hough, Colonel David K., 118

House of Commons, 121, 128, 130

Huelfer, Major Evan A., 32, 38

Hummer, Colonel Steven A., 49, 77, 97

Hussein, Saddam, 15, 17-18, 22, 25, 32, 38-40, 48-50, 55,

57-58, 61, 76, 86, 89, 100-103, 109, 110-112, 114, 117, 121,

126, 133, 149, 182-184

Hussein, Uday, 101

Hutton, Lieutenant Colonel James, 37

Imam Abu Hanifah Mosque, 103

International Red Cross, 105

Iraq, 1, 15, 25, 40, 46

Ministry of Intelligence, 101

Ministry of Oil, 101

Iraqi Units,

ICorps, 114

Baghdad Division, 77, 87, 94

6th Armored Division, 38, 126

10th Armored Division, 38, 80, 85, 86, 106

11th Infantry Division, 38

51st Mechanized Division, 38, 41, 64

Republican Guard, 38-39, 44, 85, 89, 94, 109

Special Republican Guard, 38-39

Irbil, 118

Iwo Jima (LHD 7), 118

Jalibah, 68, 76, 81, 84, 86, 96

Jalibah Air Base, 64

Johnson, Colonel Ronald J., 39, 96

Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel Richard T., 35

Joint Special Operations Command, 37

Joint Special Operations Task Force North, 28, 113, 115-

116, 118, 120

Joint Special Operations Task Force South, 28

Joint Task Force Kuwait, 19, 21

Jones, General James L.,Jr., 2,4, 13, 32, 114-115, 117, 124

Jubouri, Abed Mutlaq, 39

Judge, Colonel Dennis, 97

Kabul, Afghanistan, 6

Kandahar Airfield, 7

Karbala, 36, 89, 94, 138, 141

Kelly, Brigadier General John F., 76, 88, 107-108, 111,

136, 142

Kennedy, Lieutenant Colonel Paul J., 22, 95

King, Captain Troy K., 67

Kirkuk, 32, 107-109, 113, 115, 117

Kiser, Colonel John B., 3, 8

Korea, 1

Kosovo, 22

Kurdish Democratic Party, 113, 116-117

Kurds, 17, 25

Kuwait, 3, 16, 18, 21, 25, 28-29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 45-46, 49-

50, 57-58, 65, 76, 82-84, 89, 112

Kuwait City, 28, 46-48, 51, 121

Latsko, Colonel Thomas C., 123-124

Lawless, Colonel Keith A., 115

Lehnert, Brigadier General Michael R., 42, 81, 143

Lethin, Lieutenant Colonel Clarke R., 95

144

114

Lore, Major Joseph A., 135-136

Lynch, Private First Class Jessica, 67, 73, 109

Maas, Peter, 136

MacDill Air Force Base, 1

Manber, Major Steven B., 141

Marine Corps University, 12, 89

Marine Forces, Central Command, 1, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17, 19,

25, 46, 47

Marine Forces, Europe, 114

Marine Forces, Pacific, 1, 3, 15

Marine Logistics Command, 10, 19, 42, 47, 51, 81, 143

Marine Units,

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 2, 4, 10, 12-15, 17-22,

25-29, 31-39, 41-42, 44-50, 52-54, 56-59, 61-64, 68, 73-74,

76-77, 81, 83-87, 89, 91-94, 96-98, 100, 105-107, 110, 112-

113, 121, 123, 125, 130-131- 138, 140

I Marine Expeditionary Force Augmentation Command Element, 2

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group, 34, 47

I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group,

30

I Marine Expeditionary Force Rear, 143

II Marine Expeditionary Force, 26, 113-114

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, 143-

1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 4

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 33-34, 46-47, 113-

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable), 5, 7, 35, 47, 57, 86, 122-123, 125

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable), 85, 114

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable), 5, 7, 11, 117-118, 120

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 3, 17-18, 20, 26, 34, 42-44,

46-47, 62-63, 71, 85-86, 91

Marine Aircraft Group, 39, 41

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron, 91

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, 118

Marine Wing Support Squadron 271, 63

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365, 118

1st Marine Division, 3, 20, 26, 34, 39, 41-42, 47, 54,

65, 76-77, 80, 86, 90, 94-95, 107, 111, 123, 133, 135-137,

141

2d Marine Division, 31

Regimental Combat Team 1, 46, 65, 74-75, 77, 80, 84,

87, 99

Regimental Combat Team 2, 53, 67-68, 75, 86

Regimental Combat Team 5, 63, 65, 79-80, 87, 95, 99,

103, 125

Regimental Combat Team 7, 41, 49, 63-64, 79, 87,

101, 125

1st Marines, 46, 76, 80, 88, 96

2d Marines, 34

5th Marines, 41, 83, 87, 99, 104

7th Marines, 77, 96, 98-99, 101, 105

11th Marines, 92, 105, 107, 112

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 67, 73, 85
190 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

138

3d Battalion, 2d Marines, 73

1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 138

3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 101

1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 64, 102

2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 138

3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 77, 79, 112, 138

Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,

1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 101, 103, 138

3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 138

1st Battalion, 8th Marines, 118

1st Battalion, 10th Marines, 68, 72

5th Battalion, 11th Marines, 107

3d Battalion, 23d Marines, 138

Company G, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, 107

2d Battalion, 25th Marines, 86, 138

1st Tank Battalion, 135

Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, 101

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 107, 111

2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 107, 111

Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion, 67

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 101,

107, 109-111

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 138

1st Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 124

3d Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 124

1st Force Service Support Group, 26, 34, 42, 47, 77,

80-81, 87, 135, 143

2d Force Service Support Group, 19, 42, 143

Combat Service Support Group 11, 42, 143

Combat Service Support Group 15, 42

Combat Service Support Group 13, 42

Combat Service Support Battalion 22, 42

8th Engineer Support Battalion, 99

Maritime Prepositioning Force, 46, 143

Mattis, Major General James N., 3-5, 7, 20, 22, 29-30, 39,

41, 43-45, 49-50, 53, 55, 58, 61, 64, 71, 76-77, 80, 83, 86-

88, 92, 96, 98, 100-102, 104-105, 107 109, 111-112, 122,

134-135, 137,143-144, 152, 156, 162-163

McCrary, Lieutenant Colonel Brian K., 132

McKeldin, Major Theodore R. McKeldin III, 100

McKiernan, Lieutenant General David D., 8, 12, 32, 89,

95, 114, 121, 132

McPherson, Master Gunnery Sergeant Richard C., 115

Meyer, Staff Sergeant Randy, 109

Miclot, Colonel Jonathan G., 17-19

Mikolashek, Lieutenant General Paul T., 8, 20, 25, 29, 32,

34

Milburn, Colonel George F., 37

Military Coordination and Liaison Command, 113, 115,

116, 118, 120

Montgomery, Bernard Law, 4

Moore, Colonel Darrell L., 136

Moore, Vice Admiral Charles W., 4-5, 9

Moran, Terry, 32-33, 132, 147

Morehead City, North Carolina, 27

Morris, Major Jason L., 112

Moseley, Lieutenant General T. Michael, 12, 20-21

Mosul, 113, 115, 117, 119-120

Munch, Edvard, 46

Murray, Williamson, 12, 18, 39, 128-129, 145-146

Mutla Ridge, 30

Najaf, 36, 90, 94, 141

National Defense University, 17

Natonski, Brigadier General Richard F., 34-36, 45, 52, 66-

68, 73, 76-77, 85, 96, 113

Naval Air Station, Souda Bay, 118

Naval Forces, Central Command, 3, 5, 9, 10

Naval Support Activity, 3, 9

Naval War College, 7

Nave, Major Kevin G., 77

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1, 22, 114

O'Bannon, Lieutenant Presley N., 107

Odierno, Major General Raymond, 120

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,

120, 129, 132, 140

Operations,

Desert Scimitar, 17

Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1, 4, 9, 10-12, 18, 21-22,

24-26, 34, 38, 51, 114, 121

Enduring Freedom, 1, 7, 15, 41, 50, 118

Iraqi Freedom, 14-15, 17, 20, 24, 44

Just Cause, 18

Northern Watch, 1,12,22,25,114

Provide Comfort, 25, 114-115, 120

Sinbad, 128

Southern Watch, 1, 12, 20, 22, 25, 44

Operations Plan Cobra II, 37

Operations Plan 1003V, 25-26, 28, 32, 45, 103

Osman, Major General Henry P., 113-118, 120

Pakistan, 1

Palestine Hotel (Baghdad), 101, 105

Panama, 18

Pappas, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew, 140-141

Parker, Staff Sergeant Lonnie 0., 71-73

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 113, 116

Pelelieu (LHA 5), 5

Pentagon, 15, 24, 27, 33, 45

Petraeus, Major General David H., 120

Philippines, 1

Plush, Gregory J., 29, 31

Polanco, Corporal Jason J., 70

Pokorney, First Lieutenant Frederick E., Jr., 72

Powell Doctrine, 17

Qalat Sikar, 26, 100, 106

Qattar, 115

Quilter, Colonel Charles J. II, 87

Quinonez, Lieutenant Colonel Edward J., 124

Rashid MilitaryComplex, Iraq, 99

Red Crescent, 112

Red Cross, 112

Red Zone, 89

Risler, First Lieutenant Sunny-James M., 118

Rommel, General Erwin, 4

Royal Air Force, 123
Index 191

Rumaylah Oil Fields, 57, 125

Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Donald H., 1, 24-25, 27,

104

Saddam Canal, 65, 70, 87

Saddam City, 101

Saddam International Airport, 94

Sadr City, 101

Safwan Hill, 63

Salaheddin, 116

Salman Pak Airfield, 100

Saudi Arabia, 25, 141

Scales, Major General Robert, 12, 18, 129

School of Advanced Military Studies, 89

Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman, 8, 10, 25, 33

Sea-Air-Land (SEALs), 37

Seabees, 34

Seely, First Lieutenant Michael S., 72

Serbia, 22

Shatt al Arab, 121

Shatt al Arab Waterway, 36

Sheikh Issa Air Base, 8

Sir Galahad (L3005), Royal Fleet Auxillery, 125

Sixth Fleet, 117

Slovakia, 3

Smalley, Captain Brian B., 101

Smith, Lieutenant Colonel George W., 17-19, 22-23, 30,

36, 133

Smith, Major General Ray L., 76, 136

Southern Command, 143

Special Forces, 108, 113, 115-116

Stalder, Major General Keith J., 17, 50

Stratman, Major General Henry W., 15

Support Areas,

Chesty, 82

Coyote, 82

Sweeney, Colonel John L., 81

Syria, 118

Tactical Assembly Area Fox, 51, 81, 144

Taliban, 1, 5-6, 15

Talibani, Jalal, 117

Task Forces,

Chaos, 5

58, 4-6, 10-11, 15, 41

South, 26-27, 33-34

Tarawa, 27, 34, 36, 39, 42, 45, 47, 52-53, 64-65, 67,

73, 75-76, 85-86, 94, 96, 106, 109, 123, 130, 133, 138

Tripoli, 110-113

Tempone, Colonel John A., 1

The Basic School, 12, 43

Tigris River, 34, 37, 50, 93

Tikrit, 32, 109, 110-112

Toolan, Colonel John A., 88

Torpy, Air Vice Marshall Glenn L., 22

Transportation Command, 19, 23

Turkey, 32, 35, 107, 111, 114, 116, 121

Twentynine Palms, California, 29

Ullman, Harlan K., 17

Urnrn Qasr, 33, 57, 121-123, 125

Usher, Brigadier General Edward G. III, 42, 52, 77, 80-81

Wade, James P., 17

Waldhauser, Colonel Thomas D., 125

Wallace, Lieutenant General William S., 78, 84, 98

Warfighting Laboratory, 89, 91, 127

West, Bing, 136

Whitley, Brigadier General Albert E., 121

Williams, Major Grant A., 46-47

Wilson, Brigadier General Cornell A., 50

Wittnam, Captain Daniel J., 70, 73

Workman, Colonel Marc A., 29, 31

World Food Program, 112

World Trade Center, 15

Wright, Evan, 136

Zinni, General Anthony C., 4, 8, 10, 12, 18, 21, 34, 114,

162-163