.. ... - . 
CLEAR THE WAY
 

By Majo r General Robert B. Flowers 

Commandant, Us. Army Engineer School 

U

The Regiment Needs You! 

ncle Sam wants YOU! I know that we all have seen 

at lea st one version of the ubiquitous posters of 

America's enduring symbol that implores us to serve 

our great Nation. The appeal ol'the gentlem an in the red, white , 

and blue top hat and tails affects each individual 's senses 

differently, but the message is clear to all-America is in need, 

and YOU can make a differencel 

Ifwe were to trace the history ofthe Army, the observation 

that the Army is in a perpetual state of transition would become 

glaringly evident. Whether the Army is 

transitioning from peace to war, or from this 

kind of structure to that, or going from 

unpreparedness to prepa redne ss , the 

Regiment and its soldiers have always been 

needed. The Regiment has always made a 

difference . The Regiment has always 

responded to the call to serve. 

Why do we serve? Th e reasons for 

service are well known and run the gamut 

from patriotism , to family tradition, to 

altruism, or maybe it's simply opportunity. 

Some view servi ce in the military as an 

opportunity to achieve an ordered lifestyle, I 

to attain higher education, or to have a 

second chance. 

The Regiment and the Army are 

undergoing anoth er period oftransition. We're in the process 

of moving from Cold War force stru cture and mentality to the 

Chief of Staff of the Army's objective force through 

tran sformation, This transition (transformation) is occurring 

during an unparalleled period of economic growth, prosperity, 

and opportunity for civilian employment. Tho se of us in the 

Army continue to be pressed for service in all parts of the 

globe-wheth er it's conducting operational exerci ses or 

contingency operati ons or doing the work back in garrison for 

two and three of our contemporaries who are deployed. 

Why do we continue to serve ? We continue to serve for the 

same reasons we originally joined . For some we enjoy the lifestyle, the camar ad erie , the pr ide in our work, and the 

contributions to our Nation and to the people around the world 

who have better lives because ofour efforts. Additionally, how 

can we forget the countless souls we have protected from 

tyranny and oppression, or th ose we hav e pro vid ed an 

opportunity for a second chance ? 

FOR U.S. 

Some are now saying to themselves, "So what! What has 

the Army done for me? My senior leaders have abandoned my 

famil y and me. The Army is no longer about warfighting, and 

the risks for my mistakes are too great. The 'Powerf' ointe 

Ran gers' have taken over the Am1Y, and I' ve spent most ofmy 

career on repetitive deployments. Bottom line, the Army is not 

what I thought it was going to be, and the time has come for me 

to redirect my life." 

Tagree; it is time for all of us to redirect our lives.The time has 

come for all ofus tojoin together-junior leaders,senior leaders, 

and new recruits alike. It is now time to 

rededicate ourselves to Uncle Sam's call to 

service, to renew our obligations to each 

other, to reconnect ourselves with our civilian 

communities, and to reaffirm our commitment 

to live up to the core Army values. 

The Army' s senior leaders arc committed 

to their peopl e. The Army is still about 

preparing for war and.if called upon, to fight 

and win. Yes, the Army is in transition. The 

Anny is in a perpetual state of transition. 

As history has born e out, transition is good. 

As we continue to evolve, the Army, the 

Regiment, and the Nation will be that much 

stronger. Tassure you that the Army's senior 

leaders are listening and are concerned 

about you and you r family. As one ofthose 

leaders, I give you my personal guarantee that , standing 

together as One Team, we will rise above these uncertain times 

and resolve your well-being and quality-of-life issues. 

I have been around the world many times. I have been in 

combat and participated in numerous operational deployments. 

In my three -year tenur e as the Commandant of the Engineer 

School , I have been up close and personal with the besteducated; best-trained; and best-motivated soldiers, NCOs, 

and officers at any time in my career.The Regiment has set and 

will continue to set the standard for excellence because ofYOD 

and your phenomenal commitment to service. The Regiment is 

about its people , and I am convinced that the Regiment has 

what it takes to see this period through and continue to embod y 

the Sapp er Ethos in all that we do. 

I encourage you to keep the faith in the Army. The Army 

has faith in you. If not you, who ? If not now, when ? The 

Regiment needs YOU! 

Essay ons! 
E · yxy nglneer 

Jut	 2000 Head uarters, De artment of the Arm Volume 30 PB 5-00-3 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER SCHOOL 

COMMANDANT 

Major General Robert B. Flowers 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Lynn e Sparks 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Shirley Bridges 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer Morgan 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

)w/t}~

JOEL B. HUDSON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Sec retary of the Army 

0011013 

Front Cover: A prime-power soldier walks 

cal

beside the

power ge

current

nerator

ge

s, th

nerati

e 7

on o

50 k

f

W

larg

MEP-20B

e electri­. 

Back Cover: 

rates the 50th

Th

An

e 

niversary 

United St

of

ates 

the K

commem

orean Wa

or 

(1950-1953). 

FEATURES 

2 U.S. Army Prime Power: A Tradition of Innovation and
 

Excellence
 

By Chie f Warrant Officer 2 Andre w K. Potter 

7 The Next Generation of Power Generation 

By Captain Jared Ware and Sergeant First Class Ed Dawe 

11	 Constructing a MOUT Training Village 

By Major Michae l C. Wehr 

16	 Looking for the Pertect Leader 

By Major Ronald E. Zimmerman Jr. 

20	 ENFORCE Breakout-Session Summaries 

By Captain Sam Hudson and the ENFORCE Team 

23	 The Art of the Engineer Staff Ride 

By Captain Robert F Hynes 

24	 Libby Bridge Staff Ride 

By Second Lieutenant James A. Westgate 

25	 Chipyong-ni Staff Ride 

By Major Kei th A. Landry 

26	 Upgrading the Million-Dollar Hole 

By Captain Jonathan Gano 

28 Deliberate River-Crossing Operations: Focus on the 

Fundamentals 

By Lieutenant Colonel Miroslav P Kurka and Major Brian Dosa 

34 TACOM Sets the DEUCE Loose 

By Rae Higgins 

36 Managing the Logistics-Support Contract in the Balkans 

Theater 

By Colonel Dona ld T Wynn 

41	 Battlefield Commission Awarded for Engineer Bridge 

Reconnaissance 

By Capta in (Retired) Wallace Fiedler 

44	 A Religious-Support Primer 

By Chaplain (Majo r) Gregory K. Williamson 

DEPARTMENTS 

Inside front cover: Clear the Way 46 Engineer Update 

45 The Engineer Writer 's Guide 49 Lead the Way 

ENGINEER (ISSN 0046·1 989 0) IS prepared quarterly by the U S. Army Engineer 

School. 320 Engineer Loop. SUite 210. Fort Leonard Wood, MO 654 73-89 29 Second 

Class postage is paid at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. and additional mailing offICes 

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Engmeer Protessione! Bulletin, 

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CO RRESPONDENCE. ietters to the editor , manuscnpt s, photographs, otfrcial unit requests to recerve copies, and unit address changes Should be sent 

10 Engineer at the preceding add ress Telephone: (573) 56 3-4 104, DSN 6 76 · 

4104 Engineer's e-mail address is. bndgess @wood.army.mil. Our Internet home 

page rs located at· htl p://www.wood army.mli/engrmag/emag_hp.htm. 

DISCL AIMER Engm eer present s protess ronal Inform ation designed to 

keep U S mi litary ano Civilian eng ineers Inform ed of current and eme rging 

dev elopments Within their areas at expertise for the purpose of enhancing Iherr 

July 2000 

prot essional deve lopme nt. Views expressed are those of the author and not 

those of the Depa rtment of Def ense or Its element s. The co ntents do not 

necessarily rel lect ofll clal U S. Army posnions and do not cha nge or supersede info rmation In other U S Army publications Use ot news items constitutes neither attrrmahor- of their accu racy nor pro duct endorsement Engineer 

reserves the right to edit matenal. 

CONTENT is not copyright ed Malerial may be reprinted it crernt IS given to 

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OFFICIAL DISTRI8UflON IS largeted to all engineer and engineer-related units. 

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Address changes for personal subscnpncns should also be sent 10the Supennlendent 01 Documents 

Engineer I 
--

u.s. Army Prime Power:
 

A Tradition of Innovation and Excellence 

By Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew K. Poti er 

The 24 9th Eng ineer Batt alion (P ri me Po wer), one of 

the most unique organiza tio ns in th e Army, carries 

on a lon g and proud tradition of providin g exce lle nc e 

in en gineering support to the nation. Th e ve ry motto of Ar my 

engineers-Essayon s-vividl y ca ptures the indo mi table cando sp irit o f these spe cial sold ie rs. 

The ba ttalio n's dual thoroughb red bloodlines trace through 

many c rucial times in the history of our Army. Th is art icle is 

lim ited in scope and discusses only the unit's COll1Sof Engineers 

lineage but do es so with full and gra teful recogni tion of the 

ga llant combat and construction ance stry of the unit's highly 

decorated namesake, the 249th Engineer Combat Battalion . After 

a lon g and storied history as a tab le of distrib ution and allowance s 

(T DA) organization, today 's pri me -po wer battalion ac tivated 

as a table of orga nization and equipme nt (TOE) engineer unit 

in Novem ber 1994 (sec article, page 7). 

Historical Perspective 

I n the 1860s, the Army exp erime nted with method s fo r 

protecting A merican har bor s and ch annels . Torpe do es 

an d min e s emerg ed as th e pr eferred systems, but the 

underwater firing devic es did n ot always fun cti on . The Corps 

of En gin eers perfected reliable. easy-to- ma inta in elec trical 

firin g syste ms usin g batterie s an d sm all magn et o-b ased 

gene ra tors. M ajor Henry Abbot discu ssed the importance o f 

power in his 1876 book Note s On Elec tricity : "The pa rt which 

e lec tr ic ity n ow plays. .. is so importan t th at an ac cura te 

kn owl edge of the leadin g p ri nc iple s of th e sc ien ce . . .are 

indi spensab le to the engineer officer." I 

Coast al defense later included hu ge searchlig hts, networks 

o f underwater mines and torpedoe s, and on-site ge nerato rs 

for power. Captain George Anderson , in his 1902 Ham/h ook 

f or Electr icians, ga ve tim eless mainten an ce tip s: "Preventio n 

is the ru le fo r machinery tro ubles, not cures."? Regar ding 

s w itc h-gear: " N o o ne sho uld h e all owed to to uch th e 

sw itchboard un less he is famili ar w ith all circuits co nnected 

to it, the strength of main and feeder circuits. and the insu lation 

of each pa rt. Always close a sw itch deli beratel y and firml y, 

while watc hing the amme ter and vo ltmeter. and while standing 

ready to ope n." This was good advi ce then and still is today . 

Worl d War nbrou ght new challenges.Engineersoldiers used 

fo ur power barges for on-site electricity, eac h eq uipped with a 

30-megawa tt (mW) generator driven by two marine-type, high ­

pressure boilers. Th e barges pro vided critically needed power to 

cities whose elec trical grids had either been severely da maged 

or were ove rloaded by tile dem and s of support ing the Allied 

grou nd ad vance . The se one -of-a -k ind de signs, orig in ally 

intended for use in the United States to meet anticipa ted wart ime 

power shortages, sa w their first use in the Belgian port city of 

Antwerp and later in Rotterdam and M anila. 

Army Nuclear Power Program 

The Co rps of Enginee rs established the Army Nuclear Power 

Program in the 1950s. The Stationary Medium I (SM- l) plant, 

a 2 -m W prototype at Fort Bel vo ir, 

Virg inia, was the very first nucl ea r 

electrica l-power plant to be paralleled 

to a commercial grid . It is com monly 

th ought th at th e S h ippingpo r t, 

Pennsyl vania, plant was first, but the 

Corpss SM- ! went on-line 011 J 2 

Ap ril 1957 , more th an a mo nth 

before the Ship pingport unit. 

Founders of the Army N uclear 

Power Program carefully se lected 

h ig hl y qu al ifie d offje e rs a nd 

enliste d so ldie rs from the ra nks to 

receive th e g ruel ing, year-lo ng . 

re a c to r-opera tor tra in in g. T he 

program produced se ve ral mo dular 

power pl ants, which were shipped 

in piece s to remote outposts as a test 

of the viability of nuclear power fo r 

July 2000 

The power barge Seapower, one of four unique Corps vessels carrying a 30·mW 

power plant designed to augment war-damaged electrical grids. 
far-flung milit ary in stallati ons. One of thes e 

plants generated power from more than 30 feet 

below tile polar ice ca p at Camp Century, 

Green land, a most unusual Corps outpost just 

800 miles from the Nort h Pole . 

Army engineers carved Camp Century out 

of the ice in 1960 to house the Army 's Pol ar 

Research and Devel opment Center. More than 

a hu ndred so ldie rs and scie ntists lived an d 

worked in this fascinating tunnel complex. On 

12 November 1960 , o nly 77 da ys after the 

piece s arriveel OIl station. the compact 2-mW 

nuclear plant provided power, heat, and fresh 

wa ter for the city under the ice. Camp Cen tury 

supported the center unti l the summer of 1965 . 

Similar pl ant in st al lati ons we re mad e in 

Antarctica, Alaska, Wyoming. and Idaho.' 

The Corps's Engineer Reactor Group, as the 

nuclear program was named, advanced another The 2-mW n uclea r reacto r a t Camp Century, Gree nla nd, is 

first with the flo atin g nucl ear power stat ion home to the Corps's Pola r Re s e arc h and Development 

Sturgis. The lO-mW pressurized water reactor, Cente r. 

mounted on a modified Liberty ship hull, became the first floating 

plant to regularly supply power to a shore station. It moored from 

1968 to 1975 in the Panama CanalZone, allowing the waters from 

Gatun Lake to be used for filling locks. The: Sturgis was onstation during the height of the Vietnam War, allowing more than 

2,500 more ships per year to pass through the canal than would 

have been previously possible. 

Prime-Power Battalion 

In August 1969, Hurricane Ca mille struck the Mississippi 

Gul f Co ast with destru ctive wind gusts in excess of 180 miles 

per hour and a 23-foot-hi gh storm surge . In the final report 

on the effects of the storm, the Army Office of Civil Defen se 

noted that "Portable power sources are highly useful in an 

emer-gency. Th e ope ra tio na l probl ems for distributing, 

installing, and running .. .emergency power generators have 

not been solved and merit further study." 

On 24 August 1992 , the forward edge of Hurricane Andrew 

reached landfall 25 miles south of Miami . The winds ripped the 

anemometer off the.roof or the National Hurricane Center, with 

the last recorded speed in excess of 167 miles per hour. In 

Homestead, 90 percent ofthe structures collapsed, leaving 50,000 

residents with nowhere to live. More than 2 million people lost 

electricity. Four days later, Florid a Power and Light estimated 

that more than 500.000 were still witho ut power and would 

remain so for months. On order from Presid ent Bush, more 

than 16,000 soldiers from Fort Bragg, No rth Carolina ; Fo rt 

Drum, New York; and other installation s deployed to southern 

Florida. Amo ng them were soldiers of today's 249th Engineer 

Battalion (Prime Power), the successors to the Engineer Reactor 

Grou p. In the first three weeks of that deployment, troops from 

the 249th installed more than 200 small- and medium-sized 

gen erators at critical facilities all ac ros s so uthern Florida , 

bringing desperately needed on-site power to people in crisis. 

The Corps of Engineers ' tradition of exce llentservice to the nation 

continues today. 

M 

On-Site Power Needs 

odern military for ces dep end more and more on 

reliable, mobil e electrical po wer. Health-servi ce 

s u pport, aut oma ti on , comm un icatio ns, an d 

weapons systems all rely heavily on electrici ty. In the Army. 

there is a critical gap in the elec trica l-power co ntinuum 

between that supplied by small tactical genera tors (5-kilowaH 

[kWj to 1OO- kW) and the option for commercial power. Tactical 

generators are standard military sets distributed throu ghout 

the Arm y's fighting units, usually co nfigured for multiple 

voltag e and freq ue ncy output and ease of portability. Th e 

responsibility for setup, installation, and operation rests with 

the tactical unit. 

When soldiers construct or modify large, forward-deployed 

military installations, tactical generators are often not sufficient 

to meet the concentrated deman ds for electrical power. Dependin g 

on the area and tactical situation, commercial power may or 

may not be an option. The 249th produ ces reliable , utility-grade 

power to bridge the gap. Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 

the battalion is comprised of highly trained soldiers who serve 

as install ation specialists, plant operators , and maintenance 

personnel. Electricity generated by 249th soldiers is used as a 

supplement to tactical power, as a stand-alone so urce , or in 

parallel with a commercial source. 

The battali on 's primary mission is to generate and distribute 

prim e, utility-grade power in support of wa rfighting, stability 

and s upport, and disaster-relie f operations. The secondary 

mission is to provide advice and technical assistance in all 

aspects of power systems, with addi tional responsibilities in 

maintaining the Army's power-gen eration war reserv es. This 

broad mission , which encompasses a tremend ous ran ge of 

July 2000 Engineer 3 
logistical and techni cal challe nges, is acco mplished through 

a distin ct mi x of equipment and peopl e. 

Equipment 

Th e sta ndard deplo yable pow er plant o rganic to ea ch 

of the eight operati onal pl atoon s around the wo rld con sists 

of four diese l-engine-dri ven gen erator sets. each capable 

of pro ducing 750 kW at 4 160 vo lts. Th ey are in eithe r a 

wh eel-mounted configura tion we ighin g ab out 25 .00 0 

pounds or a skid -m ou nted set we ig hing ab out 40 ,000 

pounds. B oth mod e ls tr av el in st an dard mi lit ary aircraft, 

ships, and tru ck s wi th no modi fication s. To dis tribute the 

pow er to users, platoon s have trailer-moun ted substations 

complete with meterin g and switc h ge ar. Th e fou r generator s ar e con tro lled fr om a sing le, centra lized control 

and dis tribution van . These sys tems are co n figured into a 

2. 25-mW (3-mW peak load) pl ant complete with pr ima ry 

and secon dar y distribut ion. 

Othe r sets in the prime-pow er inventory include 500-kW, 

low-voltage, skid-mounted dies els; 1500-kW, skid-mounted 

d iese ls ; an d new 1500-kW ln rcm a rional Standard s 

Organi zati on (ISO) containe r-mo unted diesel sets, whi ch are 

complete with a laptop computer as the remot e-control and 

data-trackin g: pan el. Mo st of thes e other sets are managed 

throu gh the batt alion 's loan pr ogram, through which highpriority gove rnment sites bor row ass ets from the 249th to meet 

their critical needs. Bot h parties sign an agree ment that the 

using ag ency will be re sponsible for oper at io ns an d 

maintenance, while the 249th retain s the respon sibility for 

initial installation , train ing of the operators and ma intenance 

te chnicians, regul ar insp ection s. and on-ca ll assistance. 

4 Engineer 

A student and instructor 

carefully check the 

schematic prints of a 

system inside a central ­

control van at the Prime 

Power School. 

Soldiers 

Soldiers are the key component for success in the 249th. 

Alth ough equipment is certainly import ant in accomplish ing 

the mission , witho ut the highly trained, innovative problem 

solvers who make up this un it, the mach inery would be idle. 

With only about 170 active-duty noncommi ssioned offi cers 

holding this specialized skill, the prime-pow er field is among 

the smallest in today 's Army. 

Imagine an independent group of 14 soldiers. each trained 

in an intense powe r-systems course, each con stantl y immersed 

in high-voltage safely as a way of IireoThese people are trained 

as inn ovative troublesh oo ting experts, notjust parts changers. 

They perform both theoretica l man ipulation of probl ems and 

"down-in-the-dirt" practical work. On a job to install a po wer 

plant, [or example. any member could draw out an accurate 

one-line diagram, solve and prove the capac ity requ ired to 

meet customer stipulations, and produce a detailed bill of 

materials and man-hours required. Those same people actively 

parti cipate in the installati on or the plant, prov iding eith er 

mech anica l, electric al, or instrumentation systems expertise. 

The y perform qual ity-control inspections along the way, and 

when the time com es to pU1 the plant on-line, they analyze 

the load requi rem ents of the moment and smoothly par alle l 

the requi red number of units onto the grid. This same gro up 

of so ldiers also serves as a preventive and predictive maintenance crew. 

Does such a group exist? This is but a bri ef descripti on of 

a sing le platoon of tb e 249th En gin ee r Batta lio n (Prime 

Power). The key component in buildin g such a team is the 

initial tra ining received by each person vying to become a 

memb er of this elite circle. 

July 2000 
Prim e Power School 

Prime-powe r so ldiers co me fr om the ac ti ve-d uty 

enlisted ran ks. Soldi e rs from any career field may 

apply, but they must be at least a corporal/specialist 

(E4 ). Thi s generally means that they are on their second 

enli stment, with four to si x years in the Arm y. Entrance 

requirements are stringent, with hi gh scores required in the 

standardi zed tests fo r math and gen eral techni cal subj ects. 

Those who are acce pted are grouped into classes of about 20, 

normally with two classes starting eac h year. Th ey and the ir 

fami lies are moved on permanent-ch ange-of-station ord ers to 

Fort Bel voir, Virgini a. Th ere the soldiers are placed under 

the charge ofthe Prime Power School fac ult y. which consists 

of both civilian and milit ary instructors. 

The training is int ens e. Th e cours e of instruction is 52 

weeks long, with eight train ing hours per da y, five days a 

week. This schoo l grew out of the Army's Engineer Reactor 

G ro up p ro gram. That tr aditi on of s u pe rb te chni cal 

qu alification and rigid standards in power-plant-oper ations 

Training has not changed. The co urse is broken into thre e 

phas es: ac ademi cs, plan t operations, and techn ical spec ialty. 

Th e hom ework load averages three ho urs of work per night. 

It is one of the lon gest, most difficult courses in the Army. 

During the academic phase, soldiers stud y mathemati cs. 

physics, mechanical and electri cal theory, instrumentation and 

co ntrols, and protective devices. In operator's training, the 

emphasis is on performance-based ev aluation. Th e various 

types of sets in the inventory are introduced, and rigorous 

practical application and testing begins . Several mandatory 

manu al paralleling exercises with both 750-kW and 1500­

kW sets present a variety of chan ging load scenarios. Respon se 

time and accuracy of output par ameters are tigh tly graded. 

Substandard performance in this pha se is not taken lightly. A 

primary job of prime-power soldiers in the field is to operate 

the pow er plant. rn the spec ialty phase , so ldiers are split into 

one of three possible track s: me chanical, electrical, or instrumentation and control. Each of these spec ialty tracks trai ns 

for more than four month s in its particul ar discipline. After 

the grueling year-long co urse, soldiers graduate as fully 

certified. read y-to-work prime-power spec ialists. 

Work in the Field 

After finishing the.Prime Power School, soldiers rep ~rt

to on e o f the eight op erational platoons. A utilities warrant o ffice r leads each platoon , which is 

divided into two ope rational sections. with a furth er breakdown 

of th e techni cal specialties . Eac h pl atoon ha s tw o 

instrumentation, four mechanical. and six electrical specialists. 

From this basic structure, many different teams of peop le 

are built depending on the mission . On large power-plantinstallati on j ob s, on e or two entire platoons may depl oy 

initi ally to handle the first surge of work. Onc e complete, an 

operation s and maintenance crew of perhaps only eight or 

nine soldie rs may rem ain . Technical assis tance or survey 

July 2000 

mission s may require onl y one or two soldiers . Dis aster reli ef 

might take the entire battali on , as wa s the case in 1992 . Tn 

two short months during the summer and autumn of that year, 

two hurricanes and one typh oon (Andrew, Iniki , and Omar) 

sent the entire batt alion to Florida, Louisian a, Haw aii , and 

Guam. The unit was stretched so thin th at the battalion 

command graduated an in-se ssion class ofstudents two weeks 

early and deployed them directly to disaster-ra vaged areas. 

Technical Assistance 

The broadest part of the prime-po wer battalion's mission 

statement is to "provide advice and technical assistance in all 

as pects of power systems." Each platoon has the sk ills and 

equipment to do just th at. In addi tion to in st alling and 

operating any variation o f the basic 3-mW plant. platoons 

carry out a tremend ou s range of testin g, survey, and qualityassuran ce missions. A few examples are infrared surveys, highvo ltage cable splicing and testing, overhead and underground 

distributi on , power-factor-correction studies, substation 

ma inten ance, and protecti ve-relay/ci rc uit-breaker testing. The 

battalio n also prov ides rapid-response support to victims of 

hurrican es, floods, and ice stor ms. Again, the key to success 

in all these missions is the soldier who mak es all the systems 

work reliably, safely, and e fficiently. 

Inn ovati ve troubl esh ootin g is the hallmark of techni cal 

assistance provided by prim e-power soldiers. As an example. 

on a spring 1996 mission to provide power on an isolated grid 

to SOlO Cano Air Base. Honduras, our platoon (which was 

stationed at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri , at the time) walked 

into an intere sting technical challenge . For the previous mon th, 

daily lunchtime outages plagu ed the 3.75-mW plant due to a 

fault somewhere in the 20 or so miles of 23-kV distribution. 

Our crew was technically responsible only for the installed power 

plant, but two of us were assign ed as quality-a ssurance 

representatives for the electrical portion of the base main-tenance 

contract. The instruction s from the colonel were clear: Fix this 

problem of daily outages. and do it now. 

The fault s were happ ening around the same time every 

day, with <l tremend ous surge visible on the plant met erin g 

ju st before the relays tripped out on instantaneous overcurrent. 

With no power-line monitors ava ilable and the maintenance 

con tra ctor unable to provide much histori cal dat a. we pored 

over the distribution plans for likely suspects. Three branch 

c irc uits look ed interestin g , with bi g refrigeration and 

industrial laundry load s. With those three cir cuits isol ated , 

however, the very same sur ge bla sted our plant off-line the 

fo llow ing day. We were certain that we had a hi gh-resistance 

fault som ewhere, only showing its ugly face whe n a decentsized curre nt was dra wn across it. An infrared survey of the 

entire system that night showed no major pr oblem s. Cro ssing 

our fingers the next day, we increa sed the trip values on our 

plant overcurrent relays, hoping to send enough current down 

the line just lon g enough to bl ow something up. No luck-it 

ju st took a little longer to go out on overcurrent . We set the 

t.rip windo ws back to normal. 

Engineer 5 
Because the fault was making it all the way back to the 

plant, we requested all distribution-system-fuse data from the 

contractor, which came through in the late afternoon of the 

second clay. Normal high -voltage fuse protection should be in 

the range of 150 to 200 percent of full-load current values. 

The fuses for the five main feeders on base, however, were 

sized at more than 600 percent of full-load current, and the 

branch circuit fuses were sized between 500 and 1500 percent 

of full -load current. There was no coordination to the 

protection at all. We directed that the main feeder fuses be 

reduced to 200 percent of full-load current. The following 

day one of the main feeder fuses blew instead of our power 

plant taking that awful surge. 

The rest of the third day. we had the contractor reduce all 

branch circuit fusing to 125 percent offull-load current. In some 

cases, due to lack of proper fuse sizes, the branch fusing went 

below 100 perc ent. Although this risked a few' nuisance blows, 

it was certainly better than losing the entire base. On the fourth 

day, a single fuse at the main fuel-distribution point blew. The 

contractor replaced one transformer in the three-phase bank and 

our problem went away. We had no way to push enough current 

through the transformer on the bench to truly test it but. from 

the end result, it was pretty clear that a high-resistance fault had 

developed internally, This fault was only showing when one of 

the big pump-house motors turned on. Sure enough, the tankers 

that distr ibuted diesel fuel around the base almost always went 

to the fuel point between 1100 and 1400 hours, and each day 

one or more of those motors kicked on to level out the 

belowground fuel tanks. We wrote up a procedure for protective 

coordination, made several strong recommendations for in-depth 

available fault current and full protective studies, and closed the 

book on a problem solved, We spent the rest of our three months 

in Honduras enjoying both the warm weather and operations 

shifts that were relatively free of outages. 

Disaster Relief 

The 249th is an integral part of the federal response plan 

to disasters. Under the direction of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, the Corps of Engineers has the lead for 

the public utilities and civil-works emergency-support 

function. The Corps often tasks the 249th to install temporary 

emergency power. 

Disaster relief is among the most challenging, interesting, 

dangerous, and rewarding work performed by prime-power 

soldiers. Working safely is al ways at the front of your mind as 

you deal with fallen lines, overturned pad-mount transformers. 

the constant danger of back feeds from hurriedly connected 

small generators, wet ground, and unstable structures. 

There is tremendous psychological stress imposed on 

everyone working in an area torn apart by natural disaster, and 

soldiers from the 249th are no exception. The pressures of 

working long hours with few breaks, constant short-fuse 

missions. the frustration of wanting to help everyone all at once, 

and the reality of seeing the lives of other humans torn apart all 

combine to weigh heavily on soldiers working to help . 

6 Engineer 

As a specific operational example, prime-power soldiers 

installed over 200 small- and medium-sized generators during 

the six-week deployment to southern Florida following Hurricane Andrew. These generators, ranging in size from 10 to 

750 kW, were put into operation at many critical facilities, 

such as police stations, hospitals, feeding ce nters , radio 

stations, schools, emergency shelters, supply di stribution 

points, fire stations, medical and dental clinics. homes for the 

elderly, telephone-switching centers, pharmacies, and waterlift stations. In recent years, troops from the battalion have 

swiftly deployed on dozens of such humani rarian-relief 

missions following hurricanes, typhoons, floods, and severe 

ice storms. 

The technical challenges of di saster relief are many, The 

job for prime-power soldiers consists primarily of assessing 

critical facilities for power needs and then installing the proper 

generator. Of course, things are not always that easy. Often, 

the critical facility identified for assessment consists of only 

hall' a building, along with hall' a distribution system, or a 

tent city with no distribution network at all. 

Few street signs and landmarks remain after a major 

hurricane or typhoon. On our very first Hurricane Andrew 

assessment mission in Homestead, Florida, we drov e right past 

the city. What we saw on the ground delle, description - but it 

didn 't look like a place where people had ever lived or worked. 

Bringing help to areas such as that is indeed satisfying work. 

Some samples of my own thoughts during disaster relief 

are: Can we rebuild that panel using #2 wire and tape? 1.1 

that half-overturned pad-mount hot? Do I hear a little 1.5­

kW set running) Am 1 glad we have these police escorts; this 

traffic is unbelievable. Is there a hack-feed through {Illy of 

those wires laying on the ground? How can we possibly get a 

good ground for our generator anywhere in this muck that 

used to be a parking lot? How did half ofa utility pole wind 

up in the artie ofa community center? YiJU know, lying Oil my 

back inside this switch-gear; in the middle ofthe night, with a 

wrench on this energized bus-bar; sweat pouring off me... is a 

really bad time to wonder when I last had my gloves certified. 

If we install a trailer-mounted set here, will il be stolen during 

the night? Why does this cell phone always cut out just when 

operations is telling our flying carpet where to go next? HOlV 

did one crew lise an entire case of electrical tape in half a 

day? Are we even at the right building'! 

M 

The Future 

ajor Henry Abbot, Corps of Engineers officer of 

the late 1800s, said in his Notes on Electricitv, 

"The word electricity is used to designate a force 

that produces a class of natural phenomena of which the 

explanation is still shrouded in mystery." True enough. but 

Corps of Engineers soldiers have made a proud tradition of 

removing some of that mystery, consistently generating reliable 

on-site electricity for Army commanders. 

(continued on page 10) 

July 2000 
Thu Nuxl Gunuralion
 

of Powur Gunu alion
 

By Cap tain Jared Ware and Sergeant First Class Ed Dowe 

T he 249 th En g ineer Battali on 

(Prime Power) headquartered at 

F0I1 Belvoir, Virginia, is the Army 's 

only power-gener ation and electrica ldistrib ution unit.lts mission is to pro vide 

electri cal power for warfighting,stability 

and support, and disaster-reli ef operations. Before 1994, the prim e-power 

orga niza tion (table of distri bution and 

a llo wances [TDA \) (prov isio nal) had 

de tac hme nts at seve ra l CON US and 

OCONUS installation s with a primary 

mission to support Dire ctorat es of Public 

Works with electrical power and technical 

experti se (see article, page 2). Since 1994, 

whe n the unit ac tiva ted as a table of 

orga nization and equipme nt (TOE) battalio n, the 249 th has been involved in 

seve ral mission s around the world. 

As the twenty-first century begins, 

the 249 th continues to be on the cutti ng 

edge of power ge neration in a variety of 

areas. Th e unit's A Company, which is at 

Fort Lewi s, Washin gton , has worked on 

all thr ee of the 249t h's missions, with 

both civ ilian and military organi zat ions . 

Th e 249 th wants to ensure that the next 

Soldiers from the 249th Engi­


neer Battalion (Prime Power)
 

construct an underground
 

electrical-distribution system in
 

Bosnia.
 

generation of power-generation equipment and trainin g is capable of satisfying 

the needs of the mis sion s assig ned to 

the battalion by the Departm ent of the 

Army and the U.S. Arm y Co rps of 

Eng ineers . Toward that end, the battalion 

has in ter acted wit h civilian academi a, 

indu stry. and contractors to build better 

systems to meet the power-g eneration 

and electrica l-distrib ution challenges of 

this century. 

Power for Warfighting 

For the past few ye ars, personn el 

in the 249 th, the Air Force , and 

several ci vilian companies hav e 

been pre paring for a new ge nera tion of 

power- genera tion equipment. Th e effort 

be gan with a list of need s and will 

eventually culminate with the purchase 

of the Deployable Power-Generation and 

Di stributi on Syst em (D P GDS). Th e 

system's components are described in 

the table on page 8. 

As early as 1995. the 249tl1 was asked 

for input on how to improve the pow ergeneration equipment used by the military. 

The input centered on what could be done 

to improve the 249th's ability to support 

Department of Defense power missions. 

Th eile missi on s are very di verse and 

covered everything from providing electrical power during the 1996 Olymp ic 

Games to powering a 4,OOO-person base 

camp at Guantan amo Bay, Cuba. 

Sinc e no oth er Army unit pro vide s 

medium- vol ta ge power, th e 249 th's 

equipment is as unique as its mission. 

Ho we ver, th e Air F orce's Pr io rity 

lmproved-M an agem ent Effo rt, Base 

Eng inee r Eme rge ncy Force (P RIME 

BEEF) uses some of the same equipment for its bare-base power gene ration. 

Bec au se a need [or a ne w powergenerati on and e lectrical-dis tribu tio n 

system was identi fied th rou gh out the 

entire military, a decision was mad e that 

the new system wo uld be an interser vice 

acquisitio n. This redu ces research and 

d e velopment co st s an d e ns u re s a 

common power-generation system for 

both se rvices. 

In February 1998, personnel from the 

249 th and the Air Force reviewed seve ral 

July 2000 Eng ineer 7 
!'" '" '" ,,' fOJ',# '" .w"''''' '"''''''.... ,.................. 
 

Iitfu	 !illl <1 Deploy ab le Power-Generatio n an d Distribution System !"\ 

Component Description 

The unit is rated for 920 kilowatts (kW) at .8 power 

factor, 4160 V, 3-phase. It consists of two Caterpillars Pri me Power Unit (PPU) prime movers (3456 engines), two alternators, one 

primary distribution center (PDC) with associated 

control panels, and the chassis. 

Each engine/generator skid weighs about 8,000 

pounds. Two personnel with a forklift can remove an 

Engine engine/generator skid in less than 3 hours. The engine 

and its compon ents and accessories are independent 

of each other and produce 460 kW atB power factor. 

It is prime-rated , 4-wi re-wound, Class H, selfexcited with permanent magnet. 

•	 60 hertz (Hz)operation: 4160 V,575 kilovolt amperes 

Alternator (kVA), 460 kW, .8 power factor, 1,800 revolutions 

per minute (rpm) 

•	 50 Hz operation : 3800 V, 480 I<VA, 383 kW, .8 power 

factor, 1500 rpm 

The DPGDS power-distribution center has two 

feeder circuit breake rs and one load-tie breaker. The 

load-tie breakers connect PPUs and provide a common Primary Distribution Center 

bus for the electrical grid. The common bus uses two 

200-ampe re load -bre ak elbo ws pe r phase to 

accommodate the desired current. 

A main design goal for the Army version of the 

chassis wa s that the unit be Department of Transportation highway certifiable (it can be towed at 55 Chassis 

miles per hour by a standard tractor) . However, the 

Army version is restricted from C-130 and C-141aircraft 

due to its height and weight. 

proposals. Only one system met all of I logistical needs. This is one ofthe major 

the c riteria of the system-requirements ! rea son s the 249 th was included in the 

docu ment. T he two mo st importa nt DPGDS resea rch and deve lopment. The 

requirements were to reduce the number Army o nce sto c ke d all its ow n 

of aircra ft need ed to depl oy the equip­ replacement part s, but that system is 

ment and to increase fuel economy. Of bei ng up dated with the Just in Tim e 

the 30 personnel reviewing th e lo g isti c al mod el. Rad ian Inc. has 

prop osals, the only active-duty Army pro posed a new and radically different 

person was from A Company, 249th way of supplying parts, which uses the 

Engi neer Battalion. His task was to read wo rldwide distribution system from 

the pro pos a ls , check the technical Caterp illar o, Th e user identifies the 

cont ent , and ens ure that the proposals replacement parts, then orders, receives, 

would meet the Army and Air Force and purc hases them dir ectly from the 

spec ificat ions. On 13 March 1998, the local Ca ter pi llars deal er-using the 

contract was awa rded to Radian Inc., int ern ation al merch ant purchase authwhich is an inte grator and produ ces no ority card (lMPAC) VISA.Underthis plan, 

equipment. the De partment of De fense would no 

Introducing a new piece of equipment lon ger maintain an in ven tory, a nd 

in to the militar y syste m require s a obtaining parts would be much quicker. 

th orou gh und er standing of its future Caterpillare can provide most parts within 

8 Engineer 

24 hours and can provide 98 percent of 

all rep lacem ent parts anywhere in the 

world within 72 hours. For locations too 

dangerous for civilians, or where the local 

government is hostile, the dealer wo uld 

deliver the parts to the military installation 

closest to the operation site. Then, the 

installation would be respon sibl e for 

getting the pam to the user throu gh its 

own supply channels. 

After th e DPDGS pr otot yp e was 

assembled, the fo llo wi ng tests we re 

performed: ambient:hot-temperature;coldtemperature: solar; sand, wind, and rain; 

humidity; fuel-co nsumption; road; and 

altitude . The final phase of testing began 

in June 2000 at Holloman Air Force Base, 

New Mexico, and it should be completed 

by September 2000. The Air Force Ope rational Testing and Evaluation Command, 

which is conducting the testing, invited 

all DPGDS stake hol ders . Called the 

Qualification Ope rational Testi ng and 

Evaluation, this final phase has a two-fo ld 

purpose: to test the equipment in a "realworld" environment and to ensure that 

soldiers and airmen can learn to operate, 

maintain, and troubleshoot the equipment 

in a reasonable amount of time. 

Radian Inc. will develop a program of 

in structi on fo r tr ainin g sold ie rs and 

airmen. Although the DPGDS equipment 

is very similar to existing prime-power 

equipment , it will still requ ire a major 

change in the missi on-essenti al co llective tasks and potenti ally in primepower doctrine. Ove rall, the new DPGDS 

will effective ly imp rove and enha nce 

prime-power ca pabilities in the twentyfirst century, similar to the way the MEp· 

o12A 750-kilowatt generator changed the 

Army 's power-generation capabilities in 

the mid-1980s. 

O

Power for Stability and Support 

peration Joint Endeavor was 

th e se tt ing fo r th e 249th 

Engineer Battal ion' s electricalpower co ntribution to the Task Force 

Eagle base in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzeg ovina. 

A Compa ny ass ume d th e po wergeneration mission on 1 January 1999. 

Initi ally, the goal was to continuously 

operate a 5-megawatt power plant and 

July 2000 
The key Army component of the DPGDS, the 

920-kilowatt PU8108 

generator, shown here 

at a manufacturer's 

facility in Illinois. The 

PU8108 was on display 

at ENFORCE 2000 at 

Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri, in May. 

supervise contrac tors on the constr uction of an electrica l-distrib utio n 

system (sec photo above). 

While pr eparing to tra nsi tion to 

commercial power, the major operational 

concern was to develop a proce dure to 

restore the base's power in the event of a 

power outage . After war-gaming several 

methods, A Company developed an SOP 

based on its own power-plant oper ations. 

A powe r plant can parallel to the local 

utility co mpa ny, offer ing both peak 

shaving capabi!ities and load testing for 

generators. It can parallel to the utilities 

bef ore a schedul ed ou tage , thereby 

isolating the base camp from commercial 

power (this option keeps continuou s 

power to the base). It can also be used to 

reenergize the base after an unschedul ed 

outage. In an y case , the base mu st 

schedule an outage with the local utility 

company before returning to comm ercial 

power from prime power. 

After dev elopin g the SOP, A 

Company 's mission was to train local 

nationals and Americans contracted by 

Brown & Root, the contractor selected to 

provide logistics support in the Balkans, 

to operate 311d maintain a power plant and 

transition the base camp from prime power 

to commercial power. The employees 

included diesel mechanics, low-voltagegenerator operators, and exterior highvoltage electricians, but none of them had 

any training on large, medium-voltage (750­

July 2000 

kilowatt) ge nerato rs. A Com pany 

developed a unique training program that 

took into account the various levels of 

experience. The program ensured a safe, 

efficient, knowledge-based program that 

focused on the "three Cs" : concept, cross 

trai ning , and contra ct. The training 

program was conducted in both English 

and Serbo-Croatian, with translators 

on-site. 

During the conce pt stage, everyone 

trained on the basic operation of a power 

plant and be came familiar with th e 

equipment and its functions. The crosstraining stage provided an overview of 

each person 's duties and responsibilities. 

Mechanics learned basic electrical skills 

and wire diagrams, and el ect rician s 

learned how to work on engines and order 

gen erator parts. During the contr act 

stag e, A Company personn el ensured 

th at all employee s understood an d 

followed the power-plant contract. Unlike 

soldiers, contracted employees can only 

perform their particularjo b according to 

the specifications in the contrac t. This 

ensures that the proper skills are applied 

to the power plant and that all employees 

adhere to safety checks. 

The entire mission proved successful 

for the 249th and its stakeholders. The 

local nationals and the Brown & Root 

pe rsonnel quickly learned power-pl ant 

operations, p assed a "sc he duledoutage" trainin g exercise, and took over 

full plant operations in Apri l 1999 . The 

Task Force Eagle base camp successfully 

tra nsitioned to co mmerc ial electrical 

power, and the plant has remained in a 

"back-up" status since June 1999. The 

lessons learn ed from Oper ation Joint 

Endeavor allowed the 249th to train with 

local nati onals and develop tac tics, 

techniques, procedures, and doc trine for 

future stability and support operations 

around the world. 

Power for Disaster Relief 

E mergency power is one of the 

most important elements to local 

communities in the event of a 

disaster. Without power, critical faci lities 

cannot opera te effectively and contribute 

to th e rel ief effort. In th e Federa l 

Resp on se Pl an , th e Department of 

Defense is responsible for the Emergency 

Support Function 3 (E SF3) (Public 

Works) cell, which encompasses emergenc y electrical power. The Depa rtment 

of Defen se delegates the emergencypower mission to the Corps of Engineers, 

! and the Corps further delegates it to the 

249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power). 

The ESF3 cell, which has a prime-power 

representative, sends the 249th a list of 

ele ctrical ass essments for facilit ies 

deemed mi ssion-critic al by loc al 

govern me n t authoriti es. The 249th 

conducts facility assessments, used to 

"size up" the electrical load of the facility, 

Enginee r 9 
and pro vides the informati on to the 

ESF3 cell. The ce ll then coordina tes for 

in st alling generators at th e asse ssed 

sites. 

In mo st in stances, the 249 tl1 is the 

disast er effort's " reconna issance ele ­

ment" that determines th e ro utes for 

tran sporting the generat ors to th e 

desired facilities, Hurri can es. flood s, 

tornadoes, and ea rthquakes tend to make 

roa d routes and cr itical facilities difficult 

to identify, and often the existing dam age 

slows the relief effort. In most cases, 

local govern me nts have diffi culties with 

idcn tifying their electrica l need s and 

critica l facilities after a disaster strikes. 

Th e Los Alamos Na tional Laboratory 

in New Mexico is devel oping an Intern etbased computer-simulation model to 

h elp decision makers d ur ing: natural 

disasters. The Corps of Enginee rs ' South 

Pacific Division 's emergency-operations 

planners invited the A Co mpa ny commander to provide an "emergency -power 

persp ecti ve" to the devel opment of the 

simulation model. 

The c urre n t model si mula te s th e 

e ffec ts an earthquake wo uld ha ve on the 

Los Angeles Basin's power gri d. The 

Web-based model wi ll co ntain damage 

estimates from potential carthq uakes; 

mission, opera tiona l modes, and ge neral 

information about the stakeh olders; and 

an int eractive Web sit e wh e re stakehold er s can coordinate planning issues. 

8 1' usin g a predict ive model, dec ision 

makers ca n identify the potential damage 

an ea rthquake will present to the power 

grid. With this inform ation, planners ca n 

identify which crit ical faciliti es will be 

withou t power and for what duration . 

Currently, city plann ers have identified 

more than SO critical fac ilities in the 

greater Los Angeles area. which include 

command-and-control centers, hospitals , 

and water-treatment plants. Th e 249th is 

wo rking with the Corps of Eng inee rs to 

develop an earthq uake-disas ter sc enario 

to test the simulation model and train its 

soldiers on disaster-relief opera tion s in 

an urban en vironment. By training for 

disaster relief usin g the late st simu lation 

models, the 249th C3n ens ure th at its 

stakeholders will have el ectri cal power 

10 Eng in eer 

at critical facilities in the event offuture 

earthquakes or other natur al disa sters. 

Remaining Relevant 

A Company will co nti nue to se ek 

training opport unities with the 

j oint, c ivilia n, an d academic 

communities that tie into the company 's 

three distinct mission s. As the Army 

transforms int o For ce XXI, the 249th 

Engineer Battalion (Prime Pow er) will 

remain relevan t by addressi ng the 

electrical needs of the Army and the 

nation . A Company trains with the Federal 

Emer gen cy Management Age ncy and 

the civilian side of the U.S. Army Cor ps 

o f Engineers for eme rge ncy -po we r 

disa ster-r eli ef mission s. The. co mpa ny 

also pro vides suppo rt to joint-task-force 

headq uarters suc h as Joint Task Force 

Pacific Command for Exercise Cobra Go ld 

in Thailand and to Joint Task Force Bravo 

for border-patrol missions, The company 

deploys annuall y to Korea to provide its 

technical exp erti se to the Eighth United 

St ates Army for the joint and combined 

e xerci ses on the peninsul a. 

A Co m pa ny is o ne of o n ly two 

multi component companies in the Army; 

th e other is B Co mpany, its sister unit at 

Fort Bragg. North Carolina . Th e 249th is 

a mode l for the Arrn ys future force 

structure , where both stron g technical 

and tac tical experti se at the individual 

and collecti ve levels ar e necessary for 

mission success . Th e 24 9th En gine er 

Battalio n (Prime Power ) stands ready to 

acc e p t the t went y-first c cn tu ry's 

challenges for the coun try and abroad. 

W 

Captain Warf' commands A Company, 

2491h Engin eer Battali on , Fort Lewis, 

Wash in.gton . His a rticle "A m m unition 

Forecasting for Task Force Ope rations " 

appeared in the Ma rch 1999 issue of 

Engineer 

S e rgea nt First Class Da we is (I 

p latoon se rgean t in 1st Plat o on , A 

Company; Schofield Bar racks, Ha waii. 

He served as the Project NCO/or powerplant operation at the Task Force Eagle 

base camp and H'a s the DPCDS liaison 

for the 249th Engineer Batta lion. 

(continued from page 6) 

The Army 's electrical needs wil l 

continue to grow. TIle trend istoward more 

mobile weapo ns sys tems and vehicles. 

The electrical so urces to supply tho se 

systems will become more mobile as well 

(see article , page 7.) Whether produced 

with diesel engines, gasturbines, fuel-cell 

devices, nuclear power. or some other new 

technology, in creasing amounts of 

electrical power will be consumed in the 

Army of tomorrow. The 249tl1 Engineer 

Battalion (Prime Power) will be there, 

trained an d read y to provide support 

anytime , any place . Responsive, re ­

spected, and reliable prime-powersoldiers 

will continue to produce utility-grade 

power and pro vide that all-important, inperson techni cal assistance to support the 

Army mission. W 

CW2 Potter. a utilities operations and 

maintenance warrant off icer (MOS 2 lOA) , is 

a combat developerfor prime power and othe I' 

Anny utilities systems at F OI1 Leonard Wood, 

Missou ri. He may be reached bye-mail at 

pouera Gwood.army.mil or by phone at 

(5 73)5 96-0131 extensio n 3- 7336, or DSN 

676-7336. The Web sitefo r the 249lh Engineer 

Battalion (Prime Power) may be fo und at 

http ://1 44.3.J44.66/dejault.htm or throu gh 

the organization section of the Corps of 

Engineers home page at www.usace.army.mil/ 

met/organizatio n. 

Acknowledgments: The author thank s all 

prime-power soldiers who helpedprepare this 

pape r. Of specia l not e {I re LTC Kur t 

Ubbelohdc , CW5 (Ret) Terry ]iJdd, CW3 Jim 

Flinn, SFC Phyllis Stange, SFC Mik e Wakelin , 

andMr: Bill Evans. They provided key insight. 

backgro und material, and photog raphs. 

Endnotes: 

'Major Henry Abbot, Notes on Electricity (In /Is
 

Applications to Submarine Mining), Torpedo Schoo l
 

Batta lion Press, (Sergeant Carmichael, Printer),
 

December 1876. Chapter 1.
 

2 Captain Geor ge Anderson, Handbook fo r
 

Electricians in the Operation and Care of Electrical
 

Machinery and Apparatus, D. Van Nosfrand Company,
 

New York, New York, 1902, p. 5.
 

3 Anderson, p. 64.
 

• Army Office of Civil Defense, "The Ellects of 

HUrricane Camille on Industry, Public Utilities, and 

Public Works Operations ," UAS Research, San 

Mateo, California, 1970, p. 73. 

; Charles Daugherty, City Under the fee: The Story of 

Camp Century, MacMillan, New York, New York.1963. 

s Abbot, Chapter 1. 

July 2000 
constructing a
 

MOUT Training village
 

By Major Michael C Wehr 

H O\V does an act ive en gineer co nstructio n battali on 

execut e great training, improv e its installation, and 

co ntribute to the training obj ec tives of a maneu ver 

elivision ... all in a span offi ve months? One way is to be prepared 

to seize every opportunity. The 92d Engineer Combat Battalion 

(Heavy) (RCBIHJ) at FOI1 Stewart, Georgia, (known as the Bl ack 

Diamond Battali on) is just that. During one five -mo nth window 

o f oppo rt unity, the unit became pan of the solution for a 3d 

Infantry Di vision (3 ID) stab iliza tio n-force (SFOR) training 

ch allenge and exec uted its co nstruc tio n mission with tena city. 

Th e result was Ern Karo Village , a trainin g village for military 

operations in urb an terrai n (MO UT) . The process could only 

have taken pl ace with a solid fo undation o f readiness. Th e 

battali on wa s gu ided b y the motto "M a intenanc e Is the 

Foundation for Eve rything We Build." 

H ow well did thi s foundati on of re ad ine ss wo rk? T he 

requirement occurred after the 92d ECB (H) retu rned in late 

November 1999 from a deployment to Egy pt for Exe rcise Bright 

Star 2000. By mid -D ecember, the entire battalion had signed up 

[or ano the r maj or construc tio n mixxion with a very sho rt 

suspense. Th is was possible only becau se our co nstant focu s 

on readiness. eve n throu gh a deployment , ensured the flcxib ility 

to launch into any mission thai became available. 

Seize the Opportunity 

Early in December o f 1999, 

the 3m was de cidin g ho w 

to establish trai ning lane s for 

th e SFOR d epl o yin g to Bo sn ia 

(SFOR 8-9). One idea wa s to build a 

MOIJT village. Th e problem wa s ho w 

to keep the co st lo w and still ge t a 

wo rld-class training facility that could 

be used for many years. The 92d ECB 

(H) becam e part o f the solutio n. Since 

we had a pro ve n track record with a 

high degr ee of success in both Bright 

Star and a company deployment 10 

Hait i. we kne w we could be read y. 

During the rem ainin g weeks o f
 

Dece mber, wh ile the batt ali on was
 

A soldier from the 92d ECB(H)
 

receives on-site gUidance from
 

a DPW engineer.
 

July 2000 

reco vering, we put together a prop osal that wo uld contribute 

to the training requirem ents of SFOR 8-tJ. T he missio n was to 

pro du ce a usable MOUT facility within fo ur months, no lat er 

than 1 May 2000. After an alyzin g the mission . the batt ali on 

establ ished the following mission statement: 

The 92d ECB (-) bui lds an R-[0 lO-structure 

MO UT villag« starting 03JA NO() andfinishing 

NLT 01MAYO() in the vicinity ofMR 223425 that 

meets [he requ irements (~l SFOR 1:1 and can be 

int egrated intofuture MO UT training on FSGA 

(Fort Stewar t. Geo rg ia }. 

Th e inten t of the batt alion com mand e r wa s to pro vide Fort 

Ste w art with the first -class eng ineering support requ ired for 

cons tructing a MOUT trainin g vill age . This mission would be 

acco mp lished by ex ec uting it at a rap id but sus ta inab le 

operational tempo. Com panies would have the flexibility to plan 

and execute their proj ects within an agreed-upon schedule , 

while sustaining mainten ance and personnel readiness. Upo n 

completion o f the mission , the MOUT vi II age wo uld mee t the 

training requirements of SFO R 8-9. The mission would be 

successfu l if the 92d EC B (H )­

Engineer 11 
- - ---

Site Layout l

N	 

I av~a I

0 

s rop Q


ChLXCh 

0 

Cafe [§J Square 0

Rtil b!c 

I 

Shop 

7 

ShOp 

/ 

Ci

B 

ty Hall 

Domce 

0 ~F s ervce Rubble 

S1'atllfl 

Legend I I o	 Pnase 1 Construction -- Existing RQad 

-- New Road 

•	 Sa tisfied the units and agencies it supported. 

•	 Improved constru ct ion sk ills of its so ldie rs witho ut 

compromising safety. 

•	 Sustained its equipment at combat-ready (10/20) standards. 

•	 Maint ain ed indi vidu al so ldier deployabl ity and family 

readine ss. 

Designing the Buildings 

To jump-start the plannin g process, we developed our own 

proposal and then sought endorsement from the 3ID. We used a 

village layout from previous SFO R training at Fort Carson, 

Colorado, to develop a concept sketch. For the buildings, we 

used a basic, single-roam-schoolhouse design that we had just 

produced in Haiti. The structure was of concrete-masonry-unit 

(CMU ) block, which provided a known reference point for 

company planning and material estimates. We knew that each of 

our four vertical platoons could build at least two schoolhousetype structures in the required tirneframe. Our concept sketch 

included nine structures that varied in construction effort (see 

figure above). The plan included two rubble buildings, two shop 

buildings, an office building, a service station, a cafe, a city hall, 

and a church. Because of the proven village design from Fort 

Carson , the 3lD immedi ately supported the general concept of 

the layout and the CMU-type structures. 

Briefing the Commander 

A mission of this magnitud e and time con straint had an 

impact on pre viously planned acti vities and how norm al 

garrison activities were condu cted.This was best demonstrated 

12 Engi neer 

by the fact that we gave our quarterly training briefing (minus 

the MOUT construction) to the commanding general on the 

morning of7 Decembe r, followed by our proposal to execute 

the MOUT construction that very afternoon. We had to use a 

completely new calendar. We included a detailed breakdown of 

changes that would result and our ability to execute other 

missions. Our goal was to immediately establish an agreement 

on the suppor t and curre nt tasking relief we would need to 

accomplish the MOUT mission. 

Defining the End State 

The most import ant part ofthe agreement was the definition 

of the end state and what constituted success. The division 

approved the battalion commande r's intent. The over all 

agreement reached was that two-thirds of the battalion would 

be considered in a deployed status, especially important due 

to the one-hour travel time from garrison to the construction 

location. 

Setting Up for Success 

Besides this deployed status, the 3ID and vario us garrison 

agencies were instrumental in setting us up for success on our 

"deployed mission." What was originally listed as assumptions 

in our briefings rapidly became fact. Representatives from the 

garrison command and range control and the G3 quickly agreed 

on a site for construction. The G3 agreed to manage the training 

activity in the area and arrange to share facilities to ensure 

uninterrupted construction. The Dir ectorate of Publi c Works 

(DPW) took the lead on critical design requirements, materials 

procurement, special-equipment rental , and enviro nmental and 

bu ilding permits. Using the ba sic building design of the 

schoolhouse, we produ ced a rough estimate for material s, the 

procurement ofwhich DPW immediatel y put into motion .The 

majority of the materials would not change in type but would 

adjust slightly in quantit y. All of this support allow ed us to 

start work on 3 January, less than a month after approva l of the 

initial briefing to the 3ID commander. 

One of the most dramatic selling points to our propo sed 

missi on was the cost savings realized if we construc ted the 

MOUT village rather than hire a civilian contractor.The project 

had to produce a usable facility under $500k to meet statutory 

requirement s. The majority of the estimated cost was for 

materials ($38 6k). Rental equipment and operational tempo 

constituted $26k and $88k of the estimate, respectively. The 

estimated savings for the installation in labor and design costs 

was estimated at more than $700k. The true value of the 92d 

ECB (H) construction effort was our ability to react quickl y. 

T

Execute the Mission 

he training opportunity sounded too good to be true. 

The 92d ECB (H) had writte n its own missi on 

stateme nt, recei ved funding, and had trem endou s 

supp ort from higher headquarters and the installation, namely 

the DPW. However, as with any mission-especially those that 

are accel erated in the planning phase-there are challenges in 

July 2000 
A view of city hall in the background at the village 

exe cution . But the team work requ ired and achieved throughout 

the ranks of the battalion and with various agencies on thc 

installation made the MOUT village a reality. The 92d ECB (H) 

maximized the train ing opportunity and remained flexible to 

changes . 

Split-Base Operations 

The battalion staff was faced with the challenge of a splitbase ope ratio n. Rather th an depl oy the bat tal ion tactical 

operations ce nter (T Oe), the battalion staff continued with 

garrison operations, in addition to supporting the project site. 

The administra tive, logistical , and opera tional support ea ch 

had a different center of gravity. 

Administrative Support. Thi s support, which included 

logi stical maintenance support, was based in the garrison. The 

5 1 shop and motor pool provided support to the companies 

primarily on days when there was no co nstruc tion. The usual 

schedule wa s four co nstruc tion days and one administrati ve 

day each week. Init iall y, this depend ed hea vily on the we ather 

and the deli very sched ules of materials. For the first few weeks 

o f hori zontal earthwork and fo unda tion construction, the 

platoons worked as quickly as possible. This minimized weather 

impacts by getting the project "out of the ground," or having 

completed slabs for each building. Coordination with the DPW 

for ground insect icide pre paration , inspecti ons , and de live ry 

of premi xed co ncrete was the major benchmark for identifying 

wh ich days wo uld be used for garriso n administrative suppo rt. 

How ever, once block wo rk began, administrative-supp ort days 

we re more predictable. 

Logistical Support. Th e ce nter of grav ity for logisticalmaterial s supply was on-site, prim arily becau se a material s yard 

had been established. The battalion also established othe r life 

support on-site, to include a mobile kitch en trailer, sleep tents, 

July 2000 

an ambulance with ,I medic, and an eq uipme nt park. Altho ugh 

this infrast ructure ha d to be guarded at night, the stock pi le or 

supp lies pre vented co nstruction de lay s due to non avail ability 

of materials or equ ipment. It also streamlined the delivery of 

mat e ri al s wi th the easier a nd q uic ke r method of bul k 

"thro ughput" of resour ces to the loc ation. An officer assigned 

to run the materials yard developed a tracki ng system to valida te 

reque sts and in iti al e stimates of m ateri al s. Eve n more 

impor tantly, the tracker provided a record of the ma terials 

required to build eac h structure. The initial estimates took on 

an ac curate resolution fo r future construc tio n -ma terials 

estimates. The most efficient method of gaining this information 

was on-site materials support. 

Operational Support. Operati onally, the 5 3 sec tion had the 

same challenge of spli t-base support. However, the center of 

gr avity was informati on, not the location . Th e primary 

ingredi ents for success at the co nstruc tion site included a fulltime inspector and a sma ll version of the battalion TOe. Th is 

provided information needed for a systematic approach to 

interna l and external reportin g. Th ere was no substitute for 

havi ng a full -time ba ttalion-level inspector (a sergeant first 

class) on-site. He provided the main lin k between the DPW 

and the leaders ofthe platoons that were building the structures . 

This coordination with the DPW inspector and procur emen t 

rep resentatives was inva lua ble becau se of the incomplete 

design details, an inherent part of fa st-track con stru ction . As 

the plato on s needed clarificatio n, the battalion inspector 

wo rked through the specifica tions with the DPW. Thi s wo rked 

so well that all design cha nges were acco mplished on-si te . 

At this point , it is important to note that the support pro vided 

by the DPW on-site was key to proj ect completion. Th e more 

effic ient con structi on techniques that were relayed to the 

soldiers and the ability to design while construc ting kep t the 

Engin eer 13 
project on schedule. The small battalion T Oe included a 

computer that eac h platoon used for updating its construction 

sc hedule as it encou ntered changes and made pro gress. 

Methodology 

Th e methodology of managing this pr oject at the battalion 

lev el hinged on accurate and updated construct ion schedules . 

The intent was to maximize the training value of this proj ect 

since we had establish ed our own mission stateme nt. While 

most co nstruction projects result in we ll-tra ined craftsme n, 

leaders often only rea ct and ex ecute instead of exercising true 

plan ning and managin g. To ma ximi ze the op po rtunity, the 5 3 

co nstruction officer used a software program ca lled Mi crosofto 

Project. The goal was to track a proj ect with the same database 

that would be used to re port on its status, and this software 

made the goal a reali ty. 

From the start, pl atoon s dev elop ed their own construction 

lo gic networks (critica l pa th methods ICl' M s I). The initi al 

batt ali on constru ct ion meeting inv ol ved a review of the best 

(mos t detail ed ) pl atoon CPM, followed by the distribu tion of 

all the pl ato on s' M~ to eac h platoon leader. The intent was 

to learn from each othe r and increa se the overa ll projectmanagem ent qu ality. Within two weeks, the construction officer 

co nso lidated th e proj ec t files int o a master batt ali on file . 

Imm ediately. the battali on 53 co uld id entify and wo rk throu gh 

any resource or timing confl ict, Weekl y repor ts involv ed a 

co nstruction meeting, platoon-l eader status update" company 

commander bri efs to the 5 3. and a status upd ate to the battali on 

co mma nder. 

The re solution o n project status offered by Mi cro soft « 

Proje ct en abl ed the battalion to immedi ate ly assess the impact 

o f an y c hang es in the con stru ct ion sched ule . Armed with this 

knowledge, both internal and ex te rna l sched ule challenges co uld 

be met with a real-time answer. Th is en sured that all de ci sions 

were based o n quantitati ve im pact s. Internally, the so ftware 

progr am allo wed the com panies and platoon s to determine the 

amount of overti me required to make up for delays. Also , if an 

unforeseen requirem ent (such as mandatory tr aining) pulled 

so ldiers off the co nstructio n site, the actua l im pact could be 

assesse d. This inform ation wa s used to help decid e wh en to 

execute the newl y iderui fied traini ng. 

Even durin g the co nstruc tio n ph ase , we never lost sigh: o f 

ma int enance being o ur founda tio n. Pl ato on le ad ers a lso 

disco vered the capa bility to track equipmen t serv ices usin g 

Mi crosoft» Proj ect. Th ey could identify th e so ld ie rs and 

equipment (as resou rces) that wo uld be unavailabl e for 

co ns tructio n and immedi at el y know the effec t on pr oj ect 

duration. Externall y, the biggest challenges were in the form o f 

task in gs from hi gh er he adqu arters and potenti al work 

sto ppages due to co ncurre nt tra inin g exerc ises in the same 

area. The battalion was able to qu anti fy the impact of a tasking 

o r wo rk stoppage in terms of th e re sultin g ad di tio na l 

construction days, This kn owl edge always convinced high er 

headquarters that fo rcing the tasking: or wo rk stoppage wa s 

not wo rth the delay in the project comple tion date. 

Inform ation wa s the center of gr avi ty for the o pe ratio n, and 

the computer. digital camera. and cell phone made inform ation 

work for the batt alion. The computer wa s the primary trackin g 

tool for co nstructio n status and materi al ac co untability and 

provided the leverage needed to wo rk through the ch allen ge 

of spli t-base op e ratio ns. Th e di gi tal ca mera pro vided an 

in valu able means for conve ying the ground tru th via e-mail 

and 'v ari ous presen tation s. While not ju st a way to docu ment 

progres s, ph otos were used to aid in mak ing dec isions and to 

generate or maintain interest in our rem ote project site . Be sides 

the on-site visits that these ph otos prompted. ther e was no 

better way to convey the result <; o f emp loying the 92d ECB (H) 

for co nstructio n projects. Wit hout the ce ll ph on e, co ordination 

wo uld have been too slo w to keep up with the dem an din g 

sc hedule of this project. 

With all this overhead staff coordination, the co mpanie s 

and pla toon s executing the mi ssion mu st he sing led out as the 

Ern Karo Village, shown on 11 April 2000, was constructed in three months by the 92d ECB at Fort Stewart, Georgia. 

/ 4 Engine er July 2000 
I 

primary re ason [or mission accomplishment. 

With a freedom to ex ecute and man age their own 

sch edules, they finished the proj ect in time [or 

the I M ay ribbon-cutting cer em ony. 

Challenges 

n complcte plans can be a challenge tl.) 

fast-track co nstruc tio n, and thi s project 

was no exceptio n. Compan ies in iti at ed 

p lann ing with o n ly con c ept sket che s of 

bu ildings, Each buildi ng evo lved throu ghout 

the constru ction peri od as time allo wed . Th e 

in te nt was to mo ve from the ba si c sq uar e 

struc tu res of the Haiti SCh oolhouse to more 

det ailed structure s that would resem ble a village, 

maxim ize the available funds. an d still meet the 

dea d line. 

. The must ex tens ive de sig n mod ifi cati on s The ribbon-cutting ceremony after completion of the village involved th e ch urch and city hall. For example. 

the fl o or su pports, in teri or layout. stair s. 

build ing heights. vau lt tru sses. opening s, porch es, and CUpO] Li S 

were all mo dified. Some bui ld ing elevations. wa ll o ffset s. and 

shop me asurements were changed on -site , Other cha nges th at 

had to he sc hed uled incl uded stag ge ring buildings to produce 

h idden corners . addi ng awni ng... and pa tios on cafes and shops, 

definin g bu ilding a reas with sidewalk s, and in stul lm g oth er 

visual impro veme nts such as lights and signs. Th e platoon s 

h ad time t o inc orp orat e th e se changes be cau se o f a n 

aggre...... ivc ... chedu le througho ut the proj ect. An ex am ple of 

this included an initial one- to two-week deployment on-site. 

Another significant ch allen ge that the co mpanies o vercame 

was split-base ope rat ions. While the focus wa s forwa rd at the 

construc tion site. garr ison requ irements did nOL stop. Company 

leadership had to co nte nd with garrison ope rations and project 

superv ision . O ne le sson learned invo lved th e sign if icant 

challenge of a com pany executive officer in handling the 

mission of the company construction off icer and primary 

company ma intenance office r. M eeting times sh ifted to take 

into ac co unt the tra vel require me nts fro m the site to the 

g a rrison , Despite the c ha lle n ges o f initi all y in co m p le te 

drawi ngs, design cha nges. and co mpet ing ga rriso n/pvojec t 

responsibilities. the companies and plato ons made it all happen 

and produced a village well beyo nd the 31D 's expectation s. 

Mission Accomplishment 

A c o n st r uc ti on b attal ion c an c o n t ro l its o wn 

de vtin y if it c an d emo nstra te to hi g her he adqu art ers that it can me et new challenges and sti!l 

sustain its readine ss, Because o f the overwhelm ing success 

o f the MO UT trainin g-village proj ect , the post lead ership's 

tru st in the 92 d Ee B (H) is tremendou s. Conseq ue ntly, the 

battalion ha s be en offered seve ral maj or construction proj ects 

to improve Fort Stewart 's infrastructure, which will pro vide 

July 20()O 

e ve n more opportu nit ies to enh anc e our cons tructio n skills. 

The process can wo rk for othe r eng ineer co nstruction battalion s 

as well. W 

M aj or Weh r is the XO ot the 11fir En gineer Bana lion (Mech ). 

3d ln janti» D ivision, Fort St ewa rt, Georgia. He previoitstv 

served {II' S3 of the 92d Engineer Comba t Batt a lion (H I!(/\)') 

and Eng inee r Brigade S4, Fori Stewart, j iJllm l'ing Command 

and Gen er al Stuff Co llege. MA l Weh r ho lds a mosier \ deg ree 

in structural en gineering from the Un iversity ofTexas. Austin, 

and is 0 licensed professional engineer in Virginia. 

Acknowledgements: The oppo rtunity 10 write this art icle is the 

direct res ult ojwork ing wit h outstan di ng Blue]: Di am ond 

soldiers and their leaders and The !JaIIOlio/1 staff. During the 

de vel opm ent and executio n nt th e project, th e foll owing 

individuals nrovided direct operational I'U/ )/ JO/'I 10 the battal ion 

.'>3: LTC l3o!J Carpe nter (battal ion commander) showe d us 

\\'11Ot (I [oun dation of ma intenance co uld build: IIJ Jamie 

Chapman (battalion civil eng ineer [or planning ] undcrvtood 

the commander 's intent and comp iled the ('OJln'/JI and est imate 

to p ro ve tha t thr m ission Iras p ossible: I l.T Zach Mil le r 

(ba ttalion civil engineer to r execu tion ] ma stered Mi cm l"Otl® 

Project and conv inced senio r leaders to use it; 1LT h oy Funk 

tba ttalion civi l engineer 1(11' logist ics) co o rdi na ted exterio r 

support and material tracking 10 ensure no p roject del ays due 

to material sh ortages; JLT Eri c Go ldman (bcntal ton S2 ) 

forecast ed the weather and described il,1 impa ct and coordina ted 

fo r phot og raph ic su pport; SFC (P) D unn." M uth p ro vided 

qualitv assu ra nce durin g split-ba se opera tions; Mr. Tim 

Whitehurst Ch ief of Buildi ngs and Crounds ) helped 

ensure more efficie nt techn iques throughou t the projec t: Mr. 

Don Pons (DPVI, Mater ial Expedit er) coord ina ted ma te rial 

deli veries directly f rom vendo rs TO the co nstruction site. 

Eng inca J5 
Looking for thB PBrfBet LBadBr
 

By Major Ron ald E. Zimme rman JT. 

"The implications are certainly far more than.just platforms. 

They are organizational. And they 're als o people skills.. .we 

are working 0 11 producin g leaders for change, not just 

lead ers who ar e doctrinally capable and competent lead ers 

for w arjighting but leaders also for all kinds of 

missions...capability to continue to deal with an evolving 

global situation in which the array of threats that yo u f ace 

goes across the entire spectrum... "I 

Honorable Lou is Caldera 

Secretary ofthe Army 

October 1999 

The perfect leader is a twenty-first-century soldier who 

is adaptive in nature. This soldier knows and ca n read 

enemy actions, can make sen se out of those actions, 

can adapt the commander's plan whil e maintaining its integrity, 

and then has the strength to de al with the changes. "Redu ced 

to its essenc e, adaptive leaders are those who have a feel for 

the figh t. Th e ability to read the situation allows our twentyfirst-century lead ers to analyze the c aus e-a nd -effec t 

relati on ships of various course s of action from the beginning 

to the end of an operation-the second- an d third-order 

effects. " 2 

An adaptive lead er is capable of translating the vari able s of 

combat (geography, wea ther, capabilities, strategy and tacti cs. 

mission , eivil and military oper ations, and time) into situational 

understanding and cause-and-effect relationships. At the 

Cent er for Army Le adership at FOl1 Leavenworth, Kan sas , an 

adaptive leader is defined as "A leader who can influence 

peopl e-by providing purpose , direction. and moti vationwhile operating in a co mple x, dynami c environment of 

uncertainty and ambiguity to accomplish the mission and 

improve the organizatio n.'" Adaptive leaders hav e mul tidimen sional thought a nd analysis vers us se q ue ntial or 

"cookbook-style" processing. 

Is the evolving twenty-first-century leader a result of our 

ch angin g operational e nv iro n me nt or c ha nges in the 

information age brought on by increased techn ology in digital 

command and control? Is there a leadership framework for the 

twenty-first-century leader') How will we train this leader'? Just 

as important, is the twenty-first-century leader attainable and 

retainable? 

Army of Excellence 

Succe ss in todays Army of Excellence ha s a direct 

relationship to three co nce pts. First, be tter soldiers 

were recruit ed as a result of the volunteer force , Second, 

16 Engineer 

struc tured training programs were developed with defined 

tasks , conditions , and standa rds- all coupled with training 

realism and assess ment. Lastly,junior leaders were supported 

by the policies and pro grams of their leaders, both military and 

civilian.' Since the end of the Cold War. the Arm y has used this 

foundation to build better training and leaders, while responding 

to various crises throu ghout Southwest Asia , Africa , Southern 

Europe, and Central Americ a. Surprisingly, each ofthese crises 

ha s a commo nality of reliance upon young Army leaders in a 

decentralized exe cution of mission intent. As an exampl e, a 

squad leader wh ose squad is mannin g a checkpoint is repeatedly 

making decisions with the potenti al of second- and third-order 

nati onal effect s. 

Operational Environment 

The operational enviro nment of the future continues to 

represent conditions and operations as see n in the 

Sinai, Iraq. Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia , 

and Kosovo .These operations include a wide range of stability 

operation s and support operations, to include small-scale 

contingencies and possibly major theater-of-w ar engagements. 

According to the Fort Lea venworth Battle Command Battle 

Lab: 

Worldwide challenges f ocus a u.s. nat ional-security 

strategy ofengage me nt that contributes to glo ba l stabi lity 

and prosperity in the twenty-first cen tury. Th e ra pid 

emerging of region al instabilities and tran sactional issu es 

(such as terrorism , rogu e sta tes see king power and 

resources, pro liferation of weapons of mass destru ction, 

natural disasters, and belligerent actions be tween state 

and nonstate actors) signals a less predictable and more 

di verse world, As a result a/ the geostrategic environment 

and the national mili tary strate gy, the Army is transforming 

itself into a f orc e based on capabilities fi n shaping and 

responding to crisis, while simultaneously preparing f or 

fu ture threats. 5 

The most dan gerous threat our twenty-first-century leader.', 

face will come from an armed force of an indu stri alized or 

dev eloping nation that seeks to combat U.S. for ces through 

activities ranging from terrorism, illegal drug trading, illicit arms 

traffi cking, international o rganized c rime. and deliberate 

e nviro nmental damage. This threat will most likely be a 

dismounted infantry that fights from small towns or enclaves 

and uses tangibl e efforts against the rule of law and publi c 

opinion with the inten t to harass and keep the America n force 

in a defensi ve posture . The changing threat, complex en ­

vironments, and more requ irements with fewer resource s se t 

Julv 2000 
operational environmental condit ions cente red on crisis, 

change , and instabil ity. 

In the future operational environm ent, young Army leaders 

wiII oper ate on decentralized mission execution only after 

thoroughly understandin g their commander's intent and scheme 

of man eu ver. Their leader ship style will evo lve around 

transformational lea dership beh avior versus transactional, 

developing and communicating a vision that their soldiers can 

rally around. and indi vidualized soldier concern and selfsacrifice .' Twent y-fir st- centu ry leaders communi ca te their 

vision through words and pe rsonal examples to pr ovide 

purpose, direction, and motivation . 

Information Technology 

The integration of informati on technology launched 

Army leaders into the twenty-first cen tury. Operations 

Desert Storm, Just Cause, and Joint Endeavor opened 

a visionary window on the capabilities of the information age. 

The future ba ttle field with integrated technology has- ­

•	 A larger battlesp ace at a higher tempo. 

•	 Increased lethality through precision munitions, 

•	 Ma ssing of effects versus massing of forces. 

•	 Increased ability to visualize a battlefield consisting of both 

friend ly and threat force s, 

Army Battle Command System technology systemsintegrate 

the func tional elements required to plan, prepare , and execute 

LI full range of operation s in basically any environme ntult imatel y pr ovidin g a sec ure, vigorous, and surv iva ble 

communications network for voice. data, and video . Information 

operations give leadersrelevant friendly information and enemy 

intell igence. as well as weather and terrain data , Collecti vely, 

relevant inform ation and intelli gence provide the situational 

awareness and battlefield visualization necessary for twentyfirst-century leaders, 

Increased co mma nd-and-control capability gives Army 

leaders the advantage of enhanced near-rea l-time situational 

awareness and ul ti mately in creased underst and ing for 

employment of assets at the right time and place. Twenty-firstce nt ur y le ade rs rely on situatio nal awarene ss or their 

enviro nme nt to help fully understand their surroundings and 

recognize how political, cultural, economic, and ethicalfactors 

impac t their operations. Future leaders will require a deeper 

understandin g of their operational environment as it relates to 

peace and conflict and the demands those relationships place 

on their leaders hip style, 

Leadership Framework 

F or eac h level of lead ersh ip , enha nce me nts in 

technology have brough t great oppo rtunities, Our 

Army must continue to exploit thoseopportunities in leader 

development. while maintaining leaders with character and 

competence who act to achieve excellence in themselves. their 

July 2000 

soldiers, and their organizations. The basics of yesterday hold 

true today. Our Army must continue to develop leaders who 

provide purpose. direction, and motivation, while operating to 

accomplish the mission and improve the organization, Our future 

will involve fast-paced operations in complex and changing 

environments, shaped by leaders who are­

•	 Comfortable with ambiguity. 

•	 Team build ers with role s of trainer and mentor. 

•	 Acce lerated, passionate learn ers. 

•	 Flexible and innovative, 

•	 Skilled at developing concepts. 

•	 Tactical experts with technical proficiency.' 

Our Army has always been and is stilJ about winning our 

nation 's wars,Le adership in the pursuit of that mission is each 

Ar my le ader's pr im ary res po nsibility, c ha lle nge, and 

opportuni ty, Army leadership is solidified by the character, 

competence, and exce llence of its leaders and their values, 

attributes, skills, and actions." Soldiers of tomorr ow will enter 

the Army with inherent digital and analog skills as a found ation 

to th eir scholastic preparat ion s, They will be ex tremely 

knowledgeable in network use and capable of making complex 

decision s, In some ways, these young soldiers and leaden ', 

havin g g ro wn up in an en vironment technology and 

expanded skills, will (Ower over our existing leaders, But 

altho ugh they will be technologically enhanced, tom orrow's 

soldiers and future leaders will enter the A rm y without the 

knowledge to achieve excellence in leadership. 

Field Manual (FM) 22- 100, Army Leadership, surrounds itself 

with what leaders must BE, the skills they must KNOW, and 

the characteristics and knowledge they must apply to DO what 

they must." The framework of BE, KNOW, and DO (from FM 

22- 100) describes characteristics of our twenty-first-century 

leaders, 

Wh at Leaders Must BE 

Sold iers enter the Army wit h va lues Li nd attribute s 

formed by environmental influ ences, such as family, friends. 

schools, religion , and television . However perfect these values 

are, they begin the definition of the total person and describe 

in essence what that person stands for. From entrance into or 

association with the Army,soldiers and leaders begin a pyramid 

of building on their character.The intent is to enhance, refine, 

and deve lop the ir existing values into the seven Army values 

described in FM 22-100: 

L oyalty 

Duty 

Respect 

Selfl ess Service 

Honor 

Integrity 

Personal Courage 

Engineer 17 
These values are the foundation of leadership. For our Army, 

they are "points of light" that drive our actions in peacetime 

throu gh combat, providing the force (soldiers. leaders. and 

civil ians) with building blocks for what is right and wro ng. 

These seven values - co upled with ment al, physical, and 

emotional attributes-collectively influence what a leader 

must BE. 

What Leaders Must KNOW 

Th e twenty -first-century battlefi eld is fast -paced and 

riddl ed with tec hnologi cal e nhanc ern ents that incr ease 

information flow to the leader. These enhancements are all 

centered on greater kn owl ed ge and understanding of the 

situation. Our twent y-First-century leade rs are tactical and 

techn ical experts who rely on concrete values to assimilate the 

complex inform ation now, conceptualize plans of actions. and 

utili ze interpersonalskillsfor leadership -all with the intent of 

mission accomplishment. KJ\lOWing their occupation becomes 

an esse ntial variable of the leadership model. as our twentyfirst-cen tury leaders are passionat e learners with a drive [or 

increa ving their skills. KNOWing does not come easy: it requires 

hard and realistic training that is founded on practical experience 

and individual and colle ctive training. The word s "task," 

"c ondi tions," and "standards" co ntinue to embody Army 

training. 

Tra ining of the futur e mu st address improvements in 

techn ology. however reso urce-intensive the eve nt. Developing 

and tailoring realistic training are essential for honing soldiers' 

and leaders' skills in adaptability. conceptualization. flexibility, 

and inn ov ation. Training mU~1 continue to pro gress from 

individual , team. and squad orsection up to the unit. Proficiency 

demands challenging training from the time a soldier enters the 

Army through unit training to build on the success of previou s 

training and sustainment of perishable skills. 

What Leaders Must DO 

Leader ship is th e art of bringing toge ther values and 

attributes: knowledge and underst and ing or the wor king environment and applicable skills; and providing purpose, 

direction , and moti vation. Leadership is about open dialogue. 

Iwl Weh-sitl! posting. Twenty-first-centur y leaders will find their 

leadership styles (the DO portion of leadership ) fluctu ating 

between direct. participating. delegating, transformational . and 

transactional leadersh ip styles . Var yin g condit ions will 

determine the styIe use and, to a certain degree. the mixture of 

each style for mission accomplishment. Leader characteristics 

in the twenty-first century may very well be domin ated by 

soldiers' esteem needs. 

Influencing Forces 

n Maslow's hierarchy of needs (sec figure), esteem is 

defined as peopl es ' se lf-res pect tied to their pay. 

responsibility, recogniti on. and respect. 10 Senior leaders 

Esteem
 

Social or Belongingness
 

Safety and Security
 

Physiological
 

Maslow's hierarchy of needs 

may rind that their junior leaders. both commissioned and 

noncommissioned, struggle to ident ify their responsibilities. 

The young leaders' increased capabilities in technology and 

ability to learn quicker will drive a need for more and more 

c ha lle ngi ng respon sibil ities. Self- esteem that is tied to 

responsibilit y and contributing effectiveness is directly related 

to the retainability of soldiers and leaders, At the end of the 

day. leaders and soldiers of tomorrow will (more than ever) 

need to feel a sense of accomplishment and job satisfaction. 

r be lieve there are basica lly three types of forces that 

int1uence recruitment and retention in our Army: environmental. 

social. and individu al. 

Environmental 

Collectively . environmenta l for ces suc h as economic 

conditions. educational opportunities, political influ ences, and 

technological advancements help define American attitudes 

toward a military lifestyle . A strong economy. fueled by 

opportunities and advancements in techn ology, means higher 

wages. Because of a better lifestyle, young American paren ts 

now have the ability to provide their children a higher ed ucation 

without using scholar ships off ered hy the military. fewer 

and fewer Americans enter the military and are associated with 

the military. a lack of understanding develops concerning the 

importance of variables within the milit ary model. Programs 

begin to be cut, less capital is resourc ed for milit ary programs. 

and soldiers' self-esteem becomes harder and harder to maintain. 

Military lifestyle becomes a ne gat ive " word-of-mouth" 

expre ssion that is soon a transitional expression for the want 

of a livelihood outside the military. 

Social 

Social needs are the sense of belonging and identification 

with a group. These needs are nurtured by religious activities. 

professional organizations,sports, or social clubs.The longing 

to be a part or something and to share the same interests. 

values. and attributes is a strong need. As we enter the century 

of techn ology where computers and digital enhancements 

dominate the working environment,soldiers can easily become 

disillusioned about their responsibili ties a, team members. If 

/ 8 Engineer July 2000 

I
decision s become cen tralize d becau se of digital enhancements, 

and the chain of command becom es more of a continuity line 

for zero-de fect versus a co mmand-and-co ntrol feature, retention 

will be lost. Ifdon e corre ctly, twenty-first- century leaders can 

capita lize on individual social needs as an enhancement to 

their leader ship style . Mo tivation has second- and third-order 

e ffec ts whe n worki ng as a tea m is bo th cha lleng ing and 

rewarding, and those intrinsic rewards arc spread ac ross the 

life-style enviro nment from the wo rkp lace to the spo rts field. 

Individual 

These forces inclu de indi vidu al and family perceptions of 

military lifestyle. Soldiers in the armed force s have a unique 

person alit y, a partic ular se t of learned experiences, and a 

percep tio n of how best to achi eve their go al s. Ed uca tional 

oppo rtunities and funding of educational goals provide great 

assistance in recru itment. Ho we ver, witho ut c halleng ing 

oppo rtuni ties for growth in estee m an d self-act ualizatio n, 

rete ntio n suffe rs . As fe w e r and fewer Ameri can s hav e 

assoc iatio ns with the armed forces and our borders remain 

safe, fam ilies be gin to th in k le ss about a stro ng defe nse . 

Reli ance on a strong econo my fuels furth er budget cuts on 

low- priority governme ntal programs.Th e lack of familiarization 

with the armed for ces and a comple te sense of security lead to 

mili tary program c uts. I propose that our adv er tising efforts 

focu s on the intan gibles of milit ary lifestyle- the benefits of 

bein g a tea m member, cama rade rie , esprit de corps- and that 

we ge t bac k to the grass roots fe eling of wh y soldiers remain 

members of the Ar my team. Let 's adve rtise the goo dness of 

o ur organiza tio n, no t j ust wh a t th e Army gives us as a 

prep aration for life outside the military after [our yea rs. 

Conclusion 

Technology e nhancements pro vide the foundat ion for 

twenty-first-century opera tions. Lead ers will imp ro ve 

thei r ability to make timely decisions: manage abundant 

amounts of informa tion; and communicate purpose, direction . 

and motivation-all to accomplish the ope rat iona l mission . 

Digital skills become no rma l operating pr ocedure s in the 

exploitation of inform ation techn ology for situational awareness, understanding . and decision making. Toug h, creative , 

realistic i ndi vidual and collective training based on ex isting 

training theories will dri ve our future leaders to higher plateaus 

in educati o n and job prowess. Thi s reali stic training will help 

our leaders and so ld iers develop the knowled ge an d skill s 

requ ired for winning our na tion's wars. Our futu re leaders wi 11 

maintain the Army va lues or Loyalty, Dut y, Respect, Selfles s 

Serv ice , Hon or. Integrity. and Personal Co urage to BE, KNOW, 

and DO as their leadership framework. Our Army must build on 

recruiting and retain ing only the best and ensure that each and 

eve ry so ldie r and leader is challenged as part or the unit team . 

We, as any Army and nation . mu st not fa ll into the Chicken 

Lillie " sky-is-falling" mentality. As we enter thi s transformation al period , we must rem emb er that each challenge is 

Jul y 2000 

really an opportunity to improve. T he U.S. Army Engineer 

School's comm and sergeant major says it best: "Ta ke time and 

a little risk and have faith ; yo ur subordina tes w ill foll o w yo u. 

The odds of success are in yo ur favo r.t'I'Leade rship basics 

hold true. Leaders of the future must never forget that leadership 

is about open dialogu e. not abo ut Web- site posting. As we 

search for the perfect leade r, we m us t incorpo rate leader 

de vel opment into all levels of tr ain ing ami full y embrace 

flexibility and e ncourage crea tive innovation. W 

Major Zim me rman will atte nd the 00/0 I class at the 

Comm and and General Staff Co llege, Fo rt Leavenworth. 

Kansas. He was p rev iously a doctrine writer in the Directo rate 

ofTraining, U.S. Arm)' Enginee r Sch ool, Fo rt Leonard vVrIOd. 

M issouri. 

Endnotes: 

1 Colonel Jon H. Moilanen, Chief of Staff, Task Force TLS , U.S. 

Arm y Command and General Staff Colle ge . "TLS Strateg y Brief, " 

TRADOC DCST Training 0 &0 Conference, Fort Bennin g, Georgia, 

8-i 0 November 1999. 

> Based on my inf or mal research , inte rview s, and work ing 

knowledge of Force XXI. Joint Contingency Force, Strike Force. Interim 

Brigade Combat Team, and Task Forc e TLS from September 1998 

through date of this article . 

" Ibid. 

" Lieutenant General (Retired) Frederic J. Grown, Ph.D. , The US. 

Army in Transition II, Brassey's (US), Inc., Washington, 1993, p. 126. 

5 "TLS: A Strategy for the Human Dimension in Twenty-First Century 

Readiness," Battl e Comm and Battle Lab Leavenworth . Task Force 

TLS. htlp ://cacfs.army.mil/CIDivisionfns/strat28.htm 

6 Major Kevin S. Donou e and Major Leonard Wong. "Understanding 

and Applyin g Transforma tion Leadership." Military Review,Vol. lXXIV, 

No.8. August 1994. pp. 24-31 . 

7 Ba sed on my info rmal research, interviews. and wo rking 

knowledge of Force XXI, JointContingency Force, Strike Force, Interim 

Brigade Combat Team, and Task Force TLS from September 1998 

through date of this article. 

8Ibid., pp.i-3. 

9 U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, Washington. 

D.C.: Gove rnment Printing Office. 31 August i999. 

10 Barry L. Reece and Rhond a Brandt, Effective Human Relations 

in Organizations, 6th ed., Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Massac husetts. 

1996. pp. i 5i-175. 

11 Command Sergeant Major Arthur Laughli n. "Lead the Way: Have 

a Little Faith." Engineer Professional Bulletin, Vol. 30, Apnl 2000. 

p. 49. 

Engineer 19 
ENFORCE 

Breakout-Session S mmar 

•

es 

By Captain Sam Hudson and the ENFORCE Team 

The ENFORCE 2000 conference in May included an 

afte rnoon devoted to breakout se ssion s that allowed 

attendees to hear abo ut, and discus s. some of the most 

imp ort ant issues, concerns, and future programs that will likely 

hav e a trem end ou s impact on the Eng ineer Regiment. Six 

sess ions from this ye ar's conference are summarized below. A 

seve nth session, which wa s primarily a U.S. Army Re ser ve 

gene ra l-o ff ice r session, was devoted to e chelons -abovedi vision engi neer-battalio n redesign . 

Combat-Training Centers 

By Major Daniel Do/w ick 

Representative s from the Nati onal Training Ce nter (NTC) . 

the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and the Combat 

Maneu ver Training Center (CMTC) provided presentations on 

issues, lessons learned, and obs ervations from their respective 

co mbat-trai ning centers. The audience consis ted of senior 

engineer lead ers from the Active and Reser ve Components 

and the National Guard. 

The NTC representative stated that eng ineers need to be a 

force in the pres ence of our maneu ver brethren. He encouraged 

attendees to use the following methodologies: 

•	 Battle commanders should­

- Se e them selves, the enemy, and the terrain, and apply the 

"so what" drill to each. 

o Visual ize, decide, and lead . 

•	 Understand and apply doctr ine through­

- Combined-arms integrati on. 

- Self-stud y. 

- Officer professional developmen t. 

- Certifi cation program s. 

The BCTP representative c larified that the B CTP uses 

"p erc eption s" as opp osed to "trends," since their obse rvatio ns 

are a snapshot in time of a sing le unit versus several units over 

a long duration . BCT? perceptions for mobility and survivability 

are that20 Engineer 

•	 Command ers and staffs do not ma ke effec tive use o f 

sca ne rable-rnine systems. 

•	 Ne ithe r the G2 nor the engineer S2 continuously templates 

enemy counterrn obili ty efforts. 

•	 Co mmanders do not maximi ze countermo bility capabiliti es 

or effects . 

•	 Engin eers participate in deep-t argeting planning, but results 

are mixed. 

In prep arin g for a CMTC rotation, some " keys to succe ss" 

are that­

•	 Units must leave their horne station with trained crew -. 

•	 U nits m us t le ave Graf en wh or Tr ai nin g A rea wit h 

train ed platoons. 

•	 Co mmande rs must personally focu s on mission-criti cal 

assets (s uch as the Volcano and MI CLI C). 

•	 Command-and- control to ol s (suc h as tirnelin es and 

sy nchronization matrices) mu st be developed an d used 

continuously. 

•	 Class IVIV supply movement and man agement depend s on 

de tailed pl ann ing and co ordination before arrival. 

Regimental Synerg y 

By Reginald Snodgrass 

This session co nce rned syner gy amo ng th e three 

comp onents of the Army-Active, Reserve , and National Guard. 

Three main idea topics for discussion were­

•	 Ho w do units learn about training exerci se availability and 

requirements? 

•	 How do we get the word out to units about the Center for 

Engineer Lessons Learned (CELL)- -what the CELL can do 

for units. and how units can help support the CELL? 

•	 How do we tackl e the partne rs hip pr o blem between 

components to ensure a better working rela tionship ? 

Th e following issues and rec omm endation s resulted from 

the discussion : 

July 2000 
Issue: There is no cen tral location where e-mail addresses 

can be found lor all engineer units. 

Recommendation: Th at a datab ase, which is available to 

everyone, be establis hed that co ntains addresses for all 

enginee r units. If the unit address is a personal e-mail addre ss, 

develop a meth od for ensuring that the add ress is changed if 

the point of contact chan ges, or establish a permanent e-mail 

add ress for units. 

Issue: There Is 110 IVUy f or engineer units to determine 

wha t training exercises are being planned and whic h ones 

still need unit participa tion. 

Recommendations : That a database be estab lis hed 

identifying training missions, req uirements, and points or 

contact. That a worldwide, trainin g-exercise conference be held 

to ide ntify training missions and their requirements. 

Issue: Hull' do we so lve problem s with comp uter syst ems 

(such as the pay s ystem ) when mu lticomponent exercises are 

being p lann ed or cond ucted ? 

Recommendation: That a method (an SOP) be developed 

for working through the system to increase the likelih ood that 

multi component training exe rcises will be conducted. 

Issue: Training exe rc ises and requirements a re Hot 

advertised in a tim ely marme t; nor are they bui lt on table of 

organ iza tion and equipmen t (TOEj-type structures (such as 

sq uad, platoon, and compa ny). 

Recommendation: That trainin g exercises be advertised at 

lea st thr ee years in adva nce. Encourage all age ncies that are 

developing an exercise to establish requ irements based on xorne 

type of TO E structure. 

Issue: Many units have never hea rd ofthe CElL 

Recommendations: That the CELL be advert ised in Engineer 

Scho ol publicati ons (s uch as the Engineer Pr of essiona l 

Bulletin s. That units read Dir ector of Training (DOT) and 

Directora te of Combat Dev elopments (DCD) notes. (To get on 

the distribution list for DOT notes, contact Jim Evans bye-mail 

a t e van sjtowoad .a rm y.m il. Read DCD note s a t http:// 

wood.anny.mil/D'Clr/dcd.htm}. 

Issue: How do es/should the CELL collec t lessons-learned 

information from units con ducting exercises or mission s ? 

Recommendations: Tha t the CELL request after- action 

revi ew s from units that conduct exercises.That the CELL post a 

form on the Web site outlining the information that units should 

submitted. 

Personnel Retention 

By Maj or John Dvoracek 

Thi s session was designed to facili tate discussion between 

senior engine er commanders about current officer-retention 

issues, particularly captain retention . Representative s from 

Jul y 2000 

PERSCOM, AR-PERSCOM, and the National Guard Bureau
 

briefed attendees on current personnel-retention action s in their
 

organizations . Discu ssion centered on the most common
 

reasons cited as causes for dissatisfaction with or separation
 

from the Army . These included-


II "Zero-defects" ment ality.
 

II Microm anagement.
 

II High OPTEMPO.
 

II Poor leadership.
 

II Poor "qu ality of life."
 

II Lack of family time.
 

II Loss of benefits from service .
 

II Too much "do-more-with-less" mentality.
 

II Lack of faith in senior Army leadership.
 

Feedback from the attendees indicated that most installation s 

and organizations are actively working to solve these problems, 

when possible, at their level. Additionally, leade rs are extremely 

emo tional about man y of the rea son s officers give for lea ving 

the service. The audience ackn owl edged that eac h leader must 

work hard er to maint ain a positive attit ude and mentor the 

officers working for them in order to improve retention. Finally, 

the loss of qualit y officers is nOI confined to one co mponent 

(Active, Reserve, or National Guard) and requires a number of 

different solutions to address each component's specific needs. 

The Grizzly and Wolverine Programs 

By Major Mark Streeter 

The TR ADOC System s Manager - En gin eer Com bat 

Systems conduc ted this sess ion and presented the current 

status of the Grizzly and Wolverine programs. Key points of 

the initial briefing wereII	 Program Budget Decision 745 (PBD 745), dated 27 Decemb er 

1999, cut the funding for Fiscal Years (FY) 2000 , 2001 , and 

be yond for th e Gri z zly and Wol ve rin e p ro g r a ms . 

II	 PBD 745 was purely a budget decision that was driv en by 

the Army' s need to find funding for the transformation. 

II	 Th e Grizzly and Wolverin e programs are positioning for 

success. 

•	 Th e short-, rnedium-, and long-range ac tions for both 

programs and the possib le outcomes after congress ional 

markups are released . 

•	 The days of 366 Gri zzlies and 465 Wol verines are gone. We 

can expect about 160 Grizzlies and about 168 Wolverines for 

the active Army when the programs arc rest ored. 

II	 The bottom line is that the Grizzly and Wolverine are coming 

back. 

Eng ineer 2 1 
The following qu estions, answers, and attendee feedback 

re su lted : 

Qu estion: When Con gress plusses up the prog rams, will it 

.<till continue with exp erim en ts and test ing ? 

Ans wer : Yes. 

Feedback: There is a lso a grea ter ripp le effect. An Armyimposed 6- to 7-mon th delay in program startup equates to a 

mu ch lon ger actual delay, because there is a learning curve 

associated with rehirin g former worke rs or acquiring new 

workers. Time has pa ssed, and former program personnel have 

moved 0 11 to other job s. New employees \vill have to learn 

everything that was kno wn about the program up until the time 

it wa s "termina ted.' From a co ntractor 's viewpoi nt, il is diffi cult 

to hold on to people. Everyone is lookin g for other opport unities. 

T his i~ a ris ky time fram c. 

Question: For the initial brigade combat team (IBCT). is 

there an opportunity to develop or use llfFth e-.lhelftechnology 

(for eng inee rs)? 

Answer: Right now the de sign is ope n for the m CT. We wi II 

still depend on the Gri zzly and Wo lver ine for the heavy forc es, 

Th e req uireme nt to breach co mp lex obstacl es is a sim ple 

physics problem . We need a vehicle with the weig ht and power 

of the Grizzly to plow through obstacles at the requi red de pths. 

F eedha ck : T he governme n t lo ve s h igh-technol og y 

so lu tions bu t will not accept risk. Conce rni ng the m C T, 

engineers are low on the list and will have to wai t a lon g time to 

ge t a new system. 

Question: Will the 168 Walveri nfS be fielded onl y to III 

Corps What about the re st of the force? 

Answer: We are looking at our opt ions . We cou ld field a 

lower density of Wol verines to the force to spread the wea lth. 

We co uld do nothing. Or we co uld upgrade the armored vehiclelaunched bridges (AVLBs). 

Question: How about mountin g th e Mon goose on the 

H'l:)Il'erill e? 

Answer: Do we wa nt to put the Mongoose on an $8 million 

piece o f eq uipm ent? We do n't want to do it right now, but we 

do have a pre planned product improvement (o r suc h an actio n 

to be looked at in the future. 

Question: Whlll about turning in all AVLBs ? 

Answer: That is an option we ca n co nsider. All optio ns are 

bei ng look ed at. 

Feed ba ck : It 's a po litical de cisio n, As lon g as the AVU3 

around, it provides the Army a path of least resistance. With 

the AVLB, we still have some gap-crossing capabil ity.The Army 

can apply a "Band-Aid» fi x" to the AVLBs more cheaply than it 

ca n repl ace them . The re is not enough mon ey avai lab le to do 

all the things the Army wa nts to do. 

22 Eng ineer 

Qu estion : What about the 57 suppers the force lost when 

the Griz::Jy was terminated? A re the re plans to pu t them back? 

Answer: Yes, there are plans 10 put them back in the modified 

table of organ ization and equip ment (MT OE). 

Feedback: Termination ofthe Grizzly and Wolverine becomes 

a retention and mora le issue . It' s diffic ult to recruit and ret ain 

quality eng inccr sold iers if all they hav e to wor k with is old 

technology and equipment. Th e Grizz ly and Wol verine would 

ce rtainly hel p re tentio n amo ng engi nee r units. It is a real cause 

for co nce rn to start up a g rea t program only to have it killed 

yea rs later. Th ere is a re al co nce rn from the field that witho ut 

the Gri zzl y, so ldiers are still in harm 's way and still ou t in the 

open to perform breaching while the tankers sit in the comfort 

of their pro tected systems. 

Engine ers mu st ma ke kn own how badl y they need these 

prog ram s and keep pu shing for them. 

Topographic Concepts 

By Lieutenant Colonel Ea rl Hooper 

T he to pography breakout se ssion provi ded an opportunity 

to re vie w the year's signif icant ac tiv ities of th e Terra in 

Visua liza tion Center (T V C) and the TR ADO C Program 

In tegration Office - Terr ain Dat a (TPIO-T D). Th e session 

ope ned with the results of the worldw ide staffing ofthe Na tional 

Imager y and Mapping Ag ency (NIM A) prototypes used to 

demons tra te the Fo und atio n Data Co nce pt. Ge neral tirn clines 

were prov ided with foundation da ta co mp let ion projected for 

FYO:'i. 

Th e status o f topo gr aphic c once pts for the hea v y 

divi sio n, interim brigade , and interim di vi sion and a ge ne ral 

rev iew o f the Co r ps h e adqu art e r s a nd head qu a r te rs 

compa ny 0 & 0 (c urre n tly o n h ol d ) were di s cu sse d . 

Alt hough it is not a worki ng concept, a view was prov ided 

of the noti onal Co rps To pographic Battal io n and no tion al 

op tio ns fo r a th e at er su p po rt stru cture . T he shortage o f 

8 1T and 2 15D personnel to fi II th e e xpand ing rol e a nd 

m ission of these voldiers was o f prime concern . Th e c urren t 

growth in top o gr a ph ic structure will co ntinue to exacerba te 

the shortage of so ld iers over the next five to seven years, 

The role o f terrain -data man age r is the prima ry training 

co ncern with th e emerg ing c on cepts of suppo rt . T here is 

c lear ag reement th at c1ata management will require spec ial 

trainin g th at curre n tly is not availa ble to th e 8 l T o r 2 15D 

so ld ie r. T hese tra ini ng iss ue s w ill be addressed in th e 

co ncept e ffort note d bel o w. 

A presentation was also made o f the Army Im agery and 

Gc os pat ial In form ation - Integr ated Concept Tea m (lCT ). T he 

co sponso re d lCT between the Engi neer an d Int ell igen ce 

Schools provides the fo rum to j ointl y deve lop future concepts, 

trai ning strategies, and system architec tures requ ired to take 

(continued on pugc 27) 

July 2000 
s. Captain Roh ert F Hyn es 

W he n the subj ect of conducting a sta ff rid e is 

menti?ncd . the ,fir...t q~esti on that often co mes to 

min d IS why. When traming re sources are so sho rt. 

why spend time and money on a staff rid e when there are platoons and companies to be trai ned') We hope that sta ff rides wi11 

make us better co m mander:'. but there are a number of rea sons 

for co nduc ting them. Willi am G. Robert son , auth or or The Staff 

Ride. lists 13 purposes of staff ride s. with the end objec tive heing to furth er the professional de velopment of U.S. Army 

leaders. In analyzing a staff ride that the 307t11 En gineer Batt alion at Fort Bra gg. North Carolina, conducted in Vicksburg, 

Mississippi's CiviI War Mil itary Park and co rn paring Robert:...on's 

obj ecti ves. 1 came to this conc lusion: Experience the historical 

battle [rom the persp ective of 0 comma nder OJ' a soldier O!1 the 

ground. Regardle ss of our unit objectives. most o r u, can agree 

tha i e xperie ncing the hatti e is an outstanding oppo rt unity to 

furth er devel op the professionalism of leaders at all levels. 

T

Conducting the StaffRide 

he 307th E~gin er c hose the Civ il Wa r M ilitary Park 

fo r Its "tall ride because of the work eng rneers 

performed there during the war. The ca mp aig n for 

Vi cksbur g la st ed throu gh th e spring and into the sum me r 

months of 1863 . Be cause of redoubts over loo king the river. 

(he Confederates were able to blockade the Mi ssi ssippi Riv er 

trom the Federals through we ll-p lace d art ille ry. Becau se Confed erate force s had oc cupied the to wn since the heginni ng of 

the war, they had ample time to prepare the defen se. During 

the co ur se of th e planning and execution of the staff ride . I 

identified se veral planning principles that were ke y to suc ­

ce ss. With these sim p le tips. yo u can turn your battl efi eld to ur 

into an exciting training opportunity. 

Ch oos e the Right E x pe r t. To be a profe ssion al ex pe rien ce. a staff ride needs a rCl c ilitato r. an ex pe rt o n the history 

of the ca mpaign wh o can answe r and ask the questions that 

stim ulate (he learnin g process. It may or ma y not be someon e 

from th e unit. Just as in an y pr esentati on . the spe a ker must be 

chosen to fit the audienc e, A, k yours elf. What is the e xperi ­

en ce lev el of the staff riders? 

M ost of the tour guide s at th e Ci vil War Military Par k 

kn ew th e locations in detail but we re not historian s. We wan ted 

someon e who had studied the history o f the battle and co uld 

rel ate it to lessons learned in modern warfare . We se lected a 

professor from the Department of M ilitary Hist ory at West 

Point, because he co uld exp lain the principles of war and the 

tacti cal perspectives of a commander. 

Do Your Homework. Let's face it; it is diffi cult to plan fo r 

a staff ride whil e performing the constant ta sk s o f training . 

July 2000 

main tenance, and daily operations. In fact. it is difficult ev en 

wh en the staff rid e is a high priority. The first requirement is 

ownership. As the 53, it was my operati on , and it would s ucceed o r fail based all how J prepared for it. Some units ta sk 

on e o ffi cer to be in charge , but J recommend against it. Com ­

mand e mphas is is a lways the ke y. The 5 3 or exec utive officer 

ne ed, to be the drivin g force to di vert resource s to the proj ect 

without letting ro utine operations s u ffcr, 

As a matter o f policy. e ac h member of a staff rid e ne ed, to 

resear ch ahead of time. But ra the r than le ave that entirel y up 

to individual " come up with a training plan . Set the mile­

" tone, ahe ad of tim e . Assign cert ain a reas of re spon sibility to 

e ac h unit to mak e it the resident e xpe rt o n a pa rti cular area o f 

the battle or po svibly a historical co m m ander. Give sufficient 

Lime to research. and then tic everyth ing together. After a ssigning area!', of the sie ge of Vicks burg. I presented an officer 

dis tr ibut ion pl an on th e o ve ra ll campaign. The pr esentation 

was general enough that ev eryone understood the campaign. 

but it a lso focused on and tied the bits of resear ch int o the 

overall sc heme. The di versity o f the research are a... helped to 

stimul at e qucxti ons during the presentation. 

Delegate. Assign ar eas of research to the stuff- ride meinber-; Make each com pany re-ponxible for resea rch ing and presenting a ...ire alo ng the tour. This is 8 great way of dividing the 

work while forcing the members to learn . I conducted a thoro ugh reco nnaissance a couple o f months ahead to en- ure that T 

wa s asxigning good research .Then the com pa nies we nt to work . 

The key is qu ality not qu antity. Although the urge may be 

to try to squeeze a s much training as possible int o an entire 

da y. remember that it is supposed to be fun . Do not risk lo'iing e veryone's att ention hy over tasking. One site per company was an e as ily achi e va ble go al. Each of th e five cornpani cs in o ur b att ali on presented abo ut 45 minutes' worth o r 

material. and all had en ou gh prepar ation time to make a 

quality presentati on. 

He Creative. This is ve ry important. The purpose of the 

staff ride is to experie nce th e battlefi eld from the perspecti ve 

of a com ma nde r or soldi er on the gr ound. On e of the most 

effe ctive wa ys to do thi s is to use the terrain . What can we 

le arn histori c ally ab out thi s terrain ? On e site in parti cul ar, 

Thayer's Approach, required the Uni on forces to attack up a 

nearl y vertical slo pe again st Confederate parapets, Imagi ne 

what that mu st have been lik e. To practi ce, we enco uraged 

members of the gro up to try running up the h ill . It was ex ­

hausting. but we learned a gre at lesson. There ar e alway s new 

ways to add spice to the presentation. Find some authenti c 

un iforms or take the time to ex amine so me actu al we apo ns or 

the battl e. 

Engineer 23 
Our study of the Louisiana Redan presented the cas e of 

Uni on min ers tunneling und er the Confederate parapet and 

blow ing it up with 800 pounds of TNT. Wh en the hol e opened 

in the parapet, an entire infantry regiment stormed the ga p, 

attempting to break thr ough the lines and ca pture the fort. 

Th e battle lasted nearl y two da ys with the Union forces eventually withdrawing. 

To expe rience the battle. we began with a roc k drill on a 

terrain map prepared ahea d of time. Ea ch member took the 

rol e of a particular commander or historical figure. When the 

rock dri II was complete, we passed out cap pistols to all 

of the infantry co mma nders and told them to take up po sition s on the oppos ing hills. Caps are better than bl an ks for a 

staff ride because they do not requ ire permits for transporting 

Class V supplies, nor do tbe y have sec urity requirements like 

wea pons. 

On signal , the engineer actors walked the route of att ack, 

simu lating the tunnel that Unio n enginee rs dug und er the 

parapets. With the wave o f a flag, they signaled that the parapet was blown, and the infantrymen rushed forward, firing 

their pistol s. Both sides stood on the rem ain s of the actual 

parapet and e ng aged for several minutes. Fin all y, on the 

commander' s orde r, the Union actors with drew, 

The result was fant astic. Everyone in the grou p spo ke about 

what a great tour it was. Even the battali on co mmande r fired 

off blanks like an old cavalry comma nde r. 

Conclusion 

Don' t forge t that the main pUl1Jose of a staff ride is to 

experienc e a battle fro m th e pe rs p ective of a 

commander or soldier on the ground, rega rdless of your 

military branch or research ex perie nce. However, another purpose is to have fun. Don 't become sidetracked. A staff ride should 

be a reward to a unit that has wo rked and train ed hard and 

dese rves a chance to get away from "the mill" for a few days. 

Don't think of a staff ride asju st being more wor k. Thi nk of it as 

a chance to train out of the ordinary . With a little plan ning, you 

are sure to have a winning trainin g eve nt. Eve n if you repeat it 

year after year, your unit will still benefit each time. W 

Cap tain Hynes is attending the Ko rean Language Center 

at Sogang University, Seoul. Korea. as aforeign -urea officer. 

He previously commande d IHIe , 307th Engineer Battalion , 

82d Airborn e D ivision, at Fort Bragg, No rth Carolina. and 

serv ed as The ba ttalion S3 officer during the prepa ration for 

The stuffride. A graduate ofthe Uni ted State s Military Academy, CPT Hynes holds a I110 STer '.I' deg ree ill eng inee ring management Font the University of Missouri-Rolla. 

Reference: 

Robertson , Willia m G ., The StaffRide. United Stat es Army 

Ce nter of Military History. Wa shington, D.C. , 1987 . 

24 Eng inee r 

Libby Bridge Staff Ride
 

By Second Lieutenant Jam es A. Westgate 

Recently, officers of the 44th Enginee r Battalion at Camp 

Howze , Korea, and the 82d Engineer Company (CSE) at Camp 

Edwards participated in a staff ride to the Libby Bridge as part 

of the Broken Heart Battalion's Leader Development Program. 

The purpose of the staff tide was to present an actual wartime 

engineering challenge, discuss a possible solution. and then visit 

the terrain to see firsthand the types of challenges the 84th 

Engineer Construc tion Battalion (ECB), the "Conquerors of the 

lrnjin, ' experienced while building the Lib by Bridge. 

During the lasttwo years of the Korean War,U.S. Army engineers 

dealt with the difficult task of bridging the Imjin River in the Eighth 

U.S. Anny sector. Many float bridges and more substantial timbertrestle structures were destroyed during the summer flood season, 

By the fall of 1952, rCorps faced the winter withno bridges across 

the Irnjin to SUPPOl1 its divisions in combat along the front lines. 

Engineers of the 84th ECB made a significant contribution to the 

Eighth Army's effort by building the Libby and Teal Bridges across 

the Imjin in only 242 days. 

Teal was a low -water bridge that could be used almost yearround, except during hea vy rain s. The Libby Bridge, the focu s 

of the staff ride, was a mu ch mo re substantial struc ture . Made 

of reinforced-concrete piers and stee l-plate girders. it spa nned 

1,075 feet and could be used year-round to support a possible 

advance or an armist ice. But, before the 84tb ECB co uld begin 

constru ction, it had to ov ercome significant su pp ly and 

personnel shortages. In add ition , both brid ges had to be built 

simultaneous ly before July 1953 by three line comp anies, 

which in Oc tober 195 2 were spread between Seoul a nd the 

Freedom Gate Bridge working on oth er projects. 

At the beginning of the staff ride, officers of the 44111 Engineer 

Battalion received a prel iminary briefi ng from the 5 3 on the 

timeline and plans prepared by the 2d Engineer Grou p for the 

construction ofLibby Bridge. The focu s of the brief was to point 

out the personnel shortages. equipment availability, logistic al 

shortfalls, and enginee ring design challe nges that co nfro nted 

the 84th ECB during the various phases of tbe Libby Bridge 

construction . Th e officers learned that after conducting initi al 

site preparation and rece iving steel, wood , and other supplies 

from Japan, the 84th ECB worked through the winter to emplace 

the concr ete caisson s, build the rein forced-concrete pi er s, 

fabricate the steel-plate girders, and place the bridge deck. DUling 

the bridge co nstruction, which was within artillery range ofNorth 

Korea, tJ1e 84th ECB sustained two deaths. On 4 July 1953 , 

Eighth Army commander General Maxwell Taylor dedicated 

the bridge, which was named after Sergeant Geo rge Libby, 3d 

Engineer Battalion , who eamed the first Medal of Honor in the 

Korean War for actions near Taejon in July 1950. 

For the offi cers of the 44 th Eng inee r Battalion , the intent 

of the Libby Bridge sta ff ride was to foster an understanding, 

from the pe rs pec tive of engineers fa ci ng a formidabl e 

Julv 2000 
constru ction task in a combat theater, of the hardships and 

challenges confronting engi neers across the depth of the 

battl efi eld. Eng ineers of the 84 th ECB completed their 

mission , draw ing from the experiences they gai ned while 

fighting along the Imjin during the past year. 

It is important to realize that no similar permanent fixedbridging effort had ever been attempted in the history of the 

Corp s by an engineer con struc tion battalion in a combat 

theater-nor has it been done since. Today, nearly 50 years 

after its completio n, the Libby Bridge still serves as a crossing 

si te on the Irnjin Riv er. It stan ds as a sy mbo l of the 

contributions that eng ineers have made- and continue to 

make-in support of maneuver units on the battlefield. 

Second Lieutenant Westgat e is the Assault and Obstacle Platoon 

lead erfor C/44th Engineer Batta lion in Korea. where he previously 

served as A/S3 . A gra duate ofthe University ofTexas at AUSTin with a 

degree in aerospace engineering , he has also completed the Engineer 

Offic er Basic Cou rse. 

Chipyong-ni Staff Ride 

By Major Ke ith A. Landry 

On 1\ February 2000, officers of the 44th Engineer Battalion 

at Camp Howze, Korea, participa ted in a staff ride to the 

battlefield at Chipyong-ni as part ofthe Broken Heart Battalion's 

Leader Development Program. The intent was to conduct a 

detailed case study of the di.rect and indirect leadership actions 

demonstrated by officers of the 23d Regimental Combat Team 

(RCT) during the battle of Chipyong-ni from [3 to15 February 

1951.The 44th's commander wanted every officer to come away 

with a better understanding of what it takes to train, prepare, 

and motivate units and soldiers to tig ht- while surrounded and 

outnumbered- in Korea's severe winter environment and win. 

In many annals, the siege of Chipyong-ni is described as one 

of the most bitterly contested engagements of the Korean War. 

Amid the snow-covered hills encircling the small town of 

Chipyong-ni in the X Corps sector. Colonel Paul Freeman's 

23d RCT, 2d Infantry Division, made a decisive stand. During 

twu long nights of brutal close combat, the 23d RCT-consisting 

of the regiment's three organic infantry battalions, the French 

battalion task organized with a Republic of Korea company, the 

Ist Ranger Company, an engineer company, a battalion of 105­

millimeter howitzers, a battery of ISS-millimeter howitzers, a 

company of 14 tanks, and 10 antiaircraft Quad 50s-inflicted 

tremendous casualties on clements of five attacking Chinese 

divisions. Chipyong-ni proved to be the culminating point of 

the Fourth Chinese Offensive and the Chin ese Communist 

Forces' first operational defeat. 

After a two-hour bus ride from Camp Howze, the officers 

began the staff ride at the Chipyong-ni battlefield monument 

(see photo) that was erected by the Korean 5th Infantry Division 

north of the village. Overlooking the village of Chipyong-ni, 

the Al44th officers set the stage for the tactical discussions to 

follow by providing an overview of the Korean War from 25 

June 1950 up to Lieutenant General Ridgway's assumption of 

command of the Eighth U.S. Army in December 1950. Officers 

ofB/44th provided an overview of the organization, capabilities, 

tactics, and limitations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army 

forces and the 23d RCT. Once the stage was set for understanding 

the political and military factors impacting on the battle, the 

44th's commanderled a discussion (on 14 February 2000) aimed 

at assessing the combat readiness of the Chinese Communist 

Force and the 23d ReTon in tenus of morale,logistics, and training. 

The officers then moved to the site of some of the fiercest 

fighting near the G/23d Infantry positions to continue the 

tactical discussion. The C/44th officers reviewed the actual 

battle of [3 to 15 February 1951 to determine what leadership 

actions contributed significantly to the 23d RCT's success at 

Chi pyong-ni . Finally, officers of HHC/44th analyzed the 

supply and mainten ance challenges faced by the 23d RCT, to 

include the resupply options available to the unit. The staff 

ride ended with a discussion to assess the contribution of 

logistics to the victory at Chipyong-ni. 

Durin g the sie ge, the 23d ReT intl icted tremendo us 

cas ualties on attacking Chinese Commun ist Forces and 

suffered 52 killed, 259 wounded, and 42 missing. For this 

action, the 23d RCT received the Presidenti al Unit Citation. 

Together, the officers of the 44th Engineer Battalion discovered 

that in the seve n months between Task Force Smith 's defeat 

near Suwon and the victory at Chipyong-ni, the U.S. Army 

had learn ed how to fight a num erically super ior force on 

difficult terrain, at night , in a severe and logisticall y co nstrained environment and win. 

As they walked off the battlefield, each officer from the 

44th seemed to retlect on the contributions enginee rs make in 

support of maneuver units on the battlefield in Korea. It was 

a day well spent. 

Major Landry is working on a Ph.D. in civil enginee ring at 

Renssela er Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York. He was prev iously 

the operations officer for the 44Th Engineer Battalion, 2d Infantry 

Division. in Korea. MAJ Landry is a graduate of the United States 

Military Academy and the Com mand and General StaffCollege and 

is air-assault, airborne, and ranger quali fied. MAl Landry is a 

professional engineer in the state ofVirgin ia. 

July 2000 Eng ineer 25 
U GRADI G THE
 

MILLIO -DOLlAR OLE
 

By Captain JOIWtlWII Gana 

E ac h yea r, more th an 8 ,0 00 e ng inee r cq uiprn cnt 

operators and me chanics from all services train at 

Fort Leonard Wood -on more than 25 different mode Is 

of equipme nt, tot alin g more than 700 vehicl es. Th e 577th 

Eng ineer Batt alion conduc ts most of this training at th e 

Norma ndy Training Area (TA) 244, also kno wn as the "milliondoll ar hole" because of the value of the equipment there. TA 

244 is 900-pll1s acres that consist of 18 remote equipmentope rati on sires with a centralized hub of mai ntenance bays. 

maintenance-training facilities , and administrative buildings. 

U nfortunatel y, man y of the po st's training areas need 

considerable work to bring them up to standard. To correct 

some of the shortcomings, the 1st Engineer Brigade initiated 

several projects for the most heavily used area s. The main focu s 

i, on TA 244. where 16 upgrades are planned for six of the sites 

that require varying degree s of the same basic improvements, 

Th ese remo te sites consist mostly of open, graded fields used 

for hands-on equipmen t-operation training. Typically. the 

equipme nt is parked in the mud or on a slightly improved gravel 

sur face . Some of the sites have a sma ll temporary or semi ­

permanen t <truc ture that is used for cl assroom instructi on. 

Th ese struc tures hav e portable latrines and trucked-in wat er. 

Th ese rem ote sites offer littl e in the WLl Y of protection from 

the elements. During co ld weath er. stude nts now \\ ail to operate 

equipment in tents w ith potbellied stove s or on un covered 

blea chers. The Ist En gin eer Brigade 's proposed solution is to 

cons tru c t heated. pre -en gin e ered buildin gs ad jace nt to 

cquipment-o peration sites . An example of such a structure is at 

Figure 1. 

Figure 1 

Currentl y, stude nts sit on uncovered bleachers to obse rve 

training and rec eive safety briefings and instruction. The 

sunshade shown in Figure 2 would provide protection [rom the 

sun and rain. 

26 Engineer 

Figure 2 

The solution to maintenance-facility shortfalls .~ to erect a 

"Kvspan" structure at each site. These semipermanent, arched 

buildings can house four pieces of equipment for a fraction of 

the cost of a conventional metal structure of similar size. Figure 

:1 illustrates a K-sp an stru cture already in use at thc gr adcr 

co urse . 

Figure 3 

Relocating and refurb ishing metal bui Idin gs fro m ot her 

locations un post will solve the problem of inadequate classroom 

space. The building in Figure 4 is large enough to accommodate 

two classroo ms tha t satisfy Army de sign standards. 

The SS4th Engineer Ba ttalion co nducts a fi vc-day field ­

trai ning exe rcise for the Engineer Officer Basic Course (EOBC) 

at TA 22 1. also known as Fir e-Support Base Thunder. Thi s 

training area requires several projects to bring it to established 

training and safety standards. EOBC students will complete 

most of these projects as part of their field training. However, 

Julv 2000 
Figure 4 

.... orn e of th e sites need extern al support , su ch a s road 

co ns tr uc tio n a nd s ur faci ng, su rveyi ng , a nd a bu tment 

co nstruction. Fi gure 5 shows the site plan for TA 221. 

./ I 

. / 

; I 

:1 

' j
 

i
 

W"';:1 i'""-=,--=J 

I 

I' J 

Figure 5 

Th e one-stati on unit training units, the 35th and 169th 

En gineer Battalions. usc TA 106 to conduct phy sical training. 

hand-to-hand co mbat, and end -of- cycle testing reinforcement. 

With so me earthwork and simple co nstruc tion, the area will 

acco mmodate a greater variety of training. It doe s not have a 

storage facility for training aid s or an are a for lane training. To 

expand the training opportunities of this area. a portion of the 

pe rimeter must be cleared and foxholes install ed . The 1sr 

Engine er Bri gad e 's goal for TA 106 is to mak e it an allenco mpassing site for basic co mbat training and refresher 

training for militar y occupati on al sp ecialties 12B (combat 

engineer) ancll2C (bridge crewman). 

Some of these projects are within the capabi lities of the 1st 

Engineer Bri gade. However, due to the brigade's extensive 

training and support mission s, it would take much longer to 

co mp lete them using onl y internal assets. Th e I st Engineer 

Bri gade would like to offer the projects as training opportunities 

to other units, perhaps during their annual training. With prior 

coor dination, intere sted units also can use the training rang es 

at Fo rt Leonard Wood. The post ha s rea sonable hill eting and 

me ss arrangements that are 'Ivailable with proper coo rdina tion. 

Upon requ est. the brigade will pro vide a folder for each project 

described in this art icle. Units may view the bill of mat erials and 

project desi gns on the 1sr Engineer Brigade's construc tion Web 

July 2000 

pa ge at httpv/www. wood.army. milll STBDJ:;/con struction. 

Co ntac t the bri gade 's operation s officer ar (57 .1 ) 596-0223 or 

DSN 581-02 23 1'01' more details. W 

Captain Gano is a train ing dev eloper in the Engineer 

WOI.1ighter DivisiO/1 of the Dire ctorate ofTraining DevelopmenI, 

MANSCEN, Fo rt Leonard Wo od, Missou ri . Previous 

assignm en ts include pla roo n leader and battulio n 

maintenance office r; 40th Engineer Battalion, Baumholder. 

Germany; and Assistan t 53, 1.1' 1 En g ineer Brigade, Fort 

Leonard Wood. CPT Gano is a graduate ofthe Unit ed States 

Military Aeadem» 

(continued from page 22) 

the imagery and geospatial community to 2005. Th e concept is 

currently und er revi ew with the Council of Colonels. The coeffort with the Intelligence Sch ool was generally acc epted as 

the appropri ate directi on for ward . 

TcJeEngineering 

By Rose Acheson 

The sess ion opened with an overview ofthe TeleEnginecring 

program. TeleEn gineering began as a technology demonstration 

to provide rapid solutions to the Department of Defense in 

support ofmaneu ver engineering and force-support engineering 

using comm and-and-control architecture a n d existing 

communications systems. From the time ofthe Sava Rivcr llood. 

in 1997 , to the pre sen t, the TeleEngineering Operation s Ce nter 

has provided more than 700 engin eering so lut ions to requests 

for information that is not readily acce ssible in the field. 

An example was given or a TeleEngineering capa bilitybrid ge assessment and repair. Several examples of damaged 

brid ges were show n, and explanati on s were give n on how the 

En gineer Research and De velopment Center helped identify 

the military load class of the damaged bridges. 

Attendees also watched a sh ort demonstrati on of the 

AntiTe rrori st Plann er (AT Planner). which is being developed 

to help engineer officers plan and implement measures required 

for force protecti on . Some comparati ve studies have been 

completed for air blast in urban are as. There are other tools for 

che mical and biolo gical weapons, but they are not included in 

the AT Planner. 

Conclusion 

This year 's breakout se ssions provided an ex tr em ely 

valuable forum for senior lead ers to discuss some of the most 

important subjects facing the Engin eer Regiment. Some very 

important issue s were raised and addressed . Se ssion notes 

wer e forwarded to the DTLOMS int egrator's o ffice in the 

Engineer Sch ool for furth er acti on as necess ary. 

Engin eer 27 
Delibe ate Ri er- Crossing Opera t ions: 

Focus on the Fundam ent als
 

By Lieutenant Colonet Miroslav P Kurka and Mqjor Brian Do.1Ll 

river crossings are complicated and 

difficult operations that require the commitment of 

substantial resources and a high degree of 

synchronization to be successful. This may be one of the 

reasons that maneuver forces infrequently train for rivercrossing operations. 

DUling its recent Warfighter Exercise, the Ist Cavalry Division 

(lCD)-with operational control of the 937th Engineer Group 

(Combau-i-plarmed and executed a deliberate river crossing in 

a Korean scenario. ln the process, both units thoroughly 

reviewed river-crossing doctrine as outlined in Field Manual 

(FM) 90-13, Ri ver-Crossing Operations, and developed useful 

tactics, techniques. and procedures (TTP) for executing and 

controlling division river-crossing operations. In the process, 

the 1CD combined-arms team reaffirmed the importance ofthe 

river-crossing fundamentals. 

Preparation 

The ICD began preparing for the river crossing in early 

November 1999 during its Warfighter Seminar at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. A major focus of this seminar 

was a doctrinal discussion of river-crossing operations by the 

division commanders and battlefield-operating-system chiefs. 

Additionally, the assistant division engineer, ICD Eng ineer 

Brigade S3, and the 937th Engineer Group 53 compared and 

synchronized the tools that the division and group would 

usc to plan and control the crossing operation. Foremost 

among the se tools was a simple matrix (Figure 1) for tracking 

the progress of the crossing at each site. 

28 Engineer 

In addition to track ing planned and actual crossing times, 

the matrix allowed the division and group to track the status of 

key bridging assets at each crossing site. The 1CD assistant 

division engineer developed a simple Microsofte Excel program 

for calculating the engineer/bridging equipment and for ces 

required to support a crossing operation. This program also 

calculated cro ssing time s for both rafting and bridging. based 

on the number of vehicles to be crossed. 

In December, the staffofthe 937th Engineer Group deployed 

from Fort Riley , Kansas, to Fort Hood, Texas, to participate in a 

ICD command post exercise (CPX). Before the CPX began, the 

937th's staff conducted professional-development instruction 

on river-crossing operations by attending the III Corps training 

exercise "Road Runner 2000." A critical event during this exercise 

was the deliberate river cro ssing of Corps assets across Belton 

Lake, located adjacent to FOIt Hood. The 62d Engineer Battalion 

commander and crossing force engineer (CFE) instructed the 

937th's staff in the crossing area. Group officers conducted a 

terrain walk of the staging area, call-forward area , and engineer 

equipment park. The 74th Engineer Company (Multirole Bridge 

Company) emplaced the 120-meter assault-float ribbon bridge. 

and members of the 937th were able to walk across the bridge 

and learn the proper techniques of proofing the bridge before 

actually crossing as part of III Corps. 

This river-crossing exercise provided excellent situational 

awareness for the 937th 's staff and significantly enhanced their 

ability to plan and execute river crossings. During the December 

CPX, the ICD and 937th planned a deliberate river-crossing 

operation. Thi s crossing was not actually executed because 

the cro ssing force was able to execute a hasty cros sing using 

July 2000 
••• ••• ••• ••• ••• 

Crossing Site Arapaho 

(BH77642740) 

Assets Available : 1 [1[] rT1 957 2 rT1 957 1 IMRrTl S I299 2 rT1 299 1 rT1 814(+) 

Crossing Time (Hrs) Planned Actual #Raft Cl Cross Cross 46 Tripslh' (10 Rafts) Beg,n End <:: '" Vi <:: Order of Order of Vehicles Tnps 3 art Frmsh then H+ H + '" '" Cross ing Crossing ReqUIred 0

o :;;; '" Time Time 300 Vehih r (2 Bridges) 

Begin Preparatory FIres 34 00 

Beg n Preparing Crossing Are s 35 00 42 .00 C\ DismounlsAssaullAcross 36 00 37.00 0; 

Begin RaflConstruetio n 42 .00 4300 "" a:: '" Beain Raftinq 43 .00 

TF 1-5(-) I I 250 I 134 300 43.00 46 .00 

Transition To Bridging 46 .00 47 .00 

A/47BEN 30 rif8 025 47 .00 47 .25 

1-171 r:A (M LRS) 223 rif8 0.75 47 .25 4B.00 

A/1-B2 FA 30 rif8 0 25 48.00 4B.25

1-82 FA 128 rif8 0.50 48.25 48.75 

1-158 FA rMLR S) 212 rif8 0 75 4875 49 .50 

1-7 CAV 201 rif8 0.75 49 .50 50.25 01 TF 2-12 200 rif8 075 50.25 51.00 c I­ '5> U HHC. 2 BCT 39 rifa 025 5100 51.25 "'0

II) 299 EN CO (MRB) 40 rifs 0 25 51.25 51.50 N 

TF 1-12 195 rifa 0 75 51 50 52.25 

91 ENGR 45 rifa 0.25 5225 52.50 

478 EN 50 rifs 0 25 52 .50 5275 

1·21 FA( MLRS\ 149 rif8 0.50 5275 53.25 

1-202 FA 149 rifa 0.50 53 25 53.75 

2 x FLEs 170 rif8 0.75 5375 54.50 

DTAC 25 rifa 0.25 54.50 54 75 

8/ 13 SIG (-) 60 0.25 54 75 5500
 

Slant: lnt eno r Ba ys I 80/80 I Ra m p Bays \ 30 / 30 I Bn dge Boats 135 / 351
 

A F B I536 m / 536 m I Rafts 

rifa 

Figure 1 

numero us ford sites . Despite this, the exerc ise prov ide d 

val uable training for the staffs of the l CD, the Engineer Brigade. 

and the 937 th 011 river-crossing pl anning. 

The 9371h's headquarters return ed to Fort Hood in late 

January 2000 for the 1CD Warfighter ramp-up CPX. During this 

exerci se , the 1CD and the 937th conducted deta iled planning 

for a deli berate cro ssing of the Yesong River in Korea, but 

once again did not exec ute a delibera te cro ssin g . The opposi ng 

force (O PFOR) failed to destroy the brid ge over the Yesong 

River, and the 1CD was able to cross the river over existing 

bridges. The division would not be so lucky when fightin g the 

"world-class" OPFOR. 

Planning and Rehearsals 

On 22 February 2000, the 937th Engin eer Group 

deployed to Fort Hoo d for the third and fina l time to 

support the ICD during its Warfi ghter Exerc ise. 

control of en gin eers in support of a de liberate river c rossi ng . 

Th e I CD Warfighter sce nario had the division attacki ng north 

into "Orangeland' on the Ko rean peninsul a as the supporting 

effort ofthe U.S. III Co rp s. A major obstacle in the LCD 's zone 

was the Yesong River, which was 200 to 24() mete rs wide and 

fordable only in the ea stern 25 percent of the division 's zo ne. 

To support a de libe rate cro ssing of the Yeso ng. III Co rps 

allocated the 937[h Engineer Group two corps combat-eng inee r 

ba tta lions (one wheeled and one mechanized) and fo ur bridgc 

comp an ie s (o ne assault-fl oat -bri dge company an d three 

multiro le bridge companies) to the 1CD. 

Using terrain products provided by the 1CD's terrain te am, 

the assistant div isio n engineer identified 14 poten tial crossing 

sites over the Yesong River in the 1CD attack zone : four fords, 

four fixed-bridge sites, two assault-float-bridge sites, and four 

rafting sites. The Yeson g cross ing sites are shown in Figure 2, 

page 30. 

Working wit h the battle staff, the assistant div ision engineer 

developed a synchronized deliberate river-crossing plan wi th 

Traini ng objective s for this exercise were fo cused on the 

integration of the 937th into the 1CD, the development of plan s 

two crossing areas-the 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT) in and orders to fight in a Korean sce nari o, and command and 

Julv 2000 Engin eer 29 
Ford S le 

Legend 

H Raft

PL 

Fred 

I 

River-Crossing 

Sites 

.>"""'( :=xistlrq 

8 "ixe d Bridge 

AFB S'te 

/ 

Figure 2 

the we st and the IBeT in the east. The di vision maneu ver and 

fire-support plan de tailed all four phases of the river crossing: 

• Phase T. Advance to the river. 

• Phase II. Assault across the river. 

• Phase Ill. Advance from the ex it bank. 

• Phase IV. Sec ure the bridgehead line. 

Althoug h the 1CD's eng ineer plan also focu sed on all [our 

phases of the cro ssing , the divisio n 's river- crossin g annex 

focu sed onl y on the first three phases. The plan called for two 

bridging sites-Arapaho in the west and Ottawa in the east. 

Because ford sites we re located in the east, the IBCT would 

co nduct its assault crossing (Phase IT) ove r the ford s and secure 

both the near and far shores with heav y maneu ver forces before 

commenc ing bridging ope ratio ns at the Ott awa crossing site. 

Th erefore, no rafting was plann ed at Ottawa . No ford sites 

were available in the 2BCT zone of atta ck , and the division 

plan ned to conduct the assault phas e at the Arapaho crossing 

site using dismounted infantry in IS-person rubber boats (R BISs). After securing the far shor e from direct fire, engineers 

would construct rafts and raft a mechani zed task fo rce across 

the Yesong to build combat power, allow the 2BCT Lo eliminate 

observe d indirect fire , and the n allow the 937th to co nstruc t 

bridges. The 1CD designated the assistant division comm ande r 

for maneuv er (ADC- M) as the cros sing-force command er and 

the 937th comma nder as the cro ssing-force engineer. Figure 3 

shows a sketc h of the crossing plan. 

Also located in the 2BCT zone of attack wa s the Kaw 

cro ssing site, an ex isting fix ed bridge over the Yeson g River 

Dam. If Orange land forces destroyed the dam, the river would 

drain and become fordable in several locati ons. If it wa sn 't 

severely da maged or destr oyed , it provided a hi gh- speed 

cross ing . Thus, it was expected that Orangelancl forces would 

atte mpt to damage , but not de stroy. the dam and use chemicals 

to prevent the ICD from using it. Th e division co mma nde r 

directed that the 937th be prepared to rep air the roadway of the 

Kaw Dam. 

After rec eiv ing the 1CD operatio ns order, the 937 th began 

to develop a detailed crossing plan 10 suppo rt the maneu ver 

plan . Using the military dec ision-making process outline d in 

FM 101-5, Staff Organiza tion and Ope rations, the 937th 's staff 

analy zed the mission , dev eloped cour ses of action , conducted 

30 Engineer .lulv 2000 
Yesong 

?F\i f'\ " "c'" River Crossi ng 

875 rn - " 0 0 I · I ~~e

«Iv 

Figure 3 

war gam ing, and then compared courses or action. During its 

plann ing. the staff wo rked closely with the assista nt division 

eng ineer and the ICD Engi neer Brigade staff. During its 

intelligence preparation of the battlefi eld, the 937th identi fied 

an add itional crossing sire ju st south of the Kaw Dam. Based 

on sa tellite imagery, it appeared to be a ford site. The ICD 

Ca valry Squadron (1- 7 Cavalry) was gi ven the mission to 

reconn oiter this site. Th e 937th's plan refined and completed 

the initial division- cro ssin g plan and was incorporated into 

the overall plan. 

As parr o f the planning process, the division conducted a 

combined-arms synchronization drill and a detail ed combinedarms rehea rsal for the deliberate river cro ssing. A key element 

of both the synchronization drill and the rehe arsal was the 

development of a battlefield-operating-system checklist (Figure 

4, page 32) to ensure that the conditi ons for a deliberate crossing 

were set. Thi s ch eckl ist used the princ iples of supp res s, 

obscure, secure, and reduce to en sure that conditions were set 

be fore the river crossing began . 

July 2000 

Suppress. During the advan ce to the river (Phase I), a twohour preparation by the ICD divi sion artille ry (DIVARTY) 

foc used on key command- and- control elements, enemy forces 

at the river. and divisional and regim ental artillery groups that 

could range the river. 

Obscure. Smo ke wo uld be used in a ll four phases of the 

cro ssing. In addition to the BCTs' smoke assets , the 937th 

Eng ineer Gr oup wa s all ocated a dual-purpos e chemica l 

company to provide mechanical smo ke for the movement to 

the river and the crossing operations. Although the 1CD did 

no t plan a decepti on operation for the river crossing, a det ailed 

smoke plan obscured the location of bridge assets during the 

advance to the 1; ver and obscured the locati on of actual assau It, 

bridge. and raft sites Juring crossing operations. 

Secure. Befo re the assault crossing. the near shore must 

be secured. The ICD planned to accomplished this with a 

mechani zed task fo rce . Dismounted infantrym en wo uld then 

assault across the river in RB-15 s to sec ure and clear the far 

shore (Phase II). Addition ally , air-de fens e-artillery cov era ge 

Engineer 31 
River-Crossing Conditions 

Conditions Met Arapaho Ottawa 

Suppress 

Artillery preparation 

Q.bscure i 

Wnd data updat ed 

FiVme chanical smoke delivered 

gecure 

Near shore secured 

- Local security 

• CFZs activated 

- ADA umbrella in place 

Far shore secured 

• Direct and observed indirect fires eliminated 

Reduce 

Cros sing area established 

Sufficient bridge assets available 

Decontam ination sites con firmed 

COS COM FLE STX established 

Figure 4 

wa s required . The 937th Engineer Group wa s tas k-organ ized 

wi th an Avenger battery to provide sho rt- range air defen se. 

Patrio ts from III Co rps (gene ral suppo rt to the ICD) were to 

provide high- to-medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD). Critical 

friend ly zo nes were also esta blis hed ov er the c rossing area. 

Red u ce. Once the threat of direct fire was eliminated, bridge 

companies wo uld move forward to con struct six -bay rafts, with 

local sec urity provided by infantrymen. Rafts would then move 

co m ba t ve hicle s across the riv er to sec ure th e fa r-s hore 

object ive and elirninate the threat of obser ved indirect fire. Once 

the threat of ob served indirect fire was eliminated, bridging 

co uld begin. The cros sing-area engineer s ( 14 th En gineer 

Battali on [Combat] lWl in the west and 875thEnginee r Battalion 

[Combat! IMJ in the eas t) would establ ish the crossin g 

areas to support rafting and bridging opera tio ns. Chemicaldecontam ination sites and a 13th Corps Su pport Command 

forward logi stics e lement were pl anned to suppo rt the cro ssing. 

Th e river-crossing- condition s checklist was used by the 

crossing-force co mmander in the di vision tact ical com mand 

post (DTAC) and the BCT and 93 7th command posts. 

T

Execution 

he di vision crossed the line of dep arture at H-hour 

(292000 Feb ruary) with the IBCT (m ain effort in the 

east) and the 2BCT (sup po rting effo rt in the we st) 

attacking to destroy Orang ela nd fo rces in the zone . Th e 3BC T 

mission was to follow the I BCT and, on orde r. assume its 

missi on. Th e 1-7 Cavalry was fo rward co ndu ct ing zone 

reconn aissance to id entify the 1st tacti cal echelon 's main 

defen ses and allow the lead BCTs to retain combat pow er. The 

937 th Engineer Group was di vided into two task forces (Pio neer 

West and Eas t) to support the crossings at Arapaho and Ottawa 

respect ivel y. Th ese task forces we re under operations co ntrol 

32 Engineer 

for mo vement of the two lead BCTs. Ba sed on the wa r ga ming , 

the river crossing at Arapaho was ex pected to occ ur at 1I+36. 

Based on a clearer picture of the Orangel and force's dispositi ons and obstacles a lo ng th e hi gh -speed av en ue of 

approach lead in g to Ara pa ho c ro ssing site , th e 937 th 

commander and the ICD division engineer (DIVEN) commander 

discu ssed alternat ives for the 2BCT's cross ing site in the we st. 

Th e 1-7 Cavalry re po rted that the bridg e over the da rn at Kaw 

had bee n damaged and co nfirmed that the sites south of the 

dam could be used for rafting and brid ging o peratio ns . In 

additi on , Orangeland fo rc es in th at ar e a ap pe ar ed to be 

vuln erabl e , since they we re massing their defense in the center 

and east. A crossi ng south of Kaw wo uld surp rise the OPFOR. 

Th e ICD DI VE N co mma nde r recommended to the ADC -M at 

approxima tely H+ 26 that the 2BCT cross at the site so uth of 

Kaw: this recommendation was approved. That even ing, the 

DIVEN S3 and th e 5 3 of the 9 37th helped write a ICD 

fragmentar y order that directed the 2BCT to cross at Kaw and 

prov ided ne w crossing co ntrol measures. 

The 2BCT recei ved the I CD fragment ary ord er on the move 

and prep ared to cross at the new sit e, which dem on strated a 

high degree of flexibility.The 937t11 's liaison officer to the 2BCT 

proved in valu abl e at this point by helping to adj ust the plan. 

Th e 2BCT arr ived at the river at H+ 36 and rep orted that the 

near shore wa s secure. At the same tim e, the ICD DI VARTY 

exec uted preparator y fires and report ed that critical friend ly 

zo nes we re establis hed over the crossing area. After the DTAC 

recei ved re ports tha t all crossing conditions we re se t, the 

crossing-force co mma nder directed the 2BCT to co ndu ct the 

assault crossi ng . 

Wh en the far shore was reported secured, Task Force Pioneer 

West moved to the river, began to co ns truct six -bay rafts, and 

then began to ra ft tanks and Bradleys to the far shore. Due to 

a repo rt th at Orange land's tan k for ces we re pr ep arin g to 

July 2000 
counterattack the crossing area, the decision wa s made to 

transition to bridging early to build combat power on the far 

shore quicker. Emphasizing the fundamental of speed, Task 

Force Pioneer We st rapidly built a ribbon bridge, while 

co ntinuing rafting operations at the Kaw site, and cros sed two 

task forces before the OPFOR destroyed the bridge with ma ssed 

rocket artill ery and close air support. 

A bypassed Oran geland special-forces team on the near shore 

observed and dire cted accurate artillery and close air SUPPOlt to 

de stroy the bridge . Du ring the aft er-action review, it was 

determined that the critical friendly zon es had not been set 

properl y and that the HIMAD coverage was inadequate. This 

action demonstrated th at cl earing the near- and far-shore 

lodgments is a tenuous and diffi cult task. One lone OPFOR with 

a radio is the most dan gerous person in the crossing area. In an 

effort to take advantage of the surprise created by the virtu ally 

unopp osed crossin g at Kaw, the division accepted risk by not 

ab solutely ens uring that the crossing site was sec ure from 

observed indirect fire before beginning bridging operations.This 

allowed the division to quickly cross two mech anized task forces 

but left the ribbon bridge at Kaw vulnerable.Although the OPFOR 

destroyed this bridge, Task Force Pioneer West salvaged enough 

bridge asse ts to continue raftin g until both near and far shores 

were fully secure and the threat of direct and observed indirect 

tire was eliminated. Crossing operati ons at Kaw were disru pted 

and del ayed , but they were not eliminated. The 2BCT continued 

to build combat power on the far shore and eventually secured 

the bridgehead line . 

T 

Conclusions 

he ICD Warfi ghter Exerc ise provided exce llent 

tra ining 0 11 planning and co nduc ting river -crossin g 

operations at the division level. Th e exerc ise also 

rei nforced the crossi ng fundame ntals ou tlined in FM 90- 13. 

Surprise. Becau se it planned a persi stent chemica l attack 

on the Kaw Dam, the OPFOR was not ex pecting a deliberate 

crossing in the vicinity. Th e 2BCT co nd ucted a virtuall y 

un opp o sed c rossi ng a t Ka w (south o f the ch emi ca lly 

con taminated zone) and rapidl y built combat power on the far 

shore by surprising the OPFOR. 

Extensive Preparation. Preparation for crossing at Kaw 

began with the lCD Warfi ghter Seminar in November and 

co ntinued for four months. Pr eparation included assembling 

tools, developing TTP, analyzi ng intelligence, planning , and 

reh earsing. Thi s preparation allow ed the ICD and the 937th to 

ha ve a co mmo n and thorou gh understanding of river- cro ssing 

ope ratio n s a nd exec ute th em r apidly, even though the 

en vironment was co nfused and hostile. 

Flexible Plan . Th e lCD cro ssing plan included all 14 

potenti al crossing sites . Staging areas, call-forward areas. and 

routes we re located to allow a rapid shifting of crossing assets 

from one site to another. This flexible plan allowed the division 

to shift its main cross ing effort from the Arapaho to the Kaw 

site in less than 10 hours. 

July 2000 

Traffic Control. An extensive traffic- control plan, which 

included military poli ce to operate traffic-control poi nts at all 

maj or intersections and all staging and ca ll-forward areas, was 

incorporated into me ICD crossing plan . Th e plan also included 

holding area s and ex tensive later al routes to allow traffi c to be 

shifted off congested routes. 

Organization. Th e 1CD rive r crossing at the Kaw site was a 

comb ined-a rms operation commanded and controlled by the 

AD C-M from the DTAC. The crossi ng force combined all 

battlefield-operating- system elements and focused its e fforts 

on the en emy and tact ical tasks on the far side of the ri ver. All 

opera tio ns were sy nc hro nize d at both the 2B CT tactical 

ope rations center (the cross ing-area command headquarters) 

and the DTAC (the cross ing-for ce comma nd headquarters). 

Th e one asset not dir ectly under divi sion co ntrol was HIMAD 

cove rage. The Patriot baltery that was to pro vid e this covera ge 

was in ge neral suppo rt to the divisi on. This lack of co ntrol 

contributed to ineffective HIMAD co verage at the Kaw crossing 

site and the loss of a brid ge. 

Speed. The requirement to build comb at power on the far shore 

is critical. In the case of the 1CD crossing at Kaw, however, the 

desire for speed caused the crossing force to lose tactical patience 

and transition to rafting and brid ging before all conditions had 

been met. Most importantly, in the rush to get combat power 

across the river, critica l friendly zones were not full y established 

over the crossing area (res ulting in ineffective response to enemy 

rocket-artillery attacks), and all enemy artill ery observers were 

not eliminated from the crossing area. The rush to transition to 

bridging resulted in the loss of numerou s brid ge assets that migh t 

have survived had rafting continued. 

Combined-arms river crossi ngs are complicated and diffi cult 

operations . Organizations that want to be proficient at river 

crossing must de vo te subs ta ntia l training resources, most 

notabl y time, to ensure the high degree of synchro nization 

requ ired for success. The recent 1st Cavalry Division Warfighter 

Exercise provided both the divi sion and the 937th En gine er 

Group (Co mbat) the oppo rtuni ty to train ex te ns ive ly and 

devel op useful TTP for executing and controlling crossing 

opera tions. III 

Lieutenan t Colo nel Kur ka commands the 1st Eng ineer Battalion 

(Com bat), Fo rt Riley. Kansas. He previously was the executive off icer 

ofthe 937t1l Eng ineer Group (Combat) at Fort Riley, and commande r 

of the 565th Engineer Battal ion (Provisiona l) in Hanau, Ge rmany. 

LTC Kurka is a graduate of the Unite d Stutes Mi litarv A cademy, 

Central Michi gan Unive rsity, lind the Com mand and Gene ral Staf] 

College. 

Maj or Dosa is the XO ofthe 70th Eng inee r Battalion, Fort Rile}; 

Kan sas. He \l'a.1 p reviously The S3 of the 93 7th En gineer Group 

(Combat) at F0I1Riley. He is a gra duate ofthe United Sta tes Mili tary 

Academy an d the Comma nd and Gene ral Staff College and holds a 

master 's degree ill civi l and en vironm ent al enginee ring fro m Corne ll 

University. MAl Dosa is a professional eng ineer in De lawa re and 

Penn sylv an ia. 

Engineer 33 
TA(OM Sets the OEI1(E Loose
 

B\' Rae Higgm s 

The u.s. Army Tank-automo tive 

and Armame nts Co mma nd has 

give n some of the Army's e lite , 

"hig h-speed" e nginccr s some thing to 

say "hooah" abo ut - a new, and eq ually 

hi g h- spced. hi gh-tech doz er. T h e 

depl oyable uni versal comhat earthmover 

(DE UC E) is a state -of-the art dozer tha t 

promise s to se t the co mbat-e ng inee r 

community on its car. as it repreverus a 

ne w co nc e pt in eq ui pme nt use, crew 

co mfort, tra ining. and maintenance. 

Li ght infantry unit s headqu art ered at 

Fort Drum, New York . and airb orne units 

at Fort Bragg, No rth Caro lina . we re the 

first to be equipped with the new do zers 

last summer. Altho ugh the DEUCE is no t 

yet slated for Arrnywide fieldin g. units at 

Fort Lewis. Wa shing ton. will rece ive a 

few DE UCEs to test in suppo rt of the 

initial brigade co mbat tecum. as the Army 

marc he s forwa rd on its p la n for 

transformation . 

The DEUCE enables light infantry and 

airborne engineers to prep are airstrips, 

wad", and pro tective position s. while 

keeping pace with the gro und forces. The 

great th ing about this du zer is that it 

doesn 't have to be loaded and haul ed 

from one co mbat co nstruction site to the 

next. All the operator hal, to do i, flip a 

dashb oard switch to shift the dozer from 

t he earthmovin g mode int o th e se lfdeploy mod e. And , to the deli gh t o f 

combat e ngin ee rs e ve r yw here . th e 

DEUCE feat ures an en closed cab with 

hea t and air conditio ning. 

Requirements 

T he Army's DEU C E pr o gr am 

began in late 1992 . According to 

TACOM's DE UCE system acquisition man ager, the co mbat dev eloper 

(the U .S, Army En ginee r Sc hoo l) csiahlished the mission need for the DEU CE 

in an opera tional-req uirements documen t 

(ORD) . The DEUCE ORD stales that 

"Eng ineers. as part of the light combinedarm s team (or ganic or task -orient ed to 

light division s), need a light-w eight earthmoving ca pability that does not require 

a prime mover and trailer for operational 

an d tactic al movemen t and is strategically depl oyable by air.Th e DEUCE 

must tra vel rap idly between job sites 

and travel across and on paved airfields 

and highway s witho ut damagin g th e 

surface ." 

TACOM's DEUCE team played a critical 

ro le in makin g the dozer a reality for 

enginee rs, W hen a combat de vel op e r 

expresses a need for a piece of equipment. 

TACOM's ma teriel dev elope rs procure 

equipme nt that can meet that need . 

Th e 35, 500- po und D E U C E 

manufact ured by Caterp illar» TACOM 

wa nted to capital ize on ex isting comme rcial components ra ther th an introd uc ing unique parts and achie ved th is 

goal by the no ncleve lo p men ta l ite m 

integration of Ca terpillar',', com mercia l 

co mpo ne nts, This res ulted in on ly about 

20 percen t of the parts being DE UCEunique, 

Features 

Three importa nt featu res of the 

DEUCE are theI 

I
 

I II Abi lity to se lf-de ploy.
 

I • Six-way (power, angle , and tilt) blade. 

DEUCEs like these allow light 

infantry and airborne engineers to keep up with ground 

forces. What's more, these 

air-dropped , self-deployable 

dozers don't have to be 

loaded and hauled from one 

combat construction site to 

the next. 

34 Engi neer July 2000 
•	 Electronically controlled engin e/ 

tran smi ssion combination. 

The DEUCE, which can be ready to 

dig in less than a minute, replaces the D5 

dozer in the light en gin eer for ces. Its 

abilit y to switch int o the self-deploy mode 

is a radi cal depar ture from dozers use d in 

the past. It saves the time and manpower 

it used to take to load, haul, and unl oad 

doze rs like the DSB , whi ch was <Itlea st a 

two-person job. This se lf-dcployability 

was a ke y ope ra tiona l factor. A lon e 

DEUCE operator can move rig ht int o 

balt ic, com ple te his mi ssi on , and 

redeploy to the rear with out re lying on 

anyo ne or anything else to ge t him and 

the vehi cle there and back . 

In the earthmovin g mod e, an operator 

dri ves the DEU CE with standard powershift tran smission. This allows for the 

slow, hi gh -t orque d rive required for 

dozin g . Conversely, on ce he switches to 

th e se lf-de p loy m od e , a six -s peed 

automatic tran smission kicks in, which 

enables the DE UC E to reach road speeds 

of 30 to 35 mph. 

The DEUCE's hydrauli c blade is 

differen t from "reg ular" dozer blade s. It 

not only goes up and down but also can 

tilt left and right for ,.y -cut s' and can 

angle left and right. Thi s flexibility gives 

an oper ator a variety of do zing options, 

depen din g on the task at hand . Moreo ver, 

hydraulic bl ade s c a n si gnifi c antly 

imp rove do zing times. 

Th e DEUCE also sports rubber track. 

Steel track. which is the norm for most 

cons truc tion eq uipment. can dam ag e 

roads by chc wi ng up the as phalt. 

Th e DEUCE wa s designed with the 

soldier-opera tor in mind. Th e enclosed , 

climate-contro lled cab se ts the stag e for 

optimal operator performance-s-m eaning 

the so ldier at the whee l i-, less likel y to 

become fati g ued du e to extrem e weather 

co nd itio ns lik e oppressive heat a nd 

hum idit y or frigid co ld. Tn addition. the 

vehiclc feat ures a seat that adj usts to the 

operator's he ight and we ight, a hook-up 

for hydraulic tools . and a communication 

c o n nec tion for ra d io a nd g lo bal 

positioning systems. 

The DEUCE is also diff erent fro m 

o the r doze rs in th a t its co n tro ls are 

July 2000 

er gonomically designed. so op erator ­

traini ng requirements are k e pt to a 

minimum. Simply put, the DEUCE has a 

steering wheel, an ac c elerator, and 

bra kes-s-much like a car. This is a big 

change from older tracked con struction 

equ ipment that co mbat e nginee rs use. 

Maintenance 

DOl er mech anics have rea son to 

give the DEUCE high marks 

becau se of a ne w electro nically 

controll ed dia gn o stic s sy st em. The 

soldiers' portable o n-systems rep air tool 

(S P O RT) sig na ls a maintenan ce 

spec ialist of mech anical problems. Th e 

SPORT is a separa te piece of equipment 

and is th e A rmy's o nly auth ori zed 

"ruggedized lap top, Using the SPO RT, 

a mechani c can simply pl ug in a standard 

tester to ze ro in on a probl em. He doesn' t 

h ave to craw l around the DEU CE to 

pinpoint maintenan ce iss ues. 

The DE UCE is also co mpa tib le to 

hookup with th e small emp la ce me nt 

excavator's hydr aulic tools, including the 

pavement breaker, hammer drill. chain saw. 

impact wrench , and hose asse mbly. 

Respon se to the new dozer ha s been 

positive. In November 1999, the Engineer 

Schoo ] trained several so ldiers, bo th 

operators and maintainers , from the 5th 

Enginee r Battalion. who recentl y tried out 

two DEUCES at the National Training 

Ce nter (NTC) at Fort Irwin. Ca liforn ia. 

Their positi ve comments ce ntered o n 

ease of operation, plentiful power, ride 

comfort. ami user-friendly maintain ability 

at the operator level. 

According to the ex pe riment projects 

NCO at the Maneuver Support Battle Lab 

at Fort Leon ard Wood , Mi ssouri. the 

NTC's fearsome, f abled , an d fam ous 

oppo sing force thou ght th e DEU CE's 

mobility was good, hut the digging time 

wa s slower than they would have liked . 

Th e op erators real ized that their lack o f 

exper ience on the equipme nt was a factor 

in the slowe r digg ing time hut, with more 

experience, digging limes would improve. 

Th e DE U CE performed well o n 

reliabi lity, mobility, a nd durability, but 

some mod ificati on s, such as a wider 

blade, will enhance its ability to perform 

requ ired mission s fast er, Ho we ver, a 

wid er blade does not fit th e tran sportability requirements. 

Troops aren't the onl y ones who ar e 

becomin g more familiar with the DEUCE' s 

derring-do. When Secretary or the Army 

Loui s Caldera came to Fort Leonard 

Wood last December, he visited Training 

Are a 244, wh er e o pera to rs fro m all 

se rvices learn to run hea vy-constructi on 

equipment. Secretary Caldera c limbed 

into the driv er's seat of a D EUCE,revved 

it up. and took it fur a spin. He returned 

with a big smile on his fa ce and sa id that 

he considered this chance to dri ve the 

DEUCE an ea rly Christmas present. 

Program Success 

T ACOM ' S dedi cation to makin g 

th e DEU CE th e best possible 

sta te-o f- the-a rt pi ece o f Army 

eng ineer con struction eq uipme nt has, 

with out a doubt, grea tly added to the 

succ ess of the program. In meetin g the 

depl oyability (C-130 dri ve on/o ff, low 

ve loc ity air -d ro ppa ble ) and mobility 

requirements (30-plus mph), the DEUCE 

has significa ntly e nhanced cap abilities 

that wiII shape the battl efiel d in its 

combat-engineer mission for Army XX I. 

Th e "creature-comfor t" improve ments, 

along with its operatio nal fe atures. make 

the DEUCE a unique piece o r eng ineer 

equipme nt that is highl y universal. 

TACOM is curre ntly on co ntract for 

130 DEUCEs, but the system acquisition 

manager anticipates procuring a total 

of about 200 for the Ac tive and Reserve 

Comp one nts . DEUCE fi eldings wi ll 

co nti nue as sc hed ule d th rou gh 

Decem ber 2001. III 

Ms. Higgins is a public jJi l iJ specialist 

assigned to Headquarters. us. Army Tankautomot ive and Arm aments Command, 

Warren. Michigan. She hold» 0 bachelor 's 

degree in commu nication fro m Oakland 

University, Rochester; Michigan. and is a 

graduate ofthe Defense Infonnation School's 

Public Affairs Officer Course. She il' also (I 

member ofthe Public Relations Society of 

America. 

e ngineer 35 
Managing tbe Logistics-Support
 

Contract in tbe Bafkans Tbeater
 

By Colonel Donu ld T WvnJ1 

On 12 Jun e 1999, U.S. forces moved into Koso vo in 

support o f the NATO peacekeeping operatio n. That 

was the beginning of extreme ly intense ope rations by 

the total Engi neer Reg iment, which wa s compos ed of Army 

engineers, Seabees, Corps of Engineers civilians, and a Co rps 

contractor (Brow n & Roo t Services of Houston , Texas). In less 

than 90 days, the Reg iment accomplished a minor mir acle: It 

built enoug h So ut he ast Asia (SEA) hu ts (la rge pl ywood 

buildings based on a design originally used in Vietnam) to 

house Task Force Falc on throug h the bitter Ba lkans winter. Of 

course, the real winners we re the men and women of the task 

force. The Regim ent did not rest on its laurels but forged ahead 

to complete the base cam ps and establish an enviable qualit y 

of life for the American forces. 

Brown & Root was a sign ificant fac tor in the success ofthe 

Eng inee r Regiment and Task Force Falcon. Thi s en gin eer 

success, combined with the requisite contracted logisti cs 

support, has clearly established a template for rapidly providing 

temporary facilities and services in future operations other 

than war. 

Brown & Root' s ope rational sco pe was large and diverse. 

Fro m 12 .r une to 30 September 1999, the contracto r provi ded 

15,559 trusses and 7,22 2 sidewalls for SEA-hut construc tio n 

(prefabricated in Macedonia and trucked to the Koso vo camps); 

ass embled 192 SEA huts in conj unction with Army and Navy 

eng ineers ; and erected two temporary (Tier nr tents) dining 

facilities, 13 helipads, 2 avia tion-maintenance clamshells, 12 

tempor ary mess-k itc hen -tra ile r dini ng faci lities , and 37 

temporary showe r units. While Brown & Root supported this 

inten sive temporary construction effort, it also supp lied task ­

fo rce me mbe rs with log istic s services th at contributed 

immeasurably to troop mor ale and mission readiness: 1,134,182 

high-q uality meals, 55 ,544,000 gallons of water, and 383, 07 1 

ga llon s of diesel fuel (DF) 2. Th e contractor also serviced 67 1 

by Brown & Root, but the list is by no means all-incl usive. 

The Corps's Trans atlantic Programs Center (TAC), on behalf 

of the U.S. Army Euro pe's Deputy Chi ef of Staff for Logistic s 

(USAREUR DCSLOG). awarded and are administe ring the 

Brow n & Root co ntract. The TAC receives exte nsive suppo rt 

from the Defense Con trac t Management Agency (DCMA). the 

Defense Con tract Aud it Agency (DCAA), and the Base Camp 

Coordinating Agency (BCCA). Simp ly put,these agencies ' roles 

in overseein g the Brown & Root contract are as foll ows: 

•	 The TAC provides the program management, funds control, 

and contrac ting -officer ove rsight. 

•	 The DCMA provi des the administrative contracting officers 

(ACOs) in the Balkans, along with quality-ass urance and 

property -con trol teams. The teams are coordinated out of 

the DC MA's so uthern Europe headquarters. Th e DCMA 

also pr ovides an ACO at Bro wn & Root 's corpora te 

headquarters to review and approv e corporate fu nctions 

re lated to the contract. 

•	 Th e DCA A pro vides indep endent veri fication of all costs 

incurred by Brown & Root. 

•	 Th e BCCA perform s many of the same function s that are 

performe d by the Directorate of Publi c Works at a regu lar 

Army insta llation, plu s the BCCA assists the DCM A ACOs 

with assuring the qua lity of Brown & Root 's const ruction. 

Th e curre nt BCCA groups are pro vided by the Corps 's 

North A tlan tic Di vision and supervised by the Co rps 's 

Europe District. 

With so many di ffer ent organizations invol ved in the 

administra tio n of o ne co ntract. inten sive communications and 

coordination are required to ensure the smooth flow of logistics 

se rvic es to the task force. 

Contracting in the Balkans 

porta ble latrines a total of 3 1,037 times, co llected 89,228 cubic he nu mbers capturing Brown & Root's suppo rt to 

meters of trash , and loaded/offloaded 4,229 containers. These Task Force Fa lcon are impre ssive, even for the short 

numbers represent a snapshot ofsome of the serv ices provided Ttime period mentioned above. However, the contractor

36 Engineer	 July 2000 
has provided logistics services in the Balkans region since 

December 1995, when U.S.forces were committed to the NATO 

peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From then 

through May 1997, the services were provided under a contract 

awarded by TAC to support the Arm y's Logi sti cs Civil 

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), which provides contracted 

logistics services durin g milit ary contingency operations.The 

Army expended $546.6 milli on for services supporting the 

peac ekeeping operations in Bosnia. 

As a result of the continuing U.S. commitment in Bosnia, 

USAREUR asked TAC to award a follow-on, sustainmentservices contr act to Brown & Root. This contract, with a value 

of $413 .5 million, was effective from May 1997 through May 

1999. The contract was not part of LOGCAP, which is now 

administered by the U.S. Army Materiel Command. (See art icle 

"LOGCAP : Providing Vital Ser vices to Soldiers," Enginee r, 

March 1997.) 

The co ntinued U.S. inv olvem ent in the Balkans region 

prompted the competitive award of the current logistics-support 

contract, which became effective in May 1999. The contract 

was awarded for one year, with four one-year option periods 

that can be awarded at the government's discretion. Servic es 

are pro vided for U.S. forces deployed to support­

•	 Operation Joint Forge, the U.S. portion of the NATO-led 

peacekeep ing operation designed to help stabilize Bosnia 

foJlowingthe 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. U.S. military units 

also SlJPP0I1 Joint Forge at locations in Hungary and Croatia. 

•	 Operation Joint Guardian, the U.S. portion oftbe NATf,1ed 

military force whose aim is to achieve a secure environment 

to ensure peace and stability in Kosovo. U.S. military units 

also support Joint Guardian in neighboring Macedonia. 

The contract is a cost-reimbursement, indefinite-deli very/ 

indefinite-quantit y contract, with task orders issued to the 

contractor to match custo mer requirem ent s. This type of 

contract is used whe n the gov ernment cannot specify in 

adva nce a firm quantity of se rvices becau se of ch anging 

mission requ irements. Having this contrac tual flexibility has 

been a key elementof providing logisticsservices in the Balkans, 

wh ere mission requirements m ay chang e frequently , 

Additi onally, the contract is structured so that it can be used 

to support othe r operation s in the region at USARE UR 

DCSLOG's request. 

From May 1999 through early April 2000, providing services 

cost in excess of$625 million. Most ofthat went for the intense 

build-up operations in Kosovo ($389.2 million) and Macedonia 

($7 5 million), with the rema inder support ing sustainme nt 

operations in Bosnia, Hungary, and Croatia ($161.6 million). 

Deciding to Contract 

AC was requested by its customer to competitively 

award the current logistics-support contract because 

USAR EUR DCSLOG determined that this contracting 

July 2000 

SEA huts in Tuzla, Bosnia 

support is critical for meeting soldiers' need s in the theater. 

However, the genesis of providing contracted logistics services 

predates the Balkans operations by well over a decade . 

Wh y did the Army decide to use a civilian contractor to 

pro vide logistics-supp ort services to U.S. forces ove rseas ? 

And what considerations, decisions, and requirement s are 

required to manage a contract of this magnitude? 

Obviously, the optimal solution to providing logi stics 

servi ces for any operat ion is to have a robust uniformed force 

structure in an uncon strain ed environment-a scenario that 

would give the field commander full control of his logistics 

assets. It' s just as ob vious that in today's constrained budget 

and for ce- structure enviro nments, that sc ena rio is 

extraordinarily unlikely,The Armyenvisioned these constraints 

in the 1980s, before the fall of the BerlinWall and the Gulf War, 

and developed a plan that would use civilian contractor s to 

augment the Army'slogistics capability durin g contingency or 

wartime operations. 

Sin ce then , two factors have forced the Army to use 

contrac ted se rvices even mor e hea vily than ori gin all y 

envisioned : a greater-than- anticipated reduction in the force 

structure and the limited size of the military footprint in overseas 

milit ary opera tions. Thus, the Army has come to rely heavily 

on co ntrac ted serv ices in the areas of life support (food, water, 

she lte r, sani tatio n , and laundr y), tran sp ort ati on, a nd 

maintenance.This enables the footprint of U,S.forces to consist 

primarily of combat units. 

As the Army began developin g this plan , it reviewed 

industry's support of past military operations and looked at 

the potential for continued support.The 1980$and 1990s have 

Engineer 37 
Brown & Root provides container-handling services for U.S. Army 

operations in Bosnia. 

produced several robust co rporations with exten siv e global 

net works. Prudently engaged, these corpor ation s are prepared 

a nd practiced in ind epen dentl y deli vering logi sti cs-type 

services in a vast spec trum of environments and location s. 

This competitive en viron ment places corpora tions in a positi on 

to re spond rapidly to com mercial needs which, in turn, can be 

ex tended to support the need s of combat so ldiers in military 

missions around the world . 

Whether suppo rti ng a large combat o peratio n or an 

ope ration other than war. the logistics-support requirem ent s 

ar e ximilar. ln both case s, soldiers need food and she lter. 

tran sport ati on to and in the theater of o perations. materials 

pr ocu red and delivered . and heavy equipment maintained. 

Co ntrac ted logistics pr ovide field commanders with ano ther 

tool for meeting these needs. If commanders are capped by 

force-stru cture limit s. they can rely on a contrac tor that can 

hire people or award subco ntrac ts to me et basic needs. Thus, 

field commanders have additional flexibility for acco mplishing 

their mission , 

With any military ope ration, the "fi ve Ps' prevail: Prior 

plan ning prevents poo r performance. The co ntra cto r mu st be 

integr ated into the plannin g process, or maj or disconnec ts will 

occ ur during the military ope ra tion when it' s time to deliver 

logisti cs support. 

Selecting the Contract Type 

When the Army as ked the Corps of Eng inee rs to 

manage the co ntrac ting effort [or the LOGCAP. 

the first step was to determine the best contractual 

ve hicle for this logistic s sup po rt. The Corps de term ined that a 

cost contrac t wa s the only vehic le fle xibl e and respon sive 

eno ugh to me et the need s of maneu ver co mma nde rs. 

It is instructive to compare a cost co ntract to a fixed -price 

instrum ent. With <1 fixed-price contract, the price is known (fixed), 

because the sco pe of work is relativ ely welldetailed with no known pricin g contingencies. 

With this milch detail, the contractor ass umes 

the cost and performance risks. 

With a cos t co ntract, the exact pri ce is not 

kn own , becaus e the gove rn m e n t ca nnot 

completely define the scope o f work. The 

government a ssumes th e cost ri sk and 

negotiates an estimated pri ce [or the work. 

Th e governme nt mu st pay the co ntractor unti I 

all services are performed or unt il available 

fund s are expe nded . However. cos t contrac ts 

require intens ive oversight by the go vernment 

to identi fy and constrain scop e-of-wor k creep 

and cost growth in a timely mann er. 

In determining the co ntrac t typ e, the 

gove rn men t knew it requ ired immediat e 

respon se from the contrac tor but could not 

defin e th e scope of work a nd cost. The 

go vern me nt knew tha t the variables wo uld 

be different for each milit ary operation: number of troop s, length 

of dep loym ent, and actua l serv ices required. Be cau se of these 

va riables, the govern me nt knew it could not app ly a cookiecutter app roach to providing logistics suppo rt for o verseas 

military operations. 

The Co rps not only de termi ned that a cost-type contractua l 

vehicle would best suit the needs but also that a se lf-s ufficient 

co ntractor with a global presen ce was required , for the reasons 

st ~d earlier. Most criti cally, this contractor had to have the 

finL\ cial c a pac ity to operate up to 60 d a y s w it ho ut 

reimbursem ent. Sin ce the co ntractor must respond imm ed iate ly 

to an .undefin ed requirement , ther e was no time to full y define 

the scope of wo rk nor se t up complex fin an cial systems h<:/o r(' 

the start of se rvice s. Ac cordingly. the 60 -day win dow allowed 

tim e fo r the c ash flow to begin while delivering serv ices 

immediately to our troops. 

The Corps required a self-sufficient contractor for two other 

reasons: 

•	 S ince th e Corps soug h! a co ntrac to r to pr o vide thi s 

capabi lity. there would be minimal assis tance from the 

go vernmen t in executing the contractual requirement s. 

•	 Th e co ntractor would need to develop it, ow n line s or 

co mmunic atio n and supply and ma ximi ze th e use of 

co mme rcial seaports and airfields. This is critica l wh en the 

gove rnment's lift capabilities arc consu med in moving the 

maneuver force int o the area of operations. 

Th e Corps developed a generic scope of work for contract 

perfor ma nce with rive major areas of effort: develop fac ilities, 

run supply operations, pro vide life-SUPPOH ser vice s. perform 

maintenance. and pro vide tra nsportation services. 

These deli verables have rema ined co nstant in the thr ee 

logistics-support co ntrac ts managed by the TAC, two of which 

have suppo rt ed Balkan s operations solely. In all instances. the 

3R Eng ineer	 July 2000 
Aerial view of Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo 

field comma nde r determines the level of co ntrac ted support. 

Often, as the military footprint redu ces during an operation , 

the co ntrac tor will step in to provide still- nee ded suppo rt 

services.These may include flight-line operations; fire fightin g; 

and reception, staging, and onwar d movement. Whil e the scope 

of work was gene ric, it was written 10 provide maximum flexibility 

in meeting the logistics needs-from the basics that have been 

me nt ion ed to ot he r se r vices. suc h a s mortuary and 

environme ntal. 

Cost-t ype contracts carry a number of impli cation s. Th e 

go vernment mu st reimburse all costs incurred by the co ntrac tor 

during the co ntrac t performance, provided certain conditions 

arc met ; the costs must be reasonabl e, allo cable, and allowable. 

•	 A cost is reasonable if it do es not exceed that which a 

prudent person would incur while conducting a co mpetitive 

bu sin ess. Wh at is re asonable dep ends on a variety of 

co nsideratio ns, including wheth er the cost is recog nized as 

or dinary and necessary for conduc ting bu sine ss or for 

performin g tasks under the co ntract, Does the work meet 

acceptable so und busin ess pr actices? Does it meet federal 

and state law s and regulations? Does the work significantly 

de viate from the co ntractor's estab lish ed pra ctices') 

•	 A cost is allocable if it. is incurred specifically for the contract 

or if it is nece ssary to the overall operation of the business. 

•	 A cost is allowab le if it is reasonable, allocable, meets the 

term s of the contrac t. and is not spec ifically disallowabl e. 

So me ex amples of disallow able cos ts are those incurred for 

enterta inment, fines and penal ties, lobbyin g, and politic al 

activities. 

Anothe r critical co mponen t of a cost contract is the fee or 

profit. Within the Depa rtment of Defense contracting laws. 

options ex ist for these fee payments. A cost contract may have­

•	 A base fee, no matter ho w the contrac tor perform s. 

July 20Q(j 

•	 An ince ntive fee, whe re the co ntracto r and go vern ment 

have a target cost, and the fee is adj usted up or down based 

on how close the co ntractor is to the target , 

•	 A n award fcc, whic h is a su bjec tive fee based o n a 

performance evaluation. 

Th e Corps chose to have a low base fee (l percent ) with a 

higher award fee as an incentive for outstanding performance. 

Thu s, the co ntrac to r can earn up to an 8 percent awar d fee for 

premium performance. Th e Corps, in conj unction with the 

customer (USAREUR DCSLOG) , chose the 8 percent awa rd fee 

to maximize performance. 

The contractor is rat ed three times ann ua lly, using a 

num erical scorin g system, w ith evaluation in three areas: cost 

co ntrol and funds managem ent , per formance , and flexib ility 

and coordination. Participating in this process me the end users, 

the ACOs wh o dire ct the work in theater, the co ntracting offic er 

in th e TAC headquarters, and any othe r c ustome rs with 

significant interac tion. Th e contracto r mu st sco re abo ve 70 

percent to earn an award fee . 

Using the Contract 

co nce rn of the joint-task-force comma nder is 

the co mmand and co ntro l of the operat io na l eleme nts critical to mission su ccess. In joint operational 

doctrine, the joint-tusk-force comma nde r con trols all aspects 

of the operations and the support necessary to ens ure success. 

However, within U.S. military co ntrac ting regulation s, author ity 

to administer this type of logistics-support co ntract tra vels 

through the co ntrac ting chai n of the co ntracting organization 

to the ACOs in the field . Hen ce , the operational co ntrol and 

contractua l autho rities for logistics support flow th rou gh two 

separate chains. They inter sect in the theater of ope rations 

with the ACOs. 

Eng ineer 39 
In a sense, the ACOs have two masters to serve. While they 

must support the task- forc e commander in the miss io n 

accomplis hment, they also must administer the contract 

according to all appropriate laws and regulations. It is necessary 

tha t both the maneu ver commander and contracting officers 

understand each others' roles and resp on sib ilities and have an 

integrated process to resolve co nflicts in mission requirements 

and con tractual obliga tions. 

Coo rdination is key. It is critical that the ACO s communicate 

directly and frequ entl y with the task-force commander so that 

the co ntractua l ca pabi litie s and the co ntracti ng officer's 

authorities are clearly understood by the maneuver forces. With 

so many participan ts, there's pl enty o f room for 

mis understanding, es pe cially in the harried days when a 

deployment isfresh. For that reason , working a logistics-support 

contractor into an exercise scenario is an extremely effective 

way of ed ucati ng co m mande rs o n the capabil ities and 

restrict io ns of the co ntractor. In circ umstances whe re the 

con tractor cannot be integrated into exercises, coordination 

becomes even more critica l. Co mmanders invo lved wit h the 

contract must comm uni ca te freq ue ntly and fully to mitigate 

any possible disconnects. 

Considering the Cost 

s the flexibility tha t the Army gains with the Brow n & 

Root logistics-supp ort contrac t worth the cost of that 

contrac t, conside ring that the Arm y has spent more than 

$600 million for contracted logistics support in Kosovo alone? 

Advantages. While not an exact compar ison , a study by the 

Logistics Managem ent Institute (based on its ex amination of 

contracted logistics support in Bosnia) prov ides insigh t. The 

institute estima ted that it would have taken 8,900 support troops 

to provide the same se rvices that Brown & Root provided with 

some 6,700 emp loyees for operations in Bosnia. As in previous 

operatio ns, many of these emp loyees were local nation als. 

Obviously, it is much cheaper to hire the m tha n it is to keep a 

soldier on the books full-time with all the necessary support. 

Us ing the lo gi stics-supp ort contract produces o the r 

benefits. It helps to avoid mobilizing large numbers of National 

Gua rd and Reser ve un it s to s up por t th e se as pe c ts of 

deployment missions. In the area of foreig n rel ations, hiring 

person s on the local econ om y provides seve ral spin- offs. First, 

this ac tio n im mediatel y starts p umping revenu e into th e 

depressed local economies, which in tum provides a favorabl e 

impression of the U.S . mili tary presence. Second, with the 

number of U.S. military troops mini mized, the re is less of a 

perce ption tha t the country is bein g occupie d. 

Disadvantages. While contracting for logistics services 

pro vides se vera l econo mic and po litica l advant ages, some 

drawbacks exist. Th e U.S. military recognizes and antic ipates 

that contrac tors will continue to play a critical role on the 

battl efield ; however, this heavy reliance does not necessari ly 

mean that contracted suppo rt will be ava ilable in all cases. The 

40 Engine er 

Army mu st ma intain a capability for operating with out 

contracted logistics sUPPOt. In a heavy combat environment, 

the ab ility of a contrac tor to move into and operate within the 

theater of operations will be severe ly restricted . Likewise, will 

the contractor be there in a Iull-sc ale war ? How far can we 

extend the use of contractors in a hostile environme nt? And at 

what point does this opti on become nonviabl e? 

Two other significant considerations merit mention: First, 

co ntracted logistic s support re q uires intense co ntrac t 

admi nistration becau se the co st risk is on the U.S . gov ernment. 

Second, the Uni ted States mu st prov ide securi ty fo r the 

co ntractor. This is a recurring co ntentious issue; maneuver 

com ma nders do not want to use their limited combat struc ture 

to guard the contractor, and it is usually illeg al for the contractor 

to hir e its own security. 

T

Applying Lessons Learned 

here are so me crit ical lesson s learn ed from Kosovo 

that should be applied to subseque nt op erations. 

First, it is critica l that all age ncies and organiza tions 

un der st and th eir ro les, respon sibilit ies, and authoritie s in 

the administ rat io n of logi st ics-su pport co ntracts. This may 

be an obvi ous req uirement; howe ver , there is no written 

doctrine abo ut thi s type of contrac t, so man y ind ivid ua ls 

operate from in adequ at e knowledge or misp er ceprion s 

ge nerated by experience with fixe d- price contracts. W he n 

at all po ssible , these rel at ion shi ps sho uld be estab lished in 

a wo rking con fer en ce before the operatio n. Also , contract ing offi cers mu st have co nsiderable experie nce wi th 

cost-type co ntract s an d mu st und erst and the fa st-p ac ed 

tempo of conti ngen cy ope rations. 

Restrictions in the forc e structure and the military footprint 

in many overse as ope rations make using a logistics-support 

contractor like Brown & Root almos t mandatory. All parties 

gain by this rel ationship. The United Sta tes is able to leverage 

the g lo bal pre s en c e a nd ca pab ili ties of large ro bu st 

corpo rations and limit the amount of forces it must devote to 

the logistical tail of an operation. Corporatio ns ga in a very 

reliable customer (albeit a sometimes difficult one) with a health y 

workload. U.S. forces gain an accep table qualit y of life at a 

reasonable cost. The citizens of the United States gain more 

effec tive and efficient arme d force s supporting democracy 

aro und the world. III 

Co lone l VVYIU1 com ma nds the Tra nsat lan tic Pro gram 

Center; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Winchester, Virginia. 

Other Corp s assi gnments include tours with the Sea ttle, Far 

East, Honolulu, and Riyadh Distri cts. He also has served in 

Korea, Thailand, Honduras, Hawaii, and Saudi Arabia. COL 

Wynn holds two master of scien ce deg rees, one fro m the 

Universit y ofCalifornia at Davis and the otherfro m the Nava l 

War College; and a master of business administration deg ree 

fro m Long Island Univ ersity. He is a licensed professional 

eng ineer in Virginia. 

July 2000 
By Captain (Retired) Wallace Fiedl er 

On 18 February 1951 , Gen eral 

Matthew Ridgway summoned 

his staff to the G3 operations 

tent at his frontlin e Eighth U.S. Army 

headqu arters. He announced that Eighth 

Army would attack the Chinese Communist Forces within 60 hours in an offe nsive call ed "Operation Killer." 

At the time , I wa s the engineer reconnaissan ce-section sergeant for the 1Oth 

Engineer Combat Battalion of the U.S . 3d 

Infan try Divi sion in I Corps. My team 

conducted all of the special ground and 

aerial com bat-engi neer reconnai ssance 

for the 3d Infantry Division . The troops 

in the I Corps area we re getting ready to 

launch their assigned missions for Operati on Killer. Thi s would take us into the 

Iron Tri angl e-made up of Chorwon on 

the west, Kurnhwa on the east , and 

Pyonggang as the npex of the triangle. 

The problem for I Corp s wa s that the 

route went through the city of Seoul, the 

South Korean capital. which wa s across 

th e Han River. The river 's high tide s 

caused engineer s major floating-bridge 

problems. Although there were three 

highway brid ges in Seoul that were still 

inta ct , wc suspected that they were pre ­

pared for dem olition. Since there was no 

way to bypass them, engineers would 

have to brid ge the gaps if they were destroyed so arm ored vehicles could cross. 

United Nations strategic intelligenc e 

reports indi cat ed that about 1R,OOO Ch inese Communist 50th Army troops were 

in Seoul , in addition to about 19,000 

troops from the North Korean 8th and 

47th Infantry Divisions and 47th Mechanized Divi sion . When I was assigned to 

the assistant-division-enginee r section 

at the 3d Infantry Di vision advanced 

command post (before I became the 

Jul.',' 2000 

~~

/lvxveded 

&~ ~'ZidtJe
 

Forces and the North Korean 

Army were rec eiving strateg ic and tacti 

ca l advi ce from the East Germans. I decided that if the East German soldiers were 

advising the Chinese and NOIt h Kore ­

ans about American combat tactics, there 

was a good chance [ could reconnuiter 

the three bridges and get the information 

needed to decide if the main attack force 

could go through the city of Seoul or if it 

would hav e to take the more mountain ­

en gi nee r re connaissan ce -section sergeant), I attended many of the G2 intelligence and G3 operations briefings. So I 

was familiar with the big picture. 

The 15th Regiment of the 3d Infantry 

Division was assig ned the rout e that 

crossed the thre e bridges going thro ugh 

Seoul to the Iron Triangle area by way of 

Uijongbu, Yongpyong, and Kumhwa. 

I The 15th Regiment kept sending combat 

patrols across the Han River at low tide 

to reconnoiter the bridges, but they always were turned back by heavy enemy 

defense fire. Meanwhile, I was conducting special aerial reconnaissance by getting rides in the artillery spotter plan es. 

Becau se of the narrow valleys between 

the ste ep hills, the pilots co uld not get 

clos e enough for me to see if the bridges 

were prep ared for demolition or if the 

banks and road approaches were mined. 

The plane s flying photoreconnai ssance 

flights were not able to get good pictures 

either. 

Acc ording to United Nations intelligence reports, the Chinese Communist 

~~~~• 
 

People 's 

­

ous route farther east. 

I had been a combat-engineer recon ­

naissance scout with the 297 th Engineer 

Combat Battalion in Europe from the time 

of the Normandy invasion until we met 

the Russians at the Torgau Bridge on the 

Elbe River. We learned that if we could 

get through the Gelman minefields, we 

probably could get to our obj ective . 

Therefore, I hoped and expected that the 

East German advisors, hoping to find out 

what I was lookin g fur, would tell the 

Chinese and North Koreans La let me go 

th rough. 

I knew that (0 get the information on 

the three brid ges, I would have to cro ss 

the Han River at Seoul. But to get back, it 

would be better to co me out at th e 

bomb ed-out railroad bridge in the southwest part of the city in the U.S. Army 7th 

Infantry Di vision sect or. 

On 19 February, I checked the U.S . 

Geodetic Surv ey manual to see what time 

low tide would be for the Han River that 

day and had my recon scout and je ep 

driver get our two -man reconnaissance 

boat. We tuok off for the riv er below the 

big stone dike where I knew, from maps 

and ae rial reconnai ssance, that there was 

a T-junction at a main highway. When 

we go t to the river, we inflated all of the 

compartme nts of the recon boat, which 

Engineer 41 
made all of us di zzy. The thre e of LIS go t 

into the small boat and crossed to the 

big stone di ke . A fe w North Korean or 

Chinese so ld iers sho t at us as we crosse d 

the river. bu t non e of their bulle ts hit us. 

I got out of the boat with a Polaroide 

camera, a wire cutter, and some tags with 

wire ties. I d idn 't take a weapon. I told 

the driver to take the jeep and go to where 

the rail road bridge crossed the Han Ri ver 

in the U.S. 7th Infantry Division sector 

and wait for me to co me out there. I instructed the sco ut to leave the boat infla ted and put it in the jeep. I also told 

him to not go back by way of the ba tta lion S2 se ctio n but to wait for me at the 

ra ilroad br idge. That was the first tim e 

th at either o f them knew wh at I intended 

to do on th is recon missi on . I had g iven 

th em se parate in stru ct ion s, so if o ne 

co uld n' t make it, the other wa s to co n- ! 

tinu e on to the rail way bri dge . ! 

I climbed over the big stone dike and II 

went down to the stree t below, which was 

the highw ay that went alo ng the dike , I 

then straight up the T -ju nct ion that led ! 

to the first bridge . When I go t to the i, 

bridg e, I saw a lot of Russi an picri c-acid i antitank box mine s on the highway that I were not du g in or co vered up. I flipped I open the woode n lids , took out the de tonators, and threw them int o the snow on 

the rice paddy along the high way. 

After taking a picture of th e bridge 

from the friendl y side toward the enemy 

side . I cu t a len gth o f com municatio n 

(cornmo) wire that we had laid during one I 

of our previo us time s in Seoul , tied a rock 

to it. and let it down fro m the high est part 

of th e bridge to get the height abo ve the 

streambed. I roll ed up the length of wire 

and tagged it as "Bridge # 1." Th en , I wen t 

down un der the bridge to see if it had 

been prep ared fo r dem olition. Nothing 

had been done to it, and the three co nc rete stringe rs were still in go od condition. I went up to the othe r side and took I a picture from the enemy side lookin g I 

across the brid ge tow ard the friendly side. I 

I continued up the high way, go ing i 

north through Se oul toward Uijongb u, I 

to the nex t bridge, wh ich was in the north i 

part of the city. When I gut there, I did I 

the same as 1 ha d at the first bridge , I 

42 Eng inee r 

tagging the ro lle d-up co m ma wire as 

"Brid ge #2 ." After [ took a pictu re across 

the bridge from the enemy side toward 

the friendl y side. I started back dow n the 

highway to the third bridge. wh ich was 

o n another hi gh way co m ing in from 

Incho n from the west. 

While I was wal king throu gh the city, 

I never saw a single person . But T felt as 

if there we re thou sands o f eyes look ing 

at me all the time . As I approac hed the 

th ird bridge , I heard thr ee loud rep orts 

that so unded like pistol shots. I stopped 

dead in my tracks. I heard the re ports 

aga in, and the n I reali zed they were the 

'I sounds of so me one wash in g clo the s. 

(T he Koreans lay their clothes on rocks 

' ne ar the wa ter and hit them wi th wooden 

paddl es to ge t out the dirt.) I wa lked a 

little farth er, and there were three women 

by a small pool near the bridge , apparen tly washing c lo thes. None of them 

looked at me- even as I wa s measuring 

the bridge he ight above the streambed 

and looking unde r the bridge for demolition s-and I did not acknowledge them . 

(T am sure they were women. bu t when I 

wa s in German y, the Germans often had 

tro o ps dressed as women who wou ld 

wo rk in the farmyard s and fields so they 

could observ e us. l3ut with bin oculars, 

we usu ally could see their army boots at 

the bottom o f their dresses.) 

After I fin ish ed reconn oit ering the 

third bridge , Tonly had to get to the railroad bridge and be picked up in the reconnaissance boat. I began to think that 

if Twas being watched, the y might decide to take me now and see what intellige nce information they could ge t. 

The rail road bridge wa s in sig ht. I felt 

that my recon team would be wa iting for 

me across the river in the 7th Infantry 

Division sector, and I would soon be 

picked up. 1 had left the high way and wa s 

walki ng on the railroad tracks toward the 

en d of the bombed -out bridge . T he tide 

was coming in, and the Han River was 

already quite wide. About that time , I 

heard Pom ! Porn! Porn! Porn! I real ized I 

was be ing sho t at by a Quad .50 on an 

M 16 from our side of the rive r. I hit the 

side of the o-foot ste el l-beam of th e 

bri dge and sta rted ye lling for everyo ne 

that I could imagi ne mi ght possibly be 

there. including my dri ver and sco ut. The 

Quad .50 started sp itt ing o ut bull ets 

ag ain, but they were go ing way ov er my 

head . Fina lly, so meone call ed out and 

asked if [ was from the 3d Division . I sa id 

I wa s and that they should put the recon 

boat into the river and come and ge t me. 

Engineers from the 7th Division ca me 

over with a motorboat to pic k me up. No 

one had bel ieved my driver and sco ut 

whe n they sa id I' d be coming out on the 

railro ad bridge, and no one had told the 

Philippine soldiers on the M 16 Qu ad .50 

that someo ne frie nd ly was supposed to 

be coming down the railroad track s from 

insid e the city. 

1t was late in the aftern oon. and we 

still ha d to get back to the 10th Engineer 

Comba t Battalion S2 intelli gence sec tion 

to turn in the infor matio n I had gathered . 

As we drove into the headquar ters area . 

Captain Stanfield. the ba ttalion S2, saw 

us arrive and wanted to know where we 

had been . At the same time. Col on el 

Gross came by and wan ted to know wha t 

had happened to LIS. When I sho wed 

them th e pictu res T had taken of the 

bridges and the rolls of tagg ed wire. Colone l Gro ss said, " You've go t to show them 

to the ge neral right now!" (Major General Robert IShorty] Soule was the 3d Division comma nder.) 

We went to the 3d Division ad vanced 

co mmand post, which was in a nearby 

sc hoo l building. In the G2 int ell igence 

room , Tex plained the pictures I had taken 

of the bridges and related them to the 

bridges on a large city map ofSeoul. They 

asked qu estion s about the road and stree t 

co nditions and if Thad see n any ene my 

troop s, weapon s, or materiel. Th e 3d Division G2 officer (a lieu ten ant colo nel) 

told the ge neral that he didn't believe T 

had actual ly been across the river and in 

the city of Seoul, even though I had the 

pictu res of the bridge s and the rolls of 

wire th at me asu red th e he ight of the 

bridge dec ks abo ve the streambed . 

Maj or General Soul e asked Colonel 

Gross wh at he was goi ng to do for this 

recon sergeant for getting this information . Co lo ne l Gross told him that they 

plan ned to have me promoted to master 

July 2000 
se rgeant when it wa s time Cor me to rotat e back 10 the States. "M aster se rgean t, 

hell !" General Soule retorted. "After this 

campaign, I want him to appear before 

the Battlefield Commission Board ." Colonel Gross said to me , "Tha t is a ge neral's 

or de r, Fiedl er, and you better obey it." I 

told them [ would be there if I lived 

thr ou gh the campaig n, because I figured 

my mothe r wo uld rather gc t a dead lieutenant shippe d back home than a dead 

se rgean t ! (l really thought most of us 

would ne ver rotate back to the State s 

ali ve anywa y.) 

After lea vin g th e 3d Division advanced co mmand post, I went back to 

our battalion S2 tent to make out my re ­

port of the brid ge rec onn aissance ; albeit 

un authorized , it was the reason for the 

recommenda tion for my battlefi eld commission award . 

On the morning of 21 February 1951 , 

Op eration K iller was launched. Th e plan 

wa s to go around the city of Seoul. with 

the attacking for ces con ver gin g north o f 

the c ity on the hi ghway to Uij on gbu . 

Th ere, a line was est ablished to prepare 

for the next attack north across the 38th 

parallel. 

The attack for the Iron Triangle and 

the territor y north, design ated Operation 

Ripp er, began on 7 March in the U.S . 25th 

Infantry Di vision sector. Alth ou gh the 

July 2000 

OPERATIONCOURAGEOUS 

22·28 MarCh 1951 

=- f QIVNd ~!QM 2\ W I c::J ~OOOot ¢Ie-.n l.t.... e lS"" ACH..lln<jijlQ. n _ T~ G,"""""'....,..-.. 23 t~... 

- - r_ p~,.24M.t

---J' 1e1'l',~r ~" 24 n 1.1. 

- f."....."'p",.MnS,n< ..... 

o 

Chinese Comm unist Forces and the N 011h 

Korean People's Army put up some resistance, the real enemy was the early 

rains and warmer we ather. It melted the 

ice and sno w and made it necessary fo r 

engineers in particul ar to do lots of road 

and b rid gew ork. 

On 15 Mar ch , General Rid gway rece ive d wo rd that there was a lot o f di ssatisfac tion with the term s "Opera tio n 

Killer" and "Operation Ripper" in stateside magazine s an d new sp apers. The 

ge nera l said that he didn ' t understand 

w hy it was objectionable to acknowle dg e the fact th at war was co ncern ed 

wi th killin g the ene my . Ho wever, he 

c om bine d the tw o operatio ns, and th ey 

contin ued under th e nam e " Ope ratio n 

Courageous." 

By 27 March 1951 , all of the attacking 

United Nation s troop s were north of the 

38 th Parallel. South Kore a had been 

cleared of Chinese Communist and North 

Korean troops for the second time. By I 

April, the co mbat pha ses of Operations 

Kill er, Ripper, and Courageou s ended . 

After the big push and all the battles it 

entailed , whe n we ca ptured the towns o f 

Chorwon, Kumhwa, and Pyonggang (the 

Iron Triangle) and Pyongyang (the abandoned capital of North Korea), we finall y 

slowed down to routine co mbat-eng inee r 

assig nme nts. 

10 

I 

The Battl efi eld Commission Bo ard 

con vened at 3d Divisi on rear headquarters in Seoul , Korea, on 22 June 195 I. 

Th ere, a cleaned -up group of troop s in 

new fatigue uniforms was brought together to appear before the board . We 

certainly did not look like the "com ba t 

warri ors" we were several months before. 

That evening the re was a ce le bratio n 

banquet for us, and we we re awarded our 

shiny second lieutenant or warrant officer bars. Th e next day, we were all flown 

to Tokyo, Japan , for 10 days of rest and 

recreation. III 

When Capta in Fiedler return ed to 

Korea, he becam e leader ojrhe lst Platoon. C Company, 10111 Eng ine er Combat Battalion . Fro m there, he went to 

Ca mp McCo y. Wis con sin, to become 

commander of C Company . J99th Engineer Combat Battalion . Lat er; the entire En gineer Combat Group was se nt 

to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to renovate large areas ()f the post[o r reo pening . The re, Cap tain Fi edl er wa s the hattali on S3 ofthe 199th Eng ineer Combat 

Ba ttalion. He everuuallv ret ired at the 

Pentagon as (/ captain in the U S. Army 

Co rps ()f Eng ineers with a combination 

of mor e than 22 years active duty and 

more than 12 years active US. Arm)' 

Reser ve. 

Engineer 43 
AReligious­
 Support Primer
 

By Cha plain (Major) Gregory K. Williamson 

ur nation ' s con stitutio n pr ovide s for in di vidual 

re ligio us free dom . In keepi ng with th is constitu tion ally guarantee d right. the nation established 

the United States Chaplain Corps to minister to the div erse 

spiritual needs of those serving in uni form. 

Every commander m ust e nsure that soldi ers are give n the 

opportunity to wors hip and practice their religion accordin g to 

the tenets of their faith . This normally mea ns tha t soldiers are 

given time to worship, pray, and serve in their local syn agogue , 

temple, church, or mosque. Mo re narro wly spea king, it means 

that the com mand er establishes a pl an of religious support 

within the uni t. 

Developing a Plan 

The co mmande r's staff officer for devel opin g this plan 

is the cha plai n. Eve ry chap lai n is profession ally 

trained to function as a religious lead er. Typically, but 

not always, the chapla in gradu ate s from a seminary, serves a 

congregation [or several years, and then comes on acti ve du ty 

under the aus pic es o f a part icul ar endorsing agency. Th e 

chaplain rem ains accountable to two author ities: ecclesiastic al 

and military. He min isters according to the tenet s of his faith 

and as the com mander determines is best for his unit. 

With in the contex t of personal rel igious co nviction, unit 

needs , and the comma nder's wish es, the ch apl ain develo ps 

and recommends a reli gious-support plan. Eac h plan should 

be tailored to the reli giou s composition o f the un it , the 

commande r's guidance, and the unit' s mission . Typi cally, the 

plan evol ves int o a reli gi ou s-support sta nding opera ting 

procedure for garrison operations and one for field operations. 

In addition , each operations order sho uld address relevan t and 

essentia l elements of religio us support. 

When de vel oping a reli giou s-su pport pl an, th e chaplai n 

identifies the foc us of reli giou s acti vities. Thi s focu s should 

ali gn itself with th e phases of an order or mission . Before 

battl e , the cha plain foc us es on ministry to so ldie rs most 

li kel y to e ngage in co mba t op era tions . Du ring b attle , he 

focu ses on mi nistry to wou nded soldi ers . Foll owing co mbat 

o pe ratio ns , hon ori ng th e d e ad an d minist erin g to th e 

grieving is th e foc us. 

A similar proces s is impl em ented for garrison opera tio ns. 

However, ano ther compo nent is add ed to the support plan : 

namel y, famil y members. The chaplain, with the co mm ander's 

guida nce , must consc iously decide where to focus mini stry in 

garriso n and determi ne when and where his religious-support 

assets are best applied . For instance, the commander may 

choose to ha ve the chap lain pe rform home visits rath er than 

visit a compa ny on a range. 

Elements of Support 

To perform mini stry effe cti vely, the Unit Ministr y Team 

(the cha pla in and a c ha p la ins a ssi st an t) need s 

support fro m the commander and his or her staff. The 

four mo st significant eleme nts of support -s-communica tion. 

tran sport ation , informa tion, and funding-s-gre atly enhance the 

team's ability to provide quality mini stry. 

Communication. Whet her in ga rriso n or the field , the 

chaplain must be abl e to communicate with the units he is 

assigned to cover. In garrison, the chap lain ne eds a telephone 

and elect ronic mail;in the field , he needs a radio and a ded icated 

tactical telephone on the rnobi le-subscriber-equ iprnent network. 

Co mmanders are best served by ensuring that their cha plains 

and cha pla ins' assist ant s are thorou ghly trained in ra dio 

operations . 

Transportation. To provide religious coverage, the unit 

chapla in must have appropria te tran sportation available. 

Chaplains need transp ortation resources to visit soldie rs and 

their family members in their homes and whil e hospi tali zed, 

incarcerated, or con valescing. Most often, a sedan or V3 n meets 

44 Engineer July 2000 
these needs. Wh en in the field , the chaplai n must have either a 

tactical vehicle assigned for his use orshare access to a vehicle . 

In the latter ca se, the command group mus t establish clear 

pri orities among use rs before deploying. 

Information. Chaplains gather informa tion to assess the 

moral and religious health and need s of soldiers, their famil y 

members, and the unit. The following information is relev ant 

for this purpose, although it does not ex haust the possibilities: 

soldiers' religions preferences, marit al status, dependents other 

th an spo use . e me rgen c y le a ves, hos pitaliz a t i ons, 

co nva lesce nce leaves, Red Cross messages, marriage s and 

divorces, adve rse actions, and blotter report s. After assessing 

these needs, tbe cha plain impleme nts a religious-support plan 

and conducts mini stry appropriate to them. Assessing and 

co nducting ministry is not a "once-and-for-all" activ ity; rather. 

it is an ongoing process that must be done regularly and in 

respo nse to part icular situatio ns. 

Funding. The unit 's Comm and Ma ster Reli gious Pl an 

(CMRP) incorporates fundin g for the unit' s religious support. 

Th is doc ument detail s programs and ministry that meet the 

religious and moral needs of the unit along with the estima ted 

co sts. Two fun ding so urces are availab le to the chaplain: 

appropriated fund s thro ugh the unit and nonappropriated funds 

through the consolidated chaplains' fund. A well-written CMRP 

serves both the commander and the chap lain as a tool for 

prioritizing ministry and fundi ng for it. 

Commanders' Needs 

The above discussion pre supposes that commande rs 

themselves identify religious life as a training and unit 

priority. Furthermore, commanders may choos e to seek 

the counsel of the unit chaplain for personal pastoral needs,such 

as prayer and meditation, or simply as a sympathetic em' to hear 

ab out the day's frustrations. As com mande rs see k out the 

chaplain for personal pastoralcare, they will invigorate the religious 

and moral climate within their units, sending a message that none 

are beyond the need of encouragement, care, and comfort . 

W 

Chaplain (Major) Williamson was the senior Unit Ministry 

Team observer/controller at the Joint Read iness Training 

Center befo re his current assignment as group chap lain, 4th 

Psvc hological Op erations Group (Aj, Fo rt Bragg, No rth 

Carolina. 

The Engineer Writer's Guide 

We think engineers take a speci al pride in their profession, and Engineer is always looking for articles from readers who want to share their expertise, ex.perience, and ideas. 

If you are a potential contributing writer, here are a few tips to 

steer you in the right direction, 

Art icles may discu ss engineer training, operations, doctrine. equipment, history. or other areas of general interes t to 

an engineer readership. 

We're especially interested in articles that have a "howto-do-it-better" them e. For insta nce. we 're not lookin g for 

articles telli ng readers how you conducted a rout ine field 

exercise . But if you think you have a "new-and -improved" 

way of conducting a tactical operation. train ing exe rcise, or 

other operational procedure that may prov e helpful to othe r 

enginee rs, that' s what we need. 

Articles sho uld generally come from co ntrib utors with 

firsthand experience of the subject being presen ted. Articles 

shou ld be concise, straigh tforward, and in the active voice . 

Length should range from 2,000 to 4,000 wo rds, and text 

should be double-spaced. Gen erally, each such page should 

contain from 200 to 250 words. Manuscripts should be originals or clear copies. Provide a 3 II2-inch disk in Mic rosofts 

Word, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please indica te wordprocessing forma t on disk or cover lette r). You also may 

"end articles by e-m ail tobridgess@wood.army.mil. 

Articles co ntaining attributable information or quotations 

not referenced in the story should carry appropriate endnotes. 

Contributors are encouraged to include black-and-white 

or color photos, artwork, and/or line diagrams that illustrate 

information in the article. Include captions for any photographs submitted. Hard-copy photos are preferred, but we 

wiIl accept digital images origina lly saved at a resolution no 

lower than 200 dpi. Please do not include them in the text. If 

you use Powerl'ointe, save each illustration as a separate file 

and avoid excessive use of color and shading. Please do not 

send photos embedded in Powerf'ointe. 

Include your full name, ran k. current unit, and job title . 

Also include a list of your past assignments, experiences, 

and education; your mailing address; and a fax number and 

commercial daytime phone number. 

Reviews of books on engineer topics are also welcome. 

Articles or book reviews may be mailed to: Editor, Engineer Professional Bulletin , 320 Engineer Loop , Suite 210, 

Fort Leonard Wood , Missouri 65473-8929 . 

All submiss ions are subject to editing. 

If you have questions about an article yo u're work ing 

on-or co nsidering writing- call Sh irley Bridg es, at DSN 

676-5266, or commercial (573) 596-0 l 31 ext. 3-5266.We look 

forward to hearin g from you. 

Note: Due to the limited space per issue, IVI' will not 

pri nt articles that have been accepted for publication by 

other Anny prof essional bulletins. 

July 2000 Engineer 45 
ENGINEER UPDATE
 

Commercial numbers are (573) 563- xxxx and Defense System
 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherw ise noted.
 

Doctrine Development Enginee r Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TIP). Draft TTP available at 

Division http://www. wood.army.miJ/PUBS/ttps/engrttps .htm are­

• Antipersonnel Obstacle-Breaching System (APOBS) 

• Deployabl e Universal Combat Earthmover (DEUCE) 

• Joint Rapid Airfield Construction (JRAC) 

• Maneuver Control System-Engineer (MCS-E) 

• Military John Deere GATOR (MGATOR) 

• Mini Mine Detector (MIM1D) 

• Miniflail 

• Robotic Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Rubble Clearer 

• Raptor 

• Rapid Hardcopy Reproduction (RHR) 

• Rapid Terrain Data Generation (RTDG) 

• Skid Steer 

• Selectabl e Lightweight Attack Munition (SLAM) 

• Smart Mine Probe (SMP) 

• Volcano Light 

• Multipurpos e Bunker 

Deletion of Obsolete Publications.	 We have requested that several engineer 

publications be deleted from the Armywide invent ory. The following publications 

are no long er valid for use by any Army component: 

• TM 5-270, Bridges, Cable ways, Tramways and Suspension Bridges 

• TM 5-370 , Railroad Construction 

•	 TM 5-401, Erection Procedures for Bldg, T-5 Arctic, Prefabricated, Panelized 

Wood , 20' x 48' 

•	 TM 5-402, Erection Procedures for Bldg, Prefabricated, Ready Cut, Round 

Arch, Frigid, 20' x 48' 

• TM 5-744, Structural Steelwork 

• TM 5-745 , Heating, Ventilation, Air-Conditioning and Sheetmetal Works 

• FM 5-488 , Logging and Sawmill Operations 

POC is LTC Harry Rossander, (573) 596-0131 ext. 3-7537, or DSN - 7537, or 

e-mail rossandh@wood.army.mil. 

The Army School System	 E-5 Instructor Policy Letter. The Engineer School has published an E-5 Instructor 

(TASS) Division	 Policy Letter to alleviate the current instructor shortage adversely impacting engineer 

TASS battal ions . TASS training battal ions desiring to use E-5 instructors must 

comply with all aspects of the policy letter before the Engineer School will grant 

authorization to use E-5 personnel. 

46 Engineer	 Julv 2000 
pac is MSG Robert Chartier, (573) 596-0131 ext. 3-5950 , or e-mail 

chartier@wood.armymil. 

Graduate School. We continue to increase the number of graduate-degree 

options for our advanced-course students. We now have a degree in geology 

and geophysics to complement our pree xisting degrees of engineering 

management, environmental engineering , civil engineering , and public policy and 

administration. Lieutenants should contact branch immediately for Engineer 

Officer Advanced Course scheduling. 

pac is CPT Marc Hoffmeister, (573) 596-0131 ext. 3-5641, or OSN -5641 , or 

e-mail hoffmeim @wood.armymil. 

Small-Group Leaders (SGLs) for Engineer Officer Advanced Course. An 

SGL serves as the instructor, leader, and mentor for his team of 14 students. 

The assignment is challenging and rewarding as each SGL contributes to the 

future shape of the Engineer Regiment. Branch-qualified captains are encouraged 

to consider an assignment as an SGL as a valuable comp onent of their career 

progression and experience base. Commanders are encouraged to identify 

suitable officers and highlight the SGL assignment during career counseling . 

pac is MAJ Dave Luhrs , -4128 , or e-mailluhrsd@wood.armymil. 

Planning Aid for Combat Engineers (PACE). PACE provides engineer planners 

at the battalion and brigade task-fo rce levels with doctrinally based standardized 

engineer planning tools, information , and battle-tracking spreadsheets in digital 

and analog format. It includes sections on key duties of engineer staff, the military 

decision-making process/eng ineer estimate, engineer battlefield assessment, 

battle -tracking charts, and planning considerations for offensive and defensive 

operations. It can be downloaded from the Fort Leonard Wood Web pages at 

http://www.wood.armymillTactl. 

pac is MAJ Ken McKay, (573 ) 596-01 31 ext. 3-559 2, or OSN -5592 , or e-mail 

mckayk@wood.armymil. 

Countermine/Mine Awareness Training Aids. The Countermine Traini ng
 

Support Center does not have a supply of training aids, and the Humanitarian
 

Oemining Training Center (HOTC) is restricted from releasi ng trainin g aids to
 

units other than those legitimately supporting the U.S. Humanitarian Oemining
 

Program. In light of this situation, we offer the following assistance:
 

•	 Redston e Arsenal is the Army 's production facility for many training aids 

(mine and UXO boards and "rubber ducks"). POCs at Redstone are Randy 

Porter, (256) 955-6079; Merlin Largen, (256) 842-2351; or Kenneth Patrick, 

(256) 876-0036. 

.lulv 2000 

Department of Instruction 

Tactics Division 

Countermine Training 

Support Center 

Engineer 47 
•	 Your installation TSC should carry GTA 5-10-44 , The Mine-Awareness 

(SANDI) Card, and the U.S. Mine Awareness Training Video (number 

710956). 

•	 The United Kingdom has produced an excellent mine-awareness video 

titled Mine Strike . You can obtain a copy through the British Defense 

Film Library, phone 011 44 1494 87825 , or e-mail bdfl@ssvc.com. 

•	 You can also attempt to procure actual inert mines (high quality but 

expensive) through Miltra Engineering Limited. The POC is Donald Syme, 

phone 011 44 1268 526 756. Redstone Arsenal and numerous other 

companies also produce expensive , inert mines. 

Mobile Training Teams (MTIs). We continue to support requests for mineawareness and countermine MTTs. Our calendar is filling fast, so if you're 

preparing for deployment and are in need of an MD, please call soon . We 

normally try to schedule the actual training within three months of deployment. 

poe is MAJ Randy Glaeser, (573) 596-0131 ext. 3-6199, or DSN -6199, or 

e-mail glaeserr@wood.armymil. 

Directorate of Training	 Field Manual Update. The following field manuals have recently been printed 

Development	 and distributed . They are also available for viewing and downloading from the 

Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library at http://155.217.58.58/atdls .htm. 

•	 FM 5-436 , Paving and Sul1acing Operations, dated 28 April 2000. 

•	 FM 5-434, Earthmoving Operations, dated 15 June 2000. 

The following field manuals will be sent to print within the next 60 days. 

Look for them on the MANSCEN Publications Page at http:// 

WWli1I. wood.army mil/PUBS/newpubs.htm. 

•	 FM 90-13-1 , Combined-Arms Breaching Operations. This manual 

provides combined-arms commanders , from company to brigade, and 

their staffs with the doctrine, tacti cs, and techniques needed to 

successfully overcome obstacles. It provides the commander with 

breaching fundamentals and information for planning , preparing, and 

executing breaching operations. 

•	 FM 5-105, Topographic Operations. This manual describes doctrine for 

topographic operations insupport of the U.S. Army's strategic,operational, 

and tactical mission. 

POC is Sandra Gibson , -4100, or e-mail gibsons @wood.armymil. 

48 Engineer	 July 2000 
Lead the Way
 

Command Sergeant Ma j o r A rthur Lau ghlin 

U.S . AI'm)' Engineer School 

An Azimuth Check 

Engineers everywhere are fully engaged in their heavy 

summer train ing sc hedules. Here at Fort Leonard 

Wood, the drill sergeants and cadre are busy with the 

annual surge of trainees who migrate with the civilian schoo l 

cycles. And in our many reserve and guard training area s. 

en gineer units ar e co nduc ting their annu al train ing that 

provides their best opportunity of the year to gain collec rive 

competence in their missi on-essenti al tasks. At active duty 

posts, the normal hustle of trainin g depl oyment s and suppor t 

is increased with reserve aug rn entees. cadets in appre ntice 

troop-leadin g role s. supporting re serve unit trainin g, and the 

surge of personn el turnover. 

It is during these busy times when we lose sight of the 

bigger picture-what we are and what we are all about and 

how are we doing. Fortun ately, our Reg iment addressed all 

that in our recent ENFORCE Conference. It is important that 

all of us understand the big picture and how it co uld change . 

We NCOs must understand it and pass it on to the troops. We 

have known since George Washington was in charge that 

American soldiers are more effective, more committed, and 

more dogg ed in action if they know the big pic ture and what 

they are fighting for. We. as NCOs, are the glue that holds 

together the senior leadership and the soldiers . So here is a 

quick, big picture from ENFORCE. Tell your troops about it. 

Genera l Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, explained 

that the Arm y is " bifurcated." Th at is, it has the best ever 

heavy forces in the world's history and light forces that are 

unmatched . That combination can be effective when used in 

a deliberate theater of war. But, the combination , when 

depl oyed , is either lean OR mean in a hasty theater-which 

isn 't effec tive. So, Ge neral Shinseki has asked the Army to 

find a \vay to become lean AND mean by making a majo rity 

of its force s medium weight. There would no longer be a heavy 

force or a light force-just one basic type that combined the 

best of both forces. This is the Army's Vision. 

General Abrams, TR ADOC Commanding Gen eral, told 

us that the Army isn 't go ing anywhere without its cngineersthat we have always been and always will be an inte gral piece 

of Army missions. 

Lieu tenant General Ballard, Chief of Engi neers. expressed 

his great affection for the Corps and its soldiers. He told us 

that the branch would come out of this transition bett er. 

stronger, and smarter and remain fully engaged throughou t. 

Thus, we cannot lose our perspective. In the end, the resu lt 

will be a stronger Regiment. 

Jul y 2000 

We must pass these words of wisdo m out to our soldiers. 

They, too, must see the big picture. 

Essayons !! 

CSM's Note: 

I want to publicly thank and say farewell to the foJlowing 

command sergeants major who will leave the Army this year 

after having served with all their being, mind . heart, and body. 

Our Regiment will be forever in their debt. Th eir presence in 

their units will certainly be missed. We wish them God speed 

and the best of everything. 

•	 CSM Harold Montgomery, Division CSM , 1st Infantry 

Division, Wurzbu rg, Germany 

•	 CSM Thomas Bru ce, 44th Engineer Battalion. Camp 

Howze. Korea 

•	 CSM John Cooper, Garrison CSM, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Mi ssouri 

•	 CSM Mi ch ael Garman , 14th Engin eer Battalion , Fort 

Lewis, Washingt on 

•	 CSM Jesus Gomez, Commandant, NCO Academy. Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri 

•	 CSM Raym ond Greigo, 52 d En gin eer Battalion , Fort 

Carson, Colorado 

•	 CS M John Hemrick , 20th Engineer Brigade, Fort Bragg, 

North Car olina 

•	 CSM Michael Leiber, 5th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri 

•	 CSM Anth ony Orl ando , 299th Engi neer Battalion . Fort 

Hood , Texas 

•	 CSM Norman Rowland, 8th Engineer Battalion. Fort Hood 

Texas 

•	 CSM Lonni e Clark, 588 th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, 

Texas 

•	 CSM Frank J-fall, 937th Engineer Grou p, Fort Riley, Kansas 

•	 CSM Robert Seil er. Engineer Bri gade , 4th Infantry 

Division , Fort Hood , Texa s 

•	 CSM Alvin Shimizu, 29th Topographic Batt alion, Fort 

Shafter. Hawaii 

Engin eer 49