J-S13042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALONZO HILL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2307 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0303621-2001

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 17, 2023

Alonzo Hill (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing as untimely his second 

petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

We glean the procedural history and pertinent facts from our 

independent review of the certified record.1 On August 18, 2003, Appellant 

entered a counseled guilty plea to first-degree murder, two counts of 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Appeals Unit of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ Trial Division

notified this Court on 10/24/22 that the case file for Defendant/Appellant 

Alonzo Hill is missing from its file room. Accordingly, the Appeals Unit has 

prepared a reconstructed record from available documents from the Court 

Document Management System. The notice advises that once the record is 

located, a supplemental record will be sent to this Court. Nevertheless, the 

notice confirms that the record includes the docket entries and the judicial 

opinion for the present PCRA petition and appeal.
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attempted murder, one count of kidnapping, sexual assault, arson, and 

conspiracy for his involvement in the 2000 shooting death of Kevin Williams

and the aftermath of violence that culminated with his fatal shooting of

Maurice Edwards. On the same date, Appellant was sentenced to life 

imprisonment and concurrent sentences. His judgment of sentence became 

final 30 days later, on September 17, 2003, when his time for filing a direct 

appeal expired. See § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). 

On June 14, 2006, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition, and the PCRA 

court appointed counsel to represent him. On June 25, 2007, counsel filed a 

Turner/Finley2 no-merit letter contending that Appellant’s pro se PCRA 

petition was untimely filed, and on the following day the PCRA court issued its 

dismissal notice under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On July 26, 2007, the PCRA court 

entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition for relief. No appeal 

was filed.

On March 2, 2020, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his second, 

in which he made several assertions. First, he asserted “facts [he knows] to 

be true of his own personal knowledge” that he was “the person that was 

forced and coerced into Plea[ding] Guilty to a murder I did not commit. But 

ADA Roger King when he new [sic] I was in Vermont at the time of the crime.” 

PCRA Petition, 3/2/20, at p.4 ¶¶ 6(A); p.8 ¶15.

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2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Appellant’s petition also claimed there were facts made known to him 

by means other than his own personal knowledge, namely, through his recent 

use of the prison library and reading the Philadelphia Daily News, that 

constituted what he termed “newly discovered evidence” of “prosecutorial 

misconduct, in that Roger King suppressed evidence[,]” and that he intended 

to seek withdrawal of his guilty plea on such facts. Id. at p. 4 ¶ 6(B) and (C). 

Finally, the petition asked the PCRA court to consider the following argument, 

“I was coerced by Roger King, as well there are new newspaper work that 

came out 2019 on Roger King. And new by [sic] FBI paperwork show I was 

in Vermont at the time of the crime. Which Roger King was told this. And he 

still falsely accused me for the crime.” Id. at p.8 ¶ 15.3

On April 7, 2022, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 Notice of Intent to 

Dismiss Appellant’s second petition because it was patently untimely and did 

not invoke an exception to the timeliness provision of the PCRA found at §

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Acting under an apparent assumption that he was entitled 

to continued representation by counsel from his first PCRA action,4 Appellant 

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3 Neither the referenced newspaper articles nor any FBI paperwork was 

attached to Appellant’s May 2, 2020, petition.

4 A petitioner is generally not entitled to court-appointed counsel on a second 

or subsequent PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 746 A.2d 

621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000) (although first-time PCRA petitioner is entitled to 

appointment of counsel, there is no such entitlement on second and 

subsequent petitions). But see Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(D) (providing rule-based

entitlement to counsel on a second or subsequent PCRA petition when an 

evidentiary hearing is required as provided in Rule 908) and Rule 904(E) 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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filed a response complaining that the PCRA court had not informed him why it 

had issued a notice to dismiss instead of a Finley letter. Appellant’s Response 

filed 4/19/22. On August 16, 2022, the PCRA Court entered an order 

dismissing his second PCRA petition and notifying him of his appeal rights. 

This timely appeal followed.

In Appellant’s pro se brief, he asks whether the PCRA court erroneously 

dismissed his untimely petition when, he maintains, the petition qualified for 

an exception to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. In support of this issue,

however, Appellant offers only a single, conclusory statement that his petition

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(judge shall appoint counsel whenever the interests of justice require it). We 

find no error with the PCRA court’s application of the general rule in the case

sub judice.

Nevertheless, Appellant has raised in his brief the apparent claim that 

appointed counsel who represented him in his first PCRA action in 2007 has 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel and/or abandoned him in the 

present PCRA action by failing to either act in reply to correspondence he sent 

to her in relation to the present petition or file a Turner/Finley notice of 

withdrawal from representation. See Brief for Appellant at 6. Appellant’s 

claim affords him no relief. 

In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), a decision 

Appellant cites as supportive of his claim, our Supreme Court held that a 

defendant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel for the 

first time during an appeal from the denial of a timely filed first PCRA petition

where the PCRA counsel in question represented the defendant until the 

appeal. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401-05. In contrast to the operative facts in 

Bradley, however, Appellant filed no appeal from the denial of his first PCRA 

petition in which appointed counsel represented him, nor has he been

represented by any counsel in this, his second, PCRA petition. Accordingly,

Bradley is inapposite to his case, and his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel fails. 
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is reviewable under the Newly Discovered Fact Exception at Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii). Brief of Appellant at 2. Moreover, in his reply brief,5 he 

expands on his position with the lone assertion, “on 3/1/2020, Appellant filed 

a post-conviction [sic] alleging Newly Discovered Evidence in the form of 

newspaper articles in addition to federal documents that indicate Appellant 

was not in the city when the murder occurred. See Exhibit “B”.” Reply Brief 

at 4 (unpaginated). 

Exhibit B of Appellant’s reply brief consists of a photocopied segment of 

an unattributed and undated newspaper article reporting that police obtained 

arrest warrants for Appellant in connection with the death of Maurice Edwards

and that Appellant “also is under federal investigation for running a drug 

trafficking ring with connections to Vermont, police said.” Appellant’s Reply 

Brief, Exhibit B. Relatedly, Appellant avers that Exhibit A of the reply brief

shows that he submitted to prior counsel in 2021 purported newly discovered 

evidence from the FBI indicating that he was not in Philadelphia on the day 

Maurice Edwards was murdered. Exhibit A consists of a Department of 

Corrections “Cash Slip” dated 10/29/21 upon which Appellant wrote “for my 

attorney information, federal information” and included the name of PCRA 

counsel who represented him 14 years earlier.

The Commonwealth responds that neither the referenced newspaper 

articles alluding to ADA Roger King’s misconduct in other cases nor the yet to 

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5 We grant Appellant’s April 13, 2023, Application for Extension of Time to 

File a Reply Brief.
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be revealed FBI paperwork supposedly offering exculpatory proof of his 

whereabouts on the day of Maurice Edwards’ murder was ever attached to 

Appellant’s second PCRA petition or submitted to the PCRA court prior to the 

court’s order dismissing the petition. Likewise, the Commonwealth asserts 

that Appellant failed to allege either in his petition or appellate briefs any “new 

fact” about how he was allegedly coerced or forced to plead guilty while 

represented by counsel during plea negotiations.

6

Initially, we address the adequacy of Appellant’s briefs. Appellate briefs 

must conform to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Where an appellant's brief 

contains substantial defects, we may quash or dismiss the appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 497-98 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(citation omitted).

“Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a 

pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit.” Commonwealth 

v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017). “This Court will not act 

as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” 

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

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6 The record contains Appellant’s March 21, 2001, Written Guilty Plea Colloquy 

that both he and his counsel signed. In it, Appellant represented that nobody 

had threatened or forced him to plead guilty. 
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“[I]t is an appellant's duty to present arguments that are sufficiently 

developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent 

discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal 

authorities.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c). As 

such, “[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when 

the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court 

will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445 A.2d 

149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citations omitted).

However, because we can discern the crux of one argument offered in 

support of Appellant’s “newly discovered fact” exception-based challenge, we 

decline to quash the present appeal because of briefing deficiencies. 

Specifically, we review Appellant’s contention that newspaper articles 

regarding ADA Roger King’s prosecutorial misconduct in other cases supplies 

a “new fact” enabling Appellant to claim an exception to the time-bar under 

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).7

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7 With respect to Appellant’s remaining issues, we find he has waived them 

for his failure to develop them sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate 

review. See Hardy, 918 A.2d at 771 (“When briefing the various issues that 

have been preserved, it is an appellant's duty to present arguments that are 

sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with 

pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal 

authorities. ... [W]hen defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct 

meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find 

certain issues to be waived.”).

Even if we did not find such claims waived for briefing deficiencies, we would 

find they fail to establish that Appellant provided predicate “newly discovered”

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In reviewing an order denying a PCRA petition, our standard of review 

is well settled:

[O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is 

limited to examining whether the PCRA court's determination is 

supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal 

error. The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when 

supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we 

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal 

conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted and formatting altered). The timeliness of a post-conviction

petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 

(Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including 

a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, 

that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met. Id.

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facts in his petition. For example, in Appellant’s petition, he states in the most 

general terms that ADA King “coerced and forced” him to plead guilty. This 

claim as stated, however, necessarily implies that the alleged fact of ADA 

King’s “coercion and force” were known to Appellant prior to his guilty plea 

and, thus, are not newly discovered. 

The same is true of Appellant’s claim that he presents new facts—namely, the 

newspaper article attached in Exhibit “B” of his brief—that indicate he was in 

Vermont on the day Maurice Edwards was murdered in Philadelphia. Setting 

aside that the attached article does not address Appellant’s whereabouts on 

the day of the murder but, instead, reports only that he was under federal 

investigation for running a drug trafficking ring with connections to Vermont,

the most that can be said of the article is that it is a newly-discovered source 

of a “fact” that Appellant would be presumed to have known all along: his 

own whereabouts on the day of the murder.
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The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as 

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the 

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional 

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA's 

time bar must be pleaded in the petition and may not be raised for the first 

time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the 

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pleaded

and proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has 

jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the 

legal authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. 

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 17, 2003. 

Therefore, he had until Friday, September 17, 2004, to file a timely petition. 

Because he filed the petition at issue in 2020, it is patently untimely unless he 

has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated 

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.
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Appellant argues that his petition comes under the newly discovered 

facts exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) to the jurisdictional time-bar. This 

exception

“renders a petition timely when the petitioner establishes that 

[‘]the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence.[’]” Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 

1271 (Pa. 2020) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)). A PCRA 

court must first determine “whether the facts upon which the 

claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner[.]” Id. at 1282 

(original quotation marks omitted). If the PCRA court concludes

that the facts were unknown, then the PCRA court must next 

examine whether “the facts could have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence, including an assessment of the 

petitioner's access to public records.” Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 262 A.3d 472, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 6, 

2021).8

Under the newly discovered facts exception, the focus is “on [the] newly 

discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for 

previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 863 A.2d 423, 427 

(Pa. 2004) (emphasis in original). Similarly, in the context of media reports 

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8 Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 

(1) As used in this rule, “non-precedential decision” refers to an 

unpublished non-precedential memorandum decision of the 

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 ...

(2) Non-precedential decisions as defined in (b)(1) may be cited 

for their persuasive value.

Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (effective May 1, 2019).
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offered under the exception, our decisional law instructs that it is not the 

source of the facts, e.g., a press release or a newspaper article, but, rather, 

the information contained in those media sources which may satisfy the 

exception. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617, 628 (Pa. 2017)

(observing, “facts are not what a reader gleans from media reports or 

newspaper articles but, instead, facts are the substantive events . . . which 

prompted the report by the media.”).

9

 

Applying such precedent, this Court has recognized that when a 

newspaper reports on admissions or conclusive findings of wrongdoing in other 

criminal cases committed by a law enforcement officer or prosecutor who also 

was involved in the petitioner’s case, the petitioner still must demonstrate that 

such wrongdoing may be linked to his case. Trivigno, 262 A.3d 472 at *4 

(discussing Chmiel ).10 

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9

In Chmiel, the appellant asserted that his conviction and death sentence 

relied heavily on a Commonwealth forensic expert’s presentation of an FBIapproved method of microscopic hair analysis that the FBI subsequently 

rejected publicly for the first time, through a new press release, as erroneous 

in the vast majority of cases. Recognizing his PCRA petition was untimely,

petitioner Chmiel relied upon the timeliness exception for newly discovered 

facts under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Our Supreme Court acknowledged that 

the newly discovered facts consisted not of the press release and Washington 

Post article in and of themselves, but of the FBI’s public admission “that the 

testimony and statements provided by its analysts about microscopic hair 

comparison analysis were erroneous in the vast majority of cases” and that 

“the FBI had trained many state and local analysts to provide the same 

scientifically flawed opinions in state criminal trials.” Id. at 625.

10 To link the newly discovered fact to his case, petitioner Chmiel asserted in 

his petition that the Pennsylvania State Police expert who presented the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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For example, in Trivigno, the petitioner offered as a newly discovered 

fact a newspaper article concerning improper investigatory methods of a 

detective who had worked on his case. The article, however, did not mention 

or relate to petitioner’s case, as it described ongoing investigations into 

misconduct committed by the detective in other cases. Distinguishing 

petitioner Trivigno’s case from Chmiel, we observed:

[Here,] [a]lthough the newspaper article reports instances of 

alleged misconduct by [the subject detective] in his investigation 

of other criminal cases, the newspaper article, unlike the FBI press 

release in Chmiel, does not specifically cite any admissions or 

conclusive findings of wrongdoing by [the detective] that may be 

linked to Appellant's case. Id. ... Therefore, Appellant failed to 

demonstrate that the newspaper article contained a fact that 

triggered the newly-discovered facts exception set forth at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

Trivigno, 262 A.3d at *4 (citation omitted).

In Appellant’s PCRA petition, he alleged that the newly discovered facts 

upon which he sought PCRA review consisted of newspaper articles addressing 

instances of prosecutorial misconduct committed by ADA Roger King in other 

cases. Nowhere in either his petition or appellate briefs, however, are the 

articles identified, attached as exhibits, or described with any specificity, nor 

does he explain how the other cases and conduct described therein are 

connected to his case. 

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forensic hair analysis results and provided expert testimony on the reliability 

of the process had been trained by the FBI and “provided the same 

scientifically unsupportable testimony that the FBI now disclaims.” Id. at 623. 
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Therefore, Appellant has failed to plead and prove that the referenced 

newspaper articles regarding ADA King’s prosecutorial misconduct in other 

cases contained a fact that triggered the newly discovered facts exception to 

support the present petition. Accordingly, we discern no error with the Order 

denying Appellant relief under his untimely second PCRA petition.

Order affirmed. Appellant’s Application for Extension of Time to File a 

Reply Brief is granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023