U.S. Army Engineer School 

573-xxx-xxxx IDSN 676-xxxx 

COMMANDANT 

MG Anders B. Aadland 

563-6158 

aadlanda@wood.army.mil 

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

BG Randal R. Castro 

563-6192 

castror@wood.army.mil 

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR 

CSM Robert R. Robinson 

563-8060 

robinsonr@wood.armymil 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

COL John (Pat) Leake 

563-8080 

leakej@wood.army.mil 

DEPUN ASSISTANT COMMANDANT - USAR 

COL Jimmy T. Fox 

563-8045 

foxj@wood.army.mil 

DEPUN ASSISTANT COMMANDANT- ARNG 

LTC Robert Hudnall 

563-8046 

hudnailr@wood.army.mil 

TRADOC SYSTEMS MANAGER for 

ENGINEER COMBATSYSTEMS 

COL John Holler 

563-4081 

hollerj@wood.army.mil 

TRADOC PROGRAM INTEGFMTION OFFICE-TERRAIN DATA 

COL David Kingston 

563-4086 

kingstond@wood.army mil 

COMMANDER, 1st ENGINEERBRIGADE 

COL James Rowan 

596-0224 

rowanj@ wood.armymi1 

DIRECTOR OFTRAINING 

COL Jeffrey LaMoe 

563-4093 

iamoej@wood.army.mil 

DEPARTMENTOF INSTRUCTION 

LTC Jeffrey A. Bedey 

563-4129 

bedeyj@wood.armymil 

CHIEF OF DOCTRINE 

LTC William Duddleston 

563-7537 

d~ddle~tonw@wood.arm)tmd 

COUNTERMINETRAINING SUPPORT CENTER 

Mr. Paul Arcangeli 

596-3869 

arcangelip@wood.arm~ 

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION 

COL Robert S. Kirsch 

563-4119 

kirschr@wood.army. mil 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

ERIC K. SHlNSEKl 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

JOEL B. HUDSON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of theArmy 

01m 


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'ENGINEE]W
 The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers 

I Februaw 2002 Headtiuarters. Department of theArmy Volume32 PB 5-02-1 1 

ENGINEERSCHOOL 4 A Call to Rescue: Sappers Assist at the World Trade Center 

By Sergeant Flrst Class W~lliam Rostad 

? Forcible-Entry Rapid Runway Repair COMMANDANT By Flrst Lieutenant Willam R. Elliott 

Major General 


Anders 8. Aadland 13 Assessing Engineer Priorities in the Division Capstone Exercise 


By Major Eugene Snyman and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Bedey 


17 Engineer Offlcer Basic Course Transformation 

MANAGING EDITOR By Lieutenant Colonel Susan Myers, Captain Heather Levy, and M,: Roy Blackburn 

Lynne Sparks 

I8 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) Responds to Terrorist Attacks 

EDITOR 

Shirley Bridges By Captain Hans J. R. Pung 

GRAPHICDESIGNER 24 Engineer Battalion MobiiitylSurvivability Rehearsals 

Jennifer Morgan I By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H Magness 

31) Demining Oman: Third U.S. Army Soldiers Help Make the Nation Safer 

By Staff Sergeant Jeff Troth 

Front Cover: 32 Enemy Geospatiai Engineers: We Are Not Alone 


Full-spectrum By Captain Amy Wallace 


engineers - at home 


and abroad 38 Masters of Terrain 


By Captain Charles E. Driscoll 


Beck Cover: 39 Effective Leadership in a Garrison Environment 

U.S. Army engrneers I By Major Laurence Farrell and Colonel Allen C. Estes 

ln action. 

44 Response to 'Where Is the MTOE Guy?" 

By Garry N. Hamlet 

DEPARTMENTS 

2 Clear the Way 27 CTC Notes 

By Major General Anders B. Aadland By Lieutenant Colonel Scott Bickell (BCTP) 

3 Lead the Way 46 PERSCOMNotes - "Olmsted Scholarship 

Adventure of a Llfetime" By Command Sergeant Major Robert R. Robinson 

19 Past in Review - "Carrying on the Legacy of the By Captain Michelle Anderson 


Black Lions" 48 Engineer Update 


By Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Vesay 

21 Past in Review - "A Glimpse of History: The 249th 


Engineer Combat Battalion" 


By Colonel John K Addison (Retired) 

February 2002 Engineer I 
2 Engineer February 2002

Clear The Way

By Major General Anders B. Aadland

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

The second year of the third Millennium

finds our nation and its allies prosecuting a new and different war, one that

takes asymmetry to the extreme: the war against

terrorism. For the first time in more than a century,

our citizens are genuinely concerned about our

security here at home. Over the last 100 years,

peace and security in the western hemisphere

have allowed our democracy to thrive and grow,

while our military focused on and designed itself

to fight conventional battles in distant theaters.

That situation changed very suddenly on 11

September 2001. The comforting adage, “Sleep

well, your Army is awake,” took a shot that none

of us saw coming.

In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the

Secretary of Defense established the mission of defending the U.S.

homeland as the top priority for the Department of Defense. U.S.

military commanders have now been given additional authorities to

defend the states, territories, trusts, and commonwealths of America

and have set about developing plans and training to increase the

military’s ability to respond more effectively and quickly to requests

from civil authorities to combat terrorism in our country. A new

management complex has begun to unfold from the top: the Secretary

of the Army, as the DoD Executive Agent for Homeland Security

(HLS), is coordinating the department’s efforts with the White

House Office of Homeland Security; U.S. Joint Forces Command is

charged with the land and maritime defense of the continental United

States, as well as providing military assistance to civil authorities;

the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has

charge of aerospace defense; U.S. Space Command will support

computer network operations; while U.S. Pacific Command and

U.S. Southern Command are responsible for HLS in their respective

geographic areas.

Our government is working feverishly to develop operational

concepts and technologies to detect and deter terrorist threats before

they happen. In the unfortunate event an attack on our homeland is

successful, local, state, and federal agencies are expected by the

American public to have a system in place that will trigger a seamless

system of rapid response and recovery. The Army and its maneuver

support branches—Engineer, Military Police, and Chemical, in

particular—will always be among the first DoD assets called upon

to support the emerging 21st century national and military security

strategy.

The 11 September attacks were threshold events with profound

implications for our military, leaving absolutely no doubt that terrorism is a pervasive threat to the nation’s security. The Army’s

response through Operations Noble Eagle at home and Enduring

Freedom abroad have already imposed significant impacts upon the

Engineer Regiment. Unprecedented HLS and antiterrorism requirements will change the face of the Army and Engineer Corps forever.

With the Army’s aggressive pursuit of the Objective Force, we already understand that the

tactical side of the Engineer Corps will undergo

profound change over the next decade; but the

events of 11 September have brought to the fore

changes that must be made immediately. Combat engineer doctrine, units, systems, training,

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) must

address a new threat, a new operational environment here and abroad, and new roles that

must fill voids in Army planning. In the HLS

arena, engineers have always been key players

in areas such as fire fighting, prime power, civil

and environmental engineering, disaster relief,

barrier design and construction. But now, the

engineers also join the combined arms team on

the tactical front to chart out the warfighting

TTP on a potential battlefield we call home.

Overseas, we face new asymmetric threats that challenge the

conventional TTP of the combat engineers. For example, our intense

examination of the mine and booby trap threat in places like Afghanistan and the Middle East have produced a wake-up call to our

countermine doctrine, training, and operational TTP. We will be reporting to you in detail on how countermine DTLOMS have already

turned a sharp corner from the conventional battlefields of the Soviet-influenced past and how the Engineer School must deal with this

as an urgent priority.

The Army leadership is asking the Engineer Corps to be prepared

under its HLS role to successfully perform “homeland defense and

civil support” missions as two simultaneous and mutually supporting functions. Homeland defense requirements could assign Army

engineer forces augmentation and assistance tasks to restore critical

infrastructure capabilities or to respond to, if required, simultaneous

and possibly different weapons of mass destruction incidents. Civil

support requirements could place Army engineer resources and forces

in support of lead local, state, and federal authorities responding to

natural and man-made disasters and other critical national events

such as civil disturbances or special security events. Engineer civil

support requirements would be part of a progressive effort starting

with local and state first responders initially supported by statecontrolled National Guard units supplemented with federal assets

including unique Army engineer capabilities on an exception basis.

In developing an Engineer Corps HLS strategy, the first step is

determining the Army and Engineer Corps’s HLS roles and finding

the gaps between where the Engineer Corps is today and where it

needs to be tomorrow to support the full-spectrum Army HLS mission requirements. The second step is defining the future engineer

capability requirements in measurable terms of performance and

knowing what tasks need to get done as an integral member of a new

Army HLS combined arms team. The third step is building a bridge
Lead The Way

By Command Sergeant Major Robert R. Robiri~orr 

U.S.Army Engineer School 


bile preparing to write this article, 1 Wcouldn't help but ask: Where did the 

last year go? Although the events of 

the year have run together for me, the events of 

one day-l ISeptember-remain as clear as they 

did on that day. Those events have had a profound effect on our Army, our Regiment, and our 

way of life; they have dramatically changed the 

way we, as At~iericans, live. The last year has 

been extremely eventfill for us all, marked by all 

those things (especially 1 ISeptember) that effect 

change in our Army and Regiment and affect our 

most valuable resource--our soldiers. Iwill focus 

this article on transition, safety, and change. 

Transition can mean somany things, especially 

to soldiers. We tnnsitioned to the beret. desoite . all the controversy. Although not fully fielded throughout our Army, I 

think it was accepted by the majority of our force. Transitioncan mean 

the physical move of units from home station, on deployments, which 

takes soldiers far away from family and the security of familiar 

surroundings, and now more so, in light of IISeptember. To others, it 

means transitioning in and out of organizations. Every month, onetwelfth of our enlisted force moves on permanent change of station to 

new organizations. We need to ensure that sponsurship and integration 

happen and that all these soldiers are welcomed into our units properly. 

Muchof our Reeiment'sleade~shin has lransitioned overthe oast n~onths. 

and those new> command team relationships are now solidly leading 

theiro~anizations. Although we embrace these trunsitionsin leadership 

as necessruy andcommon in our Army, ither a distinct effect on soldiers, 

civilians. and theirfamilies. 

Safety awareness, force protection, and risk management procedures are and will continue to be of paranlount impo~tance as our 

Regiment and Army transition towards the Objective Force. The 

events of and since 1 ISeptember have demanded that we discontinue 

our complacent attitude towards the safety and security of not only 

our soldiers but also of our citizens. Since the stand up of the Initial 

Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington, and the 

recent announcement of four more brigades - to become IBCTs, we 

have begun to change the way we prepare for and execute framing. In 

do~ngthat, we must be aware of the impacts of those changes on our 

risk assesstilent and force protection procedures. 

Last year we lost too many soldiers in our Regiment and Anny, 

and with the increased emphasis on homeland security and 

deployments, the potential for our soldiers to be placed in harm's 

way has grown tenfold. The loss of a soldier's life has a profound 

effect on the unit and fanlily. Remember how stunned we all were 

when the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and the 

plane crash in Pennsylvania happened, and the reality of the great 

loss of life that resulted. Our countly went into a momentary stall 

but recoveredquickly; yet families, organizations, and services were 

significantly impacted. We can take actions within our units and 

organiztttions to minimize the potential for risk. 

even inlight ofourgiven situation. Soldiers who 

stand watch and provide force protection to our 

installations need to be reminded not w become 

complacent. Leaders must continually reinforce 

to soldiers the importance of what they do and 

remind them of the state of readiness and awareness of our country. Routine and normal ale no 

longer SOP in our daily duties. Many of us have 

been involved in the upgraded security measures 

on our installations and, as we become more 

accusto~ned to our increased force protection, 

we must always remind ourselves and our 

soldiers of what brought us to implement the 

measures we have. 

With transition and renewed focus on the 

direction inwhich uur Army and Regiment are going come change. 

One of the issues Isaid Iwould focus on and work to improve was 

the Sapper Leader Course. Through the efforts of many of the 

commanders and command sergeants major of rhe Reginlent. along 

with the leadership ofthe 577th Engineer Battalion and the Sapper 

Leader Course, we have ~nade some significant changes which will 

produce a better sapper. In a nutshell, we have revised the course in 

an attempt to reduce the attrition related to the Army Physical 

Fitness Test (APFT) and land navigation events. Additionally. we 

have moved the 12-mile footmarch to the 5th dav of winine - and are 

changingrhe hand-to-hand training and patrolling pha.se of the course. 

We are also rewriting the prerequisites for the course so that ALL 

engineer soldiers are eligible to attend. All these revisions should 

result in more soldiers graduating from this outstanding leader 

development course. We ask that the commanders, command 

sergeants major, and first sergeanls of the Regiment put their 

emphasis on ensuring that units filltheir assigned quotas with fully 

prepared (mentally and physically mined) soldien. 

Many other changes are brewing in our Army: lhc proposed 

APRT program, the revision of AR 670 1, and the updated NCOER, 

to name a few. Many throughout all components are discussing the 

merit. of change and the many challenges that these changes present. 

It is our duty to advise those making these policy decisions. based 

on our experiences and knowledge. but Iwould just ask and expect 

that the leaders of our Regiment beprofessional when doing so. And 

when the decision is made, Ifully expect and know that we all will 

salute and move out and support the decisions made. 

Iwould again like to thank all the leaders and soldien of our 

Regiment for all that you do for our Army. As Itraveled around the 

Army and visited units over this past year, Ihave gained a better 

appreciation of what you all do to represent the Engineer Regiment 

in thegnany missionsofour Army. Iam tluly proud to be an engineer 

and to be in the company of such great servants to our nation. 

Engineers Lead the Way! 
I

t is 0130 hours on 17 September 2001. I am standing

 on top of a pile of twisted metal and cement dust that

 rises 100 feet in the air on what used to be a street in New

York City. This rubble is all that remains of the two World

Trade Center Towers. When I am not moving, I notice that the

soles of my boots are melting from the heat inside the pile of

debris. At least 5,000 firefighters and police have passed out

from exhaustion at the edges of this mess, most of them still

covered with the fine gray dust that resulted when the

buildings fell 6 days ago.

My guide takes me to where the rescue teams are trying to

move large oxygen and acetylene bottles over wreckage that

a mountain goat would not cross. There is steel everywhere

—laying down, sticking up in the air—it is indescribable.

The news reporters were right—pictures on TV cannot come

close to depicting the magnitude of the destruction. The steel

sticking up150 to 200 feet in the air looms like a big flyswatter.

Each 15- by 20-foot piece weighs from 7 to 20 tons, depending

on the part of the building it came from. The smell in the air is

like the one you experience when you are engulfed in the dust

cloud that results after a door or wall charge detonates. The

respirator cannot mask the smell—it just causes a rubbery

taste in your mouth. I have never felt so small or insignificant

or been humbled so much by my surroundings in my life.

Why was I there at “Ground Zero?” My mission

statement was simple: help the rescue workers move

the mound of rubble—easier, safer, and faster. I was

to train, maintain, assist, and advise the rescue workers on the

use of the Broco® torch, a manpackable torch system created

to meet the military’s tactical cutting needs, such as during

operations in an urban environment. Weighing half as much as

industrial cutting sets, the torch can cut almost 10 linear feet of

1-inch-thick steel in less than 10 minutes. The torch’s small

tanks allow the user to maneuver in smaller places.

In addition, I was to provide training to the rescue workers

on the handheld thermal camera and the infrared pole camera.

Thermal cameras make it possible to find underground fires in

the rubble before rescue workers unknowingly lift heavy pieces,

giving the flames oxygen and causing the fires to spread.

A Call to Rescue: A Call to Rescue: A Call to Rescue:

Sappers Assist at the World Trade Center Sappers Assist at the World Trade Center Sappers Assist at the World Trade Center

By Sergeant First Class William Rostad

4 Engineer February 2002

Aerial view of Ground Zero
Therefore, the few fire trucks that were still working in the area

could be deployed elsewhere. We hoped that we would find

signs of body heat with the thermal cameras and effect a

rescue—even though no one had been found alive after the

first day. Because the cameras allowed us to search areas and

determine sooner if there was life there, heavy machinery could

move in sooner to clear the debris.

The infrared pole cameras saved hours of search time by

allowing us to search huge, dark chasms through small holes,

rather than having to create a hole large enough for someone

to crawl through to search.

At the disaster site, I was under the operational control of

the Department of Defense Federal Emergency Management

Agency team from Fort Drum, New York. Even though I was

there to train others, I knew that before I left, I, too, would learn

a lot.

At 0730, I started training the first group—the New York

Police Department Emergency Services Unit. The initial training

lasted 10 minutes, and I prepped each torch system and

conducted the before-use checks for them. Most of these guys

had not slept for 2 to 3 days; showing them anything more

than how to turn the torch on, start it, burn through the steel,

and shut the torch off would have been a waste. I told them to

call me or bring the system to me if they had any problems.

Training on the cameras took about 3 minutes, and then

away the workers went for a 12-hour shift. On the first day, we

couldn’t find holes to insert the pole cameras into. There were

people from the Hilti Corporation® working next to us with a

hammer drill. After talking to them, we rigged a system that

used the Coleman© ULTI-Mite generator from the carpenter’s

tool box to power a hammer drill and create holes to allow us to

insert the cameras’ 15-foot extensions. Now we could work

without having to move tons of material and crawl inside.

On day 2, I asked for some help, and Master Sergeant Jose

Gordon, senior enlisted adviser from West Point, was tasked to

join me. I knew him from training sessions in the past, and I

knew that he could handle the Broco torch.

 The torches were working well. It took the ironworkers an

average of 4 hours to cut the 5-inch-thick beams with their

SFC Rostad cuts a fire truck apart for transport.

SFC Rostad uses a Broco torch to cut through a 3-inchthick box beam.

February 2002 Engineer 5
torches, but it took only 40 minutes with the Broco. It burns at

10,000 degrees Fahrenheit versus the oxyacetylene torch’s 1,000

to 1,200 degrees. We can backpack ours to the work site when

needed or use the larger, standard K-bottles on the fringes or

from the cage hanging from a crane.

As part of the mission, we advised the city on techniques that

we, as combat soldiers, use to gain entry through obstacles. The

ironworkers were fantastic, but they are more accustomed to

building things than destroying them—and when they do destroy

something, it is not usually a building that has dropped 220 acres

of debris. Box beams that were 150 feet in the air in the vicinity of

the underground retaining wall that keeps the Hudson River out

of the entire subway system were giving them problems. They

were worried that if the beams were cut enough to allow them to

drop easily, they would fall back on the people doing the cutting.

After performing a site assessment (target analysis), we felt

confident that we could bring the 40 tons of steel down safely.

We met with city representatives, briefed the plan, and gave a live

demonstration of the torch’s capabilities. The next morning, we

cut down the sections of beams.

All active duty military personnel were pulled out of the

World Trade Center site by 5 October. We were the last to

leave. By that time, about 400 police, firefighters, and ironworkers had been trained on the Broco torch system, and about

300 had been trained on the handheld thermal cameras and

infrared pole cameras. We were concerned that after we

departed, the technology that we had left behind would not be

used. However, an officer from the police department’s

Emergency Service Unit called to tell me that they are using the

gear more now each day than they did during the entire 3 weeks

we were there.

I want to take a moment to pay homage to the heroes of

New York City. We arrived, helped for a little while, provided

some capabilities that they did not have, and then left to resume

our normal duties—whatever they might be. But there are

thousands of people in New York and across the country who

stopped working and drove, walked, ran, and probably

crawled to help. These people lost loved ones or came to help

strangers, just because they are fellow Americans. They are

sleeping on cots donated by the Red Cross—or in their cars.

They were there when I arrived, and they are still there. These

people make you proud to be a soldier. They are the reason

we exist.

Sergeant First Class Rostad is a 12B40 (combat engineer)

training developer in the Maneuver Support Center

Directorate of Training Development, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri.

A civilian uses a hammer drill with generator to

drill concete.

Workers clear debris at Ground Zero.

6 Engineer February 2002
enemy has mined and cratered the main runway. The Airfield

Assessment Team (AAT), comprised of two engineer equipment

operators who are among the first on the drop zone, quickly

reports the location and dimensions of two large craters.

As the brigade gathers, contact with the enemy begins in

earnest. A specialized component of the 618th Engineer

Company (Light Equipment) (Airborne), called the Light

Airfield Repair Package (LARP), remains hidden—prepping

men, weapons, and equipment in “Assembly Area Clear.” Their

mission is straightforward: conduct a combat parachute

assault and perform airfield damage repair (ADR), formerly

known as rapid runway repair (RRR), in support of a task

force airfield seizure.

Intelligence reports of enemy vehicles massing north of the

airhead travel through the command nets. The Immediate

Reaction Company (IRC) from the 3d Infantry Division will

arrive overhead at P+8. A minimum operating strip (MOS) is

required to land them—and two 20-foot by 20-foot craters

are in the center of the strip. The LARP is ready to take on the

damaged runway and complete the mission.

The unique task of the 618th Engineer Company is to

 support the forcible-entry, airfield-seizure mission of

 the Division Ready Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

The 618th is continuously developing and maintaining the

standards for ADR kits, LARP equipment, and prepared

(concrete) and semiprepared (clay) crater repair procedures.

The intent of this article is to—

 Explain the planning and execution methodology of the 82d

Airborne Division’s forcible-entry ADR.

 Differentiate between standard ADR and forward aviation

combat engineering procedures in secure areas versus

combat-expedient forcible-entry ADR in hostile objective

areas.

 Discuss challenges inherent to complex and joint forcibleentry operations.

 Point out the relevance of combat-expedient forcible-entry

ADR to the force projection imperatives of the Objective

Force.

January 2002 Engin

Soldiers from the 618th Engineer Company use the sa

grid method to repair a damaged airfield.

division relies on an air-landed IRC, typically a 14-veh

balanced mechanized-armor company team, and is comm

to evacuating its casualties—factors that impact the as

landing zone (ALZ), formerly known as the flight landing 

(FLS), selection in forcible-entry operations. These rea

demand that the 618th Engineer Company maintain profici

in concrete pavement crater repair.

The LARP is a capability-based organization. Its compos

varies according to mission specifics such as the type of A

number of pallets available, and engineer parachute alloca

(see Figure 1, page 8). It generally consists of 8 to 16 perso

and seven platforms for airdropping vehicles and equipm

The current operations plan (OPLAN) calls for the inse

of Team Recon, which should include the AAT, at P-48. A run

assessment by Special Operations Forces/ Long-R

Surveillance Detachment (LRSD)/AAT must satisfy the LA

information requirements and help determine the 

composition of the LARP (or medium airfield repair pac

[MARP]/ heavy airfield repair package [HARP]). The cu

LARP is optimal for a no-notice 18-hour (N-HR) ou

sequence. Additional vehicles would require an exte

(X-HR) outload sequence. 1
8 Engineer 

Figure 1

Types of mines/obstacles/explosives used.

 Unexploded ordnance (UXO) present.

Troops:

 Engineer parachute allocation.

 Location of heavy equipment point of impact (HEPI).

 Personnel (PAX) assembly instructions and equipment marking.

 LARP communication/reporting requirements.

Time:

 Proposed arrival time of IRC.

Terrain:

 Airfield dimensions and layout:

Number of aircraft it can hold in taxi area (maximum on round [MOG] by type of aircraft).

Type of runway surface:

 Prepared (hardened) vs. semiprepared (clay FLS).

 Surface conditions:

- Ditches must be eliminated if > 6 inches deep.

- Potholes must be filled if > 15 inches across and > 6 inches deep.

- Rocks (in traffic areas) must be removed, embedded, or interlocked in a manner that will preclud

 ment when traversed by aircraft.

- Ruts should be a maximum depth of 3 inches.

- Surface thickness of ALZ should be a minimum of 6 inches.

- Tree stumps should be cut within 2 inches of ground.

 Number of each type of runway capable of heavy lift.

 Recent aircraft use of the FLS.

 Borrow pits availability, size, and content (quarries, clay pits, etc., to include turnaround times).

 Soil types in surrounding area.

 Water sources (compaction of clay caps).

 Water table depth in area.

 Construction sites in close proximity.

Weather:

 Weather conditions in the last 48 to 72 hours.

Civilian:

 Commercial vendors (concrete).

 Hangars available.

 Working power grid.

 Engineer construction equipment or barrier material (Class IV) around the airfield.
LARP operations begin as soon as possible during the

seizure of initial assault objectives. In order not to interfere

with the assault team, the LARP must remain in laager. This

reduces the vulnerability of the LARP—a high-value target

whose location constitutes an essential element of friendly

information.

Consequently, the estimated time of ALZ readiness is entirely

event-driven. “It is absolutely critical during mission analysis

to use these factors in developing the task force operational

timeline and execution matrix—P+4:00 ISN’T NECESSARILY

THE ANSWER....” 3

Mission Standards

According to Training Circular (TC) 5-340, Air Base

Damage Repair (Pavement Repair), “The sand-grid

repair method, with a cover of fiberglass-reinforced

polyester (FRP) mat, is designed to withstand ...200 sorties of

a C-l41B and 300 sorties of a C-l30.” 4 “For rapidly deployable

forces...the sand-grid method is the emergency repair solution.

Army engineer units, especially light, airmobile, and airborne,

should train with the sand-grid method since it is easily emplaced

and provides an acceptable emergency repaired surface. The

sand-grid method is lightweight and air transportable.” 5

Concrete Crater Repair

The LARP NCOIC continuously multitasks his crater

 and equipment teams, ensuring that concurrent work

 is performed. A trained crater team quickly executes the

following:

Organization

Command and Control

“The seizure of an airfield is an extremely 

dangerous operation (creating) an environment 

command and control are essential.” 6

The LARP is difficult to understand using st

unit designations. Although often referred to as 

LARP size actually ranges from squad (+) to pla

principle of span of control is vital. By task-o

“package” into crater and equipment elements

leader and construction foreman retain accounta

prepared for contact on hostile drop zones. The 

command is the OIC, NCOIC, crater NCO, equipm

senior operator.

Personnel

The crater team performs the majority of the 

hand tools to work the crater and emplacing the 

The team members also serve as alternate op

contingency measure accounting for heavy-dro

a two-man maintenance team accompanies the o

in-built redundancy, all personnel are trained an

all LARP equipment.

Equipment

All LARP-essential equipment is organic 

Engineer Company and maintained by its three lig

platoons (see Figure 3, page 10). The ADR kit a

January 2002 

Figure 2

Time estimates are actual repair time from arrival at the crater, not P+ Hour.

 2 large craters: 15 feet in diameter X 6 feet deep (140 CYd) = GOAL: 8 Hours

 1 large crater: 15 feet in diameter X 6 feet deep (70 CYd) = GOAL: 6 Hours

 Small crater: 5 to 15 feet in diameter X 4 feet deep (26 CYd) = GOAL: 4 Hours

 Spalls: Up to 5 feet in diameter X 6 inches deep = 3-4 spalls/hour

Note: Large and small craters have damage that penetrates the pavement surface and have

disturbed the subbase material. Spalls are similar to potholes with a damage area of 5 feet or

less in diameter that do not penetrate the pavement surface to the subbase material.

LARP — Light Engineer Platoon (-)

Estimated Repair Time for Prepared Surface Craters
aerial supply (FAS) box (or toolbox) remain deployable for realworld contingencies by the platoon habitually associated with

the current Division Ready Brigade. Training versions of both

are available to the platoon during its intensive training (green)

cycle. Manpacked special equipment includes, but is not limited

to, airfield cone penetrometers, hot-wire kits, and bolt cutters.

Challenges

There is no authoritative doctrine for the repair of prepared

 surfaces on captured enemy airfields. The 82d Airborne

10 Engineer 

 Division’s ADR procedures are a compil

reference material and training experience. Th

Company and the 887th Engineer Comp

association with divisions with forcible-ent

updated Joint Service doctrinal sources that 

close operations.

After the initial airdrop, the sustained c

airborne forces depends on resupply by air. 

in the flow of resupply aircraft can cause a po

of the airborne force. TC 5-340 defines RRR a

Figure 3

items in the repair kit are packaged in a

wooden crate, skid-mounted to allow for

mobility both on the ground and in the airdeliverable mode. The kit weighs about 5,200

pounds and contains sufficient materials to

repair a crater that is 25 feet in diameter.

 Rigged and maintained at the heavy-drop 

Bragg, NC.

Basic Contents:

 Sand grid: eight 20- x 8-foot sections

 FRP* matting: four full panels and four h

 Mat anchor bolts.

Specifications:

 18.5 feet long x 7 feet wide x 19.5 feet h

 About 5,310 pounds per box.

Capabilities (two RRR kits):

 One 50-foot crater.

 Two 24-foot or smaller craters.

* The FRP mats furnished in the kit are 18 feet long by 6 1/2 feet wide by about 1/2 inch thick. The mats consist of tw

fiberglass impregnated with polyester resin. On one side and one edge of the mat, 2 1/2-inch-diameter holes are prov

anchor bushings or bolt bushings can be inserted into the holes. The selection of bushings is dependent on whether 

is being anchored to the pavement or being connected to another mat. On the opposite side and end of the mat, 3/4-in

threaded holes are provided by bonding circular metal plates containing threaded holes (nuts) to the bottom of the ma

joined with 1-inch-long by 3/4 inch-diameter bolts. Half panels, which are 8 feet 8 inches long and 6 1/2 feet wide, ar

to allow stagger of end joints. The top surface of the panels contains a green antiskid coating to prevent glare and pr

adequate coefficient of friction especially during inclement weather. (Reference: GL 90-1, page 12, paragraph 12).3

 30w lube oil - 10 gallons

 15w40 lube oil - 5 gallons

 Grease, auto - 5 gallons

 Antifreeze - 5 gallons

PLL:

 Z-Lite tire (on rim)

 Loader tire (on rim)

 SEE tire (on rim)

 5-ton tire (on rim)

 Additional PLL lines: 50

Special Tools

 Rakes, sho

 Gas-powere

 Rescue (ste

 Hydraulic s

 Sump pump 

5-gallon wa

FAS Box 16 feet POL:
 Construction management of emergency repairs.

Army responsibilities include the following:

 Assistance to the Air Force for emergency repairs.

 Beyond emergency repairs (semipermanent) (post attack

+4 hours).

 Assistance to the Air Force with force beddown.

 Construction management of Army assets.

 Development/acquisition of air bases.

The last Army responsibility listed above—development/

acquisition of air bases—is the forefather from which the current

forcible-entry ADR mission is derived. This mission assumes

greater importance due to its relevance to the Interim Brigade

Combat Team (IBCT) concept. Without seizure and repair of a

concrete runway that can support C-17 traffic, the IBCT will

not be able to conduct operations. It is important to note that

neither the sand-grid repair nor any other rapid runway repair

method has been certified to support sustained C-17 traffic.

The likely configuration of the extremely heavy C-17 will result

in an aircraft that is nearly three times as heavy as a C-130. 9 At

this time, the Waterways Experiment Station (WES) and the

Engineer School recommend that runways used by C-17s be

repaired using semipermanent or permanent methods (stone

and grout or concrete cap methods). Please contact WES or

the Engineer School for further information on this topic.

Just as Army doctrine encompasses the spectrum of

operations, Army engineer doctrine should provide guidance

across the range of missions. Mobility tasks in areas where

enemy contact is likely need to address tactical movement and

security. “Establish Jobsite Security” (Training & Evaluation

Outline [T&EO] 05-3-0904) is not adequate. Factors of time and

resource constraints must be addressed. This is construction

in close vicinity to combat. Engineer T&EOs must reflect this.

A prototype T&EO, directed at forcible-entry ADR

conducted under combat conditions, is currently in use by the

618th Engineer Company and has been submitted to the

Doctrine Development Division, U.S. Army Engineer School.

For more information, contact Commander, 618th Engineer

The same expediency will be required to 

theater within 4 days. Current estimates r

functional airfields to deploy an IBCT d

5-day (120-hour) window that the Chief of 

has envisioned (see Figure 4, page 12).

IBCT engineers facing an unopposed-un

be required to conduct forcible-entry A

following:

 The C-17 Globemaster III aircraft allow

additional airfields worldwide and c

equipment (such as the Interim Armored 

thus permitting faster force closure.

 The primary airlift challenge is a lack o

lack of aircraft. Consequently, maximum th

airports is paramount.

 Large concentrations of soldiers and equ

areas represent attractive targets to terr

 Initial repairs may consider a subseq

“beyond emergency repair” if time and r

do not exist.

 “Deployable - the Objective Force was 

force capable of simultaneous deployment 

exploiting multiple air and ground entry poi

of methods.”10

The expeditionary qualities of the Inter

quickly become five to nine brigades, heighte

of forcible-entry ADR to the 15 to 27 newly tr

companies as well. If “force projection an

require investments now in advanced...air

then a corresponding relook by U.S. Army e

essential to meet this end.

Conclusion

The methodology of the 82d Airborne 

 flexible and combat-focused. Light e

 and air assault companies provide a 

future IBCT engineers supporting future stra

January 2002 
Successfully analyzing and executing a mission depend on the

Army engineer understanding of U.S. Air Force aircraft

capabilities and landing requirements. ADR on hostile airfields

requires tactics, techniques, and procedures not fully addressed

by our doctrine today. Changing threats and probable hot spots

continue to drive the 618th Engineer Company, 307th Engineer

Battalion, to develop and refine its forcible-entry ADR.

0600 Hours (P+ 8), 19 April 2004

The distant rattle of small-arms and mortar fire signals

that the battle for the international airport is not over. The

airhead line expands and the IRC birds are on station. The

LARP leaders conduct a link-up with the Air Force Combat

Control Team. After the special tactics squadron inspects the

repaired MOS to ensure that surface roughness criteria has

been met (repairs are within 3/4 inch of the original pavement

surface), the MOS is certified, giving the aircraft the green

light to land. Airborne engineer effort proves central to its

success.

First Lieutenant Elliott is the battalion construction officer/

S3 Air for the 307th Engineer Battalion. He previously led 3d

Platoon, 618th Engineer Company, in support of the 505th

Parachute Infantry Regiment, and served enlisted in 1st

Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. 1LT Elliott is a graduate of

Officer Candidate School and holds a bachelor’s in

international relations from Syracuse University.

Endnotes:

1 TACSOP, 307th Engineer Battalion, November 2000.

2

 Ibid.

3

 “The 82d Airborne Division’s Rapid Runway Repair,” CPT Eric

M. LaChance, 21 March 1997.

4 TC 5-340, Air Base Damage Repair (Pavement Repair), 27

December 1988.

5

 Ibid.

6

 82d Airborne Division Airfield Seizure T

7

 FM 90-26, Airborne Operations, 18 De

8

 TC 5-340.

9

 Jeb S. Tingle, E.I., Research Civil Engine

Engineers, Engineer Research & Develop

Geotechnical & Structures Laboratory.

10 U.S. Army News Release # 01 – 033, 

Wargame Insights Honing Objective Force 

Public Affairs, Washington, DC 20310, May 

11 Ibid.

12 Engineer 

References:

1. SFC Franklin T. Bell, senior 

construction engineering division, U.S

School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missour

2. FM 5-430-00-2 and Air Force Jo

32-8013, Vol. II, Planning and Design o

and Heliports in the Theater of Ope

and Heliport Design, 29 September 

3. FM 5-7-30, Brigade Enginee

Company Combat Operations (Airbo

Light), 28 December 1994.

4. “OPLAN GIANT III - Airfield Seizu

82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg

28307-5100, June 1998.

 5. “Rapid Runway Repair and the 

Mathews, 307th Engineer Battalion 

2000.

6. AR 415-30 and AFR 93-10, Tr

and Engineering Support of the Air 

15 May 1979.

Figure 4

What is a sufficient runway surface repair?

What will the Air Force land on in wartime?

Certified by CCT/STT

Certified by CCT/STT
In the Dlvilsion Capstone Exercise 


By Major Eugene Sn)sman and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Bedey 

The Division Capstone Exercise (DCX), a key event in 

the Amiy digitization strategy, provided the Maneuver 

Support Center (MANSCEN) a vehicle to examine 

organizations and systems that soldiers will use as the Legacy 

Force develops in parallel to the Interim and Objective Forces. 

MGAadland,CommandingGeneral, MANSCEN,andDirector 

of the Maneuver Support Center Battle Lab (MSBL), focused 

MSBL, as the lead MANSCEN agency for 

on five engineer issues throughout the exercise. The "Top Five" 

included the size of the digitized division's engiueer battalion, 

the engineer logistic support structure, obstacle situational 

awareness in a digital environment, Digitized Topographical 

System (DTSS) and terrain team redesign, and engineer 

command and control (C2) structure in the new division. While 

great progress was made on many aspects of these issues, full 

resolution will require more work. 

DCX Background -

The DCX, conducted in September 2001, marked a 

significant step in the Army's transformation campaign. 

The Force XXI Campaign Plan consisted of complementary efforts of experimentation at each echelon, beginning 

with the task force and moving through the division. Plans to 

digitize I11 Corps are tentatively set for FY04. The campaign's 

primary focus was on new organizational design and battle 

command concepts. Central to this new force design was the 

ability to exploit information. In March 1995, the Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) identified the 4th Infantry 

Division, Fort Hood, Texas, as the unit to undergo experimentation with Information Age concepts and technologies. 

In early 1997, TKADOC conducted the Task Force XXI 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment, focusing on a digitally 

equipped, brigade-size experimental force (EXFOR). Later that 

year, the 4th Infantry Division participatcd in the Division 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment. It validated the hypothesis 

that digitization improves lethality, survivability, sustainability, 

and tempo and that a smaller digitized ForceXXJ(FXX1) division 

was as effective as a larger Army oFExcellence (AOE) division. 

The new division structure approved later that year had 3,000 

fewer personnel and 25 percent [ewer combat systems. The 

engineer brigade was cut and engineer battalions became 

organic to maneuver brigades. 

The pulpose of the DCX was to demonstrate and assess 

the warfighting capability ofthe Force XXI division across a 

full spectrulii of combat stability and sustainment operations. 

Additionally, the exercise validated the operatio11 and 

organization (0&0) plan of the new division and sought to 

integrate command, control, comnlunications, computers, and 

Fehrnaip 2002 

intelligence(C41) operations at all levels overextendeddoctrinal 

distances. Although it was a component of the Army experimental campaign, the DCX was not a "test" or a passifail event 

but a demonstrationdesigned to provide evaluation, validation, 

and feedback on the FXXI division design. 

The DCX was a two-phase exercise evaluated by the 

TRADOC Analysis Center and Battle Command Training 

Program (BCTP). The first phase, conducted fmm 31 March to 

14~~ri1, was a~ationa[~ ~center(NTC) ~ rotation, ~h~ ~i 2d i 

~ ~combat i T~~~~ conducted ~ ad three.battalion ~ rotation 

adapted ~~~~j~~ terrain. ~h~ second ,,base (15 to 19 

october) was a Corps Battle Simulation exercise conducted at 

Fort Hood with brigade and higher tactical operation centers 

(TOC~) deployed and mobile. 

DCX Top Five Issues 

Engineer Battalion Size 

Although the capability of the division remained the same 

under the new 0&0 plan, engineer battalion commanders in 

the new division experienced a significant reduction in structure 

when compared to the previous AOE battalions. As previously 

stated, a fundamental component of the FXXI design theory 

was that digitally driven situational awareness would facilitate 

greater capability with a smaller force. Also, it was envisioned 

that this division would be Inore offensively oriented and would 

therefore require fewer survivability assets, which translated 

to fewer armored combat earthmovers and elimination of small 

equipment excavators. Further, the maintenance and support 

slice was pulled out of the armor, infantry, and engineer 

battalions and consolidated in the support battalions. 

The real issue arose with the omission of the Grizzly. The 

FXXI engineer battalion was designed to have the Grizzly as a 

breaching enabler, which-because of its obstacle-reduction 

capability-further reduced the number of required sappers. 

In fact, with this key enabler,each platoon had only two squads. 

With the Army'sdecision tocut Grizzly funding, theU.S.Anny 

Engineer School began efforts to restore personnel strength to 

compensate for the lost enablers. 

In preparation for the DCX NTC rotation, planners 

determined that the battalion lacked requisite breaching 

capability and supplemented the force with acompany of AOE 

Corps engineers. While the sapper battalion performed 

admirably, the decision to augment the organic engineer 

capability undcrscored the requirement for a more robust 

battalion. 

This issue was essentially resolved with the decision to 

field the Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) to the engineers. An 

Engineer 13 
increase in personnel would accompany BFV fielding, whichwhen combined with the strength of the proposed Engineer 

Support Company (sec next issue)-will actually excecd the 

AOE battalion strength. While some subordinatc issues 

(number of squads, potential sapper reconnaissance role) must 

still be worked through, the new force structure is adequate 

and efforts will now focus on the Interim and Objective Force 

Structures. 

Engineer SupportElement 

The engineer CSS structure in the FXXI division consists 

of an engineer suppol? element (ESE) within the base support 

company (BSC) of the forward support battalion (FSB). Thc 

DCX NTC rotation exposed some inadequacies of this new 

structure. The BSC, located in the brigade support area (BSA), 

was unablc to hlly support the ESE, located in the brigade 

forward support area (BFSA). The ESE is only resourced for 

support operations with one warrant officer (90A), who is 

essentially consumed with maintcnance. In addition, Class IV 

and V transportation requirements, which require the ESE to 

effectively Icverage BSC transportation assets, were not 

adequately met. Although supported maneuver task forces 

failed to properly allocate lift and haul assets, a shortage of 

these assets in the ESE conhibotcd to Class IV repositioning 

shortfalls. The ESE distribution section has three heavy 

expanded-mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) load-handling 

systems (LHSs), but they were fully taxed with internal 

requirements. Key Class 1V and V moves wcre not accomplished 

in a timely manner, and the ESE was unablc to maintain the 

backup Class N stocks. Further, the HEMTTcrane lit3 capability 

was ncarly exceeded when lifting individual Volcano reloads. 

Finally, the support companies of the armor and infantry 

battalions had nearly twice as Inany mechanics and PLL clerks 

as the ESE. Previous structures allnured some engineer machanic 

redundancy. Under this stmcture, conunanders had no flexibility, 

especially during critical task organization changes when 

support requirement cxpand. 

Previous alticles published in both Engineer ("Facing The 

CSS Challenge." May 2000) and the Army Logi,rlician further 

expounded on these issues. As attention on the ESE problem 

increased, so did the defense of a more robust engilieer support 

structure. Recommended solutions included the addition of a 

support operations cell, an increasc in PLL and maintenance 

perso~incland skill levels, and an increase in HEMTT LHS 

vehicles. This structure concept, essentially a company-size 

clement, has bcen approved by IMANSCEN and is cut~ently 

gaining momentum at TRADOC and tlic Combined Arnis 

Support Command. 

Obstacle Situational Awareness 

The power of situational awareness experienced by 

commanders in the FXXI division should not be understated. 

The ability to immediately communicatc the location of 

obstacles to adjacent organizations and contribute to a common 

operational picture is a tremendous capability. Howcver, the 

DCX showed that situational awareness must still bc refined. 

Loss of life and combat power during DCX I was partly due 

to the soldier's ovel~elianceon digital systems that improperly 

tracked obstacle location. Increased mine fratricides resulted 

from two factors: 

FXXI division structure resulted in greater proportion of 

scatterable to conventional mines. 

A lack of operator obstacle awareness. 

AlthoughtheArmy BattleCommand System(ABCS) in general, 

and the Maneuver Control System (MCS) and the Force XXI 

Battle Cominand Brigade and Below (FBCB2) in particular, 

significantlyincreased the overall situational awareness,theMCS 

and FBCB2 did not easily or accuratelyfacilitatethedissemination 

of obstacle situational awareness to platfo~mlevel. 

System problems fall into two categories. First, connectivity 

bctwee~ithe lower (essentially below brigade) and upper 

(brigade and above) tactical Internet (between FBCB2 and MCS) 

must be seamless. Currently, although some obstacle situational 

awareness exists with FBCBZ, the data does not effectively 

transfer to MCS. Hence, brigade and above TOCs have 

extremely limited minefield visibility through MCS. At these 

echelons, obstacle overlays must be manually created tlicn 

manually sent to each intended recipient. The 4th Infantry 

Division engineers had somc 40 to 50 addresses to "fat-finger" 

into MCS each time the overlay was updated. The rcal-time 

obstacle awareness expected from a digital environment was 

nonexistent. Further, obstacle plans generated at division, 

brigade, and task force level do not digitally transfer firom the 

MCS to the FBCBZ platfonn. 

Secondly, the FBCB2 does not have an input screen (called 

a Joint Variable Message Text) that allows obstacles to be 

tracked and updated using the doctrinal obstacle number. 

Essentially, an obstacle identified or created by any FBCB2 

operator will autoniatically populatc all other FBCB2 screens, 

but the ability to store, update, query. or consolidate obstacle 

information is ve~ylimited. 

Tlie MANSCEN Directorate of Combat Developments 

(DCD), thc Maneuver Support Battle Lab, Wamor-T, TRADOC 

SystcmManager-MCS, and TRADOC System Manager-FBCB2 

are developing a thorough campaign plan to ensurc that Cuttire 

updates and system developments address these problems. 

Additional requirements include an FBCB2 screen that 

automatically updates a relational database that is kcyed off 

the doctrilial obstacle number. This would allow each status 

update to override existing data on a particular minefield, thus 

keeping minefield records current. This database must then 

automatically update an overlay that is periodically auto-posted 

to other MCS screens. Data eiitercd by reeon elements or 

sappers on their FBCB2 screens would essentially creatc an 

automatic, real-time, dirty battlefield overlay. 

DigitalTopographic Support System 

Tlie FXXI structure created a brigade-levcl terrain analysis 

team fully supported by the DTSS. During both phases ofthe 

DCX. constderahle progress was made In the timely deliveiy of 

14 Engineer Fehrrrn~y2002 
terrain visualization products to the maneuver commanders 

and staffs. The division terrain team successfully received a 

digital terrain data update of several gigabytes via satellite 

from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). This 

validated one aspect of the reach-back capability proposed in 

transformation discussions. 

Many examples exist that illustrate the general movement 

toward consistent interest, understanding, and utilization of 

terrain visualization among maneuver commanders. At the division level, the assistant division commander-maneuver 

(ADC-M) specifically requested a reverse line-of-site analysis 

to assist the G2 in identifying likely opposing force (OPFOR) 

movement routes and support-by-fire positions. In addition, 

the terrain team at the DTAC was provided recent OPFOR indirect firing vectors. Using line of sight, the G2 was able to recommend focused reconnaissance in these areas. At the brigade, three-dimensional perspectives, which helped commanders understand complex terrain through which they were attacking, were included in the brigade operations orders. These 

perspective views and other terrain visualization products were 

made available to the battalion commanders through the use of 

the terrain team's Web site. 

Improvements to this capability will fall into three categories. First, there are training issues that need to be addressed at 

the Engineer School. Terrain teams need tactics, techniques, 

and procedures to increase the proficiency of the complex and 

perishable skills required of an 81T terrain analyst. Since there 

are more customers (division artillery, engineer group) than 

terrain teams, their work and products must be centrally managed. Finally, engineer staffs and ABCS users need training to 

know what products to request, when in the planning and execution cycles to request them, and how to use these geospatial 

products. Engineers must continue to be persistent advocates 

of geospatial solutions to maneuver problems. 

Secondly, there are technical issues with the way geospatial 

products are stored, managed, and used in the TOCs. 

Proponency has not yet been established for the map server 

on which all maps are stored and which is integrated into the 

ABCS architecture. Although the MANSCEN DCD has the 

expertise, the Engineer Regiment cannot, and should not, 

attempt to solve this alone. ABCS also lacks an effective common 

tool kit to view and manipulate map data across all ABCS 

systems. The Project Management Ofice for Combat Terrain 

Information Systems is the material developer working with 

TRADOC Program Integration Office -ABCS to resolve both 

of these issues. 

The third issue involves dissemination of data from national 

sources to combined arms commanders. Although the NIMAto-TOC transfer of map data worked, it was not without 

challenges. The Global Broadcast Service (GBS) that facilitates 

the data transfer at the TOCs was a TRADOC Program Integration Ofice for Terrain Data (TPIO-TD) initiative, dependent on 

contract support. The Engineer School is working on plans to 

educate other maneuver community members on this critical 

data transfer capability. 

Engineer Commandand Control 

Perhaps the most controversial change to the FXXI Division 

is the replacement of the engineer brigade with an 0-6 led staff 

element. The weakness of this structure is two-fold: 

There is a lack of a single engineer with command authority 

to direct organic engineer effort or mass engineer effort in 

accordance with the division commanders' intent. 

There is a C2 void when integrating multiple engineer units 

into the digitized division. 

In the DCX, there was no single C2 node responsible for 

integrating engineer forces, which severely limited C2 options. 

Maneuver brigades were forced to accept all echelon above 

division (EAD)engineers working forward in the division which 

stsained the limits of their span of control. This resulted in the 

main-effort brigade combat team having a total of eight battalions 

(3 maneuver, 1 field artillery,4 engineer) under its direct control; 

there are normally three maneuver battalions, a DS artillery 

battalion, a support battalion, and an engineer battalion. 

The engineer group task organized to the division was 

positioned with the division rear command post or division 

support element (DSE) to allow control of engineer units to the 

rear of the brigade combat team boundaries. This positioning 

prevented the group from influencing the forward fight due to 

their analogue communication in the expanded battlespace of 

the digital division. Further, the breadth and depth of the group's 

area of responsibility created communication problems 

preventing it from maintaining situational awareness of its 

organic units and accuratelymonitoring logistical requirements. 

The division engineer (DIVENG) was staffed and resourced 

to function as a planning node, working for the commanding 

general and the G3, not a command and control node. The 

DIVENG staff primarily tracked mobility (enemy obstacles, 

breaches, and bridging assets). The staff did not have the 

responsibility, nor was it organized, to oversee the logistical 

and training requirements of organic or EAD engineer units. 

The task of anticipating the classes of supply requirements 

and specialty-specific training requirements fell on the brigade 

combat team maneuver headquarters. With the EAD group in 

the rear out of communication range of its subordinates, there 

was no single headquarters tracking status of all engineer 

assets to advise the division commander of engineer requirements andlor capabilities. With no engineer command and 

control node organic to the division, there is a lack of engineer 

integration between the maneuver brigade commander's fight 

and the EAD engineer group commander's work line. 

A change to the force allocation rules could create a 

partial solution. A second EAD engineer group would allow 

the cornmander to focus forward while the other worked 

traditional rear area missions. At least one of these groups, 

however, would need to be digitized and given a habitual 

relationship with the division much like the old Wartrace 

concept. It is true that habitual association is not the same 

as a tenant organization-"on the team" is not the same as 

"in the family." 

February 2002 
A more viable option is to embed, in the division, a command Unfortunately, evidence available from DCX to support 

and control capability with resident digital architecture enablers claims of inadequacies in the new structure was, at best, 

designed to receive and integrate EAD units, then command circumstantial.Certainly, numerous historicalexampleshighlight 

a tailorable maneuver support package up to brigade size. the neccessity of support fromunits not organic to the division. 

This node, sewing as an organic and integral component of Ad hoc brigade-level engineer organizations are common. And, 

the division commander's staff, would have four primaly since the concept is sound regardless of the size of the unit of 

responsibilities: action, the requirement to absorb supportwill exist in the Interim 

and Objective Forces as well. 

Plan, integrate, and employ any and all assets configured 

to execute division-level mobility, survivability, conter- Conclusion 

mobility, sustainment, or geospatial operations coo- The DCX provided the opportunity to observe and make 

ducted forward in the battlespace. recommendations regarding the employment of enCoordinate with engineer groups or brigades operating in gineers in the mechanized digital division and to track 

the division rear area. and influence important aspects of engineer integration.

.provide trainingandmaintenanceoversight offiedivision~s Clearly, these issues are in various stages of resolution and 

engineer assets. require additional attention, especially as they relate to the 

Interim and Objective Force concepts. Provide the flexibility to serve as a C2 node for the division m 

during stability operations or other unique mission sets. Major Snymarr ir Chid Heavy Forces Division. Maneuver Support 

Boltle Lab, Fo~ortLeonard Wood, MissouK He previolcr!~commarzded 

Critical to the functionality of this node would be its core the 535th Engineer Company (CSE), 130th Engineer Brigade, Hannu, 

staff and digital communication enablers. Staff sections, with Germa,z.v. MAJ Sn~,n~a~t ir a groduate of rlte Cornmand and General 

the full suite of^^^^ architecture, would be augmented with StaffCollege and holds a master? degree in military. sciencefrom !he 

personnel appropriate to the mission, yet have resident staffing Col'ege. 

robust enough to maintain gam'son planning requirements and Lieutena,tl Colo,re-1 Bede," is Chid Deportment ofInstrrrcllon, US. 

in digital architecture, rhis unit would maintain Army Engineer School, For1 Leonard Wood, Missouri. He previousiy. 

detailed contingency plans with support and reception, staging commanded the 299th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry. 

Division, Fort Hood, Teros.LTC Bedey is n grndrrare ofrhe Command and Onward integration (RSO1) units in order to quickly and General StaffCoNege and hold3 a master's degree in eonrtruction 

assimilate these required units into the division's operations. nlanagcmen,from Coiorndo universi9, 

'"1 page 2) 

ebasic tencts of HLS.Asamaior World War TI. "You ask. what is our aim? I can answer in one 

plays) iir u~t-ivauutrar urraamr Responsc Plan, we have a long word: victoryvictory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, 

histoly of supporting state and federal agencies and have gained ever long and hard the road may be; without victory. 

valuableexperience in respondingto natural and man-made disasters ~rvival.~' 

across our nation and tel~itories.as well as throughout Central :than 200 years, men and women-civilians and 

America. the ~aribbean,and the Pacific Rim. At this moment, solalers~navcsewed the corpsof Engineers.In peace, Engineers are supporting JTF-6 in its critical mission to enhance the of our nation,snew Capitol building in 

security on our nation's borders. Since I I September, the US. a dredge boat pilot in a lock Inaster in 19j0, or an 

Army Corps ofEngineers (USACE),Nonh Atlantic Division and environmental~~~i~~~~ today;whether an astronaut aboardthe 

249th Engineel- Battalior] (Prime Power). have committed to space in 2,300, or an explorer of the westel,l frontier in 

massive disaster relief and infrastructure repair efforts in New 180~Enginccrs served, In war, whether in the deserts of 

York City and Washington, D.C. The Engineer School has much SaudiArabia,thejungles the mountains (,fKorea,or to draw upon-from within our great corps, from sistcr services islands, forests, and plains of two world wars; on with whom we work and train. and from our allies who 1 our own soil throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, in numersimilar attacks against their lhomelands-to sct the cl nus conflicts in between, or at the he World Trade 

training and concept development that must scrvc Center in 2001-Engineers have se legiment is still 

priorities of our tnilitary as it transforms to thc Objective Forcc, up of a diverse group of increalnlyaealcated 

The Army and Engineer Corpsoftoday are forging ahead with who, when called upon, have fought our wars and ensured our 

Transformationefforlsthat now must not only create an Objective peace. They are thc visionaries who built. and continue to build, 

Force in record time but also define a new force to address the our nation. The story of the U.S. Army Engineers is nothing 

immediate needs of HLS and antiten-orisniand create blueprints more than the history of individual Americans and nothing less 

to overcome asymmetric threats and win future wars. Ilistorical than the history ofAmerica. And now, the vital and varied HLS 

lessons can temper our azimuth for our strategic colllpass as we missions, roles, and capabilities of the Engincers will help build 

accelerate this auest to defeat 21 st centurv threats and terrorism. the new legacy of its great contribution to our nation's survival, 

stabilitv. and security in tlic 21st cenhlry. 

-.-... .... , S. 

(Clear 1"he Way, cc 

The 

solemn1 

:ades of exp ..L. x...:.. 

ericnce in th .-I r.:" ..-.. 

road ahead 7 

y echo hou 

vill no1 be el 

Britain ov 

laveseen , 

~ursefor 

the I-ILS 

I's words 

rs during 

victory how, 

there is no SI 

For marl . .. 

,. Essayon 

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rved. This T ,.*. , ,. 

16 Engineer Fehruaty 2002 
transitions to this two-phase BOLC. Phase I, a 6- or 7-

week leadership and common-core course, is taught at Fort

Benning, Georgia. Phase II, the 10- or 11-week engineerspecific training, is taught at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

 Basic Officer Leader Course

The transition of EOBC to a shorter (10-week)

 program of instruction was predicated by the

 development of BOLC Phase I by the Training

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Phase I focuses on

leadership, common-core classes, and basic soldier skills. It includes

counseling, land navigation, weapons qualification, physical training,

and common-task training. More than three-fourths of the instruction

is in the field—tactics, weapons qualification, and situational training

exercise lanes. The garrison training includes counseling and leadership

doctrine, as well as classes in maintenance, supply, communication,

and preventive medicine. In addition, students conduct physical

training, road marches, combatives, and the confidence course. After

completing BOLC, Phase I students will move on to their respective

branch schools for Phase II.

Transition From EOBC to BOLC

The EOBC 17-week program of instruction is divided into

 inprocessing, common core, combat engineering and

 tactics, vertical construction, field exercise, horizontal

construction, and outprocessing. As the program of instruction is

condensed and adjusted, the course will be reoriented into inprocessing,

common core, combat engineering and tactics, field exercise,

construction, and outprocessing to eliminate duplication of BOLC

Phase I training.

Common Core. This instruction, formerly 3 weeks, will be cut to

just 1 week. Most classes cut from this phase of the EOBC will be

covered in either BOLC Phase I or Phase II. Most course material—

including military history, risk management, maintenance, and

supply—will continue to be a part of the program of instruction.

Combat Engineering and Tactics. This segment, which is 7

weeks long, covers instruction in demolitions, bridging, mine warfare,

and combined-arms tactics. This training culminates in a 4-day field

training exercise that reinforces operations orders and emplacement

and breaching of a complex obstacle.

Field Training Exercise (FTX). With the lar

time in BOLC, much of the common tactics, land n

and platoon and squad missions have already been 

will remain a 4-day, engineer-specific event with em

obstacle emplacement/breaching and stability and 

Recovery operations are also a significant part 

inspections to ensure that personal equipment is m

standards. The cadre conducts detailed evaluation

to provide feedback as they perform leadership ro

Construction. This 2-week segment covers ver

construction. It has largely remained intact, except f

10 hours of instruction in site investigations and eart

This segment includes training in project management

concrete, drainage, road construction, and force pro

Summary

Overall, students who are commissio

 officers in FY03 and attend BOLC w

 quality engineer training as lieutenants 

EOBC, with the addition of combined arms, hands

training. Future students will receive additional 

analysis, scatterable mines, and complex obstacles

that will be eliminated from EOBC will be includ

some additions such as the confidence course, comba

qualification. BOLC reflects updates in the Enginee

will train our future lieutenants as warrior leaders

the way as engineers in battle.

Lieutenant Colonel Myers is the battalion co

Levy is the assistant S3, and Mr. Blackburn is a 

with the 554th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard W

February 2002 

Graphic by CPT Melvin D. Juan
.

By Captain Hans J. R. Pung

18 Engineer February 2002

On the morning of 11 September, terrorists

 launched a series of coordinated attacks

against the United States that left our

nation stunned. Both towers of the World Trade

Center in lower Manhattan collapsed, killing and

injuring thousands, and a fire raged in the

Pentagon, the result of suicidal airline crashes.

By the end of the day, the federal government

had moved quickly to respond to the crisis, and

the soldiers of the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime

Power) comprised a vital part of that response.

With President Bush declaring both New York

City and Virginia federal disaster areas, the 249th

moved into action. Working under the direction

of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),

as part of the larger Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-administered Federal

Response Plan, the 249th provided liaison

support between the local power company and

FEMA and assisted with electrical assessments and generator

installation in areas directly impacted by the terrorist attacks.

Early on 12 September, the battalion deployed a two-person

Prime Power Action Team to Edison, New Jersey, to serve as

action officers in the emergency power portion of the FEMA

relief effort. The following day, the commander of the 249th led

a team of prime power soldiers from both Fort Belvoir, Virginia,

and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to New York to assist the North

Atlantic Division (NAD) of USACE and to serve as subjectmatter experts for any power-related issues.

After meeting with the NAD forward commander, representatives from FEMA, and the local power company (ConEdison), the 249th provided an additional 21 soldiers to assess

power needs and install emergency generators in lower

Manhattan. Soldiers deployed from both Fort Belvoir and Fort

Bragg on 16 September and spent the next 3 days helping

ConEdison perform various electrical tasks within New York City.

Some of the significant missions included assessing power and

installing generators at multiple financial buildings (to include

the New York Mercantile Exchange and the NASDAQ Electrical

Hub) to ensure that the financial district would be powered and

ready to reopen less than 1 week after the terrorist attacks.

Soldiers from the 249th worked with ConEdison to set up

generators at medical triage facilities and transient lodging

centers in support of the relief effort. To accomplish these

missions in a more efficient manner, the 249th split its

assessment/installation teams into day and night shifts,

enabling electrical repairs to continue around the clock. By 18

September, most of the city’s power was restored, and FEMA

determined that the 249th was no longer needed to augment

249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power)

Responds to Terrorist Attacks

Soldiers survey damage before emplacing a generator.

the local infrastructure. Accordingly, the soldiers redeployed

back to their home stations that evening.

The 249th also contributed to disaster relief efforts at the

Pentagon. On 12 September, the battalion deployed a twoperson Prime Power Action Team to Arlington, Virginia, to assist

the FEMA Emergency Response Team with any power queries

it might have. The USACE representative on-site asked the

team to determine the Pentagon’s power requirements and

recommend how to meet those needs. Fortunately, the Pentagon’s electrical systems were largely intact after the attack and

needed no external assistance from FEMA.

Their mission accomplished, the 249th soldiers redeployed

to Fort Belvoir later that day. However, just 5 days later, the

Military District of Washington requested assets from the 249th

to consolidate the power needs of the entire relief effort located

just outside of the Pentagon. To support this, the battalion deployed two of its 500-kilowatt, low-voltage generators to the

site, along with personnel to install and maintain the generators.

This mission is still ongoing, and the 249th will continue to

support the disaster relief efforts as long as necessary.

In reaction to the tragic events of 11 September, USACE has

been at the forefront of federal efforts to respond to this crisis.

The Black Lions of the 249th Engineer Battalion have been a

major contributing factor in the Corps’s efforts and will continue

to be our Army’s primary resource for emergency power.

Captain Pung, assistant operations officer for the 249th Engineer

Battalion, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, previously served with the 1st Armored

Division Engineer Brigade in Germany and the 44th Engineer Battalion

in Korea. A graduate of the United States Military Academy, CPT Pung

holds two master’s from the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom.


I 

Past In Review 

A Glimpse of History: 


The 249th Engineer Cornbat Battalior1 


By Colo~lel John K. Addison (Rerrrud) 

was one of those graduating Rescr\c Ufficcr Training lCo~sseniors of the class of '41 at Oregon State who was 

alled to service for I year under the provisions of a national 

eniergency then in effect. The advent of war on 7 December 

changed the destiny of many of us. 

In rapid succession, I was a platoon and company uomniander. 

plans and training officer (S3). and executive officer in differing 

engineer combat battalions, and finally-m 5 May 1943-1 

commanded a banalion of my own. Somehow. there was time in 

this 23-month period to attend the officer refresher; assault of 

fortified positions. and cadre training courses at Fon Belvoir, 

Virginia. and the 3-month wminie course a1 the Command and 

General Staff College at Forl Leavenworth, Kansas. 

I was a caprain when I assumed command of the newly 

activated 249th Engineer Combat Battalion at Camp Bowie, 

Texas. It was August before we could begin training in eaunest, 

but by the spring of 1944. we had becollie a sharp and 

functioning outfit. In March, while on maneuvers in Louisiana, 

we were alened l'or oversea shipment; and on 2 July, we were 

on our way in a great convoy bound for Liverpool. England. 

After 6 weeks at Camp Doddington4rawing and outfitting 

ourselves with vehicles and equipment-we crossed the 

channel on landing ship, tanks (LSTs). We went ashore at 0400 

on Utah Beach, in Normandy, on August 19-my 29th birthday. 

I learned of my promotion to lieutenant colonel while at Camp 

Doddington. 

We moved by convoy, with orders to repon to the commander 

of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group, which was several hours 

inland from the beach. Although during training, we had learned 

to handle the battalion in convoy very well, we soon began 

having trouble keeping the convoy together. Long gaps were 

developing, so I went back in a jeep to find the problem. At a 

halted sement of the column, a fellow came running down the 

hill with a bottle of wine in his hand. He was a three-stripe 

sergeant and squad leader. I reduced him to private, put him in 

the back of the truck, and promoted his corporal assistant to 

sergeant. There was quite a ripple through camp that evening 

over the incident. I never had problems again with convoy 

discipline. The next morning I met my new commander, Colonel 

George A. Morris, who-to my great fortune-would be one 

of the best commande~s under whom I would ever serve. 

Our first major engineer project was constructing a fixed 

bridge across the Moselle River, near Toul, France. The concrete 

structure had been blown, destroying the piers, and the 

crossing was a key to an attack being planned by General 

Patton's Third Amy. The work would have the highest of 

priorities. The site was close to the front lines on an important 

roadway that would become a main supply route, suggesting 

COL Addisonatthe Rhine-Oppenheim 

Crossing, March 1945 

wurk of a lasting nature. The concrete blabs, wh~ch weir 

dropped onto the streambed, were fractured and broken, hut 

many were usable as footings for the new structure. The site 

was well within atillery range and mortar fiealthough none 

came in on us during construction, for reasons that were never 

cleau. The only infanuy forward of the site were light patrols. 

The intelligence officer and his driver from the group 

headquarters went forward to reconnoiter, with a little too much 

ambition, and were captured or perhaps killed. 

The bndge we were to build was a two-way. 193-foot span 

of 40-ton capacity and steel beam and wood constructton I 

put the entire battalion on the job initially, with one company 

clearing away the debris and the other two companies statting 

construction from each end to join at the center. I came to the 

site with my sleeping bag, prepared for the night. Two members 

of the group headquarters staff came there as well, presumably 

at the direction of the commander, to assure progress. After 

spending a few hours on the job, and after it became apparent 

that I would be there all night, the fellows left the job site. I did 

tiot experience that type of supervision in the future. 

The artillery was booming in the distance, and the bright, 

clear sky was filled with artillery flashes. The work went on in 

blackout conditions without interruption. As the bridge was 

nearing competit~on, General Patton came to the site with his 
corps commander and staff. As he walked over the bridge, he 

waved his staff and entourage away, saying that he didn't 

want the whole staff wiped out with an artillery round. We 

finished the work well within the timespecified and urere pleased 

to later receive a letter of commendation from the XI1 Corps 

commander for our work there. 

Our next major challenge was downriver on the Moselle at 

Pompey. Again, the bridge was critical in the plans of a Third 

Army attack. Because the river was split by a small island into 

two channels, both pile driving and post and beam construction 

were required for a two-way, 546-foot, 40-ton-capacity bridge. 

We had priority on all equipment, personnel, and materials needed 

for the job. I asked for an additional company of engineer troops, 

a platoon of a ponton company, a lighting detachment, elements 

of a light equipment company, and trucks (as needed) from a 

trucking company. We were given 12 days to complete the project 

The scope and complexity of the project called For 

management more in the nature of civilian work, so a project 

engicieer was assigned. With lights available, we worked around 

the clock. We drove the piling with pile drivers mounted on 

ponton rafts. Since we were in an area of steel mills, we had no 

difficulty in obtaining steel 1-beams and piling of most any size 

we needed. One dark overcast night, with all our lights on, a 

large British four-engine bomber came down out of the cloud 

cover-the pilot apparently lost and attempting to orient 

himself. He must have wondered about all those lights. We 

hoped he made it home safely. We finished the project 011 time, 

but because of major flooding on the Moselle, the attack never 

developed as planned. The bridge did serve a critical purpose, 

however, as it was one of the few functional bridges in the 

Amy zone for some time. 

It was now mid-October. The Third Army was bogged down 

all along the Moselle (with the gasoline supply nearly cut of0 

but fighting its way forward as fuel supplies allowed. By 

December, we were building a fixed bridge across the Saar River 

on the border of Germany, expecting to move on into Nazi 

territory at any time. But it was not to be. While we were at the 

bridge site, we were notified to move to the Ardennes, later to 

become the Battle of the Bulge. 

We moved out on 20 December for Arlon, Belgium, joining 

the great mass of Third Anny vehicles and equipment headed 

north. Our journey to the front from Arlon to join the 26th 

lnfantly Division was a night I shall always remember. We were 

ordered to move off the main roads, without time to reconnoiter, 

dispatching our vehicles at 2- to 3-minute intervals-all, of 

course, in blackout conditions. I sent a platoon forward to post 

guides and hoped for good luck. 

We traveled all night and arrived early next morning, with 

snow falling. We were to fight this snow and ice for the next 6 

weeks. All of our one hundred or more vehicles and other 

equipment arrived without a hitch. The 26th Division was 

fighting desperately to hold a line at the southern hinge of the 

Bulge by an aggressive defense. Our mission was to prepare 

and man backup positions behind their lines by laying mines, 

felling trees, and doing anything we could to delay an enemy 

breakthrough. And, of course, we had road maintenance and 

snow removal to perform. 

On 24 December, the day before Christmas, while I was in 

the field, I received verbal orders from the assistant division 

commander to relieve elements of the 4th Armored Division, 

which were holding two small villages-Arsdorf and 

Bigonville-some 5 miles to our north flank. It was early 

afternoon, and we were to move out at once. I gave the mission 

to A and C Companies, commanded by Captains Sullivan and 

Cissna, respectively. Sullivan was to take over Bigonville and 

Cissna the village of Arsdorf 

Sullivan moved into Bigonville without difficulty, taking some 

30 prisoners in the process. Cissna ran into trouble, finding 

that ArsdorF had never been taken by the 4th Armored and was 

still in the hands of the enemy. The company fought its way in, 

having no other instructions. It never occurred to me that the 

information given me would be faulty. Captain Cissna was killed 

while manning a machine gun and was awarded the 

Distinguished Service Cross, posthumously, for his heroic 

actions. Twenty-seven of our men were captured, with 23 being 

recaptured a few days later. The three others spent the remainder 

of the war as prisoners. 

Following this infantry mission, B Company, then 

commanded by Captain Berman, was detached from the 

battalion for several weeks and assigned to Task Force Fickett, 

a reinforced armored cavalry group, protecting the south flank 

of the Third Anny. They became, it1 effect, the point of the 

armored goup performing mine clearance and snow removal. 

The fellows jokingly claimed the distinction of being the point 

of the whole Third Army. 

We continued our support of the 26th Division, which was 

fighting its way northeast, performing all kinds of engineer 

work until final closure of the Bulge. 

Our last challenge of the Bulge Campaign was a bridge over 

the Our (Uhr, in German text) River, smack up against the 

Siegfried Line. This was in the vicinity of Dasburg and coursed 

along the far hillside of the Our River canyon, with pillboxes 

and concrete emplacements readily visible from the so-called 

Skyline Drive atop the high ground on the near side of the 

deep Our River canyon. We learned early on that we would be 

building a Bailey bridge across the Our at Dasburg. The site 

was at the bottom of the canyon, clearly visible by the enemy 

and in line of sight of many of the pillboxes. The attack on the 

line would he by surprise, with no artillery or bombing 

preparation. The near side of the canyon was covered with a 

heavy growth of 12- to 20-inch timber, with a winding, steep 

one-way earth road to the bridge site. Although the snow had 

mostly melted in the open, the road was covered with a thick 

coat of snow and ice. The trucks carrying the bridge equipment 

had to move in blackout conditions over this road to the bridge 

site. I discussed all this with the division engineer, pointing 

out the line-of-sight enemy coverage of the hridge site and 

showing them line-of-sight profiles, but his response was only 

a shrug of the shoulders. 

The Bailey was to be a 120-foot double-double, meaning a 

bridge of two panel widths and two in height. We moved to the 

bridge site early the night of 21 February. I went withthe column 

of trucks to the site, with the bridge panels rattling and banging 

and the ice crunching and breaking as we came down the steep 

February 2002 

importance of rehearsals at the taskforce and brigadecombat

team (BCT) levels is paramount; both synchronize across the

width and depth of the battlespace, especially for detailed

operations such as combined-arms breaching or forward

passage of lines. Successful units rehearse everything,

including fire support and combat service support (CSS).

The purpose of this article is to make a case for mobility/

survivability (M/S) rehearsals at the engineer-battalion/BCT

level. Specifically, the article will address rehearsals in doctrine

and among other members of the combined-arms team; highlight

the need for engineer rehearsals; and suggest a framework—

specific issues, timing, and participants—for the rehearsals.

Doctrine

As important as the fire-support rehearsal is to

 integrating the fire-support Battlefield Operating

 System (BOS) into the tactical operations, the M/S

rehearsal is no less critical. This is especially true in the offense,

y 

 Execution of situational obstacles.

 Decisions tied to BCT-level decision 

 Transition to the defense.

 Engineer CSS (such as resupply op

clearing line charge [MICLIC] an

[CASEVAC]).

A similar menu of possible issue

defensive operations. Admittedly, these 

will often involve engineers who are not 

the engineer battalion (for example, com

the operational control of or that prov

maneuver units). This is a challenge sim

the fire-support coordinator (FSC

synchronize all the components of his 

air support, direct support, and reinforcin

many of which he does not command. T

24 Engineer 

Engineers conduct a sand-table rehearsal at NTC.
of his position (direct-support battalion commander/brigade

staff officer-FSCOORD) is no different from that of the engineer

commander (battalion commander/brigade engineer). Our

challenge is not in deciding IF we should synchronize combatengineer operations across the width and depth of the

battlespace—it is HOW!

Training Circular (TC) 25-10, A Leader’s Guide to Lane

Training, indicates that rehearsals are “training techniques to

ensure that team members understand what they and other

members of the team must accomplish to perform a task

successfully.” Furthermore, rehearsals are “one of the

techniques used by the commander to achieve synchronization

both in military operations and in training.” Combat engineers

are generally successful at rehearsing engineer drills and, to a

lesser extent, in integrating these drills into combined-arms

operations. Where we often fail to rehearse—and achieve the

appropriate degree of synchronization—is with the other

(engineer) team members (engineer peer leaders, Reserve

engineers, and our own engineer CSS). The result is that

engineers often struggle with identifying key decision points,

make “on-the-fly” tactical decisions, do not leverage the full

capabilities of engineer units, and fail to fully integrate our

BOS within the higher-level maneuver scheme.

Need

Some generalized observations from the NTC that

 highlight the challenge are as follows: The engineer

 battalion issues the M/S requirements to subordinate

units through two primary mechanisms—the BCT operations

order (OPORD) and the engineer battalion OPORD. Field Manual

(FM) 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations, articulates

the specific issues and requirements of each. These, however,

are top-down requirements documen

(engineer battalion) parallel-planning 

of refinement that follows OPORD issu

and subordinate unit levels) highlight 

capture the bottom-up refinement of 

and synchronize combat-engineer ope

synchronize the BOS through detaile

results in the engineer being a “nonpl

arms rehearsals (CARs) and, in executio

if not impossible, integrated action. W

fix it!

Framework

The discussion below is an 

 framework for M/S rehears

 however, is that the command

enemy, terrain, troops, and time available 

time!—to determine the best way. But a

but a HOW!

Who? – The engineer battalion com

be able to count on the participatio

commands—the headquarters and h

commander, support-platoon leader, com

platoon leader, mobility Reserve leader 

battalion leaders—the S1/S4, S2, S3, co

and executive officer. Obviously, th

subordinate units whose actions must 

is the baseline requirement? Consider a

who can articulate the maneuver-leve

support to it. This could be the su

commander, executive officer, or assau

leader. Basically, it is any engineer lea

February 2001 

IPC - initial 

LOGPAC - l

LRP - logis

MA - missio

PCC/PCI - p

inspect

PMCS - pre

and serv

SITEMP - s

ULLS - Uni

UMCP - un
the location and disposition of engineers in the maneuver

formation, task-force decision points, condition setting for

breaching operations, and the task-force situational-obstacle

plan.

When? – FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined

Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task/Force,

and Company/Team, indicates that “rehearsals must be

executed at the right time and in the right sequence to maximize

their potential value.” Ideally, subordinate engineer units

“should have developed at least a tentative plan before they

participate in a rehearsal of their higher-headquarters operations.” Without a tentative plan from subordinate engineer

leaders, “feedback on the higher-headquarters plan is very

limited, and the actions rehearsed may not resemble the final

plan of the subordinate unit.”

In general, the M/S rehearsal should be after the task force

CAR and before the BCT CAR to be of value (see table on page

26). For comparison’s sake, the fire-support rehearsal is often 1

to 2 hours before the BCT CAR. Additionally, the staff and the

mobility reserve (for example, those who work directly for the

engineer battalion) should have conducted internal rehearsals

before the M/S rehearsal. An article titled “Command and

Control: Seeing the Battlefield,” Engineer, February 1998,

identified some decision-making tools for engineer commanders.

This article highlights some examples of staff-generated

products that should be produced and synchronized for the

commander before the rehearsal. They may form the basis for

what must be rehearsed.

Where? – Consider the battalion tactical command post

(TAC) or some centrally located command post. The TAC is

often ideal since we have great talent available to construct the

terrain model or other similar rehearsal tools. It could also be

conducted on the hood of a high-mobility, multipurpose

wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) (map rehearsal) but should

minimize the travel time for subordinates as well as the

commander—who likely must get his own act together before

his own higher-level rehearsal (the BCT CAR).

What? – FM 71-123, TC 25-10, and oth

comment on various tactics, techniques, and p

for rehearsals. All are valid techniques and 

time available, the attendees, and what is bein

various techniques may include maps, sand

models, rock drills, FM radios, or tactical e

troops (TEWTs). Each implies a different de

resources.

Why? – TC 25-10 indicates the follow

rehearsals (parenthetical comments are added 

BOS):

 Rehearsals ensure that personnel know—

 What the commander intends to accom

 commander’s intent).

How he intends to accomplish it (conc

 scheme of engineer operations).

 Rehearsals enable synchronization by—

Verifying specific responsibilities (situa

 CSS, and obstacle breaching).

Coordinating timing of actions (enginee

 and transition to the defense).

Confirming backup procedures.

 Rehearsals enhance battlefield success (e

FM 71-123 gives several examples of 

rehearsals. A framework for M/S rehearsals 

following:

 The S2 sets the conditions of the battlespa

the enemy courses of action (COAs) and hig

engineers, obstacles, key terrain, and “sh

also be appropriate to review the BCT rec

surveillance (R&S) plan to focus the engi

on obstacle-intelligence collectors, named 

and observers that trigger key engineer a

26 Engineer 

Map, san

model, ro

radio (FM

are all va

(Contin
February 2002 Engineer 27

Reporting and Disseminating Relevant

Engineer Information

By Lieutenant Colonel Scott Bickell

Each year, the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)

 consolidates significant lessons learned as a result of

 the Warfighter exercises. Developed for each Battlefield

Operating System (BOS), these lessons learned become BCTP

Perceptions, once approved. This article focuses on one

Engineer Perception for FY 01 and lists some tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Perception: Units must adequately report and disseminate

engineer information.

Discussion: During the past several division and corps

Warfighter exercises, units have not adequately reported and

disseminated relevant engineer information such as locations

of obstacles and breach lanes and the status of main supply

routes (MSRs). As a result, we have observed numerous incidents of fratricide in our obstacles, logistics convoys trapped

in known enemy obstacles with breach lanes, and units having

to breach obstacles that were known but not reported or

disseminated. With all of the “common-operating-picture” tools

that we possess, how can this be?

 All units that we have observed during Warfighter exercises

possess some type of digital system for reporting and

disseminating information and maintaining a common

operating picture. These systems are either from the Army

Tactical Command and Control System suite—such as the

Maneuver Control System (MCS) and the All-Source

Analysis System—or an off-the-shelf e-mail system. While

these systems are good tools for reporting, consolidating,

and disseminating information, “message sent” does not

equal “message received, opened, and used.” Figure 1

reflects that this division was reporting and disseminating

enemy obstacle information, to include known and templated

obstacles, using MCS-Phoenix (P). All of the command posts

(CPs) listed in the left column had this information on their

systems, but several were not aware that it was there.

Therefore, they did not post this relevant information on

their maps and overlays. All but one of these CPs had a

copy of the original enemy obstacle template posted, but it

was not updated with current information that was available

in MCS-P.

 For units that do not have digital systems, we observed the same issues with disseminating information.

These units rely on hard-copy overlays and reports for

gathering and disseminating information. Typically, engineer

units will produce obstacle overlays for friendly and

enemy obstacles (to include templates) and disseminating

these to major subordinate command CPs. The problem

arises when new obstacles are emplaced or reported other

than what is already on the overlay. This information is

rarely disseminated throughout the force.

 Another issue we have identified is the echelon above

division/corps units that are supporting the division/corps

are often left out of the information loop. Sometimes these

units will not have the digital system that the corps or

division is using and will rely on analog overlays and reports.

Many corps artillery units and corps support command

(COSCOM) convoys have suffered fratricide in our

obstacles because they were unaware of the location of

these obstacles. Figure 2, page 28, shows the impact of

units not having a “common obstacle picture.” The unit in

the figure was transitioning from the defense to the attack.

The brigades did not have a common picture of where the

obstacles were emplaced in the division sector—in other

words, a division obstacle overlay. As a result, the division

had to breach its own obstacles, and it lost a battalion

task force of combat vehicles in obstacles that it

emplaced.

Figure 1. Common Engineer Picture

Enemy Obstacles and Breaches

CP MCS-P Overlay

DMAIN Posted and updated in Engr Bde

Posted; obstacles not updated

Posted; not updated

Posted and updated

x

x

x

x

x

x

Posted; not updated

Posted; not updated

Posted; not updated

x Posted and updated

x

x

DTAC

DREAR

Not posted or updated

1BDE

2BDE

BDE

CAV

FA BDE

DIVARTY

Battle Command Training Program
28 Engineer February 2002

 The lack of adequate and accurate obstacle breach reporting

and disseminating of this information is another issue. Do

we need to report every breach lane to the division or corps?

The unit SOP should address this issue, but we should, at

a minimum, report those breaches that we conduct on

MSRs, alternate supply routes (ASRs), and other routes

such as cross-mobility corridors. Figure 3 shows that the

unit conducted 40 breaches of enemy obstacles and reported

only nine to the division. Many of the breaches that the

unit did not report were along the MSRs. Also, the unit did

not report many of the obstacles that were breached.

 Figure 4 depicts the cause and effect of the lack of reporting and disseminating obstacle and breach

information. The convoy symbols show three logistics

convoys that became trapped in enemy obstacles, which

were on MSRs, that had been breached and not reported.

Because they were not reported, the division transportation

Figure 2. Dirty Battlefield “Obstacle Impacts”

Figure 3. Breach Reporting
Figure 4. MSR/ASR Interdiction “Dirty Battlefield”

officer had designated the status of the MSR as “Green”

and continued to send convoys up these MSRs.

So, how can we fix this problem of not reporting and

disseminating relevant engineer information? The cause

of many of these issues lies in unit SOPs. Some units do not

follow their SOP for reporting and disseminating information; others have a cumbersome system that makes

accurate and adequate reporting difficult.

TTP:

 Conduct a review of unit SOPs and streamline the reporting

process. Determine what information is actually needed for

reporting obstacles and breaches.

 Ensure that your SOP includes reporting and disseminating

information using digital systems for units that have them.

Also include how you will receive reports from and disseminate information to supporting units that do not

have digital systems.

 Develop a systematic process for reporting and disseminating relevant engineer information throughout

the force using digital and/or analog systems. Include this

process in your SOP and the division/corps SOP.

 Follow up with a call on the radio, mobile-subscriber

equipment, or nonsecure digital voice terminal to the units

that you disseminated engineer information to using digital

systems. Tell them where the information is, and then get a

confirmation that they received it.

 Ensure that you include echelon above division/corps

units in your distribution. It is easy to forget the reinforcing

artillery brigade, Patriot units, and COSCOM.

 Ensure that you have a tracking chart/matrix or some other

mechanism that can provide a roll-up of all obstacle reports

and breach-lane locations. This can be disseminated to

units using digital systems and/or tactical facsimile. Again,

follow up with a voice transmission after you have

disseminated the information.

Lieutenant Colonel Bickell is the mobility/survivability BOS chief

for BCTP Operations Group Bravo at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Before this assignment, he served as the assistant division engineer,

4th Infantry Division, and S3, 588th Engineer Battalion, 4th Infantry

Division. LTC Bickell has also served in various command and staff

positions in divisional and corps combat engineer battalions.

February 2002 Engineer 29

“ ”
DEMlNlNG OMAN: 


THIRD U*I+ARMY IOLDIEW HELP MAKE 


THE NATION IAFER 


ost U.S. citizens go through their entire life without MFhaving to worry about encountering a land mine. 

or some countries in the middle of a war, land mines 

are an everyday occurrence. Still other countries have not had 

a war in years, yet land mines buried decades ago still pose a 

hazard to their citizens. 

The middle-eastern country of Oman falls in this last 

category. Although the majority of its citizens have never 

encountered a land mine, parts of the country are scattered 

with minefields from past skirmishes. Unfortunately, neither 

side recorded most of these minefield locations. But the land 

mines ofserious concern are the recorded minefields that have 

shifted positions because of heavy rains in the region. The 

handwritten records have faded, making it even more difficult 

to locate these minefields. 

Oman has a low-to-moderate land minelunexplodedordnance problem. From 1964 to1975, antitank and antipersonnel 

land mines were laid in the Dhofar region, in the southwestern 

Partofthecounw, duringaninternalsmgglewith the People's 

Front for the Liberation of Oman (a wnununist separatist group). 

- .* '" .,.-C; " 

oman[ deminer gets up before a practical

exercise on lane-clearing techniques. 

In 1984, the Royal Army ofOman (RAO) established a 60-man 

Mine Clearance Troop to conduct demining operations. 

Currently, the troop is demining known battlefields and areas 

where land mine incidents have occurred. 

To help alleviate the land mine problem in Oman, a 25-man 

humanitarian demining team from the Third U.S. Army1U.S. 

Army Central Command (ARCENT), Fort McPherson, Georgia, 

went to Oman this year to train the RAO engineer soldiers on 

international delnining tactics and techniques. The team's goal 

was to assist in reclaiming the minefields for civilian use. The 

90-day training was divided into three main areas: demining, 

information management, and mine awareness. 

Deminiig 

By regulation, U.S. soldiers do not go into a country for 

humanitarian demining and start clearing minefields. 

Instead, they train that country's engineers to 

international demining standards-in other words, train the 

trainer. Then, the U.S. soldiers become assistant trainers, and 

the soldiers they have trained, in turn, train their fellow 

According to one Omani engineer, who had 3 years of 

training with the RAO combat engineers before his training 

with the U.S. demi~iing team, the RAO operation is basically 

the same as the U.S. soldiers taught. But he said that the biggest 

difference was the safety consideration, because U.S. (raining 

gives a higher priority to the safety aspect ofdemining. Within 

theminefield, safety standards are similar, but the international 

standard calls for safety before entering the minefield. Soldiers 

are taught not only to mark the boundary of the minefield hut 

also to mark a safe zone around the minefield for demining 

operations. 

The training the U.S. soldiers brought to these engineer 

soldiers includedmethods for determining the sizeof a minefield 

and calculating the time it would take to clear a minefield. 

Learning the necessary formulas was difficult unless a soldier 

had a background in geometry, but with practice it became 

easier. 

Adding to the difficulty of learning the new calculations 

and demining techniques was the language barrier. Although 

some of the RAO soldiers have an understanding of the English 

language, few of them speak or read it fluently, so having a 

good translator was essential. However, the translators were 

not the only place the instructors got help with teaching the 

RAO soldiers; the students also helped each other. They 

wanted to make sure that everyone in the class understood 

what was being taught. They knew that one day, they would 
A U.S. soldier shows Omani soldiers how to calculate the 

area of a minefield. 

be dolng th~s for real, and their l~fe could depend on the11 

classmates getting it right. 

Besides the classroom work, the O~nani demi~~ers received 

hands-on training in the field, where U.S. soldiers set up 

simulated minefields, complete with practice land mines. Here 

RAO soldiers were taught how to prepare an area for demining, 

as well as procedures for safe demining, which included using 

25-pound blast suits and a variety of metal detectors. 

Information Management 

Hulnauitarian demining information managsnrerlt la 

the collection of all data for minefields, suspected 

minefields, and unexploded-ordnance sites where 

there have been incidents. The U.S. soldiers taught the Omani 

soldiers to store raw collected dataand analyze it onacomputer. 

This information included minefield location and size, 

demographics, and whether or not the minefield had shifted 

from a previously known site. 

Soldiers in most Third World countries don't have 

computers at woik, and the ones who do are usually highranking officers. So before the U.S. demining team amved in 

Oman, computers were purchased from a local vendor (with 

U.S. Department of State funds), and the RAO soldiers attended 

a computer course to Ieam the basics. Once the training was 

completed, the equipment was donated to the country for use 

in demining. Omani soldiers in the Information Management 

Section believe that they will benefit greatly from having 

computers. Before they had computers, minefield information 

was on large ((paper) files. Now everything is on one disk, so 

the information will be easier to manage. 

The Information Management Section provides repons to 

rhe RAO and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers commanders that 

indicate where the demining teams are, what they are doing, 

and how they are progressing. As the central system-the 

brain of the whole operation-the Information Management 

Section keeps track ofthe actual demining areas and maintains 

a cumu~and and cunuol nerwork uker the other denuning 

sections. 

Mine Awareness 

hile the majority of the training the U.S. soldiers wprovided built on the RAO deminers' current tasks, 

the Omanis were shown a new way to protect their 

fellow countrymen from land mines-mine awareness. Mine 

awareness is considered to be advertising-telling someone 

to do something or not to do something. Soldiers from the 8th 

PsychologicalOperationsBattalion,FonBragg,North Carolma, 

are the first wave and show up at a mine-clearing site before 

the deminers. According to one soldier from the battalion, the 

demining students thought that letting the Omani people know 

about mines and minefields would be an easy task, but they 

quickly learned it wasn't that simple. 

Before developing products and getting the word out, the 

mine-awareness team analyzed its target audience to detem~ine 

how the people received their news. Since the majority of the 

Dhofar region is a vast rocky desert, which is used by nomads 

for grazing livestock (goats, cattle, and camels), it was pointless 

to make TV comnercials telling that a dernining operation was 

going to take place there. But even if they don't read, or don't 

have radios or TVs, there is still some-way that they gel news. 

It may be the town sultan, who tells them about world events 

everyday at prayer time. But you must know their media source 

to develop a product. 

The point of knowing their target audience was driveuliome 

when the U.S. team showed the RAO soldiersmine-awareness 

products from other countries. One product had a picture of 

someone holding a land mine, but it was overprinted with a red 

circle with a diagonal line through it. Although most Americans 

and several other uationalities know this means not to touch 

land mines, it meant nothing to the Omanis. Their symbol for 

"no" uses the red circle, but they place an "X" inside it. 

The class determined that for a mine-cleanng scenario near a 

playground, using smcer balls and T-shuts w~th me-awareness 

messages on them was a good way to educate the luds about the 

dangers of mmes and what to do if they found one 

Conclusion 

0

ne 011~ani soldier in the mine-awareness class had besri 

a field engineer tasked with putting up and clearing 

minefields. Before the U.S. soldiers came, hisjob was 

just related to the militaty, but now it combined military with 

civilian. He said that his people know about mines and that 

they are dangerous, but it isn't really a topic that is talked 

about. The mine-awareness class showed hiin how to get the 

word out. With this training, he not only can serve his country 

better-but also his people. Y 


StujfSergenni Truth was ussigned tu the Third US. .4rmy/ 

;IKCENT Public Affairs Office,Furl McPherson, Georgia, 

when he wrole lhis article. 
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.

No endorsement by the U.S. Government or its agencies or

subparts, including the Department of Defense and the

Department of the Army, is intended and none should be

implied.

As the United States entered into Desert Shield in 1991,

the armed forces faced a serious problem. All existing

maps of the Persian Gulf were old and outdated.1 To

correct the problem in a time-efficient manner, the Department

of Defense turned to Satellite Probatoire d’Observation de la

Terre (SPOT) Image, a commercial satellite imagery company in

France. With 20-meter multispectral images of the area,

commanders and planners could identify urban areas, roads,

and other features on the ground, as well as begin planning for

the coalition forces’ airfields, logistical bases, drop zones, or

whatever else they would need for operational success. With

an unprecedented knowledge of the battlefield, coupled with

overwhelming offensive power, the complete success of the

Gulf War marked a vast turning point in how future battles

would be fought.2 At that time, did anyone realize that warfare

had hit a turning point? The success of the United States in the

Persian Gulf demonstrated how valuable commercial space

technology could be in military operations, and the market has

been booming ever since.

The Imagery Market

At the time of the Gulf War, SPOT Image was one of a

very few companies that provided satellite imagery on

the commercial market. Today, there are half a dozen

such companies in the United States alone. 

Orbital Science Corps, EarthWatch, and I

Space—are expected to launch satellites th

than-1-meter resolution imagery this year

by the year 2010, ten nations will have 

systems—many with the ability to collect 

resolution.3

In his 1998 paper titled “Commercial Sate

or Allies?” U. S. Navy Lieutenant Comma

observed that commercial satellite comp

driving their systems to 1-meter resolution

need such fine resolution is unclear. 

observations of areas for environmental st

individual trees to be useful? Urban plan

from detailed photos, but it would be far mo

use conventional aerial methods to obtai

expense involved, there are only two reaso

resolution satellite photos: first, when a pe

access to the target area, and second, to 

without the knowledge of the area’s own

reason, demand for this quality imagery ex

Major Imagery Vend

There are five major commercial image

 mostly in data collection method

 processing techniques, although th

by each are similar:

SPOT Image, the brainchild of the Fre

(Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales [CNES

with Sweden and Belgium—was the first co

By Captain Amy Wallace

Enemy Geospatial Engine

 We Are Not Alone

Enemy Geospatial Engine

 We Are Not Alone

32 Engineer 

© CNES 2001/Courtesy SPOT Image Corporation

By Captain Amy Wallace
duced. The SPOT constellation can get repeat coverage of any

location every day for disaster monitoring and other rapid response applications.

Space Imaging is the current operator of the land remotesensing satellite (LANDSAT)-series, which was previously operated by the government. The LANDSAT program was commercialized in the 1980s and, to date, the only operational systems are LANDSAT 6 and 7. These systems, which offer imagery qualities of 25-meter MSI and 15-meter pan, have been

widely used in land cover monitoring and assessment, as well

as mapping large areas.

Space Imaging has also been operating its own satellite—

IKONOS—since 1999. This system offers markedly higher

resolution than the LANDSAT systems, with 4-meter MSI and

1-meter pan. The IKONOS revisits locations on the earth’s

surface every 1 to 3 days, depending on the quality of

resolution.

Delivery times for Space Imaging products vary from several

hours to 5 days, depending on the products requested and the

availability of raw data. Product prices range from $30 to $300

the fifth satellite in the Orb quintet.

Aerial Images, Incorporated, in a consorti

American-based companies and the Russ

Association SOVINFORMSPUTNIK, market

resolution images and image-based products w

Images is also home to TerraServer, an Interne

imagery “gazetteer” that is free to download 

computer.

EarthWatch, Incorporated, is the first comm

line to break the 1-meter-resolution threshold. 

EarthWatch was granted a license to operate a le

resolution satellite, which is under constructio

scheduled for launching later this year, will offer 

0.61-meter pan resolution for worldwide distribu

the first satellite in orbit operated by EarthWatc

failed attempts. However, the company already p

and imagery-derived products from other sou

viewed or purchased online.

Table 1 shows a comparison of the five m

imagery vendors.

February 2002 

Table 1. Comparison of Commercial Imagery Vendors

Company SPOT Image Space Imaging OrbImage Aerial Images E

Satellite SPOT 1, 2, 3, 4 LANDSAT IKONOS OrbView 2 SPIN-2

Resolution 20 MSI, 10 pan 25 MSI, 15 pan 4 MSI, 1 pan 1,000 MSI 1-2 pan

Resolution,

Next Generation

10/20 MSI,

 2.5/5 pan 4 MSI, 1 pan 

Cost $0.09-$3.50

sq km $.14-$1/sq km $12-$34/sq km $500/1,500 x 2,800 km $25-35/sq km $4

Revisit 1 day 16-18 days 1-3 days 1 day 8-15 days

Ordering Average Easy Difficult Average 

Minimum Order

Requirement X X

Delivery 1-5 days 1-5 days 2 days 15 days 

X

Payment

 Check

 Money Order

X 

 Credit Cards X X 

 Other Account

Restrictions * ** 

Ordering ease is an opinion based on the author’s experience.

*Federal law prohibits U. S. companies from selling products to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakis

Serbia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

**EarthWatch does not currently operate any of its own satellites but sells imagery collected by other comp

X

X

X
Using the Products

Because of the similarities of the imagery products

 themselves, and the exponentially growing demand,

 most of the products are processed into a form that

makes them easy to use. An Internet search will provide some

online images with free downloadable viewers. Although these

products are mostly archived images of metropolitan areas,

they provide an idea of where this field is heading. Most

commercial vendors market their products in photographic form

or in the form of computer-compatible tapes and CD-ROMs.

Most products can be read and manipulated using common

raster conversion software, available as a “stand-alone” product

that can be installed on any newer computer with a Windows

95 or higher operating system.

The price range for raster conversion software is about

$1,200 to $4,000, and many software companies offer training

courses for an additional fee. Other training can be received by

enrolling in 2- to 5-day “crash courses” offered by community

colleges all over the country.4

Anyone with good computer

skills, and especially a knowledge of AutoCAD®-type programs,

could easily use this type of conversion software and produce

imagery-based products to suit his own needs.5

Future Conflicts

What does this mean? “In a word, future U.S.

 adversaries will have at their disposal many of the

 space-based capabilities that the United States

employed so effectively in 1991. They will not need to develop

a space industry, launch constellations of satellites, or operate

them. The prerequisites will be merely a major credit card,

Internet access, and the addresses of an array of new globally

owned commercial satellite service providers.” 6

Space-derived information has been used by our adversaries

in the past. Iraq purchased data from SPOT Image before the

invasion of Kuwait. During the conflict, SPOT completely

restricted the distribution of imagery so that only the allies had

right software, military forces would be able 

representation of their area of interest. In 

simulation, troop movement and logistics 

rehearsed before deploying to a theater. C

even see where radar towers could most effe

using line-of-site calculations.10 Many 

mentioned commercial satellite imagery ven

however, DEM products are also distribu

other companies. Table 2 describes some o

available from commercial vendors.

 Joint Vision 2010 focuses on the import

being able to maneuver quickly and flexibly 

with precision from greater distances and a

more focused and more maneuverable. The 

that commanders will need timely and accu

lead these highly mobile forces. The intellig

operating forces must work together to ens

decision-making requirements are in harm

capabilities. Commanders must keep in mind 

they will be using to make tomorrow’s 

battlefield will be based on the capabilities 

are being built and launched today.

Maintaining Information Do

As dependence on the commerci

 enemy forces are likely to have 

 information that joint force comm

34 Engineer 

A digital image of southern Iran shows

geological features, drainage patterns, and

vegetation (Indian Remote Sensing Satellite).

A U.S. Navy plane sits on a runway in 

China Sea. (Space Imaging’s IKONOS 
then, do we maintain information dominance? GLOBAL-97, a

Navy war game, demonstrated that information superiority must

be considered an operational object.12 Early in the game, the

Red Forces launched missiles at and destroyed several satellite

ground receiving stations and leveled the intelligence playing

field. Measures of this type of destructive attack may not work

so well in a real battle. Besides the fact that both enemy and

friendly forces may be using the same commercial sources for

their intelligence, commercial satellites and receiving stations

are sovereign property. Their destruction will just add to the

complications that already exist. The best answers are yet to

be found and addressed in training and doctrine revisions.13

In future battles, information dominance may not be in the

hands of the wealthiest and most technologically advanced

nation. As both sides look at the world with the same eyes, the

intelligence “upper hand” will go to the nation that can use

information to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses quickly and

effectively, while practicing higher levels of deception and

operational security.14

Captain Wallace is the assistant S3, 40th Engineer Battalion,

Germany. She was previously a plans officer with the 937th Engineer

Group (C). She wrote this article while serving as a snowbird in the

TRADOC Program Integration Office for Terrain Data as an

assignment into threat activities. CPT Wallace is a graduate of the

Engineer Captain’s Career Course and holds a degree in biology

from Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington.

February 2002 

Endnotes:

 Cynthia A. S. McKinley, “When the Enemy Has 

1996, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/mckinley.htm.

2

 James Oberg, “SPYING FOR DUMMIES-T

Security Implications of Commercial Space 

SPECTRUM Magazine, November 199

jamesoberg.com/articles/spy.

3 Thomas Behling and Kenneth McGruther

Satellite Reconnaissance to Support Military O

1998, http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/a

4

http://www.autodesk.com/supp/resource/atc/t

5http://www3.autodesk.com/adsk/index/0

123112,00.html.

6

 Oberg.

7

 McKinley.

8

 Oberg.

9

 Behling and McGruther.

10http://www.intermap.ca/HTML/application_m

11 Behling and McGruther.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About 

With Nongovernment Experts, December 20

www.cia.gov.nic.nic_publications/index.htm.

Table 2. Sample of DEMs Available From Commercial Vendors

**Delivery is approximately 24 hours after imagery is received.

**Distributors include Space Imaging, EarthWatch, OrbImage, and several others.

Single scene worldwide $895 per scene Does not include processing fee

Multiple scenes worldwide $1,095 per scene Does not include processing fee

*Image data collected by LANDSAT.

Intermap Technology (DEM of 2.5-meter resolution)

North America +/- 1 m vertical accuracy $3,185 per 7.5 x 7.5 minute tile

$1,910 per 7.5 x 7.5 minute tile +/- 1.5 m vertical accuracy

$1,590 per 7.5 x 7.5 minute tile +/- 2.5 m vertical accuracy

Southeast Asia $12,130 per 7.5 x 7.5 minute tile +/- 1 m vertical accuracy

$7,510 per 7.5 x 7.5 minute tile +/- 1.5 m vertical accuracy

$6,355 per 7.5 x 7.5 minute tile +/- 2.5 m vertical accuracy

*Provides DEMs of North America, Central America, Puerto Rico, South America, Southeast Asia, and

 Europe only.
team, working to build a solution. Our challenge was to provide

a variety of terrain products throughout the brigade, with the

ability to customize products much like a division terrain team.

Through weeks of NTC train-up, lots of research, and a brigade

that was willing to procure the necessary tools, we were able to

assemble enough “off-the-shelf” equipment to produce quality

terrain products for our brigade and subordinate units. The

purpose of this article is to share some tactics, techniques, and

procedures (TTP) that we have developed with other brigades

and battalions. Using a standard computer with the latest

version of TerraBase II, a color printer, and—if available—a

plotter, engineer units without the DTSS can produce highquality terrain analysis products on their own.

Setup

About 9 months before deploying to NTC, we took a

 hard look at our current equipment and capabilities

 for terrain analysis. This is what we had to start with:

 Computer, Pentium II, 300 MHz, 128 MB RAM, 8-gigabyte

hard drive.

 Hewlett-Packard (HP) Deskjet 1600C printer.

 TerraBase II, Version 4.0, software.

 Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Levels 1 and 2,

Controlled-Image Base (CIB), and a Compressed Arc

Digitized Raster Graphic (CADRG) of NTC.

 DTED 1 and 2 of Korea.

Although this is the minimum equipment needed for quick

terrain analysis, we wanted to expand our capabilities.

Specifically, we recognized the need to produce products and

distribute them down to the user level. A TerraBase image on a

computer screen may look pretty, but it is practically useless

unless that information can be printed out and distributed.

Thus, we established further requirements for what would

become our terrain analysis station:

 Increased speed to process complex analyses and printing.

 More hard drive space to hold digital terrain data.

 Capability to print large maps and overlays.

Through several months of train-up, t

research, we were able to greatly expand 

capability with the following assets:

 Micron computer, Pentium III, 800 MH

 20-gigabyte hard drive, Zip drive, and 

 HP 488CA plotter with 32 MB RAM 

rolls of paper and film).

 HP 2000C color inkjet printer.

 MicroDEM/TerraBase II, Version 5.0, s

 Multiresolution Seamless Image Databa

software.

 Five-meter DEM of NTC.

 DTED 2 of Fort Riley.

 MrSID image of NTC (aerial photo and 

Fort Riley.

 Printer switch box.

 Three Anvil field cases for the computer

(see Figures 1 and 2).

All of this equipment is currently av

through local-purchase channels. Digital ter

36 Engineer 

Figure 1. A computer, monitor, an

board arranged in an Anvil case 
through the supply system or from your post Integrated

Training Area Management (ITAM) office, or it can be

downloaded from the Internet. DEMs of the continental United

States are available free from the United States Geological

Survey Web site: http://edcwww.cr.usgs.gov/doc/edchome/

ndcdb/ndcdb.html. TerraBase II, Version 5.0, can be

downloaded from http://www.wood.army.mil/TVC/or at http:/

/www.usna.edu/Users/oceano/pguth/website/microdem.htm.

Training

The Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses

 currently include several hours of TerraBase II

 instruction, but these skills are perishable. The battalion

assistant brigade engineer section refreshed its terrain analysis

and TerraBase skills by reviewing the tutorial and program

“Help” function. It is comprehensive and very user-friendly.

We also conducted research on the Internet, maintained a

close working relationship with our post ITAM office (an excellent

source for training-area digital data), and even tapped into the

Kansas State University Department of Geography for additional

ideas. Our initial objective was to conduct “train-the-trainer”

classes within the engineer battalion and other brigade staff

sections. This would later pay huge dividends; the more Battlefield

Operating System elements that can conduct their own terrain

analysis, the better off the brigade staff would be during the

military decision-making process. Plus, it reduces the number of

emergency requests to the engineers for simple terrain products.

Lastly, we further customized MicroDEM/TerraBase by writing

directly to the programmer, Dr. Peter Guth, who took our requests

for additional functions (Print Preview, for example) and included

them in the program.

 Products

All too often, brigade and battalion staffs in general,

 and engineers in particular, receive after-action review

 comments from observer-controllers that reflect

“insufficient detail in terrain analysis.” Field Manual 5-33,

Terrain Analysis, offers some good analysis techniques, but it

is aimed toward military occupational specialty 81T topographic

 Print preview to select scale and media 

 Line-of-sight analysis (weapons fans) 

post locations.

Additional TTP include the following:

 Printing out oblique views of the area 

chromadepth colors) to help build terra

 Conducting radio retransmission line

using weapons fans.

 Planning support-by-fire positions usin

intervisibility lines.

 Printing high-resolution enlargements o

photos (see Figure 4, page 38).

 Using line-of-sight analysis of enemy 

around engineer work sites.

 Using line-of-sight analysis to plan f

positions that cover brigade-directed o

February 2002 

Figure 3. A 1:50,000 modified comb

overlay (MCOO) created with Terra

printed on clear film
 Using miniature maps for staff note-taking/sketches during

war games.

 Locating precise 10-digit grid coordinates to trails or stream

crossings using MrSID images.

Conclusion

The latest updates in TerraBase II and other digital terrain-

 viewing software keep us on the cutting edge of terrain

 analysis for tactical planning. Not only do we need to

be proficient with this software, but we also must be able to

communicate the results of our analysis through maps, overlays, and other products. Until all units begin fielding the DTSS,

engineers at the brigade level and below can purchase off-theshelf technology—the most useful of which is a plotter—to

produce products. The real work, however, is selling ourselves

as the subject-matter experts on merging terrain analysis

technology with its applicability in tactical planning. With or

without a terrain detachment, engineers at all levels must

continually remind our maneuver brothers that we are the

“masters of terrain.”

Captain Driscoll commands Charlie Company, 1st

Engineer Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas. Previously he was

the assistant brigade engineer for the 1st Engineer Battalion

and platoon leader, assistant S3(training), and company

executive officer in the 307th Engineer Battalion, Fort Bragg,

North Carolina. A graduate of the United States Military

Academy and the Engineer Captain’s Career Course, CPT

Driscoll holds a master’s degree in engineering management

from the University of Missouri-Rolla.

Notes:

1. TerraBase II images are used with the permission of

Dr. Peter Guth.

2. Request additional graphics from pbd@wood.army.mil.

Figure 4. War gaming on a 1:20,000 map

created with TerraBase II and a color plotter

38 Engineer 

should also highlight BCTlevel decisi

plans with associated engineer decisi

 CSS issues, such as CASEVAC supp

the defense (movement forward of bl

supplies).

 The S3 or executive officer captures 

and bottom-up refinement and 

commander’s synchronization tools.

 The M/S rehearsal should result in 

execution tool for the commander be

product should identify—by phase—

engineer actions, task organization a

subordinate engineers, and key engi

(action, friendly criteria, enemy criteri

Conclusion

This is obviously not something 

out for the first time at the NTC. S

need to be rehearsed! Hopefully, 

units recognize the need for M/S rehears

to identify some TTP for consideration. Try 

at your home station to see what works 

observations at NTC indicate that this wil

the combat effectiveness of sapper units

likely result in a manifold increase in th

engineers across the width and depth of t

ensuring that our BOS has the appropria

the combined-arms team.

Lieutenant Colonel Magness is the e

trainer on the Sidewinder Team at the 

Center, Fort Irwin, California. Previous 

brigade and battalion S3, 4th Infantry D

Texas; company commander, 16th Eng

Armored Division, Germany; and platoon 

staff officer, 17th Engineer Battalion, 2d 

LTC Magness is a graduate of the Un

Academy and the Command and Gener

holds a master’s degree from the Univers
Captain Smith walked into the brigade headquarters

 and the unpleasant feeling in his stomach worsened.

 Standing to his left was the company first sergeant, and

in front was the battalion commander and command sergeant

major. The four of them were going to see the brigade commander

to explain why the awards in their units were late—again.

Approaching the command corridor, Captain Smith could

clearly see the division commander’s policy letter concerning

awards. He had specifically instructed that when young

soldiers changed duty stations, they would receive their

awards in unit formations and not through the U. S. Post

Office. The division commander had required a monthly status

on all soldiers who left their units without their awards, along

with an explanation.

As Captain Smith stood outside the brigade commander’s

door, he thought about what was taught at the Engineer

Officer Advanced Course (EOAC). He had learned the full

spectrum of engineer tasks and necessary systems that a

captain must know to be an effective company commander in

the Army. In EOAC, instructors addressed breaching complex

obstacles, building bridges, analyzing battles, and performing

a variety of other combat tasks. As he waited nervously, he

wished that leadership in a garrison environment had been

addressed more directly.

Many new commanders discoun

 garrison operations and dism

 pushing.” Nothing can be far

Garrison operations are good indicators 

performs in larger and more difficult mis

cannot execute routine tasks, how can it 

tasks that require a great deal of preparati

such as rotations at the National Train

extensive coordination and administrati

conducted in garrison. The success of the

largely on the paperwork that is required m

depart from the motor pool and that m

routinely.

How a company operates in garrison 

morale and esprit de corps. Deploying to th

Center and driving a 70-ton tank or jumpin

naturally motivating. Compare this to a 6-w

where morale can drop significantly in 

boredom. If soldiers see routine things ha

garrison—such as awards, pay, and per

there is a high probability that morale can 

of the most demoralizing events that can 

are when soldiers are told that their awar

promotion packets didn’t make the boar

inquiries were never submitted.

Effective Leadership

in a Garrison Environm

By Major Laurence Farrell and Colonel Allen C. Estes

February 2002 
Although it is not meant to be all-inclusive, the

 following list highlights 10 characteristics of a

 successful commander in a garrison environment:

Executes Routine Events in a Timely Manner. A successful

company commander ensures that routine events occur

routinely and on time. The administrative burden on a

commander includes everything from reenlistment counseling,

family care plans, and the overweight program to monthly

inventories, urinanalysis testing, and unit status reports. These

tasks simply cannot be accomplished without organized

systems in place and clearly defined responsibilities. In the

scenario on page 39, the chain of command obviously did not

intend to insult soldiers and not have an award ceremony;

however, due to an inability to track the progress of a routine

event, the result was the same. It is clear that the company

commander had a systematic failure in his company.

In a traditional table of organization and equipment company,

there were at least two noncommissioned officers (NCOs)

(squad leader and platoon sergeant) and

an officer (platoon leader) who should have

been accountable long before the deadline

was missed. The system that a commander

implements in his unit must be easy to

understand and must hold individuals

responsible for completing clearly

described tasks by a published suspense

date. Visual tracking tools may be used,

such as the matrix timeline for awards

above. This matrix clearly shows all

suspenses and the people responsible for

meeting them. Any tracking tool should be

actively used, periodically reviewed (such

as at staff meetings), and regularly

updated, rather than serve as part of an

SOP on a shelf.

 This technique can be applied to a

variety of garrison tasks, such as

Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation

Reports, Article 15s, reports of survey,

dental appointments. A command

defines what information he wants to 

to his subordinates to design, even 

Such systems, once in place, greatly 

and effort a commander spends on 

An effective leader is not late for 

routine taskings. In a garrison envi

justifiable excuse for missing su

frequently miss suspenses are undisc

of missing suspenses is a breakdow

between the battalion commander a

commanders are usually not unreaso

to be missed, bring it to the comma

possible, not the day before the sus

it will be late, what you have done t

what you think the new due date sh

Uses the Battalion Staff and D

company commanders are hardw

40 Engineer 

Recognizing good performance and including 

will help show soldiers that the commander ca
the planning agent, and the company is the executing agent.

After receiving the plan, an effective company commander

properly delegates as much as possible to the platoon leaders

and monitors the execution of their missions. A commander

cannot sit on information; he must get it into the hands of the

executors, even if it is incomplete. To delegate properly, he

must give maximum authority and responsibility to subordinate

leaders but must be willing to take blame and provide

forgiveness when subordinates make mistakes.

Shows Concern for Soldiers and Their Long-Term Goals.

Soldiers are motivated by a wide variety of concerns and goals.

If a company commander can convey the sense that these

concerns and goals are personally important, the performance

of the unit will increase significantly. One effective and simple

example is to provide the soldiers with a college recommendation. Many soldiers enter the Army today for the

educational benefits that are provided in the Montgomery G.I.

Bill. They serve their country honorably, leave the service,

reenter their community, and attend college. Although it should

not be automatic, these soldiers are sometimes entitled to a

college or future-employment recommendation from their

company commander. This provides a great morale boost to

the soldiers, and they often become great recruiters for the

Army in the community.

Other ways to show concern include sending congratulatory

notes to soldiers who complete correspondence courses,

conducting meaningful reenlistment ceremonies, providing

photos of unit events to soldiers in the photos, publishing

articles in the post newspaper using names and quotes from

soldiers, and personally meeting with soldiers as they arrive

and depart the unit. The possibilities are limited only by the

imagination of the commander and his staff.

Get to know a soldier’s family, and include them whenever

practicable in unit activities. At a minimum, this should include

newcomer briefings, organization days, and social events.

When a married soldier is not at work, he is usually at home

with his family. Conditions at home can greatly affect

performance at work. Making the effort to know a soldier’s

family cannot help but further the perception of caring. A spouse

a great unit is cleaning the compa

not be filled with outdated field man

should not simultaneously serve as 

must be filed and handled accor

Record-Keeping System.

For a successful commander, th

ideal opportunity to think about, 

tasks and missions that must be a

day. He should set up a general sc

he is going to allocate his most pre

preparation allows immediate execu

at the beginning of the next duty da

and thoroughness.

Although it is difficult to do so

allocate some quiet time to simply 

day-to-day events, it is commonpla

developing a long-term plan or vis

charging, dedicated commanders 

solitude for contemplation, but 

developed; without this time, a uni

Prioritizes Missions. A compa

a clear understanding of his priorit

three long-term priorities that rec

focus. At least one of these areas sh

the battalion and brigade command

if the number-one goal of brigade an

is to improve physical fitness pe

this needs to be the number-one 

quarterly training. The second p

commander’s personal goal—eve

list—such as winning the Chief of 

Award.

A company cannot excel at ev

can maintain and sustain performan

as rifle marksmanship, physica

inspection areas. Understanding th

is-a-priority” syndrome from occu

and prevents soldiers from being w

February 2002 
consistently communicating a few priorities over the long term

help soldiers understand your philosophy and prevent a unit

from losing focus.

Knows the Job of His Subordinates and Superiors. Ensure

that the executive officer (XO) and first sergeant know—and

are comfortable with—the daily functions and duties of being

a commander. In essence, they should know your job. Ensure

that the XO knows the supply and operation sergeants’ jobs.

And, as a commander, you should know the XO’s job. This

vertical and horizontal integration is truly a sign of an excellent

unit. How many times have you requested information or

support and were told, “Sergeant Smith handles those requests,

and he is on leave.” Ironically, this lack of vertical integration

typically occurs at the headquarters level in a company.

Compare the following two examples: In a routine company,

when the platoon sergeant goes on leave, the senior E-6 in that

platoon automatically fills the position, and no loss of mission

occurs. However, in the same company, when the supply

sergeant goes on leave, the whole company dreads it because

the availability of necessary supplies becomes an issue. If the

company is vertically integrated, the XO and training NCO can

perform the supply sergeant’s duties with no loss of mission.

Besides knowing the job of subordinates, it is important in

the development of subordinates that they know the job of

their superiors. The classic example is the XO filling the duties

of the commander when necessary. This should also extend

down to the operations sergeant. When the XO goes on leave,

the commander covers down on some of the duties and

responsibilities of the XO, while the operations sergeant covers

up. This vertical integration results in no loss of mission and

truly sets a unit apart from other units that seem to stall and

sputter when key personnel take leave. The temporary loss of

a key member should be viewed as a leadership-development

opportunity for a promising subordinate.

Makes Tough Calls. An effective leader ensures that an

appropriate decision is made for the proper performance.

Sometimes leaders have to make a tough call when it is clearly

required. For example, the commander recommends a staff

sergeant who has been a squad leader for 18 months for a

Meritorious Service Medal. This award 

commands, but under “guidance” and rec

the first sergeant, platoon leader, and 

captain may be easily convinced to recom

forward this to the battalion commander. T

commander in a bind. If the soldier truly 

the solution is to recommend approval. H

does not deserve the award, the battalio

recommend disapproval, which contra

commander. The battalion commander h

“bad guy” in the award process. This dis

two commanders is the fault of the compan

credibility is now lessened. The compa

unwilling to make the difficult decision an

battalion commander in a bind.

An unwillingness to make tough call

can extend beyond awards. Does the co

from the service a soldier who clearly doe

the uniform, or does he transfer the soldi

under a “rehabilitative transfer?” In the com

go in front of the promotion board regard

deserve and are ready for promotion? It 

and leadership to explain to a soldier tha

promotion and tell him what he must do to 

to make tough calls cheapens special r

awards and promotions, and leaves comm

special to offer the truly best soldiers 

extraordinary effort. It reduces the motiv

exceed the standard.

Conducts Physical Training. An e

ensures that rigorous physical training 

times a week. One reason soldiers enlist 

physically challenged. While many of th

take away from physical training come fro

or higher, many companies misuse their ph

At the company level, physical training 

and imaginative and have variety. It sh

sports. Physical training must be view

prepares soldiers for war—and their s

training test. Sporting events that provid

42 Engineer 

with post agencies and invite them to visit the unit.
weey 3to 5e oad acto segeats te povdes

two benefits: First, done properly (with a rucksack), it quickly

raises an individual’s Army Physical Fitness Test score;

second, it adds realism to the sergeant’s-time training. The

3-day-a-week physical-training schedule has now become a

4-day-a-week schedule, resulting in more physically fit and

better-trained soldiers. The road march, though simple, is a

win-win solution for the commander and the soldiers.

Leads From the Front. Too often, a company commander

leads from behind a desk. Soldiers expect to see their commander

at training sites and in the motor pool, executing the tasks that

they are directly responsible for. In Army doctrine, the

commander is placed at the point where he can have the greatest

effect and influence on the occurring event. On a range, this is

the officer in charge (OIC). He is directly linked to the NCO in

the tower and the range safety and control personnel and easily

has the greatest impact.

The effect of a company commander performing the duties

of a range OIC for a company-sized range is immense. The

NCOs who run the range develop a sense of ownership as they

see their commander actively engaged in range activities. The

efficient commander leverages such opportunities to talk with

soldiers, shake hands, pat backs, and keep abreast of what is

happening in the unit. However, this is often not what actually

happens. More likely is that the company commander comes

out from 1000 to 1200 hours and then goes back to the orderly

room. If something is urgent at the company headquarters, the

commander should instruct the executive officer—who by

definition is the headquarters platoon leader—to accomplish

the mission. Again, he is the deputy and must be able to replace

the company commander on a moment’s notice.

The company commander cannot be the OIC on all the

company’s ranges, but over the period of a command, the

opportunity presents itself more than once where the

commander can fill this role. Leading from the front is a mentality.

It consists of being at physical training, leading the road march,

and taking the annual company common-task-training test. On

command maintenance days, it means that the commander is in

the motor pool all day, not just in the morning. It also means

that the commander performs maintenance on his vehicle,

demonstrating the importance of ownership. Leading from the

example is the class offered by the Army Com

that teaches soldiers basic money manageme

Working with post agencies is one area th

for delegation, especially among the compa

The first sergeant may be the person t

relationship with the unit’s TRICARE represe

operations sergeant could handle requests tha

Emergency Relief fund or the Army Community 

a good working relationship with the post s

translates to faster and better help for soldier

Summary

Acommander’s duties and responsibi

are numerous and tremendously imp

often thankless and extremely ti

Although the mission and purpose of the Arm

win the nation’s wars, there is a tactical c

garrison component to this mission. Reducin

time and effort spent on garrison tasks will 

energy to focus on critical wartime tasks—wh

for survival—and will improve the morale of 

Major Farrell is an instructor in the Dep

and Mechanical Engineering at West Poin

commanded Alpha Company, 35th Engi

(OSUT), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. MAJ F

combat tours in Saudi Arabia (Operations D

Desert Storm) and Somalia (Operation Resto

a graduate of the Virginia Military Institu

master’s degree in civil engineering from t

Missouri at Rolla.

Colonel Estes is the director of the Ci

Division in the Department of Civil an

Engineering at West Point. He previously 

169th Engineer Battalion (OSUT), Fort 

Missouri. COL Estes served a combat t

(Operation Restore Hope) as the battalion 

Engineer Battalion, Fort Benning, Georgia. 

of the United States Military Academy and h

in civil engineering from the University of C

February 2002 
To answer Captain Chamberlyne’s article (Engineer,

 August 2001, page 41), the modified table of

 equipment (MTOE) guy is in the unit’s major command

(MACOM) headquarters. Personnel at Forces Command

(FORSCOM), the United States Army Pacific Command

(USAPAC), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the Office Chief

of Army Reserves (OCAR), and United States Army Europe

(USAEUR) develop the MTOEs for the units assigned to their

commands. However, all MTOEs are based on a table of

organization and equipment (TOE), which the proponent

schools design and develop. The Engineer Organization Branch

of the Maneuver Support Center’s Directorate of Combat

Developments develops engineer TOEs. Most issues are TOE

and not MTOE issues. The MTOE merely reflects what is

documented on the TOE.

The TOE is a requirements document. It contains only the

minimum mission-essential wartime requirements necessary to

accomplish an organization’s doctrinal wartime mission. TOEs

do not document personnel and equipment for peacetime

functions or to support operations other than war. Every three

years, a TOE is reviewed to make necessary adjustments to

meet current documentation rules and apply requested changes

from various sources, including a review of comments from the

field. The MTOE is the authorization document and, even

though it is updated every year, it typically lags three years

behind the latest change to the TOE.

Factors exist that cause MTOEs to differ from TOEs. Because

of the costs involved in maintaining units at a high level of

readiness, the Army has organized units in stratified levels of

readiness based on a unit’s response time according to war

plans. One way to accomplish this stratification is the authorized

level of organization (ALO), which normally refers to personnel

and the percentage to which a unit is staffed. TOEs have only

three levels of organization: 100, 90, and 80 percent. When

manned to any of these three levels, the unit, in theory, should

still be able to accomplish its doctrinal wartime mission.

However, MTOEs have eight ALOs. Once a unit’s authorized

strength level falls below the 80 percent required-strength level,

its wartime mission capabilities are impacted.

Another way of stratifying an organization is the Department

of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL), which affects the

authorization of equipment systems and personnel manning to

the organization. DAMPL prioritizes which units will receive

equipment and personnel primarily based on which units will

be “first to fight.” Because the Army rarely buys 100 percent of

the equipment requirements, this action affects which units

will actually be fielded certain items of modernization equipment.

Note, some reserve organizations are higher on the DAMPL

sequence than active units.

Other reasons MTOEs differ from TOEs are the use of

authorized substitute-in-lieu-of items and exceptions to the

MTOE. If a unit lacks 5-ton cargo vehicles, it may receive

a 2.5-ton cargo truck as a substitute-in-lieu-of item. MTOE

exceptions, which does occur in National Guard organizations,

document a capability to support a particular state mission

requirement.

Over the years, the Engineer School found that the majority

of the units’ major issues concern the TOE and tend to be the

same basic issues. One major point is that when designing and

changing a TOE, cost is seldom the determining factor. Adding

to the TOE without causing overall growth to the engineer

force structure, using regulations, doctrine, and availability of

personnel spaces as justification, is a factor. Below are some of

the most common TOE issues that the Engineer School has

heard over the years and explanations as to why the TOEs

have or have not been changed.

High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) for

the First Sergeant

This is a common Armywide issue, not an engineer-specific

one, which has been raised numerous times to the DA staff. No

unit according to the TOE receives a HMMWV specifically for

the first sergeant. Good arguments and justifications have been

submitted; however, DA has nonconcurred. Its rebuttal has

been that the first sergeant can use the company supply vehicle.

However, since Force XXI units have presented the issue, it is

still open. One major stumbling block is that there is a shortage

of 10,000 HMMWVs to meet current TOE requirements.

Mix of Armored Combat Earthmovers (ACEs) and Dozers

This issue was originally proposed by then Colonel Anders

Aadland, commander of the 2d Armored Division Engineer

Brigade. Over the years, the issue has been raised several more

times with various mix quantities each time. The Engineer School

made the final decision that there would not be a mix of dozers

and ACEs in the TOEs. Dozer assets exist at the corps level,

specifically the combat support equipment company, that was

designed to augment divisional capabilities. That was part of

Response to Response to Response to

ìWhere Is the MT here Is the MT here Is the MTOE Guy?î OE Guy?î OE Guy?î

By Mr. Garry N. Hamlet

44 Engineer February 2002
the overall concept involved with the redesign of the engineer

support to the heavy division as we moved from an engineer

battalion to an engineer brigade.

Changes to Communications Equipment

Communications equipment continually evolves and

changes in the TOE, based on field input. The process of

changing communications equipment involves gaining

approval by the operational facility (OPFAC) board, which uses

a series of rules to provide communications equipment to

positions and organizations. For example, a battalion

commander in an engineer battalion, heavy division, gets

different equipment than a battalion commander in a

topographic battalion. When a change is submitted to the

OPFAC board, it evaluates the request based on doctrine and

the communications nets used. It balances this against the rest

of the division’s and corps’s communication nets to see if there

are enough nodes for the equipment to function as planned.

The current TOEs document the maximum amount of

communications equipment that the OPFAC board has

approved.

Capturing the Loss of Capability Associated with Eliminating

the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV)

Over the years, many proposals have been recommended

about this issue. DA directed eliminating the CEV and

associated personnel requirements for what it saw as an

essentially unsupportable vehicle. As the Army continued to

downsize, CEV personnel positions were reallocated. The

Engineer School was promised that the positions would be

returned when the Grizzly was fielded. However, the Grizzly

program is currently in jeopardy with only the Force XXI

organizations still reflecting a requirement. If the Grizzly program

is killed, a variation of the heavy division Force XXI TOE exists,

which was approved by the Engineer School leadership, in

which the third squad per platoon and the number of ACEs are

increased to offset the lost capabilities. For all non-Force XXI

units, the capability and personnel are still lost.

Adjustments to Various Quantities of Weapons and NightVision Devices

Many of these systems have been adjusted in the TOEs.

The Engineer School is currently reviewing the various mixes

of night-vision sights and goggles with the Infantry School,

the proponent for these devices, for approval to make changes

in the basis of issue. The goal is to have the same basis of

issue as the infantry.

Additional Maintenance Personnel in Various Military

Occupational Specialties (MOSs)

The number of positions in a TOE for maintenance is based

on the estimated number of hours per piece of equipment

required per year to keep the systems operational. This is known

as the manpower requirements criteria (MARC). It is not based

on a ratio of mechanics to rolling stock or ratio to radios, as is

often cited by units when comparing their maintenance sections

to that of the maneuver forces. All engineer TOEs are

documented to the full number of mechanics as authorized by

MARC. To add a position, the Engineer School would have to

request a deviation, which would require identifying a position

from another source due to the zero-sum-gain policy in the

Army’s force structure. MARC is not a perfect system, and the

Army is aware of the problems. The Army Materiel Command

is currently working to establish a study to reevaluate the hours

assigned to various pieces of equipment.

More Unit-Level Logistics System-Ground (ULLS-G) Boxes

and MOS 92As, Per Organization

According to MARC, the ULLS-G requires one 92A per box

to operate. To add more personnel means identifying positions

from another source because of the zero-sum-gain policy. The

structure of many TOEs was determined when they were

originally designed; risks were accepted in that area to sell the

overall concepts.

Conclusion

I

 encourage units with an MTOE problem to contact me or

 the Organization Branch at (573) 596-0131, ext 3-7236. We

 will assist you in analyzing whether it is an MTOE or a

TOE problem. We can also explain the logic behind how the

TOE was documented and if there is a possibility of achieving

any of your unit’s proposed changes. If it is an MTOE-only

problem, the installation’s Force Modernization Office can assist

you or you can contact your MACOM. The point of contact

for FORSCOM units is Captain Robert Kroning, (404) 464-7729;

the Office Chief of Army Reserve is Lieutenant Colonel

O’Conner, (703) 601-0649; and the National Guard Bureau is

Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jahner, (703) 607-7824.

Mr. Hamlet is the chief of the Engineer Organization

Branch, Maneuver Support Center, Directorate of Combat

Developments, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He has been

involved with the documentation of engineer TOEs for the

last 15 years.

February 2002 Engineer 45

Due to recent events, current and back issue of

Engineer are temporarily unavailable online. If you

would like a copy of an article, send your request

to: pbd@wood.army.mil. Please include your

organization or unit and your reason for requesting

the article. Include the issue of Engineer and the

date of publication. The table of contents for the

February 2001, May 2001, August 2001, and

February 2002 issues can be found at http://

www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/emag_hp.htm.
Adventure of a lifetime—this is what the Army Recruiting

home page promises today’s youth who are brave

enough to embark on a military career. For many

soldiers, this adventure includes the mountains of Korea, the

deserts of Saudi Arabia, the streets of Haiti, the jungles of

Panama, and other exotic locations. As engineers, we can expect

multiple opportunities for travel. But the adventure does not

have to be restricted to short-tour locations, peacekeeping

missions, and deployments. How would you like to spend a

couple of years in Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, or

Brussels? Instead of patrolling the streets, how about strolling

through the streets with your family taking in the local shops,

cuisine, and entertainment? Rather than handling personnel,

logistical, and maintenance challenges, how about the

challenge of pursuing graduate studies taught in a foreign

language at a foreign university? An opportunity exists for

just such an adventure—the Olmsted Scholarship Program.

Major General [Retired] George H. Olmsted stated,“The

United States is one of the major forces in the world today. As

a consequence, its military leaders come into contact with

citizens and military leaders of many nations. Relationships

between nations require a unique consideration of many factors

including political, economic, and military. It is not enough to

know one’s own strengths, weaknesses, and general characteristics. The solutions of difficulties that arise between nations

require knowledge and depth of understanding of the particular

nations involved.” General Olmsted served in the War

Department, North Africa, and China during World War II. His

experiences, particularly in China, convinced him that American

military leaders lacked exposure and sensitivity to foreign

cultures. Therefore, to educate young military officers in foreign

cultures to better prepare them for senior leadership in the

military, he established the Olmsted Scholarship Program in

1959, in cooperation with the Department of Defense.

Annually, the George and Carol Olmsted Foundation awards

an educational grant to officers from the Army, Navy, and Air

Force, to participate in 2 years of graduate education at a foreign

university. The intent of the program is to immerse the officers

and their families in a foreign culture, where the officers are

expected to familiarize themselves with the institutions, cu

language, and people of the host nation. Before reportin

country, the officers attend intensive language training to 

for study in a foreign language. Spouses also receive gr

language training. Finally, due to the inherent challen

earning a degree at a foreign university, the Olmsted Fou

offers an additional modest grant to scholars to pursue a g

degree upon returning from overseas or anytime durin

military career. They must, however, coordinate with thei

branch before accepting the grant.

The Olmsted scholarship provides a unique, releva

enduring career opportunity. Major General Bruce Sc

senior Army Olmsted scholar on active duty, serves 

Board of Directors of the Olmsted Foundation. MG Sc

engineer, was in the Olmsted scholar class of 1979 and a

the University of Freiburg, Germany. He earned 

opportunities to use his experience as an Olmsted scho

commanded the 16th Engineer Battalion and the En

Brigade, 1st Armored Division—both located in Germa

also served as a White House Fellow and on several 

Army and Department of Defense staffs. His dutie

included military assistant to the Executive Secretary 

Secretary of Defense; executive assistant to the Vice Ch

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and chief, legislative liaison

of the Secretary of the Army. MG Scott is curren

commanding general, U.S. Army Security Assistance Com

The Olmsted scholarship also provides an excellent p

opportunity for the military scholars and their families. C

Dave Ridenour, commander of the Pittsburgh District, U.S

Corps of Engineers, attended the University of Innsb

Austria as a 1982 scholar. He states, “We had a great 

experience. My wife, children, and I consider the vil

Mils, Austria, as our second home. The people we m

became friends with are friends for life.” He adds, “For 

experience was invaluable. I realized the importance of l

another language and culture.” Colonel John W. Pe

commander of the Engineer Brigade, 3d Infantry Di

attended El Colegio de Mexico and refers to the O

Scholarship Program as the “best deal in the Army.”

By Captain Michelle Anderson

Adventure of a Lifetime

46 Engineer February 
The Engineer Regiment boasts several other Olmsted

scholars. They include Captain Elias Ursitti, who began studies

at the University of St. Petersburg in Russia this fall, and Captain

Albert Mategrano III, who will study at the Institute of Political

Studies in Paris, France, once he completes language training.

The chart above lists engineer Olmsted scholars spanning more

than 30 years.

Are you interested in competing for an adventure of a lifetime

and adding your name to this list of distinguished engineer

officers? Check out www.perscom.army.mil/opfamacs/

FELLOWS07.htm for information on eligibility criteria and

application procedures. The primary target is branch-qualified

captains. The next PERSCOM Olmsted selection board meets in

February 2003. Interested officers should contact their assignment

office. You must be available not later than August 2003.

General Olmsted believed that “the greatest leaders must be

educated broadly.” This education can take place during any

assignment at any location. The Army offers multiple chances

for adventure. The Olmsted scholarship is just one of many

opportunities available to the Engineer Regiment. It may be

just the adventure you and your family are looking for.

Captain Anderson is the non-branch-qualified ca

assignments and future readiness officer. Previously, s

the chief, civilian education, at PERSCOM, respons

executing the Army’s advanced civil schooling, traini

industry, and fellowship/scholarship programs.

1986 – Institute of Political Studies

 France

1987 – Pontifical Catholic Universi

 of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

1992 – University of Zurich, Switze

1998 – National University of Tucu

 Argentina

2002 – Institute of Political Studies

 France

2001 – University of Petersburg, R

Due to recent events, the 2002 Engineer Unit

Directory is temporarily unavailable online. It i

also not available in printed format. If you wou

like a copy of the Microsoft Word document fi

(1,102KB), send your request to:

 pbd@wood.army.mil

If you have changes to your unit’s listing, plea

let us know.

Did You Know?

February 2002 Engi

g

Colonel (Retired) 

y , 

McClure, Robert L. Colonel USMA 1976 1983 – Gutenberg University, Germ

Sole, Thomas R. Major (Retired) USMA 1980

Fullerton, William B. Lieutenant Colonel USMA 1981

Grewatz, Vincent E. Lieutenant Colonel USMA 1982 1988 – University of Munich, Germ

Peabody, John W. Colonel USMA 1980 1988 – El Colegio de Mexico, Mexi

Jordan, John D. Lieutenant Colonel University of Toledo

1982

Raymer, James H. Major USMA 1989

Ursitti, Elias

Mategrano, Albert

Captain

Captain

USMA 1993

USMA 1991
48 Engineer F

duddlestonw@wood.army.mil.

Organizational Changes. DOT has made two significant structural changes. First, we elevated the Countermine Traini

Center/Humanitarian Demining Training Center from under DOI to a position directly under the Director of Training. Secon

mental staff is now directly under the assistant commandant. Both changes reflect the increased presence and visibility of th

WANTED! Applicants for Terrain Analysis Technician Warrant Officer. NCOs in MOS 81T with 4 to 12 years of 

apply. You can find the duty description in DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure. Information 

become a warrant officer is on the Warrant Officer Career Center home page, http://leav-www.army.mil/wocc/. The accession 

for May 2002, and you must submit your packet to the appropriate component by 26 April 2002.

POC is CW4 Frederick Kerber, 34088; DSN -4088; or e-mail kerberf@wood.army.mil.

ASI 2S (Battle Staff Operations). Revisions will add coding for selected table of organization and equipment (TOE) an

TOE positions as engineer operations sergeant and construction foreman in the following positions:

Center for Engineer Lessons Learned (CELL). We are continually updating the lessons learned Web site, and we are w

the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to link our two databases/Web sites. We thank units tha

electronic copies of their tactical SOPs, which are on the Engineer School CELL Web site at http://www.wood.army.mil/CELL

We ask units that have developed a Leader Certification Program to send an electronic copy of their documents to be posted 

site as well. Also, please continue to forward engineer lessons learned from exercises and operations. Others can benefit from 

experiences. Contact this office if you have questions about engineer lessons learned, the digital SOP, or the Leader Certificat

POC is Mr. Reggie Snodgrass, 37762; DSN -7762; or e-mail snodgrar@wood.army.mil.

The Army School System FY01/02 Accreditation/Assessment Visits. Accreditation evaluations of Region B (80th D

[IT]), Region E (84th Division [IT]), and 4960th Multifunctional Brigade, Hawaii, are complete. All three organizations w

The assessment evaluations of Regions A (98th Division [IT]), C (108th Division [IT]), D (100th Division [IT]), F (95th 

[IT]), and G (104th Division [IT]) are complete. During FY02, Region C (108th Division [IT]); Region F (95th Division [I

G (104th Division [IT]); and the Combat Support Battalion, 8th Brigade (108th Division [IT]), Puerto Rico, will be evalu

accreditation. All other regions will undergo assessment evaluations.

POC is MAJ James Avants, 34114; DSN -4114; or e-mail avantsj@wood.army.mil.

TOE Unit Para/Line No Section Title Grade

05336L000

05053L000

05113L000

HHC, Engr Bn Hvy Div

Engr Co, ACR

HHC, Engr Bn Inf Div Lt

HHC, Engr Bn Air Asslt

Engr Co, Sep Inf Bde

Engr Co, ACR

Engr Co, Hvy Sep Bde

HHC, Engr Bn, Abn Div

HHC, Engr Bn, Hvy Div

08/01

08/02

07-02

14/02

14/03

16/02

16/03

07/02

08/02

08/02

08/03

14/02

14/03

05/02

05/03

Assistant brigade engineer

Regimental engineer

Brigade engineer

Brigade engineer

Brigade engineer

Regimental engineer

Brigade engineer

Brigade engineer

Assistant brigade engineer

Operations sergeant

Construction foreman

Operations sergeant

Operations sergeant

Construction foreman

Operations sergeant

Construction foreman

Operations sergeant

Operations sergeant

Operations sergeant

Construction foreman

Operations sergeant

Construction foreman

Operations sergeant

Construction foreman

12B40

12B40

12B40

05153L000

05156A000

05216A000

12B40

12B30

12B40

12B30

12B40

12B30

12B40

12B30

12B40

12B30

12B40

12B30

05143L000

05026A000

05336F000
February 2002 Enginee

as follows:

Engineer Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Although there have been minor modifications in the Bradley A3 fielding plan due to the

refinement of the Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan and the Unit Set Fielding Strategy, the plan for fielding M2A2-Operation De

Storm (ODS) vehicles to III Corps and 2d Infantry Division engineer units remains essentially unchanged.

What has changed is the availability of certain resident training courses at Fort Benning, Georgia, due to the recent consolidation of

MOS 11Ms (mechanized infantryman) and 11Bs (light infantryman). Details on the impact of these changes on our engineer Bradley

training strategy and other Bradley news can be found on the Warfighter Web page at http://www.wood.army.mil/warfighterBradley.htm

POC is MAJ Otis Cagle, 37747; DSN -7747; or e-mail caglee@wood.army.mil.

 as follows:

POC is Mr. Ed Zielonka, 37061; DSN -7061; or e-mail

zielonke@wood.army.mil.

POC is MAJ Steve Cross, 34128; DSN -4128; or e-mail

crosss@wood.army.mil.

3 ID 29 N/A 4 Qtr 07 1 Qtr 08

Quantity ODS Source ODS Turn-In (funded separately) Unit OPNET

1 Cav

1 Cav

1 Cav

4 ID

4 ID

4 ID

3 ACR

2 ID

2 ID

3 ID

3 ID

91 Engr

20 Engr

8 Engr

299 Engr

588 Engr

4 Engr

43 Engr Co

2 Engr

44 Engr

10 Engr

11 Engr

317 Engr

29

29

29

29

29

29

13

29

29

29

29

2-5 Cav, 1 CD

2-5 Cav, 1 CD

1-9 Cav, 1 CD

2-7 Cav, 1 CD

2-7 Cav, 1 CD

2-7 Cav, 1 CD (5)

1-22 Inf, 4 ID (24)

2 ID/F

2 ID/F (1)

4 ID/R (28)

1-22 Inf, 4 ID (24)

UFR

UFR

UFR

Sep - Dec 01

Sep - Dec 01

Dec 02 - Mar 03

Mar - May 03

Mar - May 03

Mar - May 03 (1 CD)

2 Qtr 04 (4 ID)

Mar - May 04 (4 ID)

4 Qtr 05

2 Qtr 06

N/A

N/A

Mar - Jul 02

Aug - Nov 02

May - Sep 03

Jun - Oct 03

Jul - Nov 03

Aug - Dec 03 (1 CD)

N/A (4 ID)

N/A

1 Qtr 06

3 Qtr 06

1 Qtr 07

2 Qtr 07

Jul - Oct 02

Jan - Mar 03

Aug - Dec 03

Jan - May 04

Aug - Dec 03

Jun - Sep 04

Sep - Oct 04

2 Qtr 06

4 Qtr 06

2 Qtr 07

4 Qtr 07

Higher

HQ

Digital Upgrade

Class Report Start End

ECCC 1-02 09 Nov 01 13 Nov 01 04 Apr 02

ECCC 2-02 15 Mar 02 18 Mar 02 23 Jul 02

ECCC 3-02 03 May 02 06 May 02 11 Sep 02

ECCC 4-02 09 Aug 02 13 Aug 02 19 Dec 02

Class Report Start End

ECRC 2-02 30 Nov 01 03 Dec 01 14 Dec 01

ECRC 3-02 18 Jan 02 22 Jan 02 24 Feb 02

ECRC 4-02 22 Feb 02 25 Feb 02 08 Mar 02

ECRC 5-02 12 Apr 02 15 Apr 02 26 Apr 02

Class Report Start End

003 13 Jan 02 14 Jan 02 25 Jan 02

005 03 Mar 02 04 Mar 02 15 Mar 02

007 07 Apr 02 08 Apr 02 19 Apr 02

Directorate of Training Development (DOTD)

Visual Archives. The History Office at the Engineer School is developing a visual archives. It currently has more than 18,00

photographs, largely from World War II and Korea. Units that would like to contribute photographs (copies) or other visual materia

should contact Dr. Larry D. Roberts, Historian, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473. Where possible

caption information should accompany the images. If you have questions, please call Dr. Roberts at (573) 563-6109.