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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MIGUEL WILLIAMSON

(AC 36451)

Alvord, Keller and Harper, Js.

Argued December 1, 2014—officially released January 27, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, geographical area number fourteen,

Bentivegna, J.)

Thomas S. Rome, for the appellant (defendant).

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s

attorney, and Mark Brodsky, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendant, Miguel Williamson,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing

his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. He claims

that the court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following undisputed facts appear in the record.

On August 15, 2012, the defendant pleaded guilty to

possession of marijuana with the intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (b). The court canvassed the defendant, accepted his plea, and sentenced

him to a term of incarceration of seven years, execution

suspended after eighteen months, followed by three

years of probation. On August 13, 2013, seven days

before he began to serve the probationary portion of

his sentence, the defendant filed a petition for a writ

of error coram nobis, in which he alleged, inter alia,

that, in connection with his guilty plea, he received

ineffective assistance from his trial counsel and that,

consequently, he lacked knowledge of the nature of the

charge. On this ground, he requested that the judgment

of conviction ‘‘be reopened and voided’’ and that he

‘‘be given a new opportunity to reach a just resolution

to his case.’’ Additionally, the defendant alleged that he

was unaware of any other adequate remedy at law.

The state objected to the petition on the ground that

the court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant,

who began serving the probationary portion of his sentence on August 20, 2013, had an adequate remedy at

law, namely, the right to file a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. The defendant filed a written response

in which he represented that, upon the commencement

of his probation, he was no longer in the custody of the

state, but was currently in a facility in Massachusetts, in

the custody of the United States Bureau of Immigration

and Customs Enforcement, while proceedings to

remove him from the United States were underway.

Further, the defendant stated that, in these circumstances, his ability to petition for a writ of habeas corpus

was not an adequate remedy because it would not afford

him ‘‘any relief from removal.’’ In a supplemental memorandum of law in support of his petition, the defendant

represented that, on November 22, 2013, the United

States Immigration Court ordered that he be deported

from the United States. The defendant asserted that,

under these circumstances in which he was awaiting

deportation, the writ of error coram nobis was his only

adequate remedy.

On December 19, 2013, the court held a hearing

related to the jurisdictional issue, during which it heard

arguments from both parties in this case.In its decision,1

the court set forth the relevant and undisputed facts,

and dismissed the petition for a writ of error coram
nobis after concluding as a matter of law that it lacked

jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The court determined that the defendant, who was serving a period of

probation, had an adequate remedy at law because he

had the ability to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

This appeal followed.

Reiterating in substance the arguments he advanced

before the trial court, the defendant relies on the fact

that, at the time that the court dismissed his petition,

he was no longer in the physical custody of the state,

but was serving his probation while in federal custody

and awaiting deportation from the United States.2 Without stating that he had the right to petition for a writ

of habeas corpus, he asserts that such legal remedy

was inadequate given his circumstances because ‘‘there

is no reasonable and practical prospect for timely adjudication of a prisoner’s application for a habeas writ

when the prisoner faces immediate forced removal by

[the United States Department of Homeland Security].’’

Underlying the defendant’s argument is his belief that,

in contrast with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is the only

means of providing practical relief to him in a timely

manner so as to thwart his deportation, which was a

consequence of his conviction.3 The state urges us to

agree with the trial court that dismissal was proper

because the defendant had other legal remedies by

which to seek redress, such as a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. Alternatively, the state urges us to

conclude that dismissal was proper because, if the writ

of error coram nobis existed in the common law, it has

been supplanted by other remedies in Connecticut law

and therefore is no longer a viable remedy.4

‘‘Adetermination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and, therefore, we

employ the plenary standard of review and decide

whetherthe court’s conclusions are legally and logically

correct and supported by the facts in the record. . . .

[I]t is well established that a reviewing court properly

may address jurisdictional claims that neither were

raised nor ruled on in the trial court. Indeed, [o]nce the

question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised,

[it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is

presented. . . . The court must fully resolve it before

proceeding further with the case.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Warner v. Bicknell,

126 Conn. App. 588, 594, 12 A.3d 1042 (2011). ‘‘Jurisdiction involves the powerin a court to hear and determine

the cause of action presented to it and its source is the

constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is

created. . . . Article fifth, § 1 of the Connecticut constitution proclaims that [t]he powers and jurisdiction of

the courts shall be defined by law, and General Statutes

§ 51-164s provides that [t]he superior court shall be

the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of

actions, except such actions over which the courts of
probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute. . . . The Superior Court is a constitutional court

of general jurisdiction. . . . In the absence of statutory

or constitutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction

are delineated by the common law.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence,

281 Conn. 147, 153, 913 A.2d 428 (2007).

‘‘A writ of error coram nobis is an ancient commonlaw remedy which authorized the trial judge, within

three years, to vacate the judgment of the same court

if the party aggrieved by the judgment could present

facts, not appearing in the record, which, if true, would

show that such judgment was void or voidable. . . .

The facts must be unknown at the time of the trial

without fault of the party seeking relief. . . . A writ of

error coram nobis lies only in the unusual situation [in

which] no adequate remedy is provided by law. . . .

Moreover, when habeas corpus affords a proper and

complete remedy the writ of error coram nobis will

not lie.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Das, 291 Conn. 356, 370–71, 968 A.2d

367 (2009); see also State v. Henderson, 259 Conn. 1,

3, 787 A.2d 514 (2002) (writ of error coram nobis

unavailable when proper remedy afforded by means of

writ of habeas corpus); State v. Grisgraber, 183 Conn.

383, 385, 439 A.2d 377 (1981) (writ of error coram nobis

unavailable when proper remedy afforded by means

of appeal).

To the extent that the defendant argues that he was

unable to petition for a writ of habeas corpus because

he had completed his definite term of incarceration and

was serving the probationary portion of his sentence,

this argument is legally unsound. Recently, this court

rejected a similar argument, concluding that probation

constituted a form of legal restraint that satisfied the

custody requirement of General Statutes § 52-466. See

State v. Stephenson, 154 Conn. App. 587, 588, A.3d

(2015) (reversing judgment denying petition for

writ of error coram nobis and remanding case with

direction to dismiss petition because defendant serving

probation had ability to obtain relief by way of petition

for writ of habeas corpus). Neither the defendant’s probationary status nor his federal detention impeded his

ability to petition for a writ of habeas corpus and,

thereby, to raise a claim related to the representation

afforded him by his trial counsel in connection with his

guilty plea.

To the extent that the defendant argues that a writ of

habeas corpus would afford him a ‘‘nominal, technical,

theoretical, or‘academic’remedy,’’ because it would not

provide him with timely relief, we are not persuaded.

Before the trial court, the defendant argued that the

writ of error coram nobis was the only available remedy

because the relief he could obtain in connection with

a writ of habeas corpus would not occur in time to
prevent his deportation. He argued that even if he

obtained relief in the form of a new trial, ‘‘there is no

conceivable chance, practically speaking, that [his] case

could be reopened in time to forestall or vacate his

federal removal order.’’ In terms of timeliness, we

observe that, although he was convicted on August 15,

2012, he did not file the present petition until August

13, 2013, seven days before he began to serve the probationary portion of his sentence. The defendant filed the

petition at issue approximately three months prior to

the time at which he received his final order of deportation on November 22, 2013, a fact that substantially

weakens the force of his argument that the writ of error

coram nobis, rather than a writ of habeas corpus, was

a necessary remedy in light of the immediacy of his

removal.

Additionally, beyond stating his subjective belief that

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus would not provide

him with timely relief, the defendant did not present

any evidence in this regard before the trial court. As

the state correctly observes, in the context of a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, the defendant could have

requested that the habeas court adjudicate the matter

expeditiously. This fact helps to allay reasonable concerns related to timeliness.5

In support of this observation, the state aptly has cited in its brief numerous

examples of habeas court decisions in which such

courts have adjudicated petitions for writs of habeas

corpus in an expedited manner because they involved

the rights of petitioners who, like the defendant in the

present case, were facing issues related to deportation.

Moreover, the defendant has not cited any legal authority that stands for the proposition that, in the present

circumstances, in which deportation was imminent, the

writ of habeas corpus is not an adequate legal remedy.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the court

properly dismissed the petition for a writ of error

coram nobis.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The court delivered its decision orally at the conclusion of the hearing,

but later created a signed transcript of its decision in compliance with

Practice Book § 64-1 (a).

2

In his brief to this court, the defendant represents that an appeal from

the decision of the United States Immigration Court is pending and that he

is presently incarcerated underthe authority ofthe United States Department

of Homeland Security at a facility in Alabama.

3 The defendant argues: ‘‘Were a writ of error coram nobis be allowed,

on remand, for the instant case, a hearing in Superior Court on all factual

issues presented by [the defendant’s] circumstances could likely be scheduled within weeks, at worst. This is not so for an application for a writ

of habeas corpus: scheduling delays are well-known to practitioners and

judges alike.’’

4 Because we conclude that dismissal of the petition was proper because

there was at least one other remedy available to the defendant, we do not

reach the state’s alternative argument in which it calls into question the

viability of the writ of error coram nobis. See also State v. Stephenson, 154

Conn. App. 587, 590 n.4, A.3d (2015) (upholding dismissal of petition

for writ of error coram nobis because ‘‘even if the [writ of error coram
nobis] does exist, the prerequisites for granting relief were not met’’); State

v. Carter, 142 Conn. App. 156, 161 n.5, 64 A.3d 366 (2013) (‘‘[a]ssuming

that the writ of error coram nobis exists, we conclude that the court lacked

jurisdiction over the petitions at issue herein’’ [emphasis in original]).

5 There is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant has filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus related to the issue set forth in the

present petition.