Filed 6 / 28 / 24 Sadeghi v. Sadeghi CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) , prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.11 15.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANGIZEH SADEGHI,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SIDNEY SADEGHI,

Defendant and Appellant. G062028

(Super. Ct. No. 30

- 2021

- 01228676)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Martha K. Gooding, Judge. Affirmed. Requests for judicial

notice denied. Motion to dismiss denied.

Holt Law Firm and Peter T. Holt for Defendant and Appellant.
Maralan Law and Sam Maralan for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *2 Angizeh Sadeghi (Angizeh) sued her brother Arman Sadeghi
(Arman) and his former spouse

, Sidney Sadeghi (Sidney)

, for failing to repay

a loan

. 1 At the time the lawsuit was filed , Sidney and Arman were in the

middle of a dissolution proceeding in which they both listed the loan as a
community debt. Angizeh obtained a default judgment in the civil case ; Sidney later sought to vacate the default on the grounds the court lacked
jurisdiction to issue orders affecting a community debt. We are not
persuaded and t herefore affirm

.

FACTS

Sidney and Arman married in 2009. In 2018, Sidney and Arman

received a loan from Angizeh. In 2020, Sidney filed for divorce

. In their
pleadings, Sidney and Arman both identified the loan as a community debt.
In 2021, while the dissolution matter was pending in the family law c ourt
, Angizeh filed a separate civil complaint against Sidney and Arman which
alleged breach of the loan agreement

. In 2022, while the mar i tal dissolution
matter was still pending, the court entered a default judgment against
Sidney and Arman. Sidney later filed a motion to vacate the default
judgment on the grounds the family law court had priority jurisdiction and,

the civil court therefore lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

loan. The court denied the motion. 2

1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

2 Sidney requests we exercise our discretion and take judicial notice of certain trial court pleading s filed in the family law case. Since Sidney has no basis to appeal

, we decline to judicially notice these documents.3 DISCUSSION
Sidney appeals from an order denying her request to vacate the
default judgment. 3 It is well established that Sidney can appeal from the
court’s ruling only if the underlying default judgment is void. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 473, subd. (d )

. ) A default judgment is void if the issuing court did not
have jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter of the action when the
judgment was entered

. ( Kingston Constructors, Inc. v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (1997) 14 Cal.4th 939, 951

- 952 ; Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250

. ) A void
judgment is the equivalent of no judgment at all. ( LAOSD Asbestos Cases
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 862, 870 ( LAOSD Asbestos Cases ).) A party can attack
a void judgment at any time after its entry . ( Ibid. )

When a court with personal and subject matter jurisdiction over a

case act s beyond the bounds of its jurisdictional authority, such action is

voidable rather than void

. A court exceed s its jurisdiction al authority when

its action “ contravene[ es ] certain defined limitations on the exercise of its

powe rs [citation] ; ordinary mistakes of law or procedure do not constitute acts
in excess of jurisdiction. ” ( LAOSD Asbestos Cases , supra , 28 Cal.App.5th at

3 Sidney’s n otice of m otion and m otion to v acate d efault and to d ismiss for l ack of s ubject m atter j urisdiction make no mention of a statutory basis for the motion. Sidney only mentions Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), once o n the final page of her m emoran dum of points and authorities

. The trial court treated the motion as brought under section 473, subdivision (d), which permits the court to set aside a void judgment upon motion of a party . ( Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) Accordingly, we treat this as an appeal from a denial of a statutory motion to
vacate a default judgment. We note even if this were an appeal from a nonstatutory motion to vacate a default judgment , we would reach the same conclusion.4

p. 870.) A judgment in excess of a court ’ s jur isdiction remains valid unless it
is set aside in the same action. ( Id. at p. 871.)

Here, Sidney contends that because the family court was first to
assert jurisdiction over the loan , the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue

orders or judgments relating to the loan , and its default judgment was

therefore void. We disagree

.

E ven if the doctrine of priority jurisdiction applie s , the judgment

here is voidabl e rather than void

. Under the doctrine of priority jurisdiction,

when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute , th e
court which first assumes jurisdiction over the subject matter does so to the

exclusion of others

. ( BBBB Bonding Corp. v. Caldwell (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
349, 374.) “ The rule is based upon t he public policies of avoiding conflicts
that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory
decisions or awards relating to the same controversy and preventing
vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits. ” ( Shaw v. Superior Court ( 2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255.) But t his does not mean the second court lacks
jurisdiction. The second court re tains jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter. It simply must wait to act until the first court resolves its

action

. ( Id. at p. 255

- 256 .)

Therefore

, even assuming the priority jurisdiction doctrine
applies here

, it would limit the power of the trial court to act ; it would not

divest the court of jurisdiction

. The default judgment would therefore be
voidable, not void . Accordingly, Sidney has no grounds to appeal

, and we

affirm the court’s ruling

. 4

4 Angizeh filed a motion to dismiss the a ppeal on disentitlement grounds. As we affirm, the motion becomes moot.5 DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to vacate
default judgment is affirmed

. Respondent shall recover her costs incurred on
appeal.

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

DELANEY, J.