IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ryan William Lieberman :

:

 v. : No. 1047 C.D. 2021

: Submitted: March 11, 2022

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: April 29, 2022

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau 

of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals the September 10, 2021 order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Northampton County (the trial court), which sustained Ryan

William Lieberman’s (Lieberman) driver’s license suspension appeal, thereby 

prohibiting DOT from enforcing a five-year suspension of Lieberman’s operating 

privilege following his third conviction for a driving under the influence (DUI)

offense. On appeal, DOT argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing 

to apply this Court’s bright-line rule that a delay between a DUI conviction and a 

notice of license suspension is not an extraordinary delay unless it exceeds the period 
2

of the license suspension plus 10 days. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

trial court. 

I. Background

DOT suspended Lieberman’s Pennsylvania driver’s license for 30 days on 

March 25, 2015, following his acceptance into the accelerated rehabilitative 

disposition program for a first offense DUI. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 54a, 59a. 

DOT suspended Lieberman’s Pennsylvania driver’s license for the second time on

January 31, 2018, following Liberman’s conviction for a second DUI offense on 

December 13, 2017. R.R. at 48a. This suspension was for 18 months. Id. 

Lieberman received his sentence for his third DUI offense on December 21, 

2017. R.R. at 72a. He did not receive a separate notice of suspension from DOT 

after this DUI conviction, and he testified in this matter that he was not aware at the 

time of his guilty plea that he would be considered a habitual offender and be 

subjected to a five-year driver’s license suspension. R.R. at 33a-34a.

On February 11, 2021, the clerk of the trial court electronically transmitted a 

notice to DOT that Lieberman had completed treatment. R.R. at 52a. On February 

20, 2021, DOT mailed Lieberman a letter indicating he was eligible to have his 

driver’s license restored. R.R. at 77a-78a. Lieberman paid the restoration fee and 

complied with the requirements of the restoration letter, including paying over 

$250.00 to have an ignition interlock device installed in his vehicle. R.R. at 25a-26a. 

DOT restored Lieberman’s driver’s license in late March 2021. R.R. at 25a. 

The clerk of the trial court did not electronically submit notification of 

Lieberman’s third DUI conviction to DOT until June 1, 2021 – almost three and half

years after the date of the conviction. R.R. at 46a. The clerk of the trial court is 

statutorily required to make this report within 10 days of the conviction. See 75 
3

Pa.C.S. § 6323. After receiving the delayed notification, DOT mailed Lieberman a 

notice of suspension on June 9, 2021. R.R. at 19a. This notice informed Lieberman 

that he was considered a habitual offender and was subject to a five-year driver’s 

license revocation, beginning on July 14, 2021. R.R. at 41a. 

Lieberman timely appealed the notice of suspension to the trial court, which 

conducted an evidentiary appeal hearing. At that hearing, Lieberman stated that he 

no longer drinks alcohol and has not had any contact with law enforcement, been 

arrested, or had any Vehicle Code1 violations since his last DUI conviction in 

December 2017. R.R. at 32a-33a. Lieberman also stated that on June 7, 2021, his

employer, knowing that he had his driver’s license restored, offered him a promotion 

to a position that would require him to be able to drive to his employer’s various 

locations. R.R. at 29a, 31a, 32a. Relying on his driver’s license, Lieberman accepted 

the promotion, which raised his compensation from approximately $36,000.00 per 

year to $59,000.00 per year. R.R. at 31a-32a. 

After hearing evidence and considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court 

found that DOT’s delay in imposing Lieberman’s driver’s license suspension was 

an extraordinary delay that violated Lieberman’s due process rights. R.R. at 97a. 

Accordingly, the trial court sustained Lieberman’s appeal. R.R. at 81a.

II. Discussion

On appeal, DOT asserts that this Court previously established a bright-line 

rule that an extraordinary delay in imposing an operating privilege suspension only 

exists if the delay exceeds the length of the suspension plus 10 days. Appellant’s 

Br. at 4. DOT further asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law for not 

applying that bright-line rule in this matter. Id.

1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9805.
4

“In reviewing a driver’s license suspension case, our standard of review is 

limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact were supported by 

substantial evidence, whether errors of law had been committed or whether the trial 

court’s determination demonstrated a manifest abuse of discretion.” Finnegan v. 

Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 844 A.2d 645, 647 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2004) (citation omitted). “The scope of review is plenary . . . when the matter 

involves no disputed facts, and nothing but a question of law is considered.” Id.

A review of the record reveals that no disputed facts exist in this matter. Due 

to his three DUI convictions, Lieberman should have received a five-year driver’s 

license suspension as a habitual offender. See 75 Pa.C.S. §1542. Following his 

second license suspension, however, DOT restored Lieberman’s driver’s license. 

Relying on the restoration of his operating privilege, Lieberman accepted a job that 

required him to be able to drive. At nearly the same time, the clerk of the trial court

electronically sent a notification to DOT of Lieberman’s third DUI conviction, 

which had occurred almost three and a half years earlier. DOT then sent Lieberman 

a notice of driver’s license suspension. The delay between Lieberman’s third DUI 

conviction and the notification of driver’s license suspension was not caused by 

DOT, nor was it caused by Lieberman.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has extensively analyzed whether DOT may 

suspend a person’s driver’s license based upon a DUI conviction when there is a 

significant delay between the conviction and the notice of suspension. See Dep’t of 

Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Middaugh, 244 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2021)

(Middaugh II). In Middaugh II, our Supreme Court was reviewing this Court’s 

ruling in Middaugh v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 

196 A.3d 1073 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (Middaugh I). In Middaugh I, this Court 
5

established a bright-line rule that a delay between a DUI conviction and a notice of 

driver’s license suspension can only be an extraordinary delay if it exceeds the length 

of the suspension plus 10 days. Middaugh I, 196 A.3d at 1083. In reviewing that 

determination, our Supreme Court began by noting that the DUI driver’s license 

suspension statutes (75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802, 3804, 6323(1)(i)) are mandatory, and that 

they require license suspensions even when “administrative lapses” occur. 

Middaugh II, 244 A.3d at 433. The Court noted, however, that “restrictions imposed 

by the Constitution can limit whether otherwise-valid legislation may be applied in 

specific circumstances.” Id.

Our Supreme Court then analyzed state and federal due process jurisprudence

and agreed with this Court’s prior line of decisions, including Middaugh I, “to the 

extent it suggests that a license suspension which is unreasonably delayed through 

no fault of the driver’s can potentially result in a denial of due process.” Id. at 436. 

The Court then determined that a driver’s due process rights were not affected by 

“whether the delay is chargeable to [DOT] or the clerk of the common pleas court.” 

Id. at 437. The Court then noted that in considering a driver’s due process challenge, 

a court must engage in a “means-end” analysis to determine if there is a “connection 

between a suspension of privileges and the legislative goal of protecting the public.” 

Id. To do this, a court must consider any additional violations a driver had during 

the course of the delay, the “severity and age of any further violations,” and the 

“severity of the predicate offense.” Id. Finally, the Court noted that a driver must 

be able to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from the delay to establish a due 

process violation. Id. 

Although the Supreme Court extensively reviewed and affirmed our decision 

in Middaugh I, it carefully limited the extent to which it agreed with our analysis. 
6

See generally Middaugh II, 244 A.3d 426. Pertinent to this matter, the Supreme 

Court did not endorse the bright-line rule we established in Middaugh I that a delay 

could only be an extraordinary delay if it exceeded the length of the suspension plus 

10 days. Id. Instead, the Supreme Court engaged in the fact-specific analysis 

outlined above to determine if a driver’s constitutional due process rights can restrict 

DOT’s statutory right to impose a driver’s license suspension when a significant 

delay exists between a DUI conviction and a driver’s license suspension. See 

generally Middaugh II, 244 A.3d 426. 

With regard to the specific facts presented in Middaugh II, our Supreme Court 

determined:

[T]he approximately 28-month delay in this case can appropriately be 

viewed as denying Appellee his due process rights. Although this is not 

as long as the delays that have occurred in some [other cases], it seems 

to us objectively unreasonable for a driver to have to wait nearly two 

and a half years for administrative action that is expected to occur 

within approximately two months – and would occur during that 

timeframe where the governmental entities involved are functioning 

competently, as citizens have a right to expect them to do.

. . . .

We therefore agree with the Commonwealth Court majority that a 

suspension at this late date will have lost much of its effectiveness with 

regard to its underlying legislative purposes, result in prejudice which 

can be attributed to the delay, and ultimately deny fundamental fairness.

Id. at 438, 439. 

In this matter, the trial court reviewed the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Middaugh II and determined, as we have also determined, that “the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court did not adopt the use of [a] bright-line rule.” R.R. at 96a. The trial
7

court then found that the delay of nearly three and a half years between Lieberman’s 

third DUI conviction and the notice of driver’s license suspension was extraordinary, 

and that it violated Lieberman’s due process rights. R.R. at 96a-97a. 

Instead of challenging the trial court’s due process determination,2 DOT’s 

only assertion on appeal is that the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to 

apply the bright-line rule we established in Middaugh I that an extraordinary delay 

can only exist if the delay between a DUI conviction and a notice of driver’s license 

suspension exceeds the period of the driver’s license suspension plus 10 days. As 

fully outlined above, however, our Supreme Court in Middaugh II did not endorse 

the use of this bright-line rule. As prescribed by Middaugh II, the trial court engaged 

in a fact-specific due process analysis in this matter. In doing so, the trial court did 

not commit an error of law. 

III. Conclusion

In Middaugh II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a fact-specific 

analysis for determining if a driver’s constitutional due process rights can restrict 

DOT’s statutory right to impose a driver’s license suspension when a significant 

delay exists between a DUI conviction and a notice of driver’s license suspension. 

The Supreme Court did not endorse a bright-line rule for determining a length of 

delay that does not violate a driver’s due process rights. Accordingly, DOT’s only 

contention on appeal – that the trial court erred as a matter of law by not applying 

2 DOT did not request review of, or address in its brief, whether the delay in this matter 

violated Lieberman’s due process rights. Accordingly, DOT has waived any challenges to the trial 

court’s determination that the delay violated Lieberman’s due process rights. See Muretic v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.), 934 A.2d 752, 758 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) 

(citations omitted) (stating that under Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 2116(a) and 

2119(a), an issue that is not addressed either in the statement of questions involved or argument 

section of the appellant’s brief is waived). 
8

such a bright-line rule – is without merit. Therefore, we affirm the order of the trial 

court.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ryan William Lieberman :

:

 v. : No. 1047 C.D. 2021

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

O R D E R 

AND NOW, this 29th day of April 2022, the September 10, 2021 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County in this matter is AFFIRMED. 

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge