Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Balark, 2019 IL App (1st) 171626

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

DERIC BALARK, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Third Division

No. 1-17-1626

Filed November 20, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-CR-7930; the 

Hon. Joan Margaret O’Brien, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Joseph Michael Benak, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,

Janet C. Mahoney, and David H. Iskowichm, Assistant State’s 

Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Gordon and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant Deric Balark was found guilty of unlawful use or 

possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant 

to a term of six years in prison. 

¶ 2 Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because the police lacked probable cause to arrest 

defendant and (2) the State failed to prove defendant guilty of UUWF beyond a reasonable 

doubt.

¶ 3 In May 2016, defendant was indicted on two counts of UUWF, four counts of aggravated 

unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), and one count of possession of cannabis. The State later 

dismissed the possession of cannabis charge. Defense counsel filed a motion to quash 

defendant’s arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that defendant was arrested without a valid 

arrest warrant and his conduct prior to the arrest did not constitute probable cause that he had 

committed or was about to commit a crime. However, immediately prior to trial, counsel 

withdrew the motion and proceeded to a bench trial. The following evidence was presented at 

defendant’s February 2017 bench trial.

¶ 4 Officer Leonidas Ferreras testified that in April 2016, he was assigned to the Fifth District 

tactical team with the Chicago Police Department. On April 23, 2016, at approximately 7 p.m., 

he was working with Officer Raske 1 and Officer Sharita Edwards. The officers were in 

plainclothes with vests and duty belts and driving an unmarked vehicle. Their duties were to 

patrol the area and attempt to suppress gang and narcotic violence. Officer Raske was driving 

with Officer Ferreras in the front passenger seat and Officer Edwards in the backseat. Officer 

Ferreras testified that the sun was still out and “artificial lighting was starting to turn on.” 

¶ 5 At approximately 7:10 p.m., Officer Ferreras observed a red minivan at the intersection of 

107th Street and Michigan Avenue in Chicago when the minivan disobeyed a red light. The 

officers then curbed the vehicle at approximately 10519 South Michigan Avenue. He and the 

other officers exited the patrol vehicle. Officer Raske approached the driver’s side of the 

minivan while Officer Ferreras approached the passenger side with Officer Edwards “slightly 

behind” him. As he approached the minivan, Officer Ferreras made the following observation:

“I observed the gentleman to the right of me in the tan shirt with a white long-sleeve 

undershirt place what I believe to be a black semi-auto pistol with an extended 

magazine protruding from the magazine as well into the passenger side glove 

compartment.”

¶ 6 Officer Ferreras identified defendant in court as the person he observed in the passenger 

seat of the minivan. He observed the firearm in defendant’s hand and the extended magazine 

drew his attention. He estimated that he was approximately 5 to 10 feet away when he observed 

defendant place the weapon in the glove compartment. 

¶ 7 Officer Ferreras testified that there were three other occupants in the minivan. He gave all 

occupants verbal directions to exit the vehicle, and they complied. As the occupants exited the 

vehicle, Officer Ferreras “noticed that the environment was getting very hostile.” He observed 

members of the community coming out of their homes and gathering on the sidewalk. He stated 

1

The record does not disclose Officer Raske’s first name.
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that this occurred “very quickly” after the vehicle occupants exited the vehicle. He testified 

that his “main mission” was to watch the hands of the vehicle occupants as well as ensure the 

officers’ safety and to conduct an investigation. The environment became “very tense” and 

“members of the community started becoming very hostile to us; yelling out profanities and 

very irate.” Specifically, he described an older middle-aged black female who attempted to 

enter the area where the officers were conducting their interviews. Due to the situation, Officer 

Ferreras and his partners requested backup assistance and decided to continue the investigation 

at the Fifth District police station. While at the scene, a small bag of cannabis was found on 

another occupant of the minivan. 

¶ 8 Officer Ferreras testified that he did not alert his partners about his observation of 

defendant with a weapon while on the scene. He explained that due to the hostile environment, 

he did not believe it was the “right or appropriate time” to converse with his officers about the 

weapon in the vehicle. He estimated that the assisting vehicles arrived on scene in no more 

than 5 to 10 minutes. All of the vehicle occupants were transported to the Fifth District. The 

red minivan was driven by Officer Edwards to the Fifth District. Officer Ferreras estimated 

that around 10 to 15 minutes had passed from when the vehicle was curbed to when the vehicle 

was being taken to the Fifth District. 

¶ 9 Officer Ferreras did not alert Officer Edwards to the weapon when she entered the vehicle 

because of the hostile environment. He believed that the safety of the officers and the vehicle 

occupants was a priority. According to the officer, more people started coming out to the scene 

and asking what the officers were doing and why. From the time the officers arrived on the 

scene to when Officer Edwards entered the vehicle, Officer Ferreras did not observe anyone 

else enter the front passenger area of the vehicle. 

¶ 10 Officer Ferreras rode to the Fifth District with Officer Raske. While driving to the Fifth 

District, Officer Ferreras notified Officer Raske about his observation of defendant placing a 

weapon in the glove compartment. He observed Officer Edwards park the vehicle at the police 

station. He then began a search of the vehicle with Officer Raske. Officer Ferreras searched 

the glove compartment and recovered “a black sub-compact Glock 26 Gen 4, nine millimeter 

with an extended magazine containing 12 live rounds.” He also recovered a bag containing “a 

greenish/brown plant-like substance” that he believed to be cannabis. While at the police 

station, a custodial search of defendant was done by Officer Ferreras and Officer Raske. The 

officers recovered a little over $2700 in cash. 

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Officer Ferreras testified that he believed he had his weapon drawn 

as he approached the minivan and it was “fair to say” his partners also had their weapons 

drawn. He could not recall the position of his firearm. Officer Ferreras drew his weapon based 

on his observations of the traffic violation and the vehicle traveling “at a fast rate of speed on 

Michigan Avenue.” The officer clarified that the vehicle was not fleeing the police. 

¶ 12 Officer Ferreras stated that he directed the vehicle occupants to put their hands in the air at 

the same time he observed defendant place the weapon in the glove compartment. When the 

occupants exited the vehicle, the officer conducted a protective pat down and began his 

interview. However, the officer was not able to perform his typical interview procedures due 

to the hostile environment. 

¶ 13 When asked why the vehicle occupants were taken to the police station if he had not found 

anything, Officer Ferreras answered as follows:
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“As I mentioned, I observed your client place a handgun onto [sic] the passenger 

side glove box. I later learned that the driver of the vehicle did not have a driver’s 

license and he didn’t have proof of the lease agreement. We also had another occupant 

in that vehicle who had a small portion of cannabis on his person, so the whole totality 

of everything; of all of the occupants and what we had and also the hostile environment 

that we were dealing with, we felt that it was more appropriate to continue this 

situation—continue this investigation at the 5th District.”

¶ 14 Officer Ferreras did not have an evidence technician take a photograph of where the 

weapon was recovered because it was not standard protocol. He could not recall how many 

additional police vehicles arrived on the scene after assistance was requested. He did not 

inform the assisting officers about his observation of the weapon. He denied that the weapon 

was recovered three and a half hours after the traffic stop. Officer Ferreras estimated that the 

weapon was recovered about a half an hour after the traffic stop. He admitted that the weapon 

was not inventoried until 10:40 p.m. On redirect, Officer Ferreras clarified that the first thing 

he did was search the vehicle and recover the weapon. He then continued his duties and 

processed defendant and the other occupants. On re-cross, Officer Ferreras testified that he did 

not submit the weapon for fingerprinting because he and Officer Raske had handled it without 

gloves. According to the officer, gloves are used if available and he did not have gloves when 

searching the vehicle at the Fifth District. 

¶ 15 Following the officer’s testimony, the State presented a stipulation of defendant’s certified 

statement of conviction for robbery on November 13, 2012. The State also presented a 

stipulation that an employee from the Illinois State Police searched the Firearm Services 

Bureau records on June 23, 2016, for defendant’s name and date of birth. Her search indicated 

that defendant had never been issued a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card or a 

concealed carry license (CCL) in Illinois. The State then rested. Defendant moved for a 

directed finding, which the trial court denied.

¶ 16 Defendant presented a stipulation from Officer Raske that if he were called to testify he 

would testify that he never observed a weapon on the scene. Defendant then testified on his 

own behalf. 

¶ 17 On April 23, 2016, defendant was in a Chrysler minivan receiving a ride home from a 

friend of the family. The other two occupants were his cousins. He was picked up at 107th 

Street and Wabash Avenue. He had been in the vehicle for five minutes when they were pulled 

over for a traffic stop. He was in the passenger seat.

¶ 18 During the traffic stop, the three officers approached the vehicle. Officer Ferreras 

approached the passenger side with his gun drawn and pointing his gun toward defendant. 

Defendant denied having anything in his hands while in the vehicle or placing anything in the 

glove compartment. He also denied having a gun with an extended clip and opening the glove 

compartment. When Officer Ferreras came to the door, defendant had his hands up. He put his 

hands up “immediately as [the officer] approached the door.” The officer then opened the door 

and pulled defendant out of the minivan. The other occupants were also pulled from the 

vehicle. He was asked if there was anything in the vehicle. Defendant testified that he told the 

officer he did not know because he had just been picked up. 

¶ 19 Defendant and the other occupants were then handcuffed together at the back of the vehicle 

while all three officers searched the vehicle. Defendant testified that the female officer 

searched the back of the vehicle and watched them at the same time. He stated that the officers 
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searched the vehicle for 5 to 10 minutes until the other police vehicles arrived. According to 

defendant, he thought the officers found cannabis on one of the individuals, but that was the 

only item found. A weapon was not recovered during this search, and he never saw a weapon 

recovered. Defendant estimated that six or seven police vehicles arrived on the scene. He was 

then taken to the police station. Two hours later, a police officer asked defendant if he had a 

gun, and defendant told him that he did not know anything about a gun. 

¶ 20 On cross-examination, defendant testified that he had $2700 in cash on him at the time. He 

had received the money from a girlfriend, and he was going to take his children shopping the 

next day. Defendant denied knowing there was cannabis in the glove compartment. The 

defense then rested its case.

¶ 21 In rebuttal, the State recalled Officer Ferreras. Officer Ferreras testified that he and Officer 

Raske gave Miranda warnings and spoke with defendant at the police station. See Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). They asked defendant about the recovered weapon and 

cannabis. Defendant acknowledged knowing about the cannabis but denied knowing about the 

weapon. The officer also asked defendant about the large amount of currency he had on his 

person and defendant responded that “he has a lot of girlfriends that give him money and that’s 

how he acquired his money.”

¶ 22 On cross-examination, Officer Ferreras testified that defendant was given his Miranda

warnings around 11 p.m. The interview with Officer Raske occurred at that time. A separate 

interview with a detective occurred later, and Officer Ferreras was present for that interview, 

but the detective asked the questions. The officer did not show the weapon to defendant. 

Officer Ferreras clarified that defendant told the officers that he knew the cannabis was in the 

glove compartment but did not tell the officers that the cannabis belonged to him. 

¶ 23 In surrebuttal, defendant reopened his defense and called Officer Edwards to testify. On 

April 23, 2016, she was on duty with Officer Ferreras and Officer Raske. The officers used the 

lights and the siren to curb a minivan. The minivan pulled over approximately 45 seconds to a 

minute after the lights and siren were activated. Officer Edwards was the rear passenger of the 

police vehicle and did not have access to use a “spotcam” on the minivan. Officer Edwards did 

not recall if she had her weapon drawn when she exited the vehicle nor could she recall if 

Officer Raske or Officer Ferreras had their weapons drawn. Officer Raske approached on the 

driver’s side. She approached the passenger side of the minivan behind Officer Ferreras. She 

estimated that she was approximately five feet behind him. She did not observe any of the 

occupants of the van do anything, nor could she see if their hands were in the air. She explained 

that she was further back from Officer Ferreras and the rear windows were tinted. Officer 

Ferreras was closer to the vehicle than she was. She was not close enough to see whether the 

occupants in the vehicle were moving. Officer Ferreras gave verbal commands for the 

occupants to raise their hands, but she was not close enough to see if they complied. She did 

not observe anyone in the vehicle open the glove compartment. The occupants were then 

ordered to exit the vehicle and placed to the rear of the vehicle. She did not know if they were 

handcuffed together, but she knew at some point they were handcuffed. She did not know how 

much time passed until more officers arrived at the scene. 

¶ 24 The vehicle occupants were placed in vehicles belonging to the assisting officers. Officer 

Edwards did not search the vehicle. She denied that Officer Raske and Officer Ferreras 

searched the vehicle at the scene. Officer Raske and Officer Ferreras searched the vehicle in 

the station parking lot after Officer Edwards drove the vehicle to the station, but she was not 
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present for the search. She went into the police station to take possession of the vehicle 

occupants. She was later informed that Officer Ferreras had recovered a weapon and illegal 

drugs. 

¶ 25 On cross-examination, Officer Edwards described what happened at the scene:

“Well, there were citizens coming out into the street and a few individuals in 

particular were approaching as we were conducting the investigation at that point. We 

were asking them to step back which they weren’t following our verbal directions to, 

you know, remain back.”

¶ 26 Officer Edwards identified defendant in court as the front passenger of the vehicle. She 

testified that people at the scene were yelling and screaming profanities at the officers. She 

estimated there were at least 10 people at the scene. On redirect, Officer Edwards admitted that 

Officer Ferreras did not notify her about a weapon being in the glove compartment. At the 

station, she gave the keys to Officer Raske and Officer Ferreras and went inside the station. 

She did not “stand there and watch” their search of the vehicle. She did not view the weapon 

recovered. Defendant then rested.

¶ 27 Following arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of all counts. The court made 

the following findings on the record.

“After considering the testimony that I heard from all of the witnesses as well as 

the evidence that came in through—by way of stipulations and any arguments of the 

attorneys, looking at the credibility of the witnesses, one of these things that Mr. Balark

testified to I find inconceivable. He said that the female searched the back referring to 

the police officer and watched us at the same time. To have one female officer doing 

double duty of searching the back of a mini-van and watching four individuals seems 

inconceivable to me.

What does not seem inconceivable is that Officer Ferreras let his partner take the 

van without telling her about the gun being in it. It’s not like they took some unknown 

person off the street and said here, drive this van when you don’t know if the person 

had an FOID Card or a Concealed Carry. This was a Chicago Police Officer that drove 

the van back to the station, so then the argument is that there is reasonable doubt all 

stemming from that because Officer Ferreras didn’t yell gun when he saw the gun with 

the extended clip in the Defendant’s hand and as I said earlier even though that is 

unusual, there are circumstances that explain the snap decision that he has to make that 

day that was going to protect not only himself and his fellow officers, but also the 

Defendant, the occupants of the car, and all of those individuals on the street and the 

extended clip has the capacity to hurt a lot of people. He made a decision that he thought 

was best for everyone and that does not create reasonable doubt in my opinion. I find 

both officers testified credibly.”

¶ 28 In March 2017, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. At 

the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of six years in the 

Department of Corrections. Counts II through VI merged into the count of UUWF. 

¶ 29 This appeal follows.

¶ 30 Defendant first argues on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. We note that defense counsel did file a 

motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence but withdrew the motion without a hearing. 
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According to defendant, had trial counsel not withdrawn the motion, then the motion would 

have resulted in the suppression of defendant’s criminal history. Specifically, defendant 

contends that he was arrested without probable cause and, at the time of his arrest, the police 

had no knowledge of defendant’s status as a felon and that it was unlawful for him to possess 

a weapon. The State maintains that trial counsel was not ineffective because the decision to 

withdraw the motion was strategic and was not prejudicial because there was sufficient 

probable cause to support defendant’s arrest. 

¶ 31 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are resolved under the standard set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court delineated a 

two-part test to use when evaluating whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance 

of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. Under Strickland, a defendant must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficient performance 

substantially prejudiced defendant. Id. at 687. To demonstrate performance deficiency, a 

defendant must establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142, 162 (2001). 

¶ 32 “A defendant is entitled to reasonable, not perfect, representation, and mistakes in strategy 

or in judgment do not, of themselves, render the representation incompetent.” People v. Fuller, 

205 Ill. 2d 308, 331 (2002). “In recognition of the variety of factors that go into any 

determination of trial strategy, courts have held that such claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel must be judged on a circumstance-specific basis, viewed not in hindsight, but from the 

time of counsel’s conduct, and with great deference accorded counsel’s decisions on review.” 

Id. at 330-31 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000), and Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689). 

¶ 33 In evaluating prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If a case may be disposed of on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, that course should be taken, and the court need not ever consider the 

quality of the attorney’s performance. Id. at 697. 

¶ 34 Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 

quash arrest and suppress evidence. Specifically, defendant asserts that he was arrested without 

probable cause based on his possession of the firearm because the police had no basis to know 

his possession was unlawful at the time of the arrest. He maintains that his trial counsel’s 

decision to withdraw the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence lacked trial strategy and 

prejudiced him. In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must overcome 

the presumption that the challenged conduct might be considered sound trial strategy under the 

circumstances. People v. Giles, 209 Ill. App. 3d 265, 269 (1991). A decision that involves a 

matter of trial strategy will typically not support a claim of ineffective representation. People 

v. Simmons, 342 Ill. App. 3d 185, 191 (2003). The question of whether to file a motion to 

suppress evidence is traditionally considered a matter of trial strategy. People v. Rodriguez, 

312 Ill. App. 3d 920, 925 (2000). “[I]n order to establish prejudice under Strickland, the 

defendant must demonstrate that the unargued suppression motion is meritorious, and that a 

reasonable probability exists that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence 

been suppressed.” People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 15.
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¶ 35 “Both the fourth amendment and the Illinois Constitution of 1970 guarantee the right of 

individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 

111835, ¶ 31 (citing U.S. Const., amend. IV, and Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6). “This court has 

explained that ‘[t]he “essential purpose” of the fourth amendment is to impose a standard of 

reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officers to safeguard the 

privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. 

McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 266 (2010), quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 

(1979)).

¶ 36 “It is well settled that not every encounter between the police and a private citizen results 

in a seizure.” People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 544 (2006) (citing Immigration & 

Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)). “Courts have divided policecitizen encounters into three tiers: (1) arrests, which must be supported by probable cause; 

(2) brief investigative detentions, or ‘Terry stops,’ which must be supported by a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) encounters that involve no coercion or 

detention and thus do not implicate fourth amendment interests.” Id. (citing United States v. 

Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th 

Cir. 1982)). 

¶ 37 “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest 

are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee has committed a 

crime.” People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 563-64 (2008). “That is, the existence of probable 

cause depends upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest.” Id. at 564. 

“ ‘ “The standard for determining whether probable cause is present is probability of criminal 

activity, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” ’ ” Id. (quoting People v. 

Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 115 (2006), quoting People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 485 (2005)). 

Further, “probable cause does not even demand a showing that the belief that the suspect has 

committed a crime be more likely true than false.” Id.

¶ 38 The State maintains that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, and thus, the 

motion to quash would not have been meritorious. The arrest report from April 24, 2016, stated 

that the officers observed a red Chrysler minivan “disregard a solid red light and proceed north 

bound on Michigan Ave from 105th Street at a high rate of speed.” The vehicle was then 

curbed. When approaching the vehicle, Officer Ferreras observed defendant in the front 

passenger seat place a “black semi-auto pistol with an extended magazine protruding from the 

magazine,” which Officer Ferreras believed to be a weapon, in the glove compartment. 

According to the State, these facts would lead a reasonable person to believe that defendant 

was committing the offense of unlawful use of a weapon. 

¶ 39 Defendant argues that following the Illinois Supreme Court’s September 2013 decision in 

People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, his conduct could not have given rise to probable cause 

because the police observing a person in possession of a handgun is no longer sufficient 

probable cause without other evidence of a crime. In Aguilar, the supreme court considered 

the constitutionality of a prior version of the AUUW statute, which “categorically prohibit[ed] 

the possession and use of an operable firearm for self-defense outside the home.” Id. ¶ 21. The 

Aguilar court specifically noted that the subsequently amended version of the AUUW statute 

was not at issue in the case. Id. ¶ 22 n.4. 

¶ 40 Significantly, also in 2013, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Firearm Concealed 

Carry Act (the Act) (codified at 430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2014)), which, in part, “amended 
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the AUUW statute to allow for a limited right to carry certain firearms in public. See Pub. Act 

98-0063 (eff. July 9, 2013).” Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22 n.4. Defendant’s offenses were 

committed after the relevant statutes had been amended and the Act had been enacted. Thus, 

our focus on appeal is not on Aguilar, but on the laws in effect at the time of his arrest. 

¶ 41 We find the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, to be 

relevant to our analysis. While Colyar was decided a few months prior to Aguilar, we note that 

the petition for rehearing in Colyar was denied after the Aguilar opinion had been issued. See

id. (rehearing denied Oct. 3, 2013); Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 (filed on September 12, 2013). 

In Colyar, the supreme court considered whether the defendant’s fourth amendment right to 

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by police during a proper 

Terry stop. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 1.

¶ 42 In the trial court, the defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Id.

¶ 4. At the hearing, one of the arresting officers testified that he and his partner arrived at a 

motel at about 8:45 p.m. to check for “ ‘parties and stuff of that nature’ ” involving minors. Id.

¶ 6. The officers had not received reports of criminal or suspicious activity that day. Id. When 

they arrived at the motel, defendant’s vehicle was parked in the south entrance to the motel’s 

parking lot, between 50 and 100 feet from the main building entrance. Id.

¶ 43 The officers parked and exited their vehicle and walked toward defendant’s vehicle to ask 

him why he was parked in the entrance. Id. ¶ 7. They did not draw their weapons. Id. The 

defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat with the engine running, and there was a passenger in 

the vehicle. Id. As the officers walked to defendant’s vehicle, a third person exited the motel 

and entered the rear passenger side of the vehicle. Id.

¶ 44 When the officer asked the defendant why he was blocking the entrance, the defendant 

replied that he was picking someone up from the motel. Id. ¶ 8. The officer shined his flashlight 

into the center console and saw in plain view a plastic bag with a bullet “ ‘sticking up’ ” inside. 

Id. The officer then ordered defendant and his two passengers out of the vehicle and handcuffed 

them. Id. ¶ 9. The officer recovered a plastic bag from the center console containing five live 

rounds of .454-caliber ammunition. Id.

¶ 45 The officers then patted down the defendant and recovered a bullet from his front pants 

pocket matching the five .454-caliber bullets. Id. ¶ 10. Based on the recovery of the five bullets 

from the center console and the single bullet from the defendant’s pocket, the officer believed 

that a gun might be inside defendant’s vehicle. Id. The officer’s partner subsequently found a 

.454-caliber revolver under the floor mat on the front passenger side. Id.

¶ 46 Following the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress and the 

appellate court affirmed, holding that the police subjected defendant to an unlawful search 

without probable cause because the bullet did not establish evidence of a crime. Id. ¶ 2. 

¶ 47 On appeal, the supreme court observed that the defendant conceded that his initial 

encounter with the officers was proper under Terry. Id. ¶ 41. The State contended that based 

on the totality of the circumstances, the neutral encounter escalated when the officer observed 

the bullet in plain view on the center console of the defendant’s vehicle. The officers then had 

a reasonable suspicion that the defendant or a passenger were armed and dangerous and that 

criminal activity was afoot to warrant detaining the individuals and performing a protective 

search of their persons and the areas of the car that were immediately accessible for a weapon. 

Id. ¶ 28. The defendant argued that the officers’ conduct was not justified under Terry because 

the circumstances were “ ‘absolutely benign’ and possession of a bullet is not per se illegal.” 
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Id. ¶ 29. The Colyar court recognized that “roadside encounters are ‘especially hazardous,’ 

and a police officer may reasonably believe that he is in danger from the possible presence of 

accessible weapons inside the vehicle.” Id. ¶ 38 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 

1049 (1983)).

¶ 48 In holding that the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were not violated, the supreme 

court found that the police officers, having seen a bullet inside the vehicle in plain view, could 

reasonably suspect that their safety was in danger and could reasonably order the passengers 

out of the vehicle and search them for weapons. Id. ¶¶ 42-45. The Colyar court further found 

that handcuffing the defendant and the other occupants was reasonable because the police 

officers were outnumbered, it was dusk, and the police could reasonably suspect that some of 

the vehicle occupants possessed a gun or would be able to access a gun inside the vehicle if 

they were not secured by handcuffs. Id. ¶ 47.

¶ 49 Similar to Colyar, we consider whether defendant’s conduct in possessing a firearm gave 

rise to probable cause that a crime was being committed. As discussed, the State asserts that a 

reasonably cautious person would believe that a crime was being committed, unlawful use of 

a weapon. 

¶ 50 A person commits unlawful use of a weapon when he knowingly “[c]arries or possesses in 

any vehicle” any pistol, but this offense does not apply to or affect transportation of weapons 

that meet one of the following conditions, if the weapon is: (1) broken down in a nonfunctioning state, (2) not immediately accessible, (3) unloaded or enclosed in a case, or 

(4) “[c]arried or possessed in accordance with the Firearm Concealed Carry Act by a person 

who has been issued a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.” 720 

ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2016). 

¶ 51 Here, based on the evidence presented at trial, the only potential exception is if the firearm 

was in possession in accordance with the Act. The Act defines “ ‘[c]oncealed firearm’ ” as “a 

loaded or unloaded handgun carried on or about a person completely or mostly concealed from 

view of the public or on or about a person within a vehicle.” 430 ILCS 66/5 (West 2016). 

Under the Act, a CCL shall permit the licensee to “(1) carry a loaded or unloaded concealed 

firearm, fully concealed or partially concealed, on or about his or her person; and (2) keep or 

carry a loaded or unloaded concealed firearm on or about his or her person within a vehicle.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. § 10(c). Under the Act, if an officer initiates an investigative stop, upon

the request of the officer, a licensee shall disclose to the officer that he or she is in possession 

of a concealed firearm under the Act or present his or her license to the officer and, upon 

request, identify the location of the concealed firearm. Id. § 10(h). Further, during a traffic 

stop, any passenger within the vehicle who is a licensee must comply with the disclosure 

requirements. Id.

¶ 52 This court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs to address the issue of probable 

cause for unlawful use of a weapon and the statutory language of “on or about a person within 

a vehicle” as used for a concealed firearm under the Act. That issue is the crux of defendant’s 

argument on appeal. It is undisputed that defendant did not possess a valid CCL, but he 

maintains that his conduct as viewed by Officer Ferreras did not suggest a crime was being 

committed. For purposes of our analysis only, we will presume that defendant had a valid CCL 

and address whether his conduct would be permitted under the language of the Act. For the 

reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant’s conduct was not in accordance with the Act. 
- 11 -

¶ 53 “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s 

intent.” People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139, 144 (2011). “The legislature’s intent is best 

indicated by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “A court must 

view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory 

provisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a 

reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous.” People v. Clark, 

2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20. “The court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to 

be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one 

way or another.” Id. Further, a court presumes that the legislature did not intend absurdity, 

inconvenience, or injustice in enacting legislation. Id. “Legislative intent is ascertained by 

considering ‘the entire Act, its nature, its object and the consequences’ of ‘construing it one 

way or the other.’ ” Quinn v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) 

170834, ¶ 69 (quoting Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990)). 

“While a statute’s title cannot be used to limit the plain meaning of statutory text, it can provide 

guidance in resolving statutory ambiguities.” Home Star Bank & Financial Services v. 

Emergency Care & Health Organization, Ltd., 2014 IL 115526, ¶ 40. Additionally, “[w]hen 

discerning legislative intent, it is also proper to compare statutes relating to the same subject 

matter as well as statutes ‘upon related subjects though not strictly in pari materia’ because 

‘statutes are to be read in the light of attendant conditions and the state of the law existent at 

the time of their enactment.’ ” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 

455, 470 (2010) (quoting People v. Boreman, 401 Ill. 566, 571-72 (1948)).

¶ 54 In considering the unlawful use of a weapon statute as a whole, we review the other 

exceptions and the intention of the legislature. These exceptions, i.e., (1) broken down in a 

nonfunctioning state; (2) not immediately accessible; or (3) unloaded and enclosed in a case, 

firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person with a valid FOID card (720 

ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2016)) indicate that the legislature sought to limit the possession of 

loaded and readily accessible firearms in vehicles. There is a clear public safety purpose in 

preventing individuals from carrying or possessing loaded and accessible firearms in a vehicle 

to deter criminal activity and keep the public safe. 

¶ 55 The exception before us, carried or possessed in accordance with the Act, does not change 

our position. Under the Act, the licensee is permitted to “keep or carry a loaded or unloaded 

concealed firearm on or about his or her person within a vehicle.” 430 ILCS 66/10(c)(2) (West 

2016). Thus, the question is whether defendant’s conduct fell within this permitted possession 

under the Act. 

¶ 56 Defendant argues in his supplemental brief that the firearm was a “concealed firearm” both 

before and after the firearm was placed by defendant in the glove compartment. According to 

defendant, a firearm is considered a “concealed firearm” under the Act in a vehicle even when 

visible to the public. Defendant asserts that the definition of “concealed firearm” under the Act 

does not require that the firearm actually be concealed when in a vehicle. 

¶ 57 The State notes that this interpretation creates, in essence, an open carry law while in 

vehicles. As the State observes, under defendant’s interpretation, placing a firearm on the 

dashboard while driving, driving with one hand on the steering wheel and the other hand on a 

firearm, or as in the present case, having a visible firearm on a passenger’s lap or in his or her 

hand would be in compliance with the Act. The State further points out that defendant’s 

position does not comport with other provisions of the Act, such as, section 10(h), where the 
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licensee must “identify the location of the concealed firearm” when asked. Id. § 10(h); see also 

People v. McMichaels, 2019 IL App (1st) 163053. We agree with the State.

¶ 58 Illinois does not allow for open carry of firearms. We cannot agree with an interpretation 

of the Act in which an individual’s conduct in a vehicle would equate with open carry. The 

name of the Act is the “Firearm Concealed Carry Act.” 430 ILCS 66/1 (West 2016). The term 

“concealed” cannot be read out of the Act where the term is, in essence, the entire purpose of 

the Act. The Act allows for a licensee to possess a concealed firearm on or about his or her 

person within a vehicle. As the State points out, the use of the term “concealed” to modify 

firearm indicates the legislative intent for firearms in a vehicle to remain concealed as well as 

on or about the person within a vehicle. See id. § 10(c)(2). If the legislature did not intend for 

concealment of firearms, then it could have omitted the word from the statutory language. 

Moreover, under defendant’s view, the term “concealed” is superfluous. When viewing the 

Act as a whole, we reject an interpretation that renders the term “concealed” superfluous. Each 

word of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning and avoid any interpretation that renders 

a word superfluous. Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20. 

¶ 59 As previously stated, section 10(c) of the Act specifically provides what a license permits 

an individual to do under the Act. According to defendant, the use of the phrase “concealed 

firearm” in that section relates back to the definition. We disagree. The Act defines 

“ ‘[c]oncealed firearm’ ” as “a loaded or unloaded handgun carried on or about a person 

completely or mostly concealed from view of the public or on or about a person within a 

vehicle.” 430 ILCS 66/5 (West 2016). Our interpretation is supported when section 10(c) is 

read together with section 10(h), which governs a licensee’s required responses during an 

investigative stop with law enforcement. That section requires the licensee to disclose his or 

her status as a CCL holder when asked by law enforcement. Id. § 10(h). Further, the statute 

requires the licensee to “identify the location of the concealed firearm and permit the officer

to safely secure the firearm for the duration of the investigative stop.” Id. This language 

illustrates that the legislature envisioned that that a firearm in the vehicle of a licensee would 

be concealed. Under defendant’s interpretation, this provision would be unnecessary. 

¶ 60 In his supplemental brief, defendant cites several cases to support his argument that his 

possession of a firearm was proper under the Act. However, we find these cases do not support 

defendant’s position on appeal since we are considering whether the officer had probable 

cause. All of the cases relied on by defendant were challenging whether the evidence of “on or 

about” the person was sufficient to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

People v. Wise, 2019 IL App (3d) 170252; People v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419 (1950); People v. 

Niemoth, 322 Ill. 51 (1926); People v. Foster, 32 Ill. App. 2d 462 (1961); People v. Cosby, 118 

Ill. App. 2d 169 (1969); and People v. Woodworth, 187 Ill. App. 3d 44 (1989). None of the 

cases considered the question under the lower standard of probable cause for arrest. In this 

case, we are considering whether Officer Ferreras had probable cause to arrest defendant. The 

standard is whether a reasonably cautious person could have believed that the defendant had 

committed a crime, not whether the State had proven all elements of an offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Somewhat ironically, some of these cited cases actually lend support to our 

analysis. Specifically, several of these cases considered whether a defendant was guilty of 

carrying a concealed firearm on or about his person and discussed these required elements. 

These cases illustrate the consistent interpretation of what constitutes a concealed firearm 

under Illinois case law for nearly a century. 
- 13 -

¶ 61 In Niemoth, 322 Ill. 51 (1926), the defendant was found guilty of carrying a concealed 

firearm on or about his person and argued on appeal that evidence failed to prove him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. There, the relevant statute provided: “ ‘No person shall carry 

concealed on or about his person a pistol, revolver or other fire-arm.’ ” Id. at 52 (quoting Ill. 

Rev. Stat. 1925, ch. 38, § 155). The supreme court observed that, “Before there can be a 

conviction under the statute prohibiting the carrying of fire-arms concealed on or about the 

person there must be proof that the fire-arm is carried in such a manner as to give no notice of 

its presence and in such proximity of the accused as to be within his easy reach and under his 

control.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 53. In that case, two firearms were found lying on the floor 

of the car behind the front seat. The court held that the evidence did not show whether the 

firearms were in position where the defendant could have reached them without changing his 

position, whether the defendant knew the firearms were present, or whether the firearms 

belonged to him. Id. “The pernicious practice which the legislature intended by this statute to 

interdict was the carrying concealed of a gun of a size capable of being concealed on or about 

the person, in a place so accessible as to allow its immediate use as a deadly weapon when 

wanted.” Id.

¶ 62 Similarly, in Liss, 406 Ill. 419 (1950), the supreme court again considered the same 

statutory language from the defendant’s appeal of his conviction. There, a firearm was found 

underneath a car’s seat, approximately six inches back in a space three inches wide. The car 

was occupied by the defendant and a passenger. Id. at 420-21. In reversing the defendant’s 

conviction, the Liss court built on the holding of Niemoth and held that under a reasonable 

construction of the statute, “there must be concealment of the weapon, and it must be on or 

about the person; and it must be so placed that it may be used without appreciable change in 

the position of the owner.” Id. at 424. The court concluded that the firearm was not accessible 

to the defendant because he would have to change his position. Id.

¶ 63 Later, the Fourth District in Foster, 32 Ill. App. 2d at 467, found that a firearm found inside 

an “athletic type” zippered bag next to the defendant was concealed on or about the person, in 

violation of the same statute. The reviewing court detailed the required elements as follows:

“Breaking down the elements necessary to show a violation of the statute we find that 

under the Illinois rule there are two. First, the weapon must be concealed. There can be 

little question that if the gun was in the zipper bag, it was concealed. The second 

requirement is that the weapon must be on or about the person. To be on or about the 

person two conditions must be met. First, the weapon must be located either on the 

person or in such close proximity that it can be reached without a material or 

appreciable change in his position. Second, once the defendant reaches to where the 

weapon is located, the weapon must be readily accessible.” Id.

¶ 64 These cases demonstrate that a required element was concealment, i.e., hidden from view 

with “no notice of its presence.” Niemoth, 322 Ill. at 53. 

“It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that ‘where terms used in [a] 

statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and are retained 

in subsequent amendments or re-enactments of the statute, they are to be understood 

and interpreted in the same sense theretofore attributed to them by the court unless a 

contrary intention of the legislature is made clear.’ ” In re Marriage of O’Neill, 138 Ill. 

2d 487, 495 (1990) (quoting People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 

78-79 (1935)). 
- 14 -

“This rule is based upon the view that ‘the judicial construction [of a statute] becomes a part 

of the law, and it is presumed that the legislature in passing the law knew [of] such construction 

of the words in the prior enactment.’ ” Id. at 496 (quoting Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. at 79). 

While the Act was new legislation and not an amendment to an existing enactment, we believe 

this rule is equally applicable here where the judicial construction of a “concealed firearm” in 

the criminal statutes has a longstanding interpretation. Since we presume the legislature was 

aware of this construction of the terms “concealed” and “on or about the person” within a 

vehicle, we reject defendant’s reliance on these decisions here. 

¶ 65 We further find defendant’s reliance on the governor’s amendatory veto to be misplaced. 

Governor Pat Quinn offered an amendatory veto of the pending version of the Act. In his 

statement, Governor Quinn offered thoughts on multiple parts of the bill and specifically 

addressed his concerns with the definition of concealed and stated: 

“The definition provided for ‘concealed firearm’ is insufficient and must be 

clarified to ensure that when guns are carried, they are completely concealed from 

public view.

As written, the definition includes the phrase ‘mostly concealed,’ which would 

allow a licensee to walk around in public with a portion of his or her gun exposed.

Make no mistake—this is a step towards open carry in Illinois. This vague 

definition can lead to fear and confusion among the public, varying interpretations and 

enforcement, and the potential for subsequent litigation.

If Illinois is going to legalize the carrying of loaded, concealed guns, the legislation 

must be clarified to ensure when guns are carried, they are completely concealed.” 

Letter from Pat Quinn, Governor, to the Members of the Illinois House of 

Representatives, 98th General Assembly (July 2, 2013), http://www.ilga.gov/

legislation/98/HB/PDF/09800HB0183gms.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZC5-G4FB]. 

¶ 66 Governor Quinn included in his multiple amendments to the bill the following definition 

for a concealed firearm under the Act, “a loaded or unloaded handgun carried on or about a 

person completely covered or not visible from the view of the public, or carried in a vehicle 

concealed, covered, or not visible from the view of the public.” Id. Both houses of the General 

Assembly overrode the Governor’s amendatory veto. I Final Legislative Synopsis and Digest 

of the 98th Ill. Gen. Assem. (No. 17), at 1961, 1966. 

¶ 67 When we read Governor Quinn’s reasoning along with his proposed amendment, it is clear 

that his concern was the phrase “mostly concealed” when firearms were carried in public. His 

amendment wanted all firearms completely concealed at all times. The legislature overrode his 

veto. However, this does not suggest that the legislature intended for an individual to carry a 

visible firearm in a vehicle, and we decline to infer such a broad intention. Moreover, the 

legislature did not need to add this language to the phrase “concealed on or about the person” 

in a vehicle because of the long settled meaning the courts have given to this same language. 

Accordingly, we conclude that possessing a firearm in one’s hand while in a vehicle is not in 

compliance with possession on or about a person within a vehicle under the Act. 

¶ 68 Turning back to the present case, we find that based on the totality of the circumstances at 

the time of the arrest, a reasonably cautious person could have believed that the defendant had 

committed a crime, unlawful use of a weapon. Similar to the circumstances in Colyar, the 

officers initiated a legal stop, in this case for a traffic violation. Officer Ferreras initially 
- 15 -

observed the vehicle disregard a red light at a high rate of speed. As the officer approached the 

curbed vehicle, he observed defendant in possession of a firearm with an extended clip, which 

defendant placed into the glove compartment. When the occupants exited the vehicle, a pat 

down revealed that one of the occupants had a small amount of cannabis. These circumstances 

in their totality suggest that the officers’ safety was at risk. The risk to officer safety escalated 

when residents surrounded the scene and yelled at the officers, with at least one individual 

crossing into the scene. 

¶ 69 We further find the recent decision in People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474, to be 

helpful. There, the defendant was charged with AUUW after police observed him hand off a 

gun to another person while in the common area of an unlocked multiunit apartment building 

and then flee upstairs to an apartment unit. Id. ¶ 1. The charges asserted that the defendant 

illegally possessed a handgun while not on his land or in his home and without a valid FOID 

card or CCL. Id. ¶ 3. The defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, 

which the trial court granted and the State appealed. Id. ¶ 1. 

¶ 70 In his motion to quash and suppress, and in response to the State’s appeal, the defendant 

argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe he was 

committing a crime because, pursuant to Aguilar, possession of a gun is not per se illegal and 

the police failed to ask him whether he had a valid FOID card or CCL prior to arresting him. 

Id. ¶ 35. The appellate court disagreed, noting that “mere gun possession was not the scenario 

that presented itself to police.” Id. ¶ 40. The reviewing court examined the totality of the 

circumstances, specifically that the arresting officer had made multiple arrests for narcotics, 

gangs, and drugs in the neighborhood and was patrolling due to the activities of two rival gangs 

at the time of the incident; around 7:30 p.m., he observed the defendant loitering on the 

sidewalk in front of an apartment building; he fled into the apartment building upon seeing the 

officer; the officer entered the apartment building, where he observed the defendant and 

another man in the common area; the officer observed that the defendant had a firearm, which 

he handed to the second man and then fled to a second floor apartment unit and closed the door 

behind him; the second man threw the handgun on the landing and was detained; and the officer 

recovered the loaded firearm and went to the apartment unit, where a female inside opened the 

door and the officer arrested the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 4-7. The appellate court concluded that the 

totality of these circumstances “suggested criminal activity” (id. ¶ 40), which gave the officers 

not only a reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop but probable cause to arrest him. Id.

¶¶ 38-39.

¶ 71 “The facts indicated a probability that defendant did not have the necessary gun licenses, 

that he had violated the FOID Card Act and the Concealed Carry Act with an illegal transfer 

to another individual, and that he had violated the Concealed Carry Act by exposing his gun in 

a semi-public place.” Id. ¶ 38. The reviewing court held that a possible innocent explanation 

that the defendant possessed the requisite FOID card or CCL did not necessarily negate 

probable cause. Id. ¶ 39. 

¶ 72 Defendant argues that his possession of the firearm was not sufficient for probable cause 

for unlawful use of a weapon because Officer Ferreras did not know if he possessed a valid 

CCL. However, as we have concluded, defendant did not possess the firearm in accordance 

with the Act when he was observed with the firearm in his hand and moving it about the 

vehicle, and thus, his conduct was not within the exception to the unlawful use of a weapon 

statute. Defendant also fails to acknowledge the entirety of the situation that arose, including 
- 16 -

the valid traffic stop and the presence of approximately a dozen residents crowding the scene 

and yelling obscenities at the officers. Similar to Colyar and Thomas, it is when the totality of 

the circumstances is considered that we find a sufficient basis to support probable cause.

¶ 73 We also find defendant’s reliance on the decisions in People v. Horton, 2017 IL App (1st) 

142019, vacated by No. 122461 (Ill. Nov. 22, 2017) (supervisory order), and People v. Thomas, 

2016 IL App (1st) 141040, vacated by No. 121947 (Ill. Sept. 27, 2017) (supervisory order), 

unpersuasive. Defendant contends that following Aguilar, “the police seeing a person 

possessing a handgun in public is no longer sufficient, without other evidence of a crime, to 

provide probable cause to arrest that person,” citing Horton and Thomas. As defendant 

concedes, both of the cited decisions were vacated by the Illinois Supreme Court and ordered 

to be reconsidered in light of People v. Holmes, 2017 IL 120407. Judgments vacated by the 

supreme court are void and have no effect. People v. Simmons, 2016 IL App (1st) 131300, 

¶ 116. 

¶ 74 In Thomas, the appellate court did not enter a published opinion following the supervisory 

order by the supreme court but, rather, issued an unpublished Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 

(eff. Apr. 1, 2018) order in June 2018, prior to the filing of defendant’s brief in December 

2018. See People v. Thomas, 2018 IL App (1st) 141040-U. In the unpublished order, the Fifth 

Division of the First District of this court reversed its prior decision and affirmed the trial 

court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. 

There, the court found an in-person citizen tip describing the defendant and stating that the 

defendant possessed a gun to police officers while on patrol was sufficiently reliable for a brief 

stop. During the subsequent Terry stop, the defendant dropped a backpack as an officer was 

beginning a pat down search. The officer and his partner heard a “thud” in the backpack, and 

a gun was subsequently recovered from the backpack. Id. ¶¶ 10-14. 

¶ 75 In its original decision, the Thomas court found the tip sufficiently reliable but held that it 

did not provide the officers with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the 

holding in Aguilar because “suspected criminal activity based on a statute that was void from

its inception could not supply the officers with reasonable suspicion to effectuate the Terry

stop.” Id. ¶ 31. However, following the supreme court’s decision in Holmes, the court found a 

different result was warranted, finding that the tip was sufficiently reliable for the officers to 

have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry stop of the 

defendant. Id. ¶ 33. 

¶ 76 As for the Horton case, the reviewing court recently issued a new opinion. People v. 

Horton, 2019 IL App (1st) 142019-B. We disagree with the majority in Horton and also find 

it distinguishable from the facts of this case based on one significant difference. In Horton, the 

majority concluded that the arresting officer did not observe the defendant with a gun in his 

hand but, rather, had a “hunch” that the defendant possessed a firearm because he observed a 

metallic object in the defendant’s waistband that may or may not have been a handgun and 

then pursued the defendant who fled the scene. Id. ¶ 1.

¶ 77 In that case, at the suppression hearing, the officer was on patrol in an unmarked squad 

vehicle with his partner in Chicago when the officer observed the defendant with two other 

people in front of a house. The defendant turned and looked at the officer, and at that point, 

the officer observed a “ ‘metallic object’ ” in the defendant’s waistband. Id. ¶ 15. The officer 

asked his partner to stop the vehicle. As the officers were exiting the vehicle, the defendant 

made eye contact with the officer and then fled into the house. When the officers approached 
- 17 -

the house, they found a set of keys on the ground, which they used to enter the house. One of 

the officers heard a noise upstairs. The officers then went upstairs and found the defendant 

crouched next to a bed. A handgun was found under the mattress of the bed. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 103. 

The defendant denied living in the house as well as ownership of the firearm. Id. ¶ 16. The trial 

court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, and following a jury trial, the defendant was 

found guilty of being an armed habitual criminal. Id. ¶¶ 22, 43.

¶ 78 On appeal, the majority concluded that “the record does not support a finding of probable 

cause to believe that [the defendant] had a gun at all” and the officer admitted that he had not 

seen the defendant violate any law. Id. ¶ 57. The Horton court reasoned, “[a] belief that a 

defendant ‘may or may not’ possess a weapon is simply a hunch and does not reach the 

threshold of probable cause.” Id. The court further held that even if the officers had probable 

cause to believe the defendant had a gun, the officers’ observations did not support probable 

cause that the defendant was committing a crime. The reviewing court observed that under the 

pre-Aguilar version of the AUUW statute, it was not a crime to possess a firearm in one’s land 

or abode or as an invitee to another’s abode with permission. Id. ¶ 59. “Nothing in the record 

suggests that [the officer] had any reason to believe, at the time of the arrest, that [defendant] 

was not standing in his own yard or a friend’s yard. In other words, no reason to believe that 

[the defendant] was committing a crime.” Id. In contrast, Officer Ferreras observed defendant 

with a firearm in his hand and then place it in a glove compartment during a traffic stop. For 

these reasons, we find the circumstances in Horton to be distinguishable from the instant case. 

¶ 79 Additionally, we agree with the dissent’s analysis and conclusion that the record showed 

“conclusively that reasonable, articulable facts, deemed credible by the trial court, were 

presented by the State in support of this arrest.” Id. ¶ 106 (Pierce, J., dissenting.) The dissent 

further found that “the evidence known to the officers at the time of the arrest supports a 

reasonable belief that [the defendant’s] possession of a gun was illegal, and they had every 

right to continue to investigate.” Id. ¶ 110. The dissent reasoned that the officer’s initial 

attempted contact would have been a valid Terry stop, but this contact did not occur because 

the defendant fled. Id. “It cannot reasonably be argued that the circuit court was in error in 

finding that an experienced police officer seeing a person in possession of what appeared to be 

a gun did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity that entitled him to 

make further inquiry.” Id. ¶ 113. 

“Should a reasonable officer have ignored what he just saw? Common sense and 

human experience compels the conclusion that the last thing our citizens want is for 

police officers to shrug their shoulders and continue down the street when they see 

someone with a gun run away at the mere glance at a police officer, especially given 

the current level of violence in this city. There is nothing illegal or unreasonable about 

the police conduct in this case. Defendant’s conduct does not defeat a finding that the 

officers had reasonable suspicion to justify their pursuit of the defendant. The officers 

were properly in the house and the recovery of the handgun from underneath the 

mattress was proper. Clearly, probable cause existed to arrest defendant. Finally, any 

implication that there is a temporal component to specifically knowing which law has 

been violated at the time of arrest must soundly be rejected. The totality of the 

circumstances provided the officers with probable cause to arrest the defendant for 

possession and to thereafter continue to investigate and charge, or not, defendant with 

any and all applicable criminal violations.” Id. ¶ 120.
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¶ 80 Defendant has not cited any valid case law to support his argument that, post-Aguilar, 

probable cause cannot be supported by open possession of a firearm when an individual is 

stopped for a valid reason, such as, a traffic stop. 

¶ 81 Since we have concluded that Officer Ferreras had sufficient probable cause to arrest 

defendant, a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence would not have been meritorious 

and cannot sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the arrest was proper, 

we need not consider whether the evidence obtained following the arrest should have been 

suppressed. 

¶ 82 Next, defendant asserts that the State failed to prove him guilty of UUWF beyond a 

reasonable doubt because Officer Ferreras’s testimony was “improbable, illogical, and 

contrary to human experience.” The State maintains that it was the trial court’s responsibility 

to assess credibility and we are to defer to the trial court’s findings.

¶ 83 When this court considers a challenge to a criminal conviction based upon the sufficiency 

of the evidence, our inquiry is limited to “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979); accord People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70. “Under this standard a 

reviewing court does not retry the defendant, and the trier of fact remains responsible for 

making determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their 

testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Wright, 2017 IL 

119561, ¶ 70.

¶ 84 The reviewing court must carefully examine the record evidence while bearing in mind 

that it was the fact finder who observed and heard the witnesses. People v. Cunningham, 212 

Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard but 

only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept 

it beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “A conviction will not be set aside on appeal unless the 

evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable 

doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70.

¶ 85 According to defendant, Officer Ferreras’s testimony that he did not inform the other 

officers at the scene about his observation of defendant placing a weapon in the glove 

compartment was improbable, illogical, and contrary to human experience. Defendant raises 

multiple reasons why Officer Ferreras’s testimony was not believable. First, he contends that 

the officer’s explanation that he did not notify anyone because he was concerned about the 

hostile environment at the scene and his priority was the safety of the officers and the vehicle 

occupants “defies logic.” Second, defendant reasons that since Officer Edwards testified that 

the rear windows were tinted and she could not see any activity in the vehicle, then it “defies 

belief” that Officer Ferreras could observe a weapon in defendant’s possession. Third, 

defendant asserts that Officer Ferreras’s explanation regarding why he and Officer Raske did 

not wear gloves while handling the weapon was “improbable and contrary to human 

experience.” Fourth, defendant argues that Officer Ferreras’s testimony about why the other 

occupants of the vehicle were transported to the Fifth District was implausible and undermined 

the credibility of his testimony. 

¶ 86 Defendant has not established reasonable doubt under the sufficiency of the evidence 

standard because all of these claims relate to the credibility of Officer Ferreras’s testimony. 
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Officer Ferreras’s reasoning for all of these alleged shortcomings were presented to the trial 

court. The court, as the trier of fact, was tasked with resolving all conflicts and inconsistencies. 

¶ 87 According to defendant, it was illogical not to notify the officers at the scene of the 

presence of weapon in the vehicle. However, the trial court in its ruling acknowledged the 

unusual circumstances of the traffic stop. The court found the officer’s testimony credible to 

explain his “snap decision” not to inform his partners to protect the officers, the vehicle 

occupants, and the individuals on the street. There are many reasons why the officer chose not 

to notify the other officers immediately. At that time, four individuals were in the vehicle and 

one weapon had been observed. There was no way for Officer Ferreras to know if more 

weapons were present. If he called out to his partners who were behind him and on the other 

side of the vehicle, he would likely have informed the occupants of what he had observed and 

created a potentially dangerous situation. Moreover, by the time the occupants were removed 

from the vehicle, the scene had become hostile with the residents’ presence. The testimony 

established that this was not a routine traffic stop as it became a hostile environment when 

approximately 10 citizens came to the scene yelling profanities at the officers and attempting 

to disrupt the investigation. The officers then decided to continue the investigation at the station 

when the assisting officers arrived. The presence of additional officers in a hostile environment 

does not render Officer Ferreras’s decision improbable and unworthy of belief. 

¶ 88 Defendant further contends that Officer Ferreras’s decision not to notify Officer Edwards 

about the weapon in the glove compartment while she drove it to the police station undermined 

his testimony about his safety concerns. We find Officer Ferreras’s explanation of his decision 

to be credible. Officer Ferreras did notify Officer Raske as the officers drove to the station. 

Officer Edwards was driving the minivan by herself, the presence of the weapon in the glove 

compartment was not a danger to her at that time. The notification was not necessary for her 

safety or for the investigation while she was driving the vehicle. We cannot say that the trial 

court’s credibility assessment of Officer Ferreras’s decision not to inform his partners about 

the weapon at the scene was “so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains 

a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” See id.

¶ 89 Further, we reject defendant’s reasoning that because Officer Edwards was unable to 

observe the occupants due to the tinted rear windows, it was improbable that Officer Ferreras 

was able to see in the front window. No evidence was presented that the front windows were 

tinted. While Officer Edwards testified that the rear windows were tinted, she offered no 

testimony regarding the front windows. 

¶ 90 Defendant also calls attention to Officer Ferreras’s testimony that the weapon was 

recovered without gloves. When asked if the use of gloves to handle a weapon was protocol, 

Officer Ferreras responded, “If available,” and stated he did not have gloves at that point in 

time. Again, this is a credibility issue left to the trier of fact. Further, this testimony was not 

contested. 

¶ 91 Defendant finally argues that Officer Ferreras’s testimony failed to explain why all of the 

occupants were transported to the Fifth District. We disagree. At that scene, Officer Ferreras 

had observed defendant with a weapon and a small amount of cannabis was discovered on 

another occupant. The scene then became hostile, which prohibited an investigation at that 

location. The officers decided to continue the investigation at the police station for the safety 

of the officers as well as the vehicle occupants. Whether Officer Ferreras’s explanation for 
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transporting all of the vehicle occupants was credible was a question for the trial court, we will 

not disturb it on review. 

¶ 92 Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to prove actual or constructive possession of 

the weapon. The State responds that it presented sufficient evidence of actual possession when 

Officer Ferreras testified that he observed a firearm with an extended magazine in defendant’s 

hands when defendant placed the weapon in the glove compartment of the vehicle. No 

argument of constructive possession was made by the prosecutors at trial, and we will not 

consider it on appeal. 

¶ 93 To prove a defendant guilty of UUWF, the State must present evidence to establish beyond 

a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant has a prior felony conviction and (2) the defendant 

knowingly possessed a weapon. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2016). Here, it is undisputed that 

defendant had a prior felony conviction for robbery. Defendant contends that the State failed 

to establish that he knowingly possessed a weapon. 

¶ 94 Possession may be actual or constructive. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 335 (2010). 

“Actual possession is the exercise by the defendant of present personal dominion over the illicit 

material and exists when a person exercises immediate and exclusive dominion or control over 

the illicit material, but does not require present personal touching of the illicit material.” Id.

(citing People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75, 82 (2000)). Stated differently, actual possession is 

proven by testimony that shows that the defendant exercised some form of dominion over the 

weapon, such as trying to conceal it or throwing it away. People v. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d 784, 

788 (2010). “[W]here possession has been shown, an inference of culpable knowledge can be 

drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 335. “Whether 

there is knowledge and whether there is possession or control are questions of fact to be 

determined by the trier of fact.” Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d at 81. 

¶ 95 The crux of defendant’s argument is the same as his other claims of reasonable doubt, that 

Officer Ferreras’s testimony is not credible. However, the trial court heard Officer Ferreras’s 

testimony that he observed defendant from approximately 5 to 10 feet away possessing a 

firearm with an extended clip and then placing the weapon in the glove compartment. During 

the subsequent search of the vehicle, a 9-millimeter handgun with an extended magazine 

containing 12 live rounds was recovered from the glove compartment. Officer Ferreras’s 

testimony established that defendant exercised dominion over the weapon by personally 

concealing it in the glove compartment when the officers were approaching the vehicle. The 

trial court found such testimony to be credible and sufficient proof of possession of the weapon. 

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we cannot say that the 

evidence was so improbable that no rational trier of fact could have found defendant possessed 

a firearm and was guilty of UUWF beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 96 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.

¶ 97 Affirmed.