IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In Re the Matter of:

LUKAS BACKSTRAND, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

KATHY BACKSTRAND, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0742 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County

No. S0300DO201700099

The Honorable Elaine Fridlund-Horne, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Loose Law Group, P.C., Phoenix

By Edward J. Walneck

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

The Wilkins Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix

By Amy M. Wilkins (argued) & Laura C. Brosh

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 12-24-2020
BACKSTRAND v. BACKSTRAND

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION OF THE COURT

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s opinion, in which Presiding 

Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Kathy Backstrand (“Mother”) appeals from the superior 

court’s order placing her child, Lola, in the primary care of Lukas 

Backstrand (“Father”) and modifying the couple’s parenting time. We hold 

that a court may modify a parenting plan only if it first finds a material 

change of the circumstances affecting the child’s welfare since the last court 

order. If the court finds a material difference in the circumstances, it then 

may determine whether a change in the parenting plan will be in the child’s 

best interests. See A.R.S. 25-403(A) (listing the factors a court must consider 

when deciding legal decision-making and parenting time either initially or 

on a petition to modify). We reject Mother’s contention that the court cannot

modify parenting time unless it first finds a material change detrimental to 

the child’s welfare.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Lola was born in 2011 while her parents were living in 

Minnesota. The family moved to Arizona five years later. In March 2017, 

Father filed for dissolution. After Mother and Father reached agreements 

on dissolution matters, the court approved a consent decree prepared by 

the parties in August 2017. While the dissolution proceeding was pending, 

Father moved back to Minnesota.

¶3 The parties agreed to share joint legal decision-making 

authority of Lola. They also decided on two different parenting schedules, 

entitled “Plan A” and “Plan B.” Under Plan A, which would apply if Father 

lived in Minnesota, Lola would live primarily with Mother in Lake Havasu 

City and attend school there. Father would have parenting time in the 

summers, during school breaks, and on certain holidays. Under Plan B, 

which would apply if Father lived in Lake Havasu City, the parents would 

equally share parenting time. After the court approved and entered the 

parenting plan, Father did not return to Arizona, and the parties

implemented Plan A.
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Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 In April 2018, less than a year after entry of the decree, Mother 

informed Father that she wanted to move with Lola to Las Vegas, Nevada.

Father objected. See A.R.S. § 25-411(A) (“[a] person shall not make a motion 

to modify a legal decision-making or parenting time decree earlier than one 

year after its date”). Mother did not move at that time. In August 2018, just 

more than a year after entry of the consent decree, Mother sent Father a 

letter informing him that she and Lola were moving to Las Vegas. Father 

again objected and petitioned to prevent Lola’s move.

¶5 In his petition to prevent relocation, Father alleged the move 

was not in Lola’s best interests under the factors specified in A.R.S. 

§ 25-408(I). While Father’s petition was pending, Mother sent an email to 

Father stating she planned to move with Lola to Las Vegas on October 3.

The day before the scheduled move, Father filed an emergency motion with 

the court seeking temporary orders enjoining Mother from relocating until 

further court order. The next day, the court denied the motion, and Mother 

moved with Lola to Las Vegas and enrolled her in school.

¶6 In response to the move, Father amended his petition to 

request a modification of legal decision-making and parenting time. Father 

alleged Mother had created a substantial and continuing change of 

circumstances by moving that justified modifying legal decision-making 

and parenting time. Father requested, inter alia, that the court make him 

Lola’s primary residential parent and grant Mother long-distance parenting 

time. The court appointed a family court evaluator and ordered the parties 

to participate in an evaluation concerning legal decision-making and 

parenting time. The court-appointed evaluator recommended the court 

allow Lola to remain with Mother in Las Vegas.

¶7 In July 2019, the court conducted a three-day trial on Father’s 

petition. During the trial, Father questioned the court-appointed evaluator

about his process and findings. Father then presented testimony from an 

expert witness challenging the evaluator’s report’s evidentiary value and 

opining on the importance of Lola’s relationship with other family 

members. Father and Lola’s paternal grandfather testified about the 

Minnesota town where Father and his family lived. The testimony revealed

their family’s involvement in Lola’s life, activities available to Lola there, 

and identified the school she would attend if Father became her primary 

residential parent. Finally, the court heard extensive testimony concerning 

Mother’s other child, Lola’s half-brother Cole, who had lived with Mother,

Father, and Lola before the divorce.
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Opinion of the Court

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¶8 When Mother and Father separated, Cole relocated to 

Minnesota to live with his father, and Mother voluntarily agreed to 

terminate her parental rights to Cole. Both Cole’s father and Father testified 

that Cole and Lola had a close relationship, and Cole frequently stayed with 

Father and Lola for extended periods during Father’s parenting time.

Father also testified that Cole and Lola’s relationship had deteriorated since 

they began living apart.

¶9 For her part, Mother testified about the reasons she decided 

to move to Las Vegas. She elaborated on the benefits of her new career, 

work schedule, and how the increase in income allowed her and Lola to 

have a better life than in Lake Havasu City. Mother also testified concerning 

Lola’s integration into her new school, extracurricular activities, social life, 

and living situation. Finally, Mother testified about her fiancé’s relationship 

with Lola.

¶10 Father and Mother each testified about their respective places 

of residence. Both parents believed the other’s home would negatively 

affect Lola, and both expressed distaste for the environment in the other’s 

community. Father asserted a move to Las Vegas would expose Lola to 

inappropriate matters. Mother claimed the small town where Father lived 

would cause Lola to become small-minded. However, neither parent 

pointed to specific evidence showing that the other’s residence was 

detrimental to Lola’s welfare. After the hearing, the court took the matter 

under advisement.

¶11 In August 2019, the court placed its findings and conclusions

on the record. The court first found that “[M]other created [a] change in 

circumstances that [is] substantial and continuing affecting Lola’s best 

interests by relocating from Lake Havasu City to Las Vegas.” Based on this 

finding, the court then considered and made findings regarding each of the 

factors outlined in A.R.S. § 25-408(I) and A.R.S. § 25-403(A). The court

concluded that it was in Lola’s best interests to make Father her primary 

residential parent and allow her to reside in Minnesota. Accordingly, the 

court reversed Mother’s and Father’s roles under the parenting plan and 

ordered Lola to live and attend school in Minnesota. The court also ordered

that Mother be given more parenting time during the summers than the 

plan initially provided for Father. The court made no other changes to the 

parenting plan but ordered Father’s counsel to prepare a formal written 

order addressing its ruling. When Father’s counsel failed to file the order, 

the court issued a written order reaffirming and elaborating on its oral 

findings and conclusions.
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Opinion of the Court

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¶12 Mother appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding a 

Material Change of Circumstances Affecting Lola’s Welfare.

¶13 Mother first argues Father failed to demonstrate a material 

change of circumstances affecting Lola’s welfare. As a result, Mother asserts 

the court lacked any basis to modify the original decree. We disagree.

¶14 When presented with a request to modify a dissolution 

decree’s decision-making and parenting-time provisions, the superior court 

must engage in a two-stage inquiry.

1 “First, the court must ascertain 

whether there has been a change of circumstances materially affecting the 

1 We note that the two-stage approach is inconsistent with A.R.S.

§ 25-411(J). Arizona adopted a version of the Uniform Marriage and 

Divorce Act (1970) (amended 1971 and 1973). Under section 409(b) of the 

uniform act, a parent may not modify a parenting plan unless that parent 

presents “facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown 

to the court at the time of entry of the prior decree” or “that a change has 

occurred in the circumstances of the child or his [or her] custodian” and the 

“modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.” Our 

legislature did not adopt the change-of-circumstance requirement of the 

uniform act, opting instead for A.R.S. § 25-411(J)’s directive that a court may 

modify an existing parenting order “whenever modification would serve 

the best interest of the child.” Despite the statutory change, our caselaw has 

not addressed the continuing validity of the change-of-circumstance 

jurisprudence regarding parenting plans. Cf. Waldecker v. O’Scanlon, 375 

P.3d 239, 249 (Haw. 2016) (“[J]urisprudential concerns regarding repetitive 

motions cannot be addressed in a manner that conflicts with the 

requirements of [the Hawai’i family code] that custody should be 

awarded . . . according to the best interests of the child and any custody 

award shall be subject to modification or change whenever the best interests 

of the child require or justify the modification or change.”) (quotations 

omitted). This court, however, is bound by our supreme court’s precedent. 

Sell v. Gama, 231 Ariz. 323, 330, ¶ 31 (2013) (The lower courts are bound by 

Arizona Supreme Court decisions, and that court “alone is responsible for 

modifying that precedent.”).
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Opinion of the Court

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welfare of the child.” Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977) (citation 

omitted). Only if it finds such a change in circumstances may it “then 

proceed to determine whether a change in custody will be in the best 

interests of the child.” Id.; see also A.R.S. 25-403(A). “[T]he burden is on the 

moving party to satisfy the court that conditions and circumstances have so 

changed after the original decree as to justify the modification.” Burk v. 

Burk, 68 Ariz. 305, 308 (1949). The superior court is vested with broad 

discretion to decide whether a change of circumstances has occurred. 

Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 179 (1982). “On review, the trial 

court’s decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion, i.e., 

a clear absence of evidence to support its actions.” Id.

¶15 Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by finding that 

Lola’s relocation to another city in another state was a change of 

circumstances materially affecting her welfare. It is undisputed that the 

move placed Lola in a new home, school, and community, where she has

and will continue to engage in new activities, form new relationships, and 

face new challenges. These changes are substantial and continuing.

2

¶16 The changes affect nearly every facet of Lola’s life with 

Mother, and Mother did not testify that the move was temporary. Whether 

the changes are ultimately positive or negative is immaterial to the 

change-of-circumstances inquiry. See, e.g., Black, 114 Ariz. at 284 (change of 

circumstances included that petitioning parent had remarried); Ward v. 

Ward, 88 Ariz. 130, 135–36 (1960) (change of circumstances included age of 

the child, child’s desire to visit the other parent more frequently, and 

increased distance between the child and noncustodial parent); Canty v. 

Canty, 178 Ariz. 443, 448–49 (App. 1994) (change of circumstances was that 

joint custody became “logistically impossible”); see also Burk, 68 Ariz. at 309 

(petitioner not entitled to modification when no evidence existed of change 

of circumstances showing primary parent was “an unfit person” or that 

“the welfare of the children would be improved by a modification”). The 

2 The court would have been presented with an entirely different 

situation if Mother had sought the court’s authorization to relocate before

she moved with Lola to Las Vegas. This court has explicitly held that a 

proposed relocation, by itself, does not constitute a material change of 

circumstances affecting the child. Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 422, 

¶¶ 15–16 (App. 2003). So long as a residential parent is willing to remain in 

the state if the court were to find that relocation is not in the child’s best 

interests, that parent’s desire to relocate, by itself, creates no basis to modify 

any provision of the decree or order. Id. at ¶ 16.
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Opinion of the Court

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court’s only task at this initial stage is to determine whether (1) a change of 

circumstances affecting the child’s welfare has occurred and (2) whether the 

difference is material, or, in other words, whether the change justifies 

departing from the principles of res judicata underlying the order currently 

in place. See Black, 114 Ariz. at 283; Ward, 88 Ariz. at 134–35 (“The change of 

circumstances rule as a limitation on modification of a divorce decree is one 

aspect of the principle of res judicata.”).

¶17 Moreover, Mother’s relocation of Lola to Las Vegas also 

caused a material change of circumstances by undermining several decree 

provisions. For example, the parties’ parenting plan provided that Lola 

would attend school in Lake Havasu City. By moving Lola to Las Vegas,

Mother rendered this provision logistically impossible to enforce. The 

superior court may find a material change of circumstances when the 

change has caused the original decree to serve its purpose no longer. Ward, 

88 Ariz. at 135; see also Canty, 178 Ariz. at 448–49; Hendricks v. Mortensen, 153 

Ariz. 241, 244 (App. 1987) (finding that “[i]t is obvious that the decree must 

be modified” when one parent remarried and relocated to Texas).

¶18 Whether imposed by the court or agreed to by the parties, the 

parenting provisions of a decree or other order represent a snapshot of the 

child’s best interests when they are entered. In turn, this snapshot forms the 

baseline from which future courts assess whether a material change of 

circumstances has occurred. See Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, 209, ¶ 18 (App. 

2009) (in part, the rationale for A.R.S. § 25-403’s requirement for specific 

findings on the record is to provide a baseline for “any future petitions by 

either party based on ‘changed circumstances’”). Thus, a change that 

materially reduces or eliminates the effect of a parenting-plan provision

constitutes a change of circumstances because that provision no longer 

advances the child’s best interests. Parenting plan provisions that are no 

longer tailored to the current circumstances force children and parents to 

either comply with logistically impossible directives or go forward without 

the measure of stability offered by a defined parenting plan. Under either

scenario, the welfare of the child will be affected.

¶19 Accordingly, the court was well within its discretion to find 

that Lola’s relocation to Las Vegas was a material change of circumstances 

affecting Lola’s welfare.

¶20 Relying on our supreme court’s decision in Davis v. Davis, 78 

Ariz. 174, 176 (1954), Mother counters that the court must find the alleged 

change of circumstances both substantial and detrimental to the child’s 

welfare before it may consider changing the parenting plan. Claiming the 
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Opinion of the Court

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evidence presented at trial showed that Mother’s move to Las Vegas was 

beneficial to both Mother and Lola, Mother argues the court should not 

have proceeded past the change-of-circumstances inquiry.3 However, Davis

does not stand for this principle.

¶21 In Davis, our supreme court addressed a superior court order 

altering a father’s parenting time after the child’s mother alleged that the 

child experienced conditions while living with the father that detrimentally 

affected the child’s health, safety, and general welfare. 78 Ariz. at 175. The 

father argued that no showing had been made of a “substantial change of 

conditions” since the date of the divorce. Id. In addressing this argument, 

the court held the following:

Th[e] power to modify the decree is to be exercised only when 

cogent reasons are shown. Such reasons must constitute facts 

or conditions unknown at the time of the original decree, or 

occurring subsequent to the decree. These substantial 

conditions must detrimentally affect the child whose welfare 

is the paramount consideration at all times. But all changes in 

the activities or environment of a minor will not necessarily 

constitute a basis for a modification unless shown to be 

substantial and detrimental.

Id. at 176 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court then reviewed the 

record, found no evidence that the son’s living conditions presented 

unreasonable risks to his health, safety, or welfare, and reversed the 

superior court’s order. Id. at 176–78.

¶22 Although the Davis court did not specifically reference the 

two distinct stages of the modification inquiry, it required both (1) a change 

3 Father asserts Mother has waived this argument on appeal because 

she failed to raise the change-of-circumstances issue as a contested issue

within her pretrial statement. Under Arizona Rule of Family Law

Procedure 76.1(h), “[a] party waives the right to raise an objection at the 

trial or hearing if the specific objection to a . . . claim is not raised” in that 

party’s pretrial statement. However, because we conclude the court did not 

err regarding this issue, we need not address whether waiver applies here.

City of Tempe v. Fleming, 168 Ariz. 454, 456 (App. 1991) (Whether a litigant 

can raise on appeal an argument not made in the superior court is 

procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be suspended at the appellate 

court’s discretion.).
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arising from new “facts or conditions” and (2) a resulting detrimental effect 

on the child. The court’s reference to a change of environment as a “basis 

for a modification,” rather than a basis for a finding of changed 

circumstances, indicates the court was referring to each prong of the 

two-part modification inquiry when it used the phrase “substantial and

detrimental.” See also Pridgeon, at 179 (“In considering a motion for change 

of custody, the court must initially determine whether a change of 

circumstances has occurred since the last custody order. Only after the 

court finds a change has occurred does the court reach the question of 

whether a change in custody would be in the child’s best interest.”).

¶23 Our interpretation is reinforced both by the fact that the 

two-stage inquiry was already in use when the court ruled in that case, and 

it is consistent with the current legislative directive. See Cone v. Righetti, 73 

Ariz. 271, 276 (1952) (“[B]efore the court has authority to change the custody 

of a minor child it must be shown that there had arisen a change in the 

conditions or circumstances surrounding the children affecting their 

general welfare and that it would be for their best interests that a change in 

custody be made.”) (emphasis added); A.R.S. § 25-411(J). Davis, therefore, 

aligns with this court’s analysis outlined above. A change in environment

will permit modification only if the difference is: (1) “substantial,” i.e., a 

change that materially affects the welfare of the child; and

(2) “detrimental,” i.e., not in the child’s best interests after considering the 

A.R.S. § 25-403(A) factors.

¶24 Under Davis, a parent’s decision to move with the child to the 

house next door, without more, would not be a “substantial” change in the 

child’s environment warranting modification. A move to another city, 

county, or state, on the other hand, could be considered “substantial” but

might not be “detrimental” absent evidence that the change in environment 

does not serve the child’s best interests. And concerning the “detrimental” 

prong of the inquiry, the legislature’s statutory framework enacted in the 

years following Davis has clarified how and in what manner the

best-interests analysis must be conducted. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A) (first 

adopted as A.R.S. § 25-332 in 1973); A.R.S. § 25-408(I) (first adopted in its 

current form in 1997). Mother’s citation to Davis, therefore, does not alter 

our conclusion.

¶25 Having found a change of circumstances, the superior court 

then proceeded to the second step of the modification inquiry: whether the 

decree should be modified based on the court’s assessment of the child’s 

best interests as provided by the relevant statutory framework—in this 

case, A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A) and -408(I). See Layne v. LaBianca ex rel County of 
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Maricopa, 249 Ariz. 301, 302–03, ¶¶ 5–7 (App. 2020) (the superior court must 

consider whether the decree should be modified based on the court’s 

assessment of the child’s best interests as provided by the relevant statutory 

framework of A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A) and -408(I)). At this step, the court was 

required to assess the present circumstances and determine whether Lola’s 

best interests were to modify the parenting plan. This assessment included 

both the positive and negative impacts of Lola’s relocation to Las Vegas. See 

A.R.S. § 25-411(J) (“[t]he court may modify an order granting or denying 

parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best interest 

of the child”); Black, 114 Ariz. at 284 (“While the factors that establish a 

change of circumstances . . . are not always completely dispositive of the 

question of what will be in the child’s best interests, they are highly 

relevant.”).

¶26 Mother argues that the court failed to give due deference to 

the original decree in making this determination. Specifically, Mother 

contends the court could not consider the presence of Lola’s extended 

family in Minnesota to determine whether a change of circumstances 

occurred or whether the modification was warranted because that fact 

already existed when the original decree was entered. Mother is correct that 

“[t]he allegation and proof of some additional change occurring since the 

entry of the prior order is prerequisite to any later modification.” Pridgeon, 

134 Ariz. at 180 (quoting Harder v. Harder, 552 P.2d 852, 854 (Or. App. 1976)). 

But once the court found that Lola’s relocation to Las Vegas caused a 

material change of circumstances affecting her welfare, it was statutorily 

required to consider “all factors that are relevant to the child’s physical and 

emotional well-being.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A). This includes considering “the 

interaction and interrelationship of the child with . . . the child’s siblings 

and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest.”

A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(2).

¶27 During the trial, the court heard extensive testimony by 

Father and Lola’s paternal grandfather concerning Lola’s present-day 

relationship with her extended family. Cole’s father and Father also 

testified about Lola and Cole’s close relationship and the extended time 

they have been able to spend together in Minnesota during Father’s 

parenting time. Therefore, reasonable evidence supports the court’s 

conclusion that the best-interest factors, particularly A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(2),

weighed in favor of modifying the decree to make Father Lola’s primary 

residential parent. We will not substitute our judgment by reweighing the 

evidence underlying the court’s best-interests analysis. See Vincent v. 

Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 18 (App. 2015) (“[T]he family court is in the best 

position to judge the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting 
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evidence, and appellate courts generally defer to the findings of the family 

court.”).

B. The Superior Court Provided Mother with Due Process.

¶28 Mother also contends the superior court allowed Father two 

and a half days to present his case but limited her case to only 50 minutes, 

thereby depriving her of due process. Mother asserts this imbalance was

fundamentally unfair and skewed the court’s findings and conclusions in 

Father’s favor. She also contends the inadequate time the court allowed her 

prevented her from recalling and examining the court-appointed family 

evaluator, whom Father had questioned extensively during his case.

Whether the superior court afforded Mother due process presents a 

question of law we review de novo. Jeff D. v. DCS, 239 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 6 

(App. 2016).

¶29 “The touchstone of due process under both the Arizona and 

federal constitutions is fundamental fairness.” Jeff D., 239 Ariz. at 207, ¶ 7 

(quoting State v. Melendez, 172 Ariz. 68, 71 (1992)). At a minimum, due 

process requires that litigants be heard “at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting 

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). But the due-process right to 

an adequate opportunity to be heard must be balanced against the superior 

court’s broad discretion to impose reasonable time limits on proceedings 

and control the management of its docket. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 22(a) (“The 

court may impose reasonable time limits appropriate to the proceedings.”); 

Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a) (“[t]he court should exercise reasonable control over 

the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence”); 

Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346 (1992) (“A trial court has broad discretion 

over the management of its docket. Appellate courts do not substitute their 

judgment for that of the trial court in the day-to-day management of 

cases.”). Thus, this court has held that “[t]hough the court may impose time 

limits that appear reasonable in advance of a proceeding, those limits 

become unreasonable if they prove insufficient to allow a substantive 

hearing.” Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 468, ¶ 21 (App. 2014). But this does 

not mean “that the court must indulge inefficient use of time by parties or 

their counsel,” and whether additional time is necessary remains 

committed to the court’s discretion. Id. at 469, ¶ 22.

¶30 After reviewing the record, we conclude the court’s 

management of the proceedings did not violate Mother’s due-process 

rights. At the outset, Mother’s characterization of an “imbalance” in the 

time allotted to each party ignores the fact that Mother’s trial counsel 
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cross-examined nearly all of Father’s witnesses extensively over the first 

two days of trial—especially Father’s expert. Nevertheless, when it became 

apparent that the remaining time initially set aside for the trial would not 

allow Father to finish his case or provide Mother an adequate opportunity 

to present her witnesses and evidence, the court extended the trial by nearly 

a full day. The court informed both parties of the date and time allotted for 

the trial, and both agreed without objection.

¶31 Despite being fully aware of the time allotted and that the 

court had already extended the trial once, Mother’s trial counsel again

chose to undertake an extensive cross-examination of Father. Before the 

cross-examination was complete, the court informed the parties that only 

an hour remained, and it did not intend to extend the trial a second time.

Mother’s counsel objected. In response, the court noted that Mother’s 

counsel had used more than an hour and a half to cross-examine Father and 

stated that it believed “everybody was aware of how much time was set for 

trial and has used their time accordingly.” But the court guaranteed Mother 

50 minutes of the remaining hour to ensure that she could present her case, 

including her testimony. In doing so, the court limited Father’s time to 

cross-examine Mother, noting that Father had used a significant amount of

time for his testimony.

¶32 After completing direct and redirect examination of Mother 

within the time remaining, Mother’s trial counsel did not renew the

objection, request additional time, or specify what other evidence was 

needed to present Mother’s case adequately. Nor does Mother identify on 

appeal additional evidence the superior court’s time restrictions prevented 

her from offering at trial. Under these circumstances, we have no difficulty 

concluding the court did not deprive Mother of a meaningful opportunity 

to be heard, nor did it act unreasonably in refusing to provide her with 

additional time. It is incumbent upon counsel to manage the time allotted

and balance cross-examination’s strategic value against the time necessary 

to present testimony and other evidence. Cf. Nicaise v. Sundaram, 244 Ariz. 

272, 277, ¶ 15 (App. 2018) (finding no denial of due process when brevity of 

parent’s testimony “was the product of her counsel’s strategic decisions 

regarding use of time at trial”), vacated in part on other grounds, 245 Ariz. 566, 

569, ¶ 15 (2019). The court did not deny Mother due process.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶33 Both parties request an award of attorney’s fees under A.R.S. 

§ 25-324. In the exercise of our discretion, we deny both requests. As the 
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successful party on appeal, Father is entitled to recover his costs upon 

compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

¶34 We affirm the superior court’s order.