United States

Department

of Agriculture

www.ers.usda.gov

Electronic Outlook Report from the Economic Research Service

RCS-0303-01

March 2003

Rice Sector Policies in Japan

Abstract

Japan's rice sector is supported by high prices paid by consumers that allow many farm

households to maintain small rice farms. Japan's government controls trade within a 

tariff-rate quota and imposes a prohibitively high tariff on imports outside the quota.

Within Japan, diversion programs pay farmers to substitute other crops for rice since,

without government-mandated diversion, supply would exceed demand at the price 

levels in Japan's market. Farmers are compensated for market price declines below a

moving average of past prices. Government subsidies are used to restructure farming into

larger operations, enabling lower production costs. Japan freed its wholesale and retail

rice markets from government control in the late 1990s, and market prices have been

gradually falling. Nevertheless, producer prices are 10 or more times higher than prices in

other japonica rice-growing countries, and consumer prices are 2-3 times higher. 

Keywords: Japan, rice, policies, domestic support, trade, trade liberalization,

tariff-rate quota.

Acknowledgments

The authors gratefully acknowledge the reviews of Nathan Childs, Linwood Hoffman,

Praveen Dixit, and Joy Harwood of ERS; Amy Burdett and Michelle Moore of FAS;

Andrew Aaronson of the World Agricultural Outlook Board; Carol Goodloe of the Office

of the Chief Economist; Daniel Sumner and Hyunok Lee of the University of California

at Davis; Eric Wailes of the University of Arkansas; and Robert Cummings of the USA

Rice Federation. Excellent support was provided by the editor, Lou King, and by the

designer, Wynnice Pointer-Napper.

Hisao Fukuda, John Dyck, and Jim Stout1

1 Hisao Fukuda works in the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) and John Dyck and Jim Stout work in the

Economic Research Service (ERS), both in USDA. This article is part of a project jointly conducted by the

FAS Tokyo office and ERS.
This article is one in a series examining Japan’s policies that protect and regulate its agricultural markets.

Its policies are of special interest both because Japan

is one of the world’s leading agricultural importers and

because they are subject to review in the current

“Doha” round of global trade negotiations conducted

by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 

Rice, the traditional staple food of Japan, is grown

throughout the country’s main islands. Production is

almost exclusively on specially laid out rice paddies,

where summer rains and an extensive network of irrigation facilities provide abundant water. Almost all

rice is japonica—a short-grain variety widely grown in

Northeast Asia. Income from rice farming is about 25

percent of Japan’s total agricultural income, and most

Japanese farmers derive part of their income from rice,

either by raising rice or contracting out paddy land for

rice growing. 

Rice has long been a fundamental feature of Japan’s

agriculture. Rice paddies in Japan’s lowlands are irrigated from rivers running down from the mountains.

The irrigation systems require coordination among

farmers, who share the irrigation and drainage channels as well as the available water. Traditionally,

Japan’s rice areas have been worked by many small

households that cooperated extensively. 

In the early 1950s, a thorough land reform divided the

rice-growing area into millions of smallholdings, each

less than 3 hectares (ha) in size. Many households that

had rented from large landowners received their own

land during the reform, and felt that the new, smallscale land tenure system was fair and needed to be

defended. However, in the succeeding 50 years,

Japan’s economy has changed so that the income from

farming less than 3 ha of rice is dwarfed by other

income opportunities. Farmers have shifted to off-farm

employment, and rice cultivation has become a parttime household activity for most farms. 

Total rice consumption has been falling since the

1970s. In the last half of the 20th century, Japan’s consumers greatly increased the variety of foods that they

ate, and other foods were substituted for rice. Because

Japan’s government has heavily subsidized rice production since the 1970s, at the same time that consumption was falling, output has sometimes exceeded

demand (fig. 1), and subsequent high stocks have

prompted export and food donation programs, as well

as land diversion from rice to other crops. 

Japan’s government has resisted rice imports for over 30

years. At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (UR) of

global trade negotiations in 1995, Japan agreed to a

quota on rice imports that now brings 682,000 tons of

rice into the country annually.2 However, most of this

rice is not released directly into Japan’s market. Instead,

2 Economic Research Service, USDA

Introduction

Figure 1

Japan: Rice production, consumption, stocks, and trade

1,000 tons

Source: PS&D, Feb. 2003.

Production

Stocks

Imports

Consumption

1961 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 2001

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

Exports

2 Milled basis.
imported rice often remains in government stocks until

it is released as food aid to developing countries or sold

as an input to food processors.

It is now evident that Japan’s rice farm structure will

have to evolve to a larger scale. Japan’s rural areas are

losing population and the farm owners are aging. Even

on a part-time basis, they cannot continue operating all

of Japan’s small farms. Private-sector initiatives, such

as custom, contract, and cooperative farming, and public initiatives to consolidate rice paddies into larger

fields, are widespread. All these initiatives seek to

reduce the amount of labor and the number of small

machines needed in rice farming, in order to cut costs.

However, land ownership has not changed much.

Households are reluctant to sell the smallholdings they

received during the land reform. The establishment of

larger and fewer farm operations requires the consent

of many landowners, and can be a difficult task.

The longstanding cooperation among farmers is still

reflected in strong rural communities in which an individual farmer’s actions are weighed against the welfare

of the rest of the farmers. This can make it difficult to

assemble a large farm operation and difficult to design

government policies that support both small landowners and large farmers. Japan’s rice policies have

changed in the last decade and are likely to change

again as the society struggles to transform its smallscale land holdings into more efficient farms.

Economic Research Service, USDA 3
Japan’s government has introduced new policies for

rice farming in the last 5 years, and relinquished some

control over rice marketing in the 1990s. Nevertheless,

government subsidies to rice production remain high.

In 1999, the last year for which detailed information is

available, government spending in support of rice production was at least 206 billion yen ($1.82 billion)

(table 1). In addition, the government spent about 120

billion yen ($1 billion) in payments to divert rice paddies out of rice production (table 1). Additional

expenses include the stockpiling of rice and subsidizing rice used in school lunch programs, as well as

research and farmer pension expenditures. The total

burden of domestic rice policies on taxpayers is likely

to be over $2.8 billion per year. This amounts to

expenditures of over $340 per ton of milled rice produced (using 1999 as a typical year).

In the late 1990s, Japan’s government ended years of

regulation over the marketing of rice. Farmers are now

free to choose any marketing channel, and wholesale

and retail marketing of rice is largely free of government supervision and licensing requirements.3 In

recent years, retail prices of rice in Japan have fallen,

perhaps in part because of the increased wholesale and

retail competition that has accompanied the deregulation of marketing.

Compensation for declines in producer prices. The

government offers support to farmers’ income from

rice through a program that compensates for part of

the loss in case market prices fall below a historical

average price. In 1999, the last year for which data are

available, payments made under the Rice Farming

Income Stabilization Program were 92.7 billion yen,

about $815 million. 

The Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program began

in 1998. Under this program, there is no intervention to

support market rice prices. However, rice farmers are

compensated when the market price in a crop year falls

below a standard price, which is calculated as the moving average market price of preceding years. In 2002,

the standard price calculation was changed to reflect the

previous 7 years, with the highest and lowest prices

removed from the calculation.4 If current-year market

prices fall below the standard price, producers can collect 80 percent of the difference between the currentyear price and the standard price, multiplied times current production. The money comes from the Rice

Farming Income Stabilization Fund, filled by contributions from participating farmers (2 percent of the standard rice price times their output volume) and the government (6 percent of the standard rice price times

national output volume) each year. 

Participation in the Income Stabilization Program is

voluntary, and some farmers have chosen not to participate. To get the full benefits, participating farmers

are required to join the current Production Adjustment

4 Economic Research Service, USDA

Domestic policies

Table 1—Japanese government expenditures in support of rice farming, 1999

Billion yen Million U.S.$

Direct expenditures in support of rice production

Rice farming income stabilization program 92.7 815

Interest concessions for variable inputs 35.791 315

Insurance premiums 24.209 213

Extension services 4.56 40

Onfarm investments 49.12 432

Total 206.38 1,815

Related program:

Production Adjustment Promotion Program (diversion program) 116.7 1,026

Total of direct and related programs 323.08 2,842

Sources: WTO; OECD; NAIA.

3 See Wailes et al. for a discussion of the earlier marketing system.

4 From 1998-2002, the standard price had been the average of the

previous 3 years’ market prices.
Promotion Program (PAPP), which diverts some of

their paddy land away from rice.5 Thus, a farmer

diverting a paddy field to another crop receives the

revenue from selling that crop, plus the diversion payment (see Rice diversion policies, below) and the right

to be eligible for income stabilization payments based

on the farm’s remaining rice production. Japan notified the WTO that the Income Stabilization Program

was a “blue box” policy—where payments to farmers

are linked to output-limiting measures, such as the

diversion requirement (see How Japan Notifies Its

Domestic Policies on Rice to the WTO).

Rice diversion policies. In 2001, diversion payments

were 193.1 billion yen ($1.60 billion), and the area

diverted was 1,010,000 hectares, over a third of total

paddy area (table 2). Payments averaged about $1,580

per hectare diverted.

Japan has had difficulties with surplus production

since the 1960s. Because of its climate and land base

for rice paddies, Japan is well suited for growing rice.

However, until the 1950s, Japan’s large population

consumed more rice than the country could consistently produce. As society changed in the course of recovery from World War II and national income rose, rice

consumption per person began a fall in 1963, a trend

that has continued until the present time. 

As rice consumption dropped, Japan’s government

sought to raise the incomes of the many households

raising rice. The government ceased rice imports and

took other steps, such as purchases, to raise the

domestic producer price of rice. Farmers responded

with higher production, leading to rising government

stocks. Measures such as exporting the rice into the

world market or using it for feed proved expensive and

faced opposition from other countries, whose exports

of rice or feedgrains were hurt by Japan’s actions.

Thus, in 1971 Japan turned to supply control measures

that have remained in effect through the present. 

Diversion has been administered under five different

plans since 1971.6 The current plan, PAPP, was started

in 1998. Under it, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry

and Fisheries (MAFF) determines adjustments to rice

paddy area needed to bring supply and demand into

balance. Farmers are offered payments if they use

paddy land for certain purposes other than growing

rice for food use. Per hectare payments from the government (revised annually) vary according to the use

made of diverted land. Payments for various crop

alternatives have also varied over time (payments for

selected crops are presented in table 3). The main

source of funds for the diversion payments is the

national budget. However, farmers participating in the

PAPP are required to pay 4,000 yen ($33) per 10 ares7

for the land kept in rice into a mutual compensation

fund. Table 4 shows the choices that farmers were

Economic Research Service, USDA 5

Table 2—Rice area diverted and the level of 

diversion payments, 1971-2001

Year Area Payments

1,000 ha Billion yen

1971 547 172.5

1972 520 181.2

1973 498 180.9

1974 325 115.0

1975 244 95.0

1976 215 77.1

1977 215 94.0

1978 391 260.7

1979 391 224.8

1980 535 299.6

1981 631 358.1

1982 631 361.1

1983 600 340.7

1984 600 252.3

1985 574 223.7

1986 600 235.0

1987 770 197.9

1988 770 198.0

1989 770 189.6

1990 830 169.4

1991 830 168.2

1992 700 142.6

1993 676 100.4

1994 600 74.0

1995 680 88.4

1996 787 139.7

1997 787 140.1

1998 963 122.6

1999 963 123.71

2000 963 152.2

2001 1,010 193.1

Source: FAS/Tokyo.

1The number for 1999 is larger than the 116.7 billion yen reported to

the WTO. The discrepancy may reflect expenditures in a related program to promote feed stuff production.

5 Full benefits from the Rice Income Stabilization Program are

available only to farmers who are also participating in the

Production Adjustment Promotion Program. Reduced benefits are

available to other farmers.

6 See Wailes et al. for details on earlier plans.

7 An are is one hundredth of a hectare. Because of the small size of

farms, many policies are defined on the basis of 10 ares, which is

equivalent to one-tenth of a hectare, or about one-quarter of an acre.
offered in 2001, and How Diversion Payments Are

Calculated explains how the diversion subsidies vary

according to the land use chosen.

Some of the diversion program alternatives involve

keeping the paddy planted in rice, but not harvesting

the rice for grain for human consumption. Payments

for these options are given in table 4.

 Rice can be planted and fed to animals as fodder

(the whole plant is used as feed).

 Rice can be cut and the whole plant fermented for

use as cattle feed (fermented fodder).

 Rice can be cut and used as straw.

 Rice grains can be harvested and fed to animals

(feed rice).

 Rice (and other) plants can be plowed under the soil

as green manure.

6 Economic Research Service, USDA

Policy Box Justification

Construction of irrigation/ Green Infrastructural services for agricultural sector.

drainage facilities and rural 

roads; land consolidation

Interest concessions for Green Structural adjustment assistance. 

agricultural loans

Compensation to producers Blue Payments based on 85% or less of the base

for market price declines level of production.1

Rice diversion payments Green Environmental payments: for maintaining 

paddy fields in environmentally good condition 

through growing any plants other than rice.

Disaster insurance subsidies Green and amber2 Green: payments for relief from natural 

disasters: subsidies on premiums of agricultural 

insurance for production loss more than 30% of 

average levels.

Amber: subsidies on premiums of agricultural 

insurance for production loss less than 30% of 

average levels.

1 Further justification is given in a notification by Japan to the WTO, G/AG/N/JPN/62, March 1, 2001. 

2 Premium payments for insurance coverage for losses less than 30 percent for all commodities (not just rice) were 22.2 billion yen ($195

million) in 1999, which was 0.2 percent of the value of Japan's total agricultural output, and thus considered de minimis and not counted

as part of Japan's total Aggregate Measurement of Support because the payments were less than 5 percent of the value of production.

Source: Notification concerning domestic support commitments reported by the Government of Japan to the WTO for fiscal year 1999,

G/AG/N/JPN/72, Feb. 19, 2002.

How Japan Notifies Its Domestic Policies on Rice to the WTO

Table 3—Diversion payments by crop, 1971-2001

Year Wheat, barley Vegetables Long-life crop

soybeans, forage (fruit orchard)

Yen/10 ares1

1971 - /75 40,000 40,000 40,000

1976 - 77 50,000 47,000 47,000

1978 - 83 70,000 50,000 70,000

1984 - 86 62,000 42,000 70,000

1987 - 89 50,000 17,000 55,000

1990 - 92 50,000 19,000 55,000

1993 - 95 50,000 19,000 37,000

1996 - 97 50,000 26,000 39,000

1998 - 99 50,000 11,000 30,000

2000 73,000 13,000 13,000

2001 83,000 13,000 15,000

Notes: Payments shown are the maximum payments under the 

various programs.

1 10 ares are equivalent to 0.1 hectare or 0.25 acre.

Source: FAS/Tokyo.
Two other alternatives allow harvesting rice for human

consumption, but with adjustments to farming structure that might not otherwise be made.

 Paddies that are adjusted for greater efficiency can

get a partial diversion subsidy. This rewards changes

that make fields easier to cultivate.

 Rice can be grown for scenic purposes. Some scenic

rice plots have low yields and might otherwise be

abandoned in favor of more productive activities.

In its annual accounting of agricultural policies to the

WTO, Japan places the diversion payments in the

“green box,” where they are not subject to any upper

limit or to reduction over time. Use of the “green box”

is justified, according to MAFF, by the preservation of

Japan’s paddies in an environmentally useful condition. Planting of other crops is regarded as necessary

to maintain the environmental benefits of the paddies.

However, the diversion payments clearly subsidize the

planting of other crops for which MAFF seeks greater

domestic production.

Because the diversion is on an area basis and is voluntary, the program does not offer complete protection

against overproduction of rice. If yields are higher than

expected, Japan’s farms can still flood the market with

more rice than planned for—a situation that has occurred

several times. Proposals have been made to base the rice

diversion policy on volume, rather than area. (See FAS

GAIN report JA3012, “Japan’s Proposed Rice Reforms,”

for more information.)

Insurance. In 1999, the Japanese government paid

24.2 billion yen ($213 million) in insurance premium

subsidies for rice.8 About 89 percent of rice area was

insured,9 and about 280,000 farmers were paid claims,

Economic Research Service, USDA 7

Table 4—Diversion payments, 2001

Commodities

Wheat, "Green cut" Fodder, Pulses, Tobacco Perennial Vegetables, Paddies 

barley, rice fermented buckwheat, crop, konyakku preserved 

soybeans rice plant feed rice, adjusted for scenery

fodder, rapeseed, paddies2

straw rush,

Payments green manure

Yen/10 ares

Basic subsidy 40,000 20,000 40,000 20,000

Bonus if area

commitment

is met 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000

High-utilization 

paddies1 10,000 10,000

Mutual fund

compensation 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 10,000 10,000 10,000

Additional subsidy

to reduce rice 

crop size by 

250,000 tons 10,000 40,000 10,000 5,000 10,000

Maximum 

total payment 83,000 83,000 73,000 43,000 23,000 15,000 13,000 10,000

U.S. dollars/acre

Maximum 

total payment 2,778 2,778 2,443 1,439 770 502 435 335

Notes: 10 ares=0.25 acres. In 2001, 1 U.S. dollar = 120.96 yen.

1 Applied if the field is double-cropped.

2 Subsidies are reduced by 1/3 to 2/3 for adjusted (consolidated) paddies.

Source: FAS/Tokyo.

8 National Agricultural Insurance Association, p. 53.

9 National Agricultural Insurance Association, p. 53 and MAFF,

Monthly Statistics, March 2002, p. 9.
with the indemnity amounting to 21.75 billion yen

($191 million).

Rice farmers are eligible for insurance against yield

losses, except those caused by farmer negligence. The

insurance is part of a national system that includes a

local level (a municipality or insurance association),

and prefectural and national levels. Normally, the local

level indemnifies rice farmers for losses, drawing on

premiums that are split evenly by farmers and the

national government. If losses overwhelm local funds,

additional indemnity is fully paid by the national and

prefectural agricultural insurance agencies, with general budget funds if necessary.10

Rice farmers can choose coverage for individual plots

or their entire rice farming operation. In the case of

plot coverage, indemnities are paid when losses are

greater than 30 percent of a predetermined yield. For

rice farm coverage, farmers can choose to be insured

against yield losses greater than either 10 percent or 20

percent of the standard yield, applied to the output of

all the farm plots. Farmers can choose how much, in

yen per kilogram (yen/kg), they wish to be indemnified for each kilogram of lost output. 

The premium is determined by multiplying a premium

rate times the coverage amount. For example, if a

farmer wants a rice plot to be covered for 220 yen/kg,

the premium per kilogram is 2.846 percent times 220,

or 6.26 yen/kg. This is multiplied by the standard yield

to get the plot insurance premium. Given the 1999

national average standard yield of 510 kg per onetenth hectare, insurance in the example above would

cost 3,193 yen ($28.08) for a tenth of a hectare, or

31,930 yen for a hectare ($280.80 per hectare or $114

per acre). This premium is then split between the

farmer and the national government.11

The insurance policy also covers extra precautionary

expenses (e.g., applying fungicides) farmers take when

MAFF declares that they are advisable. For example,

if MAFF officially alerts farmers in a region to a danger from a specific disease, and advises that farmers

8 Economic Research Service, USDA

Consider a farm with 1 hectare of rice paddies, with

30 ares being diverted and 70 ares kept in rice. These

examples illustrate how the diversion payments work:

1) If wheat is produced on the 30 diverted

ares, then the farm receives a base subsidy of

120,000 yen (40,000 x 3). If the surrounding

area meets its rice diversion quota, a payment

of 9,000 yen also accrues to the farm (3,000

x 3). In the case of wheat double-cropped

with wheat or another non-rice crop, a further 30,000 yen would be received (10,000 x

3). The mutual compensation fund would

contribute another 60,000 yen (20,000 x 3).

A special payment of 30,000 yen (10,000 x

3) applied in 2001. The maximum payment

for wheat would have been 249,000 yen

($2,059) for diverting 30 ares. For an acre of

land, this would be $2,778.

2) If tobacco is grown on the 30 ares, the

farm receives 9,000 yen (3,000 x 3) if the

surrounding-area quota is met; 30,000 yen

from the mutual compensation fund (10,000

x 3); and a special payment of 30,000 yen

(10,000 x 3) in 2001. The maximum payment

would be 69,000 yen ($570). 

3) If a perennial crop, such as an orchard, is

planted to the diverted 30 ares, the farm

receives 30,000 yen from the mutual compensation fund (10,000 x 3). In 2001, a special payment of 15,000 yen (5,000 x 3) was

also available. The maximum total payment

was 45,000 yen ($372). 

4) If vegetables are produced on the 30

diverted ares, then the farm receives 9,000

yen (3,000 x 3) if the area as a whole

achieves the diversion quota, in addition to

30,000 yen (10,000 x 3) from the mutual

fund compensation. The maximum total payment would be 39,000 yen ($322).

In all these cases, if rice is planted on 70 ares and 30

ares are diverted, the farm pays 28,000 yen (4,000 x

7, equivalent to $231) into the mutual fund.

How Diversion Payments Are Calculated

10 National Agricultural Insurance Association, pp. 9-12. 11 National Agricultural Insurance Association, pp. 7-8.
should apply a pesticide, costs of the pesticide and its

application can be covered by the insurance policy, in

addition to the indemnity for yield loss.12

Government subsidies for crop insurance are accounted

for in the “green box” when coverage is only for production loss greater than 30 percent of production (i.e.,

the plot coverage described above). When coverage is

also given for losses under 30 percent (i.e., the whole

farm coverage described above), WTO rules place government premium subsidies for such coverage into the

“amber box,” because the premium subsidies are considered to encourage greater production by lowering the

risk of income loss from weather or disease setbacks. In

1999, the last year with data available, Japan spent 22.2

billion yen ($195 million) on government subsidies for

insurance premiums that fit the amber box definition.13

The portion of this spent on rice farm insurance premiums is not known, but is likely to be substantial.

Subsidies for restructuring rice farming. Large paddies, laid out for easy use by a few large machines, can

be farmed with less labor than smaller paddies.

However, land reform in the 1950s and subsequent legislation kept land ownership in agriculture below 3 ha

(7.4 acres) per household. Individual rice paddies were

often much smaller. The small size of paddies and the

rising cost of labor led to widespread farm investment

in small machines as a way to substitute for labor use.

Since the 1980s, MAFF has sought to change the structure of rice farming in ways that would use less labor

and, on balance, less spending on machines, as a few

large machines replace many small ones. 

Restrictions on ownership of more than 3 ha of land

have been lifted, and restrictions on renting land (originally designed to thwart the return of landlord dominance over tenant farmers) have been eased.

Nevertheless, sales of rice land are relatively infrequent and adjustments through rentals and other

arrangements have not been sufficient to clear the way

for large-scale farming. 

Despite the limitations to market transfers of land,

Japan has succeeded in changing the rice farming

landscape so that paddy fields of one-half or 1 hectare

are now common. However, such changes are expensive. Consolidating a large paddy almost always

requires the cooperation of more than one landowner.

Physically, irrigation and drainage infrastructure must

be changed, and roads adjusted. 

Various funds have been used to pay for much of the

adjustment and compensate households when a small

plot is made part of a large paddy. Land trades are a

possibility, but actual sale of land is uncommon, so the

ownership of a restructured large field is sometimes

divided among several households, and compensation

goes to households who agree to the restructuring and

thereby lose their physical ability to farm the land by

themselves. Physical restructuring is paid for primarily

by the national government. Interest rate subsidies are

available for larger scale farmers to purchase big tractors, harvesters, and other equipment. 

Loans are available for cooperative ventures in which

a single firm operates the land on behalf of a large

number of households that formerly farmed rice. In

2001, 74 billion yen ($616 million) was budgeted for

the establishment of high-productivity rice paddy field

farming. A budget of 377 billion yen ($3.12 billion)

was allotted for agricultural infrastructure construction

and improvement programs,14 much of it for physical

restructuring of rice land.15 Such expenditures have

been sustained each year since 1995.

Aggregate Measurement of Support and Producer

Support Estimate. Each year, Japan’s government

calculates the Aggregate Measurement of Support

(AMS) to satisfy the WTO requirement that Japan

report its domestic support for agriculture. The

Organisation of Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) calculates the Producer Support

Estimate (PSE) each year to estimate Japan’s government support for agriculture (fig. 2). 

These international estimates of support to farming in

Japan indicate the distortions caused by Japan’s policies. The AMS is regarded as an indicator of domestic

support and the PSE is intended to measure domestic

and border support. In both indicators, however, it is

difficult to isolate the effects of domestic support from

border support. In 1997, Japan calculated the rice

AMS as 2.398 trillion yen ($19.82 billion).

Economic Research Service, USDA 9

12 National Agricultural Insurance Association, p. 11.

13 World Trade Organization (Japan’s notification to the WTO of

agricultural policies in 1999, document G/AG/N/JPN/72).

14 MAFF, Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2000, p. 741.

15 The OECD estimated that onfarm investment subsidies for rice

were $432 million in 1999, and that interest concessions for variable inputs were $315 million.
Constituting 75 percent of the total AMS, this was the

largest commodity subsidy reported by Japan in 1995-

97.16 The OECD’s PSE estimate for rice was 2.267

trillion yen ($18.74 billion) in 1997 and 2.193 trillion

yen ($20.42 billion) in 2000.17

The methodologies used for the AMS and PSE differ,

but, until 1998, both indicators were mainly based on

the concept of market price support. Japan annually

sets a government purchase price for rice. Until 1998,

the government purchased a certain quantity annually

from farmers at the predetermined purchase price.

Only farmers who cooperated with the rice diversion

plans were eligible to sell to the government. The government purchase was free of most risk, and rice quality considerations were not as important as in the private market. In practice, the government often lost

money on the purchases because storage and administration costs, added to the purchase price, exceeded the

price MAFF’s Food Agency could obtain when it sold

the rice in the market. Therefore, the purchases constituted a subsidy to farmers, who got a better price with

less risk than they would have on the open market.

However, the subsidy amounted to only a fraction of

the unit value of rice in Japan, and has been declining,

on a per unit basis, as the margin between the government sales and purchase prices has widened (fig. 3). 

Nevertheless, because Japan did have an administered

market price (the government purchase price) for rice,

both Japan and the OECD based their estimates of support on this price. Both calculated the value of the market price support as the difference between the adminis10 Economic Research Service, USDA

Figure 2

Japan: Producer Support Estimate (PSE) and Aggregate Measurement of 

Support (AMS) for rice1

Billion yen

Sources: WTO and OECD.

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

PSE AMS

1

The OECD calculates the PSE to measure government support to rice. Japan notifies the AMS to the WTO to measure 

trade-distorting government support, as required by the Uruguay Round Agreement (1995). After 1997, Japan's policies 

changed and the AMS for rice disappeared. 

Figure 3

Japan: Government purchase and sales

price for rice

Yen/60 kg, brown basis

Source: MAFF, Statistical Yearbook.

Purchase

Sales

1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

16 World Trade Organization (Japan’s notification to the WTO of

agricultural policies in 1997, document G/AG/N/JPN/47).

17 OECD, table III, Producer Support by Commodity.
tered price and an international reference price, multiplied by total rice production.18 Because Japan’s administered price was at least 7 times the reference price (fig.

4), the resulting estimate of market price support was

very large. This estimate, however, primarily reflects

Japan’s closed market for rice, in which competition

from imported rice is excluded. Thus, it actually reflects

the importance of border measures (see Border policies)

more than domestic support policies. 

In 1998, Japan changed its policies and introduced the

Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program (see

Compensation for declines in producer prices). The government announced that its future rice purchases would

be solely to maintain rice stocks for food security.19

Thus, the government purchase price, in the interpretation of Japan’s government, was no longer a tool for

market price support. The Income Stabilization Program

subsidizes rice farmers, but does so without directly

affecting current market prices. In this way, the primary

component of Japan’s AMS for rice, market price support, ended, and the AMS was notified to the WTO as

being zero in 1998 and 1999.20 It is expected to remain

zero in future years. The change in the AMS was dramatic (fig. 2), seemingly wiping out about $20 billion in

subsidies at one stroke, but the change to Japan’s rice

markets was much less important. The reason for this

contradiction is that the market price support at the heart

of both the AMS and the PSE was not primarily the

result of domestic policies, but rather reflected limits on

import competition. The PSE, which reflects both

domestic and border support, continues to be high. 

Economic Research Service, USDA 11

Figure 4

Japan: Producer and reference prices 

for rice1

1,000 yen per metric ton

Source: OECD.

Reference

Producer

1986 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1

The reference price (since 1996) is the unit value of rice

imported by Japan. The producer price, since 1996, is 

the weighted average of the prices of voluntarily marketed 

rice and rice purchases by the government.

18 For the international reference price, Japan used the average of

the 1986-88 unit values for Thai rice imported by Japan to fill a

special quota for Okinawa sake (rice wine) production. While

Japan used a fixed reference price for its AMS calculations, the

OECD PSE uses current annual average rice import unit values for

calculation of the PSE.

19 See ABARE, 2001, p. 77, for information on Japan’s government stockpiling of rice.

20 Payments of 41.9 billion yen in 1998 were less than 5 percent of

the value of rice production, and therefore not counted as part of

the AMS (notification to the WTO, G/AG/N/JPN/61, Feb. 28,

2001).
Tariffs and the tariff-rate quota. Since 1999, Japan

has used a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system for rice

imports.21 Within the quota, the tariff is zero.

However, since the MAFF Food Agency has the sole

right to import rice within the quota, the tariff level is

irrelevant (see State trading and markups in the TRQ,

below). Imports outside the quota are legally possible

and not subject to state trading (exclusive purchasing

by the Food Agency), but are effectively prohibited by

the high tariff applied to them: 341 yen/kg, equivalent

to $2,819/ton in 2001.22 The tariff for imports outside

the quota was calculated by Japan’s government as the

tariff equivalent to the nontariff barriers that protected

Japan’s rice in the 1986-88 base period used by the

UR negotiations.23 Tariffs for rice and rice products

are shown in table 5. Over 100,000 tons of rice-based

preparations, worth over $70 million, were imported in

2001 in categories not subject to the quota (table 5). 

Japan’s import quota for rice and rice products is

682,000 tons per year, on a milled rice equivalent

basis. This represents 7.2 percent of average consumption in the 1986-88 base period. 

State trading and markups in the TRQ. MAFF’s

Food Agency has the exclusive right to import rice into

Japan within the TRQ. This includes not only unmilled

and milled rice, but also rice flour and other rice products, and food products that contain more than 30 percent rice by weight. For imports within the quota, the

Food Agency can collect a markup of up to 292 yen/kg

($2.41/kg in 2001). 

In practice, the actual markup varies. Most imported

rice is delivered to Food Agency stocks. This is known

as the Ordinary Market Access (OMA) portion of the

quota (table 6). Later, this rice is either sold into

Japan’s market or donated as food aid. In those cases

where the sale value to the Food Agency is greater

than its purchase price, the Food Agency has discretion to add a markup, as long as it does not exceed 292

yen/kg. The markup is very important in the remaining

portion of the quota that the Food Agency designates

as a Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) component. 

Under the SBS system, the Food Agency conducts a

kind of auction. Prospective importing firms specify

what the markup (the difference between the price at

which they sell the rice to the Food Agency and the

price at which they later buy it back from the Food

Agency) will be, as well as the quantity and type of

rice involved. The Food Agency selects those bids that

maximize its markup, as long as the markup does not

exceed 292 yen/kg. In practice, the markup has always

been below 292 yen since mid-1995. The markups

vary by type of rice. For the imported rice that is closest in quality to Japanese table rice—short-grain,

milled nonglutinous rice—the markup has ranged from

100 to 200 yen/kg (fig. 5), and between $1,000 and

$2,000 per ton. In fiscal year 2001, the SBS portion of

the quota was 100,000 tons (down from earlier

years—see table 6). 

12 Economic Research Service, USDA

Border Policies

21 See Dyck et al. on the transition from the previous quota to 

the TRQ.

22 Compared with an average import value of 38.17 yen/kg for

semi-milled or fully milled rice in calendar year 2001 (within the

quota), this would have been equivalent to a tariff of 793 percent.

The import unit value, in yen, of rice imported by Japan varies

according to foreign country prices and the exchange rate of the

yen. The percent equivalent of the 341-yen tariff thus also varies

year to year. In 1998, it would have been 369 percent.

23 A tariff was calculated according to the attachment to Annex 5

of the UR Agreement, which involves using the difference between

an internal and an external price in the 1986-88 period as the tariff

equivalent. The tariff equivalent was reduced by 15 percent, to 341

yen/kg, to satisfy the UR requirements.

Figure 5

Markups on short-grain rice imports

Yen/kg

Note: Milled, nonglutinous.

1995 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02

0

50

100

150

200

250

Source: USA Rice Federation, Tokyo Office.
Economic Research Service, USDA 13

Table 5—Japan: Rice sector tariffs and imports, 2001

Tariffs Imports

Specific Ad valorem Volume Value

Yen/kg Percent Tons Bil. yen Mil. US$

Rice 1 341 0 645,675 23.786 196.650

Rice bran 0 708 0.027 0.223

Rice flour, groats, and pellets1 375 25 968 0.064 0.529

Rolled and other worked rice1 341 25 0 0 0.000

Rice bran oil 8.5 2 10,114 0.499 4.125

Rice mixes and doughs 1 375 25 0 0 0.000

Rice preparations from swelling or roasting 341 19.2 5 0.003 0.025

Rice flour preparation in containers of 

of 0.5 kg or less 16 68,165 5.373 44.421

Rice flour preparations containing 

added sugar 23.8 36,585 2.617 21.636

Mochi rice cake containing less than 30 percent

rice and no added sugar 16 1,992 0.58 4.795

Mochi rice cake containing less than 30 percent

rice and less than 15 percent sucrose 24 208 0.041 0.339

Mochi rice cake containing less than 30 percent

rice and over 15 percent sucrose 25 121 0.056 0.463

Mochi rice cake containing more than

30 percent rice1 341 25 22 0.006 0.050

Other rice prepared foods1 341 25 1,148 0.179 1.480

Japanese rice biscuits 29.8 3 6,457 2.703 22.347

Sake 70.4 4 2,407 5 0.301 2.489

Food preparations containing more than

30 percent rice1 341 25 25 0.488 4.035

Subtotal 36.723 303.606

Notes: Highlighted rows are included in the overall rice quota. This should not be regarded as an authoritative listing. For that, check the

Customs Tariff Schedules of Japan.

1 Imports are subject to the rice tariff-rate quota (682,000 tons). The tariff within the quota is the ad valorem amount. The tariff on imports 

over the quota is the specific amount.

2 For crude oil with an acid value exceeding 0.6, the tariff is 8.5 yen/kg for imports from developed countries, 5 yen/kg from developing 

countries, and 0 from least-developed countries.

3 If the biscuits contain added sugar, the tariff is 34 percent.

4 Yen per liter. The tariff on sake imports from developing countries is 0.

5 Thousand liters.

Source: Customs Tariff Schedules of Japan, 2002; Japan Trade Statistics.
14 Economic Research Service, USDA

Table 6—Results of Japan's minimum-access rice tenders, 1995-2001

U.S. Thailand Australia China Others Total

1995 SBS, metric tons 5,715 246 1,935 2,390 408 10,694

Share, % 53.4 2.3 18.1 22.3 3.8 100

OMA, metric tons 188,000 95,100 85,000 30,000 0 398,100

Share, % 47.2 23.9 21.4 7.5 0.0 100

Total, metric tons 193,768 95,348 86,953 32,412 412 408,894

Share, % 47.4 23.3 21.3 7.9 0.1 100

1996 SBS, metric tons 14,134 360 1,173 5,113 1,220 22,000

Share, % 64.2 1.6 5.3 23.2 5.5 100

OMA, metric tons 201,000 127,650 80,000 35,000 0 443,650

Share, % 45.3 28.8 18.0 7.9 0.0 100

Total, metric tons 215,198 128,012 81,178 40,136 1,226 465,750

Share, % 46.2 27.5 17.4 8.6 0.3 100

1997 SBS, metric tons 34,657 911 3,159 13,882 2,532 55,141

Share, % 62.9 1.7 5.7 25.2 4.6 100

OMA, metric tons 237,900 133,900 82,400 30,000 5,000 489,200

Share, % 48.6 27.4 16.8 6.1 1.0 100

Total, metric tons 272,620 134,813 85,565 43,907 7,537 544,441

Share, % 50.1 24.8 15.7 8.1 1.4 100

1998 SBS, metric tons 36,498 5,297 14,538 61,965 1,702 120,000

Share, % 30.4 4.4 12.1 51.6 1.4 100

OMA, metric tons 265,400 130,000 87,000 10,000 20,000 512,400

Share, % 51.8 25.4 17.0 2.0 3.9 100

Total, metric tons 301,928 135,301 101,550 72,017 21,703 632,500

Share, % 47.7 21.4 16.1 11.4 3.4 100

1999 SBS, metric tons 36,826 3,753 14,587 62,611 2,223 120,000

Share, % 30.7 3.1 12.2 52.2 1.9 100

OMA, metric tons 276,000 138,200 90,000 13,900 15,000 533,100

Share, % 51.8 25.9 16.9 2.6 2.8 100

Total, metric tons 312,857 141,956 104,599 76,563 17,225 653,200

Share, % 47.9 21.7 16.0 11.7 2.6 100

2000 SBS, metric tons 46,273 4,960 14,269 53,264 1,234 120,000

Share, % 38.6 4.1 11.9 44.4 1.0 100

OMA, metric tons 284,000 144,370 94,000 35,000 15,669 573,039

Share, % 49.6 25.2 16.4 6.1 2.7 100

Total, metric tons 330,312 149,334 108,281 88,308 16,904 693,139

Share, % 47.7 21.5 15.6 12.7 2.4 100

2001 SBS, metric tons 25,173 421 8,529 65,702 175 100,000

Share, % 25.2 0.4 8.5 65.7 0.2 100

OMA, metric tons 298,877 129,376 91,500 55,516 4,700 579,969

Share, % 51.5 22.3 15.8 9.6 0.8 100

Total, metric tons 324,075 129,797 100,038 121,284 4,875 680,069

Share, % 47.7 19.1 14.7 17.8 0.7 100

Notes: OMA=Ordinary Market Access portion of the quota; SBS=Simultaneous-Buy-Sell portion of the quota.

Source: FAS/Tokyo.
Prices. By isolating its markets from world rice markets, Japan’s policies have caused domestic prices to be

higher than they would be given free trade. Within its

isolated national market, Japan’s rice area diversion policy has further restricted supply to keep prices higher.

Higher prices have affected both supply and demand. 

Japan’s farmers produce japonica rice, a round grain

rice with low amylose starch content. Other producing

regions are Korea, Taiwan, northern China, California,

and New South Wales (Australia). Foreign producers

in all these areas produce rice at a lower price than

most Japanese farmers. In recent years, typical prices

received by Japan’s producers have been 60 percent

higher than in South Korea and more than 10 times

higher than U.S. prices (table 7). High and relatively

stable prices in Japan allowed 1.15 million households

to operate commercial rice farms on 2.485 million

hectares in 2000. Most of these farms are small, and

incur high costs when they grow rice. The small scale

of farming is made economically rewarding by the

very high producer prices.

Consumers pay a high price for rice. At retail, Japan’s

rice prices tend to be 2.5-3 times higher than U.S.

prices (fig. 6), although quality and packaging differences make the comparison imprecise. Econometric

estimates of Japanese consumer demand for rice show

that price changes have little effect on direct food consumption. However, high prices affect processing uses

of rice, encouraging substitution of other grains for

rice. To some extent, imports of foods and beverages

that use foreign rice as an ingredient have grown as a

result of the high price of Japan’s own rice. This has

decreased consumption of domestically produced rice,

and marginally increased use of foreign rice. 

Gains and losses. The high prices for rice in Japan

have imposed a tax on consumers, who have paid considerably more for rice than if they could have access

to rice from outside Japan. Although rice has become

less important as a share of consumer expenditures, in

2000 it reflected about 1 percent of total expenditures

for the average household.24 Cutting rice prices in

half, for example, would obviously benefit households

and free up 0.5 percent of household income ($170 per

year) that could be spent on other goods or saved.

Further savings could come from expenditures on

meals outside the home that include rice.

As a group, rice farmers have received a subsidy from

Japan’s policies. Border measures have, for the most

part, kept foreign rice out of competition for Japan’s

market. Any imported rice available to Japan’s consumers is sold at a steep markup, so that price competition with Japan’s domestic rice is reduced. While

higher prices stemming from reduced competition

have been the main subsidy to farmers, they have also

benefited from the Rice Income Stabilization Program

Economic Research Service, USDA 15

Table 7—Producer prices for japonica rice

Year U.S.$/kg

milled basis

Japan1 2000 2.63

U.S.2 1999/2000 0.20

Taiwan 2000 0.81

South Korea 1999 1.62

Australia 1999/2000 0.20

China3 2001 0.22

1 Voluntarily marketed rice.

2 Medium- and short-grain rice.

3 Milled grade number 1 japonica prices in producing areas.

Sources: Japan, Monthly Statistics of Agriculture, Forestry and

Fisheries; U.S., Rice Yearbook, 2001; Taiwan, Statistical Yearbook of

Agriculture, 2000; South Korea, Agricultural and Forestry Statistical

Yearbook, 2000; Australia, Australian Commodities, March 2002;

China, FAS GAIN report CH2010.

Policy Implications

Figure 6

Retail rice prices

US$/kg

Sources: ERS; MAFF.

1991 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

U.S.

Japan

24 MAFF, Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2000, p. 680.
payments in recent years, from area diversion subsidies under the Production Adjustment Promotion

Program, and from infrastructure and equipment subsidies. Payments under these programs are high on a per

hectare basis, by international standards. However,

since the typical landholding is small (averaging 1 ha),

the payment per farm household is not remarkable

when compared with payments per farm in Europe or

North America.

Large-scale, full-time farmers have both gained from

and been held back by Japan’s policies.25 Such farmers, with lower costs than small operators, gain extra

income because of the high rice prices in Japan resulting from tight border controls. Large-scale farmers,

who often farm land owned by other farmers, have

also benefited from government payments that have

restructured paddies to make them easier to farm and

from subsidized farm equipment purchases. On the

other hand, the diversion program has put pressure on

large farmers to divert some land away from rice.

Otherwise, neighboring farmers would have to divert

more land, or a producing area would not realize its

diversion target. Not meeting a target means that subsidies for farmers who do divert are lower (see Rice

diversion policies). However, diversion is counterproductive for a farmer seeking to specialize in rice on a

large scale. Land prices have also been higher because

of the expectation that government subsidies will be

available. High land prices make it uneconomic for a

farmer to expand farm size permanently through purchasing land.

Thus, while Japan’s policies make it profitable to grow

rice, they have hindered structural change that could

lead to lower costs. Proposals have been made to refocus the subsidies under the Rice Income Stabilization

Program on larger scale, full-time farmers, with less

compensation for small and part-time farmers, and to

reorient the diversion program toward small and parttime farmers. (See FAS GAIN report JA3012, “Japan’s

Proposed Rice Reforms,” for more information.)

If Japan were to eliminate government support for rice

production (including tariffs), restructuring would be

encouraged by sharply lower prices for rice. Farm

operations would be able to use more land as small

producers exited the market. Land costs, both for purchase and rent, would fall, since the value of rice land

to Japanese farmers would be less if prices were lower.

Despite easier access to less expensive land, and the

greater ability to cut labor and equipment costs on

larger operations, the fall in the market price of rice

would also discourage large-scale producers. In general, the land abandoned by small rice farmers might

exceed expansion by larger farmers, and a price drop

would lead to lower production. The degree to which

Japanese rice production would contract depends on

what happens in the world market, as well as on the

capacity of Japan’s farming to restructure itself at

lower costs of production.

Greater imports by Japan would have a positive

impact on world prices. Japan represents a large share

of the global market for japonica rice. This market is

not clearly defined, partly because barriers to trade

that exist now prevent consumers from comparing

various types of rice. However, short-grain japonica

production and consumption have a core market area

in northeast Asia: Japan, South and North Korea,

Taiwan, and northeast China. In Korea and Japan,

japonica rice has been the staple food for many centuries. In Taiwan, japonica rice became a staple in the

20th century, and its consumption has become more

important in recent decades in northeast China.

Outside this core area, rice production in California

and in New South Wales, Australia, has been linked to

northeast Asia. Medium-grain rice produced in

California and New South Wales has been favored by

South Korea and Japan when extreme production

shocks (in 1980 for South Korea and in 1993 for

Japan) left those countries short of rice. Other countries also produce japonica or medium-grain rice, but

their ties to northeast Asia have been weaker, and the

degree to which northeast Asian consumers will

accept their rice is not known. 

Table 8 shows recent japonica production in northeast

Asia, California, and Australia. The average for 1999-

2001 was about 57 million tons (milled basis).26 Of

this, Japan’s production represented about 15 percent.

In the event of a global elimination of all tariffs, rice

16 Economic Research Service, USDA

25 See Hayami for a full discussion of the impact of policies on the

structure and competitiveness of Japan’s rice farming.

26 Data used were from USDA’s PS&D database, except for China

and Taiwan. For China, an estimate of 38 million tons of japonica

rice was derived from a 2000 estimate cited in Hansen et al., p. 32.

For Taiwan, the data are for japonica glutinous and nonglutinous

rice production, from the Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, 2001.

While the data for the other areas include both glutinous and nonglutinous production, the estimate for China is only for nonglutinous production.
from South Korea and Taiwan would also face full

world trade competition for the first time.27 Together,

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan represent about 26

percent of production shown in table 8. If these highpriced markets were opened to free trade, the impact

on the world japonica market would be considerable.

Either production would expand outside those three

markets and exports to the three markets would rise,

or, if production could not be expanded, prices for rice

outside the three markets would rise. If prices outside

Japan rose significantly, rice farming inside Japan

could become competitive. New South Wales,

California, and northeast China all face limitations on

water supply. Thus, their capacity to expand output in

the event of free trade is limited. This could mean a

significant rise in prices if Japan, Korea, and Taiwan

liberalize trade. 

A further factor is the important japonica production in

central China, in provinces near Shanghai. While there

is no shortage of water, the quality of this rice is reportedly lower than japonica from northeast China.28 If the

assumption is made that only japonica from northeast

China would be acceptable to Japanese, Korean, and

Taiwanese consumers, then the impact of liberalized

trade would be greater: Japan, South Korea, and

Taiwan constitute about 42 percent of the japonica market in table 8 if central China’s production is excluded.

Without central China’s production, it would be difficult

to supply the full needs (15 million tons) of the three

liberalizing markets. World prices would rise, and production in Japan would be more competitive.29

Current negotiations about a new multilateral agreement

on agricultural trade in the WTO are likely to focus on

tariffs and TRQs and on domestic support, and may

lead to significant changes in Japan’s rice policy regime.

The discussion above suggests that trade liberalization

would provide significant benefits to Japan’s consumers

(through lower prices) and to rice producers in exporting countries (through higher prices). 

Economic Research Service, USDA 17

Table 8—Japonica rice production average,

1999-2001

1,000 metric tons, Proportion of total,

milled basis percent

China1 38,164 67.3

Japan 8,409 14.8

South Korea 5,356 9.4

North Korea 1,417 2.5

Taiwan 1,171 2.1

California2 1,203 2.1

Australia 992 1.7

Total above 56,712

1 Estimate for China is for 2000. Japonica glutinous rice is not

included.

2 Sum of medium- and short-grain production in California.

Sources: Except as noted, Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA; For

China, Hansen et al., p. 32; for Taiwan, Council of Agriculture; for

California, appendix table 8, p. 45, in Economic Research Service,

Rice Situation and Outlook Yearbook.

27 Sumner and Lee analyze effects on prices of the partial opening

of japonica rice markets in the UR.

28 Hansen et al., p. 33.

29 Cramer et al., in one of the most thorough studies of rice trade

liberalization, reported model results showing that almost all of

Japan’s production would be displaced by imports and that world

japonica prices would rise by 171 percent, given a complete, global liberalization. However, they noted that production increases

required elsewhere to produce rice for Japan and Korea were not

realistic (p. 21).
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource

Economics (ABARE). March 2002. Australian

Commodities. Vol. 9, No. 1.

__________. 2001. Agricultural Trade Policies in

Japan: The Need for Reform. Research report 01.5.

__________. 1988. Japanese Agricultural Policies: A

Time for Change. Policy monograph no. 3. 

Childs, Nathan and Linwood Hoffman. Nov. 1999.

“Upcoming World Trade Organization Negotiations:

Issues for the Rice Sector.” Rice Situation and

Outlook Yearbook. Economic Research Service,

USDA. RCS-1999, pp. 27-32.

http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/so/view.asp?

f=field/rcs-bby/

Council of Agriculture [Taiwan]. 2001. Agricultural

Statistics Yearbook.

Cramer, Gail L., Eric J. Wailes, John M. Goroski, and

Stanley S. Phillips. November 1991. The Impact of

Liberalizing Trade on the World Rice Market: A

Spatial Model Including Rice Quality. Arkansas

Agricultural Experiment Station, University of

Arkansas, Special Report 153.

Dyck, John. April 2001. “Japan’s Changing

Agricultural Policies.” Agricultural Outlook.

Economic Research Service, USDA, pp. 14-19.

http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/AgOutlook/

April2001/AO280e.pdf

Dyck, John, Nathan Childs, Karen Ackerman, David

Skully, and Sarah Hanson. April 1999. “Rice

Tariffication in Japan: What Does It Mean for

Trade?” Agricultural Outlook. Economic Research

Service, USDA, pp. 13-16. http://www.ers.usda.gov/

publications/agoutlook/apr1999/ao260c.pdf

Economic Research Service, USDA. 2002. Rice

Situation and Outlook Yearbook. RCS-2002.

http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/erssor/field/

rcs-bby/rcs2002.pdf

ERS/Penn State Trade Modeling Project. http://coldfusion.aers.psu.edu/wto/

Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA. Grain and feed

reports in the GAIN series. http://www.fas.usda.gov/

scriptsw/attacherep/default.asp

Hansen, James, Frank Fuller, Frederick Gale,

Frederick Crook, Eric Wailes, and Michelle Moore.

November 2002. “China’s Japonica Rice Market:

Growth and Competitiveness.” Rice Situation and

Outlook Yearbook. Economic Research Service,

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http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/so/view.asp?

f=field/rcs-bby/

Hayami, Yujiro. 1988. Japanese Agriculture Under

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Policies. New York, NY: MacMillan.

Japan Tariff Association. 2002. Customs Tariff

Schedules of Japan.

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [Korea]. 2000.

Agricultural and Forestry Statistical Yearbook.

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

(MAFF) [Japan]. Monthly Statistics of Agriculture,

Forestry and Fisheries. 

__________. Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture,

Forestry and Fisheries.

__________. Food Agency. An Outline of Japan’s New

Rice Policies. No date.

National Agricultural Insurance Association (NAIA),

Planning and Training Department. June 2001. 

The Framework of Japan’s Agricultural Insurance

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Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

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Sumner, Daniel A. and Hyunok Lee. August 2000.

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Five Years?” American Journal of Agricultural

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U.S. Department of Agriculture. Production, Supply,

and Distribution database (PS&D).

http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/

18 Economic Research Service, USDA

References
USA Rice Federation, Tokyo office. Data on markups

(unpublished).

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Prospects for Trade Liberalization. Arkansas

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Economic Research Service, USDA 19