OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 

October 29, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR: U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT OFFICE 

MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq 

 (SIGIR-06-034) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit 

in accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, 

which requires that we provide for the independent and objective conduct of audits, as 

well as leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of programs and 

operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. We initiated this audit to 

determine if security concerns were affecting Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 

operations, if participating organizations were coordinating their programs and 

operational support, and if sufficient financial and human resources were available to 

support the PRT initiative. 

We received and considered comments from Department of Defense’s Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division, the 

Multi-National Force-Iraq, the Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and 

the U.S. Embassy-Iraq, on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. The 

comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and copies are included in the 

Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott (703-604-0982 / 

joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil); or Mr. Clifton Spruill (703-343-9275 / 

Clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil). For the report distribution, see Appendix E. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

 Inspector General 

cc: See Distribution 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

Security Environment 5

Civilian and Military Integration 8 

Resources 12 

Observations 17 

Conclusion and Recommendation 18

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 20 

B. Typical PRT Organization 22 

C. Detailed PRT Program Staffing 23 

D. Acronyms 24 

E. Report Distribution 25 

F. Audit Team Members 27 

Management Comments 

Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 28 

and U.S. Mission-Iraq 

Multi-National Force-Iraq 33 

Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 38 

Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers 39
Status of the Provincial Reconstruction 

 Team Program in Iraq 

SIGIR-06-034 October 29, 2006

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

The U.S. government continues to advance capacity-development programs in Iraq's 

ministries and provinces. For the past four decades, Iraq was a statist economy with a 

highly centralized administration. Baghdad drove budgeting and service delivery through 

ministries that funded the provinces. The decentralization of authority that the Coalition 

Provisional Authority initiated following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime had the 

effect of empowering inexperienced local officials to manage the delivery of provincial 

government services. The consequences of this devolution in decision-making required 

the United States and other donors to establish programs aimed at developing local 

capacities. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program is key among these. 

PRTs provide the best opportunity for U.S. government experts to provide grassroots 

support in the development of nationwide governance capacity in Iraq. 

National Security Presidential Directives 36 and 44 provided the policy and 

organizational framework for U.S. civilian-military organizations to implement nationbuilding programs. The PRTs comprise personnel from the Departments of State (DoS), 

Justice, and Agriculture; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its 

Local Governance Program contractor, RTI International; the U.S.-led Multi-National 

Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate element, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I); 

the Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (GRD); and Iraqi-born 

expatriates (often holding U.S. citizenship). 

In October 2005, the PRTs were established by Cable 4045, issued jointly by the U.S. 

Embassy-Iraq and MNF-I. The PRT’s mission is to assist Iraq’s provincial governments 

in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased 

security and rule of law, to promote political and economic development, and to provide 

the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population. The 

operational concept agreed to by DoS and the Department of Defense (DoD) called for 

the U.S. Embassy to support the establishment and hosting of some PRTs at DoSoperated sites and for MNF-I to support the establishment and hosting of some PRTs at 

military sites. Integrated and multidisciplinary teams composed of U.S. civilian and 

military personnel and locally employed Iraqi staff were to train, coach, and mentor 

provincial governments in core competencies of governance, economic development, rule 

i
of law, and infrastructure development. This audit report examines the status of the PRT 

Program in Iraq. 

Objectives 

The objectives of this audit were to determine whether PRTs are fully empowered, 

staffed, and resourced to meet their mission, and to identify any other barriers impeding 

achievement of the PRT mission. Specifically, we addressed these questions: 

• Are security concerns affecting PRT operations? 

• Are participating organizations effectively coordinating their programs and 

operational support? 

• Are sufficient financial and human resources available to support the PRT 

mission? 

This report did not assess the performance of the PRTs—only the ability of the PRTs to 

meet the mission. We intend to assess the performance of the PRTs during 2007.

Results 

The unstable security environment in Iraq touches every aspect of the PRT program 

comprising 10 PRTs and 8 local governance satellite offices.1

 Despite very difficult 

operating conditions, creating the PRTs in the short period of time is a noteworthy 

achievement and was directly related to effective senior leadership at the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office and to the Commanding General, MNC-I. Further, 

we observed some outstanding individual efforts at selected PRTs to execute the mission. 

It is anticipated that the majority of PRTs will continue operating through fiscal year 

(FY) 2008, at which time the mission will transition to a traditional USAID training 

program to develop local governance capacity. The PRT program has been ongoing for 

more than a year and some PRTs are still being established. Many obstacles have been 

overcome, but many remain, such as the ever-changing security situation, the difficulty of 

integrating civilian and military personnel, the lack of a finalized agreement on PRT 

operational requirements and responsibilities, a lag in funding resources, and the 

difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified civilian personnel. 

Because of security concerns, face-to-face meetings between provincial government 

officials and PRT personnel are often limited and, in some cases, do not occur. Security 

challenges have limited the teaching, coaching, and mentoring that form the core of the 

PRT capacity-development mission. PRT members are at particular risk when traveling 

to and from their engagements with their Iraqi counterparts, as are provincial government 

officials and local Iraqi staff working with the PRT. All are equally at risk if they are 

identified as cooperating with the U.S. government. Although no one is currently 

 

1

 The 8 local governance satellite offices are supported by one of the 10 PRTs and they have a role similar 

to that of a PRT. 

ii
responsible for recording and reporting security incidents, security officials with the U.S. 

Embassy expressed concern for the overall physical safety of unarmed civilians and 

cautioned that the security situation may deteriorate as coalition forces withdraw and turn 

over areas to the Iraqi government. 

Given the security situation, the PRTs and the local governance satellite offices have 

varying degrees of ability to carry out their missions. Specifically, of the 9 PRTs and 4 

satellite offices that we reviewed, 4 were generally able, 4 were somewhat able, 3 were 

less able, and 2 were generally unable to carry out their PRT missions. 

DoS and DoD have not yet finalized their agreement on PRT operational requirements 

and responsibilities. This has delayed startup of some PRTs and hindered operations of 

others. The lack of a formal agreement means that the lines of authority and coordination 

between U.S. Embassy and military components have not been spelled out and agreed to, 

and the operational support mechanisms that the PRTs at military bases depend on—

facilities, life support, communications, and basic supplies—have not been settled on. 

Despite the lack of a formal agreement, we found that in general the civilian and military 

organizations within the PRTs are effectively working together, coordinating their 

activities, and synchronizing their efforts with coalition stability operations in the 

provinces. We also noted that when DoS had difficulty filling many civilian positions, 

DoD filled the gap by providing military civil affairs personnel for the vacant PRT 

positions. Although this military assistance filled the temporary void many of these DoD 

civil affairs personnel did not have the full range of skills needed for these civilian 

positions. 

During discussions with DoS leadership, we learned that the DoS portion of the PRT 

program had enough resources and personnel to meet its PRT program expectations in 

FY 2007. However, DoS faced a new challenge. In the congressional conference 

committee report accompanying P.L. 109-2342, DoS was directed to take several actions 

before any funds contained in or made available by this Act can be expended in support 

of PRTs in Iraq. On October 25, 2006, DoS told us that it had submitted on October 23, 

2006 a report with the required information to the Congressional Committees on 

Appropriations, thus satisfying the prerequisite for expending funds on the PRTs. 

 

Observations 

Because of the unstable security situation at both the Anbar and Basrah PRTs and at the 

local government satellite offices in Najaf, Karbala, Qadisiyah, and Wasit, the PRT 

members there have not been able to interact personally with their Iraqi counterparts, 

significantly limiting the PRTs from carrying out the mission. Therefore, we question 

whether the continued deployment of PRT personnel to Anbar and Basrah and the 

planned deployment of additional staff to support the local governance satellite offices in 

south central Iraq makes operational sense at this time. In commenting on the draft of 

 

2 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane 

Recovery, 2006 (Public Law No: 109-234), June 15, 2006.

iii
this report, MNF-I told us that it did not believe U.S. personnel would be required to 

engage one-on-one with local government officials at the satellite offices. However, in 

discussions with staff at the Hilla office, we were told that, to be effective, U.S. personnel 

assigned to a PRT should have regular direct contact with the local government officials 

supported by the satellite offices. 

On balance, the PRT experience in Iraq demonstrates individual successes arising from 

individual efforts and improvisations, which allowed some PRTs to move forward with 

their capacity-development mission. Lessons learned from the PRT experience in 

Afghanistan showed that the lack of specific guidance led to confusion about civilianmilitary roles at PRTs. Similarly, executing an effective PRT Program in Iraq would have 

been greatly enhanced if DoS and DoD shared a common understanding of their 

respective roles and responsibilities. Now that the PRT has completed its first year, it is 

time to start gathering lessons learned about what works and what needs improvement in 

the implementation of the Iraq PRT model. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense take these actions: 

1. Issue a joint statement reaffirming that the PRT initiative is a DoS-DoD priority, 

clearly defining the mission, and delineating the lines of authority and 

coordination between civilian and military personnel. 

2. Finalize a memorandum of agreement that spells out the shared approach of 

funding infrastructure, life support, and operating costs of the PRTs at the DoS 

and DoD sites. 

3. Develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the PRTs, including clearly 

defined objectives and performance measures; milestones for achieving stated 

objectives; future funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining results and 

successfully transitioning the program to USAID. 

We also recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, 

MNF-I, take these actions: 

4. Issue a joint statement reaffirming the lines of authority and coordination to 

achieve effective civilian and military integration in the PRT Program. 

5. Assign responsibility for reporting attack incidents to one individual at each 

Regional Embassy Office and military forward-operating base and coordinate 

closely with the U.S. Embassy’s Tactical Operations Center. 

6. Specify skill-set requirements for civil affairs personnel at PRTs to enable better 

training, selection, and assignment. 

7. Consider temporarily assigning the PRT personnel identified for Anbar and 

Basrah, as well as the local governance satellite offices in south central Iraq, to 

functioning PRTs until the security environment improves. 

iv
Management Comments and Audit Response 

We received written comments from DoS, U.S. Mission–Iraq, and MNF-I on a draft of 

this report. All of the respondents concurred with recommendations 1 through 5. 

Although MNF-I concurred with recommendation 6, DoS did not. DoS officials believe 

that the civil affairs units supporting the PRTs have the necessary skills to accomplish the 

role for which they have been assigned. We agree with the DoS position; however, we 

also noted that assigning personnel on a particular skill-set—rather than as a general civil 

affairs staff member—added value to the PRT mission. We also observed that most 

members of the civil affairs units assigned to the PRTs were motivated to give their best 

effort to support the mission. 

DoS and MNF-I did not concur with recommendation 7. DoS responded that, despite the 

security concerns, PRT leadership believed the mission was necessary. However, in a 

meeting after receiving the DoS written comments, we were told by a senior DoS official 

that DoS is now reassessing the staffing of PRTs in locations considered to be highsecurity risks. We consider DoS‘s action to be responsive to recommendation 7. In nonconcurring, MNF-I responded that SIGIR may want to consider that although security is 

an issue in Anbar and Basrah, there is progress to be gained by having an active PRT in 

the Provinces. MNF-I also noted that security is a concern at all PRTs; however, 

continuing evaluation needs to be conducted at high risk PRTs to assess their viability in 

relation to risk and cost. 

We also received written technical comments on the draft of this report from the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as GRD. These comments are addressed in the 

report. GRD generally concurred with the conclusions. 

We consider that all comments received are responsive to the intent of the 

recommendations and that technical corrections have been made as applicable. All 

comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report. 

v
Introduction

Background 

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program for Iraq is a U.S.-led civilianmilitary effort to assist Iraq’ provincial governments with: 

• developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern; 

• promoting increased security and rule of law; 

• promoting political and economic development; 

• providing provincial administration necessary to help meet the basic needs of the 

population. 

Though referred to under the umbrella term reconstruction, the initiative’s primary 

purpose is capacity development. Program support comes primarily from U.S. sources, 

including the Economic Support Fund, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and new funding targeted specifically for 

focused stabilization, community action, local governance, and PRT expansion. Other 

funding sources include the Development Fund for Iraq, coalition partners, 

nongovernmental organizations, and donor nations. 

PRT staffing is dependent on the needs and circumstances of the individual province. A 

team may have up to 100 members; including approximately 30 locally employed staff 

(see Appendix B). The PRTs are comprised of personnel from the Departments of State 

(DoS), Justice, and Agriculture; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

and its Local Governance Program contractor, RTI International; the Multi-National 

Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate element, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I); 

the Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (GRD); and Iraqi-born 

expatriates (often holding U.S. citizenship). 

The U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s National Coordination Team (NCT), its staff augmented with 

MNF-I and MNC-I officers, provides operational guidance and direction to the PRTs 

based on strategic and policy guidance from the Joint Executive Steering Committee. The 

Steering Committee is comprised of U.S. Mission officials, U.S. military and coalition 

representatives, and Iraqi government officials. The MNF-I, headquartered in Baghdad, 

leads coalition military efforts in establishing the PRTs. MNC-I, currently staffed by the 

U.S. Army’s V Corps, provides support capability to the PRTs, including deputy team 

leaders, liaison officers with the major subordinate commands in the field, and movement 

and other logistical assets. MNC-I commands the Major Subordinate Commands that 

work alongside and support the PRTs in the provinces (see Figure 1): 

1
• the 101st Airborne Division (replaced by the 25th Infantry Division in midSeptember 2006) in northern Ninawa, Ta’mim, and Salah ad Din 

• the 4th Infantry Division in north central Diyala, Baghdad, and Babil 

• the Polish and El Salvadoran military contingents in south central Karbala, Najaf, 

Qadisiyah, and Wasit 

• the British-led multinational formation in southern and southeastern Basrah, 

Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna 

• the I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) in western Anbar 

Anbar 

Ninawa 

Najaf

Salah ad 

Din 

Muthanna 

Basrah 

Diyala

Ta’mim

Karbala

Wasit 

Maysan 

Dhi Qar

Qadisiyah 

Babil 

Baghdad 

Sulaymaniyah 

Erbil

Dahuk 

U.S.-led 

 Coalition-led 

 Satellite 

Regional Embassy Office 

Figure 1─PRT Locations 

Originally conceived as a two-phase program over four years, the PRT initiative has 

evolved over the past year to include 7 U.S. led PRT’s, 3 coalition led PRT’s, and 8 local 

governance satellite offices (that receive technical support and oversight from U.S. 

personnel assigned to the PRTs at Erbil, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Basrah). During the first two 

years, the PRTs are to support provincial government capacity development. As the 

provincial governments demonstrate increased capability to govern and manage their 

security environment, thereby reducing the role of coalition forces in the provinces, then 

each PRT would transition to a traditional USAID training program to develop local 

governance capacity for the remaining two years. However, because of startup delays and 

the security concerns in the provinces, all PRTs (except for the Dhi Qar PRT) are now 

proposed to remain in the first phase into FY 2008 (Table 1). 

2
Table 1—Projected PRT Schedule as of September 15, 2006

Province (City) 

Lead 

Nation 

Transition 

Date Functional Status 

Inaugurated full operational capability,a Ninawa (Mosul) U.S. 12/2007 11/2005 

Ta’mim (Kirkuk) U.S. 09/2008 Inaugurated full operational capability, 11/2005 

Babil (Hillah) U.S. 09/2008 Inaugurated full operational capability, 11/2005 

(Babil to serve as support base for Najaf, Karbala, 

Qadisiyah, and Wasit provinces) 

Baghdad (Baghdad) U.S. 09/2008 Inaugurated full operational capability, 03/2006, but 

full engagement with Iraqi counterparts delayed until 

06/2006 because of a 3-month political boycott 

Basrah (Basrah) U.K. 09/2008 Inaugurated full operational capability, 07/2006 

(Basrah to serve as support base for Maysan 

province) 

Dhi Qar (Nasiriyah) Italy 09/2007 Initial operational capability,b 05/2006, but reverted 

to pre-initial operational capability because of 

departure of Italian contingent and restructuring of 

civilian staff (Dhi Qar to serve as support base for 

Muthanna province) 

Anbar (Ramadi) U.S. 09/2008 Initial operational capability, 04/2006, but reverted to 

pre-initial operational capabilityc

 due to security, 

staffing, and operational issues 

Diyala (Baqubah) U.S. 09/2008 Inaugurated full operational capability, 09/2006 

Salah ad Din (Tikrit) U.S. 09/2008 Inaugurated full operational capability, 09/2006 

Erbil (Erbil) Korea 12/2007 Approved 08/2006 as a regional reconstruction 

team, with negotiations ongoing over staffing and 

support (Erbil to serve as support base for Dahuk 

and Al Sulaymaniyah provinces) 

Source: SIGIR analysis of NCT data 

Notes: 

a Full operational capability: Functional assessment and work plan completed and approved by NCT; 

training, coaching, and mentoring provincial government personnel started; PRT and major subordinate 

command personnel working together to accomplish mission of governance and economic capacity 

development 

b Initial operational capability: Core personnel, life support, and equipment in place; movement support 

delivered; and both baseline functional assessment (local governance, economics, and infrastructure) and 

provincial work plan developed 

c Pre-initial operational capability: Personnel, life support, and equipment arriving, 3-day workshop and 

orientation conducted, movement support unavailable

3
Objectives 

The objectives of this audit were to determine whether PRTs are fully empowered, 

staffed, and resourced to meet their mission, and to identify any other barriers impeding 

achievement of the PRT mission. Specifically, we addressed these questions: 

• Are security concerns affecting PRT operations? 

• Are participating organizations effectively coordinating their programs and 

operational support? 

• Are sufficient financial and human resources available to support the PRT 

mission?

This report does not assess the performance of the PRTs—only the ability of the PRTs to 

meet the mission. We intend to assess the performance of the PRTs during 2007. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For a typical PRT 

organization, see Appendix B. For detailed PRT program staffing, see Appendix C. For 

the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix D. For the report distribution, see 

Appendix E. For the audit team members, see Appendix F. 

4
Security Environment

The unstable security environment in Iraq touches every aspect of the PRT mission. 

Because of security concerns, face-to-face meetings between provincial government 

officials and PRT personnel are often limited and, in some cases, do not occur. PRT 

members are at particular risk when traveling to and from their engagements with their 

Iraqi counterparts, as are provincial government officials and local Iraqi staff working 

with the PRT. If identified as cooperating with the U.S. government, all are at risk of 

threats and attacks by anti-coalition elements. Despite these conditions, some PRT 

members frequently find ways to interact with their Iraqi counterparts. 

Constraints on the PRT Mission

The PRT Program’s effectiveness depends on regular interaction of PRT members with 

local Iraqis in their respective seats of government. Security challenges have constrained 

the PRT members’ ability to meet regularly with their provincial counterparts and to 

perform the teaching, coaching, and mentoring that form the core of the PRT capacitydevelopment mission.3

 Many of the PRT members we interviewed believed that they 

had insufficient contact with their Iraqi counterparts. When security concerns prevented 

face-to-face meetings, they used email and cell phones when available. At the time of our 

review in August and September 2006, we determined that the PRTs and the local 

government satellite offices had varying degrees of ability to carry out their mission, as 

follows: 

• Ninawa, Ta’mim, Babil and Baghdad—generally able 

• Salah ad Din, Diyala, Dhi Qar, and Najaf —somewhat able 

• Karbala, Qadisiyah, and Wasit—less able 

• Basrah and Anbar—generally unable 

• Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah—not established yet but no problems expected 

 

A key objective of the PRTs is economic development and job creation, with a focus on 

encouraging increased engagement by Iraqis with the international business community. 

Several economic development officials assigned to various PRTs told us that that they 

had identified numerous business opportunities and had conversations with Iraqi and 

foreign investors who were interested in economic opportunities in the provinces but 

were unwilling to move forward until the security situation improved. 

 

3

 We defined the ability of PRT members to carry out their capacity development mission as consistent 

engagement with provincial government officials. Determinations were based upon interviews with PRT 

members, with regional Embassy security and forward operating base officers, with U.S. Embassy officials, 

and with MNF-I and MNC-I officers, as well as upon analysis of security trends, attack incident data, and 

movement assets, including helicopter support records. 

5
Similarly, the security environment limits provincial governments from conducting 

business. Though one of the goals of the PRT initiative is to foster open and transparent 

government meetings, council meetings in some provinces are held clandestinely because 

of the danger of being targeted by anti-coalition forces. Many other government meetings 

have been canceled altogether. PRT members reported that they often would meet 

provincial officials in neutral locations away from government buildings. In Anbar 

province, for example, the Provincial Council4

 holds its meetings in Baghdad, because it 

is too dangerous to gather at government buildings in Ramadi. Also, according to USAID 

officials, training programs to develop local governance capacity for Anbar, Salah ad 

Din, and Diyala provincial government officials are often conducted outside the 

respective provinces because of security concerns. 

PRT members require regular and secure transportation with protective security details. 

The U.S. Embassy and the MNF-I agreed to follow a common set of minimum 

requirements to transport nonmilitary PRT members. Movement requirements include a 

minimum of three armored vehicles and eight “shooters” trained in protection duties. The 

U.S. Embassy ruled that movement security provided by coalition partners did not meet 

U.S. security requirements and therefore prohibited U.S. personnel from traveling with 

them. As a result, U.S. civilian personnel working at the Italian-led PRT in Dhi Qar and 

the British-led PRT in Basrah were generally unable to leave their compounds to meet 

with provincial government staff. 

Security Incidents 

The personal security of PRT members is a significant challenge at the provincial sites. 

Iraq is a dangerous place and everyday the PRT members are at some risk of exposure to 

anti-coalition attacks. The U.S. government does not collect security incident/attacks 

data at all the PRTs, although the Mosul, Kirkuk, Hillah and Basrah Regional Embassy 

Offices and the Baghdad PRT (located in the International Zone) had the following 

statistics that comprise incidents occurring in their area of operations (but not specifically 

against PRT staff): 137 incidents resulting in 15 deaths and 47 casualties during the 

period January 1, 2006 through August 31, 2006. In particular, the Basrah Regional 

Embassy Office has experienced almost daily indirect fire attacks since July 2006, and 

some nonessential Regional Embassy Office staff, including PRT staff, were evacuated to 

Kuwait. Some of these staff members were relocated to more secure British facilities in 

Basrah. 

Collecting attack incident data for PRTs located at military forward-operating bases is the 

responsibility of the base command. However, we were told that no mechanisms are in 

place to aggregate U.S. Embassy and military attack data. Such a system would allow the 

U.S. government to maintain visibility on all attacks against its personnel and provide the 

PRTs with critical intelligence. Nonetheless, despite the large number of attacks at some 

of the locations, U.S. Embassy security officials told us that they are predominantly 

harassing in nature and generally not effective. 

 

4

 The Provincial Council is made up of elected representatives. 

6
The growing variety of explosives used in these attacks poses the greatest threat for PRT 

members. The more prevalent type is the improvised explosive device used against U.S. 

convoys. For example, during a seven-day period in mid-August, explosive devices hit 

three different convoys carrying Salah ad Din PRT members en route to meetings with 

provincial officials. Between January and August 2006 in the Babil, Karbala, Najaf, 

Qadisiyah, and Wasit provinces, 57 incidents were recorded on supply and movement 

routes used by U.S. personnel. In addition, because of the increased threat to U.S. 

personnel in the south central region of Iraq, travel by civilian PRT members to several 

provinces in the region now takes place primarily by air. 

U.S. Embassy security officials also told us that they were concerned about the overall 

physical safety of unarmed civilian PRT members because of their exposed state when 

interacting with provincial government officials. They cautioned that as coalition forces 

downsize, consolidate, and turn over areas to the Iraqi government, the security situation 

will most likely deteriorate. Furthermore, according to DoS’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, the physical security practices in Iraq do not fully meet the Overseas Security 

Policy Board physical security standards and are considered “field expedient” based on 

Iraq-specific conditions. 

At even greater physical risk are those Iraqis identified as working at or cooperating with 

the PRTs. We were unable to obtain overall attack incident data against these Iraqis; 

however, PRT officials provided accounts of assassinations, attacks, and threats against 

provincial government officials who worked at or with the PRTs we visited. Locally 

employed Iraqi staffs must use great caution during their commute from their residences 

to the PRT compounds and must conceal the fact that they are employed by the U.S. 

government. Similarly, we also learned that the Arabic-speaking translators employed at 

the PRTs have endured verbal harassment, being called traitors by some Iraqis, and have 

received death threats. 

7
Civilian and Military Integration 

DoS and DoD have not reached agreement on PRT operational requirements and 

responsibilities. This has delayed startup and hindered operations. Despite several “pain 

points” that have undermined the PRT initiative, we found that the DoS and DoD staffs 

within the PRTs generally work well together. 

Cost-Sharing 

When the U.S. Embassy and the U.S.-led MNF-I jointly agreed to establish the PRTs in 

October 2005, the concept of operation, as stated in Baghdad Cable 4045, called for the 

U.S. Embassy to support the establishment and hosting of PRTs at DoS sites and the 

MNF-I to support the establishment and hosting of PRTs at military sites. This 

arrangement worked well initially when the first three PRTs were inaugurated in 

November 2005 at regional Embassy sites in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hillah. However, in 

April 2006, the MNC-I Staff Judge Advocate ruled that DoS is responsible for the PRT 

mission and that DoD operations and maintenance funds could not be used to support 

PRTs. This decision had an immediate impact on a pending transfer of the Mosul PRT to 

a military base, the imminent startup of the Diyala and Salah ad Din PRTs, and the future 

rollout and continued support for the other PRTs. 

The questionable ruling affected the finalization of a memorandum of agreement 

specifying that operational requirements and responsibilities would be jointly shared 

between the U.S. Embassy and MNF-I. Submitted for DoS and DoD approval in March 

2006, the agreement stalled over a DoD-proposed funding formula that DoS believed 

contradicted the spirit of National Security Presidential Directive 36 and the joint 

civilian-military premise of PRTs. The lack of an overall memorandum of agreement had 

serious ramifications. The lines of authority and coordination between U.S. Embassy and 

military components were never spelled out and agreed upon, and the operational support 

mechanisms the PRTs are dependent upon at military bases—i.e. facilities, life support, 

communications, management services, and supplies—were not settled upon. 

In July 2006, in an effort to prevent further delays in establishing the remaining PRTs at 

military forward-operating bases, DoS agreed to reimburse DoD for $2.6 million in 

infrastructure costs from its FY 2006 emergency supplemental funds. With this action, 

we believe a major stumbling block for the PRT rollout has been removed. 

Doctrine and Leadership 

Both DoS and DoD face the challenge of integrating their operations and organizational 

cultures to enable their civilian and military personnel to work jointly. Baghdad Cable 

4045 provided the concept of operation that PRTs were a joint civilian-military mission. 

Similarly, Defense Directive 3000.05 states that stability operations are a core U.S. 

8
military mission, and that DoD shall be prepared to lead and support the development of 

civilian-military teams.5

 However, according to MNF-I and MNC-I officers responsible 

for managing the military’s PRT effort, the policy guidance does not supersede other 

DoD regulations and policies. Thus, without specific operational guidance and 

delegation of authorities in accordance with Title 10 of the U.S. Code, they are restricted 

from supporting the PRT mission. These officers explained that Title 10 gives the 

Secretary of Defense authority, direction, and control over DoD and that a specific 

delegation of authority is required for military personnel to fall under DoS operational 

control.6

 But DoS officials said that it was never intended for civilian team leaders to 

exercise command authority over the military forces assigned to the PRT; the civilian 

PRT team leader only has supervisory authority to direct the local activities of those 

forces. We believe that Defense Directive 3000.05 allows civilian-military PRT teams. 

Thus, we believe additional clarification on the use and management of joint civilianmilitary PRTs is necessary. 

Based upon numerous interviews with both current and former officers and officials at 

MNF-I, MNC-I, Major Subordinate Commands, NCT, and area PRTs, operational startup 

problems persisted for months during the PRT Program’s early stage, with individuals 

arguing instead of working together to find solutions and implementing corrective 

actions. For example, after the MNC-I Staff Judge Advocate ruling on the use of DoD 

operation and maintenance funds for PRT construction, we found no attempt by 

responsible military officers to locate or utilize other available DoD appropriations for 

PRT support. Furthermore, military and PRT members in the provinces told us that they 

were informed by military headquarters staff that no DoD funds could be used to support 

the PRT mission. This is erroneous. 

As reported during numerous interviews with civilian officials and military officers 

directly involved with managing the PRT Program, a basic problem has been the poor 

working relationship between the NCT and MNF-I/MNC-I elements. Contributing factors 

included DoS’s inability to fill staff positions; program leadership and control issues, 

including employment of civil affairs assets; and disagreement over the PRT mission. 

Illustrative of the strained relationship, in a response to our query as to why MNC-I did 

not take any proactive steps to resolve issues, a senior officer in charge of the PRT 

mission replied that MNC-I had not received any official paperwork from NCT reporting 

shortfalls in PRT support. 

Support Dependency

The ability to field and support fully functioning PRTs depends on the Embassy Regional 

Offices or military forward-operating bases’ ability to provide operational, logistical, and 

life support. We observed that PRTs located at Embassy sites were well supported, able 

to move forward on their action plans (security considerations aside), but those at military 

 

5

 DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 

Operations, November 28, 2005. 6

 See U.S. Code 10 (2006), §113. 

9
forward-operating bases often struggled. According to PRT members a key determinant 

was whether the brigade commander at the forward operating base believed in or 

understood the PRT mission. For example, as we observed, the Mosul PRT was generally 

well supported in its operations because the brigade commander saw the PRT as a force 

multiplier that would help him succeed in his non-lethal stabilization efforts. 

Yet other commanders viewed capacity development in provincial governments as too 

vague a mission. For example, in Anbar province, the military commander did not 

support the PRT mission, would not provide resources, such as transportation, and 

excluded PRT members from attending meetings with other government officials. Some 

military commanders expressed their frustration over perceived inaction by PRTs to 

address unemployment concerns at state-owned enterprises. PRT officials countered, 

however, that Iraqi state-owned enterprises are generally failed ventures, and that they are 

working with Iraqis to attract private investors and develop sound business plans to 

ensure long-term success. 

A contributing factor to obtaining military support was whether the PRT’s deputy team 

leader (a military billet) had an organizational connection with the brigade or subordinate 

command that was co-located with the PRT. Deputy team leaders in Mosul and Baghdad, 

for example, reported that they often utilized their informal networks to obtain needed 

support, such as transportation and communication equipment. Conversely, the Salah ad 

Din PRT, which had a Navy captain serving as deputy team leader, was struggling to 

carry out its work plan. 

PRT Organizational Dynamics

Overall, we found that the civilian and military organizations within the PRTs worked 

well together, coordinating their activities and synchronizing their efforts with coalition 

stability operations in the provinces. While various PRTs are organized differently 

depending on the needs and circumstances within their province, they all address 

capacity-development issues in the areas of governance, economic development, rule of 

law, and infrastructure. We observed personnel from four executive branch civilian 

agencies, three military organizations, and four contractors working together in crossdisciplinary teams within these thematic areas. For example, military civil affairs 

personnel—by far, the largest component of the PRTs—were typically assigned across all 

the thematic areas based upon their individual skill sets. In addition, bilingual/bicultural 

advisers and translators, made available to all members at the PRTs to facilitate 

interactions with Iraqi provincial officials, proved to be key contributors to the PRT 

mission. 

We also learned, however, from PRT officials that they often were uninformed about 

other U.S. organizations’ related programs and activities under way within the provinces. 

For example, PRT officials frequently came across not only infrastructure projects 

conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, projects begun by brigade commanders 

10
utilizing Commander’s Emergency Response Program funding,7

 and local governance 

capacity-development and community action programs under USAID. These projects 

related directly to the PRT mission. A senior USAID official acknowledged the problem 

of information sharing, partly because of concerns over security of their locally employed 

staff, and reported that policy measures were under way to permit full disclosure and 

coordination of USAID activities in the provinces. We were told by the Director of the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office that coordinating these multiple organizational 

projects and events was a high priority for the NCT to ensure that the PRT leadership and 

senior staff members were aware of the ongoing and completed activities within its 

province. 

 

7

 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering and construction services to MNF-I and the Iraqi 

government in support of military and civil construction throughout Iraq. The Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program allows U.S. military commanders in Iraq to undertake a variety of nonconstruction and 

construction activities in response to the urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements of the 

local population within their areas of responsibility. 

11
Resources 

The PRT program faced significant resource challenges, including securing necessary 

infrastructure and logistical support and filling staff positions with qualified personnel in 

a timely manner. However, DoS leadership believed they had enough resources and 

personnel in order to meet its PRT program expectations in FY 2007. However, DoS 

faces a new challenge. In the conference report accompanying P.L. 109-234, Congress 

directed that before any funds contained or made available by this Act are expended in 

support of PRTs/Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs) in Iraq, 

DoS must take several actions. 

Support 

The lack of a DoS-DoD memorandum of agreement is a major impediment to smooth 

PRT operations, as evidenced in the uneven infrastructure and logistical support for PRTs 

located at the military’s forward-operating bases. During visits to the PRTs at Ninawa, 

Ta’mim, Salah ad Din, and Diyala, we catalogued recurring support problems.8 These 

include inadequate office space; limited phones, computers, printers, copiers, internet 

access, and information technology support; and shortages of such basic office supplies 

as printer cartridges, paper, pens, and pencils. For example, the Salah ad Din PRT had a 

shortfall of more than 25 computers, no copiers, and only 3 phones. To accomplish the 

mission, PRT members reported that it was common for staff to use personal computers 

at the office. 

The PRTs lacked funding and logistical supply resources. Operational budgets initially 

were not authorized for the PRT program. Accordingly, they functioned without 

dedicated operating budgets that were needed for purchasing basic office supplies or 

sundry items for official functions with provincial government officials and private sector 

businessmen. They also functioned without any access to using the base logistics system. 

PRT members stressed that obtaining office items was a continuous problem. Their only 

recourse was to use personal funds to purchase office supplies at the base exchange. 

Similarly, PRT members used personal funds to host luncheons and provide refreshments 

for Iraqi officials so as to build the personal relationships critical to working in the Iraqi 

culture. 

According to PRT team leaders and deputy team leaders, an inordinate amount of their 

time and attention was devoted to solving support issues as opposed to substantively 

engaging with their Iraqi counterparts. One team leader estimated spending 40% of her 

time working on support problems. The consensus among the interviewed PRT leaders 

was that no PRT should be started until the requisite operational and infrastructure 

support were in place. 

 

8

 In June 2006, with the closing of Forward Operating Base Courage, the Ninawa PRT was relocated to 

Forward Operating Base Marez. Kirkuk PRT members were divided between the Regional Embassy Office 

in downtown Kirkuk and Forward Operating Base Warrior on the city’s outskirts. 

12
Our visit to the Italian-led and funded PRT in Dhi Qar revealed some of the same support 

problems, although to a lesser degree. We observed that the Baghdad PRT in the 

International Zone and the Babil PRT at the Regional Embassy Office compound in 

Hillah were well resourced. Based upon our review of weekly situation reports and 

discussions with PRT members, we learned that the Basrah PRT had no support 

problems, but that the Anbar PRT had significant shortfalls. 

During the course of the audit we learned that DoS, in the absence of an overall 

memorandum of agreement with DoD, was taking steps to address some of the support 

shortfalls impeding the full rollout of the PRT Program. From its FY 2006 emergency 

supplemental appropriation, DoS planned to: 

• reimburse DoD for infrastructure requirements at military bases; 

• meet PRT information management hardware requirements, including computers, 

commercial internet access for contract employees, phones, facsimile machines, 

printers, and copiers; 

• provide operating budget support; 

• procure security movement teams, helicopter-lift capability, and quick-reaction 

force support for the Dhi Qar and planned Erbil PRTs. 

Based upon an analysis of the DoS financial plan, we identified some possible gaps in 

support. According to the evolving PRT Program, the Babil PRT is to provide support to 

local government satellite offices in Najaf, Karbala, Wasit, and Qadisiyah provinces. The 

overarching concern is that the current financial plan was prepared before final 

determination of support requirements for the satellite offices. Although the supplemental 

provides funds for the procurement of computers, printers, copiers and other hardware, a 

provision for technical support for PRTs located at military bases is not included. As a 

DoS budget officer reported, DoD will be responsible for information technical support 

requirements at military bases. However because there is still no official agreement, we 

are not sure that the PRT Program will have enough financial resources to support its 

mission through FY 2007. 

Congressional Requirements 

In the congressional appropriations conference committee report accompanying P.L. 109-

234,9

 the committee directed that before any funds contained in (or otherwise made 

available) by this Act are expended in support of PRTs/PRDCs in Iraq, the Department of 

State shall present to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, (1) the formal 

assessment completed by the U.S. embassy and military command in Iraq of the initial 

performance of the first three demonstration PRT projects; (2) a complete program plan, 

 

9 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 

Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law No: 109-234), June 15, 2006.

13
including total cost and staffing requirements of the PRT’s/PRDC’s program in Iraq; (3) 

the official implementing guidance that incorporates the recommendations cited above in 

this report; and (4) a plan to transition PRTs/PRDCs in Iraq by the end of FY 2007. The 

following is an excerpt from the committee’s conference report agreement that is referred 

to under bullet (3) as the official implementing guidance that incorporates the 

recommendations in this report: 

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs)/provincial reconstruction development 

councils (PRDCs).--... The Committee, however, remains concerned about the 

scope and nature of the PRT/PRDC initiative. There is little formal doctrine, 

military or civilian, on PRTs/PRDCs or their function, and only limited--and 

mixed--experience on the concept from Afghanistan. Therefore, it will be critical 

for the chief of mission to provide detailed guidance on their functions in Iraq. A 

key element of this guidance should be that senior U.S. government employees 

within the PRTs set overall reconstruction direction and priorities. Moreover, it 

should be clear that PRTs--under the guidance of the chief of mission--are the 

agent for the management, auditing and coordination of all U.S. government 

reconstruction funds available in the region, including civilian agency funds and 

military reconstruction funds such as the Commanders' Emergency Response 

Program and the Commanders' Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction 

Program. 

The primary goal of the PRTs in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, is to extend the role of, 

and improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. Support for PRDCs and other 

Iraqi federal structures should be managed through the PRTs. Given the work 

successfully completed thus far through USAID's Civilian Action Program 

(CAP) to build community-based democracy, PRTs should carefully coordinate 

the remaining elements of the CAP program with PRDC funding, in order to 

build effective linkages between community governance and provincial 

governance. The CAP program has generated a network of more than 1,300 

community associations across 17 governorates in Iraq and has trained 17,281 

community association members. A January 2005 audit by the Office of 

Inspector General (USAID) found that CAP `achieved 98 percent of its intended 

outputs, including citizen participation, inter-community cooperation, local 

government cooperation, local employment generation, and consideration of 

environmental concerns . . . CAP provides a vehicle for empowering 

communities, building community cohesion, and providing evidence that the US 

is committed to improving the lives of Iraqis.' 

Finally, given the wide interest in PRTs and high expectations of this relatively 

new concept, the chief of mission should ensure that a carefully designed 

monitoring, auditing and evaluation system is in place to measure the impact of 

PRTs on reconstruction and development in Iraq. 

We were told on October 25, 2006, by DoS officials, that DoS had submitted on October 

23, 2006, a report with the required information to the Congressional Committees on 

Appropriations, thus satisfying the prerequisite for expending funds on the PRTs. 

14
Staffing 

DoS’s inability to attract qualified civilians to fill positions in Baghdad has been a 

continuous challenge throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Attracting civilians to serve 

at the PRTs in austere and dangerous locations has proved even more difficult. According 

to NCT officials, DoS was largely successful in recruiting and deploying civilian officials 

to serve at the PRTs in Ninawa, Babil, and Ta’mim in the fall of 2005. However, PRTs 

encountered significant problems in the first half of 2006, when operations for PRTs in 

Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf, and Salah ad Din were scheduled to begin. Although we 

could not obtain staffing data for this period, NCT personnel reported that they were 

unable to fill many core PRT positions—rule of law, political officer, and program 

manager. 

To compensate for the lack of civilians, DoD stepped up and provided numerous military 

civil affairs personnel to fill the void for many of the vacant PRT Program positions (see 

Appendix C), such as local government, economic, and agriculture advisers. Baghdad 

Cable 4045 established the basic military staffing requirement at each U.S.-led PRT, 

specifically: 3 officers to serve as deputy team leaders, a Major Subordinate Command 

liaison officer, an engineer, and a civil affairs team consisting of 4 to 20 military 

personnel. The military infusion of personnel enabled the PRTs to function, but many 

personnel did not possess the full range of needed skills. 

The NCT neither identified nor established specific skills set requirements for PRT civil 

affairs positions. Senior NCT officials stated that civil affairs team members assigned to 

PRTs are fully qualified by the military to perform civil affairs functions. Further, they 

stated the PRT Program construct did not envision using individual civil affairs team 

members as functional specialists. The civil affairs personnel that filled the civilian void 

provided essential assistance, and if DoD had not provided these personnel to the PRTs, 

some PRTs may not have been established. However, we believe specifying skills set 

requirements would allow the military to better identify, train, and assign civil affairs 

personnel to match the skills needed at PRTs. 

Despite the staffing problems, we believe the PRT Program is generally well positioned 

to carry out its mission. According to NCT officials, an additional 30 civilian personnel 

have been identified to fill vacant positions bringing authorized civilian slots up to 84%. 

Furthermore, at a trilateral meeting in London in August 2006, the Italian government 

committed to leading and fully staffing the Dhi Qar PRT. Still to be determined was the 

level of staffing required at the Korean-led PRT and how long the British-led PRT in 

Basrah would operate. DoS will provide limited personnel to the three coalition-led PRTs 

(see Table 2 and Appendix C). 

15
Table 2—PRT Program Staffing as of September 29, 2006 

Civilian a U.S. Military Total Personnel 

PRT Authorized Actual Authorized Actual Authorized Actual 

Ninawa 13 9 23 29 36 38 

Babil 13 7 23 32 36 39 

 Najafb 8 4 8 4 

 Diwaniyahb 2 1 2 1 

 Karbalab 3 2 3 2 

 Wasitb 2 1 2 1 

Ta’mim 13 9 23 16 36 25 

Baghdad 12 9 23 39 35 48 

Anbar 11 5 24 4 35 9 

Diyala 13 6 23 22 36 28 

Salah ad Din 13 7 23 19 36 26 

Basrahc 8 7 1 9 7 

 Maysand 4 1 4 1 

Dhi Qare 7 7 7 7 

 Muthannaf 6 2 6 2 

Total 128 77 163 161 291 238 

% Filled 60% 99% 82% 

Inbound 42 1 43 

Source: SIGIR analysis of Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, DoS, and NCT data 

a

 Includes RTI International Local Governance Program third-country nationals 

b Housed with PRT Babil at Regional Embassy Office Hillah 

c British-led 

d Housed at Regional Embassy Office Basrah 

e Italian-led 

f Housed with PRT Dhi Qar 

16
Observations 

Because of the unstable security situation at both the Anbar and Basrah PRTs and at the 

local government satellite offices in Najaf, Karbala, Qadisiyah, and Wasit, the PRT 

members there have not been able to fully interact personally with their Iraqi 

counterparts, significantly limiting the PRTs from carrying out the mission. Therefore, 

we question whether the continued deployment of PRT personnel to Anbar and Basrah 

and the planned deployment of additional staff to support the local governance satellite 

offices in south central Iraq makes operational sense at this time. In commenting on the 

draft of this report, MNF-I told us that it did not believe that U.S. personnel would be 

required to engage one-on-one with local government officials at the satellite offices. 

However, in discussions with staff at the Hilla office, we were told that, to be effective, 

U.S. personnel assigned to a PRT should have regular direct contact with the local 

government officials supported by the satellite offices. 

On balance, the PRT experience in Iraq demonstrates individual successes arising from 

individual efforts and improvisations, which allowed some PRTs to move forward with 

their capacity-development mission. Lessons learned from the PRT experience in 

Afghanistan showed that the lack of specific guidance led to confusion about civilianmilitary roles at PRTs. Similarly, executing an effective PRT Program in Iraq would 

have been greatly enhanced if DoS and DoD shared a common understanding of their 

respective roles and responsibilities. Now that the PRT has completed its first year, it is 

time to start gathering lessons learned about what works and what needs improvement in 

the implementation of the Iraq PRT model.

17
Conclusion and Recommendations 

Conclusion

The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq provides the best opportunity for 

U.S. government experts to provide grassroots support in the development of local 

governance capacity in Iraq. Despite very difficult operating conditions, creating the 

PRTs in the short a period of time is a noteworthy achievement and was directly related 

to effective senior leadership at the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and to the 

Commanding General, MNC-I. Complicating the U.S.-led PRT program are the lingering 

issues concerning the PRT mission and civilian-military integration, which, in part, have 

led to set-backs, operational delays, and resource shortfalls. We believe a critical first 

step to resolving these “pain points” is for DoS and DoD to formalize an agreement 

reaffirming the PRT mission, defining not only command authority and relationships, but 

also operational support, including defining objectives and performance measures. 

It is anticipated that the majority of PRTs will continue operating through FY 2008, at 

which time the mission will transition to a traditional USAID training program to develop 

local governance capacity. Until then, DoS and DoD will need to identify personnel and 

funds to sustain PRT operations and to develop a transition plan to USAID and Iraqi 

governance. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense take these actions: 

1. Issue a joint statement reaffirming that the PRT initiative is a DoS-DoD priority, 

clearly defining the mission, and delineating the lines of authority and 

coordination between civilian and military personnel. 

2. Finalize a memorandum of agreement that spells out the shared approach of 

funding infrastructure, life support, and operating costs of the PRTs at the DoS 

and DoD sites. 

3. Develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the PRTs, including clearly 

defined objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving stated 

objectives, future funding requirements, and strategy for sustaining results and 

successfully transitioning the program to USAID. 

We also recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, 

MNF-I, take these actions: 

4. Issue a joint statement reaffirming the lines of authority and coordination to 

achieve effective civilian and military integration in the PRT Program. 

18
5. Assign responsibility for reporting attack incidents to one individual at each 

Regional Embassy Office and military forward-operating base and coordinate 

closely with the U.S. Embassy’s Tactical Operations Center. 

6. Specify-skill set requirements for civil affairs personnel at PRTs to enable better 

training, selection, and assignment. 

7. Consider temporarily assigning the PRT personnel identified for Anbar and 

Basrah, as well as the local governance satellite offices in south central Iraq, to 

functioning PRTs until the security environment improves. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

We received written comments from DoS, U.S. Mission–Iraq, and MNF-I on a draft of 

this report. All of the respondents concurred with recommendations 1 through 5. 

Although MNF-I concurred with recommendation 6, DoS did not. DoS officials believe 

that the civil affairs units supporting the PRTs have the necessary skills to accomplish the 

role for which they have been assigned. We agree with the DoS position; however, we 

also noted that assigning personnel on a particular skill-set—rather than as a general civil 

affairs staff member—added value to the PRT mission. We also observed that most 

members of the civil affairs units assigned to the PRTs were motivated to give their best 

effort to support the mission. 

DoS and MNF-I did not concur with recommendation 7. DoS responded that, despite the 

security concerns, PRT leadership believed the mission was necessary. However, in a 

meeting after receiving the DoS written comments, we were told by a senior DoS official 

that DoS is now reassessing the staffing of PRTs in locations considered to be highsecurity risks. We consider DoS‘s action to be responsive to recommendation 7. In nonconcurring, MNF-I responded that SIGIR may want to consider that although security is 

an issue in Anbar and Basrah, there is progress to be gained by having an active PRT in 

the Provinces. MNF-I also noted that security is a concern at all PRTs; however, 

continuing evaluation needs to be conducted at high risk PRTs to assess their viability in 

relation to risk and cost. 

We also received written technical comments on the draft of this report from the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as GRD. These comments are addressed in the 

report. GRD generally concurred with the conclusions. 

We consider that all comments received are responsive to the intent of the 

recommendations and that technical corrections have been made as applicable. All 

comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report. 

19
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated this audit on July 

21, 2006, (Project No. 6031), specifically to answer three questions: (1) are security 

concerns affecting Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) operations, (2) are the 

participating organizations’ effectively coordinating their programs and operational 

support, and (3) are sufficient financial and human resources available to support the PRT 

mission. 

To determine how security concerns are affecting PRT operations, we interviewed U.S. 

Embassy security officials about the overall security environment and trends in Iraq and 

the specific situation faced at the PRTs. We reviewed DoS’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security documents describing PRT security responsibilities and requirements; Embassy 

security incident data and situational reports; PRT weekly situation reports describing the 

security situation in the provinces. We interviewed Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 

and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) officials concerning security concerns and 

attended commander update briefs in the provinces. During our visits to seven PRTs, we 

discussed the security environment with various team members and how it affected their 

ability to engage with their Iraqi counterparts and perform their mission. In addition, we 

participated in PRT movement missions using both military and contractor personal 

security details, which allowed us to observe firsthand security requirements and to 

discuss the security situation with personnel responsible for protecting PRT members. 

To determine the ability of PRT members to carry out their capacity development 

mission with provincial government officials, we held interviews with PRT members, 

with regional Embassy security and military forward-operating base officers, with U.S. 

Embassy officials, and with MNF-I and MNC-I officers. We also conducted analysis of 

security trends, attack incident data, and movement assets, including helicopter support 

records. 

To determine how participating organizations coordinated their programs and operational 

support, we interviewed officials from the Embassy’s National Coordination Team 

(NCT); MNF-I, MNC-I, and the major subordinate commands; the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and its Local Governance Program contractor, RTI 

International; and current and former members from 9 PRTs. We reviewed the program 

documents of the respective organizations, as well as the PRTs’ weekly summary reports 

of their political, economic, infrastructure, and reconstruction programs. When 

examining issues related to the PRT cost sharing disagreement between the Departments 

of State (DoS) and Defense (DoD), we examined the joint Baghdad Cable 4045, National 

Security Presidential Directives 36 and 44, and the DoS-DoD draft memorandum of 

agreement. We examined the requirements pertaining to utilizing DoD operations and 

maintenance funds for PRT support, evaluated the legal opinion of the MNC-I Judge 

Advocate General, and researched defense appropriation sources for alternative funding 

sources. To determine civilian-military command-and-control relationships, we also 

20
analyzed relevant DoD laws, regulations, and policies, including Defense Directive 

3000.05 and Title 10 USC 113. 

To determine if sufficient financial and human resources are available to support the PRT 

mission, we examined NCT and MNF-I documents establishing the framework and 

requirements for PRTs. We obtained NCT staffing data and cross-referenced the data 

with our firsthand observation of PRT personnel. We also examined NCT and MNF-I 

financial documents and the draft DoS financial plan for the PRT 2006 supplemental 

funding. While conducting fieldwork at 7 PRTs, we observed actual infrastructure, 

logistical, and staffing conditions and interviewed numerous PRT members regarding 

these issues. 

We conducted this audit in Iraq from July to September 2006. The audit was conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit. 

Prior Coverage

There have been no audits performed concerning PRTs in Iraq with the same or similar 

objectives as this audit. 

21
Appendix B—Typical PRT Organization 

Team

Leader

1 x Civ/Mil

1 x Mil/Civ

Engr USAID

1 Mil 

IRMO

PPM

1 DoS

IPAO

2 DoS

CA Co(-)

1USAID

MSC LNO

1Mil

Contractor Personal Security Details

or Military Movement Teams

(direct support)

Local 

Governance 

Team*

3-5 Contractors

15-25 LES

*USAID Contract

Other

Organizations

Donors

Functional

Team (BBA)

RoL

Coord

1 DoJ

1 INL

ca. 20 Mil

6 Contractors

Coordination

7 LES

PDO Econ

Dev

1DoS 1USAID 

AG

1 DoA

(at 6 PRTs)

APPROXIMATE NUMBERS

USG/Contractor Civilian: 13-15

LES Professional Staff: 22-32

BBA DoD Civilians: 0-6

Military PRT Members: 23

Total: 58-87

Governance Assistant

Reconstruction Assistant

Public Diplomacy Assistant

Development Assistant

Administrative Assistant/Translator (3)

LEGEND

RoL Rule of Law

DoJ Department of Justice

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

DoS Department of State

IRMO PPM Iraq Reconstruction Management Office Provincial Program Manager

IPAO Iraq Provincial Action Officer

PDO Public Diplomacy Officer

Econ Dev Economic Development

AG / DoA Agriculture Adviser / Department of Agriculture

Engr Engineer (U.S. military)

CA Co Civil Affairs Company (U.S. military)

BBA Bilingual-Bicultural Adviser

MSC LNO Liaison officer to major subordinate command

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

LES Locally employed staff (Iraqi)

USG U.S. government

DoD Department of Defense 

Deputy Team

Leader

Source: National Coordination Team, U.S. Embassy-Iraq, September 2006. 

22
Appendix C—Detailed PRT Program Staffing 

The table reflects civilian and military staffing as of September 29, 2006, and does not 

include contract staffing for translators, bilingual-bicultural advisers, and locally 

employed Iraqi staff. 

C i v i l i a n U.S. Military PRT 

DoJ DoS USAID DoA LGP Staff CA 

Total

Ninawa 1 1 6 4 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 20 26 36 38 

Babil 1 1 6 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 20 29 36 39 

 Najaf a 1 5 3 2 1 8 4 

 Diwaniyah a 2 1 2 1 

 Karbala a 3 2 3 2 

 Wasit a 2 1 2 1 

Ta'mim 1 1 6 4 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 20 13 36 25 

Baghdad 1 1 6 4 2 1 3 3 3 3 20 36 35 48 

Anbar 5 3 2 1 1 3 1 4 4 20 35 9 

Diyala 1 1 6 3 2 1 3 2 3 3 20 19 36 28 

Salah ad Din 1 6 3 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 20 16 36 26 

Basrah 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 9 7 

 Maysan b 3 1 1 4 1 

Dhi Qar 3 3 1 1 3 3 7 7 

 Muthanna c 1 4 2 1 6 2 

Total 9 5 66 39 20 9 6 27 24 23 22 140 139 291 238

% Filled 56% 59 45 89 96 99 82

Inbound 1 27 d 3 5 6 1 43 

a Housed with PRT Babil at REO Hillah 

b

 Housed at REO Basrah 

c

 Housed with PRT Dhi Qar 

d

 Estimated arrival of 27 DoS civilians: 10 – 10/06, 2 – 11/06, 3 – 12/06, 1 – 04/07, and 11 – NA 

Source: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, DoS, and National Coordination Team data

Legend

DoA Department of Agriculture 

DoJ Department of Justice 

DoS Department of State 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

LGP Local Governance Program 

CA Civil Affairs 

REO Regional Embassy Office 

Grey column = Authorized 

White column = Actual 

23
Appendix D—Acronyms 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

FY Fiscal Year 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

NCT National Coordination Team 

PRDC Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

24
Appendix E—Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State* 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq* 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense* 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq* 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq* 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

25
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

* Recipient of the draft audit report. 

26
Appendix F—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. 

McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Karen Bell 

Joanne M. Brignolo 

Pat Bowers 

Frank Campbell 

Patrick A. Dickriede 

Glenn D. Furbish 

Robert B. Gabriel 

Teravy Mol 

27
Management Comments—Department of State’s 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and U.S. MissionIraq* 

*Note : This memorandum is the official management response from the Department of State, 

received via email by SIGIR on October 6, 2006. 

28
29
30
31
32
Management Comments—Multi-National Force-Iraq 

33
34
35
36
37
Management Comments—Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy 

38
Management Comments—Gulf Region Division, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers 

39
40