DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Headquarters United States Marine Corps 

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

1 August 1997

FOREWORD

Tactical success in combat does not of itself guarantee victory

in war. What matters ultimately in war is strategic success:

attainment of our political aims and the protection of our national interests. The operational level of war provides the linkage between tactics and strategy. It is the discipline of

conceiving, focusing, and exploiting a variety of tactical actions to realize a strategic aim. With that thought as our point

of departure, this publication discusses the intermediate, operational level of war and the military campaign which is the

vehicle for organizing tactical actions to achieve strategic

objectives.

The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) clearly has operational as well as tactical capabilities. Thus it is essential

that Marine leaders learn to think operationally. Marine Corps

Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-2, Campaigning, provides

the doctrinal basis for military campaigning in the Marine

Corps, particularly as it pertains to a Marine commander or a

MAGTF participating in the campaign. Campaigning applies
the warfighting philosophies in MCDP 1, Warfighting, specifically to the operational level of war. It is linked to the other

publications of the MCDP series and is fully compatible with

joint doctrine.

MCDP 1-2 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM)

1-1, Campaigning, of 1990. MCDP 1-2 retains the spirit,

scope, and basic concepts of its predecessor. MCDP 1-2 further develops and refines some of those concepts based on recent experiences, continued thinking about war, and the

evolving nature of campaigning in the post-Cold War world.

The new version of Campaigning has three significant additions: an expanded discussion of the linkage between strategic

objectives and the campaign, a section on conflict termination,

and a section titled “Synergy” that describes how key capabilities are harmonized in the conduct of a campaign to achieve the

strategic objective. These additions have been derived from the

development of the other doctrinal publications in the MCDP

series and joint doctrine.

Chapter 1 discusses the campaign and the operational level

of war, their relationship to strategy and tactics, and their relevance to the Marine Corps. Chapter 2 describes the process of

campaign design: deriving a military strategic aim from political objectives and constraints, developing a campaign concept

that supports our strategic objectives, and making a campaign

plan that translates the concept into a structured configuration

of actions required to carry out that concept. Chapter 3
discusses the actual conduct of a campaign and the problem of

adapting our plans to events as they unfold.

Central to this publication is the idea that military action

at any level must ultimately serve the demands of policy.

Marine leaders at all levels must understand this point and

must recognize that we pursue tactical success not for its own

sake, but for the sake of larger political goals. Military strength

is only one of several instruments of national power, all of

which must be fully coordinated with one another in order to

achieve our strategic and operational objectives. Marine leaders must be able to integrate military operations with the other

instruments of national power.

This publication makes frequent use of historical examples.

These examples are intended to illustrate teachings that have

universal relevance and enduring applicability. No matter what

the scope and nature of the next mission—general war or military operations other than war—the concepts and the thought

processes described in this publication will apply. As with

Warfighting, this publication is descriptive rather than prescriptive. Its concepts require judgment in applica- tion.

This publication is designed primarily for MAGTF commanders and their staffs and for officers serving on joint and

combined staffs. However, commanders at all levels of any

military organization require a broad perspective, an understanding of the interrelationships among the levels of war, and

knowledge of the methods for devising and executing a
progressive series of actions in pursuit of a distant objective in

the face of hostile resistance. Marine officers of any grade and

specialty can easily find themselves working—either directly or

indirectly—for senior leaders with strategic or operational responsibilities. Those leaders need subordinates who understand

their problems and their intentions. Therefore, as with MCDP

1, I expect all officers to read and reread this publication, understand its message, and apply it.

C. C. KRULAK 

General, U.S. Marine Corps 

Commandant of the Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: 142 000008 00

©1997 United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Navy. All rights reserved.

Throughout this publication, masculine nouns and pronouns

are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise

noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either gender.
Campaigning

Chapter 1. The Campaign

Strategy—Tactics—Operations—Strategic-Operational

Connection—Tactical-Operational Connection—

Interdependence of the Levels of War—Campaigns—

Battles and Engagements—A Comparative Case

Study: Grant Versus Lee–Policy–Military Strategy–

Operations in 1864–Tactics—The Marine Corps and

Campaigning

Chapter 2. Designing the Campaign

Supporting the Military Strategic Aim–Campaigning

Under an Annihilation Strategy–Campaigning Under

an Erosion Strategy—Identifying the Enemy’s Critical

Vulnerabilities—The Campaign Concept–Phasing the

Campaign–Conceptual, Functional, and Detailed

Planning–Conflict Termination—Campaign Design: 

Two Examples–Case Study: The Recapture of Europe,

1944-45–Case Study: Malaysia, 1948-60—The Campaign

Plan

 MCDP 1-2
Chapter 3. Conducting the Campaign

Strategic Orientation—The Use of Combat—

Perspective—Surprise—Tempo—Synergy–Command

and Control–Maneuver–Fires–Intelligence–Logistics–

Force Protection—Leadership 

Conclusion

Notes

Campaigning MCDP 1-2
Chapter 1

The Campaign

“Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and

deciding features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as

armies have been destroyed by strategic operations without

the occurrence of pitched battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs.”1 

—Henri Jomini

“For even if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of strategy

must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting.”2

—B. H. Liddell Hart

“It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to

what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal. To

this end it is necessary to decide the development of operations before the initial blow is delivered.”3

—Bernard Montgomery 

his book is about military campaigning. A campaign is a

series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and

space.4 A campaign plan describes how time, space, and purpose connect these operations.5

 Usually, a campaign is aimed

at achieving some particular strategic result within a specific

geographic theater. A war or other sustained conflict sometimes consists of a single campaign, sometimes of several. If

there is more than one campaign, these can run either in sequence or—if there is more than one theater of war—simultaneously. Campaigning reflects the operational level of war,

where the results of individual tactical actions are combined to

fulfill the needs of strategy.

Military campaigns are not conducted in a vacuum. Military

power is employed in conjunction with other instruments of national power—diplomatic, economic, and informational—to

achieve strategic objectives. Depending upon the nature of the

operation, the military campaign may be the main effort, or it

may be used to support diplomatic or economic efforts. The

military campaign must be coordinated with the nonmilitary efforts to ensure that all actions work in harmony to achieve the

ends of policy. Frequently, particularly in military operations

other than war, the military campaign is so closely integrated

with other government operations that these nonmilitary actions

can be considered to be part of the campaign.

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

3

T
In this chapter, we will describe how events at different levels of war are interrelated, focusing on the operational level as

the link between strategy and tactics. We will examine the

campaign as the basic tool of commanders at the operational

level and discuss its relevance to the Marine Corps.

STRATEGY

War grows out of political conflict. Political policy determines

the aims of each combatant’s strategy and directs each side’s

conduct. Thus, as Liddell Hart wrote, “any study of the problem ought to begin and end with the question of policy.”6

 Strategy is the result of intellectual activity that strives to win the

objectives of policy by action in peace as in war.

National strategy is the art and science of developing and

using the political, economic, and informational powers of a

nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to

secure national objectives. National strategy connotes a global

perspective, but it requires coordination of all the elements of

national power at the regional or theater level as well. Because

a campaign takes place within a designated geographic theater

and may involve nonmilitary as well as military elements, campaign design is often equivalent to theater strategy.

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

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Military strategy is the art and science of employing the

armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national

policy by the application of force or the threat of force. It involves the establishment of military strategic objectives, the allocation of resources, the imposition of conditions on the use of

force, and the development of war plans.7

Strategy is both a product and a process. That is, strategy

involves both the creation of plans—specific strategies to deal

with specific problems—and the process of implementing them

in a dynamic, changing environment. Therefore, strategy requires both detailed planning and energetic adaptation to evolving events. 

Strategic concepts describe the ways in which the elements

of national power are to be used in the accomplishment of our

strategic ends, i.e., our policy objectives.8 U.S. military strategy is implemented by the combatant commanders and is always joint in nature. In practice, the execution of our military

strategy in any particular region requires coordination—and

often considerable compromise—with other governmental

agencies, with allies, with members of coalitions formed to

meet specific contingencies, and with nongovernmental organizations.

Military strategy must be subordinate to national strategy

and must be coordinated with the use of the nonmilitary instruments of our national power. Historically, we have sometimes

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

5
found it difficult to maintain those relationships correctly, and

we have sometimes fought in the absence of a clear national or

military strategy. 

TACTICS

Marines are generally most familiar—and therefore most comfortable—with the tactical domain, which is concerned with defeating an enemy force through fighting at a specific time and

place.9 The tactical level of war is the province of combat. The

means of tactics are the various elements of combat power at

our disposal. Its ways are the concepts by which we apply that

combat power against our adversary. These concepts are sometimes themselves called tactics—in our case, tactics founded on

maneuver. The goal of tactics is victory: defeating the enemy

force opposing us. In this respect, we can view tactics as the

discipline of winning battles and engagements.

The tactical level of war includes the maneuver of forces in

contact with the enemy to gain a fighting advantage, the application and coordination of fires, the sustainment of forces

throughout combat, the immediate exploitation of success to

seal the victory, the combination of different arms and weapons, the gathering and dissemination of pertinent information,

and the technical application of combat power within a tactical

action—all to cause the enemy’s defeat.

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In practice, the events of combat form a continuous fabric of

activity. Nonetheless, each tactical action, large or small, can

generally be seen as a distinct episode fought within a distinct

space and over a particular span of time.

Tactical success does not of itself guarantee success in

war. In modern times, victory in a single battle is seldom sufficient to achieve strategic victory as it sometimes was in Napoleon’s time. In fact, a single battle can rarely determine the

outcome of a campaign, much less that of an entire war. Even

a succession of tactical victories does not necessarily ensure

strategic victory, the obvious example being the American military experience in Vietnam. Accordingly, we must recognize

that defeating the enemy in combat cannot be viewed as an

end in itself, but rather must be considered merely a means to

a larger end.

OPERATIONS

It follows from our discussions of the strategic and tactical levels of war that there is a level of the military art above and distinct from the realm of tactics and subordinate to the domain of

strategy. This level is called the operational level of war. It is

the link between strategy and tactics.10 Action at the operational level aims to give meaning to tactical actions in the context of some larger design that is itself framed by strategy. Put

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

7
another way, our aim at the operational level is to get strategically meaningful results from tactical efforts.

Thus at the operational level of war we conceive, focus, and

exploit a variety of tactical actions in order to attain a strategic

goal. In its essence, the operational level involves deciding

when, where, for what purposes, and under what conditions to

give battle—or to refuse battle—in order to fulfill the strategic

goal. Operations govern the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from combat, and the sequencing of

successive tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives.

The nature of these tasks requires that the operational commander retain a certain amount of latitude in the conception

and execution of plans. “The basic concept of a campaign plan

should be born in the mind of the man who has to direct that

campaign.”11 If higher authority overly prescribes the concept

of operations, then the commander becomes a mere executor of

tactical tasks instead of the link between those tasks and the

strategic objectives. Such was the case in many U.S. air operations over North Vietnam. 

The term “operations” implies broader dimensions of time

and space than does “tactics” because a strategic orientation

forces the operational commander to consider a perspective

broader than the limits of immediate combat.12 While the tactician fights the battle, the operational commander must look beyond the battle—seeking to shape events in advance in order to

create the most favorable conditions possible for future combat

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

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actions. The operational commander likewise seeks to take

maximum advantage of the outcome of any actual combat

(win, lose, or draw), finding ways to exploit the resulting situation to the greatest strategic advantage.

Although the operational level of war is sometimes described as large-unit tactics, it is erroneous to define the operational level according to echelon of command. Military actions

need not be of large scale or involve extensive combat to have

an important political impact.13 The distance between tactical

actions and their strategic effects varies greatly from conflict to

conflict. In World War II, for example, strategic effects could

usually be obtained only from the operations of whole armies

or fleets. In a future very large-scale conventional conflict, a

corps commander may well be the lowest-level operational

commander. In Somalia, on the other hand, strategic (i.e., political) effects could result from the actions of squads or even

individuals. Regardless of the size of a military force or the

scope of a tactical action, if it is being used to directly

achieve a strategic objective, then it is being employed at the

operational level.

STRATEGIC-OPERATIONAL CONNECTION

No level of war is self-contained. Strategic, operational, and

tactical commanders, forces, and events are continually interacting with one another. Although we may view the chain of

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

9
command as a hierarchical pyramid in which directives and

power flow from higher to lower, in fact the command structure is often more like a spider web: a tug at any point may

have an impact throughout the structure. Information must

therefore flow freely in all directions. To use a different metaphor, the fingers have to know what the brain is feeling for,

and the brain has to know what the fingers are actually

touching.

We must always remember that the political end state envisioned by policy makers determines the strategic goals of all

military actions. We must also understand that the relationship

between strategy and operations runs both ways. That is, just

as strategy shapes the design of the campaign, so must strategy

adapt to operational circumstances and events. 

Strategy guides operations in three basic ways: it establishes

aims, allocates resources, and imposes restraints and constraints on military action. Together with the nature and actions of the enemy and the characteristics of the area of

operations, strategic guidance defines the parameters within

which we can conduct operations.

First, strategy translates policy objectives into military terms

by establishing the military strategic aim. What political effect

must our military forces achieve? What enemy assets must our

tactical forces seize, neutralize, threaten, or actually destroy in

order to either bend the enemy to our will or break him completely? The operational commander’s principal task is to

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

10
determine and pursue the sequence of actions that will most directly accomplish the military strategic mission. It is important

to keep in mind that the military strategic aim is but one part of

a broader national strategy.

Strategists must be prepared to modify aims in the light of

actual developments, as they reevaluate costs, capabilities, and

expectations. While required to pursue the established aim, the

operational commander is obliged to communicate the associated risks to superiors. When aims are unclear, the commander

must seek clarification and convey the impact— positive or

negative—of continued ambiguity. 

Second, strategy provides resources, both tangible resources

such as material and personnel and intangible resources such

as political and public support for military operations. When

resources are insufficient despite all that skill, talent, dedication, and creativity can do, the operational commander must

seek additional resources or request modification of the aims.

Third, strategy, because it is influenced by political and social concerns, places conditions on the conduct of military operations. These conditions take the form of restraints and

constraints. Restraints prohibit or restrict certain military actions such as the prohibition imposed on MacArthur against

bombing targets north of the Yalu River in Korea in 1950 or

the United States’ policy not to make first use of chemical

weapons in World War II. Restraints may be constant, as the

laws of warfare, or situational, as rules of engagement. Constraints, on the other hand, obligate the commander to certain

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

11
military courses of action such as President Jefferson Davis’s

decision that the policy of the Confederacy would be to hold as

much territory as possible rather than employ a more flexible

defense or resort to wide-scale guerrilla tactics, or the decision

that the Arab members of the Coalition should be the liberators

of Kuwait City during the Gulf War. Similarly, strategy may

constrain the commander to operations which gain rapid victory such as Abraham Lincoln’s perceived need to end the

American Civil War quickly lest Northern popular resolve

falter.

When conditions imposed by strategy are so severe as to

prevent the attainment of the established aim, the commander

must request relaxation of either the aims or the limitations.

However, we should not be automatically critical of conditions

imposed on operations by higher authority, since “policy is the

guiding intelligence”14 for the use of military force. Nonetheless, no senior commander can use the conditions imposed by

higher authority as an excuse for military failure.

TACTICAL-OPERATIONAL CONNECTION

Just as strategy shapes the design of the campaign while simultaneously adapting to operational circumstances and events, so

operations must interact with tactics. Operational plans and directives that are rooted in political and strategic aims establish

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

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the necessary focus and goals for tactical actions. Operational

planning provides the context for tactical decisionmaking.

Without this operational coherence, warfare at the tactical level

is reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused tactical

actions. Just as operations must serve strategy by combining

tactical actions so as to most effectively and economically

achieve the aim, they must also serve tactics by creating the

most advantageous conditions for our tactical actions. In other

words, we try to shape the situation so that the outcome is

merely a matter of course. “Therefore,” Sun Tzu said, “a

skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does

not demand it of his subordinates.”15 Just as we must continually interface with strategy to gain our direction, we must also

maintain the flexibility to adapt to tactical circumstances as

they develop, for tactical results will impact on the conduct of

the campaign. As the campaign forms the framework for combat, so do tactical results shape the conduct of the campaign. In

this regard, the task is to exploit tactical developments—victories, draws, even defeats—to strategic advantage.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE LEVELS OF WAR

The levels of war form a hierarchy. Tactical engagements are

components of battle, and battles are elements of a campaign.

The campaign, in turn, is itself but one phase of a strategic design for gaining the objectives of policy. While a clear

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

13
hierarchy exists, there are no sharp boundaries between the levels. Rather, they merge together and form a continuum. 

Consequently, a particular echelon of command is not necessarily concerned with only one level of war. A theater commander’s concerns are clearly both strategic and operational. A

Marine air-ground task force commander’s responsibilities will

be operational in some situations and largely tactical in others

and may actually span the transition from tactics to operations

in still others. A commander’s responsibilities within the hierarchy depend on the scale and nature of the conflict and may

shift up and down as the war develops.

Actions at one level can often influence the situation at other

levels.16 Harmony among the various levels tends to reinforce

success, while disharmony tends to negate success. Obviously,

failure at one level tends naturally to lessen success at the other

levels.

It is perhaps less obvious that the tactics employed to win in

actual combat may prevent success at a higher level. Imagine a

government whose strategy is to quell a growing insurgency by

isolating the insurgents from the population but whose military

tactics cause extensive collateral death and damage. The government’s tactics alienate the population and make the enemy’s

cause more appealing, strengthening him politically and therefore strategically.

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

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Brilliance at one level of war may to some extent overcome

shortcomings at another, but rarely can it overcome outright incompetence. Operational competence is meaningless without

the ability to achieve results at the tactical level. Strategic incompetence can squander what operational success has gained.

The natural flow of influence in the hierarchy is greatest at

the top. That is, it is much more likely that strategic incompetence will squander operational and tactical success than that

tactical and operational brilliance will overcome strategic incompetence or disadvantage. The Germans are widely considered to have been tactically and operationally superior in the

two World Wars. Their strategic incompetence, however,

proved an insurmountable obstacle to victory. Conversely, outgunned and overmatched tactically, the Vietnamese Communists prevailed strategically. 

The flow can work in reverse as well: brilliance at one level

can overcome, at least in part, shortcomings at a higher level.

In this way, during the American Civil War, the tacti- cal and

operational abilities of Confederate military leaders in the eastern theater of war held off the strategic advantages of the

North for a time until President Lincoln found a commander—General Grant—who would press those advantages.

Similarly, in North Africa, early in World War II, the tactical

and operational flair of German General Erwin Rommel’s Africa Corps negated Britain’s strategic advantage only for a

time. 

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

15
What matters finally is success at the strategic level. The

concerns of policy are the motives for war in the first place,

and it is the political impact of our operations that determines

our success or failure in war. It is far less important to be able

to discern at what level a certain activity takes place or where

the transition between levels occurs than to ensure that from

top to bottom and bottom to top all the components of our military effort are in harmony. We must never view the tactical domain in isolation because the results of combat become

relevant only in the larger context of the campaign. The campaign, in turn, gains meaning only in the context of strategy.

CAMPAIGNS

The principal tool by which the operational commander pursues the conditions that will achieve the strategic goal is the

campaign. Campaigns tend to take place over the course of

weeks or months, but they may span years. They may vary

drastically in scale from large campaigns conceived and controlled at the theater or even National Command Authorities

level to smaller campaigns conducted by joint task forces

within a combatant command. Separate campaigns may be

waged sequentially within the same conflict, each pursuing intermediate objectives on the way to the final strategic goal. It is

also possible to pursue several campaigns simultaneously if

there are multiple theaters of war. In modern times, for each

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U.S. conflict or military operation other than war there is normally only one campaign at a time within one geographic theater of war or theater of operations.17 That campaign is always

joint in character and falls under the command of either a regional commander in chief or a subordinate joint force commander. The joint force commander’s campaign is made up of

a series of related major operations, some of which may be

conducted by a single Service.

In the past, however, the word “campaign” has been used

very flexibly. Historians often refer to lesser campaigns within

larger ones. For example, the Allied Pacific campaign in the

Second World War comprised subordinate campaigns by General Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, Admiral

William Halsey in the South Pacific, and Admiral Chester

Nimitz in the Central Pacific. Halsey’s campaign in the South

Pacific itself included a smaller campaign in the Solomon Islands that lasted 5 months and consisted of operations from

Guadalcanal to Bougainville. Similarly, we often hear of “air

operations” or “submarine operations” as if they constituted independent campaigns. Nonetheless, while the Desert Storm

campaign had an initial phase dominated by aerial forces, we

do not refer to this as an air campaign.

At times, the relationships of these operations may not be

readily apparent. They may seem to be isolated tactical events

such as Operation Eldorado Canyon, the punative U.S. airstrike against Libya in 1986. On the surface, this operation appeared to be a single military response to a specific Libyan act,

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

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the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin in which two

U.S. servicemen were killed and a number injured. In fact, this

operation was part of much larger series of actions intended to

attain the strategic objective of reducing or eliminating Libya’s

sponsorship of international terrorism. Nonmilitary actions included efforts to isolate Libya diplomatically coupled with economic sanctions and information to publicize Libya’s support

of terrorism. Military actions consisted of a series of freedom

of navigation operations conducted in the Gulf of Sidra that

showed U.S. military commitment and put more pressure on

the Libyan government.18

BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS

A battle is a series of related tactical engagements. Battles last

longer than engagements and involve larger forces. They occur

when adversaries commit to fight to a decision at a particular

time and place for a significant objective. Conse- quently, battles are usually operationally significant (though not necessarily operationally decisive).19 This is not always so. The Battle

of the Somme in 1916, which was actually a series of inconclusive battles over the span of 41⁄2 months, merely moved the

front some 8 miles while inflicting approximately 1 million

casualties on the opposing armies. 

An engagement is a small tactical conflict, usually between

maneuver forces.20 Several engagements may compose a battle.

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Engagements may or may not be operationally significant, although our intent is to gain advantage from the results.

Battles and engagements are the armed collisions that mark

potential turning points in a campaign. While such combat provides perceptible structure, it is the campaign design that gives

combat meaning. In some campaigns, military forces play a

supporting role and are not really the main effort, as in the

campaign to isolate Iraq following the Gulf War. In that case,

tactical actions are small, infrequent, and undertaken largely to

enforce political and economic sanctions and to maintain

blockades. Even in campaigns where military forces represent

the main effort, sometimes small engagements are so continuous and large battles so rare that a campaign may seem to be

one drawn-out combat action. For instance, we often refer to

the Allies’ World War II campaign against German submarines

in the Atlantic as the “Battle of the Atlantic.” Guerrilla wars

and insurgencies often follow a similar pattern. The structure

of campaigns in such cases is sometimes hard to perceive because the ebb and flow in the antagonists’ fortunes happen bit

by bit rather than in sudden, dramatic events.

Even when a campaign involves distinct battles, operational

and strategic advantage can be gained despite tactical defeat.

General Nathaniel Greene’s campaign against the British in the

Carolinas during the American Revolution provides an example. In the winter of 1781, Greene maneuvered his army for almost 2 months to avoid engagement with the British force

commanded by Lord Cornwallis. In March of 1781, reinforced

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

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by Continental soldiers, militia, and riflemen from Virginia and

North Carolina, Greene decided to challenge the British in

North Carolina at Guilford Courthouse. The Americans fought

well, inflicting more casualties than they sustained, but were

forced to withdraw from the field. This engagement, a defeat

for Greene, proved to be a turning point in the campaign.21 The

British, exhausted from the previous pursuit and short on supplies, were unable to exploit their tactical victory and withdrew

to the coast, leaving their scattered South Carolina garrisons

vulnerable.22

The point is that victory in battle is only one possible means

to a larger end. The object should be to accomplish the aim of

strategy with as little combat as practicable, reducing “fighting

to the slenderest possible proportions.”23

However, none of this is to say that we can—or should try

to—avoid fighting on general principle. How much fighting we

do varies according to the strength, skill, intentions, and determination of the opposing sides. The ideal is to give battle only

where we want and when we must—when we are at an advantage and have something important to gain that we cannot gain

without fighting. However, since we are opposed by a hostile

will with ideas of his own, we do not always have this option.

Sometimes we must fight at a disadvantage when forced to by

a skilled enemy or when political obligations constrain us (as

would have been the case had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s plan for the forward defense of Germany against

the old Warsaw Pact been executed).

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A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY: GRANT VERSUS

LEE

A comparative examination of the strategic, operational, and

tactical approaches of Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert

E. Lee during the American Civil War offers an interesting illustration of the interaction of the levels. Popular history regards Grant as a butcher and Lee a military genius. A study of

their understanding of the needs of policy and the consistency

of their strategic, operational, and tactical methods casts the issue in a different light.24

Policy

The North faced a demanding and complex political problem,

namely “to reassert its authority over a vast territorial empire,

far too extensive to be completely occupied or thoroughly

controlled.”25 Furthermore, President Lincoln recognized that

Northern popular resolve might be limited and established

rapid victory as a condition as well. Lincoln’s original policy

of conciliation having failed, the President opted for the unconditional surrender of the South as the only acceptable aim. His

search for a general who would devise a strategy to attain his

aim ended with Grant in March 1864. By comparison, the

South’s policy aim was to preserve its newly declared independence. The South’s strategic aim was simply to prevent the

North from succeeding, to make the endeavor more costly than

the North was willing to bear.

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Military Strategy

The South’s policy objectives would seem to dictate a military

strategy of erosion aimed at prolonging the war as a means to

breaking Northern resolve. In fact, this was the strategy preferred by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Such a strategy would require close coordination of the Southern armies

and a careful husbanding of the Confederacy’s inferior resources. In practice, however, no Southern general in chief was

appointed until Lee’s appointment in early 1865. No doubt it

was in part because of the Confederacy’s basic political philosophy of states’ rights that the military resources of the various Southern states were poorly distributed. Campaigns in the

various theaters of war were conducted almost independently.

Lee’s decision to concentrate his army in northern Virginia

reflected a perspective much narrower than Grant’s and the

fact that he was politically constrained to defend Richmond.

However, this decision was due also to Lee’s insistence on an

offensive strategy—not merely an offensive defense as in the

early stages of the war but eventually an ambitious offensive

strategy in 1862 and ’63 aimed at invading the North as a

means to breaking Northern will. (See figure.) Given the

South’s relative weakness, Lee’s strategy was questionable at

best26—both as a viable means of attaining the South’s policy

aims and also in regard to operational practicability, particularly the South’s logistical ability to sustain offensive

campaigns.

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MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

23
Grant’s strategy of 1864 was directly supportive of the established policy objectives. He recognized immediately that his

military strategic aim must be the destruction of Lee’s army,

and he devised a strategy of annihilation focused resolutely on

that aim. Consistent with the policy objective of ending the war

as rapidly as possible, Grant initiated offensive action simultaneously on all fronts to close the ring quickly around his opponent. (See figure.)

General George Meade’s Army of the Potomac was to

lock horns with Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, pursuing it relentlessly. “Lee’s army will be your objective

point. Wherever he goes, there you will go also.”27 Grant’s headquarters accompanied Meade.

In the Shenandoah Valley, General Franz Sigel was to fix

a large part of Lee’s forces in place. “In other words,”

Grant said, “if Sigel can’t skin himself he can hold a leg

while some one else skins.”28

On the Peninsula, south of Richmond, General Butler was

reinforced by troops taken from occupation duties along

the Southern coast. He was to move up and threaten

Richmond from a different direction than Meade.

General William T. Sherman was to sweep out of the

west into Georgia, then up along the coast. “You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up and

to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as

you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

24
MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

25
war resources.”29 After eliminating Confederate forces in

Georgia and the Carolinas, Sherman’s army would move

north in a strategic envelopment of Lee.

Union land and sea forces in the vicinity of New Orleans

were to concentrate and take Mobile, Alabama, thus cutting off one of the last functioning Confederate seaports.

Satisfied that he had finally found a commander who could

translate policy into a successful military strategy, Lincoln

wrote Grant in August 1864: “ ‘The particulars of your plans I

neither know nor seek to know. . . . I wish not to obtrude any

restraints or constraints upon you.’ ”30

Operations in 1864

Consistent with his strategy of grinding Lee down as quickly as

possible and recognizing his ability to pay the numerical cost,

Grant aggressively sought to force Lee frequently into pitched

battle. He accomplished this by moving against Richmond in

such a way as to compel Lee to block him. Grant never fell

back to lick his wounds but rather continued relentlessly to

press his fundamental advantages no matter what the outcome

of a particular engagement. Even so, it is unfair to discount

Grant, as some have done, as an unskilled butcher:

He showed himself free from the common fixation of his contemporaries upon the Napoleonic battle as the hinge upon

which warfare must turn. Instead, he developed a highly uncommon ability to rise above the fortunes of a single battle

and to master the flow of a long series of events, almost to the

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

26
point of making any outcome of a single battle, victory, draw,

or even defeat, serve his eventual purpose equally well.31 

Lee, on the other hand, had stated that having the weaker

force, his desire was to avoid a general engagement.32 In practice, however, he seemed unable to resist the temptation of a

climactic Napoleonic battle whenever the enemy was within

reach. Despite a number of tactical successes, Lee was eventually pinned to the fortifications at Petersburg, where he was besieged by Grant from mid-June 1864 to early April 1865. Lee’s

eventual attempt to escape from Petersburg led to his army’s

capture at Appomattox on 9 April 1865. (See figure on page

28.)

The most important subordinate campaign, other than that

of the Army of the Potomac itself, was Sherman’s. His initial

opponent, General Joseph Johnston, in contrast to Lee, seemed

to appreciate the Confederacy’s need to protract the conflict.

Johnston—

fought a war of defensive maneuver, seeking opportunities to

fall upon enemy detachments which might expose themselves

and inviting the enemy to provide him with such openings,

meanwhile moving from one strong defensive position to another in order to invite the enemy to squander his resources in

frontal attacks, but never remaining stationary long enough to

risk being outflanked or entrapped.33

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

27
Campaigning MCDP 1-2

28
Between Chattanooga and Atlanta, while suffering minimal

casualties, Johnston held Sherman to an average advance of a

mile a day. Of Johnston’s campaign, Grant himself wrote—

For my own part, I think that Johnston’s tactics were right.

Anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond

the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent that they might have

abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation.34

Tactics

Lee’s dramatic tactical successes in battles such as Second

Manassas and Chancellorsville speak for themselves. Nevertheless, neither Lee nor Grant can be described as particularly

innovative tactically. In fact, both were largely ignorant of the

technical impact of the rifled bore on the close-order tactics of

the day, and both suffered high casualties as a result.35 However, due to the relative strategic situations, Grant could better

absorb the losses that resulted from this tactical ignorance than

could Lee, whose army was being bled to death. In this way,

Grant’s strategic advantage carried down to the tactical level.

Grant’s activities at all levels seem to have been mutually

supporting and focused on the objectives of policy. Lee’s strategy and operations appear to have been, at least in part, incompatible with each other, with the requirements of policy, and

with the realities of combat. In the final analysis, Lee’s tactical

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

29
flair could not overcome operational and strategic shortcomings of the Confederacy. 

THE MARINE CORPS AND CAMPAIGNING

Having described how goals at the different levels of war interact and introduced the campaign, we must now ask ourselves

what is the relevance of this subject to the Marine Corps. We

can answer this question from several perspectives. Marine airground task forces (MAGTFs) will participate in campaigns,

and Marines will serve on joint staffs and participate in the design of campaigns. MAGTF commanders and their staffs may

find themselves designing major operations in support of a

campaign. 

Organizationally, the MAGTF is uniquely equipped to perform a variety of tactical actions—amphibious, air, and

land—and to sequence or combine those actions in a coherent

scheme. The MAGTF’s organic aviation allows the commander to project power in depth and to shape events in time

and space. The command structure with separate headquarters

for the tactical control of ground, air, and logistics actions

frees the MAGTF command element to focus on the operational conduct of war.

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

30
A MAGTF is often the first American force to arrive in an

undeveloped theater of operations. In that case, the MAGTF

commander will often have operational-level responsibilities regardless of the size of the MAGTF. In some cases, the

MAGTF may provide the nucleus of a joint task force headquarters. Even in a developed theater, a MAGTF may be required to conduct major operations as part of a larger

campaign in pursuit of a strategic objective. The commander of

a MAGTF must be prepared to describe its most effective operational employment in a joint or multinational campaign. 

The news media, because of its global reach and ability to

influence popular opinion, can have operational effects—that

is, it can often elevate even minor tactical acts to political

importance. Consequently, Marines must understand how tactical action impacts on politics; this is the essence of understanding war at the operational level.

Finally, regardless of the echelon of command or scale of

activity, even if an action rests firmly in the tactical realm, the

methodology described here—devising and executing a progressive series of actions in pursuit of a goal and deciding

when and where to fight for that goal—applies.

MCDP 1-2 The Campaign

31
Chapter 2

Designing the

Campaign

“By looking on each engagement as part of a series, at least

insofar as events are predictable, the commander is always

on the high road to his goal.”1

—Carl von Clausewitz 

“To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy’s

power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the

circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along a line which

offers alternative objectives.”2

—B. H. Liddell Hart 

aving defined and described the operational level of war

and the campaign, we will now discuss the mental process and the most important considerations required to plan a

campaign. The commander’s key responsibility is to provide

focus. Through the campaign plan, the commander fuses a variety of disparate forces and tactical actions, extended over

time and space, into a single, coherent whole.3

SUPPORTING THE MILITARY STRATEGIC AIM

Campaign design begins with the military strategic aim. The

campaign design should focus all the various efforts of the

campaign on the established strategic aim. Effective campaign

planners understand the role of the campaign under consideration in the context of the larger conflict. They also understand

the need to resolve, to the extent possible, any ambiguities in

the role of our military forces. This focus on the military strategic aim is the single most important element of campaign

design.

There are only two ways to use military force to impose our

political will on an enemy.4 The first approach is to make the

enemy helpless to resist the imposition of our will through the

destruction of his military capabilities. Our aim is the elimination (permanent or temporary) of the enemy’s military capacity—which does not necessarily mean the physical destruction

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

35

H
of all his forces. We call this a military strategy of

annihilation.

5

 We use force in this way when we seek an unlimited political objective—that is, when we seek to overthrow

the enemy leadership or force its unconditional surrender. We

may also use it in pursuit of a more limited political objective

if we believe that the enemy will continue to resist our demands

as long as he has any means to do so. 

The second approach is to convince the enemy that making

peace on our terms will be less painful than continuing to fight.

We call this a strategy of erosion—the use of our military

means with the aim of wearing down the enemy leadership’s

will to continue the struggle.6 In such a strategy, we use our

military forces to raise the enemy’s costs higher than he is willing to pay. We use force in this manner in pursuit of limited

political goals that we believe the enemy leadership will ultimately be willing to accept. (See figure.)

All military strategies fall into one of these fundamental

categories. Campaign planners must understand the chosen

strategy and its implications at the operational level. Failure to

understand the basic strategic approach (annihilation or erosion) will prevent the development of a coherent campaign plan

and may cause military and diplomatic leaders to work at

cross-purposes.

Campaigning Under an Annihilation Strategy

If the policy aim is to destroy the enemy’s political entity—to

overthrow his political structure and impose a new one—then

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

36
our military aim must be annihilation.7

 Even if our political

goal is more limited, however, we may still seek to eliminate

the enemy’s capacity to resist. In the Gulf War, we completely

destroyed the ability of Iraqi forces to resist us in the Kuwaiti

theater of operations, but we did not overthrow the enemy regime. Our political goal of liberating Kuwait was limited, but

our military objective, in the Kuwaiti theater of operations,

was not.8 In the Falklands war, Britain had no need to attack

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

37

Determining Military Strategy.
the Argentine mainland or to overthrow its government in order

to recover the disputed islands. In the area of operations, however, the British isolated and annihilated the Argentine forces.

Strategies of annihilation have the virtue of conceptual simplicity. The focus of our operational efforts is the enemy armed

forces. Our intent is to render them powerless. We may choose

to annihilate those forces through battle or through destruction

of the infrastructures that support them. Our main effort resides in our own armed forces. The other instruments of national power—diplomatic, economic, and

informational—clearly support it.9 Victory is easily measured:

when the enemy’s fighting forces are no longer able to present

organized resistance, we have achieved military victory. Regardless of whether our political goal is limited or unlimited, a

strategy of annihilation puts us into a position to impose our

will.

Campaigning Under an Erosion Strategy 

Erosion strategies are appropriate when our political goal is

limited and does not require the destruction of the enemy leadership, government, or state. Successful examples of erosion

appear in the American strategy against Britain during the

American Revolution and the Vietnamese Communist strategy

against France and the United States in Indochina. 

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

38
Erosion strategies involve a great many more variables than

annihilation strategies. These distinctions are important and

critical to the campaign planner. In erosion strategies, we have

a much wider choice in our operational main efforts, the relationship of military force to the other instruments of power is

much more variable, and our definition of victory is much more

flexible. 

The means by which a campaign of erosion convinces the

enemy leadership to negotiate is the infliction of unacceptable

costs. Note that we mean unacceptable costs to the leadership,

not to the enemy population. Our actions must have an impact

on the enemy leadership. We must ask ourselves:

What does the enemy leadership value?

How can we threaten it in ways the enemy leadership will

take seriously?

Often, the most attractive objective for a campaign of erosion is the enemy’s military forces. Many regimes depend on

their military forces for protection against their neighbors or

their own people. If we substantially weaken those forces, we

leave the enemy leadership vulnerable.

In erosion strategies, however, we may choose a nonmilitary

focus for our efforts. Instead of threatening the enemy

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

39
leadership’s survival by weakening them militarily, we may

seize or neutralize some other asset they value—and prove that

we can maintain our control. Our objective may be a piece of

territory that has economic, political, cultural, or prestige

value; shipping; trade in general; financial assets; and so on.

The aim to seize and hold territory normally makes our military

forces the main effort. Successful embargoes and the freezing

of financial assets, on the other hand, depend primarily on diplomacy and economic power. In the latter examples, therefore,

military forces play a supporting role and may not be engaged

in active combat operations at all.

We may also seek to undermine the leadership’s prestige or

credibility. Special forces and other unconventional military

elements may play a role in such a campaign, but the main effort will be based on the informational and diplomatic instruments of our national power.

Victory in a campaign of erosion can be more flexibly

defined and/or more ambiguous than is victory in a campaign

of annihilation. The enemy’s submission to our demands may

be explicit or implicit, embodied in a formal treaty or in

behind-the-scenes agreements. If we are convinced that we

have made our point, changed his mind or his goals, or have so

eroded the enemy’s power that he can no longer threaten us, we

may simply “declare victory and go home.” Such conclusions

may seem unsatisfying to military professionals, but they are

acceptable if they meet the needs of national policy.

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

40
IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY’S CRITICAL

VULNERABILITIES

Economy demands that we focus our efforts toward some object or factor of decisive importance in order to achieve the

greatest effect at the least cost. Differing strategic goals may

dictate different kinds of operational targets. If we are pursuing

an erosion strategy, we will seek objectives that raise to unacceptable levels the cost to the enemy leadership of noncompliance with our demands. Depending on the nature of the enemy

leadership, our objectives may be the military forces or their

supporting infrastructure, the internal security apparatus, territorial holdings, economic assets, or something else of value to

our specific enemy. If we are pursuing a strategy of annihilation, we will seek objectives that will lead to the collapse of his

military capabilities.

In either case, we must understand both the sources of the

enemy’s strength and the key points at which he is vulnerable.

We call a key source of strength a center of gravity. It represents something without which the enemy cannot function.10

We must distinguish between a strategic center of gravity

and an operational center of gravity. The former is an objective whose seizure, destruction, or neutralization will have a

profound impact on the enemy leadership’s will or ability to

continue the struggle. Clausewitz put it this way—

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

41
For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of gravity was their army. If the

army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in

history as failures.11 In countries subject to domestic strife, the

center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries

that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and

in popular uprisings [the centers of gravity are] the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. It is against these that

our energies should be directed.12

An operational center of gravity, on the other hand, is normally an element of the enemy’s armed forces. It is that concentration of the enemy’s military power that is most

dangerous to us or the one that stands between us and the accomplishment of our strategic mission. The degree of danger a

force poses may depend on its size or particular capabilities, its

location relative to ourselves, or the particular skill or enterprise of its leader.13

The strategic and operational centers of gravity may be one

and the same thing, or they may be very distinct. For example,

think of the campaign of 1864 in the case study in chapter 1.

Sherman’s strategic objectives were the destruction of the

South’s warmaking resources and will to continue the war. Until Johnston’s Army of Tennessee was disposed of, Sherman’s

army had to stay concentrated and could not disperse over a

wide enough area to seriously affect the South’s economic infrastructure. For Sherman, Johnston’s Army represented the

operational, but not the strategic, center of gravity.

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

42
Usually we do not wish to attack an enemy’s strengths directly because that exposes us to his power. Rather, we seek to

attack his weaknesses in a way that avoids his strength and

minimizes the risk to ourselves. Therefore we seek some critical vulnerability. A critical vulnerability is related to, but not

the same as, a center of gravity; the concepts are complementary. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a

key strength. It also must be something that we are capable of

attacking effectively.

Critical vulnerabilities may not be immediately open to attack. We may have to create vulnerability—to design a progressive sequence of actions to expose or isolate it, creating

over time an opportunity to strike the decisive blow. An example would be to peel away the enemy’s air defenses in order to

permit a successful attack on his key command and control

facilities.

Just as we ruthlessly pursue our enemy’s critical

vulnerabilities, we should expect him to attack ours. We must

take steps to protect or reduce our vulnerabilities over the

course of the campaign. This focus on the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities is central to campaign design.

In order to identify the enemy’s center of gravity and critical

vulnerabilities, we must have a thorough understanding of the

enemy. Obtaining this understanding is not simple or easy.

Two of the most difficult things to do in war are to develop a

realistic understanding of the enemy’s true character and capabilities and to take into account the way that our forces and

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

43
actions appear from his viewpoint. Instead, we tend to turn him

into a stereotype—a cardboard cut-out or strawman—or, conversely, to imagine him 10-feet tall. We often ascribe to him attitudes and reflexes that are either mirror images of our own or

simply fantasies—what we would like him to be or to do,

rather than what his own particular situation and character

would imply that he is. This insufficient thought and imagination makes it very difficult to develop realistic enemy courses

of action, effective deception plans or ruses, or highprobability branches and sequels to our plans. In designing our

campaign, we must understand the unique characteristics of

our enemy and focus our planning to exploit weaknesses derived from that understanding.

THE CAMPAIGN CONCEPT

After determining whether the strategic aim is erosion or annihilation, describing its application in the situation at hand, and

identifying the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities that we will attack to most economically effect the enemy’s submission or collapse, we must now develop a

campaign concept. This concept captures the essence of our

design and provides the foundation for the campaign plan. It

expresses in clear, concise, conceptual language a broad vision

of what we plan to accomplish and how we plan to do it. Our

intent, clearly and explicitly stated, is an integral component of

the concept. Our concept should also contain in general terms

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

44
an idea of when, where, and under what conditions we intend to

give or refuse battle.

The concept should demonstrate a certain boldness, for

boldness is in itself “a genuinely creative force.”14 It should focus on the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. It should exhibit

creativity and avoid discernible conventions and patterns; make

use of artifice, ambiguity, and deception; and reflect, as Churchill wrote, “an original and sinister touch, which leaves the

enemy puzzled as well as beaten.”15 It should create multiple

options so that we can adjust to changing events and so that the

enemy cannot discern our true intentions. It should be as simple

as the situation allows. It should provide for speed in execution—which is a weapon in itself.

Each campaign should have a single, unifying concept. Often a simple but superior idea has provided the basis for success. Grant’s plan of fixing Lee near Richmond while loosing

Sherman through the heart of the South was one such idea. The

idea of bypassing Japanese strongholds in the Pacific became

the basis for the Americans’ island-hopping campaigns in the

Second World War. MacArthur’s bold, simple concept of a

seaborne, operational turning movement became the Inchon

landing in 1950.

Phasing the Campaign

A campaign is required whenever we pursue a strategic aim not

attainable through a single tactical action at a single place and

time. A campaign therefore includes several related phases that

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

45
may be executed simultaneously or in sequence. A campaign

may also have several aspects, each to be executed by different

forces or different kinds of forces. Phases are a way of organizing the diverse, extended, and dispersed activities of the campaign. As Eisenhower pointed out, “These phases of a plan do

not comprise rigid instructions, they are merely guideposts. . . .

Rigidity inevitably defeats itself, and the analysts who point to

a changed detail as evidence of a plan’s weakness are completely unaware of the characteristics of the battlefield.”16

Each phase may constitute a single operation or a series of

operations. Our task is to devise a combination of actions that

most effectively and quickly achieve the strategic aim. While

each phase may be distinguishable from the others as an identifiable episode, each is necessarily linked to the others and gains

significance only in the larger context of the campaign. The

manner of distinction may be separation in time or space or a

difference in aim or in forces assigned. 

We should view each phase as an essential component in a

connected string of events that are related in cause and effect.

Like a chess player, we must learn to think beyond the next

move, to look ahead several moves, and to consider the longterm effects of those moves and how to exploit them. We

cannot move without considering the enemy’s reactions or anticipations, unlikely as well as likely. 

Because each phase involves one or more decision points,

we must think through as far as practicable the possible

branches or options resulting from each decision. Such decision

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

46
points are often represented by battles, which—despite everything we can do to predetermine their outcome—can be either

lost or won. Each branch from a decision point will require different actions on our part and each action demands various

follow-ups—sequels or potential sequels.17 “The higher commander must constantly plan, as each operation progresses, so

to direct his formations that success finds his troops in proper

position and condition to undertake successive steps without

pause.”18

Each phase of the campaign is aimed at some intermediate

goal necessary to the accomplishment of the larger aim of the

campaign. Each phase has its own distinct intent which contributes to the overall intent of the campaign. Generally speaking, the phasing of a campaign should be event-driven rather

than schedule-driven. Each phase should represent a natural

subdivision of the campaign; we should not break the campaign

down into numerous arbitrary chunks that can lead to a plodding, incremental approach sacrificing tempo.

The process of developing a sequence of phases in a campaign operates in two directions simultaneously: forward and

backward.19 We begin our planning with both the current situation and the desired end state in mind—recognizing, of course,

that the end state may change as the situation unfolds. We plan

ahead, envisioning mutually supporting phases, whose combined effects set the stage for the eventual decisive action. At

the same time, however, and as a check on our planning, we

envision a reasonable set of phases backward from the end

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

47
state toward the present. The two sets of phases, forward and

backward, have to mesh.

Phasing, whether sequential or simultaneous, allows us to

allocate resources effectively over time. Taking the long view,

we must ensure that resources will be available when needed in

the later stages of the campaign. Effective phasing must take

into account the process of logistical culmination. If resources

are insufficient to sustain the force until the accomplishment of

the strategic aim, logistical considerations may demand that the

campaign be organized into sequential phases. Each of these

must be supportable in turn, each phase followed by a logistical resupply or buildup. Moreover, logistical requirements may

dictate the purpose of certain phases as well as the sequence of

those phases. 

Resource availability depends in large part on time schedules—such as sustainment or deployment rates—rather than on

the events of war. Therefore, as we develop our intended

phases, we must reconcile the time-oriented phasing of resource availability with the event-driven phasing of operations. 

Conceptual, Functional, and Detailed Planning

The process of creating a broad scheme for accomplishing our

goal is called conceptual planning. To translate the campaign

concept into a complete and practicable plan requires functional planning and detailed planning. Functional planning, as

the name implies, is concerned with designing the functional

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

48
components necessary to support the concept: the subordinate

concepts for command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection.20 Functional planning ensures that we work through the feasibility of the campaign

concept with respect to every functional area.

Detailed planning encompasses the specific planning activities necessary to ensure that the plan is coordinated: specific

command relationships, movements, landing tables, deployment or resupply schedules, communications plans, reconnaissance plans, control measures, etc. Detailed design should not

become so specific, however, that it inhibits flexi- bility.

No amount of subsequent planning can reduce the requirement for an overall concept. While conceptual planning is the

foundation for functional and detailed planning, the process

works in the other direction as well. Our concept must be

adaptable to functional realities. Functional planning in turn

must be sensitive to details of execution. The operational concept (a conceptual concern) should be used to develop the deployment plan (a functional concern). However, the realities of

deployment schedules sometimes dictate employment schemes.

Campaign design thus becomes a two-way process aimed at

harmonizing the various levels of design activity.

The farther ahead we project, the less certain and detailed

should be our design. We may plan the initial phase of a campaign with some degree of certainty, developing extensive functional and detailed plans. However, since the results of that

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

49
phase will shape the phases that follow, subsequent plans must

be increasingly general. The plan for future phases will be

largely conceptual, perhaps consisting of no more than a general intent and several contingencies and options.

Conflict Termination 

Two of the most important aspects of campaign design are defining the desired end state and planning a transition to postconflict operations. Every campaign and every strategic effort

have a goal. Every military action eventually ends. 

The decisions when and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate combat operations are, of course, political

decisions. Military leaders, however, are participants in the decisionmaking process. It is their responsibility to ensure that

political leaders understand both the existing situation and the

implications—immediate and long-term, military and political—of a suspension of combat at any point in the conflict. In

1864, for example, Union commanders understood well that

any armistice for the purposes of North-South negotiation

would likely mark an end to Union hopes. Regardless of the

theoretical gap between the military and the political realms,

combat operations, once halted, would have been virtually impossible to restart.21 In the 1991 Gulf War, the timing of conflict termination reflected the achievement of our political and

military aims in the Kuwaiti theater of op- erations. 

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

50
Campaign designers must plan for conflict termination from

the earliest possible moment and update these plans as the

campaign evolves. What constitutes an acceptable political and

military end state, the achievement of which will justify a termination to our combat operations? In examining any proposed

end state, we must consider whether it guarantees an end to the

fundamental problems that brought on the struggle in the first

place, or whether instead it leaves in place the seeds of further

conflict. If the latter, we must ask whether the chosen method

of termination permits our unilateral resumption of military operations. Most practical resolutions of any conflict involve

some degree of risk. Military leaders must always be prepared

to ask the political leadership whether the political benefits of

an early peace settlement outweigh the military risks—and thus

also the political risks—of accepting a less-than-ideal conclusion to hostilities.

When addressing conflict termination, commanders must

consider a wide variety of operational issues including disengagement, force protection, transition to postconflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment. Thorough

campaign planning can reduce the chaos and confusion

inherent in abruptly ending combat operations. When we disengage and end combat operations, it is of paramount importance

to provide for the security of our forces as well as noncombatants and enemy forces under our control. The violent emotions

of war cannot be quelled instantly, and various friendly and enemy forces may attempt to continue hostile actions. 

MCDP 1-2 Designing the Campaign

51
Once combat operations cease, the focus will likely shift to

military operations other than war. The scope of these operations ranges from peacekeeping and refugee control to mine

clearing and ordnance disposal to food distribution. Repairing

host nation infrastructure and restoring host country control

are operational-level concerns. Commanders at all levels must

coordinate their efforts with a variety of governmental, nongovernmental, and host nation agencies.

A final issue to be addressed in conflict termination is reconstitution and redeployment. Reconstitution begins in theater.

Units are brought to a state of readiness commensurate with

the mission requirements and available resources. The results

of combat will dictate whether this is done through the shifting

of internal resources within a degraded unit (reorganization) or

the rebuilding of a unit through large-scale replacements

(regeneration).22 The capability to reconstitute and redeploy is

especially important to naval expeditionary forces who must be

able to complete one mission, reembark, and move on to the

next task without hesitation. Regardless of the methods, reconstitution and redepolyment pose a complex and demanding

leadership and logistics challenge.

CAMPAIGN DESIGN: TWO EXAMPLES

The design of each campaign is unique. The campaign design

is shaped first and foremost by the overall national strategy and

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

52
the military strategic aim. The nature of the enemy, the characteristics of the theater of operations, and the resources available all influence the exact nature of each design. Nevertheless,

the basic concepts of campaign design apply in any situation.

Consider the following two case studies. While the designs of

these two campaigns are radically different, the end result is

the same: successful attainment of the strategic aim.

Case Study: The Recapture of Europe, 1944–45

An excellent example of campaign design during a major conflict is Eisenhower’s broad plan for the recapture of Europe in

the Second World War. The strategy was one of annihilation

with the aim of eliminating Germany’s military capacity. The

design focused on the German forces as the primary center of

gravity, although it recognized the importance of both political

and economic centers such as Berlin and the Ruhr. The design

employed a series of phases that were carried out in sequence

as the campaign gained momentum and progressed towards the

accomplishment of the ultimate objective. Eisenhower described this campaign design as “successive moves with possible alternatives.”23 (See figure, page 54.) 

Land on the Normandy coast.

Build up the resources needed for a decisive battle in the

Normandy-Brittany region and break out of the enemy’s encircling positions. . . .

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Pursue on a broad front with two army groups, emphasizing

the left to gain necessary ports and reach the boundaries of

Germany and threaten the Ruhr. On our right we would link

up with the forces that were to invade France from the south.

Build up our new base along the western border of Germany,

by securing ports in Belgium and in Brittany as well as in the

Mediterranean.

While building up our forces for the final battles, keep up an

unrelenting offensive to the extent of our means, both to wear

down the enemy and to gain advantages for the final fighting.

Complete the destruction of enemy forces west of the Rhine,

in the meantime constantly seeking bridgeheads across the

river.

Launch the final attack as a double envelopment of the Ruhr,

again emphasizing the left, and follow this up by an immediate thrust through Germany, with the specific direction to be

determined at the time.

Clean out the remainder of Germany.25

Eisenhower remarked that “this general plan, carefully outlined at staff meetings before D-Day, was never abandoned,

even momentarily, throughout the campaign.”26

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Case Study: Malaysia, 1948–60

An example of campaign design very different from Eisenhower’s can be found in the British campaign against a Communist

insurgency in Malaysia. This example demonstrates that the

concepts used to design a campaign in conventional conflicts

apply as well in military operations other than war. While the

British strategy was also one of annihilation, the nature of the

conflict and the characteristics of the enemy dictated that the

strategy had to be carried out over a much longer period in order to be successful. The centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities were not primarily military in nature. Since this

campaign was conducted over a number of years, the phases or

building blocks of the campaign had to be pursued simultaneously rather than sequentially. 

Both sides had clear goals and a clear concept for the political and military phasing of the struggle. The British had promised Malaysia its independence. Their goal was to leave a

stable, non-Communist government in place after their departure. The Communists’ goal was to obtain such a powerful

military and political position within Malaysia that the British

withdrawal would leave them dominant in the country. The

British identified the center of gravity of the Communist movement as the large, impoverished Chinese minority who furnished the vast bulk of recruits for both the political and

military wings of the Communist Party. Overall, the movement’s critical vulnerability was its ethnic isolation in the Malaydominated country. Militarily, its critical vulnerability was the

dependence of Communist military units on food and other

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supplies from the widely scattered Chinese farming population.

The center of gravity of the British-backed Malaysian government, on the other hand, was its claim to legitimacy and its

promise of a better life than Communism could offer.

The British launched a multipronged campaign against the

Communists. The navy insured that external support did not

reach the Communists by sea. The army was responsible for

keeping organized enemy units in the jungle, away from the

population base and food supplies of the settled agricultural areas. The Malaysian government forces recognized that the jungle gave the enemy strength: enemy bases were hard to find and

easily relocated if discovered. Search-and-destroy efforts were

counterproductive because British strike forces were easily detected as they thrashed through the bush. This permitted the enemy not only to escape but to lay ambushes. However, the

enemy’s forces needed to move through the jungle as well, especially to obtain food. This made their forces vulnerable. The

British knew where the food was grown and the routes the enemy supply columns had to follow to obtain it. Accordingly,

the government forces themselves came to concentrate—very

successfully—on the tactic of ambush.

Meanwhile, the police forces (recruited from the Malaysian

population to a much greater size than the army) concentrated

on providing security in the populated areas. They did this under very strict rules of engagement respecting the rights of the

citizens, thus upholding the legality and legitimacy of constituted authority. Simultaneously, the destitute Chinese

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population was concentrated in clean, secure, well-designed

new settlements, provided with the economic means to build

homes in their own style, and given legal title to those homes

and to adequate farmlands. This resettlement policy cut the

guerrilla forces off from sources of recruits and, perhaps more

important, food. The resettlement effort was accompanied by a

political program to ensure that the Chinese minority obtained

rights of citizenship equal to those of the Malay majority.

In combination, these patient and thoroughly coordinated

military, police, economic, and political operations isolated the

Communists both physically and psychologically from the

main population. Despite some tactical successes (which included killing the first British commander in an ambush), the

Malaysian Communist military forces were annihilated and the

Party eliminated as a factor in Malaysian politics.27

Despite the obvious differences in the designs of these two

campaigns, they both applied the basic concepts of campaign

design to achieve the desired strategic objective. While the type

of conflict and the nature of the enemy were radically different,

both campaign designs had a clearly identified strategic aim,

both focused on the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, and both employed a campaign concept with appropriate phases tailored to accomplish the strategic aim.

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THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

The campaign plan is the statement of the design for prosecuting the commander’s portion of the overall strategy. It flows

directly from the campaign concept and translates the concept

into a structured configuration of actions required to carry out

that concept. The plan describes a sequence of related operations that lead to a well-defined military end state. The campaign plan is a mechanism that provides focus and direction to

subordinates.28

The campaign plan must be built around the strategy. It

should describe, to subordinates and seniors alike, the end state

which will attain the strategic aim. It must present the overall

intent and concept of the campaign; a tentative sequence of

phases and operational objectives which will lead to success;

and general concepts for key supporting functions, especially a

logistical concept that will sustain the force throughout the

campaign. The logistical concept is vital since logistics, perhaps more than any other functional concern, can dictate what

is operationally feasible. 

The plan may describe the initial phases of the campaign

with some certainty. However, the design for succeeding

phases will become increasingly general as uncertainty grows

and the situation becomes increasingly unpredictable. We must

build as much adaptability as we can into the design of the

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campaign plan. Nevertheless, the final phase, the anticipated

decisive action which will achieve final success and toward

which the entire campaign builds, should be clearly envisioned

and described. The campaign plan should establish tentative

milestones and provide a measure of progress. It is not, however, a schedule in any final, immutable sense. Until the final

aim is realized, we must continually adapt our campaign plan

to changing interim aims (ours and the enemy’s), results, resources, and limiting factors.

Above all, the campaign plan should be concise. General

MacArthur’s plan for his Southwest Pacific theater of operations was only four pages.29 The campaign plan does not describe the execution of phases in tactical detail. Rather, it

provides a framework for developing operation orders that in

turn provide the tactical details.

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Chapter 3

Conducting the

Campaign

“A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by

managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his

resources, doing neither too much nor too little.”

1

—Carl von Clausewitz

“We must make this campaign an exceedingly active one.

Only thus can a weaker country cope with a stronger; it must

make up in activity what it lacks in strength.”2

—Stonewall Jackson

ecause campaign design is continuous, there is no point at

which campaign design ceases and campaign execution

begins. In fact, design and conduct are interdependent. Just as

our design shapes our execution, so do the results of execution

cause us to modify our design even in the midst of execution.

Only with this thought firmly in mind can we proceed to discuss campaign execution.

Reduced to its essence, the art of campaigning consists of

deciding who, when, and where to fight and for what purpose.

Equally important, it involves deciding who, when, and where

not to fight. It is, as Clausewitz described, “the use of engagements for the object of the war.”3

STRATEGIC ORIENTATION

The conduct of politics and diplomacy continues in all its complexity even when military operations are under way. Sometimes the political situation is simple, and military operations

can proceed in a straightforward fashion. It is increasingly

common, however, for commanders even at the tactical level to

find themselves navigating on terrain as complex politically as

it is physically—cluttered with a confusing array of enemies,

allies, neutrals, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, United Nations forces and observers, and

the press. 

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B
The art of campaigning means understanding when military

force is our main effort and when it is acting in support of

some other instrument of our national power. Thus, in the conduct as well as the design of a campaign, the overriding consideration is an unwavering focus on the goals of our strategy.

The aims, resources, and conditions established by strategy are

the filter through which we must view all our actions. Joint

force commanders who may function anywhere from the theater to the tactical level must make their operational and tactical

decisions with the theater strategy in mind. Lower-echelon

commanders must understand the strategic context of their tactical missions if they are to provide useful feedback to higher

levels on the effectiveness of field operations. Consequently,

our strategic goals must be communicated clearly to commanders at every level.

THE USE OF COMBAT

Because tactical success alone does not guarantee the attainment of strategic goals, there is an art to the way we use combat actions in pursuit of our larger objectives. We must view

each envisioned action—battle, engagement, interdiction mission, feint, or refusal to give battle—as a element of a larger

whole rather than as an independent, self-contained event.

While combat is an integral part of war, it is by nature

costly. The flames of war are fueled by money, material stocks,

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and human lives. As Eisenhower wrote, the word war “is synonymous with waste . . . . The problem is to determine how, in

time and space, to expend assets so as to achieve the maximum

in results.”4 Economy dictates that we use combat actions

wisely.

We do this first by fighting when it is to our advantage to do

so—when we are strong compared to the enemy or we have

identified some exploitable vulnerability—and by avoiding battle when we are at a disadvantage. When we are at a disadvantage tactically, economy leads to refusing to engage in battle in

that particular situation. When we are at a tactical disadvantage theater-wide, it leads to waging a campaign based on hitand-run tactics and a general refusal to give pitched battle, except when local advantage exists. This can be seen in countless

historical examples: Rome under Fabius versus Hannibal, the

Viet Cong in Vietnam, Washington and Nathanael Greene in

the Revolutionary War.

By the same token, given a theater-wide tactical advantage,

we might want to bring the enemy to battle at every opportunity: Rome under Varro versus Hannibal, the United States in

Vietnam, Eisenhower in Europe, or Grant versus Lee. Nevertheless, such an approach is generally time-consuming, and

success depends on three conditions: first, and most important,

there is something to be gained strategically by exploiting this

tactical advantage as in Grant’s series of battles with Lee; second, popular support for this approach will outlast the enemy’s

ability to absorb losses as was not the case with the United

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States in Vietnam; and third, the enemy is willing or can be

compelled to accept battle on a large scale as the Germans

were in Europe in 1944, but the Viet Cong generally were not. 

It is not sufficient to give battle simply because it is tactically advantageous to do so. It is more important that battle be

strategically advantageous or strategically necessary. That is,

there should be something to gain by fighting or to lose by not

fighting. Strategic gain or necessity can be sufficient reason

even when the situation is tactically disadvantageous. Consequently, it is conceivable that we might accept battle even expecting a tactical defeat if the results will serve the goals of

strategy. For example, after running away from Cornwallis’

British forces in the Carolinas for 6 weeks in 1781, Nathanael

Greene could decide to give battle “on the theory that he could

hardly lose. If Cornwallis should win a tactical victory, he was

already so far gone in exhaustion it would probably hurt him

almost as much as a defeat.”5

Ideally, operational commanders fight only when and where

they want to. Their ability to do this is largely a function of

their ability to maintain the initiative and shape the events of

war to their purposes. “In war it is all-important to gain and retain the initiative, to make the enemy conform to your action,

to dance to your tune.”6 Retaining the initiative, in turn, is

largely the product of maintaining a higher operational tempo,

which we will discuss later in this chapter.

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Even so, we must realize that we may not always be able to

fight on our own terms. We may be compelled to fight because

of strategic constraints (like Lee’s requirement to defend Richmond) or by a skillful enemy who perceives an advantage and

seeks battle. In such cases, we have no choice but to give battle

in a way that serves our strategy to the extent possible and to

exploit all possible advantage of the tactical results. 

The conduct of a battle, once joined, is principally a tactical

problem, but even the tactician should keep larger aims in mind

as he fights. As an example, consider General Guderian at the

Battle of Sedan in May 1940. (See figure on page 68.) Guderian’s XIXth Panzer corps was attacking generally south with

the strategic aim “to win a bridgehead over the Meuse at Sedan

and thus to help the infantry divisions that would be following

to cross that river. No instructions were given as to what was

to be done in the event of a surprise success.”7 By 13 May,

Guderian had forced a small bridgehead. By the 14th, he had

expanded the bridgehead to the south and west but had not broken through the French defenses. Lacking instructions on how

to continue the battle, Guderian opted to attack west in concert

with the strategic aim of the campaign. “1st and 2nd Panzer

Divisions received orders immediately to change direction with

all their forces, to cross the Ardennes Canal, and to head west

with the objective of breaking clear through the French

defenses.”8 Guderian’s forces broke through and sped all the

way to the coast at the English Channel, cutting off the AngloFrench armies to the north. 

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PERSPECTIVE

The campaign demands a markedly different perspective than

the battle. It requires us to “think big,” as Field-Marshal Slim

put it, seeing beyond the parameters of immediate combat to

the requirements of theater strategy as the basis for deciding

when, where, and who to fight. We should view no tactical action in isolation, but always in light of the design for the theater

as a whole.

While the tactician looks at the immediate tactical problem

and the conditions directly preceding and following, the operational commander must take a broader view. The operational

commander must not become so involved in tactical activities

as to lose the proper perspective. This broader perspective implies broader dimensions of time and space over which to apply

the military art. The actual dimensions of the operational canvas vary with the nature of the war, the size and capabilities of

available forces, and the geographical characteristics of the

theater. Nonetheless, all the time and space subject to the commander’s influence must be considered to create the conditions

of success. In 1809, Napoleon carried with him maps of the entire continent of Europe, thereby enabling consideration of operations wherever they suited his purposes. Similarly,

Rommel’s intervention in the North African theater of war in

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1942 successfully delayed American and British efforts to open

up a second front in support of their Russian allies.

Based on this larger perspective, the operational commander’s concern with military geography is on a different

scale than that of the tactical commander. The operational

commander is not concerned with the details of terrain that are

of critical importance to the tactician in combat, such as hills,

draws, fingers, clearings or small woods, creeks, or broken

trails. Rather, the operational commander’s concern is with

major geographical features which can bear on the campaign:

rivers and major watersheds, road systems, railways, mountain

ranges, urban areas, airfields, ports, and natural resource areas. Patton believed that “in the higher echelons, a layered map

of the whole theater to a reasonable scale, showing roads, railways, streams, and towns is more useful than a large-scale

map cluttered up with ground forms and a multiplicity of nonessential information.”9 His concern was with the movement of

large forces.

We describe activities at the strategic level as bearing directly on the war overall, at the operational level as bearing on

the campaign, and at the tactical level as bearing on combat—that is, on the engagement or battle. Therefore, in designing and executing a campaign, we seek to focus on the

attainment of strategic and operational objectives. At the same

time, we adapt to the realities of the tactical situation. 

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SURPRISE

Surprise is a state of disorientation that results from unexpected events and degrades the ability to react effectively. Surprise can be of decisive importance. Tactical surprise catches

the enemy unprepared in such a way as to affect the outcome

of combat. It is of a relatively immediate and local nature. Operational surprise catches the enemy unprepared in such a way

as to impact on the campaign. To achieve operational surprise,

we need not necessarily catch the enemy tactically unaware.

For example, at the Inchon landing in 1950, the need first to

capture Wolmi-do Island, which dominated the inner approaches to Inchon harbor, removed any hope of achieving tactical surprise with the main landings. Operational surprise was

nonetheless complete. Even though the assault on Wolmi-do Island was preceded by a 5-day aerial bombardment, the North

Korean army, far to the south menacing Pusan, could not react

in time. Wolmi-do was cut off and soon collapsed. 

Surprise may be the product of deception that misleads the

enemy into acting in a way prejudicial to his interests.10 For example, the Normandy invasion succeeded in large part because

an elaborate deception plan convinced the Germans that the invasion would take place at Calais. Long after Allied forces

were established ashore in Normandy, vital German reserves

were held back awaiting the real invasion elsewhere. A major

factor in the success of the deception plan was that it was

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designed to exploit a known enemy belief that General George

Patton—in the Germans’ opinion the best Allied operational

commander—would lead the key attack.11 

Surprise may also be the product of ambiguity when we

generate many options and leave the enemy confounded as to

which we will pursue. For example, prior to the Allied invasion

of North Africa in 1942, Eisenhower’s choice of a thousand

miles of coastline from Casablanca to Tunis precluded the Axis

forces from anticipating the actual landing sites. 

Surprise may simply be the product of stealth where the enemy is not deceived or confused as to our intentions but is ignorant of them. Exploiting his knowledge of Japanese

intentions and their total ignorance of his, Admiral Nimitz was

able to strike a decisive blow against the Japanese invasion

fleet at the Battle of Midway in June 1942.

Of these three sources of surprise, deception may offer the

greatest potential payoff because it deludes the enemy into actions we actively desire him to take. However, because deception means actually convincing the enemy of a lie rather than

simply leaving him confused or ignorant, it is also the most difficult to execute. This is even truer at the operational level than

at the tactical. Due to the broader perspective of operations,

operational deception must feed false informa- tion to a wider

array of enemy intelligence collection means over a longer period of time than is the case with tactical deception. This

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increases the complexity of the deception effort, the need for

consistency, and the risk of compromise. 

TEMPO 

Tempo is a rhythm of activity. It is a significant weapon because it is through a faster tempo that we seize the initiative

and dictate the terms of war. Tactical tempo is the pace of

events within an engagement. Operational tempo is the pace of

events between engagements. In other words, in seeking to control tempo, we need the ability to shift from one tactical action

to another consistently faster than the enemy. Thus it is not in

absolute terms that tempo matters, but in terms relative to the

enemy. 

We create operational tempo in several ways. First, we gain

tempo by undertaking multiple tactical actions simultaneously

such as the German blitzes into Poland and France in 1939 and

1940 which were characterized by multiple, broadly dispersed

thrusts. Second, we gain tempo by anticipating the various

likely results of tactical actions and preparing sequels for exploiting those results without delay. Third, we generate tempo

by decentralizing decisionmaking within the framework of a

unifying intent. Slim recalled of his experience in Burma in the

Second World War—

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Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they

were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to

achieve what they knew was the Army Commander’s intention. In time they developed to a marked degree a flexibility

of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act

swiftly to take advantage of sudden information or changing

circumstances without reference to their superiors.12

Finally, we maintain tempo by avoiding unnecessary combat. Any battle or engagement, even if it allows us to destroy

the enemy, takes time and energy, and this saps our operational

tempo. Here we see another reason besides the desire for economy to fight only when and where necessary. Conversely, by

maintaining superior operational tempo, we can lessen the need

to resort to combat. The German blitzkrieg through France in

1940 was characterized more by the calculated avoidance of

pitched battle after the breakthrough than by great tactical victories. By contrast, French doctrine at the time called for deliberate, methodical battle. When the German tempo of operations

rendered this approach impossible to implement, the defenders

were overwhelmed. The French were unable to reconstitute an

organized resistance and force the Germans to fight for their

gains.13 Liddell Hart wrote of the 1940 campaign in France—

The issue turned on the time factor at stage after stage.

French countermeasures were repeatedly thrown out of gear

because their timing was too slow to catch up with the changing situations . . . .

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The French commanders, trained in the slow-motion methods

of 1918, were mentally unfitted to cope with the panzer pace,

and it produced a spreading paralysis among them.14

As with almost everything at the operational level of war,

controlling the tempo of operations requires not only speed, but

a solid understanding of the operational and strategic goals of

the campaign. During Desert Storm, for instance, the Marine

Corps’ drive on the main effort’s right flank rolled forward

much faster than higher commanders had anticipated. Although

this fast pace unquestionably offered tactical advantages within

the Marines’ area of operations, from the standpoint of the

overall Allied plan it posed problems. Rather than fixing the

Iraqi forces in place, as planned, the Marines were routing

them. This created the possibility that major Iraqi forces would

flee the trap before other Allied forces could close the envelopment from the left. Had the primary objective been the destruction of the Iraqi army, it might have been necessary to slow the

Marines’ advance even though this might have increased their

casualties in the long run. The main objective, however, was to

free Kuwait of Iraqi occupation. Given that the Iraqis had already broken and started running, there was no guarantee that

slowing the tempo on the right would have the desired effect.

Therefore, the wisest course—and the one that was taken—was to let the Marines maintain their high tempo, while

expediting the movements of other Allied formations.15

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SYNERGY

The conduct of a successful campaign requires the integration

of many disparate efforts. Effective action in any single warfighting function is rarely decisive in and of itself. We obtain

maximum impact when we harmonize all warfighting functions

to accomplish the desired strategic objective in the shortest

time possible and with minimal casualties.16 Within the context

of the campaign, we focus on six major functions: command

and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force

protection.17

Command and Control

No single activity in war is more important than command and

control. Without command and control, military units degenerate into mobs, the subordination of military force to policy is

replaced by random violence, and it is impossible to conduct a

campaign. Command and control encompasses all military operations and functions, harmonizing them into a meaningful

whole. It provides the intellectual framework and physical

structures through which commanders transmit their intent and

decisions to the force and receive feedback on the results. In

short, command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.18

Command and control during the conduct of a campaign

places unique requirements on the commander, the command

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and control organization, and the command and control support

structure. The scope of activities in the campaign (both in time

and space) will likely be vastly greater than in a battle or engagement. The number of organizational players will also influence the effective conduct of command and control. In any

modern campaign, the commander must be concerned with

more than just the higher headquarters and subordinate elements. A wide range of participants must be informed and coordinated with, both military (such as other units of a joint or

multinational force) and civilian (such as other governmental

agencies, host nation authorities, and nongovernmental organizations). Information management is a key function since communications and information systems can generate a flood of

information. It is important to ensure that this flood of information does not overwhelm us but provides meaningful knowledge to help reduce uncertainty. Finally, the nature of these

factors can make it difficult to ensure that the commander’s intent and decisions are understood throughout the force and implemented as desired.

In implementing command and control during the campaign,

we seek to reduce uncertainty, facilitate decisionmaking, and

help generate a high operational tempo. Through effective information management and a well-designed command and control support structure, we attempt to build and share situational

awareness. Planning is another essential element of command

and control. Campaign design is largely the result of planning,

and planning continues throughout the campaign as the campaign plan is modified and adapted based upon the changes in

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the situation and the results of campaign activities. We must

prepare to function or even thrive in an environment of uncertainty and to make decisions despite incomplete or unclear information. A clear statement of intent that is understood

throughout the force, flexible plans, an ability to adapt to unforeseen circumstances, and the initiative to recognize and

seize opportunities as they present themselves permit us to generate tempo and perform effectively despite uncertainty.

Maneuver

Maneuver is the movement of forces for the purpose of gaining

an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish our objectives. While tactical maneuver aims to gain an advantage in

combat, operational maneuver seeks to gain an advantage bearing directly on the outcome of the campaign or in the theater as

a whole.

A classic example of operational maneuver was General

MacArthur’s landing at Inchon in 1950. (See figure.) The bulk

of North Korea’s army was well to the south, hemming the

U.S. Eighth Army into the Pusan perimeter. Using the sea as

maneuver space, MacArthur conducted a classic turning movement. By landing X Corps at Inchon, MacArthur threatened the

enemy’s lines of communications and forced the overextended

enemy to shift fronts. This maneuver not only cut the North

Koreans’ flow of supplies and reinforcements but also forced

them to move in a way that exposed them to a counterattack

from the south.

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Operational maneuver allows us to create and to exploit opportunities. It affords us the opportunity to develop plans

which employ multiple options, or branches.19 A branch plan

helps us to anticipate future actions. Operational maneuver

provides the means by which we can assess the situation, determine the branch which offers the best opportunity for success,

and implement the decision. By skillful use of branches, we add

to our flexibility and speed.

General Sherman’s campaign in Georgia in 1864 illustrates

the use of operational maneuver to retain the initiative and keep

the opposition off balance. (See figure.) During his march

through Georgia, Sherman ingeniously sought to keep his opponent constantly on the horns of a dilemma. His line of advance kept the Confederates in doubt whether his next

objective was first Macon or Augusta, and then Augusta or Savannah. Sherman was ready to take whichever objective conditions favored. Campaigning through the Carolinas Sherman

repeated this approach—

so that his opponents could not decide whether to cover

Augusta or Charleston, and their forces became divided. Then

after he had ignored both points and swept between them to

gain Columbia . . . the Confederates were kept in uncertainty

as to whether Sherman was aiming for Charlotte or Fayetteville. [Finally, when] he advanced from Fayetteville they

could not tell whether Raleigh or Goldsborough was his next,

and final, objective.20

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If tactical maneuver takes place during and within battle,

operational maneuver takes place before, after, and beyond

battle. The operational commander seeks to secure a decisive

advantage before the battle is joined by rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. Such action allows us to gain the initiative and shape the action to create a decisive advantage.

The operational commander also uses maneuver to exploit

tactical success, always seeking to achieve strategic results.

The commander must be prepared to react to the unexpected

and exploit opportunities created by conditions which develop

from the initial action. By exploiting opportunities, we create in

increasing numbers more opportunities for exploitation. The

ability and willingness to ruthlessly exploit these opportunities

often generates decisive results.

Our ultimate purpose in using maneuver is not to avoid battle, but to give ourselves such an advantage that the result of

the battle is a matter of course. In the words of Liddell Hart,

the “true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to

achieve this.”21

If the classic application of maneuver is movement that

places the enemy at a disadvantage, then superior mobility—

the capability to move from place to place faster than the

enemy while retaining the ability to perform the mission—is a

key ingredient of maneuver. The object is to use mobility to

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gain an advantage by creating superiority at the point of battle

or to avoid disadvantageous battle altogether. 22

Operational mobility is the ability to move between engagements and battles within the context of the campaign. It is a

function of range and sustained speed over distance.23 Patton

recognized the importance of distinguishing between tactical

and operational mobility when he wrote: “Use roads to march

on; fields to fight on . . . when the roads are available for use,

you save time and effort by staying on them until shot off.”24 If

the essence of the operational level is deciding when and where

to fight, operational mobility is the means by which we commit

the necessary forces based on that decision.

An advantage in operational mobility can have a significant

impact. In the Second World War in the Pacific island-hopping

campaign, the Allies used operational mobility that allowed

them to shift forces faster than the Japanese. The result was

that Japanese forces were cut off and allowed to wither while

the Allies consistently moved towards the Japanese home islands to bring them under direct attack.

Although we typically think of shipping as an element of

strategic mobility, it may be employed to operational effect as

well. In many cases, an amphibious force can enjoy greater operational mobility moving along a coastline than an enemy

moving along the coast by roads, particularly when the amphibious force has the ability to interfere with the enemy’s use

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of those roads. The same use can be made of airlift. Such an

advantage in operational mobility can be decisive.

Fires

We employ fires to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy

capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as to affect the enemy’s

will to fight. Our use of fires is not the wholesale attack of

every unit, position, piece of equipment, or installa- tion we

find. Rather, it is the selective application of fires to reduce or

eliminate a key element, resulting in a major disabling of the

enemy system. We use fires in harmony with maneuver against

those enemy capabilities, the loss of which can have a decisive

impact on the campaign or major operation.

During the conduct of the campaign, we use fires to shape

the battlespace. By shaping, we influence events in a manner

which changes the general condition of war decisively to our

advantage. “Shaping activities may render the enemy vulnerable to attack, facilitate maneuver of friendly forces, and dictate the time and place for decisive battle.”25 Through those

actions, we gain the initiative, preserve momentum, and control

the tempo of the campaign. Operation Desert Storm provides

an excellent example of a successful shaping effort. Our extensive air operations destroyed facilities, eliminated the Iraqi

navy and air force, reduced the effectiveness of ground forces

within Kuwait, and shattered the enemy’s cohesion. An elaborate deception plan also confused the Iraqis as to the size and

location of ground attacks while intense psychological operations helped undermine their morale. The end result was an

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

84
enemy who was both physically and mentally incapable of

countering the maneuver of Coalition forces.

Campaign planners must analyze the enemy’s situation,

keeping in mind the commander’s mission, objectives, intent,

and our capabilities available for employment. We seek to target those enemy vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will deny resources critical to the enemy’s ability to resist.26 These targets

may range from military formations, weapon systems, or command and control nodes to the target audiences for a psychological operation. However, the nature of these targets is

situationally dependent and is based on an analysis of the enemy and our mission.

Intelligence

Intelligence is crucial to both the design and conduct of the

campaign. Intelligence underpins the campaign design by providing an understanding of the enemy and the area of operations as well as by identifying the enemy’s centers of gravity

and critical vulnerabilities. During the conduct of the campaign, intelligence assists us in developing and refining our understanding of the situation, alerts us to new opportunities, and

helps to assess the effects of actions upon the enemy. Intelligence cannot provide certainty; uncertainty is an inherent attribute of war. Rather, intelligence estimates the possibilities

and probabilities in an effort to reduce uncertainty to a reasonable level.

MCDP 1-2 Conducting the Campaign

85
Because the operational level of war aims to attain a strategic objective through the conduct of tactical actions, operational intelligence must provide insight into both the strategic

and tactical situations as well as all factors that influence them.

The differences among the tactical, operational, and strategic

levels of intelligence lie in the scope, application, and level of

detail associated with each level. Operational intelligence pertains broadly to the location, capabilities, and intentions of enemy forces that can conduct campaigns or major operations. It

also is concerned with all operational aspects of the environment that can impact on the campaign such as geography, the

national or regional economic and political situation, and fundamental cultural factors. Operational intelligence is less concerned with individual enemy units than it is with major

formations and groupings. Similarly, it concentrates on general

aspects of military geography such as mountain ranges or river

valleys rather than on individual pieces of key terrain or a specific river-crossing site. Operational intelligence should be focused on patterns of activity, trends, and indications of future

intentions. It should examine the enemy as a system rather than

as individual components in an effort to determine how the entire enemy organization functions and as a means to identify

the enemy’s strengths, weakness, centers of gravity, and critical vulnerabilities.

During the execution of the campaign plan, intelligence

strives to provide as detailed and accurate a picture of the current situation as possible while updating the estimate of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. Intelligence is a key

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

86
ingredient in gaining and maintaining situational awareness and

makes an essential contribution to the conduct of the campaign

through its support to targeting, force protection, and combat

assessment. Intelligence operations are conducted throughout

the campaign. Just as campaign plans are based on intelligence,

intelligence plans are grounded in operations. The intelligence

collection, production, and dissemination efforts are integrated

with planned operations to support modification of ongoing activities, execution of branches and sequels, exploitation of success, and shaping the battlespace for future operations.

The successful use of intelligence at the operational level

was illustrated in the dramatic victory achieved by U.S. naval

forces in the Battle of Midway in June 1942. Japanese naval

successes during the months following their attack on Pearl

Harbor had provided them enormous advantage. In particular,

their significant aircraft carrier strengths provided them with

tactical warfighting capabilities far superior to those of the Allies. The questions facing Admiral Nimitz, Commander-inChief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, were: What would the Japanese do

next? Would they continue, and if so, where? 

Intelligence helped provide the answer. U.S. naval intelligence succeeded in breaking the codes used by the Japanese

fleet to encrypt radio messages. The resulting intelligence reports, codenamed “Magic,” provided significant insight into

Japanese operations. Analysis of Magic reports combined with

other intelligence uncovered the Japanese intentions to strike at

Midway in early June. Using this intelligence to obtain an

MCDP 1-2 Conducting the Campaign

87
operational advantage, Nimitz concentrated his numerically inferior forces where they could ambush the main body of the

Japanese invasion fleet. U.S. forces achieved complete surprise

and sank four Japanese carriers. Their overwhelming success

in defeating a numerically superior enemy proved to be the major turning point in the Pacific theater of operations, dramatically altering the balance of naval power in a single decisive

engagement.27

Logistics

At the operational level much more than at the tactical, logistics dictates what is possible and what is not. “A campaign

plan that cannot be logistically supported is not a plan at all,

but simply an expression of fanciful wishes.”28

Logistics encompasses all activities required to move and

sustain military forces.29 Strategic logistics involves the acquisition and stocking of war materials and the generation and

movement of forces and materials to various theaters. At the

opposite end of the spectrum, tactical logistics is concerned

with sustaining forces in combat. It deals with the feeding and

care, arming, fueling, maintaining, and movement of troops

and equipment. In order to perform these functions, the tactical

commander must be provided the necessary resources.

Operational logistics links the strategic source of the means

of war to its tactical employment.30 During campaign execution, the focus of the logistics effort is on the provision of resources necessary to support tactical actions and the

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

88
management of resources to sustain operations throughout the

course of the campaign.

The provision of resources to the tactical forces requires a

procurement of necessary material as well as the creation and

maintenance of an effective theater transportation system. Procurement is usually accomplished through the strategic logistics system. However, when capabilities or assets cannot be

obtained from strategic-level sources, our logistics system must

be able to obtain the necessary support from host nation, allied,

or other sources. The transportation system must have sufficient capacity and redundancy to sustain the necessary level of

effort. Transportation requires sufficient ports of entry to receive the needed volume of resources, adequate means of storage, and lines of communications (land, sea, and air) sufficient

to move those resources within the theater of operations. 

Managing the often limited resources necessary to implement the commander’s concept and to sustain the campaign is

just as important as providing and delivering the resources to

the tactical commanders. At the operational level, logistics demands an appreciation for the expenditure of resources and the

timely anticipation of requirements. This requires both the apportioning of resources among tactical forces based on the operational plan and the rationing of resources to ensure

sustainment throughout the duration of the campaign. While

failure to anticipate logistical requirements at the tactical level

can result in delays of hours or days, the same failure at the

MCDP 1-2 Conducting the Campaign

89
operational level can result in delays of weeks. Such delays can

be extremely costly.

Finally, the provision of logistics in conduct of the campaign

demands adaptability. We expect our plans to change. Flexibility in planning and organization coupled with the logistician’s

continuous situational awareness can foster the innovation and

responsiveness necessary to meet these challenges. A dramatic

example of adaptability in the provision of logistics occurred

during Operation Desert Storm. Just before the start of offensive ground operations, a change in the Marine Forces’ concept

of operations created the requirement to reposition a significant

portion of the logistics support structure. Early recognition of

the requirement and flexibility of organization permitted the reconfiguration of support capabilities and the timely movement

of necessary resources. An immense hardened forward staging

base covering over 11,000 acres was constructed in just 14

days. Fifteen days of ammunition for two divisions; 5 million

gallons of petroleum, oils, and lubricants; a million gallons of

water; and the third largest naval hospital in the world were

positioned before the assault.31

Force Protection

We need to take every possible measure to conserve our forces’

fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time

and place. We accomplish this through properly planning and

executing force protection. These actions imply more than base

defense or self-protection procedures. At the operational level,

force protection means that we must plan to frustrate the

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90
enemy’s attempts to locate and strike our troops, equipment,

capabilities, and facilities. Force protection actions may also

extend to keeping air, land, and sea lines of communications

free from enemy interference.

Force protection safeguards our own centers of gravity and

protects, conceals, reduces, or eliminates critical vulnerabilities. When we are involved in military operations other than

war, force protection may include the additional task of protecting the supported nation’s population, infrastructure, and

economic or governmental institutions. Force protection also

encompasses taking precautions against terrorist activities

against our own forces and noncombatants.

Successful force protection begins with the determination of

indicators that might reveal our plans and movements to enemy

intelligence systems. By identifying these indicators and then

taking appropriate steps to reduce or eliminate them, we can

significantly decrease the potential for the enemy to disrupt our

operations.

Aggressive force protection planning and execution improves our ability to maneuver against the enemy and to

achieve our operational objectives. By safeguarding centers of

gravity, protecting our troops and equipment, and ensuring the

security of our installations and facilities, we conserve our

combat power so that it can be applied at a decisive time and

place.

MCDP 1-2 Conducting the Campaign

91
LEADERSHIP

Leadership is the ability to get human beings to put forth their

efforts in pursuit of a collective goal. Strong leadership creates

an understanding of goals and a strong commitment to them

among all members of the organization. At the higher levels of

command, leadership is much less a matter of direct personal

example and intervention than it is a matter of being able to energize and unify the efforts of large groups of people, sometimes dispersed over great distances.

This is not to say that personal contact is unimportant at the

operational level, nor that charisma and strength of personality

do not matter. In fact, we might argue that an operational commander who must influence more people spread over greater

distances must be correspondingly more charismatic and

stronger of personality than the tactical command- er. The

commander must see and be seen by subordinates. As the Supreme Commander in Europe, Eisenhower spent a great deal of

time traveling throughout the theater partly to see and to be

seen by his men. Nor does this imply that the operational commander does not intervene in the actions of subordinates when

necessary. Just as planning at the operational level requires

leaders who can decide when and where to fight, campaign

execution requires leaders who can determine when and where

to use personal influence. 

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

92
Leadership at the operational level requires clarity of vision,

strength of will, and great moral courage. Moreover, it requires

the ability to communicate these traits clearly and powerfully

through numerous layers of command, each of which adds to

the friction inhibiting effective communication. British FieldMarshal Sir William Slim, who in early 1945 retook Burma

from the Japanese in a brilliant jungle campaign, noted this requirement by saying that the operational commander must possess “the power to make his intentions clear right through the

force.”32

Operational commanders must establish a climate of cohesion among the widely dispersed elements of their commands

and with adjacent and higher headquarters as well. Because

they cannot become overly involved in tactics, operational

commanders must have confidence in their subordinate commanders. With these subordinates, commanders must develop a

deep mutual trust. They must also cultivate in subordinates an

implicit understanding of their own operating style and an explicit knowledge of their specific campaign intent. Operational

commanders must train their staffs until the staffs become extensions of the commanders’ personality.

The nature of campaigns places heavy demands on a leader’s communications skills, demands that are quite different

from those experienced by tactical unit commanders. Operational commanders must coordinate units from other services

and nations. Operational commanders must maintain effective

MCDP 1-2 Conducting the Campaign

93
relationships with external organizations, which is particularly

difficult when other cultures are involved. Operational commanders must be able to win consensus for joint or multinational concepts of operations and represent effectively to higher

headquarters the capabilities, limitations, and external support

requirements of their forces.

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

94
Conclusion

“Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious. Those who discern when to use many or few troops

are victorious. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the

same desire are victorious. Those who face the unprepared

with preparation are victorious.”1

—Sun Tzu 

t the risk of belaboring a point, we will repeat for the

last time that tactical success of itself does not necessarily bring strategic success. “It is possible to win all the battles

and still lose the war. If the battles do not lead to the achievement of the strategic objective, then, successful or not, they are

just so much wasted effort.”2 Strategic success that attains the

objectives of policy is the military goal in war. Thus we recognize the need for a discipline of the military art that synthesizes

tactical results to create the military conditions that induce

strategic success. We have discussed the campaign as the principal vehicle by which we accomplish this synthesis. 

Understandably perhaps, as tactics has long been a Marine

Corps strength, we tend to focus on the tactical aspects of war

to the neglect of the operational aspects. This neglect may be

also caused by the often contradictory virtues of the two levels:

the headlong tactical focus on winning in combat (and the

spoiling-for-a-fight mentality it necessarily promotes) compared to the operational desire to use combat sparingly. As we

have seen, actions at the higher levels in the hierarchy of war

tend to overpower actions at the lower levels, and neglect of the

operational level can prove disastrous even in the face of tactical competence. Without an operational design which synthesizes tactical results into a coalescent whole, what passes for

operations is simply the accumulation of tactical victories.

MCDP 1-2 Conclusion

97

A
Tactical competence can rarely attain victory in the face of

operational incompetence, while operational ignorance can

squander what tactical hard work has gained. As the price of

war is human lives, it is therefore incumbent upon every commander to attain the objective as economically as possible. Operational leaders must understand strategic issues and the

fundamentally political nature of all strategic goals. The design

and conduct of a successful campaign results from a clear understanding of the relationship between strategic and operational objectives, the interaction between the military and other

instruments of national power, and the need for judicious and

effective use of combat to achieve the objectives.

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

98
The Campaign

1. Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood

Press, 1971) p. 178. What Jomini describes as strategic would be

classified as operational by today’s construct.

2. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1967) p.

338.

3. The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery (New York:

World Publishing Co., 1958) p. 197.

4. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

5. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (February

1995) p. III-4.

6. Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 351.

7. Military strategy: “The art and science of employing the

armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy

by the application of force or the threat of force.”

Strategic level of war: “The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national

or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these

objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national

MCDP 1-2 Notes

99
power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these

objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

8. Strategic concept: “The course of action accepted as the

result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of

what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its

use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, psychological

and other measures which stem from it.” (Joint Pub 1-02) Sometimes itself referred to as a “strategy.”

9. Tactical level of war: “The level of war at which battles

and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military

objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this

level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat

elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

10. Operational level of war: “The level of war at which

campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of

operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic

objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives,

initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain

these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or

space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative

support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical

successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.” (Joint Pub

1-02)

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

100
11. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Novato, CA: Presidio

Press, 1982) p. 79.

12. David Jablonsky, “Strategy and the Operational Level of

War,” The Operational Art of Warfare Across the Spectrum of

Conflict (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1987) p. 11.

13. In fact, they can be quite small. For example, consider the

killing of Haitian guerrilla leader Charlemagne Peralte by two

Marine noncommissioned officers in 1919. During this period, U.S.

Marines were involved in the occupation of Haiti. Peralte had

raised a rebel force of as many as 5,000 in the northern part of the

country. From February through October, Marine forces pursued

the rebels, known as “cacos,” fighting 131 engagements but were

unable to suppress the rebel activity. So, disguised as cacos, Sgt.

Herman Hanneken and Cpl. William Button infiltrated Peralte’s

camp, where Hanneken shot and killed the caco leader. The rebellion in the north subsided. In this case, a special operation consisting of two Marines accomplished what 7 months of combat could

not.

14. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed., Michael

Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1984) p. 607. “No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate

the military point of view to the political.”

15. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 93.

16. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and

Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) pp. 69–71

and 208–230 discusses this “interpenetration” of the levels of war.

MCDP 1-2 Notes

101
17. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (February

1995) pp. III-4–III-5.

18. Col W. Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, “Crossing

the Line,” Proceedings (November 1986) pp. 40–52 and LCdr

Joseph T. Stanik, U.S. Navy (Retired), “Welcome to El Dorado

Canyon,” Proceedings (April 1996) pp. 57–62.

19. Battle: “A series of related tactical engagements that last

longer than an engagement, involve larger forces, and could affect

the course of the campaign. They occur when division, corps, or

army commanders fight for significant objectives.” MCRP 5-2A,

Operational Terms and Graphics (June 1997).

20. Engagement: “A small tactical conflict, usually between

opposing maneuver forces.” (MCRP 5-2A)

21. For a detailed discussion of the Guilford Courthouse battle

and its impact on British operations, see Thomas E. Baker, Another

Such Victory: The Story of the American Defeat at Guilford Courthouse That Helped Win the War of Independence (New York: Eastern Acorn Press, 1992).

22. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973) pp. 32–35. 

23. Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 338.

24. See J. F. C. Fuller, Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality

and Generalship (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,

1982) particularly pp. 242–283.

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102
25. Weigley, p. 92.

26. Ibid., p. 118. Fuller, p. 253.

27. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant (New

York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1982) p. 369.

28. Ibid., p. 367. Grant to Sherman, 4 April 1864. Grant repeated this phrase directly from Lincoln.

29. Ibid., p. 366.

30. Fuller, pp. 79–80.

31. Weigley, p. 139.

32. Ibid., p. 108.

33. Ibid., p. 123.

34. Grant, p. 384.

35. Fuller, p. 268. “In this respect there is no difference between Grant and Lee; neither understood the full powers of the rifle

or the rifled gun; neither introduced a single tactical innovation of

importance, and though the rifle tactics of the South were superior

to those of the North, whilst the artillery tactics of the North were

superior to those of the South, these differences were due to circumstances outside generalship.”

MCDP 1-2 Notes

103
Designing the Campaign

1. Clausewitz, p. 182.

2. Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 343–344.

3. John F. Meehan III, “The Operational Trilogy,” Parameters (September 1986) p. 15.

4. The distinction between strategies of annihilation and erosion is discussed further in MCDP 1-1, Strategy. It originates in

Clausewitz’s distinction between limited and unlimited war. See

Clausewitz, On War, Book I. It was further developed in the theories of Hans Delbrück, whom John Keegan calls “the figure who bestrides the military historian’s landscape.” John Keegan, The Face

of Battle (New York: The Viking Press, 1976) p. 53, see also pp.

34–35 and 54. See Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War Within

the Framework of Political History, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985) especially vol. 3, book III,

chapter IV, “Strategy,” pp. 293–318.

5. We use the terms “annihilation” and “incapacitation”

more or less interchangeably, but the words themselves pose some

problems. Soldiers tend to think of annihilation as the absolute

physical destruction of all of the enemy’s troops and equipment.

This is rarely achieved and seldom necessary. Germany still had

large numbers of well-armed troops at the end of World War II, yet

there is little argument that the Wehrmacht was strategically annihilated. Nonmilitary people tend to confuse the military goal of annihilating the enemy’s military capacity with political or

ideological goals like genocide and extermination and may thus be

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

104
shocked or horrified to hear of our plan of annihilation. “Incapacitation,” on the other hand, is literally exactly what we mean to convey: the destruction of the enemy’s military capacity to resist.

Unfortunately, the word also connotes the use of nonlethal weapons

and other limited forms of warmaking that contradict the strategic

concept we seek to convey. To deal with such semantic problems,

military leaders must understand the underlying concepts and, in

describing their strategies, use words appropriate to the particular

audience.

6. As with annihilation and incapacitation, labels carry some

problems. Attrition has developed a negative connotation because of

the experience of tactical attrition in Grant’s later campaigns, the

Western Front in World War I, and U.S. actions in Vietnam. Erosion carries no such negative connotations, and that is why we use

it more prominently here. The words mean literally the same thing,

however, and attrition is the traditional term used in classical military theory to describe the concept we wish to convey.

7. The United States pursued such unlimited political aims in

the American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Grenada in

1983, and Panama in 1989. Another successful example is the

North Vietnamese war against South Vietnam. Unsuccessful examples are the German invasion of Russia in 1940, the North Korean

campaign against South Korea in 1950, and the Russian war

against Chechnya in the mid-1990s.

8. Some readers will object that this could not have been a

strategy of annihilation because we left Saddam Hussein in power.

That is confusing the political with the military goal. Had we

wished to pursue the overthrow of Saddam’s government, we were

well positioned to do so, having eliminated Saddam’s air and naval

MCDP 1-2 Notes

105
power, thoroughly demoralized his army, and completely isolated

him from external support.

9. In annihilation strategies, military forces always represent

the main effort—with the important exception of internal wars.

Such internal struggles for power are very often zero-sum events in

which one side’s victory entails the other’s elimination. Therefore,

the opponents seek each other’s complete destruction, which normally cannot be achieved until the enemy’s military protection is

removed. Remember, however, that every government at war has to

take political action to maintain the “home front,” as well as military action against the enemy. In internal wars, the opponents share

a common home front. Therefore, economic, diplomatic, and psychological programs (e.g., land reform, political reform, pacification operations, etc.) sometimes take precedence over purely

military operations even when the military goal remains annihilation. In Vietnam, for example, the U.S. and the government of

South Vietnam waged a strategy of erosion against what they perceived to be an external foe, North Vietnam. Within South Vietnamese borders, however, they waged a war of annihilation against

the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese regulars who supported

them. Energetic search-and-destroy and aerial bombing operations

against enemy military forces often conflicted with various internal

nation-building efforts which sought to create legitimacy for the

government in Saigon. The failure to harmonize both military and

nonmilitary actions at the operational level often proved

counterproductive.

10. The term “center of gravity,” as it is used in military doctrine, originated with Clausewitz. He used the term (Schwerpunkt in

the original German) in many different ways, usually as a handy

metaphor rather than a well-defined doctrinal term. Often he used it

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

106
merely to mean “the main thing” or “the most important concern.”

Our definition derives from a few specific discussions in On War,

especially pp. 485–486 (which deals with the concept at the operational level) and 595–597 (which looks at the concept in strategic

terms). The purpose of identifying centers of gravity (preferably reducing the list to one crucial item) is to force us to think through

the essential elements of a particular enemy’s power and thus to

help us focus on what makes him dangerous and what we need to

do to defeat him. Unfortunately, this sometimes leads us into thinking that we must directly attack those strengths. The philosophy of

Warfighting therefore uses the concept of the critical vulnerability,

which forces us to think through creative ways of undermining the

enemy’s strength at the minimum possible cost and risk to

ourselves.

11. Charles XII of Sweden did in fact lose his army in Russia

in 1709 and is considered a failure.

12. Clausewitz, p. 596.

13. Ibid., p. 163.

14. Ibid., p. 77.

15. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 2 (New York:

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923) p. 5.

16. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York:

Doubleday, 1990) p. 256.

MCDP 1-2 Notes

107
17. L. D. Holder, “Operational Art in the U.S. Army: A New

Vigor,” Essays on Strategy, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986) p. 124.

18. Eisenhower, p. 176. Also: “In committing troops to battle

there are certain minimum objectives to be attained, else the operation is a failure. Beyond this lies the realm of reasonable expectation, while still further beyond lies the realm of hope—all that

might happen if fortune persistently smiles upon us.

“A battle plan normally attempts to provide guidance even into

this final area, so that no opportunity for extensive exploitation may

be lost . . . .” p. 256.

19. These two approaches are also called “progressive” and

“inverse.” The concept is discussed in the Advanced Amphibious

Study Group’s, Planner’s Reference Manual (Draft), vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1983) pp. 7-1-6.

20. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04A, Universal Joint Task List, version 3.0 (September 1996).

21. The Confederates understood this too. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989) p. 766.

22. Reconstitution: “Those actions that commanders plan and

implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness

commensurate with mission requirements and available resources.

Reconstitution operations include regeneration and reorganization.”

(MCRP 5-2A)

23. Eisenhower, p. 228.

Campaigning MCDP 1-2

108
24. Ibid., p. 225.

25. Ibid., pp. 228–229.

26. Ibid., p. 229.

27. The Malaysian campaign illustrates the exception noted in

footnote 9 on page 105: In internal wars, even a military strategy of

annihilation may require the subordination of the military effort to

other instruments of power.

28. Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

(April 1995) pp. II-18–II-21 and MCDP 5, Planning, pp. 18–21.

29. Meehan, p. 15.

Conducting the Campaign

1. Clausewitz, p. 77. 

2. Quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and

Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy, 1978) p.

1.

3. Clausewitz, p. 128.

4. Eisenhower, p. 119.

5. Weigley, p. 32. Such a victory is called a “Pyrrhic victory,”

after the Greek king Pyrrhus. After meeting the Romans in battle

for the first time and winning but suffering great losses in the

MCDP 1-2 Notes

109
process, Pyrrhus reportedly said, “ ‘One more such victory and I am

lost.’ ” R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia

of Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York:

Harper & Row, 1977) p. 59.

6. Sir William Slim, Defeat Into Victory (London: Cassell

and Company, 1956) p. 292.

7. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: E. P. Dutton

and Co., 1952) p. 97.

8. Ibid., pp. 105–106.

9. Gen George S. Patton Jr., War As I Knew It (New York:

Bantam Books, Inc., 1979) pp. 373–374.

10. Deception: “Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.” (Joint

Pub 1-02)

11. Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York:

Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1963) pp. 399–400.

12. Slim, pp. 451–452.

13. See Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919–1939 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985) p. 4.

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14. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New

York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970) p. 73–74.

15. The extent to which these subtleties were actually taken

into account at the time is unclear. For a good examination of the

problem, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1995) especially pp. 361–363.

16. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (February

1995) pp. III-9–III-10.

17. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04.

18. For further explanation of the importance of command and

control, see chapter 1, MCDP 6, Command and Control (October

1996).

19. Holder, p. 123.

20. Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 152.

21. Ibid., p. 339. Italics in the original.

22. Mobility: “A quality or capability of military forces which

permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability

to fulfill their primary mission.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

23. For example, the light armored vehicle has less tactical

mobility than a main battle tank in most environments but has far

superior operational and strategic mobility. It can be transported in

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much greater numbers by strategic lift. Its comparatively simple

automotive system, fuel efficiency, and wheels give it far greater

operational range and speed.

24. Patton, pp. 380–381.

25. MCDP 1, Warfighting (June 1997) p. 83.

26. Targeting: “2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to

the commander’s mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commanders’ disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities

that, if expoited, will accomplish the commander’s purpose through

delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

27. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York:

Vintage Books, 1985) pp. 168–176, 448–451.

28. Meehan, p. 16.

29. Logistics: “The science of planning and carrying out the

movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive

sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,

maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement,

evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and

d. acquisition or furnishing of services.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

30. The distinction between strategic, operational, and tactical

logistics is outlined in Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support

of Joint Operations (January 1995) p. III-3 and MCDP 4, Logistics

(February 1997) pp. 48–53.

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31. Maj Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Englander, and Capt

David A. Dawson, comps., U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf,

1990–1991: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1992) pp. 158–159.

32. Slim, p. 542

Conclusion

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston:

Shambala Publications, 1988) pp. 80–81. 

2. Meehan, p. 15.

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