UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

Case No. 1:20-cv-23391-GOODMAN 

[CONSENT CASE] 

ADT LLC, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

VIVINT SMART HOME, INC., et al., 

 Defendants. 

___________________________ _/

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE

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I. Issue No. 1: ADT’s “Non-Hearsay” Purposes for the Out-of-Court Customer 

 Complaints Require Assuming the Truth of the Matter Asserted in the Complaints. 

In at least three prior cases, this Court rejected ADT’s attempt to introduce the Out-ofCourt Customer Complaints to prove deceptive sales practices against those customers, as 

inadmissible and unreliable hearsay not subject to any enumerated exception. (Motion at fn. 3.) 

ADT no longer disputes that the Customer Complaints are inadmissible if offered for the truth of 

the “complaints,” and abandons its thrice-rejected arguments to apply any hearsay exceptions. 

ADT now insists that it intends to offer the Customer Complaints for only “non-hearsay 

purposes.” (Opp. at 3.) It proceeds to promptly invalidate these “purposes” by equating the 

Customer Complaints with “deceptive sales practices” committed by Vivint, i.e., the truth and 

validity of the “complaints.” As explained below, each of ADT’s “non-hearsay” roads inevitably 

lead to the same, singular place and “purpose”: evidence of a customer call or report = deceptive 

sales conduct = actual damages claimed by ADT. The Customer Complaints should be excluded 

because ADT relies on the truth of these “complaints” at every turn. 

 A. Vivint’s records as evidence of “notice and knowledge.” 

ADT does not seek to admit the Customer Complaints to show Vivint’s notice and 

knowledge of its receipt of Customer Complaints, but rather to show “evidence of Vivint’s notice 

and knowledge of deceptive sales practices[.]” (Opp. at 4 (emphasis added).) To equate 

“complaints” with actual “deceptive sales practices,” the jury must presume the truth and validity 

of each inadmissible hearsay “complaint” as a “deceptive sales practice.” Invoking “notice” does 

not change ADT’s conceded purpose. See, e.g., Moon v. Advanced Med. Optics, Inc., 2010 WL 

11500832, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2010) (database reports based on “subjective communications 

from lay persons” were inadmissible hearsay, and the plaintiffs “cannot avoid the hearsay rules by 

arguing that they seek to introduce the [database] entries and reports to show notice—Plaintiffs 

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necessarily are seeking to introduce the [database] entries and reports to show the truth of the 

matters contained in those documents”). 

Indeed, Vivint’s mere notice or knowledge of the receipt of customer calls have no 

probative value if ADT cannot tell the jury these calls alleged deceptive conduct and that those 

reports were valid. ADT confirms this singular purpose. It claims that Vivint’s records show the 

receipt of “more than 75,000 complaints about the conduct of its sales representatives” and will 

argue that Vivint has failed in sufficient “deterrence” or “punishment” of deceptive sales practices, 

based on its “extensive knowledge of the magnitude of this problem[.]” (Opp. at 4, attaching a 

purported “Vivint spreadsheet collecting customer complaints” as Ex. A (emphasis added).) 

 ADT cannot presume the existence of a “problem,” much less of a certain “magnitude,” 

without offering these “complaints” as actual instances of deceptive conduct. ADT further intends 

to mischaracterize all customer feedback as “complaints about the conduct of its sales 

representatives.” (Opp. at 4.) This is false. Vivint’s “spreadsheet” includes all manner of customer 

feedback,1

 including calls to compliment Vivint2 and complaints against ADT.

3

 Yet, based on its 

summary mischaracterization of inadmissible hearsay, ADT intends to seek damages for 

customers its purportedly lost to Vivint as a result of these “complaints.” (See Ex. N to Motion, 

1

 (See Ex. B to Opp., Vivint Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. (K. Hansen) at 31:14-21, explaining that 

Vivint26660 (Ex. A to Opp.) is “a download of all customer feedback records from Vivint’s 

Salesforce files for a given time period . . .and it’s not always a complaint.”) 

2

 (See, e.g., Ex. A to Opp. at 1, “[Customer] just wanted to say thank you for all and for the service 

of Vivint!!!”; at 4, “Customer is very pleased with the system, she loves the equipment and is very 

happy that it works so well!!! . . She was considering going with ADT but changed her mind 

because they cannot match the level of technology and service that we have.”) 

3

 (Id. at 57, “[Customer] states that ADT Reps are out in his neighborhood slamming Vivint 

Accounts. Several times the same rep has come to his home & told him that we are changing 

Company names”.) 

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ADT 2nd Suppl. Discl. at 5, disclosing intent to seek “lost account damages” based on “totality of 

the evidence” including “records produced by Vivint regarding consumer complaints.”) 

No authority permits inadmissible hearsay to establish the fact of unlawful conduct and 

actual damages. The parties’ 2017 Lawsuit and the Alder case affirmed that Customer Complaints 

could not come in for their truth (Motion at fn. 3), and neither court endorsed the purported use of 

“notice” or “knowledge” to circumvent these holdings, as ADT intends here. (See Ex. D to Opp., 

Judge Middlebrooks noting, at most, that “in the event” ADT attempts to admit the Customer 

Complaints for “a non-hearsay purpose such as notice, any objection shall be dealt with at trial”; 

Ex. E to Opp., Judge Rosenberg summarily adopting magistrate’s recommendation, which 

recommendation was limited to evidence “relevant to Alder’s knowledge/notice of complaints by 

these ADT customers . . .to the extent [the complaints are] offered solely to establish 

notice/knowledge (and not for the truth of the matters asserted)[.]”) (emphasis added).) ADT did 

not attach Magistrate Reinhart’s critical clarification in this regard. (See Ex. A hereto at 5.) 

 B. Vivint records as non-hearsay “party admissions.” 

 Vivint’s documentation of customers’ inadmissible hearsay allegations do not qualify as 

“party admissions” under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Vivint customer service employees merely 

receive and document what a customer claims a Vivint sales representative said. As such, these 

records cannot “manifest[] that [Vivint] adopted or believed to be true” a third-party customer’s 

hearsay allegations because Vivint customer service was not present at the interaction and has no 

personal knowledge or authority to adopt a binding admission on behalf of Vivint. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 801(d)(2)(B); see, e.g., Gracias v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2005 WL 8158045, at n. 17 

(N.D. Ala. July 7, 2005) (out-of-court statement offered for the truth that it was actually uttered 

was inadmissible as a non-hearsay party admission; witness “[could] do nothing more than repeat 

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statements made to him that purported to report statements made earlier by [the party]. Again, this 

is hearsay and not an admission by a party. If [the witness] himself had heard [the party] make 

such statements, the situation would be different”). Vivint’s records attest to nothing more than an 

outsider customer’s inadmissible hearsay, or Vivint’s proffered resolutions based on that 

inadmissible hearsay. These are not adopted “admissions.” 

 C. ADT records as evidence of Vivint’s “intent” by its “failure to investigate.” 

 ADT next intends to offer its own records of Customer Complaints as evidence of Vivint’s 

failure to substantiate these “complaints” on ADT’s behalf, and this purported failure shows that 

Vivint “intends for its sales representatives to engage in deceptive sales practices.” (Opp. at 6-8.) 

First and foremost, in order to show that Vivint “intended” to condone these “deceptive sales 

practices,” ADT again necessarily offers the Customer Complaints for the truth of the customer 

allegations asserted therein—that there were “deceptive sales practices” to condone. 

 Second, ADT’s burden to develop its evidence into an admissible format for trial was not 

shifted to Vivint by ADT’s mere disclosure of these materials. ADT cites no authority for this 

novel proposition. As demonstrated in the Motion, ADT’s Customer Complaints spreadsheet (and 

any underlying materials) are riddled with inconsistencies and inherent unreliability. Vivint was 

under no obligation to substantiate ADT’s inadmissible hearsay evidence or risk nullifying the 

protection of the Rules of Evidence. Where the Customer Complaints cannot be taken for their 

truth, ADT cannot argue that Vivint’s “failure” to take unspecified action on allegations of 

unsubstantiated conduct is evidence of its “intent” to commit deceptive sales practices.4

4

 ADT further misstates Vivint’s testimony in this regard. Mr. Hansen testified only that he 

personally did not “investigate” ADT’s spreadsheet, and could not recall specific action or inaction 

that Vivint’s compliance investigation team may have otherwise taken. (Ex. B to Opp. at 9:16-25; 

11:16-22.) 

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 D. Vivint and ADT records as evidence of “actual confusion.” 

 ADT makes the unremarkable point that evidence of “actual confusion” is relevant under 

the Lanham Act. (Opp. at 8-9 (citing Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 38 F.4th 114, 137 (11th 

Cir. 2022) (having no mention of the word “hearsay”).) Inadmissible hearsay is not overcome by 

(the alleged) relevance of the evidence. See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 269 

F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming exclusion of testimony relaying two anecdotal instances 

of actual confusion because it was inadmissible hearsay). That ADT intends to offer the Customer 

Complaints as evidence of actual confusion only underscores its intent to impermissibly offer this 

evidence for the truth of the matter asserted, that is, that the customers were actually confused as 

a result of what they allege a Vivint sales representative told them. 

 E. ADT records as evidence of the “number of ADT customers harmed.” 

 ADT’s intent to offer the Customer Complaints to show the “number of ADT customers 

harmed” (Opp. at 9 (emphasis added)) again relies on an inadmissible presumption of the truth of 

the customer’s allegation that a Vivint salesperson made a statement or omission, and that 

statement or omission “harmed” ADT through the loss of that customer. 

ADT’s solution is to simply redact the content of each complaint and proceed directly to 

showing the jury a list of customer names as victims of a deceptive sales practice. (Opp. at 9.) 

Based on this (inadmissible and unsubstantiated) presumption of liability, ADT then purports to 

identify which of those customers are no longer with ADT, and tallies those customers as “Total 

Known Lost Accounts” as a “result of Vivint’s conduct[]” for purposes of computing its “Lost 

Account Damages.” (See Ex. P to Opp. at 2-3.) ADT has not elicited any admissible testimony 

from those non-testifying customers as to whether they were a victim of a deceptive sales practice 

or if that was the reason they cancelled. Plainly, ADT must prove liability and causation for a lost 

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customer before it can claim damages for that customer. See Optimum Technologies, Inc. v. Henkel 

Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1252 (11th Cir.2007) (“To recover actual damages, 

PODS “was required to establish that [U–Haul's] Lanham Act violations proximately caused it to 

suffer monetary damages.” ). It has no such evidence absent reliance on the inadmissible hearsay 

content of the Customer Complaints, regardless of whether it intends to admit that content or to 

give the jury a list of names presuming that content. 

The Alder ruling ADT attaches does not support its position. Judge Rosenberg excluded as 

“inadmissible hearsay” the “recorded telephone conversations between Plaintiffs and nontestifying customers and any summaries of those conversations[.]” (Ex. G to Opp. at 3.) That same 

order rejected ADT’s argument that this evidence was admissible to “show numerosity of 

complaints to prove damages.” (Id.) ADT claims that the magistrate subsequently allowed 

introduction of its spreadsheet with the substance of the complaints redacted, but cites no ruling 

or discussion in this regard that would provide any guidance to this Court. (Opp. at 10.) 

In any event, in this case ADT confirms its intent to use “numerosity” of Customer 

Complaints to seek actual damages for those “complaints” in which it “lost” an account, without 

offering admissible evidence as to the actual reason that customer left. The cited Alder decision 

did not endorse this purpose, nor did Judge Middlebrooks in the 2017 Lawsuit. ADT LLC v. Vivint, 

Inc., 2017 WL 11632866, *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2017) (excluding ADT’s Customer Complaints 

spreadsheet on the grounds that “any documents that purport to summarize any customer phone 

calls are inadmissible hearsay . . . This includes the spreadsheet and corresponding summary.”). 

Because ADT has not identified admissible evidence other than sworn testimony of select 

ADT customers to prove Vivint’s alleged deceptive sales practices (and only as to those 

customers), sworn testimony remains the only admissible means to prove such conduct. ADT 

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attempts to fault Vivint for its own inability to garner its desired number of trial depositions. (Opp. 

at 11.) To the contrary, ADT moved the Court to allow additional depositions and expressly 

requested leave to take a total of 15. (ECF 77 at 8-9 (requesting the Court grant either live remote 

trial testimony or 15 customer depositions).) Vivint did not oppose this Motion. The Court mooted 

the motion after it amended the scheduling order, and Vivint subsequently stipulated to ADT’s 

requested number of customer depositions. (ECF 82 at 5.) 

F. ADT’s response underscores the unreliability of the Customer Complaints. 

 The Motion demonstrates the inherent unreliability of the Customer Complaints to show 

that no hearsay exception applies, based on the undisputed circumstances of how these complaints 

are received, prepared, and generated. (Motion at 5-11.) Having unsuccessfully argued to apply 

hearsay exceptions in prior cases, ADT now tries to ignore the dispositive hearsay issue and frame 

the truth of the outsider customer allegations as an “authenticity” and “credibility” issue. (Opp. at 

11.) Vivint does not challenge the “authenticity” of the parties’ account notes documenting 

Customer Complaints. Nor can there be a “credibility” issue for customer witnesses that do not 

even testify. The dispositive issue is that there is no reliable, admissible means for the jury to verify 

the accuracy of a customer’s allegations based solely on hearsay materials. 

Whether due to its inability or unwillingness to locate and develop witness testimony, ADT 

purports to flip its burden to Vivint to disprove its inadmissible hearsay allegations. (Opp. at 12-

13.) ADT is the proponent of this evidence. As stated above, it is not Vivint’s obligation to package 

ADT’s facially unreliable and unsubstantiated evidence into an admissible format. 

 Next, the Motion cites a handful of non-exhaustive examples that personify the inherent 

unreliability built into the structure of the Customer Complaints. Vivint did not purport to disprove 

every Customer Complaint. Nor is Vivint required, or even able, to disprove inadmissible hearsay. 

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ADT’s efforts to rehabilitate (some) of the cited examples illustrate this point. (Opp. at 14-15, 

attempting to offer contrary explanations or inferences from customer call transcripts.) ADT 

engages in a self-defeating exercise that merely exposes the nuance of each customer interaction, 

the fact that customers often contradict themselves, and the ambiguity of what they were told, what 

they understood or did not understand, and unspoken motivations that can inform their testimony. 

The jury cannot assess the “credibility” of the parties’ respective customer account notes absent 

testimony. This is precisely why customers must testify subject to cross examination. 

In sum, because each purpose proffered by ADT necessarily reverts back to inadmissible 

hearsay, the Customer Complaints should be excluded. 

II. Issue No. 2: ADT’s Use of the External Matters to Prove “Intent” Requires Assuming 

the Truth of Unproven, Inherently Dissimilar, and Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct. 

As a threshold issue, ADT does not address, much less dispute, the inadmissibility of its 

customer depositions, materials, and settlement in the parties’ 2017 Lawsuit because all such 

materials were subject to a full release by ADT. (Motion at 17-18.) This release operates to exclude 

any evidence of the 2017 Lawsuit independent of the applicable evidentiary rules. 

ADT confirms its intent to offer the remaining “Agency Complaints” and “Other 

Proceedings” for the same improper reasons as the Customer Complaints: to attribute unproven 

conduct to Vivint as fact, and then to seek damages for itself based on a presumption of liability 

in external matters that did not concern ADT or any ADT customer at issue in this lawsuit. (Opp. 

at 19.) ADT’s attempts to obfuscate this singular purpose are without merit. 

A. External matters as evidence of “knowledge” and “party admissions.” 

ADT cannot invoke the non-hearsay purposes of “notice,” “knowledge,” or “admissions” 

to admit evidence that will necessarily be offered for the truth of the allegations raised in the 

external matters, which (according to ADT) is “the fact that [Vivint] sales representatives were 

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engaging in deceptive sales practices.” (Opp. at 17 (emphasis added).) To accept this assertion, 

the jury must assume inadmissible hearsay as to Vivint’s liability for unspecified customers in 

unrelated matters. It cannot do so with respect to unadjudicated allegations and contested litigation. 

 B. External matters as “other bad act” evidence under Rule 404(b). 

ADT’s reliance on the Rule 404(b)(2) exceptions to show Vivint’s “intent” and “absence 

of mistake” is misplaced. ADT intends to offer this evidence to argue the fact of Vivint’s 

“pervasive misconduct in the market” and “longstanding pattern of misconduct.” (Opp. at 18.) The 

problem is that the external matters establish neither; they are nothing more than contested, 

unadjudicated allegations. It is far outside the province of the jury’s finite time and resources to 

undertake mini-trials as to the validity of allegations having nothing to do with ADT customers. 

These external allegations are also necessarily dissimilar to the experience of any given ADT 

customer with a given Vivint sales representative on a given date or place. That is simply the nature 

of door-to-door conduct at issue. It varies in each instance. ADT has not even attempted to show 

substantial similarity of these matters. See United States v. Liuzzo, 608 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (S.D. 

Fla. 1985) (“While it is true that the ‘similar acts’ evidence need not be identical to the act charged 

. . . there must be sufficient similarity to insure its probative value will outweigh the prejudice that 

will inevitably be suffered by the Defendant by its introduction.”); Moon v. Advanced Med. Optics, 

Inc., 2010 WL 11500832, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2010) (excluding other lawsuits, claims or 

incidents against defendant attributed to the same product where showed only “cursory evidence” 

that failed to meet its burden to show substantial similarity of prior incidents). ADT’s conclusory 

refrain that these external matters establish Vivint’s “deceptive conduct” is insufficient. 

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 C. External matters are unfairly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

 The Rule 403 implications of allowing ADT to offer unadjudicated external matters are 

plenary, starting with the untold number of mini-trials (not only as to each matter, but as to each 

customer or allegation in each matter) that will result in response to ADT’s intent to 

mischaracterize these matters as established deceptive conduct. Vivint has neither the trial time 

nor resources to respond to this highly prejudicial implication. ADT seeks to exploit the resulting 

confusion and improper inferences certain to infect the jury. It insists that admission is critical to 

its punitive damages, premised on the expectation that the jury will assume the validity of unproven 

matters, i.e. that “Vivint has defrauded customers throughout the United States for many years.” 

(Opp. at 19.) Allowing ADT to frame the trial around Vivint as a “bad” company because it has 

been involved in other proceedings has no probative value as to whether a particular ADT customer 

was misled, whether ADT was harmed as a result, and/or whether Vivint’s alleged conduct in this 

case justifies punitive damages. 

III. Issue No. 3: Vivint’s Years-Old Competitor Lawsuits Are Not Relevant to ADT’s 

Burden to Prove Deceptive Sales Practices Were Committed Against Its Customers 

and Any Resulting Damages. 

ADT seeks to shirk its burden to establish Vivint’s alleged conduct against its customers, 

and its burden to prove causation and damages (if any) pertinent to those customers, by referencing 

Vivint’s “admissions” in years-old litigation pleadings. There is no contention that these matters 

had anything even remotely to do with ADT or its customers. Undeterred, ADT first identifies 

statements made by a former Vivint employee that Vivint, in 2011, termed “false or misleading 

statements” made to Vivint customers as a “slam.” (Opp. at 21.) Now, a decade later, and following 

untold turnover of employees and processes, Vivint testified in this case that “slam” may not be 

so limited: “I’m not sure the word ‘slam’ would mean the same thing to every customer service 

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rep.” (Ex. B. to Opp. at 53:5-7.) Even if Vivint were “bound” to a decade-old description, this 

statement cannot be the “admission” ADT presumes. Vivint employees merely “cod[e] the 

allegation and not necessarily the conclusion.” (Id. at 55:8-10.) Admission of outdated, attenuated 

pleadings for this confusing purpose, and irrelevant to whether or not any ADT customer complaint 

is valid, violates Rule 402 and 403. 

Second, ADT makes an even larger leap in seeking to establish its computation of actual

damages in this case based on Vivint’s prior legal argument in an (unsuccessful) motion for 

preliminary injunction suggesting that complaints are underreported. (Opp. at 22.) ADT uses this 

“admission” as evidentiary foundation for its mathematical formula to multiply its “lost accounts” 

comprised of the hearsay “complaints.” ADT’s so-called extrapolation theory is not established by 

an “admission” by an opposing party in a decade-old pleading. This theory requires admissible 

expert survey testimony. ADT attempted to proffer expert testimony to support this “tip of the 

iceberg” theory in the 2017 Lawsuit, but was rebuffed based on the expert’s failure to do the 

requisite survey, instead relying on ADT’s inadmissible hearsay. (See Ex. B hereto at 3-6, order 

excluding ADT’s “multiplier” expert.) Where ADT’s prior expert could not support this theory 

with adequate methodology to survive muster under Daubert, ADT certainly cannot meet the 

admissibility threshold by reference to a footnote in a decade-old motion pleading. 

In sum, for the purposes identified by ADT, admission of the Competitor Lawsuits would 

unfairly prejudice Vivint not only by painting it as a litigious character, but by improperly 

instructing the jury to attribute both the fact of unlawful conduct and extrapolate damages that, 

under applicable law, require expert survey testimony ADT does not proffer. See, e.g., Chao v. 

Tyson Foods, Inc., 2009 WL 10687776, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2009) (distinguishing between 

party admissions “to prove facts in each case” as opposed to “legal conclusions” to be drawn by 

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the court; “It would be inappropriate for [defendant] to offer legal materials to the jury that attempt 

to effectively preempt a decision the jury must make or to preempt this Court’s duty to instruct the 

jury on the applicable law.”). 

IV. Issue No. 4: ADT’s Damages Indisputably Rely on Inadmissible Hearsay. 

ADT’s formula for its “lost account damages” was inexplicably and untimely withheld 

until the middle of ADT’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, unduly limiting Vivint’s ability to conduct 

discovery to a single deposition without any ability to adequately prepare, challenge or probe the 

“formula.” ADT elects to expend the entirety of its response to Issue No. 4 reciting the dates of its 

various unrelated damages disclosures, none of which disclosed the “formula.” (Opp. at 23.) 

ADT offers no rebuttal to the dispositive grounds for exclusion of its damages, which rely 

on the inadmissible Customer Complaints, External Matters, and Vivint’s Competitor Lawsuits. 

ADT instead defers to the Daubert motions briefing. (Id.) What ADT does acknowledge 

throughout its Opposition is that it has no intention of offering any admissible evidence to prove 

any of these out-of-court, unproven allegations, other than the out-of-court, unproven allegations 

themselves. ADT’s damages theories depend on its ability to tell the jury that it can presume 

Vivint’s liability in each of thousands of unique customer interactions based on ADT’s 

mischaracterization of what constitutes a deceptive sale practice “complaint,” and the 

unsubstantiated validity of such “complaints” from non-testifying, outsider customers and external 

matters involving outside litigants. ADT does not address any of the authority cited in the Motion 

that summarily rejects its attenuated theories of “damages.” Thus, for the reasons stated in the 

Motion, ADT’s damages computations—each of which is based on inadmissible hearsay and none 

of which purport to calculate the alleged loss specific to its testifying customers (as Vivint has 

done in support of its Counterclaim)—should be excluded. 

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Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/Joshua R. Brown 

Michael N. Kreitzer 

Florida Bar No. 705561 

kreitzerm@gtlaw.com 

GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.

333 S.E. 2nd Ave., Suite 4400 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone: 305.579.0500 

-andGregory W. Herbert 

Florida Bar No. 0111510 

herbertg@gtlaw.com

Joshua R. Brown 

Florida Bar No. 826391 

brownjr@gtlaw.com

GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.

450 S. Orange Ave., Suite 650 

Orlando, Florida 32801 

Telephone: 407.420.1100 

-andMatthew A. Steward (pro hac vice) 

mas@clydesnow.com 

Shannon K. Zollinger (pro hac vice) 

skz@clydesnow.com 

CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS

201 S. Main Street, Suite 1300 

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 

Telephone: 801.322.2516 

Counsel for Defendants Vivint Smart Home, 

Inc. and Legacy Vivint Smart Home, Inc. 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on February 3, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the 

Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of filing to all counsel of 

record. 

/s/Joshua R. Brown 

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