United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

June 1998 DEFENSE DEPOT

MAINTENANCE

Contracting

Approaches Should

Address Workload

Characteristics

GAO/NSIAD-98-130

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-279569 

June 15, 1998

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Chairman

The Honorable Charles S. Robb

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to achieve large savings by

contracting out many of its support functions and activities to the private

sector. As part of this effort, DOD plans to contract out more of its

$13 billion annual requirement for depot-level repair and maintenance of

weapon systems and equipment. In addition, DOD plans to streamline its

contract management and oversight activities and rely more on

competitive market forces to assure product quality and reasonable prices.

As you requested, we reviewed how DOD manages contracting for depot

maintenance to determine the characteristics of that contracting and the

implications of those characteristics for future depot maintenance

contract management processes and procedures.

Background Depot maintenance involves the repair, overhaul, modification, and

upgrade of weapon systems, vehicles, and other DOD items at DOD-owned

facilities and private-sector contractor activities. The workload mix

between the public and private sector has remained relatively constant for

many years.1 DOD is seeking to contract out more of its depot maintenance

requirements. The expectation is that increased competition for DOD’s

depot maintenance work will produce substantial savings. In March 1996,

DOD issued regulations directing that new systems and major upgrade

programs “shall maximize the use of contractor provided, long-term, total

life-cycle logistics support that combines depot-level maintenance along

with wholesale and selected retail materiel management functions.”

DOD’s approach to assuring product quality and fair prices for depot

maintenance work that is contracted out to the private sector where

competition is limited is through contract management and oversight

1

This mix was influenced by 10 U.S.C. 2466, which limited depot maintenance work that could be

contracted out to the private sector to not more than 40 percent of depot-level maintenance funds for

any fiscal year. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 amended 10 U.S.C. 2466 to

provide for a 50/50 mix. The act also included a new provision, 10 U.S.C. 2460, which establishes a

statutory definition of depot-level maintenance and repair work that includes interim contractor

support and contractor logistics support work.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

requirements. This includes on-site inspections and record keeping and

reporting requirements. The military services manage and oversee depot

maintenance contracts with assistance from the Defense Contract Audit

Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC).

DCAA provides accounting and financial advisory services in connection

with negotiating, administering, and closing out contracts. DCMC is DOD’s

principal contract oversight agency, which provides assistance ranging

from evaluation of contractors’ proposals to on-site monitoring of

contractors’ day-to-day operations.

DOD is implementing the preference for the acquisition of commercial

items established in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994

(FASA). DOD expects that commercial products and services, which are

subject to competitive market forces, will result in high-quality products

and services at a lower cost. Greater reliance on commercial products and

services, if done in a competitive environment, should shift much of the

quality assurance and cost control responsibility to the contractors and,

thereby, reduce management and oversight required by DOD contract

administration personnel. This approach is intended to provide needed

product quality and price control at less cost to the government. DOD states

that it expects the inclusion of more commercial products and

components in weapon systems to result in a competitive commercial

market for depot-level maintenance and repair of these systems.

Results in Brief DOD is attempting to rely more on competitive market forces to assure

quality products at fair prices. Consistent with recent declines in the

defense budget, resources for administering and auditing contracts have

been cut significantly, with DOD reducing its total acquisition workforce at

all levels. From fiscal year 1993 to July 1997, DCAA and DCMC reduced their

personnel levels by more than 18 and 24 percent, respectively, and further

reductions are planned. In making these reductions, both organizations are

reengineering their processes. They are attempting to rely more on

competitive market forces and contractor internal processes and controls

to assure quality products at fair prices, but it is uncertain whether these

processes and conditions will function as expected.

At present, depot maintenance contracting represents a challenge to

relying on commercial market forces. This is because most depot

maintenance is currently performed on noncommercial, DOD unique items.

About 91 percent of the depot maintenance contracts we reviewed were

awarded noncompetitively, mostly to original equipment manufacturers

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

that own the data rights. Other factors, including difficulties in precisely

defining requirements, also impact efforts to rely on competitive market

forces. As DOD continues transitioning from its traditional contract

management and oversight structure, it will need to increase the use of

competitively awarded depot maintenance contracts. To the extent that

competition for some maintenance workloads is not possible or

practicable, DOD will need to address how best to assure product quality

and reasonable prices when competitive market forces are not present.

DOD has developed a logistics strategic plan that lays out specific

objectives and strategies for improving DOD’s logistics activities. However,

the plan does not address the depot maintenance issues raised in this

report. We have previously recommended that the Secretary of Defense

require the development of a detailed implementation plan for improving

the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s logistics activities to include

depot maintenance.2

 The challenges that DOD faces in successfully relying

on competitive market forces for depot maintenance require management

attention and actions to address the unique characteristics of DOD’s depot

maintenance activities and assure that expected savings can be achieved.

Streamlining Contract

Management and

Oversight Activities

As a result of budget declines and DOD’s efforts to increase reliance on

competitive market forces for cost control and quality assurance, DCAA and

DCMC have substantially downsized and streamlined their operations.

DCAA’s staffing has decreased by 1,046 personnel—over 18 percent—from

fiscal year 1993 to July 1997. During the same time period, DCMC’s staffing

has decreased by 4,579 personnel—a 24-percent reduction. In addition,

since 1993, DCMC has reduced its field offices from 140 to 79. This has

required prioritizing work to focus on areas of higher risks and relying

more on contractor self-oversight where risks are low.

DCAA is focusing its efforts on implementing risk assessment procedures

and process reengineering. For example, as part of DOD’s plan to rely more

on contractor self-oversight, DCAA can reduce its oversight after

determining that strengthened contractor internal controls can be relied

upon. DCMC officials are focusing resources on contract areas that have the

highest risk for cost growth, schedule slippage, or significant technical

problems and are allowing contractors to perform self-oversight in the

more routine, low-risk contracting areas. They are also relying more on

sampling methods to assure quality and contract compliance rather than

having inspectors doing 100-percent inspections. Sample sizes are based

2

Outsourcing DOD Logistics: Savings Achievable but Defense Science Board’s Projections Are

Overstated (GAO/NSIAD-98-48, Dec. 8, 1997).

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

on assessments of the risks inherent in the contractors’ processes. DCMC

officials stated that they will use a contractor performance-based

assessment model to determine risk and the level and frequency of review

based on an assessment of past performance.

In our high-risk series report on defense contract management, we

discussed some of the issues related to DOD’s management of future

contract risk.3

 We stated that the risk increases substantially when the

activity is coupled with (1) continuing fundamental changes in the

acquisition and contracting processes that have yet to be fully

implemented or evaluated and (2) a contract administration and auditing

resource base that already has been substantially reduced.

Characteristics of

Depot Maintenance

Work Create

Challenges for

Implementing

Reforms

Defense depot maintenance contracting has a number of characteristics

that must be considered as DOD moves toward contracting out more of its

depot maintenance. Primary among these is that most depot-level

maintenance is on noncommercial, DOD unique, weapon systems parts and

components for which there is often no competition or a limited

competitive market. Other characteristics include (1) reliance on cost

reimbursable type contracts because requirements are often undefined,

(2) use of government provided parts and materials, and (3) contract

provisions that allow contractors to perform work that may be needed but

is not included as a fixed-price line item in the contract. This work is

usually ordered on the basis of fixed hourly rates specified in the contract.

These characteristics affect contract costs and/or performance risks and,

accordingly, affect contract management and oversight requirements.

Competition Is Limited for

Depot Maintenance

Workloads

Most depot maintenance contracts are currently awarded without

competition. This is largely because most depot maintenance contracting

is for work on noncommercial, DOD unique items. Most of this work is

awarded on a sole-source basis to original equipment manufacturers that

own the technical data rights.4

To assess competitive conditions, we asked 12 government contracting

organizations to classify as competitive or sole source all depot repair and

maintenance contracts awarded from the beginning of fiscal year 1996 to

3

High-Risk Series: Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-97-4, Feb. 1997).

4

Technical data are the designs, drawings, and specifications necessary for the production and repair

of items. In most of the contracts we reviewed, the original equipment manufacturer owns the

exclusive rights to this data.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

March 1997. They identified 15,346 contracts totaling $2.2 billion.

Sole-source awards were made in 13,930 contracting actions—about 

91 percent—that were valued at about $1.5 billion, or about 69 percent of

the total dollars awarded. Table 1 shows the percent of noncompetitive

contracts by service.

Table 1: Percent of Sole-Source DOD

Depot Maintenance Contracts by

Service Service

Percent of total

number

Percent of total

dollar value

Army 95 99

Air Force 50 43

Navy 99 72

In examining the rationale for sole-source awards, we found that DOD had

not acquired the technical data rights to compete the work for many of its

weapon systems and components and DOD officials believe that, at this

point, buying the data would be too costly. Officials at the contracting

organizations told us that if technical data is not bought as a part of the

initial acquisition package, the government has little leverage to get the

data at an affordable price later on in the system life-cycle. Additionally, it

is difficult to make an argument for a large one-time investment for

technical data once the acquisition program is completed. Officials also

said that even if the government owns the technical data, private

contractors may have little interest in competing for the work when it

involves (1) small volume, (2) obsolete technology, (3) irregular

requirements, and/or (4) unstable funding.

DOD plans indicate greater reliance on noncompetitive contracts to original

equipment manufacturers (OEM) for depot maintenance support. Within

legislative requirements, DOD policy calls for maximum use of long-term,

total life-cycle logistics support contracts for new weapon systems. Under

such arrangements, the OEMs could become the providers of many

systems’ depot maintenance support.

Undefined Requirements

Are a Characteristic of

Many Maintenance

Workloads

We examined 345 depot maintenance contracts awarded by 12 contracting

organizations, and found that 212, or 61 percent, were fixed-price type

contracts that had price and performance generally defined at the time of

contract award. However, because of reasons such as undefined work

requirements, 80, or 23 percent, were cost-reimbursable type contracts.

The remaining were a combination of the two types of contracts. Table 2

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

shows by service the contract types used for the 345 contracts we

sampled.

Table 2: DOD’s Use of Contract Type

for Depot Maintenance Work Number of contract types

Type of contract Army Air Force Navy

Fixed price 22 111 79

Cost 37 38 5

Combination 10 18 25

Total 69 167 109

Officials at the contracting organizations said that as risk increased with

the degree of complexity of the work, the more likely it was that

something other than a fixed-price type contract would be used. They said

they used fixed-price contracts when adequate repair histories were

available to establish a price range for the maintenance work. Officials

said they used cost-reimbursement type contracts when maintenance

requirements could not be predetermined for the contract period or when

adequate repair history did not exist on which to establish reasonable

price ranges. For example, officials at the Army

Communications-Electronics Command stated that selection of the

contract type generally was based on technical uncertainties surrounding

the maintenance work to be performed. A cost-reimbursement contract

was used whenever the uncertainties were of such magnitude that cost

and performance could not be reasonably estimated for a fixed-price

contract.

Under fixed-price type contracts, more risk is borne by contractors

because they incur losses when costs are greater than expected. Since the

contractor assumes most of the risks, the government’s contract

administration and oversight burden is reduced. Conversely, DOD is subject

to greater cost risks under a cost-reimbursable contract because

contractors generally are reimbursed for all allowable, allocable, and

reasonable costs incurred. Because the contractor’s incentive to maximize

efficiency and minimize cost is generally less, more oversight is required

for cost-reimbursable contracts. If more commercially available weapon

systems parts and components are used in the future, this could reduce

the use of cost-reimbursable contracts, particularly if repair histories were

commercially established.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

Government-Furnished

Material Agreements

Require Close Attention

In some depot maintenance contracts, DOD agrees to provide the

contractor with repair parts and materials from its supply system. These

practices generally require increased management attention to assure that

the parts and materials are available as required, that material

accountability is maintained, and that the contractor does not use

excessive quantities of government-furnished material. When materials are

not provided in accordance with contract requirements, the contractor

could incur added costs, which are passed on to DOD. Further, if material

accountability is not accurately maintained, costs to the government can

be substantially increased. For example, the Warner Robins Air Logistics

Center had a $113.2 million cost overrun on F-15 aircraft contract

maintenance work that was directly related to government-furnished

material. DOD and Air Force officials believed that a cause of the cost

overrun was loss of control over government-furnished items that the

contractor returned in exchange for new ones. In another instance, we

found that the Air Force paid $24.9 million to settle claims related in part

to its failure to provide a contractor with timely government-furnished

material. Finally, we have identified workloads where increased usage of

government-furnished material by the contractor significantly increased

the costs to the government of contracting out the work. Given these and

similar situations, changes in contract management practices need to take

into account the unique aspects of government-furnished material.

Nature of Repair Work and

Associated Contract

Provisions Require Close

Attention

Depot maintenance contracts often contain provisions that allow

contractors to perform and charge the government for additional work

that could not be specifically defined at the time of contract award but

may be needed as an item is being repaired. For instance, when an item is

disassembled and inspected during the repair process, the contractor may

discover work needed that was not spelled out by the basic contract

requirements, such as corrosion hidden inside an aircraft wing. DOD

anticipates the potential for such additional work and increased costs by

including clauses in its maintenance contracts referred to as

“over-and-above” work. The contract specifies an hourly rate for such

work.

According to DOD officials, over-and-above work requires close attention to

validate the extent and cost of such work. For example, in fiscal year 

1997, the Air Force experienced a substantial increase in the over and

above contract cost for programmed depot maintenance on the B-1B

aircraft—from $150,000 to $500,000 per aircraft. The Air Force examined

the contractor’s over-and-above requests and found that some requests

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

should have been accomplished by the contractor as part of the basic

programmed depot maintenance contract. After rescinding the

administrative contracting officer’s authority to approve them, program

officials are now reviewing all over-and-above requests for the B-1B.

DOD Plans for Improving

Logistics Functions and

Activities

As reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Defense

Reform Initiative (DRI), DOD has begun a program to improve the

operations of its business activities. DOD also has developed a strategic

plan for improving logistics functions and activities. The plan gives

direction to improvements needed to reduce the cost of its logistics

systems and lays out specific objectives and strategies to produce these

improvements. For instance, the plan provides general guidance and

implementation strategy for depot maintenance related activities involving

(1) outsourcing, privatization, and elimination of unneeded maintenance

capability; (2) reducing existing public sector maintenance infrastructure;

(3) using public-private competition to the maximum extent allowed by

statute for workloads being performed by DOD depots; and (4) using

maximum competition for workloads previously awarded without full and

open competition.

Although the plan provides guidance and implementation strategy for

some important objectives related to depot maintenance, it does not

specifically address the contract depot maintenance issues raised in this

report. Previously, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense require

the development of a detailed implementation plan for improving the

efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s logistics activities, to include depot

maintenance.5

 We recommended that the plan establish time frames for

identifying and evaluating the most cost-effective solutions and identify

required resources for accomplishing cost-reduction initiatives. In

response to that recommendation, DOD has stated that a specific plan for

improving the efficiency and reducing the cost of DOD’s logistics programs,

including depot maintenance, is not needed because the QDR and DRI

provide an overall strategic plan and strategy for reducing DOD’s

infrastructure. While we agree that the QDR and the DRI provide strategic

guidance, our work illustrates the need for more specificity in

implementation plans related to individual business activities, such as

depot maintenance.

5

Outsourcing DOD Logistics: Savings Achievable but Defense Science Board’s Projections Are

Overstated (GAO/NSIAD-98-48, Dec. 8, 1997).

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

Conclusions DOD is streamlining and reengineering its traditional contract management

and oversight organizations—including those in its buying activities, DCAA,

and DCMC. These initiatives are in their early stages of implementation as

they relate to depot maintenance contracting. A number of factors unique

to contracting for depot maintenance repair and maintenance workloads

create challenges to DOD’s efforts as it implements new contracting

approaches. Primary among these at this time is that most depot-level

maintenance is on noncommercial, DOD unique parts and components for

which there is often little or no competition. Other factors that need to be

addressed as implementation continues are the inherent difficulties of

defining repair requirements at the time of contract award, the

management tasks associated with providing government-furnished

material, and the management tasks associated with approving additional

work that contractors discover once the repair of an item has begun.

Citing the QDR and DRI, DOD has disagreed with previous recommendations

that we have made for the development of a detailed implementation plan

for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s logistics activities,

including depot maintenance.

However, given the results of this and other recently completed work, we

believe DOD should reconsider the need for a detailed implementation plan

to guide future management improvement efforts to increase the

cost-effectiveness of DOD’s depot maintenance program, including that

portion of the program that is contracted out to the private sector.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the development of a

detailed implementation plan to guide future management improvement

efforts to increase the cost effectiveness of DOD’s depot maintenance

program, including issues related to improving the management and

cost-effectiveness of contract depot maintenance workloads.

Agency Comments DOD reviewed a draft of this report and provided official oral comments.

DOD officials stated that they generally concurred with the intent of our

recommendation. They also provided comments to improve the technical

accuracy of the report, which have been incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To evaluate the implications of outsourcing and other acquisition reform

initiatives on DOD’s management and oversight of depot maintenance

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
B-279569 

work, we made extensive use of our prior work and the work of others on

issues related to contracting. See a list of related GAO products at the end

of this report. We reviewed the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), DOD

supplements to the FAR, and other pertinent regulations to identify the

policies, procedures, and processes that DOD follows in contracting for

depot maintenance support from the private sector. We examined studies

of DOD’s acquisition system that identified concerns with DOD’s

management and oversight of its contracting function and proposals to

improve the system. In addition, we analyzed data from DOD organizations

to evaluate (1) the status of initiatives to improve contract management

and oversight, (2) the impact of these initiatives on staffing and workload,

and (3) the potential impact that increased outsourcing would have on

their management and oversight of contract maintenance.

We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees.

Copies will be made available to other interested parties upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please

contact me on (202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this report are listed

in appendix I.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Major Contributors to

This Report

14

Related GAO Products 16

Tables Table 1: Percent of Sole-Source DOD Depot Maintenance

Contracts by Service

5

Table 2: DOD’s Use of Contract Type for Depot Maintenance

Work

6

Abbreviations

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency

DCMC Defense Contract Management Command

DOD Department of Defense

DRI Defense Reform Initiative

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FASA Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act

OEM original equipment manufactures

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

James Wiggins

Julia Denman

Glenn Knoepfle

Jackie Snead

Ed Waytel

Atlanta Field Office Bobby Worrell

Terry Wyatt

Dallas Field Office Penney Harwell

Office of the General

Counsel

John Brosnan

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
Related GAO Products

Public-Private Competitions: Review of San Antonio Air Force Depot

Solicitation (GAO/OGC-98-49, May 14, 1998).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Use of Public-Private Partnership

Arrangements (GAO/NSIAD-98-91, May 7, 1998).

Public-Private Competitions: Review of Sacramento Air Force Depot

Solicitation (GAO/OGC-98-48, May 4, 1998).

Public-Private Competitions: DOD’s Additional Support for Combining

Depot Workloads Contains Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-98-143, Apr. 17, 1998).

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New

Weapon Systems to the Private Sector (GAO/NSIAD-98-8, Mar. 31, 1998).

Depot Maintenance: Lessons Learned From Transferring Alameda Naval

Aviation Depot Engine Workloads (GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR, Mar. 25, 1998).

Public-Private Competitions: Access to Records Is Inhibiting Work on

Congressional Mandates (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-111, Mar. 4, 1998).

Public-Private Competitions: Access to Records Is Inhibiting Work on

Congressional Mandates (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-101, Feb. 24, 1998).

Public-Private Competitions: DOD’s Determination to Combine Depot

Workloads Is Not Adequately Supported (GAO/NSIAD-98-76, Jan. 20, 1998).

Public-Private Competition: Processes Used for C-5 Aircraft Award Appear

Reasonable (GAO/NSIAD-98-72, Jan. 20, 1998).

DOD Depot Maintenance: Information on Public and Private Sector

Workload Allocations (GAO/NSIAD-98-41, Jan. 20, 1998).

Air Force Privatization-in-Place: Analysis of Aircraft and Missile System

Depot Repair Costs (GAO/NSIAD-98-35, Dec. 22, 1997).

Outsourcing DOD Logistics: Savings Achievable but Defense Science

Board’s Projections Are Overstated (GAO/NSIAD-98-48, Dec. 8, 1997).

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Information on the Cost-Effectiveness of

B-1B and B-52 Support Options (GAO/NSIAD-97-210BR, Sept. 12, 1997).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
Related GAO Products

Navy Depot Maintenance: Privatizing the Louisville Operations in Place Is

Not Cost-Effective (GAO/NSIAD-97-52, July 31, 1997).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Challenges Facing DOD in Managing Working

Capital Funds (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-152, May 7, 1997).

Depot Maintenance: Uncertainties and Challenges DOD Faces in

Restructuring Its Depot Maintenance Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-111, Mar. 18,

1997, and GAO/T-NSIAD-112, Apr. 10, 1997).

Navy Ordnance: Analysis of Business Area Price Increases and Financial

Losses (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-97-74, Mar. 14, 1997).

Defense Outsourcing: Challenges Facing DOD as It Attempts to Save

Billions in Infrastructure Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110, Mar. 12, 1997).

High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997).

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly

While Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec. 31, 1996).

Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization Without Further Downsizing

Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept. 18, 1996).

Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to

Privatizing-in-Place the Louisville, Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202,

Sept. 18, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Commission on Roles and Mission’s

Privatization Assumptions Are Questionable (GAO/NSIAD-96-161, July 15,

1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD’s Policy Report Leaves Future Role of

Depot System Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-96-165, May 21, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: More Comprehensive and Consistent

Workload Data Needed for Decisionmakers (GAO/NSIAD-96-166, May 21, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the

Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr. 16, 1996, and GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148,

Apr. 17, 1996).

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
Related GAO Products

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not

Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

Depot Maintenance: Opportunities to Privatize Repair of Military Engines

(GAO/NSIAD-96-33, Mar. 5, 1996).

Closing Maintenance Depots: Savings, Personnel, and Workload

Redistribution Issues (GAO/NSIAD-96-29, Mar. 4, 1996).

Navy Maintenance: Assessment of the Public-Private Competition Program

for Aviation Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-96-30, Jan. 22, 1996).

Depot Maintenance: The Navy’s Decision to Stop F/A-18 Repairs at Ogden

Air Logistics Center (GAO/NSIAD-96-31, Dec. 15, 1995).

Military Bases: Case Studies on Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and 1991

(GAO/NSIAD-95-139, Aug. 15, 1995).

Military Base Closure: Analysis of DOD’s Process and Recommendations

for 1995 (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-132, Apr. 17, 1995).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for

Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center: Cost Growth and Other

Factors Affect Closure and Privatization (GAO/NSIAD-95-60, Dec. 9, 1994).

Navy Maintenance: Assessment of the Public and Private Shipyard

Competition Program (GAO/NSIAD-94-184, May 25, 1994).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public and

Private Sectors (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161, Apr. 12, 1994).

Depot Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-93-292R, Sept. 30, 1993).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Management and Restructuring to Support a

Downsized Military (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-13, May 6, 1993).

Air Logistics Center Indicators (GAO/NSIAD-93-146R, Feb. 25, 1993).

Defense Force Management: Challenges Facing DOD as It Continues to

Downsize Its Civilian Workforce (GAO/NSIAD-93-123, Feb. 12, 1993).

(709251) Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-130 Defense Depot Maintenance
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