United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 21-1515

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

STEVEN TUCKER, a/k/a CHILL,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge] 

Before

Kayatta, Lipez, and Thompson, 

Circuit Judges.

Megan A. Siddall, with whom Christina N. Lindberg and Miner 

Siddall LLP were on brief, for appellant.

Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom 

Jane E. Young, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

February 23, 2023
- 2 -

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Steven Tucker, 

appeals his convictions for sex trafficking of a minor (in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591), use of an interstate facility to 

promote unlawful activity (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952), and 

maintaining a drug-involved premises (in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 856). In this direct appeal, Tucker raises two issues: 

(1) whether he was entitled to a mistrial after the trial judge 

dismissed two jurors just before the jury started deliberating, 

and (2) whether he is entitled to a new trial when, several weeks 

after the jury returned the guilty verdicts, the government 

disclosed that it had inadvertently withheld impeachment evidence 

about one of its witnesses. For the reasons we explain below, we 

affirm.

Background

Before delving into the events on which the two appellate 

issues are based, we hit the highlights of the factual 

underpinnings of Tucker's counts of conviction to provide a widelens view of the conduct for which the jury found Tucker criminally 

culpable. See United States v. Laureano-Salgado, 933 F.3d 20, 24 

(1st Cir. 2019) (explaining similar set up). We present "the 

pertinent facts in the light most agreeable to the verdict, 

deferring some details to our analysis of the issues raised on 

appeal." United States v. Blanchard, 867 F.3d 1, 3 n.1 (1st Cir. 
- 3 -

2017) (quoting United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 

2012)).

The testimony at Tucker's four-day jury trial revealed 

that, between October 2013 and July 2014, Tucker ran a robust 

heroin trade and prostitution venture out of his address of record 

on Walnut Street in Manchester, New Hampshire. Serving as both a 

pimp and a drug dealer during this time, Tucker fed the heroin 

addictions of several women, incentivizing their sex work by 

withholding or providing heroin (as well as withholding or 

providing food) depending on their earnings from day-to-day. The 

testifying witnesses included a few of these women, all of whom 

were in recovery and struggling to stay sober.1

The women arranged the sex work through Backpage.com. 

Now defunct, the Backpage website had allowed any user to post 

advertisements for products or services, including under 

categories for "adult entertainment" or "escorts," with the 

postings sortable by geographic area.2 Jane Doe No. 1 v.

Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016); see also United

1 At the time of their testimony, the women had been sober

for somewhere between several months to a couple of years. Most 

also testified that they had experience with cycles of sobriety 

and relapse. 

2 Backpage.com ceased to exist in 2018 after its chief 

executive agreed to shut it down as part of a plea deal he 

negotiated to resolve the conspiracy and money laundering charges 

filed against him in federal court. Maggie Astor, Guilty Pleas 

From C.E.O. of Backpage, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 2018, at A21.
- 4 -

States v. Blanchard, 867 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2017). For $7 per 

post (paid with a prepaid Visa card Tucker provided), Tucker or 

one of the women posted an ad with their individual photo and phone 

number and then waited for the phone to ring to schedule a time to 

meet up. Many of the sexual encounters took place at Tucker's 

Walnut Street residence, others at hotels in Manchester,

Massachusetts, or Rhode Island. 

The roster of women working in Tucker's "stable"3

included at least nine women with two or three of them working on 

any given day. When each sexual encounter ended, the women handed 

Tucker all or part of the money they had been paid, and he gave 

them heroin. At times, he also gave them money for clothes, rent, 

food, and cigarettes. One of the women estimated that she and the 

others completed around five "dates" per day on weekdays and "up 

to ten" on weekends, receiving hits of heroin from Tucker three or 

four times a day.

Shifting our attention to some of the individual 

relationships between Tucker and these women, Tucker and Jasmine4

(the underage woman on whom the government based the trafficking3 In this context, "stable" means "a group of victims who are 

under the control of a single pimp." Linda Smith, Renting Lacy: 

A Story of America's Prostituted Children xvii (Shared Hope 

International, 2009).

4 The parties agreed at trial to refer to the witnesses by 

their first names. We follow suit.
- 5 -

of-a-minor count) first met when she was around 14 years old and 

he was dating her aunt. Approximately three years later, they ran 

into each other and exchanged phone numbers. At his invitation, 

Jasmine visited him at the Walnut Street house. Three days later 

she posted her first ad on Backpage. Jasmine, who had been sober 

before reencountering Tucker, started using heroin again --

courtesy of Tucker -- "to cover up the pain" of her sex work. In 

October 2013, Jasmine, while working for Tucker, turned 17 years 

old. Jasmine testified that Tucker knew her age at the time she 

worked for him; she told Tucker how old she was and said that he 

"[k]ind of avoided it" ("it" being the topic of her age). Haley, 

who both worked for Tucker and dated him during most of the time 

in question, had known Jasmine was only 17 years old and also 

testified that Tucker knew Jasmine's age and neither said nor did 

anything about it. Morgan, another sex worker who also had been

in a relationship with Tucker (overlapping significantly with the 

same time period as Haley), also gave testimony about Tucker's 

knowledge of Jasmine's age. She told the jury that Tucker told 

her Jasmine was underage during an incident in which they had all 

been detained in a highway traffic stop and a needle and drugs had 

been found in the car they were in. Tucker had been angry with 

Jasmine for not taking the fall for them over the drug find, given 

her juvenile status.
- 6 -

After three days of witness testimony,5 the jury was set 

to begin deliberating but got delayed because the trial judge found 

out that a couple of jurors made comments about the case to each 

other during the trial. We will lay out all the details soon --

for now it's enough to know that the trial judge investigated the 

information brought to his attention, dismissed two jurors, and 

denied a mistrial motion Tucker had filed because of the alleged 

juror misconduct. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three 

indicted counts later that day. A few months later, the government 

revealed to the defense that it had inadvertently failed to 

disclose that one of its trial witnesses (Morgan) had been arrested 

before trial on a New Hampshire drug charge. The felony state 

charge had been pending at the time of Morgan's testimony and --

also at the time of trial -- the U.S. Attorney's Office had been 

considering whether to prosecute Morgan in federal court for the 

same alleged drug sale conduct. Based on this revelation, Tucker 

once again moved for a new trial, which, after a hearing, the trial 

judge denied. Now before this court, Tucker challenges the denials 

of each of these two motions. We start our work with the jurorrelated motion for mistrial.

5 The other trial witnesses included other sex workers 

addicted to drugs, another Walnut Street house resident, the Walnut 

Street house property manager, Tucker's sister, and Tucker's 

nephew.
- 7 -

Juror Comments

Bear with us as we summarize the sequence of 

conversations that led to Tucker's motion for mistrial; to provide 

the necessary context for Tucker's arguments we need to paint the 

full picture. By the end of the third day of trial, the defense 

rested, the trial judge provided instructions to the jury, both 

the prosecution and defense delivered their closing arguments, and 

the court chose the alternate jurors. The next morning, before 

deliberations got underway, one of the jurors brought a concern 

about another juror to the court's attention. Juror No. 1

apparently told another juror partway through Trial Day 3 that, on 

the day before he had reported for jury duty, he looked up the 

court schedule for the next day and, based on the schedule posted 

on the court's website, guessed he had been summonsed for jury 

duty in Tucker's case. He also commented that he thought the case 

was really old.

The court investigated by speaking with Juror No. 1, who

admitted to looking at the district court's website the day before 

reporting and he saw a schedule that included jury selection for 

Tucker's case. He denied discussing the case with anyone after he 

was selected for Tucker's jury. He disclosed that he had deduced 
- 8 -

the age of the case from the testimony about the events which had 

taken place in 2013 and 2014 (the trial was held in March 2019). 

At defense counsel's request, the judge spoke with each 

of the other seated jurors to determine whether they'd had any 

conversations with Juror No. 1. Two of the remaining seated jurors 

relayed that they had overheard another juror commenting about 

looking up the court schedule, but had not known which juror had 

spoken at the time or to whom. After the judge and the attorneys 

discussed what they had learned, the judge -- at Tucker's request

and over the government's objection -- dismissed Juror No. 1. The 

judge did so because this juror's demeanor during the court's

questioning of him had appeared defensive -- at times combative -

- and the judge was concerned that the questioning process may 

have "impacted [Juror No. 1's] duty to be fair and impartial."

The court then questioned the first alternate juror 

(Juror No. 4) to ensure she was still qualified. In response to 

the court's inquiry about whether she knew if any jurors had 

violated the court's instructions about not discussing the case or 

accessing media, she said that, one day at the lunch break, as the 

jurors were walking out of the courtroom, Juror No. 7 -- who Juror 

No. 4 perceived throughout the trial to be "agitated" and "intense" 

-- said to another male juror: "I can't believe that. That 

witness was . . . ." But before Juror No. 7 could complete his

thought Juror No. 4 told him to stop talking, and he did. Juror 
- 9 -

No. 4 also reported that, the day before, the same Juror No. 7 

said "we should be able to wrap this up today" in a tone she 

understood to mean he thought the outcome was very clear. Juror 

No. 4 also heard Juror No. 7 make a "derogatory" comment about 

defense counsel and when he did several jurors told him to be 

quiet. Juror No. 4 insisted that overhearing these comments had 

not affected her ability to be fair and impartial.

Based on this new information, the trial judge suggested 

to the defense counsel and prosecutors that he again speak with 

each juror individually to inquire about the comments Juror No. 4 

reported overhearing. In response, defense counsel moved for a 

mistrial, asserting that Juror No. 7 had tainted the entire jury 

pool. Counsel argued that the juror clearly had made up his mind 

and was expressing his thoughts to other jurors, had indicated he 

wanted to get the trial over with, and had been described in 

general as one who could have an aggressive approach during 

deliberations, all of which resulted in jury corruption. The 

government objected, commenting that defense counsel was blowing 

two isolated comments out of proportion. The court reserved its 

ruling until after it had an opportunity to "examine the other

jurors" to investigate and assess whether this one juror "had 

impact enough that even excusing him would not be sufficient to 

alleviate any problems he may have caused."
- 10 -

When called to speak with the judge and the parties, 

Juror No. 7 said he had made a comment that he thought the jury 

would "be here for a while" but denied making any comments about 

the lawyers in the case or their performances. The court did not 

confront him directly with the statements Juror No. 4 had relayed 

-- an approach both parties agreed was prudent so Juror No. 7 would 

not be placed in a defensive posture. The examination of the 

remaining jurors did not turn up any other venire members who had 

heard Juror No. 7's purported comments. Nonetheless, defense 

counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial, claiming one of the 

jurors must have been lying. The court disagreed, labeling Juror 

No. 4's report about Juror No. 7's comments "amorphous."

Backing up briefly to the court's second round of 

speaking with each juror, Juror No. 9 did say that she'd overheard 

two jurors (Nos. 1 and 11) commenting that some of the questions 

defense counsel asked the witnesses sounded redundant. By this 

point, Juror No. 1 had already been dismissed, so the court only 

followed up with Juror No. 11 -- the second alternate -- who did 

admit to commenting at some point about the redundancy of some of 

defense counsel's questions. Tucker then insisted that a mistrial 

was warranted because the factual inconsistencies which emerged 

from the judge's inquiry of each juror about who said what and 

when and which juror overheard something meant that "the jury has 

been, you know, deliberating in some cases out loud" and Juror No.
- 11 -

11 (the alternate who could replace Juror No. 7) had herself made 

a comment about the redundancy of the defense counsel's 

questioning. In the alternative, the defense requested the court 

discharge Juror No. 7. The government countered there was no 

indication Juror No. 7 had engaged in any actual misconduct.

The trial judge ultimately denied the motion because, 

after speaking with each juror twice, he was "thrilled" to discover 

that "they followed the instructions as carefully as human beings 

can generally be expected to follow them" given that it's not 

"unusual for one juror to mention to another that something is 

monotonous . . . I'm not surprised that occasionally a sideline 

comment is made about a witness or about a lawyer and a lawyer's 

effectiveness." The judge discussed each of the comments the 

jurors alleged they heard and concluded there had been no juror 

misconduct because either the comment couldn't be conclusively 

interpreted as pro or con prosecution or defense, the alleged 

comment was not corroborated by any other panel member, or the 

comment was an innocuous observation that any juror may have made. 

In the judge's view, Juror No. 4 had drawn a lot of inferences 

based on just a few words spoken by Juror No. 7, and whatever Juror 

No. 7 said hadn't influenced any of the other jurors. In the 

judge's words:

So I didn't see anything in these discussions with the 

jurors today that amounted to being in my view juror 

misconduct or manifest necessity, which is a 
- 12 -

circumstance involving juror misconduct, among other 

things, which is of such an overwhelming and 

unforeseeable nature that the conduct of the trial or 

reaching a fair result is impossible and which 

necessitates the declaration of a mistrial. I don't 

think we've reached that point here.

He did grant the alternative relief Tucker requested, dismissing 

Juror No. 7 over the government's objection though "not based on 

misconduct but more I guess I would call it in an abundance of 

caution." The judge also found Juror No. 11 qualified to replace 

Juror No. 7.

That backdrop in place, before this court Tucker argues 

that the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the

mistrial motion. Before examining Tucker's specific contentions

on this issue, we provide a quick primer about how trial judges 

are to handle suspected juror misconduct. The overarching 

principle is that "an impartial jury is an integral component of 

a fair trial and must be jealously safeguarded." United States v.

Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 38 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied RiveraAlejandro v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 729 (2021), and cert. denied

Rivera-George v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1184 (2022), and cert.

denied Rivera-Alejandro v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1185 (2022) 

(quoting Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 160 (1st Cir. 

2013)). Therefore, "the trial court has a duty to investigate 

[an] allegation [of jury taint] promptly," United States v.

Therrien, 847 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. 
- 13 -

Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 289 (1st Cir. 2002)), determining first 

"whether a taint-producing event actually occurred and, if so, the 

extent or pervasiveness of the resulting prejudice," id. (citing

United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st Cir. 1990)). "If 

the trial court finds both a taint-producing event and a 

significant potential for prejudice, it must then consider 

possible measures to alleviate that prejudice." Id. (citing 

Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 289). "If the potential for prejudice 

remains too high even after the trial court's best efforts, then 

the court must grant any resulting motion for a mistrial." Id.

(citing Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 289). However, "[g]ranting a 

defendant's request for a mistrial is 'a last resort, only to be 

implemented if the [jury] taint is ineradicable.'" Id. (quoting 

United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1184 (1st Cir. 1993))

(second alteration in original). 

"When reviewing the denial of a mistrial request, we 

. . . 'consider the totality of the circumstances to determine 

whether the defendant has demonstrated the kind of clear prejudice 

that would render the court's denial of his motion for a mistrial 

a manifest abuse of discretion.'" Id. (quoting United States v. 

Trinidad–Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 2014)). In other 

words, "[s]o long as the district judge erects, and employs, a 

suitable framework for investigating the allegation and gauging 

its effects, and thereafter spells out [his] findings with adequate 
- 14 -

specificity to permit informed appellate review, the court's 

'determination deserves great respect and should not be disturbed 

in the absence of a patent abuse of discretion.'" Maldonado-Peña, 

4 F.4th at 38-39 (quoting United States v. French, 977 F.3d 114, 

122 (1st Cir. 2020)) (cleaned up).

Tucker primarily attacks the trial judge's denial of the 

motion for mistrial in two ways. First, he contends the trial 

judge used a standard (that of "manifest necessity") that is not 

applicable when -- as here -- the defendant is the party seeking 

the mistrial.6 Second, Tucker asserts the trial judge made the 

wrong call about the absence of actual juror misconduct and the 

lingering effect of the jurors' comments on the remaining jurors. 

We'll start our work on this issue with Tucker's claim that the 

trial judge applied the wrong standard to the mistrial motion.

As summarized above, the trial judge provided a detailed 

take on why he was denying Tucker's motion for mistrial,

articulating his reasoning why he found no juror misconduct or 

"manifest necessity," but dismissing two jurors anyways. Tucker 

zeroes in on the judge's use of the phrase "manifest necessity." 

6 Manifest necessity is the standard applied to determine 

whether the government is entitled to a mistrial over the 

defendant's objection. See United States v. McIntosh, 380 F.3d 

548, 553 (1st Cir. 2004). "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause . . . 

bar[s] retrial of a defendant after a mistrial ordered over the 

defendant's objection unless the mistrial was occasioned by 

manifest necessity." Id.
- 15 -

This phrase is relevant when a court must determine whether the 

Double Jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution bars a retrial 

after a mistrial is ordered over a defendant's objection; double 

jeopardy principles do not bar a retrial, however, when "the 

mistrial was occasioned by manifest necessity" -- e.g., a hung 

jury. United States v. Brown, 426 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2005) 

(quoting United States v. McIntosh, 380 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 

2004)). When a defendant is the party requesting a mistrial then 

he or she is "ordinarily . . . deemed to have waived any subsequent 

claim of double jeopardy" and so the manifest necessity standard 

does not come into play. McIntosh, 380 F.3d at 554; see United 

States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976) (stating "[d]ifferent

considerations obtain . . . when the mistrial has been declared at 

the defendant's request"). Here, Tucker moved for the mistrial, 

so he is correct -- the manifest necessity consideration is not 

applicable here.

But our analysis does not end there. The record reveals 

a couple of hitches with Tucker's attack on the trial judge's use 

of this inappropriate standard as an error: Not only did he not

object to the use of this standard below, he (as the government 

points out) actually invited the judge to use it, kicking off his 

argument for a mistrial with "Frankly, you know the standard is 

manifest necessity." The trial judge's mention of the standard 

was clearly invited by the defense and Tucker may not now benefit 
- 16 -

from an invited error. See United States v. Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th 

1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2021) (concluding waiver applied to an appellate 

argument about why an attorney's motions to withdraw should have 

been granted after the defendant/appellant had asked the trial 

judge to deny these motions); United States v. Amaro-Santiago, 824 

F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting the defendant's challenge 

on appeal to the trial court's delayed issuance of a curative 

instruction because the defendant had asked the court to hold off 

until the next day). Regardless, the trial judge did not rely 

solely on determining whether there was "manifest necessity" for 

a mistrial. Rather, he reasoned through all the information before 

him, concluded there was no misconduct, implemented corrective 

measures out of (his words) "an abundance of caution," and 

determined the remaining jurors were not influenced by the comments 

of the dismissed jurors.7

7 Anticipating the government's response to his challenge to 

the standard on which he contends the trial judge impermissibly 

relied, Tucker also argues that the government waived any argument 

that the trial judge adjudicated the motion for mistrial using the 

appropriate standard. This is so because, according to Tucker, 

the government suggested to the trial judge that this court could 

decide the juror misconduct issue in the first instance. We read

the record differently. The government, while arguing against the 

defendant's bid for a mistrial, asserted that whichever way the 

trial judge ruled there would be no downside to Tucker -- i.e., if 

the court granted the motion then Tucker would get a retrial, and 

if the court denied the motion then the issue was undoubtedly 

preserved for appeal so if this court decided the trial judge 

abused his discretion then Tucker would get a retrial. The 

government was not asking the trial judge to punt the issue to 

this court to take the first pass on it. Moreover, as the 
- 17 -

Shifting to Tucker's second line of attack on the denial 

of his juror related mistrial motion, he asserts that even if the 

judge could be viewed as having applied the right standard, his 

finding that there was no juror misconduct was clearly wrong 

because "[t]here is evidence in the record that some jurors engaged 

in predeliberation or were biased and that others were exposed to 

that predeliberation and bias." Tucker highlights the trial 

judge's discussion of three statements allegedly made by Juror No. 

7 that were -- as the judge put it -- "problematic enough to 

require our attention": (1) that "the case should wrap up quickly,"

(2) a "disparaging comment about defense counsel" in comparison to 

the prosecutors, and (3) the incomplete statement of "I can't 

believe that. That witness" before Juror No. 4 shut him up. The 

way Tucker sees it, these three statements indicated prejudice 

against the defense and the trial judge could not be confident the 

other jurors were not affected by these comments. So, from 

Tucker's vantage, the judge should have concluded there was 

misconduct.

government states in its responsive brief, if the trial court had 

understood the government to be requesting that it punt on the 

issue, the trial judge clearly did not embrace this suggestion. 

The judge's denial of the mistrial motion was based on his

conclusion that there was no misconduct but that it could and did 

take remedial measures to remove any possible taint from the jurors 

who had made comments heard by others.
- 18 -

Tucker also argues that the remedial measures taken by 

the judge -- excusing the two jurors and asking the remaining 

jurors if they could remain impartial -- failed to cure the 

problem. As his reasoning goes, the judge could not be 100% sure 

that the comments did not affect the remaining jurors and therefore

the taint could not be completely cured.

The government rejoins that even if the judge was clearly 

wrong to conclude there was no juror misconduct, there was no 

effect on Tucker because the judge dismissed the two offending 

jurors. The government also points out that the judge conducted 

a thorough investigation into the allegations about the comments 

and found no evidence that other jurors were affected.

Our review of the record shows that the trial judge 

carefully considered the comments that Juror No. 4 reported she 

overheard Juror No. 7 utter and reasonably concluded there were "a 

lot of inferences and leaps involved in that that are not explicit 

in the record and that were not corroborated by any other juror." 

We note that while Juror No. 4 reported that several jurors shushed 

Juror No. 7 after she heard him make a disparaging comment about 

defense counsel, none of the other jurors, when asked, said they 

heard the comment. And all reaffirmed their ability to render a 

fair and impartial verdict. 

Our review of the record also shows the trial judge bent 

over backwards, likely doing more than was minimally necessary
- 19 -

when a credible claim of jury misconduct is brought to the court's 

attention. With diligence and sensitivity, he questioned each 

juror at least twice and thoughtfully considered whether the 

information his inquiries unearthed meant Tucker was entitled to 

a mistrial. In addressing Tucker's concerns, he reasonably

exercised his discretion to excuse two jurors -- eliminating the 

potential for them to behave improperly during deliberations. 

Further, we perceive no patent abuse of discretion with his 

ultimate conclusion that the remaining jurors were still qualified 

to deliberate and that mistrial was unwarranted. He even went so 

far as to read the transcript of his conversation with Juror No. 

11 to himself and then into the record before securing both 

parties' agreement that Juror No. 11 was qualified to deliberate 

as a member of the jury. See Therrien, 847 F.3d at 18 ("Given the 

circumstances, we are reassured that the trial court's inquiry and 

repeated warnings effectively ascertained the extent and degree of 

any prejudice suffered by Therrien, mitigated the effects of that 

prejudice, and was 'appropriate and reasonable.'" (quoting United 

States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 86 (1st Cir. 2000))); see also

Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 39-40 (concluding the trial judge's 

careful and thoughtful consideration of a jury's potential bias 

revealed through a note sent to the judge during trial resulted in 

a "reasonable and appropriately measured" response); Therrien, 847 
- 20 -

F.3d at 18 n.11 (collecting cases addressing a trial judge's abuse 

of discretion vel non in denying a motion for mistrial).

On the whole, the reported juror misconduct was quite 

minimal. As the experienced trial judge aptly observed, it is 

hardly a cause for any heightened concern that a juror might 

briefly comment about the lawyers or the pace of the trial. There 

was no suggestion that any juror was biased against any group or 

person. Nor was there a suggestion that a juror misled the court 

in voir dire. Nor was there any claim that material, extra-record 

information was involved.

Suppressed Impeachment Evidence

In Tucker's second challenge to his convictions, he says 

he was entitled to a new trial because the government had 

suppressed impeachment information about one of its witnesses.

This information came to Tucker's attention when, a 

couple of months after the jury returned the guilty verdicts, 

Tucker sent a written request to the government for "evidence 

probative to all sentencing issues." In its written response, the 

government (memorializing a phone call it had already made to 

defense counsel) disclosed that it had "inadvertently failed to 

disclose possible impeachment information about" Morgan (who, 

recall, testified about dating and working for Tucker as well as 

about the other women who worked for him). The government 

explained that the prosecutors had known prior to the trial that 
- 21 -

Morgan "had been arrested on state drug charges by the Manchester, 

NH Police Department" but, at that time, had not intended to call 

her to testify at Tucker's trial and so had not included her on 

its witness list or disclosed her arrest to Tucker. A week before 

trial, the government decided to call Morgan to testify but, "in 

the whirlwind of trial preparation," forgot to disclose the state 

arrest and charge information to Tucker. The letter also explained

that, approximately six weeks after trial, one of the federal 

prosecutors noticed Morgan's name on an initial appearance hearing 

calendar in the federal courthouse and "learned for the first time" 

that his office had filed an indictment against Morgan based on 

the state charge for the sale of one gram of fentanyl to one of 

Manchester police's confidential sources.

In response, Tucker filed a motion for new trial pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,8 asserting that the 

failure to disclose Morgan's pretrial arrest, state charge, and 

possible prosecution by the federal government9 violated the 

8 Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows 

the district court, "[u]pon the defendant's motion" to "vacate any 

judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so 

requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). The discovery of new evidence 

falls squarely within this rule and "must be filed within 3 years 

after the verdict." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). Tucker timely 

filed his motion 7 months after the jury returned the guilty 

verdicts. 

9 Morgan's state felony charge was referred to the U.S. 

Attorney's Office shortly after her arrest by the Manchester Police 

Department, but the federal prosecutors (different prosecutors to 
- 22 -

government's obligations under Brady and Giglio,10 and arguing that 

if this impeachment evidence had been disclosed prior to trial

then Tucker would have had a reasonable likelihood of a not guilty 

verdict.11 The government did not dispute that it suppressed 

"potential impeachment evidence" about Morgan but stressed the 

"inadvertent" nature of the suppression and contended Tucker had 

not been prejudiced by the nondisclosure because the evidence had 

little impeachment value when examined against the trial judge's 

pre-trial evidentiary rulings (in which he indicated he would allow 

cross-examination about witnesses' prior convictions and pending 

the ones responsible for Tucker's prosecution) did not decide to 

pursue a federal charge against her until after Tucker's trial 

ended.

10 "Under Brady, the government offends due process if it 

causes prejudice to the defendant by 'either willfully or 

inadvertently' suppressing 'exculpatory or impeaching' evidence in 

its custody or control that is 'favorable to the accused.'" United 

States v. Peake, 874 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United

States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 212 (1st Cir. 2007)); see

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). As we've 

observed, in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), 

"the Supreme Court applied Brady's disclosure obligation to 

'information potentially useful in impeaching government 

witnesses.'" United States v. Calderón, 829 F.3d 84, 88 n.3 (1st 

Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Misla–Aldarondo, 478 F.3d 52, 

63 (1st Cir. 2007)).

11 Tucker also argued in his Rule 33 motion that he was 

entitled to a new trial on the combined basis of the Giglio

violation, other alleged less-than-timely discovery disclosures 

prior to trial, trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance 

during Morgan's cross-examination, and allowing all the witnesses 

to be referred to by their first names only. These other alleged 

grounds for Tucker's motion are not carried forward in his 

appellate arguments.
- 23 -

charges but not prior arrests), the admitted impeachment evidence, 

and other overwhelming testimony corroborating Morgan's. 

Following a hearing, the trial judge denied Tucker's 

motion, acknowledging the failure to disclose the pending charges 

against Morgan likely denied Tucker "the opportunity to truly cross 

[her] about that pro-[g]overnment bias" but also stating that these 

impeachment points "would [not] have been significantly augmented 

by cross-examination using the inadvertently withheld evidence." 

The judge concluded that:

[F]urther evidence about a pending charge wouldn't have 

added much to Tucker's impeachment of Morgan's 

credibility [because t]here was already evidence that 

she was testifying under immunity both on direct and 

cross[,] . . . evidence that she lied to . . . [p]olice, 

that she had a drug addiction, . . . was a drug addict, 

had a prior conviction on her record. 

In addition, he found that Morgan's testimony had been 

"significantly corroborated" for each element of the three charges 

against Tucker. The judge also expressed his frustration at the 

sequence of events that led to the inadvertent suppression of the 

evidence and the resulting questions the defendant and the public 

could reasonably have about the fairness of the trial process, 

even though his confidence in the outcome of the trial ultimately 

was not shaken.12

12 We agree. Of the two issues Tucker brings to us this one 

is more troubling. Tucker spills a little ink arguing that the 

trial judge should not have denied the new trial motion because 

the judge himself thought Tucker was entitled to a new trial. 
- 24 -

On appeal, Tucker asserts the trial judge's decision to 

deny the new trial motion was simply wrong. In our review of 

Tucker's claimed error, we review the trial judge's denial of a 

new-trial motion for abuse of discretion, finding such "only when 

no reasonable person could agree with the judge's decision." 

Laureano-Salgado, 933 F.3d at 29. "This is as it should be," id., 

the trial judge "has a special sense of the ebb and flow of the 

trial . . . [so] we afford substantial deference to the [judge's] 

views regarding the likely impact of belatedly disclosed 

evidence," United States v. Peake, 874 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2017)

(deletion and citations omitted). "We also keep in mind that the 

new-trial remedy 'must be used sparingly, and only where a 

miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.'" LaureanoSalgado, 933 F.3d at 29 (quoting United States v. Conley, 249 F.3d 

38, 45 (1st Cir. 2001)).

To prevail on a new-trial motion based on newly

discovered evidence, ordinarily the defendant must show "that the 

Tucker is referring to the judge's comment that "if it were . . . 

'up to me' I'd order a new trial." The way Tucker interprets this

comment, the judge thought "there was a reasonable probability of 

a different result." But when the judge's full comment is read in 

the context of his decision denying Tucker's motion for a new 

trial, it's clear this statement was part of his express 

frustration with the prosecutors and with the situation created by 

their unintentional suppression of the impeachment evidence, and 

that the judge was simply acknowledging that a feeling of 

unfairness could linger for Tucker.
- 25 -

evidence (1) was either unknown or unavailable to him during the 

trial; (2) could not have been uncovered sooner with diligence; 

(3) is material, not just cumulative or impeaching; and (4) is 

sufficiently compelling that it would probably produce an 

acquittal at a retrial." Id. at 28 (string citing cases parroting

this well-established standard). This court has acknowledged this 

is "a hefty burden" for the defendant. Id. When, however (and as 

here), the defendant's new-trial motion is based on an alleged

Brady or Giglio violation, the third and fourth prongs are merged 

and tweaked, creating a more defendant-friendly standard for 

showing the defendant's prejudice. To be sure, the defendant "must 

still satisfy the first and second elements (unavailability and 

due diligence)," but "the third and fourth elements (materiality 

and prejudice) [are replaced] with 'a unitary requirement that the 

defendant need demonstrate only a reasonable probability that, had 

the evidence been disclosed to the defense in a timely manner, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Id. at 28-

29 (quoting Peake, 874 F.3d at 69). "So rather than having to 

show 'actual probability that the result would have differed,' a 

defendant need show only 'something sufficient to undermine 

confidence' in the jury's verdict." Id. at 29 (quoting United

States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 504 (1st Cir. 2010)) (additional 

internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
- 26 -

Both sides agree that the first two elements (evidence 

was unknown to the defendant during the trial through no lack of 

diligence on his part) are met. The point of contention centers 

on the merged inquiry into materiality and prejudice and whether

there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial 

would have been different if Morgan's pending state charge and 

potential prosecution by the feds had been disclosed prior to 

trial. As the parties argue, this merged materiality/prejudice 

inquiry turns on four factors distilled from our previous 

discussions and assessments of the "reasonable likelihood" 

standard: Whether the impeachment evidence (1) is strong, (2) 

impeaches on a collateral issue, (3) is cumulative of other 

evidence on the record, and (4) the impeachable witness's 

substantive testimony is corroborated by other evidence in the 

record. See United States v. Paladin, 748 F.3d 438, 444-48 (1st 

Cir. 2014). As we have said before, "[t]he strength of impeachment 

evidence and the effect of suppression are evaluated in the context 

of the entire record to determine materiality," id. at 444 (citing 

Conley, 415 F.3d at 189), "[e]vidence is immaterial where it is 

cumulative or merely impeaches a witness on a collateral issue,"

id. (citing United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 

2000)), and "suppressed impeachment evidence has little probative 

value if additional evidence strongly corroborates the witness's 
- 27 -

testimony the suppressed evidence might have impeached," id.

(quoting Conley, 415 F.3d at 189). 

Tucker argues each factor cuts in his favor; the 

government disagrees for all but one factor. We start our 

discussion with the factor on which the parties do agree: that 

the suppressed impeachment evidence was not collateral. Evidence 

is collateral when it is not "relevant for a purpose other than 

mere contradiction of the . . . [witness's] . . . in-court 

testimony." Id. at 448 (quoting United States v. Beauchamp, 986 

F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993)). This court has indicated, however, 

that a "witness's self-interest or motive to testify falsely is 

generally considered to be a non-collateral issue." Beauchamp, 

986 F.2d at 4. Tucker contends that the suppressed impeachment 

evidence was not merely collateral because it went directly to 

Morgan's credibility as a key witness and that, without this 

impeachment evidence, the jury was left with the misleading 

impression that she had no ongoing motive for bias in favor of 

pleasing the government. The government agrees that the suppressed 

information here is not collateral. We agree with the parties,

see id., and move on.

The strength of the suppressed evidence factor considers 

whether the impeachment value is "merely marginal." Paladin, 748 

F.3d at 444 (quoting Mathur, 624 F.3d at 505). If the value is 

marginal, then the withheld evidence will be "manifestly 
- 28 -

insufficient to place the trial record in 'such a different light 

as to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" Id. (quoting Mathur, 

624 F.3d at 505). Tucker again asserts that the suppressed 

impeachment evidence would have revealed the depth of Morgan's 

potential for bias in that Tucker was denied the opportunity to 

argue "that her criminal conduct was ongoing and that she had a 

reason to shade her testimony in favor of the government." He 

says that the district court was wrong to conclude that the 

suppressed evidence wouldn't have increased any doubt of Morgan's 

credibility because a motive for bias at the time of the trial 

testimony is different than other forms of bias inherent to a 

witness as a result of their life experiences (e.g., Morgan's drug 

addiction and previous convictions).

For its part, the government contends that the potential 

impeachment value of the suppressed evidence was "weak" because 

the jury actually heard Morgan had a pending felony charge at the 

time of her testimony (though not the nature of the charge or that 

it was a state case and not (yet) also a federal prosecution) and 

her acknowledgment that her testimony in this case wouldn't affect 

the result of that pending charge. Here's how some of the 

questioning played out at trial: At the beginning of Morgan's 

testimony, the government asked her about her criminal history.

Q. Now, you have a conviction for felony possession of 

drugs; is that right?

A. Yes.
- 29 -

Q. And was there an occasion in Las Vegas where you 

gave a false name to a law enforcement officer?

A. Yes.

Q. And you currently have a pending felony, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it your understanding that no promises are 

being made in exchange for your pending felony?

A. Yes.

Q. So, you understand that your testimony today is not 

going to impact that, right?

A. Yes.

. . .

Q. Okay. So, Morgan, I'm going to ask you some 

questions that, if you answer them truthfully, may 

incriminate you.

A. Okay.

Q. And you are aware that you've been given immunity 

today, right?

A. Yes.

Q. So, you won't be prosecuted for what you testify 

about today. Do you understand that?

A. Yes.

Q. But you also understand that you must testify 

truthfully today?

A. Yes.

In addition, partway through Morgan's direct testimony, she 

answered questions about the time New Hampshire police pulled over 

a car she was riding in and she "got arrested with [Tucker's] 

drugs."

Tucker's cross-examination did not ask any follow-up 

questions about her conviction or pending felony charge. Instead, 

the cross focused on Morgan's activities while working for Tucker 

and primarily explored why she had not told the police (when she 

had contact with them) about the harm she claimed she suffered 
- 30 -

from him as well as whether she worked for another pimp during the 

same time period she worked for Tucker. 

Responding to Tucker's assertions about the strength of 

the suppressed impeachment evidence, the trial judge called it

"not particularly strong," a characterization we agree with given 

that the jury heard the fact of the pending felony charge and 

Tucker had an opportunity (even if he didn't use it) to explore it 

during cross. See Paladin, 748 F.3d at 444 (confidence in a 

verdict is not undermined by suppressed impeachment evidence of 

marginal value). The trial judge next examined whether the new 

information was cumulative of impeachment evidence in the trial 

record or whether Morgan's testimony was significantly 

corroborated. We examine these factors next. 

Starting with cumulativeness, "[s]uppressed evidence 

that is cumulative of evidence presented at trial is immaterial." 

Paladin, 748 F.3d at 446 (quoting United States v. Avilés-Colón, 

536 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008)). The inquiry here focuses on 

whether the witness to whom the withheld impeachment evidence 

applies was "already impeached at trial by the same kind of 

evidence." Id. (quoting Conley, 415 F.3d at 192) (deletion and 

emphasis omitted). 

Tucker argues the suppressed information about Morgan's 

pending charge was not cumulative of other impeachment evidence 

presented at trial as the government itself asked Morgan whether 
- 31 -

she had any prior convictions or contact with the justice system.

Morgan answered by admitting to a few prior run-ins with the law. 

She acknowledged a prior conviction for felony possession of drugs, 

a time when she had given a false name to a police officer in 

Vegas, and to a pending felony charge, though the government did 

not ask for details of any of these contacts with the justice 

system and Morgan did not offer any additional details. Tucker 

homes in on the difference between using a prior conviction to 

impeach Morgan's credibility and a pending prosecution as motive 

for testifying in a way that will please the government. The progovernment bias is even worse here, says Tucker, because the same 

office prosecuting Tucker had been considering prosecuting Morgan 

for the conduct underlying the state felony drug charge that Morgan 

knew was pending at the time of trial. Tucker insists that his 

trial defense counsel would have structured Morgan's crossexamination differently had this key impeachment evidence not been 

suppressed.

Not so fast, counters the government. Morgan could only 

be biased in favor of making a good impression on the federal 

prosecutors if she knew they (or their office) were considering 

their own prosecution based on the alleged conduct underlying her

pending state charge, but there was no indication that she knew

before or during her trial testimony that her state charge had 

been referred to the U.S. Attorney's office. Regardless, continues 
- 32 -

the government, the jury knew Morgan was testifying under an 

immunity agreement,13 so it was aware that Morgan had a current 

relationship with the prosecution and a reason to curry favor with 

it. The additional information about the possibility of a federal 

charge was therefore, according to the government, cumulative of 

all the other impeachment fodder indisputably on the record.

We believe the government has the better argument here. 

Whether or not Tucker picked up on the pending felony inquiry 

during Morgan's direct examination, he knew about the immunity 

agreement and the potential bias this could create because Morgan 

would be motivated on this front to keep the government happy.14 

13 The trial judge provided a special instruction to the jury 

after Haley's testimony and before Morgan's about what it means to 

testify under the promise of immunity and reiterated the 

instruction after Morgan's testimony: "[Y]ou should determine 

whether or not the witness's testimony has been colored in any way 

because of the grant of immunity." 

14 We also note that the trial judge explicitly indicated 

pending charges were ripe fodder for challenging a witness's 

credibility during cross-examination. During the final pre-trial 

conference, the trial judge (when discussing the admissibility of 

prior convictions and pending charges) said that "pending charges 

go to bias, go to credibility, even if it's in another 

jurisdiction. . . . [I]t's fair cross-examination to ask a witness 

if they are facing criminal charges somewhere and the usual followup about wanting to curry favor with law enforcement. . . . [Y]ou 

can inquire as to pending charges on cross-examination but not as 

to the nature of those charges." Morgan testified two days later. 

There is no doubt that Tucker had several bases for impeaching 

Morgan's credibility. That he did not either explore or exploit 

the information about her then-pending charge does not help Tucker 

meet his burden to show a reasonable probability that had the 

suppressed evidence been revealed before or during trial, the jury 
- 33 -

See Paladin, 748 F.3d at 447 ("A prejudicial Brady violation has 

not been effected, however, where the defendant already had 

available to him evidence that would have allowed for impeachment 

on the same or similar topics.") As in Paladin, the details (if 

deemed admissible at trial) about Morgan's pending state felony 

and referral to the federal prosecutors for consideration "would 

have permitted one additional avenue to accomplish" showing the 

jury that Morgan had a motive to testify in a way to please the 

government and was, thus, not a credible witness. See id. We 

therefore agree with the trial judge's conclusion that the 

suppressed evidence was cumulative of other impeachment evidence.

We proceed now to the last factor of our four-point 

inquiry: Corroboration. As we mentioned above, "[s]uppressed 

impeachment evidence has little probative value if additional 

evidence strongly corroborates the witness's testimony the 

suppressed evidence might have impeached." Id. at 448 (quoting 

Conley, 415 F.3d at 189). Tucker stresses that Morgan's testimony 

was crucial to the count for trafficking of a minor because she 

was the only witness to provide any detail about how Tucker knew 

or should have known that Jasmine was a minor during the time 

would have reached a different verdict. See Paladin, 748 F.3d at 

447.
- 34 -

period in question.15 The government responds that both Jasmine 

and Haley provided corroborative testimony that Tucker knew 

Jasmine was underage, so the jury could easily have reached the 

same verdict even if it ultimately discredited Morgan's testimony. 

Let's take a look at what evidence the trial produced on the issue 

of corroboration.

As we summarized above, Morgan testified that Tucker 

told her Jasmine was only 17 years old after the three had been 

stopped on the highway and Morgan got arrested for the drugs found 

in the backseat of the car. Tucker was "pissed" because the needle 

found in the backseat had been Jasmine's, but she hadn't fessed up 

to claim ownership. Morgan understood from Tucker that had Jasmine 

owned up then she wouldn't have been in much trouble because of 

her age (i.e., she would have been treated as a juvenile offender). 

When Jasmine was on the stand, she testified that she had told 

Tucker her age and he "kind of avoided it." Haley, for her part, 

testified that when she learned Jasmine was underage, she tried to 

talk to Tucker about it but he "told me that she was of age and I 

15 During the trial judge's oral decision denying Tucker's 

motion for new trial, he went through each element of each count 

and stated which witness had also provided testimony from which 

the jury could have concluded the element had been met. As the 

government points out, Tucker only argues about the lack of 

corroboration with respect to the knowledge element of the 

trafficking-of-a-minor count, so we follow his lead and examine 

whether there was in fact corroborating testimony on this element

only.
- 35 -

got into an argument with him." She then stated she was present 

when he did find out Jasmine was in fact underage and said he did 

not do anything with the information.

Tucker tries to convince us that Haley and Jasmine's 

testimonies cannot be considered corroborative of Morgan's 

testimony because Morgan provided greater detail about Tucker's 

knowledge. While neither Haley nor Jasmine provided a detailed

context for Tucker knowing Jasmine was underage, each directly 

stated that she was present when he learned Jasmine's age.16 This

is consistent with Morgan's testimony that, during the relevant 

time period, Tucker knew Jasmine's age, even if not exactly 

duplicative of his acknowledgement of his knowledge. The absence 

of the detail in Haley's and Jasmine's testimonies does not detract 

from their uncontroverted statements that Tucker knew Jasmine's 

age and corroborated Morgan's testimony on this point.17

16 When the trial judge discussed the testimony in the record 

that corroborated Morgan's, he mentioned Haley "testif[ied] that 

Jasmine couldn't buy cigarettes because she was under 18," but, as 

Tucker has been quick to point out, this is a part of Haley's 

testimony to which the judge had sustained an objection on hearsay 

grounds. Tucker suggests this was a clearly wrong finding of fact 

on which the trial judge relied. A close look at Haley's testimony 

reveals she made that comment when she was describing when and how 

she knew Jasmine was underage. So the judge's misrecollection of 

the record has no bearing on what Tucker knew and when, but Haley's 

other (and admitted) testimony corroborated Morgan's about the 

fact of Tucker's knowledge.

17 We also acknowledge that, during cross-examination of these 

witnesses, Tucker's trial counsel may have, for strategic reasons, 

not wanted to probe the testimony about Tucker's knowledge of 
- 36 -

Summing up the factors in controversy, we find the 

suppressed impeachment evidence about Morgan was immaterial 

because the evidentiary strength was weak, the information about 

her pending state charge and her potential federal charge was 

merely cumulative of other impeachment evidence on the record, and 

Morgan's testimony about Jasmine's age was sufficiently 

corroborated by other witnesses. See id. at 444. Accordingly, 

though the undisclosed information was not collateral we

nonetheless conclude that its suppression does not undermine the 

confidence in the jury's guilty verdicts because there was not a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome had the government 

produced the information about Morgan's pending state charge 

before or during trial. See id. at 450. The trial judge did not, 

therefore, abuse his discretion when he denied Tucker's motion for 

a new trial. See Laureano-Salgado, 933 F.3d at 28-29.

Last Words

All that is left to say is Tucker's convictions are 

affirmed.

Jasmine's age and the circumstances surrounding his knowledge. 

But the weight to be given to properly admitted evidence was up to 

the jury. See United States v. Cruz-Ramos, 987 F.3d 27, 38 (1st 

Cir. 2021) ("[D]etermining where the truth lies is the sort of 

work that falls squarely within the jury's province." (quoting 

United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 46 (1st Cir. 2007))).