ain 


IFESSIONAL BULLETIN FOR ARMY ENGINEERS I 


eadqualters, Department of the Army 

wlicn is unlimited 
F k 


'

C 

-.LEAR THE WAY 

By Major General Daniel W. Christman 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

1n today's climate of change, the Engineer School 

continues to be a proactive force. We are committed to addressing issues that will allow engineers 

to meet the demands of a downsized Army. 

In an effort to rapidly implement emerging technologies, TRADOC has recently formed six Battle 

Labs. The six labs (Dismounted Battle Space, 

Mounted Battle Space, Depth and Simultaneous Attack, Battle Command, Early Entry, and Combat Service Support) will define high payoff requirements for 

the conduct of future operations. Each lab, operating 

within the structure of the Concepts Based Requirements System, will collect and examine ideas and 

technology, refine requirements, and generally serve 

as a fertile environment for fast-track developments. 

The Engineer School has formed a cell, headed by 

Colonel Wy Leadbetter, to supporl the Battle Lab effort and ensure that engineer combined arms initiatives receive maximum visibility. 

In August we presented the Engineer Functional 

Review, which is a comprehensive personnel wrapup, to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 

Lieutenant General Thomas P. Carney. The Eng~neer 

Functional Review was a precursor to the Engineer 

Functional Area Assessment (FAA), which was 

presented to the Vice Chief of Staff in October. We 

used the FY 92 FAA to examine the impacts of 

downsizing and restructurng the engineer force 

through the next several years. My focus was on 

equipment modernization, an area which has been 

"broken" for years. Will give you a complete update 

on FAA details in the next edition of ENGINEER. 

Regarding another personnel issue of concern, a 

Presidential Commission convened to address the assignment of women in the Armed Forces. To that end, 

Commissioner Herres, General (Retired) U.S. Air 

Force, asked for my views on this subject. After gathering data and speaking with commanders in the field, 

as well as a broad cross section of women, I have concluded that all positions in the Engineer Branch should 

be opened to women. I know this is a tough call, but 

our female soldiers must be afforded full opportunity to 

pursue careers in the military. I would like to share 

with you the views I forwarded to the commission. My 

testimony, provided in full, begins on page 2. 

The preliminary draft of FM 100-5, Operations, was 

released in September (distribution of the final field 

manual is scheduled for May 1993). The new manual 

will reflect an evolutionary, not revolutionary, change 

in Army doctrine: AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1986 

version remains relevant. Changes, for the most part, 

will reflect changes in our environment and a desire 

to extend capstone doctrine into areas not emphasized previously. 

The manual describes the Army as a force projection Army, fully integrated into joint operations, and 

often participating in battle as part of a coalition. Success is described as a Total Army achievement-Active, Reserve, and civilians. Doctrine emphasizes the 

concept of "balance:" a balance of armored, light, and 

special operating forces; balance between the offense 

and defense; and balance between fire and 

maneuver New ground is broken in discussions of 

"operations other than war." 

Publication of the 1993 FM 100-5 will require 

revisions in other doctrinal manuals, including FM 101- 

5, Command and Control of Commanders and Staff, 

and FM 5-100, Engineer Operations. 

Finally, some lessons learned from Hurricanes 

Andrew and lniki. The scope of the storms' devastation was enormous, and getting engineer teams on 

the ground early to assess the damage was critical. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineer districts and local offices were well prepared for early response, and Army 

engineers are playing a vital role in assisting with the 

clean-up efforts. Much of the engineer effort has been 

horizontal and tested our hauling and loading 

capabilities. Hard engineering skills and the development of contingency plans to support natural disasters, however, are areas where engineers need to 

improve. Suggest you read Chapter 3 of FM 5-114, 

Engineer Operations Short of War, which provides 

procedures for supporting disaster relief efforts. Will 

provide additional feedback on this important mission 

area in forthcoming issues of this bulletin. 

As ahvays, engineers are at the forefront of changes 

occurring within our Army. We will stay in front if we 

focus on quality support to the combined arms team 

and to all our customers; we must truly function as "One 

Army," Active, ReSe~e, and civilians alike. ESSAYONS! 
-- 

F*r( 

- I 

w

r fl.r .rl 	 w ,r ,r. 1 : 8 -

November 1992 	 Volume 22 PB 5-924 .. ..-	 --

I 

UNITED STATES ARMY 	 FEATURES 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 2 MG Daniel W. Christman's Testimony to: Presidential 


FORT LEONARD WOOD Commision on the Assignment of Women in the Armed 


Forces 


5 	Reserve Engineer Command: Helping Latin America 

by Major Roberl R. Boffin, Jr. and Major Jimmy E. Fowler COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 

Major General Daniel W. Christman 12 Water Distribution in a Bare-bones Base Camp 

by Major Michael W. Biering 

16 Living With Foreign Commercial Construction Equipment MANAGING EDITOR by Captain William J. Penny and Captain Paul D. Crarner 

Catherine Eubanks 


20 The Battle of Chancellorsville 
 FEATURES EDITOR 

Phillip R. Howell, Jr 	 1 by First Lieutenant John A. Vigna 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 25 Improving Combat Intelligence With Engineer Scouts 

Jennifer C. Bolyard ! by First Lieutenant Douglas Zaenger 

28 Engineers in Rough Terrain Airborne Operations .-- I by Captain William E. Rapp 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 32 Expanding Productivity By Trying Something Different 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN bv Second Lieutenant Dean W. Kucera 

General, United States Army 	 40 Engineer Support to Reconnaissance Chief of Staff by Captain Thomas W. Kula 

Official: 	 16 Address by Lieutenant General Franqois Bresson 

43&dQL.&- "lnspecteur du Genie" to Students at the U.S. Army 

Engineer School 

MILTON H. HAMILTON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army / nEPARTb7EhlTS 

I 

02743 

Inside Fmnt Cover: Clear the Way I 

11 Personal Viewpoint 52 Engineer Update 

Cover: Second Lieutenant Gene I 9 Book Review 55 Past in Review Freeland ties one of seven required knots 

during a sapper test. 36 Lessons Learned 57 Bridge the Gap 

-. ..~-

ENGINEER (ISSN 0046-19890) is prepared quaiterly by me US Army En~ of expeeise Views expressed are m- at the author end do not necessarily 

gineer School, AVN: ATSE-TOM-PB. For1 Leonard Wwd, MO 65473-6650 reflect oncia, Army or TRAOOC posltions. nor does the mntent change or superSecond Class postage 1s pala at Fort Leonard Wood. MO, end additonel mslllng sede informaton in other aMcis1 Army publications. ENGINEER reservesthe ilght 

omces to ed~tmeterial 

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to ENGINEER me Protesstonal Bui- CONTENT IS not copyrighted. MsCrial may be reprinted if credl is given m iet~ntor Army Engineers. AiiN: ATSE-TDM-PB, Fori Leonard Wood. MO 65.173~ ENG~NEERB~~ me aumor.

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION is iarDeCd to all engineer and engineer-relsted 

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DISCMMER: ENGiNEER presenn prafesionai infarmaton deslgned to keep 20402. Address changss for personal subscriptions should alu, be sent to the 

Army engineers informed ol current and emerging developments wthin meir areas Superintenden( ol Documen* 

6650 
MG Daniel W. Christman's Testimony to: 


Presidential Commission on the Assignment of 


Women in the Armed Forces 


r. Commissioner, distinguished members of 

the Commission. Deealv . - aaareciate .. the ODporiunity to submit testimony to this commission. I 

fully understand the importance and the sensitivity 

of the issues you have asked me to address. Previous witnesses from my service have attested to 

the commitment all of us in the Army share to provide the best opportunity for our female soldiers. I 

share fully in that commitment. I would like to 

offer some perspectives from my position as branch 

chief for a significant combat arms branch of our 

Army-the Corps of Engineers-where females are 

currently permitted to serve. 

Would like first to give you a brief personal background on my earlier assignments, and then outline the situation prevailing today in my branch 

with respect to assignment of female soldiers. I 

then intend to outline steps I have taken to open, 

within practical limits, additional positions in the 

engineers for women. I'll close with a specific 

recommendation regarding the most difficult assignment issuethe role of women in those units at 

the "point of contact" for the land battle and what, 

if anything, I would do beyond those steps I initiated this spring for female engineer officers. 

By way of background, I am the Commanding 

General of the Army's second largest basic combat 

training installation. Although our primary day-today mission is in the training arena, we also are 

the home for several 'I'able of Organization and 

Equipment (TOE) units belonging to the AEmy's 

Forces Command. Fort Leonard Wood became the 

home four years ago for the combat engineer 

branch, and at our engineer schoolhouse we are currently training 896 engineer officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), of which 102 are 

women. In addition, we are training 9,547 initial 

entry soldiers, of which 1,906 are women. Of the 

16,220 soldiers currently assigned to Fort Leonard 

Wood, 2,700 are women. At the Engineer Center we 

also have roughly 2,100 civilian employees, 55 percent of whom are women. 

My previous command positions in the Army involved company and battalion commands in Korea, 

Vietnam and Germany; each of these was an allmale organization. At the full colonel level, I commanded the Savannah District, United States 

Army Corps of Engineers, an organization composed primarily of civilians; approxin~ately 33 percent of the 1,100 employees at Savannah were 

women. 

As branch chief, the issue of female career opportunities, particularly for female officers, has been a 

front burner issue for me since I assumed command of the Engineer Center. Roughly five percent 

of our Active Component officer corps is female, 

and although the vast majority of our officer, NCO, 

and enlisted positions are open to females, particularly for the grades of major and above, a significant number of positions remain closed. This 

generally involves service at battalion level and 

below for the divisional and corps combat engineer 

battalions of our TOE Army. 

Although promotion opportunities for women in 

my branch are roughly comparable to their male 

counterparts, very few women are currently found 

in the Corps of Engineers at grades above captain. 

The decline in the percentage of women represented at each grade level in the engineers is reflective of the broader Army situation: Army-wide, 

females represent 21 percent of lieutenants but 

this percentage declines to only 3 percent at the 

grade of colonel; in the enlisted grades, 13 percent 

of the privates are female, but the number falls to 
2 percent at the sergeant major level. 

The situation outlined above is exacerbated for 

our Active Component engineer officers by planned 

reductions in Army end strength which affect certain 

engineer units disproportionately. Army combat 

heavy engineer battalions, for example, will be significantly reduced in the outyears. Those units have 

traditionally been the source of greatest lieutenant, 

captain, and junior major experiences which qualify 

young female officers for promotion to lieutenant 

colonel and battalion command. Taken together, in 

projecting engineer end strength through 1996, the 

percentage of "key troop positions" (platoon leader, 

company commander, battalion executive officer, battalion S-3, etc.) open to females will be reduced at 

the captain level from 35 to 31 percent; at the major 

level the reduction will be from 32 to 29 percent. 

Ironically, this will occur while female strength increases within the branch. While male strength is 

projected to decline by 31 percent, female strength 

will actually increase by nine percent between now 

and 1996. Additionally, would like to point out that 

the number of women entering command age is increasing exponentially, with little accommodation in 

increased opportunity. 

That completes a quick review of the personnel 

data for my branch. A complete picture of the 

branch, however, requires more than data; it requires a look as well at attitudes and outlooks. 

Thus, I must also share with you perceptions of 

female officers within the Corps. I have spoken to 

female cadets at West Point who chose the engineers as a branch, and to many female 

lieutenants and captains who are assigned as students at Fort Leonard Wood in the Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced courses and as permanent party cadre. From this group emerges a 

clear perception that career advancement potential is seriously constrained given current assignment policies which prohibit service in combat battalions. Even though senior positions are open to 

women, females sense they cannot qualify for 

those positions through branch assignments at 

lieutenant and captain levels. As a result, many 

leave the military following their initial periods of 

obligated service. This perception is perhaps best 

reflected in the words of one young officer, who 

wrote to our school recently about assignment 

policies. Her words are typical of the views of 

many in our branch: "Opportunities for female engineer officers have followed a roller-coaster path. 

Stop coding positions; either completely open or 

completely close branches." The view of female officers at Fort Leonard Wood on this issue is almost unanimous: open the branch now, and open 

it completely 

In view of these conditions, last spring I 

directed that additional positions, heretofore 

closed to females, be opened to women at the first 

opportunity. These included company command 

positions for bridge companies as well as staff positions in the newly formed engineer brigades that 

were created internal to each mechanized and armored division. This decision had a significant and 

positive impact on authorized positions open to 

females. At the lieutenant and captain grades, opportunity will increase markedly rather than 

decrease as previously projected; field grade positions will remain essentially unchanged rather 

than decrease; and "key troop leading positions" 

will be expanded significantly. The chart (page 4) 

summarizes the impact of these changes. Although 

Table of Distribution and Allowances positions are 

gender neutral, women are precluded from service 

in some units at Fort Leonard Wood due to previous military occupational specialty (MOS) 

documentation. I issued guidance to review these 

positions and make changes to open to the maximum extent possible all positions to females. 

These are limited first steps. Engineer branch is 

a popular branch among females because of the 

high percentage of our career fields open to 
Engineer Officer Corps Key Troop Positions* 


Percentage Open to Females 


*Includes Platoon Leader, Company Commander, EN XO, EN 5-3,ADE, Bde Engineer, 

Bn Commander, and BrigadeiGroup Commander 

women-24 of our 29 enlisted MOS and all of our 

officer and warrant officer specialties are open in 

whole or in part. I want to maintain this branch enthusiasm, and cpnsequently there is much more I 

would prefer to do. However, as previous Army witnesses have explained, the combat engineers are 

not independent actors on the battlefield. We 

operate as a member of a tightly knit combined 

arms team. Thus, I am reluctant to open positions 

at the level of combat battalion and below until 

positions in those branches with whom we most 

closely interact-infantry and armor-are also 

opened to females. For the time being, I agree that 

these branches-and only these branches--should 

remain closed. I recognize there is ongoing debate 

on the impact of an immediate opening of positions 

in these units to women. One approach I favor-although fraught with the danger of being perceived 

as yet another delay-is a "field test" for a limited 

number of units in these branches. Hopefully, the 

results of such a test can dispel the hysteria associated with the role of women in close combat 

and provide decision makers with a set of data conducive to objective conclusions. I am convinced we 

can fabricate such a test using our combat training 

centers and a limited portion of our TOE force in a 

way which does not impede the combat readiness of 

our total force. 

Where does this leave the combat engineers? Unfortunately, in a dilemma. Unlike the infantry and 

armor branches, significant numbers of females are 

already in my branch, as outlined above. My bias is 

to be inclusive, not exclusive. Success factors in 

war are training, planning, coordinating, rehearsing, discipline, team effort, and leadership. Female 

soldiers are already versed in each of these areas 

and have clearly demonstrated their tactical and 

professional competence in engineer positions currently open to both sexes. Why ignore this tremenleaders regarding career potential outlined earlier, 

I would urge opening my branch entirely to 

women. I recognize this places engineers apart 

from other members of the close combat combined 

arms team, but I would rather deal with this than 

perpetuate a "coding" policy which is increasingly 

difficult to rationalize on the modern, fluid battlefield of precision-guided, deep-strike weapons 

and simultaneous attacks throughout the depth of 

the battle area. 

We must allow women to have a career in the 

Corps of Engineers-not just a specific job or assignment today A large percentage of female engineer officers feel that coding key troop leadership 

positions in combat engineer units as "male only" 

has denied them the opportunity to gain experience 

and places them at a distinct competitive disadvantage with their male peers. 

We have advanced considerably since 1760 when 

our first female soldier, Deborah Sampson, had to 

impersonate a man to serve her country. We must 

look to the future and provide women with greater 

access to career enhancing positions. Patience and 

perseverance will be needed; instant equality in all 

branches is not possible for the reasons spelled out 

so well by Lieutenant General Peay and others. 

However, the Army must move beyond the current 

debate and resolve quickly the issue of female roles 

in our Services. The time spent addressing and 

readdressing this issue is rapidly preempting other 

important matters and serves to accentuate the distinctions between our male and female soldiers 

rather than focus on our united aspirations. 

One of our Army's goals is to be the premier 

employer. We can only attain this goal through 

equal opportunity for all. Know it is a tough call, 

but it is time to get on with changes so that female 

soldiers will be afforded full and equal opportunity 

to pursue careers in the military 

dous resource? In this light and in view of the per- Appreciate the opportunity to respond to this disceptions and frustrations of female engineer tinguished commission. w 

4 Engineer 
By Major Robert R. Bottin, Jr. and Major Jimmy E. Fowler 

F;$1ngineer teams from the 412th Engineer Corn. 

.A mand are training in South and Central 

America in support of U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM). SOUTHCOM's area of operations 

ranges from the southern border of Mexico in 

Central America to the southern tip of Chile in 

South America. American national interests in this 

theater include preservation of stable, non-repressive, democratic national governments and cessation of illicit drug trafficking in the theater. To 

achieve these interests, the Department of Defense 

includes among its objectives the development of 

nation infrastructure, the detection and countering 

of narcotics trafficking, and the improvement of 

professionalism among national security forces. 

The 412th, headquartered in Vicksburg, Mississippi, is a major United States Army Reserve Command assigned to Second U.S. Army. It's also a 

major subordinate command (MSC) of United 

States Army, Europe (USAREUR) and Seventh 

Army, and is the Engineer Command for Europe. 

Commanded by Major General Gene P. Hale, the 

412th would command about 50,000 engineer 

troops on mobilization. Due to its mission, the 

412th has been designated a direct deploying unit, 

the first such unit in the Reserve Components. 

This means the unit deploys directly to its wartime area of operations without first processing 

through a mobilization station as other Reserve 

units do. 

country teams conduct site inspections and prepare work es 

tlrnmes for potential 

nation assistance 

projects. Estlrnates 

Include the manpower, number and 

sizes of culverts, 

materials, and equipment needed to complete the project. 
Bridges along the 

routes to potential 

projects must be cias- " 

. . ~..., 1 sified to ensure equip . . ..,. >, 

;;*:.. 

j., >. ment and materlais ,.: :':,

-. , 

. , can reach the slte. . 

The 412th recently acquired the mission of 

providing engineer support to SOUTHCOM. 

SOUTHCOM's need for support coincided with 

events in world politics which have reduced the 

unit's opportunities for conducting realistic 

European engineer-related mission training. The 

SOUTHCOM mission provides an excellent opportunity for unit training and, at the same time, 

meets SOUTHCOM's unfulfilled engineer 

requirements. 

The engineer command is acting as an extension 

of t,he SOUTHCOM engineer staff and assists in 

the development of engineer work estimates, engineer annexes to ambassador country plans, engineer construction management plans, and engineer force structure plans. Each country has a 

designated country chief who is responsible for coordinating engineer assistance in support of both 

short- and long-range country plans, goals and objectives. This individual develops and maintains an 

overall knowledge and institutional memory concerning the assigned country, is an active participant in engineer-related planning activities, and 

directs the activities of that country's deployment 

teams. To assist in the coordination of country 

team visits, the 412th established a forward element that is composed of two field-grade engineer 

officers and one senior operationsladministrative 

noncommissioned officer. 

Country deployment teams from the 412th normally consist of two or three officers and one NCO. 

To the maximum extent possible, each team is 

tailored to meet deployment mission needs. At least 

one, and preferably two, of the team members are 

graduate engineers. The deployment team chief is 

a graduate engineer (lieutenant colonel or major). 

Country deployment teams are generally supported 

during country visits by one administrative support 

individual who remains at SOUTHCOM Engineer's 

(SCEN) office in Panama. This soldier assists in 

trip report preparation, project file maintenance, 

and related duties. 

In addition to 412th personnel, the teams include members from the Air Force and Mobile District, Corps of Engineers. While in country the 

teams conduct site inspections and prepare work estimates for potential nation assistance and counterdrug projects. These estimates include projections 

of manpower, material, and equipment requirements, and the timeframe in which the projects 

could be constructed. The projects are then 

evaluated in terms of their potential as sites for 

the deployment of engineer troops for training. 

Since initial deployments in 1990, engineer 

teams have deployed to Bolivia, Colombia, Costa 

Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Panama, Peru, 

Uruguay, and Venezuela. In Bolivia and Peru, engineer teams evaluated airfields, road construction, 

and water supplylsanitation projects. 

Road construction projects and a ferry dock terminal project were evaluated in Costa Rica. In 

Ecuador, river port facilities, potable water supply 

projects, sewer sanitation projects, road and bridge 

projects, and airfield projects were assessed. In 

Guatemala, a site for a military base headquarters, 

extension andlor repair of existing airport runways, 

repair of a quaywall (seawall), a water quality improvement project, water well drilling projects, and 

a road construction project were investigated. The 

team deployed to Panama furnished support to 

6 Engineer 
SOUTHCOM by conducting route reconnaissance 

and bridge classification for 11road construction 

projects. 

In Uruguay the team evaluated potential sites 

for water supply and well-drilling operations. The 

Venezuela team did not visit any sites but did consult with Venezuelan military officials to identify 

numerous potential projects, including solar energy 

projects, water supply, and sanitation. These 

projects would alleviate health hazards and foster 

economic growth by expanding the country's infrastructures and providing access to underdeveloped areas. Some projects would also provide 

facilities to aid in combating narcotics trafficking. 

IJrojectSunin~aqr 

4n engineer work estimate (project summary) 

\provides a description of the project, scope of 

work required, the general priority of the project 

both from the host nation's and the country team's 

perspective, how the project relates to the 

ambassador's goals, and general specifications for 

construction. The summary will also specify 

material, manpower, equipment, and construction 

time requirements for specific project assessments 

for short-term tasking, and execution by U.S. 

military units and/or host nation forces. The 

project summaries may also serve as precursors to 

final design/construction documents or as the basis 

for more detailed project planning. The project summary includes a recommendation as to whether 

trwp or contract effort should be used. A typical engineer work estimate (project summary) is shown 

below: 

Cano Blanco Road (Costa Rica) 


Project Summary 


a. Location. The project, which includes the improvement and construction of a road between 

Maryland and Parismina, is located in the Limon 

Province. Equipment could be shipped via sea 

transport to the Port of Limon. The equipment 

would then be hauled or conveyed along Highway 

32 to Siquirres. At Siquirres, the convoy would 

take a gravel road to the site. This road is capable 

of supporting the maximum loads presented by the 

equipment. It should be noted that Del Monte has 

a large banana plantation located near the project, 

and uses the same route for large tractor-trailer 

units loaded with bananas. 

b. Scope of Work. 

(1) The gravel road from Siquirres to Maryland 

has been improved to the point that it can support 

relatively large loads (approximately 84,000 

pounds). The road has a wearing surface and is approximately 16 feet wide and capable of passing 

two large trucks. The road from Maryland to Cano 

Blanco is basically 7 kilometers (km) long and has 

a base 12 feet wide with no wearing surface. It is 

impossible to maintain. The project in this area requires adding a wearing surface and widening the 

road to 16 feet. The construction of 5 lon of road 

from Cano Blanco to Parismina will entail clearing 

and constructing the roadway. This part of the 

project will need filter fabric placed prior to fill 

material. 

(2) The road is important to the country because it opens a route to the Atlantic Ocean. According to Mr. Jose Chacundo, Assistant Director of the 

Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, construction of the road would: 

(a) Facilitate the construction of a small port 

on the Rio Parismina. This would provide a much 

closer and cost effective route for the shipment of 

agricultural products. 

(b) Provide access to families living in the 

region. During the site visit, it was noted that 

many families live in the area, especially along the 

Rio Parismina. Mr. Chacundo stated that these 

people have to rely on horses and canoes for 

transportation. 

(c) Open access to the town of Parismina. The 

town of Parismina is a tourist community, catering 

to tarpon and snook fishermen. The only access to 

the town is water taxi or small airplane. 

(3) Mr. Chacundo stated that this road project 

is the number one priority for his country It was 

determined that the local citizens desperately want 

this project. Several local residents met with the 

country team, expressed their desire for the 

project, and stayed with the team during the site investigation. The local people provided canoes, horses, and a power boat to visit the site. 

c. Background. The project supports the 

ambassador's goal of strengthening people-topeople relations by providing economic development and modernization. The strategic objective of 

democratization and economic modernization would 

be supported, and the country would be favorably 

disposed to U.S. interests. These projects are supported by the local people and will modernize the 

infrastructure in the region as well as promote 

economic development. 

a. Site Characteristics. 

(1) Geotechnical. The area soils generally consist of clayey silts to sandy silts. The top 6 to 8 

inches have a high organic content. It was noted 

during the investigation that, during the wet 

season, the top organic layer gets extremely muddy 
making transportation very difficult. The soil approximately 8 inches below the surface is usually 

not permeated by the moisture and is capable of 

supporting light loads. Mr. Chacundo stated that in 

the dry season this silt drys out and will support 

extremely large loads. 

(2) Topographical. The project is located on 

the coastal plain. Only minor variations in elevation are evident. The project will cross one manmade canal. 

b. Weather. 

(1) Temperature Variations. The Caribbean 

region of Costa Rica is characterized by moderately 

high temperatures that vary only slightly 

throughout the year. Daytime temperatures range 

from 81 to 88 degrees Fahrenheit. 

(2) Expected Rainfall. The mountain ranges 

that bisect the country block the rain-bearing northeast trade winds, causing heavj. and continual rainfall in the Caribbean coastal area during the rainy 

season. Annual precipitation ranges from 35 to 60 inches. The wet season occurs from May through October and the dry season from January through April. 

The project should be constructed in at least two phases. The first phase 

will be the improvement of 7 km of road between 

Maryland and Cano Blanco. The only borrow pit 

for this project is a river site located approximately 15 km from the beginning of the project. The 

first phase should be completed before the second 

phase is started because the road probably would 

not support the continual hauling of fill material 

View of a road in 

costa Rica where 

engineer work estimates were 

oerformed. 

and aggregate and would not allow the passage of 

two dump trucks (the road is approximately 12 

feet wide). To adequately improve the roadway in 

phase one, 12 inches of loose aggregate (9 inches 

compacted) should be applied, and the roadway increased to 16 feet in width. When the roadway is 

expanded, the new base should be compacted with 

a pneumatic tire roller to 95 percent standard proctor. The aggregate for the wearing surface should 

be applied in 6-inch lifts and compacted with four 

passes of a vibratory roller. Once the aggregate 

surfacing is completed, the roadway should be 

final graded, and compacted with four passes of 

the pneumatic tire roller. The borrow area 

material is large river-run rock and will need to be 

crushed. The rock-crusher should probably be onsite at least one month prior to the heavy 

equipment. 

The second phase of the project will involve the 

construction of a road between Cano Blanco and 

Parismina. The project will require the clearing of 

small vegetation (vines and grass) and large trees. 

The roadway will be constructed over several swampy areas ranging in size from 50 to 200 meters (m). 

Filter fabric should be used in these areas. A borrow pit about 5 km from Maryland will produce 

sand fill needed to construct the base. Approximately 24 inches of this fill will be required to raise the 

road above the natural ground. The sand fill should 

also be placed in 6-inch lifts and compacted with 

four passes of the vibratory roller. After four lifts 

have been placed, aggregate surfacing can commence. A crushed stone wearing surface of 15 
inches loose (12 inches compacted) should then be 

applied, as described above. 

a. General Bill of Materials. 

(1) First Phase. 13,000 cubic yards (cy) of aggregate will be needed to complete this phase. It is 

assumed that an additional 8,000 cy of material 

will be needed to maintain the haul road, for a 

total of 21,000 cy The aggregate should have a 

gradation of: 

Total Percent by Weight, Passing Sieves 

2" 1-112" 314" No. 4 No. 16 No. 100 

100% 95.100% 65.95% 35.95% 35.55% 4.15% 

A 10-foot section of 60-inch corrugated metal culvert is also needed to extend one culvert. 

(2) Second Phase. 18,500 cy of fill material 

will be needed to construct the road base, and a 

total of 11,500 cy will be needed for the wearing 

surface. Approximately 11,500 cy of aggregate will 

also be needed to maintain the haul road, since 

hauling will be over the road constructed on the 

new base and some settling is anticipated. Total aggregate required is 23,000 cy, with the same gradation as in the first phase. A 40-meter bridge 

designed and acquired by the Costa Rican Government should be on-site. Approximately 1,500 m of 

filter fabric, 24 feet wide, will be needed for construction through the swamps. 

b. Source. All aggregate will come from a 

river borrow pit approximately 15 km from the 

start of the project. A small sand hill approximately 5 km from Maryland will provide all 

earth fill for the project. The culvert, bridge, and 

filter fabric will be provided by the Costa Rican 

government. 

a. Mzlitary Inventory. 

(1) First Phase. 

EZW Amount 

(Days) 

Rock-crusher 90 

Front-end loader 

(5 CY) 

D7E dozer 

Motor grader 

Tractor trailer 

5-ton wrecker 

Contact truck 

Pneumatic tire roller 

Vibratory roller 

5-ton dump trucks 

(2) Second Phase 

I.Yw Amount 

(Days) 

Rock-crusher 145 

5-ton dump truck 120 

Front-end loader 

(5 cy) 

D7E dozer 

Motor graders 

RTO crane (20-ton) 

Tractor trailers 

5-ton wrecker 

Contact truck 

Concrete mixer 

Pneumatic trailer 

and tools 

Vibratory roller 

Pneumatic tire roller 

(Note: 'henty dump trucks are projected and it is an 

ticipated that at least 15will be opemtional at all times. 

The time estimate is based on wing 15trucks.) 

b. Nonmilitarj Inventory. None. 

c. Fuel and Repair Parts. Fuel can be obtained in 

Siquirres. Repair parts can be air delivered to San 

Jose and then delivered via truck to the project site. 

,, , 

a. Detailed Site ExplorationlProject Design. No further site exploration is needed. The project design detailed in this report is sufficient to construct the project. 

b. Qpes of Construction Skills. The project can 

be constructed by either a combat construction or 

combat construction heavy unit. The construction 

unit should be company size, augmented with additional heavy equipment operators from the battalion. The construction can be performed by Active, Guard or Reserve units on 2- or 3-week 

rotations (preferably 3 week). Total time required 

from deployment through redeployment is 90 days 

for phase 1,and 145 days for phase 2. Key officers 

and noncommissioned officers should overlap rotations by at least 3 days for continuity of operations. 

c. %es of Support Skills. The construction 

troops should be augmented by organic maintenance and mess personnel. The company should 

have personnel with local purchase order authority, 

and the battalion's maintenance section should be 

added. A Costa Rican security force should be assigned for base security operations. A water purification team with a reverse osmosis water purification 

unit must be on-site to provide potable water. 

a. Project Design. No further project design is 

required for the first phase. The second phase will 
require that the Costa Rican government design a 

bridge to span the man-made canal. 

6. Material Acquisition. The rock-crusher should 

operate from December through April so that adequate supplies of rock are available. The rock 

crusher should be on-site approximately one month 

prior to the arrival of construction troops in order to 

have a stockpile of aggregate at the start of construction. The crusher should operate continually through 

construction so that a stockpile of material can be 

left for the local maintenance crews. The Costa 

Rican government will need sufficient time to design 

and procure a bridge. 

c. Equipment Acquisition. Equipment can be 

shipped via sea to the Port of Limon and then 

transported overland to the project site. 

d. Suppo~? Facilities Construction. A basecamp 

should be constructed by the battalion's vertical section, 

with construction taking approximately seven days. 

a. The first phase of the project Lends itself to troop 

construction. Equipment can be easily transported to 

the project. The project is not complicated and could 

be constructed by almost any engineer unit. 

b. The second phase of the project lends itself to 

troop construction; howeueq this phase of the project 

should be ended at the man-made canal. As stated 

in the time estimate, this entire phase should take 

approximately 145 days to complete. By stopping 

the phase at the canal, the time estimate is 

decreased to approximately 80 days. 

Other 412th Proiects " 

wembers of the 412th are also preparing en- ~ ~ 

d " - -gineer annexes in support of the 

ambassadors' country plans. The annexes are definitions and forecasts of long-term nation development 

needs, primarily from the host nations' perspective. 

Developed by in-country visitations with host nation 

officials and ministries, the engineer annexes serve 

as the basis for identifying specific construction 

projects to support host nati0nN.S. goals. 

Similar to the Civil Engineering Support Plans 

generated for the European theater, Engineer Construction Management Plans (ECMP) are being 

developed. These plans are summaries of engineer 

requirements specific to a host nation and/or a 

SOUTHCOM campaign area. The 412th is compiling a theater-specific computerized construction 

management data base for forecasting, prioritizing, 

controlling, and supporting the execution of identified construction requirements. The command 

will also recommend an engineer force structure 

capable of accomplishing the construction requirements of SOUTHCOM's campaign plans. 

Engineer force requirements will be driven by engineer construction management plans and will involve determinations of the engineer units/resource 

needs for design and construction accomplishment. 

All facets of the engineer work force will be addressed, including U.S. military and civilian 

capabilities, and host nation capabilities. Recommendations will be made as to the most appropriate 

means to construct specific projects. Close coordination will be maintained in this effort with the SCEN, 

Forces Command, the host nation, and the Mobile 

District, Corps of Engineers. An engineer support 

matrix is being developed which will identi& overall 

engineer responsibilities for coordination, planning, 

design, and construction of projects in the SOUTHCOM area of operations. 

During Fiscal Year 92, at least 19 engineer teams 

from the 412th Engineer Command visited 11 

countries in Central and South America to support the 

SOUTHCOM mission. The emphasis of these deployments is to train 412th personnel while assisting these 

nations in formulating viable procedures to develop 

their infrastructures. The 412th exchanged information with the host nation engineers and develop 

methods of training them, or keeping them abreast, of 

state-of-the-art const~uction techniques. 

To strengthen future deployments, home station 

training is currently being conducted in numerous 

areas, including: 

Spanish language soil classification 

vertical construction hydraulics and hydrology 

road desi9./mnstmetion airfield design/ rehabilitation 

bridge construdion/placement sanitation (pumping systems) 

environmental designs oil stabilization rnethals 

terraidtrafficability analyses mad and bridge classification 

capability of engineer units metric system of measurement 

'The work we're doing in SOUTHCOM is very 

important," remarked Major General Hale. ''Not 

only does it provide valuable training for our unit 

members, but it helps the less developed Latin 

American countries and gives them a positive 

image of the United States." Y 

Major Bottin is a Reservist and public affairs officer for the 

412th Engineer Command. Previous assignments include 

headquarters commandant, liaison officet: facility engineer: 

executive offcet: and civil engineer As a civilian, he works 

as aphysical scientist at the U.S. Army Engineer Water.. 

ways Expeiiment Station. He r-ecieued his bachelor's degree 

fmm the University of Southern Mississippi, and is a 

gmdunte of Command, and Geneml Staff College. 

Major Fowler is a Reservist and facility engineer with the 

214th. Previous assignments include headquarters commandant and i-efiigeiationlair conditioning engineel: In his 

civilian occupation, he serves as a hydraulics engineer for 

the U.S. Anny Engineer Waterways Experiment Station. He 

earned his doctriate degree tivm Clemson University, and 

is a graduate of Command and Geneml Staff College.. 
The Engineer Challenge 


By Dr. Robert Sickler 

Turing Desert Shield, the 

- tragedy of past U.S. Army 

apathy toward the need for a 

dynamic and effective countennine 

capability came t~ light. Not only 

the military, but politicians and fie 

public became aware of the broken 

U.S. Army countermine program. 

Illumination of the countermine 

prnblem has openeda dmr of op 

podunity throu& which hyen. 

gineers can gain supportand research dollars for counternine systemsdevelopment. 

Unfortunately, Desert Storm's 

rapid victory and the new 

TRADOC Battlefield Dynamic Institutes (Battle Labs) threaten to 

close this door. I contend that engineers must keep the Army 

focused on countermine issues 

long enough for us to establish a 

technology breastwork for future 

systems development. Fate has 

thrown a gauntlet before the engineers, and we must rise to the 

challenge! 

As preparations were being 

made to assault Iraqi defenses in 

southern Kuwait, it became apparent that our countermine assets for this task were woefully 

lacking. Since the 1950s the 

Army's countermine development 

effort has focused on defeating a 

Soviet mine warfare capability. In 

our quest for a countermine silver 

bullet we filled a graveyard with 

dead and unfielded countermine 

systems (SLUFAE, VEMASID, 

MIRADOR, MASSIS, VMDS, 

ROBAT, COV, LIBS, ANIPSS7&8). Thus, not only did we have 

nothing new to take to Kuwait, our 

most sophisticated countermine 

system (the Mine Clearing Line 

Charge (MICLIC)) often failed to 

perform its mission. 

Desert Storm made it clear that 

our current countermine technology is inadequate. Inadequate because today, as in the past, 

TRADOC has been unable to focus 

basic research toward countermine and other engineer needs. 

Without basic research to bring 

forth new technologies, old technologies are reworked and 

reworked, and countermine systems remain inadequate. 

The need for land mines 

- .began in the September 

1916 Somme battle, when allied 

forces demonstrated that tanks, 

if properly employed, were a 

major contributor to mobility. As 

tanb began influence the 

come of battles, armies were 

forced to develop ways of defeating this new weapon. In the German trenches of World War I, for 

example, soldiers fabricated 

"trapsn (land mines made from 

artillery shells or boxes of explosives) which were design& to 

detonate under tanks. Although 

the use of land mines began in 

World War I, countermine 

development did not begin until 

World War 11. 

During the Second World War, 

British troops in North ~ f 

were faced with tremendous losses 

due to land mines. To counter this 

threat the British began an exten. 

sive developmental program to 

buildcounterminesyste~.Bythe 

time of the Normandy invasion 

they had built rollers, plo~s, flails, 

explosive line charges, and both 

hand-held and vehicle-mounted 

mine detectors. 

The American Army unfortunately did not agree with the 

British on the need for countermine systems. This attitude 

changed quickly when, as a result 

of very limited breaching assets, 

the American landings at Omaha 

Beach were a disaster. Forced by 

necessity, we then began making 

'Yankee" modifications to British 

countermine systems, and had 

developed a very expanded 

countermine inventory by the end 

of the war. 

Gulf \TTil:. Expe~*i~nre 

TjF,j-rapped in the banner of 

World War I1 success and 

with a belly full of new cauntermine tools, the U.S. Army 

entered a state of countermine 

Comatose. It was a coma so deep 

and widespread among the 

branches that, to this very day, 

the U.S. Army has not fielded a 

single new countermine system. 

This was proven in the Gulf War: 

The allied countermine devices 

in Kuwait were rollers, plows, 

flails, explosive line charges, 

rakes, and hand-held mine detectors. Although modified by many 

Years of repetitious Programs 

that reworked past technology, 

they were the same basic systems ~ developed i ~ in World ~ War 11. 

Luckily for many American 

fighting men, our antique countermine systems were never really 

put to the test! The anticipated 

level of Iraqi resistance never 

materialized, and the war ended 

without any significant ground 

(Continued onpage 51) 
By Major Michael W.Biering 

Rroviding a reliable supply of potable water for 

a base camp located in a remote area of northcentral Honduras sounds simple enough. But making - it happen took a lot of brain and brawn on the part of 

Task Force 536, which deployed to Honduras in January 1992 as part of the Fuerte Caminas exercises. 

The 550-man task force consisted of the 536th 

Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy) from Fort 

Kobbe, Panama; elements of the 41st Area Support 

Group, 193rd Support Battalion, and the 142nd 

Medical Battalion; the 534th Military Police Company; Team Delta, 535th Engineer Detachment 

(Prime Power); and the 162nd Combat Communications Group, California Air National Guard. 

Planning for water supply anddistribution for 

TF 536 started with a site survey of the proposed 

base camp area. The camp would be located in a 75- 

acre cow pasture in the Aguan River valley. The 

Macora River (actually a small stream) originates 

in the surrounding mountains and ran along the 

southeastern edge of the base camp. Unfortunately, 

the area had no significant terrain relief suitable 

for elevated water storage. 

. hiThe task force S-3 used the site survey to begin 

work on the water system, and considered several 

factors in the design: 

The Macora River was unsuitable for use as a 

sustained, principal water supply. Upstream of 

the base camp, the local population used the 

river for bathing and washing clothes, and livestock entered the stream at will. That meant a 

well would be required. 

Because of the lack of terrain relief, the camp 

needed a storage tower to provide pressure to 

the water distribution system. 

Water purification assets were needed to meet 

water quality standards. 

The task force then determined the amount of 

water needed to sustain the camp. We set the 

authorized population for the base camp at 550 

personnel. System designers calculated total 

daily demand (TDD) for personnel, shower and 

laundry operations, and the following consumption rates: 
GallonsIDayl 

Consumer Soldier Remarks 

Personnel 7.5 Includes 50 percent 

increase for hot climates 

Laundry 5.0 Based on two loads/soldier/ 

week, 17.5 gal per load 

Bathing 35.0 Based on two showers1 

- soldierlday at 17.5gal per 

TOTAL 47.5 shower 

This consumption formula yielded a TDDof 26,125 

gallons per day Therefore, the camp requid a storage capacity of half this amount, or 13,063 gallons. 

The task force TDD clearly exceeded the theater of 

operations (TIO) guidelines of 5 to 25 gallons per person per day Those guidelines include two showers a 

week for each soldier. However, the task force commander decided that this was inadequate to meet the 

rigorous schedule of daily physical fitness training 

and road construction for the six-month deployment. 

The S-3 shop did not consider facilities demand 

in the design because there were no hospitals, 

bakeries, or other large water consumers planned 

for the site. The commander also decided that the 

base camp, a temporary facility, did not require 

water for fire protection. 

Designers calculated peak demand based on the 

camp's shower facilities. Using 36 shower heads 

with a fixture value of 4.0, and 20 sinks with a fixture value of 2.0, designers calculated a peak 

demand of 61.8 gallons per minute. 

'. in.. I,* 


Above: .me completed water tower provided pressure for 

the water system. 

Below: The 20.000gallon water storage bag and one of two 

ROWPUS. Well head s at the right of the round 3,000gallon 

water storage bag 
Water tower and To living areas 3000 gallon bllvet 

T-I -

U 

Kitchen I KEY; P = ~unip

w =well 

BLR =Bailer 

Water Distribution Schematic 

Assets to put the system together were the next 

priority. Two 600-gallons per hour, reverse-osmosis 

water purification units (ROX'PU), a port,able bath 

unit, and a 20,000 gallon water storage bag were 

obtained for the site. Some general plumbing 

materials were obtained from Honduran 

contractors. 

The needed well was drilled by an Air Force Red 

Horse (engineer) unit. The unit drilled a &inch, 

117-foot, gravel-packed well, and installed a multistage, 5-horsepower Zoeller Model 70L pump at 55 

feet. The static water table was at 15.5 feet. 

To determine well capacity, the S-3 section established a maximum allowable drawdown of 45 feet 

below ground level. This allowed an acceptable 

safety factor to prevent pump damage in the event 

of over-pumping the well. A drawdown test was conducted at a constant pumping rate of 55 gallons 

per minute. Well drawdown reached the 45 foot 

level after 12 hours of constant pumping. 

The well recharged to the original static water 

level in four hours. Using the established pumping 

rate, we calculated the well would produce 39,600 

gallons of raw water for the ROWPUs every 12 

hours. About 60 percent of this water, or 23,760 gallons, would be processed as potable by the 

ROWPU. This would meet the camp's requirements. 

Having taken care of the well, demand calculations, and initial assets, we turned to the supply 

and distribution system. 

Water tower height would be limited to 20 feet 

because of the limited length of poles available in 

Honduras. Shower and laundry facilities, the 

largest water users, would be located at the base of 

the tower to minimize pressure loss in the supply 

lines to these facilities. 

Before entering the distribution system, 

processed water was stored in the 20,000-gallon 

storage bag. Storage time was limited to 24 hours 

to eliminate the risk of contamination. The water 

was then pumped to a 3,000-gallon storage bag at 

the top of the water tower. We did this with a 

diesel-powered 170-gallon per minute, 21.5 pounds 

per square inch (psi) centrifugal pump. We could 

fill the tower bag in less than 20 minutes, allowing 

for uninterrupted base camp service. 

Discounting line losses, and using a 3,000-gallon 

bag for water storage at the top of the tower, we 

could only expect about 10 psi water pressure at 

the tower's base. This was below the TI0 standard 

of 20 psi needed to run base camp facilities. While 

it was suitable for hand washing facilities in 

selected areas of the base camp, it was not adequate for the showers, laundry, or kitchen. 

We solved the water pressure problem as shown 

in the schematic above. Since raw water was 

provided under pressure to the ROWF'Us from the 

well pump, several extra pumps were available 

from the ROWPU set. 

For the showers, we placed 2-horsepower electric 

cent,rifugal pumps in the supply line before the 

bath unit boilers. The pressure relief valves on the 

boilers protected the system, and with some maintenance and fine-tuning, the showers worked fine. 
We used the same arrangement for the camp 

laundry. An electric pump from the ROWPU set 

provided the necessary pressure for 10 commercial 

washing machines. As a side note, we pumped 

laundry water from the ROWPU brine tank. This 

tank contained treated-but not chlorinated-water. 

This procedure saved us from wearing progressively 

bleached BDUs during the six-month deployment. 

The kitchen pressure problem was solved by increasing the line size to reduce pressure loss, and 

gravity feeding the water into an additional storage 

bag next to the kitchen. We used another electric 

pump from the ROWPU to pressurize the kitchen system. No pressure relief valve was available to install 

in the system, so we looped the supply line in front of 

the pump back into the water bag. This prevented 

broken pipes and pump damage if all water outlets in 

the kitchen were closed at the same time. 

Each of the branches of the "dead-end" distribution system was isolated by a gate valve to 

facilitate system maintenance and repairs. All 

water lines were buried for protection. 

The task force learned many valuable lessons 

about base camp water suppiy in a relatively barren location. The first lesson was the importance of 

information provided in Engineer School materials, 

and Army field and technical manuals. Most of 

The ENGINEER Writer's Guide 

We think engineers take a special pride in their 

profession, and ENGINEER is always looking for articles from readers who want to share their expertise, experience and ideas. 

If you're a potential contributing writer, here are a 

few "writer's guide" tips that should help steer you 

in the right direction: 

Articles can cover engineer training, operations 

or doctrine, engineer equipment, history, or other 

areas of general interest to an engineer readership. 

We're especially interested in articles that have a 

"how-to-do-it-betteI" theme. For instance, we're not 

looking for articles telling readers how you conducted a routine field exercise. But if you think you 

have a "new-and-improved way of conducting a tactical operation, trainingexercise, or other operation. 

al procedure that may prove helpful to other engineers-that's what we need. 

Articles should generally come from contributors 

with first-hand experience with the subject being 

presented. 

Avoid theatrical writing styles like: "It was a dark 

and stormy night ...,"or "...the soldier blazed through 

the jungle on his lumbering D7, providing a trail of 

freedom for the other vehicles ...." 

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and 

what we accomplished was based on information in 

these publications. 

Secondly, Army engineers must be innovative in 

their approach to problems--and not limit themselves 

to "textbook" solutions. The way the task force handled the low pressure problem is a good example of 

this. 

Next, we learned that standard PVC (polyvinyl 

chloride) pipe does not hold up well under pressurized hot water. Within the first 30 days of the 

exercise, the hot water supply line to the showers 

had to be replaced with galvanized steel pipe. No 

CPVC (chlorinated PVC) was available from Honduran contractors. 

Water supply to the base camp was a challenge, but 

one that the engineers were able to meet. Their work, 

along with Lhat of the other soldiers and airmen, 

turned a Honduran cow pasture into '%ome3' for the six 

months of Fuertes Caminas 1992. Id 

Major Bie~ing is S-3 of the 536th Engineer Battalion. Previous assignments include engineer achange oficer to 

Brazil, assistant district engineer; Sauannah District, Cofps 

of Engineers, and company commander for the 3nl Engineer Battalion (Combat). He is a gmdunte of West Point, 

Command and Genemi Staff College, ad Georgia Tech 

University, where he holds a master's degree in soil mechanics. He is a Registered Professional Engineer in Virginia. 

in the 

Length should range between 2,000 and 4,000 

words, and the text should be typewritten and 

double-spaced. Generally, each such page will containfrom 200 to 250 words, 

Articles containing attributable information or 

quotations not references within the story should 

carry appropriate footnotes. 

Manuscripts must be original, unpublished, and 

not under consideration by another publication. Normally, you can expect a reply to your submission 

within one month after we receive it. 

All submissions are subject to editing. 

Contributors are encouraged to include black-andwhite photos, artwork, and/or line diagrams to help 

illustrate your article. 

Include your full name, rank, current unit and job 

title. Also include a list of your past assignments, experience and education, your mailing address, and 

commercial daytime phone number. Send your articles to: Editor, ENGINEER Professional Bulletin, 

ATTN: ATSE-TDM-PB, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

65473-6650. 

If you have questions about an article you're 

working on-or considering writing--give our editor, 

Cathy Eubanks, a call at DSN 676-7535, or commercial (314) 563-7535. 

We look forward to hearing from you. 
By Captain William J. Penny and Captain Paul D. Cramer 

Important lessons were 

learned during the Gulf War 

concerning the military use of 

foreign commercial construction 

equipment for pre- and postwar missions. With more emphasis on containing costs for 

military operations abroad, 

"falling in" on such equipment 

is becoming a more attractive 

proposition for the Army 

But while cost-effective, the 

use of foreign commercial equipment has drawbacks, and commanders must consider several 

potential obstacles to mission accomplishment. These include 

maintaining the equipment without an associated maintenance 

support system, and giving 

equipment operators adequate 

training. 

The 34th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat) (Heavy) deployed two 

companies to the Gulf to assist in 

theater closure operations. While 

taking along much of their gear, 

the units did not deploy with' 

their organic construction equipment. Instead, Government of 

Japan (GOJ) commercial equipment was provided when they arrived in the Gulf. The units 

gained valuable experience in 

the use and maintenance of 

foreign commercial equipment. 

This article shares some of that 

experience with engineers who 

may find themselves in a similar 

situation. 

Two significant problems surfaced as soon as the equipment 

was placed in operation: lack of 

manuals and difficulty procuring 

of repair parts. 

Some of the Government of Japan purchased trucks used by 

the 34th Engineers included Nissan 20-ton 

dump, Hi-no fuel, and 

Mack trucks. 

16 Engineer 
Manuals 

ahe GOJ vehicles did not 

have comprehensive operator or maintenance manuals. 

The lack of manuals outlining 

procedures for preventive maintenance, checks and services 

(PMCS), scheduled services, 

and repair was a major hurdle. 

The entire Army maintenance 

program is based on checks 

before, during and after vehicle 

operation. Without proper references to guide operators and 

mechanics, maintenance can become a haphazard affair. 

The companies adapted organic 

equipment maintenance procedures for the commercial equipment. Although the mechanical 

components were different, there 

were enough similarities to maintain a relatively effective fleet of 

vehicles. Maintenance of unfamiliar components was left to 

careful trial and error. 

Commanders of units deploying to regions where commercial 

equipment may be used should 

determine the kind of equipment 

on station. If manuals are not 

with the vehicles, obtain them 

from the distributor, manufacturer, or other source. The effort 

will be well worth it. Considerable savings in maintenance 

down time and operator training 

can be realized if the proper 

manuals are on hand. 

Repair Parts 

Another negative spin-off of 

the lack of manuals surfaced with repair parts. Replacing worn or inoperable parts 

was a tedious, hit-and-miss 

proposition. Without parts numbers or illustrations for reference, parts had to be removed 

and taken to vendors to try for 

a match. This was a timeconsuming operation because of 

travel time to the vendor and 

time spent trying to match components with illustrations and 

stock numbers. 

One bright spot in the repair 

parts area was the use of a 

blanket purchase agreement 

(BPA) by the two engineer companies. The BPA made the job of 

Kamotsu and Champion road graders 

were used by the engineers in ileu of TOE 

equipment. 

paying for parts easier and 

reduced lost time. 

Operator Training 

F	ortunately, getting soldiers 

uu to swed on the foreim - equipment was not as challenging as equipment maintenance. 

But the variety of equipment, 

coupled with the lack of operator 

manuals, required close attention 

to training. 

The foreign equipment used by 

the 34th units included Kamotsu 

and Champion road graders, 

Nissan 20-ton dump trucks, HiNo fuel trucks, D9 dozers, and 

Mack trucks. Each of these 

equipment manufacturers has a 

different philosophy about the 

arrangement and functioning of 

controls and instruments, much 

like the differences between 

major makes of automobiles. For 

example, the control lever for 

the blade of a Caterpillar road 

grader might have the same appearance and be in the same 

location as the throttle lever on a 

Kamotsu road grader. 
To compensate for the differences between TOE and foreign 

equipment, the 34th developed a 

training program for operators 

that included: 

Equipment familiarization 

m Equipment operation 

m Preventive maintenance 

checks and services 

Familiarization called for 

operators to sit in the driver's seat 

of each vehicle and work the controls. By practicing with static 

equipment, soldiers became 

thoroughly familiar with the location and function of all controls. 

During the second phase of 

training, soldiers operated the 

equipment in a designated practice area. This allowed the 

operators to get a feel for the sensitivity of the hydraulics of each 

piece of equipment. Solid proficiency on TOE equipment made 

it relatively easy for the operators 

to transition to the foreign 

equipment. 

After becoming familiar with the 

equipment, operators were given 

instruction in proper preventive 

maintenance procedures. 

Cross-Training 

Some forethought on the part 

of the battalion's leadership 

paid off after the companies 

deployed to the Gulf. Prior to 

leaving, operators had been 

cross-trained on different pieces 

of TOE equipment. This allowed 

commanders greater flexibility in 

assigning missions. For example, 

with cross-trained operators, 

commanders could assign missions based on the total number 

of assigned operators instead of 

limiting specific missions to individual operator MOSS such as 

625, 62E or 62F. 

A More Frequent Option 

ilitary-leased foreign 

commercial eauiument . . is

now being used by engineer units 

in Honduras, Bolivia, and elsewhere. And the use of foreign 

equipment appears to be an increasingly viable method of augmenting TOE equipment in some 

circumstances. 

By planning ahead, engineers 

can make maximum use of this 

While the equipment 

held up well under 

heavy use, rnalntenance was a challenge because of the 

lack of manuals. 

relatively new resource. Prior to 

unit deployment, the advance party 

should determine the make and 

models of all equipment and ensure 

all manuals are on site. If not, get 

them fmm the manufacturer or a 

distributor. Cruss-train operators 

on TOE equipment. This will make 

familiarization with foreign commercial equipment easier, and will 

expand mission capabilities 

While certainly not a replacement for equipment built to 

military standards, commercial 

equipment can be an important 

asset in non-combat areas. The 

important role of foreign construction equipment was proven in the 

GUI~War. Y 

Captain Penny is commander of 

Alpha Company, 34th Engineer 

Battalion. He previously serued in 

the 20th Engineer Battalion and 

the 554th Engineer Battalion. He is 

a graduate of the United States 

Military Academy and the Engineer 

Officers Advanced Course 

Captain Cramer is commander of 

Bmuo Company, 34th Engineer Battalion. He previously serued in the 

317th Engineer Battalion. He is a 

graduate of the Engineer OfticemAdvanced Course, and is a registered 

pmfessional engineer in Virginia 
Book Review 


The Coming War With Japan, by George 

Friedman and Meredith LeBard, St. Martin's 

Press, New York, 1991, ISBN: 0-312-05836- 

he title warns of imminent war in the 

Pacific-war in our time. Round Two. 

as it were, of the Pacific Theater in World 

War II. The major premise is that the fundamentai conditions for which Japan 

challenged the United States for hegemony 

of the Pacific in 1941 are re-emerging in the 

post-Cold War era. The enemies of World 

War II, who later became friends, are now 

becoming enemies again. 

"No greater power can tolerate a situation 

in which the very lifeblood of its society and 

economy are in the hands of another nation, 

let alone a nation that has interests fundamentally opposed to its own." 

Since 1945, Japan has exercised 

sovereignty at the pleasure of the United 

States. We encouraged Japanese industry 

and gave her free access to American 

markets (the Korean War pumped billions of 

dollars into the Japanese economy). The 

U.S. used Japan as an instrument for "containment." the policy of opposing the spread 

of Soviet communism. American bases in 

Japan were crucial to containment because 

the Japanese archipelago "sealed" the 

Soviet Far East. Japan has successfully adjusted to less-than-full sovereignty by restructuring herself into a trade giant. Thus, the 

U.S. and Japan had different but converging 

interests-American containment and 

Japanese trade. 

Japan's attack on the United States on 7 

December 1941 was a desperate gamble to 

establish the "Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere." Japan had already reorganized Korea, Manchuria (Manchukuo), 

and key coastal parts of China into her 

economy. As rich as these prizes were, she 

still lacked the natural resources a modern 

nation needed to be a "going concern." 

Japan's northern strategy and victories on 

the Asian mainland encouraged her and 

aroused only indignation from western 

powers, but they did not provide the oil she 

needed. For oil Japan had to go south, and 

the U.S. Navy was in her way. 

Japan thought she saw a window of opportunity caused by an inadequate American 

naval building program and our preoccupation with the war in Europe. Japan bet that 

she could extend the frontiers of the Greater 

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere so far into 

the Pacific and Indian Oceans that 

"pinpricks" at the edge would not affect the 

inner core. Japan gambled and lost everything, including her sovereignty. 

Since 1945, the U.S. has returned elements of sovereignty to Japan. The most important element not returned is military 

power. The three elements of any nation's influence are political will, economic strength, 

and military capability. Japan has the first in 

abundance: she is highly organized and 

capable of decisive political action. Japan's 

economic strength is more apparent than 

real: a month or two of an effective oil embargo would sink her economy. Japan's current 

military force projection capability is totally inadequate to preclude depredations to her 

vital interests. Today, Japan is barely an 

Asian military power, much less a world 

power. She has little interest in reconstituting 

her military power-why should she? The 

U.S. Navy protects her sea lanes in a manner that was only a dream for the old Imperial Japanese Navy. 

The authors convincingly describe Japan's 

rising desperation in the post-Cold War era. 

(Continued on page 31) 
The Battle of Chancellorsville 


By First Lieutenant John A. Vigna 

ay April 1863, the American 

Civil War entered its third 

year. The divided nation was coping 

with two devastating years of a war 

which was originally predicted to 

last less than a month. Thus far, 

the Union failed to crush the rebellion and no end was in sight. The 

Union Army of the Potomac, under 

Major General Joseph Hooker, its 

fifth commander, attempted to 

bring a sweeping end to the war by 

defeating General Robert E. Leds 

Army of Northern mrginia at the 

Battle of Chancellorsville. 

The events that unfolded from 

April 28, 1863toMay6, 1863, however, dashed all Union hopes of a 

quick ending to the war. Despite 

being greatly outnumbered, Lee 

decisively defeated Hooker at 

Chancellorsville using an aggressive offense, tactical surprise, and 

superior battlefield intelligence, 

By employing these principles, Lee 

caused Hwker to lose confidence, 

react defensively, and retreat in 

defeat. At Chancellorsville, Leearguably fought his greatest battle 

against heavier odds than in any 

other campaign of the war. 

Following the Union's disastrous 

defeat at Fredericksburg the previous December, Hooker's army occupied winter camps on the north 

side of the Rappahannock River. 

In the first two years of the war, 

the Union had no decisive victory 

over the Confederacy, and the 

Union soldiers' morale and confidence were very low. Thus, 

Hooker's tasks were to restore his 

army's morale, decisively engage 

and defeat Lee's army, and bring 

an end to therebellion. 

By early April, President 

Abraham Lincoln reviewed 

Hooker's rejuvenated army with 

great satisfaction. Hooker now 

possessed an impressive, wellequipped force of infantry and 

cavalry totaling 134,000 men and 

an artillery division of 404 cannon. 

"Fighting Joe," as Hooker was 

known, boasted that he had "the 

finest army on the planet," but 

Lincoln did not have nearly as 

much confidence in Hooker's competence to command the army as 

he did with the army's readiness. 

Meanwhile, Lee's army, the antithesis of Hwker's, occupied positions in and mund Fredericksburg. 

What his battlehardened men lacked in numben and supplies, they 

made up for in morale, experience, 

and confidence. The absence of over 

half of Lieutenant General James 

Longstreet's corps depleted Lee's 

€om after they were sent south to 

Suffolk to counter a supposed 

threat to Richmond. Therefore, at 

his immediate dispcsal, Lee had ap 

pmximately 57,800 men and cavalry and 170 cannon. 

With winter subsiding and the 

good weather upon them, both armies devised their plans. 

Hooker's plan was aggressive. He 

planned to dispatch Brigadier 

General George Stoneman's cavalry to disrupt Lee's rear and attempt to trap him in Fredericksburg. He then planned to cross his 

V, XI, and XI1 Corps over the 

Rapidan and Rappahannock 

Rivers, secure all ford sites, and 

assemble around the small, onebuilding village of Chancellonville. Meanwhile, his I, II,111, 

and VI Corps would cross south of 

Frederickburg, fix Lee if he stood 

fast, pursue him if he retreated to 

Richmond, or attack him if he 

withdrew towards Chancellorsville. In all, Hooker's ~lanof 

double envelopment via "dual incers" was beautifully simple as all 

great plans must be. 

Lee's plan was equally simple. 

He initially elected to remain in 

a tactical defense around Fredericksburg and let Hooker make 

the first moves. 

This strategy proved effective 

and less costly than plwious battles with the Union Army. Lee, 

while always offensive minded, 

decided to give Hooker until May 1, 

1863 to make his move. I€Hooker 

remained in the defense, Lee would 

attack Hooker to help relieve pwSure on other Confederate forces in 

the west and south. 

Hooker began his offensive on 

April 13, 1863. Thirty-six hours of 

rain, however, prevented Stoneman 
fmm crossing the Rappahannock 

until April 28. This delay disrupted 

Hooker's maneuver timetable. The 

ensuing battle would be over before 

Stoneman could leach Lee's rear 

and provide any battlefield intelligence to the Union Army The 

delay also gave Lee ample time to 

react to Hooker's actions. Hooker, 

however, continued with his plan. 

On April 28, his I, 111, and VI 

Corps conducted demonstrations 

south of Fredericksburg, while his 

main body crossed the Rappahannock Two days later, Hooker's II, 

V, XI, and XI1 Corps assembled 

around Chancellorsville, outflanked 

Lee, and sat in his rear Lee was 

skeptical of Hooker's maneuvers 

but did not fall for the demonstrations at Fredericksburg. He felt 

Hooker's intentions were elsewhere. Later that morning, General J. E. B. Stuart, he's cavalry 

commander, confirmed Lee's conclusion when he reported that the 

Union Army was assembling near 

Chancellorsville. Lee, aware of the 

threat to his rear, decided his only 

options were to attack or retreat. 

Believing Hooker wanted him to 

retreat and that a large engage 

ment would take place in his rear, 

Lee dispatched Major General 

Lafayette McLaws' and Major 

General Richard Anderson's divisions, as well as Stuart's cavalry, 

toward Chancellorsville to intercept 

the Union advances. 

The stage was now set for the 

battle. The two armies made contact on May 1, 1863.For the better 

part of six days, they bitterly 

fought each other in restricted terrain, until Lee once again soundly 

defeated yet another Union commander. Over the course of those 

six days, four critical events led to 

Hooker's ultimate defeat. These 

events portray Lee's use of aggressive offense, tactical surprise, and 

superior battlefield intelligence. 

The first critical event of the battle was Stoneman's failure to crass 

the Rappahannock River on April 

13. This rain-delayed crossing disrupted Hooker's plan by two weeks 

and set the stage for the rest of the 

battle. Instead of waiting for 

Stoneman to conduct his missions, 

Hooker decided he had lost valuable time and must launch his offensive without the full benefit and 

use of his cavalry asset. This 

proved costly throughout the battle. Hooker's inactive cavalry 

provided him with absolutely no 

intelligence on Lee's forces. Hooker 

was also unable to disrupt Lee's 

maneuver intentions or keep the 

famed Confederate cavalry in 

check and diverted from the battle. 

The second critical event was 

Hooker's delay in attacking Lee's 

advance elements of McLaws'and 

Anderson's divisions on May 1, 

1863. On that morning, Hooker 

failed to advance his consolidated 

forces with any sense of urgency. 

While Hooker waited around 

Chancellorsville, Lee's advance 

elements made contact with the 

Union Army Hooker did not continue his maneuver plan because, 

with no hard intelligence, he was 

uncertain of the size of the enemy 

to his front. When Hooker finally 

gathered enough nerve to attack 

the Confederate forces, Lee had 

already arrived with his remaining men to unite his army and 

stifle any Union momentum. 

Lee's aggressive offensive action 

surprised Hooker and seemingly 

caused Hooker to lose his nerve. 

Despite Hooker's vacillation, 

the Union held the strategic high 

ground of Hazel Grove and Fairview around Chancellorsville and 

was able to gain ground on the 

Confederates. By nightfall, however, Lee's outnumbered men put 

The 291h Pennsyivania (of Kane's 

Brigade, Geary's 

Division, Xii Corps) 

in the trenches under 

artliiery fire. (ARwork 

from Baftles and 

Leaders of the Clvil 

War) 
up such a sustained, aggressive 

fight that Hooker once again lost 

his nerve. To the consternation of 

his commanders, Hooker ordered 

all units to give up their ground 

and retreat to the original defensive positions for the night. This 

second loss of initiative by Hooker, 

brought on by Lee's aggressive offense, is arguably where the 

Union lost the battle. 

Despite taking up defensive 

positions around Chancellorsville, 

Hooker still felt confident that Lee 

would retreat due to lack of 

provisions, and, therefore, he concluded that Lee would not attack 

the strong Union defenses. If Lee 

surprised Hooker and caused him 

to lose his nerve on the first day, he 

would shock Hooker with his 

maneuvers the following day. 

The third, and most important, 

critical event was Lieutenant 

General "Stonewall" Jackson's 

flank march across Hooker's front 

and into the Union right flank 

during the afternoon of May 2, 

1863. Through the second day of 

fighting, neither side was able to 

Map 1 

gain an advantage. St,uart's reconnaissance reported that Hooker's 

right flank was extremely illprepared After a careful estimate 

of the situation, Lee decided to 

send Jackson's entire corps of 

28,000 men on a flank march, 

under the concealment of forest, to 

attack Hooker's right and move 

into his rear. This left Lee with 

only Anderson's and McLaws' 

divisions to fix the entire Union 

Army (Map 1).Despite the risk, 

Lee once again divided his army in 

the face of a numerically superior 

enemy This time, however, his 

divisions marched across Hooker's 

front. 

Although an unsound tactic, this 

trpe of calculated risk-taking made 

Lee a great general. During the 

twelve mile march, several Union 

units reported that a large force 

was moving acm their front. 

Hooker took these reports lightly 

because he was convinced that Lee 

was in retreat. When elements of 

Hooker's 111Corps seized tail units 

of Jackson's column, which included ambulances and other supply wagons, Hooker was totally 

convinced that Lee was in retreat. 

By 1700, Jackson had hismenin 

position and conducted his 

surprise attacks on the Union 

right flank (Map 2). Jackson's attack took Major General Oliver 

Howard's XI Corps by such 

surprise that Howard later commented, "... every sort of organization that lay in the path of the mad 

current of panic stricken men, had 

to give way and be broken into 

fragments." Sensing his momentum, and despite the fatigue of his 

men, Jackson was not going to halt 

his offensive at any cost. By evening, Hooker stabilized his lines 

and could only maintain his defensive perimeter around the Chancellor House. Thus, Lee successfully offset Hooker's numerical 

superiority through his maneuver 

and surprise. Despite Jackson's 

over-whelming success, Lee suffered one of his greatest losses of 

the war. While out checking his 

lines in the late evening, Jackson 

was accidentally shot and mortally wounded by his own men. Lee 
appointed Stuart to take immediate command of Jackson's corps. 

He did so with great success. 

The final critical event was 

Stuart's seizure of the high ground 

at Hazel Grove and Fairview after 

Hooker abandoned it. On May 3, 

1863, Confederate forces were still 

divided. Despite the success of 

Jackson's flank march, Lee knew 

he needed to unite his forces, drive 

Hooker from Chancellorsville, and 

regroup before fresh Union troops 

arrived from Fredericksburg. 

Therefore, he urged his commanders to "press the attack." 

Fighting was stiff throughout the 

day until Hooker abandoned all 

high ground during his retreat 

from Chancellorsville. 

While Hooker attempted to 

strengthen his shrinking perimeter, Stuart seized the initiative 

and took Hazel Grove and Fairview. He placed his artillery on 

these positions and fired down on 

Hooker's retreating men, thus offsetting again Lee's disadvantage 

in men and artillery. Lee now occupied all the high ground around 

Chancellorsville, and his forces 

were united once again. 

Hooker attempted to relieve his 

retreating forces by calling for his 

VI Corps to attack Lee. Lee, however, defeated this assault at 

Salem's Church on May 4, 1863. 

Thus, from May 4 through May 6, 

Hooker was in full retreat acrcss 

the Rappahannock, and Lee was 

victorious. Nevertheless, it was a 

castly battle for the Confederacy 

In addition to Jackson's death, Lee 

suffered 12,800 casualties, equalling twenty-five percent of his force. 

Hooker, on the other hand, suffered 17,300 casualties in the rout, 

but this was only thirteen percent 

of his force. The Confederacy 

gained no real tactical advantage 

and would not be able to recoup its 

Icsses, but the battle was a pat 

moral victory, and Lee immediately 

made plans to invade the North. 

The Union, =pially Lincoln, was 

devastated. The loss was another 

crushing blow to morale and support 

for the war. Linmln's only solemn 

words were, 'My Gcd! My God! 

What will the muntry say?" 

From the Chancellorsville battle, 

important lessons about the principles of war and tactics are evident and applicable to modern 

doctrine. When looking at the critical events, it is evident that Lee 

defeated Hooker by employing superior battlefield intelligence, an 

aggressive offense, and tactical 

surprise. Lee's cavalry was always 

at work probing Hooker's forces. It 

discoved the Union Army's initial 

crossings, as well as the illprepared Union right flank These 

were undoubtedly decisive pieces of 

information in helping Lee make 

his decisions. Hooker, on the other 

hand, was virtually 'blind" for the 

entire battle. Hicavalry was nonexistent and he received little or no 

information about Leds forces. If 

he had known the size of Lee's advance elements on May 1, 1863, he 

may have continued his attack If 

Map 2 

Engineer 23 
he knew that Jackson was not 

retreating during the flank march, 

he may have acted differently At 

any rate, intelligence is crucial for 

every commander, especially on 

today's highly technical battlefield. 

Hooker lacked crucial intelligence, 

so he made uneducated guesses. 

Lee epitomized the term "offense." It was his army's key to 

survival. During his initial contact 

with Hooker, during Jackson's 

flank march, and during his consolidation on the key terrain 

around Chancellorsville, Lee firmly believed in and pressed his commanders to maintain the offense. 

This paid great dividends for him 

because he continually maintained momentum, seized the initiative, and caused Hooker to constantly second guess himself. 

Hooker, in turn, always reacted 

defensively, which further caused 

the momentum to sway in Lee's 

favor. The values of offensive tactics are evident through Lee's success. Lee used his offense to offset 

his severe disadvantages in men 

and artillery. Since current 

doctrine calls for fighting while 

outnumbered, commanders must 

be willing to gain momentum and 

initiative through constant offensive pressure coupled with quick 

maneuvers and calculated risks. 

Surprise is an extremely effective 

principle, especially when it is 

coupled with offense. In addition to 

oeetting his numerical disadvantages with strong offensive tactics, Lee employed tactical surprise 

with equal effectiveness. Hooker 

never expeded Lee to do anything 

that Lee eventually did, and Lee 

always had "something up his 

sleeve." From his immediate movement to meet Hooker on the first 

day to Jackson's flank mamh, Lee 

kept Hwker guessing. Part of 

employing surprise is taking risks, 

and Lee took many of them. It is 

evident in today's military that 

commanders who use surprise 

through calculated risks can expect 

the same results as Lee achieved. 

When lwkingat Lee's succes, it 

is also important to note that the 

principles of war and the tactics he 

used were interdependent. For example, Lee could not have 

achieved success during Jackson's 

flank march if he did not have the 

proper intelligence to devise the 

Stampede of the 

XI Corps on the 

Plank Road. 

(Artwork from Battles and Leaders 

of the Civil War) 

plan and, therefore, push his units 

to maximize their offensive potential. Commanders today must also 

understand that the principles of 

war and the tactics of war are 

most effective when they complement, augment, and support each 

other. By employing both aspects 

of war, commanders can greatly 

increase their combat power 

regardless of the circumstances. 

History is our greatest teacher. 

Although the Battle of Chancellorsville took place over 130 years 

ago, Lee's actions still provide 

valuable and applicable lessons to 

today's commanders and for 

today's battlefield doctrine. 

Great leaders such as General 

Lee are timeless, and the principles 

he applied at Chancellorsville will 

continue to be applicable on many 

battlefields of the future. Y 

Lieutenant Egna received the Engineer Officer Advanced Course 

Thomas Jefferson Writing Award 

for his Chancellorsuille battle 

analysis. Before attending the 

course, he previously served as assistant S-4, company erecutive officer, and platoon leader for the 

94th Engineer Battalion. He is a 

gmduate of West Point. 
By First Lieutenant Douglas Zaenger 

uring combat operations, getting accurate and 

useful tactical intelligence is critical to success. 

For a mechanized infantry or armor battalion task force 

conducting offensive operations, this means knowing 

where the enemy is--and how he is defending. 

Items of critical importance include where the 

enemy's antitank missiles, tanks, dismounted infantry and artillery are located. It also includes an 

evaluation of the terrain for tracked and wheeled 

vehicle trafficability, potential kill sacks, key terrain 

and the enemy's integration of the terrain with his 

obstacles. 

These engineer-specific items are critical pieces of 

the intelligence picture that the task force commander 

needs to make winning decisions. The problem is 

that he often doesn't get this information, and so 

doesn't get the complete picture. 

The Shortfall 

A 1-2 mechanized/armor battalion task force's . : primary intelligence gathering asset is its scout 

platoon. Often, there is a critical shortfall in the engineer-related information gathered by the scouts. 

This information includes enemy obstacle intelligence 

on enemy obstacles; terrain as an obstacle and the 

trafficability of routes; and the effort and assets required to breach the obstacles and improve the trafficability of the routes. 

One reason for this shortfall may be that the 

scouts are too busy trying to find and maintain contact with the enemy. They also may not be adequately trained to analyze engineer intelligence or the 

capabilities of friendly and enemy engineer units. As 

combat engineering becomes more sophisticated and 

capabilities improve, the scouts' lack of knowledge of 

engineer capabilities will become a more serious 

shortcoming. The solution to this problem is the creation of an engineer scout team. 

The Engineer Intelligence Needed 

nuring a zone clearing mission in support of a 

mechanized battalion task force movement to 

contact, a typical scout report on an enemy obstacle 

found on the axis of advance might be "There's a 

minefield at AB123456." If the scouts cannot get 

close enough to get any more information than this, 

then the report will have to do. But it is almost useless. If more detailed information on the obstacle is 

not gathered, critical tactical intelligence has been 

lost. Needed information includes: 

The type of obstacle 

D The endpoints of the obstacle 

Its overall depth 

Determining if it is complex (combination of different obstacles into a single system) 

Number of belts 

Determining if the mines (if any) are buried or 

surface laid 

m Determining if the mines are pressure, tripwire, 

or tilt-rod activated 

With this information, along with knowledge of the 

terrain and the enemy's weapons capabilities (maximum effective range, and destructive potential), the 

scouts can evaluate the enemy disposition. The combination of obstacles, terrain and enemy weapons 

capabilities, as seen by the scouts on the terrain, 

puts them in the best position to evaluate the 

enemy's defenses and identify his weakest or most 

vulnerable points. 

If breaching is preferred over bypassing an 

obstacle and the breach force isn't adequately task organized, additional troops and equipment can be identified and linked up with the breach force. They will 

then be able to breach the obstacle efficiently and 

move on with the mission. In some cases, the scouts 
may be able to breach the obstacle. This could 

eliminate the need for an instride breach and significantly aid the attacking task force. 

Rc' Hoc Lash-Up Sol~~-;i~n 

F=i .-resently, the scouts don't seem to possess the 

capabilities (technical skills or time) to give adequate attention to engineer-related tasks. One solution is to augment the scout platoon with combat engineers, who can provide both technical expertise 

and time-saving assistance. 

Without an established structure or any kind of 

doctrine governing their employment, though, this 

ends up being a marginally effective ad hoc "lash up." 

During two deployments at the National Training Center (NTC), I observed this lash up in practice. It was 

discussed by the task force battle staff prior to the 

deployment, but only in general terms. No integration 

planning or specific tasks or missions were discussed 

until we began preparing an offensive operations 

order in the desert. 

The use of engineers with the scouts under these 

conditions was only marginally successful. But the little success we had showed how valuable a formal engineer scout organization could be. Besides providing 

technical expertise in evaluating enemy obstacles 

and the terrain, the engineer scouts were able to 

breach obstacles without detection before the main 

body of the task force arrived. When such breaching 

was possible, it denied the enemy an opportunity to 

mass fires on the task force. 

1 Engineer augmentation 

of scouts can provide 

valuable information to 

the maneuver commander. Joint training of englneers and scouts, as 

here during a field ex" 

ctse, is critical to the 

success of this team. 

trained together and didn't know each others' 

capabilities. SOPS, or battle drills; and 2) riding in the 

back of the scouts' Bradleys prevented the engineers 

from being proactive by reporting observations that 

the scouts missed or ignored. To overcome these 

shortcomings, I recommend that units establish formal engineer scout teams. 

The En~ineerSCGIJ;Tealii 

rrm 

he engineer scout team concept makes available an experienced team of combat engineers, 

who train with habitually associated battalion task 

force scouts, to augment the scouts during combat 

operations. With the Engineer Restructure Initiative 

providing each of nine maneuver battalions with their 

own habitually associated combat engineer company, 

it becomes practical. It is also practical within the 

limits of the new engineer company TOE. 

Two courses of action (COAs) can be used to create the engineer scout team. It could be a separate 

organization under the engineer company headquarters, or it could be a line squad detailed as the 

company's engineer scout team. The decision criteria 

used for choosina - a COA are:

w The COST of new equipment needed to equip 

the team (either taken from elsewhere in the 

company or added to the company's authorization and purchased). 

m PERSONNEL needed to equip the team (either 

taken from a platoon or added to the company's 

Key shortcomings of the scoutlengineer lash up at authorization). 

the NTC were 1) the scouts and engineers never Availability of TIME for scout TRAINING. 
COA Comparison 

AVAilABlLlTY of the team on the battlefield 

(competing missions for a single element). 

This COA makes scout operations the team's fulltime occupation and eliminates competition for time between scout and engineer squad training. The drawback, given that the team is equipped and manned 

from within the existing company TOE, is that a vehicle 

and personnel must be allocated to the team. 

I recommend that the vehicle be a HMMWV. It can 

keep up with Bradleys better than the M-113, and 

with a ballistic shell and doors (MI025 Weapons Carrier) it provides protection against small arms fire and 

shell fragments. Since neither the M-113 nor the 

HMMWV is in the same class of combat vehicle as 

the Bradley, engineer scouts should not be used in 

direct fire engagements. 

The personnel for this scout team are an NCOIC, 

an assistant, and a driver. The major equipment required, in addition to the HMMWV, are a secure 2-net 

radio set (ANNRC-46 and ANIGRC-160), three CVC 

helmets and associated installations kits (to improve 

communications among the crew), two ANIPRC-127 

radios, GPS (global positioning system), demolition 

kit and either an M-60 MG or MK-19 grenade launcher (for the MI025 weapons station). 

The cost of these items (excluding the M1025) is approximately $22,313. The cost of an MI025 (M998 with 

ballistic shell and weapon station) is $33,180;the basic 

M998 costs $28,894. The difference is $3286. The final 

cost of exchanging one of the company's M998s for an 

MI025 is $25,599. The final cost of adding an MI025 

to the company's TOE is $55,493. 

Availabilty 

+ 

>....................... 

This COA makes scout operations the squad's 

secondary mission. No vehicles or personnel are 

diverted to the team and the only new equipment requirements are the GPS, a second secure radio 

(ANNRC-46), and two ANIPRC-127s. The cost of 

this equipment is $12,454. 

A disadvantage of this COA is the need to balance 

..... ............... .......... ....... . . .... ......... : ::: ...................:... .... 

training time between the scouts and engineer squad 

training. Also, only one mission can be performed at 

a time, forcing a choice between using the squad as 

line combat engineers or as scouts. 

COA 2 $12,454 

Comparison of the Courses of Action 

T 

he matrix shown above shows the strengths 

and weaknesses of the two COAs. The 

cheapest solution is COA 2.However, COA 1 has significant strengths: consistent mission availability of 

the engineerlscout team, and full-time engineerlscout 

training. 

+ i . -

cost 

Summary 

t ne of the keys to success on the battlefield is 

b' good tactical intelligence. Unfortunately, one of 

the most glaring shortfalls in this area is engineer-related intelligence. This is because scouts, while possessing some basic engineer training, are not technically proficient at combat engineer skills. Additionally, 

the scouts are overtaxed by their primary missions of 

finding the enemy, maintaining contact with the 

enemy and reporting to the task force. 

A solution to correct this shortfall is the creation of 

an engineer scout team. To create this team, we 

must develop the combined arms doctrine for the integration of the engineer scout team with the cavalry 

scouts and establish a company engineer scout team 

TOE. 

Now is the time to create and implement the engineer scout team. Without it there is a critical 

shortfall in the engineer-related intelligence gathered. 

Without this information the maneuver commander 

doesn't have all of the information needed to make 

winning decisions. With this information the task 

force's chances for victory are greatly improved. 

Y 

First Lieutenant Zaenger was the S-2 for the 3rd Engineer 

Battalion (Combat). He previously served as a platoon 

leader for the baltalion. He is a graduate of the Engineer 

Officer Basic Course and Carnegie Mellon University, 

where he earned a B.S. in civil engineering. 

Engineer 27 

Personnel 

COA 1 

Tralnlng Time 

$25,599 - + 
Engineers in Rough Terrain 


By Captain William E. Rapp 


28 Engineer 
Above: Uslng his nylon rappelling line, a rough terrain jumper lowers himself from atreetop 

"hang" position. (Photos by Staff Sergeant Mark Martello) 

Opposite page: A Bravo Company paratrooper practices lowerlng procedures during tower 

training. 

while mugh terrain jumping is often assclciated with sm 

cia1 operations units or civilian 

"smoke jumpers," Army engineers 

also use this technique to support a 

variety of operatiom. 

The rough terrain airborne mission for engineers is relatively 

simple. In a typical scenario, a 

rough terrain engineer platoon 

jumps into a remote, forested area 

far from established roads or airfields. Their mission is to clear a 

helicopter landing zone capable of 

handling CH-47 helicopters or 

other fixed-wing aircraft. 

Initially, a small clearing is 

created, using chain saws and 

demolition charges brought in 

with the jumpers. Small bulldozers are then lowered in by the 

cargo helicopters. The engineers 

use the dozers to clear back the 

treeline until a multi-pad landing 

zone is prepared. Thesitecan then 

serve as a forward staging area for 

infantry, reconnaissance, or antidrug operations. 

Rough terrain jumpers can use 

C-130 and C-141 aircraft, but 

rotary-wing aircraft like the UH1,UH-60 and CH-47 may be more 

suitable depending on the terrain. 

Using steerable MC1-1B parachutes, jumpers group near designated leaders during their descent. Close-grouped landings, 

aimed at earlier equipment drops, 

facilitate rapid team assembly and 

mission accomplishment. 

contrary to normal airborne 

operations, the objective during a 

rough terrain jump is to become 

hung high in a tree and avoid landing on the ground. Using his 

steerahle parachute, a jumper will 

aim for thick stands of trees, and 

attempt to "hang" his chute from 

high tree branches. 

Once the chute catches the top 

branches of a tree and the jumper 

is suspended, he gets ready to rappel to the ground. Usinga 120-foot 

tubular nylon line stored in a leg 

pocket of his protective suit, the 

jumper ties off to his parachute 

risers. He then prepares the line 

for rappelling, using a snaplink, 

and dons heavy gloves. Releasing 

himself from the parachute harness, he lowers himself slowly to 

the ground. The line, which is still 

tiedsecurely to the parachute, will 

help in recovering the chute later. 

Such procedures require highly 

specialized training. The base 

proponent for rough terrain 

parachuting is the U.S. Forest 

Service's Smokejumper School in 
control and aiming techniques, 

correct tree landing positions, and ... 

.. rappelling from a tree. 

The rappel from the tree is 

potentially the most dangerous 

phase of the operation. Each student must demonstrate his ability 

to rappel from a hang position on 

a rappelling tower. 

The rough terrain parachutist's 

. *, M16 rifle is rigged exposed, that is, 

without a protective weapons container, and the rucksack is not 

lowered prior to landing. This 

makes it safer for the jumper to be-

,/ come hung up in a tree, and avoid 

a ground landing where his equip 

ment might cause injuries. These 

techniques are not natural for an 

experienced jumper and require 

careful attention during training. 

Special equipment is required to 

protect the jumpers. A modified 


motorcycle helmet with heavy 
 . wire or plastic mesh face cover 


,+- j - protects the jumper without 
 ., . degrading his vision. A special 


two-piece nylon jump suit with 


foam padding on major impact 
 , ., points provides body protection. 


, . The top of the suit has a large 
 , . ' padded collar to prevent branches 
 . . from jamming up under the 


jumper's helmet. AB-7 life preserver is also worn. While it's bulky, it 

can keep a fully loaded jumper 

afloat if he lands in water. 

The rough terrain parachuting - .- mission for engineers is a highly 

One of the dangers of rough terrain jumping is failing to "hang" in the treetops. specialized and valuable capability. 

Here, a rough terrain student starts to derig after coming through the trees. The ability to get combat engineers 

into remote sitg allows rapid foxe 

Missoula, Montana. Mast Special plete. The engineer specialties projection and sustainment. With 

Forces rough terrain jumpers are selected for rough terrain include the Amy making ~nf~genc~ 

products of the two-week course. combat engineers (12B) and en- operations a priority, rough terrain 

However, the instruction is gineer equipment operators (62E). airborne engineers will continue to 

prohibitively expensive for large Each student receives training in See plenty of action. Y 

numbers of jumpers-those in an rough terrain techniques, equipengineer company, for instance, mcnt, parachute control, and tree Captain Rapp has sewed as the 

For large groups, rough terrain rappelling. Actual rough terrain tmining officer; 27th Engineer Batjumping is taught through in- jumps cap the training program. talion. assignments hclude executive officer and assistant house courses. Often, the instruc- From a trainer,s perspective, S-3, 16th Engineer Bettalion. He is tors for these courses are Smoke- rough terrain parachuting pre- a graduate of the U,S, Military jumper School graduates. sents many challenges. Jumping Academy, the Air Assault Course,

The unit-sponsored training into trees requires that soldiers be ~~i~ ~ i course ~ and jump. b ~ course takes three days to com- extremely well trained on canopy master Course. 
(Book Review continued) 

Japan is in much the same predicament in 

1992 as she was in 1941. And in some ways 

her external environment is more hostile now 

than it was then. Today Japan is more dependent on international suppliers of raw 

materials than they are on her finished 

products. Japan's strategic partnership with 

the United States is declining, and she 

seems destined to become a world military 

Cassandra, in the Trojan legend, had the 

power of prophecy but no one believed her. 

The authors of The Coming War With Japan 

take a Cassandra-like attitude. They state in 

the preface that the prediction of an imminent 

war between the United States and Japan 'is 

bound to be ridiculed by the conventional 

among us." me book does not deSe~e 

ridicule but should be read with caution because it contains some flaws in logic. 

A major flaw is their inadequate treatment 

of Japan's "China Problem." Japan must 

come to terms with the Chinese threat before 

she can seriously consider the United States 

to be an enemy. China is organized as a 

unitary state with a sense of purpose that 

would have terrified Japanese statesmen in 

1931 (and has scarcely less impact in 1992). 

Chinese interests are clearly divergent from 

those of Japan. Japan's growing antisubmarine capability is in response to the 

Chinese submarine threat. 

The authors also fail to acknowledge the 

impact of post-World War II independence 

movements of those states whose membership would be required in a new Greater East 

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The 1941 appeal 

to French Indochina, British Malaya, Dutch 

East Indies, and American Philippines, is no 

longer relevant. In fact, the Japanese, by 

their brutal treatment of fellow Asians, have 

left an enduring legacy of distrust, if not outappear capable of organizing her industrial 

base. For example, between 1922 and 1937, 

the US, launched only two dry cargo ships. 

Who would believe that, at the peak of the 

battle of the Atlantic (March 1943), American 

shipyards would launch 140 Liberty ships in 

one month! The Japanese are unlikely to underestimate American production again. 

As a final consideration of why war is not 

imminent, one must think of the enormous 

investment in ballistic missile defenses that 

Japan would require. By 1945 Japan knew 

that she could not defend herself from air attack. The world-wide proliferation of ballistic 

missiles must concern the Japanese because their densely populated islands are 

highly vulnerable. Japan does not appear to 

be seriously considering fielding a missile 

"umbrella." 

The authors recommend a defense 

strategy for the United States. They recommend that "the U.S. must slash the United 

States Army," employ U.S. Army troops 

primarily as "garrison forces," and "use the 

savings from Army cuts to build a Marine 

Corps at least twice its current size." Admittedly, it was hard for this reviewer to objectively consider such a proposal. The 1992 edition 

of National Military Strategy has shifted the 

focus of our preparedness from a global war 

to regional conflicts. But there are more 

regions than the littoral reaches of the 

Pacific, and celtainly more cogent threats 

than Japan. 

For all its faults, I recommend reading The 

Coming War With Japan. The authors did extensive research, and they have dissected 

and masterfully explained complex ideas in a 

very readable style. While no single idea 

presented is impossible, some strings of 

ideas are highly improbable. Read the book, 

but be careful the authors do not sell you 

something that you do not wish to buy. 

Reviewer: Jeb Stewart is an analyst in the 

Concepts Branch, Directorate of Combat 

candidate at Southwest Missouri State 

University. 
Expanding Productivity 

By Trying Something '?FfC?~en~ 

"In the current 

climate of reduced 

military spending, 

units need to find 

ways to minimize 

costs and maximize 

efficiency." 

By Second Lieutenant Dean W. Kucera 

yn a recent de~lovment . - to I to increase ~ruductivitv:

-' -California, Bravo Company, 

34th Engineer Battalion, Fort 

Riley, tried out some new techa New staking techniques 

a Headset radios for directing 

niques and products during a I owrators -

construction project. As a result, 

thev increased ~roductivitvand Carbide coatings for cutting 

cut-costs at thesame time. This I edges 

article outlines the site prepara- .~ ~dozer tracks . ~ tion project for the Riverside 

Police Department, and describes 

some of the ideas that helped the Staking 

mission along. 

Bravo Company's mission was 

to prepare the construction site for 

the Riverside Police Department's 

new facilities at the Riverside 

Municipal Airport. The new 

facilities will house the Police 

Department's special services 

department and aviation unit. 

Excavation began on April 7, 

1992, and site preparation was 

completed on May 26. More than 

5,000 cubic yards of earth were 

moved every day, using five 

scrapers and four dozers. In all, 

the company moved 140,000 cubic 

yards of earth in about 28 work 

days. 

Four new techniques and 

products were used in an attempt 

vrior to the start of con-

- struction, the 15-acre 

worksite was surveyed by an advance party, and 300 stakes were 

placed on 50-foot by 50-foot 

grids. The surveyor who laid out 

the stakes used a unique method 

to mark them. 

The Riverside project called for 

cuts up to 27 feet deep and 8-foot 

fills. To quickly and easily identify 

the range of cut or fill from a distance, the stakes were marked 

with different colored flagging. 

Red flags showed a change in 

elevation of more than 10 feet, 

orange flagging between 5 and 10 

feet, yellow between 1 and 5 feet, 

and blue within 1 foot of grade. 

32 Engineer 
This marking system was effective in giving operators and 

site NCOs a quick visual reference of how much to cut or fill. 

The system also helped leaders 

plan daily operations without 

having to constantly refer to individual stake markings. On a 

site of this size, this was a significant time saver. 

Qhortly after the project 8 3 

I ,began, the squad leaders 

and platoon sergeants talked 

about the potential advantages of 

communicating with the equipment operators while they 

worked. With the battalion 

commander's approval, 12 headset radios were purchased to test 

this concept. Purchased from a 

local electronics store, the headsets had a quarter-mile range, 

which was perfect for the project. 

The radios were worn by scraper 

operators, water-truck operators, 

the cut-site NCO, and the fill-site 

NCO These radios allowed supervisors to more efficiently direct the 

cutting, filling, and watering 

operations. Additionally, mistakes-in-progress could be cor- The Rlverslde project site as It appeared on April 21, 1992. 

rected quickly, and praise for good 

work could be doled out on the progress of the project and the and contribute to maintenance 

spot. quality of the work. and safety programs. 

Surprisingly, the radios also Durability was a problem with 

helped with maintenance. The site the headsets. The transceiver 

NCOs could often spot a leak or worked well, but the headsets Carbide Coatings 

problem on the equipment that were not durable enough for the 

the operator could not see. The rough construction work. The varly in the project, a visit 

NCO informedtheoperatorimme- noise of the D7G dozer made it .Ato a local construction 

diately so the equipment could be difficult for operators to use the equipment dealer revealed that 

shut down and repaired before any headsets effectively. they often welded carbide chips 

serious damage occurred. While the headsets were a great onto the cutting edges of equip 

Esprit de corps also got a shot in success, improvement was needed ment in order to increase the 

the arm from the headsets. in the models used. For maximum wear life of blades and bits. 

Operators could talk to each other effectiveness,the speaker and Bravo Company decided to test 

and break the sometimes tedious microphone should be mounted in the coating on the cutting edges 

nature of the work. Good-natured a set of durable headphones, muf- of the 621B scraper, the end bits 

competition about the quality of fled against exterior noise. With of a D7G, and the ripper caps on 

work done by each operator was increased durability and sound- a D7G. 

"broadcast" over the headsets, proofing, such headsets could in- The coating isachieved by using 

This served to bolster both the crease productivity and morale, a welding process and ground up 
Top: Carbide coating on a D7G dozer end bit. 

Above: A cut side on April 9,1992. Cut depths in this area ranged from 1 foot 

to 12 feet. 

34 Engineer 

carbide steel chips from drill bits 

on the outer edge of the cutting 

surfaces. On the Riverside site, 

the soil was primarily decomposed 

granite (DG). This highly abrasive 

soil made a good testbed for determining the usefulness and cost effectiveness of the carbide coating. 

For the test on the 621B 

scraper, standard cutting edges 

and router bits were mounted on 

one scraper, and carbide-coated 

edges were installed on another 

scraper. The equipment operators then counted the number 

of loads they cut. After 650 loads, 

the standard edges showed an 

average 2 inches of wear on the 

end bits and 3 inches of wear on 

the center (stinger) bit. The carbide-coated edges showed no appreciable wear. 

The scraper with the standard 

edges used three sets of cutting 

edges to complete the project. By 

the end of the project, after 3,000 

loads and six weeks of work, the 

carbide edges still showed only 

minor wear. 

For the D7G test. Bravo Cornpany mounted one carbide end bit 

and one standard end bit. After six 

the standard bit had 1 to 2 

inches of wear, with rounding of 
the outer edge, while the coated 

edges showed only minor wear. 

The D7Gs on this project were 

used primarily for pushing 

scrapers-not for digging. And 

even with the light digging duty 

encountered in this project, the 

carbide advantage was clear The 

results of the test. on the ripper 

caps were similar. 

The carbide coating cost $1.61 

per linear inch. Cost comparisons 

are shown below. 

Based on the wear data, the additional cost of carbide coating is 

worth the price. The carbide coatings also saved equipment down 

time normally devoted to changing worn cutting edges or waiting 

for replacement edges. In locations where the soil is abrasive, 

the coatings will allow a unit to 

remain mission capable for longer 

periods. 

The only drawback to the carbide, according to 

the equipment 

dealer, is a tendency for the 

'?, t the start of the projed, all of 

''%the unit's dozers had only 

abut one inch of track lePc on the 

track shoes. Tracks with that much 

wear will diminish the effectivenes 

of dozers in digging or pushing missions. Because of this wear, the unit 

had the tracks re-groused. This 

simply means that the life of the 

existing track shoes is extended by 

welding new strips of metal onto 

each track shoe. 

The re-grousing procgs took two 

days at a local equipment dealer. 

The rebuilt tracks performed well, 

and showed no signs of chipping or 

breaking. The cost of the re-grousing was $1,500 per dozer, including 

materials and labor. The cost of a 

new set of track shoes is $2,706 

not including the cust of labor. 

Carbide coated cutting edges on a 

6215 scraper. 

From Bravo Company's experience, the re-grousing was costeffective. If re-grousing is accomplished at direct support 

maintenance, costs will be reduced even further. 

Concll~sion 

-Fn the current climate of reduced 

.. .military spending, units need to 

find ways to minimize costs and 

maximize efficiency. The Riverside 

project gave the 34th Engineers the 

opportunity to demonstrate the 

kind of ingenuity and planning that 

saves money and still gets the job 

done. Y 

Semnd Lieutemt Kucem is an eaith 

mouing platoon leader fir Bmuo Company, 34th Engineer Battalion. He b a 

gmduate of the Engineer O@i' Basic 

Course and the 

University of Nebraska, where he 

Cost Comparison for Cutting Edge Sets 	 earned a bacheiork 

degree in constmtion mnnagement. A Carbide Standard former enlisted en- 621B Scraper-1 center bit, 2 edge 	 gimr; he preuiollsly coatings to chip bits and 2 router bits $1,361 $754 served as a heavy when the cutting construction equip edges hit rocks. 	 D7G dozer-2 end bits 451 213 ment opemtoi for 

070 dozer-3 ripper teeth caps 337 225 the 7th Engineer 

Brigade. 

Engineer 35 
Lessons Learned . 

Small Emplacement 'Excavator (SEE) Operations . ~ 

. . 

he following lessons learned apply to 

Army engineer and explosive 

orrlnance disposal (EOD) units that use the 

Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) in 

training or combat. They are based on 

results of a post-fielding training effectiveness survey and observations made during 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

For more information, write to Commandant, 

U.S. Army Engineer School, ATSE-ESA, 

Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-6630. Or, 

call (314) 563-5305, DSN 676-5305. 

The Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) 

has been completely fielded to designated 

engineer and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units. The vehicle, which performed well in Operations Desert Shield1 

Storm, is used extensively in construction 

operations and the performance of tasks supporting combat operations. Observed operational problems will be difficult to fix through 

materiel changes because the SEE was 

procured as a non-developmental item. 

-"-, .- -. 	 Proper training will enhance operators' skill 

and confidence and lessen the hazards associated with vehicle operation. The following 

information will help your unit achieve optimum production from your SEE fleet. 

ISSUE: The SEE has a tendency to roll 

DISCUSSION: Of units surveyed, 23 percent experienced roll-over accidents when 

operators turned corners or drove the SEE 

on side slopes or uneven terrain. The 

By Peggy McAvenia and Sergeant First Class Greg Copas 

36 Engineer 
potential for roll-over accidents adversely affects 

operators' confidence in their performance. The absence of ground guides and excessive speed increase the potential for roll-over accidents. 

LESSONS LEARNED: To gain confidence in their 

skills, units must provide SEE operators ample "behind the wheel experience" on uneven terrain and 

side slopes. Ground guides should be used to alert 

operators of potential roll-over sites. For safe operation, a maximum speed of 8 kilometers per hour or 5 

miles per hour (8kphI5mph) must be observed when 

maneuvering across uneven terrain. 

ISSUE: The size of the SEE'S cab restricts movement and provides limited storage space. 

DISCUSSION: While the operators' compartment 

in the SEE is small, it will not be redesigned. All 

operators have experienced difficulty when performing tasks in MOPP IV and arctic gear. Some 

operators have difficulty operating the controls: they 

continually bump their heads, elbows, and knees. 

Other operators experience cramps and reduced 

response rates, which eventually leads ro operator 

fatigue. The cab also lacks space to store personal 

equipment such as CTA-50, protective masks, and 

weapons. 

LESSONS LEARNED: Units must provide ample 

training opportunities for operators using MOPP 1V 

and arctic gear. Supervisors must continually check 

SEE operators for fatigue, which could contribute to 

an accident. When a second seat is not required in 

the cab, consider removing the passenger seat to create additional storage space. 

ISSUE: The SEE cannot ascend or descend a 60- 

percent slope. 

DISCUSSION: in a recent test, 51 percent of the 

SEE operators were unable to ascend or descend a 

60-percent slope. The test required operators to start 

the SEE on a 60-percent grade and climb on a surface free of loose material. The test was conducted 

on a dry concrete surface under ideal conditions. (In 

the field, most SEES operate under condiiions much 

worse than the test conditions.) Most of the operators 

tested could ascend a 60-percent slope but could 

only descend a 50-percent slope safely. The major 

reason for test failure is the weight distribution of the 

front bucket and backhoe. Also, some operators attempted to negotiate slopes at excessive speed, 

creating a stall condition and an unstable situation. 

LESSONS LEARNED: Supervisors must identify 

routes at the jobsite that ascend or descend a slope 

with less than a 50-percent grade. Operators must be 

trained to select the correct gear when negotiating a 

steep grade and maintain that gear throughout the 

climb. Operators MUST NOT de-clutch on a severe 
Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) 

grade! Furthermore, operators must always drive the 

SEE at slow speeds (less than 8kphl5mph) when 

maneuvering on unimproved surfaces at the jobsite. 

ISSUE: The SEE lacks sufficient power to dig with 

the front bucket. 

DISCUSSION: The front bucket on the SEE is 

designed only to load or backfill loose soil. It is not 

designed to excavate banked or compacted soil, and 

numerous front-bucket failures occur when operators 

try to perform these tasks. 

LESSONS LEARNED: Supervisors must ensure 

that the front bucket is used only for its designed purpose. Operators must know the limitations of the front 

bucket and use it only to move loose soil. 

ISSUE: The backhoe stabilizers will not hold the 

SEE on side slopes. 

DISCUSSION: Supervisors and operators report 

that the backhoe stabilizers will not hold the SEE in 

place when they maneuver on side slopes, especially 

when the bucket is moved to the downhill side of the 

slope. Initial production tests show that the SEE cannot operate satisfactorily on side slopes greater than 

20 percent because the maximum leveling angle of 

the stabilizers is 10 degrees. 

LESSON LEARNED: When backhoeing on side 

slopes, operators must excavate and dump material on 

the uphill side of the slope from the vehicle's centerline. 

ISSUE: Mechanical problems increase when nonqualified personnel operate the SEE. 

DISCUSSION: Some mechanical problems occur 

because SEE operators do not follow established procedures. This is especially apparent when personnel 

other than military occupational specialty (MOS) 62J 

operate the SEE. Specific problems caused by nonqualified operators include burned out starters and 

burned out clutches. 

LESSONS LEARNED: Units must ensure that the 

SEE is operated only by qualified personnel (MOS 

62J). When missions require that other personnel 

operate the SEE, supervisors must ensure that they 

follow proper operating procedures at all times. 

ISSUE: Rust, corrosion and condensation occur in 

the SEE'S air system. 

DISCUSSION: Survey responses indicate that 

problems with rust, corrosion and condensation in the 

air system are common. These problems probably 

occur because of improper preventive maintenance 

checks and services (PMCS) and improper maintenance supervision. 

LESSONS LEARNED: Supervisors must ensure 

that the air tank is drained daily and the alcohol 

evaporator system is serviced daily. Operators must 

ensure that the seasonal switch is on the correct setting for current climatic conditions. 

ISSUE: Periodic maintenance se~ices on the 

SEE are performed late because of inaccurate hour 

gauge readings. 

DISCUSSION: The mechanical-electrical hour 

gauge on the SEE is difficult to read. The gauge is 
mounted outside the cab at an inconvenient location 

and the two sets of numbers are poorly displayed, 

making it difficult to read. Many operators assume that 

the red numbers record tenths of an hour when they actualiy record hour increments. Because of these difficulties, operators frequently guess at operational times 

rather than read the instrument. As a result, the intervals between periodic services are too long, causing 

mechanical failures and performance problems. 

LESSONS LEARNED: Supervisors must ensure 

that the operational hour gauge is read accurately in 

spite of the difficulty with access. Operators must be 

trained to read the hour gauge correctly. 

ISSUE: The primary fuel filters on the SEE clog 

before the recommended scheduled maintenance 

interval. 

I I 

. ~. '. . ~ ~ 

~ ~ 

DISCUSSION: Of maintenance supervisors surveyed, 61 percent report that the primary fuel filters on 

the SEE clog before the scheduled maintenance. Corrosion in the fuel tank contributes to fuel-filter clogging. 

LESSON LEARNED: Alleviate the problem of 

clogged fuel filters by draining the primary fuel filter 

daily and topping offthe fuel tank after operating the 

SEE. If the problem persists, replace the factory-installed fuel tank with an aluminum tank that is available under the same parts number. 

Mrs. McAvenia is an education specialist assigned to the 

Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, U.S. Army 

Engineer School. 

Sergeant First Class Copas is an action officer assigned to 

the Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Engineer School. 

How Big is a "Birdsmouth"? 


By Les Fortner 

or those suddenly thinking of a creature with 

feathers, a birdsmouth is that part of a common rafter which sits on top of, and is anchored 

to, the upper wall framing member of a building 1 (the top plate), as shown below. 

C Blrdsmouth 

Department of the Army Field Manual 5-551, 

Carpenby, February 1984, indicates the seat cut 

should equal 3 518 inches or the width of the top 

plate. A seat cut equal to the width of the top 

plate is satisfactory for a roof pitch of 4:12. However, as the pitch of the roof is increased, the 

width of the seat cut must be decreased. Otherwise, the tail of the rafter will be weakened to the 

point of possible roof failure. 

When laying out cuts for common rafters, 

adjust the length of the seat according to the pitch 

I L - " = 

of the roof. As a rule of thumb, 50 percent of the 

rafter stock should be left to support loads of ice, 

snow, construction materials or workmen. 

The illustration below depicts the cutting of a birdsmouth for a building to be constructed with a flat ceiling and a roof pitch of 312 or less. This includes shed 

type roofs. On this roof structure, the length of the 

seat cut must be greatly increased to eliminate an obstruction when the flat ceiling is installed. 

Celllng Jolnt Double top plate 


Wall stud -

I1 


In conclusion, adjust the size of the birdmouth 

depending on the pitch of the roof but never cut 

away more than 50 percent of the rafter stock's 

width. 

Mr. Fortner is a training specialist in the Directorate 

of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Engineer School. 

I 

Engineer 39 
By Captain Thomas W. Kula 

PI ngineers are the experts in obstacle reconnaismsance. They are the ideal augmentation for the 

scout platoon in offensive reconnaissance missions. 

Yet, observations of task force (TF) operations at the 

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) show that engineers are not effectively integrated into the TF 

recon effort. 

Doctrine stresses engineer involvement in reconnaissance for offensive missions. Unfortunately, TF commanders are not effectively using this expertise. This article provides some ideas on why this is happening. 

Two offensive missions from JRTC scenarios are 

presented to illustrate how engineers can be effectively 

used to augment the recon effort. 

(The JRTC, located at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 

provides advanced training for light, airborne, and air 

assault [LT, ABN, AASLT] task forces.) 

Engineer Support to Light Forces 

T 

o understand engineer support within 

LTIABNIAASLT divisions, one must first understand that an engineer company normally supports a 

LTIABNIAASLT infantry brigade. Normally, an engineer platoon supports a battalion-sized TF. In airborne and air assault divisions, one platoon is regularly associated with a maneuver battalion. Within light 

divisions, a two-platoon company supports the 

brigade's three maneuver battalions on an area 

basis--or by priority for the offense. 

While engineer support to LTIABNIAASLT divisions 

is increased when corps engineers augment 

divisional engineers, the brunt of engineer support to 

maneuver battalions for the offense is provided by 

divisional engineers. In LTIABNIAASLT divisions, the 

40 Engineer 

L-Series Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 

stipulates an engineer captain as the brigade 

engineer. 

In the task force, the TF engineer is also the 

platoon leader of the engineer platoon. One engineer 

lieutenant and three engineer squads may not seem 

like a lot to the casual observer. But the TF commander knows that this platoon is a vital combat multiplier and uses it often and effectively in the offensehe doesn't just hold it in reserve, waiting for the 

defense. 

Missions 

7-he two offensive missions outlined here are 

deliberate attacks. The first is a TF mission to infiltrate forward enemy defenses and secure an enemyfortified position in order to support the passage of a 

heay task force. The second is a TF mission to infiltrate and destroy a regimental command post (CP). 

Before discussing recommended engineer support 

to these two missions, it's important to list some common TF deficiencies in planning engineer support to 

reconnaissance. 

Engineer Planning 

-tlefield operating systems planning, supports 

ngineer planning for operations, like other batthe tactical planning process. For offensive missions, 

the TF engineer analyzes the factors of MET-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available) 

during the engineer estimate process. He also recommends the amount of engineer support provided for 

the recon effort. 
Observations 

egardless of what the TF engineer recom 

. mends--or how extensive the reconnaissance 

effort is--many TF commanders either (1) do not augment the scouts with engineers, or (2), more commonly, augment the scouts with only two engineers to 

"check the block." Some observations on why engineers are not effectively included in the reconnaissance are: 

m TF commanders that don't task organize engineers to the scouts may not realize that engineer expertise can provide the detailed 

obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) collection 

that is critical to breach planning. 

m Minimal engineer support to reconnaissance 

generally means the TF commander doesn't 

want to risk losing his engineers. However, iessons learned show that poor obstacle recon 

results in failed breaching operations, and the 

collection of critical OBSINTEL is worth the risk. 

The TF commander is reluctant to attach engineers to the scouts because they have not 

trained together. This is a valid point-but only 

shows that such training should have been accomplished at home station. 

The Army Research Institute conducted a study in 

1989 of 47 TF offensive missions at the National 

Training Center (NTC). Certain variables were 

analyzed (OBSTINTEL, rehearsals, breach planning) 

to determine their effect on breaching operations. 

When OBSTINTEL was collected during recon and 

other variables were not considered, 75 percent of 

the breaching operations were successful. In breaching operations where OBSTINTEL was not conducted, breach effectiveness averaged 1.5 on a scale 

of 1 to 9 (1 showing lowest effectiveness: force 

stopped by obstacle--and 9 indicating most effective: 

force barely slowed by obstacle). While similar data 

are not available for JRTC, the results probably 

would show the same trend. 

Without sufficient engineer support to the scouts, 

the following outcomes are the norm: 

The scouts, lacking required engineer support, 

are either overtasked and/or are unable to provide detailed information on the obstacles. 

m Lack of detailed OBSTINTELmeans templated 

obstacles are neither confirmed nor denied, and 

the TF cannot refine the plan. Thus, the plan and 

rehearsals are based on a template that may not 

reflect the current situation. The TF engineer cannot refine the type of breachingtechnique without 

information on the type of obstacles. 

m When hard intelligence on enemy obstacles and 

enemy disposition is received by the TF staff, it 

is often too late to refine the plan or to properly 

disseminatethe information. A planned deliberate attack, in essence, becomes a hasty attack. 

Mission 1 

[n the first deliberate attack, the task force receives 

the mission to infiltrate and destroy a motorized 

rifle company (MRC) (-) fortified position NLT 04 0400 

Feb 92 in order to pass a heavy TF through the 

chokepoint. 

The brigade order is received by the task force at 

01 1600 Feb 92. The TF has 60 hours to plan, 

prepare, and execute the attack. Prior to receiving 

the brigade operations order (OPORD), the TF has 

conducted some initial planning based on the brigade 

warning order. 

The scouts received a warning order from the TF 

to be prepared to move out on or around 01 2000 

Feb 92 for reconnaissanceto support the mission. 

The TF engineer also received a warning order from 

the TF to be prepared to augment the scouts with engineers for this reconnaissance. 

The brigade provided the TF data on the enemy 

situation: The attacking enemy first echelon 

motorized rifle regiment had been destroyed. Remnants of the second echelon have transitioned to the 

defense and are preparing defensive positions. The 

enemy is defending in sector with a mounted security 

force forward, guarding obstacles along high speed 

avenues of approach. The enemy's main defense in 

sector consists of a series of fortified positions blocking high speed avenues of approach. The enemy has 

begun digging in and emplacing protective and tactical obstacles. These enemy-fortified positions are 

believed to be of company-sized strength, consisting 

of approximately 60 dismounted infantry, three BMPs, 

and one T-62. 

The TF plan is to-conduct reconnaissance beginning 01 2000 Feb 92; begin infiltration 03 1800 Feb 

92, and execute the attack 04 0400 Feb 92. The 

focus of the TF staff prior to the scouts moving out 

is to develop and support the preparation of the 

recon and surveillance (R&S) plan. In addition to 

the R&S plan and information requirements, the 

scouts require a proposed friendly scheme of 

maneuver in order to understand the intent of the 

R&S plan. 

The TF engineer begins his planning by participating in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

(IPB), and assisting in terrain and threat analysis. 

The TF engineer adds to the S-2's situation template by templating enemy tactical and protective 

obstacles. 

Engineer 41 
From this template, the 5-2 and TF engineer 

identify named areas of interest (NAls) which form 

the basis for the R&S plan (Figure 1). The S-2 

develops inteiligence requirements needed to verify 

his picture of the battlefield. The commander designates intelligence requirements critical to the success 

of his plan as priority intelligence requirements (PIR). 

The PIR chosen for this mission are: 

What are the locations of enemy positions and 

obstacles along proposed infiltration routes? 

What is the disposition of enemy forces on the 

objective? 

What are the locations and extent of obstacles, 

mines, and fortifications on the perimeter and 

within the objective? 

m What is the best breach location, with priority, in 

order, to the northwest, west, south and east? 

m Is the assault position a good concealed 

position? 

Figure 1 

Does the support position offer good 0bSe~atiOn 

and fields of fire onto the objective? 

What is the disposition of enemy forces surrounding the objective? 

The 5-2 and TF engineer determine specific 

obstacle PIR to obtain detailed OBSTINTEL which 

includes: 

w Obstacle locations 

w Obstacle crientation 

w Presence of wire 

w Presence of boobytrapslearly warning devices 

w Gaps 

Minefield composition (buried, surface antitanldantipersonnel, and antihandling devices). 

m Type of mines 

w Location of enemy direct fire weapons 

Good OBSTlNTEL 

is important for discovering the type of 

mines and mine fuzes 

the enemy has employed. The TF engineer depends on 

this information to 

determine which reduction techniques 

offer the best chance 

for success and minimal risk to the breach 

force. A recon team 

must examine mines 

within the minefield. 

Obtaining OBSTINTEL requires use of 

all available collection assets: scouts, 

other maneuver 

patrols, engineers, 

aviation, and ground 

surveillance radars. 

Engineer expertise 

(two engineers per 

obstacle reconnaissance team) or an en 

gineer squad move 

with the scouts-or 

patrol-and conduct 

the detailed recon of 

the obstacles. 

Friendly engineer 

assets available to 

the TF include one 
Figure 2 

engineer platoon attached to the TF. The TF en- The 5-2and TF engineer recommend the comgineer, after conducting mission analysis, determines mander attach one engineer team (four men) to the 

that the engineer critical tasks are to: scout lat to on. This enaineer team links UD with the 

scouts and conducts pianfling and rehearsals with Provide engineer support to reconnaissance the scouts for the mission, The scout platoon leader 

m Provide engineer assets to the assault breach attaches the engineer team to one of his squads. 

Breach lanes to pass the heavy force through 

The proposed maneuver course of action is for 

one company to be the breach and assault force, a 

second company to be a follow-on assault force, and 

a third company (-) to be the support force. The TF 

will infiltrate as companies along two infiltration lanes 

and link up in the assault position. 

The TF engineer determines he must: 

Provide support to the breach team to breach 

two or three footpaths for the assault force 

m Be prepared to provide engineers as demolition 

teams on the objective 

Be prepared to breach one or two lanes for the 

heavy force 

Because the infiltrations will be on restrictiveterrain, 

the TF engineer assumes that instride breaching will 

not be required. He determines he can attach one engineer team to the scouts and still provide support to 

the assault. 

This scout and engineer squad has the mission to 

rapidly infiltrate to the objective and begin collecting 

OBSTINTEL and other PIR on the objective. 

The other scout squads will concentrate on NAls 

along the infiltration lanes, and find and report bypasses of enemy positions. Later they will assist in the 

collection of PIR in and around the objective. They 

wit focus on the timely collection of OBSTINTEL and 

other PIR on the objective. 

Engineers engaged in recon for OBSTINTEL 

should rarely, if ever, be used to reduce obstacles 

during recon. This may compromise the recon effort 

and, thus, the entire attack. 

The TF engineer continues hls staff planning and 

engineer estimate. He plans to task organize two 

squads to the breachiassault force, and one team to 

the follow-on assault force. He will consolidate his engineers, after destruction of the enemy force, to 

breach two lanes for the heavy task force. 

Detailed OBSTINTEL gained from the recon 

provides information needed to update IPB products, 
Figure 3 

0+;,*."' --X-'X3-

XcX--Xrefine the plan, and conduct a rehearsal based on 

hard intelligence (Figure 2, page 43). Based on this 

intelligence, the TF engineer can finalize the best 

breaching technique. 

The ultimate success of intelligence collection is 

determined by: 

0400 Feb 92, and be prepared to conduct follow-on offensive missions. They receivedthe 

brigade OPORD at 01 1600 Feb 92. Their attack was part of a brigade coordinated attack 

against a fortified position to pass a heavy 

force through, along with an attack to destroy 

the regiment's command and control. 

The task force has 84 hours to plan, 

prepare, and execute the attack. The scout 

platoon received a TF warning order to be 

prepared to move out for a recon mission at 

01 2200 Feb 92. The TF engineer also 

received a warning order to be prepared to 

provide one squad to the scouts for recon. 

The TF received an enemy situation 

similar to the first mission. Additionally, the 

briaade orovided the location of the susm Early preparation of the situation template, complete with templated obstacles. 

Preparation of the initial concept of the operation 

so the recon force understands the scheme of 

maneuver. 

Developing the R&S plan based on NAis and PIR. 

Allowing adequate time for reconnaissance. 

Ensuring engineer expertise accompanying the 

recon gather detailed OBSTINTEL. 

m Priority to OBSTINTEL and collection of PIR on 

the objective. 

lmely reporting of PIR. 

Mission 2 

The task force received the mission to infiltrate 

and attack to destroy a regimental CP at 05 

petted regimental CP. The CP is supported 

by one rifle platoon (+). 

The brigade commander's guidance is for 

the task force to infiltrate by platoons through 

selected passage points beginning 03 1900 

Feb 92. The TF plan was to initiate recon 

beginning 01 2200 Feb 92. The TF would 

begin infiltration by platoons at 03 1900 Feb 

92 along two infiltration lanes, and move to 

A company hide positions by 04 0600 Feb 92. 

The TF will move again beginning 04 1900 

Feb 92 to the assault position and initiate the 

attack at 05 0400 Feb 92. 

The TF engineer begins templating enemy 

obstacles on the S-2's situational template (Figure 3). 

Obstacles along the infiltration lanes are expected to 

be limited, but this must be confirmed by reconnaissance. The TF engineer templates the regimental CP 

protective obstacles based on a doctrinal template 

received from brigade. 

Templated protective obstacles are limited, and 

consist primarily of wire boobytraps and early warning devices. Because the protective obstacles will not 

be extensive and require minimal engineer support, 

he plans for one engineer squad to support the 

breach force. 

The infantry breach force is capable of providing 

the majority of the breach teams for this mission. He 

determines that engineer support to reconnaissance 

is more critical to mission accomplishment than support to the assault breach. More engineers are required to support recon on long infiltration lanes (14 

kilometers for this mission) where the enemy situation and obstacles are unclear. 

The need for timely and detailed reconnaissance 

requires more engineer support for this mission than 

for the first mission. The TF engineer recommends to 

the 5-2 and TF commander that two engineer squads 

be provided to the scouts. One squad will support the 
scouts along each infiltration lane. 

Finding bypasses around enemy positions along 

these infiltration lanes-and avoiding contact-is critical to the success of the recon and the main body infiltration. It's important for the recon element to move 

rapidly to the objective to attain timely PIR and 

OBSTINTEL. 

The PIR chosen for this mission are the same as 

those for the first mission, with the addition of confirming suitable company hide sites and proposed landing zones (LZs). 

Engineer teams accompanying the scouts provide 

OBSTINTEL collection along the infiltration lanes. 

They bypass obstacles as their first option. Engineers 

along each lane support covert breaches of obstacles 

that cannot be bypassed. Surveillance left on these 

covert breach lanes also act as guides for the main 

body. 

Engineer teams conduct OBSTINTEL collection on 

obstacles supporting the objective. This recon is conducted 02 1900 to 03 0500 Feb 92, during the hours 

of darkness, using stealth. Scouts concentrate on 

enemy disposition in and around the objective and 

collect other PIR. Engineers who conducted OBSTINTEL on the objective provide guides for the breach 

force from the assault position to the breach location. 

Again, success of the recon depends on timely 

development of an R&S plan, adequate time for recon, 

The use of engineers 

with scouts can signlflcantly improve the 

chances for successful 

offensive operations. 

Unfortunately, some 

task force commanders do not use their 

engineers for 

reconnaissance. 

engineer expertise to recon, and timely reporting. 

Conclusion 

ithout engineer and other collection asset 

support to OBSTINTEL collection, the scouts 

are limited by time and expertise in providing detailed 

information on enemy obstacles. Only through effective use of engineers can a commander expect his 

recon force to provide an accurate picture of the 

battlefield. 

Engineers are well trained for dismounted patrolling and reconnaissance. It's essential that TF 

recon training include their supporting engineersand that engineers consistently train with the 

scouts. The reward of this integration is development of an effective combined arms reconnaissance team. Field Manual 90-13-1, Combined 

Arms Breaching Operations, contains an excellent 

discussion on this subject that is applicable to both 

light and heavy forces. Y 

Captain Kuia is attending Command and General Staff College. He was previously assigned to the Tactics, Training 

and Doctrine Division of the Engineer School's Department 

of Instruction. He served as the senior engineer obse~er/controlier at JRTC from 1987-1989. He is a graduate 

of West Point and the Infantry Officers Advanced Course. 
Address by 

Lieutenant General Franqois Bresson 

"Inspecteur du Genie 99* 

To Students at the U.S. Army Engineer School 

y dear engineer friends, 

it is a pleasure and an 

honor for me to meet you today. 

First, because as engineers we 

share common features. In our 

missions, in our techniques, and 

in the way we work and we 

serve. Second, because between 

the French and Americans there 

are more than two centuries of 

friendship, during which time 

our two nations never confronted 

each other but were always in 

the same camp, the one of 

freedom. Lastly, because anyone 

who has 36 years of service like I 

do takes a lot of interest in 

speaking with young sappers 

still at the beginning of their 

careers. 

Before beginning, I must tell 

you that last year Major General 

Schroeder (former commandant of 

the U.S, Army Engineer School) 

took a rather bad initiative: he 

gave his lecture in French. Therefore, you should complain to him 

for listening to me in English now. 

I hope that despite my pronunciation, you can still recognize the 

language I am using! 

I also bear a grudge towards 

General Schroeder for another 

reason: he said everything about 

Putnam and Vauban that there is 

to be said! 

Therefore, I decided instead to 

tell you about the FrancoAmerican cooperation in 1917 to 

1918, and about the role taken by 

a great engineer, Marshall Joffre. 

Then, I will present to you the different components of the French 

engineers and their prospects for 

the future. 

Lastly, I would like to tell you 

the guidance I give to engineer 

officers to help them in their 

commands. 

Exactly three quarters of a century ago, on April 24, 1917, the 

French cruiser Lorraine arrived at 

Hampton Roads, Virginia. On 

board was Marshall Joseph Joffre. 

He was welcomed by the admiral 

commanding the American Atlantic Fleet. President Wilson sent 

him his personal yacht, the Mayflower. It was on board the 

Mayflower that Joffre sailed up 

the Potomac River and arrived in 

Washington on the 25th ofApril. 

How was Joffre welcomed? 

How were the Franco-American 

agreements developed, and on 

which points did they focus? 

What lessons can an engineer 

draw from Joffre's personality? 

These are the three topics I 

* General Bresson holds a position in the French Army 

similar to the Chief of Engineers. 

46 Engineer 
French river crossing training on a Rhine slte. 

would like to address in order to 

recount this historical event. 

Jofie's welcome from the highest ' 

authoritiff and from the American 

people is summarized by this quote 

in a New York newspaper: "Ibday, 

the nation salutes France through 

the person of Jofre. Just as 

Lafayette once symbolized France 

for millions of Americans, so does 

Joe symbolize France for miZions 

of Americans today. Gcd save 

America." 

Much ceremony surrounded 

Joffre's visit to the White House 

and to the State Department. He 

was also received at the War Collee by General Kuhn and the chief 

of st&, General Scott. He visited 

the Engineer School, then located 

at Washington Barraclcs. There he 

said, 'T feel at home!" Congress 

gave him a standing ovation and 

asked him for 'Sust a word." He 

raised his hat at arm's length and 

said 'T don't speak English. Long 

live the United Stah." 

He did a passing review of 

West Point cadets, he visited 

Mount Vernon and meditated 

in Washington's room, in front 

of the three swords with the 

inscription: "These swords 

will not be drawn to shed 

blood, acept for the defense of 

the country and of its 

freedom." Lastly, in New 

York, Mayor Mitchell welcomed him with these words: 

"You are a man from the 

people, and by degrees, you 

have reached the highest 

military honors." 

In short, this month-long 

welcome expressed the Franco-American friendship and 

the generosity and dynamics 

of the United States. 

As far as the FrancoAmerican agreements are concerned, two things are significant. The first is the 

extraordinary mood of confidence and sympathy that 

marked the talks. Marshall 

Joffre was received in the 

afternoon-long tet.e-a-tete by 

President Wilson, and he met 

many times with Secretary of 

State Baker, General Scott 

and General Kuhn. The most 

difficult questions about organization, command, accommodation, training, and so on, 

were solved in the highest 

community of thinking. 

These decisions are the subject of a simple memorandum. 

As proof of outstanding 

mutual confidence between the 

two nations, it was agreed that the 

memo would be implemented 

without an official signature. 

And that is what really happened, for less than three weeks 

later, the First Infantry Division 

embarked for France. Heading 

these first elements was the 

famous General Pershing. President Wilson solicited the advice of 

Marshall Joffre in selecting 

General Pershing. 
Joffre's action on the general 

philosophy of these agreements 

was key When it was recognized 

that the United States would 

enter into the war, the British 

staff and part of the French staff 

wanted to recruit small units of 

American volunteers who would 

be scattered within allied units in 

order to reinforce them. But Joffre 

was convinced this would be a mistake. He knew that one must not 

set up an army of mercenaries who 

would fight under a flag other 

than their own. 

He said one must set up a grand 

American army, for a grand people 

fights well only under its own flag, 

commanded by its own leaders 

and organized according to its own 

methods. 

This is a lesson we must not 

forget. And this is why on November 11, 1918, at the end of the war, 

more than 800,000 Americans 

were in the trenches and more 

than 1,500,000 were ready to fight 

under General Pershing's orders, 

and under the folds of the star 

spangled banner. 

As for Joffre's personality, there 

are several things for us engineers 

to remember. Like Putnam and 

Vauban, he was from quite modest 

origins. His father made barrels 

and sold wine in the south of 

France (a good French job!). 

His qualifications were 

thorough and varied. He attended 

the Ecole Polytechnique, but he 

also knew Tonkin, Taiwan, Sudan 

and Madagascar, during times 

when these countries were hostile 

environments. He was also "in the 

field" a lot, this being normal for 

an engineer. 

He mastered all the techniques 

of our branch, particularly fortification and building railroadsso important at this time. His 

main quality was serenity, based 

on confidence, skillfulness, 

and a rational examination of 

all situations. 

The following anecdote illustrates Joffre's serenity. It was 

during the very difficult period of 

late August 1914. One of Joffre's 

main subordinates came to the 

general in his CP to tell him some 

important news. Joffre asked him: 

'Won't you stay and have lunch 

with us?" 

'Yes, sir, but before I would 

like..."the general stopped him. 

'Very well, we have veal. Do you 

like veal?" 

"Sir, I've got important news 

to..." 

"Do you like veal?" 

'Yes, Sir." 

Well, we will speak about the 

rest after lunch." 

Recognize that Marshall Joffre, 

when he arrived in the United 

States, had just been relieved of 

his command. Joffre, a man who 

never weakened during the most 

difficult moments of those first 28 

months of war; Joffre, thevictor of 

the battle of the Marne. But he 

disagreed with the government on 

the conduct of operations. And in 

this case, as is the rule in a 

democracy, it is the military chief 

who quits. This story can happen 

again nowadays. 

It is my pleasure to remind you 

that Joffre, an engineer general 

officer, was chief of the French armies (at the time, 4,000,000 soldiers) from August 1914 to December 1916. From this, each of uscan 

conclude that all hopes for a career 

are within ourselves. 

I would now like to speak to you 

about the French engineers of 

today Their responsibilities and 

strengths are certainly different 

fmm American engineers, but this 

does not prevent us from sharing 

numerous pints in common. 

First, how are the French engineers structured? Basically, 

there are five types of organizations. The first type of organization is the civil engineers. Their 

expertise covers the whole 

military infrastructure (except 

harbors and some air force bases). 

The central directorate is located 

in Paris: Lieutenant General 

Delorme has his office right above 

mine and we work together often. 

The civil engineers' district covers 

not only the whole national territory in Europe, but also overseas 

as well, in the West Indes, 

Guyana, Reunion Island, New 

Calendonia and in Polynesia 

(Tahiti and Nururoa atoll). 

There is a central design bureau 

in Paris; officers and civilian 

employees are trained in the engineer service school in Versailles, 

or in civilian engineerschools. The 

operating budget is roughly $1 

million. 

The second organization is the 

adapted military service battalions that exist only overseas. 

They have the twofold mission of 

giving draftees a professional 

education and carryingout national assistance programs. 

The third orpnization is comprised of the battalions devoted to 

civilian security missions. They are 

designed to protect the civilian 

population against the hazards of 

warfare and, in peacetime, fmm 

natural or technological disasters. 

They are always on alert and are 

able to deploy an emergency rescue 

detachment to anywhere in the 

world within a few hours. One such 

unit is the Paris firefighter brigade. 

This brigade also fulfills a number 

of very specific missions, such as 

the technological security in the 

Kourou space center in Guyana. 

The fourth organization is comprised of the battalions specializing 

in lines of communication. By this, 

I mean the rapid repair of mads or 

airstrips attacked by the enemy. 

We also have a minimal railroad 

works capability. During peacetime, 

the battalions train by constructing 

army training camps and doing infrastructure work for air force 

bases, which saves us money In 

past years, they were assigned missions in Chad and Benin,and soon 

they will deploy to Cambodia. 

The final organization is the 

combat battalion at corps and 

division levels. They have a 
modular structure. That is, 

we strive to restrict the types 

of companies to four: 

Combat companies, designed for breaching and 

countermine operations. 

a Forward bridging companies, able to provide forward river-crossing equipment for both dry and wet 

gaps. 

m Countermobility companies, designed for creating barriers and mining. 

1 Heavy bridging companies, equipped with 

PFM (looks like your ribbon bridge). 

The structures are identical, but the equipment varies 

denending - on whether the

division is armor, wheeled, or 

airborne. 

What are the main concerns 

of the French engineers 

today? First, to succeed in 

reducing our Army by 20 percent, from 285,000 to 225,000 

soldiers, by 1996 or 1997. The 

engineers represent 12 to 13 

percent of this total. We want 

to minimize the impact of 

this downsizing on the people 

concerned. 

Second) to mod- This engineer NCO uses an international hand signal that we all can understand. ernize our basic trainina - to

produce effective soldiers that 

serve only 10 months. Draftees 

constitute half our strength. We 

think that th'is is possible with 

some conditions that I will explain 

later if you wish.. 

Third, to draw all the lessons 

learned from the new state of the 

world, and more specifically 

from the Gulf War. We must implement these lessons within a 

budgetary context that is not 

very optimistic. 

For the engineers, and more 

generally for the French Army, we 

stress the following points. In any 

operation that includes a projection of force, the first detachment 

must have an engineer reconnaissance party 

Afterwards, it will be converted 

into an engineer command, for we 

think that any combined arms 

chief must have next to him the 

commander of the engineer unit 

that supports him. This is always 

the key in order for the engineers 

to be properly employed. Moreover, it is the engineer who has to 

propose to his commander the part 

of the operation order that concerns engineers. 

The engineer assets devoted to 

facilitate deployment and logistics 

for the force must deploy first, 

something our infantly and armor 

friends tend to forget. Within this 

echelon, we must find sufficient 

assets for heavy roadworks, something we did not do during the 

Gulf War. It might be said that the 

conditions of our previous commitment in Europe have given us bad 

habits! 

Moreover, we have tosatisfy two 

deficiencies. On the one hand, if 

we have very skillful and highly 

trained mine clearers, we lack 

heavy mine-clearing equipment, 
maybe because we are looking for 

the "perfect" asset which doesn't 

exist. 

We are emplacing in each armored combat company assets 

similar to your expectations for a 

MICLIC-like machine, on which 

no decision has been made yet. 

We work intensively on infrared 

cameras, whose future seems interesting to us, especially for spotting minefields and perhaps for 

locating individual mines and for 

clearing mines. 

On the other hand, like you, we 

think about the threat of scatterable mines and submunitions. 

We have initiated a vast training 

endeavor in this field, but so far 

we have not found a good solution 

for either equipment or for the distribution of missions between engineers and other branches. 

Should we give to units from 

another branch the capabilities to 

get out from mined or "polluted" 

areas? 

Before ending this second part, 

I would like to speak to you about 

one more important dilemma for 

the future of engineers that may 

also exist in your country: Our 

strength is decreasing, and at the 

same time, the diversity of our 

possible commitments is increasing. Actually, we seethat the areas 

where the French Army could be 

committed in force are no longer 

limited to Western Europe. They 

now cover the whole of Europe and 

many other regions, some of 

which have different climates and 

far less developed civilian infrastructures. 

At the same time, combat 

mobility is increasing and engineers must be able to act within 

the whole operational theater, for 

example, for mineclearing or 

"de-pollution." 

And finally, the diversity of missions is increasing also, with the 

larger probability of peacekeeping 

or humanitarian actions. It is the 

reason why we aregoing to have to 

continue to cultivate engineers to 

be multi-talented, which seems 

difficult to me, at least for soldiers 

and especially for officers and 

NCOs. Like General Schroeder 

said last year, "It is better to have 

skillful soldiers for mine-clearing 

operations, but at the same time, 

it is hazardous to commit a combat 

company to plumbing!" 

Yes, of course, but it will be 

necessary for our cadre and especially our line officers to know how 

to do both. That is not new, but we 

are going to have to wonder again 

in the years to come, is it better to 

take an officer and then make him 

an engineer, or to take an engineer 

and train him as an officer? We 

have to think about that for our 

schools. 

In my third and final point, I am 

going to tell you about the way to 

command. Of course, I know that 

only experience is the best teacher. 

As far as I am concerned, I owe a 

lot to the jeep driver my first captain gave me in 1959 in Algeria. 

He had a reputation for being a 

bad soldier and he had just been 

punished for having struck his 

sergeant. This was not very encouraging for a young lieutenant 

like myself. 

I decided to intentionally forget 

his bad past, and he appeared to 

be an excellent soldier then, 

courageous and devoted. This first 

experience has comforted me in 

the idea that any man is able to 

improve himself, if he is trusted. 

And this certainly made a bigger 

impression on me than my 

commanders' long speeches. 

Nevertheless, it is useful to 

study the advice given by our 

seniors. I often recommend that 

young engineer officers read this 

little book It was written in 1831 

by an officer who had begun his 

career under Napoleon. Unfortunately, he has a failing: he was 

a cavalryman. But, after all, engineers are, like infantry and 

cavalry, a branch of direct contact 

with the enemy-as we say, "a 

melee branch." 

This small book has a strange 

format, exactly the dimensions of 

an explosive petard from that 

time. As a matter of fact, it was an 

enormous success. During the 

19th century, the French light 

cavalrymen used to have an explosive petard on each side of their 

saddle inside their "legs." But 

their officers carried a petard on 

the left side and this book on the 

right side. 

This book has a lot of very valuable advice. On education, it 

reads: "Let the officer get ready, 

let him educate himself, let him 

search his job in the smallest 

details; one cannot command that 

which one ignores. The chief who 

imagines that he hides his weaknesses from the soldiers is sillythe soldier knows him better than 

he knows himself, let him use his 

time to correct his weaknesses, 

not to hide them." 

This book reads too: "...the officer must not wear his overcoat 

when the soldier has not been 

given the order to put it on nor 

warm himself inside a house that 

is off limits to the soldiers." 

And this last advice which we 

have to modify in our day, of 

course, "In the field, at the 

bivouac, the officer must make 

sure that horses eat (i.e. to refuel), 

that damaged saddlery be fixed (to 

do maintenance), that weapons 

are sheltered, and there are no 

quarrels between soldiers, and so 

on..." 

You may have noticed two 

things from these few examples of 

the experiences of senior leaders. 

On the one hand, moral qualities 

become actual behavior in every 

day life. On the other hand, much 

of this advice remains true 150 

years after being written, for technique and equipment change, but 

man changes little. 

Some other principles are very 

useful today. I want to quote two of 

them. At the head of a unit, 

platoon or company, leaders succeed one another every two or 
three years. We must be mindful 

to progress in the continuity, 

which requires unselfishness. 

Your problem is not to be better 

than your predecessor, but to work 

so that your successor might be 

better than you. 

Besides, relations between 

men must be our essential concern. Surely there are differences between you, who work with 

volunteers, and us, who have a 

good proportion of draftees. But 

either way, a soldier needs his 

leader to listen to him and needs 

his leader to speak to him. This 

is not always easy for a young 

officer who sometimes has to 

command men who are older 

than he is. The truth is that in 

peacetime everyday life, we may 

forget that we are made to fight 

together, that we are "fellow soldiers."The military men have an 

enemy-life in the barracks, and 

a friend-life in the field. 

Finally, there is one peculiar 

concern for an engineer leader. 

Placed next to a higher-level combined arms chief, the sapper must 

always begin with a good understanding of the goal sought by this 

chief. For example, the engineer 

captain must be thinking at the 

level of theinfantry battalion commander he is supporting. 

If he is able to do that, he will 

make good recommendations for 

the employment of his company, 

and eventually he will be sure to 

get orders suited for engineers. 

The engineer will not dwell on the 

terrain difficulties or delays as the 

engineers are often reproached 

with! 

In conclusion, the main quality 

of the sapper is certainly courage 

and the will to succeed. You know 

this, and you know how to say it 

within a single French word: "Essayons." Isn't it too, by itself, a 

magnificent testimony of the 

friendship which links us? 

Thank you very much. It has 

been my honor and pleasure to 

speak to you today! Id 

combat operations. (These operations were insignificant in the 

sense that they did not put our 

men and machines under the 

gun-so to speak.) In the Gulf 

War, all countermine operations 

were conducted against undefended or very lightly defended 

minefields. 

-My concern is that we fought the 

shadow of an enemy in Kuwait, 

yet we tend to picture the Persian 

Gulf ground war as a tremendous 

military success. This picture 

threatens to mask the issue of our 

inadequate countermine capability and, if left uncorrected, may 

rob our Army of its ability to conduct offensive operations. 

Today's Opportunity 

ngineer~ must not join with 

- Jmemh of the military community who use the victory in the 

Persian Gulf to spotlight limited 

sum while hiding abject failures. 

Rather than allowing the success of 

Desert Storm to hide our capability 

needs, engineers should use this 

war to illustrate that combat engineer systems development has 

not kept pace with that of other 

combat systems. 

TRADOC's eabblishment of six 

Battle L& may further degrade our 

ability to maintain a suitable level of 

countermine priority in the Army 

TRADOC headquarbm strongly sup 

port the Battle Lats and has tasked 

all schools and centers to support 

their development. It apFears the 

Battle Labs will b e TRADOCs 

focal pint for all high-technologysp 

terns combat developmenls. All the 

attention given to these labs, if 

coupled with a weak countermine 

straw,will almost guarantee that 

the Army will once again ignm the 

need for countermine capabilities. 

This issue is especially important as TRADOC brings the mission of the Battle Labs into focus. 

. . inadvertently focus much of 

TRADOC combat developments 

toward the interests of the Battle 

Labs' host branches. Therefore, 

engineers must take immediate 

steps to influence Battle Lab 

development while they arestill in 

the embryonic stage. We must ensure that the labs receive strong, 

dynamic engineer input for 

countennine and other engineer 

initiatives. 

Engineers must ensure that, 

within the Battle Labs, there is an 

understanding that the Gulf War 

was an anomaly, and that the 

probability of our next conflict 

being like Desert Storm is very 

low. The Persian Gulf victory and 

the loss of a Soviet threat in 

Europe does not mean we are 

entering a period with no mine 

threats. If anything, these events 

should be viewed as harbingers of 

escalating global destabilization, 

where antagonists will capitalize 

on the warfighting contribution 

and economics of land mine usage. 

While we cannot foresee what 

the future will bring, we can set 

into motion events which may influence the future. Engineers at 

all levels must work toensure that 

engineer military art, and the 

resultant force, keep pace with the 

ever-changing face of the battlefield. It is our responsibility to 

push for "leap ahead" changes in 

technology. We must demand that 

our doctrine, tactics, techniques, 

and procedures evolve in such a 

way that they capitalize on future 

capabilities and do not languish in 

the bowels of the "old Army." 

Above all, we must push for new 

canvases of technology on which 

we can design countermine war 

machines for tomorrow's conflicts. 

Essayons! while the door of opportunity is open. 

DI: Sickler is the Science and Technology Advisor for the Technology 

Division, Directorate of Combat 

Developments, at the Engineer School. 

Engineer 51 
w ENGINEER UPDATE 

Commercial numbers are (314) 563-XYXY and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-XYXY unless ofherwise noted. 

Directorate of Training and Defense System Network (DSN) Lines Eliminated. When 

Doctrine (DOTD) calling the Engineer Hotline or Engineer School personnel, 

callers must leave a commercial telephone number (not Autovon 

or DSN). Effective 1 September 1992, Engineer School personnel can dial only commercial numbers; outgoing Autovon/DSN 

lines have been eliminated. POC is MSG Nick Payton -7528. 

Repair Parts for Place Training Mine (PTM) Kits. Repair 

parts for PTM Kits are being produced at the Army Training and 

Support Center, Fort Eustis, VA. The repair parts allow units to initiate action to make inoperable PTM kits Serviceable. Parts may 

be ordered through local Training Aids Support Centers (TASC). 

POC is CPT Bart Ives, -7805. 

DA PAM 350-38, STRAC Revisions. DA Pam 350-38, 

dated 24 September 1990, remains in effect until 1 October 

1993. The revised DA Pam 350-38 (dated 1 October 1992) is 

scheduled for distribution in December 1992 but will be used 

ONLY for planning purposes until the strategy becomes effective on 1 October 1993. Major revisions for individual and crew 

qualifications are: 

Active Component: Five inert MICLICs.(3-inch rockets) for 

combat companies at home station, two live MlCLlCs for 

each company rotating to the National Training Center 

(NTC). CEV qualification converts from the 165mm TP 

round to the M970 device (with 40mm round). TP and M970 

are both authorized during a CALFEX. No night qualifications are required. 

Reserve Components: One inert MlCLlC per company 

every two years. CEV qualification converts to the M970. 

TP and M970 are both authorized during the LTX. No night 

qualifications are required. Minimal demolition increases are 

planned to support collective training. POC is Rayburn Toy, 

-7784. 

Training Films. Two new training films are available through 

your local Training Aids Support Center (TASC): 

TVT 5-28A, The Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE), 

Familiarization and Initial Inspection Procedures, 28 minutes. 

Film identifies major components and controls, illustrates operational checks, and demonstrates initial inspection procedures. 

TVT 5-29, The High Mobility Material Handler (HMMH), 

Familiarizationand initial lnspection Procedures, 28 minutes. 

Film identifies major components and controls, and demonstrates 

inspection procedures for the forklift assembly and other parts. 

POC is Dave Shafer, -7749. 
Digital Topographic Support System (DTSSJ. A total of 22 Directorate of Corn bat 

DTSS are scheduled for distribution to Active division, and Developments (DCD) echelons above corps units. Low rate initial production of seven 

DTSS will begin in January 1992, with fielding scheduled for 4th 

quarter, FY 93. The remaining 15 systems will be fielded by PI 

97. Planned enhancements to the basic DTSS include terrain 

visualization, increased processing capabilities, multispectral imagery exploitation capability, and downsizing to support light 

divisions. POC is SFC Paul Lake, -7327. 

M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (M9 ACE) Improvements. A systems improvement plan for the M9 ACE will increase effectiveness and operational readiness. Modifications 

include a ripper blade with a blade uplock kit, strengthened 

roadarms, improvements to filters and hoses, a bolt-on front 

track retainer (Florida plate), and steel skid plates. The National Training Center's Blue Force vehicles will be modified first 

(1st quarter FY 93) so rotating units can try the enhancements. Some modifications will be in kits applied at the organization level. Others will be applied by the contractor or 

depot personnel concurrent with a modification to the 

microclimate cooling system. Additional improvements will be 

introduced to the supply system as they become available 

through attrition. POC is SSG Rothstein. -7974. 

Modernized Demolition Initiators (MDI). A nonelectric initiation system under evaluation is expected to replace detonating cord and time fuzes, making blasting machines and continuity testers obsolete. The MDI will be used to initiate all 

demolition items in FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions. 

They will be used by engineers, infantry, cavalry, special forces, and explosive ordnance disposal soldiers. Human factor 

evaluations will be conducted in November 1992, with full testing planned for FY 93. The MDI may be fielded as early as 

FY 94. POC is SFC Burgess Ewing, -7337. 

Explosives and Demolitions Accidents. Three engineer Engineer Eranch Safety Office 

soldiers have suffered serious accidents on explosives and (EBSO) demolitions ranges in the past 12 months. One soldier died as 

a result of injuries, and two other were seriously maimed. 

Contributing factors to these accidents were ~mproperly trained 

and certified range personnel, non-compliance with m~nimum 

safe distance requirements, and not performing to standards. 

Standards for using explosives and demolitions are in AR 385- 

63 and FM 5-250. Explosives and Demolitions. POC is Paul 

Rusinko, -5002. 
Directorate of Evaluation New Director Welcomed. DOES welcomed LTC Joseph P. 

and standardization(DOES) 	 Maher, their new director, in August. LTC Maher, who previously 

sewed as a project manager with the U.S. Transportation Command at Scott Air Force Base, may be reached at -5270. 

Total Engineer Force Readiness. Input from engineer units 

is requested to support a study to determine total engineer force 

readiness in terms of personnel, equipment, and training. The Engineer School is gathering data from recent unit status reports 

(USR). To participate, engineer units should forward copies of 

their latest USR cover letter and DA Form 2406 through their 

major command headquarters to Commandant, US Army Engineer School, Attn: ATSE-ESA, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473. 

POC is Vern Lowrey, -5304. 

Enginee? %rs.clnn~I Female Opportunities. A decision was made in April to open 

?t-oponency Office (E3DC?) all positions in corps bridge units except CMF 12 to females. 

The determination on CMF 12 positions depends on the outcome 

of the CMF 12 consolidation study. Because the proposed consolidation will drastically affect the configuration of CMF12, that 

decision was delayed until all phases and issues of the consolidation are resolved. POC is Cynthia Mathews, -6341. 

RE!$!?YV~CU2-:g~r.~r?': j3C:; Engineer Officer Advanced Course-Reserve Component 

(EOAC-RC). The new EOAC-RC will consist of Phase I,Correspondence, and Phase II, Resident. Officers must be at least 

a first lieutenant to enroll and will have two years from the date 

of enrollment to complete the work. The new course is designed so that knowledge gained during the correspondence 

phase will be reinforced by practical exercises conducted in the 

resident phase. 

Enrollment for Phase I (Correspondence) of the new course 

will begin in January 1993. Phase I, which contains 208 hours of 

correspondence studies, will be a prerequisite for attendance at 

Phase II. 

Training for the new Phase II (Resident) EOAC-RC will begin 

in January 1994. Phase II will be two weeks of resident training 

at the Engineer School. 

The Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) catalog, 

DA PAM 351-20, and Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) will be updated to reflect the new course requirements. 

POC are COL Colcol (USAR), -6336, or LTC Juneau (ARNG), 

-7742. 

54 Engineer 
Assault River Crossing in Normandy 


By Dr. James W. Dunn 

'

A 1 rmy engineers played a 

1:-tmajor role in the advance 

of American forces out of the 

Normandy beachhead area in 

July 1944. The 105th Engineer 

Combat battalion supported 

the 30th Infantry Division assault across the Vire River on 

7 July. A successful river crossing was crucial to the drive 

toward St. Lo and the eventual 

breakout. 

Preparing to attack, the 30th 

Division deployed with its right 

along the north bankof theVire Et 

Taute Canal, its left on the east 

bank of theVire River, and its center near the village of Airel, where 

the canal and river met. The 60- 

foot wide river was 9 to 14 feet 

deep and had steep banks while 

the shallow, 20-foot wide canal 

had gently sloping banks and a 

muddy bottom. 

On the other side of this water 

obstacle, German strength included elements of an SS Panzer 

Division and an infantry division. 

The Germans were well rested 

and occupied ground that rose 

Stone Bridge at Airel 

gradually toward thesouth, giving 

them good observation and fields 

of fire. 

To attack this strong defensive 

position, the 30th Division had 

considerable support, including 

dive-bomber strikes and eight 

battalions of corps artillery. The 

1104th Engineer Combat Group, 

a corps unit that had the 

246th and 247th Engineer Combat Battalions, the 992d Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, and the 503d Engineer 

Light Ponton Company supported the division's 

105th Engineers. 

The division planned 

to use this force in a 

two-regimental, converging attack toward 

St. Jean-de-Daye, 

which was 3 miles equidistant from the river 

and the canal. The 

117th Infantry Regiment's attack across 

the river at dawn on 7 

July was to precede the 

120th Infantry Regiment's attack across 

the canal by about 8 

hours. 

The 105th commander, LTC Carroll 

H. Dunn, assigned C 

Company to assist the 

120th Infantry across 

the canal. They were to 

build a footbridge, provide scaling ladders for 
the first assault wave, and help 

the corps engineers install a 

treadway bridge. He assigned A 

Company to support the 117th 

Infantry's effort across the river. 

They were to build scaling ladders for the first wave, provide 

infantry assault boats for the 

first three waves, help the corps 

engineers construct a ponton infantry support bridge and a floating treadway bridge, and repair 

the stone bridge at Airel. He ordered B Company to assist A 

Company with the assault boat 

crossing and to build a foot-bridge 

across the river. 

Prior to the attack, the engineers crossed infantry patrols to 

the far shore, reconnoitered potential bridge sites, and cleared approach paths through hedgerows 

and minefields. They rehearsed 

the assault boat river crossing, 

practiced bridge construction, and 

prepared footbridge and treadway 

bridge sections. While practicing 

hedgerow tactics, they found that 

two 15-pound TNT charges in burlap bags opened a gap large 

enough for a tank. 

By 0300 on 7 July, all preparations were made and everyone was 

ready when A Company and a 

platoon from B Company, 105th 

Engineers, met the 117th Infantrymen at the line of departure. Rain and bad weather had 

grounded their air support, including artillery spotter planes, 

and made the riverbanks muddy 

and slippery Carrying rubber assault boats and scaling ladders, 

the soldiers moved to the riverbank and started across at 0430. 

The first wave of 32 boats, each 

carrying three engineers and 12 

infantrymen, met resistance from 

only a single German machine 

gun. But as engineels on the near 

shore pulled the rope-attached 

boats back, artillery and mortar 

shells began to fall. The second 

and third waves paddled through 

heavy German fire to cross 

successfully 

As the assault waves crossed, 

engineers in LT. Gilbert Ray's 3D 

Platoon, B Company, began to install the footbridge. They had six 

bays in the water when a direct hit 

killed four men and wounded four 

others. Seeing the bridge builders 

in trouble, Sergeant Oliver 

Pointer's squad from A Company 

came forward to help emplace the 

bridge. The last bay was just in 

when artillery rounds tore the 

bridge loose from its moorings and 

inflicted additional casualties. 

Swimming into the river, engineers secured the bridge and 

had it ready by 0530. The 3d 

Platoon lost 50 percent of its 

strength and gained a distinguished unit citation in this 

action. 

By 0700, the corps engineels in 

support of the 105th Engineers 

were in action, working first on 

the partially destroyed stone 

bridge at Airel. As artillery rounds 

continued to fall, the 247th Engineers cleared mines and filled 

holes while a platoon from the 

992d Engineers brought up treadway sections on Brockway trucks. 

Suffering heavy casualties, the engineers emplaced the treadway 

sections and had the stone bridge 

ready for a bulldozer to cross by 

0900. 

Meanwhile, the 503d Engineers 

began to install the ponton infantry support bridge at 0730. 

They had it ready by 0830, hut at 

a cost of 15 casualties. At thesame 

time, A Company, 247th Engineers, while under heavy artillery fire, began to install a floating 

treadway bridge just south of the 

stone bridge. It was ready at 1130, 

at a cost of 4 killed and 7 wounded. 

Thus, by noon, the engineers had 

repaired one bridge and installed 

three others at the river. 

Germans had flooded the canal, 

causing it to be wider and deeper 

than expected. The infantrymen 

hesitated to wade across at 1330, 

waiting instead for the engineers 

to install a duckboard footbridge. 

After some confusion, the infantry 

started to wade across at 1345 and 

within 35 minutes the 1st and 3d 

Platoons, C Company, 105th Engineers, had the footbridge in 

place for the heavy weapons companies. The 2d Platoon accompanied the 120th Infantry across 

the canal to clear the roads and aid 

the advance toward St. Jean-deDaye. The 3d Platoon crossed to 

gap the hedgerows for the following armor units. 

To accommodate the tanks, A 

Company, 246th Engineers, had 

treadway bridge sections loaded 

on Brockway trucks waiting in the 

rear for some halt in the German 

artillery fire. Ordered to disregard 

the artillery fire and erect the 

bridge, the 246th engineers, assisted by the 992d Engineers, 

began to install the treadway sections as division artillery fired 

smoke rounds. Within 20 minutes 

the bridge was ready for tanks to 

cross. 

That night the 30th Infantry 

Division's converging attacks met 

to establish a continuous line near 

St. Jean-de-Daye. The 105th Engineer support for river assault 

was successful, and thedrive to St. 

Lo could continue. While there 

was much hard fighting ahead, 

the first critical steps toward a 

breakout from the Normandy 

beachhead had been taken. 

Additional Reading: 

Beck, Alfred M., The Corps of 

Engineers: The War Against Germany, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1988. 

Blumenson, Martin, Breakout 

and Pursuit, U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1961. 

Dr. James Dunn is chief, 

Studies and Analysis Diuision, 

Office of History, U.S. Arnay 

Corps of Engineers, Fort Beluoir, Virginia. 
BRIDGE THE GAP--: 

By Command Sergeant Major Richard N. Wilson 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

'&The American soldier is a proud one and he 

i demands professional competence in his 

leaders. In battle, he wants to know that the job is 

going to be done right, with no unnecessary casualties. The noncommissioned officer wearing the 

chevron Is supposed to be the best soldier in Me 

platoon, and he is supposed to know how to perform all the duties expected of him. The American 

soldier expects his sergeant to be able to teach 

him how to do his job. And he expects even more 

from his officers. " 

General Omar N. Bradley 

rephe requirements for Army leaders and their 

soldiers' expectations, as identified by General 

Bradley during World War II, are still valid today. 

The question "What do my soldiers have the right 

to expect from me?" is complex and difficult to 

answer. Our soldiers do have some very valid expectations and rights that we leaders must fulfill. 

As noncommissioned officers (NCO), we have always believed that "accomplishing the mission" 

and the "welfare of our men" were our principal 

responsibilities. Those responsibilities will not 

change in the future. If we are to accomplish a mission, no matter what it is, we must focus our actions on maintaining the welfare of the soldiers we 

serve. 

First, our soldiers have the right to live and work 

in a disciplined environment. Many soldiers join the 

Army looking for and expecting discipline: They 

want an environment where confidence is instilled 

through tough training, where good performance is 

acknowledged and rewarded, and where leaders 

establish and enforce standards and hold all soldiers to those standards. 

Our soldiers have the right to serve in units 

where leaders protect them from harassment. 

They expect, and deserve, to serve in units 

where treatment is fair and equal for all. it is totally unacceptable for any leader to tolerate any 

type of discrimination toward a soldier or to provide only lip service to the philosophy of equal 

treatment. 

Our soldiers also have the right to expect firstclass training that is conducted in a safe environment. They expect the training they receive and 

the equipment they train on to be the very best 

that we can provide. All NCO leaders must plan 

for, rehearse, and execute a quality of training that 

provides the edge needed for survival on the battlefield. That training must be tough and demanding, and support the commander's mission essential task list (METL). 

As engineer leaders, we must also support our institutional training bases. First, we must continue to 

adequately prepare our soldiers for participation in 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES) and functional courses. Then we must 

select the best qualified NCOs for career development at our schools. 

Quality of life has become a priority for our Army. 

NCO leaders must make that our priority if we expect to keep the quality of soldiers the Army 

needs. We must work to improve the environment 

in which our soldiers live, work, and train. All of us 

must strive to upgrade billets and housing; develop 

active, effective sponsorship programs; and 

demonstrate genuine concern for everything that affects our soldiers' lives. 

Above all, soldiers have the right to expect their 

leaders to live by the Army's personal values and 

professional ethics: loyalty, duty, selfless service, 

and integrity. A leader who lives by these values 

will totally fulfill his soldiers' expectations.