U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION March 1978 

REGULATORY GUIDE 

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 

REGULATORY GUIDE 5. 

STANDARD FORMAT AND CO E FEGUARDS 

CONTINGENCY PLANSFO OS ORTATION

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES 

Regulatory Guides wre isued to describe arnd make available to the public methods 

acceptable to the NRC Staff of implementing specific Parts of the Commission's 

regulations, to delineate techniques used by the gaff in evauating specif ic problems or postulated accidents, or to Provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them is not required. Methods sad solutions different from those eat out in the guides will be accept able I they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance 

of a permitse license by the Commission. 

Comments nd iuggestions for imrovements in these guides we encouraged at all 

limes, and guides will be revised, - appropriate, to accommodate comments and 

to reflect new information or experience. Howseve, comments on this guidelf received within about two months after its bsuance, will be particularly useful in 

evaluating the eed for an early revision.

Comments$ ouid be went to the Secretary of the Commission, US. Nudear Regu letory Coremission. Washington, D.C. 20655. Attention: Docketing end Service Branch. 

The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions: 

1. Power Reactors 6. Products 2. Research arid Test Reactors 7. Transportation 1. Fuels and Materials Facilities B. Occupational Health 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust Review S. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General 

Requests for single copies of issued guides 4which may be reproducedI or for place ment on an automatic distribution list for single copies of future guides in specific divisions should be made in writing to the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555. Attention: Director. Division of Document Control.

II
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION 

Purpose and Applicability ...................................................... ii 

Use of Standard Format ................................................ ii 

Style and Composition .................................................... iii 

Physical Specifications of Submittals ........................................... 

Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages ..................................... iv 

Number of Copies ........................................................ iv 

Public Disclosure ................................................... iv 

Compatibility ................................................................. V 

CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND 

1.1 Perceived Danger ................................................... 5.56-1 

1.2 Purpose of the Plan ........................................................ 5.56-1 

1.3 Scope of the Plan ......................................................... 5.56-1 

1.4 Definitions ............................................................... 5.56-1 

CHAPTER 2 GENERIC PLANNING BASE . ........ ....................................... 5.56-2 

CHAPTER 3 LICENSEE PLANNING BASE 

3.1 Licensee's (or Transportation Agent's) Organization for Safeguards 

Contingency Response ............................................ 5.56-3 

3.2 Route Information .......................................................... 5.56-3 

3.3 Law Enforcement Interface and Assistance .................................. 5.56-4 

3.4 Policy Constraints and Assumptions ......................................... 5.56-5 

3.5 Control and Communications ............................................ 5.56-5 

3.6 Safeguards System Hardware Considerations ................................ 5.56-5 

3.7 Administrative and Logistical Considerations .............................. 5.56-6 

CHAPTER 4 RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX ...................................................... 5.56-6 

CHAPTER 5 PROCEDURES SUM4ARY ......................................................... 5.56-7 

SUPPLEMENT: A REPRESENTATIVE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ROAD TRANSPORTATION .... 5.56-9

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INTRODUCTION

The Energy Reorganization-Act of 1974, which established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), directed the NRC, among other things, to develop contingency plans "...for dealing with. 

threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive 

wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic Energy 

Act of 1964, as amended...." 

The principal requirements for the development of safeguards contingency plans for trans

portation are found in 10 CFR Part 70, "Special Nuclear Materials," and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." Paragraph 70.22(g) of 10 CFR Part 70 identifies the 

requirements for a safeguards contingency plan for transportation. Appendix C to 10 CFR 

Part 73 identifies the criteria to'be followed in developing the contingency plan. 

A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a document that provides guidance to licensee 

personnel and identifies procedures to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of 

threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities. An 

acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and 

actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, 

and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and (3) a specifica tion of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and 

action. 

A safeguards contingency plan consists of five elements: (1) Background, (2) a Generic 

Planning Base, (3) a Licensee Planning Base, (4) a Responsibility Matrix, and (5) Procedures. 

The Background contains the purpose and scope of the plan, describes the environment 

within which the plan will be put into effect, and defines the terms used. 

The Generic Planning Base contains a list of events to be planned for and the associated 

objective'to be reached for each event. It may also include for each event an overview of the 

general types of decisions and actions and other generic information helpful to the licensee in 

clearly presenting the planned responses to reach the objective. 

The Licensee Planning Base contains the information peculiar to a' given licensee: his 

organizational entities for contingency response tasking, facility descriptions and locations 

necessary for response planning and coordination, command and control'functions, etc. 

The Responsibility Matrix is a format used to specify the assignment of specific decisions 

and actions that each organizational entity takes to effect such response.. 

For each organizational entity, the decisions andlactions, as assigned in the Responsiblity 

Matrix, are finally summarized in a Procedures Summary for that entity. The Procedures 

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Summaries that result are simplified preientations of the assigned responsibilities for use in 

training and implementing the plan. The Procedures Summary, although part of the contingency 

plan, does not have to be submitted to the NRC for approval (see Chapter 5). 

This regulatory guide presents the proposed standard format for a safeguards contingency 

plan for transportation and contains an example contingency plan, included as a supplement, to 

illustrate the guide's application. The guide may be revised to reflect comments received and 

additional staff review. 

Purpose and Applicability 

This standard format and content document has been prepared to aid in ensuring completeness 

of planning and presentation and to simplify the NRC review of the safeguards contingency plan. 

It applies to the transportation of special nuclear material that is subject to the requirements 

of 10 CFR § 73.30 through § 73.36 (proposed 10 CFR § 73.25 and § 73.26, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 

1977). 

This document describes the information required for a plan. Information submitted will 

be reviewed for completeness on the basis of the contents of this guide. If a submittal does 

not provide a reasonably complete presentation of the required information, final review will 

be delayed until the needed information is provided. It is anticipated that the safeguards 

contingency plan will be submitted as an attachment to the physical security plan (10 CFR 

§ 70.22(g)). To the extent that the topics in the contingency plan are treated in adequate 

detail in a physical security plan, they may be incorporated by cross-reference to the security 

plan. The applicant or licensee should include additional information as appropriate. It is 

also the responsibility of the applicant or licensee to be aware of new and revised NRC 

regulations. 

Information and procedures delineated in regulatory guides in Division 5, "Materials and 

Plant Protection," and technical reports and appropriate to certain sections of the physical 

security plan submitted under Paragraph 70.22(g) of 10 CFR Part 70 or 10 CFR § 73.30 through 

§ 73.36 (proposed 10 CFR § 73.25 and § 73.26, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977) may be incorpo

rated by reference. The applicant, licensee, or agent should discuss. his plans and programs 

with the NRC staff before preparing his contingency plan, giving particular emphasis to the 

depth of information required for this plan. 

Use of the Standard Format 

The standard format and content is described in succeeding chapters and is illustrated in 

the example plan presented in the supplement. If the applicant or licensee chooses to adopt 

the standard format and content, he should follow the numbering system of this document at 

least down to the level of subsectionj (e.g., 1.5.1). Certain subsections may be omitted from.a 

contingency plan if they are clearly unnecessary to provide a complete plan or if'they are 

needlessly repetitive. In such cases appropriate adaptation of the standard format to accom

modate the particular circumstances is permissible. /

ii
The applicant or licensee may wish to submit in support of his contingency plan information 

that is not required by regulations and is not essential to the description of the physical protection program. Such information could include, for example, historical data submitted in 

demonstration of certain criteria, discussions of alternatives considered, or supplementary 

data regarding assumed models, data, or calculations. This type of information should be 

clearly labeled and provided as an attachment to the submittal so that it will not be con

sidered as a license condition. 

Style and Composition 

The applicant or licensee should strive for a clear, concise presentation of information 

that portrays the general perspective and concepts of the basic plan. Details about specific 

aspects of the plan may be relegated to the appendices to enhance the clarity of the presenta tion in the basic plan and to facilitate updating and maintenance of the information. Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be avoided. Definitions and 

abbreviations should be consistent throughout the submittal and should be consistent with 

generally accepted usage unless otherwise defined in the document. 

Drawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may be presented more clearly or conveniently by such means. In general, these illustrations should be located in 

the section where they are first referenced. Care should be taken to ensure that all informa

tion presented in drawings is legible, that symbols are defined, and that drawings are not 

reduced to the extent that they cannot be read by unaided normal 'eyes. 

A table of contents should be'included in each submittal. 

Physical Specifications of Submittals 

All mterials submitted in a safeguards'contingency plan should conform to the followin g physical dimensions of page size, quality of paper and inks, numbering of pages, etc.: 

1. Page Size 

Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches. 

Drawings and graphics: 8-1/2 xll'inches preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable 

provided the finished copy when folded'does not exceed 8-1/2 x 11 inches. 

2. Paper Stock and Ink 

Suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density for handling and for 

microfilming... 

3. Page Margins 

A margin of no less than one inch should be maintained on the top, bottom, and binding 

side of all pages submitted. 

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4. Printing

Composition: text pages should be single spaced. 

Type face and style: must be suitable for microfilming. 

Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically reproduced. 

Pages may be printed on both sides with the images printed head to head. 

5. Binding 

Pages should be punched for standard 3-hole looseleaf binder. 

6. Page Numbering 

Pages should be numbered sequentially. 

7. Format References 

In the application, references to this Standard Format should be by chapter and section 

numbers. 

Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages 

The updating or revising of data and text should be on a replacement page basis. 

The changed or revised portion of each page should be highlighted by a vertical line. The 

line should be on the margin opposite the binding margin for each line changed or added. All 

pages submitted to update, revise, or add pages to the plan should show the date of change. 

The transmittal letter should include an index page listing the pages to be inserted aid the 

pages to be removed. When major changes or additions are made, pages for a revised Table of 

Contents should be provided. 

Number of Copies 

The applicant or licensee should submit 6 copies to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Alternatively, 

these copies may be filed In person at the Commission's.offices at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, 

D.C. or at 7915 Eastern Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland. 

Public Disclosure 

The NRC has determined that safeguards contingency plans contain information of a type. 

specified in 10 CFR § 2.790(d) and shall be subject to disclosure only in accordance with the 

provisions of 10 CFR 9.12. 

iv
Compatibility 

The applicant or licensee should ensure that the contingency plan is compatible vith the 

other sections of his application. Reference to sections in the physical security plan may be 

made in response to information requested by this guide.

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1. BACKGROUND

1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER 

Provide a statement of the perceived danger to the security of licensee personnel and 

licensee property posed by the possibility of attempts to commit sabotage or to steal strategic 

special nuclear materials. The adversary attributes assumed for safeguards contingency planning 

stem from those specified by NRC as a basis for current safeguards system design or upgrading. 

The statement contained in 10 CFR § 73.55(a) or subsequent Commission statements will suffice. 

The information is included in the safeguards contingency plan for ready reference and clarity 

with regard to the adversary capabilities that are assumed to oppose the performance of the 

primary security mission of the plan. The applicant or licensee should examine his operation 

to determine its vulnerabilitites in light of the threats postulated by the Commission. This 

examination is to make the applicant or licensee more aware of the total scope of response and 

will facilitate the generation of initiating events for the Generic Planning Base. 

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN 

State the general aims and purposes underlying the implementation of the plan, e.g., the 

transportation activities covered, general uses intended for the plan, etc. 

1.3 SCOPE OF THE PLAN 

Discuss the scope of the plan by addressing the following information: 

1. The general types of contingencies that have been considered, i.e., threats related 

to a shipment of SNM or an attempted theft or sabotage of a shipment while enroute. 

2. The primary security mission (task to be accomplished) in response to an adversary 

incursion and the general operational concepts or approach to performing the mission. The 

mission statement simply reveals what is to be accomplished and when and why. The operational 

concept presents an overview of how the mission is to be accomplished. Also, for clarity of 

intent, the operational concept may indicate explicitly the conditions under which the plan 

might be executed, e.g. ,night, day, all weather, natural disasters, etc. 

1.4 DEFINITIONS 

Alphabetically list the terms and the corresponding definitions used in describing the 

operational and technical aspects"of the plan. 

5.56-1 

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2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE 

Identify those events that signal the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency 

according to how they are first perceived by the licensee's or transportation agent's personnel, 

as applicable. A sufficient number of events should be identified to cover the range of possible 

safeguards contingencies that are envisioned. Generic specification of the events is suggested 

to limit the number that are required for the plan. Refer to Appendix A of the supplement for 

examples illustrating the manner of specifying these events. 

For each event identified, specify the objective to be accomplished by the operational 

elements when they respond to that particular event. In selecting an objective, consideration 

should be given to uncertainties about the situation that generally will prevail as of the time 

the subject events occur. For example, if information available at the time is likely to be so 

vague that the operational elements will be uncertain whether or not an adversary incursion is 

in progress, an appropriate objective for the event would involve determining what the actual 

situation is. Attainment of this objective would in turn clarify the situation and lead to the 

next event and objective most appropriate for the continued response in order to accomplish the 

primary security mission, which is reflected in Section 1.3. 

In addition to the required information above, other information that is helpful to the 

licensee (or transportation agent) in preparing or clearly presenting the general nature of the 

planned responses to achieve the selected objectives may be included in the generic planning 

base. For example, listing of the categories of actions or the general approach that will be 

taken by the overall response organization to accomplish a given objective may be helpful in 

planning, assigning, and subsequent training of personnel in the specific response actions 

developed in the Responsibility Matrix relating to that objective. Such listing would be 

tantamount to presenting a limited operational concept that is specifically applicable to the 

attainment of the particular objective. Another type of information that may be helpful for 

ready reference is an illustration that shows sequential relationships among all the generic 

events and objectives utilized for planning. 

3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE 

In successive paragraphs, briefly present information about the licensee's organization, 

infrastructure, capabilities, constraints, law enforcement assistance, and other considerations 

that bear upon the execution of the contingency responses of the plan. Only current capabil

ities should be reflected to ensure realistic prospects for plan execution in the event of a 

contingency during the current period. Where applicable, reference may be made to parts of the 

physical security plan where pertinent information is adequately presented, rather than repeating 

the particular information in the safeguards contingency plan. Types of information that 

should be considered for inclusion in the plan are further described below. Use additional 

paragraphs as necessary to present other pertinent information.

5.56-2
3.1 LICENSEE'S (OR TRANSPORTATION AGENT'S) ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE 

Provide a description of the organization adopted for purposes of planning, assigning, and 

conducting coordinated safeguards contingency response actions to attain the specified objec

tives presented in the Generic Planning Base. This task organization should reflect the-type of personnel and principal equipments composing the various operational entities that appear in 

the Responsibility Matrix and Procedures Summaries; these are the entities in the plan that 

implement detailed contingency response actions. The general procedure for designating the 

leaders and alternate leaders and the composition of the operational entities for a specific 

shipment should also be reflected in this paragraph. 

3.2 ROUTE INFORMATION 

Information on planned road routes routinely used to transport SNM fnnquantities requiring physical protection should be presented in this paragraph,.elther directly or by reference to 

pertinent appendices of the basic plan. For brevity and clarity of presentation in the basic 

plan,'the route information generally is best presented in appendices; one appendix should be 

devoted to each planned route. 

With regard to assembling necessary data for planned road routes, it is contemplated that 

NRC will undertake a task to cover the most commonly and frequently used routes for interstate 

transport of protected SNM. When the information is compiled on a route, NRC will provide it 

to licensees or their agents. The licensees or their agents may Include this information in 

their respective transportation safeguards contingency' plans with the understanding that they 

accept responsibility for its continued accuracy. 

For-routes used as a matter of convenience to a particular licensee or agent when a suit

able NRC planned route is available or for one-time or seldom-used routes, the licensee or his 

agent is responsible for assembling the necessary data and planning the route. The plan for 

such a route should be submitted to NRC for review and approval if it is contemplated as an addition to the safeguards contingency plan by the licensee or agent. 

For each route, the route information should include route segment identifications,.perti

nent time and distance factors, route reference points and directions to locations of pertinent 

law enforcement facilities, and the expected response capabilities of the associated law enforce

ment agencies. Tables and charts required for presentation of the information are illustrated 

in Appendix E of the example plan presented in the Supplement and are further explained below. 

1. Route Overview This is a graphic display of the overall route presented on one or more sheets. It may be a line diagram as In the example plan, or-it may be depicted on a road

map. The map or diagram should be large enough in scale'to clearly indicate the pertinent law 

enforcement agency (LEA) to be contacted for contingency assistance. The planned route segments should be reflected on the display. Route segments selected for planning should have easily recognized geographic features as boundaries and should be easily correlated with the pertinent 

LEA. For example, if a pertinent LEA is a county sheriff's department, a route segment marked 

by the county boundaries (if easily recognized on the ground) or other geographic features near 

5.56-3

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the county boundaries would be appropriate. The enroute overview should also show the location 

of each pertinent LEA relative to the route, the route's origin and destination, state boundaries 

as applicable, and other information that will aid in rapidly correlating.route position with 

the LEA appropriate for that position. 

2. Time and Distance Factors - This is a table showing the following, information for 

each planned route segment: 

a. Identification code of the segment. 

b. LEA pertinent to the segment. 

c. Segment boundaries (start and end points). 

d. Distance of the segment in road miles. 

e. Total trip miles traveled from origin to end. of the segment. 

f. Average time required to transit the segment. 

g. Total trip time elapsed at the end of the segment. 

h. Estimated variability in time for crossing the segment and the variability of 

total trip time at the end of the segment. 

i. Critical reference points that give detailed route instructions for movement to 

the location of the pertinent LEA. 

3. Law Enforcement Response Summary - This is a table that summarizes for each pertinent 

LEA the expected response, the emergency telephone numbers and other communications means, and 

selected segment information. It provides quick reference data to facilitate communication 

with pertinent LEA and to estimate response times after the contact. 

4. Law Enforcement Capabilities - This is a brief narrative description of the LEA 

capabilities. The description should be, adequate to provide the enroute supervisor a general 

overview of each enroute LEA's strength, mobility, communications, weapons, and other capabil

ities that are available if needed. 

3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE AND ASSISTANCE 

Fbr the transportation safeguards contingency plan, details regarding LEA assistance along 

road routes are more simply presented in connection with the applicable route information (see 

Section 3.2).. Therefore, simple reference in this section to the location of that LEA informa

tion in the plan serves-to. highlight it for ready reference. Other general LEA information not 

contained in the referenced material, however, may be applicable to this section. For example, 

to enhance clarity, this section might also be used to briefly describe the general nature of 

requests for enroute LEA assistance that will be made if the need arises. Other general infor

mation regarding LEA assistance deemed appropriate for clarity or emphasis by the licensee or 

agent may be included. . . 

(K

5.56-4
3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS . ' ''

Identify laws, company policies, or other factors that will substantially constirain or 

otherwise influence execution of response actions during contingency situations.- This may 

include, but need not be limited to, the following areas as applicable: 

1. Extent to which local, county, and State law enforcement will be depended on to 

protect shipments against adversary intrusion and theft incidents. 

2. Extent to -which company employees will be allowed to perform hazardous physical 

security duties incident to accomplishing safeguards contingency response actions. 

3. Extent to which enroute personnel can assist LEA in hot pursuit operations. 

4. Equipment performance constraints dictating specially planned procedures. 

3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS 

Information concerning the planned control arrangements and the use and operation of the 

various means of communication (licensee and LEA as applicable) during safeguards contingency 

response operations should be included in this section. Emphasis should be on the planned 

operating procedures that are to apply for coordination of the various :operational entities 

involved. 

The Information on control arrangements should clearly reflect who controls what and when. 

Also, as applicable, the manner of passing control from one point of leadership to another 

during progress of a contingency situation should be specific. The leader of any operational 

entity Is presumed to be in control of that:entity unless otherwise specified. 

With regard to communications, the allocation, control, and usage of the various means of 

communications should be specific along with any special instructions that apply regarding 

operation of the equipment. As applicable, the specification and use of various codes for 

rapid communication of situational information also are appropriate items for this section. 

Details may be relegated to an appendix in the interest of clarity in the basic plan. 

3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS 

As applicable, information of operational significance to the utilization of safeguards 

systems equipment may be included here or elsewhere in the plan, as desired for clarity. For 

example, the location of special weapons and protective equipment that are available if needed 

might be indicated here or in the section on operational elements. Also, information concerning 

communications equipment might be more appropriately included in the control and communications 

section than here. Information of interest in this section is the type that is necessary to 

coordinate commitment or use of the equipment during contingency response operations, e.g., its 

location if not installed, who obtains it, what operating modes apply and when, thie readiness 

"5.56-5

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state maintained, etc. Descriptive information on system configuration and-technical perform

ance characteristics may be included by reference to appropriate parts of an approved transporta

tion physical security plan if such information is felt necessary in the interest of clarity. 

If no. information is included in this section, the simple statement "This section not used", 

should be inserted. 

3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE-AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 

Describe any special arrangements and practices that are maintained or implemented to 

ensure adequate administrative and logistical support incident to enroute safeguards contin

gency events. 

The descriptions should include provisions for ensuring that all equipment and expendable 

supplies needed to effectively deal with an enroute safeguards contingency will be easily 

accessible, in good working, order, and in sufficient supply. Particular attention should be 

focused on extra supplies and equipment such as radio batteries, ammunition, special weapons, 

gas masks, body armor, and helmets that could substantially affect the effectiveness of 

response personnel. 

Include also the planned arrangement for provision of necessary emergency services incident 

to enroute safeguard contingency operations, such as medical evacuation and treatment of 

casualties, health physics, and vehicle maintenance. If standard procedures are applicable in 

that regard, a statement and brief explanation to that effect is appropriate. 

4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX 

Develop a Responsibility Matrix corresponding to the Generic Planning Base. The tabula

tions in the Responsibility Matrix should provide an overall picture of the response actions 

and their interrelationships. 

The Responsibiloity Matrix illustrated below is in array format to facilitate systematic 

presentation and crosscheck of the contingency response actions planned for each operational 

element. The three dimensions depicted are: "Events," "Operational Elements," and "Decisions

Actions." 

-Event n 

S- o° 

Event3 

Event 2 

Event 1 1 I 

Operational 

Elemnents

5.56-6
Each Event should correspond to one of the contingency events selected in the Generic 

Planning Base (Chapter 2). The Decisions-Actions for each Event should delineate the decisions 

and actions and their assignment to the responsible Operational Element (Sections 3.1 and 3.3) 

so as to gain the objective associated with that Event in the Generic Planning Base. One or 

more pages may be used to present the contingency actions associated with each event, depending 

on the number of operational elements involved in the plan and the amount of column width allo

cated for each operational element. The matrix format shown in the "Representative Safeguards 

Contingency Plan for Road Transportation" contained inothe Supplement has spaces for five dif

ferent operational elements on two pages of presentation for each contingency event; however, 

more or less may be used as necessary. 

It may be noted that the example matrix contained in the Supplement also shows the objective 

associated with each contingency event in two places: the first column and at the top in one 

other column. The presentation is for ease of reference. The first column permits quick 

reference during development and maintenance of the plan, and the other column serves to identify 

the particular operational element that decides when that objective has been attained. 

Safeguards responsibilities must be assigned in a manner that precludes conflicts in 

duties or responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards 

contingency. 

5. PROCEDURES SLWIARY 

Develop a Procedures Summary for each operational element that summarizes the actions from 

the Responsibility Matrix for assignment to that operational element. The set of Procedures 

Summaries that results is to aid in the assignment and training of tasks for effective imple

mentation of the plan. The procedures summary, although part of the contingency plan, does not 

have to be submitted to NRC for approval. It will be prepared and maintained at the licensee's 

facility and will be inspected by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to ensure 

compliance with the Responsibility Matrix. 

Each Procedures Summary should provide clear and concise statements of the general responsi

bilities of the operational element during any safeguards contingency and of the specific 

actions assigned with respect to the range of contingency events covered in the plan. In that 

regard, show where a task begins and follow its progress through each operational element until 

the task is completed; i.e., show the actions that each of the operational elements accomplishes 

to carry out the task. In summarizing actions from the Responsibility Matrix, a given set of 

summary statements may be utilized to cover more than one event when the events involved require 

the same or effectively the same type of actions. Also, where a given action is found to be 

common procedure for a number of operational elements, regardless of the specific contingency, 

that action may be included in a summary grouping of standard operating procedures for presenta

tion in each of the procedures summaries. Statements of standard operating procedures may also 

reflect information of general interest to all operational entities, ,for example, the assignment 

of overall control responsibilities. 

5.56-7

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To facilitate operations, the licensee may wish to condense key portions of the Procedures 

Summary to checklist format according to stages of increased preparedness to respond. For 

example, events deemed to require a comparable level of preparedness may be grouped under some 

predetermined alert code, e.g., yeliowialert for conditions that are not perceived as imminent 

but do require a further enhanced state of readiness (some expressed threats, non-threatening 

civil demonstrations, unresolved perimeter alarms, etc.). When the condition is evaluated and 

deemed to require an enhanced state of readiness, the alert posture is increased to an appro

priate higher level, e.g., orange or red. In effect, the events are grouped in alert categories 

by their sensitivity and assessed immediacy. To achieve the assigned alert status, checklists 

are used by each operational element as reminders to perform specificially assigned duties.

5.56-8
SUPPLEMENT 

A REPRESENTATIVE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN 

FOR ROAD TRANSPORTATION 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND 

1.1 Perceived Danger ................................ ......................... 5.56-10 

1.2 Purpose of the Plan ............................................ 5.56-10 

1.3 Scope and Operational Concept of the Plan .......................... 5.56-10 

1.3.1 Types of Contingencies and Responses Considered ..................... 5.56-10 

1.3.2 Operational Concept in Response to an A4versary Incursion .......... 5.56-11 

1.4 Definitions ................................................................ 5.56-11 

CHAPTER 2 GENERIC PLANNING BASE ........................... ..................... 5.56-U2 

CHAPTER 3 LICENSEE PLANNING BASE 

3.1 Operational Elements ...... ........... ...................................... 5.56-13 

3.2 Route Information......................................................... 5.56-14 

3.3 Law Enforcement Assistance ................................................ 5.56-14 

3.4 Policy Constraints and Assumptions .................................... 5.56-14 

3.5 Control and Communications ........................................... 5.56-14 

3.5.1 Enroute Elements .................................................... 5.56-14 

3.5.2 MWVT Control ................................................. 5.56-15 

3.5.3 Consignor and Consignee ........................................... .5.56-15 

3.5.4 Enroute LEA ....................................................... 5.56-15 

3.6 Safeguards Systems Hardware Considerations ................................. 5.56-15 

3.7 Administrative and Logistical .............................................. 5.56-15 

3.7.1 Enroute Supplies .................................................... 5.56-15 

3.7.2 Vehicle Maintenance ............................................... 5.56-16 

3.7.3 Medical Services .................................................. 5.56-16 

3.7.4 Health Physics Services ............................................. 5.56-16 

3.7.5 Materials Handling ................................................. 5.56-16 

CHAPTER 4 RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX ...................................................... 5.56-16 

CHAPTER 5 PROCEDURES SUMMARY ..... ............................................ 5.56-16 

APPENDIX A - EVENTS AND OBJECTIVES FOR CONTINGENCY RESPONSES ....................... 5.56-18 

APPENDIX B - COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES .......................................... 5.56-19 

APPENDIX C - RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX ................................................... 5.56-22 

APPENDIX D - PROCEDURES SUMMARY .................. 5.56-25 

APPENDIX E - PRIMARY ROUTE: ALPHA TO BRAVO .. ................................... 5.56-83 

5.56-9 

!/

"- I I
1. BACKGROUND 

1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER 

For planning purposes, it Is assumed that an adversary incursion against the shipment to 

steal or to sabotage the cargo could occur at any time while enroute with little or no prior 

warning. Also, as a hoax or with serious intent, a potential adversary could threaten to steal 

or sabotage the cargo. The assumed adversaries may be well-trained and dedicated persons with 

no responsibility for the shipment (external adversaries) or knowledgeable persons with assigned 

responsibilities with respect to the shipment (internal adversaries). It is assumed that an 

attempted incursion will be well planned and rehearsed and will be directed toward accomplishing 

the adversary mission and withdrawing from the scene as quickly as possible. 

An external adversary may include one to a small group of armed or unarmed persons. If 

armed, their weapons could vary from hand guns and shotguns to mixtures of weapons such as automatic rifles and explosives. Tactics employed might include armed hijack, ruse, duress, 

rolling or static ambush, or opportunistic theft of the cargo carrier. Coordinated team move

ments and use of*weapons might be employed in furtherance. of these tactics. External adver

saries might also be assisted by an internal conspirator. 

An internal adversary may be a member of the enroute elements (Escort or Transporter) and 

thus wouldrbe armed as the enroute elements are. Such an individual may endeavor to steal the 

cargo himself through use of force or ruse or to assist external adversaries by decoying the 

shipment or by creating diversions that may weaken the cargo vehicle's security coverage. An 

internal adversary not a member of the enroute elements might also be involved in a conspiracy 

with an external adversary. In such cases, the internal adversary may assist the external by 

providing specific shipment information or by deceptions to cover the activities of the external 

adversary. 

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN 

This document presents the, safeguards contingency plan for road transportation of a representative company that provides transportation for nuclear materials that require physical 

protection for compliance with NRC regulations. The plan was prepared to gutde and coordinate 

response actions of the operating elements involved against perceived or actual incursion 

attempts to steal or sabotage the cargo of a road shipment. 

1.3 SCOPE AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE PLAN 

1.3.1 Types of Contingencies and Responses that have been Considered 

Responses to deal with and prevent successful execution of threats and attempts of theft 

of SNM and sabotage are covered in the plan. The safeguards contingency plan does not include 

any actions under emergency plans concerned with hazards to public health and safety that are

5.56-10
the consequence of nuclear accidents other than steps to,,initiate the implementation of such 

emergency plans even though those accidents may result from acts of threats, thefts, or sabotage. 

1.3.2 Operational Concept in Response to an Adversary Incursion 

The primary security mission of the operating elements is to protect the cargo at all 

times during its road shipment from point of origin to point of destination to prevent theft or 

sabotage of any part of the cargo. 

This mission is accomplished routinely by protecting the cargo at all times and by coordina

tion among the operational elements to ensure a high state of readiness to deal with contingency 

situations if they occur. 

M1VMT Control maintains current information of tIe shipment's status and the on-going 

enroute situation and coordinates with enroute LEA *as necessary to ensure early LEA awareness 

of possible security threats against the shipment. Additionally, the enroute elements con

tinuously guard the cargo in transit and maintain all-around security surveil-lance of the local 

scene to avoid being surprised by incursions against the-shipment if they are attempted. Cargo 

stowage is kept locked, sealed, and alarmed, as applicable, and the transporter moves via 

well-traveled routes at maximum speed limits when possible-, making only essential stops. 

To accomplish the mission under the extraordinary circumstances of a contingency situation, 

the enroute elements will contact the pertinent LEA for assistance as necessary and will deal 

with the situation to protect the shipment until the LEA response effectively develops. As a 

hedge against the chance that enroute elements may not be able to contact the LEA in an emergency, 

MVI4T Control will -request assistance of pertinent LEA in the event that enroute elements fail 

to render a report as expected. The mobility of the shipment will be used by enroute elements 

to avoid a perceived incursion wherever possible..' Otherwise, depending on the nature and 

strength of the adversary, enroute elements will block or delay the incursion to prevent 

penetration of ,the cargo transporter. In the event an adversary gains possession of any part 

of the cargo and endeavors to depart, enroute elements will follow and maintain'contact as 

necessary to assist LEA convergence in pursuit.

1.4 DEFINITIONS 

Terms and expressions used in the plan are alphabetically listed and defined below for 

ease of reference. " 

Term _efinition 

(A) Notation :used'in Responsibility Matrix, Appendix C, that indicates 

an action is always taken; the action may be a hedge against 

uncertainty or necessary in light of the situation. 

(C) Notation used in Responsibility Matrix, Appendix C, that indi

cates an action may or may not be taken depending on the obvious 

circumstances of the situation. 

5.56-11

II
Citizens band radio.

ETA Estimated time of arrival. 

ETD Estimated time of departure. 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

FCC Federal Communications Commission. 

ID Identification. 

LEA Law enforcement agency(ies). 

MT Mobile radiotelephone. 

MVMT Movement. 

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region , Office of 

Inspection and Enforcement. 

Sabotage A malevolent act that damages and results in dispersal of nuclear 

material., 

Shipper The terminal element--consignor or consignee--who arranged with

the company providing nuclear materials transportation services 

for the nuclear shipment of concern. 

SNM Special nuclear material. 

Stolen SNH SNM that has been acquired unlawfully and is being held in a safe 

haven by the thief. 

2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE 

The operational elements indicated in Section 3.1 will respond as a team to events that 

either suggest or reveal an adversary incursion against the shipment. The types of events 

experienced and the clarity of the situation at the time will depend on the nature of the 

incursion, the state to which the situation has progressed, and the amount of interaction that 

has occurred between the adversary and the operational elements. The total response from start 

to finish! will be a dynamic process conditioned by, the circumstances of the situation as it

progresses. As a means of planning for contingencies, a set of 16 events has been, specified to 

cover the range of events that will trigger contingency response actions by the operational 

elements. For each of these events, the most important objective to be achieved by the opera

tional elements responding to the particular event has been identified. Attainment of the 

objective will improve the situation to the extent possible at. the time and will lead to the 

next event and the objective most appropriate for continued dealing with the situation, 

Appendix A summarizes the events and osjectives of the Generic Planning Base and codes 

each combination for ease of access to the detailed task planning reflected in the Responsi

bility Matrix (Appendix C).

5.56-12

CB
3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE 

3.1 OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS 

The following operational elements are the organizational entities adopted for purposes of 

assigning and executing the road transportation security response tasks and procedures Identified 

in this plan. The designated leaders and specific composition of the operational enhtities ar ,e 

specified I n the instructions issued for each shipment. 

Functional Categor Operational Elements 

-,Transportation '1. Escort 

2., Transporter 

3.' I4V Control -Terminal Elements 4. Consignor, 

5. Consignee 

1. Escort is tailored to provide the security needs for a given-shipment in light'of the 

cargo that is to be protected, the vulnerability of the route that will be used, and the response 

capabilities -of the pertin~ent enroute LEA. -The Escort includes: 

a. One or more unmarked cars equipped with mobile telephone, citizens band 

radio, vehicle- to-vehi cl e VHFý communications, -and shotguns. 

b. At least two armed guards per vehicle, inclusive of the driver. 

2. Transporter includes the -cargo transporter equipped with mobile telephone, citizens 

band radio, vehicle-to-vehicle VHF communications, and shotguns. The Transporter may also 

feature armored-protected crew compartment, firing ports, and an enclosed cargo trailer with an 

immobilization system. If an open cargo trailer is employed, Individual cargo containers will 

weigh at least 500.pounds.. Normally two armed guards,-incdlusive of the driver, constitute-the 

crew of the Transporter. 

.3. MV14T Control includes: 

a. An adequately furnished operations center room with dedicated telephone equipment 

and the pertinent transportation plan and shipment plan information. 

b. One or more staff members inclusive of the Operations Center supervisor, as 

needed for conti nuous operational coverage of on-going shipments. 

4. The Consignor and Consignee are represented by the shipper and receiver staff members 

designated to monitor the shipment status and to make operational decisionsi and arrangements 

concerning the shipment in coordination with NVW Control. 

5.56-13

I I
3.2 ROUTE INFORMATION 

Pertinent time and distance data and law enforcement jurisdictions needed for shipment 

planning and operations are presented for each route in a series of appendices to this plan 

(see, ~for example, Appendix E). 

3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE 

Selected law enforcement agencies (LEA) whose jurisdictions are crossed when the shipment 

is enroute will be requested, as needed, to provide contingency assistance to the shipment. 

LEA contacts and capabilities for-assistance along a particular route .art presented in the 

appendix for that route. In general, the enroute LEA will be depended on to provide assistance 

by investigating and providing information on suspicious activity and events, by dealing with 

unlawful incursions against the shipment, and by providing assistance to! arrang-e local supporting 

services and traffic control when required. 

3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 

The following constraints and assumptions- are reflected in this plan and will influence 

the conduct of operational activities during execution: 

1. Enroute elements will depend on available LEA assistance to the maximum extent possible 

to deal with unlawful incursions against the shipment. 

2. Enroute elements will use firearms only as a last resort when other tactics fail to 

provide -adequate protection of, the shipment or enroute personnel against violent incursion 

attempts. 

3. Enroute, elements will conduct operations to protect the shipment in a manner that 

avoids injury to innocent bystanders and needless damage to private or public property. 

4. It is possible that enroute elements will be unable to use the mobile electronic 

communications equipment to report the situation and request LEA assistance during the 

emergency because of communication dead zones that exist along the route for the operating 

equi pm~nt. 

3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS 

Communications equipment and procedures used during a shipment are-indicated in Appendix B. 

The control relationships among the operating elements are presented below: 

3.5.1 Enroute Elements 

1. The enroute supervisor will be designated in the movement order for a shipment. The 

enroute supervisor will designate an alternate to ensure continuity of control enroute. The 

enroute supervisor controls the operation of enroute elements, i.e.; 

5.56-14
. directs the movement and overall response actions of enroute elements. 

• requests assistance and coordinates operations with the LEA providing response 

assistance. 

. ensures that reports as required from enroute elements are made. 

2. Escort and Transporter elements submit reports and request LEA assistance as dictated 

by the situation; Escort will normally be relied upon for such contacts to preclude stops by 

Transporter. 

3.5.2 MVT Control 

1. Accomplishes necessary coordination with Shipper (Consignor and Consignee, as appli

cable) during the shipment. 

2. Monitors the status of the shipment and the enroute situation. 

3. Coordinates with pertinent LEA to obtain investigative and security assistance as 

required and to inform LEA of possible security threats against the shipment. 

3.5.3 Consignor and Consignee 

Shipper coordinates with NWT Control to monitor the shipment and to provide support and 

supervisory assistance to enroute elements as required. 

3.5.4 Enroute LEA 

1. Directs and coordinates local operations of LEA response forces 

2. Coordinates with other LEA as required to obtain additional investigative and response 

assistance if needed. 

3. Coordinates local enroute LEA response operations with the enroute supervisor. 

3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS 

This section not used. 

3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL 

3.7.1 Enroute Supplies 

1. Transporter and Escort vehicle will be refueled at times selected to minimize enroute 

stops and to randomly vary the refueling points utilized along a route. 

5.56-15

I I
2. Spare replacement batteries for portable electronic equipment will be carried by 

enroute elements as appropriate to the type of equipment being used. 

3. Extra ammunition will be carried in each vehicle for the weapons available in that 

vehicle. 

3.7.2 Vehicle Maintenance 

Enroute requirements for vehicle maintenance and evacuation service will be reported to 

M4VMT Control. MVMT Control will arrange for the service in accordance with company maintenance 

procedures. 

3.7.3 Medical Services 

Local enroute hospitals will be used for emergency medical treatment. Emergency medical 

evacuation to the hospitals can be arranged through contact with the pertinent enroute LEA. 

3.7.4 Health Physics Service 

in the event of cargo dispersal while enroute due to adversary action or an accident, 

additional radiation monitoring service as required will be arranged by HVMT Control through 

contact with the Consignor or Consignee and DOE radiological assistance, as appropriate. 

Pertinent LEA may also be contacted to arrange for local civil defense preparedness assistance 

where applicable. 

3.7.5 Materials Handling 

In the event Transporter immobilization requires transfer of the cargo to another vehicle, 

MVMT Control will arrange with the Consignor or Consignee, as appropriate, for advisory personnel 

to monitor and assist in the transfer. MVMT'Control will also arrange for the replacement 

carrier, materials handling equipment, and necessary additional labor as required. 

4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX 

Within the context of the general responsibilities that are assigned to each operating 

element, the planning of detailed tasks to support the attainment of the contingency objectives 

(specified in the Generic Planning Base, Appendix A) has been accomplished through use of the 

Responsibility Matrix in Appendix C. This appendix also lists tasks for the operating elements 

that are assigned and practiced as standard operating procedure during a: shipment to enhance 

the readiness of the operating elements for executing the specific tasks reflected in the 

Responsibility Matrix. 

5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY 

To facilitate training and plan implementation, a Procedures Summary for each operating 

element is contained in Appendix D. These procedures present the general responsibilities of 

5.56-16
the operating elements, the applicable standard operating procedures, and summaries of the 

contingency task sequences that are assigned the elements via the Responsibility Matrix (Appen

dix C). In the event security contingencies that are not reflected in the contingency task 

sequences occur, operational elements will coordinate their response in accordance with the 

general responsibilities and standard operating procedures indicated in the procedures summary 

so as to accomplish the primary security mission (Subsection 1.3.2). 

5/ 

5.56-17

II
APPENDIX A 

EVENTS AND OBJECTIVES FOR CONTINGENCY RESPONSES

I0 

Code Events

Ti Explicit threat to steal or sabotage 

cargo in transit is received before 

shipment departs. 

T2 Explicit threat to steal or sabotage 

cargo in transit is received while 

enroute. 

T3 A civil disturbance or other 

suspicious situation is encountered 

while enroute. 

T4 Licensee/Agent or Enroute Elements 

perceive TI or T2 serious. 

T5 Duly constituted authority perceives 

a serious threat against SNM cargo 

in transit. 

T6 Enroute Elements perceive T3 serious. 

T7 Event occurs while enroute that 

temporarily degrades certain enroute 

safeguards. 

T8 Attack is perceived imminent or develops 

while Transporter is at a stop. 

T9 Attack is perceived imminent or develops 

while Transporter is moving. 

1o Attack or accident has occurred; 

Transporter or Escort is damaged without 

dispersal of SN14 cargo. 

T11 Attack, sabotage, or accident has 

occurred; Transporter is damaged and 

$N4 dispersed. 

T12 Code reserved for future revision. 

T13 Enroute Elements are reported delayed 

or diverted from the planned route. 

114 1NMT Control does not receive 

expected report from Enroute Elements. 

M15 Enroute Elements do not arrive at 

destination as expected. 

T16 SNH in transit has been stolen.

Response Objectives 

Determine if threat 

as perceived is 

serious. 

Determine if threat 

as perceived is 

serious. 

Determine if threat 

as perceived is 

serious. 

Prevent theft or 

sabotage of cargo. 

Prevent theft or 

sabotage of cargo. 

Prevent theft or sabotage of cargo. 

Determine perceived 

magnitude of 

danger. 

Prevent theft or 

sabotage of cargo. 

.Prevent theft or 

sabotage of cargo. 

Restore protection of 

the shipment. 

Restore protection 

of the shipment. 

Determine if SN1 

has been stolen or 

sabot&ged. 

Determine if SNM 

has been stolen or sabotaged. 

Determine if SNM 

has been stolen or 

sabotaged. 

Report theft to NRC 

and FBI. *

K

Conditional Jumps 

If serious, go 

to T4. 

If serious, go 

to T4. 

If serious, go 

to T6. 

If attack imminent, 

go to T8 or T9. 

If danger, go 

to T8 or T9. 

If theft or 

sabotage, go to 

710, T11, T16. 

If theft or 

sabotage, go to 

T10, T11, T16. 

If theft, go to 

T16. 

If theft or sabotage, go to 

TIO, T11, T16. 

If theft or 

sabotage, go to 

T10, 11, H16. 

If theft or 

sabotage, go to 

110, 111, T16.

5.56-18

K

\
APPENDIX 6

COM4MUNICATION PROCEDURES 

1. PURPOSE 

To outline procedures for use of radio equipment and other communications'. 

2. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 

Radio equipment with enroute elements normally includes mobile radiotelephones, citizens 

band radios, and vehicle-to-vehicle radios. In addition, regular telephone communications are 

used by operating elements as required. 

a. Mobile Radiotelephones (NT) 

• One located in TRANSPORTER, one in each ESCORT vehicle 

* Used as the primary-mobile means of communication with the enroute elements for 

contact with MMVTCONTROL and enroute LEA. 

Features: 

- Eleven VHF channels available in the frequency band from 152 to'162 Hiz. 

- Channel selection pertinent to operating area is by manual pushbutton 

system. 

- Direct dialing or operator assisted calls are possible. 

- The kT generally must be within 20 miles of a phone-patching central for 

the system to be used.. 

- Unreliable zones for MT communication and locations of phone-patching 

centrals for the routes of this plan are shown in Enclosure 1 of Appendix E. 

Operating Information: 

- Enroute elements MT number shown on the equipment will be included in the 

movement order for a particular shipment. 

The operator of the N4T will announce the telephone number of the unit 

before terminating a call to comply with FCC rules. 

b. CB Radio Transceivers 

"* One located in TRANSPORTER, one each ESCORT vehicle. 

"• Used as the alternative mobile means of communication for contact with MM 

CONTROL or enroute LEAin emergency situations, either directly or by relay as 

' :hecessary; used whenfiT is ineffective. 

* 5.56-19

I I
*Also provides alternative mobile means of vehicle-to-vehicle communication in 

the event VHF transceiver fails. 

*Features: 

- Twenty-three HF AM channels available in the frequency band from 26. 965 to 

27.225 M4Hz. 

- Omnidirectional dipole antenna. 

- Mobile-to-base communications range: 1 to 10 miles; mobile-to-mobile 

communications range: i-to 5 miles. 

- Locations of enroute LEA and REACT CB capabilities for the routes of this 

plan are shown in Enclosyre 1 of Appendix E. 

*Operating Information:, 

- CB call sign for Enroute Elements is 

- Operator of CB will announce above call sign before terminating a call to 

comply with FCC rules. 

- Channel 9 is the emergency C3 channel; REACT groups and many LEA routinely 

monitor this channel., Channel 1i9 is, currently monitored widely by truckers. 

Information relay can generally be accomplished via either of these channels; 

channel 9 rel ays, however,, must. be of an emergency naturei . 

C. VHF Radio Transceivers 

*Each enroute vehicle is equipped with a unit. 

"* The primary mobile means of vehicle-to-vehicle communication.. 

"* Features: 

-Two VHF FM channels, both set to the single company operating frequency of 

_________MHz.,. 

-Omnidirectional, dipole antenna. 

-Communication range: 10 to 20 miles. 

"* Hand portable units, ore, available, with Enroute Elements for off-vehicle 

communications. 

"* Operating Information; . 

- VHF call sign for enroute elements is ____________ 

- Operator of VHF radio will announce above call sign before terminating a 

call to comply with FCC rules. 

d. Regular Telephone Calls 

,Used as the primary,,non-mobile means of, communication from enroute elements to 

1VTCONTROL and enroute LEA, and between MIVMT CONTROL, the.LEA,, CONSIGNOR, and 

CONSIGNEE. 

5.56-20
Operating Information:, 

- ESCORT will make stops for necessary telephone usage by enroute elements in 

order to minimize requirements for TRANSPORTER stops. 

- t•4V1T CONTROL is located at , , telephone 

(_) - ; collect calls from LEA and enroute elements will be accepted. 

- LEA telephone numbers for the routes of this plan are in Enclosure 3 of 

Appendix E. 

- CONSIGNOR and CONSIGNEE telephone numbers will be indicated in the movement 

order for a particular shipment. 

3. GENERAL OPERATING RULES AND CONSTRAINTS 

a. Company enroute elements will be identified as (Co. name) Special 

Number (Truck Number) in transmissions to LEA or for relay to LEA or MiMT 

CONTROL. 

b. Requests to CB REACT or other CB units for message relay to LEA or i4V/T CONTROL will 

include name and telephone number of pertinent addressee. 

C. In the absence of a universally applicable standard code, the use of code words for 

communicating emergency information to non-company element is discouraged. 

d. Transmissions will be as short as possible consistent with assuring clarity of meaning. 

e. Radio channel will not be used whenever it is being actively used by another unit. 

To indicate that the channel Is free for others to use, termination of the last transmission of 

a radio conversation will be with the word '!out," preceded by the pertinent company radio call 

sign. 

4. TESTS AND MAINTENANCE 

a. Prior to departure of a shipment, all communication equipment will be checked and 

maintained as necessary to ensure. proper operation. 

b. During periods of communication inactivity while enroute, communication checks with CB 

and FM radio will be accomplished at least hourly to be aware of any communication deficiencies. 

5.56-21

Ii
APPENDIX C

RESPONSIBILiTY MATRIX 

Content Page 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE ............................................... 5.56-22 

- Escort and Transporter Elements ....................................... 5.56-22 

- MVNT Control ............... ..... ................................. 5.56-23 

- Consignor and Consignee ... ........................... 5.56-23 

MATRIX 

- Threat received before shipment departs................................ 5.56-25 

- Threat received while shipment is enroute .................................... 5.56-27 

- Civil disturbanceýOr suspicious situation encountered..................... 5.56-r29 

"- A threat is assessed as,"serious" by Enroute Elements or Licensee ...... ..... 5.56-31 

- A threat is assessed as "serious" by appropriate authorities ............... 5.56-33 

- Enroute Elements believe T3 threat is "serious". ........................ 5.56-35 

- Enroute safeguards are temporarily degraded ................................. 5.56-37 

- Attack,is believed imminent or develops at transporter stop ................ 5.56-39 

- Attack Is believed& imminent or develops while transporter is moving. . . 5.56-41 

- Transporter or escort-vehicle is damaged by'attack or accident without SNM 

cargo dispersal ............................................................. 5.56-43 

Transporter is damaged by attack, sabotage, or accident and SNM cargo is 

dispersed.................................................. ....... 5.56-45 

Enroute Elements are reported'delayed or diverted from planned'route... .... 5.56-47 

- MVMT CONTROL does not receive expected report from Enroute Elements........ .5.56-49 

- Enroute Elements fail to arrive at destination ............................... 5.56-51 

- SMM cargo in transit has been stolen.,.. . . .................... 5.56-53 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

The following listed tasks are assigned and practiced as standard operating procedure 

during a shipment to enhance the readiness of the operating elements for executing the tasks 

reflected in the Responsibility Matrix attached. 

ESCORT and TRANSPORTER (Enroute Elements): 

1. At each report to MVNT CONTROL, inform MVNT CONTROL of: 

- present location, enroute situation, next starting time 

- expected time and location of next planned report to MVNT CONTROL. (A) 

5.56-22
2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may "contact LEA and tVMT CONTROL to 

render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor designates and briefs a "getaway" 

messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event mobile electronic communications 

fail. (A) 

3. On the move and ot stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously. 

Members not in visual contact with Enroute Elements (at stops) will use the hand portable 

radios. (A) 

4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information to each other by 

the most expeditious means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice. (A) 

5. Maintain TRANSPORTER vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to block surprise 

penetration and to be prepared to move, operate communications, and immobilize cargo vehicle as 

dictated by the situation. (A) 

6. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPORTER to permit 

continuous observation, but not close enough to present a single target. (A) 

7. At TRANSPORTER stops, dispose the guards to obtain coverage of the TRANSPORTER position; 

ideally such positions would provide close-by cover for guard protection, good observation and 

fields of fire covering the TRANSPORTER position, and mutual support among the guards. (A) 

MVMT CONTROL: 

"1. As indicated by the enroute security situation, contact each pertinent LEA in advance 

of TRANSPORTER arrival in the respective jurisdiction and inform them of: (C) 

- the ID of Enroute Elements (company name, special number) 

- nature of shipment (handling nuclear cargo) 

- route and direction of movement 

- ETA and ETD for the jurisdiction 

- the enroute security situation of concern 

2. Provide information, investigative assistance, and support as requested by Enroute 

Elements or dictated by situation. (A) 

3. Maintain information on current status of shipment. 

4. Keep Shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate) informed as to changes in movement 

plan and schedule, and of extraordinary enroute situations. (A) 

CONSIGNOR and CONSIGNEE (Terminal Elements): 

1. Report expected and actual shipment departure and arrival times to each other as 

applicable. (A) 

5.56-23

II
2. Mlaintain current information on changes in movement plan and schedule; keep each 

other informed as appropriate. (A) 

3. Provide safe haven for TRANSPORTER vehicle upon arrival and unloading of cargo into 

appropriately protected facilities irom TRANSPORTER. (A) 

4. Shipper keeps NRC informed, as appropriate, of chahges in movement plan and schedule 

and of extraordinary enroute situation%. (A)

5.56-24
K K

RESPONSIBIL ITY MATRIX

TI-1i MOVER ELEMENT. .....-

ENROUTE ELEMENTS 

EVEN-TIOBECTIVE ESCORT TRANSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

EXPLICIT THREAT TO STEAL OR 

SABOTAGE CARGO IN TRANSIT IS 

RECEIVED BEFORE SHIPMENT 

DEPARTS. 

OBJECTIVE: 

DETERMINE IF THREAT AS 

PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS.

General Tasks >I

Report without delay all threat information to the Enroute 

Supervisor and as directed to M *T CONTROL and to the shipper 

(CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable). (A).

Report without delay all threat 

information to shipper (CONSIGNOR/ CONSIGNEE as applicable) and to 

ESCORT and TRANSPORTER as 

appropriate. (A) 

Assist CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE in 

assessing threat as requested. (A) Ch cI

.%
Ti-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Reports threat information to 

local FBI and to pertinent NRC 

Regional Headquarters. (A) 

- Assists in assessing threat as 

requested. (A)

CONSIGNOR (or CONSIGNEE if applicable) DETERMINES IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS. 

< 'General Tasks 

1. Report without delay all threat information to: 

a. MVYT CONTROL as appropriate. (A) 

b. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate. (A) 

c. NRC. (A) 

2. Assemble available information on threat and adversary from: 

a. NRC. (A) 

b. Pertinent LEAs. (A) 

c. HVNT CONTROL and CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate. (A) 

3. Analyze available information to assess seriousness of threat. (A) 

4. Decide if threat should be considered serious. (A) 

5. If threat is perceived serious go to event T-4. (A)

1-

At U' 

0%

r
K

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T2-1 MOVER ELEMENTS 

ENROUTE ELEMENTS 

EVENTIOBJECTIVE ESCORT TR.NSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

THREAT TO STEAL OR 

CARGO IN TRANSIT IS 

WHILE ENROUTE.

OBJECTIVE: 

DETERMINE IF THREAT AS 

PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS.

General Tasks > 

Report without delay to the Enroute Supervisor and as directed to MVMT CONTROL all threat information and on-scene 

assessment of situation as applicable. (A)

DETERMINE IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED 

IS SERIOUS 

- Report without delay all 

threat information to: 

a. ESCORT and TRANSPORTER 

as appropriate. (A) b. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as 

appropriate. (A) 

c. NRC. (A) 

- Assemble available informatto 

on threat adversary from: 

a. NRC. (A) 

b. Enroute elements and 

CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as 

appropriate. (A) 

c. Pertinent LEAs. (A) 

- Analyze available information 

to assess seriousness of 

threat. (A) . 

- If threat is perceived seriou 

go to event T-4. (A)

0

\ K

EXPLICIT 

SABOTAGE 

RECEIVED

in M' 

Nt

----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -- ftft - -- - - - ft
T2-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Reports threat information to 

local FBI and to pertinent NRC 

Regional Headquarters. (A) 

- Assists in assessing threat 

as requested. (A)

< General Tasks 

Report without delay all threat information to MVYT CONTROL and to CONSIGNOR/ 

CONSIGNEE as appropriate. (A) 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

a

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RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

173-1 

. ._ _ _ _ .E NT I OM E C T IV E 

A CIVIL DISTURBANCE OR OTHER 

SUSPICIOUS SITUATION IS ENCOUNTERED WHILE ENROUTE, e.g., 

"- Protest demonstration or 

labor strike. 

- Unexpected route detour. 

- Unexplained road blockage. 

- Signaling to stop from 

apparent accident or main

tenance problem. 

- Signaling to stop from 

apparent police patrol. 

- Suspicious persons tailing shipment. 

- Suspicious persons endeavor 

ing to isolate a guard or driver at stop. 

- Suspicious persons endeavor 

ing close-up or hands-on 

inspection of TRANSPORTER. 

OBJECTIVE: 

DETERMINE IF THREAT AS 

PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS.

-MOVER ELEMENTFI" 

-ENROUTE ELEME.N. - -.. ,

ESCORT TRANSPORTER 

ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL DETERMINE IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS 

SAssist TRANSPORTER movements - In coordination with ESCORT -to 

pletely 

avoid 

or 

situation 

until com- accomplish TRANSPORTER move

mined 

it is deter- ments to avoid the situation. to be non-serious. (A) (A) 

- Accomplish 

necessary 

investigations as - Report TRANSPORTER observa to obtain informa- tions and situation to tion needed for assessing Enroute Supervisor and the situation. (A) assist in assessment of 

- Report ESCORT observations situation. (A) 

and situation to Enroute 

supervisor and assist in 

assessment of situation. (A) 

Enroute Supervisor Will 

Direct actions as necessary to collect and assemble information needed for assessing the situation, e.g., 

a. Query MVMT CONTROL or pertinent LEA. (C) 

b. Dispatch of ESCORT patrol to investigate and report. (C) 

c. Observation of situational activity. (A) 

Analyze available information and decide if situation is serious. (A) 

If situation is perceived serious, go to event T6. (A)

U' 

LDI 

U' 

No

MVMT CONTROL 

NA
T3-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Provides information and 

investigative assistance 

as requested. (A)

NA KA

/I

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RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T4-1 

'MOVER ELEMENTS 

ENROUTE ELEMENTS 

EVENT/OBJECTIVE ESCORT TRANSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

LICENSEE/AGENT OR ENROUTE 

ELEMENTS PERCEIVE TI OR T2 

SERIOUS. 

OBJECTIVE: 

PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF 

CARGO.

PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO 

ICE General Tasks + 

As directed by Enroute Supervisor in coordination with MlvIT CONTROL, implement increased readiness, e.g., 

a. Cancellation or delay of shipment. (C) b. Use of alternative route or safe haven. (C) 

c. Increased guard/escort strength. (C) d. Arrangements for and coordination with LEA escorts. (C) e. Review and use security tactics and procedures as applicable: (C) 

- Escort actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops. - Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formation and actions to increase adversary operational problems and reduce vulnerability. - Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols. - Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops. - Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual support among guards and TRANSPORTER positions.

-I

As necessary, coordinate with 

shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE 

'as applicable) and with enroute 

elements and LEA to arrange for 

increased readiness appropriate 

to perceived seriousness of the 

threat. (A) 

In coordination with shipoer (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as 

applicable) report perceived seriousness of threat and the 

increased readiness measures 

to NRC. (A)

U' 

C" Z!
T4-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

Provides escort and is prepared 

to reinforce security of shipment, 

as arranged in coordination with 

MVMT CONTROL. (A)

Tasks Performed by Shipper 

1. Coordinate with MVNT CONTROL to arrange for increased readiness of enroute elements 

and LEA, or for cancellation or delay of shipment, as appropriate to the assessed 

seriousness of the threat situation. (A) 

2. Report the assessed seriousness of the threat and contemplated enroute readiness 

actions to NRC. (A)

C

!nW
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RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T5-1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 

MOVER ELEMENTS 

ENROUTE ELEMENTS I 

EVENT/OBJECTIVE ESCORT TRANSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY 

PERCEIVES A SERIOUS THREAT 

AGAINST SM CARGO IN TRANSIT. 

OBJECTIVE: 

PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF 

CARGO.

PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO 

General Tasks 

As directed by Enroute Supervisor in coordination with MVYT 

CONTROL, implement increased readiness, e.g.,

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

e.

Cancellation or delay of shipment. (C) 

Use of alternative route or safe haven. (C) 

Increased guard/escort strength. (C) 

Arrangements for and coordination with LEA escorts. 

Review and use security tactics and procedures as 

applicable: (C)

(C)

- Escort actions to minimize or eliminate need for 

TRANSPORTER stops. - Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formation 

and actions to increase adversary operational problems and reduce vulnerability. - Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols. - Continuous al1-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops. - Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to 

attain continuous mutual support among guards of 

TRANSPORTER positions. 

-- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - -

- As necessary, coordinate with 

shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE 

as applicable) and with enroute 

elements and LEA to arrange for 

increased readiness appropriate 

to the perceived seriousness of 

the threat. (A) 

In coordination with shipper 

(CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as 

applicable) report perceived 

seriousness of threat and the 

increased readiness measures 

to NRC. (A)

11

L" 

Zn 

Ca 

U'
T5-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Provides escort and is prepared 

to reinforce security of shipment, 

as arranged in coordination with 

MVNT CONTROL. (A)

<_ Tasks Performed by Shipper 

1. Coordinate with NVMT CONTROL to arrange for increased readiness of enroute elements 

and LEA, or for cancellation or delay of shipment, as appropriate to the assessed 

seriousness of the threat situation. (A) 

2. Report the assessed seriousness of the threat and the contemplated enroute readiness 

actions to NRC. (A) 

--------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------

!n 

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a'

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RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T6-1 - MOVER ELEMENT! 

ENROUTE ELEMENTS . 

EVENT/OBJECTIVE ESCORT TRANSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

ENROUTE ELEMENTS PERCEIVE T3 

SERIOUS. 

OBJECTIVE: 

PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE 

OF CARGO.

PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO 

The Enroute Supervisor Will: 

Brief ESCORT and TRANSPORTER on perceived$.seriousness of situation. (A) 

Contact pertinent LEA; report situation; request LEA 

escorts. (A) 

- Report situation to MYNT CONTROL. (A) 

- Direct ESCORT and TRANSPORTER movement operations to: 

a. Continue avoidance of any suspected adversary. (A) b. Avoid remote, little-traveled routes. (A) 

c. Close on destination (or adequate safe haven) in shortest possible time consistent with safety of 

movement. (A) d. Tactically screen and cover TRANSPORTER movement. (A) 

If LEA escorts are not available, be prepared to dispatch "getaway" messenger in case electronic communications fail. (A) 

- If attack occurs or is imminent, go to T8 or T9. (A) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---

- Screen and cover TRANSPORTER 

movement. (A) 

- Prepare to defend TRANSPORTER 

cargo against attack by coordi

nating actions all briefing of 

,escort guards. A.

- In coordination with - ESCORT, continue to use 

TRANSPORTER mobility 

to avoid suspected 

adversaries and to 

reduce vulnerability. (A) 

(Continued in adjacent column)

- Contact pertinent LEA in 

advance of Enroute Elements; 

report situation; request 

LEA escorts. (A) 

- Contact safe haven objective 

(as applicable) and report situation. (A) 

- Report situation to Shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as 

applicable) and to NRC. (A) 

- Prepare to dispatch backup 

TRANSPORTER and ESCORT as 

needed if such is indicated 

by situation. (C) ------------------------------ O~

TRANSPORTER (Continued) 

- Prepare to defend cargo 

against attack by alerting crew and coordinating tactical 

plans with ESCORT. (A) 

- Review procedure and criteria* 

for immobilizing cargo as required. (A) 

e.g.: Immobilize when TRANS

PORTER momentum cannot be 

maintained because of adversary action. Select immobilized 

position to block traffic and to 

deny opportunities to conceal 

cargo vehicle from the road or air.

U' 

Ot 

u.'
76-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA 

- Provides LEA escort and investi a

tive assistance as requested. (A) 

- Prepares to respond with addi

tional force as necessary to deal 

with unlawful acts against the

shipment. (A) 

- Coordinates with adjacent LEA 

jurisdictions as necessary to 

provide continuous LEA escort 

protection. (A) 

- Reports by telephone (collect) to 

14VMT CONTROL situation information; 

passage of shipment to succeeding 

LEA jurisdictions. (A)

-CONSIGNEE CONSGNOR

<_ Task Performed by Shipper 

Continue to monitor shipment through MVMT CONTROL contacts.. (A) 

S-------------

Cl Zn 

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/I

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\1

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T7-1 I MOVER ELEMENTS 

VTJC ET ENROUTE ELEMENTS 1C 

EVENT/OBJECTIVE .... ESCORT TRANSPORTERI MVMT CONTROL

EVENT OCCURS WHILE ENROUTE 

THAT TEMPORARILY DEGRADES 

CERTAIN ENROUTE SAFEGUARDS, 

e.g.: 

- TRANSPORTER or ESCORT 

vehicle breaks down. 

- Radio or MT equipment Is 

damaged or jammed. 

Enroute personnel gets 

suddenly sick. 

OBJECTIVE: 

DETERMINE PERCEIVED MAGNITUDE 

OF DANGER.

DETERMINE PERCEIVED MAGNITUDE OF DANGER 

General Tasks 

1. Report situation to MVMT CONTROL ; request assistance as 

appropriate. (A) 

2. Assemble and assess information on circumstances of the 

event; decide if the event indicates a possible attempt 

at theft or sabotage of the TRANSPORTER cargo. (A) 

3. If an attempt at theft or sabotage is perceived, go to 

T8 or T9. (A) 

4. Otherwise, in coordination with MVMT CONTROL and LEA as 

necessary, arrange for local maintenance or medical 

service needed to restore TRANSPORTER mobility and 

continue the cargo movement. (A)

- Provide supporting assistance 

as requested by ENROUTE 

ELEMENTS. (A) 

- Inform LEA, Shipper (CONSIGNOR 

CONSIGNEE as applicable) of 

changes made in movement plan and schedule. (A)

Un 

U' 

w
T7-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Assists in arranging for medical 

or maintenance services as 

requested. (A)*

Task Performed by Shipper 

Monitor shipment's progress via MVMT CONTROL contact; inform CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE 

(as applicable) of changes in planned schedule. (A)

U'

I-
\

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T8-1 MOVER ELEMENI 

ENROUTE ELEMENTS 

EVEN.T/08JECTIVE ESCORT ,TRNSORTER MVMT CONTRIOL

ATTACK IS PERCEIVED IMMINENT Of 

DEVELOPS WHILE TRANSPORTER IS 

AT A STOP. 

- Developed via T6, T7. 

- Just occurs. 

OBJECTIVE: 

PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF 

CARGO.

4 - PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO > 

The Enroute Supervisor Will: 

- Contact pertinent LEA, request assistance,'report situation, 

e.g., (A) 

a. 1D and TRANSPORTER location. 

b. Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and 

activities.

- Depending upon observed adversary 

situation, protect TRANSPORTER 

cargo by: (A) 

a. Challenging and turning 

away adversary approach. (A) 

b. Using force as necessary to 

delay adversary until effec

tive LEA response arrives. (A) 

c. Covering TRANSPORTER escape 

from situation by preventing 

adversary pursuit. (A) 

d. Following and maintaining 

visual contact if adversary 

gains possession of any part 

of cargo. (A)

- Use TRANSPORTER mobility 

to escape from stationary 

situation. (A) 

- If unable to escape from 

stationary situation due 

to adversary actions, 

immobilize cargo vehicle 

in place. (A) 

- Defend cargo with force 

if necessary to prevent 

penetration by adversary. 

(A)

If TRANSPORTER moves out and adver

sary pursues, go to T9. (A) 

If enroute vehicle is damaged, go to 

TIO or T1l. (A) 

If TRANSPORTER or any part of 

cargo is stolen, go to T16. (A)

NA

U' 

U, 

0
T8-2 

IISONSE LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Converges LEA patrols upon TRANSPORTER location to intercept MA 

and deal with the adversary. (A) 

Pursues and apprehends adversary 

as necessary to recover TRANSPORTER 

or any cargo in their possession. (A) 

CM 

Ch 4

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RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T9-l MOVER ELEMEri 

ENROUTE ELEMENTS 

",EE.OBJECIVE ESCORT' ,TRANSPORTER , MVMT'COMNTOL

ATTACK IS PRECEIVED IMIINENT OR 

DEVELOPS WHILE TRANSPORTER IS 

MOVING. 

- Developed via T6, T7, T8. 

- Just occurs. 

OBJECTIVE: 

PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE 

OF CARGO.

ESCORT (Continued) 

d. Following & maintaining 

contact if adversary gains possession of any part of 

cargo, in order to assist 

LEA convergence. (A) 

If enroute vehicle is damaged, 

go to T1O or Tll. (A) - If TRANSPORTER or part of 

cargo is stolen to to T16. 

(A)

< PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO - -- - - - - - - - m -- - - - - - - -M- -- - -m- - - - - -

The Enroute Spervisor Will: - As applicable, contact pertinent LEA, request assistance, 

report situation, e.g., (A) 

a. ID, TRANSPORTER location, route, and movement direction. 

b. Adversary strength, description, disposition, activities. ------ -------- m ----------------------- - - - - m 

- Assist TRANSPORTER movement to 

escape adversary contact and to 

move toward LEA or local safe 

haven as applicable. (A) 

- Report changing location and 

situation to LEA as occurs.. (A) 

- Depending upon observed adver

sary situation, protect 

TRANSPORTER cargo by: (A) 

a. Blocking adversary movement 

toward TRANSPORTER. (C) 

b. Immobilizing adversary 

transportation. (C) 

c. Defending cargo to prevent 

adversary penetration or 

departure with cargo until 

effective LEA response 

arrives. (C) 

(Continued in adjacent column)

- Use TRANSPORTER mobility to 

escape contact and to move 

toward LEA or local safe haven 

as applicable. (A) 

- If TRANSPORTER momentum cannot 

be maintained because of 

adversary action, immobilize 

cargo vehicle at position that: 

a. Effectively blocks traffic 

(A) 

b. Affords little if any 

opportunity to conceal 

cargo vehicle in vicinity. (A) 

- If cargo vehicle is immobi

lized, occupy position with 

tractor that offers good 

(Continued in adjacent column)

NA 

TRANSPORTER (Continued) 

observatioft and fields of 

fire to cover cargo location. 

(A) 

- In cordination with ESCORT 

defend cargo to prevent adver

sary penetration or departure 

with cargo until effective 

LEA response arrives. (A)

U' 

U' 

o'
T9-2 

RESPONSE

. Converges with LEA patrols upon the 

TRANSPORTER location to intercept 

and deal with the adversary. (A) 

Pursues and apprehends adversary as 

necessary to recover the TRANSPORTER 

or any cargo in their possession. (A)

CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE 

NA

IdvCn 

T U' 

f'

iLE.A
\

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

TI0-I MOVER ELEMENTS 

ENROUTE ELEMENTS 

EVENT/OBJECTIVE ESCORT TRANSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

ATTACK OR ACCIDENT HAS OCCURRED; 

TRANSPORTER OR ESCORT IS DAMAGE[ 

WITHOUT DISPERSAL OF SNM CARGO. 

- Developed via TB,.T9. 

- Just occurs. 

OBJECTIVE: 

RESTORE PROTECTION OF THE SHIP

MENT.

TRANSPORTER (Continued) 

c. Coordinate with enroute 

LEA for LEA escorts as arranged by MVMT:CONTROL. 

(A) 

If TRANSPORTER is not reliably 

mobile, 

a. In coordination with 

ESCORT provide continuous 

security for cargo. (A) 

b. Supervise local repair/ 

evacuation operations. 

(A) c. Assist in transfer of 

cargo to replacement 

vehicle as arranged. (A)

SRESTORE PROTECTION OF THE SHIPMENT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- 

The Enroute Supervisor Will: 

- Arrange for local emergency medical and traffic control assist ance via LEA contact as needed. (A) 

- Notify MVMT CONTROL of situation. (A) 

- Arrange for local emergency repair/evacuation services for 

damaged vehicles as directed by MVMT CONTROL. (A) 

- If TRANSPORTER is reliably mobile and ESCORT is not,

a. 

b. 

C.

Transfer ESCORT guards to TRANSPORTER if possible. (A) 

Direct TRANSPORTER to continue trip. (A) 

Request MVMT CONTROL arrange continuing LEA escorts as dictated by the situation. (A)

If TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile, 

a. Request local LEA security assistance as dictated by situa

tion. (A) 

b. Request MYNT CONTROL dispatch replacement TRANSPORTER, 

material handling equipment, and additional escorts as required to complete movement. (A) - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------- - Accomplish ESCORT reorganization - If TRANSPORTER is reliably directed by Enroute Supervisor. mobile and ESCORT is not, (A) a. Assimilate additional 

guards from ESCORT. (A) - Provide continuing security for b. Continue movement of ship TRANSPORTER cargo during reor- ment. (A)

ganiZation a repair or transfer 

operations. (A) (Continued in first column)

- Coordinate with Enroute Elements 

& LEA, as appropriate to situa

tion, to arrange for escorts and 

guards needed for continued 

protection of shipment & for 

procurement of needed maintenance 

and medical service. (A) 

- If TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile, 

a. Inform Enroute Elements of 

arrangements for local 

assistance to move TRANSPORTEý 

to temporary safe haven for 

repair or transfer operation. (A) 

b. As required by situation, 

dispatch additional escort, 

replacement TRANSPORTER and 

material handling equipment 

to complete shipment. (A) 

c. If transfer operation is 

necessary, request shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE, as 

applicable) to send necessary personnel to transfer point 

to supervise the transfer. 

(A) 

d. Report situation to NRC. (A)

Ul
Ti0-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Assists in arranging for local 

maintenance and medical support as required by the situation. (A) 

- Accomplishes traffic control as necessary to isolate cargo vehicle 

location or evacuation. (A) 

- In coordination with VNYT CONTROL 

and Enroute Elements, provides 

temporary security assistance and 

escorts as needed to protect the 

cargo. (A)

Tasks Performed by Shipper 

- In coordination with MVMT CONTROL dispatch personnel to supervise transfer operation as necessary. (A) 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I- ( I

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RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Tl1-1 , MOVEn ELEMENTS 

I: ENROUTE ELEMENTS 

EVENT/OWECTIVE ESCORT TRANSPORTER [ MVMT CONTROL

ATTACK, SABOTAGE, OR ACCIDENT 

HAS OCCURRED; TRANSPORTER IS 

DAMAGED AND SNI DISPERSED 

- Developed via T8, T9. 

- Just occurs. 

OBJECTIVE: 

RESTORE PROTECTION OF THE 

SHIPMENT

The Enroute Supervisor Will: 

- Contact LEA, arrange for medical, security, and traffic control 

assistance as dictated by situation.' (A) 

- Notify MVIMT CONTROL of situation; request dispatch of radiation 

monitoring, recovery, security, transportation, and decontamina

tion assistance; report any observations of possible theft that 

might have occurred. (A)

- In coordination with TRANSPORTER 

and LEA, cordon off TRANSPORTER 

and CARGO disperal areas; allow 

no one to enter area unless 

cleared by Enroute Supervisor. (A) 

- Assist and protect recovery, inventory, and transfer 

operations to prevent theft 

of cargo. (A) 

- Continue to provide escort 

security on resumption of 

cargo movement as directed 

by Enroute Supervisor. (A)

- Assist in protecting 

TRANSPORTER and cargo dispersa 

areas, in coordination with 

ESCORT and LEA. (A) 

- Assist recovery, inventory, 

and transfer operations as 

Indicated by situation. (A) 

- Supervise local repair and 

evacuation operations regardinj 

TRANSPORTER. (A)

RESTORE PROTECTION OF THE SHIPMENT 

- Notify NRC and shipper (CONSIGNOR, 

CONSIGNEE as applicable) of TRANS. 

PORTER damage and cargo dispersal 

situation; request inspection, 

recovery, inventory, and decon

tamination assistance be sent to 

scene. (A) 

- Arrange dispatch of additional 

escort, replacement TRANSPORTER, 

and cargo handling equipment to 

provide resources as needed for 

transfer operation and continua

tion of shipment. (A) 

- Coordinate with Enroute Elements 

and LEA to arrange for the 

authorized operations to proceed and to ensure continued protection of the shipment when resumed. (A)

CA 

in
Tll-2 RESPONSE COSGI 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

Arranges for local maintenance, 

radiation monitoring, and medical 

assistance as required by the 

situation. (A) 

Accomplishes traffic control as 

necessary to isolate damaged cargo 

vehicle and dispersal area. (A) 

In coordination with NV1T CONTROL 

and Enroute Elements, provides 

temporary security assistance and 

escorts as needed to protect the 

shipment. (A)

_._ Tasks Performed by Shipper 

1. Dispatch health physics personnel and recovery and inventory teams to scene to 

accomplish necessary cargo recovery, inventory, transfer, and decontamination 

operations; coordinate arrangements with NRC, NVHT CONTROL, and Enroute Elements. (A) 

2. Report on-scene situation to NRC; request additional resources as required from 

Federal sources. (A) 

3. If SNJ4 cargo has been stolen, to to 116. (A) 

-------------------------------------------------------- -- ----------------------------------

"(I

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T13-1 -•MOVER ELEME 

4NPOUTE ELEMENTS 

EVENTIOBJECTIVE ESCORT; TRANSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

EMENTS ARE REPORTED 

DIVERTED FROM THE 

LTE.

DETERMINE IF SNM 

OR SABOTAGED.

< - General Task 

Report to MYNT CONTROL, as soon as practical, delays or detours that have occurred or will occur, the reasons therefor, and location at time of report. (A)

HAS BEEN STOLEI

MYMT CONTROL (Continued)

a. 

b. 

c. 

d.

Assume attempted theft; (A) Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives; (A) Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTER relief crew to complete shipment; (A) 

Report incident to NRCand FBI for investigation as appro priate. (A)

If shipment cannot be located but subsequently reports, request pertinent LEA to verify that the shipment Is located and moving as reported; if it is not, assume attempted theft of shipment; go to T16. (A) 

If shipment cannot be located and fails to report, assume ship ment stolen; go to T16. (A)

)ETERMINE IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEN OR SABOTAGED. 

Contact LEA Jurisdictions along route from location of last 

report to location of next planned report to determine information 

that might indicate a valid delay. (A) 

According to Information gained, request LEA to:

a. Attempt to locate shipment; (A) 

b. Determine reasons for delay if any; (A) 

c. Report shipment's status and 

situation as determined; (A) d. Render assistance to ship ment as indicated by situa

tion. 

If shipment is located by LEA and. is delayed because of vehicle 

damage, go to TIO or Tll. (A) 

If shipment Is located by LEA and 

obviously is delayed/detoured for no valid reasons.

(Continued in adjacent column)

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

ENROUTE ELI 

DELAYED OR 

PLANNED I 

OBJECTIVE:

cn 

Zn 

U, 

Il

?
T13-2 

RESPONSE C CONSIGNEE 

I LEA COSOE

Accomplishes investigation as re- HA NA 

quested; informs MVMT CONTROL of 

results. (A) 

- If shipment is found and is on the 

planned route and schedule or is 

actually delayed or detoured for a 

valid reason, renders assistance 

as dictated by the situation and 

allows shipment to proceed; other

wise, holds shipment in custody 

until further disposition is 

indicated by V1HT CONTROL. (A) 

U' 

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f /•-

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K

K

•MOVER ELEMENTS

TI14-1 

EVEN.TIOBJECTIVE 

MVMT CONTROL DOES NOT RECEIVE 

EXPECTED REPORT FROM ENROUTE 

ELEMENTS.

Mflnu w.

ESCORT TRANSPORTER 

NA NA

OBJECTIVE: 

DETERMINE IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEW OR SABOTAGED.

MTT CONTROL (Continued) 

- If shipment is located by LEA and is delayed/detoured for no obviously valid reasons, 

a. Assume attempted theft; (A) b. Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives; (A) c. Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTER relief crew to complete 

shipment; (A) d. Report incident to NRC and FBI for investigation as appro priate. (A) 

If shipment cannot be located, assume stolen and go to T16. (A)

MVMT CONTROL 

DETERMINED IF SNN HAS BEEN STOLEN OR SABOTAGED. 

- Contact LEA jurisdiction along route from location of last re port to location planned for missing report to determine 

information that might explain delayed report. (A) 

- According to information gained, request LEA above and those 

further along route to: 

a. Attempt to locate shipment; (A) 

b. Determine reason for delayed. 

report; (A) c. Report shipment's status and 

situation as determined; (A) d. Render assistance to shipment as indicated by the situation. 

(A) 

- If shipment is located by LEA and is delayed because of vehicle 

damage, go to TIO or Tll. (A) 

(Continued in adjacent column) -1

U, 

u'

RESPONSIBILIT MATRIX
T14-2 

RESPONSE CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE LEA-----" 

- Accomplishes investigation as re- NA NA 

quested; informs MVMT CONTROL of 

results. (A) 

- If shipment is found and is on the 

planned route and schedule or is 

actually delayed/detoured for an 

obviously valid reason, renders 

assistance as dictated by the 

situation and allows shipment to 

proceed; otherwise, holds shipment 

in custody until further disposi

tion is indicated by MVYT CONTROL. 

(A) 

uM 

(311

/(
\ K

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T15-1 1 MOVER ELEMENT, 

ENROUTE ELEMENTS 

EVENT/OBJECTIVE ESCORT TRANSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

IL•~L LLrMU 0fl UU RUI AKKAVr 

AT DESTINATION AS EXPECTED. 

OBJECTIVE:

DETERMINE IF SNM 

OR SABOTAGED.

HAS BEEN STOLE1

NA NA

MT CONTROL (Continued)

a. 

b. 

c. 

d.

Assume attempted theft; (A) 

Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives; (A) Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTERr*elief crew to complete shipment; (A) 

Report incident to NRC and FBI for investigation as 

appropriate. (A)

- If shipment cannot be located, assume stolen and go to T16. (A) L

DETERMINED IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEN 

OR SABOTAGED. 

- Contact LEA jurisdictions along 

route from location of last repori 

to destination to determine infor

mation that might explain delayed 

report. (A) 

- According to information gained, 

request LEA to:

a. Attempt to locate shipment; (A) 

b. Determine reason for delayed 

report; (A) 

c. Report shipment's status and 

situation as determined; (A) 

d. Render assistance to shipment 

as indicated by the situation. 

(A) 

If shipment is located by LEA and 

is delayed because of vehicle 

damage, to to T1O or Tll. 

If shipment is located by LEA and 

is delayed/detoured for no 

obviously valid reasons,

(Continued in adjacent column)

U, a' 

U,

--------------------------------------------------------------
T15-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Accomplishes investigation as 

requested; informs HVNT CONTROL 

of results. (A) 

- If shipment is found and is on the 

planned route and schedule or is 

actually delayed/detoured for, 

an obviously valid reason, renders 

assistance as dictated by the 

situation and allows shipment to 

proceed; otherwise, holds shipment 

in custody until further disposi

tion is indicated by MVNT CONTROL. 

(A)

Task Performed by Shipper 

- Report non-arrival of shipment to MVMT CONTROL. (A) 

----------------------------------- -------------------------------------------- -----------

- Report non-arrival of shipment - Report non-arrival of shipment at 

at destination to NRC as appro- destination to CONSIGNOR and MVNT CONTROL 

priate. (A) as appropriate. (A)

U' 

U' 

U'
\

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

,T16.1 ,1 MOVER ELEMENTS 

I ENROUTE ELEMENT ., 

EVENTIOJECTIVE ESCORT -TRANSPORTER MVMT CONTROL

SNM IN TRANSIT HAS BEEN STOLEN. 

lo Licensee/Agent Objective, 

reporting only.

General Task

- Report information of theft and circumstances related thereto to 

MYNT CONTROL and local LEA as appropriate. (A)

- Report known information of theft 

and circumstances related thereto 

to:

a. 

b. 

c. 

d.

Shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE 

as applicable). (A) 

Appropriate State LEA. (A) 

FBI. (A) 

NRC. (A)

!P 

4P U' 

U' 

u1

30 1

il---i-----/-----l-lllll--l-----lllll-ll--l--ll---l--l-l-l---------
T16-2 

RESPONSE 

LEA CONSIGNOR CONSIGNEE

- Assists FBI in recovering stolen 

StM as applicable. (A) General Tasks 

- Report known information of theft and circumstances related thereto to FBI and NRC. (A) 

- Assist efforts to recover stolen materials. (A) 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

C

U'!
Appendix D 

PROCEDURES SUMMARY 

This appendix provides a ready reference to specific task sequences for the enroute super visor and each of the Operational Elements. The events that have similar task sequences are grouped together along with the appropriate response procedures to be used for the various 

contingencies. The summary of procedures, responsibilities, and task sequences is given in the 

six enclosures listed below: 

Enclosure 1. Enroute Supervisor's Procedures Summary 

Enclosure 2. Escort's Procedures Summary 

Enclosure 3. Transporter's Procedures Summary 

Enclosure 4. MVYT Control's Procedures Summary 

Enclosure 5. LEA's Procedures Summary 

Enclosure 6. Consignee's/Consignor's Procedures Summary 

5.56-55

I I
Enclosure 1 

Appendix 0 

ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S PROCEDURES SUMIARY 

1. PURPOSE 

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences nor

mally accomplished by the Enroute Supervisor. The context and background perspective of these 

duties are presented in the basic plan. 

2. ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S CENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

1. Plans, directs, and coordinates the local movements and overall response actions of 

the enroute elements while enroute. 

2. Coordinates with MVMT CONTROL and ensures that required reports from enroute elements 

are submitted. 

3. Requests assistance and coordinates operations with LEA providing response assistance. 

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 

1. At each report to MV4T CONTROL, inform them of: 

* present location, enroute situation, planned departure time; and 

• expected time and approximate location of the next planned report to ?VMT CONTROL. 

2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to 

render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor will designate and brief a "getaway" 

messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event that mobile electronic communica

tions fail. 

3. On the move and at stops, ensure that the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net is monitored 

continuously; members not in visual contact with enroute elements (at stops) will use the 

hand-portable radios. 

4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information among enroute 

members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice.

5.56-56

.
5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPORTER position 

to permit good observation of the position, but not close enough to present a single target. 

6. Maintain TRANSPORTER vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to block surprise 

penetration and to be prepared to move, operate communications, and immobilize cargo vehicle 

as directed by the situation. 

4. ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR: 

* Receives or learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or 

* Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious activity encountered while enroute, 

e.g., 

- Protest demonstration or labor strike, 

- Unexplained route detour, 

- Unexplained road blockage, 

- Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem, 

- Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol, 

- Suspicious persons tailing shipment, 

- Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at stop, 

- Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of TRANSPORTER, 

THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL: 

1. Ensure that threat information and on-scene assessments of the threat situation are 

reported to NYMT CONTROL (and the Shipper when directed) as quickly as possible, consistent with 

the local circumstances. 

2. Direct and coordinate local movement to avoid suspicious circumstances and cover the 

TRANSPORTER with the ESCORT where applicable. 

3. As feasible, initiate and coordinate enroute investigative activity to obtain informa

tion about the threat when necessary for assessment, e.g., 

5.56-57

II 1
Query MVMT CONTROL on pertinent LEA, 

Observation of situational activity, 

* Dispatch of ESCORT patrol to Investigate. 

4. Perform continuing assessments of the available threat information in light of the 

on-going enroute circumstances to decide if the threat should be considered serious while 

enroute. 

5. If the threat is perceived serious or is reported to be so by duly constituted authority 

and the source of the threat is not evident, coordinate with MVMT CONTROL and implement addi

tional enroute security measures as appropriate to deal with any attempt that might be made to 

carry out the threat, e.g., 

* Cancellation or delay of shipment, 

SUse of alternative route or safe haven, 

* Increase of guard or escort strength, 

* Arrangement for and coordination with LEA escorts, 

• Review procedures and place operational emphasis on security tactics, as applicable, 

e.g., 

- ESCORT actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops, 

- Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formations and other actions to 

reduce vulnerability and increase adversary operational problems, 

- Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols, 

- Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops, 

- Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual 

support among guard and TRANSPORTER positions. 

6. If the threat is perceived serious and is physically evident, i.e., suspicious activity 

encountered:

Alert ESCORT and TRANSPORTER to the seriousness of the situation. 

Report situation to pertinent LEA as appropriate and request LEA escorts.

K

5.56-58
Plan, direct, and coordinate TRANSPORTER movement to: 

- Continue avoiding the suspicious activity. 

- Screen and cover the TRANSPORTER with the ESCORT. 

- Avoid remote, low-traffic-density, low-speed routes. 

- Close on destination (or safe haven) as quickly as possible consistent with 

safe speeds. 

7. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is inminent, perform tasks indicated 

in paragraph 4.3. 

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR: 

Learns that certain enroute safeguards capabilities have been degraded or neutralized, 

e.g., 

- TRANSPORTER or ESCORT vehicle breaks down, 

- Radio or mobile telephone equipment is damaged or Jammed, 

- Enroute personnel get suddenly sick, 

THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL: 

1. Ensure, as applicable, that the situation is reported to YMMT CONTROL. 

2. Investigate the circumstances of the degradation to determine if it indicates a pos sible incursion attempt against the shipment. 

3. If an attempted incursion is perceived or appears imminent, perform tasks indicated 

in paragraph 4.3. 

4. Otherwise, coordinate with MV14T CONTROL and LEA as applicable to arrange support needed to continue the cargo movement. 

4.3 IN THE EVENT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR: 

Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent or in process 

of development, 

THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL-: 

1. Contact pertinent enroute LEA, request assistance, and inform the LEA of the situation, 

e.g., 

5.56-59

I I
Identification of shipment; current location of TRANSPORTER; route and movement 

direction, 

Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities. 

2. Report the situation to NV4T CONTROL as soon as practical under the existing cir

cumstances. 

3. Direct and coordinate ESCORT and TRANSPORTER operations to: 

Escape or avoid contact with the adversary and to move the TRANSPORTER toward the 

LEA or a local safe haven as appropriate. 

Assist the LEA response forces to intercept and deal with the adversary effectively. 

Protect the TRANSPORTER and cargo against penetration if contact with the adversary 

is unavoidable. 

4. If the adversary penetrates the TRANSPORTER and departs with any part of the cargo, 

assist LEA intercept and hot-pursuit of the adversary by dispatching an ESCORT patrol to follow 

the adversary and report his position and situation until the LEA effectively gains contact. 

5. If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary attack or otherwise, perform tasks 

indicated in paragraph 4.4. 

6. If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, report the theft and 

the circumstances related thereto to MVMT CONTROL and to local LEA as appropriate. 

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR: 

Learns that an ESCORT vehicle or the TRANSPORTER has been damaged by accident or an 

attempted adversary incursion against the shipment, 

THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL: 

1. Arrange for local emergency medical, traffic control, and security assistance via LEA 

contact as needed. 

2. If the TRANSPORTER and cargo are reliably mobile and tt~e ESCORT is not, reinforce 

TRANSPORTER guard with ESCORT personnel as feasible and direct TRANSPORTER to continue the trip. 

3. Notify MVMT CONTROL of the situation; report any observations of theft that might have 

occurred; and, as applicable, arrange for:

5.56-60

K
Additional escorts and cargo recovery or transfer assistance, along with replace

ment transportation as required to complete the shipment, 

Emergency repair and evacuation services, 

Emergency radiation monitoring and Oecontamination services. 

5.56-61

II
Enclosure 2

Appendix D 

ESCORT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 

1. PURPOSE 

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences nor

mally accomplished by the ESCORT. The context and background of these duties are presented in 

the basic plan. 

2. ESCORT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

ESCORT will accomplish the general responsibilities listed below in coordination with the 

Enroute Supervisor and the TRANSPORTER. 

1. Make reports to MVMT CONTROL and communication contacts with enroute LEA to eliminate 

need for TRANSPORTER stops for such tasks. 

2. Provide security screening for TRANSPORTER to obtain early warning of suspicious 

situations. 

3. Assist TRANSPORTER movement to avoid suspicious situations, to prevent pursuit by 

actual or suspected adversaries, and to ensure continued progress toward the destination (or 

safe haven if appropriate). 

4. Request LEA assistance to deal with suspected or actual adversary incursions against 

the shipment or to investigate suspicious activity as appropriate. 

5. Assist LEA convergence upon the TRANSPORTER location as required by the situation. 

6. Guard and protect TRANSPORTER to prevent adversary access to or departure with any part 

of the cargo. 

7. Maintain visual contact with adversaries that gain possession of any part of the cargo, 

and assist LEA convergence upon such adversaries. 

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 

1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform them of: 

5.56-62 K
* present location, enroute situation, planned departure time, 

• expected time and approximate location of the next planned report to MVHT CONTROL. 

2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and 14VMT CONTROL to 

render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor will designate and brief a "getaway" 

messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event that mobile electronic comnunica

tions fall. 

3. On the move and at stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously; members 

not in visual contact with enroute elements (at stops) will use the hand-portable radios. 

4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information among enroute 

members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice. 

5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPORTER position 

to permit continuous observation of the position, but not close enough to present a single 

target. 

4. ESCORT'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 

4.1 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT: 

Receives or learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or 

* Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious situations encountered while enroute, 

e.g., 

- Protest demonstration or labor strike, 

- Unexplained route detour, 

- Unexplained road blockage, 

- Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem, 

- Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol. 

- Suspicious persons tailing shipment, 

- Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at stop, 

- Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of the TRANSPORTER,

5.56-63
THE ESCORT WILL: 

1. Report all information concerning the threat to the Enroute Supervisor and to MVYT 

CONTROL and the Shipper as directed. 

2. Assist the TRANSPORTER'S movement to avoid the suspicious situation as applicable. 

3. Accomplish investigations as necessary to obtain additional information on the threat 

and to assist the Enroute Supervisor assess the seriousness of the situation. 

4. Accomplish additional enroute security measures to protect the TRANSPORTER or reduce 

its vulnerability as directed by the Enroute Supervisor, e.g., 

• Assimilation of additional escort strength as available, 

• Coordination with LEA escorts, 

* Actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops, 

• Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formations and other actions to reduce 

vulnerability and increase adversary operational problems, 

* Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols, 

* Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops or 

while in the vicinity of suspicious activity, 

* Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual 

support among guard and TRANSPORTER positions. 

5. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is imminent, perform tasks indicated 

in paragraph 4.3. 

4.2 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT: 

Observes a temporary degradation in certain enroute safeguards capabilities, e.g., 

- Vehicle breaks down, 

- Communication equipment is damaged or Jammed, 

- Enroute personnel get suddenly sick, 

5.56-64
THE ESCORT WILL: 

1. Investigate and report information on the circumstances leading to the event and 

I accomplish other actions as directed by the Enroute Supervisor. 

2. If an incursion attempt against the shipment is associated with the observed degrada

tion or is announced as imminent by the Enroute Supervisor, perform tasks indicated in para

graph 4.3. 

4.3 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT: 

Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent or in process 

of developing, 

THE ESCORT WILL: 

1. Report the situation immediately to the Enroute Supervisor and the TRANSPORTER as 

applicable, e.g., 

* Observed adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activity, 

* Own dispositions and activity. 

2. Inform pertinent LEA of the situation and request assistance as directed by the Enroute 

Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation. 

3. Depending on the observed adversary situation, protect the TRANSPORTER cargo by: 

Challenging and turning away any adversary approach toward the TRANSPORTER if 

stationary, 

Covering the TRANSPORTER'S escape from the situation by preventing or diverting 

adversary pursuit, 

Defending cargo to prevent penetration or to delay the adversary until effective LEA 

response arrives, 

Following and maintaining visual contact if adversary gains possession of any part 

of the cargo. 

4. Assist LEA convergence on the adversary by reporting location and situation as changes 

occur. 

5. If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, report all observed 

information concerning the theft to the Enroute Supervisor and others as directed. 

5.56-65

i I
6. If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary action or otherwise, perform tasks 

Indicated in paragraph 4.4. 

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT: 

Observes that an enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or adversary attack, 

THE ESCORT WILL: 

1. Report the location, circumstances, and extent of damage, as applicable, to the Enroute 

Supervisor and to MVWT CONTROL as indicated by the situation. 

2. Accomplish ESCORT reorganization actions directed by the Enroute Supervisor. 

3. In coordination with TRANSPORTER and LEA, cordon off TRANSPORTER and any cargo dis

persal area if applicable, allowing no one to enter without prior approval from the Enroute 

Supervisor. 

4. Assist recovery, inventory, and transfer operations as applicable, and provide con

tinuing security for the cargo during the reorganization period. 

5. Provide continued escort security as feasible on resumption of the cargo movement.

5.56-66
-I

Enclosure 3 

Appendix 0 

TRANSPORTER'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 

1. PURPOSE 

This document summarizes the general .responsibilities and contingency mally task sequences nor accomplished by the TRANSPORTER. The context and background perspective of these duties 

are presented in the basic plan. 

2. TRANSPORTER'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

The TRANSPORTER will accomplish the general responsibilities listed below in coordination with the Enroute Supervisor and the ESCORT. 

1. Make reports to MVMT CONTROL and request LEA assistance as directed by the Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation. 

2. Prevent adversary penetration of TRANSPORTER to deny adversary usage of TRANSPORTER 

mobility and to protect the cargo. 

3. Use TRANSPORTER mobility to avoid suspicious situations, to escape suspected or actual incursion attempts, and to maintain continued progress toward destination (or safe haven if 

appropriate). 

4. Immobilize cargo if TRANSPORTER momentum is lost because of adversary actions. 

5. Assist LEA convergence on TRANSPORTER location as. required by the situation. 

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 

1. At each report to MVYT CONTROL, inform them of: 

present location, enroute situation, planned departure time,. 

expected time and approximate location of the next planned report to MYMT CONTROL. 

2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to 

messenger 

render reports or request assistance; the EnrouteSupervisor will designate and brief a "getaway" to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event that mobile electronic communica

tions fail. 

5.56-67

I I
3. On the move and at stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously; 

memters not in visual contact with enroute elements (at stops) will use the hand-portable radios. 

4. As required by the situation, alert' and pass situational information among enroute 

members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice. 

5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park TRANSPORTER vehicle with reference to the ESCORT to permit 

continuous observation of the TRANSPORTER position, but not close enough to present a single 

target. 

6. Maintain TRANSPORTER'vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to block surprise 

penetration and to be preparbd to move, operate communications, and immobilize cargo vehicle as 

dictated by the situation. 

4. TRANSPORTER'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 

4.1 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER:. 

::Receives or-learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or 

Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious situations encountered while enroute, 

e.g., 

Protest demonstration or labor strike, 

Unexplained route detour, 

Unexplained road blockage, 

Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem, 

- Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol, 

- Suspicious persons tailing shipment, 

- Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at stop, 

- Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of-the TRANSPORTER, 

THE TRANSPORTER WILL: 

1. Report the TRANSPORTER'S situation and all observations.concerning the threat to 

the Enroute Supervisor and assist in assessing the seriousness of the situation as applicable. 

"2. Coordinate with available ESCORT assistance and move the TRANSPORTER cargo so as to 

avoid suspicious situations as applicable.'

5356-68
3. Accomplish additional security measures to protect the -TRANSPORTER or reduce its 

vulnerability as directed by the Enroute Supervisor or' otherwise as indicated by the situation, 

e.g., 

Assimilation of additional assigned TRANSPORTER guards, 

Coordination with LEA escorts, 

Coordination with the Enroute Supervisor and the ESCORT to accomplish required func

tions without having to stop the TRANSPORTER, 

Continue all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops or 

while in the vicinity of suspicious activity, :, 

* Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to •ttain continuous mutual 

support among guard and TRANSPORTER positions in the event of an attack, 

Review of procedures and criteria for immobilizing cargo trailer if such action 

becomes necessary. 

4. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is imminent, perform tasks indicated 

in paragraph 4.3. 

4.2 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER: 

Observes a temporary degradation in certain enroute safeguards capabilities, e.g., 

- Vehicle breaks down, 

- Communication equipment is damaged or Jammed, 

- Enroute personnel get suddenly sick, 

THE TRANSPORTER WILL: 

1.; As applicable to the TRANSPORTER, investigate and report information on the circumn

stances leading to the event and accomplish other actions directed by the Enroute Supervisor. 

2. If an incursion attempt against the shipment is associated with the observed degrada

tion, or is announced as imminent by the Enroute Supervisor, perform tasks•indicated in para

graph 4.3. 

5.56-69

I I
4.3 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER: 

Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent or in process 

of development, 

THE TRANSPORTER WILL: 

1. Report the situation immediately to the*Enroute Supervisor and the ESCORT as applicable, 

e.g., 

* Observed adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activity, 

* Own location and activity. 

2. Inform pertinent LEA of the situation and request assistance as directed by the Enroute 

Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation. 

3. Use the TRANSPORTER mobility to escape from a stationary situation or, if mobile, to 

avoid adversary contact and to move toward LEA or local safe haven as applicable. 

4. If the TRANSPORTER cannot escape from a stop or cannot maintain its momentum because 

of adversary action, immobilize cargo in place if the vehicle is at a stop or, if mobile, at 

a position selected to: 

• Effectively block traffic, 

* Afford little if any opportunity to conceal the cargo vehicle in the immediate 

vicinity. 

5. If cargo vehicle Is immobilized, occupy a position with the tractor, as feasible, that 

offers good observation and fields of fire covering the cargo location. 

6. In coordination with the ESCORT, defend the cargo to prevent adversary penetration or 

departure with cargo until effective LEA response arrives. 

71.If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, report all observed 

information concerning the theft to the Enroute Supervisor and others as directed. 

8. r If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary action or otherwise, perform tasks 

indicated in paragraph 4.4. 

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER: 

Observes that an enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or adversary attack,

5.56-70
THE TRANSPORTER WILL: 

1. Report the location, circumstances, and extent of damage, as applicable, to the Enroute 

-/ Supervisor and to 4YKMT CONTROL as Indicated by the situation. 

2. If the TRANSPORTER is reliably mobile, the ESCORT is not, and the cargo is intact, 

" Assimilate additional guards assigned by the Enroute Supervisor from the immobilized 

ESCORT and continue movement of the shipment. 

" Coordinate with enroute LEA escorts as arranged by NYNT CONTROL and directed by 

the Enroute Supervisor. 

3. If the TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile or the cargo has been dispersed, 

" Coordinate with ESCORT and LEA as applicable to provide continuous security for 

the cargo and cargo dispersal area. 

" Assist in recovery, inventory, and transfer operations as indicated by the 

situation. 

" Supervise local repair and evacuation operations regarding the TRANSPORTER as 

applicable. 

J 5.56-71

IIT
Enclosure 4 

Appendix D 

NYNT CONTROL'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 

1. PURPOSE 

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences nor

mally accomplished by MVM4T CONTROL. The context and background perspective of these duties are 

presented in the basic plan. 

2. M1/MT CONTROL'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

MI"T CONTROL will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with 

the Enroute Elements. 

1. Track enroute progress as necessary during the shipment and inform enroute LEA of 

possible security threats against the shipment. 

2. Arrange for and coordinate support and provide investigative assistance for enroute 

elements as required by the situation to ensure continued protection and progress of the shipment 

to the destination (or safe haven if appropriate). 

3. Maintain continuing cognizance of the enroute situation during the shipment and 

request pertinent LEA assistance in absence of expected reports from enroute elements or to 

resolve suspicious situations. 

4. Keep Shipper (CONSIGNOR or CONSIGNEE as applicable) informed of unusual shipment status. 

5. Render reports to NRC and FBI as required by the situation and request assistance if 

needed. 

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 

1. As indicated by the enroute security situation, e.g., a threat or suspicious situation 

is perceived serious, contact each pertinent LEA in advance of TRANSPORTER arrival in the respec

tive jurisdictions and inform them of: 

* The identification of the Enroute Elements (Company Name, Truck Number), 

Nature of the shipment (handling nuclear cargo),

5.56-72
Route and direction of movement, 

ETA and ETD for the jurisdiction, 

The enroute security situation of concern. 

2. Provide information, investigative assistance, and support as requested by Enroute 

Elements or as dictated by the situation. 

3. Maintain information on current status of shipment. 

4. Keep Shipper and NRC informed as to changes in movement plan and schedule and of 

extraordinary enroute situations. 

4. MVYT CONTROL'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 

4.1 IN THE EVENT THE MVMT CONTROL: 

Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the shipment, 

THE MVMT CONTROL WILL: 

1. Report as soon as practical all threat information and assessments to the Shipper and 

to the Enroute Elements and to NRC as arranged with the Shipper; assemble additional Information 

on the threat and adversary as available. 

2. As applicable, assist the Shipper assess the threat if the shipment has not yet departed 

from its origin. 

3. If the shipment is underway from the origin to destination, analyze the available 

information on the threat to assess the seriousness of the situation. 

4. If the threat is perceived to be serious or is reported to be serious by duly con

stituted authority, coordinate with the Shipper, Enroute Elements, and pertinent LEA, as 

applicable, to implement increased security readiness appropriate to the perceived seriousness 

of the situation, e.g.: 

Cancellation or delay of the shipment. 

Use of alternative planned routes. 

Alerting and briefing of applicable safe haven objectives. 

Arrangement for and coordination with LEA assistance and escorts. 

5.56-73

I I
* Increase of assigned guard or escort strength. 

* Alerting of backup transportation and escort for standby status. 

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT ?V1T CONTROL: 

Receives a report from the Enroute Elements. that certain enroute safeguards capabilities 

have been temporarily degraded or neutralized, e.g., 

- TRANSPORTER or ESCORT vehicle breaks down, 

- Radio or mobile telephone equipment is damaged, 

- Enroute personnel get suddenly sick. 

THE iVMT CONTROL WIILL: 

1. Arrange for the provision of supporting assistance as requested by the Enroute Elements 

or otherwise as indicated by the situation. 

2. Inform pertinent LEA, as applicable, and the Shipper if changes are made in the move

ment plan or schedule. 

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT MVMT CONTROL: 

Receives a report from Enroute Elements or other duly constituted authority that: 

- An adversary attack has occurred against the shipment, 

- An enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or by an adversary attack 

against the shipment, or 

- Part or all of the cargo has been stolen. 

THE MVMT CONTROL WILL: 

1. Keep the Shipper and NRC informed of the situation as applicable, e.g., 

The details of the adversary attack or the accident as known, 

* Amount of cargo stolen or dispersed as applicable, 

* The equipment damaged and personnel injured,

5.56-74
Ongoing actions to deal with the situation,

* Any assistance needed at the scene from Federal or Shipper resources, i.e., inspec

tion, recovery, inventory, decontamination, or transfer assistance. 

2. Coordinate with Enroute Elements and LEA, as appropriate to the situation, to arrange 

for escorts and guards needed for continued protection of the shipment, and for procurement of 

needed emergency maintenance and medical services. 

3. If the TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile, 

As appropriate to the situation, arrange for local evacuation of TRANSPORTER and 

cargo to a temporary safe haven to'accomplish necessary repair or transfer 

operations. 

Dispatch additional escorts, replacement cargo vehicle, and materials-handling 

equipment needed to complete the shipment. 

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE MVMT CONTROL: 

Receives a report that the Enroute Elements have been delayed or diverted from the 

planned route or that they have not arrived at the destination as expected, or 

Does not receive an expected report from the Enroute Elements, 

THE MYVT CONTROL WILL: 

1. Contact LEA jurisdictions along the route from the location of the last report from the 

Enroute Elements to the location of the next planned report to determine information that might 

indicate a valid delay. 

2. According to information gained from the above queries, request the LEA to: 

Attempt to locate the shipment. 

Determine reasons for delay if any. 

Report shipment's status and situation as determined. 

Render assistance to the shipment as indicated by the situation. 

3. If the shipment is located by the LEA and is delayed because of vehicle damage, perform 

tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3. 

5.56-75

I I
4. If the shipment is located by LEA and is delayed or detoured for no obviously valid 

reasons, . 

* Assume attempted theft. 

Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives. 

* Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTER relief crew to complete the shipment. 

Report incident to NRC and FBI for investigation as appropriate. 

5. If shipment cannot be located but subsequently reports, request pertinent LEA to 

verify that the shipment is located and moving as reported; if it is not, request LEA to search 

for TRANSPORTER and apprehend; report incident to NRC and FBI for further investigation as 

appropriate. 

6. If shipment cannot be located, assume that the shipment has been stolen; report known 

information concerning the suspected theft to the Shipper, NRC, FBI, and appropriate state LEA.

5.56-76
j

I I

-Enclosure 5 

Appendix D 

LEA'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 

1. PURPOSE 

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and task sequences that are requested 

of the pertinent LEA in the planned contingency .situations. The context and background per

spective of these actions are presented in the basic plan. 

2. LEA'S GENERAL FUNCTIONS 

The LEAs have an overall responsibility to maintain law and order within their respective 

jurisdictional area. With their available resources, they endeavor to prevent illegal activities, 

solve crimes, and apprehend law breakers. Within the context of their law enforcement responsi

bilities, applicable LEA along NRC planned routes have been requested to perform the functions 

listed below in response to contingency situations. 

1. Provide investigative assistance to check on a suspicious enroute situation or to 

determine status of a shipment. 

2. Provide temporary escort for those shipments requiring an increased state of readiness 

owing to threats or suspicious situations that are encountered enroute. 

3. Provide a response force to deal with unlawful adversary actions against SNM4 shipments 

within their jursidiction. 

4. Provide traffic control and area isolation (cordon) for post-accident or post-attack 

situations. 

5. Assist Enroute Elements to obtain emergency medical care and maintenance assistance 

if needed. 

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 

Applicable LEA along NRC planned routes have been requested to: 

1. Maintain general awareness of the frequency, company, identities, enroute composition, 

and the routes of the SNM shipments within their jurisdiction. 

• 5.56-77
2. Report any available information to the NRC and the FBI that is indicative of possible 

danger to a shipment. 

4. LEA TASK SEQUENCES 

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: 

An explicit threat against the shipment, or 

A civil disturbance or other suspicious occurrence encountered while enroute, 

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: 

1. Report threat information to local FBI and to pertinent NRC Regional Headquarters. 

2. Provide information and investigative assistance as necessary. 

3. Assist in assessing the threat as applicable. 

4. Provide temporary escort of the shipment, as arranged in coordination with MYMT 

CONTROL, and coordinate with adjacent jurisdictions to ensure continuing LEA escorts as 

necessary. 

5. Prepare to respond with additional force if necessary to deal with unlawful acts 

against the shipment.' 

6. Report situation information and passaqe of shitnent to succeedinq LEA .iurisdications 

by telephone (collect or HATS) to MYMT CONTROL. 

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: 

An unlawful attack against the shipment, 

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: 

1. Converge LEA patrols on the TRANSPORTER location to intercept and deal with the 

adversary. 

2. Pursue and apprehend adversary as necessary to recover the TRANSPORTER or any cargo 

in their possession. 

5. 56-78
4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REquESTED REGARDING: 

• Cargo dispersal, 

Vehicle damage, or 

Sick or injured personnel in need of care, 

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: 

1. Arrange for local maintenance, radiation monitoring, and medical assistance as required 

by the situation. 

2. Accomplish traffic control as necessary to isolate damaged cargo vehicle and dispersal 

area. 

3. Provide temporary security assistance and escorts as needed to protect the shipment as 

arranged in coordination with MW CONTROL or the Enroute Supervisor. 

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: 

* A delay or diversion of Enroute Elements from the planned route, or 

* Enroute Elements not reporting or arriving as expected, 

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: 

1. Accomplish investigation of the situation and inform NV4VT CONTROL of results. 

2. Hold shipment in custody until disposition is arranged by MVNT CONTROL if the shipment 

is: 

* Not following the indicated route and schedule, or 

Delayed or detoured for obviously invalid or suspicious reasons. 

5.56-79

T I
Enclosure 6 

Appendix Q 

CONSIGNOR'S/CONSIGNEE'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 

1. PURPOSE 

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences nor

mally accomplished by the CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE. The context and background of these duties are 

presented in the basic plan. 

2. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE will accomplish the general repsonsibilities listed below in coordina

tion with MVYT CONTROL. 

1. Keep each other informed of shipment status and departure and arrival times as 

appropriate. 

2. Render reports to NRC and FBI as indicated by the stituation and request assistance 

if needed. 

3. Provide support for enroute elements as required by the situation. 

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 

1. Report expected and actual shipment departure and arrival times to each other and to 

NRC as applicable. 

2. Maintain current Information on changes in movement plan and schedule and keep each 

other informed as appropriate. 

3. Provide safe haven for TRANSPORTER upon arrival and unloading of cargo into appro

priately protected facilities. 

4. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE TASK SEQUENCES 

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CONSIGNOR or CONSIGNEE: 

Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the shipment, 

K

5.56-80
THE CONSIGNOR OR CONSIGNEE WILL:

* Report without delay all threat information: 

- To each other as applicable. 

- To MVYT CONTROL and NRC (if the Shipper). 

If the shipment has not departed, the Shipper will: 

* Assemble any available information on the threat and the adversary from NRC, pertinent 

LEA, MVMT CONTROL, and CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate. 

Analyze the available information to assess the seriousness of the threat. 

If the threat is perceived serious or is reported to be so by duly constituted 

authority, 

- Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to arrange for increased readiness of enroute elements 

and LEA or for cancellation or delay of shipment as appropriate to the assessed 

seriousness of the threat situation. 

- Report the assessed seriousness of the threat and contemplated enroute readiness 

actions to NRC. 

If the Shipment has already departed, the Shipper will: 

As applicable, assist MVMT CONTROL in assessing the threat situation and keep NRC 

informed of the enroute situation. 

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SHIPPER (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE AS APPLICABLE): 

Learns that the TRANSPORTER vehicle has been damaged by accident or adversary attack, 

THE SHIPPER WILL: 

1. Coordinate with NVYT CONTROL to determine the on-scene situation and assistance 

required. 

2. Report the situation to NRC and request additional resources, as required, from 

Federal Agencies. 

3. Dispatch health physics personnel, recovery and inventory teams to the scene to accom

plish necessary cargo recovery, inventory, transfer, and decontamination operations. 

5.56-81

I I1
4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE: 

* Observes or learns that the enroute elements do not arrive at the destination as 

expected, 

THE SHIPPER WILL: 

" Report non-arrival of shipment to NRC and to CONSIGNEE, as appropriate. 

" Coordinate with NVNT CONTROL to initiate tracer investigation and keep CONSIGNEE 

informed of the trace results as appropriate. 

THE CONSIGNEE WILL: 

" Report non-arrival of shipment at destination to the CONSIGNOR and NRC. 

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE: 

• Learns or infers that enroute cargo has been stolen, 

THE CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE WILL: 

1. Report known Information of theft and circumstances related thereto to FBI and NRC. 

2. Assist efforts to recover the stolen materials.

5.56-82
APPENDIX E 

PRIMARY ROUTE: ALPHA PLANT, JONESVILLE, X.,-TO BRAVO PLANT. SMITHVILLE, G.. 

This appendix provides enroute information for the primary route of shipments from Alpha 

plant to Bravo plant. This route starts at the Alpha plant area 10 and follows the access 

road to U.S. Route 99, east into Bingo City, thence Interstate 77 east to the Bong City Inter

section with State Route 714. It then proceeds north on State Route 714 to the, intersection 

of Smith Road, thence south on Smith Road to Bravo plant. The following enclosures are 

Included: 

En'closure 1. Route Overview 

Enclosure 2. Time and Distance Factors 

Enclosure 3. Law Enforcement Response Summary 

Enclosure 4. Law Enforcement Capabilities 

) 5.56-83

1 )1
ENCLOSURE 1 - APPENDIX E 

ROUTE OVERVIEW

RADIOTELEPHONE DEAD ZONE

JONESVILLE 

LEA BEET' 

ALPHA PLANT 

JONESVILLE, X. 

E-3

DEETOWN 

x 

0 

OWN R 

•BINGO CITY 

0 

MTr

sm ..... %-

IJONES: CHARLIEI 

ICOUNTY COUNTY I II 

II I 

MILES IN II I 

COUNTY: 0II 1.I 

II I 

I II I 

I II I I I 

TOTAL I I 

MILES 0 12.0[.3 29. 

"a COUNTY 

(2.31

EVILLE 

S 

R 

MT

EVANSTOWN 

i 

R

FREETOWN 

a

GEETOWN 

R 

R HOTVILLE 

& 

R INKVILLE 

It 

R IWSTATE LINE

JAKESTON 

x S BONG CITY 

U m T 

R 

MT

SAYER 

0 R 

MT

BRAVO PLANT 

SMITHVILLE, G.

X RAY GAMMA

0N~yELTA 

20.4 

502

ECHO I 

COUNTY I I 

I 

3i.2 

84.I I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

84.4

FOXTROT COUNTY 

23.2 

107.6

GOLF 

COUNTY C 

28. 3I 

138.4

HOTEL 

OUNTY 

1mg9

166.3

SI i 

TM JAKE I LIAE 

COUNTY COUNTY 7 COUNTY 

I I I

I 

2&s. 24.2 I 30.6 

III 

I ~ I I. 

I 

180.8 20 210.5 

KILO COUNTY 

15.51

I. I 

SMITH 

COUNTY 

17.0 

241.1 259.0

KEY 

LEA RESPONSE CENTER 

STATE HIGHWAY PATROL 

CB RADIO MONITORED 

REACT GROUP 

RADIOTELEPHONE (MOBILE)

ROAD TRANSPORTATION ROUTE -ALPHA TO BRAVO 

1. U. S. 99 East to Bingo City 

2. Interstate 77 East to Bong City 

3. State Route 714 to Smith Road. Smithwife 

4. Smith Road South to Bravo Plant

/-C £

U' 

U'

SMITHVILLE 

a

x 

me 

R 

MT

I

f_ le
\

Seament 

XRAY 

I-2 .

County. 

LEA 

Jones 

Charlie

Start 

Point 

Alpha 

Plant 

Enter 

Charlie 

County

2-3 Delta Enter. 

Del ta 

County 

GAMMA Echo Enter' 

Gamma 

County 

4-5 Foxtrot Enter 

Foxtrot 

County 

5-6 Golf Enter 

Golf 

County 

6-7 Hotel Enter 

Hotel 

County

End 

Point 

"Exit" 

Bee 

County 

Exit 

Charlie 

County 

Exit. 

Delta 

County. 

Exit" 

Echo 

County 

Exit 

Foxtrot 

County 

Exit 

Golf 

County 

Exit 

Hotel 

County

- , ENCLOSURE 2 - APPENI 

TIME AND DISTANCE FJ 

ROUTE SEGtNTS -ALPHA, JONESVILLEI X., 

, . . Average Total 

;County Total County Trip Distance Trip Time Time Cr 

(Miles). Mileage (Mi) (Hr:Min) TI 

14(3d 14.3 26 / 0:26 (includes' 2.3 in'... 

Bee County) 

15.5~ 29.8 -2-4 0:50so

20.4. 50.2

34.2 

23.2 

28.8

84.4 

107.6 

136,4

23 1;13

38 1:51

26 2:17 

34 2:51

DIX E 

ACTORS 

TO BRAVO. SMITHVILLE. G. 

Variabilit..6f 

County Total 

tossing Trip Time 

tme (Mn) (Min) Critical Reference Points (See Notes) 

45 ± A.'-US`Route 33 to Jones C6untkPolice 

(Note 1).-' 

5 ' ±7 B. US Route22 East toeBinio City-Police (Note 2). 

C. US Route 44 to Charlie County Police 

(Note 3). 

+5 D8 0. Exit 26 (189) Route 5 to State 

Highwtay Patrol Station at Deetown 

(Note 4). 

E. Exit 26 (189) to Deetown Police 

(Note 5).: 

±3 ±8 F. Exit 16 (189) to Echo County Sheriff, 

Evanstown, G. (Note 6). 

+2 ±8 G. US Route.12 Exit 14 (189) to Foxtrot 

COUnty Sheriff (Note, 7). 

±5 ±9 H. Exit 11 (189) to Golf County Sheriff 

(Note 8). 

1. US Route 32 to Gamma State Patrol 

(Note 9). 

±2 ±9 J. All mile markers in Segment 6-7 

(Note 10).

6

18.9 155.3 23 3:14
ENCLOSURE 2 - APPENDIX E 

TINE AND DISTANCE FACTORS 

ROUTE SEGMENTS - ALPHA, JONESVILLE, X., TO BRAVO, SMITHVILLE, G." 

(Continued)

County Start 

Segment LEA Point 

7-8 Item Enter 

Item 

County 

8-9 Jake Enter 

- Jake 

County 

9-10 Lime Enter 

Lime 

County 

-10-11 Smith 'Enter 

Smith 

County

End 

Point 

Exit 

Item 

County 

Exit' 

Kilo 

County 

Exit 

Lime 

County 

Exit 

Smith 

County

County Total 

Distance Trip 

(Miles) Mileage 

25.5 180.8 

29.7 210.5 

(includes 5.5 in 

Kilo County) 

30.6 241.1 

-17.9 259.0

Average County 

Time 

(Min) 

28

Total Trip 

Time 

(Hr:Min) 

3:42

40 4:22 

39 5:01 

24 5:25

Variabiliy County Total f 

Crossing Trip Time 

Time (Min) (Mn) 

±3 ±10

t5 

±5 

±3

+11 

±12

Critical Reference Points (See Notes) 

K. Exits 10,9, 8, (189) as directed 

(Note 11). 

None (Note 12). 

None (Note 12). I: -: , .

±12 .1. Bravo Plant (Note 13).

NOTES: CRITICAL REFERENCE POINTS 

1. Pt. A - Exit US Route 33 in Beetown, Xray, at courthouse (corner of Main St. and Way). Right turn on Way St.; proceed one block to 

Church St.; police (State) here has central dispatch. Telephone: (888) 354-4123, 354-4124. 

2. Pt. B - Exit near center of Bingo City (one block after railroad tracks), right turn on US Route 127 (East); proceed east 

approximately 5 blocks to 800 East Main St., new brick building. Police in force available. Central comaunications to State and 

county. forces. Future exit from Xray Route 187 will be located one block northwest. Telephone: (888) 692-4141. Three-man FBI 

groupiocated in city. 

3. Pt. C - Entering Bingo City on US Route 99, turn left one block beyond 4th active traffic light (5th light from city limits). After 

turn, 2s blocks at Ash St. courthouse. County Sheriff's Office-is located in building. Telephone: (888) 623-1717, 623-1718.

4. Pt. D - Exit 26 from 189 and turn left on US Route 5. Approximately 4h-5 miles north on Route 5 is an Xray State Highway Patrol 

Station at Deetown. Telephone: (888) 641-333. 

5. Pt. E - Exit 26 and proceed as above. Pass Highway Patrol. Deetown P.D. is 1h miles farther on corner of East Sevier. 

Telephone: (888) 521-1616. 

f-- . r

Co U'ý 

4n
ENCLOSURE 2 - APPENDIX E 

TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS 

ROUTE SEGMENTS - ALPHA. JONESVILLE, X.. TO BRAVO, SMITHVILLE• G. 

(Continued) 

NOTES- CRITICAL REFERENCE POINTS 

6. Pt. F - Exit 16 from 189; turn left and proceed back under 189. Enter Evanstown and turn right at first traffic light. Proceed through 

Echo County 

next 

Sheriff's 

traffic light 

Department. 

and up a steep grade. At top turn right (courthouse Is on left side at top); go downhill one block to Telephone: (555) 721-6141. 

7. 

Foxtrot 

Pt. G -

County 

Exit 14, 

Sheriff 

Route 12 

is 

from 189. Freetown, G., at 2nd traffic light turn left and proceed 3 blocks to courthouse on Main Street. located behind courthouse. Telephone: (555) 283-1240. 

8. Pt. 

Is located 

H - Exit 

in 

11 

basement. 

from 189 

Telephone: 

to Geetown (US Route 21). Turn right on 6th St., one block to Circuit Court Building. Golf County Sheriff (555) 844-3217, 211-7486. 

9. Pt. I - US Route 21 to Gamma State Highway Patrol. Continue on 189 toward Fort Beta (7-mile section of 189 is not completed in this 

4-lane 

area). 

divided. 

In this sections 

Telephone: 

approximately 

(555) 

5 miles north of Exit 13 of 189 is State Police HQ on the north side of highway, which is 715-1313. 

o 10. Pt. J - All mile markers,on 189 in Golf County. Sheriff requests you give nearest mile marker at time of problem over CB radio and telephone. Two county cars monitor CB and also make contacts with Gomer React. Use CB immediately when in trouble and proceed on course. Help will converge on you as soon as possible. Telephone: (555) 488-6666 emergency; routine calls 804-6020. 11. Pt. K - Proceed to nearest exit from 189, either 10, 9, or 8 depending on location. Notify Item County Sheriff on CB of exit number. Expect instructions on C8 or telephone. County Sheriff has CB radio and works with React. Telephone: (555) 345-6789. 

12. Continue 

a. 

on 189, 54, and US Route 123 and request assistance on CB and telephone: Jake County Sheriff: b. Lime County Sheriff c. song Cty Police (555ý 821-"9I•)17 e-rgency b•555 711-1914- (555) 451,-9a76 555 8314018 ext. 206 routine R55 256-76 54 Have: React Have: CM Monitor - React Have: 4 CB Units 

13. 

Telephone: 

Continue toward plant. Call for assistance on CB Radio. County Sheriff has base station CB and mobile units. (555) 233-8715 emergency; (555) 266-1313, 266-1314 routine.
COUNTY DATA 

County Distance/Time2 

XRAY7 

Jones 12 m1/23 min 

(Bee) (2.3 mi/3 min) 

Charlie 15.5 mi/24 min

Delta 20.4 mi123 min

WAOWA 7 

Echo 

Foxtrot 

Golf 

Hotel 

Item 

Jake

34.2 mi/38 min 

23.2 mi/26 min 

28.8 mi/34 min 

18.9 mt/23 min 

25.5 mi/28 min 

24.2 mi/32 min

ENCLOSURE 3 - APPENDIX E 

LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY 

ROAD ROUTE ALPHA, XRAY. TO BRAVO, GAMMA 1 

CHIEF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

Name 

Joke Jones, 

Sheriff 

Moe Miller, 

Sheriff 

Ralph Brown, 

Chief of Police 

Jay Sturet 

Sheriff 

J. D. Smith 

Sheriff 

Marty Marion 

Sheriff 

Walter Black 

Sheriff 

H.. Martin Murphy 

Sheriff 

Ronnie Smith 

Sheriff ' 

D. Dewight Doe 

Sheriff 

Chief Newton 

Chief of Police

Location 

Jonesville, X. 

Beetown, X. 

Bingo City, X. 

Deetown, X. 

Evanstown, G. 

Freetown, G. 

Geetown, G. 

Hotville, G. 

Inkville, G. 

Jakeston, G. 

Bong (City). G.

Telephone 3 

(808) 634-2715 

(888) 793-2151 

(888) 423-1111 

(888) 876-7112 

(555) 739-0529 

(555) 984-5796 

(555) 347-6973 

(555) 283-4574 

(555) 544-2525 

(555) 387-1102 

(555) 347-6978

CB Monitor4 

LEA REACT

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No

Yes 

No 

Yes

RESPONSE CAPABILITY Patro1 Response TimesO 

Cars4 Per (minutes)

Shift Ist Car atl. Cars

4 

5 

9 

6

8 

4 

3 

3 

7 

9

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes

Yes Yes

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

10 

10 

10 

5

15 

10 

10 

10 

15 

10 

15 

10 

17-18 

10

?I 

cc
COUNTY DATA

Distance/Time

2 

(5.5 mi/8 min) 30.6 mi/39 min 

17.9 mi/24 min

ENCLOSURE 3 - APPENDIX E 

LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY 

ROAD ROUTE ALPHA, XRAy, TO GRAVO. GAMM•A 

(Continued) 

CHIEF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 

CB Monitor 4 Name Location Telephone A RECT 

Sheriff 

I. M. Sad Sayer, G. (555) 437-8192 4 cars 

Yes

Chief Bill Burgin Smithville, G. Chief of Police 

William Bailey Dustville, G. Sheriff

(555) 654-1170 

(555) 251-4141

Totals 259 mi/5 hr 25 min

No Yes 

Yes Yes 

Base Station

RESPONSE CAPABILITY "Pat'olRespon!s"e ýTmes6 

Cars9per inutes 

Shift 1st Ca tl Cars 

5 15 15

20 

6

2 

5

Notes: 

1. 

2. Distance 

Route US 99, East to Bingo City, X.; 1-77 to Bong City Intersection with State Route 714; South on Smith Road to Bravo Plant. across county via routes indicated in Note 1; transit times are based on travel at posted speed limits ±5 mph. 3. For emergencies. 

4. Citizens band radio. 

5. All agencies indicated have cooperative agreements and communications with the adjacent counties and municipalities State police. and with 

6. Time after initial notification. 

7. In addition to the county sheriffs and city police listed here, there are also three State Highway patrol posts along this route. 

These posts have a limited capability in comparison to the selected county sheriffs. They can be contacted via telephone as follows: 

1. Deetown, Xray (888) 354-2121 2. Freetown, Gamma (555) 222-6161 3. Inkville, Gamma (555) 974-6322 Additional information is given in Critical Reference Points, Enclosure 2.

5 

7-8

Cou nt 

(Kil o) 

Lime 

Smith

V" 

cp U, 

Co 

'0)
ENCLOSURE 4 - APPENDIX E 

LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES 

The eleven County Sheriffs that provide the primary response force for the Jonesville, 

Xray, to Smithville, Gamma, route have county patrol strengths varying from 11 to 42 officers. 

Their normal patrol unit in general consists of one man per vehicle. Patrols are armed with 

individual's pistols and a riot control shotgun. In an emergency situation, these weapons can 

be augmented with automatic weapons, semiautomatic rifles, and tear gas if required. The 

referenced city police forces along the route have similar or greater capabilities. In all 

cases, there are mutual aid agreements with adjacent and higher jurisdictions that would be 

used to obtain reinforcements if necessary. 

All the referenced enroute LEA, with the sole exception of the Gamma State Highway Patrol, 

have modern car-to-car radio communication systems. Unfortunately there is no single channel 

that will provide continuous communications by the enroute element with all the enroute LEA 

forces. However, all the county LEA either monitor the citizen's band radio or work with a 

local REACT group. 

Each enroute Sheriff's department typically operates a central dispatch facility that has 

equipment to maintain communication between counties, between a county and adjacent states, 

and between a county and local and state law agencies. In addition, there are hot-line tele

phones or one-digit dial systems between adjacent LEA jurisdictions. 

In addition to car-to-car and car-to-central-station radio communications, many patrol 

units also have a walkie talkie system that can be relayed by the vehicle back to the base 

station. 

*•.s. Oov2l•2 iUMa OFFCZ 1 1980 o-6Zo-269/100 5.56-90
UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 

OFFICIAL BUSINESS 

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 

UNITED STATES NUCI EAR 

REGULATORY COMMISSION

*

A