December 11, 2003

EA-03-057

Mr. Alfred J. Cayia

Site-Vice President

Point Beach Nuclear Plant

Nuclear Management Company, LLC

6610 Nuclear Road

Two Rivers, WI 54241-9516

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A RED FINDING AND NOTICE

OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-266/02-15(DRP);

50-301/02-15(DRP))

Dear Mr. Cayia:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you the final results of our significance determination of

the preliminary Red finding identified in the subject inspection report. The inspection finding

was assessed using the Significance Determination Process and was preliminarily

characterized as Red, a finding of high importance to safety that results in increased NRC

inspection and other NRC action. This Red finding involved the potential common mode failure

of all trains of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system due to the susceptibility of the pressure

reduction orifices in the AFW pump recirculation lines to become plugged by debris typically

found in the plant service water system.

At the request of the Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC), a Regulatory Conference

was held, on June 6, 2003, to further discuss NMC’s views on this issue. A summary of that

meeting and a copy of the handout provided by NMC was provided with a letter to

Mr. John Paul Cowan of NMC dated June 16, 2003, and is available from the NRC’s document

system (ADAMS) at Accession No. ML031681102. During the meeting, NMC staff stated that

the analysis of the risk from internal events associated with the orifice plugging issue would be

completed in about two weeks and that the analysis of the risk from external events, including

fire, would be completed in August 2003. This information was submitted to the NRC with

letters dated June 27, 2003, and September 18, 2003. The September 18, 2003, letter

provided the NRC with the Unit 2 internal and external events risk analysis results, including fire

events. Your analysis determined that the total change in core damage frequency due to

internal and external events for Unit 2 was in the range of 1.9E-4 to 3.1E-4 (Red), with fire

events dominating the results. We understand that the Unit 2 results bounded the Unit 1 results

because the Unit 2 turbine-drive AFW pump (TDAFWP) recirculation line orifice was installed

much longer than the Unit 1TDAFWP recirculation line orifice. 
A. Cayia -2-

After considering the information provided during the June 6th Regulatory Conference and a

review of the information provided in the June 27th and September 18th letters, the NRC has

concluded that the inspection finding is appropriately characterized for Unit 1 as Yellow, an

issue with substantial importance to safety that would normally result in additional NRC

inspection, and for Unit 2 as Red, an issue of high importance to safety that would normally

result in increased NRC inspection and other NRC action. The difference in significance

between the Units is a result of the longer period of time that the AFW recirculation line

pressure reduction orifices were installed in Unit 2.

As discussed in the letter dated April 2, 2003, transmitting Inspection Report No. 50-266/02-15

(DRP); 50-301/02-15(DRP), the failure to implement thorough and complete corrective actions

for the AFW/instrument air Red inspection finding allowed other design deficiencies, including

the use of a nonsafety-related power supply for relays, single electrical bus dependencies for

three of the four recirculation line air-operated flow control valves, and the inadequate orifice

modification to continue to exist. As a result, the finding associated with the AFW/instrument air

issue was determined not to be an old design issue. The AFW/instrument air finding and the

AFW orifice plugging finding, which is the subject of this letter, share as a common cause the

lack of understanding of the design basis of the recirculation lines. However, the differences in

time of occurrence and the failure of corrective actions for the first finding to prevent occurrence

of the second finding warranted treating these issues as separate findings. In response to the

AFW/instrument air Red inspection finding, the NRC recently conducted an inspection per

Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003, “Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded

Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs, or One Red Input,” in

accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, “Operating Reactor Assessment

Program.” During this inspection, the inspection team also reviewed NMC’s corrective actions

for the AFW orifice plugging issue. Based on the results of the IP 95003 supplemental

inspection, which are currently under review, the NRC will determine what further regulatory

action is warranted. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of that determination. 

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff’s determination of

significance for the identified Unit 1 Yellow finding and the Unit 2 Red finding. Such appeals will

be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual

Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.

The NRC has also determined that the installation in the AFW recirculation lines of orifices

susceptible to plugging by service water-borne debris is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” as cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). 

In addition to the two AFW recirculation line orifice design control violation examples, a third

example of inadequate design control is cited in the Notice. This example involves the failure to

assure that the upgraded safety design of the AFW recirculation line air-operated flow control

valves relied upon a safety-related power source for a relay associated with the air-operated

valves. The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in the subject

inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, the Notice

of Violation is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a Red

finding.
A. Cayia -3-

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the

enclosed Notice when preparing your response.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC’s “Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC’s document

system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). To the extent possible, your response

should not include any personal privacy, propriety, or safeguards information so that it can be

made available to the public without redaction. 

Sincerely,

/RA/

James L. Caldwell

Regional Administrator

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301

License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Notice of Violation

cc w/encl: R. Kuester, President and Chief

 Executive Officer, WE Generation

J. Cowan, Executive Vice-President

 Chief Nuclear Officer

Licensing Manager

D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager

Plant Manager

Regulatory Affairs Manager

Training Manager

J. Rogoff, Esquire General Counsel

D. Cooper, Senior Vice-President

J. O’Neill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman, 

 Potts & Trowbridge

K. Duveneck, Town Chairman

 Town of Two Creeks

D. Graham, Director

 Bureau of Field Operations

A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin

 Public Service Commission

J. Kitsembel, Electric Division

 Wisconsin Public Service Commission

State Liaison Officer
DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML033490022.wpd *See previous concurrence

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII OE

NAME MKunowski/trn* SBurgess* AVegel* BClayton* AVegel for

FCongel*

DATE 11/03/03 11/03/03 11/18/03 11/19/03 11/24/03

OFFICE NRR NRR RIII RIII

NAME AVegel for

BRuland* (email)

AVegel for

SRichards*

SReynolds* JCaldwell

DATE 11/21/03 11/21/03 11/26/03 12/11/03

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

FCongel concurred via telecon with J. Dixon-Herrity.

SRichards concurred via email from Doug Coe
A. Cayia -4-

ADAMS Distribution:

WDR

DFT

JFS2

RidsNrrDipmIipb

GEG

HBC

KAC

DRPIII

DRSIII

PLB1

JRK1

BJK1

FJC

JGL

JLD

LAD

OEMAIL

OEWEB

SECY

OCA

MDS1

RJS2

PLA

RWB1

MRJ1

MAS

JRJ

RML2

BAB2

WMD

LSG

WHR

SAR

DWS

DWW

WDT

SJC1

JLC1

LJC

DCD

JED2

JWC1

DJH

CFE

GFS

RLF2

PGK1

WMB

HTB

GPC

RDC
NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Nuclear Management Company, LLC Docket No. 50-266; 50-301

Point Beach Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

EA-03-057

During two NRC inspections conducted between September 23, 2002, and March 24, 2003, a

violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of

Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed

below:

Criterion III, “Design Control,” of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requires, in part, that design

control measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the

design basis for structures, systems, and components were correctly translated into

specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.

Contrary to the above, as of March 24, 2003:

1. The licensee failed to establish adequate measures to assure that the auxiliary

feedwater (AFW) system design bases were correctly translated into specifications,

drawings, procedures, and instructions (modification packages) for the installation of the

pressure reduction orifice in the recirculation line of the Unit 1 turbine-driven AFW pump

(1P-29). Specifically, the licensee developed Modification Packages 99-029*A, B, C,

and D in 1999 to install a revised design orifice in the four recirculation lines of the four

pumps of the AFW system. By May 2002, the revised design orifices were installed per

Modifications Packages 99-029*A, B, and D in three of the four recirculation lines. 

Subsequently, the licensee developed Modification Package 02-029, “Safety Upgrade of

the AFW System Recirculation Line Air-Operated Flow Control Valve,” to change the

safety-related design basis of the AFW system to require that the recirculation line,

including the pressure reduction orifice, be able to pass flow during all required

operating conditions. This modification package was implemented on September 12,

2002. On October 14, 2002, the licensee installed the revised design orifice into the 1P29 turbine-driven AFW pump recirculation line per Modification Package 99-029*C. 

However, the licensee failed to establish adequate measures to assure that the design

basis change requiring the safety-related passing of flow during all required operating

conditions, approved as part of Modification Package 02-029, was translated into

Modification Package 99-029*C prior to the installation of the revised design orifice.

2. The licensee failed to correctly translate the AFW system design basis recirculation line

flow requirements into modification packages. Specifically, service water (SW) strainer

mesh size was not considered when the pressure reduction orifice design using

0.125-inch diameter holes and smaller-sized, inscribed flow channels was incorporated

into Modification Packages 99-029*A, B, C, and D. The SW strainer mesh size of

0.125-inch was larger than the smallest limiting flow dimensions of the revised orifice

design. Consequently, a common mode failure of all AFW trains could have occurred

because debris passing through the SW strainers could plug the holes and flow

channels of the AFW recirculation line pressure reduction orifices.
Notice of Violation -2-

3. The license failed to correctly translate the AFW system design basis power supply

requirements into Modification Package 02-029 for the safety classification upgrade of

the recirculation line air-operated flow control valve (AOV) in each of the four

recirculation lines. Specifically, the licensee did not assure that the upgraded safety

design relied only upon a safety-related power source for a relay associated with the

AOVs. Instead, the AFW system relied on a single train of nonsafety-related power

supply for all trains of the AOV relays. Consequently, a common mode failure could

have occurred during a loss of the nonsafety-related power supply.

This violation is associated with a Yellow SDP finding for Unit 1 and a Red SDP finding for

Unit 2 (EA-03-057).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, is hereby

required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the

Regional Administrator, Region 3, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that

is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of

Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation;

EA-03-057" and should include: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for

disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the

results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and

(4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include

previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required

response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order

or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified,

suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. 

Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. 

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. 

Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC

Public Document Room or from the NRC’s document system (ADAMS), accessible from the

NRC Web site at http://www.usnrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should

not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made

available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is

necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your

response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your

response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must

specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in

detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will 
Notice of Violation -3-

create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by

10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial

information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please

provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working

days. 

Dated this 11th day of December 2003.