Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023 Page 1 of 17

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Bryan L. Ciyou

Ciyou & Associates, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Thomas B. Roberts

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Maria del Carmen Casimiro

Murietta,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Guillermo Fernandez Romero,

Appellee-Respondent.

December 19, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-DC-193

Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

The Honorable Joel A. Schneider, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D16-2112-DC-10561

Opinion by Judge Bradford

Judge Vaidik concurs.

Judge Brown dissents with separate opinion.

Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Maria del Carmen Casimiro Murietta (“Maria”) and Guillermo Fernandez 

Romero (“Guillermo”) were married and are the parents of three children. 

Maria and Guillermo separated in January of 2021, and, in December of that 

year, Maria filed for divorce. Maria appeared pro se at the evidentiary hearing, 

during which she referred to the parties’ prenuptial agreement (“the 

Agreement”), in which the parties had agreed that all property owned by Maria 

prior to the parties’ marriage shall remain Maria’s separate property in the event 

of a divorce. Although Maria had referred to the Agreement, due to her limited 

understanding of the proceedings and her erroneous belief that the Agreement 

had been submitted to the trial court by her prior counsel and was therefore a 

part of the record, she did not seek to have it admitted into evidence during her 

case-in-chief. Maria did, however, seek to have the Agreement admitted into 

evidence at the end of the hearing. The trial court denied Maria’s attempt to 

submit the Agreement into evidence. In dividing the marital estate, the trial 

court included the property that was subject to the Agreement. Maria filed a 

motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. On appeal, we conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Maria’s motion to correct 

error. As such, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new 

trial wherein the Agreement can be presented for consideration assuming a 

proper foundation for its admission can be met. 

Facts and Procedural History
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[2] In January of 2016, Maria and Guillermo were married. They had had two 

children together prior to their marriage and had one child together during their 

marriage. Prior to their marriage, Maria and Guillermo had entered into the 

Agreement, which indicated that all property owned by Maria prior to the 

parties’ marriage would not be considered part of the marital estate and would 

be considered Maria’s sole property in the event of divorce. On January 20, 

2021, the parties separated, and on December 9, 2021, Maria filed for divorce.

[3] Maria was initially represented by counsel who was forced to withdraw her 

representation after being suspended from the practice of law. Maria claims to 

have provided counsel with numerous documents, including the Agreement. 

Maria was then represented by subsequent counsel, who filed a motion to 

withdraw from representation prior to the evidentiary hearing, citing a 

breakdown of attorney-client communication. 

[4] On October 3, 2022, the trial court held a virtual evidentiary hearing. Maria 

appeared at the evidentiary hearing pro se. Guillermo appeared and was 

represented by counsel. A translator was present given Maria’s and 

Guillermo’s limited capabilities to speak English. 

[5] While Maria indicated that she was ready to proceed, it is clear from her 

statements to the court that she was unfamiliar with the legal process and the 

terminology used by the court. She did not seem to understand basic trial 

tenets, such as what evidence is or what she was expected to present to the 

court. See Tr. Vol. II p. 36. She also did not appear to have understood that 
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presenting relevant documents, namely the Agreement, to her attorney was not 

sufficient to ensure judicial review of the document. See Tr. Vol. II p. 53. Once 

it became clear to Maria that submitting the Agreement to her counsel had not 

been sufficient to ensure that it would be submitted for the trial court’s 

consideration, Maria attempted to submit the Agreement into evidence. The 

trial court did not accept the Agreement into evidence.

[6] The trial court issued a decree of dissolution on November 18, 2022, in which it 

included property that had been owned by Maria prior to the parties’ marriage 

and ordered an equal division of the marital estate. On December 13, 2022, 

Maria filed a motion to correct error in which she alleged as follows:

3. Petitioner was previously represented by counsel and 

presented her prior counsel with a copy of the Premarital 

Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A, which was executed by

the parties on January 14, 2016. This agreement set forth the 

division of assets and debts in the case of a dissolution of 

marriage.

4. Petitioner was unaware that counsel failed to present a copy of 

the premarital agreement to the Court and did not know the 

same was not in fact provided to the Court until such time as she 

sought alternate counsel to review the final Decree of Dissolution 

of Marriage.

5. Petitioner was pro se at the final hearing and had a translator 

present to assist her given that English is her second language. 

Nonetheless, Petitioner continued to advise the Court that there 

were no assets or liabilities to be divided, based on her belief that 

the Court had a copy of the Premarital Agreement which in fact 

would have required the Court to divide the assets and liabilities 

as Petitioner was requesting.
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****

7. Had Petitioner not mistakenly believed that her prior counsel 

had submitted a copy of the Premarital Agreement to the Court, 

she would have ensured she provided the same herself. Had the 

Court been provided with a copy of the parties’ Premarital 

Agreement in advance of the hearing, it would have been 

required to distribute funds in accordance with the agreement, 

which have resulted in Petitioner not being required to pay a cash 

equalization payment to Respondent.

8. Petitioner has demonstrated a meritorious defense and mistake 

such that the Court should set aside the property settlement 

provisions of the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage.

9. Petitioner is respectfully requesting this Court set aside the 

property division set forth in the Decree of Dissolution of 

Marriage and for all other relief just and proper in the premises.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 50–52 (emphasis added). The trial court denied 

Maria’s motion to correct error on January 17, 2023.

Discussion and Decision1

[7] While the parties largely focus their arguments on the question of whether 

Maria was entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), they acknowledge, and the 

record demonstrates, that Maria appeals following a denial of her motion to 

1 Guillermo has filed a motion to strike certain documents, including the Agreement, from Maria’s 

appendix. In a separate order handed down simultaneously with this opinion, we deny Guillermo’s motion. 
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correct error. While there may be some overlap between a Trial Rule 60(B)

motion for relief from judgment and a Trial Rule 59 motion to correct error, the 

trial rules discuss the two separately and provide two different potential avenues 

for relief. Given that Maria filed a motion to correct error (and only 

alternatively argued that she was entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)) and 

the trial court denied that motion, the question on appeal is most appropriately 

framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Maria’s 

motion to correct error. 

[8] It is well established that 

[t]he trial court is permitted to alter, amend, or modify its 

judgment without limitation “up to and including the ruling on a 

motion to correct error.” Rohrer v. Rohrer, 734 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 

1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). A trial court is vested with 

broad discretion to determine whether it will grant or deny a 

motion to correct error. Volunteers of America v. Premier Auto 

Acceptance Corp., 755 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). A 

trial court has abused its discretion only if its decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before 

the court or the reasonable inferences therefrom. Id.

Jones v. Jones, 866 N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In reviewing a denial 

of a party’s motion to correct error, “we look at the record to determine if (a) 

the trial court abused its judicial discretion; (b) a flagrant injustice has been 

done to the appellant; or (c) a very strong case for relief has been made by the 

appellant.” Id.
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[9] While evidence must be offered during the course of a trial, the trial court has 

the discretion to “permit a party to present additional evidence or testimony 

once the party has rested, once both parties have rested, or after the close of all 

of the evidence.” In re Paternity of Seifert, 605 N.E.2d 1202, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1993), trans. denied. Moreover, “Indiana courts have long had both statutory 

and inherent equitable powers to set aside or modify erroneous or inequitable 

judgments.” Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds, 171 Ind. App. 515, 518, 358 N.E.2d 146, 

148 (1976). In this case, the record reveals that Maria’s motion made a very 

strong case that she was entitled to relief because the trial court’s judgment had 

resulted in a flagrant injustice to her. As such, we conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying Maria’s motion to correct error.

[10] The record demonstrates that Maria, a pro-se litigant with a language barrier to 

the court, did not understand the proceedings or what the court was asking of 

her. Maria only proceeded pro se after both her first and second attorneys had 

been granted permission to withdraw their representation. Maria’s first 

attorney, to whom she claims to have given numerous documents including the 

Agreement, withdrew after being suspended from the practice of law. Her 

second attorney withdrew following a breakdown of attorney-client 

communication and trust. While Maria may be partially responsible for her 

second counsel’s withdrawal, she bore no responsibility for the fact that her first 

attorney, with whom she seemed to have some level of comfort, had to 

withdraw from the case. 
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[11] The record is also clear that Maria was unfamiliar with the legal process and the 

terminology used by the court. She did not seem to understand basic trial 

tenets, such as what evidence is or what she was expected to present to the 

court. See Tr. Vol. II p. 36. She also does not appear to have understood that 

presenting relevant documents, namely the Agreement, to her attorney was not 

sufficient to ensure judicial review. See Tr. Vol. II p. 53. While she did not 

tender the Agreement as evidence during her case-in-chief, Maria made 

multiple references to it. She also attempted to tender the Agreement at the end 

of the hearing once she apparently came to understand that it had not 

previously been submitted to the court. At this point, the trial court simply 

denied her attempt to submit the Agreement with no further inquiry. 

[12] We agree with Maria that “[i]gnoring such a document due to a procedural 

oversight can have life-altering financial and personal implications for the 

parties involved.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 5. Furthermore, while pro-se

litigants are generally held to the same standard as an attorney, the Indiana 

Supreme Court has indicated that a trial court may, under some circumstances, 

take steps necessary to prevent a good faith pro-se litigant, like Maria, from 

being placed at an unfair disadvantage. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 

266 (Ind. 2014) (“Even if a court may take reasonable steps to prevent a good 

faith pro se litigant from being placed at an unfair disadvantage, an abusive 

litigant can expect no latitude.”) The Indiana Supreme Court has further 

indicated that 
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a court should not blindly adhere to all of its rules. “Although 

our procedural rules are extremely important, it must be kept in 

mind that they are merely a means for achieving the ultimate end 

of orderly and speedy justice. We must examine our technical 

rules closely when it appears that invoking them would defeat 

justice; otherwise we become slaves to the technicalities 

themselves and they acquire the position of being the ends 

instead of the means.” [Am. States Ins. Co. v. State, 258 Ind. 637, 

640, 283 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1972)].

Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Ind. 1997) (internal quotation 

omitted). While Maria had rested her case when she ultimately attempted to 

submit the Agreement, the evidentiary hearing had not concluded, and the trial 

court easily could have allowed limited questions relating to the Agreement. 

Based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that 

the trial court abused its discretion by failing to admit the Agreement into 

evidence when tendered to the court by Maria.2 

[13] In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that prenuptial agreements “are 

favored by the law as promoting domestic happiness and adjusting property 

questions that otherwise would often be the source of litigation.” Boetsma v. 

Boetsma, 768 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. These 

agreements “are legal contracts by which parties entering into a marriage 

relationship attempt to settle the interest of each in the property of the other 

2 While we are cognizant of the challenges facing trial judges with respect to pro-se litigants, we are troubled 

by the trial court’s apparent “move the case along approach” in this case, especially considering the fact that 

the evidentiary hearing was conducted remotely, causing more confusion for a pro-se litigant who already was 

at a disadvantage due to a language barrier with the court. 
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during the course of the marriage and upon its termination by death or other 

means.” In re Marriage of Boren, 475 N.E.2d 690, 693 (Ind. 1985). The Indiana 

Supreme Court “has consistently held that [prenuptial] agreements, so long as 

they are entered into freely and without fraud, duress, or misrepresentation and 

are not, under the particular circumstances of the case, unconscionable, are 

valid and binding.” Id. Such agreements “will be liberally construed to effect, 

so far as possible, the parties’ intentions.” Boetsma, 768 N.E.2d at 1024. 

[14] It is undisputed that Maria owned all the property listed in the Agreement prior 

to the parties’ marriage and that Guillermo had contributed nothing to its 

acquisition. In addition, the authenticity of the Agreement is not disputed. 

During her case-in-chief, Maria made repeated references to the Agreement. 

Guillermo did not object to these references or allege at the close of evidence 

that no such agreement existed. Given the favor granted to prenuptial 

agreements combined with the facts and circumstances of this case, we 

conclude that the trial court’s order will result in an unjustified windfall for 

Guillermo and an inequitable and flagrant injustice to Maria because, in order 

to retain her property, she would be required to compensate Guillermo for the 

property in contradiction of the Agreement. As such, based on the record 

before us, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Maria’s 

motion to correct error.

[15] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter remanded for a new 

trial wherein the Agreement can be presented for consideration assuming a 

proper foundation for its admission can be met. 
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Vaidik, J., concurs.

Brown, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
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Brown, Judge, dissents. 

[16] I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court. To the extent the 

majority considers Maria’s December 13, 2022 motion to be a motion to correct 

error, in her motion she requested that the court “Correct Errors from the 

Decree of Dissolution of Marriage,” did not indicate any errors committed by 

the trial court, stated that “[h]ad [she] not mistakenly believed that her prior 

counsel had submitted a copy of the Premarital Agreement to the Court, she 

would have ensured she provided the same herself,” and stated she was 

“respectfully requesting this Court set aside the property division set forth in the 

Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and for all other relief just and proper in the 

premises.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 51-52. At the January 9, 2023 

hearing on her motion, Maria’s counsel did not mention Ind. Trial Rule 59, and 

discussed only Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) in arguing “the mistake is that my client 

was under the impression that her attorney had filed a copy of the prenuptial 

agreement with the court” and “we’re requesting the Court set aside the Court’s

final order with regard to the property division and the division of assets and 

debts, and to proceed with having a hearing and issuing an order that is in 

agreement with the terms of the prenuptial agreement.” Transcript Volume II 

at 60-61. Maria’s counsel later clarified: “What my client’s asking is this Court 

to set aside the decree based off of the fact that she was under the mistaken 

belief that this Court had a copy of the prenuptial agreement. This clearly falls 

under the mistake and excusable neglect provision in Trial Rule 60.” Id. at 64. 

In her appellant’s brief and reply brief, the only error she asserts is that she 
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believed her prior attorney had submitted the marital agreement. I would find 

that Maria’s motion was a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Ind. 

Trial Rule 60(B)(1), and the erroneous belief that her prior attorney had 

presented the agreement did not constitute mistake or excusable neglect. 

[17] Even if Maria’s motion were a motion to correct error, it did not comply with 

Ind. Trial Rule 59(H)(1), which provides that a motion to correct error based on 

evidence outside the record “shall be supported by affidavits showing the truth 

of the grounds set out in the motion and the affidavits shall be served with the 

motion.” A party may not offer by affidavit, in connection with his or her 

motion to correct errors, evidence which he or she neglected to present at the 

prior proceeding. Collins v. Dunifon, 323 N.E.2d 264, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). 

“Rather, the provision provides the basis for disclosing on the record matters 

constituting a basis for correction of error which occurred during the prior 

proceedings, but were not reflected in the record.” Id. Maria did not attach any 

affidavit to her motion to correct error as required, never offered the agreement 

into evidence, and the agreement was never properly before the trial court. 

[18] Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) affords relief in extraordinary circumstances which are not 

the result of any fault or negligence on the part of the movant. Wagler v. West 

Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 980 N.E.2d 363, 371-372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g 

denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 952 (2014). To the extent the 

majority considers the trial court’s judgment a flagrant injustice, before the final 

dissolution hearing on October 3, 2022, Maria did not move for the 

appointment of an interpreter, the court provided an interpreter at the 
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dissolution hearing pursuant to Guillermo’s request, and Maria did not indicate 

she could not understand the interpreter or could not communicate to present 

her case. The court swore in two interpreters at the start of the hearing and had 

the first introduce herself to both parties to “make sure they understand [her],” 

the interpreter and parties conferred, and the interpreter stated: “We understand 

each other.” Transcript Volume II at 4-5. Throughout the hearing, the 

interpreter made clarifications as necessary. 

[19] The court questioned Maria as to whether she was ready to proceed multiple 

times, and the following exchanges occurred:

THE COURT: We are set for a half-day final hearing in this 

matter. Are the parties ready to proceed? 

[Maria]: Yes. 

[Guillermo’s counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

* * * * *

THE COURT: Okay. So, Ms. Del Carmen, it’s -- I guess that’s 

a question. The question that I have -- you’ve previously 

indicated that you’re ready to proceed. I was ask -- I was just 

asking, before we get into evidence today, if there are any 

stipulations, so anything that you and Mr. Roberts have agreed 

to prior to this hearing or if there’s any pre-trial motions. And 

the Court’s not hearing anything to that effect.

[Maria]: The lawyer that I had before, I told her that I didn’t 

want her services anymore, and that’s why I’m here today.

THE COURT: Okay. So you are -- since you -- I granted – I 

granted the motion for your previous attorney to withdraw. So at 

this point, you are representing yourself, Ms. Del Carmen, which 
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you’re entitled to do. And you have previously indicated that 

you are ready to proceed this afternoon. So I’m going to confirm 

that again, that you are ready to proceed.

[Maria]: I am ready, not because I want to, because things were 

not being done the way that I thought they should have been 

done, and that’s why I don’t have a lawyer today. 

THE COURT: Okay. So I will indicate that the parties are 

ready to proceed with their final hearing then. Okay.

Id. at 5-6. The record reveals that Maria’s second attorney emailed her on 

August 30, 2022, telling Maria that “you seem to want to go to court,” “[i]f you 

want to do that, you will have to hire another attorney,” and “[i]f you just want 

to go to court for the sake of going to court, then I will withdraw from your 

case. There is no reason to waste your time and mine if you want to meet with 

me just to tell me you want to go to court.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 

30. On September 2, 2022, her former attorney emailed her stating that her 

final dissolution hearing was scheduled for October 3, 2022, attaching a copy of 

her Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appearance, noting that she would file the 

motion ten days from September 2nd, notifying Maria that “failure to obtain 

counsel to represent [her] in this action could result in the Court entering a 

judgment against [her] or dismissing [her] case,” and stating that her hearing 

would “proceed as scheduled regardless of whether or not [she] hire[d] another 

attorney.” Id. at 31. On September 12, 2022, the court granted the motion, and 

on October 3rd, approximately twenty-one days later, the final dissolution 

hearing was held. The record does not indicate that Maria sought the services 
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of other counsel after her second attorney withdrew, requested a continuance, 

or indicated that she was not ready to proceed. 

[20] It is well settled that a pro se litigant is held to the same legal standards as a 

licensed attorney. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). A pro se 

litigant “is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being selfrepresented.” Id. Pro se litigants are required to follow procedural rules, Evans 

v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, and “must be 

prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 

58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. This Court will “not 

become an advocate for a party . . . . Id. at 984 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Ind. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.2 provides that “[a] judge 

shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office 

fairly and impartially.” A judge’s role as an impartial decision maker does not 

permit offering legal advice to pro se litigants. See Reinoehl v. St. Joseph Cnty. 

Health Dep’t, 181 N.E.3d 341, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that “[t]he 

court did not err by holding the Reinoehls,” pro se, to the standard of a trained 

attorney when “dismissing their Amended Complaint without first giving them 

the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint”). 

[21] Maria acknowledges that she “undoubtedly shares some fault in failing to 

ensure that her former attorney had produced the Agreement in discovery and 

in assuming the risk of representing herself at the dissolution hearing.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 18. She did not mention the agreement throughout 

questioning about child custody and support, whether she and Guillermo 
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owned real estate together, her business, a financial declaration form detailing 

her assets, and her bank accounts, or while cross-examining Guillermo. The 

court provided her with ample opportunities to present additional information. 

After “about two-and-a-half hours of evidence,” and closing arguments, Maria 

referenced an agreement but did not state that she had the agreement with her, 

explicitly ask the court to admit the agreement, or make an offer of proof 

regarding the terms of the agreement. Transcript Volume II at 52. 

[22] In light of it being well-settled that we hold pro se parties to the same standard as 

attorneys and we expect counsel to know and follow the trial rules, I would 

affirm the trial court’s denial of Maria’s motion for relief from judgment.