*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-30072

(Summary Calendar)

WARDELL HUNTER, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

KEITH HALL, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(94-CV-360)

August 9, 1995

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:* 

In this appeal from the dismissal of his petition for habeas

corpus filed under 42 U.S.C. § 2241, Petitioner-Appellant Wardell

Hunter, a federal prisoner, collaterally attacks the calculation of
2

the time he must serve in federal prison, claiming entitlement to

credit for time served prior to sentencing. Wardell has now filed

a motion with this court to hold the instant appeal in abeyance so

that he might deal with purported newly discovered evidence. For

the reasons set forth below, we deny that motion and we affirm the

district court's dismissal of Hunter's habeas petition. 

I

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Hunter was arrested by state authorities on January 22, 1991,

on two counts of probation violation. Two days later a federal

detainer was lodged against Hunter in connection with several drug

counts. He alleges that, even though he posted bond in connection

with the state probation violation, he was not released from

custody due to this federal detainer. 

Almost four months later, on May 13, 1991, Hunter was

sentenced in state court to serve two concurrent prison terms, one

of five years and the other of six months, on the above-said state

probation violation counts. On August 21, 1991, however, this

sentence was set-aside by a state court so that Hunter's state

sentence could be coterminous with the federal sentence. 

On January 8, 1992, the federal district court sentenced

Hunter to serve 115 months imprisonment on his federal drug

conviction, specifying that this sentence was to run consecutively

to his state sentence for drug possession and distribution. In

sentencing Hunter, the district court stated that Hunter would be

entitled to a credit for time served since the federal detainer was
3

lodged on January 24, 1991. 

On November 6, 1992, Hunter was re-sentenced in state court to

a term of 20 months on the probation violation for which he had

been arrested on January 23, 1991, with credit for time served.

Only a week later, on November 13, 1992, Hunter was paroled by

state authorities, and he began to serve his federal sentence on

the same date. As Hunter was not received into exclusive federal

custody until that daySQNovember 13, 1992SQthe Bureau of Prisons

(BOP) determined that Hunter did not commence serving his federal

sentence prior to that date. 

The government attached to its answer the declaration of the

Inmate Systems Manager for FCI-Oakdale, where Hunter is

incarcerated. According to that declaration:

Mr. Hunter was originally arrested on January 23,

1991 by the State of Louisiana on the basis of a

previously filed capias for a Rule to Revoke Probation,

Docket No. 312-383, and a warrant for Docket No. 325-876.

the U.S. Marshals Service lodged a detainer with the

State of Louisiana on January 24, 1991, for conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute cocaine. 

The Records Clerk for Orleans Parish indicates that

no bond was set for the probation violation as statute

precludes bond. A bond of $100,000 was set for Docket

No. 325-876; however, no attempts were made to post bond.

The detainer filed by the U.S. Marshals Service did not

affect the bond status of either state case. 

According to a Time Computation and Jail Credits furnished by the

State of Louisiana, the time Hunter spent in custody after January

23, 1991, was credited against his state sentence. Consequently,

he was not entitled to credit for that time against his federal

sentence. 

The magistrate judge found that Hunter's custody status
4

resulted from his state offenses, not from the federal detainer

that was lodged against him while he was in state custody.

Moreover, Hunter was not entitled to have the time spent in state

custody credited against his federal sentence because he had

already received credit for this time against his state sentence.

The magistrate judge also found that it was not improper for the

district court to have imposed a sentence that would run

consecutively with a yet-to-be imposed state sentence, even though

the state court might have intended for the state and federal

sentences to terminate simultaneously. 

The magistrate judge recommended that the petition for a writ

of habeas corpus be denied. Adopting the report and recommendation

of the magistrate judge, the district court denied the habeas

petition, and Hunter timely appealed. 

II

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Hold Appeal in Abeyance

Hunter claims to have discovered new information that had not

been available to him at the time he filed his § 2241 petition, and

has moved the court to hold his appeal in abeyance. He has not

identified the new information, however; neither has he moved to

supplement the record on appeal. His vague and conclusionary

motion is insufficient and is therefore denied. 

B. Substance of Appeal

Hunter contends that the district court should have given

effect to the intention of the state court for the state and
 

1 The government argues that this issue is being raised for

the first time on appeal. We disagree. Hunter did argue in the

district court that the state court vacated its original sentence

so that its sentence would be coterminous with the federal

sentence. In the district court Hunter did not cite Barden v.

Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1990), which he now relies on, but

the issue was nonetheless raised; in fact it was discussed by the

magistrate judge in his report and recommendation. 

5

federal sentences to expire simultaneously. Hunter urges that the

district court should have done so by designating the state

facility as a place of confinement for purposes of his federal

sentence.1 In determining whether to impose concurrent or

consecutive sentences, the district court, in the exercise of its

discretion, "may consider subsequent sentences anticipated, but not

yet imposed, in separate state court proceedings." United States

v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S.

925 (1991); see United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1510 (11th

Cir. 1993). 

Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1990), relied on by

Hunter, does not conflict with the rule in Brown and Ballard. In

Barden, the Third Circuit ordered the BOP to exercise its

discretion to determine whether a state prison in which Barden was

incarcerated on state charges prior to being transferred to a

federal facility should be designated a place of federal

confinement for purposes of Barden's federal sentence. Barden, 921

F.2d at 478. The state court had ordered that the state sentence

be served concurrently with the federal sentence. Id. Unlike the

instant case, however, the federal court in Barden had not

indicated whether the sentence should be served concurrently with
6

any subsequently imposed state sentence. Id. at 483. In reaching

its decision, the Third Circuit stated, "[w]e recognize that

neither the federal courts nor the Bureau [of Prisons] are bound in

any way by the state court's direction that the state and federal

sentences run concurrently." 921 F.2d at 478 n.4. The Barden

court thus recognized that the district court was not bound by the

state court's decision to have the state and federal sentences run

concurrently; the district court in its discretion could order that

its sentence run consecutively with the subsequently-imposed state

sentence.

Hunter argues that here the district court intended that he

receive credit for the time he served in state custody prior to

sentencing. But Hunter overlooks the fact that, under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3585(b), the Attorney General, through the BOPSQnot the district

courtSQcomputes the credit for prior custody . United States v.

Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, ___, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 1354-55 (1992). A

defendant is given credit toward his term of imprisonment for any

time spent in official detention prior to the commencement of his

sentence "that has not been credited against another sentence." 18

U.S.C. § 3585(b). The BOP determined that Hunter was not entitled

to a credit for time served in state custody because that time had

been credited against his state sentence. Even if, as Hunter

suggested in the district court, his release on bail had been

prevented by the federal detainer, he still would not have been

entitled to a credit for the time served in state custody because

that time was credited against his state sentence. See United
7

States v. Dovalina, 711 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1983). The

district court's judgment is

AFFIRMED; Motion DENIED.