L BUU€llN FOR ARMY ENGINEERS 1 
'By Major General Clalr F. Glll 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

elcome to ENFORGE 96' One of my major goals 

is 10 enlist your help in spreading the message of 

engineers' relevance as masters of terrarn. My 

motives and our challenge follow. 

"Relevancy" is the direct relationship-t he importance, 

signtficance. and demonstrable bearing-to a problem. 

Working harder or smarter at old patterns is not relevancy. 

Nor is it simply harnessing the power of integrated informat~en as we do in Force XXI, although that's a new manifestation of relevancy. 

The literal Englrsh translation of the French expression 

fin de siecle is '"nd of century:'The expression implies a 

weariness with the closing century and a sense of optimism for the new. We live in extraordinary times as we 

approach both a new century and the 2,000-year mark of 

the common era. Recently we've witnessed the death of a 

military empire, and many of the grim posslbifities for which 

we trained as young soldiers have vanished. The process 

of change has accelerated. So what "attitudinal adjustments" must Army engineers make to cope with acceleratrng change and the expectations of the approaching millennium? It seems to me that we have two choices: We can 

wait to see what new challenges wash upon us, or we can 

renew our relevancy-That's not much of a choice! Let's look 

critiea[ty at our collective ability as engineers to project relevancy into the new millennium. 

Why is the Engineer Regiment always lapping up the 

dregs on resource issues7 Why does something have to 

gel broken (I mean really broken, like countermine) before 

we focus attention and rally resources7 Apparently we 

have a relevancy-projection problem. It's not that we are 

irrelevant-we are very relevant. The problem is that we fail 

lo articulate our value to those who do not wear the Essayons button. That large group includes the decision makers 

who currently allocate resources as well as those who will 

someday be decision makers. 

The approach of a new century has raised expectations 

that patterns of international behavior during the bloody 

20th century are dangerous and obsolete. Historian Barbara Tuchman, In her book The Proud Tower. described the 

worfd during the period 1890-1 91 4. She developed the 

premise that weariness wiZh warfare and the belief in 

progress created high expectations for the 20th century. 

Now, at the other end of the 20th century, sirnilat expectations are being optimistically forecast. The thesis is sometfi~ng like thrs: The concept of war developed sometrme 

after humans transitioned from the nomadic hunting and 

gathering era to the agricultural era. Agriculture demanded 

that we protect no2 only our homes and possessions but 

also the land needed to grow food. The industrial revolution 

broke the old patterns of subsistence and now, in the 

postindustrial era, we are t~nally ending the age-old cycle of 

war. Some people say that war is on its way to the scrap 

heap of history. While they may not articulate their beliefs, 

many Amer~cans believe this rationale, and our political 

processes (including the defense budget) are being influenced as a result. 

Let's consider some specifics, the peace process in the 

termar Yugoslavia is at center stage. Engineering capabilities in Bosnia (such as countermine and river-crossing 

operations) are receiving much attention. For years. Army 

leaders had neglected the relevancy of these capabilities 

although, as engineers, we knew their importance very 

weli. This was partly because countermine operations were 

difficult ro model and river crossings were hard to do and 

usually gummed up perfectly good maneuver exercises. 

Nevertheless, we should have articutated the relevancy of 

these capabilities more clearly. 

Engineers must create relevancy by giving the "boss'" 

something he or she needs and can't get anywhere else. ft 

seems to me that we spend a lot of time convincing ourselves of our relevancy when there is a long list of powerful 

would-be friends who are starved for our message. For 

example, in peacetime, we will often demonstrate our relevancy wFthin models and simulations. To be recognized as 

masters of terrain, though, we must farce the integration of 

real and dynamic terrain and its impacts into all of our landforce models and simulations. Then every time we train, 

commanders will know how important engineers are to 

successful operations. 

The relevancy of engineers depends on our abil~ty to 

artrculate and project our unique and enduring skills. Several factors affect thks capability. The fcrst 1s a recognized 

weakness--engineers' shortcomings with the English language. (We often speak more fluently in mathematics or 

physics.) Second, we tend to talk mainly among ourserves-we "preach to the choir." 

One way to meet the relevancy challenge and clear the 

way inta the new rnilfennium is to telt our story in diverse 

professional journals. In addition te sending articles to 

Engineer, we should consider such publications as MiIitary 

Review, the Armed Forces Journal, and the Marine Corps 

Gazette. Frnd your pens or word processors and tell the 

world about our relevance. Essayons! 
Apnl 1996 Headquarters. Departmen1 of the Army Volume 26 PB 5-96-2 

'UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 

COMMANDERJCOMMANDANT 

Major General Clair E G11l 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURES EDIMR 

Shrrjey Bridges 

CONTRIBUTING EDITQR 

Sandra Gibson 

GRAPHlC DESIGNERS 

Jennr fer C. Bolyard 

benrse F: Sphar 

I 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

DENNIS J. RElMER I 

General, Unlted States Army 

Chief of SFaff 

Official: 

JOEL B. HUDSON I 

I Acting Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

01556 

Cover: The Engineer Regiment's vision, 

shown on the front and bad covers, inchdes 

four primary lirnctims that will lead Army 

engineers into he 219f cenfury: 

FEATURES 

2 Engineers: Masters of Terrain 

By Colonel Thomas J. Hodginn' and Michael L. Fowler 

5 Force XXI Engineer Update 

By Coionef Edwin Arnold and Vern Lowrey 

1 1 Terrain Visualization: The Challenge for the Whole Team 

By Major General Clair F: Gill 

7 7 The Hornet: A Wide-Area Munition 

By Major Gregory Flelds 

71 The Maneuver Support Center Operational Concept 

By Lieutenant Cdonel John Johnson and Jacqueline Guhrie 

24 Embracing Change: Reflections From the Chief of 

Engineers 

By Lieutenant Genera/ Arthur E. Williams 

3R The Engineer Squad Vehicle 

By Major Scott Gourley 

3*n The 1995 Engineer Functional Area Assessment 

By Alan Schl~e 

34 Rapid Runway Repair in Need of aepair 

By Captain Paul Huszar 

57 Bde Command Knowledge and Sklll 

By Major George DeMarse 

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

: Personal Viewpoint 

A? Past in Review 

.I:: Bridge the Gap 

ENGINEER (TSSN W46-1089D: 19 prepat& quarterly Dy Ihe U 5 Army 

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April 1996 Engineer 1 
By Ccllonrl Thclrnns J. Hodgini and Mir:hnel I,. Fo~ijler 

a hen UnitecI Stntes nrmecl forc~s arp called 

; Izpan, they will he required to quicklv 

aclu~v~ "f~tll-.sp~ctrum dominance" nver 

any pot~ntial pnpmy .Joint Vision 2010, the vision of 

thp Joint Chief of Staff, states that forc~s will havr 

to sply on their speed and a~ilit v supported I>v 

advanced comlnunications and information t~chnnlnp. Accorrlin~ to a rec~nt issue of Def~n.?~ Arpws, 

this visicn was largely written hy a form~r cornmandant of the Engineer School, Lieutt?!iaut General 

Daniel W. Christman. 

As the ,4rmy enters the 21st century, several fartors wiIl reqz~ir~ that the Army modify the way it 

conducts operations. Some of the fnct0r.s driving this 

change xre new tcchnolo~?., reduced resources, 

~xte~ded battlespace, and the move toward a 

CONUS-bnsecl force. The ability to project ground 

forrns from th~ rnntinentnl United States to anywhem in the wnrirl is the esspnce of tleterr~nce for 

regional conflicts. 

Even with ttlesc changes, the great IlattI~ c~ptains of history wn111d recognize old patterns of war 

in todav's conflicts after overcoming their initial 

astonishment nt th~! weRpons of moderr1 war. Those 

battle captains did not achieve victory sol~ly on the 

basis of s~rperinr weapons. They also employer1 doctrine that dominated maneuver and controlled their 

adversaries. 

The Vision 

n the 21st century, e~igitleers will master terrain 

to S~FIPF! the bat,tlesplice. AS R k~y member of th~ 

- - cornbin~rI arms tmm, ~nrineerr; will cornhine 

their sUs wit11 technnlo~~caIly actvanced, informationhns~d systems tn give the nranpuver comtnand~r the 

condj tions he neerls for deei;si\~e victory. We cannot 

realistically PK~PC~ bat.tI~ Ipadprs fn intuitively grasp 

the value of terrain. Instpad WF: n~nst prnvicle tool..; 

and derision aids tn huilrl this capfil)ilitv. Terrain 

visunlizatlon tpchnnlogi~s offer leaders seal-tim~, 

:hre~-dimensional capabilities ro walk or fly through 

terraiir hcfore deployment and battle. Where the 

industrial revolution harnessed ewr~y and 

machines to enhance mnsde power, the infnrrnation 

revolution harnesses rornrnu~licatirr!~~. synsors. anrl 

computers to enhance brain power. This is th~ power 

of Erlginepr Fwce XXI (ENFORCE =I). 

ENFORCE ,W is a t~rm that d~lscrihes the evolution of enginerr soldiers and umts into the future 

U.S. Arm!. While only the shadows of great future 

events car: be dimly perceived in our time, the 

rpn~rirements for th~ future Axmy r~flcct some current conditions. Our curr~nt NationaI Military Stratep requires that the Army project military power tn 

compel any ndveruaxy to do our will, d~ter ag~ession, reassure our allies, and support at home. 

ENFORCE D3 incarprates cnrnbat engineers 

withn mnneuver forces to acheve decisive victov in 

support of national polici~s. Tomorrow's operations 

place engineers as fidl partners with joint and coalition responses. As partners in information-based operations on the cli~itized battlefield, engineers WQ 

int~nated in versatile o~nnizations that can function 

in hoth war and stability nnd support operations across 

th~ f~dI spectrum of environments. The ENFORCE 3CW 

orgnnization is easily tdnrahle, mpitlly deployable, 

operationally afile, capable of l~verafing techoln~cd 

advancements, orgrtniz~d amund information, and 

formed wit.11 all optimum mix of both the Active 2nd 

Reserve Camponen ts. 

Our viaion of ENFORCE XXI enlploys enhanced 

battl~ command, information, nnd technology to 

empower highly efficient units to rtccomplish much 

lnr~er missions In mounted and dismounted battlpslpnce throughout the continuum of operations. 

The rc?suIt: increased force lethality and survivability. Leap-ahead t~chnnlogres ~n~hl~ en~neers to 

emplace nbstacles just In time to control the enemy. 

Areas Gll~tI with int~lli~pnt munitinns nllow free 

pass:qe Ily Srieudly forces and cnordinntcd nttnck on 

the enemy. Ground robotics systems txke the soldier 

out of ham's way in especidly dangerous situations. 

En~ineers predict requir~ments and base responses 

on simulatttd dynamics iri a virtual world. Ro1)otics 

coastruction equipment, cniis~~contmllecll operating 

aicis, ~lohal posit inn in^: systems, ant1 ran~e-of-sensor 

controls bring precision, speed, and r~onstop operaf ions tn rnnstr~~ctinn. En~inecr headquarters mass 

eCforts precisely, monitor execution, and make 

changes on the move. Thpse enrineer operations are 

key to the AUCCf.5:; of "full-spectrum dominnnr~.'' 

2 E'ngine~r April 1996 
terrain: by eliminating obstacles that might impede 

maneuverabjlity; and by breaking into ciefenuive 

,I/ Force Counterrnobility. Using the terrain as a 

weapon against the enemy enhances the cornrnander's ability to mass fires for an overwhelming 

decision. By employing obstacles hefore and during 

battle and by hsguising terrain reality, engineers 

cause frustration and confusion for the enemy. These 

activities disrupt enemy operations and molnentum 

. . and provide a window of opportunity for our combat -&I / 

--v. - forces ta initiate their attack. 

,t ;' ,I %. 

. . Terrain Visualizetian. By portraying the terO. L rain as digital images and information, engineers ' .-,I 

--,\ - enable the mnneuver force to prorluc~ a precision . 7, , -. --. , , engagement. Engineers providr the allied forces' bat -- - tle command staff with a relevant picture of the battlefieId and the detailed terrain data they need to 

Mastering Terrain maneuver and make decisions. Pmviding c? terrain 

picture, detaded analyses on the terrain, and updathe engineer mission to master terrain is con- ing video-mapped images in red time are engineer 

ducted at all levels of an operation-from task missions that give o~u. forces the information they 

- - force theater to stratefiic levels of COE.I'US need to operate in a di~tized wu. The terrain piclocations-and is dispersed over all of the extended tures and analysis tmls engineers provicle are the 

battlefield. Mastering terrain includes four primary underpinnings to ~11 appliqued informatian used to 

fiinctlons: depict the battlefield. 

Force mobility Terrain visualization has already added to the 

success of the Army's Advanced W~rfi~I~ting Experi- Force countermobiIity rnents (AWES). Through the Joint Venture axis of 

Terrain lisuahizntion Force XXI, AWES have providedForce protection 

These fiinctions (shown on the front cover) allow 

the commander to fight where he wilIs; go where he 

wills; use the terrain as a weapon: portray the terrain; 

and mount, sustain, and recover horn operations by 

creating and maintaining an array of lines of cornmunications (LOCI. (In Force XXI, the LOC may be a 

mixture of combat trails, main supply routes, ant1 

strategic forced+entry locations.) The four functions 

also encompass engineer support in defensive areas 

and combat senrice support areas as well as the 

requirement for engineers to fight as idantry when 

necesav. Det~iled descriptions follow. 

Force Mobility. The engineer force moddies, 

overcomes. and uses terrain 80 the mmrnander can 

fight where he feels is best for a quick, decisive victory whle eliminating as many casnalties as possihle. This engineer support allows the maneuver 

commander to focus on tactical operations and frees 

him from terrain constraints. Force XXI units will 

rely on mobilitv to quickly overcome the enemy. 

Keeping his maneuver forces mobile is a key concern 

for the commander, and hs ability to decide where 

and when to move should be unrestricted. The engineer force ensures this capability by building and 

rnaintainin~ an entry base in any envimnment; by 

finding, f~liing, and building routes through any 

Opportunities to experiment with cor~cepts anci 

emerging systems. 

Methodology to evaluate results. 

Means to modify systems to meet identified 

requirements. 

Insights leading to optimizing military capnbdities. 

Additionnl information about the AWES is provided in an article beginning on page 5. 

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Aprirl1996 Engineer 5 
Force I+rotection. Manizgit~g term~n, upgi-adiu~ 

t~rrain, and constructing on terrnin yield the capability to reinforce, support, maintain, supply, and reconstitute the fnrce. Modern comhat systems and new 

technologies (such as information-based construction 

techniques nnd light.-weight, high-strength construction rnateriaIs) ennble enffjneers to provide more 

responsive and complete force protection. Throughout 

dl phnses of operations, enpneers construct and AUKment initial defenses with fortifications and pmtective structures: hide the force through wide-area 

camouflage: and decoy enemy fires, harden critical 

facilities. and install sensor s~st~erns forfaciliv protect ion. Ths function provides fnd-dimensionnl psotection for the force, not only from enemy fire but also 

kom weather, nature, and physical limitations. 

In Ebrce XXI, the farce-protection function is 

expanded in at least three mas. 

Defensive Posit iom. At different times during 

an engagement, forces require defensive posit.ions when massing fires. These positions are 

required for soldiers, nrmo~edmechanized vehicles. artillen, nircrnft, and other support equipment. Engineer soldiers provide the expertise 

and ~quipment needed tn adequately protect the 

force in areas where they may he suhject to 

enemy fire. In addition to bt~iIcIing positions, 

engineers use camouflage ad concealment to 

increase the survivability of allied forces. 

Force Beddnwn. As forces continue to operate. 

they require areas to regenerate from the fatigue 

al military missions. Engineers provide the technical expertise to plan, construct, manage, and 

contract, as required, adequate areas to house, 

rest, and care for soldiers. 

-1- - 1 

4 Engineer 

Lin~s of Comrnr~nicatian (I,OC). Enpneer 

stlppart to the force dows fmrised lo+tics by cwating and maintaining combat tds ancl LOC. For the 

maneuver force to maintain a high level of mobility. 

their Lifeline for supplies must he kept open, Without adequate LOG and routes, combat service support unit3 are unable to deliver the assets needed to 

keep the force moving and fighting. Engineers 

design, create, and maintain the LOC in d wens so 

that trafic cm mow throughaut the hattIespace. 

In summary, the 21st centu~ en~neer leader will 

continue to he a crjtical link to the maneuver corn. 

rnander. The leader of Force XXl wrll control semiautonomous units over an expanded hattlespace. He 

will use tools such as the Counterrnobility R~rnotpControl Computer, the Obstacle Plannin~ System, 

and the Route Manning and Assessment System. 

With a solid base in engineer, combined-arms, and 

joint doctrine, the en~neer leader will combine leadership skills, a deep understrinding of the terrain, 

second-nature computer literacy, and overall versatility to provide situationally responsive support. 

The Road Ahead 

4 s the Army moves toward a fully digitized 

force, Army leaders must realize that informa1 tion alone will not defeat enemies or win wars. 

Much of the physics of war remains cconstant. A cubic 

yard of dirt will require the same amount of energy to 

move tomnrmw as it did in WarEd Was 11. Mastering 

terrain is key. Throt~ghout the 21st century, engineers wiLl continue to multiply lethality and dominance for the total force hy levernsng terrain. Our 

2010 mission of mastering terrain, aIong with its 

accompanying four battlefieId functions, facilitate our 

efforts to reach a common vision for the regiment: 

"The Engineer Regiment ... trained and rcararly. n 

rnpidIy d~ployable and r)ersafile menaher of iha strafegic force ... corn bin in^ effici~nries of information 

uuth p1wicn.i a.nd t~chniml capabilitirs. to master 

terrain in support of d~cisiup tlirfory." 

The nation will continue to achieve decisive victory, particularly when the full power of our regiment 

is unleashed to enahle power projection, enhance 

infrastmcture, ancl exploit terrain Together, Tcll 

members of th~ regiment, from the combat eng.lneer 

solclier though our engineer commands to the 

USACE Carps Real Estate Support Teams [CREST) 

and contractors, form the greatest capabiiity to 

achieve this vision that the world can pmduce. 

Colonel Hod~ini rs Director, Department of Trrtining and 

Doctrine, U.S. Army Engineer ScImol. He preoiorrsl,~ fierrr~d QS 

Deptrt+v Director of Combat Developments for Fbrce A73 

Inlepaiion nt [he Engineer School. 

Michael fitder is a milllary WIgineeriIt~ deueloprnertt 

rrno L~sf in the Concepts Division, Dirmtomte of Combat 

Deuelopm~nts. U. 5. Army En~fl'neer School, 
By Colonrl Ed~vin Arnold and V~rn LOEIITP~ 

?Re April 1995 editinn of ENGINEER described 

how th~ Army and th.e Engineer School tmrp "Shaping Form XXI Engine~rs." This article r~la fes wher~ 

rue have been since then an.d prouides lessons Iearned 

and 0 tjiew of what is nhend. The Engineer Sahonl 

con tin ues f o support the Army's Force XXI Cnmpaign. 

Plan to rnrlrle the Army into the 21st century. A (:en - 

t ral f h me in that cnrnpaign is lo exploit information - 

age tech,no?ogies to win the information. war primarib fhrough th,e use of digitization. 

Joint Venture Battle Lab Experiments 

A s part of the Force XU Campaign Plan, TRADOC cont,inues to lead the main effort, called 

Joint Ventur~, by using Battl~ Lab experiments to test and showcase information-ag~ t,echnologies. Battle Lab experiments are iterativ~ and 

progressive in nature and focus on a sp~cific capabili ty or technology opportunity, Each experiment may 

employ eombi nntinn s of live, virtual, and constructive simulations. 

Live simula-tiam are exercises conduct~d by soldiers and units in a field environment, preferably 

against a tactically competitive opposing fo~ce. 

m Virtual simulations employ man-in-the-loop 

simulators, recon figurable simulators, andor distributive interactive simulations that duplicate 

effects of the blrain, the weather, and the enemy 

situation. 

Cnnst~tetiae simr~tatiow portray soldiers and 

equipment reacting with generated message traffic to simulnt~ operational condit,ions. 

B uilding Force XXI 

April 1996 Enpin~er 5 
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Assault Breach Marking System {ABMS) mounted on an MI tank 

Advanced Watfrgh ting E.rperim@nis (AWER). 

large-scope Battle Lab experiments include AWES. 

They are cen ter-of-gravity culminating efforts 

focused on a major increase in warfighting capability. 

AWES provide insight into critical decisions affecting future Amy and engineer doctrine, training, 

leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier IDTLOMS) programs. Sponsored by TRdDOC 

Rattle Labs, AWES cross many, if not a1 I, of the 

enduring battlefield functions and battlefield dynamics. Several recently conducted Joint Venture Campaign Ams provided engineer-related insights: 

an intelligent minefield IIMF) emulator. It has 

the ability to turn the Hornet sensors on or OR 

and it can launch submunitions agajnst threat, 

armared vehicles, Results from the virt,ual engagements were manually passed to the live simulation 

to depict, actual battlefield effeck. During the live 

experiment, the Assault Breach Marking System 

IABMS) successhlly marked breached lanes while 

stippers re-rnained under proWctlon in their squad 

vehide. A robotic counbrmine vehicle (ROC-V) 

WRS used to a limited extent to brcach complex 

obstacles. ATEMOPS workstation provided tactical decision aids at the maneuver brigade level. 

The battalion task Sorcr engineer (engineer corn- Prairie Warn'erlMobile Strike Force IMSF) pany XO) occupied a workstation in one of two 95 was a constructive simulation at Fort Leaven- difitized task force command and control vehi- worth, Kansas, with selected Cnmmnnd and Gen- cles. Insights from Focused Dispatch AWE will b~ ~ral Staff Course students, Conducted from 

February through May 1995, th e experiment used t.n enhance the Task Force XXI AWE at the 

National Training Ccnter in February 1997. focused on MSF battle-staff improvements due to 

digital tschncrlogies. Several engineer-related systems were employed successfully-Deep- Attaek 

Wide-Area Munitions (DA-WAM), the Airborne 

Standoff Mine-Detection System (A-STAMIDSI, 

and the T~rrain Rvaluation ModuldObstacl~ 

Planning System (TEM/OPS ). Organizationally, 

using a separate engineer command headquarters at echelons above corps proved essential. me 

experiment showed that we ne~d to explore ways 

to make the Deployable Univ~rsnl Combat Earthmoves (DEUCE) transportable by helicopter to 

support light force ~urvivabilit~y, 

Focuqed Dispatch was a virtual and live simulation conducted in three phases FI~ Fort Knox and 

the Greenville Training Area, Kentucky, during 

the summer of 1995. It used a digitized heavy battalion task forcc! in both virtual and live experiments. The Hornet (a hand-emplaced wide-area 

munition) pmved successful at shaping the hattlespace in the live experiment. In the virtllal 

experiment, Hornets were made visible by using 

I Wurrior Focus was a live simulation conducted in 

two phases at Fort Drum, New York, and at the 

Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, during the summer and fall of 1995. This 

AWE employed a lightheavy battalion task force 

to demonstrate increases in force lethality, sunivability, and tempo gained througll digitized arid 

own-the-night (OTN) technologies. The Thermal 

Mine Avoidance System (TMAS) pefirrned well in 

the AWfi: and has subsequently received support 

fi-om Amy leaders. MG Hendrix, Commandant of 

the Infan t,ry Cenkr, recornmend~d that the Army 

procure the TMAS for the field. Effoarts are ongoing to make the TMAS available for countermine 

ehrts in Bosnia. The Antipersonn~l Obstacle 

Breaching System (APOBS), a modem replacement for the World Was TI vintage hangalore torpedo, was used extensively at Fort Drum and at 

Fort Polk. As with TMAS, it performed as winning 

technology. A Aultispectral Imagery Processor 

OfSZP) provided tactical decision aids to the task 

6 Engineer April 1996 
force and hi~her brigade headquarters nt Fort 

Polk, although an early attempt to demonstrate 

spli t-based operat.ions was unsuccessful. Engineer 

platoons were equipped with OTN technolorn that 

aid ~d in breaching and countRrrnobil i ty operations. 

On the down side, an attempt to send obstacleintent graphics overloaded the digital connectivity 

svsttm, d~monstrating the need to furthpr develop 

digital systems. 

Qfh~r Battle T,ah E.zperim~nts. Tl3ADOC also 

conducts Battle tab experiments that are smaller in 

scope than the AWEs. They include Battle Lab Warfighting Experiments (BLTVE), Advanced Concept s 

:and Technology IT (ACT 11). and Concept Evaluat.ion 

Prnpam (CEP3 experiments. 

Rnttle Lab WurfiRhfing Exp~rim~nts. The 

En g~ n eer Fch ool supports ongoing RI,CVEs, such ' 

as the Disrnount~d Countermine BLWE: being 

conducted by the Dismoun t,ed Rattlespace Battle 

Lnb at Fnrt Renning, Geor~a. BLJVEs apply to a 

singl~ imttlefi~td dynamic and may be a singl~ 

event or prop~ssive, it.erat.iv~ simulations. 

Adranced Concepts and nchnolegy IT. The 

Erlpn~er School hns limited participation in the 

ACT I1 psog-ram, which provldes funding and an 

arch~tecture that facilitat~s industry interaction 

with the TRADOC Battle Labs. The intent ofACT 

I1 is to invite industry to propose matur~ techno]- 

ogi es, nond rv~luprnent~nt items, and/or protoQpes 

for demonstrat,ion as Ba ttJe Lah exp~rim~nts. 

Cnnc~pt Eualunfion Program. This in11ovative t~st.ing provam p~ovid~s a quick reaction 

and simplified process to resolve DTLOMS issues. 

CEP provid~s t,he Battle Labs and the Engin~er 

Schonl thr al)ilit;y t,o acquire. le~se, nt fabrjcat~ 

rquipmcnt and conduct ~xp~rirnents and tests to 

determine military utility or the pot.entin1 to satisfy DTLOMS n~eds. CFP experim~nts arp used 

t,n assess new operntional mncepts, such as one 

rec~ntl~ conducted for the rnultirolr bridge campany cnnc~pt. They are also used ~xtensjvely in 

the proof-of-princjpf e and development/ product,ion provrr-out phases of the materiel acquisition 

process. For example, the CEP was us~d for developing t.hhp nrw hydraulic ~xcavivator 1FWEX). 

Battle Lab Experiment Engineer 

Trends 

he AWES conducted in 1995 identified cornmon issues currently being worked by the 

Engine~r School, other Army agencies, and 

support in^ civilian con tractors: 

Anlipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System (APOBS) 

components 

Prnvid~ Army Battle Command System (ABCSj 

compon~nts with the same common di.git.al t~rrain picturc fny full situational awareness and 

battlefield visualizatinn by t,h~ commander. 

Equip and train engineers with the same digit'al 

and OTN technolnpes used by the forces they 

suppost.. 

a Insert enfinper planning software tools into 

ABCS cnmpnnents. 

Refine the ~rnplopwnt concepts of Hnrn~ts and 

IMFs llased on AW resul t,s. 

Recommend that the Army invest now in thc 

ABMS. the TMAS, and the APOBS programs and 

get, these s,yst~.ms to soldi~rs in the field. 

Future Experiments 

~v~ral more Joint Venture A?VEs are planned 

through 1997. T~P Engineer School is working 

to Pnsure that vital engineer issues and initintives are ins~rted, executed, and analyzed in future 

Joint Venture AWEs. This will result in engjne~rs 

bcing properlv organized, trained, and equipped in a 

newly designed heavy division structur~ b~ginning 

in 1999. 

Prairi~ Warrior 96 AWE. The Bnt,tle Command 

Batt,l~ Lab will conduct this experiment at. Fort 

T,~avenwnrth, Kansns, nrld Fort Mood, T~XEIS, 6 -14 

May 1996. Comn~and and G~n~ral Staff College students will participat,~ in a constructive simulation of 

an Arniy corps and sev~ral divisions and n digitized 

MSF fighting on the mythical island of Lantica. 

Engineer-related exercise initiatives include the 

MSF mohilit.ylsu~ivnbility brigade h~adquarkrs, 

terrain visualization using TEMJOPS, IMFs, river 

crossings, theater engineering, and 1igh t infantq 

engineer support. 

April 1.996 Engin~~r 7 
ACOUSTIC OVERWATCHING 

SENSOR 

IMF FRMII,Y 

, '-. 

,# --. 

STATION 

CONTROL 

STAT1 ON 

Intelligent Minefierd Configuration 

Task ForceXVAWE. Tn Februaly 1997, the 

rxperimental force (EXFOR) will conduct this AWE 

AS a live simulation with a fully digitized manpuver 

brigade at the National Training Center, Fort Trwirr, 

California. Several engineer initiatives within the 

Task Force XXI AWE include the Hnrnet, the ARMS, 

the Didtal Tnpographic Support System (DTSSM 

Quick-Respon se Mu1 ticolor Prin t~r (QRMP), surrogate breathers, and eniyineer forc~ structure. Enpneers within the 1i~h.ht task force wiIl receive digital 

Maneuv~r Control System-Phoenix (MCS-PI workstations, dimt.al appliques for pnpneer equipment 

and vehiclps, and select OTN technologies. 

Division XXI AWE. The EXFOR will conduct 

this experiment in several phases at Fort Hood in 

1907, using constructive simulations in an exercisc 

similar to those performed in the Batt.le Cornm~nd 

Training Program. En~necr initiatives will resemble thos~ in the Prairie WarrinrJMobile Strike Force 

96 AWE. The Army Chief of Stsff will use results 

From this and pr~viotis AWES to approve the final 

Heavy Division X>CT design in January 1998. 

The Fng-ineer School is pushing the following 

irnperativrs in future liw7 virtual. or construcdivc 

simulations to ensurr that terrain and ~n~ncer 

functionality and other functianal areas are properly 

purtrayed in exp~rimental diktal command and cnnt.rol systems: 

Modelinp and sirnulat,ion syst~ms must port.ra.y 

realistic dynamic terrain, not featlrreless plains 

that do not impart on maneuver. 

Digital command and control syst~ms must connect across all bnt.tlefield op~rating syst,~rns. 

Digital commarld and control systems must st,ress 

battle staff synd~ronizatian. information manaEcmerit, and full situational nwarenpss across all 

battlefield operating systems. 

1 Command and control spst.ems must ensurp n 

common terrain data bas^, in kegration, interop~rability, text and graphics, and horizontal and vprt.ical int,evation amms all batt,lefield operalirig 

system% 

Science and Trchnology 

5 part of the Army's Science and Trchnoln~y 

Program. doint V~nt.ure AWES and RLMIEs 

are t.ied to oi~gning Advanc~d Technology 

Demonstra tjons (ATDs I and Advanced Conc~p ts 

Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), The u'ltimnte 

real of this proflam is to provide the snldi~r with n 

winning edge on the bfittlefield. These demonstrations attempt IF transition pronli~ing technolofical 

developments into tnrnnrrow's op~rational capahifitips. Ev~ntually, they will evolve into syst~ms and 

systems upgrad~s that are incorporat~d int,n the 

Army Modernization Plan. These demonstrntions 

will gain importance aft~r 1997 because the Division 

8 Enginerr April 19.96 
Experimentation 

Linkages 

TRADOC Army 

Joint Venture Science and Technology Working Group 

Rattle Lab Experiments: 

Advanced Warfighrlrlg Experirnenr L ( AW,) Advanced Concepts Technolny? 

Demonstrarions I.4CTD) 

Batrlc Lab WarLght~ng Expeemen1 A 

( BLWF,) 

Advanced Technolr7gy Adt.anced Concepts and Tchnolopy I1 Demonmar~ons (ATD) (ACT 11) 

XYI AWE in Nav~mber 1907 is the final sch~dulrrI for collection rnanagerncnt,, terra~n rlatabas~ EP~ 

Joint Ventur~ AWE. AS FI r~nlft, f~llnw-on pxppri- cration and tailoring, terrain dat,abase diss~mitner~ts will: iricludc more virtual and cnrlstrttctivt~ nation, and terrain data display and usr. 

simulations as part of ATDs and ACTDs. 

Adrlanced Technojn~y Demonatmtions. ATRs 

3r~ risk-r~ducin~, intrgrat~d "proof-of-principle" 

demonstratjnns. The Army currently h~s 28 ATns 

that have \wen approv~d by th~ Army Science and 

Trchnnlnm Working Group. Enginee~-relatrd ATDs 

includpr TIw Inf~Jligcnf Min~fi~ld ATll, which will in tegrate nmv mtnp systems nnd technologies into an 

uptimized, lofistically efficient, autonomous antiarmor rlbstaclr. 

The OfFRorif~ Sni arf Mine Clearanrp ATLI, 

which will dcvelop I.echnolo"~~ies and conccpts t.o 

neutmlixct advanced off-route smart. min~ systems and clear fhtl way for nbstacl~ breaching and 

main-suppo~t-route clearing operations. 

T~P V~lricle-Morrn led Mine Detector ATD, 

which \\-ill evaluate and demon st rat,^ the matuAdvanced Cnnc~pts Techno?ng.'tl D~ntnn~frations. ACTDs are conducted t.o highlight several 

related arpas of techr~olom and to IP~VP rrsidunl 

eqrliprnpnt witch participating. units fnr further t~stins They are an integrating cffort to nss~mhl~~ an11 

d~monstrnte R significant,, new military capability, 

hased on maturing advanced t~chnolo~li~~), in ;1 

real-tim~ operation. They nre conducted at a scale 

adequate to clearly ~stablish nperat.icrna1 utility and 

systprn int.pgration. ACTTI5 are jointly spnnsortad and 

i~ilplernrr~ted by the operationnl user and rnat~rie! 

dev~loper with approval ~nd oversight midance 

frnn~ the Department of Drfenw. These dernnnstrations are the last step in drtermininr whpthpr the 

military needs and can afford thp new technnlnly. 

The Engineer School is nrtiv~l~v involved with fuur 

ongoing ACTDs: 

rity of a vehicle-mounted mine detector that 

detpcts metallic and nonmetallic mines ai. tactical r Tilp Joint Cnrsnlerm ine (+JCfifj ACTD h~prtn in 

1994 a4 a joint ~fTort. betw~en t';i~ Naiy and tJte sped s, Army t n showcase emerginr r~~unterrnin~ f euhnolTJ~P Rapid Tt-rrain VZstlalizafion ATD, which &es. S~~mlrss courit errnirle efforts from thr: lit.- 

will evaluate the end-to-end battlefield visua'liza- tom1 Isear, to b~ach, to inland environments will 

lion prncess from data cnllection through display be demnnstrated in two phas~s. In EYE)i', the Army and use by snldirrs and I~aders. This evaluarinn will lead Phase I, which will cmph:~size ahnllnw 

will pnsurc that, trrrain r?at.aha~~s arpoptimiz~d wat.er and h~ach land-cnunterminr capabilities. 
P~~sP 11,1~d by the Navy in FY98, will emphasiz~ 

fully sean~less counkrminp capability and clandestine r~connaissance and surveillance capabilitics. 

Initial JCM-ACTD C41 (command, control, communications, computers, and in t,elligen ce) connpctivity h~t,ween the Army, the Navy, and th~ 

Marine Coqw was demonstrated during t,h~. 1995 

tlnintITTarfighting Tnt,erop~rability Demonstration 

(J\IWD) frnm 18-29 Sepkniber. Connectivity 

b~twe~n various digital command and control systems was also d~monstrated. Results from thr 

JCVID will hp availabl~ in 1406. 

a Thp Rapid Force Pmojecfidn Initiatiue (RFPI) 

ACT11 will demonstrate hunterkiller technnlngips fnr UPC hy early-entry and light forces tn 

reduce sensor-tn-shooter communicat.ions links. 

RFP? eniploys new weapons systems such as the 

IMF, Enhanced Fiber-optic Guid~d Missile 1EFOGM), High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System 

IHIMARS), and the Line-of- Site Antitank System 

I LOSAT). As the r~sult of an early-version demonstration IEVD I conducted in S~ptember 1995 at 

Rcdstone Arsenal, Alal~ama, improv~ments are 

b~ing dpvploppd FOT initial s~nsor-to-shooter communication links and thp subsequ~nt increases in 

fe~cr lethality and survivnbility. currently we 

are coordinating effort.^ for upcoming ACTD 

activities with the LOlst Ai~bornp Division (Air 

Assault.). En~neer systems tested during the 

1995 Em includ~d the Hornet. and the EMF. 

Rcsults of the EVD id~r~t-ififie t,he need to improve 

th~ IMF acoustic ov~rwatching senaat (AOS) and 

do int,egrat;e: ~clnfin~~rs into the digital tactical 

oprtntions cent~r. 'l"n~ Engine~r Schnnl is curr~nt.ly working t,he follow-on ACTD scenario and 

doctrinal support to the ACTD. 

r Thp RuttIefi~Id Visualization ACTD IBVACTL)) was c~eated from the mprger of two 

related ATDs scheduled in FY97: the Rapid Trrrain Visualizat.ion ATD and the Battlrspnce Conimand and Control ATD. Batt.I~field ~isualizat~ion 

is the proccss whereby the commander dev~lops a 

clear undcrstnnding of his current statme in relat.ion tn the Pncniy and ~nvfronment,, envisions n 

d~sired end stat,^, and then visualizes the 

sequencp of activit I'PS that wilt move his force 

from t,he current state to 1.h~ end sf.at,e. The Engineer School suppnrts BV-ACTD efforts in t,he 

amns of termin product battle drills, terrain data 

updatin~, t~rrain data storage, and t~rrnjn data 

disseminatinn capability needed for Army warf ~ht-big, mndcling. nnd sirnulntio~is. 

n TIZP MiIitary Operafions in Urban T~rrain 

IhfOUTI ACTn wilt explor~ promising t~chnolngips that support and enhancp MOLT op~rational 

concppts and ~TRTIS~PT those technolo~es to the 

services. Beginning in 1997, the MOUT-ACTT, 

will attempt to expand and dominate the battlrspace of the dismounted force by improving nightfi~hting capabilities, target acquisition, l~nttle 

command, simulation, and force protection. Thr 

Mom-ACTD engineer focus hill be in the areas 

of urban reconnaissanc~, obstacle detectinn and 

breaching, terrain visualization, demolit inns, 

nonenplnsive technolngi~s~ nnd robotics. 

The Road Ahead 

he EnRineer School Directornt~ of Battle Lab 

Suppclrt continues to attack down the Joint 

Venture axis t,ownrd Force XXI. Eng$ne~r 

DTLOMS proflams arr changing to reflect the nt+w 

r~alit,ies of information-age tecchnolngies. Fiscal constraints will cotitirlue to fnrc~ us to make hard decisions concerning whn ~et,s rnod~rniz~d and who dn~s 

not. Shrinking djvjsian force desips will cause 

organic and supporting en~neer o~anizations to 

change their wav of doing business. 

New t~chnologies will continue to surprise us. 

The demonstrated abilit,~ of our rengine~r soldiers to 

assin~ilnte and use new technologies continues to 

astound many people both inside and nutside of thp 

engineer community. As we experiment. with npw 

ideas gathrr~d from people in the field, we will continue to d~rnanstraat the relevance of Army engineers as R critical componerit of Fnrcc XXT. 

~VP consider all Pngneers in the field as "~ngmeer 

scnut,~." prnviding eyes and ents for our eff0l-t.s. Your 

input is n~ed~cl to make intelli~ent and r~l~vant 

decisinns in the future. If we atr not successful in 

this endeavor, enfineers, like old soldiers, may 

nwer die but will nadually fade atva.v. 

Send your ideas to COL Arnnld or Blr. Lowrey at 

(DSN) 676-4082 or fC) 573-563-4082 or send an 

 mail message t,o ~ar~~olde@upood-vin~s.am~y.mil, 

Colonrjl Anrold is fhr Dirrclor of Rattle Lnh 

Slipport, US. Army Enginerr Sclinnl. He prertious!~ 

serrrcd as !he co~tnland~r of the KsfhloreR' i?li~iision 

Engine~r Rri~iip in G~rmnn+v. 

hyr Lo~urcy is fh~ senior nna/ysl ~~'ifll, the 

Direrlornlc of Brrttle Lab Support, US. Army 

E~lgincer Srhool. IJe pr~clirrusiy serrlcd as Analysis 

DIuision Chirf for thc Dirc~.tnrafr! of E~mluaf inn cr rtd 

Sfandc~rdizntion nr the Enginper School. 
The follou~ing infnrmalion is based on a speech given by Major Geneml Clair I? Gill at the ConsoEidated Army 

Topographic, Terrain Analy.qis, and Mull ispecfral Imagery Conference at Fort Reiun ir, Virginia, in Nouern her 1995. 

April 1996 Enginper 1 I 

to w;irfighting 

requirements- too 

focus of DTLO*S has become 

with of the 

getting far Ips attention+ 

is so for many Force 

terrain given the 

gmwth technolOm- battalions tao 

wpll: of 

equipment witI~aut the whole supporting DTLoMSWhil~ technolow is essential 

t.0 our ability to prnvirle topagraphic support, it may not be our 

greatest challenge as we foeus fin 

the true esserrce of terrain visunlizntion. From the combat sngiriper" perspective, our greatest 

chdl~nge will be leader rleveloprner~t. Let's consider !r few historical examples. 

On the eve of the Rattle of 

Austerlitz, Napoleon walked the 

battlefieIct and decided how he 

would use terrain to his advan. 

tage. He even had his engineers 

shnpe the terrain by digging ,some 

A rnonE the many &a]- 

Een~es WE! face in todnyts 

Army, th~! most impostant 

one is sustaiGn~ the ability to 

decisively win our nation's wars. 

In the current resource climate, 

thnt mpans we must work hard to 

ensure that our programs are relevant and hattle-focused. lhs is 

especially true for many of our 

Force X3U initiatives. The Army 

topopnpkic rornmz~nity must. 

abarr? ideas ~rld exchange inform.?- 

tion to build the team thnt will 

provide arfordable, battle-fncusecl 

solutions for terr~in visualiznticn 

and, ultimately, for the battleheld 

visudizntion it supports. 

Unfortunately, hnth termsbattlefi~lcl vistlalization and ter. 

rain visualization-mean different things to different pmple. 

There are many pnrhcipants, each 

in charge of somp porkion of this 

business. For example, Army R~Eulatians 115-1 1 and 10-5 name the 

Chief of EnFjneers the 'Tnpngraphes of the Army." The same rewlations desivate the Deputy Chef 

of Staff for Intedligence as the tentral Army staff proponent for 

Army tnpamaphy and the central 

point of rontact for Army towg~aphrr plans, promms, and zrquirements. T~P cornrnnnder of the 

Engiric~r Center serves as the 

TRADOC commander's pmpnnrnt 

for topofiraphic doctrine, concepts. 

and training requirem~nts. 

Tbe following is my perspective 

of the role that combat enFineers 

haw in terrain visun1ization. It 

identifies where we will need help 

from other key memhers nf the 

tnpographic support team ta collectiv~ly provide the best passible 

support to our grouncl force 

con~mander.s. 

Leader Development 

w ithin TRADOC, a concept called DTLOMS 

(doctrine, training, leader development, or~anizatinns, 

materiel, and solriiers) is used to 
Leader training includes visualizing the terrain with the help of computers such as the DigitalTopographic Support 

SystemIMultispectral Image Processor. 

ditches and moving some berms. 

Though outnumbered, the 

French Army literally routed the 

Kussian Army the next day. Much 

of the battle unfolded just as 

Napoleon had envisioned. 

About 50 years later at the 

Battle of Gettysburg, Major General Meade, the Union commander, sent Brigadier General 

Warren to assess the importance 

of an area that Meade considered 

key terrain. Warren, an engineer, 

went to a point on the battlefield 

where he could see the ground 

and assess its impact. He confirmed the need to get forces to a 

hill called Little Round Top to 

protect the flank of the Union 

Army and deny that key terrain 

to the Confederates. 

A third example involves a 

heavily outnumbered armor force 

desperately defending the Golan 

Heights in the 1973 Yom Kippur 

War. A few Israeli tanks defended 

the Golan heights and effectively 

12Engineer 

bought time for reinforcements to 

arrive. One of the keys to Israeli 

success at the tactical level was 

that often a few Israeli tanks 

arrived at key terrain 30 minutes 

before the Syrians. 

These examples show a common thread. In all three cases, a 

warfighter visualized the impact 

that terrain would have on the 

outcome of his fight. Each saw the 

potential in a situation. Each 

understood that impact in terms 

of the warfighting tools with 

which both he and his enemy had 

to work. And each acted quickly 

enough to influence the outcome 

of the fight. In today's combat 

training centers, we revalidate 

these lessons over and over 

again-that to visualize and 

understand terrain is the first 

step toward dominating the battlefield. 

These examples clearly demonstrate that while terrain visualization is a new term, it is far from 

a new concept. If we keep this perspective, then leader development, not materiel, becomes our 

central focus for terrainvisualization. To develop leaders who 

understand the art of war, given 

the tools and environment at their 

disposal, we must have leaders 

who understand terrain in the 

first place. The topographer must 

provide effective support to help 

that warfighter become familiar 

with a piece of ground before he 

walks on it. 

Whether looking at a computer 

screen or actually standing on the 

ground, terrain visualization occurs only when you realize how 

you will use that terrain to accomplish the mission. If you don't 

understand what you see, or if you 

don't know how to use your war- 

! 	fighting tools to defeat the enemy 

in that environment, you won't 

accomplish terrain visualization, 

and you may not accomplish your 

mission. 

April 1996 
Combat Engineer Role 

A	s combat engineers, we 

have an especially important role in terrain visualization because of our mission. 

Terrain is a source of friction in 

war, and engineers-whether 

supporting mobility, countermohility, survivability, or sustainment-are either the lubricant or 

the sand in that friction. To be an 

engineer requires a basic, fnndamental understanding of terrain 

because we are the ones who will 

shapo the battlefield. And we support every other battlefield operating system when we do this. 

So how will we grow leaders to 

truly visualize the impact of terrain on mission accomplishment 

across the enduring battlefield 

functions? And, Bven such mas. 

tery, how will we harness our 

materiel solutions to maximize 

our leaders' ability to exploit the 

terrain when they cannot walk 

the terrain ahead of time? Here 

lies the real challenge. We bombard our leaders with more and 

more information, but we don't 

necessarily succeed in giving 

them better information. 

Consider the three-dimensional 

"fly through" that almost anyone 

can demonstrate on today's computers. Is this a good terrain visualization tool? In Vietnam, 

commanders were provided a similar view of the battlefield by flying thern around in helicopters at 

various altitudes. Commanders 

didn't always understand what 

they saw from above the battlefield, but that doesn't mean we 

shouldn't view the terrain from 

that perspective. It simply means 

that we need to develop both the 

view and the leader simultaneously. We must ensure that the 

leader understands what he sees 

and knows the limitations of his 

view and how to use that information to win. In other words. com- 

"Our engineers must 

be terrain visualization experts so they 

can help the maneuver commander use 

the terrain to his 

advantage to win." 

puter models are only as good as a 

warfighter's ability to apply them 

to win. Pretty pictures don't 

always equate to terrain or battle. 

field visualization. 

We recently eliminated the 

topographic engineer specialty 

and proclaimed that every engineer would be a topographic engineer. The focus of that change 

should be that every enpineer 

must become a terrain visualization expert-but not necessarily 

a technical expert on how to use 

new technology to provide more 

terrain information. While we 

cannot escape the fact that our 

terrain visualization experts 

must master the information 

tools at their disposal, we cannot 

afford to make that mastery the 

object of our leader development. 

We need to focus a level aboveon combined arms warfighting 

operations. 

We need technical experts, but 

even more we need leaders who 

know how to view terrain and 

apply what they see to win battles. These same leaders must 

then articulate what the battle 

commander needs to know to 

understand terrain. The tempo of 

Force XXI operations will make 

such mastery extremely important. We must have leaders who 

can decide and act more quickly 

than ever, and those leaders will 

need battle-focused decision aids 

if they hope to have any chance of 

coping with the operations tempo 

of 2lst century warfare. 

Engineer Center Role 

the Army topographic Acommunity continues to s 

make impressive strides in 

providing greater resolution of the 

terrain to warfighters, the Engineer Center will provide a parallel 

effort to identify and develop the 

leader skills necessary to use that 

information effectively. Some of 

our effort will, in turn, drive the 

requirements for materiel solutions. The focus will be on developing solutions to meet battlecommand requirements, not the 

other way around. 

In practical terms, our engineers must be terrain visualization experts so they can help the 

maneuver commander use the 

terrain to his advantage to win. 

We must keep that perspective 

as we develop our terrain visualization support to battlefield 

visualization. 

Our early experience with 

advanced warfighting experiments and the experimental force 

indicates that lenders and their 

solhers in the field are getting 

overwhelmed with so-called "good 

ideas" that lack focus. They are 

drowning in new technology, new 

media, new jargon, and massive 

amounts of information of all 

types. In that type of environment, we must help warfighters 

sort the wheat from the chafe. 

Army topographers can make a 

good start to this end by doing two 

things: learn to speak tho warfighter's language and avoid bombarding him with highly technical 

language, endlcss "topoupeak," 

and unique acronyms. Then we 

must become experts on our doctrine for tactical decision making 
and the staff processes that support it, With that expertise, we 

will acquire the ability to provide 

battle-focused information ahout 

terrnin and not simply offer a 

smorgasbord of computer graphics and data that result in inform:ition overload. 

Modeling and 

Simulation 

nother area where the 

Army needs our help is in 

modeling and simulations, 

whch nre rapidly becoming critical to the Army's future. We will: 

USF! these systems as both combat 

and training development tools 

to develop and evaluate doctrine. 

to train all echelons of the force, 

and for mission planning anti rehearsnl. 

The requirements for dynamic terrain modeling and the 

consistent portrayal of terrain 

~ncl its impacts present major 

challenges. Bnth require detailed 

terrain data ~nd well-developed, 

empirically snund models. We 

cannot afford tn develop a system 

or capability on a simulation and 

then find that the system does not 

work ~RCRUSP the simulation was 

fundamentally flawed through 

its terrain database. Nor can we 

afford to develop tactical decisian 

aids or mission planning and 

rehearsal systems that provide 

results that are inconsistent with 

reality. 

If the modeling and simulation 

community doesn't capture the 

terrain's very real impact nn operations when they develop our sinulations, the risks are great. That 

is why TWOC tasked thc Engineer School to sohe several key 

modeling and simulation terrain 

problems. We will examine the 

way we develop and manage terrain requirements for modeling 

and simulations. At the same 

time, WF! will formulate means 

for validating terrain mod~ls so 

thnt we get reliable, consistent 

results across the full ranEe of 

applications. We will call on memhers of the topographic support 

team to help us with ths important task. As we succeed. we will 

imprnve the terrain piece of modeling and simulations. We will 

also put in place the means for 

reinforcing future leaders' appreciation of terrain's real impact on 

operations every time they use 

one of these systems. 

The Players 

s noted earlier, the combat 

engineer is just one player 

in R large talented cast. We 

cannot succeed in the business of 

terrain visualization without a 

great deal of suppost from each 

team member. Fortunately, our 

team is abundantly resourced 

with the talent and spirit to make 

terrain visualization a reality. 

The Def~nse Mapping 

Agency (DMPI). Since 1972, I3MA 

has provided our Commanders in 

Chief around the world with mapping, chart in^, and geade..;y support. When DMA was formed from 

the mapping elements nf all the services, we were a Cold-War, papermap-oriented farce. Technolow, 

wtlapons systems requirements, 

and our national strategic focus 

have certainly evolved since then, 

and DMA is warking had to refocus to the new realities. As the 

TRADOC proponent for terrain 

visualization, the Engineer School 

is vitally interested in evolving 

joint doctrine for which DMA has 

the lead. We must figure out key 

doctrinal issues inc1urli11~- 

The need for a glohal geographic information database. 

r The requirement for glohal 

coveraAe of mlrslmum essential tcrrain information. 

r The need for a rapid, terraindata-generation support capability for contingencies. 

How to expIoit the strenflhs 

of both DMA at the national 

level and the topographic elements at the theater level to 

sustain battlefield visualization terrain databases. 

We have long had a productive 

with DMks Defense 

Mapping School. DMA will provide much of the expertise to make 

our training evolve with the rest of 

our DTLOMS. We must continue 

ths worthwhle pwtnershp to 

ensure that aur topographic support soldiers are fully versed in the 

new technologies and support concepkq. We want them to he just as 

credibIe and effective as their predecessors have heen an division and 

cows terrain teams throughout the 

Army. 

We KJSO must work together to 

produce a lead~r-development 

train in^ pack~p that will help our 

leaders and soldiers come to grips 

with the essentials of datum shifts, 

gIobaE positioning system strengths 

and limitations (to include accuracy), and the strengths and weaknesses of the digital systems we put 

in place. The Engineer School will 

take that package, translate it into 

basic warfighting terms, and then 

export it to every other schooI in 

TRADOC, 

Corps of Engineers. We: RPF: 

fortunate to have the hacking of 

an enormous pool of talent in the 

Corps of Enfineers laboratories. 

These topovaphic support experts have consistently produced 

outstanding materiel and software soIutions to meet both current and future operational requirements. As we pursue our terrain visualization objectives, we 

dl need the hacking of these 

April 1996 
April 1996 Engint~r 1.5 

ensure that en~ne~rs are fillly 

integmted into the staff estimate 

process and that our DTLOMS are 

l~(led hattle-fn~lt~~~i. 

Closing 

jr think I have fot~nd the co~nhat 

en~neer's niche in the topo- 

~aphc arena. It rests on ftmdamentals. T~P combat cngineer's husiness is termin, purr 

anrl slmple. We own the round. 

Ev~rything topographic, th~n, 

has R singlr vltrposr: to help us 

experts ntnrr than ever. Th~y 

will furnisll th~ matpripl piece of 

our DrL'LOMS so that we ran provide rflnlllat engineers urith 

ne~ded digital reconnaissnnce 

tools and our terrain teams with 

rna~agement P~OCPSS. Tlrp Engvle~r School will conMost of nll, wp n~ust continue I tinup to work cJnselv with the Bat.- 

to wnrk toeether tn ensurp that I tle Cornmanti Battle Lab ancl E~Q 

I hp ~~j+ghter knows thp I llattlefield visualization crew at 

str~n~ths and limitations of nw the CnmhrnerZ Arms Center ta 

tersaln information collection systerns. We ne~rl sp~cixl elllphasis 

on what can he don^ with n map 

or image and hnw th~! addit1011 of 

an ur~derlyinp digital t~rrain 

datahasp nffects terrain and batRrnctions, Headquarters. Ilepnitment of the h?., 30 Novernher 1992. 

-4R 2 15-11. Army %pogmphy. 

30 Nnvemhe~ 199.7. 

thrater. 

I$pograph ic Units. Cornrnantl~rs rnntlnu~ to I'PCPIZ'G outdfimelztal understnndlng. 8 acrluir~ complete own~rship of 

that ground beforc wt. ~et th~re. 

The H'CI rfigI~ t~r. Thew rlw That is the reason why Pvery enpinrPr must h~ a t~rrxin-visunGzntim inany nthrrs on the tmm, but O~IP 

t h~ capa hility to build and stis- tlefield visunlization. We must 

tain t ~rrnin datahasps in thp fl~e- I accomplish this with full underntcr. We aIso rleed thrir help In ' standing of the irnmpns~ pressnlving the many chnll~ng~s of 

chtiihase management ancl cornmunicatiolls npcessnry to provide 

3 common, up-to-date picture of 

t hr hat t lpspncc, both vertlcnlly 

nnd horizontally, thrnttghout ~IIP 

surp that, filg. friction, fntim~e, nnd 

op~rxtions tenlpo ]lave nn th~ 

comn~onrl~r in the course ofng~raZions. O~sr succcss In th~ area of 

mission plan1:i IIF xtld r~henrsal 

systems will deppnrl on this funstanding support from top"- I rnenilrer !ias n gwzlter vote than expcrrt. 

If we don't apply our knowledge grnphlc units. They hatre donr a I all of the rpst. :Is VIP continue tn 

suprh job of tackling how thev 

will .support op~rat ions with new. 

systems in tl~p 111ldst of major 

c'?lan~;"cs in atn~nst every aspect of 

their husincss. We need their 

input when WP capture bnttl~ 

drills: tactirs. tcrl~njqu~:: and procedures: and pc~ssihl~ fixes to dnctrit~nl ~SSILPS. 

Tnrellig~nc~ Conamunitv. \Ve 

will ~rlt~tinue to build ollr pnrkncrpmvirle information technolorn tn 

su pp~rt hnttlefield visnaliz.?tion, 

WP n~~d the warfi~hters' input. 

In short, he must re11 us whnt 

ntmut terrain to translate the hat. 

tle commander's t~rrajn visualization requirements into somcthln~ 

tan~ihle we can provide, thprl whn 

~i-npkic team ~EIP right focus 

agnirrst which they can apply their 

consiclera tjle tnl~nts, 'l'ofieth~r we 

~ilP B~UPVP OW t~n.ain-\is~~dizatio~~ 

shr;, with the intell~gencr commzr- identify in^ priority nrP:ls Enr 

works 2nd what doesn't, and we will? This in the measure of r~lri vancy I hnve been speaking ~lhollt. need to listen. I 

TIIF warfiphtrr nlso must Thp Eneine~r Center wilI connit?. We want fo learn R:, much as 

we can about prnvicling digital 

support from th~ p~nple who 

demand thfit his t~rrnin expert, 

the cornhat engineer. fully support the terraill-relnt~d portions 

of tactical rlecisinn making. That 

supp~t includrst~rrnin informrit,inn coll~ction 

and terrain team work effort. 

d~v~loped . worklng ClnhP,V With thP tl~ e All-SOIITCP Aniilvsis System. WP will continup to 

)lave a comn~on irltcrest in solvin~ 

the ~normoi~s rlatahase managelr~ent and u~inmunications ch~llenges Ynr Imth the terrain nrid 

int~llig~nr~ databa.ses. WP will 

contitlue 10 work on krv doctrinal 

tinue tn focus its tapngraphic HIIPport on tbr? sharp ~nrl-th~ battle 

cnrnrnandpr's r~qu ir~rnent s. PIn d 

we will focus our LITLOMS to that 

~nd as well. In sn dnin~, WP hop^ 

to give the rest of thr Army's topnint~lligence .stnff to ralIect ~~.i~~~~

key inforrnat ion. 1WI 

providing a solid of 

the t~rrain in1pnc.t on thp 

cnumos of action. 

Condurting a risk assessn~ent 

.fhjor Gpnerol Gill is !hr C'onimonder of tlrp Lr.S Army Err~inwr 

CZnter find Fort I,ronnrd Il'oor! and 

thr Con~mandrtnt n[ (Ilr L!S. Arm 

Eftgijr~rr School. 

References: 

, ,4R 10-5. i?rganizations nnd 

issues. .such RX the termin vis11-11- 

imtion aspects of cfe~p targeting, 

and including ttarrai n visualizat~arl r~riuir~ments in 2 h~ rnll~rtion 

when lnck of terrain infnrm3- 

tin11 rpsutls in uncertainty 

about ~vhat the real impact of 

terrain may be. 
P~raoilnl Viewpoint - 

Tm-tesservice - + Engineer I- Training: rL 

A Progress Report 

-.P n t hc si>irtt nf rloi~~g thjncs I Anothrhr h~nvfit jh thc cxJ;,rrlpnrp I nrp:lrt mcnt of' Trilitli~~~ :1$111L)ocsmne-trr tvitt~ lrss, rrl~~sol~rlu- that pr-rhnrlnrl from rnch sewirc. ' 'rim, st;llcd in t,hc Drt:ctnll~s :W4 

- - t ion of joint s~rvicr tra~~~ing hi- in^: to J'nrt T,ro~~nrd Ifrc~nd. Thcsc is"~ of' Knri'inr~r, WP lark a unirorm 

n;nkes .I lor of rr nsc 111 th~ II~H 1 rspCrlpnce fact01+9 are wnportsllt 1 ~cd~rlnanc~ ratlnF Prnccrs fnr joinl 

ycnr, u:lr s~str r srrvicrh ~AVC poolrd ' ingr~di~nt~ in rcvi~ilje. COI~J-SP tmin- training IEI~~TUC~O~~. Fnr rxnmplr, 

th~r rriulirrcs ivit11 thr ilrmv to inp meterinls. To cnsllrr mnkr ' AT"!' and Navy i~~rtruciois ~nny hr 

coxdurt thi: rnnjor~t.). of' miiitnri 1 thr right rh;inprs, wih hnvp formrr, rntv~i ally FP~YICP, hlnrinr. instrucrnnstr~~rtion rupinrer trninilnfi ;~t ' Cnursr llctlvisnrv Groups, ~,ith repFort. 1,cnnarrl Woad. T3 Cornp:mv. rrscntntian from thr: four s<rrvicr.s. 

577th Flnginrrr Rnt,t:ll~an, providrs Thrs~ gro11ps mak~ policy dfbclsinns 

this tr;iininr for atlldents in the bnscd on thr rrquir~mrntx of all 

Fniiinecr Equipment Oll~rators / servlcrs. Wl~hin the constmint. 0: 

I.hursr! RIIC! th~ Tochnicnl Engino~r- I ~hr srvvice-imposed commancl 2nd 

ing Sp~rialist Coursr. In rldditlnn. control prnccrlur~s, thev impr0vp 

thr company is rrspon.siillr hr trsrnivi>rk nnd hclp rnsrirr thnr the 

Army-unlclt~c tl-nini ng of electri- 1 srrvicea rom municxtc- rf'fcctivclv. 

rinns, rl1torr.v sp~c~nlists, and 1 / '(I ,:,- o=v-,, ,. oLir ohjrrtlve in 

tors must br sated hv tllp firqt nffirrr 

or uivllian (GS-11 nr hxherf in his 

I ':::ti" of corn tnnntl. arlrl Air Fnr.rt. 

i1lstrupt,ors can he rat~cl h~ A11 

Force ~oyrrvi.;ars. As joint scrvin. 

tririnillg matures, wrr must ndopt rl 

sindc rating sysTrm. 

Equ~pm~nt, tnnint.ennnrta is 

nnothrr challenge. Wi t?l th~ transfc" of common SP~V~PP c;rluiprncnt, 

:~sphnlt rind corlcrttc flpcr~t0t-s. Thp ! joillt sprvj,-r! training is ta cAtahlish th'' (fcnsit? of co~l~tntcti'J11 P~E~~PPT 

goal of this joint sc.~-uirr initintivp is llnifird bbpurpir,- of 1 @'iuiplnmr incrrased frnm 205 to 

to provirf~ well-trainrd and wellqunlifiecl srjIdicrs, smlors, nirnlcn 

and rnnrinr? to th~ tntnl forcr. 

Aftrr sir rr~onths of o~orntiun. it 

is timc for progrfss rpport. The 

rnand qn that, withln rcnson, "orr '11"" %)[1 major cnd items 

&tudmts nyp trninrcl to thP hiimp ~lldrr ,krrn' rontrflj. The on]!. itrm 

stanrlxl-ds, ~h~~~ :irr some of co~~str~rtion en~inrrr.rl~~iprrrr~iit, 

errns, ~i~i~~ conrlitjonr, poljcips hr I Common smane all sprvices is thr 

rpllpntine courcps, ;-lnrl supplPmp,,. Cfikpr~illfir D7G nozpr- The IfirW 

ib!lowine is n summary of succcsr- 1 tal trslninp polieie dirpr I cf~nrit~ of cquipmcrxt mrfirie thnt 

ful aspects of joint ~n~neer train- , from sprvi,-p to sprvirp. ~n~ pxnm- m"l"tPn"nCe is c:ritical to ~Coming nc Fort Lronard i!'~od RII~ fc~ pip, Army PturlpntP livr ltlldcr lniBTC~S nf CO~PP~~. tral Enrry Trnininfi standnrtls, 

$-;J,, , '.L.i.:-- Dc5pit.r sorno rx- while other sranrlccs' studcnt.~ live 

pectcrl p~owing pntns ~ssocinted hl pcrrnanrnt party hatracks and 

with inregrn Ling nnrl nrcornmodai- 1 nrr sfiorrl~d many more prlvllrgna. 

plishjng our trninin~ missjon- of 

the Coursc :lrlvisory Gmups strew 

the importiinrc of rcgulnr preventive nl'tintpnance rrromrncnd 

thnt thc propam of instruction 

inr tllc nrrrls of' all Four rrr~irr~r, 1 Ijiffercnccs in tbes~ polieles some- rr~l"irrments sddrr.cs thr rnailltcjoint s~rvicc cnnstruction cngjnrrr I times nffect grnduntinn rnte!: and 1 """'' rquil)- 

trsininc is R ~~UCCPSC. t'ositiv~ and 1 cai~ro mornlr. prohlrrns, hrlriition- """'- "I1 ipvelr, rrp~cr-uniqi~r 

product iv~ rrxidts arcu visil,le to ally, sturlrnts ;\nd instrt~rtors ;~t "luiprnrnt is csp''cix''v 

iloth train~r~ ancl sti~dents. Unifor- Fnrt I,cnnnrd Itrood remain und~r 

miry a(. training and int~ropcl.alii1- 1 thi, cnrnmnnd irlld control of thr 

mflintnin. The tcchnirnl, manuals 

for thnse itrn- ooftn are mi pain^ 

ity 3rnong scrvicrs are nrccptrd ah individr~nl srrvrcr, with duty at thr t'ifficu't ohtni'l. Rccnusc 

rrnl ndvnntngrs Masf kill rr=r~llir~- joint roursts d~rir~~ rhtis ~rainlng th" 44rmy mcch'tnirs '" less farnilrn~nis row ue thc. ramp iilr 111 rrr- ,~~rior!r. A comjqlnnr rr,:tinnship d i"r with spr,rp-lllliqur eflui~lnlcntVIPP.~. cx~~pt for wme st-lvtce-untrlire nprra:ior~nl cantrol sho111tI rxjst '(:an ixntiunxl 

Pcfuipnrrnt. lncr-rspn*~cr. trn~ning b~twrrn th~ four xrrrir~s rn nllrzri- pqllipment lowrr 

riicn~~mgcs rvrryonc to rnn~ntain I ate rornn~unic~tion proh1c.m~. thr mt~s for rommon ct~u~prnrnt. 

?li~h ~CVCIS nf profi~ws~nt~nlis~n, pnr- Another nrrn nf cnncrrn is thr 1 On fliil othrr hnncl. use of clil'f~rticularl!- in conzolril:itrd i3sk.c: ~n- ir?structur m trng. s~-stcm. As 37s. C"t '"C'"c"r crquipment hns pomp 

vuivinq ~nulti~lr s~rvirrs. 1 Cannip \IJclrh. T~chnical ljircctor. I (C~ntlniirrl nil pow 41) 
The Hornet: 

A Wide-Area Munition 

B? Major Grrgopt Fields 

he Ammy recently completed chanaed to (1) hand-~mplsr~d. (2) 1 HOW the Hornet Works 

dev~loprnent of the world's hand-emplnced with two-way I 

T he Hornet is a 35-pnund 

munition d~signetl to dptect, id~ntify. tmck, engage, 

and defcnt moving tnr~sts up tn 

T-PO rhss tanks at rrtnges up tn 

100 meters. It cnn be arrn~d 

first wide-area munit ion colrm~unicatjnn and red~ployability 

IMTAM). The M93 hand-~rnplmed and (3 d~ep-atk~ck. 

WAM, popularly known as the I Hornet. fL~lfills the Army's need for Initially, contracts wpm na lethd. deployable rnunitierl that wnrrl~d to twn contractors. 

will defeat nrmnred x~e.elfic]Ps fit and Mljant T~chs~strms' WAhl prohwond direct-&e mnges. The 

Hornet is the first in fady of 

totype was bilscd on the sensp and 1 nmnunlly or rpn~otpl~ bythe M7 1 

destroy nrmor (SAIIARM) artil- 1 hlcld~ll~lr Pack Mine Syst~ln 

Hornet rlerivatives that a 

Z~P way an~neers fight md how we 

will influence t h~ bnttle. 

The Hornet program began in 

1986 with n Department of the 

hmv message. A required operational c;lplihilrtv document uFas 

approved in 1990 that outlined 

prioritizpd, tkree-phascd WhM 

rlevelopm~nt plan: (1) rtpepwarhend. Textron Defensp 

Syst~ms' prototme was based on 

thpir U.S. fir Force pxtenrlPdmnge ~ntiarnlor munition pmtntype. Textron won a 1990 camremote corztrnl unit. 

n~f~re empl,?ccment. the 

soldier rpmnves the Hornet's 

active hntterv from th~ shipping 

rnntainer ~tlcl inserts it for circait 

attack, (2) hand-emplaced, and (3) or renrote nrrning is determined. 

Volcano-ernplaced. With the 

the Soviet union and 

the risp in importRnce of emlv. 

ent.~ op~rations. the priority was 

petition and is now the sole I~sting. The Hornet rc~mes with 

contmctor. They are continuing , the main reserve ~PII battery 

developmpnt and testing, with 

typ~ classification sdlcdul~tl for 

, 3rd quarter ~~~fi. 

The Hornet is nl~out to ent,er the tarpt switch 1s s~t (to attack 

enrhedded in the mur~tion, and lt 

is not activat~cI until final nrn~in~. 

Nso before emplacement, mnn~inl 

low-r~te production and will he 

fielded at Fort Bragg befinnjn~ in 

only heavv, tracked VP~~CIPH, or all 

tracked vehjcl~s). and a selfJuly lgg8. d~struct time is s~l~cted. The four 
April 1996 

Analysis Commandconfirmed this 

as useful but nlso identified better 

uses. 

In a march to contact or 

meet in^ engagement situation. 

an enemy force will use rands to 

maximize speed. Hornets ernplayed in clusters of 3-6 munit ions 

, will rfisrript This movement by 

standard family of scatterable 

mines self-destn~ct times (4 

hours, 48 hours, 5 days. or 15 

days) am av~ilable, as well as a 

30-day self-destruct, time. 

The soldier exits the area nRer 

emplacing and throwing the armengage targets under 5 nletric 

tnns.) Hornets currently attack 

only tracked vehicles. but foliow-on 

manual arming, the safe se- over the left rear deck. In each j causing casualties and tlrowin~ 

puatinn time is 5-6 minutes, after ' case, the hot spot that the ! off t,iming and coorriinatinn. This 

which time the Nomet will suhrnunitinr~'~ infrared sensor sees tactic is called the gar~nflet, One 

1 

enable swilrh and before the end 

nutomatirally arm For remote 

arming, the safe separation time is 

30-36 minutes. At the end of the 

safe separation time (either 

manual or remote), micrndetonators sever the cable holding 

the Hornet's eight legs in place, 

and the munition snaps upright. 

Ths visual cue (a Hornet with legs 

deployed) indicates that it is 

armed or at least no longer safe to 

approach. A remote arm command 

may be s~nt up fa G0 days after the 

arm-ennhle switch is thrown, 

An armed Hornet goes to 

power cycling "~Eeep" mode until 

the g~ophone seismic sensor 

detects R potential target, 

usually at mnges of up to 600 

meters. This alerts the munition 

to start listening with its three 

microphones, which are dso 

deployed at legs-down. The 

Hornet tracks the two loudest 

noise sources it hears and attacks 

the louder of the two when it 

reaches the closest point of 

approach ta the munition. 

Refnre the Morilet attacks, 

pound platform electronics w 

through a sophisticated nnalysis 

and decision process to ensure the 

submunition is properly programmed to engage the target. It 

determines if the tar@. 1s moving 

left,-ta-right or right-to-left. is 

wheeled ar tracked. and is heavy 

or light, (The Hornet does not 

variants will ~ngafie heavy, 

wheeled vehjcZes as well. If the 

target is a tank, the Hornet 

determines if it is diesel Or 

turbine tank. and if it is a Russianof the safe separation time. For , style tad with the exhaust port 

is at a diff~rmt offsr: from the refineinent in to switch deeper 

engine deck Irenr for dipsel, left gauntlet clusters to detonate tanks 

rear for Russian. RRT! in the only, so lighter reconn,?issxnc~ 

exhaust plurn~ for a turbine). vehicles will falsely report the 

Properly pronammed. the route as clear. Once committed to 

si~bmuriition launches like a skeet 1 the mute. tnrlks encounter these 

at R 30-degree angle. It precesses clusters whle the reconnaissnnct! 

(wobbles) as it flies out so it can vehlcles enccrunter attacks by later 

scan t.he grnund in overlap pin^ clusters. A secnnd refinement is to 

circks. Fly-out time to the 1.00- , use ths tactic in conjunction with 

meter range is about 3-4 seconds. ' the lavout af the road network to 

Once over the target, the sub- ! iniruence the enemy commander's 

munition fires its explosively 

formed penetrator warheacl at the 

appropriate offset from the vehicle 

hot spot to achieve a mobility kill. 

The warhead can penetrate any 

vehicle on the rear deck and moat 

on the t~~~~troof. 

Not a Mine 

he Hornet began ZLS a 

sophisticated off-route, reinforcing mine- But after 

study, it became clear that it was 

more correctly a short-range, 

nut nnomous antiarmor system-a 

robot with a shoulder-fired antitank weapon. The difference is 

explained below. 

The original Elornet concept 

' route selection. This use elevates 

engineer operations to the direct 

attack of enemy planning and 

execution at re~mental and divisional echelons. 

A thrd use of the Hornet. was 

cletermirled in modeling at the U.S. 

Army Engineer School by examining enemy n~ovements h~- 

tween his approach march and 

assauIt formations. At 5 kilometers or nne terrain featur~ from 

our positions, Russian doctrine 

requires regiments and battdions 

to change from column of march to 

coIumn of companies and colrimn 

of platoons. In ths scenario, 

Hon~cts are laid in a lnrp 'X" 

pattern (a Uomet~r on each side) 

ta disrupt ths prebattle activity a.5 

was to hZ1 breaching vehicles as the enemy changes formations (set. 

they led an attack thro~l~h fipre). This causes casualties and 

I conventional or scatterable mine- conf~tsion at, a critical timing ~int 

fields. Hornets would be laid in in the area where the regimental ' front of these minefields to artillery pup will set up to 

achieve this effect. The TRADOC I support the attack. 
Hand-Emplaced WAM Area Disruption 

Obstacle 

I 

20 Munitions In 5 Clusters 

T~P~P uses of the Hornet are 

impossil~le (or logistit-ally pmhibjtive) for conventional and 

scntt~r~hle mines. Anti while the 

Hornet can b~ USP~ tn install a 

linear obstnclr, the munition's 

100-meter range is as much of a 

liability as an asset. When one 

enemy v~hid~ breaks clear of a 

min~fielrl, it might leave n 4- 

meter path; but when one enetny 

VPII~CIP CIPRIS a WAhZ obstacle, it 

clmrs R much wider swath. 

Characteristics 

m h~ Hornet is R first1 ; ' generation. autonomous. 

' sn~art antiarmor munition, ItF IlnitlUp capahiljties ' 

jl tn hr: employed in a variety OF 

rn i ssions: 

Perf~rmflnce. 

a Es survivable in severe climatic and chemical environment.~ and is not affected by a 

hgh-altitude electromagnetic 

pulse- Ilnrnpt is certified 

multiple muntl~t clu~trrs and 

sjn~le-,area disn~ption patterns is a 

platoon 

Hornet pmplacPment he 

IZRlO common task In7titutinn;ll 

tr:hing for snlrLers ant1 Ieaders 

will hegin in m97. Sup~rvisory 

tasks wdl be taught in the Basic 

~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~ oficer aursp, 

while leaders wsll learn Hnrnet 

tactics, techniques. and proc~d~lr~s 

deconbaminahle only h~fore 

u Attacks valid tsrgpts to rrmoval from its stornp ron. 

ranps of 100 meters, and any 

tarvet approachi~~e: within 15 

meters. 

o Can h~ placed on slopes of up 

to 15 dejirees on almost any 

t ainer. 

3 Can OPPT~~P in all wpfither 

conditions. However, its sensors arp somewhat aff~cted by 

we~ther conditions, such as soi 1 and surface type. rain, snow, and very heavy I in the Engineer Officer Basic and 

fog, that weaken sound and , 

The fcrlEowin~ doctrinal puhlieations will be revis~d t.o include 

Hornet information: FM 20-32, 

Mi.n~/ Counterm inr Op~rattons; 

ITvI 90-7, Comhinrd Arms Ohstncle Intt?gmfion; FM 5-100, En- 

~inwr Operrrtions; and F'M 5-71- 

100, Di.uision Fnginccr Cornhat 

Operations. 

Command and cnntrol measures will parallel those required 

for hand-~mplac~d mines. Finn1 

decisions will depend on 

St,andardizerE North Atlxnt is 

Treaty Orgnnizntion Agreements 

(STANAGs) currently under discussion. Tlze draft STANAG 

requirw form similar to the DA 

Other CItnrnrteristtcs. 1 thermal signatures. 

3 C.ontnins no explosives in 

the ground -platform modules. 

Launch is by a chemical gas 

generator. If distnrbed, tb~ 

Hornet will quick-fire and t,he 

suklct will detonate immediately On launch* In a'1 crispsthe ~~~~~-p'~~~~~~' @lect 

ics will hurn themsrlves out 

on launch to pr~cI~rde intelli- 

, 

~~~i~i~and ~~~t~ ine 

B efitming in 1997, the mnrbat 

training centers will receive 

the M97 cnIlective training 

device. In 1998. t.he M93 handemplacer1 WAM will he fielded. and 

the train in^ support rentcrs will 

Renw use if captured. 

Can he transporter' 

ship, or aircraft,. It is exterrial ly tr~nsportal~le hy helicnpter but is not yet certified 

for airdrop. A singl~ C-141 

receive the M98 inclixidud training 

drvice. The M98s will he fielded in 

seh of 20 to support platoon-level 

training. on the emplar~ment of 

multiple gnuntIet clusters md 

sin&-,-a fisruption patterns. 

aircraft can carp Squads can emplace inhidud 

Hornets. gauntlet clusters, llrrt emplacing 
* 

4 

- . 

- -- - The Horr-~et undergoes extensive devefoprnsntal lesring at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, to suhstan:iat~ system 

design reliability. 

Form 1355 that shows the 

pnsitiorl of each Hornet and an 

outline of the 100-meter Iethcll 

aresls) encnrnp~ssed by them. 

Emplacement authority r~sides at 

Corps llntil delegatetl. 

The fMF program will add an 

acoustic averwateh sensor, lonp 

haul cornrnunic~tian capability, 

mission. The Hornet helps to fr~e 

overtasked engineer resources for 

more efficient use on high-priority 

and local computer control to the combat missions. In short, the 

emplaced Hornets to coordinate 

such artions aa wh~n and what 

targets to encage. 

The Future 

nver a single-chann~l. pund-toair raho system (SINCGARS} to an 

Army common hardware comHnrnet provid~s U.S. forces with a 

significant advanta~e over opposing forces. It can support and 

An IMF can repnrt the individual influenre direct- and indirect- fir^ 

tar~~ts identrfied hy the Horn~~?, battles as well as influence enPmy 

evelopmant has hegun on 1 nppraschingakraft and personnel, 

the pmtivct improvement and the cnmpnsition and direction 

~ttack, and can caIl for reinfaming tlefield and expands the parafires. It cnn dm adjust t.h~se fires , meters of control and irfuenc~ 

far maximum effect. Employed 1 that affect the flow of battle. 

decision-making. tirnetahl~s. and 

maneuver at the regimental and 

PIP Hornet can be turned off and 

queried to confirm its statrls. If the 

legs aren't deployed. it can be 

picked up and moved fa a new 

location. If th~y we deployed the 

Hornet reports every target it 

hems tx~ the contml unit. Prior to 

launch, it reports the type of target 

it is aholrt to attack. A pmplanned 

PEP for R repeabr to extend thp 

comm~inication range is scheduled 

for 4-8 years after field in^ of the 

PIP Hornet. 

Development of the intelligent 

minefield (IMP;3 begins in 199R. 

propam PIP) Hornet. The 

PIP adds two-way communication 

puter control unit, with a line-ofsi~ht mnp of 3.5 kilomet~rs. The 

at~tonomously, the IMF can 

participate In oo~mntemonnzlisof enemy formations. An IMP can 

sance, 'Pen flanks. or cover 

tact fisk meas. When emplaced 

deep, the IMF can cue deep strikes 

hv &illpw Or Rdiust &llcrv 

divisional levels. The Hornet adds 

Major Fie/& is fhp ?hip{ fhp 

Mines Brancft, TRAWOC .Sytcnt hfc~ rlager, Engirirrr Comhnt S,wtcrns. J'rrtlious assignmfnt.s include Fncilify , , - d kes, alld Aport subsequent 

presence tn RsseRs hatt'e d'mRgp nr 

cue follow-on strikes. Developm~nt 

I n bnrffelor of sricrtrr drgrw in En~ineers' premier munition sys- I ntechanlcar' enpfn~rrina from Alawait until the middle of a column to I another dimension to the hatConstruct [on Rrsrnrch and D~i~rlopmPnt Offices and .4~~istanl I'roject 

hfanager for tlrt! ,?pnse and Ilcstrqv 

A,,,, {S~ARM) PrDewm. at 

of a dedi~zted deep-attack WPLM 

variant will hegin in 2000. 

. . -. It ~ves 'Om- bamn Agrieultrrral and M~rhaniml 

manders greater flexibility on the IJN iuersity and o bachelor of science in 

4, . Picatinny Ars~nal, NPUI J~rsey. A 

graduate of !he Contrnnnd and. GPR- 

~h~ H~~~~~ is the corns of cmI Staff Cnll~g~, hfujor Fields holds 

20 Engine~r April 1996 

battlefield, allowing enQneers to 

hetter support thp count~rrnohility 

mrospace ~n~irre~ring. from Georgia 

In~til?iip fl/ Tr~h nolog>'. 
The Maneuver Support 

B-Y Li~trlersanl Cnlnnel Johri *Job nson and Jarqrrclinc Gtrthri~ 

Aprii 19-96 

ort Leanard Wood's leaders 

asp. paving th~ uiny for the 

installation to transition 

Frnm the U.S. Army Engineer 

Center to the U.S. Amty Manellver Support Center MASCEN). Its hirth b~gan with 

Congressional approval of the 1995 

Bast? Realipnrn~nt and Closure 

(BRAC) Commission recornmendation to close Fort McCl~llfin, 

Alabama. nncl mow the Chpmjcal and Military Police Schools 

here. Fort Leonard Wnod's ?'ransition Office is facilitating the 

prncpss sn the new MANSCEN 

will he up mil running by late 

1999. Its structure and function 

concepts will mature throughout 

the trans~tion process. 

'Shis new consolidated center 

fits into the TRADOC corn. 

rnnndcr's visinn of the future. 

General William Hartzog sees 

TRAQOC as eventually becoming 

enduring battlefield function. Fort I 

Leonard Wond's Maneuver Sugport C~nt~r will he one of these 

centers. It will be linked to 

numerous satcll~tes, whuh n~r 

or~ariizations that conduct func. 

tianal training for centers. 

The h;lRNSCEN include 

three drmy branch schmlnolsEn~neer, Chemical, and Militarv 

Police-as w~ll as Fort Leonard 

Wood. It will also have a consolidated Noncommissioned Officer 

Academy. A hattl~ lab will he created wjthn the organizational 

hamework af the ce~lter. These 

additions will chan~c! the current 

Engineer Center h~lt will henefit 

all who train here after the MANSCEN is nctivatpd- primary 

bellefit will hp the battlefield synergv dprivprf from the combined 

tr~1n.n~ and doctrine ~PVP~OPment of the three schools. 

I The operational concept, of the 

New Missions 

h~ Military Police SrhonI 

curr~ntlp trains more than 

14.000 law ~nforc~ment nfficia13 n~munll!~. A joint ser\4.~ 

operation, it trains salcliers of all 

ranks. The Chemical School is the 

only onp of its kind in the worlrl. 

Each year, it tranns more thm 

6,000 U.S. ant1 foreign students. 

both military and civilian. The 

schnols are similnr to the Engineer Schnol in that their pessonnel also rlevelnp rioctrine, force 

structure. and material requirpments for their corps. T~P thrw 

hrnnches also haw similar officer 

ancl norlconlmissinned officrs 

courses and train their entry-Ievel 

in much tilp samp waythrough one-station 

(OsUT). All training 

I Will he cflnductert in the school 

complex. 

Military Polier School 

adcfition to basic rr~ninE, militmy policp personllel recPive sppda]ized instruction in wr3pons, 

commu~cotions, seeuity pmcetllres, ~h~~ train in four ma ill 

,,,,: 

r Managing battlefield circula- 1 tion. 

an organization of centers and sat- ' new MANSCEN consolidates 

cllites. A center is nil organization 

~-pnponsihle for all activities 

related tn nn endur~nn battlefield 

f~inetinn such as maneuver, 

maneuver support. battIp cornmand and fires. Each branch of 

most nonteaching functions of thr 

three schools and some of the 

officer and noncommissioned oficer ~ducntian. The commnndant of 

each school will have supervisory 

control over the development of 

the Army is aligzlerl with a center 

hased on the predominate ~ctivlties of the branch that relat~ to an 

branch-specific. training and warfighting doctrine, materiel, and 

organizat,ions. 
tnse Opt 

nent 

C.-?-. !- - 

BRAC 95 Opportunity 

School Consolidation and Reengineering = MANSCEN 

NCOA 

Battle Lab 

Corn bat Development 

r 3 

'I Fort Leonard Wood 

Leauer aralnlo~ Training Center 

$q 

* F 

Providing area serunty. 

Processing enemy prisoners of 

war. 

Maintaining law and order. 

Military police are responsible 

assist Inany local, state, anri 

national law enforcement organizations such as state police; the 

Eurenzl of Alcohol, Tnhacro, and 

.Firearms; ant1 t.he Federal Bureau 

of Investigation. 

both intact and bombed-out structures. Soldiers will learn t,o take 

advantage nf t.h~ terrain. to know 

whew to look for snipers. and to 

secure their arms. 

for battlefield circulation. which 

is n~nna~ng th~ flrd~r of troops on 

the hat tlefi~ld. They rnaintaln 

area securitv hy ps~venting the 

enemy from enter in^ US. areas 

nf op~mtion. Military polic~ prowss enc.my prlsclners of war by 

managing the confinement facilities. They ~naintain law and order 

in m11ch the same way as their 

civilian cnunterpnrts. 

Military police receive specialpurpose training in fraud inv~stigation. combat in^ terrorism, hostage negotiation, and protective 

srrvices. Th~y also support the 

growing nlission area of counternarcotics for the nepartm~nt of 

D~fense. It1 that arena. thcy 

Snme military police training is 

condt~cted at a military operations 

in urban terrain (MOUT) facility. 

On Fart. Lcnnard Woad, this trin- 

~~,~~i~~, school 

Chemical OSUT tralning includes a basic training se~ment: 

I ing will takr place in a 16-building. howev~r, ch~rnicd corps soldiers 

complex where soldiers can przc- 1 eon ti nu^ their training by l~arning 

tice fi~htinfi in nn url~nn environ- n'mutment. MOUT training enables Smoke ohscurants. 

rnilitnp policp to perform their , H~~~ 

jobs with eonficlencp in built-up 

arms. I Chemical defense. 

The MOUT site benefit 

soldiers on post. For ~xunple. 

engineers nften create or rlestroy 

These topics are not only fin 

impo*,~nt pad of training for new 

recyl'its hut for thp ranks 

ohstacl~s in an urban ~nviron- also. 

ment Soldiers use different terh- 1 Chemical corp solrliers lei>m to 

niques tvh~n fighting among use smoke ohscurants to camoubuildings, and the hlOUT village flage operations nnd strat~gic tar- i will prnvide a training site with 1 gets from emmp forces. Thcy 
create smoke seraens wlth generators thzt atomize a clean, lightweight s~~bstnnce call~d fnc nil. 

which is similar to mineral oil. 

Smoke helps dccreas~ nur cnsudtips on the hattlefi~ld arid lessens 

th~ eff~rtiv~nes~ of modern Pnemv 

wenpons snch ,-is optically -guided 

systems and certain ~nfrar~d S~Strrns. 

Anath~r area of chemical corps 

training is flame nperations, 

ivhich is similar to expedient 

flarn~ explosive training for pnpnpprs. Tn the field, existing fiwpnwer may he augmented with 

exploding and illuminating flame 

field-expedient devices such as 

fnugass~s, flarn~ mines, flame 

trenches, and husch flares. 

Chemical defense training for 

chemical corps soldiers ref~rs to 

the Departm~nt of Deknsc 

requirement to train snldiers to 

survive on a hattlefteld with 

nuclear, hiolofical, or chemical 

contamination. The training 

teaches th~m how tn use protective gear and to d~contaminntr! 

thpir eclulpment. 

Soldiers l~arn chemical d~tectinn and dernntaminat,ion with 

simulated agents and decantamination materials. Tr~inin~ includes lectures. films, d~monst rations. and practjcal exercises. After they hpcome profici~nt, soldiers participate in n 

final training exercise in a specially desi~ned facility with 

stringent safety nnd ~nvirnnrnental controls. 

New Facilities 

A lthori~h some of the missions corning with the MiZitary Police and Chemical 

Schools will he acconimodated 

with existing, excess facilities on 

Fort Lronard Wood, BRAC 

'The primary 

derived from the 

comhined training 

and d~ct~rine dvelopment of the three 

schools." 

Environmental 

Stewardship 

I actinns h~ve g~neratad a construction requirement totaling 

mnrr than $200 million. Specid- 1 

I jzed tmini1-t~ fficitities consti tut~ 

the hulk of the construction. with 

~nlisted personnd housing. Reneral-purpose administr~tive spac~, , and some range modlficatjonn 

I making up th~ haiance. Construet.ion planned for the new MANo protect the economic, natural, ancl snciaI envirnnmcnts that moving the 

Wlltnry Police and Chemical 

Schools to Fort LRnnsni Wood 

muld disrupt, past oFf~cixls are 

I 

warktng with a contract agency to 

develop an environmental impact 

statement. It is part of the legal 

requirements of the: Nation~l 

SCEN will he disc~~sssd in more 

! detail in a follow-t~p article in the 

nest issue of ENGINEER. 

One of the most challenging 1 projects is the Chemical Defense Training Facility. Contractnrs will construct this fncility 

under strict environm~ntal and 

safety controls, and it will b~ 

operated under the same strict 

g~iidelines. 

EnvimnmenLql Policy Act (NEPA) 

of 1969, whch federal zi~encics 

must complete when they conduct 

.a large operation that aff~rts th~ 

envjmnn~ent. NEFA is an informational tool to Pnsuse that federal agpncies cnnsi d~r 

anvironn~ent~l impacts when 

making decisions. It also pmvitl~s 

comrnun!t~es an opportunity to 

participate in the planning. 

To meet this requirement, Fnrt 

Leorlnrd Wnod h~Id an open house 

in Navelnb~r 1095 tn g~tber cornrnunity opinions. suggestinns. 

and concerns. post 0fflcia1s had 

alrt*i-iriy develap~d tentative plans 

for trair~ing sites, IInwever. they 

wanted cainmunity rnemh~rs to 

I 

off~r thpir prnpnsals in casp there 

were asp~cts that the post had not, 

considered. Public cornin~nts arp 

an int~g-ral part of the environ. 

m~ntal statement. 

The entire NEPA process and 

environment31 impact st~tement 

preparation take Gom 12 to 18 

months. Once this document is 

complete, it must be approv~cl up 

thmugh the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army. Then, in Janrlary 1997, 

contractors will break wound to 

hegin huild~ng and modifying 

facilities and training areas in 

preparation for the new MANSCEN missions coming to Fort 

Leonard Wood. - u 

I 

Lirrrtenan t Colonel Johnson is 

thP director of the Transition 

assist an.^^ Office at Fort Leonard 

Wood. Prerlious assignm~nts in - 

cludr Dir~clor of Public Works nnd 

8.3 and XO. 1st Engin~er Brigade, 

Fort Txonard Wood. 

Ms. Guthrie is n public affairs 

specialifit at the U.S. Army Engineer C~nter k PII blic Affairs Offrrc 

and assistant editor of ESSAYONS, the post newspaper. 

April 19.56 Engim~r 23 
Embracing Change: 


Reflections From the Chief of Engineers 


By Lieutenant General Arthur E. Williams 

S ince I expect lo retire soonafter more than 33 years in the 

Army-th editor of ENGINI3I4R asked me to u~rite an article 

that speak directly to Army engineers, both military and ciuilian. 

"Kind of a heart-to-heart chat ouer a 

cup of coffee,"she said, to discuss 

issues I consider important and to 

pass on aduice based on mv Armv 

experiences. I gladly accep;ed the 

offer, so let me giue it a shot. 

Pride and Enjoyment 

A	s I reflect on what I've enjoyed about my career, the 

common thread is the satisfaction of working with great people. 

I've enjoyed their professionalism, 

selfless service, dedication, and caring. I've enjoyed watching them 

develop individually and as teams. 

I've enjoyed celebrating their accomplishments in producing services and 

executing tough missions. 

I'm extremely proud of the engineer family, which includes the active 

and reserve components, military personnel and civilians, the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (USACE), the U.S. 

Army Engineer Center and Fort 

Leonard Wood, engineer troop units, 

the public works teams, and those 

people working engineer actions on 

Army joint and combined staffs. 

Regardless of what part of the engineer family a person hails from, each 

is important to the success of the 

overall mission. 

If I had to leave just one piece of 

advice with the Army engineer family. I'd tell you to continue to be the 

professionals you've always been; continue to be dedicated to providing 

quality, selfless service to the nation: 

and take time to have some fun along 

the way! 

Mentoring 

Although I've never been the 

recipient of a formal mentoring program, there were many 

peopl~ whose leadership styles I 

watched during the years. And I 

learned a lot from each of them. In 

most cases, the people I respected were 

not aware that I was watching them. 

One person 1 admired in particular 

was Major General Ernie Edgar, who 

was my battalion commander in Vietnam. As he approached retirement. I 

told him, "Whether you realize it or not. 

Ernie, you've been my mentor for many 

years." Major General Edgar replied, 

"Although you didn't realize it, 1 was 

trying to be a good mentor for you." 

I've also learned a great deal from 

our noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

corps. No other army comes close to 

having an NCO corps as strong as 

ours. Although I've had the honor of 

serving with many outstanding NCOs, 

I'd like to mention two of them. One I 

served with at the beginning of my 

career and the other in my current 

(and final) active duty assignment. 

When I was a captain, the Army sent 

me straight from Germany to Vietnam. 

In Germany 1 had been a company commander, and when I joined the 87th 

Engineer Battalion in Vietnam, I asked 

to be a mmpany commander again. My 

request was approved, and I was 

assigned to Bravo Company. 

The Bravo Company first sergeant was Lindsey Bowers, and he 

was a model NCO. From him, 1 

learned the importance of being 

technically competent, setting and 

maintaining high standards, and 

looking out for the welfare of soldiers. He retired as a command sergeant major. We've kept in touch. 

and he's been to all my promotion 

ceremonies since I became a brigadier general. He also attended the 

change-of-command ceremony when 

I became Chief of Engineers. 

As I close out my Army career, I've 

had the pleasure of working for 

almost four years with Command Sergeant Major James Skellion, the 

USACE Command Sergeant Major 

and the Sergeant Major of our Engineer Regiment. He's another model 

NCO and a leader for others to emulate. Each day, Command Sergeant 

Major Skellion reinforced the lessons 

Lindsey Bowers taught me many 

years ago. I have the utmost admiration and respect for Command Sergeant Major Skellion. Our Army is 

strong today because of leaders like 

Command Sergeants Major Bowers 

and Skellion. 
April 19.96 Ihgine~r 25 

Advice to Leaders 

haw always been ~ratetul to 

thos~ who guided me during my m rawer, and I'd like tc) pass on n 

fr~-r. Iesannn I've learned alon~ t,hr 

WRY. Tll~re are four principles that 1 

hplipvp are vital fnr l~aders in the forrnativp ye~rs of their careers. 

'me first is fxaining. You must pt 

dE the frnining that's exp~&d of you to 

do th~ jnh. If YOU'W an ofricer in a trm~ 

unit, you nerd t~ seek out your strnng I 

NCOs and listen to th~rn. AR I said ear1iprm OUT Army has a superh NCO corps. 

and thrv are an invaluable learning 

resource for ~oun~ oflcers. 

Next, lenders need to h~ flexihl~. 

Don't stay in a cnmfort lane-try different joha find new rhdlenges. You 

xlsn must he willing; tn move. .M~ving 

has always heen a way of life for soldiets. and civilinn advancem~nt 

within the Corps is increasingly tipd b 

task is t.o lead th~ir organieation intn 

th~ Iutur~. 

As part of their future focus. senlor 

leaders m~d to prepre for their next 

ansignment. The preparation For 

future ns.cignments IS not for selrs~rving purpo.s~s. lnst~ad, ~t is based 

, on the €undnm~ntaI issup or what pmyourself tn integrating civilinns into 

planning ~ffn~ts From th~ h~ginn~ne. 

Trust is th~ key and good, two-u"ay 

rnmmlanicatifln is n~~fkd to h~llld thp 

reqtljsite trust h~twe~n military pPrsonnel antlriviliana. 

Given the size of todxv's Armr, WP 

can't EO it alnne with strictly military 

this is an mea where we our 

eV~n@nce for the ben~fit of the Army 

"nd the natlnn. 

Disaster Operations 

I havp RJWU~S heen proud of how 

the Corps of Engineers, hot11 

military ancl civilian, responds 

to C~IMS~P~S~VPR~ aft~r yefir. Wh~th~r 

it':: a flood, an earthilu~ke. nr a hurricaw, we always get more volunteers 

thnn WP can use trr assist in disaster 

relief. These volunteers t~spond with 

all the expert is^ and prnfes~ionalisrn 

heing willing to mme. What~ver joh and effertlveness. We livp in a 

ynu nre assigned, dn the very hest you world which produces reams of 

fesstnnal development needs to wc~r forces. WP never hnv~ in the past, 

now to be reativ to better senv the WP'V~ ~lwav4 had rivilians suppartiny 

Corps and the Army in the future. 1 militap nperatinns in various ways. 

fn this ypcmd, en~ineers n~prl tn Granted. we've not had as many ribIpuratre joint nssipments. Some pea- Ian!: involved in militnr~ np~rntions in I 

can, and do not be overlv roncerned 

pl~ nvnid joint a~signrnents. 3 consider 

th~s a rnjstake h~cause ~olnt ~ssimmerits will not FO away. If anything. 

thay'lt pmhahly InCrPasP. J tanft imag- 

 in^ the Corps or thp Armv Pver executing nn operation that is not at ]past 

joint ;md probably comhin~d. 

srnior leadcrs must know 

how to harness a\,aiJahle and emerging technology and know how to 

leVerilRP technoloEy tfl increase effi. 

instant ,l,t,, Senlor lparlets milst 

make sure they are trained to do 

their jot, and your r~spnnsihiljt~l tn 

look nut for their welfare. 

the past. hut civilians alwnvs 

thprp. we need to ~mhrac~ thp 

trend toward Dexter civlli~nlzatinn of 

military nvprations and fi~re out 

'0 make it work Civilians arp a 

POM~~~VP addition our military 

~nrleavors and ~se~ntial tn S~ICFPAP~LIII~ 

~ccomplishing our missions. 

, 

0"~ last thought on this subject. 

M~llt"~-~'c"Ji]ian operations are n0t.h. 

 in^ new for the Corps Kngjnppm* 

ahnut m~king an honest mistake. 1 knna what data to tap into. how tn 

Civilians in Military 

operations 

Third, as Lindsey Rowers t~u~ht 

me, i~adem milfit and m~ntajn 

h~gh standards. This appl~es not nnly 

in yovnllr suhordinat~s hut alsn to yourself. 

Finnlly. I~aders must take cRre of 

th~ people ~ntrusted to them. 

Wh~ther you're a platoon leader. a 

r~~ident ~nginser, or 8 staff offic~r, 

you arp responsible fnr the lives nf 

penpl~, Et is vour r~aponsihllitv tn 

you'd exp~ct, hut what's r~allv notrcpable is th~ir caring attitude and pPrsonal d~dic~tion to h~lping the 

quickly port ~t, and how tn use that 

data ~FFectiv~lv to make Faster and 

hpttpr decisions, 

F~nnIly, a must For every on^--but 

especiall~ for senior leaders-is the 

.bilIt?, to cammunjcntp both vprI bally and in writing, yo matter hnw 

jn,jivjdual is. thp inability 

erMtively rnmmunjratp undermInPS his p~ctivPnPss. 

victims, 

ovFtr the I've spFn the 

results of many disasters Sirst-hand. 

In very instante, I cannot begin to 

express how proud 1 have been of the 

Corps &am. In the last. four ypnss, For 

example. the Corps played n major 

role in the aftermath of hurricanes 

Andrew. Iniki, Opal. and Marilyn. 

The Corps t.mk part in the recnvprv 

from the hs Sin~eles earthqunke and 

the record XZidw~st floods nf 1993 and 

1994. And it prov~ded t~chnical nsslstance in the wake ol th~ trnfic hnmhinert of the World Trade Cent~r and 

the Murrah Federal Huildinp in Oklahoma City. 

It is impossible to predict when or 

Thes~ principIes apply tn neninr 

leadprs as well, but I would add a FPW 

thoughts Tor them. Senior IeacIers 

need ~o s~cognize that change i~ necPssar;v and will crrntinue, They need 

to ernhrace ~hnnge ant1 be a champion 

of chanpy where chang~ is appmpriatp. I am not talking ahout chanap for 

thp sake of change; I am talking 

about change that improves an 

organization's abilitv to executp its 

mission. 

Seninr leaders must have a hroad 

perspective nn what the Corps and 

the Army are ahorrt-particularly in 

th~se chall~nging times. S~nior lendE arlj~r 1 mentioned the iwue of 

chnnae. One that we AT^ 

h~~nnrng to sep the trend 

to~vard more rivili~ns in areas of operatlnns. This includes both Depwtm~nt of Defense civilians ~nd pnuate 

contractors. Our recent experiences in 

Somalia. Rwanda. and Haiti and our 

ongoing operations in Bosnia illustrate the increasing presence of civilians in military np~rations, I'm sure 

this trend will continue, and we'll 

probahlv see an ever-increasin~ level 

of support that civilians provide. 

I Combining military nnd eisilim 1 ers ne~d to deal with current issues, capahiliti~s requires a team effort find 

hut prohahky their mest importruzt a positive approach. You must tommlt 
where the next disaster will occur. mand provided outstanding service to Army's engineers have clearly and 

hut the fact that our people provide stability and support operations in consistently demonstrated their 

superb service to the nation during Somalia. Rwanda. Haiti, and cur- value to the nation. 

disasters is part. of the reason the rently in Bosnia. Some of those opera- The engineer troop units (active 

Federal Emergency Management tions were humanitarian, some were duty, reserves, and National Guard) 

Agency (FEMA) frequently calls on peacekeeping, and some were nation- are a vital part of our team. These 

the Corps. assistance. In addition, USACE did engineer soldiers are well-trained, 

Of course, there's also a statutory work for 91 other countries during the highly motivated, and professional. 

reason for why FEMA calls on us. past 12 months, and our people were Right now many of these soldiers are Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is on the ground in 70 of those countries. in Bosnia. As the NATO Implenrentaresponsible for the Federal Response This is another example of the tion Force (IFOR) moved into Bosnia, 

Plan. The Corps is one of 26 federal responsive. quality service that we we watched engineer bridging operaagencies in that act with disaster- can provide the nation across the tions on the Sava River via CNN. It 

assistance responsibilities. But when operational continuum from peace, to was a challenging mission, and I was FEMA calls on the Corps during stability and support operations, to extremely proud of our soldiers as disasters, they know our people will they went about accomplishing their 

be responsive and get the job done! war. mission. 

0 

1 Perhaps the best testimonial to the 

Stability and Support Contributions to the I quality of the Army's engineer solOperations Nation diers came From local Bosnians as 

they watched the Sava bridging operaur response to disasters also Throughout my career, I'V~ seen tions. The people who live in the area 

shows why USACE is ideally the many significant contribu- were amazed; first, that anyone would 

suited to render assistance in tions the Corps of Engineers attempt to bridge the Sava in winter; 

stability and support operationsthe has rnade to the nation. These contri- and second, that we would attempt it 

new term for operations other than war. butions are the result of our superb during flood conditions. Their consenOur command has a wide range of capa- people. sus was that "only the American 

bilities, and some are unique capabilities Our engineer troops are diversi- Army could accomplish such a feat." 

not found in industly or other federal fied, talented, and experienced. We Army engineers got the job done 

agencies. These capabilities run the can put together a team that can han- under difficult conditions, including 

gamut from engineering, to real estate dle whatever might he needed. We cold weather, mud, floods, and a time 

expertise, to contracting, to project man- truly have a world-class organization constraint with the whole world 

agement, and to many others. that is called on time and again to watching. These soldiers were under 

In the past four years, this com- handle tough missions, and the tremendous pressure, but they were 

well-trained. they were superbly led, 

they followed their doctrine, and 

they accomplished the mission. 

You find that throughout the 

Army's engineer units. 

I Reserves and National 

Guard 

S

peaking of the reserves and 

National Guard, they comprise about 72 percent of 

our total engineer strength. Consequently, they are a vital part of 

our total engineer force, and I 

need to focus attention on reserve 

component issues. Brigadier General Anthony R. Kropp, Assistant 

Chief of Engineers for Reserve 

Affairs, is helping me do that. 

When Brigadier General Kropp 

came on board in Sentember 1995. .c .' ..: ' ... 1 . . ... - - . . . 

.... 

-

. 

-- ....',, :~ .- ] I charged him to be'auother set of . ppp .- ~ 

A Corps of Engineers emergency worker assists at the scene of a collapsed eyes and ears for me, and he has 

department store in Korea last year. done an excellent job. 

26 Engineer April 1996 
An M1 tank crosses a bridge built by engineers across the Sava River in Bosnia. 

y gr~atest rliallenge ns the 

WSACE r.ornniandrr has I 

h~en reafructuring the corn - nint~rE. It has been a long. fru~trating. 

frustratinp hecause arp don't cnntrnl 

all th~ variahIcs involv~d. 

41.800 to about 39,300 cll~r~ng th? 

past rour pars, nnd further redurti0n.s will h~ reqirir~d. 

Taking evervthing into cnnsitleration. I think wp've donp n great joh so 

rar in reatr~lct~~rinn, hut much rvork 

rprnains tn he done. Orrr trltimnt~ 

restruct~~rjng Rre to make sure 

that WP emerge wlth an ~ffertivr rrl-gaEle r~c~ntly hostpd n conf~rence fnr ] Iivr in an ern nf ~nlltinu~u:: rhnngeTe. 

the cornrnnnders nf t,he m~jor engi- I .so WP ne~d l,n ~mhracc. it and make it 

new reserve romponent cnrnrnands. work for us. 

Rrstructur~n~ hn.r weighed heavily I 

The feedback 1 rer~iv~rl fmm th~ conkrcnr~ was exceIlent I'm stlre th~ 

conf~rence's output wilt benefit our 

Army as WP con ti nu^ tu wrestle with 

the rn>rriad or issues confronting ok2r 

res~nv cnrnpnnent enginper fnrces. 

on ~v~syhndy in the comm:~nd, But I I 

have rrpnt ~onfi~l~nce in the peopl~ of 

USACE, 1 know that throu~h th~ir I 

Whatever we du in th~ restrr~rt~~r- 

 in^ nrena. WP must maintain A 

fncils nn our custnmers. We're not in 

I~u~iness tn sustain ours~lves; we'r~ 

here to prnvidr servlcp to oth~ru, 

lrnprnvirl~ an alreatlv ~tl~erh record of 

Restructuring 

IPS* sense of s~rvjce. thev will deal 

with restructuring while continuing 

customer SP~V~CP must h~ OUI. number nizxtinn and witl~ quality peoplc whn 

one r~r~orjt~ and th~ tnuch~tnll~ for all I can exerutp the rnrsaionp rntrusted 

to pmvlde tt~p respnnsi\~~ engineer- I 

rcntrurh~rin~ during the last six 

para, I llff~r the rnljowing adv~rr: 

Firat. Pverynne must rexliz~ that 

restructuring is a rontir~untrs proc~ss 

and will prnhnbly he with UY Tr~r 

crtlite FL wllilp. As I snid ~arl~er, wr I 

Coupled with custnrner fnrus is I 

missinn exer~rtion. We must he concerned ahout how inn^ a prrljrrt. takes. In Good Hands 

April 19.W Engin per 27 

thp quality nf our pmduci, clur cost nf I ngineers, hnth military nnrl rio~ng hus~npss, nur performance indi- r~vilinn. h:tve h~cn a vital pnrt catcra and st,nndnrds. and whether 

we're ljvinp up tn th~m. 

Our int~nt in r~struct~rinfi is tn 

enhance hnth custom~r senrice and 

or Am~s~cn's Army fnr more 

tli:in 2111) years. Th~ir contrih~ttions 

indelibly rrcorded in ollr na+ionns 

hiatov. btlnnF ftlur years ns 

rnlssion ererutinn. if'e'r~ nnt only 1 Chir(nfEnEineers3 lure our en^. 

lookifl~ at our nr~flninstinnnf stme- 1 new hmilY continup that lpgncy 

turp but ~l~o recluctng our rnats of Stlrlprh, sprvirp+ atm pmud 

doing h1zxlnese and reviewing ortr 

~US~~PSG prOCPSSPr. Many PrncPsx 

('han~~~ hav~ already t~ken ~larpo 

have hpen part or the Corps familv fnr 

more than 3.7 yenys, 1 hnvP no 

douht that our Ftitur~ is ~n. goori and others nrr anticipnt~rl. hands. 

There l~avp drendy been some sip ( k:.:ssayons! Hao-Ah! 

w 

niLcnnt nrganlentinnal changes. 

WP'VC: TP~LLCP~ our divisinns rrnm 13 1 

to 1 1, and wp're working on plnl~n to Liputcflflnt C~~cr~~ Willi~ma 

Furth~r i-pducp them to eight. Wp'vp 

r~duced nus work fnme frnm ahnut 

~prl~eri fls Chfpf of En~ineprs 

Since 19-92 
The Engineer Sqandl 

Vehicle 

echanized combat ~ngineer squads hvr 

their jvbs cut out for them, both on the 

battlefi~ld and on the wny to the hattlt?field, 

illany of (.he in-transit challenges stem from th~ 

311 13A2 armored personnel carrier, which is the 

stnndard carrier for the squad and its equipment. 

During Operation De~~rt Storm, three major 

deCicierlcies were noted concerning the venerablp 

M 1 13A2. 

Inadequate under-armor payload capacity for 

th~ R~~IRC~ mernbcrs and critkal equipment. 

a Iilferior mchility relativ~ to the supported 

maneuver force of M1 series Abrams tanks and 

M2M3 series Bradleys. 

1 lnsufficicnt survival~ility against lr ght and 

medium direct-fire wenpans on the madern bnttlefield. 

One of these deficiencies is being solved with the 

newly upgraded M113A2~, known as the .M113A3, 

which selected units haw alr~ndy received. First 

illtroduced in 1987. the hIL13A3 features the 

RrEiahllity Improvement for Selected Equipment 

(I7 ISE) upvndc package. The RISE tipwades include 

replacing the eistina 212-horwpnw~r dipsel cngine 

in f h~! M 113A2 with a 275-hrs~power t urhochnrgcd 

diesel engine, coupl~d with the X-200-4 transmission. This upgrade provicles vekrcle nlobilrty 

rol~ghly equivalent to that of the supported M1&12 

manpuver forc~. 

The M113A3 has virtually th~ same mobility na 

the Bradley fighting vehcle and the Abrams main 

battle tank. EIow~ver, even the M 11 3A3 docs nnt 

solve the ~ngineer squad's baslc clilernmas of 

stowage and survivahilitv. Becaus~ nf the amount af 

equipment they must carq-, it is difficult for a full? 

loaded engineer squad to enter and exit a tracked 

VP~~CIP easiIy. 

ESV Design 

proposal under consideration will solve t h~ 

M113A2tA3 deficiencies. The E:~~~I~PPI' 

School is seeking to replace then1 with a new 

cngin~~r squad velljcT~ (ESV). It not only better 

meets cornhat enpnwr requirements hut also ih 

convertible &om ~xistinc MI13 systems. This vpllirle 

modification prnqram. support~d by the MI I3 

Program M~ltlagernrnt Office at. the l'anls- 
The ESV provides 

interior stowage for an 

entire engineer squad's 

equipment. 

Automotive Command (TACOM), provides r, 

superior squad vehicle at a much lower cost than a 

new acquisition. 

The expanded hull configuration on the ESV 

prototype 1s based on the M113A3+ mohile tactical 

vehicle light (M'SVL), which uses an MI13 hull that 

is lengthened 34 inches and equipped with an 

additional road wheel (six on each side). The vehicle 

was developed as R 'production-tooled demonstrator'' 

with private-industry funding brn United Defense. 

An industry description notes that 'The MTVL I 

ESV provides more than 60 cuhic feet addtianal 

vnlume under armor and increases the payload 

capacity by up to 7,000 pounds beyond the M113A3. 

The velicle's power train consists of a 350-horsepowpr turbochargedaftercooled diesel engine driving 

though arm electratlically controlled, four-speed, 

automatic cross-drive transmission. The advanced 

suspension ronfigurntion and aggressive track 

desip provide crws-country mobility that is 

superior to most cornhat vehicles over all terrain. 

Optional modular armor packages provide for LIP to 

30-millimeter (mm) and rifle+prepeIled-grenade 

protection, Designed to retain the transportability 

features of th~ MI13, the MTVL is '2-130 roll-adrolloff transportable and air-dmppable." 

The lenfi-thened huU and significantly improved 

powPr train increase the MTVLk set payEoad capacity 

to nlrnrrst 8 tons. In many cases, this increased 

mpaci ty eliminates the current requirement for 

towing a squad equipment trailer or. in worst-ease 

scenarios, fnr relying on tactical wheeled support 

vehicles to bring mission equipment forward. 

?'here are s~gruficant suspension rnoclific~tions to 

the vehicle's Iower hull, such as rotating the find 

drives, raising the sponsona and idlers, and revising 

the spring and damping rates. In all cases, the new 

suspension system maintains 100-percent parts 

commonality with the current MI13 vehicle fleet. 

which is important from both acquisition and 

supportability standpoints. 

The increased payload capacity also allows the 

engineer squad to solvt3 the remaining deficiency of 

insufficient haStIeEeEd survjvabilily. The basic 5083 

aluminum plate hull can be supplemented with zi 

variety of armor packages, such as titanium and 

steel applique, spaced laminate steel, or ceramic 

armor tiles. The increased paylond cnpacity is a 

tremendous advancement in under-armor stowage. 

while the ability ta add things like titanium skin 

represents a giant leap forw,vd in survivability. 

Initial Testing 

he Engineer Center began testing the MTVL 

demonstrator in March 1995. Initial 

modific~ltions to create the ESV canfig-urntion 

invoIved ch~ll~es to both internal and external 

stowage. 

Internal Modifications. 

Tool boxes huilt into the vehicle were modified to 

provide easily accessible storage for all engineer 

tools. 

Stowage far other engineer equipment was rnorlified to allow it to stay in place while travelinficross 

country over any type of terrin. 

April 19.96 Engine~r 29 
External Modifications. 

Cupola armor and additional tie-down locations 

were added for rucksacks and demolition boxes, 

m An easily instaIled or removed bracket was fabricated to carry concertina wisp. 

After the stowage modifications were made, the 

Engineer School used the ESV in n '?heavynight 

demonstration" at the ENFORCE XXI Conference at 

Fort Leonard Wood in April 1995. The vehicle 

supported troops fmrn Fort Drum and Fort Rragp in 

a simulated assa~~lt on an objective. The ESV was 

one of several vehicles that demonstrated their 

inhvidual capabilities and were Iater displayed for 

the assemhlerl s~nior Ipad~rs. 

Field Testing 

ollowing the ENFORCE XYI demonstration. 

the ESV was assigned to Charlie Company of 

the 5th Engineer Rattalion at Fort Leonard 

Wood for further testing snd evaluation. Charlie 

Company" ssrl;rrnnt was the vehicle commander 

during suhsequ~nt fi~lrl operations at Fort Bliss, 

'I'PXRS, (in support of the 3rd Armored Cavalp 

Rrgim~nt) and the National Training Center (NTC) 

at Port Irwin. California. 

Bns~d on th~ field tests, the ESV satisfies a 

number of requir~ments that have been itlentifieci bp 

engineer units. ItAllows fully equipped sappers to enter and exit 

f h~ loaded vehicle quickly. 

Provrdes aappers with safe battlefield trnnsponrttion through a ballistic threat of 3n-mn~ dir~rt 

fire and 255-rnm indirert, fir?. 

Keeps pace with a11 atbcking heavy company 

nver varied terrain when Iontied for romhat. 

Prok-idcs opt~cs for night operatiotis. 

Ensures platform pwth t,o jncorparate digtal 

applique and a global positioning system. 

Retains the ability to pull a trailer. While an 

auxilianl trailer tnight he required in some mfssion sc~narios. the ~xpanderl vehcle worild eliminate th~ ctirwnt t r~jl~~ ~~eqlzirement inmost 

cornhat 5iluations. 

Under-armor stowagp wns not a prohiem during 

th~ field tests. Although the sqund size increased 

frotn 8 to 10 men with the addition of the Engineer 

Reconnaissnnc~ Acquisitior~ Team, the men and 

their equ~pment-10 large rucksacks and duffel 

bacs-fit inside the vehcIe. Durin~ the live-fire 

pha~e at th~ NTC, the ESV also carried a Gasp nf live 

C4, a roll of detonation cord, blasting caps, three 

bangalore sections, the ~~F~~OOII'S NI3C (nuclear, 

biological, and chemical) warning equipment, 

weapon tripods, spare barrel hrtgs, ammunition, and 

regular engineer equipment (three shovels, three 

axes, picks. and the pick mattock). It all fit in the 

vehcle, either strapped down or inside the box. 

Additional equipment could have been loaded inside 

If they had strapped the rucksacks to the top and 

sides of the vehicle. As the mission of combat 

engineers continues to expand and new equipment 

is introduced. th~ need for safe and accessible 

stowage will continue. 

The ESV retains the ability to pull a trailer sinc~ 

some taci.ica1 scenarios, such as a rapid transition 

from offensp to defense, could require transportation 

nf additional mines or barrier material. On onp field 

mission. when the unit carried mines and wire t 0 

facilitate transition to a defensive operation, the 

vphicle prnved it was up to the chall~nge. The anit, 

had all its equipment. pulled a trailer, and stiIl kept 

LIP with the tanka. 

The lnngcr hull of the ESV even facilitntes 

sleeping arrang~m~nts in the field. B~cnus~ nf 

restrictions at NTC about sleeping on the grmunrl, 

tile entire tinit slept comfortably in or on the ESVseven of thein inside and three nn top. If someone 

helow f~lt too crowded, he coultl move to the top of 

thc hull. 

The Engineer School's requirements docunl~nt 

forn~alizing the need for the ESV ih currently ~IL the 

sim-off process. Funding to transition the erlgjn~ers 

from the M 11 3A3 upgrade propan1 tit th~ hl L lRtt3+ 

ESV progarn has not been identified yet. With 

approximately 84 er~gine~r vehicles required irr a 

modern niecltxnizprl clivision, TACOM snrirrves 

indicate that the initial ESV requirement could 

range from 300 to 400 vehicles. 

U.S. Ariny combat engtneers must continur to 

update their hattletie1d equipment. They have lonfi 

needed an imprnvetl sqund carri~r that provides 

optimum support to front-line forcps. A critical 

component of the combat en~ineer system. a 

carrier serves as a work ronrn, hunker, power tool. 

and fighting platform for the squad. The ESV will 

finally prnvirl~ en,e-ir~~et*s the capability to support 

the modern rnaneuvrr forces in toriay's fast-pat:ed 

conflicts. A_ __ u 

MCL~OT Gnurl~y Is an indioidual rnohilizatiort 

crrrgnarntee. He is n graduat~ nf the Fi~ld Arlillrry 

Offic~r nmic and Aduanred Cour,ws. 

311 Engineer April 1996 
The 1995 Engineer 

Functional Area Assessment 

By Aiun Schl ie 

ver wonder what, happens to the soldiers and 

equipment of an &my unit when it 

inactivates? After all, each unit has a specific 

battlefield mission, and the soldiers and equipment 

represent the capabilities to accomplish that mission. 

So if the unit pees away, what happens to those 

resources? 

WhiJe the "drawdown" may be the most 

publicized, it is not the most demanding element 

affecting a unit's environment. Managing the impacts 

of modernization- new equipment fieltllng and 

training, equipment redistribution, chanRing 

doctrine, and reorganization-is by far the most 

demanding. A unit's environment consists of 

overlapping domains of dochine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and solhers 

@WMS). An action musing. a change in any of 

these domains will affect the other five. And the 

elimination of an entire unit affecb the environment of 

many other units. Consider the fielding of the first 

Grizzly: the DTLOMS impacts on the company, the 

battalion and the supporting units will be conqiderable. The Army has a numher of procedures to ensure thnt modernization takes place without 

adversely affecting the DTLOMS domains. 

Modernization Impacts 

T he answer to the original question, simply 

stated, is that inactivating a unit moves its 

resources (soldiers and materiel) into pools 

fiom which redistribution is made. But the process 

April 1996 

Thrus? of Engineer Core Competenc\es 

Figure 1 

Engineer 31 

Is Chanrino . . . 

. . . From Englnmr Mlmlon . . . to Farm Cspablllty 

Orlentntlon . . . Orlsntrrtlon 

Mdwnlzatlon Ob]aetlwm Form XXI 

to Support Dtclsivs Victofy Pwrray Terrern 

Frghl As Ws 

AlrUnd Bawl- Mow A! Vfiil 

Dwrdnas Mensuwr Weld Terrntc 

BOS PIQWC~ ma war 

P~V/~CI md S~~i8hr 

InfWBn'a? Wet 

MabWiiy \-.Pfeddoo Strike 

Cwnrem~Ilty Tralnlng 

SurvlvsblII~ 

G8mrd Englneerlng \ Tmlnd 

I 

I 

Doetrino 

Shmteglc-Operatlanal-Yaetlcnl 

1 984 m3 XllO 

Daop-ClosbRaur . . . mppwrrnp D~IS~VS ~ctoiy 

I 
Figure 2 

Engine~r L P.p?*k4Xi~AQ Assssssm~~~ 

does not always run smoothly, so procedures have 

heen developed to ensure that a11 actions are 

completed. Each of the numerous procedures has an 

oversight mechanism to validate compliance. As an 

overarching forum, the functional area assessment 

(FAA) was established years ago sso that Arrnv 

leaders can examine the impacts of force rnoclern. 

ization. The focus of the FAA is on how well the force 

can maintain its rendiness and force capability while 

undergoing change. The FAA ensures that the 

Army's force integration efforts are accomplished with 

minimal advers~ impacts on readiness, rnodernjzation, personnel and training, materiel distribution 

and sedistrihution, doctrine application. total force 

integration, base operations, quality of life, anrl 

execution of USC Title 10 functions. 

In December 1995, the Engineer School Commandant and the Director of Comhat Developmeilts 

presenter1 the engineer Functional Area Assessment 

tn the Vic~ Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) and 

key principals from the Army Staff. The presentation 

hrghlighted the diversity of responsibilities and 

missions that engineers accomplish in support of 

decisive victory (see Fietre I, page 3 1). As enfiineer 

COTP competencies chan~e from a mission orientation 

to a force-capability orientation. th~! need to leverag~ 

and int egmt~ technolagy through sound doctrine, 

hattle-focused training, and eff~ctive organizations 

hecomes more acute. Engineers must be wewed as 

MObillty 

CounterMobHlty 

Survlveblllty 

General 

Eng,nonring 

Topographic 

Engineering 

vital, integral members of the cnmbined arms team 

in the pursuit of a rnore versatile, capable, and 

cornhat-ready Force XXI. 

The Commandant addressed the most critical 

1995 2003 

in Some Areas 

& i r 

& & 

&= @ 

&& - 

issue facing endneers today-the hemorrhage of 

How Well Are We Doing? 

Fair, but Corning From - Far Back 

en~neers 

I 

born the Active Component force struct~sre 

when current operations indicate an ever-increasing 

requirement (see Figure 2). A 52 percent reduction 

in Active Component enaneers since 1988 impacts 

our abilitv to shape the terrain-and terrain is never 

neutral. Even with the Reserve Compn~nts 

shouldering an increased bad, ow ability to project 

and then protect and sustain deployed forces is 

critically hampered when an irnrnehate response is 

needed. 

Engineer Obstacles 

hp Commandant discussed seven additional 

obstacles in the path of engineers and our 

ability to suppart decisive victoy (see Figure 

3. page 33). Each obstacle was examined for impacts 

on doctrine, training, leader development. 

organization, matenel, and soldiers. Then the 

obshclc was balanced against its effect on 

maintaining the engineering capability during farce 

restructuring. 

Modernization of combat enginccr equipment is 

lag~ng behind that of the mnneuver force, Ensneers are equipped with old and slow syste~tls that 

impact operating and support costs and cnrnbat. 

capa hility . 

There arp too few of the new systrms. and new 

equipment fielding in incomplete packages 

reduces maneuver capnhilities, Many current 

technolagicnl insertions could pr~vid~ B quantitative leap in capability at a much lower cast t llan 

the cost of x new system. 

32 ISnrineer April 1996 
Engineer Battlefield Assessment Obslacles 

WrnIratTon of combat engl#e# cqvIpmenr b Iagglng behind the manwer fom. 

new fieldfng is buiIdfng impatlb~e teams. 

Aglng eonstnrctlon equipment Is pwswting pmbIems. 

Temln mllsm is 1gmM in tmlnlng, and data Is rrot available hr weratlons. 

CoLI~nnine Is dIffkutt wlth sofulI~ns taklng too long. 

Antlmim JegIslaftlon thmtens &me su~hbllw. 

7bInlng bas cuts could mortgage our Army in the 2Sst enturlr; 

Figure 3 

The aging oonstmction fleet &eta many pmpnents 

and impacts alh modernization objectives. Results of 

a Center for Army Rnnlpis shudy imply that the 

Army must spend a minimum of $50 million annually to impmve fleet agiw md sho&ge fill. 

Terrain realism is ignored in training. Current 

terrain dat.~ is not available for operations in morp 

than 95 percent of the world. 

a In countermine operations, technology is not the 

silver t~ullet. investigation into the most promising soltitions, regardless of the D%'LOMS 

domain. is need~rl to protect the soldier in the 

field. 

I An tinine lefislation strips away the sp'lfprotection and freedom-of-actron options of the 

commander. 

I A commitment to provide appropriate equipment 

and training is necessary to properly prepare the 

vehicIe replacement and any other application 

using the MI chassis, 

Wanted our fidl involvement in developing the 

terrain and engineer play for war simulations. 

II Liked the interim contingency operations countermine packages. He highlighted the need to 

invest in countermine tech~iolugies available now 

but cautioned about getting a proper return for 

the investment. Engineers need tn l~vprslgp the 

Bosnian requirements to make gains in this 

area. 

I Agreed that current legislation would hinder our 

operational choices and premised support. 

Encouraged a reevaluation of the requirem~nts 

generated in the training environment in order 

to identify more efficiencws. 

Using Technology 

ncxt generation of American ~otdiers. T he Commandant dosed the forum by saying, The FAA presentation was not so much about fix in^ 'The Essayans spirit has carried us across 

en~in~~rs as it was about optimizing the Army's many battlefields. It will continue ta do so. 

encineerina capabilities. However, we must not depend overly on the spirit of 

our soldiers and leaders to support the Force XXI 

VCSA Solution 

he FAA presenters were successful in 

obtaining support for numerous battlefieId 

initiatives at a critical time near the heginning 

of the W98-03 budget-planning cycle. The VCSA: 

II Prnmised support in programming procurement. 

of the Grizzly, the Wolverine, the Hornet, the 

Heavy Dy Support Bridge, and 24 other mrnbat 

pmmama, plus construction equipment as a 

whole. The VCSA instructed the Engineer School 

to move ahead with the technical insertion package for the engineer squad wehcle. He was enth~lsiastic nhout the propoged MI-based engineer 

Army. We must seize on technolagical advances to 

ensure that we rlo not ~~RCP engineer soldLers, units, 

and missions at unnecessary risk. The Endneer 

ReRiment is trained and ready, a rapidly deployable 

and versatile member of the strateffic fo m... comhimng 

efficiencies of information with physical and technical 

capnbilities to master terrain in support of decisive 

victory," ld 

CSM (RE13 Schlie is a force der!~lopment am!,,si 

with Ehe Directornte orcornbat Developments, U.S. 

Army Enftne~r School. HP served in various 

capacittes in Europe, Korea, and COWIS during n 

22 par military career. 

Apri E 1.996 Engineer 33 
Rapid Runway Repair 

in Meed s Repair 

Bv Captain Paul H11szar 

rmy find Air Force ~ngineer units share responsihility for rapid rutrway 

repalrs. When conducting such 

missians. circumstances usually dictate who makes the 

repairs. In mature thaaterswhen Air Force assets operate 

from advanced p~rinnnent airfield~-~~ Force engineers repair the runways tn ensurp 

their continuous nperatinn. In 

forced-entry operal.ions, Plrrny 

engineer3 m~ka the repairs so 

follow-on forces cnn he airlifted 

into immature theaters. But 

when fnrcecl-entry operations 

are into remote theaters with 

existing artvnnr:~d r1lnWR)'S 

that neecl repairs, Army enginePrs arp not equipped or 

trainpd to accomplish the mission. Th~y call insert equipment 

and personnel but lack the 

prnper materials and training to 

cnmplete the repairs. 

Ths insdequacy was apparent during Operation Restore 

Democracy-renamed Operation Uphold Dpmocracy wh~n 

the forc~d entry into 

Haiti was cancelled. HarI a 

forced entry been IlecPssary, the 

lack of materials and training 

coulrl have j~opnrtlized tb~ 

entire nperatinn. 

Defining 

Responsibility 

hp ~I~wnsizing of our 

arrn~rl fnrces ~nd reliance 

on tile rniljtary to fight 

two simultaneous maj~r regonal conflicts mecans that the 

srnaIl~r force must be stsatef$ 

cdlv deployabIe. The few €orward-cteployed units are rpql~iretI to "do more with lcss," a 

familiar phrase in today's military, and must be able t,o deplov 

rapidly. Because joint OpPrRtions are the norm, intense coordination hetween the services is 

needed to ensure th~t th~ cornbined effort will cover every contin~ency. i'hr example, Air Force 

or Naw units will transport 

Army or mar in^ soldi~rs into R 

theater af ap~rations fmm 

CONUS hnses. In this scenario. 

the roles ant1 responsihiPiti~s am 

f:iirIy WPII-Aefin~d. I-lowev~r, 

this IS tint the case in all contingency scenarios. 

Ariny airborne enpneer 

units parachute personnel and 

equipment onto nn existing alrfi~lrl to conduct r~pid runway 

repairs. The 20th Engine~r Rri- 

~ade, Fort Brapg, North Carolina, includes this task on its 

mission essential task list 

(METL) in support of the XVlll 

Grborne Corps' wadtiwide mn- 

:ingency mission. Specifically, 

.he 27th and 37th Engineer 

Sombat Bat talians (Airborne) 

train to repairI Flipht landing strips using 

,air-bppahle ~arth-moving 

equipr~r~nt, and local sources 

of soil and aggrgate. 

r Small craters in more perman~nt ~irfields using rapid 

sunway repair kits find the 

same earth-moving equipment. 

After engineer soldiers fiI1 a 

crater us in^ the earth-moving 

equipment. they secure the 

rapid ntnway repair kit over th~ 

crater to prohibit foreign obi~ct 

damag~ (IPCJI)). They repair a 

runlitay to the ~tar~tlard that 

allows C-130s to land. 

As plans for Operation KRstore Democraq unfolded and 

the intelligence pr~pasat ion of 

the battlefield developed, XVII I 

Arhorne Corps planners realized that the Haitian military 

might crater th~ TU~IWRV at I'ortau-lt'rince International Airport. 

After seizing thp airport in nn 

air1,ortle assault, the U.S. military planned to use it ns the 

main pint nf pmlwirkntion for 

persorlr~cl into the theater. One 

concern was t.hat if the Ma~tians 

packed demolitions in the 

April 1956 
c~ilverts heneath the runway, 

th~ resulting craters would he 

too large for Army engineers to 

repair with rapid runway 

repair kits. The operating 

strip th~t rern~ined would he 

1ts~E~as for a11 nircrnFt except 

C- 130s. 

This wennrio fits within the 

reaI~n of n~issions for Air Force 

engineers. because the existing concrete runwag in Haiti 

woulrl sPrve as an internat ional airprlst. However, the 

XVIII Airborne Corps' plan 

included a forccrf-entry operation with an airhorne assault 

onto Port-~u-Prince Airpnrt 

with foIlow-nn forces arriving 

imm~diately in C- ldls, C-5s. 

and Civll II~serve hr Fleet aircraft. Therefore an Army 

unit-Alpha Cerxlpnny, 37th 

Engineer Battalinn-received 

the mission tn r~pair th~ runwny at the Pnrt-au-Prince .hrpart. The unit pr~pared a 

I heavy airfield repair pacliap ( (HARP) to lrc air-dropped onto 

1 the airfield (see table). 

I I Training i 

h~ assistant corps engineer section tif the 2nth 

Engineer Brigade staff 

conrdinnted with units at adjar~at pop^ and Tpdnll Air 

Force Bases to train snlcli~rs 

from Alpha Companv ~nd provide th~m with th~ necessary 1 materials and equipment. 1 Ofic~rs from the 37th hnd seen 

the hr Force's methods and 

~quipmcnt d~monstxatetl six 

months earlier, hut soldiers 

from the battalion hail npver 

usetE these tactics, techniques, 

and procedures. Alpha Cornpany trained nn the unique 

equipment and materials for 

only three days b~fore leaving I Fort Bra~g for the interme&- I 

I at^ stfi~ing hnse. 

Heavy Airfield Repair Package 

Quantity Equipment 

2 9508 loaders 

2 D5B bulldozers 

1 130G grader 

1 Small emplacement excavator 

2 M929A2 5-ton dump trucks 

1 256CFM air compressor 

1 13.whee! towed roller 

3 SOO-gal!on fuel bllvets with pumps and hoses 

2 12-foot mass suppry boxes wlth teals and 

supplles 

3 Sections of flexlble fiberglass rnattlng wlth 

tools and materials 

Repair Technique 

he hr Fnrce repnir tech. 

niqil~ includes filllr,~ 

crat~r~d halrs in much 

th~ same way as Army unit.., 

do. However, the POD cover 1s 

much diff~rent fc;r large craters. The flexible fiberglass 

matting is 30 f~et wide and is 

stacked accordion styl~. Two 

Air Force lOlC John deer^ forklifts and R crPw of ~01dt~rs 

unfold th~ matting. These 

fork1ift.s differ gr~atly from the 

.Army's Cnterplllar 9SOR 2.3- 

cubic-yard loaders with d~tnchable buckets aalirl s~lt:~ched 

tines. The tines on the A.rmy'.i 

C;r t~rpillar arp 1~qs maneuverable than th~! forks on th~ Air 

Force's John D~ere. whch 

nldkes positiol~ing the flexjhIe 

fiberglass matting nlarp diffr 

cult. Howt:ver. th~ Armv*s lnntlem artre air-dmppnhle. The air 

cnrnprprsor. tools, and motcrials req~iirecl to anchor it to tbr 

existing surfnc~ are includ~ci 

wilh the matting. 'Shr matting 

clops not distribute a load hut 

prnvides th~ necessary FOD 

cover, essential to the jt.t transport.~ uscd in the XV111 AirImrne Corps deplnympnt. 

P~rsor~nel and th~ FIARr'. 

except for the ii~atting, werr 

lnnded on 13 C-130s. If the Halttians crat~rerl the rimwav and 

the nirhorn~: assault forre 

called th~ Il.-UP forward, it 

wnuld he air-rlropp~d onto 

Port-nu-Prin~~ Int~rnntionnl 

Airport. 

The Airllorne Test Bnnrrl ;~t 

Fort Bragg d~velops prnccdures tcr air-drag npw equipm~nt. The aEency had r~gjied 

ant! tested th~ matting for the 

airdrop hut hnd not r~fin~d 

th~ ~~roc~~lure. Tller~fore, ih~ 

mn?ting could not 2,~ pArnchutecl in with the rest of lthp 

equip mer~t. 

April 
I 

Soldiers from the 37th Engineer Battalion (Cbt) (Abn) prepare a D5 

* 

bulldozer to be air-dropped. 

I 

Air P'r>rrP l~l~lt~~~~;lst~r,~ :1nd 

Army I-re~rr:: rlrt.i(lt*cl to ri~ thr 

TII:I! 1 IT): or1 :i 1>:1llrt t ~;I~IL m~i- 

<~<ti!!c offot~r p:~ll~ts :kn(I 

Ioi~tl it OIL n ('-; 30. wiLirk wnultl 

l:i~(l ;II 1'1i~t ~'~~IICP ilirr)q>rt. r 1 1 h1.v rifi~r-d f hr 5~r.t ions it~rEivitl~l:lll\ ~arh tvit !I :I t\vtr-loc>l,. 

!!O.foclt t~ylnn *Iinll: :~ttnt.h~rl. , , I his W{III l{l :j I IO\I~ I !ir~ t L-~TJ SPC - 

tli~ll tll 1 1111rl :1111I 

cl!-.iyqi.~i off ~'l?ilt~ t ha' riast 

~~f~1l~:~l~l~~l :ltt:l(~ll~(i to t1lP ~1:lIl~t 

~rnirl. ~rl?~r.l~ w:l-: Ic~rr~li~ct ir! 

pInr~ 11: tiir n~rl.r~rfr 

51n1.p thr Kili ]o:IIIP~~ nor. 
Battle Command Knowle 

and Skill 

By Major Gmrge DeMars~ 

-4pr67 19.96 Engineer 37 

'Wnr i.s not an affair of chance. 

A grpat d~nl of knowledge, study, 

and m~ditalion is nccessng to 

conduct i.f well, "' 

Freclerick The Great: 

Instructions for His Generals, 

1747 

he art and scjenc.e of corn- T is a subject 

versed In the minds anr[ 

hexrts of rniljtarv historians, leaders, and snldiers. Many hooks 

provide thought-provnking stnries about rnilitwv leadership. As 

members of 3. profession of arms, 

officers of all ranks are encowaged to study, contemplate, and 

de!late about war ancl leadership. 

Notlung should be more importank to US. For at the forefront of 

our praf~suion. J helieve, is the 

learler's clesire rind ability to lead 

soldiers on thr battlefield. 

FM 100-5. O~erafions, hghli~hts the importancp of leadershp 

with the rloctrjnnl term bat EIP cornto assimilate information, understand the situation, and deveIop a 

dear picture of the battlefi~ld ' 

throu~h time and space. 

I have ohserved leaders-in 

cornbnt, in field exercisr?s. and at 

the National Training Centerdemonstrate their mettl~ while 

planning, preparing, and executing comhat operations. This article i3 based On my understanding 

of whnt leadp.rri must know and 

practice to achieve success on the 

From the platoon leader to the 

top of the command ch~in, doctrinal howledge is the precursor 

tn developing intuitive comhatleading skills. For example, 

understanding troop-leading 

procedures, the parallel planning process, the estimate of the 

situation, find the role of athpr 

hnttJefielt1 functions requjs~s 

extensive reading and discussion. Periodically reviewing doctrinal material refreshes our 

mtrncl. Its definition focuses on the 1 the widplines to his advantage. 

art of leaderhip: th~ ability to ' He untlerstanrls that there are no 

(ms), and respected mentors. 

Being part of the Am process is n 

battlefield- I memory ant1 strengtl'rens our 

knowled~e base, We first learn 

bow Your Business to talk nhout and underst;lntl 

doctrine hefore we apply it in the 

w often hear that leaders 

must be +echnicRlly . 

What does it really mean, in ahsolute terms. to ha wpll-verspd in 

tactics? A seasolled tactician is 

nnrnlally someone has developed knflwledge and skill thmufih 

study and practicp. He cansistently rends cfoctine and npplies 

rrffluence and to mak~ timely and 

field. CmwJ, walk. and run certainly applies here; the learn in^ 

process berins as a junior Ieatler 

and nevpr ends. 

Knowing your husiness, however, invoIves more than just 

reading doctrinal manuals. Learning fha comes from military public~tions, history books, techrlicnl 

~R"u"~s, after action reviews 

short cu~s, a pint that cannot, be peal lexrning experience, and 

accurate decisions; and the ability ovesemphasizetI, 1 information recorded can he pon- 
Battle Command 

Fundamentals 

d~r~d later. Watching k4Rs and Tinling Is Everything to react intuitively results primarwriting pertinent learning points I ily from experience anrl O~.<PITDin my spiral notepad has bwn 

very useft11 to me. 

We also o'ltfikn upAtndate n'al'uals *pplicfl''le OtLr 

unit arlrt rend and the 

material. Far example, an enpineer cornpan?. in an 

arnlnred division should haw 

n'nnuals that provide infOrmn- 

;lhnut hs and 

pquil'lnent as those 

errng the units 

and firhtn important "les 

Fh' 34-1 ''* In''' 'i~pn~p 

Prpparation 'f 'hp Bait'pfip'dq 

R rlowing where yo11 need to tion. Field training becnrncs a 

go ant! what you need to do template to ronfirm or (jelly his 

when you get there I+ 1 ability to lead soldiers incon~hat. 

p.~sel-ltial to hPin~ an effective hattl, commander. *4 fundamental 

conc~pt of battle command (see 

fimlre) is to know where to posiwhich helps tn underut.and the or kill thp and win+ Zjecome the maneuvt%r corn- IPR process; xncI FM 6-30--40. 

For ex:-lmple, H conlr~any or hnttalion rnmmander always provirles guidance cfinct.mim prlority intelligence rpqulremeats 

Fist Support for nrrgnda Oppratior's. which provides infor'''- 

Can this be taught in the class- ' m~n&r" FIR. The engineer KO 

room. or must it he learned nn the the 52 jrltprnct wit]l thpir 

battlefield? I \relieve it's a carnbi. 1 maneuver eounterpnrts to pmqorp 

tion key players on the hattlef ~ltl. (PIR) and critical illfnrmntjon I A commander must keep them requirements. These r~quirefocused on his critical task list: he merits nrp Iisually influpncerl )lv 

must maintin the reins find ksep higher headqunrters. Npvprtbpthem in "their lanes." Only then less, commander's gllidnncr 

on firs-suppc'rt capx- nation of both. Nth~u~h doctnnnl tllnt rngineer rPr/~llrprnents ;IrP 

bilities and how fire supporters ! pmficiency is foundation for 1 met, PI11 is usel~ss if it isn't n 

pIan artillery-scatterable mine- the proper application of a leader's pnduct of event tentplating and .rl 

fj~lds. ( battle-rommand skills, the nhility \ major part of the recon~missmcr 

cnn he really see the terrain, bmself, and the enemy. hd only 

then can he imfluer~ce the desired 

outcome of the battle-to capture 

the condjtion.; for whell find 

where other play~rs will participite and influences tk~p pIannjng 

process. En~ineer PZR may not 
find szrrvedlance plan The engineer XO must guide the 52 

through the IPB process and 

ensure that intelligence information is gathered at the right time 

and place. 

Time Lines are the best tools to 

ensure that combat operations are 

planned, prepared, and executed 

''on time." The time line is developed during mission analysis and 

is influenced by the supported 

headquarters. The supported 

unit dictates the planning process nnd influences the ability to 

conduct parallel planning. It is 

important to remember that the 

purpose of parallel planning is to 

provide timely and accurate information ta our suhordinates. They 

must know enemy capabilities, 

terrain considerations for positioning combat and support elements, intelligence templates, 

time and distance requirements, 

and engineer critical tasks to conduct their planning. 

Mission analysis determines 

every task that must be accomplished to ensure missinn success. 

Tasks involve degrees of coordination and synchronization. To be 

successful, engineers must understand how other combined arms 

elements--such ns artillery, close 

air support, air defense, medical 

support, and logistics-upport 

their mission. Know their eapabilities and know when and where 

you need them So get the desired 

efkt. 

For example, artillery radar 

can support engneer soIdiers in 

the offense and the defens~. The 

tough part is coordinating and 

synchronizing the support. You 

should know that a Q36 has a 

maximum range of 15 kilometers 

for mortars and 24 hlorneters for 

artillery and rockets. You must 

war-game to determine when and 

where you need the radar cueing., 

or it will not happen. Cnrnbat 

engineers in the attack at the 

point of penetration, and engineer 

systems like the Volcano in the 

defense, are high-value targets to 

the enemy. 

"Know the enemy, know your- 

.wlL your uictory u)iEl wvcr he 

endangered. Know the ,wound, 

know .?he weather; your uictnry 

will then be total." 

Sun Tzu: The Art of War 

400.320 B.C. 

I Understand Your Role 

he commander provides 

guidance that generates the 

actions required to exercise 

his battle-command skills through 

processes known as troop-leading 

procedures, IPB. tactical decis~on 

rnakin~, and METT-T (mission, 

enemy, terrain. troops, and time 

available'). He sets the stage for 

how his key players function. 

Prom the planning to the execution phases, his team provides 

inforniation needed to direct anti 

lead. These processes allow the 

commander and his staff or subordinates to gather facts and 

assumptions as they apply tn the 

enemy, friendly forces, and the 

terrain. Through it all. the comApril 1.996 Enplneer 39 
During mission analysis, the commander's 

guidance sets the conditions for how he will 

visualize the battle. 

40 Enginper April 19.96 

fmused on the criticaI tasks. 

The unit's time line establishes 

when and where tasks are executed. Inspections, rehearsals, 

and back briefs arp highli~hted 

and performed, The preparation 

phase sets the conditions for sue. 

cessful execution. This is the commander's Past opportunity to 

integrate and sqmchmnizc: ~IR battlefield functions. Time will influence how the preparatory tasks 

are performed (for example, facet~-face or by radio), Once his 

forces cross the line nf departure, 

1 a commander loses some of his 

influence. I?requentIy, the prepnratorp phase is his last opportunity to physically direct and 

iniluence subordinates. 

Time, space, and purpose are 

set before the battle bepins. From 

actions on the objective back to 

the line of departure, constant 

attention is given to synchronizI ing when and where units apply 

their capabilities to achiev~ the 

commander's intent. Back bri~fs 

to the somrnancler hscuss when 

and where critical events are execute~!. As the battle rehearsal 

plays out, the commander visualmander hopes to visualize a clear 

task, a purpose, and nn end state. 

Tactical cIecision making follows a prescribed process and 

involves steps a comrnnnder must 

influence. As the main cog, his 

guidance and intent provide the 

Enrus for stafflsubordinate planning. During mission analysis, 

the commander's pidance sets 

bility to anyone. He "steps up to 

the plate'" and lets everyone know 

who's in charge. It"s important to 

note that a commander's ability to 

physically influence the planning 

process is a product of operational 

tempo. There are times when 

much of his influence is transmitted from another location. But a 

strong commander can make his 

cal planning. The commander's 

clirection during mission analysis 

sets the st,age for timely and accurate integration and synchronization. Staff officers and subordinates must understand when 

and where to focus their skilb. 

An engineer commander's 

presence at R battalion or brigade 

command post must influence the 

the conditions for how he will presence felt. from 25 kilometers 

visualize the battle. Each staff 

officer and suborciinate has a 

dear task and purpose for each 

phase of the operation [see Table 

3-2. FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer 

Corn bat Operatiarts [Arm.or~dJ). 

Key players understand their 

critical tasks and how to integrate 

and synchronize them. The cornrnander filrther articulat.es hs 

critical information requirements 

and establishes the carnmunication network to control and disseminate timely information. 

From implied, specified, and 

essential tasks to the restated 

mission, the commander is the 

decision maker. He determines 

f he unit's task, purpose, and end 

state. Nothng is more important 

to effective horizontnI and vertithe preparatory phase, much 

effort goes into or~anizing personnel and equipment. This effort 

involves much more than simply 

affixing an overall tnsk nrganization. The commander is not only 

concerned with arraying hs forces 

but also with enswing that his 

subordinates understand his 

intent. The preparatory phase has 

away. 

The commander's ability to recognizp critical tasks during planning, preparing, and executing 

combat operations. can deterwine 

success or failure. His ability to 

influence those critical tasks will 

enhance success. Once again, the 

commander's presence becomes an 

inflziential and motivational 

force. He ensures that subordinates understand their part, of the 

operation. He is an active participant throughout every phase of 

the operation. 

Once the plan is set, the cornrnnnder focuses hs attention On 

preparing his forces for the 

upcoming missinn. Key players 

continue to monitor the situation 

and develop the picture. During 

izes the execution of the battle. 

He sees the effects of the terrain 

and the capabilities af the enemy 

and Ilis own forces. He considers 

aptions based on other conditinns 

and contingenci~s. 

Once the battle begins, the 

commander positions himself 

where he can best co~nmunicate 

with and direct hs unit. I nformadecision- rnxkirr~: process. 

He I many moving pieces, hut the corndoesn't relinquish this responsi- mander and his staff must stay 

tion flow is criticd. Command and 

control faciIities nssist hrn in 
Conclusion I 

monitoring the si tuatian. Situational awareness becomes the 

operative focus for everyone. 

Every action is geared toward 

~nforming commanders about significant changes to the situation, 

Updat.es on unit strengths, 

enemy locations and activities, 

decision points, and other critical 

information requirements are 

transmitted. Changes in ijtatl~s 

normally correspond to changes 

in capability. Commanders use 

the information to reassess the 

situation and anticipate other 

contingencies. 

attle commanders cannot 

do it alone. Combat is a 

team sport. A commander's 

v~sifin of the battle is refined and 

updated by the key players on the 

' 

t~am. They continually gather, 

analyze, and drsseminate critical 

information. War-gaming sessions 

produce a clear picture of when 

and where to ~pply unit capabilities to achleve desired results. 

Maintaining a clear picture is a 

team effort throughout planning, 

abiIity to develop a vision is a 

product of his knowledge and 

shll. Knowledge is a procluct of 

doctrinal proficiency. Ski11 re- I 

sulta from practicing and nbserv- 1 

ing the application of doctrine. 

There are no short cuts. In my 

opinion, thos~! who neglect this 

most critical prinriple of our profession should not be leading 

soldiers. 

Force XXI is a reminder that 

our profession is ever-changin~; 

that our battle-command skills 

nre perishable and replaceable: 

and that skill is truly a product 

of knowledge. We must never 

rest on our laurels but continually challenge ourselves to stay 

the course. While that's not 

easy. the battlefield will be our 

friend if we persist. Then it will 

be the enemy who suffers the 

conspquences. 

"No study is possible on the bnttlefield; one do~s there simply 

u~h~t one can in order to apply 

mhat one knoros. Therefore, in 

order to do even a little, one ltas 

already lo know a great deal and 

know it ruell." 

remain the same. A commander's I Cewrnl Staff College. 

preparing, and executing cornhat 

operations. I believe that an 

appreciation for doctrine (employ- 

 in^ doctrine to your advantage) 

and constantly keeping your head 

clown and in the ball game will 

Ferdinand Foch Principles of 

WRP, 1919 

rn 

Mnjor DeMarse is !he ex~cut~ue 

officer, 5th Engineer Batfalion, 

the Combined Arms and Sertjices 

Staff Schonl. 

(Personal Viewpoint, continucd) 

benefits. Engineers from all senices 

consttuction equipmerlt they may 

-1 

have broadened their knowledge of ' 

aperate in future joint operations, 

and they have 1-4 to appreciate 

the other services' engineer wpahilities. It is critical that all military 

engineem fully understand the other 

services' engineer capabilities and be 

able to integmte them into opemtional plans. The ability to successfully inmate engineer equipment 

was key to successful militmy operations in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and 1 

the Gulf War. I 

To remedy these deficiencies, a11 

partim must first recognize and , 

agree that things are no longer 

owned or directed by a single service. The word "I" must be replaced 

with 'We". Individuals must avoid 

the tendency to refuse to consider 

anything except what they perceive as "their" service's posit.ion. ' 

In the joint environment, the 

methodology for decision maktng 

April 19.96 Engineer 41 

must be one of consensus building 

without demands for unique positions that benefit a single service. 

T7?e Fuf urp. Joint service training is an exciting initiative at Fort 

Lanard Wood. It is at the cutting 

enhance your adds of accurately 

estimating the outcome and decisively winning any battle. 

With the advent of Force XXI 

and digitization, some people 

believe that information technology will transform the way cornmanders and staffs pian, prepare, 

and execute combat missionsthat the current mode of decision 

makine will he replaced by 

I 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. 

Preview aqsignrnenls include 

chief of the Doctrine Branch, Eng6- 

neer SchooI: tmk force engineer 

trainer and engineer bat talion 

staff trainer, National Training 

Cpntpr; msistnnt S3. 23rd Engineer Battalion, 3rd Armored Diuision; platoon leader. executive 

officer, and company commander, 

4th Engineer Battolion, Wrt Caredpp d jntersewioe cooperntion and 11 

mmpatibility. Although there are ( 

another prccess or application. son, Colorado. Major DeMarse 

challenges, this program af shared 

resom.~ is now a reality. Our werall 

goal has not ~han@d: to ploduce outstanding, d-meet, md well-qualified engine equipment operators 

md technfd en*eering spfor d dikuy se~oes. At lihrt 

kmd Wood we are making tht4 

gmdarmhty. 

Captain Dunner is commander 

of B Company, 577th Engineer Bettalion, 1st Engineer Brigade, Fort 

T~onard Wnod. He previously served 

as platoon leader in the 10th Elaginew Batfalion, USAREUR, and the 

IsE Engineer Battalion in SoutJzwesl 

Asia A gmduafe of the Unirwrsiiy of 

Idaha CPT Danner ha9 comwleted 

Whatever the change, the fundamentals of battle command will 

' 

holds a masters degree and is a 

graduate of the Command and 
Past in Review 

Wherrv u and Gapehart: Armv U Family w 

Housing Privatization Programs in the 1958s 

k~ S~crettiry of Defense, 

Willin~n .J. Perry, has 

- - mndr ~mprnvin~ military 

housing ~IIF of hs hifi.he.4 prioritip<. IS~ca~rsr the jell 1s sa big, he 

wants to ~rilisthe help) of the privatp s~rtnr. Using the resotlrces of 

privat~ industry to improve military FarniIy housing is not new. In 

the long. ~v~ntful. ant1 often 

ncgl~ct~d histnry of military hcusing, t h~ D~fense D~pnrt ment hns 

tripped th~ rpsotlrce.; of the private market to expand th~ hnusi~tg stock of th~ Army and the 

othrr s~~~ices, In the last decade, 

thp sn-call~d S~ctinns 801 and 802 

housing. prcxpnnis gavP Army 

Fnm~lt~s ~ncrensed accpxa to adequate and affordnble housing. 

Four decade ago. two Pvrn 

lar~er programs reli~d on private 

financing to vastly expand the 

UP~~IISP Department'.;: family 

housing. They produced mlrch of 

the hnusin~ in th~ Army's now 

aElng invpntory. T~P tinrnes of the 

L7.S. scnatnrs who sponsored the 

leffislation creating the two programs. Wher~y and Capehart, 

arp familiar terms in the Army 

community. 'She ori~ns and 

tlatures of th~ Wherry xnd Cnprhart progmlns, however, are less 

well ~~nrlerstnod, nnrl the lessons 

learned from those prncrnms, 

which could h~ useful to curr~nt 

dccisinn nlak~rs, nrp. often inauCPSS~~~P or rnisii~~d~rstooi~. 

After Worlrl Wnr 11. thp pPncPtime Armv was mnnv tim~s the 

size nf thr p~ac~time Arn~y nf the 

1930s. The Cold War and the 

Korean Contlict ensured that the 

Slrmv. even dtirit~g the lean years 

of the Eisenhower administratinn, 

would he the largest peacetime 

Army in our nation's histoy. 

Although family hrrusing had 

grown during the 1920s and 19.70s. 

it was barely adequate for its day 

and was clearly innd~quate for the 

expanded Army of thp. Cold Wrlr, 

Gnv~rnrnent lenders strugglerl 

to provide adequate housing for 

eli~ble families by I~uilding 

trailpr parks nnd adapting wartime temporary huilrtings. but 

t hesc improvised measures were 

not e~rough. After I hr! huge exppnditures of World War 11, Connrss 

was reluctant to pay for lar~~ 

numbers of ~nvernrn~nt quarters. 

Thc ~~Lisht of inadcquataly, pvrn 

scaridnlouslv, hnusecl .&my Familips finally made th~ pages of Life 

magazine in 1949. ronlplet~ wit.h 

photographs. In response to this 

d~sp~rate situation, Canmnss and 

th~ administrntmn dpvispd an 

in-nnvative hnrislnfi promam in 

1949. 

S~n~tnr Ksnn~th S. Wh~rry. R 

R~p1117lic~n fr~t~~ Nehraskn who 

servccl in thr Senate frnm 1943 

until his &nth in 19.51, spnnsoretl 

thp hill t.hnt hecame law wh~n 

1'rrsjflcnt Ilnrn; S. Truman 

si~ned it on $I :Iu~ust 1949. Under 

W herry'a program, l~~lsin~ssm~n. 

called privatt? sponsnrs, I,~lili and 

t hrn lopprated and maintained 

housin~ pm,ierts on or np:ls milltary inqtallat ~onh. ,4r1ny families 

could choose to rclnt thr housing 1 usmg their haalc allowance for 

quarters. Baser! nn the cost nf 1 Iluildinr and rnnintaininp th~ 

1 hooain~, the rent caulcl pxcwd tllr 

soldirr's housin~ allowanre. The I. I prruate spnnsors built most nf th~ 

iVhery housin~ on military bases, 

whre th~y I~as~d the lnnd froni 

th~ Defrns~ Departm~nt fur n 

nominal fw (see phntn). 

Thp Financing arrnngemrnts for 

Wh~rry housing werp rather cnmplicatcd. The miIitnry senlice 

2 tIveri ised a proposed I~on~iny 

proi~ct~ nnrl th~ wtrinlnF: hldcl~r 

IIPC~~IP a privnt~ sponsor. 

Equippcrl with 21 rertificnte Slam 

th~ S~rretiiry of Dd~nse, who 

asserted thnt the sawic~ neederl 

the housing and hfid no plr~ns to 

clost. th~! bnsc?, t.he privnt~ spansor 

nbt ;linrd n~ortfi;?ge insurnncp frn111 

tlw Feder~l Wousir~g Administm. 

tton (FHA). ArmerE wit11 t.l& Ypecia1 I~ISII~RT~CB, th~ sponsor then 

souph t tnnuey to hi(i3d the project 

Crorn tha ~rivate tnnrtgrlrc! rnarlcet . Cnngr~ss limited the average 

cost of rnclr housing unit tn 

!$9,0OR, :a r~nson~hle atnount in 

th~ early 1950s. The nverngc 

tnortgnjie per unit, however, w:~s 

limited to $R,100. Because the prrvat@ sponsnr harl $900 of his Own 

money tipd up in each unit, Cocjiress thought thnt would he an 

inrrntivr fnr the sponsor tn build 

and msrintain gonrl hnusing. 

51any spnnsors, how~ver, tried to 

build units for $R,100 or leua. l'!le?: 

hoped tn make n profit both o:1 

April 19.66 
- i " 

7. 't. 

- . . 

'fi:hetiv i?ousinrj .?S Fort DIY. Yew Je!s~y 

April 1996 Engineer 43 
"The Wherry and Capehart programs produced more than 

55,000 housing units for the Army and created a 'boom' generation of Army housing that is now showing its age." - 

April 1996 

cn~t.etructit~g thr, hnucinji nzd on 

op~ratin~ and ni:t~ntn~nlnji it for 

~!IP full tern1 nf thr Irasr. which 

typirnlly rat1 for 50 years (nrtd 

sninet~mps far 75 !.wJs). Hoilsinrr 

costs escalated 111 thr 1950s ns :I 

to $16,500 tn 1956 (spp photos). 

The services xssicned military 

families to the Capehart I~ousitlfi 

xntl its~rl the forf~jt~d hn~lsiil~ 

Virfiu~ia dpw;crihpd th~ provnrn as 

"...tbr wnl-st rase of Iwk-dnor 

spenciin~ thnt has rome to my 

J~I~OWIP~I,~." In l9til tllp sen at^ 

re~iili of the natinr~witlr postwnr I anti mnjrlt;lining tllp 111lits cntli~ I tl:~ 1lnr1.w c~f Rrpr~a~ntntives, 

hoilsin:: hnorn, znrl Wh~rry OII~~F fmm appropriated funds. p~tcttrE~rI if II tit il I ()C:IO~IPL. 19(32. 

sonn werp rer.nr.nin~cl as ?mail ant1 1 '1.11~ ~irlrnte own~ri of UTherry la that ypnr Cnngrms voter1 to 

1ilespPnslvP haus IRK. I housm y prnjects opposed the build militnry r:~tl~ilv liotlsing with 

The diffclrent ~xpectat~io~is of ' C~~~hnrt prclfir:lm b~cnuse t Iwy xppropr~atorl iuntlh. 

the program's proponents nnd fb~ I fpnr~d the services would favor 'rogeth~tr, the Wh~n-y 2nd 

allowances to make the mortpng~: Ivoted not to rpnwv the Capehart 

payments. Money fL>r nppmting ; prncmm ht~t, in 3 rornpmnlrw wit11 

Cap~imrt procrnols pm(loat?il 

more than 55.0CI(1 housirlg units 

private sponsors evpnt~inily P ~PW. l>ett~r housing and lpavr 

killed the Wherry prnpanl. 17) their Whprql units with high 

1953 and 1954, Gonqr~s.~: chan~etl 

tflc prneram to r~(l~iire that spnnsors rrfund the "excess" profits 

thpv made from construrtirl~: 

housinr fur $8.100 or less. By 

vacfincy mtrs. Congr~~s finntlv for th~ hrmv nntl cr~nterE a ''IJoo~'' 

I r~qll~rcd t hr srn.ir~s to 17uy the Kenmation of r21.m~ hausin,: that 

Whprrv units on instnllakionx is nnw showing its are. Thp 

U~~PI-P fl~~l* ll~lllt Gap~,hnrt i~nits, 

hut thp Wherry OwnPrs find the 

D~ft.n,qtz Drpartrnrnt ronsistrnt 1. 

rnnintninrtl that it pr~f~rr~d to 

construct hnusin~ with :Ippt-fl~~r~- 

ated f~~nrls ht~t wns pqatrf~~l for 

an!- housing thxt irn~rnv~d thp 

quality of Eif~ for ruilitnrv fnrnilies. 

AIthough Coraqress pmn~iscd In 

19fi2 to continue construrtin~ 

Iar~e nrrmb~rs of hnusing units 

with military canstruction funrls. 

the w~r in Southtrast .kin a11cI 

nth~r pvinrit ips smrl l~rought thr 

~P~P~SF! Departm~nt's pnst-\.llnrlii 

War 11 housing boom to an ~nd. 

1954 int t.rrst in b~ctlrnin~ 3 ' jinvernm~nt strugglcil for years 

Wher- sponsor hnd tn d~t~rminr n ffllr price for them. 

d iminish~d ~reatlv. l'h~ S~FII~AIP l~ft th~ Wh~rty ownIn 195.5 S~nafor Hcln~er Cfiprhnst, n R~p~lhlican from Indiana 

who spnrp(l tn Ihp Senate horn 

1944 t!mll~h 196%. sponsored 

npw housing procram. Under tht. 

Cnp~hnrt prn~rnrn, whirh became 

law on 11 .flupi~.ht 7955, private 

sponsors huil t housinf: hut Jicl not 

CTS hit t~r and Itkt1 O~P of t.)wir reprpserltatlves to rlecinre thnt "The 

tllilitav and private k.nt~rpri..;p 

are not cnrnpatihlc in the firld of 

ownership :uld rn:~n;~gemr ntnf 

military hnusing." 

After some init,ixl proh terns, 

the simpler Cnpehnrt proysnm 

i~rrir~a nrlv~rtisrrl hnosine with 36.000 hoiiaina ,mil.; i)y thr just as S~nntor C~lpehart had 

prnjwts. ~llri the wi~mlng bidders , earlv I9tiDs. Uut Cnr~hart hfiusing waruetl. instead OF replacing the 

opernt~ or maintain rt. Again the I sucreed~d In prov~tlln~ tllr ~trrny 

cvclical pztt~rn a€ military tlo~zs. 

infi pr.npmms, thr Wl~er-ry and 

Capehart programs hecitme just 

nnoth~r. IS snm~whnt lun~er, cycl~ 

olrtalnpd rnnrtz:iCp insuranw 

from the f l-{A 011 thr .pntir~ 

amount nf their bids. With this 

insuranrp, th~ sponsnrs obtained 

had its critics al-o. Sonv Lv~y.tletl 

thxt ths I~ousinc was more Pxpensive than comnarnhli? units b11iIt 

wit11 appropriat~cl funcls. Senntnr 

financing in th~ private rnoi-t~ajie 

market for 25-y~nr mortc.:ages. 

When a sponsm CCIIIIP~P~PC~ C'CJEst ruction, 111~ rntnpany transCapehart respnndecl that, with 311 In thr lnn~ Imorn-or-l>ust hstory rlf 

th~ demancls placed upon it, the I Army l~nusing. 

D~fense D~partrn~nt could not LJ6 

suxtxin a lonp-t~rm pmgran~ for 

ferr~cf the rnnrt~:3~~ to tllr L7a- hol1si117 c~nstructi~n with approparttn~rit of Dcf~nse. priatctl f~lnds. Senator Ric'h:lrd 

Dr. Willir~m C. Un1dfl:i.n is o 

hislorinn in ihr Offirr of Ilistor?, 

tJ. .Y. Army C.'orps of Kn~inr~rs. 

Under the Cnp~hnrt praprnm, 1 Russpll nf C;~r,Pin accused somp Al~rccrndrirr, Ci'rcirricr. Hta IS rc7- 

the averaEe housing li~lrt r05t privatp sponsors of "sharp prac- , searching and uv-itin~ nI1istor.v of 

3,iOa. n limit Conq~ss mi.;tcl tires." Spnntnr l larry Ryrii nf ( Army housinp. 
-i BRIDGE THE GAP 

By Command Sergeant Major Julius B. Nutter 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

Force XXI Leader Development 

7 he Chief of Staff of the W.S. Army has stated that 

training is the glue that holds the Army together. 

Trained leaders are essential to molding skilled indiv~duats into effective teams and In combining teams into 

combat-ready platoons, companies, and task forces. A key 

ingredient to well-trained units is trained leaders. 

As I assume my duties as Command Sergeant Majar of 

the Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, I fully 

support this philosophy. Over the next few years, E will 

focus my efforts to ensure areas of training are developed 

and implemented to successfully accompillsh the missions 

In November 1995, the Advanced Nancammissioned 

Officer Course (ANCGCJfor engineers was restructured ta 

better focus on the concept of leader development for 

Force XXI. The following subjects were added to the 

ANCOC program of instruction (POI): together they add 

one week to the course curriculum at Fort Leonard Wood. 

. 

ANCOC POI Cha0g.e-s 

- Ptans and Orders 

- Breaching Techniques 

- Hours 

3 

2 

and goals of the Force XXI Army. - Engineer Tactical Planning 3 

As the Engineer Regiment designs institutional leaderdevelopment programs, proponent school leaders must 

remaln cognizant of what will be expected of 21st century 

leaders. They must be trained to fight and win our nation's 

wars. They must also operate in an environment of 

complexity, ambiguity. and rapid change; be capable of 

building effective teams amid continuous organizational 

and technological changes; and be proficient at adapting 

and solving problems creatively. 

While working to develop dynamic training to meet the 

needs of 21 st century engineer soldiers, Army leaders also 

must remain committed to The basics that make our Army 

great: 

- Sustain Army ethics. 

Lead, train, maintain. and care for soldiers. 

Foster enduring values (courage, candor, wmpetence, commitment, and compassion). 

Trarn Po rigorous standards. 

-Task Force Engineer Responsibilities and 

Duties 

- Engineer Capabilities 

- Engineer Support fa Offensive Operations 

- Offensive Operations Practleal Exercise 

- Oflefensiva OperMons Tactical Exercise 

Without Troops (TEWT) 

- Engineer Support to Defensive Operations 

- Obstacle Tactics 

- Defensive Operations Practical Exercise 

- Defensive Operations TEWT 

- Engineer Support m Army Operations 

- Obtain Combat Service Supprl 

- Conduct Defensive Oporalions 

- Conducf Offensive Operations 

Train as & fight. - River Crossing 

The leader-training concept of operations requires -Threat Tactics 

that noncommissionsd officers (NCOs) integrate the 

three leader-development principles-institutional - Determine Division Organization 

training, operational assignments, and self- - Tactics Examination 3 

development-because each of them supports, 

reinforces, and sometimes overlaps the others. We must 

afso use information technology and techniques to 

maximize the learning experience. For example, we will 

increase the training and operational requirements at our 

efforts by ensurlng the proper sequence, time, focus, 

and location of training, education, and assignments. 

Finally, we must be resource-efficient and learn from 

ongoing operations, Force XXI initiatives, and the Army's 

strategic outreach program. 

Force XXI engineer NCOs must be competent in 

current engineer doctrine and task-force engineer 

operations and possess the skills. knowledge, and 

attitudes needed to suppart the digitized battlefield. The 

new ANCOC structure supports this vision. I encourage 

NCO leaders throughout our Corps to remain aware of 

technology and doctrinal changes ta ensure that today's 

NCOs are prepared for the Army of the 21st century. 

March 1.996 En,gineer 45 
tec 

dn,