Headouatiers. De~atiment of the Armv April 1993 
-

T--C 

'.LEAR THE WAY 

By Major General Daniel W Christman 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

(ICP reetings from the Ozarks! Since my last chat, 1
W I've had the chance to visit and speak with 

our great engineer soldiers at Fort Ord, Fort 

Stewart, and the National Training Center at Fort 

Irwin. From these visits, it is clear that engineers 

are providing outstanding support to the total force; 

we consistently provide exceptional products in 

every arena, in every theater, during every exercise 

or contingency. However, many I spoke with, from 

young soldiers to senior leaders, were anxious 

about the future of the Army and concerned for our 

profession as engineers. 

Although these fears and concerns cannot be totally eradicated, let me ease them a bit by explaining 

what I see for the future. The Army will continue to 

downsize--President Clinton has made that perfectly 

clear. Exactly how much of a cut we will take is still 

uncertain. Rest assured that we have done everything 

possible to minimize the impact of these reductions 

for the Corps of Engineers. Regardless of the details 

of our new military strategy, engineers must and will 

remain a vital member of the combined arms team. 

Our unique capabilities and professionalism, as showcased so vividly in recent crisis deployments, assures 

engineers of a key role in the Army structure of the 

90s and beyond. 

Let me explain. For our combat engineers, the notion of an engineer battalion aligned with a maneuver 

brigade is a clear winner. The Engineer Restructure In . . ltiative (ERI) will continue but will evolve as our 

leaders rethink the role of heavy divisions. Further, for 

our combat heavy units, the requirement for both a 

tailored and responsive sustainment engineering force 

is critical to the concept of a "power projection'' Army. 

In the operations other than war (OOTW) arena, 

engineers have consistently proven their capabilities 

throughout history; I am convinced this mission area 

will play an even more important role for the entire 

Army. 

The civil side of the Corps is restructuring, with a 

decrease in overall assets. This streamlining was 

necessary to meet future challenges and should not 

greatly reduce their capabilities. (See the article by 

Lieutenant Colonel Norwood, page 16.) If President 

Clinton's plan to spend $300 billion on infrastructure 

is approved, Corps offices will have plenty of work. 

The Corps of Engineers will have another opportunity 

to maintain their reputation as the most dynamic engineer organization of its type in the world. 

We must reassure our soldiers, civilians, and 

families about these expected changes. I need your 

help to get this word out! If we continue to let an 

"undercurrent" affect the way we do business, we will 

miss an outstanding opportunity to shape the future of 

our branch. The best way for us to ensure our future 

is to continue to demonstrate our unique capabilities. 

We must continue to demonstrate competence in all 

we do and be proactive rather than reactive to the 

changing environment. We must convince everyone, 

including maneuver commanders, of the validity of the 

ERI concept at every opportunity, and provide exceptional, not merely adequate, support. We must expand our role in the OOTW arena and continue to provide superb products, whether this be topographic 

support for a ravaged homeland, a bridge to aid a 

starving population, or an airfield to enhance contingency operations. 

To ensure this type of continued performance, each 

of us must do our part. Training must continue to be 

innovative, dynamic, and cost. effective. Professional 

development must be provided and monitored at all 

levels. Mentoring must be continued down to the 

lowest levels if we are to provide the outstanding support expected of us in the 21st century. 

Changes are inevitable. Our legacy must be the efficient and effective management of these changes to 

ensure outstanding engineer support well into the 

2lst century Tough times require strong, visionary 

leaders. Each of us must do our part in this process 

while adhering to the adage "Mission first, people always." I am convinced that the future Army and our 

Corps will survive this process and will continue to 

offer exciting, challenging, and rewarding careers. 

Join me in ensuring that every soldier is given an opportunity to excel in every circumstance, under any 

condition. Essayons! 
-


-


r I 

Apr111993 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 23 PB 5-93-2 .. 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

FEATURES ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 2 Advances in Mine Warfare: An Overview 

- by William C. Schneck, Malcolm H. Visser, and Stuart Leigh 

COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 1 

I 8 Engineers Respond to Operations Other Than War 

Major General Daniel W. Christman by Major Robert M. Ralston and Lieutenant Colonel 

Douglas L. Horn 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Catherine Eubanks 16 Corps Reorganization: Few Impacts on Engineer 

Officers CONTRIBUTING EDITORS 

Cindy Paterson I by Lieutenant Colonel J. David Nonvood 

Lynne M. Sparks 19 Leadership Prerequisites for Our New Army 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER I by Colonel Herb Harback 

!

Jennifer C. Bolyard 25 Engineer, Bring Me a Map1 

by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Campbell By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN 30 BCTP Perceptions 

General, United States Army by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Collins and Major Jim Dumolt 

Chief of Staff 34 Bridge From the Sky: Airdropping the MGB 

Official: by Captain Dave Anderson I 

~'4 9LA5 37 Operational Testing and Evaluation of Engineer Systems 

by Major Richard J. Mally 

MILTON H. HAMILTON I 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

03789 / DEPARTMENTS 

Cover: Turning point, then and now Just Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way .. 1

as Brigadier General Warren gmsped the im- 1 15 Personal Viewpoint 43 Engineer Update 

portance of key terrain on the outcome of 

22 Lessons ~ear"ed 46 Past in Review the battle at Gettysburg, today's engineers 1 

are more important than ever in helping corn- / 24 Engineer Problem 49 Bridge the Gap 

rnanders see the battlefield (Painting by 33 Engineer Solution 

Dale Gallon). ! 

ENGINEER (SSN 0046-19890) 1s prepared quarterly by the US. Army En- expressed ere tho* of the author and not those 01 the Dephmnent of Delense or 

gineer Schml, ATTN: ATSE-TDM-PS. Fort Lsonard Wood, MO 65473-6650. rt5 elemen5 The mntente do not necessary reflect onicisl I!S Army positions, 

Second Class postage is pa8d at Eon Leonard Wood. MO, and additional mslllng and do not change or supersede intormation in Omer US. Army pubiicabans Use 

omces. of new items mndwtes nsimei affirmation of thelr accuracy nor product 

endorsement. ENGINEER reservesmsriPht to edit rneteiihi. POSTMASTER: Send addteas changes to ENGINEER, the Professonai Bulletin for Army Engineers, AnN: ATSE-TDM.PB, Fort Lwnam Wwd, MO 65473~ CONTENT is not copyrighted. Malriel may be reprinted If credit is given to 

6650. ENGINEER and me author. 

CORRESPONDENCE, lemers io the editor, manuscripts, photographs, omclal OFFIUAL DlSTRiBUTlON Is targeted to all englnesr end sngineer.reiated 

unR requem R receive copes. and unlt address changes should be sent to EN- unts. 

GINEER. at the preceding sddres. Telephone: 014) 583-7535, DSN 6787535. PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTONS are avallaMe by mntacdng me Superinbndent 

DISCLAIMER: ENGINEER presents profesiond information designed to keep of Documents AlTN: Chief, Mall List Branch, Stop SSOM. Washington. DC 

Army engneers Informed of current and emerglng developments wllhin their areas 2LH02. Address changes lor personal subscriptions should aiso be sent to the 

of enpenlse tar the purpose of enhancing their professional dewlcpment Vlews SuCerlntendent of Documentl. 
By William C. Schmck, Malcolm H. Visser, and Stuart Leigh 
The tremendous worldwide 

- .proliferation of land mines, 

both simple and advanced, has 

increased the need for additional 

Army training and improved 

countermine technology The increased use of land mines 

threatens to neutralize U.S. advantages in firepower and 

mobility by severely limiting the 

ability of maneuver forces to advance and support one another. 

Easily mass produced and inexpensive, mines will likcly be encountered in any conflict, regardless of the enemy. In some cases, 

mines will be the major threat to 

U.S. forces. As with chemical 

weapons, they are a harsh 

reality of modern warfare. Army 

units must train to counter them 

as thoroughly as they now prepare for operations in a nuclear, 

biological, and chemical (NBC) 

environment. 

This article, the first in a series 

of three, discusses tho seriousness 

of the mine threat and what combat engineers can do to counter 

it. Articles in future issues of 

ENGINEER will describe the 

types of land mines that US, forces may encounter wherever they 

are called to fight. 

'I'hc: Threat 

vJ:rld threats are changlng. The collapse of communism has reduced the shortterm risk of global, conventional war. In addition, the convincing battlefield victory by the 

U.S-led coalition in Operation 

Desert Storm served notice to 

potential aggressors that the 

IJnited States remains vigilant 

in its role as the principal 

guarantor of world st,ability. 

The current geopolitical situation indicat,es that the probability of American forces engaging in a mid- or high-intensity conflict over the next few 

years is low. 

Major Producers of Land Mines 

Allied Countries 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Italy 

United Kingdom 

United States 

-Other 

Czechoslovakia 

Egypt 

Former Soviet Union 

Former Republic of 

Yugoslavia 

Republic of China 

Table 1 

Nevertheless, the world remains 

an inherently unstable place. The 

U.S. could become involved in any 

number of small-scale conflicts 

around the globe. The disintegration of Soviet power has increased 

the likelihood of destabilizing, lowintensity conflicts. This is compounded by a worldwide trend 

toward nationalism and intertribal 

conflict, as events in eastern Africa 

and the remnants of the former 

Republic of Yugoslavia have 

dernonstrated The situation is further complicated by the resurgence 

of religious fundamentalism in the 

Middle East and central Asia, 

which has increased the potential 

for civil and internecine warfare. 

Land mines will play an important 

role in all these scenarios. 

The former Soviet Union and 

countries of the defunct Warsaw 

Pact no longer support Marxist 

client states by subsidizing them 

with military equipment and 

training. But these nations have 

hardly shut down product,ion of 

arms in their weapons facilities. 

On the contrary. the new governments are seeking to obtain 

desperately needed cash by selling 

weapons to any country willing to 

pay for t,hem. Sales of "big ticket" 

items are down because few nations can afford them in quantity. 

But the sales of small, manportable weapons, particularly 

mines, are continuing at a brisk 

pace. A number of western and 

third-world countries have entered the business of manufacturing and exporting land mines as 

well (see Table 1). Some of these 

mines are quite advanced,' and 

many have begun to appear in 

global hot spots. 

The proliferation of mines was 

dramatically demonstrated at the 

conclusion of Operation Desert 

Storm, when allied forces confiscated samples of land mines from 

nine countries of origin out ofIraqi 

ammunition supply points. Many 

of these devices were more advanced than most mines in the 

U.S. inventoryZ (Fortunately for 

U.S. soldiers, the mines Iraqi soldiers emplaced by the millions 

along the Kuwaiti border were far 

less sophisticated.) The experience in Iraq illustrates that 

land mines are inexpensive and 

readily available. U.S. combat 
These are a small portion of the thousands of mine types available today. 

engineers, therefore, must be 

prepared to face a sophisticated 

mine threat, no matter where they 

are called to fight. 

Since World War 11, land mines 

have caused a surprisingly high 

percentage of casualties, particularly in counterinsurgency 

situations (see Table 2, page 5). 

They are the guerrillas'weapon of 

choice in any low-intensity conflict 

(LIC).~Mines provide guerrillas 

with an ideal economy of force 

capability and serve as equalizers 

against more sophisticated opponents. Properly employed, they 

destroy, disrupt, delay, deny (use 

of areas), and demoralize. Guerillas can emplace them with 

minimal risk, while significantly 

disrupting military operations 

and the civilian economy Even advanced mines are relatively cheap 

and can destroy multimilliondollar targets. 

More than 2,500 mine and fuze 

combinations are in use today, and 

650 million mines have been 

emplaced in the last 55 years. 

These figures indicate that mines 

will continue to rank at the top of 

the guerrillas' list of preferred 

weapons. 

The proliferation of land mines 

partly explains why winning the 

peace after hostilities have caJsed is 

koming so di5cult? Locations like 

the Falkhd Islands, which saw 

relatively limited conilid in a war 

that ended a decade ago, remain 

plagued by thousands of live and 

dangerous explmive devices. 

Technology Advances 

The last 20 years have wit- 

- - nessed significant advances 

in the technology associated with 

mine warfare. This technology is 

advancing at an almost geometric rate. Advanced electronic 

sensors and processors have been 

coupled with shaped charges or 

explosively formed penetrators. 

The resultant devices can defeat 

all known hard targets, such as 

tanks and armored personnel 

carriers-even those equipped 

with countermeasures. 
Mine Casualty Trends 

Casualties 

Conflict Combatant (Percent) 

Personnel Vehicles 

World War II 

(Italian Campaign) 

Korea 

Vietnam 

Thailand 

El Salvador 

The manufacturers of these 

electronic mines sometimes offer 

options such as integral antihandling devices, remote control 

onloff, and programmable selfdestruct and self-neutralization. 

Several countries have fielded 

low-metallic rnines that are extremely difficult to detect, even 

with today's improved mine detectors. The former Republic of 

Yugoslavia has rnanufactiir,ed 

both antitank (AT) and antipersonnel (A?) mines that contain no 

metal. Other manufacturers have 

developed hardened mines that 

have considerable blast resistance 

against explosive clearance 

devices such as the M-58 mineclearing line charge (MICLIC). 

These advances have created an 

unprecedented need for additional 

countermine technology 

The out,hreak of Operation 

Desert Storm increased interest in 

counterobstacle equipment, particularly that needed t,o upgrade 

the breaching capabilities of armored and mechanized divisions. 

Between 1989 and 1991, the US. 

fielded the M-9 armored combat 

eart,hrnover (ACE), the batt,alion 

countennine set for the M-I tank, 

United States 4.4 33 

United States 10 56 

United States 33 70 

Thai government 30 NA forces 

Salvadoran 

90 NA government forces 

Table 2 

support the tempo of operations 

demanded by AirLand Battle 

Reinfol-cement of doctrine.hdditionally, the U.S. 

Army remains poorly equipped to 

fundamental deal with mines in low-intensity 

confli~ts.~Light force capabilities 

breaching have not significantly improved 

since the Vietnam conflict. In fact, techniques through as with armored and mechanized 

units, light forces are essentially I-epetitivetraining' using World War I1 technology8 

is a proven methocl 

The Infnrl~intio~i Gap for coping w-ith 

unexpected TJ S, combat engineers lack 

access to a comprehensive 

obstacles. reference that identifies and 

describes the technical characteristics of recently fielded threat 

mines. Explosive ordnance disthe mine rake for the M-728 posal @OD) teams use the 

combat engineer vehicle (CEV). TM 60H serics iEOD Procedures 

and the M-58 MICLIC. (The for Land ,Miiiesj, but this excelMICLIC was fielded in 1986, but lent source of information is difmany using units did not train ficult to obtain The last comwith it until Operation Desert prehensive reference for foreign 

Shield.) mines available for general use 

The technology in all these sys- was TM 5.280 (Foreigiz Mine Wartems, however, is of World War I1 fare Eqzcip,?~ent).This manual 

vintage. As a result, U.S. breach- was last updated in 1971 and was 

ing capabilities and tactics remain racinded in March 1986. Copies 

too slow and complicated to are scarce, and the manual 
Countermeasures forVarious Fuze Types 

Breaching Method 

Detection Type of Fuze Method Explosives Mechanical Manuel 

neulrailreNw 

Tilt rod Visual SiIghUy reduced Good. Expect some External antihandling 

Detector elfectivenass detonations dwtce (AHD) is possible 

Influence Detector Signlicantly Good. Expect some Blow in place only 

Problng reduced detonations 

enetiveness 

Simple ~etector' Effective Good. Expect some Internal and externat 

pressure Probing detonations AHDs possible 

Blast-resistant ~etector' Reduced Gwd. Expect some Internal and exlernal 

pressure Probing effectiveness detonations AHDs posslble 

MUM-impulse ~etector' Ineffective GOO^. Expect some Internal and external 

pressure Probing detonations AHDs possible 

Command visual2 May cut suflace- Clears mines from Internal and external 

detonated laid firing wires front of vehicle. May AHDs possible 

leave off-route mines. 

h he detection method depends on !he metallic content of the mine. 

Some command-detonated fuzes may rot be visual. 

Table 3 

provides no information on newer, comprehensive information on the MICLIC, do not provide 

more sophisticated mines.' many threat mines available on reliable neutralization of blastSeveral special-purpose docu- the world market, the data base is resistant mines. In addition, while 

ments, such as the Mine Warfare not readily available to soldiers in the battalion countermine set is 

and Recognition Handbook and the field. extremely effective against most 

the Supper Countermine Guide antitank mines, it is not designed 

(both published for Operation to cope with the more sophistiDesert Storm), supplement cated side-attack and topattack 

TM 5-280, but these documents AT mines being developed around 

have limited scope and distribu- The recent advances in mine the world. 

tion. As a result, combat engineers - - warfare technology have 

must train to operate on the created a serious problem for 

The development and rapid 

modern battlefield against a U.S. combat engineers. The proliferation of scatterable mines 

sophisticated mine threat without sophisticated mines have largely has created an additional coman inclusive, up-to-date counter- outstripped the countermeasures plication, in that these mines can 

mine manual for guidance. designed to defeat them, in be emplaced at ranges up to 50 

To help counteract this problem, terms of both capability and cost kilometers,1° making them a sigthe Countermine Directorate of (see Table 3). nificant threat to the rear. Units 

the Belvoir Research, Develop- Advanced technology makes it normally assigned to rear areas 

ment, and Engineering Center difficult for U.S. soldiers equipped have virtually no experience in 

recently began assembling a with mine detectors to locate dealing with land mines or cluster 

minelcountermine data base in a many of the devices quickly and munitions. Many of these soldiers' 

software format that is compatible efficiently. Some cannot be located countermine experiences consist 

with both IBM and Apple com- at all. Explosive countermeasures, of brief overviews received during 

puters. Although it contains such as the bangalore torpedo and basic training. 

6 Engineer 
No "Silver I:ullct" 

To address these deficien-

- - cies, the U.S. Army has 

developed the Countermine Modernization Plan. Approved in 

1992, the plan prioritizes the 

development effort for promising 

countermine technologies. However, a countermine "silver bullet" is nowhere in sight. Even if 

the plan is fully funded (an extremely optimistic assessment 

considering current funding), 

technology can rovide only part 

of the answer." Combat engineers in the field must provide 

the rest, by combining available 

technology with good tactics, 

knowledge of the threat, and ingenuity to achieve an optimal 

balance. 

Realistic training on a regular 

basis is essential for engineer 

units to accomplish their mobility missions on a modern battlefield. The mine threat is as 

serious as the NBC warfare 

threat, and unit training plans 

must reflect this reality Units 

with missions for probable 

deployment into LIC environments should consider favoring 

countermine training over NBC 

training because land mines currently pose a greater risk than do 

chemical weapons. 

Units can partly offset the information gap by using the following 

guides: 

Enforce the basic rules for 

negotiating a minefield; they 

are essential!^ the same, 

regardless of the type of 

mine present. Carelessly approached, a World War I1 

vintage mine can kill as surely as the most modern, sophisticated device available today. 

Emphasize the use of basic 

battle drills in training to 

avoid unnecessary casualties. 

Reinforcement of fundamental 

breaching techniques through 

repetitive training is a proven 

method for co~ine . . with unexpected obstacles. 

Fn an ever-changing world, 

.-land mines remain a constant, dangerous threat. Limitations in technology and information mandate the need for 

combat engineers to prepare for 

this threat through realistic 

training. Such training should 

provide experience and information on the critical characteristics of land mines currently 

available on the world market. 

Taken as a whole, the approaches discussed here can help 

ensure that combat engineers 

are adequately prepared to 

negotiate any minefield obstacle 

they encounter. Y 

Mr. Schnech is a civilian project 

engineer for the Countermine Systems Directorate, Beluoir Research, 

Development, and Engineering 

Center, Fort Beluoir. During 

Operations Desert ShieldiStorm, 

he deployed with the 20th Engixeer Brigade fCbti (Airborne) to 

train U.S. soldiers in mine warfare techniques. He holds a 

bachelor's degree from the Georgia 

Institute of Technology. 

ME Visser is a ciuilian project eiigilieer for the Countennine Systems 

Directorate, Beluoir RD&E Center 

He previously sewed as aiz instructor 117, the Department of Military 

Engineering at the U.S. Army Engineer Sciiool. Mr. Visser is a 

graduate of tile U.S. Military 

Academx West Point. 

MI: Leigh is a specid projects of3 

ficer in the Countermi~aeSystems 

Directornte, Beluoir RD&E Center 

He is a retired Army officer Preuious assig7zments include depuo 

TRADOC cystenis manager for 

minelcountermine warfare. Mr. 

Leigh is a graduate of the U.S. 

Army Command mid General Stuff 

College and holds a bachelor's degree from Golden Gate Universi&, 

San Francisco. 

Endnotes 

'~ane'sMilitary Vehicles and 

Logistics, 1991-1992, Jane's 

Defence Data, 1991, pp. 143-

206. 

'~chneck, William C., "After 

Action Report, Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm," Belvoir Research, Development, and Engineering 

Center, 12 November 1991, pp. 

C-1 and C-2. 

'sapper Counterntine Guide, 

BRDEC Pamphlet 350-4, Belvoir Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center, 30 

November 1990, p. 9. 

4 " Scientific ~ ~and Techni- ~

cal Intelligence (%TI) Support 

to International Mineclearing 

Programs," Briefing by Tom 

Reeder, Foreign Science and 

Technology Center, Charlottesville, VA, view graph 113. 

5

Mine Recognition and Warfare Handbook, U.S. Army Engineer School: Fort Leonard 

Wood, MO, November 1990. 

'~chneck, "After Action 

Report." 

'Vietnant Lessons Learned, 

1965-1968, Landmine and 

CountermineWarfare, Engineer 

Agency for Resource Inventories, Washington, D.C., July 

1972. 

'western Europe, World War 

II, Lundnzine and Coltnternzine 

Warfare, Engineer Agency for 

Resources Inventories, Washington, D.C.,July 1973. 

'~orei~n Mine Warfare Equipment, TM 5-280, July 1971. 

lo~aPPerCounternline Guide, 

p. 76. 

l1 Arnzy Counterntine Modernization Plan, Department of 

the Army, 21 April 1992. 
Engineers Respond To Operations 


Other Than War 


By Major Robert M. Ralston and. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas L. Horn 

ilitary operations other 

than war (OOTW) involvi~~glarge unit task organizations have been frequent occurrences in the last few years. FM 

5-114, Engineer Operations 

Short of War, identifies several 

operations categories, one of 

which is disaster-relief operations within the United States 

and its territories. The 20th Engineer Brigade (CBT) (ABN 

Corps), stationed at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, has provided 

small, tailored support packages 

of soldiers and equipment to assist in disaster-relief operations 

several times since returning 

from the Gulf War. Deployment 

of the brigade and attached engineer units to conduct Hurricane Andrew recovery operations in Florida was the first 

major participation in OOTW. 

This article describes the steps 

taken by the 20th Engineer 

Brigade in responding to this 

natural disaster. 

Hurricane Andrew 

24 August-In the early 

morning hours, Hurricane 

Andrew slammed into the 

southern tip of Florida. The eye of 

the hurricane passed directly over 

Homestead Air Force Base and the 

surrounding communities of 

Homestead and Florida City with 

an estimated wind speed of more 

than 160 mph. The air base was 

destroyed, most trailer parks in 

8Engineer 
the area were completely 

demolished, and the majority of I 111 // 

housing in adjacent communities HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF OPERATION ''a

sustained heavy damage. The 

area lost all basic services. 

The filst military engineers to 

respond were soldiers of t,he 841st 

Engineer Battalion (USAR) stationed in the Miarni and Jackonville, Florida, area. Although the 

hurricane had destroyed their armory and many of their soldiem' 

homes, volunteers immediately 

began debris-removal operations, 

clearing main roads throughout 

the disaster area, the airstrip at 

Homestead Air Force Base, and 

select locations designated by city 

officials for the first of the dislocated personnel tent cities. Additionally, they provided transportation for the Red Cross and began 

initial debris-removal operatio:ls 

in Florida City. 

Alert 

27 August--Late in the day, 

Forces Command (FORSCOM) 

alerted the XVIII Airborne Corps 

and directed them to send an initial logistical tnsli force to aid in 

relief operations. The Corps 

directed the 20th Engineer 

Brigade to begin deployment of forces and to have an airborne engineer battali011 on the ground 

within 24 hours. With the first 

airplanes inbound, the brigade 

began crisis action planning for 

deploying forces in one-half the 

time of its normal 18-hour 

response time. In the planning 

stages, the brigade used the MI1 

Airborne Corps' contingency plan 

for disaster-relief operations as a 

guide. Engineer units throughout 

the eastern United States were 

alerted by FORSCOM to he on call. 

28 august-^^ 0630 hours, 

the brigade assault command post 

(ACP) had landed at Opa-Locka 

.4irport, in North Miami, and was 

heading to the Homestead area. At 

0600 hours, the first company of 

the 27th Engineer Battalion (A 

Co) began loading C5 aircraft at, 

Pope AFB, North Carolina. 

Restricted by competing airflow 

requirements, it would take two 

days for the 27th Engineer Battalion to close in to the area of 

operations. 

Assessment 

2.9 August -Initial reports 

from the brigade ACP indicated 

that the situat,ion was extremely 

bad. Even after five days, there 

appeared to be little organization 

to the relief effort. The main 

mission in the initial stages appeared to be strictly debris 

removal from land lines of communication. Based on the assault 

CP's assessment, brigade forces 

were told to leave their dozers and 

graders behind and to add extra 

bucket loaders when possible. 

30 August-The brigade 

commander, Colonel Bob Melchior, arrived in Miami to survey 

the damage. He immediately 

asked FORSCOM to authorize the 

deployment of more U.S.Army 

engineers to assist in the relief 

efforts. 

The brigade also began coordination with the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (USACE), 
Hurricane Andrew Fact Sheet 

Deaths: 55 in south Florida, Louisiana, and the Bahamas 

Property damage: Estimated over $20 billion 

People left homeless: 250,000 

Businesses destroyed or damaged: 82,000 

Lost jobs: 85,000 

Crop damage: Andrew destroyed or damaged 80 percent of 

Dade County, Florida's 3,655 farms, at an estimated loss of 

$1.04 billion 

Jacksonville District, to define 

priorities of work and to coordinate the brigade's efforts with 

the district's. USACE had contractors performing temporam 

roof repair and minor debris 

removal. The brigade concentrated their planning effort in 

those areas not yet covered by 

USACE contracts. Attempts were 

made to coordinate with Joint 

Task Force (JTF) Andrew, but the 

JTF was still being formed. Later, 

the JTF engineer staff would be 

headed by BG Hussell Fuhrman, 

commander of the North Cent.ra1 

USACE Division, and staffed by 

the 36th Engineer Group, Fort 

Benning, Georgia, and by reserve 

engineer officers called to active 

duty. 

Build Up of Engineer 

Forces 

30 August-The 27th Engineer Battalion closed up on 

Homestead Air Force Base, set up 

an operations base at a localjunior 

high school, andbegan disaster assistance operations in the surrounding communities. 

31 August-The 43d Engineer Battalion (CBT HVY),Fort 

Benning, deployed 20 equipment 

operators to Florida to augment 

the 841st Engineer Battalion. 

1 September-The XVIII 

-4irborne Corps assault CI-' 

(ARFOR commander) and the 2nd 

Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division 

(TFAllAmerican), had deployed to 

the area, and the advance parties 

of the 10th Mountain Division (TF 

Mountain) began to arrive Also, 

the 27th Engineer Battalion was 

augmented by the 264th Engineer 

Company (MGB) and the 362nd 

Engineer Company (CSE) of the 

20th Engineer Brigade, and the 

remainder of the 43rd Engineer 

Battalion deployed. 

2 September-The 937th 

Engineer Group, Fort Riley, Kansas, the 46th Engineer Battalion 

(CBT HVY) (-), Fort Rucker, 

Alabama, and the 92nd Engineer 

Battalion (CBT HW), Fort 

Stewart, Georgia, were ordered to 

deploy. Additionally, the 34th Engineer Battalion (CBT HVY), Fort 

Carson, Colorado, and the 62nd 

Engineer Battalion (CBT HVX, 

Fort Hood, Texas, were alerted, 

although none of these battalions 

were to be deployed. 

3 September-Six clean-up 

contracts totaling $90 million 

were signed by USACE. Contractors began mobilizing the next 

day, with full-up operations estimated to take up to a week. 

Task Organization of 

Forces 

aased on troop density and 

the engineers now available, as well as the location and 

severity of hurricane damage, 

the area was divided into sectors, 

as shown on the map (page 91, 

with the engineers task organized as shown. The engineer 

forces were augmented by 

USACE-contracted commercial 

equipment operators. These 

resources were controlled by U.S. 

Army engineers. While the use of 

the contracted equipment provided challenges, such as training soldiers to be contracting 

officer representatives, it considerably enhanced debris-removal 

operations. 

Establishment of Bases 

of Operations 

5September-.\I1 deploying 

engineer units had closed in to the 

area of operations. A key player 

during these early stages of the 

relief effort was the Brigade Judge 

Advocate General (J.4G) officer. 

Damage to the area, the number of 

displaced civilians, and the growing number of deployed units to 

the area made living space hard to 

obtain. The JAG was able to obtain excellent locations and 

prepare t,he necessary Rights of 

Entry forms. Engineers were located in such areas as the Metro 

Zoo, a beachside marina, a high 

school, a retirement home, and a 

county recreation camp. 
- - - 

Afriendly resident watches the 27th Engineers load debris. Curious children added a safety 

challenge to the hurricane clean-up efforts. 

The 20th Engineer Brigade 

conducted operations from a 

large, vacant warehouse centrally located in the disaster area 

and adjacent to US. Highway 1. 

An adlacent field was turned 

into a helicopter landing zone. -4 

lack of intcroperability of coinmu~~ications initially caused

problems in coordination. Several engineer units had not been 

issued mobile subscriber equipment. The large warehouse allowed for housing engineer advance parties, maximizing 

initial coordination. 

Areas of Responsibility 

uring the time frame required to deploy all miliidiy engineers, those units on the 

ground were busy with a varied 

amount of work. After the area's 

main roads were opened, debrisremoval operations became a 

lower-priority mission. Clearing of 

areas for the cstablishment of disaster assistance centers (DACs), 

life support centers (LSCs), and 

mobile kitchen trailer (MKT) 

feeding sites and the renioval of 

the associated trash and refuse 

from those areas became priority 

taslis. Overflights of the damaged 

area? with Dade County management officials also defined the 

militaty work effort as the debrisremoval netxis of the county were 

considered. 

School Opening Takes 


Priority 


pening. of Dade County 

schools became a major 

mile.;tone for the metropolitan 

area to start on the road to recovery. JTF Andrew, in coordination with the county school 

board, developed a list of schools 

that were to reopen. The brigade 

obtained this list and purged it,, 

identifying those schools located 

in the Corps sector. The engineer 

forces in each division sector 

were given their respective 

schools list and told to begin 

rrork on them. 

6 Septentber-JTF Andrew issued the school list to the 

XVIII Airborne Corps, but it included 58 schools located out of 

sector. The brigade was tasked 

to determine the level of effort 

required to open the out-ofsector schools. 

7 September-The 20th 

Engineer Brigade sent eight 

teams from the 92nd Engineer 

Battalion to recon the 58schools. 

This one-day recon was accomplished by using eight. OH58 helicopters flying predesignated sectors. The recon reports 

were consolidated and given to 

the XVIII Airborne Corps that 

evening. 

Later that night, Corps issued a 

fragmentary order giving the 20th 

CI 
The 43rd Engineers construct one of many temporary roads in the tent cities. 

Engineer Brigade the mission of 1 Defining Success 

clearing -the debris from theout-ofsector schools. Over the next six 9 September--The first 

days, the brigade coordinated en- meeting between the JTF engineer unit. efforts with the Dade gineer, USACE, and Corps and 

County School Board repair crews Division engineers took place to 

and, via USACE, with the local reach consensus on the definition 

megacontractor. Additionally, U.S. of success for the military enNavy SEABEE engineers helped gineers. With the forces on hand, clean up the classrooms and the brigade estimated it would 

offices. take over six months to remove all 

An interesting problem de- the debris left by the hurricane. 

veloped because debris had not Therefore, it was recognized early 

yet been cleared from com- on that a transition plan with 

Inunities near the school. When USACE was needed to hand over 

local residents saw the schools relief operations when required. 

being cleared, they began plac- Furthermore, as the megacontracing their debris on the school tors mobilized, their efforts began 

grounds. On more than one oc- to overshadow the military's, as 

casion. a school would be de- well as cause duplicity of effort. 

clared cleared one day and re- It was decided that the priority 

quire more work the next. for the military engineer effort 

However, as the megacontrac- would be school clearing, refuse 

tors increased t,heir work effort removal from relief centers, and 

in the neighborhoods, the prob- then debris removal. Also, Army 

lem diminished. engineers would provide vertical 

and horizontal construction effort 

in the construction of two additional relief camps. The first two 

camps had been built and were 

being maintained by U.S. 

Marines. The U.S. Army had 

responsibility for the next two 

camps 

Fortunately, the combat heavy 

battalions had brought their vertical sets, kits, and outfits. They 

constructed wooden flooring, installed lights and power, and installed basic plumbing. The only 

delays in the projects were caused 

by material delays and by initial 

indecision of local officials on 

which building codes should be followed. However, the initial 

decision not to include graders, 

dozers, or other horizontal construction equipment proved incorrect in the long run. In the tent 

city construction projects, graders 

and compaction equipment were 

needed to construct and grade 
temporary roads and to level 

rough areas. While the combat 

heavy battalions had brought 

some graders, no compaction 

equipment had been deployed. 

Dozers also proved to be useful 

in debris-removal operations. The 

debris caused by Hurricane Andrew had been estimated by 

various government agencies to 

equal 35-years worth of trash for 

area landfills. Special permits were 

obtained to burn the debris, but additional dozers were needed to consolidate the material. Military 

dozers with operators were provided to the public landfills to help 

accomplish this task. 

12 September-The XVIII 

Airborne Corps released two companies of the 27th Engineer Battalion for redeployment to Fort 

Bragg and subsequent deployment to the Jungle Operations 

and Joint Readiness Training 

Centers. Corps also released one 

company of the 92nd Engineer 

Battalion for redeployment to 

Joint Task Force 6 construction. 

Completing the Mission 

13 September-The last 

school was cleared. 

15 September-The militads initial debris-hauling effort 

was critical to the mission's 

success because it enabled megacontracors and residents to enter 

areas and begin their clean-up efforts. However, by this date the 

military's portion of total cubic 

yards hauled had dropped from 

almost 100 percent lo abut 6 

percent. 

By the middle of September, 

electrical power had been restored 

to many of the areas, grocery 

stores and businesses were beginning to reopen, and the communities were beginning the long 

process of rebuilding. Refuse 

removal was being assumed by 

"Engineer units are 

uniquely qualified to 

be a key player in 

successfully 

accomplishing OOTW 

missions." 

contractors, and the military's 

primary mission became spot 

checking DACs, LSCs, and MKT 

feeding sites to pick up overflow 

refuse. Furthermore, a notable 

difference could be seen during the 

daily aerial engineer recons as 

residents cleaned up their homes 

and neighborhoods. 

It was then that the focus of the 

Army engineers shifted. Debrisremoval operations shifted from 

area coverage to point targets 

such as parks, churches, public 

areas, and nonprofit organizations. The megacontractors were 

concentrating on area debris 

removal and would not start on 

these specific areas of concern for 

a long while. 

The point targets gave the engineers an opportunity to make a 

lasting impact on the communities. In anticipation of redeployment within the next two 

weeks, only short-term projects 

were accepted. This enabled the 

engineers to complete many point 

targets instead of half-completing 

a few large ones. The cleared 

parks and public areas provided 

campsites for civilian relief volunteers. Local officials appreciated 

this concept as more parks and 

public areas were restored. 

Redeployment 

20 September-As the 

brigade's organic units began 

redeployment to Fort Bragg, the 

remainder of the attached engineer units prepared to redeploy. 

The 92nd Engineer Battalion 

would remain to support the 10th 

Mountain Division, which would 

soon assume the role of the 

ARFOR commander. The 92nd 

Engineer Battalion would eventually redeploy on 7 October. However, it was several days after the 

military engineers had transitioned their missions to contractors before redeployment planning 

commenced in earnest. Redeployment was a sensitive issue--the 

military did not wish to portray 

redeployment as abandonment of 

the relief efforts. 

When the redeployment order 

came, it released the 20th Engineer Brigade, the 937th Engineer Group, two combat heavy 

battalions, and two engineer companies, with redeployment to be 

complete within three days. Because no prior coordination was 

allowed, long delays in obtaining 

the necessary line haul occurred. 

Overall, the mission of the 

military engineers was a success. 

They provided an immediate 

presence and debris-hauling 

capability, assisted in humanitarian relief missions, and gave 

area residents a sense of security 

and hope. For the first five 

days of their deployment, they 

were the only "engineers"present, 

and for the first days of the 

megacontracts, they provided a 

more-than-equal capability Later, 

they took the lead in removing 

debris from schools. In the final 

days, they opened many parks and 

public areas, helping to restore 

normalcy to the disaster area. 

While facing many challenges and 

learning many lessons, the military engineers excelled, providing 

relief to those in need. 

Special Considerations 

ngineers involved in operations such as Hurricane 
Andrew can find useful checklists in the current manual on 

OOTW (FM 5-114). Some additional considerations are: 

Coordination with government officials. Engineers 

must coordinate with federal 

officials, primarily FEMA and 

USACE. Furthermore, coordination must also be made 

with state, county, and city officials. Commanders can identify missions and priorities, allowing key tasks to be quickly 

started. This coordination will 

also establish mission objectives, major milestones, and 

the definition of success. 

m Coordination with civilian 

contractors. Coordination 

between the military engineers' work effort and that of 

civilian contractors is vital in 

preventing duplicity of effort 

and conflicts. Once mobilized, contractors do not 

want military engineer work 

efforts to interfere with their 

profits in contracted engineer work. 

IStandardized relief camp 

construction. Construction 

standards for life support 

centers must be determined 

from the onset. These standards, whether federal, state, 

or local, will affect the work 

efforts and materials required 

to complete the centers. 

Hesitation or changing requirements will only delay 

completion. 

a Standardized map usage. 

Many types of maps are available, from highway to realtor 

to U.S. Geological Survry. A 

timely decision is required to 

establish the standard theater 

of operat,ions map. 

m Lead time for redeployment. 

Several days' lead time prior 

to the redeployment date is required to ensure a smooth and 

timely transition. Contracting 

for the line haul required to 

move combat heavy battalions 

takes several days to accomplish, If required, the 

planning for redeployment can 

be conducted as a classified 

operation 

Summary 

ahe conduct of JTF Andrew's 

disaster-relief operations 

was accomplished within the 

ARFOR by overlaying the civilian area of effort with a 

military task organization operating within unit boundaries. 

This allowed all military units to 

conduct coordinated relief operations upon arrival into the area 

of operations. Engineer units are 

uniquely qualified to be a key 

player in successfully accomplishing OOTW missions. It is important to plan to coordinate 

with both the public sector and 

the appropriate government 

agencies, a requirement not normally associated with a unit's 

war-time mission. Hopefully, this 

article has provided some 

pointers on successfully executing the next operation. Y 

MAJ Robert M. Ralston currently 

serves as training officer of the 

20th Engineer Brigade. His most 

recent assignments include operations officer for the 20th (during 

Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations) and commander of C Company, 307th Engineer Battalion, 

82nd Airborne Division. A grad 

uate of the Command and General 

Staff College, he holds masters 

degrees from Purdue and the 

University of Florida. 

LTC Douglas L. Horn currently 

serves as the 53, 20th Engineer 

Brigade. His most recent assignments haue been as brigade operatzons off~cerand battalion XO. A 

graduate of the Command and 

General Staff College, he holds a 

masters degree from the University 

of Colorado. 

Lessons Learned 

The February 1993 edition of 

ENGINEER, paqe 26, presented some lessons learned that 

should help platoons, companies, 

and battalions deploying for dlsaster relief. Senior commanders 

should consider some additional 

"higher headquarters" concerns: 

IGetting engineer intelligence 

and assessment teams on the 

ground early. 

Antic~pat~ngthe need for haul 

capab~lity (such as bridge 

trucks), vertical constructlon, 

and horizontal capab~lity(compaction and grading in l~fesupport centers). 

Plannlng for and deploying early 

liaisons for federal, state, and 

local governments and municipal utilities. 

Pushing for early resolution of 

deflned objectives, the definitlon of success, and liatson 

procedures. 

IKnowing which officers in the 

command have contracting off~cerrepresentative (COR) or 

USACE experience. They should 

also cons~derOPDs for COR 

functions such as contract adm~n~strat~on and work effortitrlp 

ticket reporting systems. 

Coordinating early with USACE 

on contractor priorities and work 

areas. 

Ensuring that maneuver commanders know USACE contractor procedures, capabilities, and 

inltial work areas. 

Identifying community requirements as soon as possible. 

Priority missions may be short 

notice and outside the area of 

operations. They should look at 

the calendar and think civilian; 

for example, schools and 

elections. 
Personal Viewpoint 

Wake Up,Engineers! 


By Lieutenant Colonel William C.West 

"ake up, engineers! It is 

time to sign up for the 

Braa~ey fighting vehicle (M2) and 

the Abrams tank (MI) with mine 

plow to replace the MI13 and the 

CEV in heavy d~visional engineer 

brigades. Engineers must contribute more to the combined arms 

team. The Bradley fighting vehicle 

and the Abrams tank with plow 

provide such an opportunity 

Budget Realities 

he future will require the 

US. Army to maximize the 

contribution of each and every 

weapon system in the force structure. Elements that do not contribute significantly will be the 

first to feel the knife in future 

budget cuts. Opportun~t~es to deploy and train will go to those 

units maneuver commanders find 

indispensable 

Thls pioture should be clear to any 

engineer battalion commander who 

has tried, in vain, to have an engineer battalion with all three mmpanies support the rotational 

brigade at the National Training 

Center NTC) The answer is always 

"No!' Would tb be true if engineers 

were equipped with the Bradley 

fighting vehicle and the M1 with 

mine plow? I think not! Engineers 

would easily gaIn support to have 

FORSCOM Regulations 350-50 

revised to include the entire engineer battalion. To have our voices 

heard and understood in today's 

Army, engineers must talk in terms 

the inhntry and armor understand. 

Their language focuses on combat 

power--the M2 and MI. 

Engin- ~onm~-ons 

Divisional mechanized engineers 

must realistically appraise 

ther and htm mtributions 

to the combined arms team. Eneneers are more readily occupied 

players during defens~ve than offensive operaborn. The reason is simple: 

During defens~ve operations, engineers contribute to the countermobility effort by emplacing obstacles 

and ppeparing sunrivabilrty positions 

During offensive operations, participation of engineer squad members 

usually is limited to a few engineer 

soldiers attached to the smut platam, 

while the remaining engineer squads 

prepare to breach and mark lanes 

and bypasses. Engneers do not pas 

sess vlable countermine equipment 

for today's modern battlefield CEVs 

and MICLICs mounted on the M60 

chassis are often nonmission capable. 

The MICLIC is only effective against 

single rn~pulse mines, and the ACE is 

not designed for counternine operations Only a few engineers are used 

as scouts because space inside the 

smut platoon's vehicles is limited. En-

-IS often trail the maneuver formation, waiting to mark lanes and 

bypasses or attempt a manual breach 

if the Mls with mine plows become 

inoperable 

Maneuver commanders sometimes make the engineer the breach 

force commander However, they are 

reluctant to provlde him with the 

number of M1 and M2 vehicles required to achieve success. Should we 

expect a maneuver commander to 

entrust the combat power of theMls 

and M2s to someone who is not 

trained to utilize these assets? 

Again, the answer is "No." 

Generally, during rotations at the 

NTC, engineer battalion staffs are 

not adequately trained to conduct 

the planning process required to 

direct a brigade deliberate breach. 

When assigned the breach force 

mission, most engineer staff officers 

and commanders are unfamiliar 

with the capabilities of the M1 and 

M2, and unpracticed in maneuverIng large formations on the battlefield. Brigade commanders, 

therefore, hesitate to assign an engineer battalion a battalion mission 

in offensive operations. Should the 

engineer battalion be given the mission and the operation fail, another 

opportunity to be in command of 

such a force may not occur. That's 

why the engineer battalion staff is 

usually an underutilized asset 

during ofTensive operations. 

"ationale 

,,,ig the MI13 with the 

-_ Bradley fighting vehicle is 

righr for the engineers. Countermobility mi&~ons on the modern battlefield will be more equipment intensive than manpwer intensive. The 

fielding of scatterable mine systems 

Wolcano, WAM, MOPMS, etc) testifies to our reliance on technology. An 

engmeer squad mounted in a Bradley 

has five dismounts, while the rest of 

the crew (dtiver, gunner, and commander) remain in the vehicle. The 

Bradley's in& capability to pro 

vide security with the 25mm gun and 

long-range antitank (AT) fires hm 

(Continued on page 42) 

Engineer 15 
Corps Reorganization: 

Few Impacts on Engineer Officers 

Note: lmplementation of the Corps of Engineers reorganization has been on hold since 

February 1, 1993. the scheduled activation date for five newly restructured divisions. 

The delay is necessary to coordinate the plan with the Secretary of Defense. At this 

time, the plan is subject to modification by the Secretary of Defense and Congress. 

By Lieutenant Colonel J. David Norwood 

he U.S.Army Corps of Engineers announced 

plans on November 19, 1992, for a sweeping 

reorganization that would affect all levels of the 

Corps. Yet, despite completely restructuring the organization and eliminating 2,600 civilian positions, the 

proposed reorganizatiorr would not significantly affect 

placement opportunities for Army engineer officers, 

especially majors and captains. 

The heart of the plan is to decrease the number of 

Corps divisions from 11 to six, consolidate technical 

and administrative functions, and reduce levels of 

policy and technical reviews. All district offices would 

remain open and would retain project management 

and construction, operations, maintenance, 

regulatory, and emergency functions. 

A comprehensive reorganization of the Corps is 

necessary because of fewer traditional projects and a 

shrinking work load. Since 1965. civil works engineering and construction work has declined by nearly 40 

percent. Since 1986, 41 percent of the districts have 

had two or fewer new start projects and 42 percent 

have had no new authorized projects-the best indicator of future civil works design and construction. 

While the decline in the Corps' military construction 

program has not been as drastic, it has substantially 

reduced during the past decade. This trend is expected to increase as the armed forces continue their 

post cold-war drawdown. Other compelling reasons 

to reorganize include high overhead costs and imbalances between the work load and the work force. 

The purpose of the reorganization is to reduce the 

cost of doing business, enhance technical competence, and provide flexibility to meet the demands 

of a changing work load. The plan would improve the 

way the Corps works and serves its customers now 

and in the future. 

The plan has a projected one-time implementation 

cost of $215 million and would save taxpayers $115 

million annually. The two-phase implementation would 

be spread over a three-year period. 

Phase I 

C	ost and lmplementation. The Fiscal Year 

1993 Enerav and Water A~~rooriations ,, . bill (the 

first appropriation-ioward reorganization) includes $5 

million for Phase I. This phase focuses on headquarters and division reorganization and begins by activating the five new divisions in 1993. After the activation ceremony, the closing division staffs would take 

orders and advice from the restructured divisions until 

the moves are completed. 

During this phase, a new district in the Boston 

area would replace the former New England Division. 

Also, oversight for the Alaska district would transfer 

to the Pacific Ocean Division. 

Impact on Army Officer Positions. Phase I would 

eliminate four general officer command positions and 

four colonel, deputy commander positions when the 

current divisions are deactivated. This would save 

eight positions for overall Army officer reduction, but 

the drawdown would probably offset that. Two results 

are expected: first, the additional officer positions 

would be lost; second, the officer spaces saved by 

the reorganization would not be available for reassignment within the Corps. 
a Flnanu, end Accounting 

The Reorganized Corps 

- . , .., - Conlruct Contrsct 

m Operate (m Admlnlslratlon) -J 

Technical centers ti 

HQ USACE 

Program guldanm 

a RBY)U~C. allocation 

m Corporateleadershlp 

a MACOMiFedaralcoordination-

[m policy review I ----

i m Deslgn 

L------+ 1. Technlcal review I m Real estate I a Selected MCmCX 

--- ---- --- -_/--

Phase ll 

-

Divisions 

Reduced from 11 lo 6 

m Command and control 

m Program management 

Cost and Implementation. Phase II would 

focus on district realignment and the activation 

- // 

/

/ m Audlovloual 

/ m ~udlt 

// 

of technical and administratlve centers, without closing any districts. The plan calls for reorganizing district offices, which are the Corps' public and military 

installation-level liaisons. This part of the reorganization was scheduled to begin in FY 94 and end in FY 

95. pending congressional funding. 

Technical Centers. The planning and engineering 

functions currently performed at all districts would be 

consolidated in 15 technical centers within 15 existing 

districts. Ten centers, two per division in the continental US., would be designated as military centers to 

handle the Corps' military construction program. 

Consolidating the planning and engineering functions into technical centers offers several benefits for 

the Corps and its customers: 

Each center would have a greater concentration 

of technical expertise to apply to projects. Thus, 

skills development for engineers and planners 

would significantly improve. Positions would 

offer a wider variety of work challenges, and 

staff opportunities for job enhancement and 

career progression would increase. 

;-

I 

I 

Project managers would have a choice of technical centers for their projects. This woirld foster 

competition among the centers to provide the best 

products and services. In addition, it would encourage planners and designers to reduce costs, 

stay within time schedules, and provide further incentives for creative engineering solutions. 

~eg~onal lnte7;m, 

Poilcyrevlew A,/" I -- m Tcchnlcal review -----/ I 

m Adrnlnistratlon - I 

Districts I 

The Corps would be able to better manage workload fluctuations, without significant increases or 

decreases in the professional staff. 

I I I - I - Retarn dl

I ere 15 technical cenler* 

I 

I 

I 

I Districts I I 

The technical centers would absorb an existing 

layer of technical review and would pass project 

plans directly to the Washington, D.C.-based Central 

Review Center for policy review. This change would 

eliminate time-consuming technical and policy 

reviews at divisions. Technical centers would not 

review their own work but would review other centers' 

work on a reciprocal basis. 

Going outside the district for such expertise is not a 

new concept. Under the current organization, districts 

frequently export projects to other districts or contract 

them to architectural or engineering firms. Districts 

would retain responsibility for quality, cost expectations, 

and meeting the customers' functional requirements. 

Administrative Centers. Additional savings would 

be realized by consolidating administrative functions 
Restructured Divisions with Districts 

North Central Division 

san Francisco 

*Divinim Headquaners / Technioei Cemen # Administranon Canters 

Note: The Patie Own Obbion, which hdoder lha Narkan eod Honolulu DiiIddfr. is retained bul no!shan 

throughout the Corps into administrative centers. one 

in each division. These centers would initially perform 

some human resources, audiovisual, library, and 

audit functions. In the future, they may evolve to gain 

other functions that lend themselves to consolidation. 

Finance and Accounting Center. The reorganization plan also calls for a national finance and accounting center to consolidate payroll and other finance 

and accounting functions. Establishment of the center 

was mandated by a Defense Management Review 

Directive of the Department of Defense. 

Impact on Army Officer Positions. Creation of 

the new district in the New England area would result 

in a total of 39 districts, eight of which are currently 

commanded by lieutenant colonels, in addition, 

phase ll of the reorganization would likely result in 

the downgrade of three to eight more district command positions from colonel to lieutenant colonel. Exactly which positions or how many would be downgraded would not be known until the structure of the 

new districts is analyzed. 

The reorganization would not affect the number of 

captain positions within the Corps. Captains serve as 

project engineers, and the only change currently 

planned for them is the office to which they would report. 

The overall Army downsizing will create a more 

significant impact on engineer officer opportunities in 

18 Engineer 

the Corps. As the Corps takes its officer reductions 

along with the rest of the Army, staffing the organization with military personnel will become much more 

difficult. 

Future Expectations 

Although the Corps reorganization would be extensive, few changes would be noticeable to 

CLIstomers. Districts would retain essential services, 

and project sponsors would continue to deal with one 

district engineer, one project manager, and one construction and operations team. The impact on Army 

engineer officers would also be minimal. The Corps 

would continue to fulfill its mission, while substantially 

reducing project costs and providing more timely and 

effective sewice. Y 

LTC J. David Norwood is the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Headquarters, US. Army Corps of Engineers, in 

Washington, D.C. His most recent assignments have been 

in USAEUR as the 53, 18th Engineer Brigade; andXO, 

78th Mechanized Engineer Combat Baffalion. A graduate 

of the US. Military Academy, he earned a masters of 

science in civil engineering from the University of Illinois. 

LTC Norwood is a registered professional engineer in Virginia and Tennessee. 
Leadership Prerequisites for Our New Amy 


"It must be ,wnsnberxl thut there ts nothtng more difficult toplm~, more llneertu~nof 

success, nor more dangerous to munage than the creation ofu new order of things. For 

the iititu~fnrhm the enmity ofdl who wouldprofit by lhepreservutwn of theold institutions, wul ~nerely lukewarm defenders mthose who zmdd gauz by the new ones." 

Times Are Changing 

Let's paint the scene. Reductions in force, special separation benefits, variable separation incentives, and Selective Early Retirement Boards have taken their toll; 

the avoidance of the term "downsizing" has led to the idea of 

"rightsizing" in an attempt to show 

that all is back on track. But there 

is an undertone of concern, frustration, and fear. Transition "chop 

shop" are common, risk taking is 

011 the decline, and hull defilade is 

more apt to desc~ibe one's approach 

to the daily routine than the maneuvers of an MIA2 tank Redundancy is gone, local training is now 

a major training event, and the re 

quirements continue to roll in with 

fewer resources than ever before. 

For most leaders, all this adds up to 

a critical mass disaster; but not for 

me! 

I buy into the fact that our Army 

is better than ever before and will 

continue to improve. I understand 

the need for change and look forward to our new Army It is time 

for the "nay sayers" to get out of 

the way and for leaders who can 

see the future to take charge. But 

we will fail if we rely on our old 

ways of doing business. Tasks, 

conditions, and standards are different. Our Army needs a new 

generation of leadership thought. 

Our core values remain, but our 

energy needs to he outward, not 

inward. Leadership, not management, is needed within our new 

Army, and it requires flexibility 

and vitality. 

What is behind this "chicken littlelslry is falling" uproar? Perhaps 

we are trying to put old, square 

pegs of rules into the round holes 

of our new environment. Perhaps 

we need to recognize that what 

was, is no longer. This does not 

necessarily mean that the "good 

ole days" are gone. Those days 

were not asgood as we make them 

up to be. What was nice about 

them, though, was that we were 

used to them. It felt good to be 

within a friendly comfort zone. 

But that was yesterday. Listenit's our wake-up call. We need to 

change, given the changes to our 

Army, if we are to be what our 

nation demands. 

"NewLeader, This Is 

Op 1, Over" 

we have all seen some coroorate eiants tumble in " 

confusion as they reel in disbelief at the impact of internal 

downsizing events. I have had 

the unique opportunity to study 

these blue chip industries and 

to spend time talking about lessons learned with their leadership. Additionally, I have been 

part of the Army's look into organizational change. Now I find 

myself in the middle of that 

change. 

My conclusion is that we are in 

a mine field, but we can avoid injury All it takes is an understanding of the changes and a 

quick look at the erron and successes of others. First, we should 

seek to understand the changing 

Army before we try to be understood. "Listen, learn, and then 

lead" applies to each one of us. We 

need to break away from old 

habits that limit our vision. 

Enough said; here is a series of 

reports from my observation post. 

By Colonel Herb Harback Engineer 19 
"1 Have 12Changed 

Conditions To Report. 

Are You PreparedTo 

Copy? Over." 

SITREP I: Powering down is 

not an option; it is a critical 

first step in mission success. As 

levels of staffing are removed, 

those who remain must be trained 

to fill the gap. Smaller units will 

demand remote control, not more 

control. But it is not automatic. 

You power down to the lowest level 

that can still assure success. Cross 

training comes into play The more 

a team practices it, the more empowerment can take place. It is 

wrong to assume that centralized 

control will expedite decision 

making. You centralize for policy 

making, decentralize for execution. This means a greater use of 

task force structuring to accomplish the mission. "One size 

fits all" and "one command structure makes it simplemare not valid 

concepts in our new Army. 

SITREP 2: Leadership training costs mow and time bui is 

not an ezpense;it is a necessaq 

investment. Too often, leadership 

training is viewed in the "nice to 

have, but" category Leadership 

development is a long-term process 

with a lag time effect. You can cut 

it now and no major disasters will 

immediately happen. The disasters 

will be seen in future failures. 

Desert Storm's victory was a result 

of long-term leader development, 

not a product of some shake and 

microwave bake instant recipe. 

Now is the time to train the leadership for the Desert Storms they 

will fight in 10 or 20 yeaw. 

SlTREP 3: Sustainment is 

out; betterment is in. Continuous 

improvement must be the new 

mind-set. Sustaining the status quo 

is another way of stating the destined-to-fail saying, "if it ain't 

broke, don't fur it" Tbtal quality 

within our new Anny depends on 

an improvement pmess. We don't 

want perfection, just impmvement. 

It costs too much for perfection. It 

is far better to see a 1percent improvement in 100 areas than a 100 

percent improvement in one area 

Additionally, every action must be 

scrubbed through a ''value added" 

gauntlet and then executed with 

speed and zeal. Valueadded thinking must he part of empowerment. 

SITREP 4: All successfil 

missions start with a vision. If 

you do not know where you are 

going, you will never get there. 

Vision-study it, understand it, 

build upon it, see it, and do it. You 

must begin with the end in mind. 

Once avision is developed, it must 

be visualized-brought into focus 

with measurable goals. That focus must be a battlefield focus. 

Leaders must learn to face toward 

the sound of distant guns. No matter how common and garrisonduty-like a mission is, it must be 

taken on with combat aggressiveness and orientation. Know where 

you are going and translate all actions into a readiness mentality. 

SITREP 5: Apositive spin to 

recruitment and retention is 

critical. The new Army must be 

made up of winners not survivors. 

Our approach must be to select 

people to be part of the team, not 

select people to leave it. We will do 

far better to spotlight the improvements brought about by the new 

Army, rather than moaning the 

absence of old ways. We need to 

build on our strengths and minimize the time focused on our 

weaknesses. If each member of the 

team (be it squad size or division 

size) works on improving his 

strengths, we will be able to obtain 

true synergy. 

Your attitude sets the boundaries for your accomplishments. 

We are a smaller, newer Army but 

still have vital missions to accomplish. How we approach them 

and the results of our efforts, will, 

in large part, be a direct reflection 

of our attitude. We don't have the 

depth anymore for anybody to 

have a bad attitude. Attitudes 

ran't be hidden. Our attitude sets 

our azimuth for success or failure. 

We can have a bad day, but our 

attitude, our spirit, and our feelings about ourselves and our soldiers must be solid and upbeat. 

SITREP 6: Murphy was 

neither RIFed nor SERBed. 

There will be mistakes. Not all 

challenges are opportunities, 

some are just what they seem to 

be-pains that must be overcome. 

There is no need to beat one's 

breast over it; just get on with it. 

The old adage that "leadership 

comes from malting the right 

decisions, right decisions are 

made through experience, and experience comes from making the 

wrong decisions" tells us that 

Murphy is part of the developmental process. The way to minimize 

this type of experience is to learn 

from the experiences of others. In 

fact, the new Army demands it. We 

have neither the time nor the 

resources to have each person experience all, firsthand. Experience 

must be gained from multiple 

sources. Firsthand experiences 

are one-dimensional and too slow. 

Mentoring, hot washes, and lessons learned updates are critical 

parts to our new -4rmy. 

SITREP 7: What got us here 

today will not get us where we 

need to be tomorrow. We must 

adjust ourselves to new situations 

with the same degree of finesse as 

we adjust fire. It makes sense 

when we have a moving target, we 

need to adjust our aim. Likewise, 

as the Army and its missions 

change, we must. change, We cannot assume that the techniques 

which were acceptable on old missions will be appropriate for new 

missions and structures. Relying 

on past formulae will find us overmanaged and under-led. No doubt 

there are risks in doing new things 

and being paradigm pioneers, but 

I believe there are even greater 

risks in doing nothing and remaining paradigm settlers. Remember, 

20 Engineer 
no one wants obsolete excellence. 

Don't mistake the edge of a rut for 

the horizon. 

SITItEP 8: Mission is number 2. If you are a leader and you 

are totally focused on the mission, 

you will fail in the long run. Your 

soldiers must focus on the mission. 

To them, it is number 1.Yourjob is 

to focus on your soldiers. Only 

when you commit yourself to 

caring for them will they be able to 

totally dedicate themselves to the 

mission at hand. Caringmeans establishing, communicating, and 

enforcing standards. It means 

providing vision, focus, training 

resources, and the positive environment for success. You take 

care of the troops, and the troops 

will do the rest. 

SrTREP 9: If you are not an 

activepart of the solution, then 

you are working against the 

success of the mission. Stated in 

mathematical terms, the probability of success plus the probability of failure is equal to one. 

Either you are a team player 

working with the team or you are 

not. There is no middle of the road 

in the new Army. The fluff and 

ability to drift in indecisiveness 

are gone. And that is good. 

Our organizations are downsized to the extent that we can 

only use active team players. Passengers-those folks only along 

for the ride-can't be accommodated. Additionally, this new 

focus on teamwork requires direction, trust, and commitment. 

Team buildingbegins with a determination of a direction-a vision. 

This, in turn, leads to a team "oneness" where trust is nurtured. 

Without trust, there is very 

limited team action. Communication is censored, and bureaucratic 

and turf battles ensue. Finally, 

there is commitment. Commitment, not authority, produces 

long-term results. It allows for a 

synergistic effect to happen as we 

move from independent individuals to an interdependency 

where the actions of the whole are 

greater than the added efforts of 

each member. 

SITREP 10: Compete to a 

standard not to one another. 

Establish the standard of excellence appropriate for the mission. 

Don't set it too low, guaranteeing 

failure, nor too high, guaranteeing 

long-term failure. Competition 

against individuals creates a winlose proposition. It endorses 

failure by allowing for only one 

winner, with all others being 

marked as failures. 

Likewise, placing all of the time 

and energy on one F n does not 

ellsure sucoess. Superstars are too 

expensive and weakem any team 

building.It is amazing how much can 

be ammplished when no one person 

takrs the sptlight. The new Anny is 

based on a winning team, not individual winners.Our leaderahip must 

be built around this principle. 

SITREP II: Leadership is an 

event, not a position or a person.This means that we need to 

train in leadership, just like we 

train for an event. Through continuous improvement in our training, we will be able to successfully 

execute our responsibilities when 

our leadership time arrives. Practice, in itself, is not enough. Alone, 

practice makes one well practiced, 

not better It is constantly improving practice that we seek to accomplish. And when is it enough? 

When we hit the level of excellence 

we have established. The actual 

leadership event is not the hard 

part; it is the training that comes 

before. Training requires determination, dedication, and resources. It is neither easy nor free, but 

it is essential. Additionally, 

leaders must be masters of transitions. Quick and seamless transitions are the key to winning. For 

the runners on a relay team, it is 

the handoff, not the speed on the 

straightaway, that sets the conditions for winning. Likewise, the 

way we transition provides the 

mark for our mission successes. 

SITREP 12: Strategic leadership ispossible at all leuels of 

command. Many believe that 

strategic leadership is found only 

at the highest levels of command. 

I believe strategic leadership is at 

all levels. It is when a leader looks 

beyond his immediate responsibillties and can see distant missions and requirements-it is 

looking outside the defined 

"sandbox" of responsibility In our 

new Army, strategic leadership 

development will be at all levels. It 

will be more complex and distant 

at the higher levels of command, 

but it will be recognized at all 

levels. 

"End Of Message. 

How Copy?" 

There are three types of 

people--those who make it 

happ&; those who watch it happen; and thase who wonder what 

happened. Our new Army needs 

only the first group I am sure 

the Titanic had some great 

managers, but what they needed 

was someone trained in leadership. Let someone else arrange 

the deck chairs; we need visionary leaders in command. Leaders 

who embrace change and make it 

happen The old "now what, 

Lieutenant?" vignette is happening now for all leader ranks. The 

difference is that our new Army 

is at stake. Don't dally; don't 

shed a tear or look back It is a 

great new Army, so get fired up, 

be part of the change, and move 

forward. Y 

Colonel Harback is commander of 

the LouisvilIe District, Cop of Engineers. Previous assignments include commandet; 14th Combat Engineer Battalion; and XO, Bayonet 

Combat Support Brigade, 7th Infantry Division. He has masters 

degrees fmm N. IUinois University 

and Long Island University and is 

a gmduate of the Command and 

General StaffCollege and the Anny 

Stmtegic Studies Institute 
Lessons Learned 


Somalia and Operation Restore Hope 


By Major James R. Brannon and Mr. Vernon Lowrey 

The following Lessons Learned are some of the 

a emerging early problems experienced by U.S. 

Army, Navy: Air Force, and coalition forces in 

Somalia. The enormous scope of the human tragedy 

in Somalia was compounded by the austere conditions and a complete breakdown of civil order and 

structure. The situation presented engineers with 

several new and recurring challenges. 

The mission of U.S. forces in Somalia was to provide a secure environment so nonmilitary aid workers 

could distribute food and other humanitarian supplies. 

U.S. Army engineers provided mobility (countermine 

operations, road repair and bridge construction), survivability (force and food protection), and sustainment 

engineering (base camp construction, road and airfield repair, and utilities support) for both U.S, forces 

and civilian aid workers. For more information write 

to: Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN: 

ATSE-ESA-L, Fort Leonard Wood, MO. 65473-6630. 

Or, call (314) 563-5303, DSN 676-5303. 

ISSUE: The availability of Class IV construction 

materials was severely limited in Somalia. 

DISCUSSION: Somalia presented operational 

planners with a unique environment because a civil infrastructure was almost totally absent. Class IV 

materials (construction materials, lumber, nails, cement, gravel, etc.) were simply not there. Everything 

engineers needed to complete missions and sustain 

soldiers had to be brought in from as far away as the 

United States. 

Immediate missions to open supply routes required 

dust palliatives, gravel, and cement. Concertina wire, 

sandbags and huge numbers of pickets were needed 

for force protection. Bed-down and base-camp construction (latrines, showers, tent floors, tables, etc.) had 

to be built with imported materials. Aggregate (sand 

and gravel) borrow pits were located only through effective engineer reconnaissance. With so little in the 

country, units that brought in what they could pack or 

carry had an edge on security and comfort. 

Typically, Class IV materials are bulky and expensive and often have long lead times for procurement. 

In Somalia, it took about 30 days to obtain an adequate flow of Class IV construction materials. 

RECOMMENDATION: Implied missions often 

drive the immediate need for Class IV materials. 

Units that have the time and haul capacity should 

take everything they can when they deploy. Recommended minimal supplies are: concertina, stakes. 

pickets, and sandbags for security: plywood, lumber, 

nails, forklift pallets, exterior electrical wire (Romex 

type), electrical fixtures and supplies for base-camp 

construction and bed-down facilities. Units should consider ordering in advance a standard base camp in 

500- or 1000-man increments from the bills of 

material (BOM) found in the Army Facilities Component System (AFCS). Units unable to prestock or 

preload Class IV items should ensure their SOPS address troop security and bed-down procedures for 

extremely austere environments. 

ISSUE: Operation Restore Hope required U.S. 

and other U.N.- member military forces to engage in 

countermine operations. 

DISCUSSION: The worldwide proliferation of land 

mines places U.S. forces at risk on almost any deployment. A mine blast caused the first U.S. casualty 

in Somalia, killing a Department of the Army civilian. 

U.S. Army, Marine and coalition engineers executed 

countermine operations: They were required to 

predict, detect, remove, proof, and clear both major 

supply routes (MSRs) and other critical areas. 

Local villagers provided intelligence to locate many 

mined areas and roads. Some units reported that 

local Somalis handed over mines they found to U.S. 

forces, wanting to exchange them for food. 

Countermine operations are always very 

dangerous. We found that the current fiberglass mine 

probe breaks easily in rocky soil. All forces used their 

bayonets as substitutes. Soldiers slid their bayonets 

horizontally through the soil as they probed, well 
below a 45-degree angle. This kept the tip of the 

probe in a position to contact the lower sides of 

mines rather than the top. Army doctrine (FM 20-32. 

Mirie/Countermine Operations) advises using a nonmetallic probe to reduce the risk of detonating magnetically fuzed mines. A nonmetallic probe is still 

recommended, but soldiers must be prepared to use 

more risky methods and increase their precautionary 

measures accordingly. 

Several point mine fields, with no pattern, were 

found at the sides of roads and in bushes. Most were 

not buried and many were improperly fuzed. 

Engineers used four-man teams to detect and mark 

mines. Mines were removed and destroyed by twoman demolition teams, using satchel charges or 

prefabricated "pop and drop" charges. 

U.S. Marines proofed routes by pushing a civilian 

roller in front of their armored vehicle. The roller was 

equipped with a prefabricated "dog-bone" to detonate 

any tilt-rod mines. Army engineers used the Mine 

Clearing and Armor Protection Kit (MCAP) without 

the rake to proof cleared lanes. Routes were marked 

with dry quicklime because standard marking signs 

and tape were often pilfered. The quicklime was dispensed from squeeze bottles. 

RECOMMENDATION: Maintain training standards 

for mine detection, recognition, and clearing techniques, particularly the detection and clearing 

methods appropriate for low-intensity conflict scenarios. Mine detector teams can practice by listening 

to the tones their mine detectors make when passing 

over sample mines. This will fine-tune the soldiers' 

ears, especially for nonmetallic mines. The use of 

plows and rollers may be totally unsuitable for an 

operation where MSRs must be quickly used by nonmilitary logistics traffic. 

When mines pose a likely threat, remember: 

Sand-bag your vehicle (floor boards and under 

the seats). 

Be aware that mine fields in developing 

countries may have no order, pattern, or predictability about them. 

Seek out and exploit local sources of human 

intelligence. Local people often know where 

mines are. 

When making a risk assessment for countermine operations, use the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), based on the factors 

of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, time and 

troops available). 

ISSUE: Main supply routes and other key lines 

of communication in many developing countries will 

require military bridging. Engineer soldiers must be 

prepared to install all manner of military bridging. 

but the Bailey bridge is likely to be the bridge of 

choice. 

DISCUSSION: The 41st Engineer Battalion (Light) 

constructed two Bailey bridges across the Jubba 

River, in southwestern Somalia. The soldiers built a 

160 foot, Class 50 triple-double bridge, with one intermediate pier 40 feet from the near shore. The complexity of the bridge design required technical assistance from two senior bridge instructors (12C4) at the 

Engineer School. 

Total construction time was three days, 22-24 

January 1993. Construction time averaged 30 

minutes per double-story bay. Perforated steel plate 

(PSP) was placed over the deck chess in a staggered pattern and welded in place to prevent pilferage of the decking. All bridge components were 

welded in place. Two Bailey bridge sets and two 

bridge erection sets were employed. The 41st 

Engineers also built a 70-foot, double-single Bailey 

bridge and repaired another bridge in Bardera. 

Canadian engineers used the remaining components 

to build a 70-foot, double-single Bailey bridge near 

Mataban. 

RECOMMENDATION: Engineer units must be 

prepared to construct military bridges, even though 

bridging may not be part of their mission essential 

task list (METL). The following tips can ensure quick 

train-up: 

All engineer units should maintain a complete 

library of bridge manuals and take them on all 

deployments. 

Junior leaders (platoon sergeants and platoon 

leaders) should be able to design a bridge site 

layout. 

Unit commanders should ensure that their 

Officer Professional Development (OPD) 

programs include regular reviews of bridge construction, site layout, site security, and bridge 

park design and security. 

ISSUE: Large numbers of starving people are difficult to control. Population control measures are essential for force protection. 

DISCUSSION: U.S. forces were subject to random drive-by shootings, rolling grenades, and mortar 

fire inside compounds at the U.S. Embassy, the airfield, and the seaport. Relief centers were easily overwhelmed by surges of people needing food, water, 

clothing, shelter, and medical aid. These conditions 

are most likely to occur during the initial phases of 

any mission attempting to restore order. At the feeding centers in Somalia, long lines of people easily became unruly crowds that were difficult for relief 

workers to handle. Queuing systems constructed with 
concertina, stakes, and sandbags aided crowd control by establishing orderly feeding lines. The queues 

calmed the anxious people and simplified both crowd 

control and site security. 

RECOMMENDATION: Units deploying on 

humanitarian relief missions should take sufficient 

obstacle materials (sandbags, concertina, engineer 

tape, pickets, etc.) to construct force-protection and 

crowd-control measures (queuing systems). This is 

especially true when long lines of people must be 

managed. 

ISSUE: Waste and trash from U.S. military operations are often seen as valuable to local inhabitants 

in poor, developing countries. 

DISCUSSION: People in developing countries often 

rummage through any trash and garbage sites (kitchen 

foodstuffs) established by U.S, forces. Such activity 

promotes the spread of disease and injuries. It also 

compromises the integrity of our efforts to control pests 

and ensure the health and operational safety of U.S. 

soldiers. Compounding this problem are the environmental issues associated with spill prevention and the 

proper disposal of hazardous wastes. The wastes include batteries, antifreeze, solvents, flammables, POL, 

medical wastes, human wastes, and effluent from 

showers and laundry facilities. 

RECOMMENDATION: Units deploying to developing countries must be prepared to address each of 

these environmental issues. Hazardous wastes can 

be containerized in 55-gallon drums, if available, or 

held for packaging, collection, and later evacuation. 

Medical wastes can be incinerated or autoclaved. 

Kitchen wastes can be minimized through the prudent use of a ration cycle that limits waste production. Human wastes can be buried or burned but 

must be carefully managed. The disposal method 

used will be determined by the force size, dispersion, 

environmental policy, and the availability of fixed or 

portable facilities. Shower and laundry effluent structures must be constructed to prevent pooling of "grey 

watei' that can form pest breeding areas. The early 

deployment of heavy earthmoving equipment is vital 

to waste management. Also, dump sites may require 

full-time security. 

Future articles in ENGINEER will present lessons 

learned at higher operational levels and joint operations. The likelihood of engineers participating in 

humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions is 

increasing. We hope these lessons learned help 

make your deployment smoother in evely respect. 

Major Brannon is an anaiyst in the Directorate of Srandardization and Evaluation at the U.S. Army Engineer 

School. Previous assignments include platoon leader, DEH 

operations and executive officer, assistant 53, and company commander. 

Mr. Lowrey is chief, Analysis Division, Directorate of 

Evaiuation and Standardization, US. Army Engineer 

School. He was the engineer representative for the Center 

for Lessons Learned (CALL) team deployed to Somalia. 

Engineer Problem 

YOU are the construction officer for the 64th Combat Heavy Battalion, currently deployed 

to Somalia. Your battalion has received the mission to upgrade 40 general purpose (GP) 

medium tent frames to shelters that have corrugated metal roofing and screened window 

openings. The upgraded facilities will be used first as troop billets and then as housing for 

relief workers. The tent frames will be Army Facilities Components System (AFCS) Facility 

Number 7251 OM, which are 16 feet by 32 feet. 

To complete this mission, you must determine the following: 

A. The AFCS facilities or subfacilities required. 

B. The number of short tons of material needed for the total upgrade. 

C. The number of man-hours reauired to construct each shelter. 

References: TM 5-302, Volume 4, Chapter 4: TM 5-301-1; and TM 5-303. 

ENGINEER Solution is on page 33 
By Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Campbell 

Engineers are experiencing many changes as 

the Army evolves to a smaller force. The wellpublicized engineer restructure initiative has made 

restructure, reorganization, and deactivation the order 

of the day. A proposal currently under consideration 

at the Engineer School will reduce the number of 

engineer officer specialties by eliminating the 

topographic engineer specialty (21C). 

The proposal supports the downsizing effort by reducing the number of engineer officer specialties from four 

to three, at a time when there are fewer engineer officers to go around. This course of action would require 

every engineer officer to be a topographic engineer, and 

every engineer would become, in effect, the commander's topographic support expert. 

A Key Mission 

This change would have an enormous impact because topographic engineers have a key role in 

a contingency army. For many years, the topographic 

community focused on strategic requirements and a 

few key geographic areas, such as Europe and 

Korea. Many maps exist for these familiar areas, but 

each new deployment to a place like Grenada, 

Somalia, or Southwest Asia sends the topographic 

community into a mad scramble to provide support, 

It will take years for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) to shift from 

strategic support to conventional support in contingency areas. At the same time, the technology for 

Mobility Is more than just breaching and bridging. It's also keeping commanders off 

untrafficable ground. 

Engineer 25 

1 
iFhi -1- - chanqe in aititude in both camps And "real 

engiieers" (who already have a lot to do) 

would have to learn what engineers must be, 

know, and do to become the commander's 

topographic expert. 

Topographic engineers perform several key 

functions, which translate into a list of subjects 

that every engineer must master. Engineer 

officers, from lieutenant through colonel, support combined arms commanders who must 

synchronize several battle operating systems 

(BOSs). Each echelon of engineers, then, 

must master all or part of that list if engineers 

are to accomplish the topographic support mission. This list falls into three major categories. 

Topographic engineers mustUnderstand the basics of mapping, 

charting, and geodesy (MC&G) support. They serve as the Army's member 

of the DOD team charged with providing 

this support to the entire armed forces. 

Put simply, commanders need maps, and 

topographic engineers make sure that 

they get them. 

Be terrain analysis experts. They work 

closely with combat engineers and military 

intelligence officers to provide terrain 

Surveyors establish precise positions using GPS survey analysis support to tactical commanders on 

receivers. the AirLand Battlefield. Every BOS requires 

some form of toooaraohic su~~ort. 

providing topographic support is changing rapidly. 

Thus, engineer officers could be faced with the dual 

challenge of providing more topographic support to 

deployed forces and with maintaining technical competence as topographic engineers. 

Although topographic support is an engineer 

responsibility, engineer officers have traditionally 

treated it as a separate specialty. In fact, topographic 

engineering was once a separate specialty (the 22 

career field). Only a few engineers have filled 

topographic engineer positions. Of these, most have 

carried the 21C designation and have seldom served 

in other types of engineer assignments. 

Most nontopographic engineers don't view this 

group as "real engineers" or "warfighters." This is paitly deserved because many topographic engineers 

have failed to maintain tactical competence or focus 

and have totally immersed themselves in the technical aspects of their work. As a result, many topographic engineers have been of little value to commanders whose needs they don't understand. At the 

same time, many nontopographic engineers have 

failed to appreciate both the tacticai significance of 

topographic support and the difficulties of providing 

that support, Thus, eliminating the separate 

topographic specialty would require a significant 

a Maintain the technical expertise necessary to 

manage MC&G and terrain analysis support efforts. Not only must they understand those requirements; they must also know how to focus essential support as commanders synchronize the 

BOSs. This means that topographic engineers 

must have a warfighter's perspective to anticipate 

the tactical commander's terrain analysis requirements. They must also have the technical competence necessary to acquire that support in time 

for it to be of use to the commander. 

MC&G Support ~ ~ 

I

n the role of MC&G staff officer, topographic 

engineers advise commanders on BOS requirements, standard products, nonstandard support, and 

geodetic support. 

BOS Requirements. Topographic engineers must 

know what MC&G support each BOS needs to 

operate and advise commanders on how to get that 

support This implies that engineers must understand 

how other BOSs operate. The engineer lieutenant 

must know the company team commander's 
Military Aspects of Terrain Elements of Terrain Information Examples of Terrain Analysis 

(OCOKA) Products I 

Observation and fields of fire .Vegetation (summer and winter) Horizontal line-of-sight for dlrect-tire 

Surface configuration weapons and radar 

I I .Urban areas I I 

Obstacles (micro relief) 

'Banlefieid envlronrnentat affects on 

terraln 

I Coversndconcealrnent I .Vegetation (summer and winter) / .Potential cover from direct and I 

Emplacement sunabllily and 

performance ratings for ground 

su,,,e,itance 

Obstacles 

Surface configuration 

Banlefieid environmental effectson 

terrain 

Urban areas 

Vegetztion (summer and winter) ' Locadion of existing natural and 

Surface configuration man-made obstacles I 

indirect fire (goodifairipoor) 

' concealment from 

horizontal and vertical observations 

(goodfairlpoor) 

Drainage characteristics Potential mobility on the battlefield, 

Naturai and man-made obstacles expressed as GO, SLOW-GO, and 

NO-GO fortracked and wheeled ( .Micro reiief 1 vehicles I 

I Surface materials (wet and dry) 

Urban areas I 

Key terrain 1 .Urban areas 

Lines of communication 

Surface config~dration 

Drainagecharacterstics 

Locdion of key terrain features, 

I bath natural and man-made 

1 Examples are landslide areas, I bridges, choke points, high ground, i and Key miiitaly installations 

I Avenues ofapproach I.Veaetaiion (summer and winter) / .Identification of areas where move I 

/ .Nap of the earth navigation 1 

" 

' Urban areas 

Surface configuration 

' Surface materials (wet and dry) 

Drainage characteristics 

Lines of cornmunlcation 

business, the engineer captain must know the task 

force commander's business, and the field grade 

engineer must know the brigade and higher commanders' business. 

men! of friendly and enemy forces 

may occur 

Speed prediction 

Drop zones 

Landing zones 

Landing beaches 

This is not a new concept. Engineers have always 

needed this perspective to accomplish mobility, countermobility, and survivability support. In the future, 

however, they will need to develop additional 

appreciation for topographic requirements not directly 

associated with those engineer missions. 

Standard Products. Topographic engineers must 

know every standard topographic product used to support their echelon of combined arms operations. They 

must fully understand the specifications, uses, and iimitations of those products and how to acquire them. However, most engineer officers lack this basic knowledge. 

For example, many don't realize that three versions of the standard military 1:250,000-scale map 

exist. The Joint Operations Graphic-Air (JOG-A) has 

contours in feet and elevation tinting. The Joint Operations Graphic-Ground (JOG-G) has elevations in 

meters and standard map colors. The Joint Operations Graphic-Radar (JOG-R) is another form with 

specific applications and different shading. All three 

are made from the same base map, and each has a 

specific use. Without such basic knowledge, engineers cannot function well in the topographic arena. 

Nonstandard Support. Since a contingency force 

is likeiy to deploy to areas where standard products 
are not available, topographic engineers must know 

which nonstandard products they should expect. 

They must know what is available, the limitations for 

that support, and how to acquire it. They should be 

familiar with image-based map substitutes and understand the limitations of imagery. They need to know 

the characteristics and limitations of Landsat (multispectral scanner and thematic mapper), SPOT (a 

French satellite-imaging system), and other remotesensing imagery. 

Geodetic Support. Topographic engineers also 

need a grasp of some basic geodesy subjects. They 

must be able to use different coordinate systems, 

such as geographical versus universal transverse 

mercator (grid) (UTM) coordinates. They must also 

understand datums and coordinate transformations. 

Deploying forces will probably have nonstandard 

products generated from different datums and using 

different coordinate systems. Engineer officers must 

also be global positioning system (GPS) experts. As 

such, they must know the strengths and limitations of 

that system as well as how to navigate with it. 

Terrain Analysis 

Topographic engineers serve as commanders' terrain analysis experts. Terrain visualization, the 

essence of terrain analysis, is more than simply 

"seeing" the battlefield. It also involves interpreting 

the impact of what the commander sees on BOSS. To 

perform this role, topographic engineers must fully understand both tactical decision making and how to acquire the required terrain analysis support for the 

decision-making process. 

Topographic engineers cannot anticipate 

commanders' needs for terrain information unless they 

become full participants in several critical processes: 

lntelligence preparation of the battlefield 

(IPB). Topographic engineers must be IPB experts. Terrain affects every BOS (enemy and 

friendly), and terrain analysis is a key step in 

IPB. 

Command estimate. Topographic engineers 

support the commander and staff as they 

develop and wargame friendly courses of action. 

They must fully understand the impacts of terrain on each course of action considered and 

provide the information needed to visualize that 

terrain influence before the wargaming process 

begins. 

m lntelligence collection. Topographic engineers 

must advise commanders and intelligence 

officers (S2iG2) on terrain intelligence requirements as well as on which units should be 

tasked to collect that information. 

Technical Proficiency 

Engineers must also understand some technical 

aspects of topographic support, especially digital topographic support and existing support systems. 

Digital Topographic Support. Many forms of 

topographic support are in digital form. Moreover, 

given the difficulties of map distribution, the future 

means of sharing topographic information will probably be based on one or more digital systems. To perform well in such an atmosphere, topographic 

engineers must be familiar with computer, collection, 

and data systems. They must understand what a 

geographical information system is, the concept of an 

integrated data base, and the implications of both of 

them for providing support to a contingency army. 

They must also understand the temporal nature of 

some topographic information-after all, engineers 

routinely alter the terrain. 

Finally, topograpic engineers must know a data 

set's resolution (level of detail) and the accuracy associated with it. For example, many systems use digital terrain elevation data (DTED), which permits commanders to visualize the impact of terrain on 

operations. There are two levels of DTED, with level 

II providing a much finer resolution than level I. There 

are also several sources of DTED data. DMA 

manufactures most DTED from photogrammetric 

sources, but they have used less accurate cartographic sources in many areas. 

Existing Support Systems. Topographic engineers must know how to use the TerraBase, TerraCAMMS, the battlefield planning system on the 

Maneuver Control System (MCS), the MCS-engineer 

software, and the analytical photogrammetric positioning system (APPS). 

All engineers should know how to exploit 

topographic support elements. Terrain teams, surveyors, cartographic capabilities, and map reproduction capabilities are available throughout theaters. 

However, engineers must also know how map distribution should work and how to get special support 

to those who need it in time for that support to be 

useful. 

The Road M~D 

So, how do engineers become topographic 

engineers? The Engineer School must first 

develop a training and education program to make 

every engineer a competent topographic engineer. 

Then, engineers need a mix of institutional training. 

operational assignments, and self-development to 

make the program work. But a cultural change is also 

required. Those who have been topographic 
engineers must develop a better warfighter perspective. In turn, warfighters must develop a 

topographic perspective. 

To accomplish all this, the Engineer School 

needs a strategy or master plan for eliminating 

the 21C specialty. It should address four key 

areas: the topographic engineer task list, a 

developmental plan for that task list, key 

positions requiring special training, and 

assession standards for engineers. 

The Task List. A system already in place 

ariiculates what an officer should be, know, and 

do-Military Qualification Standards (MQS). The 

Engineer School must develop for MQS a comprehensive set of topographic engineer tasks 

that spell out the req~iired topographic skills. 

The task selection board should be balanced between topographic and nontopographic 

engineers. 

A Development Plan. Next, the Engineer 

School must decide which mix of institutional 

training. operational assignments, and selfdevelopmelit is required for topographic 

engineer training. The Engineer Officer Basic 

and Advanced programs of instruction are already full. Consequently, operational assignments and self-development will be critical to a 

topographic engineer's development. 

To avoid recreating a "de facto" topographic 

specialty, assignment officers at PERSCOM must ensure that they do not assign officers in back-to-back 

assignments dealing exclusively with topographic 

engineering. In addition, the Engineer School wiil 

have to ensure that materials are available to make 

self-development a pract~cal reality. 

Key Positions. The Engineer School and 

Engineer Branch must designate key topographic 

positions that require extra training and education. 

Officers in such positions would then attend either 

graduate school or a Defense Mapping School 

coorse en route to the assignment. These positions 

include joint MC&G staff jobs, Army Education Requirements Billets (AERBs) with DMA, and 

topographic engineer program managers in the 

Engineer School. 

Assession Standards. Finally, the Engineer 

Branch needs to recruit new officers who already 

have engineering backgroi~nds That would free a 

number of hours in basic and advanced courses 

now dedicated to engineering subjects for covering 

basic topographic subjects. Currently, many 

engineer officers in basic and advanced courses 

have neither the aptitude nor the inclination to perform relativeiy simple calculations, procedures, 

GPS: The commander's new compass 

and analyses associated with construction 

engineering. If one engineer officer must be all 

engineers to all commanders, then the Engineer 

Branch must have a head start when new officers 

arrive. Like it or not, each future engineer officer 

will need to be much more a technician but no 

less a warrior. 

Not Done Yet 

Change for engineers is inevitable. The pres. 

sure to reduce the force, consolidate functions, and redefine roles will continue. Hopefully, the 

new Army will still get the quality of engineer support in all areas, including topographic engineering. 

that it deserves. Whether or not this happens will 

depend, in large part, on how well we tackle issues 

such as eliminating the topographic engineer 

specialty. kI 

LIC Campbell currently serves as Chief, Engineer Officer 

Advanced Course Division, in the US. Army Engineer 

School's Department of 1nstruction.He has previously held 

several command and staff assignments, including several 

as a topographic engineer A graduate of the Command 

and General Staff College, LJC Campbell holds a master 

of science degree in civil engineering from Virginia Technical inst~tute. 
RCTP Percept
 5~-

By Lieutenant Colonel Dan Collins and Major 

As the Army continues to downsize and budgets 

are restrained, computer simulations become 

more imporfant as a training tooi The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) uses corps battie 

simiiiation (CBS) as a training framework to assfst 

division and corps commanders in determining areas 

they should sustain and areas needing improvement. 

Annual% BCTP publishes what it perceives as trends 

(perceptions) across the Army. These are based on 

BCTP observations during the exercises they participate in throughout the year. 

The Program 

7rhe U.S. Army has four combat training centers 

where soldiers train for future conflicts: the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the 

Joint Readiness Training Center, currently at Fort 

Chaffee, Arkansas, but moving to Fort Polk, 

Louisiana; the Combat Maneuver Training Center at 

Hohenfels. Germany; and the BCTP at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The first three centers train combined 

arms brigades, battalions, and lower echelons of command using modern training scenarios and state-ofthe-art training techniques and devices. BCTP, the 

capstone of these training centers, focuses on 

division- and corps-level operations. 

A BCTP rotation has three components: a seminar, a warfighter exercise (WFX), and a proficiency 

sustainment package. Ideally, the intent of the program is to start the rotation within three to six months 

of a division's or corps' change of command. This allows a new commander to use the BCTP rotation to 

Jim Durnolt 

assess the level of training within his command and 

plan training tor the remainder of his command tour. 

The BCTP seminar usually is conducted at Fort 

Leavenworth; it involves the division or corps staff 

and a supporting battle staff. The purpose of the seminar is to review doctrine, review how the division or 

corps operates, and do team building. In many 

cases, this is the commander's first opportunity to 

have his subordinate commanders and staff collocated to focus on warfighting. He accomplishes this 

through two events. First, the commander and his 

staff are presented with tactical scenarios that require 

them to develop a division or corps plan and subsequent OPLAN, using the tactical decision-making 

process. The supporting battle staff performs a mission analysis, develops staff estimates, and 

generates and analyzes courses of action. The 

results of these processes are briefed to the commander several times during the week for his 

guidance or decision. 

Once complete, the plan is fought on computer, 

using the CBS to resolve the conflicts and assess 

casualties and other losses. The simulation is run until 

a division- or corps-level decision point is reached; 

then the commander can alter the plan or continue to 

execute it as written. The battle staff briefs this 

decision point to the commander and primary staff in 

the form of an intelligence summary (INSUM) and an 

operations summary (OPSUM). The commander can 

then deliberate the alternatives with his major subordinate commanders (MSCs) and primary staff. Once 

the commander announces his decision, the simulation 

is continued for one more iteration, and the results are 

briefed to him the next day. 
I 

1 Summaw of 1992 BCTP Perceotions 1 I Mobility-Countermobility-SurvivabiIity 1

I

1 Obstacle control (including all FASCAM) 

Develop a concept to use and synchronize obstacles 

W Develop a system to track frlendiy and enemy obstacles 

Unclear engineer command and control functions and respcnsrb~llt~es 

Determine who controls current and future engineer operations 

Determine who controls sustainment operations 

1 Habitual association: Pull units, uslng MET-T to support the main effort I i 

I FoRlficatlon: Estimate effort and protection accurately I 

Enemy obstacie and iR/PiR 

Template fire sacks 

include threat englneer effort (MOD) in estimates 

Resupply and moveme, 

pian, including bas~clo 

Second, the commander, his MSCs, and the 

primary staff attend a series of workshops that focus 

on doctrine and make leaders aware of current and 

emerging principles. The workshops and the planning 

process are designed to stimulate coaching, learning. 

and thinking. They forge the team that will perform 

these planning functions in the field during the warfighter. 

The WFX is a training exercise that is scheduled 

three to six months after the seminar and is conducted at the unit's home station. It is a stressful exercise that "fights" the team developed at the seminar. 

The commander can use observations from the WFX 

to assess his unit's ievel of training. The WFX has 

several components: 

World class opposing forces. A thinking opponent who uses doctrinal tactics and equipment on a "level playing field" to provide feedback to the exercising unit. 

Observer/controllers. Military educational level4 majors and lieutenant colonels who make observations during the WFX. 

Training standards. Standards described in 

field manuals and Army Training and Evaluation 

Programs. 

After action reviews. A forum to discuss what 

happened during the WFX and why it happened. 

Senior observers. Retired three and four star 

generals who provide feedback to observer controllers and the exercising unit. 

Yearly, BCTP publishes what it has obsewed 

during WFXs in each of the seven battlefield 

operating systems. These perceptions are trends, not 

what BCTP observes during each WFX. Many units 

perform these perceptions well during a WFX. However, the following discussion focuses on areas that 

need im~rovement: 

Obstacle control (including the entire family of 

scatterable mines (FASCAM)) 

Perception: Some units do not develop a concept 

to use and synchronize obstacles. 

Discussion: In some cases, the commander's 

intent is not supported when obstacle placement 

and synchronization are compared with the modified 

combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and obstacle 

zones. In some WFXs, the MCOO was not 

developed, and the obstacle zones were not used 

to shape the battlefield. When units did develop 

obstacle zones, a few placed individual obstacles 

outside these zones without permission from the 

division commander. 

Perception: Units have problems when planning 

and tracking friendly obstacles. 

Discussion: Divisions (heavy) typically tly to post 

and track individual friendly obstacles rather than update obstacle zones by the percent complete and by 

discussing individual obstacles, when necessary. 

Corps, in general, do a good job in tracking 
ground-emplaced obstacles. Both divisions and corps 

on every warfighter have problems in either planning, 

executing, or tracking FASCAM, to include Gator. 

Scatterable mines have been planned outside 

obstacle zones without permission, and on unit objectives, thus placing units and mines at the same location at the same time. FASCAMIGator missions were 

either executed and not requested, executed and not 

posted, or posted and not executed. 

Engineer command and control functions arid 

responsibilities 

Perception: Units are not clear who controls current and future operations. 

Discussions: The support an engineer unit 

provides during a WFX should be organized to match 

how the division or corps fights a battle. If the TAC 

fights the close battle, sufficient personnel shouid be 

at the TAC to do current operations, at the MAIN for 

future operations, and at the REAR to support sustainment operations. If the ciose battle and future 

planning are fought out of the MAIN, appropriate adjustments should be made. 

Perception: Units have trouble controlling sustainment engineering. 

Discussion: During all WFXs, units develop a 

sustainment plan. Few plans are executed as 

designed, and some are not executed at all. For example, units may not have a central collection point 

or a decision maker identified to prioritize and assign 

missions in the rear area of operation. 

Habitual association 

Perception: Units cannot overcome the hab~tual 

association and "fair share" to mass engineers using 

mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time avaiiable 

(METT-T) to support the main effort. 

Discussion: Divisions and corps rarely have 

enough engineers to accompiish every mission 

before and during combat operations. When doing a 

task organization to support the commander's intent 

using METI-T, the division or corps commander may 

have to pull units normally associated with a brigade 

or division to support the main effort. 

Fortifications 

Perception: Units rarely estinlate how much effort 

they need to build a fortification and the protection it 

provides. 

Discussion: This area improved throughout the 

year. Units do not accurately estimate the amount of 

material or time involved in building fortifications. 

Also, once the fortifications are built, units overestimate the amount of protection the fortifications 

provide. Units have expected engineers to dig-in all 

artillery and aviation units with overhead protection. 

All this was to be done in three days with Ciass IV 

material designed to support two-man fighting 

positions. 

Enemy obstacles 

Perception: Commanders do not consider enemy 

obstacles as an information requirementipriority inteiligence requirement (IRIPIR). 

Discussion: Because enemy obstacles are not 

an IRIPIR, maneuver uriits do not focus on locating 

and repoiting them. With this information, units can 

better locate the first and second defensive belts and 

fire sacks. Without this information, brigades 

maneuver into kill sacks and are destroyed. 

Resupply and movernent of bridging, Class IV, 

and Class V 

Perception: Units do not plan accurately for 

resupply and movement of bridging, Class IV and 

engineer Class V. 

Discussion: This area improved throughout the 

year. However, some units stiil do not adequately 

track and plan for the transport of Class IV and 

engineer Class V by line item. 

Conclusion 

Computer simulation will be a very important 

traininq tool as the Armv continues to downsize 

and the focus shifts to a morerefined fighting force. 

The BCTP will continue to use corps battle simulation 

as a training framework for commanders. Perceptions 

from past WFXs can help unit commanders focus 

their traininq efforts while maintaining a well-trained 

fighting force 

LTC Dan Collins is assrgned as an observer/controller for 

the BCTP. Previous assignments included 53 for the 1st 

Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, XO of the 2nd Engineer Battalion, Camp Casey, Korea, and of the 299th Engineer 

Battalion, Fort Siii, and chief of ground operations, Warrior 

Preparation Center, E~nsidlerhof, Germany. LTC Co1li.q~ !s 

a graduate of the Command and General Staff 

College. 

MAJ Jim Durnolt is assigned as an observericontroller for 

the BCTP Previous assfgnrnents included assisrant 53 for 

the 7th Engineer Brigade during Operation Desert Storm, 

53 of the 78th Engineer Batfalion in Kartsruhe. Germany, 

and brigade engineer In the 1st Armored Divisbn MAJ 

Dumolt is a graduate of the Command and Generai Staff 

College. 
~n~ineer Solution 

A. Using TM 5-302. Volume 4, you find that the upgrade requires AFCS subfacilities Nos. 7251 OAN and 72510AR. 

Because the 16 foot x 32 foot tent frame system (AFCS No. 72510AA) already exists, only an exterior wail extension 

and a roofing system are needed. 

5. A total of 200 short tons is required to upgrade 40 shelters. Using page 108 of TM 5-301-1 and the facility planning 

tables, you determine that each wall extension requires 1 short ton and the roofing system requires 4 shon tons. Multiply 

the sum of those two numbers by 40 to obtain the total quantity required (5 X 40 = 200 shorl tons). 

TM 5-303 is used to determine the bill of materials (BOM) for this project. 

C. One troop shelter requires 130 man-hours of construction effort. Again using page 108 of TM 5-301-1, you determine that it takes 36 man-hours to construct the wall systems and 94 man-hours to construct the roof system 

(36 t 94 = 130 man-hours). 

IX 4 Con!nuau. .rrrlor,. 

ZldJ.I*,.d .O-on.mm.r( 


'dpri a1 cner to mnrn ran.r 


General Purpose TroopSheiter 

lsomeriic View 

Tent Frame 


Facility No.72510AA - AB 


ThisENGINEER Problem/Solution was submined by the Combat Construction Division, Depanment of Instruction, U.S. 

Army Engineer School. 
By Captain Dave Anderson 

he medium girder bridge 

(MGB). a standard fixed ., 

bridge originally designed to 

be truck-transported, recently 

proved itself to be far more versatile. In February 1992, the 

264th Engineer Company (MGB) 

wrote a new chapter for MGB 

delivery by conducting the firstever airborne insertion of the 

bridge system. 

The Airdrop Concept 

The concept for airdropping 

f~xed bridges was develoned 

in the early 1960s in Germany. 

.4t that time, the 8th Irifal~try 

Division (Mechanized) had one 

airborne brigade. It was supported by A Company, 12th Engineer Battalion, also airborne 

but with a mechanized table of 

organization and equipment. 

Captain Scott Smith (now Major 

General, retired) and First, 

Lieutenant Bob Howard (now 

Brigadier General Howard) 

developed a concept for airdropping a 38-foot 4-inch configuration 

of an M4T6 fixed-span bridge. 

Such a method was needed to 

provide fixed-bridge support to 

isolated units or those cut off from 

conventional bridge support. The 

operational concept was validated 

when the airbornelmechanized engineer company successfully conducted an airdrop of the palletized 

bridge in 1965. Although successful, the airdrop technique was not 

used during the Vietnam war. In 

that conflict, bridges frequently 

were sling-loaded below heavy lift 

helicopters and delivered exactly 

where t,hey were needed. 

While reviewing wartime contingency plans in the mid-l980s, 

the 20th Engineer Brigade (CombatKAirborne Corps), Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, again recognized 

the need for an airdroppable 

bridge package. War planners 

realized that if a maneuver force 

became isolated by the enemy or 

the terrain, it would be essential 

to support them with bridge assets. By that time, the MGB had 

replaced the M4T6 and the Bailey 

bridgeas the Army's primaryfixed 

bridge. 

The 20th started action to certify the MGB for an airdrop-a 

technique that had never been 

tested with the MGB. The U.S. 

Army Airborneand Special Operations Test Board and the U.S. Air 

Forcestandardized how the equipment would be configured and 

rigged to remain stable in flight 

and to land intact after the 

parachutes were deployed. The 

MGB airdrop tests conducted in 

1989 at Fort Bragg were successful, and the certification process 

was complete. 

The first operational airdrop of 

the MGB package was delayed because the 264th had deployed 

to Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm and airbornequalified bridge crewmen were not 

available. By February 1992, the 

264th had 30 percent of itssoldiers 

on jump status and was ready to 

conduct an airborne bridge mission. Their "opportunity to excel" 

came when the 20th Engineer 

Brigade directed an emergency 

deployment readiness exercise 

(EDRE). 

The First MGB Airdrop 

the EDRE scenario, the In 

264th was attached to 

the 27th Engineer Battalion 
(Combat) (Alrhorne) for a 

humanitarian rel~ef o~eratlon I 

The task force was to deploy notionally to central Mexico (actually the Rhine-Luzon Drop 

Zone at Camp Mackall, North 

Carolina). Their mission was to 

provide initial engineering support to a small town that had 

been devastated by an earthquake. The airport that serviced 

the town had been badly 

damaged, and bridges over the 

river that separated the town 

from the airport had been 

destroyed. The task force was to 

conduct an airborne insertion 

onto the airfield, repair it, and 

construct an MGB across the 

river so follow-on forces could 

land and access the town. 

The 264th received its warning 

order at 1600 hours, 25 February 

1992. One M817 5-ton dump 

truck, one 7 112-ton rough-terrain I ' crane, one IT998 HMIbIWV, and 

one 7-bay single-story LlGB were 

to be air-dropped in the mission. 

Two 5-ton trucks were pre-positioned at the drop zone instead of 

air-dropped because the number 1 @!b. 

of available aircraft was limited. 

Fourteen airborne bridge crewmen would deploy with the equip- 1

ment. Time on target was 1300 to 

1330 hours, 27 February, 45 hours 

after the warning order was j1 

received. For a "no-notice,"airdrop A pallet of bridge equipment descends onto the Rhine-Luzon drop zone. 

mission, 45 hours does not allow 

for any wasted moments. 

Troop loading procedures began the 612th Quartermaster Corn- movement routine and were then 

immediately. First the vehicles pany for rigging by 0630 hours, 26 attached to the 27th for the misand equipment were inventoried February Rigging the vehicles sion. The paratroopers'equipment 

and prepared for the mission. The and equipment took all day but was rigged, inspected, and 

"headache board", cab canvas, arld the process went well. By the time reinspected. At 2200 hours, the 

exhaust stack were removed from the operations order was pub- operationsorderwas briefed to the 

the 5-ton dump truck. The canvas lished and N-hour was announced, company There was nothing lefi 

was removed from the HMMWV the equipment. had been weighed, to do but provide liaison to the 

and ballast added to the back of rigged, and delivered to "Green 27th and wait. 

the HMMWV for proper balance Ramp" at Pope Air Force Base. Prejump manifest and training, 

during the drop. Paratroopers There it was inspected by Air standard for all airborne operawereidentified,andsupportcrews Force personnel before being tions, went smoothly. By 1200 

were organized to assist in rigging loaded on the aircraft. hours, 27 February, the bridge 

the equipment for an airdrop. Personnel involved in the mis- crewmen and their officers were 

The warningorder called for the sion went through the preparation boarding a C-141 "Starlifter" noequipment and vehicles to be at of replacements for overseas tionally bound for central Mexico. 

1 
Derigging the bridge at the drop zone. 

The equipment, which preceded 

the personnel onto the drop zone, 

encountered a few problems 

during the airdrop. The dump 

truck sustained some damage to 

its front end, but it was still operational for the exercise. The 7 112-

ton crane missed its mark and 

landed in a pine forest. Driving the 

crane out of the forest was an environmentally sensitive project 

because the trees were near the 

habitat and nesting area of the endangered Red Cockaded Woodpecker. 

The paratroopers jumped into 

the fictitious central Mexico 

after 1 hour of low-level flight. 

Following assembly procedures, 

half of the airborne bridge 

crewmen of the 264th derigged 

the bridge equipment,, dump 

truck, and HMMWV The rest 

did a reconnaissance of the 

bridge site and prepared it for 

bridge construction. 

The crane's faulty landing 

delayed the operation because 

soldiers could not load the pallets 

until they derigged the crane and 

drove it out of the pine forest. 

Once the crane was freed, soldiers loaded the pallet containing 

the end of bridge on the dump 

truck and delivered it to the 

bridge site. Construction began 

immediately. The soldiers returned the dump truck to the 

drop zone and retrieved the 

second pallet of bridge equipment. Traffic started passing over 

the bridge about 1 112 hours after 

construction began. Assuming a 

5-hour flight to central Mexico 

and 2 hours to derig equipment, 

the 264th determined that relief 

packages could have reached the 

disaster-stricken city only 8 112 

hours after the initial force left 

Fort Bragg. Such a quick response time translates into lives 

saved, whether in combat or in a 

disaster-relief scenario. 

Concept Validation 

The success of the exercise 

validated airborne delivery 

as a new means of getting the 

MGB to the battlefield. It also 

ushered in a new age for the 

264th Engineer Company (MGB) 

as the only airborne bridge company in the Army The airborne 

MBG concept was further 

validated during a corps-level 

command-post exercise in March 

1992. The deputy commanding 

general of the XVIII Airborne 

Corps called for and received an 

airborne-delivered MGB as part 

of the command-post exercise. 

The capability is there, and the 

corps is ready and willing to use 

it. The MGB again showed that 

its capabilities are only limited 

by the imagination of those using 

it. Y 

CPT Anderson is the conzrizander 

of the 264th Engineer Contpany 

IMGBj, 20th Engirzeer Brigade 

(Conzbatj (Airborne Corps), Fort 

Bragg, NC. He previously served 

as a platoon leader, XO, and adjutant in the 17th Engineer Buttalion, 2d Arnzored Division, Fort 

Hood, Texas, and as a battalion 

staff officer in the 30th Engineer 

Battalion, Fort Bragg. 
ORERATIOHAL TESTIMG AND EVALUATIOM 


OF EMGIMEER SYSTEMS 


By Major Richard J. Mully 

0perations Desert Storm, such diverse requirements and systems are undergoing developProvide Comfort, and Re- reduced budgets for new systems ment, production, or fielding. Most 

store Hope, provide vivid es- acquisition, each new piece of of them are nondevelopmental 

amples of the agility, lethality, equipment fielded by the en- systems, which are commercial 

and versatility that the Anny gineers must be proven opera- systems with little or no modificamust have to meet the challenges tionally effective and suitable tion. They are purchased for 

of today and tomorrow. These before it is fielded. military applications at a lower 

operations illustrate the diverse This article is an overview of overall cost than items that reconditions under which engineers operational testing and evaluation quire several years to develop and 

and their equipment must be (OT8.E) in the Army, as applied refine. All systems purchased by 

able to maneuver, survive, and be specifically to engineer systems. the Army undergo an in-depth 

logistically supported. Because of Currently, about 60 engineer operational assessment to ensure 

Acquisition Milestones and Phases 

r-- PHASE o Pi<fist I PHlist 11 PHASE 111 PHASE Iv 

I DCTLRIINE.TION CONCEPT OLMOtISTI,>IION ENGINEERING& PROUUCilON OPERaTIONS 

EXPLORAliON AN0 I.1AUUIACTUIIING AND AN0 ( OFty;:LON d DLFlPliTON Y&LIDAIO11 DEYCLOI'IMEIIT DEPLOYMENT I SUPPORT 

L--

.r 7 v 7 1 
 M5 0 MS i IS II MS III MS IV 

CONCEPT CONCEPT UEYELOPMENT PRODUCTION MhJOR 

STUDIES DEMONSTRATION APPROVAL PiPPROVAL MUOIFICATION 

llPPROYLL WPROVAL APPROYkL 

AS REQUIRED 

Engineer 37 
I 

i 

r 

t ' 

-- 

Double-Fold Scissor Bridge (Scissors) by BMYIlMl 

,, 

'~ 

. . 

. i 

Christchurch Tank Bridge (No. 10) by SMS,mDP 

38 Engineer 
'ear 


Horizontal Launched Bridge (Leguan) by GDLSIMAN 

that they are capable of performing effectively, in an operational 

environment, with typical users-. 

soldiers. 

The L.S.Army Operational Test, 

and Evaluation Command 

(OPTEC) in Alexandria, Virginia, 

is responsible for OT&E of Army 

systems. Its two subordisiate commands, the 'ibst and Experimenhtion Command (TEXCOM), Fort 

Hood, Texas, and the Operational 

Evaluation Command (OEC), 

Alexandria, Virginia, conduct the 

operational testing and independent evaluation, respectively. 

Why Testing and 


Evaluation are 


Performed 


The acquisition of a new system generally mcurs in five 

phases. he cha2 on page 37 

shows a generic acquisition model 

covering the full life cycle of a 

system. Each phase stark with a 

decision (milestone), where the 

status of the program progress b 

reviewed to deteil~iine whether the 

program is to proceed as planned, 

be revised, or be terminated. OT&E 

is conducted to support each 

decision point. In this way, 

programs that fail to achieve expected results can be redirected or 

terminated befbre fielding, thus 

saving t.irne and money. If a system 

perforlns as required, OT&E 

piovides the A~my, and ultimately 

the soldier, t,he assurance that this 

new equipment, with its logistical 

support, software, training plan, 

tactics and doctrine of employment, 

will funct,ion well. 

Several engineer systems are 

currently in a phase of the acquisition process that requires operational assessments to support key 

Army decisions. The following examples of recent test,ing illustrate 

a variety of approaches to OT&E 

and demonstrate the need for 

flexible and innovative testingand 

evaluation strategies 

Heavy Assault Bridge (HAB). 

Desert Storm confirmed the ueed 

for a dependable HAB that could 

maintain the pace of a tnaneuver 

force made up of M1 tanks and M2 

fighting vehicles. The current armored vehicle launched bridge 

(AVLB) is outdated and incapable 

of supporting today's heavy force. 

After Desert Storm, the HAB program was revised, arid testing to 

support an Army decision for thg. 

best bridge design is now almost 

complete. 

The HAB is a 26-meter, military 

load class (MLC) 70 bridge that is 

mounted on an M1 Abrams tank 

chassis. Capable of spanning gaps 

up to 24 meters on both prepared 

and unprepared abutments, the 

HAB will replace the current 

MLC 60 AVLB on a one-for-one 

basis. Three systems are currently 

competing for best bridge design: 

the double-fold scissors bridge 
(Scissors), by BMYIIMI; the 

horizontal launched bridge (Lepan), by GDLSNAN; and the 

Christchurch No. 10 tank bridge, a 

two-piece cable scissors bridge (No. 

lo), by SMSITDP. 

To test each system and support 

the selection process, a combined 

technical and operational test was 

scheduled to take place at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 

(APC). The photographs on pages 

38-39 show the three design systems under consideration when 

they weretested at APG. Each system would be tested side-by-side, 

under the same conditions, to ensure performance assessments 

were measured against a standard 

set of environmental and t,est conditions. The T&E objective was to 

evaluate only the bridges and 

launch mechanisms; chassis performance was not a consideration. 

The combined testing strategy 

was designed to use data from 

both the operational and technical 

port,ions of the test to assess the 

operational performance. The 

The lrnproved Ribbon Bridge (IRB) 

operational lest portion was intended to provide the majority of 

data pertaining to launch and 

rctrieval missions and heavy 

vehicle crossings. 

This plan was determined adcquate lo assess the potential of 

each system. However, unexpected system failures occurred 

during the technical portion and 

the T&E strategy had to be 

restructured. The operational portion of the test was cancelled and 

the technical portion was expanded to include six assault 

crossing missions. one of which 

was at night in adverse weather 

conditions. This flexibility produced the necessary data to support source selection and assess 

the potential operational capability of the systems. 

Cancelling the operational test 

added risk to the I-IAB program, 

but the risk will be managed 

through an aggressive T&E plan 

to ensure that a quality system is 

produced before fielding. The next 

HAB operational test is planned 

for late 1995. It will evaluate the 

overall operational capability of 

the selected design after it has 

been integrated with the refurbished Abrams chassis. The test 

will be used to determine whether 

the HAB is ready for production. 

TheImproved Ribbon Bridge 

(IRB).The IRE program was initiated in March 1985, when the 

Army approved the acquisition of 

a bridge that could cross heavy 

traffic (MLC 70). The acquisition 

strategy called for evaluating two 

candidate systems against approved I-equirements. A combined 

technical and operational test 

strategy was developed to support 

the acquisition. This strategy 

resulted in reductions in overall 

test cost, program schedule time, 

and test resources, and it 

eliminated redundant data requirements. The operational portion of the test was designed to 

obtain data on both candidate systems while each was operated 

and maintained by soldiers in a 

realistic environment. 
Init,ial testing was conducted at 

Aberdeen Proving Ground in JulyAugust 1991 to gather data on the 

physical characteristics of each 

bridge system and to ensure the 

systems were safe before soldiers 

used them. Then, all test items 

and test support equipment were 

transported to Fort Chaffee, 

Arkansas for operational testing. 

Conditions at Fort Chaffee and t,he 

Arkansas River are similar to 

those in Europe and are ideal for 

conducting bridging and rafting 

operations. 

TEXCOM conducted the operational test from September to 

November 1991. Soldiers from the 

902d Assault Ribbon Bridge Company, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, operated and maintained 

both systems during the test. The 

902d's participation was unprecedented; never before had an entire 

unit been deployed to participate 

in testingan engineer system. The 

expertise and leadership of the officers and I\TCOs contributed significantly to a successful evaluation in "real world" conditions. 

The Army acquisitiou strategy 

for the IRB was restructured because of funding cuts. The Army 

decided t,hat the available funds 

would be used to procure the best 

transporter mechanism to use 

with the M977 heavy expanded 

mobility tactical truck (HEMTT). 

They are used to t,ransport and 

launch the current bridge system. 

The second phase of technical testing, currently concluding at APG, 

was tailored to support evaluation 

of the two transporter mechanisms. The test featured about 

1,380 launch and retrieval cycles 

with each system. It was designed 

to determine performance compatibility with fielded ribbon 

bridge equipment and the operational capability of each system to 

meet the Army requirement. 

After the system is selected and 

integrated with the HEMTT, it 

will be subjected to another 

technical and operational test and 

Regardless of the cost 

or complexity of the 

engineer systems 

procured, the 

equipment must meet 

its operational 

requirements and be 

deployable on short 

notice. 

evaluation, from August to November 1994. Test results will provide Army decision makers the 

means to determine if the system 

is ready to go into full production. 

The Digital Topographic 

Support Systena (DTSS). The 

DTSS is a tactical, computerbased system that. will provide 

automated support to the Army's 

terrain analysts. It will he able to 

receive and process high-density, 

digital terrain data produced by 

the Defense Mapping Agency This 

data will he used to produce terrain analysis products used in the 

intelligence preparation of the 

battlefield (IPB).The DTSS is to 

be compatible with other tactical 

systems that provide terrain data 

and products. 

A technical test in 1991 

provided performance information 

for a special program review in 

Janualy 1992 to authorize a lowrate initial production (LRIP) of 

seven DTSS units. These units 

supported an OT&E conducted at 

Fort Hood from April to July 1992. 

The operational test was conducted using three terrain teams 

that operated the DTSS systems 

during six 96-hour wartime 

scenarios. Each team consisted of 

personnel of the same rank and 

MOS from units that will receive 

the DTSS when it is fielded. These 

teams conducted a variety of terrain analysis missions at division, 

corps, and echelons above corps 

levels. The test data will beused to 

develop an operational assessment in support of a full-rate 

production decision. 

The DTSS acquisition program 

is structured in a fashion unlike 

most engineer systems. DTSS will 

have three iterations of upgrades, 

called preplanned product improvements (P311, applied to the 

initial configuration and capability. The P31 are scheduled to be 

implemented as Bloclrs I, 11, and 

111, beginning in FY 93, with completion scheduled for FY97. 

While some of the improvements will require only limited 

testing to support an assessment 

of operational effectiveness and 

suitability, others may require 

more extensive testing. One P31 

that could require significant additional testing calls for a reduction in system size to accommodate driving on and off C-130 

and C-141 aircraft. This transportability improvement is needed to 

support fielding of the DTSS to the 

light divisions. 

TheEarthAuger. Only limited 

testing will be used to evaluate the 

operational effectiveness and 

suitability of the earth auger for 

the small emplacement excavator 

(SEE). The auger attachment is a 

con~mercially available item t,hat 

will adapt to the SEE, in place of 

the backhoe, without modification. Testing at the manufacturer's facility. with government 

representatives present, will 

verify the technical performance 

requirements. 

An operational demonstration 

will be conducted at the conclusion of the technical test. The 

demonstration is scheduled to 

take place at Fort Leonard Wood 

in late 1993 or early 1994. It will 

provide data on the auger's 
performance when operated and 

~naintained by soldiers; they 

will receive training, technical 

manuals, and repair parts 

needed to support fielding the 

syst,em. An operational assessment will be made based on the 

results of the demonstration to 

support a fielding decision. 

Conclusion 

A	s the Army replaces outdated engineer - svstems

with state-of-the-art systems, the 

need to validate system operational capability will be increasingly important. Regardless of 

the cot or complexity of the engineer systems procured, the 

equipment must meet its operat,ional requirements and be 

deployable on short notice. Assessing the systems' operational 

capabilities must include using 

economical methods that do not 

jeopardize the purpose of independent operational assessments. The type and scope of 

testing will vary, but the approach must. be flexible enough 

lo support the acquisition strategy and to accommodate inevitable changes. Testing and 

evaluation remain essential to 

ensure that soldiers receive the 

operationally effective and suitable equipment that provides 

them an edge on tomorrow's 

battlefield. Y 


;IfaJor Richard Mally is mz indo 

pendent operational e~aluator for 

engineer systems in the U.S. Almy 

Operational Eunluatiorz Conarnand. 

Kc pmuiousiy sen,ed in thc project 

rnnno,ger offwe for Commercial 

Construction Equipment!Material 

Handling Equipment. He holds a 

rnaster of business admirzistrutiorz 

degree and a master of science degree in contract and acqr~isition 

nlnlmgement. He is a graduate of 

the Program Management Course, 

Defense Systems Management 

College. 

the TOW ofEsets the price paid by 

reducing the size of the dismounted 

element to five. 

Some will argue that the Bradley 

is too small to carry an engineer 

squad and their pioneer tools inside. 

The engineer squad has eight personnel compared with nine in the 

infantry squad. The tools could be 

placed forward in the space occupied 

by the additional infantry soldier or 

affixed to the exterior of the vehicle. 

Such asimple design problem surely 

can be overcome. 

Others are concerned about the 

gunnery requirement associated 

with the Bradley's 25mm gun and 

the TOW. While these systems do 

carry an additional gunnery requirement, their compatibility with the 

maneuver battalion makes it 

feasible to integrate engineers into 

the maneuver battalion's gunnery 

exercise. 

The Bradley also provides the engineers an increased ability to see 

the battlefield. The integrated sight 

unit's thermal capability enables 

the gunner and Bradley commander 

to see during almost any visibility 

conditions. Prior to the Bradley, 

mechanized engineers and infantry 

fought from the same platform, the 

M113. If it was right then, is it 

wrong today? I think not. 

Additionally, replacing the CEV 

with the M1 with mine plow will 

enable engineers to increase their 

contribution to countermine operations. The equipment currently in 

the mechanized engineer company 

contributes very little, as previously 

indicated. 

Colonel Jack O'Neill states in the 

February 1993 issue of ENGINEER 

(page 9) that the 24th Infantry 

Division strongly endorses replacing the CEV with the M1 with plow. 

He points to the increased accuracy 

of the Ml's main gun, better readiness rating, the ability to achieve 

the same destructive effects of the 

CEV's 165mm gun by multiple 

firings of the Ml's high explosive AT 

rounds on a target, and better 

countermine capabilities. Units not 

yet equipped with ACEs are no 

doubt concerned about the absence 

of an earthmoving blade on the MI. 

This deficiency could be overcome by 

modifying the MTOE to include a 

combination of ACEs and dozers in 

heavy engineer companies. The 3rd 

Armored Division has already 

proposed this solution. 

An engineer unit with Mls and 

M2s will dictate that engineer staffs 

become capable planners, competent tacticians, and prime-time 

players on the combined arms team. 

Divisional engineer battalions 

currently have a maintenance section that cannot adequately support 

the battalion. The M1 and M2 platforms would justify maintenance 

sections comparable with those in 

Bradley-equipped infantry battalions. Thus, parts and technical expertise in the supported maneuver 

battalion's maintenance collection 

point would be more readily available. As the infantry replaces the 

ITV with the Bradley and air defense 

artillery moves toward the Bradley 

platform and away from the MI13 

family of vehicles, the MI13 will become a lower density vehicle. Engineers must not be the last element 

in the forcestructure with the M113, 

as we were with the M60 chassis. 

Acquisition Oppol-tunitp 

e must configure our organlzation to maximize all 

available assets. We must not daydream about equipment on the 

drawing board, and we cannot afford to wait! As the Army downsizes, we must seize the initiative 

and acquire the Mls and M2s from 

deactivated infantry and armored 

units. An opportunity once passed 

may not come again. 

LTC West is the senior engineer 

trainer at the National nuining Center: His divisional experience inclucles 

company command in the 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Diuision, and company command and 

battalion $3 in the 3rd Engineer Battalion, 24th Infanby Division. 
L

ENGINEER UPDATE 

Engineer Photographs Requested. Donations of photo- Directorate of Traininq anri 

graphs and 35mm slides depicting U.S. Army engineer ac- Doctrine (DOTP) tivities are requested for use in engineer media products. The 

Engineer School is seeking photographs or 35mm slides 

showing Army engineers or engineer activities in Vietnam, 

Panama, Grenada, Honduras, and Desert Storm. Donations 

should include a description of the photo location, date, and 

events depicted. The slides and photos will not be returned. 

Submit donations with a letter or note giving the Engineer 

School ownership and full use to: Commandant, U.S. Army 

Engineer School. Attn: ATSE-TDS, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-6650. POC is Dave Shafer. -7749. 

CEV Turret Mechanic (MOS 45N) Recoded. As directed Directorate of Conihn! 

by HQDA, all positions in modified tables of organization and Developments (DCD; equipment (MTOE) and tables of distribution and allowances 

(TDA) coded as MOS 45N and associated with AVLB and 

CEV armored equipment must be recoded. The new codes 

will be MOS 45E, Mi Turret Mechanic; 45K, Armament 

Repairer; or 45T, M2 Turret Mechanic. MOS 45E is the 

preferred replacement. MOS 45N now applies only to reserve forces. To adjust the MTOE or TDA, engineer units 

must coordinate with the installation Directorate of Resource 

Management or Force Modernization Office. Guidance is 

provided in Table 8-3, DA Circular 61 1-91-2, dated 1 October 

1991. POC is Alan Schlie, -7357. 

Engineer Systems Handbook. The April 1993 Engineer 

Systems Handbook is scheduled for distribution in May 1993. 

The handbook provides a description and status for fielded 

and developmental engineer systems. To obtain copies, write 

to: U.S. Army Engineer School, Attn: ATSE-CDP (Michael 

Fowler), Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473. POC is Mike 

Fowler, -7301. 

Total Engineer Force Readiness. Battalion commanders 

are urged to support the Commandant's program of monitoring engineer force readiness by sending us a copy of the 

unclassified cover letter from monthly DA Forms 2406 (USR). 

These vital readiness issues become a powerful force when 

collected; they are used to support your needs at TRADOC, 

FORSCOM and AMC. Send letters to: U.S. Army Engineer 

School, Ann: ATSE-ESA, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473- 

6650. POC is Vern Lowrey, -5304. 

Engineer 43 
Engineer Branch Safety Office 

(EBSO) 

Reserve Component (RC) 

Academic Records for Reserve Component Engineer 

Officers. Reserve Component engineer officers rnay Call this 

office to verify their status on remaining course requirements. 

For information regarding EOAC-RC, Cali PFC Smith, -5293; 

for information regarding EOBC-RC, call SPC Tate, -5294. 

Accident Fatality. Failure to follow proper established procedures resulted in a fatal accident recently when a soldier 

used a metal tape to directly measure the height of electric 

power lines. The triangulation method taught in the Engineer 

School utilizes a Transit, Pocket Clinometer, LIN #X11320, 

NSN 6675-00-641-5735, to measure a 45-degree angle (see 

sketch). Distance AC t CD - 3 feet = the height to lowest 

point of obstacle, less 3 feet for safety. This method will be 

included in the new FM 5-170, Engineer Reconnaissance, 

which is scheduled for publication in the 4th quarter, FY 93. 

POC is Paul Rusinko, -5008. 

9D. C.lr","lio". iic. CO .an. .D,r,anrr llomi~welil 

B",", oroan.n.c6gra"nd l.31311. !or 

I.lrly laclOI. 

E Nola S.,di.,Y.CI.llnom.,.r.Oi.tanrcm..ruredm 

ItelAL = BCAE ;CD. AC ;LO PI 

Engineer Officer Basic Course-Reserve Component 

(EOBC-RC). Army National Guard (ARNG) officers must 

complete the correspondence phase of EOBC-RC before they 

attend Phase II (8-week resident phase). The Engineer 

School will not allow officers to attend the resident phase 

without completion of the correspondence phase. Officers 

who arrive at Fort Leonard Wood to attend Phase II without 

having completed Phase I will be returned to their state. POC 

is LTC Juneau, -7742. 

Engineer Officer Advanced Course-Reserve Component 

(EOAC-RC): 

Effective 1 October 92, officers wishing to complete 

EOAC-RC must enroll in a new two-phase course. Phase 

44 Engineer 
I consists of 208 hours of correspondence studies 

managed by the Army Correspondence Course Program 

(ACCP). It is available for distribution. To enroll, students 

must forward a completed DA Form 145, Army Correspondence Course Enrollment Application, through 

their unit training officer, to the Army Institute for Professional Development, Newport News, VA 23628-0001, 

This phase is a prerequisite to enrollment in Phase II. 

Phase II is a 2-week resident course that will be conducted by the Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood. It 

will be offered for the first time early in 1994. The 

schedule for Phase iI will be listed on the Army Training 

Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). 

Confusion exists regarding the two resident EOAC courses 

offered by the Engineer School. One is the regular active 

duty 20-week advanced course (EOAC), which is required 

for all AGR officers. The other is the RC 14-week advanced course (EOAC-RC), which is open to M-Day soldiers and full-time technicians. Most RC officers should 

enroll in the 14-week course; they do not need the 20-

week program. To avoid confusion, RC training officers 

and NCOs must ensure that their officers are informed 

about the two EOAC courses offered at the Engineer 

School. Effective 1 March 93, students arriving at Fort 

Leonard Wood with permanent change of station (PCS) 

orders for the 20-week active duty EOAC, cannot have 

their orders changed to temporary duty (TDY) to allow attendance at the 14-week EOAC-RC. The Defense Finance 

and Accounting System has ruled this is not permined by 

regulation, POCs are COL Colcol, DAC-USAR, -6336; and 

LTC Juneau, DAC-ARNG, -7742. 

Engineer Refresher Courses Cancelled. Engineer refresher courses, including weekend classes and the I-week 

Staff Refresher Course, have been cancelled. They will no 

longer be conducted at the Engineer School. POC is Cathy 

Holland, -633617742, 

Unit Patches for 18th Engineer Brigade. Soldiers who 

Se~edin the 18th Engineer Brigade can obtain unit patches, 

both color and subdued, by sending a self-addressed, 

stamped envelope to: CPT R. L. Shelton. 565th Engineer Battalion. Unit 31117, Box 35-93, APO AE 09164. The 18th Engineer Brigade, which deactivated in October 1992, served in 

Vietnam and during Operation Provide Cornfori, in Turkey and 

Iraq. 

News and Notes 

Engineer 45 
Past in Review 


Engineers in North Africa 


By Dr. James W. Dunn 

nited States Army engineers 

experienced their first 

European combat in World War I1 

in North Africa. During the 

Tunisian campaign, which lasted 

from November 1942 until May 

1943, Army engineers executed 

their primary missions of road 

maintenance and mine warfare, as 

well as their secondary mission of 

fighting as infantry. They also 

completed two new missions by 

functioning as amphibian engineers and aviation engineers. 

Operation Torch 

n-tion 'lbrch, the Allied in-

' w' vasion of ~rench North &ca, 

began November 8, 1942, when 

three division-sized task forces 

landed simultaneously at Algiers, 

Oran, and Casablanca. At all three 

sites, a mmpany from the division 

engineer battalion was attached to 

each regimental landing team. 

As amphibian engineers, the 

36th Engineer Combat Regiment 

provided shore parties for the Eastern Task Force, at Algiers, while 

the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment and the 591st Engineer Boat 

Regiment provided shore parties 

for the Central Task Force, at 

Oran. The 36th Engineer Combat 

Regiment and the 540th Engineer 

Shore Regiment performed shore 

party duties for the Western Task 

Force, at Casablanca. 

At Port Lyautey, 80 miles north 

of Casablanca, elements of the 15th 

Engineer Combat Battalion, 9th 

Infantry Division, helped seize an 

airfield adjacent to the port. This 

46 Engineer 

L' 

( 

action began on November 8, when 

a raiding par ty that i~ lcluded e: ngineers enter, ed the ml311th of ti le 

Sebou River t( remove aI navigatic)n . .. . . obstacle. Clearing tnis obstacle 

would allow the destroyer Dallas to 

move upriver and seize the airfield. 

The first attempt failed when gunfire from a nearby fort drove the 

raiders away, but the raiding party 

succeeded in removing the obstacle 

the next night. Early on November 

10, the Dallas, with the raiders 

aboard, moved upriver and secured 

, 

Sldl BOY Zld Pas. 

the airfield. The 888th Airborne 

Aviistion En gineers 1then resurface!d the run way. 

Besides ttle 888th Engineers, . .. other eng.lneer aviation units in the 

Western Task Force were the 887th 

Engineer Airborne Company and 

the 1st Battalion, 21st Engineer 

Aviation Regiment. The Central 

Task Force had the 809th, 815th, 

and 817th Engineer Aviation Battalions. These aviation engineers 

resurfaced damaged runways on 

airfields in the landing zones. Then 
they moved on to build airfields in 

Algeria to support future offensive 

operations in Tunisia. 

Late that fall, the British First 

Army's Tunisian drive stalled in 

front of Tunis because of strong 

German opposition, bad weather, 

and supply problems. General 

Eisenhower, then commander of 

the Allied Forces Headquarters 

halted the off Decembf 

24. He decidec the defer 

sive until sprlng, wnen the rain 

season ended. He sent the U.S. I 

Corps to southern 7'unisia t 

protect the First Armj 7's expose . . flank. Later they were to take the 

offensive against Rommel's line of 

communication, when the Germans withdrew from Libya. 

The II Corps became operational 

at Tebessa, in southern Tunisia, on 

Januarv 6. 1943. Its engineer - strength consisted only of the 19th 

Engineer Combat Regiment and 

division engineers from the 1stand 

34th Infantry Divisions and the 1st 

Armored Division. 

Southern Tunisia 

Allied intelligence, based on 

Ultra intercepts (intercepts 

of the German high command's 

code) predicted the Germans would 

attack the weak French forces in 

central Tunisia. Instead, their advance in the south, out of Faid 

Pass toward Sidi Bou Zid on 

February 14, inflicted heavy 

casualties on the U.S. 1st Armored 

Division. 

On February 16, in conjunction 

with a general withdrawal caused 

by the German attack, the I1 Corps 

ordered the 19th Engineers to organize a defensive line at Kasserine Pass. In addition to his own 

regiment of 1,200 engineers, 

Colonel Anderson Moore headed a 

force of 2,000 soldiers made up of 

the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry 

Regiment, 1st Infantry Division; 

three artillery battalions; and a 

tank destroyer battalion. Colonel 

Moore ordered his engineers to 

& Ys 

I ~c, .'‘I-..::.. 

.< , . 

Clearlng mlnes In Kasserlne Pass, February 1943. 

emplace mines and org v, thus exposing the 

artillery and tank destroyers. He enaneers' left flank. That afterpositioned the 26th Infantry Bat- nwn the engineer line broke, and 

talion on high ground on the left, the Germans were through the 

covering the road to Thala, and his pass. 

engineers on high ground on the In defending Kasserine Pass,the 

right, covering the road to Tebessa. 19th Engineers' casualties were 11 

The 1st Armored Division killed, 28 wounded, and 88 missing. 

withdrew through Kasserine Pass Their Sday holding action, however, 

on the 17th, as the engineers allowed time for reinforcements to 

prepared to stop any enemy effort take strong positions in hills beyond 

to force the pass. German patrols the pnss Thge for- stopped Romand preparatory artillery increased me1 by February 22, and the Gerin intensity through February mans began to withdraw through 

18th. Their probing attacks the Kasserine Pass to their original posinext morning failed to penetrate tions the next day 

the pass, but that afternoon a As the Germans withdrew, the 

strong German effort forced Com- Allies took the offensive in 

pany D, 19th Engineers, out of its southern Tunisia. The I1 Corps, 

defensive position. A counterattack with engineer reinforcements that 

to restore their position failed, but included the 20th Engineer Comby evening, although weakened, bat Regiment and the 175th Enthe line remained intact. Before gineer General Service Regiment, 

dawn the next day, German sol- attacked south through Gafsa 

diers forced the infantry on the left toward Maknassy on March 17. 

Engineer 47 
~ 

Englneers repair an airfleld in North Africa, January 1943. 

The 1st and 19th Engineers removed mines and turned almost 

100 miles of trail into dirt roads 

that the 1st Infantry and 1st 

Armored Divisions used in their 

advance. 

Attacking toward Maby, the 

1st Infant~y Division had to break 

through a strong defensive position 

on high ground east of El Guettar. At 

dawn on March 21, after a night infiltration movement of about 10 

miles, the 1st Ranger Battalion, supported by a 1st Engineers' mortar 

platoon, attacked the rear of the 

defensive position; the 26th Infantry, 

supported by Company C, 1st Engineers, attacked the front. The Germans began withdraw noon, 

and the way to Maknass~ was open. 

The German withdrawal into 

northern Tunisia squeezed the I1 

Corps out of the line in the south. 

The I1 Corps then moved north, onto 

the left flank of the First Army, for 

the drive toward Bizerte and Tunis, 

The engineers found that the hilly 

terrain and lack of maneuver room 

made the German-blown bridges an 

effective deterrent to their advance. 

The 16th Armored Engineer 

Battalion's capability with the 

Bailey bridge, which they had 

trained with in England, helped to 

solve that problem. 

Xoi.tl1e.rn %'unsia 

mhefinal offensive, in north. 

trails, and the rest of the company helped the artillery displace forward. The remainder 

of the engineer battalion was 

under division control for use 

where needed most. 

When the North AI+ican campaign ended on May 13, 1943, 

the engineers had gained more 

than 6 months of experience in 

20th century mobile warfare. 

They had made some mistakes 

and taken some hard knocks, 

but they had learned a great 

In Operation Torch, the amphibian engineers learned the 

value of establishing a good 

working relationship between 

the Navy and the landing force. 

The aviation engineers learned 

the amount of effort required to 

maintain and construct airfields in a 

theaterofoperations.While thecom-

- ern ~ ~ ~ i on ~~fil i ~ ,

bat engineers had knowr. they could began ~ be used in infantry missions, they 24, ~h~ 20th ~ ~supportedg i ~ ~ ~ ~ now understood the need for realistic the ~~~~~h corps$ ~ f and ~ i ~ ~ ~ 

the 9th ~ ~~ i f~on ithe~~ 

left, while the 19th ~ ~sup. 

ported the 34th and ist lnfantry 

~ i ~ and i the ~ist i ~~~~~~d ~ ~

~ i ~on i the ~ right, i ~h~ ~ en. ~

maintained almost 100 

miles of macadam and 250 miles of 

dirt roads during this attack, with 

the advancing infantry fol. 

lowing the high ground, the engineers built almost 75 miles of 

new roads to the main 

supply routes with the pack mule 

trails in the hills, 

During this last offensive, the 

15th Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry Division, successfully used 

its engineers in support rather 

than attachment, thus keepingengineer assets under centralized 

battalion control. A company supported each of the two attacking 

regiments, while a platoon supported the reserve regiment. Each 

company used three echelons to 

provide a small group of reconnaissance engineers for forward infantry elements. An engineer 

platoon maintained mountain 

infantry training. i ~ t German land ~~ ~ mines were new to the engineers, g i ~ ~ ~ but their ability to overcome these 

obstacles grew with each encounter. ~ 

The Bailey bridge, new to American 

engineers, rapidly became their 

favorite device for spanning riven 

and repairing roads. ARer the North 

African campaign, U.S. Army engineers moved to Sicily and Europe, 

where they applied what they had 

learned in North -
Africa.

Additional Reading: 

Beck, Alfred M., The Corps of Engineers: The WarAgainst Germany, 

U.S.Government Printing Ofice, 

1988. 

Howe, George F., Northwest 

Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the 

West, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1957. 

D? james D~~~ is studies

and Analysis Division, Office of 

History, U.S.Amy Corps of Engineers, Fort Beluoir, Virginia 

48 Engineer 
b--A -

- .-! BRIDGE THE GAP 

By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, Jr. 

U.S. Army Engineer School

-

he times become more interesting as we continue our mandated drawdown. 

"Training is the Army's top priority; it prepares us to 

fight. As leaders, our sacred responsibility is to ensure that no soldier ever dies in combat because that 

soldier was not properly trained. " 

General Carl E. Vuono 

3urinn rnv first three months as the Enqineer 

+ center command Sergeant Major, I visited 

several units across the country to assess the quality 

of soldiers trained here at the Engineer Center and 

determine training needs. I visited the 13th and 14th 

Engineer Battalions, Fort Ord, California: the 11th 

Engineer Battalion (Combat), National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; and the 24th Infantry Division's engineer brigade as well as the 92nd Engineer 

Battalion (Combat Heavy), Fort Stewart, Georgia. 

Throughout the tour, I spoke with ail ranks, from 

division commanders to privates. My conversations 

with them were interesting, straightforward, and to the 

the point! 

The strongest points I discussed with senior 

leaders were: 

We must continue to provide tough and realistic 

training to our soldiers. 

4 We must provide the proper equipment to units 

and soldiers in order to conduct training properly. 

We must continue to enforce the standards that 

will keep our soldiers safe in training areas and 

on the battlefield, 

I learned that soldiers in skill levels 10 through 30 

are most interested in the education and job opportunities expected in our future Army. Most of the soldiers I spoke with had tremendous confidence in thei~ 

leaders. As engineers, however, they wondered 

where our responsibilities fit into the overall scheme 

of an ever-changing and currently downsizing Army. 

To answer that question, a review of our history is 

revealing: Engineers have always stood ready to 

complete their assigned missions, always executed 

and completedtraining preparations, and always executed their missions on the battlefield. We were 

taught to protect the force as leaders and as subordinates--and we must continue to do so in these uncertain times. There is tremendous anxiety among 

engineer troops about where our force is heading. 

The crystal ball is not clear about the future, but it is 

clear enough for us, as leaders, to show genuine concern for our soldiers! 

A key area we must continue to emphasize is 

education. As leaders, we must ensure our subordinates develop themselves professionally through 

both the military and civilian education systems. Our 

training efforts must be flexible enough to positively 

develop and enrich subordinates. The young soldiers 

Ispoke with want education to keep themselves 

competitive. 

As our Army gets smaller, senior leaders must continue to assist in making soldiers smarter! They must 

push to give soldiers the additional training they need 

to grow within a smaller but quality Army. Someone, 

somewhere gave our senior soldiers that chance. 

We must continue that tradition during these changing times. 

To help young soldiers develop themselves, we 

must assess their skills honestly and provide a 

means for development. One first sergeant I spoke 

with designed a program based on his soldiers' GT 

scores. Soldiers with GT scores below 100 could not 

attend college. Instead, they worked to raise their 

Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) 

scores through the Basic Skills Education Program 

(BSEP).After their ASVAB scores were raised, the 

soldiers attended college! This creative program 

provided an opportunity for success based on what 

the senior leader considered an equitable system for 

everyone. It provided all soldiers a fair chance to successfully attain a college degree (or credit toward a 

degree) without mission degradation. 

As senior leaders, we must continue to provide the 

guidance and tools required to make our soldiers successful in training areas, in school, and on the battlefield. They are our most precious resource and 

reflect our success as leaders and mentors!