River Crossing 


Hedquamm, D.p#mn.nt of the Anny 


PB 6-964 Approwd tor publlc ralmn; dlatrlbullon Is unllmlted. 

CLEAR THE WAY 


By Major General Clalr F. Gill 

Commandant, U.S. Army Englneer School 

I

n this era of dynamic change and development, I am 

proud to be the 50th Commandant of the U.S. Army 

Engineer School and the Commanding General of the 

U. S. Army Engineer Center. With your help, we are 

developing a single vision for our Engineer Regiment to 

move us successfully toward full implementation of 

Force XXI and the Army Maneuver Support Center, 

while we continue to sustain our reputation as a worldclass training facility here at Fort Leonard Wood. 

My boss, General Hartzog, has designated me as 

Engineer Personnel Proponent and Engineer Branch 

Chief. He has charged me to ensure that Army 

engineers maintain a key role in the combined arms 

team as we work to deter combat and promote peace 

in theaters around the globe. 

One major task is to formulate a proponent strategic 

plan that will chart a pathway to our future. We all have 

strategies. plans, and immediate missions that demand 

daily attention and resources. But we also need a longterm focus (strategic plan) to integrate into broad 

operational requirements and planning. Strategic 

planning is our corporate responsibility. My chartered 

team at Fort Leonard Wood recently formulated draft 

vision statements for both the Engineer Regiment and 

Fort Leonard Wood: 

"The Engineer Regiment ...trained and ready, 

a rapidly deployable and versatile member of the 

strategic force.. .combining efficiencies of information 

with physical and technical capabilities, 

to master terrain insupport of decisive victory." 

Fort Leonard Wood's vision reads: 

"America's center for maneuver support to the total 

force...the world's best multifaceted training center. ..a 

people-focused leader inquality of life, residing in the 

Ozarks...an active civic partner. ..a foundation for 

exceptional service to our nation and its values." 

When finalized, these statements will complement 


the TRADOC effort to develop a 21st century Army. 


The teams are now translating these visions into 


long-term goals and their supporting near-term 

objectives. Together, the vision, the long-term goals. 

and the immediate objectives define my intent-ur 

intent.This approach will constitute our deep battle and 

will be fully integrated into the close fight. 

While planning for the future, the Engineer Center 

team must continue to provide our regiment with the 

highest quality service in the three core mission areas: 

training soldiers, combat developments, and writing 

doctrine. The next step is to incorporate our regiment's 

vision into the entire Army engineer community and 

take the first steps toward its attainment. 

Another important hat Iwear is that of Maneuver 

Support Center planner. As a result of a recent Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decision, we have 

the mission to plan and execute receipt of the Military 

Police and Chemical Schools at Fort Leonard Wood 

beginning after 1998. In partnership with the commandants of the Military Police and Chemical Schools, 

we will form a consolidated organization tentatively 

called the "Army Maneuver Support Center." In the 

opertional concept, each branch will retain its 

commandant. He will remain the proponent for his 

regiment and its systems and functions. 

Isolicit your input throughout the entire planning and 

consolidation process. Teamwork is essential. I 

encourage you to share experiences, lessons learned, 

and ideas with others in the engineer community. Keep 

those phone calls, cards and letters coming. Use the 

Engineer Bulletin Board and the Engineer Hotline to get 

answers to your technical requests. Recent upgrades to 

Fort Leonard Wood's fiber-optic system allow us to 'Talk 

via the Engineer School's Internet Home Page. Engineer 

magazine also has a role in my strategy, and I will use 

this forum to discuss key issues affecting our corps. 

Together we will work to ensure that our great 

regiment remains a key member of the combined arms 

team, ready to support our nation and successfully 

meet any challenge. Essayonsl 
- - 

December -1995 -

Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 24 PB 5-954 -.-- --.- -- - -- I 

UNITED STATES ARMY 'FE/?TLIP"S 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 2 Operation Chosin Action: A RiverCrossing Exercise 

FORT LEONARD WOOD byMajorJames K. Rupp 

Q The Multirole Brldge Company: An Update 

byAlan Schlie COMMANDERKOMMANDANT 

Major General Clair F: Gill II Demystlfylng RiverCrosslng Operations 

byMajor Glenn Fenton 

12 Engineer Battlefield Assessment: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 

MANAGING EDIlOR by Michael W Sayer 

Catherine Eubanks 17 CMF 12Advanced Noncornmlssioned Office' Course Program of 

Insbuction 

FEATURES EDITOR bySergeantFirst Class John HurfeyandSegeant FirstClass Steven 

Shirlev Bridaes Ebefharter 


20 Wanted: U.S. Army Engineer Divers 


- GRAPHIC DESIGNER bySergeant FirstClass JimohyDillardandMaster Segeant Peter 

Jennifer C. Bolyard Swenson 

-~ / 2.1 NCO Proficiency: Bridge Demolition 

bySergeant FirstClass Gay D. Glover 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: I 

28 Design at Your Fingertips: The Theater Construction Management 

DENNIS J. REiMER I system 

General, UnitedStates Army 1 bySergeant FirstClass Tony R. ArnoldandFredSteinman 

Chief of Staff ! 2'1 Engineers Build a School In Belize 


i byFirstLieutenantBarry WIson 


Official: 1 


Y"Im 1

31 Actlve Engagement: Charting a Career Path 


byMajor James B. Balocki 


35 Engineer Battle Tracking 


byCaptainKenneh J Crawfordand Major James E. Brooks
 YVONNE M. HARRISON 1' 


Administrative Assistant to the .I? "Go and Do It": Obstacles at the Battle of Pea Ridge 
 j Secretary of the Anny byLp McFadd 

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way Front cover photo: Active assault float 1 


bridge units (the 74th Engineer Company I 1,D Personal Viewpoint A:! Engineer Solutlon 


and the 489th Engineer Battalion) support 1 27 Engineer Problem 50 U.S. Anned Forces Insignia 


the 353rd Engineer Group (USAR) during 
 / 27 Letter to the Editor ?? Engineer Update 

a river-crossing exercise in July 1995. ; 44; CTC Notes 53 Bridge the Gap 

=\? \L.LII (S8\ LIcF.I(IR~: s p14)81~1 $_a!ter y DYIho L S Amy Fngneer exor-ed , ~~ are - those ~ ot me ~~ aumor ~~ and not m e ot ~ the oeoarrmmi 01 dens w

SC~XA1 l h ATSI. ID:.R F~t.emara Wma UO 65413.6550 Semc L ass its dements The contens do "el neoeswlly reflect afi,tisl US Army posidans. 

pos'epe spac 21 ' n~l.w>a,oWO:: NI:8noado'oni. na -E 01 ces and do not change or supersede inlormauon in amer US. Army publications Use 

01 news items mnrofufes nelher amrmanan 01 their ecauracv mr orodua endasePOSTMASTER, Send address changes to ENGINEER. the Prolesson& Bulledn menl ENGINEER reservesthe right to edllrnelerlal 

lor Army Engineers ATTN ATSE-m-O-EB, Fort Lemard Wood. MO 55473.6650. 

CONTENT is no1 mpyrlghled. Msleriai may be reprinted 11uedil is plwn to 

CC'~..':>oho~hCE r:\err .c 'ns rnmn man.s:t o's ~notogm~nzr- 23 ENGINEER andthe auha mt I-: I '-'0 ~PC~<W mp&% an.: .-' e:llim cnen'~? :-x >ontent m F\li - hF1 li U. llle ?ecmr"annrrw Trecr cc e '1141 5FL4I"I -Sh 676-4101 OFFICIAL OlSTRiBUnON IS largeled to all englnser and englnew-related unn 

DISCLAIMER ENGINEER pr-nls pialesrand tnlwmalon desgned la keep PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS are auatlsble by mntaalng the Sup~~niendanf o 

Army engineers %"farmed of current and emergng developmenlo whln their weas Dooumenn PO Box 371954 Plnsburgh PA 13250.7950 Address changes 1m 

ol emeiube 101 the pLrpoae of enhancing lhelr prolessmal dwdopment Views persmsl s4bsolplons mould alsa be sen! lothe Svper~nfendenl of Daolmens 

December I995 
The following three perspectives of river crossings pmuide inaight info this complex engineer mission. First, despite the odds, the 

353rd Engineer Group WSAR)planned and successfully completed a bridging exerci-e oernsr the Arkansas Riuer. The second 

piece describes the rationale for the new multimle bridge company and the results afa recent concept evaluation for this progmm. 

It is folloured by a reuiew of river.crossing doctrine inpeaeetirne conditions. We inuite your comments concerning this topic. 

Operation Chosin Action: 


A River-Crossing Exercise 


*? 

, .- . , I:, , 

. . . . , 

By Major James K. Rupp 

2 Engineer December 1995 

. ... 
Imagine evacuating a town of 5,000 people over a 

one-lane bridge, with every vehicle arriving at 

the bridge 100 meters apart-and with no traffic 

jams, no accidents, and no impatient drivers. This 

situation is difficult to envision, hut it is what is 

expected when a division conducts a deliberate 

river crossing. A reinforced division crossing 20,000 

strong at two brigade crossing sites with two 

bridges each equates to that town of 5,000 at each 

of the four bridges. 

River crossing is one of the most complex engineer operations to plan and execute. In addition to 

overcoming the logistics problems, a deliberate 

river crossing must project forces across the river in 

synchronization with the commander's battle plan. 

Success depends on meticulous planning and 

numerous rehearsals. 

Many in the engineer community misunderstand who is responsible for planning river-crossing 

operations. FM 90-13, River Crossing Operations, a 

combined arms manual, states that corps engineers 

are additional staff planners of crossing operations 

and provide command and control of the crossing 

assets. It also states that divisional engineers 

should focus on the fight. Yet, when the manual 

outlines planning procedures and responsibilities, 

it lists the brigade and the division engineers. 

ARTEP 5-145, Mission Training Plan (MTP) 

for Engineer Brigades and Groups, provides the 

tasks, conditions, and standards for an engineer 

group to plan a river-crossing operation. However, 

some group commanders maintain that it is not 

their mission but that of the division engineers. 

Division engineers say they have no bridging assets 

and therefore should not conduct the planning. We 

must clearly deiine this responsibility so that someone has ownership. 

River.crossing exercises are not held often. During a recent 16-month period, four Warfighter exercises were conducted with Southeast and Southwest Asian and European scenarios and none of 

them included a river-crossing operation. Yet, if the 

United States was to fight in these theaters, it is 

unlikely that we could win without crossing a river. 

Additionally, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, conducted its Roadrunner exercise in September 1994 

without a single river-crossing operation. In its 

after action review, III Corps stated that it had not 

conducted such an operation in 10 years. 

Planning an Exercise 

The 353rd Engineer Group (USAR), Oklahoma 

City, decided to conduct a river-crossing exercise because we have the MTP task to plan 

river-crossing operations. Although maneuver commanders are responsible for the operation, they 

depend heavily on the engineers' technical expertise. Operation Chosin Action, planned for mid-July 

1995, would be a multiechelon exercise that integrated active and reserve units. To get the exercise 

L--

Engineer sold~ers maneuver a bridge into posrtlon by hooking a boat to the br~dge 

December 1995 Engineer 3 
Figure 1. Control elements for a deliberate crossing 

off the ground, the group identified a training area, 

a task organization, and a tactical scenario. 

Training Area. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, was 

chosen as a training area. The military reservation 

spans both sides of the Arkansns River, which allows 

control of both the entering and exit banks, and has 

four bridging sites. Permission to close the Arkansas 

River to navigation traffic during the exercise was 

coordinated with the Little Rock District of the 

Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Task Organization. Figure 1 shows the command and control relationships of a river-crossing 

operation. A full division crossing rcquires a minimum of two corps engineer battalions, four ribbon 

bridge companies, and numerous support units. 

In the plan for this exercise, the commander of 

the 353rd served as the crossing force engineer 

(CFE) and the commander of the 489th Engineer 

Battalion (C)(M) (USAR), North Little Rock, Arkansas, served as the crossing area engineer (CAW. 

Other participants initially remained unidentified. 

One year before the event, the 353rd sent invitations to every Active, Reserve, and National Guard 

ribbon bridge company in CONUS and to military 

police, medical, aviation, infantry, and signal units. 

Although no one promised to be there, the group 

staff continued to plan the exercise. Ideally, a combat force would serve as crossing force commander 

(CFC). The next best nlternative was for a maneuver training command to prepare and control the 

exercise. But those commands were preparing for 

4 Engineer 

lanes training and could not support our request. So 

the task of preparing the exercise scenario and controlling the exercise fell to the 353rd. 

Tactical Scenario. Using operations orders, 

messages, and logs from two previous Warfighter 

exercises conducted by the 4th Infantry Division in 

Korea, the group staff pieced together a tactical scenario for Operation Chosin Action. By moving their 

operations farther south in the next Warfighter 

exercise, the 4th can use the same scenario for a 

deliberate crossing of the Han River. 

While preparing for the exercise, the staff periodically contacted the units invited to participate. 

When none of them committed to attend, we 

thought that the multiechelon training exercise we 

were planning might become an elaborate command post exercise for just the group and battalion 

staffs. Then, in January, units hcgan to confum 

their attendance. As the task organization filled in, 

the possibility of developing a role for a diving 

detachment surfaced. Then vendors of Zodiac boats 

and Jet Propulsion outboards wanted the Army to 

try their new products. By April, all the pieces were 

in place. Thc final task organization is shown in 

Figure 2. 

The battalion and group staffs conducted crossing area reconnaissance. They looked at routes and 

staging areas on the Arkansas River but could not 

get within 1.5kilometers of the crossing site due to 

flooding. In May, this was a minor concern; but in 

June, when a reconnaissance with commanders 

December 1995 
Figure 2. Task organization for Operation Chosin Action 

I I I 

from the bridge companies showed that the situation had not improved, it became a major problem. 

The hydrology division from the Little Rock District 

forecast that the river would recede before the 

crossingin mid-July. However, the weather and the 

snowmelt from the Rockies did not cooperate, and 

the river remained at flood stage. When the first 

units arrived on 8 July, the river was still 1kilometer out of its banks. 

I I 

, 489 

(CC) (MECH) 511 Ti

Planning Process 

-~ ~ c l u l

(CHINOOK) 

**. 

-F i(l~, 

410 

(EVAC) 

0peration Chosin Action officially began at 

1900 on 9 July when the division operations 

order was briefed to the engineer group and battalion commanders. The exercise included the following training objectives: 

m The group staff will plan a division river 

crossing. 

The battalion staff will plan a brigade crossing and will command and control engineer 

units in the crossing area. 

The engineer companies will conduct rivercrossing operations. 

The flow chart in Figure 3 on page 6 guided the 

staff during their planning process. 

Commander's Intent. Each step required close 

coordination between the crossing force engineer 

and the crossing area engineer. The plans developed for the brigade fit within the division commander's intent and were incorporated into the 

division plan. Before the crossing area engineer 

attempted the next step in the planning process, 

the crossing force engineer incorporated the hrigade crossing plan into the division plan. 

Restated Mission and Warning Order. A 

restated mission was developed and warning 

orders were issued to subordinate units. Rivercrossing plans were based on the 4th Infantry Division's task organization in the Warfighter exercises. The tactical scenario in these exercises called 

for two brigades crossing abreast to bypass and isolate Seoul. With only one crossing area engineer 

participating in Operation Chosin Action, the group 

staff planned the second brigade's crossing and 

incorporated it into the division river-crossing 

annex. 

Crossing Estimates. The staffs prepared crossing estimates based on physical features of the 

crossing site and enemy countermobility capabilities. At regular intervals, they issued intelligence 

updates on enemy activities, engineering capabilities, and obstacles. Intelligence officers used Terrabase, a computerized terrain data system, to 

provide detailed terrain analyses and enemy obstacle templates. Korean terrain was used for the 

intelligence preparation of the battlefield, but the 

staffs used the physical terrain of Fort Chaffee at 

the immediate crossing sites. Site selection was 

based on the assumption that the river would 

recede, and the normal width of the river at the 

selected sites was used in the crossing estimates. 

The estimates were prepared on a spread sheet 

that broke the task organization down to companysized elements. It showed the number of vehicles 

present, the number of raft loads required, and the 

December 1995 Engineer 5 
Figure 3. Planning process for a river crossing 

time required to cross a bridge. The staffs calculated the time needed to construct rafts and bridges 

and the time required to make a round trip across 

the river. Using the spread sheet information, the 

staffs calculated rafting times and bridge-crossing 

times for each unit. 

Courses of Action. Crossing estimates were 

the building blocks used to develop possible courses 

of action. 

Rough Crossing Time Line. The staffs prepared a rough crossing time line for each course of 

action considered. 

War GaminglCourseaf-Action Selection. 

After war gaming possible courses of action, the 

staffs made recommendations to the commanders, 

who selected the appropriate action. 

Riuer-Crossing Annex. The group staff prepared the crossing annex using input from the battalion staffs on crossing capability matrices and 

crossing time lines for the supported hrigades. They 

incorporated the information into the division 

crossing capability matrix, crossing time line, and 

synchronization matrix. 

While they planned the situational crossing, the 

staffs also planned an actual crossing with the 

units at Fort Chaffee. But with the river at flood 

stage, it looked doubtful that the crossing sites 

would be above water in time for the exercise. They 

asked the hydrology departments at both the Little 

Rock and the Tulsa Corps of Engineer Districts to 

6 Engineer 

determine how to reduce the water level and the 

best estimates of river flows and elevations. Both 

districts provided forecasts for the next six days. If 

the river elevations followed the forecast, the exercise could be conducted at the proposed site. If not, 

an alternate site owned by the Corps of Engineers 

would be used. Officers and members of the Fort 

Chaffee training staff helped coordinate for use of 

the alternate site and approved the route upgrades 

required to access it. The staffs prepared crossing 

annexes for a division crossing the Han River and 

for Fort Chaffee units crossing the Arkansas River 

at two locations. 

Bridge companies from the 489th Engineer Battalion convoyed from Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Polk, 

Louisiana; and Fort Benning, Georgia. After conducting maintenance operations, they began rafting training at Engineer Lake and on the Arkansas 

River at the Corps of Engineer site. In addition to 

the river-crossing operation, the battalion conducted lanes training with support from its resident reserve training detachment. 

Execution Matrix. On the morning of 15 July, 

subordinate units received the operations order to 

execute the crossing on Fort Chaffee and he prepared to use the alternate Corps of Engineer site. 

The width of the river at the alternate site (almost 

500 meters) exceeded the bridging capability of two 

plus companies. Even with half of the active Army's 

bridging assets present, there was not enough to 

December 1995 
span the Arkansas River. The alternate plan was to 

conduct a rafting operation. 

As the crossing area engineer prepared the engineer execution matrix, the engineer companies conducted reconnaissance and prepared for the 

exercise. The 74th Engineer Company practiced 

sling loads and conducted rehearsals with C\158th 

Aviation Company. 

During this time, the 511th Engineer Diving 

Detachment from Fort Eustis, Virginia, was the 

focus of everyone's attention. Although there is no 

doctrine for using diving detachments in rivercrossing operations, their ability to produce hydrographic surveys of the crossing centerlines, identify 

underwater near- and far-bank conditions, and 

breach underwater obstacles was critical in determining the crossing site. The data they collected, 

when correlated with data from the Little Rock District, showed that the Fort Chaffee site would be 

above water by 18 July and that bank conditions 

could support wheeled traffic. 

Rehearsals 

0n the afternoon of 16July, the units conducted 

a sand-table rehearsal of a crossing plan that 

had two center lines, one for rafts and one for the 

bridge. They exercised the traffic patterns on the 

sand table and resolved the identified problemswhere to locate the engineer equipment park, the 

engineer routes, and the sling load area for the 

bridge bays airlifted to the site. 

The crossing site was still partially underwater, 

the river width exceeded the available bridging 

capacity, and aviation support was unavailable for 

the full dress rehearsal on 17 July. Because the 

hridge company commanders were concerned about 

the river velocity and the bridge anchorage, they 

conducted a limited rehearsal with the following 

goals: 

H Verify the traffic flow through the staging, 

holding, and call forward areas. 

H Launch bays and construct rafts at the crossing site. 

H Develop a bridge anchorage. 

H Conduct rafting operations. 

While the rehearsal was successful, several 

issues remained unresolved. Of the two centerlines 

identified, only one was usable and it was partially 

inaccessible. Divers conducted a hydrographic survey to define the site's underwater trafficable limits. The Little Rock District projected water 

elevation drops for the evening of 17 July and the 

morning of 18 July. Even so, the crossing sites 

would still be partially underwater, but with some 

work one site would be usable. Dozers reworked 

the shallow crossing area to prevent rafts from 

becoming beached. When the units convened for the 

rehearsal after action review, they decided to constrain the crossing to one centerline. The alternate 

site at the Corps of Engineers area would he used to 

launch bays and boats rafted downstream, relieving congestion on the centerline. 

The Crossing

0n the morning of 18 July, the river elevation 

was as projected and the crossing began. AN 

the preparation and rehearsals fit together for the 

first time. As the assault force prepared, smoke 

drifted across the far shore, indicating that the 

pneumatic boats had received the order to move 

across the river. When the far shore was secure, the 

814th Engineer Company began building rafts near 

the centerline. The 74th Engineer Company and 

the 2d Platoon, 586th Engineer Company, built 

rafts 3 kilometers upstream at the alternate site. 

Additional hays from the 74th were airlifted from 

Arrowhead Droo Zone to the centerline bv C\158th 

Aviation Company. 

Rafts soon moved armored vehicles across the 

river and reinforced the far shore. At the same 

time, progress was slow on the bridge being constructed 300 meters downstream because of congestion at the centerline. Bays were rafted and 

launched in a jetty about 100 meters wide and 300 

meters long. When rafts were being loaded, bridge 

launching ceased; when the rafting phase ended, 

the pace of hridge construction increased. 

Three hours after construction began, the 

Arkansas River was bridged and the crossing site 

engineers requested traffic from the call forward 

area. Although the river was spanned with every 

available bay, vehicles had to travel through 

approximately 30 meters of shallow water before 

they could drive up the ramp bay. Within an hour, 

all traffic had crossed. The only actions that 

remained were to retrieve the bridge and identify 

the lessons learned. 

Lessons Learned 

Several lessons were learned and relearned 

during this exercise. 

H Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is key 

to conducting successful river crossings. The 

crossing force engineer relied heavily on support from two nontraditional sources--civilians in the Corps of Engineers and the diving 

detachment. Without the forecast and hydrographic surveys indicating that the site would 

be crossable on 18 July, a limited exercise 

probably would have been conducted on Engineer Lake instead of on the Arkansas River. 

December 1995 
battalions are in the reserves, and 

bridging companies are split between Active and Reserve Components. Units must develop training relationships because there 

are few opportunities to train in 

the organization in which they 

will fight. 

A broad secure front is required. 

When too much activity was conducted around one centerline, 

operations were severely impacted and construction times 

doubled. There is a trade-off 

when working in training areas 

with limited resources. 

Rehearse, rehearse, rehearse. 

Even with the constrained working area, the bridging process 

would have been smoother if a 

full rehearsal had been conducted. Some problems identified during the bridging exercise 

could have been identified and 

resolved in a full rehearsal. 

Engineers will rise to any challenge 

that confronts them. Even though the 

units had not trained together before the 

exercise, as soon as they hit the ground 

they became a team. As usual, active 

and reserve units at all levels integrated readily to complete the misison. 

Concerns 

0peration Chosin Action was 

successful, but several concerns 

still exist. Engineers must know who 

is responsible for planning riverI crossing operations. Corps engineers 

- - demonstrated in this exercise that 

Although the river was spanned with every available bay, vehicles they possess the capability. But are 

had to travel through approximately 30 meters of shallow water divisions adequately concerned about 

before they could drive up the ramp bay. river crossing? Since they have lost 

Automation speeds the planning process 

through use of spread sheets and Terrabase. 

Software needs to be standardized and 

shared. 

Close coordination is required at all levels of 

the operation. The 353rd Engineer Group and 

the 489th Engineer Battalion have a peacetime command relationship but still had difficulties meshing the brigade plan into the 

division plan. Most corps engineer groups and 

their bridging assets, do they even 

consider it a mission? Are there enough bridging 

assets in the inventory? Half of the bridging assets 

in CONUS were at Fort Chaffee, but there was 

barely enough bridge to cross a task force. These 

questions must be answered to ensure that we can 

fight and win on today's battlefields. Y 

Major James K.Rupp is the S3 of the 353rd Engineer Group. He holds a bachelor of science degree in 

mechanical engineering fromthe Uniuersity of Wisconsin and is a registered professional engineer. 

8 Engineer December 1995 
The Multirole Bridge Company: 

An Update 

By Alan Schlie 

Military history is replete with defeats (and 

victories) of armies backed against 

uncrossable chasms. And many heroes were 

made in assaults across those same chasms, into 

the face of a defending army. The crossing of 

chasms is a mission of U.S.Army engineers. 

General George Washington escaped defeat 

and certain annihilation on Long Island in 

August 1776by using soldiers from Colonel John 

Glover's 14th Continental Regiment as 

pontoniers to ferry 10,000soldiers across the 

East River to Manhattan and safety. On Christmas Eve and again on New Year's Eve, Washington's soldiers and cannons were ferried across 

the Delaware River to surprise the Hessian garrison at Trenton. The pontoniers participated in 

both ground attacks before taking the prisoners 

and the victors back to Pennsylvania. Ever since, 

the Army's specialized river-crossingunits and 

equipment have belonged to the pontoniers-the 

engineers. 

Except for brief experiments with "India rubber" during the Civil War, bridging equipment 

for the horse-poweredArmy remained unchanged until the beginning of World War 11. 

The introduction of tanks to the battlefield and 

the advent of armored tactics were the impetus 

for changing the pontoniers' equipment. The 

full-fledgedmechanization of the Army created a 

need for bridging equipment to support increasingly heavy combat systems. 

Factors for Change 

Revisions to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), changes in training, and 

refinements to organizational structure always 

follow the introduction of new equipment. But 

recently other factors have affected WPs, training, and organization: 

m Restructuring the heavy division's engineering support moved all the bridging assets to 

corps level. 

The collapse of the 1rnn.Curtain changed the 

Army's focus from a single threat to multiple 

threats. 

The use of military units in contingency operations. 

Force structure planning based on the 

premise of a power-projectionArmy capable 

of fighting two nearly simultaneous regional 

contlicts. 

Reductions in forward-deployedforces. 

Budgetary constraints that forced installation closures and the costly movement of 

stockpiled supplies. 

Consolidations that result when fewer 

December 1995 Engineer9 
soldiers are left in military occupation specialties and the impact that teaching more 

skills has on available training time. 

Efficiencies are gained by consolidating units 

with similar missions. When that assumption is 

coupled with the factors listed above, the decision to merge existing, single-rolebridge units 

into a multirole bridge company (MRBC) is 

understandable. An MRBC will be significantly 

more versatile and flexiblefrom both the operational and logistical perspectives than separate 

units. It will be trained and equipped to install 

or assemble all current and developmental U.S. 

Army system bridges. It will carry mixed sets of 

bridging as a '%basicload" and expend that bridge 

as it supports the maneuver or assaulting forces, 

being resupplied when and where necessary. 

The Plan 

The MRBC process action team examined the 

impacts of doctrine, training, leadership, 

organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) 

and concluded that a field evaluation was 

needed to "proof" the concept. The Test and 

Experimentation Command agreed to conduct 

the evaluation, and the 74th Engineer Company 

(AFB) from Fort Hood, Texas, volunteered to be 

the evaluated unit. The 586th Engineer Company from Fort Benning, Georgia, provided additional soldiers and equipment. The evaluation 

began on 20 July 1995,following the rivercrossing operation of the 353rd Engineer Group 

at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas (see page 2). 

Two 72-hour field training exercises provided 

opportunities to collect data to evaluate two 

issues: 

Can the MRBC headquarters effectively com, 

mand, control, and communicate while providing bridging support? 

Can the MRBC be sustained in a combat 

environment while conducting continuous 

and simultaneous operations? 

The evaluation mechanisms for issue one 

were the decisions made during operational 

planning and the information flow. The evaluation mechanism for issue two was the MRBC's 

operational readiness rate. 

familiar with its newly acquired medium girder 

bridge. The new MRBC then deployed to a field 

location where it received bridging missions 

through both field training exercises. The company, the platoons, and sometimes the sections 

received missions to construct bridges and rafts 

at sites scattered across Fort Chaffee. Missions 

were executed during the day and at night to 

simulate battlefield conditions and provide the 

unit with data to evaluate their competence. 

Some sites were inaccessiblebecause of flooding 

on the Arkansas River. That added realism complicated travel, bridging, eating, and sleeping 

schedules. 

The evaluation was strictly for purposes of the 

Concept Evaluation Program (CEP) rather than 

a unit Army Training and Evaluation Program, 

but that did not distract the bridge builders' 

focus or reduce their intensity. When soldiers 

were asked to perform, the results were always 

"mission accomplished!" The unit was overloaded with missions, but there was no other 

way to determine the MRBC's capability to control and support its elements. 

This concept evaluation substantiated the 

MRBC's ability to effectively command, control, 

and communicate while providing bridging support and to be sustained in a combat environment while conducting continuous and simultaneous operations. 

The Future 

The next step for the MRBC is to present this 

concept to a force development review panel 

at TRADOC to seek approval to create the new 

organization and implement it Armywide. The 

MRBC's multiple capability provides a synergistic impact on the mobility of the combined arms 

team. Each DTLOMS area will be positively 

enhanced through minor changes and will be 

firmly established when the next generation of 

bridging-the heavy dry support bridge and the 

improved ribbon bridge-is fielded. 

With the completion of this CEP, the evolution of Army bridging has taken a significant 

step forward by demonstrating how the pontonier of the future will support Force XXI. 

w 

The ~ ~- Evaluation ~ -... CSM (Ret) Schlie is a Force Deuelo~mentAnaT lyst with the Directorate of ~ombhtDeuelop- he 74th reorganized under a test table of ments, U.S. Army Engineer School. He has 

organization and equipment before the served in various capacities in Europe, Korea, 

evaluation and was allowed time to become and CONUS throughout his 22-year career. 

10 Engineer December 1995 
"Nature alone is often sufficient to foil a river crossing; if a 

crossing point is expertly defended, the slightest aggrauation 

of terrain becomes a weapon in 

the enemy's hands. ...By their 

very nature, river crossings 

demand the coordinated action 

of several arms and branches 

whose roles are critical to tactical success. Yet euen when fortune appears to fauor one's own 

side, the potential for disaster in 

this, as in all military operations, is neuer far away': 

Dr. Roger J. Spillar 

"Combined Arms in Battle Since 

1939" 

Why do maneuver forces 

infrequently train for 

r~ver-crossing operations? Part 

of the answer lies in the fad that 

many maneuver commanders 

and their staffs believe it is 

unlikely that the U.S. military 

will be forced to conduct a deliherate river crossing on the modern battlefield. In some respects 

they're correct, and we hope that 

the tempo of operations will not 

aUow an enemy time to prepare 

a defense on a river. 

This type of thinking is not 

new. After the Berlin Wall came 

down, maneuver commanders 

questioned whether we would 

ever have to conduct a deliberate 

breach again. But when Desert 

Storm and the possibility of a 

deliherate breach became a reality, the Army had to relearn 

combined arms breaching techniques. For that operation, we 

had time to train the force. 

River-crossing operations are 

more difficult to conduct than 

deliberate breaches, and the 

skills at all levels are harder to 

maintain. As key players, engineers must reinforce the imporDecember I995 

tance of training the combined engineer group commander. This 

arms team for river crossings legitimate concern is often exand remove some of the mystery pressed by the maneuver comin planning and executing this mander and his staff. 

important mission. The answer is that the division 

To demystify the terrain engineer has overall responsihilaround a river, we must portray i ity for planning the river crossing 

it in a way that is usable by the 1 and coordinates for corps engicombined arms team. We do this neer units to cross the force. The 

by providing a digital terrain pic- 1 division engineer begins planning 

ture for the Army Battle Com- 1 
 immediately after he receives a

mand System, requesting ter- warning order or when mission 

rain products and providing analysis determines the need to 

detailed analyses of these for cross a river. Through parallel 

mission planning and rehears- planning and pmviding input to 

als. As terrain experts, engineers the maneuver plan, the division 

play a critical role in the selection engineer helps eliminate delays 

of assault crossing sites, support- in the planning process at diviing overwatch positions, support- sion headquarters or in the engiby-fire positions, defilade routes, neer brigade. When the engineer 

and assembly areas. We ident* group commander and his staff 

terrain that will support the link up with the division engiemployment of situational ohsta- neer, initial and critical engineer 

cles on flanks or on likely enemy input already is incorporated in 

counter.attack routes. As river the maneuver plan. 

and terrain conditions change The two engineer staffs then 

due to weather or enemy action, develop a detailed crossing plan 

we must continuauy update our that supports the maneuvcr 

maneuver forces' map data. plan. Therefore, the relationThese requirements are not ship between the division engijust Force XXI initiatives. We neer and the engineer group 

have always provided this ad- commander in the planning provice, hut Force XXI initiatives cess is mutually supporting and 

will help us do it more quickly mission-oriented. The engineer 

and easily. The Engineer Offic- community must clarify these 

ers Advanced Course trains cap- relationships by educating comtains to analyze terrain and give manders .and staffs through 

timely advice for mission plan. officer professional development 

ning. We must demonstrate our and command post exercises. 

ability to portray terrain to the How does the engineer corps 

force so that commanders will demonstrate flexible command 

feel comfortable about conduct- and support relationships that 

ing this type of operation. take into account a fast-moving 

FM 90-13, Riuer-Crossing modern battlefield? RiverOperatiow, provides the doctri- crossing operations are an ideal 

maneuver nal basis for planning and con- opportunity to show 

ducting river crossings. How- commanders the advantages of 

ever, some confusion exists in massing engineers. Traditionthe engineer community about ally, the command and control 

the planning responsibility of the of engineer support for the 

division engineer and the corps (Continued on page 19) 

By Major Glenn Fenton 

Engineer 11 
Assessmen 

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 


By Michael W. Sayer 

This is the first in a series of 

three articles about the roles of 

NCOs in an engineer battalion 

of a heavy division. 

"Tell me what you know 

about EBA," said mi battalion 

commander. 

I was dumbfounded. "EBA? 

What does this refer to, sir?" I 

asked. 

"Engineer battlefield assessment," he replied. 

Thus began my introduction to a topic that was to 

drive my field duties for the 

next two years. 

When the 4th Engineer Battalion transitioned under the 

Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI) in 1992, I inherited 

a job that no other 12B30 I 

knew of had filled-the position of intelligence NCO. The 

ERI made critical personnel 

changes. Its modified table of 

organization and equipment 

(MTOE) eliminated the intelligence officedS2 position and 

replaced it with an engineer 

master sergeant (12250) position. Since master sergeants 

are usually in short supply in a 

battalion, I got the job. As part 

of my professional development, I read FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the 

Battlefield, but my knowledge 

was still cursory. The assignment opened my eyes and 

broadened my perspective 

considerably. 

At first glance, the EBA 

seems like nothing more than 

an engineer using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. But this 

reasoning misses the purpose 

of EBA, which is to complement and broaden the IPB process. Literally, EBA is an 

analysis by engineers that concentrates on the effects of terrain, weather, and the enemy 

on the battlefield. 

Terrain Analysis 

Terrain is the bedrock 

1on which all operations 

rest. Mobility, trafficability, 

vegetation, and terrain determine how difficult an operation 

will be. In addition to analyzing soil types and cross.country 

mobility, we must consider 

the effects of these factors 

on operations. When a brigade 

commander plans a defense 

in sector, he must use all of 

the terrain visualization tools 

available. Some of the tools 

currently used by the division 

terrain team are the MultiSpectral Imagery Processor 

(MSIP) and Terrabase. These 

software programs provide 

terrain visualization information that give users a feel for 

what the area of operation 

looks like. The division terrain 

team uses cross-country mobility and trafficability overlays, 

aerial photos, and satellite 

imagery. They also keep bridge 

reconnaissance information, 

assorted overlays, and 

1:25,000 scale maps. While terrain teams have access to various scale maps, selection of the 

proper scale depends on the 

mission, equipment, time, 

troops and terrain (METT-T). 

For example, in a mechanized 

brigade movement to contact, a 

1:25,000 map is of limited use, 

but in a light infantry raid, it is 

extremely valuable. 

Engineers look at all of 

these products to provide the 

maneuver S2 with a terrain 

analysis that is in greater 

depth than the restricted and 

severely restricted evaluation 

commonly performed. By using 

the parallel planning process 

shown in the figure on page 

13, we bring the battlefield 

operating system (BOS) 

12Engineer December 1995 
THE PARALLEL PLANNING PROCESS 

Engineer Battalion 

Prepare planlorder 

December I995 Engineer 13 
input to the war-gaming process and integrate it in the 

time-space-purpose analysis 

of all previously identified 

factors. 

If a unit is to defend in sector, soil composition is critical 

information. When the commander plans a defense using 

natural obstacles such as 

drainage or slopes, he needs to 

know about the surrounding 

terrain. Whether the soil is a 

silty clay or hard rock influences his choice of battle positions and whether he will fight 

dug in or above ground. 

Because the soil type directly 

affects engineer effort, it must 

be identified early in the planning process. Without such 

information, precious blade 

and platoon hours may be lost 

during the defensive preparation. An EBA terrain analysis 

depends on an immediate and 

accurate depiction of the terrain in the area of operations; 

additional analyses are required to complete the EBA. 

OCOKA 

The process of observation 

and fields of fire, cover 

and concealment, obstacles, 

key terrain, and avenues of 

approach (OCOKA) provides 

additional depth and breadth 

of information on the military 

aspects of terrain. A brief discussion of OCOKA follows; 

for more detail, refer to FM 

34-130. 

Observation and Fields of 

Fire. Observation is the ability to see either visually or 

through surveillance devices. 

Because cover and concealment 

limit direct observation, engineers (the brigade terrain 

experts) have assets that provide detailed horizontal line of 

sight -(LOS). Soldiers use LOS 

when they emplace surveil- I 

lance and communications 

assets, such as 6-36and Q-37 

radars and retransmission 

sites. When a commander is 

forced into a hasty defense, 

Terrabase provides LOS and 

visable area plots from selected 

locations that help him visualize terrain and engagement 

areas. LOS products also help 

emplace intercept units' baselines and locate laser designators. A field of fire is the area a 

weapon or a group of weapons 

may effectively cover from a 

given position. 

After engineers analyze the 

surrounding vegetation, elevation, and man-made objects, 

they make an overlay that 

delineates locations used to 

evaluate observation and 

fields of fire. They use the overlay to determine the effects of 

observation and fields of fire on 

the plan. 

Cover and Concealment. 

Cover is protection from fire; 

concealment is protection from 

observation. Engineers provide recommendations to the 

commander about defensible 

terrain, approach routes, and 

assembly areas. Adding cover 

and concealment information 

to that already plotted on the 

overlay increases its effectiveness in the planning process. 

Obstacles. Obstacles are 

natural or man-made terrain 

features that stop, impede, or 

divert military movement. 

They are the engineer's prime 

responsibility, and we must 

determine the effects of each 

obstacle on the force. Obstacle 

systems emplaced perpendicular to the line of march favor 

the defense and those emplaced parallel favor the 

attacker. Vegetation, surface 

drainage, surface materials, 

slopes and gradients, natural 

and man-made obstacles, transportation systems (such as 

oridges and roads that are classed as restricted due to 

:urves, slopes, or width), and 

the effects of weather are factors 

affecting obstacle effectiveness. 

Annotate the effects of these factors on the overlay to produce a 

mmbined obstacle overlay. 

Key Terrain. Key terrain 

provides a marked advantage 

to its holder, but decisive terrain is necessary to accomplish 

a mission. A hilltop overlooking 

the valley containing the objective is key terrain. The pass 

leading past the hill that is the 

only route to the objective is 

decisive terrain. Annotate 

these factors on the overlay. 

Auenues of Approach. 

Avenues of approach are determined from information plotted on the overlay. First, 

identify areas that canalize 

movement due to terrain constriction; these are mobility 

corridors. Then see if the corridors are wide enough to move 

tactical formations two eeheIons below your level. After 

identifying the corridors, categorize them by the size or type 

of force they will accommodate. 

When the mobility corridors 

are grouped, they form avenues 

of approach. These avenues 

must provide ease of movement 

and enough width to allow the 

force to pass. When this information is plotted, the result is 

the Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO). 

MCOO 

The benefits of an MCOO 

1become apparent when a 

planning process begins. Because it is produced before 

deployment or just after arrival 

in theater, the MCOO is immediately available for planning. 

December 1995 
With the MCOO, it is 

unnecessary to repeat the 

entire analysis pmcess each 

time a mission is received. 

It also allows a greater 

depth of analysis. 

Engineers analyze the 

areas of OCOKA, factor in 

the weather, and then 

determine their effects on 

friendly and enemy maneuver. By comparing the 

advantages and disadvantages of various plans, we 

can focus early in the process and provide a timely 

and accurate product for 

the fight. To be effective, 

engineers must thoroughly 

understand the enemy's 

capabilities. 

'or the engineer staff, this 

is the point where the 

intelligence NCO is critical. It 

is impossible to overstate the 

need to know everything about 

the enemy in general and 

enemy engineers in particular. 

The intelligence NCO has support from the S3, the XO, and 

the commander, but he must 

be the subject matter expert. 

He must work closely with the 

S2s from the engineer and the 

maneuver brigades and make 

accurate deductions from the 

available data. 

Specifically, the intelligence 

NCO must be able to state the 

mobilitylcountermobilityl 

survivability (MICMIS) capabilities of the enemy and incorporate them in the planning 

process. For example, if the 

intelligence NCO knows the 

enemy can breach six obstacles, he must emphasize that 

the friendly unit needs seven 

or more obstacles. If enemy 

doctrine calls for antitank 

ditches, the bridging assets 

must be in a forward position. 

The intelligence NCO is the 

threat engineer subject matter 

expert. To help in war gaming, 

he advises the assistant brigade engineer about the enemy 

impact on the operation and 

describes the most likely 

method of enemy engineer 

employment. As with all brigade intelligence products, he 

coordinates his input through 

the brigade S2. The intelligence NCO works with the targeting cell to identify highvalue targets as well as highpayoff targets. In the war 

game, he also identifies the 

high-payoff targets, explains 

their location and significance, 

and identifies M/CM/S-specific 

priority intelligence requirements. In the offense, he 

ensures that the templated 

obstacles are on the reconnaissance and surveillance plan 

and in the operations order. He 

also addresses the enemy's 

weaknesses and vulnerabilities 

to help determine how to overcome them. 

Given a solid understanding of the enemy and 

connections to the division's 

intelligence pipeline, the 

intelligence NCO will provide the following information about the enemy 

engineer order of battle. 

Identification. The intelligence NCO must know 

who the enemy is. He must 

determine if the enemy 

engineer unit is organic or 

attached from a different 

echelon. Is it regimental, 

divisional, or pushed down 

from corps? By going 

through intelligence reports, he can learn who we 

are facing, from echelons 

above corps through separate brigades and battalions. If operating in a semiarid, 

desert climate, sighting bridging units forward may be 

insignificant. However, if reports state that corps-level 

breaching assets are moving 

forward, this information may 

be important. 

Composition and Strength. 

This information is extremely 

valuable. For example, if the 

enemy MTOE calls for one 

dozer per battalion, units are 

unlikely to dig in. However, if 

the enemy has mine-laying 

equipment and ditching machines, the defense will be 

stronger and harder to overcome. The friendly order of battle is sigmficantly different 

when the enemy strength is at 

90 percent than when it is at 

50 percent. 

Disposition and Location. 

The enemy will try to use the 

terrain to his advantage to support his scheme of maneuver. 

By knowing the habitual type 

of support provided by an 

enemy engineer unit to its 

maneuver force, we can predict enemy engineer activity 

December 1995 Engineer 15 
gence pipeline becomes critical 

at this point. When spot re- I Friendly MlCMlS 

fairly accurately. With this 

knowledge, engineers can determine a probable scheme of 

maneuver and support. 

Recent and Known Activities. Being tied into the intelliports indicate enemy activity. I Ca~abilities 

plan. Given what we know of 

the enemy and our counteractions to his reactions, we can 

exploit weaknesses or vulnerabilities identified during the 

EBA process. 

such as breach rehearsals or 

routine maintenance, we can 

use that information to forecast upcoming actions. 

Capabilities. This is the 

meat of the intelligence NCO's 

responsibilities. The enemy's 

capabilities are fairly apparent when we know the 

unit's identification, composition, strength, disposition, location, and recent activities. By 

combining this information 

with his doctrine, we can 

answer the following questions: 

What support will enemy 

engineers provide to their 

reconnaissance? 

What are the enemy's 

mobility capabilities? 

What are the enemy's countermobility capabilities? 

Does he employ conventional obstacles, scatterable mines, andlor tactical 

and protective obstacles? 

What are the enemy's survivability capabilities? Does he 

rely on vehicle fighting 

positions or fortifications, 

trenches, and bunkers? 

Probable Courses of 

Action. After war gaming the 

enemy's possible courses of 

action, determine the most 

likely course of action of his 

engineer assets based on his 

MICWS capabilities. Identify 

when and where enemy M/CM/S 

assets are expected, specifying 

the timelspacelpurpose matrix 

on the battlefield. Then determine the effects of enemy 

actions on friendly forces and 

our maneuver or defensive 

The final part of the EBA 

process is to evaluate the 

friendly engineer mission and 

MICWS capabilities and their 

impacts on mission accomplishment. The 53and assistant brigade engineer provide most of 

the information, based on statistics taken from reports companies send to the battalion 

headquarters. 

EBA and the Maneuver 

Brigade 

The ERI battalion's working relationship with the 

maneuver brigade is sometimes hampered because of 

problems in three areas: 

m Personnel assignments. 

Execution, integration, and 

acceptance of the EBA 

process. 

Understanding of the EBA 

process. 

Personnel Assignments. 

Engineers often assign soldiers to the intelligence NCO 

position who have neither the 

training nor the experience 

needed for the job. Frequently, 

a soldier who is probably a 

superb leader and motivator is 

thrust into a position for which 

he is unprepared, causing a 

tremendous disservice to three 

elements. 

m The soldier, who cannot 

perform his assigned mission because the noncommissioned officer education system does not train 

12B NCOs for this difficult 

and demanding position. 

The battalion, which must 

spend considerable time 

bringing this soldier up to 

speed. Typically, NCOs go 

back to line units at the 

end of 12 to 18 months, 

before they have developed 

into effective team players. 

The brigade, which has a 

weak link in a critical battlefield operating system of 

the brigade combat team. 

There are solutions to these 

problems. The Battle Staff 

Course is helpful, but there are 

few allocations for engineer 

battalions. NCOs may rotate to 

the line before receiving this 

training. I recommend that 

this position be a two-year

1 assignment to give soldiers 

time to learn the job. Addition. 

ally, the position requires an 

expensive high-security clearance, which takes from six 

months to a year to complete; 

the cost cannot be justified for 

short-term assignments. I recommend that the 12B Advanced NCO Course be modified to provide time (40 hours 

minimum) to introduce NCOs 

to the requirements of this 

position. The additional training time will allow prospective 

intelligence NCOs to become 

knowledgeable about this noutraditional 12Bjob. 

Execution, Integration, 

and Acceptance. Brigade S2 

sections often do not understand how the EBA process 

supports the total IPB process. 

Some S2 personnel think that 

engineers are only trying to 

add another product to the 

orders process. Since intelligence NCOs are not from the 

military intelligence field, they 

must prove themselves and the 

value of their product to the S2 

section. Time will solve this 

problem. 

(Continued on page 49) 

I6 Engineer December 1995 
CMF 12 Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course 

Program of Instruction 

By Sergeant First Class John Hurley 

and Sergeant First Class Steven Eberharter 

During the past two years, the National 

Training Center analyzed the present and 

future training needs of NCOs to determine their 

battlefield requirements, responsibilities, and 

duties. From this analysis, the Combat Training 

Centers and the Center for Army Lessons 

Learned concluded thatH NCOs have the technical skills required to 

perform missions tasked. 

H NCOs lack the tactical skills required to 

perform missions tasked. 

H The NCO's role on the battlefield is not 

clearly defined in doctrine or in the units. 

H Future doctrine must include NCOs as tactical assets on the battlefield. 

H The NCO's knowledge must complement the 

officer's knowledge to build a more cohesive 

team. 

Shortcomings in the NCO's ability to accomplish battle tasks relate directly to the lack of 

institutional and unit training required for those 

tasks. TRADOC Regulation 351-10, Guidelines 

for the Deoelopment of Enlisted Training, states 

that the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers 

Course (ANCOC) and the Officers Basic Course 

should integrate training of common level 

tasks. The tasks should be those that both 

NCOs and officers must perform. 

The U.S. Army Engineer School established a 

new, interim program of instruction (POI) based 

on conclusions &om the two-year analysis and 

the requirements of TRADOC Regulation 

351-10. In addition to the integrated tasks mentioned above, this POI includes common leader 

training required by the U.S. Army Sergeants 

Major Academy and technical training required 

by the Engineer School. The interim POI will be 

tested and validated during the FY96 course 

period. 

So that future ANCOC students and their 

supervisiors can become familiar with requirements of the new course of instruction, the NCO 

Academy developed Student Advance Sheets and 

sent them to all commands. They addressed the 

following lessons: 

H Provide Engineer Support to Army Operations 

H Plans and Orders 

H Breach an Obstacle 

H Conduct Engineer Tactical Planning 

H Task Force Engineer Responsibilities and 

Duties 

Determine Engineer Capabilities 

H Provide Engineer Support to Offensive 

Operations 

H Conduct Offensive Operations Practical Exercise 

H Conduct Offensive Operations TEWT 

H Provide Engineer Support to Defensive 

Operations 

H Determine Tactical Obstacle Requirements 

Conduct Defensive Operations Practical 

Exercise 

H Conduct a Defensive Operations TEWT 

H Conduct Offensive Operations 

H Conduct Defensive Operations 

m Obtain Combat Service Support 

H Determine Division Organization 

H Conduct River-Crossing Operations 

Battalion command sergeants major and 

senior NCOs must ensure that scheduled 

ANCOC students within their command are 

aware of the new POI and have copies of the 

Student Advance Sheets. When trained to standards in the new POI, the NCO's tactical skills 

will become a critical asset on the battlefield. 

Y 

Sergeant First Class John Hurley is the chfcf 

of training at Libby NCO Academy at Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri. He may be reached at 

(314) 596-6942or DSN 581-6942. 

Sergeant First Class Steuen Eberharter, the 

Project Warrior NCO, is an instructor for the 

Engineer Officers Basic Course at Fort laonurd 

Wood, Missouri. He may be reached at (314) 563-

5581 or DSN 676-5581. 

December 1995 Engineer 17 
Personal Viewpoint 

Tiered Readiness and Resident Schooling 

in the Reserve Components 

By Brigadier General Thomas Whitecotton 

reserves, CFP units have priority for 

personnel. They are authorized to be 

at 100 percent (or more) of TOE 

smngth, have priority for rec~iting, 

and maintain 100 percent of their fulltime unit suppon (FIXIS) personnel. 

Most importantly, CFP units have priority for attendanceat military schools, 

including CAS3. A proposal under discussion is to modify the Army Training 

Requirements Resourcing System 

(ATRRS) to ensure that quotas for 

needed courses are given first to soldiers in CFP units. 

Tiered readiness works! In my CFP 

units, funds are dishibuted according 

to the model, with expanded FTUS 

supportand increased OPTEMTO. The 

additional training time and operation 

readiness evaluation (ORE) preparation in these units results in their 

increased readiness. 

As units are arrayed in priority from 

CFP I through enhanced brigades to 

CFP I1 units, maneuver brigades. and 

divisions, and then to "all other units:' 

resources for units not in the upper 

echelons are cut severely. The "all 

other unit" status means they have low 

FADS,50 percent WS support, an 85 

percent ceiling of TOE fill, 60 percent 

OREMTO, and no priority for schooling. With fixed or declining budgets, 

the cuts become more serious. 

While the tiered readiness system is 

emerging, there is also turbulence in ' 

the force structure, constant change in 

TPFDLs, and declining balances in 

school and training accounts. Large 

deployments and training exercises, 

such as Reforgerand Team Spirit, have 

been severly cut. School accounts 

today have less than onethird of the 

funding they had just two years ago. 

Man-day expenditures to supportoverseas deployment training have been 

drastically reduced in RC units. 

rv"any Army combat engineer 

L - L leaders are concerned about 

the large number of Reserve Component (RC) senior captains who have 

not completed the Combined Arms 

Service Support School,(CAS3). Lack 

of this schooling may eliminate some 

fine soldiers from competing for promotion. The problem stems primarily 

from three roots: 

The recently implemented criteria 

CAS~for promotion to 

major. For the RC, this criteria took 

effect in October 1994.

.The dwindling combat support 

force structure, which causes some 

R~ engineer units to con~nually 

deploy and redeploy while other 

units do not deploy. 

H The zealous attitude of some dedicated captains, who have consistently performed missions beyond 

the point of reasonable personal 

sacrifice. Many captains delayed 

going to CAS3 in favor of numerous deployments; now their promotions or cmers are in jeopardy. 

We can solve this problem by 

applying resources at the right time 

and place and by putting mechanisms 

in place to ensure that our best and 

brightest captains survive the ongoing 

Army force structure downsizing. The 

following discussion is based on my 

experience an RC commander. but 

I'm aware that similar problems are 

emerging in Active Component units. 

Hackjirtrr~ntl. 

n the force structure of the U.S. 

-:? Army, units are an'ayed according 

to their relative priority as reflected in 

the war plans of the Commanders in 

Chief. Ultimately units appear in the 

Forces Command time-phased force 

deployment list (TPFDL). Force activ18 Engineer December I995 

ity designators (FADS) assign each 

unit a numerical priority for resources, 

including schooling. 

In the past, the relative priority for 

individual schooling was a distinction 

without a difference. Adequate maining dollars ensured that officers and 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 

attended both basic and advanced 

courses. Professional development for 

officers continues with either resident 

or corresponding studies options for 

CAS3 and the Command and General 

Staff College (CGSC). Next is the 

War (AWC), which is 

very selective, with attendance based 

on the "best qualified with most potential for advancement" criteria That 

distinction separatesthe AWC from the 

mass-production environment of preliminary military schools. Today, the 

selection criteria for CGSC appears to 

be approaching that of the AWC. 

The best-qualified selection criteria 

for AWC and CGSC may become the 

standard for attendance at other Army 

officer and NCO courses. Attendance 

qualifiers may be needed because of 

large reductions in school resource 

accounts. such funding cuts cause 

readiness '%ieringmby separating ,,,,its 

into several categories based 

on their T~~~~ priority. 

Tiercd Ttc.:~dini!sr Tiered readiness is the concept 

- . some in the table of organization 

and equipment (TOE) Army call the 

"have" and the "have not" units. Contingency Force Pool (CFP) (soon to be 

Force Support Package) units are 

"haves." They deploy early and are 

required to maintain the forcestructure 

needed to fight two simultaneous 

major regional contingencies. These 

units are funded at 100percent of optimum tempo (OPTEMPO). In the 
Impacts on Schooling 

T wo years after record levels of 

pardcipation in aaining exercises, RC units now participate in the 

minimum training opportunity required (i.e., authorized inactive duty 

training and a 15-day annual training 

(AT) period). The extra AT periods and 

man-days used to send people to resident schools are rapidly evaporating. 

There is bitter irony: Our collective 

training OPTEMPO has declined, 

allowing soldiers to attend required 

courses, but we now lack sufficient 

training funds to meet course demands. 

The Fix Army leaders must commit time 

and dollars now for ow hanicharging captains to attend CAS3 so 

they remain competitive for promotion to major. The care factor is recipmal. We must accommodate those 

who did double duty to deploy, took 

the risks,completed the missions, and 

redeployed year after year. Without 

additional paid man-days, officers 

must attend CAS3 on their own time. 

As we adapt to declining smcture 

and resources, other challenges will 

limit the number of RC soldiersattending schools. The select, aain,promote, 

and assign (STPA) system provides 

"order of merit" liits for officers and 

NCOs. The STPA concept uses these 

lists to invest schooling dollars only 

where the potential for success is high. 

This concept introduces competition 

for available school quotas in a system 

where no competition existed before. 

Tips for Commanders and Caploins. The following suggestions may 

help RC units allocate their shrinking 

training resources: 

Throughly review the order-of- merit 

liits, ensure their accuracy, and use 

them to prioritize individual training requirements. 

w Pressure captains to complete 

CAS3. Fort Leavenworth has 

increased the capacity of CAS3 

courses to accommodate expected 

student loads. The U.S. Army 

Reserve Force school system has 

scheduled extra CAS3 sessions in 

FY 96; they are soliciting students. 

December 1995 

Ensure that each officer has consulted his or her mentor and has 

developed a plan to complete 

required military courses. 

Znstilutional Training Challenge. 

The Army's Training and Docmine 

Command (TRADOC) needs to 

explore alternatives to the current RC 

CAS3 course format. RC officers interrupt their civilian careers to attend both 

the Engineer Officer Basic and the 

Advanced Courses (EOBC and 

EOAC). Now they must take additional 

time off for CAS3 and CGSC. It is 

increasingly dicult for RC officers to 

remain employed, serve in the ready 

reserve, and attend required courses in 

the formats that worked 20 or 30 years 

ago. TRADOC must adapt school formats to the needs of today's customers. 

A few ideas areIntegrate EOAC and CAS3 at the 

branch school and teach CAS3 as a 

follow-on to EOAC. 

Export CAS3 as interactive CD 

ROM. 

w Drop the CAS3 requirement Before CAS3, senior National Guard 

captains were expected to enroll in 

CGSC and complete the course 

under mentoring by experienced 

staff officers at their engineer battalion, group, or brigade while they 

served in a staff assignment through 

the rank of major. Perhaps it is time 

to reinstate that concept. 

There is a price to pay for achieving 

enhanced readiness for CFP units at 

the expense of the rest of the force. 

Our captains are paying that price now 

in schooling. It may be heroic to say 

that all units can maintain their current 

readiiess requirements under severe 

resource restraints, but practically we 

know that tiered readiiess will cause 

degradation in many units unless we 

take action! Y 

BG Whitecotton is Brigade Commander, HHC, 35th Engineer Brigade (Corps). Missouri National 

Guard. He has served in numerous 

assignments in both the Active and 

Reserve Components, including Korea 

and combat duty in Vietnam. 

(Continued from page II) 

maneuver fight was separate 

from the support force mission. 

As we move toward Force XXI, 

the ability of the engineer commander and his staff in the engineer brigade headquarters to 

command and control additional 

assets will improve significantly. 

In this scenario, the engineer 

brigade could conceivably command and control two or three 

corps engineer battalions with 

multirole bridge companies to 

cross the division and still support the maneuver fight. The 

concept of massing engineers on 

the battlefield is discussed often 

at the U.S. Army Engineer 

School, hut we must demonstrate this ability to our maneuver brethren. One solution is for 

engineer participants in the 

Command and General Staff 

College exercise, Prairie Warrior '96, to mass engineers under 

the engineer brigade when they 

conduct river-crossing operations for the Mobile Strike Force. 

Maneuver commanders will he 

interested in river crossings if 

engineers demonstrate that we 

can portray terrain accurately, 

that we understand our doctrine, 

and that we can tailor our flexible command and support relationships for specific missions. 

Advanced Course graduates are 

better trained in terrain visualization now than ever before. We 

must use them to demonstrate 

these capabilities. Let's keep education, doctrine, and debate on 

river crossings alive! Y 

Major Fenton, the Australian 

exchange officer at the Engineer 

School, is chief of the Engineer 

Officer Advanced Course Division in the Department of Tactics, Leadership, and Engineering. Previous assignments 

include a two.year exchange with 

the 65th Engineer Battalion, 

25th Infantry Division (Light), 

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. 

Engineer 19 
By Sergeant First Class Timothy Dillard and 

Master Sergeant Peter Sweneon 

Enemy sabotage andartillery deny the use of strategic 

ports. Harbors arejammed with sunken ships and downed 

aircraft. Underwater obstacles block advancingforces at 

riuer-crossing sites. Resupply effortsand mobility are 

halted. Rapid obstacle reduction and harbor clearance are 

uital, but who is trained, equipped, and available to 

quickly respond to support these critical engineer underwater missions? US.Army engineer divers! - "Be allyou can he" is a slogan that has enticed many 

young soldiers into the U.S. Army. Behind this oftenrepeated phrase is an important question that anyone 

seeking a challenge or a change must ask. "What am I 

capable of accomplishing ifI apply myself?" No one will 

Missions 

Engineer divers support allspecializedunderwater 

missions in communication and combat zones. In May 

1995,the Engineer School'sDirectorate of Combat Developments prepared an Executive Summary U.S. Army 

Concept for Engineer Diuing Forces that describes these 

missions. 

CommunicatwnZones. Divers provide sustainment 

engineering support in communication zones: 

H Furnish cornhat swimmer, scuba, and surface-supplied diving assets to commanders in ports, harbors, 

and coastal zones. 

H Construct port and logistics-over-the-shorestructures, facilities, and floating harriers. 

H Repair damaged piers, docks, wharfs, seawalls, and 

-.. . breakwaters.

take you by the hand id set goals for you. That is an Clear and mark navigational waterways. individual responsibility. The only way to find the answer .Collect underwater terrain and structure data, is to seize opportunities that present themselves. Becoming an Army engineer diver is one such opportunity. H Remove underwater obstructions. 

H Reduce and emplace underwater obstacles, mines, The Army is looking for highly motivated soldiers to and demolitions. volunteer for engineer diver training, Military Occupational Specialty NOS) OOB.Though divers have been a 

H Recover soldiers and materials. 

within the for many years, the MOS is not H Install and maintain mooring systems and off-shore 

well-known.This article answers some common questions petroleum and water-distribution systems. 

about the diving field and what it takes to apply. H Repair Army lighterage and vessels. 

20 Engineer December 1995 
-

A diving crew aboard an LCU 1542 Malados diving platform in Pohang, Korea, perform maintenance on 

the ship's mooring system. 

w Protect land forces, vessels, and underwater stmc- Army engineer divers are the only diving teams in the 

tures from underwater threats. Department of Defense that are trained and equipped to 

Reduce the probability of damage to underwater 

structures. 

Engineer divers proved their imprtance during Operations Desert ShieldfDesert Storm. Except for one lightweight diving team in Panama, all active duty engineer 

diving units directly supported the conflict. They logged 

more than 1,000hours of bottom time in five ports 

throughout SaudiArabia and Kuwait. Other recent overseas missions include operations in Somalia and Haiti and 

harbor clearance in the hurricane-stricken Caribbean 

islands. 

Combat Zones. Engineer divers provide support to 

maneuver units during river.crossing operations in forward combat zones: 

w Cross wet-gap obstacles while minimizing losses. 

Perform bottom and bank approach surveys of 

proposed river-crossing sites. 

w Locate, mark, and neutralize underwater obstacles 

using mechanical or underwater explosive 

methods. 

Assess bridge damage. 

w Make in-water repairs to bridges, dams, pipelines, 

canals, and levees. 

w Construct underwater bridge structures, obstacles, 

and floating bamers. 

w Search for and recover water casualties and 

equipment. 

w Clear and mark inland navigational waterways. 

w Place underwater explosives on bridge supports 

to deny enemy use during retrograde operations. 

- - -

accomplish these missions. The Commander in Chiefs 

reply to the 1992Army Engineer School evaluation of 

Army diving and the performance of lightweight diving 

teams in Operations Desert ShieldlDesert Storm and 

Operation Restore Hope conh that these tasks are 

essential. 

Professionalism 

Within the engineer diving community, hard work 

and the desire to excel are the rule rather than the 

exception. Soldiers in the Army diving field are among 

the most professional in the military. Those who earn 

and wear the diver's badge understand and accept the 

responsibility that another person's life may depend 

on their ability to perform their job, not only in the 

stress of combat but on a daily basis during routine 

operations. Divers earn a paycheck by placing underwater explosives to flatten a suxiken vessel that is 

obstructing ship traffic and by crawling inside the 

wreckage of a downed aircraft at depths of 190 feet, in 

total darkness, to recover equipment or casualties. 

These tasks require confidence in yourself, your team, 

and your equipment. Mutual trust and respect are the 

basis for the strong sense of camaraderie and esprit de 

corps that exist in all diving detachments. 

Entry Requirements 

AR 611-75,Management ofArmy Divers, lists entry 

requirements for MOS OOB and contains the Engineer 

Diver Applicatwn (DA Form 5030-R).The specialty is 

open to all soldiers, regardless of MOS or gender, who 

meet the requirements listed in the table on page 22. 

December 1995 Engineer 21 
Engineer Diver Requirements 

Entry Requirements 

. Be between 18and 30 years old. 

- Be in the grade of private through specialist wRh less 

than one year time in grade (engineerofficers, second 

lieutenant or first lieutenant). 

. Be in a nonpromotable status when reporting for diving 

dutv. 

Score 100 or higner on the general mechanical test ol 

tne Armed Serv~cesVocational A~titudeBatterv 

(ASVAB). 

. Score 110 or higher on the general technical or skilled 

technical test of the ASVAB. 

. Have no conviction of illegal substance abuse. 

. Have a physical profile of 111111. 

. Undergo a diver medical examination and meet the 

medical fitness standards prescribed in AR 40-501 and 

AR 600-9. 

Attain a minimum score of 240 (minimum of 80 points 

per event) on the Army Physical Fitness Test. 

Pass the Diver Physical FanessTest in the following 

sequence: 

-Swim 500 yards in 14minutes or less, using the side 

stroke andlor breast stroke. Rest 10 minutes. 

-Perform 42 continuous push-ups in 2 minutes or less. 

Rest 2 minutes. 

-Perform 50continuous sit-ups in 2 minutes or less. Rest 

2 minutes. 

-Perform 6 continuouspull-upswRh the palmsfacing 

away from the body. Rest 10minutes. 

-Run 1 1R miles in 12 minutes 45 seconds or less. 

Application Forms 

. DA Form 4187, Request for PersonnelAction, indicating your desire to reclassify as an MOS OOB, Engineer 

Diver. 

. DA Forms 2A and 2-1, Personnel Qualification Record 

Parts I and II. 

DA Form 5030-R, Engineer Diver Paining Application, 

signed by the commander. 

. DA Form 705, Army Physical Fitness Test Scorecad. 

SF 88 and 93, Reports of Medical Examination and 

History, (originals). 

. Bonus, Extension,and Reenlistment Program application, if applicable. 

Application Packet 

Application packets vary slightly but usually include 

the forms listed in the table above. Waivers may be considered for some vision or hearing requirements and for 

up to two years time in grade as a specialist. 

The Surgeon General's ofice has changed the reviewing procedures for physicals. DA Form 5030-R,Part I, 

Submission ofApplications,has a new "TO"address: Aviation Medical Consultant to the Surgeon General, U.S. 

Army Safety Center, Building 4905,5th Avenue, Fort 

Rucker,Alabama 36362-5363. Send the entire application package to this address by registered mail. Include a 

memorandum requesting that the packet be forwarded, 

upon approval, to the appropriate Personnel Command 

department listed on DA Form 5030-R. Keep a copy of the 

application for your files. 

Prequalification Course 

Candidates accepted into the diving program receive 

orders to report to the U.S Army Diving Detachment 

(Provisional),Fort Eustis, Virginia, to attend the 10-day 

Diver Preq~~cation Course. It is both physically and 

mentally demanding, which allows the instructors to 

evaluate the candidate's ability to meet the physical, 

mental, and academic challenges presented during second class diver training. 

The cumculum includes instruction in underwater 

physics, physiology, diving medicine, and dive charting. 

Instruction of academic material starts at a beginner 

level with the assumption that the candidate has never 

seen the material before. Comprehension and retention 

are tested by a written examination. 

Candidates must demonstrate their level of fitness dwing extensivephysical training and by their performance 

on the Army and the Diver Physical Fitness Tests. Physical training, conducted twice daily, emphasizes pool 

training (swimming and treading water), running, pullups, push-ups, flutter kicks, leg spreaders, and abdominal exercises. When reporting to the PrequaliGcation 

Course, it is wise to be in excellent physical condition, 

well above the minimum entry-level requirements. 

Candidates must perform an indoctrination dive using 

surface-supplied(hardhat) diving equipment. A presswetolerance test is administered to determine if they can 

adjust to ambient pressure changes. Individuals who cannot adjust are rare. Successful completion of the Prequalification Courseis required to attend the second class diver 

training. 

Second Class Diver 

Course 

This20-week course is conducted at the Naval Diving 

and SalvageTraining Center in Panama City, Florida. 

Students receive instruction in diving physiology, medicine, and physics; the operation and maintenance of 

scuba, surface-supplieddiving systems, and recompression chambers; underwater demolitions,cutting and 

welding, hydraulic tools,and photography; and marlinespike seamanship, rigging, and basic salvage. 

22 Engineer December 1995 
Graduates receive the MOS OOB and the 

second class diver's badge and hecome eligible for hazardous duty incentive pay. The 

diving school teaches confidence in the equipment and how to use that equipment to reach 

the work site. From the first assignment, an 

engineer diver learns to be productive in the 

water and to gain the experience needed to 

progress as a diver. 

Levels of Expertise 

Four levels of Army diving expertise are recognized by the award of diver rating badges: 

second class diver, salvage diver, first class 

diver, and master diver. As a diver advances in 

rank, he must advance in rating or he reclassified out of the field. 

Second Class Diver. To receive this rating, a candidate must meet entry prerequisites 

and successfully complete the PrequaMcation 

Course and the Second Class Diver Course. 

Salvage Diver. A diver must have performed satisfactorily as a second class diver for 

at least 18 months, be a specialist in a promot- Q able status or a sergeant assigned to a salvage 

diver position, be to perform as a salvage Soldiers receive scuba training at the Naval Diving and Salvage 

diver, be recommended by a master diver, and Training Center, Panama City. Florida. 

have passed the Underwater Const~ction 

Technician Basic Course to receive this rating. 

First Clm Diver. A candidate for this rating must 

have performed satisfactorily as a salvage diver for at 

least 3 years, he a sergeant who has attained promotion 

status or who becomes a staff sergeant while assigned to 

a first class diver position, be able to perform as a first 

class diver, be recommended by a master diver, and have 

passed the Basic Noncommissioned O5cer Course and 

the First Class Diver Course. 

Master Diver. To receive this rating, a diver must 

have performed satisfactorily as a fmt class diver for at 

least 3 years; be a staff sergeant who has attained promotion status or a sergeant first class; have passed the 

Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, the Underwater Construction Technician Advanced Course, and the 

Army Master Diver Certification Course. 

"Be All You Can Be" 

The limited assignment locations (Fort Eustis, Vir-


ginia, and Fort ShaRer, Hawaii) and small number of 


-engineer divers (appmximately 90) create an environment 

where individual strengths and weaknesses are wellknown and which encourages teamwork to overcome 

these weaknesses and build on strengths. The success of 

every mission directly depends on each soldier's contribution to the team-from the newest second class diver to the 

most senior master diver. The nature of the profession 

and the pride in being part ofthe Army diving community 

provide a strong incentive to 'Be all you can he" and 

inspire supenisors and subrdinates to perform to the 

best of their abilities. 

The Army Engineer Diving Program gives quaMed 

applicants the opportunity, training, and support necessary for success. The desire and determination must be 

yours. Carpe diem! 

Sergeant First Class Timothy Dillard, a master 

diver, is a senior training developer at the Engineer 

School. He was previously assigned to the 502d 

Engineer Diving Detachment, Korea; the U.S. Army 

Diving Detachment, Fort Eustis, Virginia; and the 

Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center, Panama 

City, Florida. 

Master Sergeant Peter Swenson is the senior 

coordinator for the 51 series career management field 

at the Engineer School. He previously served with 

the 34th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy), Fort 

Rile.7, Kansas; the 84th En~ineer Battalion (Combat 

~eavy),Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and the 802d 

Engineer Battalion, Korea. Master Sergeant 

Swenson is agraduate of the U.S. Army Sergeants 

Major Academy. Y 

Soldiers interested in learning more about the Prequalificatinn Course and the Naval Divingand Salvage Training Center mn call the U.S. Army Diving Detachment, 

Fort Errstis, Virginia, at DSN 927-5658/5780 or commercial (804)- 878-5658/5780; or Sergeant First Class Timothy Dillard at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. DSN 676- 

7611 /7502 or commercial (314) 563-4125. 

December I995 Engineer 23 
NCO Proficiency: Bridge Demolition 


By Sergeant First Class Gary D. Glover 

An item in the August 1995 issue of Engineer @age 64) notes that the Career Management Field 12 Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) at Fort Leonard Wood will no longer instruct bridge 

demolition in depth because that instruction is provided in the Basic NCO Course (BNCOC). 

Incoming ANCOC students are expected to be proficient in bridge demolition. Since records indicate 

that fewer than 3 percent of ANCOC students arrive with this knowledge, this article will address the 

knowledge gap. An article by Major Davis in the February 1993 issue of Engineer describes the 

history and basic concepts of the Sheffield bridge demolition method. 

Bridge demolition is outlined in FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions, Chapter 4, Appendix A, 

pages A-10 through A-14 and Appendix H. Although the following discussion refers to FM 5-250, 

some entries in the manual are incorrect and do not correspond to the answers provided below. 

Determine Bridge Category. This is the first step in determining the proper attack method and 

number of cuts needed to demolish a bridge. The flow charts on page 4-10 of FM 5-250 (for simply 

supported bridges) and page 4-15 (for continuous bridges) assist in selecting the appropriate attack 

method Gom those described in Appendix H. Read Chapter 4 thoroughly to understand the various 

bridge types and how to identify them. A simply supported concrete T-beam deck bridge with bottom 

support is used in the following examples. 

Determine and Verify the Proper Attack Method. Using Appendix H, Table H-3, page H-3, you 

must fist categorize the bridge to determine the appropriate attack method. Given a concrete T-beam 

deck bridge with bottom support, turn to page H-6. Serial 20 tells us that a top attack can be 

performed. Table H-3 also stipulates that "E is less than ER." As explained in Chapter 4, page 4-14, 

this note applies only to bottom attacks. End clearance (E) is a determining factor for bottom attacks 

but does not apply for top attacks. 

Top Attack 

A top attack, the quickest method of bridge demolition, is outlined on page A-13. This method 

should be used on all preliminary targets and when a bottom attack is not feasible. To perform a top 

attack, complete the following steps: 

First, determine the amount of concrete that must be removed to create a successful hinge, using 

the bridge measurements on page A-10 and information on Table H-2, page H-2. 

Note: For arch and pinned footed bridges, use Table 4-1,page 4-20, instead of Table H-2. 

Determine the height-to-length ratio (HL).The height of the bridge is determined by measuring 

the distance Gom the bottom of the beam to the top of the roadway. In this case H = 1.2 meters (m). 

The length (L)is the total length of the span. In this case L = 30 m. Divide the height of the bridge by 

the length of the span as shown: 

Second, determine the average length of the bearing support (Ls). Add the lengths of the near- and 

far-shore bearing supports and divide the total by 2, as shown on page 4-13. For this example, use the 

measurements on page A-10: 

Next, determine the Ls-to-L ratio, using the formula of LslL: 

24 Engineer December 1995 
Apply the values of WL and LsL to Table H-2 to determine the length-of-cut-to-length ratio (Len). 

Read Note 3 before applying the values to the table. In this example, both the WL and the LsL values 

are on the chart exactly. The Lenvalue is the point where these values intersect. In this case LcR,= 

0.029. 

Last, focus on the last sentence of Note 3. Multiply 0.029 (Len) by 30 (L)to determine the actual 

length of cut D). 

Bottom Attack 

Sometimes a bottom attack is needed, as for a reserved target where the roadway must stay open. 

The end clearance (E) is a primary factor in a bottom attack. Compare the actual end clearance (E) 

with the required end clearance (ER). Use the measurements shown in Annex A, page A-12 and Table 

H-1,page H-1. 

First, determine the actual end clearance (E) of the bridge, which is the sum of the end clearances 

of the near and far shores. Using the formula on page 4-13 and the measurements on page A-12, we 

determine the actual end clearance is 0.4 m. 

Next, determine the required end clearance (ER) needed to successfully drop the span. First, 

determine the height-to-length ratio (HL): 

H - 2.1 H 

- = 0.084

L 25 L 

Using Table H-1, page H-1, locate the H/Lvalue (0.084) on the chart. Read the first part of Note 2. 

Since 0.084 is not on the chart, round that figure up to 0.09. Read the number directly below 0.09 to 

determine the required end-clearance-to-length ratio (ERIL) -0.0160. Apply Note 3 to this value to 

determine the required end clearance (ER): 

0.016x25=0.4m 

This is the mi~mum value of total end clearance, in meters, required for a successful attack. Because 

the actual end clearance (E) is 0.4 and the required end clearance is 0.4, a successful bottom attack 

can be performed. 

A bottom attack can be performed even if the ER value is greater than E value. In that case, it is 

also necessary to destroy the near-side abutment. 

Failure to properly determine the required end clearances for a bottom attack can result in a threepinned arch (Figure 4-10, page 4-5). During a bottom attack, the bottom ends of the bridge initially 

move toward the abutments. Without sufficient end clearance, the bridge will jam at these points 

before the hinge has moved far enough to compensate for the movement. 

Charge Calculations 

Determine the amount of explosives required for bridge demolition by using the predetermined 

critical measurements in the concrete stripping charge formula: 

P = 3.3(3.3h + 0. 5)3. 

Appendix A, page A-10,shows the explosives calculation process. Using the measurements on page 

A-10, the procedure to determine the amount of explosives for the beams isStep 1:Determine the amount of explosives (TNT)required per meter: 

P = 3.3[(3.3x 1.2) + 0.513 

P = 3.3(3.96+ 0.5)3 

P =3.3(4.46x 4.462 4.46) 

P = 3.3( 88.71 6536) 

P =292.76 

Note: During this step the sum of 4.461 is left in the calculator and is cut off only after the final step 

of multiplying by 3.3. The answer, 292.76456, is cut off at the hundredthsplwe. In some situations it 

ma? be necessary to round the answer up to the next higher value of hundredths. Rounding may make 

a difference of 1 pound or I package of ezplosiue. 

December 1995 Engineer 25 
Step 2: Determine the amount of explosives (TNT) required per beam: 

P = 292.76(0.35) 

P = 102.466 

Note: At thispoint you can cut off at the hundredthsplace or round up from the thousandthsplace. 

Let's look at both scenarios. 

Cut or Rounded UD 

P= 102.46 P=102.47 

Note: If TNT is used for the demolition, round up the totalpounds at this step. In both examples 

aboue, 103potlnd.s of TNTare requiredper beam. 

Now let's determine the amount of explosives required using C4. 

Step 3: Determine the equivalent amount of C4: 

Cut or Rounded UP 

P = 76.46 P = 76.47 

Step 4: Determine the required packages of C4: 

Cut or Rounded (ID 

N = Charge weight 76.46 - -

76.47 


Package weight 1.25 1.25 


N= 61.16 N= 61.176(61.18) 

A total of 62 packages of C4 is required per beam. 

Use the same process to determine the amount of explosives needed to demolish each slab section 

of the bridge. When determining the amount of charge needed for each slab in a concrete T-beam deck 

bridge, you must consider the dimensions of the end slabs. If the sum of the width of the two end 

slabs equals the width of the internal slabs, the end slabs can be counted as one when determining 

the total explosives needed. If the sum of the width of the two end slabs differs from the width of the 

internal slabs, they must be calculated separately and added to the total explosives needed. 

Determine the total exulosives reauirement. Multiply the number of beam charges by the required 

charge per beam to determine the amount of explosives needed to demolish the beams. Use the same 

process to determine the amount of explosives needed to destroy the slab sections. The sum of the 

beam explosives and the slab explosives equals the amount of explosives needed to destroy the bridge. 

Explosives Placement. To assure a successful bridge demolition, the charges must be placed in 

appropriate positions. Annex A, page A-11, depicts a cross-sectional view of properly placed charges. 

Proper placement along the length of the span depends on the correct categorization of the bridge 

(simply supported or continuous) and the attack method (top, bottom or angled). 

Note: lnprevious bridge-demolitionprocedures,it was necessary to compare the ditch width (Wd) 

with the "LC". Current research shows that this step is not necessary and has no impact on successful 

bridge demolition, providing all calculations are correct. Therefore, the ditch width information on 

page 4-8 and the calculations onpage A-11 of FM 5-250 no longer apply to bridge demolition. 

(See manual change dated 12 January 1994.) 

Now test your knowledge of the Sheffield method of bridge demolition by completing the Engineer 

Problem on page 27. 

This article and the following Engineer Problem/Solution were submitted by Sergeant Rrst Class 

Gary D. Glover, an instructor/writer for CMFl2ANCOCat Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. SFC Glover 

previously served in the 16th Engineer Battalion and the 66th, 567th, and 43rd Engineer Companies. 

He holds a bachelor's degree from Columbia College. 

26 Engineer December 1995 
Engineer Problem 


Situation: You have tasked a squad leader to perform a demolition reconnaissance mission 

on a bridge that is a preliminary target for demolition using C4. The squad leader's report 

provides the following information: 

Bridge Type: Concrete slab, deck, with bottom support, simply supported. 

Critical Dimensions: 


Span length Q= 35 meters (m) 


Bridge height @,H)= 1.1m 


Bridge width = 6 m 


End clearances: 


Near shore (El) = 0.2 m 


Far shore (E2) = 0.3 m 


Bearing supports: 


Near shore (Lsl) =0.9 m 


Far shore (Ls2) = 0.8 m 


Type of Attack: Top attack. A bottom attack can be performed if the friendly side 

abutment is also attacked. 

Amount of Explosives: 62 packages of C4. 

As the platoon sergeant, you must determine if the squad leader's calculations are correct 

based on the given critical dimensions. 

Reference: FM 5-250. 

Engineer Solution is on page 42. 

Letter To The Editor 

I read with interest the article by Jeb Stewart 

('Thinking Through Force XXI," Engineer, August 

1996, p. 19). His personal views posed some 

engaging points. Of interest to me were his 

concerns about "...the absolute reliance on 

computer software." Mr. Stewart states that all of 

us who work with wmputers have been the victims 

of poorly designed or poorly adapted software. He 

witnessed what he called "overstressed computer 

networks shutting down under the workload." 

There probably is more truth than fiction to his 

assertions. Although he pmvided no facts related 

to his resentment of automation, especially 

computer software, I understood his point. 

My response is to look at the everyday 

conveniences we now take for granted. Today, all 

cars and trucks are built, tested, and repaired with 

wmputers and software. The venerable television 

is a digital colleague of the personal computer, 

camwrder, VCR, and electronic games. Home 

appliances have sophisticated integrated circuitry 

December 1995 

developed with the aid of wmputer software. Have 

you seen the educational software available to 

students? Do you have a cellular phone? The 

telephone systems in most cities consist of 

computer-controlling digital connections. Don't 

forget the GulfWar: It was as much a war about 

technology as it was anything else. Millions of 

people watched in astonishment as CNN televised 

live the impact and incredible accuracy of softwarecontrolled, laser-guided smart bombs and missiles 

that found their way to Iraqi targets. 

It's true that there have been many problems 

and many naysayers who did not believe in the 

changing technology. Mr., Stewart is not alone in 

this regard, and no doubt many mistakes have been 

made (and will continue to be made) by systems and 

software developers. It's still called progress even 

when we fail. But I venture to guess that most 

mistakes were the result of human errors not 

software errors. My point is that we cannot stop 

progress because we don't have a perfect solution or 

because it causes some inconveniences. 

Michael J.Killoren, Assistant to the Garrison 

Commander, Fort Leonard Wood. 

Letters lo the ediior are welcome. Address them 

to: Editor, Engineer Professional Bulletin, Am: 

ATSE-TD-D-EB, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 

65473.6650, 

Engineer 27 
The Theater Construction Management System 


By Sergeant First Class Tony R. Arnold and Fred Steinman 

Attention all combat 

heavy engineer battalions and above. Life in theater 

of operations construction will 

soon be much easier with 

designs at your fingertips. 

In 1990, the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers began a 

study to update the Army 

Facilities Component Systems 

(AFCS), used by major commands as the principal source 

for standardized construction 

in theaters of operation. Maintained by the Huntsville, Alabama, Division of the Corps of 

Engineers, this system used 

information published in Technical Manuals 5-301, Planning; 5-302, Design; and 5-303, 

Logistics Data and Bills of 

Material. The system was too 

costly to maintain, with changes 

to existing drawings requiring 

many hours of drafting in ad& 

tion to increasing reproduction 

expenses and problems in product distribution. 

Objectives of the AFCS 

update were to decrease the 

time engineers spend planning 

and designing projects and to 

improve their ability to manage 

theater construction. With this 

in mind, the Construction 

Engineering Research Laboratory developed a computer 

database system to store the 

AFCS drawings. The result is 

the Theater Construction Management System (TCMS), now 

28Engineer 

the approved source for standard designs, bills of material, 

construction time estimates, 

and planning information for 

facilities constructed by Army 

engineers in OCONUS and in 

theaters of operation. 

The Corps of Engineers 

began distributing 260 copies of 

TCMS version 1.2 in the second 

quarter of FY95 and will complete distribution in FY96. 

Units receive a 230-megabyte 

external hard drive with offthe-shelf software: Microsoft 

Projects version 4.0, AutoCad 

LT version 1.0, Close-up version 6.0, and the governmentdeveloped TCMS software and 

AFCS databases. The hardware 

that units must provide to run 

the system and its software are 

shown in the table on page 29. 

Improvements and additional 

designs to the system will be 

fielded annually. 

The Engineer School has 30 

systems in place and will 

receive 22 more during FY96. 

The school curriculum has 

included portions of the TCMS 

since April 1994. The 51T10 

course includes computeraided drafting and design 

(CADD) and Terra Model software for surveying. Project 

management using Microsoft 

Projects 4.0 is trained in the 

Engineer Officers Basic and 

Advanced Courses. The 51T30 

course includes training in 

CADD, project management, 

Terra Model, and files management for CADD. The automated training for the 51T30 

Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, which will focus 

on the use and management of 

TCMS, is scheduled to begin in 

FY96. As the systems and 

hardware become available, 

the Engineer School will incorporate more TCMS training in 

alI courses. 

With TCMS, engineer units 

can access the AFCS drawings 

and databases to speed up the 

planning and design phases of 

all theater construction. Since 

the user produces only the 

drawings needed for his project, 

reproduction costs are reduced 

40 percent or more. In addition 

to drawings and databases, the 

system combines governmentdeveloped and commercial software to provide the capability 

to plan, design, and manage all 

unit construction missions. 

Beginning in 1994, the 

AFCS program was expanded 

to include standard designs 

for facilities constructed by 

Army engineer units in support of nation-assistance programs. Army engineer construction units embark annually on OCONUS missions to 

construct schools, dispensaries, roads, bridges, wells, and 

other basic community projects. The engineer activities 

December I995 
Hardware 

Unit-Supplied Equipment for TCMS -


Microprocessor 

Hard disc drive 

Math coprocessor 

RAM 

Monitor 

Mouse 

Printer 

plotter 

Modem 

CD ROM 

Recommended Conflguratlon 

80486 

120 ME or larger 

Requlred 

16 ME or larger 

Super VGA, 16- to 194nch 

2-~utton 

Laser (dot matrix will work) 

18-pin 

Opnonal, to recdve updates in the future 

Optional medium for future updates 

required for these missions 

include planning, logistics, 

design, management, and construction. Before 1994, each 

unit accomplished these tasks 

independently, often without 

the benefit of past experience 

or standard designs (see sidebar). With the expanded mission of the AFCS program and 

the cooperation of 

Army units, a of 

dard nation-assistance designs will be available through 

TCMS. 

Units are encouraged to 

send their design drawings 

through their major command 

to the Huntsville Division of 

the Corps of Engineers so they 

can be added to the system. 

The ongoing effort to include 

standard designs depends on 

cooperation between the 

Huntsville Division, the U.S. 

Army Southern Command 

(USARSO), and the Active. 

Reserve, and National Guard 

units involved in theater con. 

struction in south and ten. 

tral America. Other theaters 

will be handled in the same 

manner. 

~h~ cycle of incorForating 

and refining designs will expedite future construction missions and enhance the sharing 

of lessons learned. It's time to 

stop recreating the wheel and 

start it evolving into the engineer force of the 21st century. 

Sergeant First Class Arnold 

is the senior training developer 

for 51T, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army 

~~~i~~~~ school, 

Mr. Steinman has worked in 

the Army Facilities Components System Program, Huntsuille, Alabama, for 17rears and 

was instrumental in its design 

modernization. A Navy ueteran from the Korean War Era, 

he is a certified professional 

logistician and a member of the 

Society of Logistics Engineers. 

For more information about TCMS 

and system requirements cdl SFC 

Tony Arnold at (314) 563-4116or DSN 

676-7593. Questions may also 

addressed to Fred Steinman or Sandra 

Huntsville Division of the 

Corps of Engineers, at (205) 895-17831 

1784. 

Engineers Build a 

School in Belize 

By First Lieutenant&ury Wihn 

Standardization is an important principle for the U.S. 

Army. Everything from a passing score on a physical fitness 

test to the number of bolts 

required to secure a Bailey 

bridge is standardized. Its importance was further emphasized to the South Carolina 

Army National Guard's 122d 

Engineer Battalion in January 

1995 when we were tasked to 

build a primary school in Double Head Cabbage, Belize. The 

122d designed the pded, 

the construction 

plan, and determined the bill 

Of materials. This process is 

to raise the eyebrows 

Of an engineer because that's 

what we do' However$the 122d 

had built a similar school in 

since Pedasi, wePanama, did not have in 1994; access but to

the new database containing this plan, the unit,s 

dtect had to design the 

ize schoo1 from scratch. 

After successfully completing 

the 1995 mission in ~~li~~

we 

submitted the school design 

through the U.S. Army southern &-and (JJSARSOJ to the 

~~~k~ill~ ~ i ~ ofi the~ i ~ 

COWSof Engineers. NOW part of 

the TCMS, these design drawingS, the bill of materials, and 

the construction plans are 

available to other units with 

similar missions. 

As units submit drawings, 

USARSO will collect a variety 

of school designs for their cusbmersto choose from, which 

will allow for nation-specific 

modifications. For example, 

December 1995 Engineer 29 
Data from previous exercises also 

will help the Army 

Contracting Office 

choose vendors that 

work well with the 

military in each 

country. With a standardized bill of materials, the contractor 

can shop for the best 

price instead of settling for an overpriced '%argain." 

Standardized 

plans with realistic 

start and completion 

dates will take the 

guesswork out of construction projects by 

allotting the correct 

amount of time, manpower, supplies, and 

equipment. Plans 

should also show the 

type of work to be 

performed in certain 

weather and climates-for instance, 

scheduling new construction in the dry 

season and renovations in the wet 

Topphoto: The old school In Double Head Cabbage, Belize, waa overcrowded and poorly 


constructed. season. 


Standardization is 

Bonom photo: Members of the 122d Engineer Battalion and children of Double Head an important concept Cabbage stand beside the new school. for the Armv because 

Panamanians prefer block- their quality is better, we or- it saves time and 

designed school windows, while dered too many blocks and money and eliminates waste. 

the Belizeans like windows wasted project funds. 	 Standardized project plans are 

no exception. Engineer units with louvers that provide protec- Standardized plans should are encouraged to cooperate tion from the weather. indicate the amount of equip- with USARSO's effort to ex- Standardized plans not on- ment to be drawn from the pand the TCMS so we can con- ly save time, they also allow home station and from the tinue to complete our missions better quality control. Each main support area for theater economically in an era of 

plan has a built-in waste factor equipment. This capability will shrinking budgets. kl 

that may vary from nation to improve coordination between 

nation. The 122d found that in the tasked unit and USARSO. First Lieutenant Wilson is 

Panama there is a 20 percent It will also allow better pro- the S2 for the 122d Engineer 

waste factor because of the cin- gramming for the limited air, Battalion. He previously served 

der block quality. When the sea, and land assets needed to as the assistant S2 for the 

same percentage was used to transport equipment to the 4/118 Infantry Battalion at 

order blocks in Belize, where area of operations. Union, South Carolina. 

30 Engineer 	 December I995 
Charting a Career Path 

By Major James B. Balocki 

Forcem,E-Force, 10diviswn Preparation andEducation foundation in the principles of 

Army, downsizing, base re- construction law. This course I alignment and closures... Today's f you attend graduate school, introduces the government conrapidly evolving military force struc- design a training plan to tracting process in a district, where 

ture demands that every engineer enhance and complement your you may manage multimillionofficer be actively engaged in chart- leadership skills. Courses in these dollar contracts. 

ing a career path Seleding the right subject areas will prepare you for Construction Management. 

job aRer company command is duty in a USACE district: This is the heart of many military 

cult and getting more so by the day. Negotiations. Nearly every- officers' duties in a district. 

Whatever you decide probably will thing you do in a district, whether Courses in project management 

take you away from troops. Among working with contractors or staff and network analysis will serve 

the potential assignments is duty team members, requires negotia- you well. Work them into your 

with a U. S. Army Corps of Engi- tions. This course is typically training plan. 

neers (USACE) district. These found in the school of business. Environmental Engineerassignments offer challenging Construction Contract Law. ing, Hydraulics, and Hydrolwork, pmfessional experience, and It's essential to have a solid ogy. Corps projects depend on 

excellent preparation for future duty 

assignments, but most engineer 

offick are not exposed to thi; part 1.- 2

of our unique o&tion before 

being assigned there. 

This article introduces company grade officers to the Civil 

Works and Military Construction 

districts and the engineer officer's 

role in their national and military 

infrastructure support missions. 

It is based on one soldier's experiences. Anyone considering a 

USACE tour should seek additional information £ram &ends, 

mentors, or other senior officers. 

Regardless of the path engineer officers follow to arrive 

there, they bring valuable qualities to a USACE district: organizational leadership skills, problemsolving abilities, a sense of mission, and a desire to work with , . people. Company grade officers 

are assigned to a district to 

broaden their leadership experience and understanding of the 

organization. These assignments 

expose them to the full spectrum 

of missions accomplished by the 

Corps of Engineers and prepare Understanding technical products is essential to effectively 

them for future senior leadership administer construction contracts, which are at the heart of a 

military officer's duties in a district. roles. 

December 1995 Engineer 31 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers District 

Commander 

Depug Cornrnander(s1 

EXBCY~VB &$Slant 

Operations Division 

Environmental Ouailg Assurance Pmjeci Management 

Su~veyiMapplng Aiemesident Omce(s) Enuronmental Regulaiory (Permits) Pmgiam Maosgemenf 

Real Estate Division lntormafion Management Safoty and Secvrlty ManagemenvDlspoul RBLY)U~SOManagement Humsn Rarourws 

Logl~ticaManagement lnternal ~avlew 

Organizational structure of a typical U.S. Army Engineer District. 

expertise in these areas, so become familiar with their fundamentals and language. 

Soils. Gain an understanding of the basics of soil mechanics, stabilization, and failure 

mechanisms. 

Other. One important course 

to complete before joining the 

district is "Management of 

Defense Acquisition Contracts 

(Basic)," offered by correspondence from the Army Logistics 

Management College. This introduction to government contracting will help decode many 

common acronyms. 

The Corps' Huntsville Division offers "Civilian Personnel 

Management for Key Military 

Leaders" in residence. This 

essential course ~rovides insight into the career development and management of civilian employees. 

Once on duty, the Corps offers 

numerous ~rofessional development courses. Engineer Regulations 350-3-5 and 350-7-l(FR) 

itemize courses required for military officers in district assign. 

ments. HNDP 350-1-1, known as 

'"The Purple Book," contains a 

comprehensive catalog of all 

courses. Subjects range from 

finite element analysis to financial accounting systems. 

Early in the tour, take time to 

learn how the authorization and 

appropriation processes work. 

Money is "painted different colors." Some funds must be used in 

the fiscal year Congress appropriates them, others expire after 

longer periods, and some don't 

ever lapse. This area is as confusing for seasoned Corps veterans 

as it is for rookies, but a good 

foundation will help avoid pitfalls. 

Organization and 


Environment 


The Corps is organized hierarchically. The figure above 

shows a typical (generic) district 

wiring diagram. Each district is 

stmctured to support and accom- 

~hshits primary mission and generally has the same functional 

divisions and offices, although 

Some roles may be combined. For 

example, the constmction and Operations functions may be autonodivisions in one district but 

be under one roof in another. 

Like a brigade, each district is 

subordinate to a division, tmically commanded by a general 

officer. The division reports to 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, commanded by the 

Chief of Engineers. 

Each USACE district's culture 

is unique and process-oriented. 

Laws, regulations, and individual personalities affect the decision making process in a district 

much more than in a troop unit. 

Because the "just do it" attitude 

can sometimes lead to disaster, 

recommendations usually are 

staffed and team consensus built 

before a decision is implemented. 

Consider, for example, a seemingly simple change to a construction contract-adding an interior 

door. This idea might be initiated 

at a construction site for an office 

building. It will be reviewed by an 

engineer to ensure that the door's 

placement and construction conform with fire-~rotection codes, 

and a contract specialist will 

ensure that the change is within 

the scope of the original project. 

Next a cost estimator will assemble a government estimate to use 

in negotiating the change. The 

resource manager will review the 

estimate to ensure that sufficient 

and correctfunds are available, 

After that, a contracting officer's 

representative will negotiate with 

the contractor to agree on the cost 

32 Engineer December 1995 
Engineer officers in a district assignment often participate in disaster recovery operations as part of a Corps team. 


Uesponses to floods, earthquakes, or hurricanes present unique problem-solving and leadership challenges in an 


adverse environment. 

and time needed to complete the 

change. Then a contract modification will be prepared, signed, 

and delivered to the contractor. 

Finally, you get a door! The process can be slow and frustrating 

at times, but staff skills 

acquired in a troop unit will 

prove valuable in accomplishing 

the mission. 

District-division-headquarters 

staff chains also work differently 

than the chain in a troop unit 

because of the nature of each 

functional staffs mission and the 

long-term tenure of the dedicated 

civilian work force. This chain is 

often called a functional "stovepipe." Many tasks and much 

information are passed through 

these staff stovepipes, outside of 

the command channel. The stovepipes exert a strong influence on 

civilian career ladders, and people tend to be responsive to functional counterparts at higher 

command levels. 

The Corps has worked hard to 

break out of the traditional hierarchical stovepipe paradigm. By 

introducing project management 

into the district structure and 

culture, they focus attention and 

resources onsuccessful completion 

and delivery of projects to customers. Project management involves 

assembling a tailored team from 

among the technical disciplines. 

The integrated team, led by a 

project manager, is responsible for 

ushering a project fmm inception 

through delivery and beyondfrom cradle to grave. 

To learn more about the organization, talk to the people who 

work there. Learn what they do 

and how they perform their jobs. 

Find out how their jobs fit into 

the district's mission and why 

they are important. Observe, 

learn, and ask a lot of questions. 

When someone uses an acronym 

you don't understand (and there 

are plenty), ask what it means. 

Chances are you'll encounter it 

again. Listen to "wag stories; 

they embody information about 

how the Corps works, what it 

does, and most importantly, the 

inner workings of the districthow things get done. 

The Corps Team 

The Corps is staffed with 

dedicated professionals and 

leaders, managers and technical 

team members. Military officers 

fit into this team. However, they 

may have to prove their worth to 

the team before they are given 

a choice assignment. Engineer 

officers enter USACE district 

service with a solid reputation as 

hard-working, intelligent leaders. District staff members have 

high expectations of them but 

understand that the officers lack 

experience and exposure to the 

system. 

Company grade officers may 

encounter different attitudes 

toward military officers serving 

in the district. Career civilian 

employees may label them "just 

passing through" because of their 

relatively short tenure. Because 

the job they fill may be a growth 

or developmental position for 

their career civilian counterparts, 

military officers may be viewed 

as restricting a civilian's career 

growth. Another tag they may 

inherit is "the colonel's spy." Military officers have a unique association and access to their commander, which many civilians 

feel they don't share. These 

labels may be a source of cloaked 

December 1995 Engineer 33 
resentment. You can't avoid 

them; simply be aware they exist 

and work hard to become a member of the district's team. 

Leadership is the most valuable asset military officers bring 

to a USACE district assignment. 

The setting offers company 

grade engineers an opportunity 

to lead in an unfamiliar environment, which requires different 

leadership skills than those used 

with troops. Missions are assigned and tasks accomplished 

in an atmosphere of cooperation. 

Situational leadership skills are 

essential whetheryou're dealing 

with contractors who are behind 

schedule or quality assurance 

representatives who are inspecting the project. The Corps has 

many fine leaders, but you bring 

a unique perspective to the 

district. 

Some USACE district assignments involve Military Construction or Civil Works projects. The 

Military Construction program 

supports infrastructure development and maintenance for the 

Army, the Air Force, and others. 

Hospitals and troop barracks 

construction, facilities rehabilitation, and hazardous-waste-site 

cleanup are among the many 

Military Construction missions. 

The Civil Works program is 

equally diverse but focuses on 

improving and maintaining the 

nation's rivers and harbors. 

Hydroelectric dam improvements, navigation lock construction, harbor dredging, and flood 

control are among the many Civil 

Works challenges. 

One emerging area, the Work 

for Others program, is growing 

rapidly. It puts our skills as the 

nation's premier engineering organization to work for federal 

agencies outside the Department 

of Defense. Some projects are 

similar to traditional Corps 

roles, while others are unique, 

leading-edge engineering endeavors. The Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of 

Energy, the Department of Agriculture, and other federal agencies are among a growing list of 

customers with diverse missions 

supported by the Corps. Regardless of where you end up, the 

work will be stimulating, intellectually challenging, and professionally demanding. 

Performance 

When beginning a USACE 

. . assimment.. ~lan . on 

spending time in at least two 

positions: the district headquarters and the field-at a project, 

resident, or area office. Keep in 

mind that every job should 

broaden your leadership skills, 

help prepare you to become a district engineer or a deputy district 

engineer, and enhance your value 

to the Army. 

Be aware that the duties of a 

company grade officer within a 

district are probably not well 

understood by many who serve on 

selection boards. The jobs you 

are likely to hold are not universally recognized as "key positions" and do not possess inherent career-enhancing benefits. This makes your performance extremely critical. 

It is important to communicate 

the level of your responsibility 

and the challenges of your duties 

in a district by writing a clear 

position description. This point 

cannot be overemphasized. The 

key to board recognition of your 

job is an accurate duty description in terms that are widely 

understood in the Army. 

Benefits 

uSACE district assignments 

offer opportunities to invest time in professional, personal, and family development. 

The demands of duty and the 

daily schedule normally do not 

require the same personal sacrifices as duty with troops. Manage 

time wisely. Set yourself apart 

by working intelligently, accomplishing each task professionally, 

and showing enthusiasm. 

Continue professional development by enrolling in and completing the Command and General 

Staff Officer's Course by correspondence. If selected to attend 

the resident course, much of the 

material will be review, or you 

may opt to attend a sister service 

school. Either way, you will be 

ahead. 

Spend time with your family. 

It is easy to become so involved in 

a project that your home life is 

sacrificed. 

USACE district assignments 

offer many opportunities to 

establish new professional contacts. Most districts have strong 

affiliations with organizations 

that offer a wide range of opportunities for professional growth' 

through association with civilian counterparts and professional societies. These beneficial 

relationships can lead to longterm associations that increase 

the overall professionalism of 

the Corps and enhance your 

qualifications. 

Engineers are constantly confronted with challenges-a changing force structure and a 

continuing need to achieve individual and career goals. These 

challenges mandate that we 

actively plan and manage our 

careers. A variety of interesting 

and demanding assignments are 

available after you've completed 

company command and leave a 

troop unit. You'll find that a 

USACE district provides challenging duty, personal satisfac. 

tion, and tremendous professional opportunities. Id 

Major Balocki is attending the 

Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We 

recently completed a second USACE 

tour, serving as deputy district engineer for the Walla Walla, Washington, 

District. He previously served with the 

United Nations and U.S. Joint Task 

Force-Somalia. 
Engineer Battle Tracking 


By Captain Kenneth J. Crawford and Major James E. Brooks 

Through wars and engagements, command and 

control elements must continually maintain 

their focus on the combat power and capabilities of 

subordinate elements. This focus is critical for those 

involved with both deliberate and combat decisionmaking processes. The commander and his planning 

staff require immediate access to the critical information they need to make informed decisions affecting the lives of subordinates and the success of their 

missions. Thmugh World War 11, Korea, Vietnam, 

and Operation Desert Storm, staff planners and 

commanders often reinvented the wheel for tracking 

battles in their tactical operations centers and command posts because no standard reporting process 

existed. Today units need complementary tracking 

systems that are applicable to the various task organizations in the combined arms environment. This 

article describes select elements of engineer support 

to a combined arms task force and presents some 

standard, complementary charts staffs and leaders 

can use to track those elements. 

H&torieol Reference: General George Patton successfully 

launched a 'kmnnaissanee.in-force" and seized Palermo on 22 July 

1943. Giuen his slaffs ability to maintain a vigilant perspectiue an 

the combaipowr of his two (+) diuisions,Palton changed a defensive 

mission fo an attock on Palerma with a great deal of success. 

Elements of Engineer Support 

We cannot standardize the precise information 

engineers need to report because requirements vary by theater and mission. Maneuver support, reports, and data for engineer requirements 

apply across a broad spectrum, with little change in 

how to sort and post information related to each 

operation. However, engineer support for maneuver 

forces conducting peacekeeping operations, lowintensity conflicts, and training exercises have one 

thing in common-the decision-making process. 

Engineers use battle tracking as a tool to provide 

timely, doctrinally based information to maneuver 

December 1995 

commanders as they implement the tactical 

decision-making process. The tracking system must 

be simple to maintain and easy to reference. First, 

we will discuss how we sort information and apply 

doctrinally correct and timely information to battle 

tracking. 

Flow of Information 

The commander's critical information requirements drive the staffs focus for battle tracking. 

Information flow is a two-way network. Subordinate 

elements, the eyes and ears on the battlefield, provide timely ground truth to leaders for dissemination as required in situation reports, scatterable 

mine warnings (SCATMINWARNs) and size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) 

reports. Higher headquarters provide subordinate 

elements with directives and information through 

operation orders (OPORDs), fragmentary orders 

(FRAGOs), and warning orders (WARNORDs), 

which have clear tasks and purposes. 

Timeliness of Information 

Disciplined units thrive on accurate and complete 

information disseminated both up and down the 

chain of command. Success prevails when commanders make decisions based on current information, 

while decisions made with outdated information 

often lead to disaster. Commanders at all levels also 

rely on the information reported to be useful. The old 

adage "garbage in-garbage out" will not apply if 

engineers ask the right questions and clearly and 

concisely report essential data. For example, reconnaissance elements must be given specific tasks that 

support current and future tactical information 

requirements so that the staff can track reports 

received on standard charts. Engineers must ensure 

that the information they receive and provide is relevant to each special staffs needs for operational 

planning and execution (intelligence, operations, 

logistics, transportation, and maintenance). If each 

Engineer 35 
staff element generates additional requirements 

based on its needs, subordinates may get caught in 

the research of outdated or super€luous data. Bottom 

line: ensure that the information you provide is relevant to the situation and don't create undue reporting requirements for others. 

Doctrinal Information 

Tactical and operational input must have a doctrinal base as an initial reference. Engineers use doctrinally based battle-tracking charts to refine the 

information required for a mission. The charts 

below are designed to provide each staff position 

and user with compatible and doctrinally based 

information. 

The commander decides how to successfully 

attain the advantage over the enemy with minimal 

losses to his troops and equipment. To facilitate 

those decisions, the staff provides the commander 

with brief updates regarding his combat power capabilities. Combat power has four primary elements: 

maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership 

(EM 100-5,Chapter 2). For engineers, the definition 

of combat power differs by unit based on its capabilities and support roles. 

Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to 

gain positional advantage. Mobility and countermobility are the engineers' implied support tasks. 

Mobility includes the unit's capability to successfully 

breach obstacles (friendly and enemy) as part of the 

attacking or movement-to-contact force. To clear and 

maintain lines of communication (LOC), engineers 

must perform several mobility, sustainment, and 

force-protection tasks. They perform countermobility 

tasks when reinforcing terrain to disrupt, turn, fix, 

or block an enemy force. 

Firepower is the destructive force determined by 

the amount of fire delivered by a unit, position, or 

weapon system. As combat multipliers, engineers 

provide countermobility and survivability support to 

maneuver forces. By integrating obstacles with firepower, engineers maximize the standoff and probability of kill to the friendly units' advantage. To maximize the unit's ability to survive and fight, they 

provide equipment to develop and improve individual and vehicle fighting positions and unit battle 

positions. Engineer "firepower" is their ability to 

shape the battlefield by tying in natural and manmade obstacles. The primary weapons systems or 

platforms used to accomplish those tasks are the 

Volcano, MOPMS, conventionally placed mines, and 

digging assets. 

Protection is the conservation of the fighting 

force. Engineers provide sappers to gather obstacle 

intelligence (OBSINTEL), conduct covert breaches, 

and support deep interdiction. Blade assets provide 

increased survivability and protection to maneuver 

and support forces. Properly integrated survivability 

and force-protection efforts can significantly in. 

crease the maneuver forces' success when they are 

applied against defending, withdrawing, or even 

attacking forces. When engineers provide higher 

headquarters with timely, accurate, friendly and 

enemy obstacle data, they increase the commander's 

overall situational awareness and decrease the number of potential fratricides. 

Leadership drives the competence and courage 

of a unit's soldiers. Unit commanders and leaders 

must know where their presence can make the 

greatest impact on the morale, motivation, and success of their soldiers. To the engineer, leadership 

represents the backbone of mobility and countermobility support tasks. It is not merely the presence 

of leaders, but the presence of qualified and trained 

leaders who successfully support maneuver 

forces. 

Flow of Missions 

Missions are generated either as proactive or 

reactive measures. For example, staffs are proactive 

when they generate OPLANs as missions to be executed at a prescribed time or when specific conditions occur. OPORDs often are reactive because they 

prescribe orders based on current intelligence, 

actions taken, or missions generated from either 

higher or subordinate headquarter's requirements. 

OPLANs take units to the initial encounter, where 

they expand through branches and sequels to the 

operation. Proactive planning provides the commander with the flexibility to execute battlefield 

missions based on his assumed or projected combat 

power and capabilities. The execution phase changes 

as a result of reconnaissance; loss of combat power; 

and discovered or identified obstacle locations, disposition, type and quantity. By tracking this critical information, engineer planners and commanders maintain the tools they need to plan for changes 

in mobility support. Units disseminate FRAGOs 

and OPORDs to subordinate elements so they can 

develop supporting tasks to meet the tenets of 

Army operations (agility, initiative, depth, synchronization, and versatility). Information received by 

supported or supporting units may affect routes. 

force array, or equipment limitationsicapabilities. 

December 1996 
Basic Battle-Tracking Charts icant deficiencies in combat power and capabilities. -

until a doctrinally based battle-tracking system Units must develop and rehearse command post batis developed, engineers can use the following tle drills using flow charts and manage the data they 

charts to provide complementary information that receive and provide for mission planning and execusupports the maneuver commanders' decision- tion. Mission requirements may alter staff or commaking processes in any theater of operation. mander decisions based on the unit's ability to support a specific task. Whether the data provided are 

subjective or objective, users can cross-reference 

Task Organization and Combat Power them against supporting battle-tracking charts to 

These charts are cross-referenced to back-up data develop a planning tool that supports the comor supporting quick-reference charts to reflect signif- mander's decision-making process. 

I Combat Power 1 

~nnalherw'hlp Maneuver Fireparer ' Proteeth I Cdr's Eval vldlriid h Hnd 

I - I 

1 I 

For .. ,Examole 

Cabat Power Color Codlnm 

Breach Equlp Enpr Equip 

Black = 0 ;@ = (049%) 

December 1995 Engineer 37 
Service Support 

Users need quick-reference charts that show critical engineer classes of supply that may affect current or future operations. Both the engineer and the 

SUogistician must closely monitor these data. Subordinate elements must be accountable for the 

receipt and expenditure of resources affecting future 

operational planning, forecasting, and cross-leveling. 

Service Support As of: -

Unil Conemlne Whc ATMbes APMlnes NECap. C4 HlCLlC APOBS MOPMS 

5201YX) lZllW BUI5 1901184 a2 515 22 

B1318W 1071tW 

(RWIndlOn nnq 

Critical Engineer Equipment mobility (M113, dump trucks, HMMWV) are critical 

The maneuver force's primary means of mobility systems to track. When planning and executing 

(ACE, CEV, AVLB, MICLIC), countermobility (Val- missions, commanders and staffs need the capability 

cano, MOPMS, ADAM-, survivability and to quickly update the number, condition, and locaforce protection (digging assets), and engineer forces' tion of these assets. 

Critical Engineer Equipment AS Ot 

Minefield Tracking Forms 1355 or 1355-1-R.Data for zones, belts, 

groups, intent, executing element, status, etc., are 

Friendly. To expedite the reporting and tracking taken from initial entries on minefield records. The 

of minefields, subordinate elements provide friendly hard-copy records are used to verify data received 

minefield information via FM radio or multiple sub- and changes disseminated by the staff engineer and 

scriber equipment and follow up with copies of DA the maneuver S3. 

Friendly Obstacles 

As 01 

hi ZonsBeW mlmd Group Nvmk 5";"; Sldus 0TG FrGrld(s) To Grldfs) Rpt Rcv'd Rmmks 

ZICR7 lWX3D MTOS 75% 08033ffiep WE123156 WE124458 Inllaaon 

llSlJ0l 108ZBlE BS02 lW1( OBlMOSep 082315Sep WE023556 WE023556 Complalm (+)Armed 

3W3'X 1101C3D RM09 S(I% OBIX2€E3ep WE4567ES WE456789 RC lWSO 

Enemy. This information, in conjunction with 

the S2's reconnaissance plan, drives route clearance, 

mobility planning, and reconnaissance missions. 

The sample minefield report on page B-3of FM 

20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, can be 

38Engineer 

revised to this format for battle-tracking purposes. 

Lines A (map sheets) and H (estimated material and 

equipment to clear) are omitted because those data 

should be decided by the executing unit. 

December 1995 
Enemy Minefields 

As at 

Unii Into DM Twx MF Grld(s) D@ MaLed Reduced Cleared LaneGrlda 

G llliU27 081705Sep (3ITM62 WE 123456 €Om UR Hmdd 081735Sap 08201354 NIA 

WB07 09W35Ssp (SIB)Y/\M5 WE234567 120rn LHandral OW215Ssp 

VUA526 093835S.p (S) TMBD WE345678 40m 

2IllU41 lW127Sep 

Situational Obstacles Figures 7-5a through 7-9, FM 20-32, apply them to 

A similar chart is used for situational obstacles. the supported situation, and disseminate critical 

Engineers extract basic data from Chapter 7, information to the maneuver force. 

FASCAM 

As of 

LW unii r~vobar system c;, >Fk z;Ts, &% z,p& SC$~f~N-

@ 

1lClZT I08UITSM1 Vduno ATiAP o80330Sap 48hr 

(long) 

WE123456-

WE1 29455 

235m Canpleaon OBEOXsp 

@ -7 108284OSM22 MOPMS ATiAP 07-sp 4hr 

(h-0 

WE023556 235 rn Canpledon 072230Ssp 

@ 21- 108217MSW13 WPiM AT(?%) CEW30Ssp 12 hi WE456789 203m Canplation 072355Sqi 

Mission Status user with a mission-status summary that enables 

This chart focuses on all aspects of missions gen- him to quickly track current operations and plan 

erated or received. It provides the commander or future operations. 

Mission Status --

a- ..+ -. 


@ C4ZW 

Number Mlukn \% LocaUon E7z SQWua %Tp Secure Rmsks BY 

",::,
 Crafsr CR7 WE125456 081YXsep 75% Dll-325 

@ 3128 Gtrrsld AP llW7 WE1334418 093015Sep lCO% W15Ssp Ail-325 

@ A300 CLV YiVJ26 WE234567 08MWC6sp 103% 

@ C101 ::",Harm 

RouteLOC Status 

Reconnaissance elements or units report route the accuracy of information reported, these data 

and LOC trafficability data to their supported head- may generate route clearance, mobility, or repair 

quarters. Depending on the route's intended use and missions for engineers. 

Route Status 

AE ot 

Route Fr Grid To Grld Surtge Slams :zc YGP Secure By Rmaks 

rdn erodoo 08233054 1Walfficp Dil-325 In1 

lmpasrabla landdide 0908WSep I 091YOSer 311-325101 

rsu rasL?ic. b"d~cut WOYX6ep lordable 

December 1995 Engineer 39 
Summarv" 

This article provides some doctrinally based 

battle-tracking charts that commanders and 

staffs can modify to fit their experience, requirements, and MElT-T. While doctrine provides reprt 

formats to aid in the currency of reported information, the Army lacks standard, basic charts to track 

this information. Given a doctrinally based tracking 

document and the necessity to maintain and report 

timely information, the potential application of these 

charts is limitless. 

Engineer leaders must focus on applying and 

maintaining the information they provide to maneuver force commanders and staffs, who rely heavily on 

timely and accurate information that supports their 

decision-making processes. In today's fluid environment, the Army executes a myriad of missions with 

nonhabitual task organizations around the globe. 

Based on the tactical situation, information flow 

within units and the Engineer Corps must be compatible to ease the transition to mission execution 

and battle tracking for maneuver commanders and 

staff officers. Y 

Captain Kenneth J.Crawford is the senior engineer Company obseruer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Previous assignments 

include company commander. 27th Engineer Battdion (Combat) (Airborne) and 362nd Engineer Company at Fort Bragg and Somalia. He holds a bachelor's degree from Tewu.A&M University and is a 

graduate of the Combined Arms Services Staff School. 

Major James E. Brooks is the senior engineer 

obseruer/controller at the JRTC. He previously 

served as the assistant division engineer XO and S3 

of the 307th Engineer Battalion (Airborne). Major 

Brooks holds a master's degree from Texas AQM 

University and is agraduate of the Command and 

General Staff College. 

Battle Command Training Program 

By Lieutenant Colonel Greg Stanley 

Engineer Brigade Tactical Operations Center 

(TOC) Operations 

Many engineer brigades struggle with the setup 

and operation of the brigade TOC. The following 

tactics, tips and procedures will help the TOC run 

smoothly: 

1.Use flat maps to track the current situation and 

vertical (hanging) maps to display plans and template enemy activity. Flat maps are preferred for 

current needs because more people can work around 

them. They provide good visibility during briefings 

and allow several soldiers good views without 

40 Engineer December 1995 
having to look over the shoulders of others. Additionally, both the S2 and the S3 can track ground truth 

on the same flat map. 

2. Separate the plans area from the current operations area. The plans area can double as a briefing 

area for issuing orders or meeting with subordinate 

units. Integrate staff sections in the operations area 

rather than separate the cells by function. Both the 

S1 and the S4 must know what is happening in the 

current operation. 

3. Use information displays within the TOC to 

provide commanders and key personnel with a quick 

update without the need for numerous questions. 

Determine what information is critical to the commander and then track and display that information 

with charts. Avoid too many charts. 

Key engineer information is determined by the 

commander. It normally includesH Task organization. 

H Elements of the engineer commander's situation 

report (engineer equipment, personnel, and the com. 

mander's assessment). 

m Status of Class IV and Class V materiel. 

w Main supply routes. 

H Current engineer missions. 

H Commander's critical information requirements. 

4. Place desks for the commander and the 

executive officer (XO) in the center of the action 

where they can see, hear, and supervise all activity. 

Radios, phones, and radio-telephoneoperators 

(RTOs) should be next to the commander and XO. 

Attach speakers to phones and radios so the 

commander and XO can turn up the volume when 

they want all members of the TOC to hear 

conversations (e.g., conference calls with the 

division commander or subordinate engineer 

commanders). 

5. Use NCOs to ensure that reports and messages 

are distributed properly, update the status of maps 

and charts, supervise the publication of orders and 

graphics, and assist in developing and war gaming 

courses of action. RTOs monitor radios, receive reports, and update status charts as necessary. All 

members of the TOC must understand the concept of 

the operation and the commander's critical information requirements. 

ANATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

National Training Center, 

Sidewinder Team 

By Major Tom Buning 

Engineer Strengths. Most engineer battalion 

combat senice support planners, headquarters and 

headquarters company commanders, and the support platoon leadership are planning, coordinating, 

and executing resupply operations to standard. They 

are addressing the following tasks: 

Order the correct type and number of logistics 

packages (LOGPACs). 

H Coordinate movement to and from logistics rally 

points with a battalion LOGPAC or with task force 

LOGPACs. This distribution system increases command, control, security, and synchronization with 

the supported maneuver unit's time line. 

Develop a system to coordinate changes in logistics requirements due to last-minute adjustments in 

task organizations and critical requirements 

received from status reports. 

w Release and return LOGPACs promptly. 

H Establish a standard resupply technique that 

meets your requirements. 

Recommend each battalion develop a standing 

operating procedure (SOP) for LOGPAC operations. 

Engineer Weakness. The Family of Scatterable 

Mines (FASCAM) planning and trigger points need 

emphasis. Recommend engineers know the doctrine 

for planning and employing FASCAM,as described in 

FM 90-7.To provide the commander maximum 

flexibility, develop plans to employ FASCAM 

throughout the depth and width of the sector or zone 

in sufficient numbers to support the base plan and all 

branch plans. Execute FASCAM based on an enemy 

event trigger, using named areas of interest (NAI) in 

the deep battle area that are tied to decision points. 

Assign dedicated observers (both primary and 

alternate) to overwatch the NAI. Assign other 

dedicated observers to the FASCAM target area to 

direct artillery and close air support. They must 

synchronize the location, trigger, and execution 

criteria for FASCAM during war gaming. 

December 1995 
~n~ineer Solution -

The squad leader's assessment and calculations are incorrect. The following calculations are correct: 

Top At,tack 

1.Determine the height-to-length ratio: 


H/L = 1.1/35 = 0.031 (Round up to 0.04 on Table H-2.) 


2. Determine the average length of the bearing supports: 

(Ls1)0.9+ (Ls2)0.8 - 1.7 - - -- 0.85 m 2 2 

3. Determine the average length of bearing supports to the length ratio (Lsn): 

+0.24 (Round up to 0.03 on Table H-2.) 35 


4. Determine the length of cut (LC): 


Using FM 5-250, Table H-2, intersect the values Gom steps 1and 3, above, to get Lck 


Lc/L = 0,029 


Multiply (LdL)0.029 by (L) 35 to get LC; LC= 1.01m 


Charge Calculatinns 

1.Determine the amount of TNT required: 

P =3.3[(3.3 x 1.1) +.513 

P= 3.3(3.63+.5)3 


P= 3.3(4.13x 4.13% 4.13) 


P = 3.3(70.444997) 


P =232.46 


2. Determine the amount of explosives (TNT) for the slab: 

P=232.46x 6 


P = 1394.76 


3. Determine the equivalent amount of C4: 

p = -1394'76 - 1040.86 

1.34 

4. Determine the required packages of C4: 

N=-- 1040.86 - 832.68 (round up) 833 packages of C4 

1.25 

Bottom ,4t,trick 

1. Determine the height-to-length ratio: 


H/L = 0.031 (same as Top Attack calculation) 


2. Determine the total end clearance (E): 

E =(El) 0.2 +(E2) 0.5; E = 0.5m 

3. Determine the required end-clearance-to-length ratio (ERIL) using Table H-1: 


ERL = 0.003 


(ERIL) 0.003 x (L)35 = 0.105; ER =0.105 m 


Again, the squad leader's assessment is incorrect. Because this is a preliminary target, the unit 

should use the quickest method of demolition-in this case, a top attack. Since E (0.5) is greater than ER 

(0.105), a bottom attack can be performed successfully without attacking the abutment. 

42 Engineer December 1995 
Obstacles at 


By Lynn McFarland 

1816, Napoleon wrote in a In 

letter, "A battle sometimes 

decides everything; and sometimes the most trifling thing decides the fate of a battle."' A perfect example of this occurred 

during the Civil War when, in 

early March 1862, two mad obstacles helped the U.S. Army of 

the Southwest secure Missouri. 

Brigadier General Samuel R. 

Curtis, commander of the Army 

of the Southwest, placed two obstacles behind his army's right 

flank to deny Confederate form 

access to the rear As the Confederate Army of the West maneuvered around Curtis' position, the 

obstacles caused its forces to split. 

Curtis was then able to turn his 

army and defeat the divided Confederates at the Battle of Pea 

Ridge. This ended any serious 

Confederate threat to Missouri for 

the remainder of the war. 

In late 1861, the fight for Miisouri was at a standstill. Union 

forces held St. Louis and the Missouri River Valley, but the proConfederate Missouri State 

Guard, commanded by Major General Sterling Price, held Springfield, located in the southwest corner of the state. The overall Union 

commander of Missouri, Major 

General Henry W. Halleck, knew 

that Price's ragtag force threatened to disrupt his upcoming offensives on the Mississippi, the 

Tennessee, and the Cumberland 

Rivers. St. Louis was the main 

the Battle of Pea Ridge 


. . -. . -. 

' . . .. . ... Boundary dSpringfleld Plateau 

December 1995 
0 -
I 

mile 

Map 2 

base of operations for these cam- ' Confederate forces in northwest ' 

ments to protect the supply line, 

paigns, and if Halleck moved forces Arkansas were commanded by the Army of the Southwest was 

out of Missouri to support the op- Brigadier General Ben McCulloch. now down to 10,500 troops. If he 

erations, Price muld move into the Even though McCulloch and Price wanted to continue to advance, 

interior of Missouri and threaten had teamed up to defeat Union Curtis would have to spread them 

St. Louis. In this way, Price muld forces at the Battle of Wilson's outso they couldforageoffthemunuse a comparatively small force to Creekon 10 August 1861 (seeMap tryside, which would expose them 

check a much larger one. I), the two frequently quarreled to a consolidated enemy force. If he 

Halleck realized that he must gu over authority and objectives. 'lb retreated to Springfield, Price 

on the offensive in Missouri and defuse the Price-McCulloch feud, would be free to re-enter Missouri. 

push the Missouri State Guard out Confederate President Jefferson Curtis decided to concentrate his 

of the state as quickly as possible. 

On 25 December, he placed Curtis 

in command of the Army of the 

1 

j 

Davis ordered Major General Earl 

Van Dorn to take command of all 

Confederate troops in Missouri 

forces in a defensive posture along 

Telegraph Road where it crossed 

Little Sugar Creek (see Map 2). 

Southwest and ordered him to andArkansas. Curtis told hiarmy to dig in along 

launch an offensive and defeat the 

Missouri State Guard. Once this 

was done, Halleck could take the 

/ 

On 14February, the Army ofthe 

Southwest started after Price, but 

he escaped Curtis'pursuit. In late 

the blufts, facing south and overlooking the creek It was a formidable defensive position. 

idle garrison tmps acrcss Missouri February and early March, Van 

and reinforce the river campaigns. 

Curtis' four-division army of 

12,000 soldiers left Rolla, Missouri, in mid-January 1862, 

Dorn ordered Price and McCulloch to unite forces, giving Van 

Dorn more than 15,000 soldiers. 

His plan was to attack and defeat 

Van Dorn's Plan

Not wanting to attack Curtis in this position, Van 

headed for Price's 7.000-pemon Curtis'anny and then advance to- Dorn ordered his already-tired 

army in Springfield. On 13 Febru- ward St. Louis. army to Camp Stephens, an old 

ary, Curtis was ready to attack Curtis faced a dilemma. He had Confederate camp a few miles 

Springfield; but Price had moved 

the Missouri State Guard southwest alongTelegraphRoad, trying 

/ 

i 

chased Price out of Missouri but 

had been unable to bring him to 

battle. Curtis' supply line was 

west of Curtis. They reached the 

camp in the afternoon of March 

6th, worn out from marching 

to reach Arkansas and Confederate reinforcements before Curtis 

could pursue and catch up. 

1

/ 

1 

stretched to its limit with supplies 

having to come from Rolla by 

wagon. After dropping off detachthrough the cold, wet weather. 

McCulloch suggested that the 

army rest overnight, then move 

44 Engineer December 1995 
along the Bentonville Detour to a 

position behind Curtis. This 

would force Curtis to either turn 

and fight at a disadvantage or 

try to retreat to Springfield. Van 

Dorn agreed to the plan but ordered the exhausted army to begin the movement immediately. 

McCulloch was shocked. He told 

Van Dorn "for God sake to let the 

poor, worn-out and hungry soldiers rest and sleep that night ... 

and then attack the next morning."2 Van Dorn disagreed and 

ordered the movement to begin. 

The Bentonville Detour went 

northeast from Camp Stephens for 

eight miles and intersected with 

Wegraph Road five miles north 

of-and behind-. Curtis' position 

(see Map 2). Van Dorn's march 

along the road would be hidden 

from Curtis' view by Big Mountain, a three-mile-long ridge extending from Telegraph Road on 

the east to Twelve Corner Church 

on the west. The Bentonville Detour ran along the north side of 

Big Mountain. 

Even though Van Dorn's plan 

was bold and brought his forces to 

Curtis' rear, there were risks involved. It meant that the exhausted Confederates had to 

march eight miles to Telegraph 

Road, turn south, march another 

two miles through difficult terrain 

to reach the open fields north of 

Curtis'position, and then possibly 

fight a major battle. IfVan Dorn's 

troops did not remain undetected, 

Curtis could turn his army and 

keep t,he Confederates bottled up 

in the rough terrain north and 

east of Big Mountain. Speed and 

surprise were critical to Van 

Dorn's plan. 

The Confederate plan had another problem. Apparently, Van 

Dorn failed to understand that 

Curtis was looking for a fight instead of trying to avoid one. A few 

days after the battle, Major Ross 

of the 6th Texas Cavalry wrote, 

"The truth of the whole matter 

was, General Van Dorn did not believe theFederals would fight him, 

but rather, that they would get 

away from him."' Ignoring McCulloch and the fact that his army 

was deteriorating, Van Dorn went 

ahead with the plan. 

In the meantime, the Federals 

had been busy An enemy force of 

unknown size at Camp Stephens 

made Curtis nervous. Curtis ordered the units on his right flank 

to face west and dig in. He also 

ordered the roads in his immediate rear kept clear so he could maneuver troops in case his right 

flank was threatened. When 

asked what would happen next, 

Curtis replied, 7 will either fight 

them tomorrow or they me."4 

"...Do It"

About sunset on 6 March, 

Colonel Grenville Dodge, 

one of Curtis' brigade commanders, suggested that the Bentonville Detour be blocked to prevent or delay Confederate 

movement around the Union position. Curtis told Dodge, "...go 

and do it."5 Dodge assembled six 

companies of the 4th Iowa Infantry and one company of the 3rd 

Illinois Cavally and headed north 

on Telegraph Road. By 2100 

hours, Dodge's detachment had 

turned onto the Bentonville Detour. Approximately one mile east 

of Twelve Corner Church, where 

the Bentonville Detour runs 

through a deep ravine, Dodge ordered his tmps to cut down trees 

and form an abatis across the narrow road (see Map 2). Then the 

soldiers moved back east toward 

Telegraph Road and created another obstacle across the detour, 

Around midnight, Dodge's pickets heard a great deal of noise on 

the west side of the first obstacle. 

Dodge gathered his makeshift engineers and returned to the main 

Union position along Little Sugar 

Creek. When Dodge reported to 

Curtis around 0200 hours on 7 

March, Curtis did not seem 

alarmed at Dodge's account of enemy activity along the Bentonville 

Detour. He thought that Dodge 

had heard only a Confederate 

scouting party Curtis believed 

that Van Dorn would spend the 

night at Camp Stephens-ince 

pickets had reported seeing hundreds of campfires burning--and 

either attack the Union position 

head on or on the flank on 7 

March. 

Van Dorn and his subordinates 

ended their meeting at Camp 

Stephens around 1800 hours on 6 

March. The march along Bentonville Detour was to begin at 2000 

hours. If all went according to 

plan, the Army of the West should 

cover the eight miles to Telegraph 

Road by dawn and as dawn broke, 

be in position along Telegraph 

Road to attack Curtis from the 

rear. Confederate troops stoked 

their campfires before moving, 

hoping to deceive the enemy into 

thinking they were spending the 

night at Camp Stephens. 

Things began to go wrong for 

Van Dorn from the beginning. He 

wanted Brigadier General James 

McIntosh's cavalry brigade in the 

front. But as McIntosh's cavalry 

tried to move up the road, its path 

was blocked by a horde of men and 

equipment. Somehow, Price's Missouri State Guard had formed up 

on the road ahead of McIntosh. 

Instead of having faster-moving 

cavalry scouting ahead of his 

march, Van Dorn was leading with 

a slow-moving mass of infantry 

and artillery 

By 2000 hours, most of the Confederate regiments were in column along the road, but they were 

plagued by disorganization, confusion, and dropping temperatures. 

Near the Bentonville Detour, 

troops were hampered by the lack 

of a bridge across Little Sugar 

Creek. Soldiers threw logs into the 

creek, broke ranks to cross the 

freezing water, and then reformed 

on the other side. It wasn't until 

2300 hours that the last of Price's 

men crossed the creek and started 

along the Bentonville Detour. 

Colonel Louis Hebert's infantry 

brigade came next, and about 

0200 hours on 7 March, McIntosh's cavalrymen, who were 
General Grenville M. Dodge 

supposed to be leading the march, 

crossed the creek. Around dawn, 

the last units of the army finally 

began to cross. 

The unbridged Little Sugar 

Creek was not the last obstacle 

that Van Dorn's tired and cold soldiers had to contend with. About 

midnight, the head of Price's column found the maze of trees felled 

by Dodge's makeshift engineers. 

The entire column waited as the 

Missouri State Guard cleared the 

road. After a two-hour delay, the 

advance began again, only to find 

a second abatis farther down the 

road. Two more hours were lost 

while the Guard cleared the road 

once more. At dawn, when Van 

Dorn planned to have his entire 

force assembled on Telegraph 

Road, the head of his column was 

just reaching the Telegraph Road 

intersection, while the tail was 

still at Camp Stephens. 

Not only was Van Dorn falling 

behind schedule, his army was 

falling apart also. The hard march 

to Camp Stephens, the cold 

weather, a shortage of food, and 

the lack of rest were causing Van 

Dorn to lase his numerical superiority A Texas cavalry officer 

wrote, '%very half mile I saw infantry in squads of 50 or 60, and 

even more lying on the roadside, 

asleep and overcome with hunger 

and fatigue."6 

The Battle

At 0700 hours on 7 March, 

Missouri State Guard cavalry turned off the Bentonville 

Detour onto Telegraph Road and 

began moving south. Not a Yankee 

was in sight. Van Dorn's plan had 

worked; he had deceived Curtis 

and was now behind him. But Van 

Dorn's forces were spread out, and 

it would be well into the afiernoon 

before he could consolidate his mlumn, giving Curtis plenty of time 

to detect him and read.Van Dorn 

had to find a way to unite his 

army quickly. 

Van Dorn, traveling near the 

head of the column with Price, decided to divide the army Price's 

Missouri State Guard would turn 

south off the Bentonville Detour 

onto Telegraph Road and advance 

two and a half miles to Elkhorn 

Tavern (see Map 2). McCulloch's 

Confederate division would leave 

the Bentonville Detour at Twelve 

Corners Church and turn south on 

Ford Road, uniting with Price's 

forces at Elkhorn Tavern. Ford 

Road lay along the south side of Big 

Mountain and intersected Telegraph Road just south of Elkhorn 

Tavern. By taking Ford Road instead of the Bentonville Detour, 

McCulloch would march only three 

and a half miles instead of seven 

McCulloch received the orders 

after the head of his column had 

passed Twelve Corner Church. He 

ordered a time-consuming countermarch to Ford Road. As he traveled down the column of cold, 

weary soldiers, he said, 'We are 

I!

! 	 going to take 'em on the other 

i 	 wing."7 It was well into the morni 	 ing before McCulloch's troop fiI 	 nally turned south on Ford Road. 

i 	 Just before noon, the head of his 

I 	 column was two and a half miles 

~ from Elkhorn Tavern. Van Dorn 

! was about an hour away fmm unit1 ing his army at the tavern. 

Van Dorn's army was in a pre- 

; 	 carious situation. The two halves 

i 	 were separated by Big Mountain 

I 	 and each half was smaller than 

Curtis' entire force. But Van Dorn 

1 	 was confident that Curtis had not 

detected his movement and that 

by the time Curtis did notice him 

and react, the two halves would be 

reunited at Elkhorn Tavern. 

December I995 
But theYankees hadalready ob- 1 the firing fmm the 36th Illinois, 1 Confederate withdrawal, believserved the Confederate force and 1 Hebert took it as the signal to at- / ing that Van Dorn was retreating 

werereacting. At 0800 hours, Cur- i tack. He led his command of four I northward up Telegraph Road 

tis'prowst marshal reported Con- infantry regiments into arriving I along the route of his advance 

federate cavalry north of Elkhorn Union reinforcements and, after i the day before, and ordered the 

Tavern, and a scouting party had some initial sucoess, hisattack was pursuit northward. What was 

seen Confederate infantry on the broken up and he was captured. Be- left of Van Dorn's army slipped 

Bentonville Detour near Twelve cause of the deaths or capture of the i away to the east. 

Corner Church. By 1100 hours, three Confederate commanders, The Battle of Pea Ridge was a 

Curtis had Colonel Peter J Oster McCullaeh'sdivisionnever wasable 1 tactical draw. Van Dorn had 

haus' troops moving toward the 1 to bring its superior numbers to i turned Curtis' superior position, 

church to develop the situation. 1 bear on Osterhaus. j but Curtis was able to keep him 

He also had Colonel Eugene A. ' Late in the day, McCulloch's di- i from massing the Confederate 

Carr's division moving toward , vision, now commanded by Colo- ; Army. The Union Army suffered 

Elkhorn Tavern. Curtis believed i nel Elkanah Greer, returned to approximately 1,400 casualties in 

he was facing two Confederate Twelve Corner Church. Some of the battle. Confederate losses 

forces: one at Camp Stephens pre- the Confederate soldiers returned 1 were hard to establish and may 

paring to attack and another on to Camp Stephens while others never be known, but they were at 

the Bentonville Detour trying to took the Bentonville Detour, try- least as high as the Union's and 

get around his right flank. 1 ing to find Van Dorn and the rest probably higher. 

Just before noon, near the vil- j of the army, Strategically, the battle was a 

lage of Leetown, Osterhaus' sol- j While Osterhaus held off 1 Union victory Curtis used the batdiem met with McCulloch's ml- ; McCulloch's unorganized attack, tle to regain the initiative and 

umn. McCulloch, who had the 1 Carr earned a Medal of Honor for 1 moved his army intooentral Arkansuperior numbers, quickly seized keeping the larger Missouri State ! sas. Van Dorn's commander, Genthe initiative and prepared to at- Guard in the rough terrain north ; eral Albert S. Johnston, ordered 

tack Osterhaus' force. Osterhaus, of Elkhorn 'Ihvern. By using artil- 1 Van Dorn's soldiers to reinforce 

realizing he was facing a signifi- i lery early in the fight and small i Confederate tmps in Mississippi. 

cant part of the Confederate force, counterattacks at critical mo- ; Eventhoughskinnishingand bushasked Curtis for reinforcements. , ments and by bending back his i whackingcontinued in Missouri for 

Meanwhile, in the rough terrain I right flank, Carr kept Price and j another three years, Missouri was 

north of Elkhorn Tavern, Cam ran i Van Dorn off balance most of the securely in Union hands. 

into t,he Missouri State Guard. afternoon. It wasn't until late in I 

Curtis soon realized that the en- the day that Van Dorn was able to obstacle ~~~~~~~i~~ tire Confederate army had moved mass the larger Missouri State 

to his rear. He told Carr to conduct Guard against Can and drive him Van Dorn's turning movean emnomy-of-force mission and 1 away from Elkhorn Tavern. But by ment along the Bentontry to keep the Missouri State then it was too late; the sun was / ville D~~~~~faltered for a num. 

Guard from breaking through gone, Union reinforcements were her of reasons: poor staff work, 

while most of the army went to ! arriving, and McCulloch wasn't tired soldiers, and quick reaction 

Leetown to support Osterhaus. coming to help. 1 from Union forces. However, After helping Osterhaus, the army That night the Union Army, re- ~ ~ obstacles d may ~ have b been 

would move to assist Carr. supplied fmm their wagons, de- the most important reason since 

McCulloch's forces prepared ployed to deliver the decisive blow they cost van D~~~ four hours 

to attack Osterhaus, McCulloch against Van Dorn, who was unable and caused him to divide his 

moved forward with the 16th AT- I to resupply because his supply 

kansas Infantly Regiment on a wagons were still at Camp What factors did Curtis and 

personal reconnaissance and was , stephem, Dodge consider at Pea Ridge that 

killed by skirmishers of the 36th i are still important to obstacle 

Illinois Infantry Regiment. Briga- I 

Victory planners today? One of the most 

dier General McIntosh assumed : important aspects of obstacle 

command and advanced with the 1 

2nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles, but 

n 8 March, realizing he 1 planning is the engineer battlethe lsth 

was almost out of ammu- 

, 

field assessment (analysis of terskirmishers ' nition, Van Dorn ordered his rain and enemy and friendly him : army to retreat eastward. Just I forces). Certainly, both Curtis and 

On the He- : as the Confederates were leav- Dodge considered the terrain and 

bert~ he never learned ing, Curtis attacked. He misin- possible avenues of approach 

that he was in command. Hearing I terpreted the direction of the when they discussed creating 

December 1995 Engineer 47 
An abatis such as this was used in the Battle of Pea Ridge. 

obstacles along the Bentonville 

Detour. Dodge took the terrain 

into consideration when he decided to chop down the trees in the 

two deep ravines. They also considered the fact that the enemy's 

tactics would likely include an envelopment or turning movement. 

The choice of abatis as obstacles 

was probably based on the amount 

of time and friendly assets (infantry with hand tools) available and 

an analysis of the Confederate's 

assets (infantry with hand tools). 

Today's army would classify 

Dodge's obstacles as reinforcing 

obstacles. FM 90-7 states, '%inforcingohstacles are obstacles specifically constructed, emplaced, or 

detonated by military forces. The 

categories of reinforcing obstacles 

are tactical and protective."8 

Dodge's obstacle would best be described as a tactical obstacles because they attack enemy maneuver 

According to FM 90-7, "Tactical ohstacles directly attack the enemy's 

ability to move, mass, and reinThis is what Curtis and 

Dodge were trying to do. They 

wanted the obstacles to delay any 

Confederate units that were using 

the Bentonville Detour to move 

around the Union right flank. 

FM 90-7 explains, "Obstacle intent is how the commander wants 

to use tactical obstacles to support 

his scheme of maneuver."lo Obstacle intent consists of three components; target, effect, and relative 

location. Curtis and Dodge must 

have also considered these things. 

The target of an obstacle is the 

enemy force that the commander 

wants to affect with the tactical 

obstacle. Commanders usually 

identify the target in terms of size, 

type of enemy force, echelon, the 

avenue of approach, or a combination of these. Curtis and Dodge 

simply targeted any size Confederate force attempting to use the 

avenue of approach defined by the 

Bentonville Detour. 

The effect that a commander 

wants the obstacle to have on the 

enemy is called the obstacle effect. 

Tactical obstacles produce one of 

four effects; disrupt, turn, fix, or 

block. Curtis probably intended 

the obstacle to disrupt the Confederates. According to FM 90-7, "The 

disrupt effect focuses ... obstacle 

effort to cause the enemy to break 

up its formation and tempo, interrupt its timetable and piecemeal the attack."" '" 

Dodge's obstacles could not possibly have stopped a determined 

Confederate movement, but they 

certainly could, and did, interrupt 

the Confederate timetable and 

disrupted Van Dorn's command 

and control. Curtis probably did 

not want to block Confederate 

movement. Evidence of this is that 

he did not cover the obstacles with 

fire. If he had wanted to deny the 

Confederates use of the road, he 

probably would have deployed 

forces at the obstacles. 

Relative location of an obstacle 

refers to where the commander 

wants the obstacle to affect the 

enemy Curtis was not specific 

about this aspect which allowed 

Dodge to choose the best location 

for the obstacles based on his 

ground reconnaissance. 

FM 90-7 emphasizes the importance of integratingfires and obstacles: "All leaders must understand 

how obstacles and fires mesh to 

achieve the obstacle effect."12 

Dodge's obstacles were not covered 

by fire, yet they seemed to be effeo 

tive for a number of reasons. 

First of all, the Confederates 

failed to conduct a reconnaissance. 

Due to poor staff work and the 

condition of Van Dorn's troops, 

Missouri State Guard units led 

the advance instead of McIntosh's 

cavalry brigade. Had Van Dorn led 

with cavalry, they might have discovered the obstacles, allowing 

him to plan how to deal with them. 

Van Dorn might have even decided 

to turn the entire force at Twelve 

Corner Church instead of just 

McCulloch's division. This would 

have completely changed the nature of the battle. 

Another reason the obstacles 

were effective was that they were 

deployed in depth. By using two 

December 1995 
-

obstacles instead of one, Dodge 

forced Van Dorn to stop and restart his column twice. Stopping 

and restarting movements is difficult for even the best staff. After 

working hard for two hours clearing an obstacle, imagine the impact on morale of coming across 

another obstacle two miles later. 

Of course, the location of the obstacles increased their effectiveness. Dodge chose natural choke 

points-where the road ran 

through deep ravines. The steep 

sides of the ravines made it very 

hard, if not impossible, for Van 

Dorn's soldiers to leave the road, 

march around the obstacle, and 

return to the road on the other 

side. It probably would have 

taken just as long to struggle 

around the obstacles as it would 

have to breach them. 

Major General Franz Sigel, one 

of Curtis' division commanden, 

summed up the Battle of Pea 

Ridge very appropriately: 

It was not a great battle, like that 

of Gettysburg or Chattanooga; it 

wasnotof such preponderating national in~portance; it did not break 

the backbone of the Rebellion, but it 

virtually cleared the Southwest of 

theenemy...and made itpossible for 

our vetemns to reinforce thearmies 

under Buell Rosecrans, Grant, and 

her man "' 

Dodge's obstacles obviously 

played a key role in the Union vie 

tory As Napoleon wrote, "A battle 

sometimes decides everything, and 

sometimes the most triflin ,Athing 

decides the fate of a battle. w 


MI: McFarland is the militaiy history 

instructor for the Engineer Officer 

Basic and Advance Courses at the 

US. A~my Engineer School. He also 

conducts staff rides to Mlson's Creek 

and Pea Ridge National Battlef~lds. 

MI: McFarland was a Park Ranger 

with the National Park Service for 10 

yea~s. He is a gincluate of Eastern Illinois University. 

Maps reprinted from Wdliam L. Shea 

and Earl J. Hess, Pea Rid8e: Civil War 

Cornpaignin the West.Copyright O 1992by 

the University of North Carolina Press. 

Used by permission of the publisher. 

December I995 

Endnotes 

Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr., Editor. 

Dictionay of Military and Naval 

Quotations. Annapolis: U.S. Naval 

Institute, 1966, p. 26. 

Shea, William and Earl Hew. 

Pea Ridge, Civil War Campaign in 

the West. Chapel Hill: University of 

North Carolina Press, 1992, p. 80. 

Shea, p.82. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

Shea, p.86. 

Shea, p.87. 

Department of the Army. FM 

90-7: Combined Anns Obstacle Integruzion. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

1994, p. 2-1. 

Department of the Army, p. 2-2. 

'O~epartmentof the Amy, p. 2-4. 

I' Ibid. 

I2~epartmentof the Amy, p. 3-2. 

I3~ughes,Michael."A Forgotten 

Battle in a Region Ignored, Pea 

Ridge of Elkhorn 'Bvern, Arkansas, March 7-8, 1862: The Campaign, the Battle, and the Men Who 

Fought for the Fate of Missouri." 

Blue and Gray Magazine January 

1988, p. 32. 

l4Heinl, p. 26. 

Reference 

U.S. War Department. The War 

of the Rebellion: A Compilation of 

the Official Records of the Union 

and Confederate Armies. 70 volumes, Washington, D.C., 1880- 

1901. 

(Continued from page 16) 

Understanding. The engineer community is not fully 

trained about EBA. Many 

units gloss over the importance of EBA, and this weakness is immediately apparent 

when they go to the Combat 

Training Centers. Units must 

consistently use the intelligence NCO and the EBA process during all exercises. To 

increase the effectiveness of 

the brigade combat team, the 

intelligence NCO, the assistant brigade engineer, and 

the brigade S2 sections must 

find ways to train together 

frequently. 

Conclusion 

The EBA is a continuous 

process that requires frequent updating from the time a 

mission is received until it is 

accomplished. The EBA must 

be adjusted based on information from both higher and lower 

echelons. Initially, the EBA is 

part of the situation report in 

the mission analysis brief to the 

commander. The EBMPB and 

the situation ternplatelmost 

likely course of action drive the 

planning process from start to 

finish. When executed poorly or 

not at all, the EBA and the parallel planning process hinder 

even the best plan. When they 

are executed well, the processes complement each other 

and ensure mission accomplishment on the battlefield. w 

Michael W. Sayer is a military 

analyst for the Sidewinder Engineer Battalwn Trainers, Operations Group, National Training 

Center, Fort Irwin, California. He 

recently retired from active duty 

after spending two years as the 

inielligence NCO for the 4th Engineer Battalwn at Fort Carson, 

Colorado. 
E-9 

Enlisted Insignia of the United States Armed Forces 

E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 

AIR FORCE 

ARMY 

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Private Clsna Firat Sageant Stan Sageant Flrst Sagsant Command Major Sageant 01 Majwthe 

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MARINES 

Private Private Lance Cwposl Sageant Staff Gunnay First Sageant Sageant 


First Cwprxal Sageant Sageant Sergeant Majw Majw 


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Master Masta 

Sergeant Gunnery 

sagssnt 

Seaman 

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Seaman P-Y 

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Chief 

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P~Y 

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50 Engineer December 1995 
Officer Insignia of the United States Armed Forces 


AIR FORCE 


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Sroml First Lleuienant BrIBadia 

Lieuteaant Llautmam Major Cdonel Cdonel Genaal 

ARMY 

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Sscmd Ueutanant , Brigadier First Caplain "lor ~olonei Colond General ~iautenant ~autenant 

MARINES 

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Seccnd Flrst Lieutenant Captain Ma'or ~eutenant ~eutenant colonel "d'::~;

NAVY 

WARRANT 

Warrant Officer Chief Warrant Chief Warrant Chief Warrant 

Wd Officer W-2 Officer W-3 Officer W-4 

I I I r n I I r n 

NAVY 

The Air Force does not have warrant officers. 

December 1995 

Melor Lieutenant 

General Genaal 

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Malor Ueutsnant 

General General 

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Malor Lieutenant 

General Genaal 

Chief Warrant 


Officer W-5 


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COAST GUARD 

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Engineer 51 
ENGINEER UPDATE 


Directorate of Training and 

Doctrine (DOTD) 

Directorate of Combat 


Developments (DCD) 


COTS Blasting Machine 

Commerclal numters are (314)563.xrrx and Defense System 

heworn (DSN) numoers are 676.nxx .nless otherwise noted 

New Fleld Manuals (FMs). Four FMs were distributed in October: 

- FM 5-10, Combat Engineer Platoon, is a companion manual for FM 

5-34 that describes how the engineer platoon supports the total 

combined-arms effort. 

- FM 5-125, Rigging, addresses the types of rigging and the 

applications of fiber rope, wire rope, and chains used to move heavy 

loads. 

- FM 5-426, Carpentry, is a guide for engineers responsible for 

planning and executing theater-of-operations construction. 

-FM 5-71 -3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored), is a 

guide for brigade engineers, their staffs, and subordinate commanders. 

POC is Sandra Gibson, -4100. 

New Army nalning and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs). Three 

ARTEPs distributed in October provide programs to train units in their 

criiical wartime missions: 

- ARTEP 5-402-33-MTP, Mission Training Plan for Engineer Groups 

and Brigades. 

- ARTEP 5-41 3-33-MTP, Mission Training Plan for Engineer Support 


Companies. 


- ARTEP 5-500-24-MTP, Mission Training Plan for Engineer Diving 


Teams - Heavy Engineer Diving TeamILight Engineer Diving Team. 


POC is Rayburn Toy, -4102. 

Commerclal Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Blastlng Mchlne. The new 

CD450-4J blasting machine to replace the current M-34 will be available 

in January 1996. Units will be able to requisition this item through 

normal supply channels using the assigned NSN 1375-01-41 7-7104. 

The item manager reports that back-order requisitions for M-34s will be 

filled initially with this item;follow-on requisitions will be filled after all 

back orders are filled. POC is Larry Allen. -4080. 

Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) Attachments. Fielding of a 

boom-mounted earth auger for the SEE began in April 1995 and will be 

completed in February 1996. This auger provides engineer units the 

capability to bore holes 6 feet deep and 12 inches across. Units can also 

purchase a boom-mounted pavement breaker and a tamperlcompactor. 

Afront-mounted rotary sweeper and a snow-blade attachment have 

been approved for use.The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments 

Command is completing a Technical Data Package List of all attachments that will be available soon. It will include drawings, instructions, 

and suggested manufacturers for equipment procurement. POC is 

Cathy Pryor, -6185. 

December 1995 
'- L BRIDGE - ---, 

THE GAP

By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, JK 

U.S.Army Engineer School 

Physical Fitness and NCO Professional Development 

"The best form of "we1fare"for the troops is first-class 

training, for this saves unnecessary casualties." 

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel 

Since enrollment requirements for attendance at 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES) courses changed in April 1995, many 

eyebrows at the Engineer Center and throughout the 

Army have been raised in concern. Department of the 

Army message, DTG 081 6502, March 95, subject: APFT 

Height and Weight Requirements, states that soldiers 

must pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) and 

meet heightlweight requirements prior to enrollment in 

NCOES courses. 

Senior Army leaders are concerned because many 

NCOs fail to meet these requirements. Since April, 

Engineer Center records show that 31 soldiers enrolling 

in the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), 

15 enrolling in the Basic NCO Course (BNCOC), and 7 

enrolling in the Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) failed 

to meet entry requirements. Those soldiers were denied 

training and returned to their units--with their units 

absorbing the temporary duty (TDY) expenses. 

These figures should be zero! They cause us to 

question the physical condition of engineer soldiers and 

the physical fitness standards upheld in units. When we 

must return soldiers to their units, it directly impacts the 

soldiers' careers and indirectly impacts their units' 

readiness. It sends a clear message that the soldier and 

the unit are not upholding the standards outlined in Army 

regulations. 

Notlce: In accordance with the Department of the 

Army (DA) message dated March 1995, the Commandant of the Libby NCO Academy must forward a letter of 

release to the first general officer in the student's chain 

of command. This policy was established by DA and is 

strictly enforced at Fort Leonard Wood. We are the 

leaders who must send soldiers who do not meet enrollment requirements back to their units, but we are not 

the "bad guys" some call us. The Engineer Center is 

committed to helping soldiers succeed1 

The leadership in our corps must prepare soldiers for 

NCOES schooling. First-line leaders and commanders 

December 1995 

are responsible for helping young NCOs better prepare 

for their careers and provide time for them to prepare for 

schooling. Many students arriving at the Engineer Center 

say they had only a week's notice, or less, before reporting to school. This is not the way to take care of 

soldiers. 

To improve NCOES entry rates, first-line leaders must 

take time to know their soldiers'strengths and weaknesses 

and then provide training to overcome the weaknesses. 

This stragegy will prepare soldiers for successful entry to 

NCOES courses--and for the demands they will face on 

the battlefield. 

TTalnlng Strategy: The following suggestions will help 

prepare soldiers for NCOES courses. 

- Ensure that soldiers scheduled to attend schools are 

mentally and physically prepared. 

- Give a thorough physical fitness test, to Army 

standards, 30 days prior to the soldiers' report date 

Send only those who pass to the course. 

-When necessary, administer a tape test and counsel 

soldiers on the weight-control policies outlined in AR 

600-9. Do this long before soldiers with potential weight 

problems must report. Failure to meet the standards 

outlined in AR 600-9 affects school attendance and is 

detrimental to the career potential of othemise outstanding 

soldiers. 

- Set a positive example for your soldiers. Make and 

take time to counsel, train, and lead by example. 

Soldiers expect and desire strong role models who 

uphold strong Army standards and traditions. 

- Discuss with your soldiers their responsibiltiy to be 

strong and to stay strong, The bottom line is that 

soldiers must assume responsibility for their physical 

fitness. 

NCOs in the Engineer Regiment must invest more 

time in training high-quality soldiers--those who are 

prepared to meet any challenge at a moment's notice. 

We must maintain our great NCO Corps. Regiment and, 

above all, our great Army. 

Engineer 53