United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 23, 2019

Decided October 23, 2019

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 18-2772

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CALVIN WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 16-cr-30036

Sue E. Myerscough,

Judge.

O R D E R

Calvin Williams pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting a child, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2251(a), and waived his right to appeal all issues relating to the plea agreement, 

conviction, and sentence. The district court later denied Williams’s motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea and imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment and 

10 years’ supervised release. Williams appeals, but his lawyer moves to withdraw from 

the appeal, arguing that it is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In 

moving to withdraw, counsel explains the nature of the case and addresses the potential 

issues that this kind of appeal might involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears 

thorough and Williams has not responded to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18-2772 Page 2

limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 

776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel first considers whether Williams could challenge the district court’s 

denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but she does not tell us whether

Williams wants to challenge his plea. If counsel did not consult Williams and advise 

him of the risks of withdrawing his plea, she should have done so before submitting her

Anders motion. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United 

States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Even so, we need not reject counsel’s brief because the plea transcript shows that 

the district court complied with all requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

11, and therefore a challenge to the plea would be pointless. See Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349.

During the plea colloquy, the court explained the nature of the charge, the statutory 

penalties (not less than 15 years’ imprisonment and up to 30, see 18 U.S.C. § 2551(e)), the 

sentence stipulated in the plea agreement, the trial rights Williams would waive by 

entering his guilty plea, and the nature of the appeal waiver to which he agreed. 

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The court also ensured that Williams’s guilty plea did not 

result from threats or promises other than those in the agreement, and that Williams

entered the plea because he committed the alleged acts. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2), (3).

Likewise, as counsel appropriately concludes, an argument that the district court 

abused its discretion by not allowing Williams to withdraw his plea would be fruitless.

Williams had moved to withdraw the guilty plea on six grounds, each of which the 

district court gave sound reasons for rejecting. First, Williams argued that his 

depression prohibited him from understanding the plea colloquy. But the court 

properly concluded that, despite his history of depression, Williams understood the 

change-of-plea proceedings and his guilty plea. In response to the court’s questions 

during the plea colloquy, for instance, Williams stated that he had not seen a 

psychiatrist at any time for a mental disorder, that he felt physically well, and that he 

understood the nature of the hearing—all statements that are “entitled to a presumption 

of verity.” See United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2015). The court also 

appropriately rejected Williams’s second argument—that he wanted to go to trial to 

prove his innocence. Williams’s bald assertion of innocence is frivolous in the face of his

admissions—both during the plea colloquy and later at the hearing to withdraw his 

plea—regarding the sexually exploitive conduct that underlie his charge.

See United States v. Hodges, 259 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2001). As for Williams’s third 

argument—that the presentence investigation report contained inaccuracies—the court 
No. 18-2772 Page 3

appropriately concluded that they too did not justify allowing Williams to withdraw his

plea. An objection to a fact in the PSR that does not bear on the defendant’s sentence is 

not a valid reason for withdrawing a plea. See United States v. Redmond, 667 F.3d 863, 873

(7th Cir. 2012). Williams argued, fourth, that he should not have to register as a sex 

offender, but this too the court properly rejected because Williams offered no evidence 

that this condition of supervised release is unfair. An argument that a defendant “does 

not believe” he should have to register, and other conclusory arguments like it, is

insufficient to justify the withdrawal of a plea. See Collins, 796 F.3d at 834. Similarly, the 

court was correct to brush aside Williams’s fifth argument—challenging the 

constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2551(a) on grounds that Illinois did not criminalize the 

underlying conduct—because Illinois and the United States are separate sovereigns.

See United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 897 (7th Cir. 2008). As for Williams’s final 

argument that similarly situated defendants have received lesser sentences than he, the 

district court properly rejected it because the statutory minimum for his conviction was 

fifteen years’ imprisonment. 

Counsel next considers whether Williams could challenge his conviction or 

sentence but correctly concludes that his broad appeal waiver would foreclose that 

challenge. In his plea agreement, Williams waived the right “to appeal any and all 

issues relating to this plea agreement and conviction and to the sentence....” We enforce 

waivers of the right to appeal if the underlying plea was knowing and voluntary and 

complied with Rule 11, see United States v. Kilcrease, 665 F.3d 924, 927, 929 (7th Cir. 

2012),

, and we already have determined that a challenge to the plea would be frivolous. 

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.