[Cite as Hammond v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 2011-Ohio-2635.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

LISA HAMMOND 

 Appellant 

 v. 

AKRON METROPOLITAN HOUSING 

AUTHORITY 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 25425 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CV 2009-10-7364 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: June 1, 2011 

 

 CARR, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Lisa Hammond, appeals from a judgment of the Summit County Court 

of Common Pleas that affirmed the decision of the Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority 

(“AMHA”) to terminate her housing subsidy because she violated the program rules. This Court 

affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} In February 2007, Lisa Hammond began receiving a monthly housing subsidy 

through the federal “Section 8” Housing Choice Voucher Program. As part of her eligibility to 

receive the subsidy, Hammond listed herself as the only adult residing in the subsidized unit and 

agreed to abide by certain rules, which included a requirement that she provide true and complete 

information to AMHA and that she receive written approval from AMHA before any other adult 

was permitted to stay in her unit more than four consecutive days or for more than 15 days in a 

12-month period. Her agreement with AMHA further provided that she understood that her 
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subsidy could be cancelled for her failure to comply with any of the enumerated family 

obligations. 

{¶3} Through a letter dated March 11, 2009, AMHA notified Hammond of its intention 

to cancel her housing subsidy because she had violated certain family obligations by allowing an 

unauthorized adult named Dalton Snow to reside in her subsidized unit. Hammond admitted that 

Snow frequently visited her unit, but denied that he ever resided with her. Following an informal 

hearing, the hearing officer found that Hammond had violated the enumerated family obligations 

by allowing Snow to reside with her and that her subsidy was properly terminated. Hammond 

appealed that decision to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the 

decision to terminate her housing subsidy. Hammond appeals to this Court and raises three 

assignments of error, which will be consolidated and rearranged for ease of discussion. 

III. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

“THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND 

ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND THAT AMHA 

VIOLATED MS. HAMMONDS’ RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS BY 

IMPROPERLY PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON HER AT THE 

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING RATHER THAN ON AMHA.” 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

“THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND 

ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE HEARING 

OFFICER’S DECISION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 

A FINDING THAT MS. HAMMOND VIOLATED A FAMILY 

OBLIGATION.” 

{¶4} Hammond’s second and third assignments of error are that the trial court erred in 

affirming the decision of the hearing officer because it was not supported by the evidence 
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presented at the hearing and was in violation of her right to due process because it improperly 

placed the burden of proof on her, rather than AMHA. 

{¶5} We begin by emphasizing the deferential standard under which we review an 

administrative appeal. Although the trial court is required to consider “the ‘whole record,’ 

including any new or additional evidence admitted under R.C. 2506.03, [to determine] whether 

the administrative order is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or 

unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence,” this Court’s 

review is even more deferential to the decision of the administrative body. Henley v. 

Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147. This Court is required to 

affirm the decision of the trial court unless it determines “as a matter of law, that the decision of 

the common pleas court is not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and 

substantial evidence.” Kisil v. Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34; see, also, R.C. 2506.04. 

{¶6} AMHA presented evidence that Hammond had listed herself as the only adult 

residing in the subsidized unit and never sought or obtained permission from AMHA to add 

another adult household member. As part of Hammond’s eligibility to receive her housing 

subsidy, she agreed to abide by certain rules, called “Family Obligations,” which included 

number 4, that all information she supplied to AMHA “must be true and complete” and number 

11, which provided in part that “the composition of the assisted family residing in the unit must 

be approved by the [Public Housing Agency, ‘PHA’]” and “[t]he family must request, in writing, 

PHA approval to add any other family member as an occupant of the unit.” Family Obligation 

number 20-C provided that “[a]ny adult not included on the [HUD Form] 50058 who has been in 

the unit more than four consecutive days, or a total of 15 days in a 12-month period, will be 

considered to be living in the unit as an unauthorized household member.” 
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{¶7} She signed the Family Obligations on October 21, 2008, directly below a 

statement that read, “I have read and been given the opportunity to discuss HUD’s revised family 

obligation. I understand that AMHA is authorized to cancel housing assistance to my family for 

failure to comply with the above mentioned Family Obligations.” Hammond was also given a 

copy of this agreement. 

{¶8} Federal regulations governing the Housing Choice Voucher Program require the 

opportunity for an informal hearing to determine whether the agency’s decision to terminate 

assistance is in accordance with law. 24 C.F.R. Section 982.555(a)(1)(v). The regulations 

further provide that “[t]he administrative plan must state the PHA procedures for conducting 

informal hearings for [Housing Choice Voucher Program] participants.” 24 C.F.R. Section 

982.555(e)(1). The “Visitors” section of AMHA’s Administrative Plan provided, in relevant 

part: 

“Any adult not included on the HUD 50058 who has been in the unit more than 4 

consecutive days without PHA approval, or a total of 15 days in a 12-month 

period, will be considered to be living in the unit as an unauthorized household 

member. 

“Absence of evidence of any other address will be considered verification that the 

visitor is a member of the household. 

“ *** 

“Use of the unit address as the visitor’s current residence for any purpose that is 

not explicitly temporary shall be construed as permanent residence.” 

{¶9} AMHA presented evidence that Snow resided in Hammond’s unit on an ongoing 

basis. An AMHA police officer testified that AMHA had received a complaint from Snow’s 

mother that Snow was residing in Hammond’s unit in violation of Hammond’s agreement with 

AMHA. His investigation included going to the apartment on December 8, 2008, and speaking 

with Hammond. Hammond admitted that Snow had lived with her, but that he had since moved 
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out because he was incarcerated due to domestic violence against her. On January 9, 2009, the 

officer verified with the post office that Snow had been using Hammond’s address as his mailing 

address. Aside from Hammond testifying that she tried to keep Snow away and he kept coming 

back, she admitted that he had been her boyfriend and that he had stayed over at her apartment 

approximately one or two nights per week over a period of several months while they were 

together. She also admitted that she allowed him to use her address as his mailing address. 

Given the evidence presented at the hearing, this Court cannot say, “as a matter of law, that the 

decision of the common pleas court is not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative 

and substantial evidence.” Kisil, supra. 

{¶10} Next, Hammond argues that her due process rights were violated because the 

hearing officer placed the burden on her to prove that Snow was a visitor, and not an 

unauthorized household member. Hammond did not raise this issue at her administrative hearing 

but raised it for the first time in her appeal to the court of common pleas. 

{¶11} Moreover, the “Visitors” section of the AMHA’s Administrative Plan further 

provided, in relevant part: 

“The burden of proof that the individual is a visitor rests on the family. In the 

absence of such proof, the individual will be considered an unauthorized member 

of the household and the PHA will terminate assistance since prior approval was 

not requested for the addition.” 

{¶12} Hammond relies on the case of Basco v. Martin (C.A.11, 2008), 514 F.3d 1177, 

1182, in which the court held that, despite such language in an administrative plan, the housing 

authority “must initially present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case” that the 

recipient of the subsidy violated the family obligations in a manner that justified termination and 

that “[t]hereafter, the Section 8 participant has the burden of production to show ‘that the 

individual is a visitor.’” Id. Because the evidence supporting the termination of Basco’s subsidy 
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consisted merely of two unauthenticated hearsay documents that an unauthorized adult had been 

present in her subsidized unit, the court found that her due process rights had been violated. Id. 

{¶13} In this case, unlike the situation in Basco, AMHA presented ample evidence to 

make a prima facie showing that Snow was an unauthorized adult who had stayed at Hammond’s 

residence on an ongoing basis, which was sufficient to create a presumption that he was residing 

there. Hammond did not dispute that Snow was not authorized to reside in her apartment, that he 

spent the night there on a regular basis, or that he received his mail at her address. 

{¶14} Although Hammond suggests that she was given no opportunity to refute the 

evidence presented by AMHA, the record reveals that she was allowed to testify, present a 

witness, cross-examine each AMHA witness, and was given the opportunity to file a posthearing brief. She had the opportunity to rebut AMHA’s evidence, but failed to present any 

evidence that Snow was merely a visitor instead of an unauthorized household member. She has 

failed to demonstrate that the manner in which the hearing officer conducted the hearing 

deprived her of her right to due process. Hammonds’s second and third assignments of error are 

overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

“THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND 

ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND THAT 

AMHA’S DECISION WAS UNLAWFUL AND VIOLATED LISA’S RIGHTS 

UNDER THE FEDERAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, 42 USC § 

1437(f).” 

{¶15} Hammond’s first assignment of error is that the trial court erred by failing to find 

that AMHA’s decision to cancel her subsidy violated her rights under the federal Violence 

Against Women Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. Section 1437f(c)(9)(C)(i), which provides that 

“[c]riminal activity directly relating to domestic violence *** engaged in by a member of the 
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tenant’s household or any guest *** shall not be cause for termination of assistance *** if the 

tenant *** is the victim *** of that domestic violence[.]” 42 U.S.C. Section 1437f(c)(9)(C)(iv) 

further provides: 

“Nothing in clause (i) limits any otherwise available authority of *** the public 

housing agency to terminate assistance to a tenant for any violation of a lease not 

premised on the act or acts of violence in question *** provided that the owner or 

manager does not subject an individual who is or has been a victim of domestic 

violence *** to a more demanding standard than other tenants in determining 

whether to evict or terminate.” 

{¶16} Hammond argues that the evidence established that she was the victim of 

domestic violence perpetrated against her by Dalton Snow and that AMHA improperly 

terminated her subsidy due to that violence. Again, the record reveals that Hammond did not 

raise this issue at her administrative hearing. 

{¶17} The record also demonstrates that, unlike the case upon which she relies, Metro 

North Owners, LLC v. Thorpe (2008), 870 N.Y.S.2d 768, in which a woman lost her Section 8 

subsidy because repeated acts of domestic violence had disturbed others in and around the 

building, Hammond’s subsidy was not terminated due to an incident or incidents of domestic 

violence. Although Hammond testified that she had been the victim of violence during her 

relationship with Snow and that she had called for police intervention on more than one 

occasion, no other evidence about the domestic violence incidents, police reports, or resulting 

charges against Snow was presented at the hearing. 

{¶18} There was no evidence to suggest that any incidents of violence between Snow 

and Hammond had prompted AMHA to investigate Snow’s presence in her apartment or take 

action to terminate her subsidy. AMHA investigated Hammond, and ultimately terminated her 

subsidy, because it received a call from Snow’s mother that Snow had been living with 

Hammond without AMHA authorization. There was no evidence that Snow’s mother mentioned 
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violence, but only that he was living there. Nothing in the record suggests that AMHA treated 

Hammond any differently from other subsidy recipients in its investigation of her alleged 

violations of the Family Obligations or in its decision to terminate her subsidy. See 42 U.S.C. 

Section 1437f(c)(9)(C)(iv). Hammond has failed to demonstrate that the decision to terminate 

her housing subsidy violated 42 U.S.C. Section 1437f(c)(9)(C)(i). Hammond’s first assignment 

of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶19} The assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 
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 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, J. 

CONCURS

BELFANCE, P. J. 

CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY

APPEARANCES:

PAUL E. ZINDLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

JAMES D. CASEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.