By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

U.S. Army Engineer School

(573) 563-8080/DSN 676-8080

COMMANDANT

BG James H. Raymer 

563-6192

<james.h.raymer.mil@mail.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

COL Kevin S. Brown

563-6192

<kevin.s.brown28.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY COMMANDANT

Mr. James R. Rowan

563-8080

<james.r.rowan4.civ@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

CSM Bradley J. Houston

563-8060

<bradley.j.houston.mil@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

CWO5 John F. Fobish

563-4088

<john.fobish.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR

COL Kenneth Z. Jennings 

563-8045

<kenneth.z.jennings.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG

LTC Bryan M. Carr 

563-8046

<bryan.m.carr4.mil@mail.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF

LTC William C. Hannan

563-7116

<william.c.hannan2.mil@mail.mil>

COMMANDER, 1ST ENGINEER BRIGADE

COL Martin “Dale” Snider 

596-0224, DSN 581-0224

<martin.d.snider.mil@mail.mil>

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

LTC H.W. Hugh Darville 

563-4093

<h.w.darville.mil@mail.mil>

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION

Mr. Robert F. Danner

563-2845

<robert.f.danner.civ@mail.mil>

COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS CENTER

COL Charles G. Phillips

563-8142

<charles.g.phillips.mil@mail.mil>

ASSURED MOBILITY BRANCH, MSCoE CDID, RDD

LTC Larry J. Lyle Jr.

563-5055

<larry.j.lyle.mil@mail.mil>

ENGINEER DOCTRINE, MSCoE CDID, CODDD

LTC Matthew Y. McCulley

563-2717

<matthew.y.mcculley.mil@mail.mil>

ORGANIZATION BRANCH, MSCoE CDID, CODDD

LTC Leonard B. Scott IV

563-6282

<leonard.b.scott.mil@mail.mil>

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MANAGING EDITOR

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EDITOR

Rick Brunk

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

Jennifer Morgan

Editorial Assistant

Cynthia S. Fuller

COMMANDANT

Brigadier General James H. Raymer

Volume 46 PB 5-16-3 Headquarters, Department of the Army September–December 2016

U.S. ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

Engineer 1

FEATURES

07 Building Bridges and Interoperability in a Strong Europe: 

River-Crossing Operations During Exercise Anakonda 16

By Major James M. Kadel and Captain Olufemi O. Apata

11 To Win in a Complex World: A Tribute to the Multirole Bridge 

Company

By Captain Jennifer G. Acojedo

15 Airfield Damage Repair: The Way Ahead 

By First Lieutenant Ryan A. Menicucci 

18 Airfield Damage Repair: A Core Competency of Airborne Brigade

Engineer Battalions

By Captain Brian T. Williams

20 Airborne Engineers and LARP

By Captain Nicolas K. Massie

24 The Airborne Brigade Engineer Battalion: Lightweight, Power-Packed 

Support to the Brigade Combat Team

By Captain Stephen C. Kraus

26 Wet-Gap Crossing: Lessons Learned

By Major Sean R. Hill

28 The New Task Force Engineer Planner

By Mr. Timothy J. Brown

30 The Sustainability of U.S. Army Firing Ranges: Heavy Metals and 

the Environment

By Captain Matthew Wright, Mr. Adam Bittinger, Mr. Brian Cassidy, 

Ms. Kathryn Lawson, Dr. Brooke N. Stevens, and Ms. Chante Vines

36 10th Brigade Engineer Battalion Conducts Assault Breacher Vehicle

Crew Qualification

By Captain Andrew A. Berreth

39 A Human Endeavor: Developing a Multinational Common Operational 

Picture

By Captain Nathan I. Foust

42 Training a Brigade Combat Team Military Intelligence Company 

By Captain Sarah A. Starr

47 Building Combat Support in the Brigade Engineer Battalion: 

Integrating the Capabilities of Military Intelligence and Signal

Companies

By Captain Heather M. Burch and Captain Alan Adame

55 Counter Explosive Hazards Planning Course

By Mr. Jason Lee Smith

59 Engineer Leader Development Through the 

Eisenhower Leader Development Program

By Captain David G. Weart and Captain Guillermo J. 

Guandique

ENGINEE

The Professional Bulletin of Army EngineersR

Front cover: U.S. Soldiers assigned to 1st 

Engineer Battalion, 1st Armored Brigade Combat 

Team, 1st Infantry Division departing the area 

after setting up man-made obstacles during Decisive Action rotation 16-08 at the National Training 

Center, Fort Irwin, California. (U.S. Army photo) 

Back cover: U.S. Army photos

DEPARTMENTS

2 Clear the Way

By Brigadier General 

James H. Raymer

4 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major 

Bradley J. Houston

5 Show the Way

By Chief Warrant Officer Five

John F. Fobish

34 Engineer Doctrine Update

54 Engineer Writer’s Guide

56 Book Review: Gates of Fire

Reviewed by First Lieutenant Marie 

Adams

57 Book Review: Starship Troopers

Reviewed by First Lieutenant 

Graham J. Jenkins

50 Emplacing Abatis Obstacles

By Captain Johnny J. Perez Jr., Major Ryan P. Hopkins, 

and Lieutenant Colonel Angelo N. Catalano

52 The Road To War for OIR Division Engineers

By Captain Travis J. Legris
 

2 Engineer

Clear the Way

Brigadier General James H. Raymer 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

T

he U.S. Army is poised to adopt 

a new operations concept called 

Multi-Do ain Battle. It denotes 

cross-domain operations in the context 

of joint, combined arms maneuver that 

create temporary windows of superiority 

across multiple domains and allow joint 

forces to seize, retain, and exploit the 

initiative.1 This new doctrine enables 

operations under four conditions that the 

Army and the joint force will face:

■ All five domains—land, sea, air, space, 

and cyberspace—will be contested.

■ The future battlefield will be more

lethal.

■ Operations will occur in complex, 

restrictive terrain and among the population.

■ Units will operate with degraded capabilities, such as the 

jamming of communications. 

These four conditions can be compared to the conditions 

under which U.S. operations have occurred in Afghanistan 

and Iraq since 2001. While operations in those two countries continue to this day, other developments in the last 

15 years have caused a critical examination of the U.S. 

Army’s current capabilities and doctrine.

An examination of the 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 

100-5, Operations, which was published when the Army had 

just emerged from another long counterinsurgency 

reveals how much change has developed in the operations 

concept in the past 40 years. The following paragraphs indicate that the Army of today is thinking about future battlefield conditions along much the same lines as its 1976 

predecessor did:

■ Concerning domains, the 1976 edition stated, “The 

Army’s primary objective is to win the land battle . . . 

we must assume the enemy we face will possess weapons 

generally as effective as our own”2 and “Modern battles 

are fought and won by air and land forces working 

together. The interaction and cooperation between 

air and land forces extends into almost every function 

in combat.”3 This edition also noted that “The commander 

must view the electromagnetic environment as a 

battlefield extension, where a different type of combat 

takes place.”4

■ Considering the lethality of the

future battlefield, the 1976 edition 

predicted that “Because the lethality 

of modern weapons continues to increase sharply, we can expect very 

high losses to occur in short periods of 

time. Entire forces could be destroyed quickly if they are improperly employed”5

 and “Great numbers of weapons of advanced destructiveness have been provided by major 

powers to client states; arms purchased by minor but affluent nations 

have further spread the latest military technology throughout the world. 

Recent wars between small nations 

have developed intensities formerly 

considered within the capabilities 

of large states only.”6

■ Regarding battlefield terrain, the 1976 edition noted that 

“Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw 

Pact is the most demanding mission the U.S. Army could 

be assigned. Because the U.S. Army is structured primarily 

for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that 

area, this manual is designed mainly to deal with the 

realities of such operations”7 and “Many areas of the world, 

especially Western Europe, have experienced a massive 

growth in built-up areas and man-made changes to the 

natural landscape. These changes significantly affect

potential future battlefields. Avoidance of built-up areas

is no longer possible. Rather, military operations in 

built-up areas are an integral part of combat operations and present special opportunities and challenges to 

commmanders at all levels . . . the larger problem of conducting operations in continuous and contiguous built-up 

areas and the principles of these operations are new. 

It is a novel and untested dimension of warfare.”8

■ With respect to degraded capabilities, the 1976 edition 

states, “The Soviet Army, or armies based on the Soviet 

model, applying radio-electronic combat can selectively 

deprive adversaries of control of the electromagnetic 

environment”9 and “A command post or weapons 

system cannot survive on the modern battlefield if it is 

easily identified and located by the characteristics of its 

electronics emitters. Their survival is dependent on good 

defensive (electronic warfare) tactics which conceal 

emitters or deceive the enemy as to their identity and 

location.”10
 

Engineer 3

So why are we going “back to the future” by adopting 

Multi-Domain Battle 40 years after the 1976 edition of FM 

100-5 introduced AirLand Battle (in Chapter 8)?11 Paul H. 

Herbert wrote that “Doctrine the times in which 

it is written. This was especially true of the 1976 edition 

of FM 100-5, Operations, which was a direct response to 

the conditions of the early 1970s. Specifically, the condition 

of the Army immediately after Vietnam, a major shift 

in American defense policy, and a relative decline in the 

Army’s budget all the manual’s authors.”12 More 

pointedly, Herbert noted that “As planners looked to the 

problem of deterring or resisting aggression in Europe, the 

most striking issue was the improvement in Soviet and 

Warsaw Pact forces, especially their conventional forces. 

The Soviet Union had added five tank divisions to its 

forces facing NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

since 1965 . . . most telling, however, was the gradual 

redeployment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact units to bases 

closer to the borders, implying the adoption of a preemptive, 

nonnuclear strategy. Outside the NATO area, Soviet naval 

and air forces were more modern and far-reaching. In 

October 1973, Soviet threats to intervene unilaterally in the 

Arab-Israeli War demonstrated new Soviet assertiveness 

on the world scene.”13

Fast-forward to today, and we see several Russian 

actions that have occurred since the Soviet Union dissolved 

in late 1991. Following a period of political turmoil and 

economic collapse, Vladimir Putin became acting president 

of the Russian Federation in December 1999 and has been 

the president or prime minister since then. Under his 

leadership, Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, then 

invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and then 

deployed a task force to Syria in 2015 to intervene in its 

civil war on behalf of the government of President Bashar 

al-Assad. The United States has officially stated that, 

“While Russia has contributed in select security areas, 

such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism, it also 

has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the 

sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to 

achieve its goals. Russia’s military actions are undermining 

regional security directly and through proxy forces. These 

actions violate numerous agreements that Russia has 

signed in which it committed to act in accordance with 

international norms, including the [United Nations] 

Charter, Helsinki Accords, Russia–NATO Founding Act, 

Budapest Memorandum, and the Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces Treaty.”14

In World Affairs Journal, Stephen J. Blank writes, “Russia is also building up its military capability. To judge from 

its procurements, the current, large-scale, comprehensive 

buildup of weaponry through 2025 aims to acquire a multidomain, strategic-level reconnaissance–strike complex as 

well as a tactical-level reconnaissance–fire complex that 

would together give Russia high-tech precision forces that 

could conduct operations in space, under the ocean, in the 

air, on the sea and the ground, and in cyberspace. This force 

would have parity with the United States and NATO in 

conventional and nuclear dimensions of high-tech warfare, 

and therefore the capability to deter and intimidate NATO. 

It would also have strategic stability, which Russia defines 

to include nonnuclear strike capabilities, and therefore 

sustain nonnuclear and prenuclear (i.e., before con ict 

starts) conventional deterrence across the entire spectrum 

of including against internal threats, which now 

feature prominently in Russia’s defense doctrine.”15

Despite the great hopes at the conclusion of the Cold War 

almost 25 years ago, it is clear that Russia has emerged 

again as a potential adversary of the United States. While 

the President has stated that international sanctions 

against Russia over its actions in Ukraine are “not a new 

Cold War,”16 the U.S. Army, as part of the joint force, must 

still prepare itself to execute the national military strategy 

objective to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries.17 The 

introduction of the Multi-Domain Battle concept recognizes 

this fact. As professional engineer Soldiers, let us immerse 

ourselves in the study and implementation of the required 

skills and capabilities, both engineer-specific and combined 

arms, to make this new concept a reality.

Endnotes:

1Herbert Raymond McMaster, Integration Center, Leader Professional Development No. 99, Professional Reading Archives, <http://www.arcic.army.mil/LPD 

/_archives?articleSeries=99>, accessed on 19 September 2016.

2FM 100-5, Operations (with included Change No. 1), 

29 April 1977.

3

Ibid.

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.

10Ibid.

11Ibid.

12Paul H. Herbert, “Deciding What Has to be Done: General 

William E. DePuy and the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations,” Leavenworth Paper No. 16, U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, July 1988, p. 5.

13Ibid, p. 6.

14Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America 2015,” June 2015, <http://www 

.jcs.mil/portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National 

_Military_Strategy.pdf>, accessed on 20 September 2016.

15Stephen J. Blank, “Imperial Ambitions: Russia’s Military 

Buildup,” World Affairs Journal, May–June 2015, <http://

www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/imperial-ambitions 

-russia%E2%80%99s-military-buildup>, accessed on 19 September 2016.

(Continued on page 6)
 

Lead the Way

Command Sergeant Major Bradley J. Houston 

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

4 Engineer

G

reetings. I recently attended 

the U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

Command Sergeant Major Workshop 

at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and would like 

to provide the field with an update on 

initiatives under the Noncommissioned 

Officer (NCO) 2020 Strategy: NCOs 

.

1

First, I encourage everyone to 

read the NCO 2020 Strategy, which 

can be found on the TRADOC Web 

site at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil 

/FrontPageContent/Docs/NCO2020 

.pdf>. All leaders must understand 

this strategy and ensure that they 

are spending time developing their 

young NCOs and Soldiers by using 

it. To be successful, future leaders 

must have a firm grasp on the various lines of effort 

that are laid out in the strategy and use them to guide 

their efforts as well as those of other leaders in their 

units.

Many NCOs believe that the Select, Train, Educate, 

and Promote (STEP) initiative is the NCO 2020 strategy. 

STEP is certainly a part of the strategy, but the strategy is 

much more than that. Ongoing components of this strategy 

include—

■ The Army University.

■ Full use of the One Army School System.

■ Common core integration into advanced and senior 

leader courses.

■ An overhaul of the Army Structured Self-Development 

System.

■ Expanded use of the Army Career Tracker.

■ An overhaul of all career maps.

■ Creation of a digital job book. 

Leaders must understand each of these components and 

continue to keep junior leaders and Soldiers informed about 

the changes and the rationale behind them. The combination 

of these efforts will create NCOs who are capable of operating in a complex world while providing first-class leadership

to our Soldiers.

During the workshop, we identified six major core competencies that will comprise common-core instruction. 

These major blocks will be resident in

all NCO Professional Development System (NCOPDS) courses, from the Basic

Leader Course to the Master Leader

Course. The topics under these core

competencies will evolve as NCOs progress through their NCOPDS journey,

with each course building on the previous one to expand the NCOs’ knowledge

and mastery of the tasks. The six major

competencies that we developed are—

■ Communications.

■ Leadership.

■ Program management.

■ Operations.

■ Training management.

■ Readiness.

These core subject areas the feedback that I 

have received from the NCOs who have attended Professional Military Education at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 

during my tenure. They also address many of the areas 

where our leaders in the field want junior NCOs to be more 

knowledgeable. 

Over the next few months, our team in the Directorate 

of Training and Leader Development will analyze current 

NCOPDS programs of instruction (POIs) to identify commonalities with these core subject areas and identify the 

time required to implement them. This will be a great opportunity for us to update POIs for engineer-specific technical 

training and to add these common-core subjects. In the end, 

we will have a course that will better prepare NCOs for their 

future duties and positively impact the operating efficiency 

of our organizations. Focusing on our people and developing 

them will continue to give the Army the competitive edge 

necessary to defeat our adversaries on any future battlefield.

I encourage all NCOs to stay plugged into the TRADOC command sergeant major’s virtual town hall meetings as he provides updates to the field on this evolution 

within our NCO cohort. The next town hall meeting is 

scheduled for 3 November 2016 and will cover the third 

line of effort in the NCO 2020 Strategy—Stewardship 

of the Profession. More information can be found on the 

TRADOC Web site, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/#>, and 

I will also disseminate the information to engineer 

senior leaders. (Continued on page 6)
Engineer 5

Chief Warrant Officer Five John F. Fobish

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer 

Show the Way 

G

reetings all! I trust that each of 

you had the opportunity to take 

time off and enjoy a safe, funfilled summer with Family and friends. 

It is now official: those of us with schoolage kids have begun a new school year, 

and it is a very exciting time for the kids. 

Just as this is an exciting time for them 

as they attend school for the first time or 

continue their academic adventure, these 

are exciting times across the Army and 

the Engineer Regiment as we continue 

to move toward Force 2025 and Beyond.

As the Army transitions, a number 

of initiatives will shape the force and 

our warrant officer cohort. To facilitate these initiatives, the Secretary 

of the Army and the Army Chief of 

Staff established the Army Leader Development Program 

(ALDP) some years ago. The program charter was approved 

on 21 December 2007 and codified in Department of the 

Army Pamphlet 350-58, 

,

1

 and Army Regulation 350-1, 

Leader .

2

 The ALDP provides the management 

process for program execution and approval, the incorporation of new initiatives, and the prioritization of resources.

The Secretary of the Army established the Army Profession and Leader Development Forum (APLDF) on 1 June 

2015. The charters of the ALDP and APLDF identify the 

commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as the senior responsible official and supported commander responsible for directing the 

execution of the ALDP to accomplish the end state established by the Department of the Army. The purpose of the 

ALDP is to critically examine leader development initiatives and programs, discuss related issues, develop potential courses of action, and advise the TRADOC commander 

on a way ahead to improve those programs and initiatives. 

One initiative is to review warrant officer Professional 

Military Education (PME) to determine its sufficiency in 

preparing warrant officers for the future operating environment. As the ALDP conducted a review of the Warrant 

Officer Intermediate Level Education and Warrant Officer 

Senior Service Education common core curricula, the Warrant Officer Continuum of Learning Study was born. 

The study identified gaps in the depth and rigor of 

the current warrant officer PME, which fails to prepare 

senior warrant officers to support commanders as they conduct unified land

operations and the Army profession in

support of Army operational requirements. Attention also has been focused

on warrant officer technical PME—

Warrant Officer Basic and Advanced

Courses and Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education—to find gaps

of depth and rigor in those curricula.

Leaders at the U. S. Army Engineer

School are working exhaustively to

ensure that courses contain the requisite depth, rigor, technical acumen,

and industry best practices to meet the

needs of maneuver commanders as they

employ The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Co plex World,

3

 while 

executing the Army missions on all three levels of war—

tactical, operational, and strategic.

As we endeavor to infuse engineer PME with the desired 

depth, rigor, and requisite skills, we are also working to 

include those elements of character development that are 

critical to our profession by inspiring and motivating warrant officers and students to live by the Army Ethic. Each 

of us must work diligently to support this effort as individuals and as a cohort.

To strengthen our warrant officer technical education, 

strong relationships have been established with academia 

and industry. We have requested that colleges and universities review and give credit to warrant officer courses 

for participation in their degree programs. This would 

award credit for the experience and education of warrant 

officers as they attend PME. Positive feedback promises 

to make this a reality. More details in the area of curriculum, transferable credits, and credit for experience must be 

determined before the program can be approved, piloted, 

and codified.

We are fortunate to have strong partnerships with 

industry leaders in construction engineering and geospatial engineering. To support the growth and development of 

construction technicians, Starbucks® Corporation provides 

a 12-month Training with Industry (TWI) opportunity as 

senior project managers for construction engineering technicians (Military Occupational Specialty 120A) in the corporation’s design and construction department. This training opportunity enhances the project management skills 
6 Engineer

of construction technicians with real-world experience in 

construction management, while introducing them to the 

latest best practices in construction project management 

and construction techniques. 

The Harris® Corporation also provides a 12-month 

training opportunity for geospatial engineering technicians (Military Occupational Specialty 125D) in its Environment for Visualizing Images software program. The 

program gives geospatial engineering technicians extensive 

exposure to corporate managerial techniques and industrial 

procedures in image-processing software development 

and programming.

The TWI program at the Environmental Systems 

Research Institute allows geospatial engineering technicians to work with the latest ArcGISTM products—such 

as cloud-based mapping, editing and analysis tools, and 

ArcGIS for Server—that include a range of client applications that summarize critical information, bring maps into 

mainstream intelligence software, and help field crews collect data. These opportunities enhance the management 

skills of geospatial engineering technicians as they direct 

the development, collection, and distribution of geospatial 

products and data.

All three TWI opportunities also support the objectives 

of The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy: In Support of 

Force 2025 and Beyond,

4

 in identifying additional cohort 

efforts to support Army priority investments in education, training, and leader development and in meeting the 

future force objectives by providing support in our highly 

specialized roles as the Army’s systems operators, managers, integrators, and leaders.

Upon completion of these TWI opportunities, warrant 

officers are assigned to work in the U.S. Army Engineer 

School Department of Training and Leader Development as instructor/writers and training developers. They 

share the experiences and industry best practices they 

have acquired so that they can be integrated into PME 

to increase the depth, rigor, and technical expertise of 

warrant officer education. This will enable engineer warrant officers to fulfill the operational expectations of 

Force 2025 and Beyond, meet the objectives of The Army 

Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy, and support the full spectrum of engineering operations to enable maneuver commanders to decisively accomplish their missions within 

the Army Operating Concept.

We must take advantage of credentialing, certification, 

and TWI opportunities as ways to strengthen our trade 

craft. By doing so, we will increase the level of technical 

competency throughout the Engineer Regiment and become 

engineer warrant officers who are capable of expertly executing core competencies and technical skills while thinking critically, anticipating and communicating engineer 

mission requirements, and providing a level of technical 

expertise that will enable the success of the Army to win in 

a complex world. 

I ask that you continue to network and communicate 

with each other and with the Engineer School at its milSuite site at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/designer>. 

This will encourage and strengthen the ties that bind us 

together throughout the Engineer Regiment. While serving 

in your area of operations, help each other to become capable, professional, and ethical engineer warrant officers. 

Strive to become technologically agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who maintain Army capability overmatch, 

reduce logistical demands for Force 2025 and Beyond, 

and ensure that commanders achieve mission success 

every time. 

Until next time, please be safe, be committed, be competent, and be that leader of character we all need you to be.

Essayons.

Endnotes:

1Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, Leader Devel-

, 8 March 2013.

2Army Regulation 350-1, Devel-

, 19 August 2014.

3The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Co plex 

World, 31 October 2014.

4The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy: In Support of 

Force 2025 and Beyond, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs 

/misc/WO2025_Strategy_20160329.pdf>, accessed on 13 September 2016.

These are exciting times for the NCO Corps, and I am 

convinced that they will continue to be the envy of every 

other army in the world. I am honored to play a part in 

shaping the future of education for the outstanding professionals who make up the NCO Corps. 

Until next time—Essayons!

Endnote:

1NCO 2020 Strategy: 

World, 4 December 2015, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil 

/FrontPageContent/Docs/NCO2020.pdf> accessed on 20 September 2016.

16Josh Gerstein, “Obama: ‘Not a New Cold War,’” Politico, 

30 June 2014, <http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/obama 

-sanctions-russia-ukraine-109510?>, accessed on 20 September 2016. 

17Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015.
Engineer 7

I

n June 2016, more than 31,000 military service members from 23 nations converged in Poland to participate 

in Exercise Anakonda 16. Among these forces was a 

multinational military engineer task force that consisted 

of members from the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom under the command of 

the U.S. 18th Military Police Brigade, 21st Theater Sustainment Command. For many participants, the exercise 

marked the first opportunity in recent years for North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) engineer bridging 

units to train together in a large, combined arms operation 

and to act as part of a multinational engineer bridging task 

force in Europe.

Exercise Anakonda 16 provided a unique training environment for engineer bridging units to improve interoperability among allied and partner nations using similar bridging systems. The exercise provided a venue for multiple 

nations to mass engineer bridging assets and emplace tactical bridges to demonstrate NATO readiness. It also provided 

a chance for U.S. Army engineers to work with European 

allies. Building on these skill sets, a multinational solution 

was necessary to meet the tactical bridging requirements of 

the mission since no single nation could fulfill these requirements on its own on the European continent.

Since 2008, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) has possessed no assigned, in-theater tactical engineer bridging 

units. To conduct wet-gap crossing training in Europe for 

exercises such as Exercise Anakonda 16, a bridging unit 

with equipment needed to be sourced from outside Europe. 

This presented some challenges during exercise planning. 

To solve this capability gap, USAREUR funded participation by the 361st Multirole Bridge Company (MRBC), a 

subordinate unit of the U.S. Army Reserve 391st Engineer Battalion, 412th Theater Engineer Command, which 

By Major James M. Kadel and Captain Olufemi O. Apata
8 Engineer

is USAREUR’s only 

regionally aligned 

engineer command. 

The Total Army 

emphasis on leveraging all Army components enabled this 

effort and undoubtedly benefited the 

unit and the gaining command. 

During the exercise, the 361st MRBC 

participated with 

bridging units of 

other armies to conduct a tactical rivercrossing operation 

at Chelmno, Poland. 

Four countries used two types of tactical bridging systems, 

the M3 amphibious bridge and the ribbon bridge, to cross the 

Vistula River there. The U.S. 2d Cavalry Regiment crossed 

the river on an M3 amphibious bridge on 8 June, while the Polish 1st Battalion, 17th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, crossed 

on an improved ribbon bridge on 15 June. These operations 

were the culmination of brigade task force training during 

the exercise.

The river crossings comprised a combined arms operation involving seven countries and approximately 1,200 

personnel, including engineer, military police, air defense, 

cavalry, and aviation units and local municipal authorities. The 18th Military Police Brigade from USAREUR 

served as the brigade level controlling headquarters. With 

no engineer brigades stationed in Europe, the 18th Military Police Brigade was the only maneuver support brigade 

U.S., Dutch, and German engineers complete a ribbon bridge during Exercise Anakonda 16.

Soldiers of the 361st MRBC raft an infantry assault force across the Vistula River.
Engineer 9

headquarters capable of providing mission command to 

river-crossing operations during Exercise Anakonda 16. 

The exercise provided a tremendous training opportunity 

for military police and engineer Soldiers since their training 

was integrated into the river-crossing operations. Adding 

to the complexity of the mission set, this was the first time 

that the 18th Military Police Brigade had provided mission 

command of nonorganic multinational and multicomponent 

engineer and military police soldiers to conduct a combined 

arms river crossing in Europe.

German Army Panzer Pioneer Battalion 130 taskorganized all bridging units under its command, acting as the 

crossing area headquarters, designated Task Force 130 for 

the exercise. There were two company level tactical bridging 

headquarters, organized by the two bridging systems in use. 

One of the company headquarters was the M3 Amphibious 

Bridge Company, a unit created for the exercise, consisting 

of British and German M3 bridge units. The other company 

headquarters included the 361st MRBC, with a German 

improved ribbon bridge platoon and a standard ribbon bridge 

platoon from the Netherlands. The overall bridging capability provided by the task force was a span of 370 meters with 

M3 bridging and 400 meters with ribbon bridging. 

Also included under the 18th Military Police Brigade 

were two military police battalions and a platoon of air 

defense artillery. The 175th Military Police Battalion, Missouri Army National Guard, was responsible for movement 

control during the crossing operations, and the 709th Military Police Battalion was responsible for farside movement 

and traffic control. A platoon from the 1st Battalion, 174th 

Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Ohio Army National Guard, 

provided air defense to the crossing site.

When soldiers from NATO countries train together, they 

use NATO standardization agreements as the doctrinal 

standards for training and assessment. In Exercise Anakonda 16, engineer bridging units used NATO Standardization Agreement 2395, Deliberate Water Crossing Procedures,

1

which outlines the doctrinal methodology, terminology, and 

procedures required to conduct what the U.S. Army calls a 

deliberate wet-gap crossing.2 While terminology may differ, 

most of the underlying concepts are the same, which allowed 

a seamless integration of NATO training standards into the 

training plans of commanders. 

As equipment and personnel converged on Chelmno to 

train together on the Vistula River, Task Force 130 organized assembly areas and water training areas for the two 

types of bridges being used. Two locations on the river 

allowed simultaneous training and rehearsals by both types 

and gave junior leaders from different armies the -

ibility to train their units with other units using the same 

bridge systems. Soon, junior leaders saw benefits from 

training with other nations, which led to increased efficiency, faster bridge erection, and improved communication 

“Exercise Anakonda 16 provided 

a unique training environment 

for engineer bridging units to 

improve interoperability among 

allied and partner nations using 

similar bridging systems.”

Mechanized infantry forces are rafted across the Vistula River during a combined arms river crossing.
among participating units. For instance, leaders

developed a simple yet effective standard

operating procedure for hand and

arm signals by U.S., German, and

Dutch units. This enabled raft commanders on the water to overcome language barriers and communicate effectively to guide 

the emplacement of ribbon 

bridge sections. 

On 8 June, the 2d Cavalry Regiment moved from its 

assembly area to Chelmno, near 

the Vistula River crossing site. 

The previous day, Soldiers of the

82d Airborne Division had jumped

into Torun, Poland, with elements

from the U.S. Army 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team and allied paratroopers from the United Kingdom and Poland to seize

farside terrain ahead of the river-crossing operation. 

On the morning of 8 June, the M3 Amphibious Company 

constructed a 350-meter tactical bridge in approximately 

30 minutes to facilitate the movement of Strykers and support vehicles for the 2d Cavalry Regiment. Military police 

Soldiers controlled military traffic on both sides of the crossing area, while local police assisted with civilian traffic. 

Once sufficient combat power had been established in a tactical assembly area on the farside of the river, 2d Cavalry 

Regiment vehicles continued movement southeast, toward 

the city of Torun, where they conducted a forward passage of 

lines with paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division and 

the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team.

On 15 June, a Polish Army mechanized infantry battalion participated in a second deliberate river-crossing operation at Chelmno. The ribbon bridge units conducted rafting 

operations to put an assault force across the Vistula River 

before constructing a bridge. As they did during the 8 June 

crossing, military police soldiers controlled movement into 

and out of the crossing area, while air defense and aviation 

units provided area security. Although ribbon bridge construction took a little longer than the construction of the 

M3 amphibious bridge, the training conducted by the U.S., 

German, and Dutch ribbon bridge units contributed to a 

smooth and coordinated river crossing.

The integration of military police and air defense soldiers 

and other enablers into the river crossing enhanced the realism of the training, enabled a combined arms crossing in 

accordance with NATO doctrinal standards, and achieved 

the largest river-crossing operation any of the participating 

units had ever experienced. The interoperability between 

the participating nations and units greatly enhanced NATO 

readiness and built cross proficiency in communication systems, doctrinal terms and graphics, mission command, and 

bridging equipment. Junior leaders implemented creative 

training scenarios such as nighttime bridging and rafting in blackout conditions to challenge their crews in new 

10 Engineer

ways. With limited European tactical bridging

assets available among our NATO allies

and partner nations, the engineer bridging interoperability builds readiness and enables freedom of movement for land forces in training

and in responding to real-world 

scenarios.

Three lessons learned about 

bridging operations during 

Exercise Anakonda 16 stand 

out. First, the individual learning and training accomplished 

are significantly enhanced by 

working alongside engineers from

NATO allies and partner nations.

The improvement in unit standard

operating procedures and performance

gained from multinational exercises cannot

be replicated in a typical stateside combat training center rotation. Second, engineer interoperability is 

critical to U.S. Army and NATO readiness since no single 

nation can meet the freedom of movement requirements in 

Europe. We must be able to integrate procedures, communications, and standards anywhere in Europe with allied and 

partner engineer units. Third, exercises in Europe provide 

dynamic opportunities for U.S. Army engineers to participate in training not readily available at home station or during combat training center rotations.

In USAREUR, tactical bridging currently requires a 

multinational solution for exercises and real-world freedom 

of movement. Tactical bridging training during Exercise 

Anakonda 16 successfully achieved enhanced interoperability for all units and nations involved and set the stage for 

future multinational engineer bridging opportunities. 

Endnotes:

1Standardization Agreement 2395 (Edition 3), Deliberate 

Water Crossing Procedures, 24 January 2007.

2Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-90.4, -

, 10 August 2011.

Major Kadel serves as an engineer planner in the USAREUR 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer. He holds a bachelor of arts degree Northwest Nazarene University, 

Idaho.

Captain Apata serves as an engineer planner in the 

USAREUR Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer. He 

holds a bachelor’s degree in app -

eral University of Technology, Akure, Nigeria, and a 

degree in and services the University 

of Maryland.
Engineer 11

By Captain Jennifer G. Acojedo

D

ue to the publicity associated with combat engineers, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 12B, 

there is a common misconception that the bridge 

crewmembers (MOS 12C) from multirole bridge companies 

(MRBCs) are secondary to more prominent engineer units. 

That myth fuels the healthy, competitive banter that exists 

between Soldiers with those MOSs. Fortunately, bridge 

crewmembers are aware of the significance of their skill set. 

They believe that their capability is a critical aspect needed 

to win in a complex world, and leaders across the Engineer 

Regiment continue to publicly reaffirm that belief. At a 

recent Army Engineer Association breakfast, guest speaker 

Colonel Jason L. Smallfield, then U.S. Army Engineer School 

assistant commandant, described a combined arms gap 

crossing as the Army’s most complex operation. And during 

a 36th Engineer Brigade semiannual training briefing, 

Major General John Uberti, deputy commanding general 

for operations for the U.S. Army’s III Armored Corps, Fort 

Hood, Texas, called bridging the “Holy Grail.”

To bridge crewmembers and Soldiers associated with 

MRBCs, such comments are always comforting. Since there 

is plenty of literature highlighting the historical feats and 

unparalleled capabilities of the MRBC, this article is not 

meant to inform the uninformed of its significance. Instead, 

it sheds light on the inherent challenges of the MRBC, which 

are often realized only by Soldiers serving in such units. Recognizing these challenges will allow a greater appreciation 

for the MRBC, whose capability further enables the Engineer Regiment to contribute to the Army mission of winning 

in a complex world. 

The 50th MRBC is the first Army unit able to construct a 46-meter dry span bridge.
.

12 Engineer

T

he MRBC table of organization and equipment 

is composed of almost 200 Soldiers, making it 

one of the largest company size elements in 

the U.S. Army. From a numerical standpoint, it can 

be argued that Soldiers serving in specialty MOSs in 

an MRBC have equal or greater levels of responsibility than Soldiers serving in more prominent units. 

For example, MRBCs are authorized two medical 

specialists who are responsible for the medical oversight of nearly 200 personnel. Sapper companies are 

authorized three medical specialists and a senior 

medic, who together are responsible for the medical 

oversight of about 100 Soldiers. In a garrison environment, the medical specialist serving in an MRBC and 

the senior medic serving in a sapper company have 

the same level of responsibility, despite a difference 

in pay grade and in the ratio of medical personnel to 

assigned Soldiers. 

The rating scheme is another inherent challenge. 

In an MRBC, staff sergeant squad leaders are known 

as section leaders, each of whom is responsible for 

21 Soldiers. One of those 21 Soldiers is a staff sergeant who serves as the senior boat. Before the 

release of the new Department of the Army Form 

2166-8, Officer Evaluation Report,

1

there was an unspoken consensus that a drawback to 

that hierarchy was that staff sergeant section leaders were required to rate staff sergeant senior boats, despite 

the fact that both were in the same pay grade. Furthermore, 

the Army Select, Train, Educate, Promote (STEP) System 

allowed senior boats to complete the Advanced Leaders 

Course and Structured Self-Development IV in step with 

their raters, the staff sergeant section leaders. The Evaluation Entry System has since corrected these drawbacks by 

requiring platoon sergeants to rate senior boats and section 

leaders. However, this also means that MRBC platoon leaders must act as senior raters for senior boats and section 

leaders, much the same as brigade commanders rate company commanders and staff captains—a responsibility not 

typically bestowed on platoon leaders. 

Maintenance

M

RBCs have robust maintenance programs and 

one of the largest company size motor pools in the 

Army. In addition to being equipped with rolling 

stock common to other units, they have MKII bridge erection 

boats, ramps, bays, cradles, and dry span bridge launchers, 

Soldiers continue the labor-intensive job of assembling a medium girder bridge.

Noncommissioned officers train bridge crewmembers to operate a combat bridge transporter at 

Training Area 250, Fort Leonard Wood.
Engineer 13

cranes, and modules. Despite having twice 

the amount of vehicles and equipment to 

service and maintain, MRBCs are often 

allotted the same amount of maintenance 

space as smaller units. The challenge of 

working in a physically constrained environment is further exacerbated by the unique 

unit inventory. Finding required parts in 

outdated or nonexistent technical manuals 

makes the routine task of ordering parts 

and performing maintenance even more 

time-intensive. A prime example is the need 

to use a commercial online search engine 

to find the proper bilge pump, gauges, and 

electrical schematics for the MKII bridge 

erection boat—none of which can be found 

in the technical manual. Another example 

is the lack of a technical manual for the 

46-meter dry support bridge and the expertise on using the equipment because it was 

so recently fielded. Although the 80-hour 

maintenance training provided by the manufacturer is not required for the success 

of the MRBC maintenance program, the 

$55,000–65,000 training could potentially 

improve maintenance efficiency and result in cost savings.

T

he most complex operation that MRBCs are 

required to conduct—a combined arms gap crossing—is also one of the Army’s most complex operations. Although many authorities acknowledge the difficulty of the task, executing it could become a lost art when 

considering the infrequency of training. Army Regulation 

350-50, states that 

“the (combat training centers) are the ‘engine of change’ for 

collective training,”2 yet MRBCs do not participate as the 

rotational training unit at the National Training Center, 

Fort Irwin, California, or the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Since MRBCs don’t participate 

in combat training center rotations, the annual Reserve 

Bridge crewmembers hone their skills in constructing an improved ribbon 

bridge capable of withstanding heavy vehicle traffic.

Fast-water training creates realistic operating conditions and challenges the ability of boat operators to maneuver 

interior bays and ramps.
.

. .

14 Engineer

Component gap-crossing exercise at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, is the training event best suited to certify the units 

because of the operating environment of the event and the 

large number of mission-essential tasks executed. This 

exercise takes place at a great location for improved ribbon bridge (IRB) training because it has four unrestricted 

slips and a current strong enough to test the most proficient Army boat operators, guaranteeing that Soldiers and 

leaders are exposed to multiple facets of bridging operations. Historically, only one Regular Army MRBC has been 

allowed to participate; the challenge for units is securing 

permission to participate. Providing MRBCs with opportunities to train with maneuver units, other MRBCs, and 

enablers is critical to introducing the Army to the complexities of a gap crossing. Stimulating this dormant capability 

has become increasingly important as we transition away 

from counter-insurgency operations.

Systems

A

ccording to the Army standardized missionessential task list, MRBCs must maintain profi-

.ciency on three systems: 

■ Dry support bridge (DSB). The inherent challenge 

 with the DSB is the long lead time required to receive 

 parts that must be ordered from its overseas manu- 

 facturer. Because the equipment was only recently 

 fielded, there is yet not enough data to identify which

 parts need to be included in bench stock to ameliorate 

 the situation.

■ IRB. The IRB is the Army’s primary assault bridge

 and the most-used U.S. bridging system. Unlike training

 on the DSB, IRB training requires a body of water. Given 

 the current locations of Regular Army MRBCs and the

 restrictions of environmental regulations, the number 

 of feasible training sites is limited. If fiscal constraints

 are considered, then finding a suitable location becomes

 an even greater challenge. However, fast-water locations 

 are essential to creating the complex and dynamic 

 environment required for bridge crewmembers to main- 

 tain training proficiency.

■ Bailey bridge. MRBCs are not equipped with the Bai-

 ley bridge, which is only accessible at one of the training 

 areas at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Most Regular 

 Army MRBCs conduct training on the Bailey bridge just 

 once a year.

Every unit in the Army overcomes challenges to accomplish the mission. However, because there are only four

Regular Army MRBCs, their challenges and contributions

are often overlooked. Bridge crewmembers do not have the

opportunity to perform their core competencies as often as

Soldiers in other MOSs; and due to the scarcity of MRBCs,

they are not at the forefront of the Engineer Regiment. This

article pays tribute to the Soldiers and leaders whom I had

the privilege of leading as commander of the 50th MRBC. It

also aims to develop a greater appreciation for MRBCs by

recognizing the challenges they overcome to provide a capability that is needed now more than ever.

The MRBC stands ready to provide the personnel and 

equipment to transport, assemble, disassemble, retrieve, and 

maintain all standard and nonstandard U.S. Army bridging 

systems. MRBCs are specialized units with value and significance that are often realized only when the need arises 

to conduct a gap crossing. That need gives MRBC Soldiers 

the opportunity to showcase their ability to let commanders quickly maneuver and respond to maintain momentum 

across an obstacle. 

Bridge the gap!

For further information about the capabilities of the DSB 

and IRB, read “Bridging the Gap—Modernizing Army Bridge 

Units,” by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew DiMarco.3 For further analysis on the complexities of gap crossings, read Gap 

Crossings: Not Just a Tactical , by Major Kristen 

N. Dahle.4

Endnotes:

1Department of the Army Form 2166-8, 

Officer Evaluation Report, 17 April 2015.

2Army Regulation 350-50, The Center Pro3 April 2013.

3Andrew DiMarco, “Bridging the Gap—Modernizing Army 

Bridge Units,” Engineer Professional Bulletin, Vol. 34, April–

June 2004, pp. 2–21.

4Kristen N. Dahle, Gap Crossings: Not Just a Tactical Prob-

, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 30 September 2012.

Captain Acojedo serves as the of the 50th MRBC, 

5th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood. She holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering the U.S. Military Point, New York, and a degree in 

engineering Missouri University of Science and 

Technology at Rolla. Her education includes the Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, U.S. Air Assault 

School, U.S. Ar y Airborne School, and U.S. Ar y Pathfinder School.

Leaders conduct training and equipment familiarization to 

ensure that drivers master the fundamentals of the unique 

inventory of the MRBC.
Engineer 15

A

irfield seizure is often the decisive point in contingency operations because airfields enable military 

.forces to “fight, sustain, and win.”1 Although the 

defending force has the advantages of time and terrain, the 

offense can exploit its own advantages 

of initiative and surprise to overwhelm 

the defending forces. The success of the 

offense depends on its speed and surprise.2

Before an assault on an airfield can 

begin, the air space must be cleared and 

enemy air defense assets neutralized. 

Accurate and strategic fires on the airfield 

can achieve those goals. One key enemy air 

defense asset is the runway itself. Damage 

to the airfield disables the enemy ability 

to gain air superiority or conduct followon counterattacks. If the runway is damaged as a result of strategic bombing, then 

the offensive force must be able to rapidly 

repair it to allow aircraft to land and carry 

on with the fight. This is where light airfield repair package (LARP) platoons fit in 

the operational picture. 

LARP platoons provide rapid runway 

repair (RRR) expertise and knowledge 

for the task force commander. When a runway is rendered unusable, LARP platoons are capable of repairing the damage to assure mobility for the maneuver 

commander. LARP platoons can drop the equipment 

By First Lieutenant Ryan A. Menicucci

Paratroopers from the 161st Engineer Support Company demonstrate how 

to install fiber-reinforced polymer matting.
16 Engineer

necessary to conduct RRR, deploy by air with the assaulting force, provide timely assessment of the runway, and 

repair any damage. Although crater repair is the most likely 

damage d in contingency operations, RRR includes 

obstacles that need to be cleared off the runway. Today, that 

encompasses any creative impediment the enemy can think 

of, including explosive obstacles. 

As the operating environment changes and technology 

improves, LARP platoons must be able to adapt to provide 

task force commanders with the skills necessary to quickly 

open runways. The U.S. Army Engineer Research Development Center spent the last decade improving LARP capabilities. Proposed components of the new airfield damage repair 

kit were tested during the first 2 weeks of March 2016. Soldiers from the 161st Engineer Support Company (Airborne) 

and select units from the 82d Airborne Division trained on 

the old methods and equipment, then demonstrated how 

much quicker and easier the task was with different equipment and methods. 

The newly purposed airfield damage repair kit includes 

better fiber-reinforced polymer matting with a new asphalt 

anchoring system and more attachments for skid steers. 

The kit is packed in two plastic boxes and is being tested for 

airdrop on a 20-foot platform. The old kit consisted of four 

boxes constructed from 2- x 4-inch lumber and plywood and 

placed on a 24-foot platform. 

An engineer uses a 

cone penetrometer to 

determine if the surface 

is strong enough to support aircraft landings.

Airborne engineers test the effectiveness of the high-mobility engineer excavator while 

filling a crater.
Engineer 17

The new fiber-reinforced polymer matting (also known as 

foreign object damage cover) is certified for C-17 or C-130 

aircraft. Matting improvements include—

■ Interchangeable half-panels, making assembly easier 

 and reducing assembly time.

■ New anchor panels, using anchor bolts for a stronger 

 anchoring system.

■ Improved anchor bushings, making joints stronger and 

 easing installation.

■ New panels featuring a stronger overall design.

■ Improved anchoring system for asphalt runways. 

The new skid steer attachments could provide redundancy for LARP platoons or even reduce the amount of 

equipment that is required to repair a crater. New attachments to the skid steer include—

■ Rock saw.

■ Pavement breaker.

■ Bucket loader.

■ Compaction roller.

A full LARP package consists of five to eight platforms, depending on the nature of the repair mission. The 

attachments may reduce the number of heavy drops in a 

LARP package.

Most skid steer attachments proved capable of accomplishing the mission. The pavement breaker was able to 

effectively break concrete, and the roller attachment proved 

fully capable. Although the compaction roller attachment 

was not as effective as a vibratory roller, it was able to compact the middle layer of dirt between two layers of sand grid 

to repair large craters. That capability reduces the time 

needed to compact dirt during the crater repair process relative to using a hand tamp. The rock saw very effectively cut 

concrete and did not require water while in operation, eliminating one logistical consideration. However, if rebar were 

present in the concrete, LARP platoons would need a rescue saw, which is included in the airfield damage repair and 

RRR kits.

On 17 March 2016, Soldiers and leaders from all over the 

world arrived at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as Soldiers from the 161st Engineer Support Company 

and the 82d Airborne Division demonstrated the LARP and 

incorporated new assets that they had trained on just a week 

earlier.3 Special guests included senior representatives from 

the 82d Airborne Division; the U.S. Army Engineer School, 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and the Maneuver Support 

Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood. 

The paratroopers learned new and better methods of 

accomplishing their missions. With these recommended 

changes, LARP platoons have the ability to adapt to 

today’s operating environment and to continue to improve 

unit readiness. 

Endnotes:

1Gordon C. Bonham, “Airfield Seizure: The Modern ‘Key to 

the Country,’ ” School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, 22 March 1991, p. 3.

2

Ibid., p. 6.

3Unified Facilities Criteria 3-270-07, Sand Grid Repair,

30 June 2003, p. 21.

When this article was written, First Lieutenant Menicucci 

was a LARP platoon leader in the 161st Engineer Support 

Battalion (Airborne), 20th Engineer 

Brigade. He holds a bachelor’s degree -

ing and is a graduate of the Engineer Basic Officer Leader 

Airborne School.

Paratroopers conduct initial training on the rock saw while squaring a crater.
18 Engineer

J

oint forcible entry (JFE) operations allow the United 

States to project capability and military force into any 

region of the world.1 They serve as a deterrent and 

viable military option for U.S. policy enforcement. The seizure of airfields is vital to the success of the JFE mission.2

This type of mission requires paratroopers to—

■ Neutralize enemy forces and any air defense weaponry 

defending the airstrip.

■ Preserve the airstrip for the introduction of follow-on 

forces. 

Once the lodgment is established, aircraft landing 

sequences can be used to begin building combat power. 

In Europe, units such as the 173d Airborne Brigade, 

capable of conducting JFE operations, provide a unique 

skill set to reassure allies; they train to fight an enemy 

that is able to obstruct or damage an airfield. Since U.S. 

Army combat engineers can emplace an effective craterblocking obstacle in a few minutes, it is reasonable to assume 

that a near-peer opponent can just as quickly damage an airstrip with effective obstacles before an airborne insertion. 

Airborne combat engineers must possess airfield damage 

repair (ADR) capabilities, which directly contribute to the 

success of JFE operations. Without a dedicated and prioritized ADR element, an airfield seizure operation could lose 

all momentum within the first few hours, eliminating any 

potential for a deterrent effect. In light of the operational 

environment in Europe and the ever-present need for light, 

fast airfield seizure equipment and skills, the 54th Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) (Airborne), 173d Airborne 

Brigade, began developing its expedient ADR capability 

through training and materiel procurement. 

I

n early 2015, before the unit transformation to a dedicated BEB, Soldiers of the 173d Brigade Special Troops 

Battalion (Airborne) participated in multiple exercises to hone their ADR and crater repair techniques. The 
Engineer 19

British 16th Air Assault Brigade Exercise Pegasus Gaul in 

the United Kingdom, from 9 to 17 May 2015, brought British paratroopers and U.S. airborne engineers from the 37th 

BEB and 173d Brigade Special Troops Battalion (Airborne) 

together to establish a common understanding of ADR and 

crater repair. At Exercise Eagle Phoenix, 18–24 May 2015, 

the Slovenian Rodovski Battalion and the 173d Brigade 

Special Troops Battalion (Airborne) constructed multiple 

concrete pads in the Pocek Training Area, Slovenia, as part 

of a joint crater demolition and repair training event. Both 

of these opportunities provided 173d Airborne Brigade 

engineers a unique perspective into allied engineering and 

reinforced the North Atlantic Treaty Organization trend 

of shifting the focus of combat engineer training toward 

conventional warfare instead of counterinsurgency. As the 

173d Brigade Special Troops Battalion (Airborne) cased 

its colors and transformed into the 54th BEB in Vicenza, 

Italy, in June 2015, the headquarters and engineer companies quickly embraced the organization’s role in providing enhanced engineer expertise to the brigade. Along with 

the previously understood roles of mobility, countermobility, and survivability, the battalion assumed the task of 

ADR, which was a more significant airfield seizure engineer responsibility than had previously been placed on the 

special troops battalion. In December 2015, Exercise Dagger Resolve incorporated airborne engineers from the 27th 

Engineer Battalion; the 37th BEB from Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina; and 54th BEB engineers from Vicenza with construction engineers from the 15th Engineer Battalion, 

Grafenwoehr, Germany. The forces assembled in Italy for 

a week of academic training and the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, with a follow-on heavyequipment airborne drop and field-training exercise in 

Hohenfels, Germany. The training was especially useful in 

developing unit standard operating procedures and establishing a shared understanding between Europe-based 

engineer organizations and the XVIII Airborne Corps best 

practices for field landing strip (FLS) clearance and ADR.

I

n April 2016, Company B, 54th BEB, was tasked with 

FLS clearance and crater repair in support of the 173d 

Airborne Brigade JFE exercise, Saber Junction 16. Along 

with U.S. Air Force combat controllers from the 321st Special Tactics Squadron, airborne engineers from Company B 

cleared the dirt FLS of wire obstacles, mines, and unexploded ordnance in preparation for C-130 airlands. On the 

simulated airstrip, Company B encountered a deliberate 

crater with a 25-foot diameter and an approximate depth 

of 8 feet. With real-world due to land in less than 

12 hours, Company B engineers worked through the night 

to repair the dirt airstrip. 

Although the FLS clearance, crater repair, and combat 

controller integration were successful and essential to the 

173d Airborne Brigade mission in Saber Junction 16, the 

exercise shed light on several organizational oversights 

regarding ADR preparedness. To execute the crater repair 

during the exercise, the 54th BEB relied on notionally airdropped platforms to introduce equipment into the theater 

for a variety of reasons, mostly related to worn or outdated 

equipment. Also, each airborne BEB is expected to conduct 

clearance and repair operations regardless of the airstrip 

surface type. This requires the addition of a vibratory roller 

and a water distributor, which were provided by the 15th 

Engineer Battalion to execute crater repair and airstrip 

maintenance during Saber Junction 16.

E

quipping units for ADR goes well beyond the usual 

authorized vehicles and includes the acquisition of 

ADR kits, forward air supply boxes, concrete saws, 

pavement breakers, foreign object debris covers, and a 

litany of other tools and expendable items. Determining 

how many resources and how much training time to commit to crater repair presents a significant challenge for all 

airborne BEBs and engineer companies. While the authorized hydraulic, electric, pneumatic, petroleum-operated 

equipment kit includes vast equipment and has a variety 

of uses, it does not fit the bill for an expeditious package 

for airfield seizures. The accompanying power packs are 

too heavy to move rapidly; and with 13 or more containers, 

the product is not conducive to streamlined repair operations. The 54th BEB experience during Saber Junction 16 

proved that a more expeditious and consolidated ADR package is needed and should be provided to airborne BEBs. 

The 54th BEB sent representatives to the ADR Limited 

Objective Experiment at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, from 

29 February to 18 March 2016. The combined airborne 

engineer element tested various equipment packages for 

crater repair and used an improved ADR kit created by the 

U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Command. 

That package should be incorporated as an issued property 

book item to all airborne engineer companies. While government purchase card procurements and operational needs 

statement requests can be used to fund additional equipment for ADR, a more methodical approach across the Engineer Regiment is required.

“Airborne combat engineers must possess airfield 

damage repair (ADR) capabilities, which directly

contribute to the success of JFE operations.”

(Continued on page 27)
20 Engineer

T

he 37th Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB), along 

with its parent unit, 2d Brigade Combat Team 

(BCT), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, assumed global response force (GRF) responsibility in October 2014. The GRF, supported by a BCT from the 

82d Airborne Division, is prepared to deploy shortly after 

initial notification. The GRF and its enablers will remain 

mission-ready as long as it is designated as the GRF-1. U.S. 

Forces Command usually rotates airborne BCTs on a regular basis as a component of this pool of available forces. During its stint, 37th BEB executed three joint forcible-entry 

(JFE) exercises requiring the repair of a seized landing strip 

to allow the task force to rapidly build combat power via airlanded forces. To accomplish this task, the battalion built 

and equipped a light airfield repair package (LARP) consisting of engineer equipment that can be heavy-dropped and 

used to support airfield damage repair (ADR).

Each mission required different techniques to succeed, 

but the 37th BEB found a common problem set with each—

how can airborne engineers rapidly clear, assess, and repair 

any type of landing surface and make it ready to accept C-17 

cargo planes to allow their task force to rapidly build combat 

power? The 37th BEB provides a niche capability to 2d BCT 

to conduct expeditionary airfield repair during JFE operations. Given the austere nature of the environment during 

a JFE operation and the limited availability of equipment, 

supplies, and materials, airborne BEB airfield repair is typically an expeditionary, temporary solution to get initial airlands on the objective. The 37th BEB solution to the problem set is to equip and organize the LARP as a scalable and 

tailorable capability set that can be modified based on the 

threat and landing surface type.

The ability to conduct a short-notice JFE is a strategic 

capability for the United States in an increasingly unstable 

By Captain Nicolas K. Massie
Engineer 21

world. JFE provides an opening in any theater by seizing an 

airfield and opening it to receive airlanded forces. During 

Operation Serval, French airborne forces parachuted into 

Mali during the night of 28 January 2013 in response to the 

seizure of towns north of the Niger River by Islamic militants. The French 2d Foreign Legion was tasked with seizing a damaged airfield in Mali to build combat power. The 

objective was an airfield outside Timbuktu that had been 

rendered unusable by parked aircraft, disabled heavy equipment, and dirt berms placed on the airfield. The French 

forces, including airborne engineer assets, cleared and 

repaired the runway to allow the buildup of combat power to 

help Malian forces stabilize the region. Their problem set was 

the same as the one confronting the 37th BEB. The French 

determined the engineer equipment that was required 

to repair the semi-improved field landing strip (FLS). 

This allowed them to deliver the right equipment without 

unnecessarily reducing the available combat power during 

the JFE. 

Armed with this historical perspective, the 37th BEB 

began tackling this problem during two large JFE exercises 

while on GRF duty. During Combined Joint Access Exercise (CJOAX) 15.1, conducted with the United Kingdom 3d 

Battalion, Parachute Regiment, 2d BCT was tasked with 

conducting an airborne assault to seize suspected chemical 

weapons. The objective consisted of a large semi-improved 

FLS with an accompanying airfield terminal complex. The 

37th BEB planned to execute four key engineer phases:

■ Assembly of the minimum force.

■ Clearance and assessment of the FLS.

■ Repair of the FLS.

■ Maintenance of the FLS after repeated airlands.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are 

critical for determining the status and type of obstacles on 

an FLS and for helping to drive the decision making process 

for equipment that airborne sappers will personally take 

into the fight. With maneuver forces providing security, 

37th BEB determined the minimum force to be one squad 

of sappers for clearance and a two-man assessment team. 

The assessment team would quickly assemble and mark 

Airborne engineers use a high-mobility engineer excavator during repair of a concrete FLS.

“. . . [the] 37th BEB executed three 

joint forcible entry (JFE) exercises requiring the repair of a 

seized landing strip to allow the 

task force to rapidly build combat 

power via airlanded forces.” 
22 Engineer

obstacles for clearance, based on the task force time constraint of receiving airlands by parachute hour + 2. Once on 

the ground, sappers from Companies A and B would assemble and begin preparing the equipment and demolitions 

needed for clearance. As maneuver forces began clearing the 

airfield terminal complex and larger area of enemy forces, 

sappers would begin their systematic clearance of the FLS. 

The 37th BEB determined through its mission analysis that 

the full LARP complement of equipment was required to 

repair and maintain the FLS.

Each piece of engineer equipment 

played a critical role in the repair and

maintenance of the FLS. As aircraft

landed and delivered combat power, the

FLS began to deteriorate. Working with

the British engineers proved that, in

the future, ADR will be a combined mission with our allies. Coordinating with

U.S. Air Force special tactics squadron

personnel, who are responsible for certifying the readiness of the FLS, proved

critical since the of airlands must 

cease during maintenance operations.

The chemical weapons were recovered

after 2d BCT combat power reached a

critical mass via airlands, and the mission was a success.

 After action reviews revealed a tradeoff of assumed risks and capabilities

using a menu of available LARP equipment: for every piece of engineer equipment heavy-dropped, one less maneuver, fires, or mission command vehicle

could be dropped. This is because there is

a fixed amount of platform space within

the aircraft. The greater the ADR capability delivered, the fewer lethal effects

could be achieved on the drop zone. 

A paratrooper demonstrates the capabilities of the rock saw attachment for the skid steer loader.

A paratrooper uses a British roller during a joint FLS repair exercise.
Engineer 23

This led the 37th BEB to the understanding that 

LARP requires a balance between initial combat power and ADR capabilities. 

Operation Dragon Spear, the second major 

JFE in which the 37th BEB participated, had a 

mission similar to that of CJOAX 15.01. The 2d BCT 

was tasked to conduct an airborne assault in the 

National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. 

The 37th BEB determined during mission analysis that there were no major repair requirements. 

Knowing the advantages of increased combat power, 

the Company A commander determined that only a 

light airfield maintenance package was needed in 

order to allow the FLS to sustain airlands.

CJOAX 15.1 and Operation Dragon Spear highlighted the need for a scalable and tailorable LARP 

based on the mission set. Both missions allowed the 

37th BEB to use current equipment. The problem set 

required 37th BEB to face another challenge: How 

do airborne engineers repair concrete- and asphaltpaved landing strips that are capable of handling 

C-17 cargo planes? The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Center 

(ERDC) helped provide the answer. In March 2016, 

ERDC sponsored training for all BEBs and airborne 

engineer units on a new ADR kit that includes skid 

steer loaders with multiple attachments for cutting and paving concrete and asphalt landing strips 

and matting that supports C-17 airlands. Using the 

ERDC-recommended crater repair process, ADR kit, 

and skid steer loaders with the new attachments, 

the 37th BEB was ready to test a new LARP that 

was even more scalable than before. During Operation Eagle Talon, conducted in April 2016, the 37th BEB 

performed an airborne assault to repair a concrete-surfaced 

landing strip that had crater and spall damage. In low visibility and with minimal training, the 37th BEB paratroopers repaired two craters with the C-17–capable matting and 

several small spalls in less than 12 hours. Key to the success 

of this mission was the use of high-mobility earth excavators, with hydraulic and pneumatic attachments, and skid 

steer loaders, with rock saws that are used to square off craters to be repaired. The 37th BEB rented the skid steer loaders, which are not issued pieces of equipment, to replicate 

the future LARP recommended by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. Skid steer loaders have the added advantage of 

saving platform space on the aircraft, increasing the initial 

combat power that a BCT can deliver to a drop zone. Building on the 37th BEB experience on GRF duty, modifications 

to the list of LARP equipment have been proposed.

2 BCT ended its GRF responsibility in December 2015. 

Based on two major JFE exercises and several smaller airborne assaults, the 37th BEB solution was to increase the 

scalability and tailorability of the LARP to increase initial combat power on the drop zone. Over the course of 

14 months, the 37th BEB established these key points for 

any JFE that requires the LARP:

■ There is a real-world need for airborne engineer units 

that can deploy and repair semi-improved, asphalt- and 

concrete-surfaced landing strips.

■ Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are 

critical for determining the type and amount of obstacles 

on, and damage to, the FLS.

■ Coordination between Services and allies is increasingly 

important to maximize the combat effects of engineers on 

the drop zone.

■ Engineer equipment, such as the high-mobility earth 

excavator and skid steer loader, provide engineers with 

versatility on the drop zone while maximizing platform 

space available for maneuver, fires, and mission command equipment.

Captain Massie serves 

and Headquarters served as 

der is a senior-rated -

Captains Career Course 

and the U. a bachelor’s degree 

in civil engineering University 

degree in engineering University of 

Science and Technology at Rolla. He is a licensed professional 

engineer in North Carolina.

A paratrooper uses a rock saw to square off a crater in a concrete FLS.
24 Engineer

T

he airborne brigade engineer battalion (BEB) provides mobility, countermobility, and survivability 

support to the brigade combat team (BCT) through 

a scalable insertion of combat power supplied to the operational environment through a variety of delivery methods—

most notably, airborne assault—focused on the maneuver commander’s intent and needs. The three significant 

parts of the BEB that are critical to providing this combat 

power are its two line engineer companies and the engineer 

staff. Through proper integration, these elements seamlessly interweave into operational planning and execution 

from the company level to the BCT staff, ensuring efficient utilization.

The most critical key to success is the integration of the 

engineer leaders and units at the appropriate level in order 

to best allocate and implement the relatively limited engineer combat power available to support the commander’s 

operational needs. At the BCT level, the BEB commander 

serves as the senior engineer, directly advising the BCT 

commander on the proper use of forces. The BEB staff serves 

as the workhorse of engineer planning. Successful synchronization with the assistant brigade engineer cell on the BCT 

staff ensures that resources are appropriately allocated and 

weighted toward the decisive operation. Given the “three 

by two” structure of maneuver battalions to engineer companies, an effective way to align habitual relationships is 

to assign each sapper platoon to a maneuver battalion. The 

sapper platoon leaders serve as the task force engineers for 

the battalions they support, providing engineer expertise 

to the battalion staff during the planning and execution of 

operations. Platoon leaders wear two hats, balancing their 

duties as platoon leaders and task force engineers. More 

recently (despite being authorized fewer personnel and different equipment), the BEB route clearance platoon began 

supporting the cavalry squadron as a dismounted sapper 

platoon. The light-equipment platoons of Companies A and 

B support the BCT according to a conditions-based priority of 

support. The direct-support artillery battalion, Company D 

from each maneuver battalion, and the brigade support 

battalion are consistent customers for the light-equipment 

platoons. Finally, the lowest official support link is the one 

between the sapper squad leaders and each company 

commander in the maneuver battalions. This link provides 

every key maneuver leader with a direct habitual relationship with an engineer element. This leads to gained respect; 

a familiarity with tactics, techniques, and procedures; and 

comfort through integrated planning and training.

By Captain Stephen C. Kraus
Engineer 25

Airborne sappers bring scalable mobility support to the 

operational environment, from airborne assault to ground 

convoy. The main objective of airborne engineers in a 

joint forcible entry is to open a ight landing strip so that 

increased combat power can arrive via fixed-wing aircraft 

through airlands. As a result, the personnel and equipment 

required to open a ight landing strip must be delivered via 

parachute. Sappers bring detection and clearance expertise and limited explosive capabilities to the objective to 

clear mechanical and explosive obstacles from the minimum operating strip to allow aircraft to land. The lightequipment platoon, predominantly composed of equipment 

operators, provides the light airfield repair package. The 

package is designed to repair craters, cuts, and spall in 

dirt, asphalt, or concrete runways. The initial objective is 

typically to provide the most expeditious repair required 

to land the first aircraft as quickly as possible so that 

the lodgment can be expanded, allowing follow-on forces, 

equipment, and supplies to be delivered. The light airfield 

repair package can also clear earthen, vehicular, or other 

obstacles that are too large to be cleared by dismounted 

sappers. The synchronization of assets between sapper and 

light-equipment platoons, typically performed at the company or battalion level, is required to efficiently leverage the 

assets on the ground.

Following this initial objective, sappers focus on supporting their maneuver battalion follow-on assault objectives, 

either in the vicinity of the lodgment or in an offset location. From their rucksacks, sappers can provide mechanical, 

ballistic, and explosive breaching support tailored for urban 

objectives. Limitations include the lack of proper explosive 

lane clearance tools, such as the antipersonnel obstacle 

breaching system and Bangalore torpedoes, to clear assault 

lanes through mine-wire or similar obstacles. Such systems 

would need to be tested and certified to be air dropped or 

delivered later via ground lines of communication.

The BCT will often move into a defensive posture immediately after a joint forcible parachute assault to wait for 

additional combat power and to prepare for follow-on objectives. Engineers support the maneuver commander with 

countermobility efforts by aiding in engagement area development, erecting tactical wire obstacles according to the 

obstacle overlay published by the assistant brigade engineer 

and developed largely by the engineer staff. This is where 

the synchronization of the task force engineer, BEB staff, 

and assistant brigade engineer cell is critical in ensuring 

that there is a nested plan that ties in unit boundaries. Sappers erect concertina wire and antivehicular wire obstacles 

to create the specific obstacle effects desired.

Assisting in the development of the engagement area, 

sappers can employ their M-7 Spider antipersonnel munitions to create a networked system that is tied into the 

maneuver commander’s direct- and indirect-fire effects in 

the expected enemy avenue of approach. This system can 

also be used to close lanes following the retrograde of friendly 

reconnaissance forces operating ahead of the forward edge of 

the battle area. In support, the light-equipment platoon can 

construct antitank ditches to shape the terrain in favor of 

friendly forces. Performing this mission depends on when 

the appropriate assets will be available on the ground. For 

example, the deployable universal combat earthmover is 

often part of the light airfield repair package and cannot 

be drawn away until the landing strip is operational. 

Therefore, antitank ditches are usually constructed using a 

bulldozer brought to the lodgment via ground assault convoy when conditions allow. Again, the task force engineer 

is key to ensuring that the maneuver commander’s countermobility needs are supported at the right time with the 

right equipment.

The successful allocation of resources to support BCT 

survivability efforts depends on the agreed-upon defended 

asset list. This list is a compilation of the survivability needs 

that BCT leaders decided to act upon, based on the limited 

number of blade assets and time available. It is just a segment of the critical asset list, which lists all the survivability 

needs of the BCT, regardless of blade assets and time. The 

engineer staff, together with the assistant brigade engineer 

cell, proposes the defended asset list to the BCT commander, 

who ultimately decides the priority of support. A technique 

that can work well for streamlining survivability operations is the creation of Dig, which works under the 

operational control of the BEB headquarters company commander. This task force encompasses both light-equipment 

platoons from the line companies and any other dig assets 

that may be available from inorganic units. The headquarters company commander manages the overall implementation of the dig assets, with task force engineers clearly 

dictating their maneuver commander requirements and 

ensuring that linkup operations are executed in their particular areas.

The airborne BEB provides the BCT commander with 

a variety of tools to enable the mission on the ground, 

starting with the opening of the ight landing strip. This 

enables the force projection and logistics of critical elements that are unable to arrive via parachute and also 

serves as the only large-volume exfiltration point to retrograde personnel or elements, as required in humanitarian assistance or rescue operations. The key to success is 

the integration of engineer leaders and units at all levels 

into the maneuver company, battalion, and brigade leadership and staff structure. Through this integration, the 

synchronized allocation of combat power in support of 

mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks can be 

effectively employed.

When this article was written, Captain Kraus was the -

-

sion. He is a senior-rated a graduate of the SapU.S. Pathfinder School. He holds a bachelor’s degree in 

civil engineering Point, 

New York, and a degree in engineering 

University of Science and Technology at Rolla. 

He is transitioning to work with the New England District, U.S. 
26 Engineer

I

n February 2016, the 4th Infantry Division executed 

Division Warfighter Exercise 16-03 at Fort Carson, Colorado. The exercise involved the division main, the division tactical command post, brigade response cells, and various other training audiences in support of the division. The 

event offered the division an opportunity to exercise mission 

command over all its subordinate units. During the second 

phase of the operation, the 299th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, conducted a wet-gap crossing. Rather than focusing on 

the engineer equipment park, the locations of the holding 

areas, or the call forward area discussed in Field Manual 

3-90.12, ,

1

 this 

article delves into the tactical issues surrounding the wetgap crossing. The training revealed the following lessons: 

■ Methods to defeat the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

 threat posed by near-peer competitors today.

■ The importance of a well-executed deception plan.

■ The importance of designating different units to assume

 the large scope of missions surrounding a gap-crossing

 operation. 

Addressing these issues will lead to improved tactics, techniques, and procedures.

U

nits today face an inevitable UAV threat from 

near-peers. When the enemy sees engineer forces 

approaching a wet gap, it interprets the action as 

a clear sign of intent to begin bridging operations. In recent 

near-peer adversaries have often swarmed friendly 

forces with UAVs to target their positions with effective 

fires. For this exercise, we adapted our tactics, techniques, 

and procedures as we approached the river. We also coordinated with the division electronic warfare (EW) cell for 

preplanned EW attacks. Once the scouts of our lead maneuver battalion moved close to the river, a number of small, 

adversary UAVs appeared and began observing our friendly 

forces. The enemy fires brigade began an initial volley of fire. 

The number of UAVs deployed indicated that there was at 

least a battalion size element on the farside objectives; this 

triggered our EW attack. The locations of the integrated 

fires command and fires brigade were within range of all 

planned crossing sites. This, along with the enemy tendency to target friendly breaching assets, led us to believe 

that we would have a very small window in which to defeat 

the UAVs before the enemy used indirect fire to destroy the 

bridging assets. Our EW attack denied the enemy the use of 

its UAV assets, which prevented it from reporting information rapidly and accurately. This made the enemy unable to 

place effective, accurate fires on our advancing maneuver 

and bridging forces. 

UAVs offer major advantages to units. Deploying numerous UAVs has diminished the need for human observers to 

be stationed in observation points forward of the front line 

of enemy troops. If no countermeasures are in place, a nearpeer force commands a significant advantage. Using our own 

EW assets, units must develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to defeat the enemy UAV threat before it can effectively identify friendly positions and call for fire. 

Deception Plan

F

rom the initial stages of planning, we recognized 

the importance of a deception plan. A psychological 

operations platoon with sound projection platforms 

that emitted audible cues was attached to our brigade. 

The brigade deception plan also included a false crossing 

party of engineer and infantry Soldiers moving on a deception site obscured by smoke. These actions played a critical 

role in deceiving the enemy, who committed ground forces 

to defeat the friendly force wet-gap crossing at the deception site. This countermove by the enemy, coupled with the 

defeat of the enemy UAV threat, enabled our forces to move 

to the nearside objective. We then established a support-byfire position without facing a direct-fire threat greater than 

a company size element from the exit bank at the actual 

crossing sites. 

By Major Sean R. Hill

“Conducting an opposed wetgap crossing is one of the most 

difficult tactical operations 

that our Army faces.”
Engineer 27

The deception operation must contain elements of units 

that would actually conduct a wet-gap crossing. Previous 

simulations and international exercises prove that if a unit 

attempts a wet-gap crossing deception but fails to send engineer assets to that deception crossing, the enemy immediately recognizes the deception and will not commit forces to 

address the false crossing site. Without an enemy commitment to address the deception operation, the deliberate wetgap crossing operation quickly falters. 

Unit Designation

F

inally, we learned the importance of the size of the 

bridgehead and the designation of different brigades. 

A unit must designate subordinate units as the 

crossing force, breakout force, and nearside security force. 

The many tasks assigned to each unit spread over multiple 

crossing sites required more than one brigade combat team 

(BCT). During the exercise, the enemy air assets assaulted 

the division infantry BCT to secure the farside objective. 

The Stryker BCT was designated as the crossing force to 

secure the bridgehead, as well as part of the breakout force 

to secure follow-on objectives. As the crossing force, the 

Stryker BCT identified critical friendly zones and plotted 

the points around the crossing sites to protect the crossing 

forces and the bridges. The bridgehead was established, and 

the entire division armored BCT crossed the river over the 

four established ribbon bridges. The immediate forward 

movement with the brigade, and emplacement within the 

bridgehead, of an air defense platoon with radar and antiaircraft weapons platforms proved critical to the success of the 

bridgehead. We also recognized a need for improvement; a 

higher-level headquarters was needed to relieve the Stryker 

BCT of its security tasks. With the Stryker BCT responsible 

for securing the bridgehead and continuing maneuver forward as one of the breakout forces, the security of the crossing site bridges required a company (+) element to remain at 

the crossing sites. 

Conducting an opposed wet-gap crossing is one of the 

most difficult tactical operations that our Army faces. We 

must look ahead at the challenges that we face from nearpeer threats and then for ways to defeat those threats. The 

use of UAVs in place of human observers is a technique that 

our enemy uses to its advantage. However, with detailed 

and careful planning, units can and should use EW and psychological operations deception to deceive and confuse the 

enemy. A detailed plan must be crafted to designate each 

unit, detailing all the tasks associated with the wet-gap 

crossing operation. 

Endnote:

1Field Manual 3-90.12, -

ations, 1 July 2008.

Major Hill serves as the training and operations officer for 

the 299th Brigade Engineer Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado. 

Staff 

College and holds degree in public policy Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Essential Task List

T

he specific addition of crater repair tasks as key collective mission-essential tasks for airborne BEB companies would bolster the requirement for additional 

equipment and create a greater emphasis on additional 

equipment funding. For airborne units outside the continental United States, the reliance on self-sufficiency in equipment and crater repair expertise is paramount to supporting 

the airborne infantry brigade combat team abroad. While 

the 20th Engineer Brigade remains the Army proponent for 

ADR, the decentralized training of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Europe requires that Company A and Company B 

of the 54th BEB maintain ADR proficiency and equipment 

readiness. In 54th BEB training events, airborne BEBs 

have enough personnel to complete the required crater 

repair tasks. Most of the training deficits relate directly to 

equipment shortfalls. Evolving the formation forward from 

simple dirt field landing strip repairs using sand grid and 

compaction, the way ahead for 54th BEB ADR training 

involves the acquisition of additional concrete-cutting saws, 

concrete-breaking equipment, and foreign object damage 

covers and accessories. Training the force for concrete

repairs and C-17-capable landings requires the use of foreign 

object damage covers and anchoring bolts and an increased 

emphasis on ADR within the mission-essential task list of 

engineer companies.

A

DR is a critical component in establishing an air 

head during JFE operations. Historical references 

.indicate that FLS clearance and airstrip repair are 

plausible requirements when inserting paratroopers to seize 

an airfield. The geographical position and mission set of the 

173d Airborne Brigade require an enhanced focus on selfreliance and leader proactivity when confronting challenges, 

so the 54th BEB is concentrating its efforts on equipping the 

force with ADR vehicles and equipment and codifying the 

airborne BEB role in ADR. 

Endnotes:

1Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, 

27 November 2012.

2

Ibid.

is currently studying design and 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology as 

part of the Advanced Civil Schooling 

served -

ter’s degree in civil engineering University of Science and Technology at Rolla.
 

28 Engineer

T

he brigade engineer battalion (BEB) is a great addition to the brigade combat team (BCT). It provides a 

more robust engineer capability for the BCT to deal 

with the elements of decisive action. However, the modified 

table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for the BEB 

does not address the engineer planning shortfall in the 

maneuver battalion and cavalry squadron staffs. It is not 

necessary to revert to old task force engineer solutions to 

resolve this shortfall; the engineer community needs new 

solutions. A permanent engineer planner is needed in each 

maneuver battalion and cavalry squadron staff that is not 

associated with a BEB platoon or company.

The old solutions for task force engineer planner do not 

allow engineer platoon leaders and company commanders to do their jobs. Having a platoon leader or a company 

commander serve as a task force engineer puts these officers in the tough position of deciding whether to act as 

staff officers or as leaders of their units. Field Manual 3-34, 

Engineer Operations, states that “The engineer staff officer at each echelon is responsible for engineer logistics 

estimates, and the engineer staff officer plans and monitors 

engineer-related sustainment support for engineering capabilities operating at that echelon.”1

 Being a task force engineer is especially tough for platoon leaders because they do 

not have the staff or the experience to properly support the 

maneuver task force. 

Although a company commander has an executive officer 

and operations sergeant to assist in planning, the job puts 

unnecessary strain on the company because two of its leaders are tied to the main command post of the maneuver battalion. Having a company commander serve as the task force 

engineer is a temporary solution at best because the BCT 

task organization changes as the mission changes. In addition, this always leaves two BCT elements—a maneuver 

element and a reconnaissance element—without an engineer planner. These two elements of a BCT need a constant 

battalion/squadron engineer planner. 

The maneuver and reconnaissance elements of a BCT 

need a constant battalion/squadron engineer planner to 

ensure that the engineer effort across the BCT is 

The New Task Force

Engineer Planner
Engineer 29

coordinated and synchronized. Also, an engineer planner would increase the engineer situational awareness of 

maneuver battalion and cavalry squadron leaders and give 

them a constant capability to plan and integrate engineer 

operations and effects into their plans. This would ensure 

that the engineer needs of the maneuver commander 

were met.

The only battalion size maneuver element in the force 

that is authorized a battalion engineer planner is the combined arms battalion of the armor BCT. Infantry battalions 

in infantry BCTs, Stryker battalions in Stryker BCTs, and 

cavalry squadrons in all BCTs are not authorized an engineer plans officer. This lack of a planning capability may 

cause the BCT engineer plan to lack coordination and synchronization across the BCT area of operation. 

Maybe it is time for the engineer community to look at 

how the field artillery community supports the maneuver 

community. The field artillery places a fires support officer 

(FSO) in every maneuver battalion and cavalry squadron. 

The battalion FSO ensures that the maneuver battalion 

fires plan is synchronized with the BCT fires plan. The battalion FSO works for the brigade FSO, who in turn, works 

for the field artillery battalion commander. Adopting this 

manning solution would solve the engineer planning problem in maneuver battalions and cavalry squadrons.

The battalion engineer plans officer should be a precommand captain or a senior first lieutenant who has a habitual 

relationship with the supported unit. This engineer officer 

should hold the position for a least 1 year, which would allow 

the officer to develop a relationship with the maneuver battalion commander and staff. The BEB commander should 

use the battalion engineer plans officer position as a key 

developmental position for the battalion’s best precommand 

captains and senior first lieutenants and should consider the 

position as a priority fill. The battalion engineer plans officer would work for the brigade engineer plans officer, who 

in turn would work for the BEB commander. Establishing 

this relationship would ensure that the BCT engineer plan 

is synchronized. This would emulate the model that the field 

artillery uses for battalion FSOs and would link the engineer plans officer back to the BEB for training, coaching, 

and mentoring.

Implementing this proposal would require the creation of 

a BCT engineer plans section in the BEB MTOE. That section would consist of the current BCT engineer section, with 

the addition of four battalion engineer plans officers. The 

Regular Army part of this proposal would require the creation of 120 battalion engineer plans officer positions. To get 

these positions in a zero-sum Army, where personnel gains 

in one area must be balanced by losses in another area, 

87 positions would come from changes to the BCT MTOE. 

The first change would transfer the engineer planner position on the combined arms battalion MTOE to the BEB 

MTOE. The second change would convert the BEB company 

executive officer position to an engineer plans officer position. The engineer company support platoon leader would 

assume the duties of the executive officer. The BEB of each 

armor BCT would give up one position to a Stryker BCT or 

infantry BCT. These two BCT MTOE changes would yield 

87 of the 120 positions needed to create the BCT engineer 

plans section in the BEB. The remaining 33 positions would 

come from converting the echelon-above-brigade engineer 

company executive officers to battalion engineer plans officers and transferring those positions to the MTOE of the 

Stryker BCT or infantry BCT. The support platoon leaders 

in the EAB engineer companies would also assume executive officer duties. These changes to Regular Army unit 

MTOEs would provide enough positions to place engineer 

planners in every maneuver battalion and cavalry squadron. 

The same analysis used to create Regular Army maneuver 

battalion engineer planner slots could be used to create similar slots in the 26 Army National Guard BCTs.

Adding a permanent battalion engineer planner to a 

maneuver battalion staff would enhance engineer planning 

at the battalion and squadron levels. It would also allow the 

BCT engineer plans officer to better integrate and synchronize the engineer effort throughout the BCT area of operation. A coordinated and synchronized engineer effort would 

better support the BCT commander.

Endnote: 

1Field Manual 3-34, Engineer Operations, 29 July 2014.

Mr. Brown is an assistant professor at the 

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a 

bachelor of science degree Marquette University and -

ter’s degrees University of Science and Technology at Rolla and Baker University, Baldwin City, Kansas. 

He is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Basic Course (now the 

Engineer Basic Officer Leader Course), the Engineer Officer 

Advanced Course (now the Engineer Captains Career Course), 

“Adding a permanent battalion engineer planner . . . 

would also allow the BCT engineer plans officer to better 

integrate and synchronize the engineer effort throughout 

the BCT area of operation.”
30 Engineer

W

orld War I military planners needed to defeat the 

trench warfare that had evolved on the Western 

Front in 1914. The need for a heavily armored 

vehicle to carry troops to the frontlines; provide augmented 

firepower; and traverse trenches, shell craters, and barbed 

wire manifested itself in the form of a tracked, iron monster that the British initially called a landship because of its 

similarity to sea-faring vessels. The vehicle soon became 

famous as the tank. When the United States entered the war 

in 1917, it also needed a tank. The need for tanks spurred 

the development of firing ranges, including locations at 

Camp Meade, Maryland, and Camp Colt, Pennsylvania. 

Eventually, tank training facilities were constructed 

across the country and now exist at Fort Knox, Kentucky; 

Fort Benning, Georgia; the National Training Center, Fort 

Irwin, California; Fort Hood, Texas, and numerous other 

locations. As the vehicle

platform evolved, so did the

guns and ammunition of

the American tank. Legacy

rounds have historically contained lead and other heavy

metal components. In the

21st century, the American

military began a permanent

move toward environmentally friendly ammunition.

The move is scheduled to be

complete in 2018. To do this,

manufacturers have removed

lead components from ammunition and replaced them

with copper ones, which

will reduce the impact on

the environment and on

human health.

Lawson, Dr. Brooke N. Stevens, and Ms. Chante Vines 

Boydston Tank Range shows 

severe erosion after decades 

of tank gunnery.
Engineer 31

*KUVQTKECNN[ TQWPFU sTGF QP C TCPIG YGTG WUWCNN[ NGHV

VJGTG#UWUVCKPCDNGOGVJQFQHFKURQUKPIQHNGICE[TQWPFU

VJCVTGOCKPQPVJGsTKPITCPIGUOWUVDGFGVGTOKPGF

+PCFFKVKQPVJGVJTGGEQORQPGPVUQHUWUVCKPCDKNKV[ō

GPXKTQPOGPVUQEKGV[CPFGEQPQOKEUōOWUVDGEQPUKFGTGFVQ

FGVGTOKPGō

Ŷ If a site requires remediation from long-term exposure to 

 heavy metals.

Ŷ What environmental impact these metals may have had.

Ŷ What value the projectile casings might possess.

Ŷ What impact potential contamination might have on the 

KPJCDKVCPVUQHCPKPUVCNNCVKQP

6QFQVJKUVJGCWVJQTUUVWFKGFVJG$Q[FUVQP6CPM

4CPIGCV(QTV-PQZYJKEJYCUJQOGVQVJG75#TO[

#TOQT5EJQQNHTQOWPVKNYJGPVJGNCUVVCPMU

left the installation for Fort Benning. The range was active 

throughout the time period and shows evidence of long-term 

exposure to legacy tank ammunition from the 75-millimeter 

CPFOKNNKOGVGTVCPMRTQLGEVKNGUWUGFKP9QTNF9CT++VJG

-QTGCP9CTCPFVJG8KGVPCO9CT+PCUUGUUKPI$Q[FUVQP

6CPM4CPIGKVKUKORQTVCPVVQICWIGVJGGPXKTQPOGPVCN

KORCEVQHVTCKPKPICPFVQFGXGNQRCUWUVCKPCDNGUQNWVKQP

VJCVECPDGKORNGOGPVGFHQTVJG#TO[CPFQVJGT#OGTKcan military components that conduct weapons testing in 

open environments. 

B

oydston Tank Range consists of approximately 

USWCTGMKNQOGVGTUQHDCTTGPUQKNOKZGFYKVJ

sparsely vegetated patches of forest. Due to conUVCPVDQODCTFOGPVHTQOVCPMTQWPFUCPFQVJGTGZRNQFKPI

QTFPCPEGVJGVQRNC[GTQHVJGUQKNJCUDGGPGTQFGFGZRQUKPITGOPCPVUQHVJGTGOCKPKPIUWDUQKN6JGUWDUQKNYJKEJKU

OCFGWRQHENC[YKVJHTCIOGPVUQHEJGTVCPFUQHVUJCNGJCU

C JKIJ RTQRGPUKV[ HQT GTQUKQP CPF UJQYU UKIPKsECPV GXKFGPEG

QHKV6JGRGTOGCDKNKV[QHVJKUUQKNKUOQFGTCVGN[NQYCPF

VJGCXCKNCDNGYCVGTECRCEKV[KUJKIJ6QQDVCKPCsTUVJCPF

CEEQWPVQHUKVGEQPFKVKQPUVGCOOGODGTUVTCXGNGFVQVJG

TCPIGQP(GDTWCT[CPFEollected 14 soil samples. 

6JGUCORNGUYGTGFTKGFETWUJGFUKGXGFCPFVJGPCPCN[\GF

HQTVJGRTGUGPEGQHJGCX[OGVCNUUWEJCUNGCFEQDCNVEQRRGTEJTQOKWOCPFXCPCFKWOYJKEJwould match components of 75-millimeter and 90-millimeter tank rounds.

Results and Discussion

I

nvestigation of VJGsTUVEQORQPGPVQHUWUVCKPCDKNKV[

ōVJGGPXKTQPOGPVōUJQYGFOKZGFTGUWNVUYJGP

 Boydston Tank Range soil samples were compared to 

VJGOQUVTGEGPV75'PXKTQPOGPVCN2TQVGEVKQP#IGPE[


75'2#UQKNUETGGPKPINGXGNUHQTTGUKFGPVKCNCPFKPFWUVTKCN

UKVGUCPFVQVJGPQTOCNDCEMITQWPFJGCX[OGVCN soil levels for Kentucky. The metal concentration in most of the 

UCORNGUHGNNDGNQY75'2#CPF-GPVWEM[UETGGPKPINGXGNU

*QYGXGTQPGQHVJGUCORNGUTGXGCNGFNGCFEQPEGPVTCVKQPU

at more than 27 times the naturCNDCEMITQWPFNGXGNHQTVJG

state of Kentucky; the level was also higher than the indusVTKCNNGXGNHTQOVJG75'2#/CP[UCORNGUUJQYGFNGXGNU

QHXCPCFKWOVJCVYGTGNQYGTVJCPVJGKPFWUVTKCNNGXGNDWV

CDQXG-GPVWEM[ŏUDCEMITQWPFNGXGNU6YGNXGUKVGUUJQYGF

CDQXGCXGTCIGNGXGNUQHEJTQOKWOCPFtwo sites with high 

NGCFNGXGNUCNUQUJQYGFJKIJEQRRGTNGXGNU.GXGNUQHEQDCNV

YGTGYKVJKPVJGCEEGRVCDNGTCPIGQHDQVJ75'2#CPF-GPVWEM[DCEMITQWPFNGXGNUKPCNNUCORNGU6JKUKPFKECVGU

that heavy metals are present at levels that are not norOCNHQT-GPVWEM[ŏUPCVKXGUQKNUKORN[KPIVJCVVJG[RTQDCDN[EQOGHTQOVJGVCPMTQWPFUVJCVYGTGNGft on the range. 

Though most of the contaminant levels are not high enough 

VQDGCPGZVTGOGEoncGTPHQTJWOCPJGCNVJVJGTGCTGQVJGT

concerns regarding the site.

Authors collect 

soil samples at 

the range.
32 Engineer

Recommendations and Conclusion

A

lthough heavy metal concentrations in most of the 

samples taken at the Boydston Tank Range at Fort 

.Knox were below their respective screening levels, 

there were unusual spikes in the concentration levels for 

lead and copper at two sample sites. Coincidentally, both 

sites are located at the base of a hill where there was a large 

volume of shell impacts. The high levels of lead and copper 

could be caused by erosion from the surface water runoff that 

collects at the base of the hill. Because the clay soils at the 

site hold on to water longer than many other types of soil, 

transport of heavy metals is typically very low. And because 

the clay has low permeability, heavy metals tend to collect 

at the surface, where they may be transported by rainfall 

along with eroded soil particles and deposited at locations 

that receive runoff during rainstorms. The authors recommend that this possibility be investigated more thoroughly. 

Also, heavy metal contamination outside the direct 

impact area could occur at ranges that have soil with a lower 

water capacity than that of Fort Knox. If there are areas 

where surface or groundwater can pool, contaminants could 

settle and build up over time. During periods of high temperature and drought, soils have a tendency to dry out, causing 

a layer of dust to build up on the surface. This contaminated 

dust could be dispersed by wind. Since particulate matter is 

one of the six USEPA-recognized criteria for air pollutants, 

this dust could pose health concerns to populations close to 

the tank ranges. This could impact the second component of 

sustainability—society. Fort Knox is still an active military 

installation where continual training takes place. Constant 

exposure to the dust could pose a potential health risk. To 

eliminate this concern, vegetation could be planted on the 

surface of the range, especially in the area that is closest 

to the residents of the installation. An additional benefit of 

added vegetation could be the reduction in surface transport 

of the heavy metals. 

The range occupies approximately 370 acres, but only 

about 120 acres are fully unvegetated. Since the unvegetated areas are relatively spread out and interspersed 

with grassy areas, it might be possible to prompt the site to 

reseed with species already present by amending the soil 

to help with plant growth. If that is unsuccessful, or is not 

proceeding fast enough, revegetation through intentional 

reseeding is also an option. Given the amount of labor 

and the large quantities of seed that would be needed, 

this method would be considerably more expensive. The 

revegetation of a site is typically done using a mixture of 

temporary species, which grow quickly and provide a thick 

groundcover, and permanent species that take over after 

the temporary crop. 

The presence of clay and the lack of topsoil at Boydston 

Tank Range make it difficult for grass to take root, especially if no intentional reseeding is done. A proposed sustainable solution is to spread organic matter over the surface, 

then apply a seed mixture or allow for natural reseeding. 

Biosolids, which are a common waste product from the 

wastewater treatment process, are commonly used where 

plant growth is difficult, such as stripped airfields, or where 

enhanced plant growth is desirable, such as tree farms. 

Boydston Tank Range is littered with 75- and 90-millimeter tank projectiles.
Engineer 33

Many municipalities look for beneficial reuse opportunities 

for biosolids; otherwise, waste products must be hauled 

away and disposed of properly, which greatly increases operating costs. If Fort Knox can find a local wastewater treatment facility to donate or provide the biosolids at a reduced 

cost, this would provide a suitable, low-cost medium for 

grass growth. 

The application of biosolids to a site results in additional 

concerns about the introduction of heavy metals to the environment due to the use of cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc 

in the plumbing industry. Therefore, it is important to determine if the wastewater treatment plant tests its byproducts 

for the presence of heavy metals. So long as the heavy metal 

concentrations are within acceptable ecological limits, the 

application of biosolids to Boydston Tank Range would be a 

sound sustainable solution.

There is a positive outlook for the third component of 

sustainability, the economics. In this unique setting and 

with the inherent safety concerns, the number of legacy 

projectiles that lie within the boundaries of Boydston Tank 

Range is unknown. However, the authors made a reasonable 

determination of the financial impacts of a site cleanup. It is 

known with reasonable certainty that the legacy rounds no 

longer pose a threat of explosion and are most likely inert. 

Verification could be achieved through coordination with the 

installation explosive ordnance disposal unit. Once safety 

was verified, units on post could be tasked with the collection of projectiles and the projectiles could then be moved 

via military transport to the nearest metal recycling facility.

Overall, the potential for heavy metals contamination 

at the Boydston Tank Range does not appear to be critical. 

However, due to the contamination levels found in some 

samples and their location on the range, the potential surface transport of the metals should be evaluated. Also, the 

potential for particulate matter pollution is of great concern 

to the nearby population, especially if the human presence 

on the site increases. The introduction of vegetation in a 

cost-effective manner could provide long-lasting health and 

aesthetic benefits to Fort Knox.

Robert S. Cameron, “Fort Knox: Birthplace of Today’s 

Armor Branch,” November–December 2006, 

pp. 27–33. 

Perry Chiaramonte, “Military,” Fox News, Fox News Network, LLC, 21 December 2013 <http://www.foxnews.com

/us/2013/12/21/end-line-for-lead-bullet-regulations-bans-force

-switch-to-green-ammo.html>, accessed on 13 July 2016.

H. F. Hemond and E. J. Fechner-Levy, 

Transport in the 3d edition, Academic Press, San 

Diego, California, 9 July 2014.

Jonathan Malory, “TANKS.NET,” <http://www.tanks.net/>, 

accessed on 13 July 2016.

I. L. Pepper, C. P. Gerba, and M. L. Brusseau, -

tal and Pollution Science, 2d edition, Academic Press, Boston, 

Massachusetts, 11 April 2006.

Maureen Rose, “Final Units Depart Fort Knox Armor 

School,” 13 June 2011, <http://www.army.mil/article/59527/>, 

accessed on 13 July 2016.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Soil Survey of Hardin 

and Larue Counties, Kentucky,” Washington, D.C., January 

1979, <http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_Manuscripts 

/kentucky/KY621/0/Hardin.pdf>, accessed on 13 July 2016.

Jeff Stringer, “Proper Revegetation of Trails, Roads, 

Landings,” The Kentucky , Spring 2003, Vol. 7, No. 4, 

pp. 1–4, <http://dept.ca.uky.edu/masterlogger/pdfs/quizes/quiz

_revegetation74.pdf>, accessed on 13 July 2016.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Method 3051a: 

Microwave Assisted Acid Digestion of Sediments, Sludges, Soils, 

and Oils,” <https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12

/documents/3051a.pdf>, accessed 18 July 2016.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Method 6010c: 

Inductively Coupled Plasma-Atomic Emission Spectrometry,” Revision 3, November 2000, <https://www.epa.gov/sites

/production /files/2015-07/documents/epa-6010c.pdf>, accessed 

on 13 July 2016.

Captain -

ter’s degree in civil engineering at The Ohio State University 

this article was written. Previously, 

he was co ander of the 76th Engineer Co pany (Vertical) at 

Fort Knox.

Mr. Bittinger has a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering 

The Ohio State University in 

engineering there. engiMr. Cassidy is pursuing a bachelor’s degree in 

engineering at The Ohio State University and is an intern at the 

design and construction of the university’s FaciliMs. Lawson is a graduate student in the of Food, 

Agricultural, and Biological Engineering at The Ohio State University. She holds a bachelor’s degree -

Dr. Stevens holds a bachelor’s degree 

in Harrisonburg, Virginia, and a 

Ph.D in bioaccessibility, bioavai -

University. She is a senior scientist with HX5, LLC, in Vicksburg, Mississippi.

Ms. Vines holds a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering 

fro Morgan State University, Balti ore, Maryland, and is 

pursuin aster’s degree in civil engineering at The Ohio 

State University. She is a Graduate Enrich ent fellow and a 

Mechanis s and Interactions of Cli ate Change in Mountain 

Regions fellow.
34 Engineer

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update pdate

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate 

Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division

Publication 

Number Title Description/Status

Army Techniques 

Publication (ATP) 

3-37.10

Publication Revisions

Base Camps

ATP 3-34.80 Geospatial Engineering This revision codifies the standardized geospatial foundation for the transmission of geospatial reference data across platforms. 

Status: To be published in 1st quarter, FY 17.

Survivability Operations This is a revision to the current survivability manual. Updates include 

survivability data in various tables.

Status: To be published in 3d quarter, FY 17.

ATP 3-37.34

Power Generation and 

Distribution

This manual will supersede Technical Manual 3-34.45, Engineer Prime 

Power Operation, and cover both low and medium voltage.

Status: To be published in 3rd quarter, FY 17.

ATP 3-34.45

FY17 Planned Publication Reviews

These publications will be reviewed for any required changes or revisions. The engineer doctrine team is soliciting feedback from the field, 

subject matter experts, and others to identify any required changes.

How can you provide feedback to doctrinal publication reviews?

The doctrine team often entertains questions from the field concerning ways that Soldiers and civilians can provide feedback 

to our doctrinal publications as well as those staffed across the Army. For existing publications, please e-mail us directly with 

feedback. For doctrinal publications under assessment/revision, the doctrinal publication staffing process includes a 45-day 

period for comments. Comments are accepted regardless of rank or position; however, there are requirements associated with 

the “level” of comment. Comment levels of “critical,” “major,” “substantive,” and “administrative” (and in some cases, the rank 

equivalent associated with the level of comment) are described as— 

C – Critical. Contentious issue that will cause nonconcurrence with publication; requires general officer level backing.

M – Major. Incorrect material that may cause nonconcurrence with publication; requires colonel level or above backing. 

S – Substantive. Factually incorrect material.

A – Administrative. Grammar, punctuation, and style.

Regardless of the level of comment, we welcome feedback to ensure that the information we are capturing for the Regiment 

is current, relevant, and useful for the force. 

Field Manual (FM) 

3-34

ATP 3-90.37

ATP 3-90.8

ATP 3-34.22

Engineer Operations

Countering Improvised 

Explosive Devices

Combined Arms Countermobility Operations

Engineer Operations— 

Brigade Combat Teams 

(BCT) and Below

This revision includes changing the size of base camps (small, medium, 

and large) from numerical values, such as 50 or 500, to organizational 

sizes, such as platoon or battalion. 

Status: To be published in 1st quarter, fiscal year (FY) 2017.
 

 

Engineer 35

Engineer Doctrine Sponsorship Program

We continue to ask for your involvement in the Doctrine Sponsorship Program. The program is a great way to ensure that 

we are receiving current feedback from the field. This timely feedback allows us to accurately capture the enduring impacts of 

current operations on the Regiment’s doctrine. Below is the current listing of publications and their associated sponsors. Those 

interested in providing additional support to the doctrine revision process for these or any other publications should contact us.

During the sponsorship review, we provide a read-ahead copy of the publication (with noted edits from the field and subject 

matter expert input), to the sponsoring unit for initial review. We then arrive on-site at the sponsoring unit location to conduct 

a page-by-page review of key updates to the publication. This ensures that we capture current and enduring changes to the 

manual that will benefit the Regiment. In some cases, reviews of the publication may be less extensive, requiring that the sponsoring unit conduct only an internal review—and we capture changes via virtual teleconference. Regardless, the sponsor unit 

has a key role in accepting/arguing noted changes within the publications. 

Upon conclusion of the initial draft revision, the doctrine team continues the staffing process, conducting worldwide staffing across the Regiment and force. This process takes approximately 45 days. Upon conclusion, all comments are reviewed, 

adjudicated, and submitted for final review and discussion with the sponsoring unit. 

Please contact us if you have any questions or recommendations concerning doctrine.

Lieutenant Colonel Matt McCulley, Telephone: (573) 563-2717; e-mail: matthew.y.mcculley.mil@mail.mil

Mr. Douglas K. Merrill, Telephone: (573)563-0003; e-mail: douglas.k.merrill.civ@mail.mil

Engineer Doctrine Team, e-mail: usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcodddengdoc@mail.mil 

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update pdate

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate 

Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division

Publication Sponsor

ATP 3-34.20, Countering Explosive Hazards 20th Engineer Brigade

 ATP 3-34.22, Engineer Operations—BCT and Below 36th Engineer Brigade

ATP 3-34.23, Engineer Operations–Echelon Above Brigade 412th and 416th Theater Engineer

Commands

ATP 3-34.40, General Engineering 1st Engineer Brigade

ATP 3-34.45, Power Generation and Distribution 249th Engineer Battalion

ATP 3-34.5, Environmental Considerations U.S. Army Engineer School Directorate of 

Environmental Integration

ATP 3-34.80, Geospatial Engineering U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Capability Manager–Maneuver Support 

Center of Excellence

ATP 3-34.81, Engineer Reconnaissance 555th Engineer Brigade

ATP 3-37.10, Base Camps 555th Engineer Brigade

ATP 3-37.34, Survivability 555th Engineer Brigade

ATP 3-90.37, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices 20th Engineer Brigade

ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility Operations 36th Engineer Brigade

ATP 3-90.8, Combined Arms Countermobility Operations 20th Engineer Brigade
36 Engineer

T

he Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV) is regularly used 

to support a combined arms breach by an armored 

combat element. It is possible to integrate ABV 

crew qualification with the qualification of an armored elements crew, setting the stage for armored brigade combat 

team success at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, 

Hohenfels, Germany, and the National Training Center, 

Fort Irwin, California. 

During a regionally allocated force rotation to Germany 

and Poland in the spring and summer of 2016, the 10th 

Brigade Engineer Battalion, 1st Armored Brigade Combat 

Team, 3d Infantry Division, developed a recommended ABV 

crew qualification standard. The ABV crew certification is 

nested within the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) gunnery 

table standards outlined in Field Manual 3-20.21, Heavy Bri-

.

1

 This article uses the framework of the 12 BFV gunnery tables to describe the ABV 

training plan, which culminates in a combined arms livefire exercise. 

T

able I gunnery is a conglomerate of critical basic 

skills required to operate an assigned fighting platform. Just as there are specific weapon systems and 

skill requirements for the BFV, the ABV also requires specific weapon system and skill requirements. 

The BFV tasks include—

■ Clear, disassemble, assemble, perform a function check,

load, and perform immediate action on the M240

machine gun.

By Captain Andrew A. Berreth

■ Load and unload the armor-piercing and high-explosive

ready box.

■ Load, apply immediate action, and unload the feeder on

the 25-millimeter main gun.

■ Evacuate an injured crewman.

■ Bore-sight the 25-millimeter main gun.

■ Perform misfire procedures on the 25-millimeter main

gun.

■ Perform misfire procedures on the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile.

The ABV tasks include—

■ Clear, disassemble, reassemble, perform a function check, 

load, and perform immediate action on the M2 .50-caliber

machine gun.

■ Load, assemble, and perform a function check of the

mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC) tub and rocket.

■ Load and perform a function check of the lane-marking 

system.

■ Evacuate an injured crewman.

■ Mount the proofing plow to the front of the ABV.

■ Perform misfire procedures on the M2 .50-caliber machine

gun.

■ Perform misfire procedures on the lane-marking system.

■ Perform misfire procedures on the MICLIC.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Engineer 37

T

able II gunnery for the BFV is conducted in a simulator, where the crew is certified on commands during 

specific engagements with the 25-millimeter main 

gun and secondary weapon system. The BFV tasks include—

■ Simulator evaluation of crew commands for the 

25-millimeter main gun.

■ Simulator evaluation of crew commands for the secondary weapon system.

The M1A2 Abrams tank simulator provides a comparable

platform for training on ABV tasks, which include—

■ Simulator evaluation of crew commands for the secondary weapon system (M2 .50-caliber machine gun) only.

■ Main gun (MICLIC) crew command rehearsal.

T

ables III and IV of BFV gunnery combine two livefire iterations, including—

■ Live-fire engagements of stationary and moving targets

with the M240 machine gun from stationary and moving

vehicles.

■ Live-fire engagements of stationary and moving targets 

with the 25-millimeter main gun from stationary and

moving vehicles.

There are four components to be evaluated on a physical

range for the ABV, including—

■ Score a minimum of 350 out of 500 points during livefire engagements with the M2 .50-caliber machine gun

at stationary and moving targets from stationary and

moving vehicles.

■ Fire an inert MICLIC at a designated minefield.

■ Plow through the detonated MICLIC charge area.

■ Use the lane-marking system to mark the plowed lane.

The Table V portion of BFV gunnery is a live-fire 

practice for the live-fire certification run performed during Table VI. Battalion and/or company master gunner skills are vital for successful qualification in these 

tables. The master gunner must plan the integration 

of the ABV secondary gun platform well ahead of the 

scheduled gunnery to ensure that there will be enough 

Class V resources and time available on the range. Building a range that is conducive to the BFV and ABV weapon 

systems requires knowledge of the weapon systems and 

skill to ensure that the proper targetry is in place and 

that the timing of the target lifts will be correct. Certain 

targets will only need to be lifted for the BFV, while the 

ABV will require different targets at different ranges. 

Some targetry will overlap, but this is where the expertise 

of the master gunner planning will be vitally important to 

the successfully integrated gunnery and qualification of 

both platforms.

Soldiers load a MICLIC tub onto the ABV.

B

FV crews are tested and qualified in Table VI, the 

evaluated live-fire run, according to the rehearsal

conducted during the live-fire practice run in Table V.

The ABV crew is also ready to be tested according to the

standards of targetry in Table V. The limiting factor

in this qualification is the resourcing of a MICLIC charge 

and rocket. If resources are minimal, then the commander 

may wait to fire a live MICLIC and rocket at the collective

gunnery test during Tables X–XII. During the final tables, 

the BFV platoon and ABV crew work together to accomplish 

the breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure,

reduce, and assault. If redundancy is not built into the plan,

a failed breach could result.

and Qualification

T

hese tables are for section qualification of the BFVs. 

Using the ABV to conduct movements within a Bradley section is the best way to incorporate ABVs during 

this phase of the BFV gunnery. This will enable the section 

leader or platoon leader of the BFV platoon to incorporate 

the ABV crew into troop-leading procedures, the communication and movement plans, formations, and execution for 

the first time. Integrating the ABV crew at this time ensures 

that the live integration during the breaching will not be 

the first time the ABV is seen and used by the platoon or 

section leaders.
38 Engineer

Tables X–XII: Platoon 

D

uring the platoon qualification, the ABV crew has 

already been certified according to the established 

Table VI standards. The ABV crew is ready to execute an offensive breach according to the training objectives 

outlined by the battalion commander for the platoon validation. Since the platoon leader was able to incorporate the 

The company MICLIC expert describes loading the 

MICLIC charge.

A MICLIC rocket 

is fired during 

Table XII live 

fire.

ABV during section live fire, the integration of the ABV into 

the platoon will be a manageable task. The battalion commander validates the platoon so that the outlined training objectives are paramount to the integration of the 

ABV training to this point. This is the perfect opportunity 

to review the training conducted thus far and refine the 

plan for future execution. Some of these tasks can include 

breaching a minefield in depth, forcing the use of both 

MICLIC tubs on the ABV during the same breach, and 

integrating redundant explosive efforts if the ABV fails to 

provide its explosive breach capability. These failures can 

be overcome with a MICLIC trailer or the use of multiple 

Bangalore kits. 

Conclusion

B

y executing ABV crew training in parallel with BFV 

gunnery, commanders can streamline the train-up 

to the culminating event of a combined arms, livefire exercise. The recommended ABV crew qualification 

standards outlined in this article provide clear training 

objectives that set conditions for a more focused use of the 

ABV in the future. The objectives focus on the integration of secondary gun qualification through master gunner 

planning, early integration into the section and platoon 

leader maneuver exercises, and redundancy of the breaching effort.

Endnote:

1Field Manual 3-20.21, -

nery, 3 September 2009.

Captain Berreth serves 

3d Infantry Division. He is a graduate of the Engineer Basic 

Officer Leader Course, the Engineer Captains Career Course, the 

Sapper Leader Course, the U.S. Ranger School, the U.S. 

Advanced Airborne School, and the U.S. Air Assault 

School. He holds a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering 

South Dakota State University and a degree in civil 

engineering Missouri University of Science and Technology 

at Rolla. He is a licensed professional engineer in Utah. 
Engineer 39

W

ith the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 

the Soviet Union, the original basis for the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) was finally realized and the alliance found itself 

searching for a new purpose. While some academics have 

questioned the post-Cold War expansion of NATO, its 

involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan notwithstanding, 

one need only look at the current political and military 

situation in Europe to understand the importance of NATO 

and its role as the “most successful military alliance in 

history.”2 The Russian annexation of the Crimea, the ongoing con ict in Ukraine, and the terrorist attacks in Paris 

and Brussels reinforce the importance of NATO. However, 

in order to maintain the alliance, members must be able to 

interoperate within it. This is particularly germane as the 

operational environment becomes more uncertain and the 

alliance continues training and out-of-area, expeditionary operations.

The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), 

Hohenfels, Germany, trains personnel from the United States 

and allied and partner countries to work together to support 

NATO operations, from unified land operations to peacekeeping missions. The common theme, regardless of the training 

unit or type of mission, is enhancing interoperability. Interoperability has been a NATO hallmark since the end of the Cold 

War, but recent emphasis has been placed on interoperability as multinational task organizations have become more 

diverse. As described in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-1, The U.S. 

Operating Concept: Win in a World,3

 the ability of NATO to address an uncertain future is improved by 

integrating a wide range of multinational capabilities.

By Captain Nathan I. Foust

“People are the basis of military organizations, and military operations occur as human interactions.”

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Technical Publication-3.2.2

Control of Allied Land Forces1
40 Engineer

At JMRC, one tactical operations function in which 

interoperability challenges are easily recognized is the 

establishment of a common operational picture (COP). Myriad issues complicate the development of a COP, including—

■ Incompatible communications systems.

■ Varying doctrine and procedures.

■ Language differences. 

This is a significant problem for an alliance whose very 

existence is predicated upon members’ ability to mutually 

support each other. However, solutions for developing a 

COP at the Soldier level can be seen through three practices 

at JMRC:

■ Development of a common understanding of doctrinal 

 terminology.

■ Capabilities briefings.

■ Use of liaisons. 

Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, 

effectively, and efficiently to achieve allied tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. NATO further delineates 

interoperability into three dimensions:

■ Technical (hardware and systems).

■ Procedural (doctrine, procedures).

■ Human (language, terminology, and training).4

The COP, based on common data and information that 

are shared by more than one command and used to facilitate collaborative planning and situational awareness, is 

the quintessential interoperability challenge, spanning the 

three dimensions. 

An effective COP begins long before the start of directaction military operations. The foundations for an effective, 

multinational COP can be built within the human dimension by developing a common understanding of doctrinal 

terminology. The current state of operations requires that 

commanders develop teamwork among units and staffs 

task-organized on an ad hoc basis. While allied doctrine 

addresses how to operate within the multinational environment, commanders and staffs must discuss, develop, and 

agree on common operational terminology. Indeed, it is 

plausible to assume that the process of establishing common 

frames of reference and terminology is essentially a social 

rather than technical challenge and is typically performed 

through discussions and negotiations between groups. This 

premise is consistently demonstrated in the COP, where 

operational graphics provide an illustrative operational narrative. Graphical representations of objects, commands, and 

movements are observed and readily understood faster than 

text alone. However, for those graphics to be understood, a 

common language that is clearly understood by all users is 

imperative. Critics may argue that building relationships 

and gaining consensus are valuable steps, but that they 

take time away from operational planning. While that argument is partially true, commanders and staffs who get to 

know the people with whom they will be working are better 

suited to grasp complex and nuanced cultural norms in the 

multinational environment. Valuable time spent identifying 

Members of brigade staff and liaison officers from Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States 

discuss differences in doctrine and procedures during planning for a recent JMRC exercise.
Engineer 41

possible friction points due to differences in, and understanding of, terminology, symbols, and national customs and values before an operation begins will allow commanders and 

staffs to develop processes and procedures to address them.

Time must also be allotted for gaining knowledge of allied 

and partnered unit capabilities and limitations, including 

national caveats. To a certain extent, NATO has addressed 

this issue through standardization agreements, which specify the agreement of member nations to implement a standard, in whole or in part, with or without reservation, to 

meet interoperability requirements. However, many units 

remain unaware of these agreements, such as the ones 

dealing with the use of persistent and nonpersistent mines, 

NATO rules of engagement, and intelligence procedures, 

which often results in a significant loss of operational effectiveness. An awareness and understanding of allied capabilities are paramount, especially in areas not covered by 

standardization agreements. 

An effective method for establishing awareness is through 

the use of capabilities briefings. After initial team building 

has begun, commanders and staffs must understand the 

capabilities and limitations that will enable or constrain 

their actions. Militaries spend much time and effort studying enemy forces, yet often fail to understand even the most 

basic characteristics and capabilities of the forces fighting 

alongside them. Such an understanding would facilitate 

the effective integration of multinational partners into 

the operation and enhance the synergistic effect of their 

forces.5 Knowledge of what units can and cannot do directly 

enhances the COP and the situational understanding of the 

commander. Without a detailed understanding of allied and 

partnered capabilities, the COP is incomplete. The COP 

consists of more than graphics on a map; it includes specific capabilities associated with that graphic, such as survivability assets, antitank weapon systems, and logistics 

capabilities. As with a common operational language, an 

understanding of capabilities and limitations before operations begin can allow commanders and staffs to identify friction points and possible work-arounds before first contact.

At JMRC, one of the most effective ways to develop common operational terminology, gain an understanding of 

allied and partnered capabilities, and ultimately develop 

the COP is through the use of liaisons. Establishing liaison 

is the first ingredient in increasing a joint force operational 

capability. It creates the foundation to augment the process 

of rehearsals, drills, and training and to develop common 

doctrine and procedures. Liaisons are consistently used at 

all levels throughout JMRC training exercises to communicate and ease the shared understanding of situations and 

the role of each unit in an operation. Liaisons are effective 

because they facilitate the of information, which results 

in cross-agency cooperation. Liaisons can assist within the 

initial team-building phase and throughout military operations by alleviating previously unidentified issues due to language or capabilities. They can also provide the commander 

and staff with real-time advice and recommendations. In a 

recent rotation at JMRC, an allied brigade headquarters 

led three allied battalion task forces that each used different, incompatible mission command systems. To alleviate 

possible problems caused by this issue, liaisons from each 

ally that maintained communication with its respective 

command were established in the brigade joint operations 

center. The COP was developed and maintained using a 

standard 1:25,000 map with multiple analog overlays, then 

disseminated by the liaisons via reproduced analog overlays. 

It was a time-consuming and arduous process, but the diligent effort of the liaisons and the brigade staff allowed the 

command to work through the technical barriers to achieve 

interoperability. 

It could be argued that the development of a multiagency 

or multinational COP replaces the requirement for liaisons 

A Soldier from 

the 10th Brigade 

Engineer Battalion demonstrates capabilities to engineers 

from the Royal 

Dutch Army.

(Continued on page 49)
42 Engineer

O

perating today under the brigade engineer battalion 

(BEB), a brigade combat team (BCT) military intelligence company (MICO) presents unique employment capabilities and training challenges. The MICO—

■ Includes Soldiers with more than 10 of the lowest-density 

 military occupational specialties (MOSs) in the BCT. 

■ Comprises a majority of the organic intelligence collec- 

 tion assets and analytical capabilities in the BCT. 

■ Has a complex task organization and command 

 structure. 

The BEB is responsible for training the company in garrison. Operationally, brigade headquarters controls the 

company, highlighting a break in the continuous relationship that traditionally exists between companies and their 

higher headquarters.

Add the Army’s transition to the decisive-action training environment (DATE), and it becomes critical for the 

company to have a cogent, MICO-specific training progression actively supported by company, battalion, and brigade 

leaders. This article describes how the 209th MICO, 3d 

Stryker BCT, 2d Infantry Division, developed and executed 

its training progression concept—military intelligence (MI) 

gunnery—to meet these requirements. It also identifies lessons learned to facilitate employment in other formations.

T

he 209th MICO gunnery consisted of seven tables 

that simplified the extensive training requirements 

of a multidiscipline intelligence unit into a logical 

training progression from individual to company collective levels.

Table design began with the company mission-essential 

task list (METL), four tasks nested with the brigade METL 

that enabled the company to perform its wartime mission. 

The company then developed its METL crosswalk, a matrix 

that identifies the supporting tasks, including key collective tasks, which enable a unit to train to standard on its 

METL tasks. The company crosswalk drew from the Army 

Universal Task List and the Combined Arms Training 

Strategy to define key collective tasks. After battalion

level validation, the crosswalk was broken into quarterly 

training projections, identifying progressive training focus, 

goals, and areas of assumed risk for the company.

With the backbone of the seven-table framework and 

crosswalk, the company constructed MOS- and platoonspecific tables. The resulting gunnery provided a clear road 

map that enabled the company to train to METL proficiency. 

Referring to MI gunnery tables also enabled leaders at all 

echelons to clearly understand the complex company training requirements and progress.

Before execution, the 209th MICO overlaid the gunnery 

template onto the brigade long-range training calendar to 

nest it with the 7th Infantry Division integrated training 

strategy, which the 3d Stryker BCT executed from August 

2014 to July 2015. The MI gunnery narrative also forecast 

when the company would be best prepared to integrate 

with brigade operations, facilitating a logical integration timeline. 

By Captain Sarah A. Starr
Engineer 43

Assessing Soldier readiness for training should be 

continuous.

■ Table 1: Training execution. Table I execution is 

 ongoing. It ensures that all MICO Soldiers establish and 

 maintain the accounts and certifications required to do 

 their jobs by MOS, requirements that are 

 unique to the unit and training environment. Platoon 

 leaders own Table I.

■ Table 1: Lessons learned. The process should be 

 standardized. A platoon standard operating procedure 

 (SOP) should contain a checklist of MOS- and grade- 

 specific requirements. The status of individual Soldiers

 is tracked as part of the company readiness program.

Before major training events, the company must plan for 

training accounts and permissions, taking scenarios unique 

to an installation or training environment into account so 

that it is able to execute its mission. 

Tables II and III: Individual, MOS-Specific 

Training and testing ensure that Soldiers can perform 

discipline-specific tasks.

■ Table II: Training execution. The DATE presents 

 a significant challenge to the MICO since the service of its 

 members has been predominantly defined by fiber-

 enabled, bandwidth-intensive counterinsurgency opera- 

 tions. Training intelligence operations in a DATE requires 

 a “back to the basics” approach. The training for every 

 discipline must be grounded in friendly and enemy doc- 

 trine, systems, and capabilities to instill the fundamen- 

 tal tactical and technical knowledge required to support a 

 maneuver commander. 

 This foundation is then complemented with discipline- 

 specific skills training. Derived from the METL cross- 

 walk and bounded by the total time allotted to complete 

 the tasks in Table II, the company prioritizes a 

 defined number of core tasks by skill level and discipline.

 Platoons plan and execute training. 

■ Table III: Certification execution. The ability of Sol- 

 diers to perform the core tasks is tested in the Table III 

 field training exercise. Soldier are certified in a 

 tactical environment and concurrently train on basic 

 field-craft and Warrior Tasks. Certified evaluators 

 assess Soldiers individually at stations using go/no-go 

 criteria derived from the Army Combined Arms 

 Training Strategy. 

■ Tables II and III: Lessons learned. Table II is the 

 foundation of a successful gunnery. The training in 

 Table II teaches each Soldier to perform discipline- 

 specific, tactical intelligence tasks and communicate 

 outputs using organic systems in DATE. The company 

 must therefore dedicate the maximum time affordable to 

 this table, prioritize the core tasks selected, and ensure 

 that they are trained to standard.

Planning and executing the tasks in Table II develop 

junior leaders by giving them experience in the training 

management process. The junior leaders of the 209th MICO 

executed Table II, and the associated training development 

and resourcing nested firmly within the squadron, brigade, 

and division leader development programs. 

 Table II also identified the systemic internal company 

weaknesses in tactical and technical proficiency required 

for combined arms maneuver-focused training. For in-depth 

training on doctrine, equipment, and tactics to cross-level 

that critical knowledge, the 209th MICO relied heavily on—

■ Brigade subject matter experts such as maneuver com- 

 manders and staff.

■ The Joint Base Lewis–McChord Foundry platform. 

■ The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Profi-

 ciency Trainer.

■ The Joint Base Lewis–McChord Mission Command Train- 

 ing Center.

Low-density MOS training requires external support. 

The 209th MICO struggled to independently train and certify personnel in the lowest-density MOSs due to a lack of 

organic commissioned and noncommissioned officers experienced in those disciplines. Support from outside the brigade 

is necessary to train personnel in these MOSs to standard.

A plan for retraining and execution is needed. Multiple 

iterations of Tables II and III integrate new unit members, 

refresh core skills, and retest Soldiers who previously failed 

certification. The Table III certification exercise is ideally 

executed twice a year and can include other BCT MI Soldiers.

Tables IV and V: Platoon 

The transition to collective training tests basic MICO 

competencies.

■ Table IV: Training execution. There are three intel- 

 ligence core competencies: 

T Intelligence operations.

T Intelligence analysis.

T Intelligence synchronization. 

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, Intelligence, defines these as “the basic activities and tasks the 

Army uses to describe and drive the Intelligence Warfighting Function.”1

The MICO consists of two major components that mirror the two core competencies of intelligence operations and 

intelligence analysis: 

T The , composed of the company 

 human intelligence and signal intelligence capabil- 

 ities, is the collection component of the company; 

 it conducts intelligence operations. 

T The infor tion collection platoon, which operation- 

 ally becomes the brigade intelligence support element 

 and also includes the company human intelligence 
44 Engineer

 and signal intelligence analytical elements, is the 

 analytical component of the company; it conducts 

 intelligence analysis.

In the Table IV transition to collective training, platoons 

train for three objectives:

T To develop proficiency on platoon key collective tasks, 

 enabling each platoon to execute its intelligence core 

 competency using organic systems. 

T To develop, test, and practice primary, alternate, con- 

 tingency, and emergency (PACE) communications 

 plans, ensuring that the company can communicate 

 on organic systems in the operating environment.

T To write, refine, and validate platoon tactical SOPs, 

 providing draft SOPs that will be further vali- 

 dated during brigade integration tables.

■ Table V: Certification execution. Platoon certifica-

 tion via an exercise evaluation involves a 10- to 12-day 

 field training exercise conducted in three iterations of 

 execu tion and retraining using the crawl-walk-run 

 methodology:

T Iteration 1—Consists of exercise operations, internal 

 evaluation, and retraining that provides platoons time 

 to examine themselves and fix internally identi- 

 fied issues. 

T Iteration 2—Consists of exercise operations, external 

 evaluation, and retraining that provides evaluation by 

 evaluators (preferably brigade and division level 

 leaders) with similar MOSs or areas of concentra- 

 tion before certification.

T Iteration 3—Consists of a certification exercise, exter-

 nal evaluation, after action report, and recovery oper- 

 ations. It certifies platoons on key collective tasks and

 confirms that they are proficient in executing their

 respective core competency of collection or analysis. 

Table V requires separate exercises for the brigade intelligence support element and each of the collection disciplines. 

Intelligence training enablers such as the installation Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer, 

Mission Command Training Center, and Foundry are critical to developing training events using live, virtual, and constructive resources with the and depth required for 

evaluation. For the company collection component, maneuver unit integration is also imperative. According to Army 

Doctrine Publication 7-0, Training Units and Developing 

Leaders,

2

 units must train like they fight. According to doctrine, in Table V, maneuver units should be integrated as a 

training enabler.

■ Tables IV and V: Lessons learned. Field time is criti- 

 cal. Neither classroom nor motor pool training can rep- 

 licate the stress and realism needed for a platoon to define

 how it will operate with organic equipment in field con-

 ditions. Platoons must practice the PACE plan, conduct- 

 ing communication exercises in field conditions using

 organic equipment. Field training should be conduc- 

 ted often.

The exercise in Table V offers the most valuable training 

opportunity for the company. It also provides a fair evaluation of company training progress. If resources are available, the exercise evaluation should be completed once while 

training on the tasks in Table IV to establish SOPs and once 

as the Table V certification exercise.

Brigade integration should begin early. Without brigade 

integration, tactical SOPs are developed in a vacuum and 

need significant future refinement. The collection component, often task-organized to maneuver units, must begin 

interacting with companies, troops, batteries, and battalion 

staffs while training on the tasks in Table IV. Interactions 

include capabilities briefings and should identify future 

integration opportunities. The analytical component will 

more accurately delineate roles and produce better SOPs 

when the brigade intelligence section is involved in Tables 

IV and V.

The MICO role in planning its training events should 

not detract from its own training goals. Table V requires 

intensive support for exercise design and execution, technical support, evaluations, and role playing. Starting with 

the exercise in Table V, the collective training and evaluations of a MICO must have significant support from the battalion and brigade to enable the company to achieve training objectives. 

The headquarters platoon establishes the company command point to monitor Table III execution.
 

 

 

Engineer 45

Best practices should be fostered and codified. With doctrine at its core, the company develops best practices while 

training on the tasks in Tables IV and V. Some of best practices of the 209th MICO included—

T Brigade-external partnerships. Discipline-driven part- 

 nerships enrich training while mitigating resource 

 and personnel shortfalls. The human intelligence and 

 signal intelligence platoons routinely conducted train- 

 ing with like elements of the former 201st 

 Battlefield Surveillance Brigade; 2d Stryker BCT,

 2d Infantry Division; and 81st Brigade Special Troops 

 Battalion, Washington Army National Guard. 

T The intelligence process rehearsal-of-concept drill. 

This iterative, company-internal, and intelligence- 

 centric drill provides a walk-through of the com- 

 pany intelligence process cycle, demonstrating how 

 the company collectively fights. It developed an

 understanding among MICO Soldiers of their roles 

 within company operations and increased their abil- 

 ity to adapt usefully in new conditions. 

T Measure of effectiveness evaluation. The tasks in the 

 209th MICO Table V evaluated task execution on a 

 scale ranging from failure to superior performance. 

 The performance metrics transitioned beyond 

 go/no-go criteria to incorporate brigade standards, 

 qualitatively assessing company performance.

Tables VI and VII: Compan

The “art” of integrating intelligence collection and analysis with operations supports decision making.

■ Table VI: Training execution. According to Army Doc- 

 trine Reference Publication 2-0, the third core compe- 

 tency of military intelligence is intelligence synchroniza- 

 tion, or “the ‘art’ of integrating information collection and 

 intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and 

 efficiently support decision making.”3

When training on the tasks in Table VI, the company 

applies the separate proficiencies of its platoons in intelligence operations and analysis to achieve intelligence synchronization. Training intelligence synchronization requires 

the MICO to simultaneously train and integrate internally 

(within the company) and externally (with brigade staff and 

maneuver elements). 

This simultaneous training and integration occurs across 

three distinct zones: 

T Zone 1. During company training, the collection and analysis platoons integrate to perform company-internal intelligence 

synchronization. The end state is company METL proficiency with platoons interoperating with ease. The

MICO is heavily involved in brigade operations during 

Table VI activities, so company leaders should 

leverage brigade training events to conduct training 

across echelons and achieve training objectives. 

T Zone 2. The linchpin of 

Table VI is external integration; the company integrates into brigade operations in logical segments: 

• Intelligence analysis integration. The analytical 

 component integrates with the brigade intelligence warfighting function (brigade and battalion 

 intelligence sections). This staff integration facili- 

 tates the development of the brigade intelli- 

 gence warfighting function SOP to test and 

 refine PACE plans, report formats, battle rhythm,

 and common operational picture management 

 in DATE. 

• Intelligence operations integration. The company 

 collectors, often referred to as intelligence enablers, 

 integrate into maneuver training. Effective inte- 

 gration occurs in field training environments at 

 platoon, company, troop, and battery levels. In 

 a best-case scenario, intelligence enabler integration is an evaluated component of maneuver

training events. Evaluated or not, effective integration requires strong battalion level support

and staff coordination, particularly with the intelligence and operations sections, for scripting intelligence collector participation.

This integration enables maneuver formations 

to better understand collector capabilities and

requirements; it enables intelligence collectors to

better collect against both brigade and battalion

level requirements. These developments are ideally codified in an intelligence enabler integration

battle drill.

T Zone 3. rehensive brigade level intel- 

 ligence synchronization. The culmination of all 

 efforts is full-scale integration; the company per- 

 forms its METL as part of comprehensive briTactical interface point sites provide live exercise feeds to com- gade operations. Ideally, this collective intepany computer systems. gration occurs during a home station mission 
integration occurs during 

 a home station mission rehearsal exercise. If time 

 and resources do not support a company exercise, 

this may only occur during the brigade mission 

rehearsal exercise. 

46 Engineer

■ Table VII: Validation Execution. Completing Table 

 VII validates the company METL proficiency by certi-

 fying Soldiers in a realistic training environment before 

 the brigade mission rehearsal exercise. Executing the 

 Table VII certification exercise is similar to executing the

 Table V certification exercise, with platoons now operat-

 ing interdependently. Company collectors in the field feed

 the brigade intelligence support element with informa- 

 tion; the intelligence support element processes it into 

 timely, relevant intelligence to answer the primary intel- 

 ligence requirement of the BCT commander and to enable 

 decision making. The full participation of the brigade 

 intelligence section is vital for realism and SOP 

 validation. 

■ Tables VI and VII: Lessons Learned. To effectively 

 integrate into brigade operations, the MICO must be cred- 

 ible. The company derives its credibility from proficiency, 

 so platoons must be proficient in their core competencies 

 before conducting brigade level integration. The more 

 proficient the platoons, the more likely they will be viewed

 by brigade leaders as training enablers and effectively 

 integrated into maneuver training. 

To achieve this, MI gunnery must be executed at least 

one quarter ahead of the brigade training progression. Ideally, the company completes its collective exercise before 

the brigade begins platoon level training. Without this lead 

time, the company lacks the proficiency to effectively integrate into brigade collective training.

The planning and execution of the Table VII certification 

exercise should occur as early as logical. Table VII is the 

company Catch 22. If the company conducts the exercise 

before brigade integration, its METL validation is arguably 

hollow. If the Table VII certification exercise is planned for 

execution too late, the training competes for time on the brigade training calendar and may not be executed. It is better 

to execute early than not at all, but leaders must be diligent 

in timing the Table VII exercise. 

The final objective of MI gunnery is brigade level synchronization, allowing intelligence to drive operations. 

Therefore, the brigade information collection plan is the 

ultimate barometer of the success of MI gunnery. Tables 

I through V prepare the MICO to integrate with brigade 

staff and maneuver elements. In Table VI and beyond, 

intelligence synchronization is directly re ected in the 

development and execution of the brigade collection plan. 

The hallmark of a successful gunnery is a collection 

plan developed and executed by leaders at all echelons 

because it—

T More accurately the requirements of the brigade commander, satisfies the commander’s intent, 

and reduces extraneous collection and analysis.

T Drives operations and intelligence synchronization 

through rehearsal at the brigade combined arms 

rehearsal.

T Enables the advanced, insightful, and complete 

employment of organic information collection assets. 

T Alleviates over-reliance on the brigade collection 

manager, a position often filled by a junior officer

who lacks collection management experience. 

This ultimately improves the brigade intelligence warfighting function, making it more capable, more relevant, 

and better able to support the requirements of the brigade commander.

Conclusion

W

hile the task organization of the BCT MICO has 

changed, the breadth of its capabilities, resources, 

and training requirements remains the same. 

Training the MICO is a complex problem set. The solution 

lies in a structured training progression, which is invaluable if company, BEB, and brigade leaders cohesively support it. 

The experience of the 209th MICO yielded successes and 

failures. The enduring message is that MI gunnery provides 

the company, battalion, and brigade leaders of the BCT 

with a framework to effectively train the MICO. In the near 

future, the MI gunnery manual (MI Gunnery 34-120-30, 

MI Gunnery for the Training of Individual, Drill, and Collective Tasks in the Military Intelligence the 

Brigade Engineer Battalion4) will provide a resource for 

MICOs to standardize training efforts. Regardless of how 

a brigade chooses to execute its MI gunnery, the simpler, 

more thorough, and well-resourced the progression is, the 

better equipped the brigade will be to leverage the unique 

tactical intelligence capabilities of the MICO to support 

brigade operations. 

Endnotes:

1Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, Intelligence, 

31 August 2012.

2Army Doctrine Publication 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, 23 August 2012.

3Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0.

4MI Gunnery 34-120-30, MI Gunnery for the Training of 

Individual, Drill, and Collective Tasks in the Military Intelligence Brigade Engineer Battalion, Coordinating Draft-Date Pending.

Captain Starr is an MI Branch officer for the 

U.S. Knox, Kentucky. 

MICO, 3d 

Stryker BCT, 2d Infantry Division. She holds a bachelor of arts 

degree Spokane, Washington, and a 

North Georgia.

rehearsal exercise. If time and resources do not 

support a company exercise, this may only occur 

during the brigade mission rehearsal exercise. 
Engineer 47

I

n the 1st Brigade Combat Team (1 BCT), 82d Airborne 

Division, the composition of the 127th Brigade Engineer 

Battalion (BEB) streamlines the employment of multiple 

companies and their unique assets to support brigade priorities. While the company training and integration methods 

vary, the overarching combat support mission drives organic 

elements to develop initiatives that enhance unique capabilities within the BCT. Several of these initiatives are the 

result of a growing relationship between the military intelligence (MI) and signal companies that emerged during the 

1 BCT intensive training cycle and new-equipment fieldings 

in fiscal year 2016. 

Colocating Command Posts

D

uring joint forcible-entry operations, the MI and signal paratroopers deploy in small elements to embed 

with maneuver units or with the BCT headquarters 

to support multiple warfighting functions. Previously, the 

companies ran separate command posts (CPs). During the 

1 BCT field training exercise in July 2015, the MI and signal 

companies merged CPs, resulting in several positive outcomes. The combined CP eased the constraint of the limited 

number of personnel available to execute battle-tracking 

operations. Also, colocating similar communication capabilities (joint capabilities release and frequency modulation 
48 Engineer

[FM]) bolstered the headquarters’ means of communication with higher and subordinate elements. 

As operations progressed, the combined CP allowed 

each unit to capitalize on areas such as resupply 

and repositioning of forward elements across the 

BCT area of operations. The most important outcome resulted from conducting integrated mission 

analysis, in which the companies identified opportunities to exploit each other’s assets to improve 

support to the BCT. 

D

uring the initial phase of the 1 BCT Joint 

Readiness Training Center rotation at 

Fort Polk, Louisiana, in October 2015, 

the MI company tactical unmanned aircraft system (TUAS) platoon relied on FM radios to communicate with the brigade aviation element. That 

element is responsible for decon icting Shadow®

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ight operations 

to support the scheme of maneuver. While supporting joint forcible-entry operations, traditional 

voice communications proved untimely and the brigade 

aviation element primarily leveraged the digital network 

because it allowed all airspace users, such as rotary-wing 

and close air support aircraft, to simultaneously receive 

information regarding airspace control measures. Word 

of the operational limitations facing the TUAS platoon—

mainly a lack of digital asset task organization—quickly 

reached the signal company within the joint CP. As the primary provider of mission command systems for the BCT, 

the signal company reenergized digital asset allocation 

analysis and a lightweight digital system was reallocated 

to the TUAS platoon. The system enabled TUAS mission 

coordinators to receive missions, expedite airspace clearance, access critical documents, and contribute to the common operating picture through real-time updates from the

mission operators.

F

ollowing the Joint Readiness Training Center rotation, the MI and signal companies achieved several 

significant accomplishments as a result of their 

integrated training efforts. In March 2016, both companies

executed a proof-of-concept exercise to assess the use of the

Terrestrial Line-of-Sight Radios (TRILOS) in 1 BCT operations. The TRILOS system is unique because it establishes

a digital link that is dependent on line of sight—not on the

use of satellites. It is power-efficient and easy to employ and

provides a cost-effective solution to legacy mission command

platforms. It is an expeditionary system that complements

joint forcible-entry operations. To stress-test the TRILOS

network, the companies transmitted full-motion video from

an unmanned aerial system to a command post 10 miles

away. Despite the high bandwidth requirements of the fullmotion video, the command post received a high-quality feed

to improve the way unmanned reconnaissance enhances the

BCT common operating picture.

An additional system tested during the proof-of-concept 

exercise was the Modular Communications Node–Advanced 

Enclave (MCN-AE). The MCN-AE merges two secure 

Paratroopers conduct a virtual teleconference using the TRILOS 

system between command posts separated by 10 miles.

Unmanned aircraft system operators work with tactical 

communicators to transmit full-motion Shadow video 

over the TRILOS network during a proof-of-concept 

exercise.
Engineer 49

tactical data networks, providing the BCT intelligence 

section with critical access to joint and national intelligence 

networks. MI systems maintainers helped establish network connectivity and successfully aligned work stations for 

access to each network. They also executed the request and 

installation of the Temporary–Sensitive Compartmented 

Information Facility. The introduction of the MCN-AE system is significant because it provides multiple secure networks using only half the equipment required by the current MI company platform. Two ruggedized boxes house the 

MCN-AE, offering for rapid asset introduction 

during airborne operations when airland space is at a premium. For an expeditionary unit, the simpler a system is to 

introduce to an area of operations, the sooner analysts can 

access these critical intelligence networks. 

Maximizing BCT 

T

he MI and signal companies are currently working together to maximize the beyond-line-of-sight 

retransmission capability provided by the Shadow 

UAV. The Shadow brings a unique advantage to FM communications due to its ability to take analog radios to a high 

altitude, delivering a line-of-sight radius unachievable by 

antenna masts and terrain features. If coordinated effectively, the Shadow retransmission capability can augment 

the organic systems of the signal company and significantly 

increase communications coverage. The relay abilities of the 

Shadow are often more expedient than the relocation of a 

dismounted retransmission team. This ensures coverage 

during short-notice missions because TUAS operators can 

reconfigure the system during the launch and recovery operations. Finally, this concept mitigates the physical security 

concerns and threats posed to a retransmission team operating on potential key terrain. 

T

he multiple exercises that the MI and signal companies conducted reinforced the notion that commanders are responsible for ensuring consistent integration with other units to levy organic capabilities supporting 

a wide range of military operations. The BEBs are exceptionally adept at managing diverse training glide paths and 

the allocation of resources to support unique initiatives and 

objectives. If units continue to approach every new system 

upgrade or fielding by including organizations with complementary missions, then the adaptability and lethality of the 

BCT will only improve.

Captain Burch 

Brigade Engineer Battalion. She holds a bachelor’s degree in 

Massachusetts.

-

nal), 127th Brigade Engineer Battalion until April 2016. He holds 

by enabling a direct link between different organizations. 

However, if the function of the liaison—communicating and 

facilitating the shared understanding of the situation and 

each unit’s role—is not preserved in some form, then performance during operations will likely suffer. The COP, which 

is meant to provide a real-time common picture of the battlefield, will maintain a technical aspect; the processes and 

information that feed the COP remain human activities and 

therefore must maintain the human link, especially in the 

multinational environment.

In the 21st century, the United States and NATO must 

continue to adapt their approaches to the core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security 

against unknown and unknowable security challenges. However, the one constant factor is the need to work together 

and become more interoperable. The development of enduring personal and professional relationships is the foundation upon which long-term solutions will be built. Lasting 

technological solutions are being developed, but are often 

stymied by national and political barriers. Although technological solutions and further NATO standardization can 

enhance the COP, they do not replace the human aspect. 

While NATO Allied Joint Publication 01(D), Allied Joint 

Doctrine,

6

 lists the dimensions of interoperability as technical, procedural, and human, a better conceptual approach 

might list the order as human, procedural, technical. This 

concept is particularly suitable for the COP, which can be 

improved by developing a common understanding of doctrinal terminology, conducting capabilities briefings, and 

assigning effective liaisons. The COP remains a fundamentally human endeavor.

Endnotes:

1NATO Allied Technical Publication-3.2.2, 

Control of Allied Land Forces, 24 February 2009.

2

Ivo H. Daalder, NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? 

What Missions? Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 

April 1999.

3TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The U.S. Operating Concept: 

, 31 October 2014.

4NATO Allied Joint Publication 01(D): Allied Joint Doctrine, 

21 December 2010.

5U.S. Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations,

16 July 2013.

6NATO Allied Joint Publication 01(D).

Captain Foust is a student at the U.S. 

General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously served as an engineer observer-coach trainer at JMRC. 

He is a graduate of the Engineer Captains Career Course, the 

Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agent Course, the Sapper Leader 

Course, and the U.S. Airborne School. He holds a bachelor’s degree engineering Military 

Point, New in engineering University of Science and 

Technology at Rolla.
50 Engineer

C

ompany B, 337th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 28th Infantry 

Division, Pennsylvania Army 

National Guard, Spring City, Pennsylvania, conducted explosive demolition 

training on 14 May 2016 to hone the 

basic combat engineer skills of its Soldiers. The unit has conducted progressively more complex training exercises 

to improve combat engineer capabilities and practice realistic training tasks 

during the past two training years. As 

the threat from unconventional warfare 

begins to subside, the unit is returning 

to a renewed emphasis on conventional 

warfare and related maneuver support 

capabilities for an armored brigade 

combat team.

Fort Indiantown Gap Military Reservation is an active Army National Guard 

training center with multiple access 

points from several adjacent civilian 

communities. The training site engineer 

authorized Company B to emplace an 

abatis obstacle to prevent unauthorized 

civilian movement into the Fort Indiantown Gap training areas from an existing unimproved road. An abatis is a 

series of intertwined, felled trees assembled to deny the usage of an avenue of 

approach. One method of creating an 

abatis is to send a small team of combat engineers with chain saws to prepare the obstacle. However, in a combat 

situation where timely emplacement is 

essential, a highly trained team of demolition experts is required. 

The opportunity to employ demolitions to emplace an abatis is a rare 

training event. Company B leaders 

determined that kicker charges would 

be necessary to ensure accuracy when 

establishing a long-term obstacle to 

block access to the controlled training 

area. Kicker charges the direction of fall when using timber charges, 

and their use added another level of 

complexity to the mission because their 

emplacement required a high-reach 

forklift with a safety cage. The use of 

kicker charges required Soldiers to plan 

for the physics of each planned detonation and to control the direction and timing for the felling of the series of trees. 

On the morning of 14 May, the unit conducted a route clearance patrol, followed 

by a dismounted foot patrol to the site. 

By Captain Johnny J. Perez Jr., Major Ryan P. Hopkins, and 

Lieutenant Colonel Angelo N. Catalano
Engineer 51

The dismounted Soldiers occupied security positions around 

the abatis site while 3d Platoon Soldiers occupied the immediate objective area. The 3d Platoon Soldiers began constructing the charges by taping several blocks of Composition C-4 together, then assembling the primed charges into 

a ring main using detonation cord. At that point, the highreach forklift moved onto the site. A buddy team composed 

of a lower enlisted Soldier and a noncommissioned officer 

was hoisted 50 to 60 feet off the ground, where they secured 

small kicker charges (approximately a quarter-stick of Composition C-4) to the rear sides of trees with duct tape. 

Most of the platoon moved away once the charges were 

placed and primed. However, the officer and noncommissioned officer in charge and a single lower enlisted Soldier 

stayed behind to tape the blasting caps and time fuses 

onto the ring main. The time fuses were initiated, and the 

shock tube was unspooled to the mine-resistant, ambushprotected vehicle that served as the initiation point and 

overwatch location. The initiator was pulled, and the 

charges severed the trees at their bases, dropping them in 

the exact locations and sequence planned. As the team of 

experienced combat engineers observed the identified trees 

fall exactly as planned, they knew the mission was an overwhelming success.

Company B continues to seek out training opportunities 

to enhance the combat engineer skills of its Soldiers and

improve the training grounds at Fort Indiantown Gap.

Captain Perez serves 

Brigade Engineer Battalion, Pennsylvania

Guard, Spring City, Pennsylvania. He is a graduate of the Engineer Basic Officer Leaders Course. He holds bachelor’s,

and doctorate degrees

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Major Hopkins serves as the operations officer for the 337th 

Brigade Engineer Battalion, Scranton, Pennsylvania. He is a

graduate of the Maneuver Captains -

and General Staff Officer Course. He holds a bachelor’s 

degree in architecture University of Notre 

is pursuing a degree in business 

Pennsylvania State University.

Lieutenant Colonel Angelo Catalano serves as the -

of the 337th Brigade Engineer Battalion. He is a graduate of the Engineer Captains Career Course and

General Staff College, Education. He holds 

a bachelor’s degree in general engineering the U.S. Naval 

Annapolis, Maryland; and a degree in -

Felled trees after the charge was detonated

Taping blasting caps and time fuses onto a tree
52 Engineer

T

he Soldiers of the division engineer cell, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, received 

orders to deploy to Iraq to support Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The already fast-paced battle rhythm 

of the engineers immediately increased, with additional 

training geared toward future operations and mobilization 

requirements. Although every Soldier in the engineer cell 

had deployed before, preparing for a division level deployment proved to be a new experience. Similar to preparations 

for past deployments, the training strategy included basic 

soldiering skills, but it also included a much different focus 

on operational awareness and understanding. With any 

plans, lines of effort can exceed or fall short of expectations 

and process reviews will uncover opportunities missed during execution. Engineers in this historic division headquarters learned many lessons by deploying into a joint environment prepared to train, equip, advise, and assist the Iraqi 

Security Forces.

The first experience the division engineers had with 

collaboration and communication as part of a division 

staff began during Operation Eagle Talon and Warfighter 

Exercise 16-2. The operational tempo, battle rhythm, 

and planning requirements helped the staff develop as 

a team throughout the months leading up to the deployment. Division engineers worked as a team around the 

clock to plan and guide critical events such as wet-gap 

crossings and route clearance operations. Specified and 

implied exercise tasks were handled throughout the 

deployment; this benefited the integration of the team 

into the division staff.

Under the Combined Joint Forward Land Component 

Command, the diversified engineer role has many responsibilities, strengths, and assets available within the structure of OIR. Since OIR has a diversified joint staff, understanding the capabilities and limitations of the joint assets 

within the operation is extremely important. The engineer 

cell completed the distance learning phase of the Joint 

Engineer Operations Course to understand the workings of 

the joint staff. The resident phase Joint Engineer Operations Course instructors at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 

followed up the distance learning with a video teleconference that discussed key points of the material studied. 

Personnel from the U.S. Army Central Command, the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, and the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) visited Fort Campbell to discuss their 

respective roles and responsibilities and to study the capabilities available upon request outside of OIR. Their effort 

greatly contributed to the engineer team understanding of 

the new context.

Participation in predeployment video teleconferences 

with the forward element is typical for any mobilizing unit, 

and video teleconferencing is a very useful capability. However, communications with the forward engineers before 

the relief-in-place were not as effective as planned. The 

By Captain Travis J. Legris

“Engineers in this historic division headquarters learned 

many lessons by deploying into a joint environment prepared 

to train, equip, advise, and assist the Iraqi Security Forces.”
Engineer 53

events were aimed at helping the incoming engineer staff to 

understand the operational environment and to retrieve as 

much information as possible, but the single hour allotted 

for the video teleconferences each week was inadequate. 

Devoting more time to discussions and requests for additional information would have paid valuable dividends.

The counter improvised explosive device (IED) training 

team from Fort Campbell also held a briefing on the impact of 

IEDs in OIR. The division engineer team did not understand 

before deploying the importance that IEDs have in the training, equipping, and planning of the Iraqi Security Forces. 

Additional meetings helped to better develop this understanding. The knowledgeable team spent hours discussing 

enemy IED capabilities based on the extensive information 

they had. All Army engineers would benefit from spending 

more time studying this subject matter and understanding 

how it shapes Iraqi army requirements.

During the deployment, missed predeployment training opportunities quickly became apparent. Some of the 

specific courses missed before deploying were the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Base Master Planning, the U.S. 

Army Installation Management Command Base Operating 

Support–Integrator, and the Army Operational Contract 

Support and Fiscal Law Courses. These courses lay the 

groundwork for requirements development in construction 

effects. The Combined Joint Forward Land Component 

Command environment is a critical connection point where 

construction requirements and contracts align. These opportunities were not foreseen before deployment; their value 

should not be ignored by incoming engineer units.

Predeployment training requires a different focus, and 

this deployment education was the critical factor. Predeployment training is difficult to plan when the deployment is 

set to take place in a unique environment because the level 

of understanding of the new environment is still unknown. 

Understanding requirements and remaining are 

vital to the training strategy, which works beyond the traditional and mantra to put nontraditional and forward-thinking resources to use. 

At the this article was written, Captain Legris was 

deployed to Iraq as the engineer training officer for the -

bined Joint Forces Land His previous was as a platoon leader with the 829th Engineer 

(Vertical), deployed to Operation Enduring 

He is a graduate of the Engineer Basic Officer Leader Course and 

the U.S. Air Assault School. He holds degree 

in busin of Wisconsin– 

Eau Claire.

Engineer is always looking for good-quality, action photographs (no “grip and grins,” please) to use on the outside 

covers. If you have photographs of Soldiers who are in the 

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send them to us at <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx 

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for more detailed information.

We Need Your Photographs!
54 Engineer

E

ngineer is a Department of the Army-authenticated publication that contains instructions, guidance, and other 

materials to continuously improve the professional 

development of Army engineers. It also provides a forum for 

exchanging information and ideas within the Army engineer 

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of the Army civilians, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to 

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As an official U.S. Army publication, Engineer is not copyrighted. Material published in Engineer can be freely reproduced, distributed, displayed, or reprinted; however, appropriate credit should be given to Engineer and its authors.

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Engineer Writer’s Gui e
Engineer 55

T

he Counter Explosive Hazards Planning (CEH-P) 

Course was developed to mitigate the vulnerability 

caused by a lack of current threat information at the 

company level. Many students attending the CEH-P course 

at the Counter Explosive Hazards Center, Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri, have mentioned the lack of intelligence 

products at company and battalion levels. 

The CEH-P is designed to develop the thought process 

needed to defeat the explosive hazard threat in a contemporary operating environment. The course, which is aimed 

at maneuver and maneuver support lower echelons, was 

designed to assist in developing situational awareness of 

the explosive hazard threat environment, which improves 

the ability to develop plans and operations that target the 

explosive hazards threat within the area of responsibility. 

The CEH-P prepares Soldiers to facilitate the collection, 

analysis, processing, and coordination of all-source intelligence across the brigade combat team to support explosive 

hazard targeting, the operational environment, 

support company level operations, and build the bottom-up 

intelligence needed.

During the 80-hour course, Soldiers receive hands-on 

training with the Tactical Information Ground Reporting 

System, Combined Information Data Network Exchange, 

and Web-Based Timeline Analysis System. Soldiers learn 

to query these systems for information that they can use 

for producing intelligence products (such as vulnerable 

point analyses, route and area analyses, and point analyses). At the end of the course, students should be able to 

query systems for data, create maps and charts of explosive hazards threats, recommend named areas of interest and target areas of interest, develop link diagrams 

and time wheels, and provide prebriefings and debriefings to patrols. The course ends with a 2-day mission 

readiness exercise to test the students’ understanding of 

the material.

The CEH-P Course aims to increase threat awareness at company and battalion levels.

(Continued on page 58)
Self-development is a major pillar in the growth of Army leaders. One tool to aid in this is the “Engineer Commandant’s Reading List” at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usaes/library/documents/ENGR_CMDT_READING_LIST_2012.pdf>. 

It includes a variety of books on history, politics, and culture that are appropriate for Soldiers and civilians in the Engineer 

Regiment. The list is not all-inclusive and will be updated over time.

Book reviews are a feature in each issue of Engineer. Authors of book reviews summarize the contents of books of interest 

and point out the key lessons to be learned from them. Readers who wish to submit book reviews may forward them to <usarmy 

.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.engineer@mail.mil>. 

56 Engineer

Gates of Fire, by Steven Pressfield, Doubleday, 

20 October 1998, ISBN 978-0-385-49251-5

Gates of Fire is a wonderfully written novel that describes 

the Battle of Thermopylae, which took place about 480 BCE. 

In that famous battle, some 300 Spartan warriors led by 

King Leonidas defended a narrow pass against an attack by 

thousands of invading Persians, until they were undone by 

treachery. The book is narrated to his captors by Xeones, a 

helot slave and Spartan squire who had fought in that battle 

and had been captured by the Persians. Although a large 

portion of the story describes the details of the historic fight, 

Xeones begins his tale years before the battle in order to 

illustrate how the Spartans came to be great warriors (and 

to delay his own execution). 

Xeones begins the story with the ransacking of his family’s home and his own to safety with a female cousin 

and a family servant. With the death of the family servant 

along the way, the cousin decides to seek citizenship in Athens. She is certain that both she and Xeones can find work 

in the city and will have the opportunity to rise to a higher 

station in life. After a long, heartbreaking debate, Xeones 

decides to leave his cousin and attempt to become a warrior 

in Sparta, although he knows he will never rise above the 

status of a servant. Only those born to a Spartan are eligible 

for citizenship.

Xeones tells the Persian king that the thing that makes 

the Spartans a force to be reckoned with is not the tactical 

genius of their king, but the way the Spartans train. At the 

age of 7, Spartan boys are sponsored by nobles and citizen 

warriors to enter military training. A helot who wishes to 

become a Spartan squire begins his training by watching 

and practicing in the background of a training platoon. Spartans and helots alike are taught to control their thoughts 

and emotions. Mental toughening is just as important as 

physical fitness to Spartan training. If a warrior were to 

break down or hesitate in battle, his vast tactical training 

would not save him. Childhood lessons in honor—in word 

and deed—are strictly enforced with whippings. If a Spartan 

adult is judged to have lost his honor, he could be stripped 

of his citizenship. 

When Xeones reaches the story of the 300, he describes 

tactics that are still used today. What makes this telling 

of a military battle so good is its depiction of leadership on 

many levels, from the individual soldier to the Spartan king. 

The narrator tells tales of strategy, courage, and negotiation. He watches as the Spartan king uses rhetoric to gather 

forces from across Greece to fight alongside the Spartans. 

King Leonidas uses his knowledge of the terrain and his 

enemy’s skills to choose the best place for the confrontation. 

The king also designates a fallback position to be defended if 

necessary. Xeones illustrates the bravery of the platoon and 

company leaders—solid tacticians who lead by example, no 

matter what the risk. 

What made the 300 Spartans an incredibly powerful fighting force was not simply their ability as warriors, 

but the method by which they were chosen for the battle. 
Engineer 57

King Leonidas, knowing that he was leading his army to 

slaughter, selected each warrior based on two criteria: he 

must have a male heir to carry on the family name, and 

he must be married to a woman of exceptional strength. 

The king knew that the rest of the kingdom would look to 

the Spartan widows for leadership. If these women were 

not mentally strong, the kingdom would crumble. For 

these reasons, Gates of Fire should be on every military 

member’s bookshelf. 

-

pany A, 554th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She holds a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering 

Santa Clara University in California.

Starship Troopers, By Robert A. Heinlein, G. P. Putnam’s 

Sons, December 1959, ISBN 0-399-20209-9

Though originally published as an abridged, two-part 

pulp fiction piece in The Magazine of Fantasy and Science 

Fiction and later released as a single-volume edition in 

December 1959, Starship Troopers has proven to be relevant 

to today’s professional development reading lists through its 

on modern popular culture and its clever dissection of the political and military themes that are not regularly discussed by military leaders today. 

The most prominent theme of the book is the notion that 

citizenship is not necessarily a birthright granted by the 

state. Through a form of federal service, civilians are transformed into citizens with a set of rights, the most notable of 

which is the right to vote. As described in the book, “Under 

our system, every voter and officeholder is a man who has 

demonstrated, through voluntary and difficult service, that 

he places the welfare of the group ahead of personal advantage . . . . Citizenship is an attitude, a state of mind, an emotional conviction that the whole is greater than the part . . . 

and that the part should be humbly proud to sacrifice itself 

that the whole may live.”1

This view has been interpreted as a form of fascism by 

various book critics—but not in the eyes of Johnny Rico, a 

commoner who enlists in the Mobile Infantry out of high 

school. He sees the notion as his civic duty and not just a 

means to citizenship. This philosophy, taken to its extreme, 

harkens to the systems around the world today in which 

military service is mandatory. Countries that subscribe to 

this ideal—such as South Korea, Finland, and Greece—

are usually noninterventionist countries that do not often 

volunteer their militaries to theaters of combat around 

the world. 

Starship Troopers also delves into the role of an officer 

in a combat unit and the vetting process required to authorize personnel to lead troops into combat. After several years 

of service as an infantryman, Johnny Rico enrolls in officer 

candidate school—the only available commissioning source. 

Eligibility for enrollment is dependent on a soldier’s prior 

service. The book describes the key differences between the 

function and selection process of officers in the U.S. military 

and those in the Terran Federation, the fictional socialist 

society in the universe of Starship Troopers. 

The officer leadership hierarchy of the Terran Federation 

is very streamlined and cost-effective. Officers make up a 

very small percentage of the military. There is no need for 

security cells, overstaffed personnel and operations shops, 

special projects officers, or any other positions that are not 

combat-oriented. These jobs are divided among the platoon 

leaders and commanders at various levels. The organizational structure drastically differs from the modern military 

structure: rather than depending on competency to complete 

the mission, it depends on the weight of numbers. Officers in 

the same grade might be assigned varying degrees of responsibility, but receive the same benefits as peers with less 

responsibility. The system provides no incentive for seeking 

additional duties or performing in positions of greater -

ence and authority. Commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers alike can remain at the “center of mass” in a 

system that focuses on retention rather than on dismissing 

those who fall to the left of the bell curve. Marginal performers may not receive the choicest assignments, but this is of 

no consequence to them because they are nearly immune to 

dismissal from the military. 
58 Engineer

Starship Troopers also touches on the merits of serving 

in a peacetime army as opposed to one that is embroiled in 

war. Johnny Rico’s father initially tries to discourage his 

son from joining the Mobile Infantry, stating that his son 

is capable of achieving more and urging him to take up a 

career in the world of business. The father fears that his 

son will become institutionalized by a system that awards 

ribbons and decorations for nothing more than performing 

garrison duties and will eventually retire with the title of 

“veteran,” receiving a pension without making a meaningful 

contribution to society. This proves not to be the case, since 

shortly after Johnny Rico joins the peacetime army, he is 

Just as Gene Rodenberry examined social issues 

through the lens of science fiction in the television series 

Star Trek,

2 Robert A. Heinlein uses the guise of science 

fiction to address the problems that plague the Defense 

Department to this day. As a graduate of the U.S. Naval

Academy, Heinlein’s personal experiences as a military officer heavily enced his writing. The issues he discusses 

are presented in an entertaining, engaging, and provocative 

way that allows leaders in the real-world military to take a 

step back and look at their problems as if they were someone 

else’s. It is only when they finish the book that they realize 

that the author was referring to them.

Endnotes:

1American science fiction entertainment franchise created 

by Gene Roddenberry and owned by CBS and Paramount 

Pictures.

First Lieutenant Jenkins serves as a platoon trainer in the 

Engineer Basic Officer Leader Course, U.S. Engineer 

School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor’s 

Major tasks associated with the training include—

■ Create a situational awareness briefing for the company.

■ Use Microsoft® Excel to create graphs and charts depicting enemy activity.

■ Prepare and present a patrol prebriefing.

■ Establish information requirements for the company.

■ Recommend named areas of interest and target areas of 

interest in each area of operations and assign information requirements to these areas.

■ Develop association and activity matrixes, link diagrams, 

and time wheels.

■ Conduct a route analysis that covers vulnerable points 

and the relative threat assessment of the route.

■ Conduct an area analysis of the area around a specific

location to establish the relative threat level of the area.

■ Conduct operational assessments and provide recommendations to the planners to ensure that the explosive hazard threat is included in the planning process.

■ Conduct explosive hazards threat assessments for a fixed

facility and make recommendations to increase force protection of the fixed facility.

The CEH-P Course is geared toward company and battalion level Soldiers ranging from specialists to captains. 

There are no clearance or military occupational specialty 

restrictions. The course is available at Fort Leonard Wood 

or through mobile training teams. The course can accommodate up to 15 Soldiers. For additional information or 

questions, please contact the Counter Explosive Hazards Center via e-mail at <usarmy.leonardwood.engineer 

-schl.mbx.cehc>.

Mr. S ith is a cartographic technician for the Counter 

Explosive Hazards Center. He is a for er Military Occupational Specialty 25C (radio operator- aintainer) with the 

Missouri Ar y National Guard. Mr. S ith holds a bachelor’s 

degree in anage ent infor ation syste s fro Colu bia 

College, Missouri.
Engineer 59

W

ith all of the tools, technology, and equipment at 

the disposal of Army engineer leaders, successful 

mission and project accomplishment ultimately 

depend on the ability of leaders to motivate, and 

lead people. For today’s engineer leader, developing the 

capacity to ence people and change organizations is just 

as important as understanding the careful calculations of 

demolitions or the bearing capacity of soil. Various graduate programs available through the Army Advanced Civil 

Schooling offer curricula that focus 

on the intellectual development of 

leadership and managerial practices. Specifically, the study of organizational development provides 

ancillary benefits for leader development. A similar alternative route 

to Advanced Civil Schooling is the 

Eisenhower Leader Development 

Program (ELDP) offered by the U.S. 

Military Academy–West Point, New 

York, to incoming tactical officers. 

ELDP offers a master of arts degree 

in organizational psychology from 

Columbia University; the program 

focuses on the processes and qualities of effective organizations and on 

the development of their leaders.

In May 2016, nineteen officers (including the authors of this 

article) achieved a unique career 

milestone when they graduated 

from ELDP. The program, named 

after President and General of the 

Armies Dwight D. Eisenhower, is 

a joint venture between Teachers College, Columbia University, and the U.S Military Academy. It immerses Army 

officers in the theory and practice of organizational psychology, leader development, and organizational change. 

The 12-month program involves a permanent change of 

station move to West Point and incurs a 2- to 3-year utilization tour as a tactical officer in one of 36 West Point cadet 

companies. Students complete an intensive master of arts 

program consisting of 45 credit hours, split between classes 

By Captain David G. Weart and Captain 

A U.S. Army engineer confers with Iraqi army engineers.
60 Engineer

at Teachers College, Columbia University in New York 

City and West Point. Dating back to 1988, ELDP continues to refine its academic curriculum to challenge its students and meet the needs of the operational environment 

in which they will operate. The exposure to, and study of, 

psychology, leadership, and organizational development 

further the intellectual capacity of students in each topic 

and give them the technical expertise to be leadership and 

organizational developers in the Army.

The need for continued education among the Officer 

Corps is not new or unique to any branch. Engineers are 

encouraged to pursue technical accreditation and graduate 

education in an engineering-related discipline. As members of one of the most technically diverse and intellectually challenging branches of the military, engineer officers 

must understand how to shape and explain the terrain 

through combat, general, and geospatial engineering disciplines.1

 Officers who attend the Engineer Captains Career 

Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, have the opportunity to pursue a graduate program in engineering. Many 

seek accreditation that supports additional skill identifiers, 

facilitating the management of capabilities throughout the 

branch. A salient theme among the armed forces is the continual development of intellectual capacity among officers. 

Field Manual 6-22, refers to education as 

a developmental opportunity and to intellect as an attribute 

of the Army Leadership Requirements Model.2 An article 

published by the Strategic Studies Institute makes the case 

for intellectual human capital. The authors, in line with U.S. 

Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, 

World,3

present a case for promoting officers who are divergent and 

creative thinkers, capable of solving the problems of future 

complex “implore[ing] the total Army to broaden 

its approach to learning.”4

The competencies obtained through continued education 

should increase technical capacity and further the ability 

of leaders to and motivate people. Highlighting 

this critical competency, A Guide to the Project Manage-

 (PMBOK) states that “Project managers [engineer leaders] should acquire skills to identify, 

build, maintain, motivate, lead, and inspire project teams 

to achieve high performance and to meet the project’s objectives.”5

 The team development knowledge area from the 

PMBOK is the focal point for the requirement of a project 

manager or engineer leader to exercise leadership competencies for the benefit of the organization and to ensure project success. The question becomes: How do engineer leaders 

develop and refine the requisite set of soft skills? The experience gained in ELDP reinforces the importance of structured , challenging and diverse assignments, and 

the intentional practice of personal leadership development. 

Studying, and practicing the concepts of organizational development and theories of motivation will equip 

engineer leaders with empirically tested frameworks that 

explain and seek to predict human behavior. 

Regardless of the operational environment, mission 

and project success are contingent on successful team 

integration and development. Effective integration goes 

beyond establishing command support relationships; it 

includes building cohesive teams that can leverage each 

other’s strengths and resources to best support the mission. Leaders need to understand what makes integrated 

teams efficient and what psychological processes are precursors to effective team relationships. These concepts are 

played out while ELDP students attend the Practicum in 

Change and Consultation, a course that offers the unique 

opportunity to provide organization development consulting to a client organization. The behaviors exhibited by 

the organization and the internal members of a team are 

Soldiers wait for a signal from the assistant jumpmaster during an airborne operation at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Engineer 61

reinforced by the theories discussed in courses such as Group 

Dynamics, Organizational Psychology, Adult Learning and 

Development, Leadership Development, and Organizational 

Change. The leader development aspect of ELDP prepares 

students to understand what is evolving within the team or 

organization that is being led and how the student can effect 

change and develop team members to become cohesive and 

effective. After all, the first principle of mission command is 

“Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.”6

The concept of teams and organizational development is 

one of the many in-depth topics in organizational psychology. The curriculum provides the knowledge and expertise 

to lead effective change in any organization. An engineer 

leader who is competent in the social and technical aspects 

of leading in the Engineer Regiment is a more complete, 

dynamic leader who is ready for the challenges of the asymmetric battlefield and the construction site. Developing the 

requisite leader competencies requires a balanced combination of challenging and diverse assignments with intentional 

study and practice. Engineer officers are encouraged to consider this unique career opportunity when contemplating 

their broadening-experience options.

Completion of the program offers officers the opportunity 

to receive a master’s degree from a prestigious university 

and the chance to shape and mold the future of the Engineer 

Regiment as tactical officers. Engineer noncommissioned 

officers (NCOs) also have the opportunity to serve as tactical NCOs for a cadet company, with the option of attending the Benavidez Leader Development Program, which is 

also supported by Teachers College, Columbia University. 

Graduates of the program receive 10 continuing-education 

hours upon completion of the 3-week, academically intensive program that focuses on organizational psychology 

and leadership development. Together, tactical

officers and NCOs form

and model a professional command team

for cadets. They inspire

cadets to develop effective leadership styles

through role-modeling,

counseling, teaching,

and training. To qualify

for ELDP and serve as

a tactical officer, engineer captains must complete their key developmental assignment

before starting graduate

school during the summer term. For further

information, interested

officers should visit

the Web site for the

Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy, <www.usma.edu 

/bsl/SitePages/bsl.aspx>, and contact their assigned branch 

representative.

Endnotes:

1Army Techniques Publication 3-34.23, Engineer Operations – 

, 16 June 2015.

2Field Manual 6-22, 30 June 2015.

3U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 

525-3-1, The U.S. Operating Concept: Win in 

World, 31 October 2014.

4Everett S. P. Spain, J. D. Mohundro, and Bernard B. Banks, 

“Intellectual Capital: A Case for Cultural Change,” 

 War College Quarterly No. 2 (Summer 2015), p. 45.

5Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project ManBody of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide), 5th Edition, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania, 1 January 2013.

6Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission C and, 

12 March 2014.

Captain Guandique serves as a tactical officer at the U.S. 

the U.S. of science degree -

souri University of Science and Technology -

Captain Weart serves as a tactical officer at the U.S. Military 

Point. He holds a bachelor’s degree 

nce degree University of Science and Technology at Rolla, and of arts 

Both authors are contributors to a podcast that can be 

found by searching for “Leaders Huddle” on iTunes® or in the 

podcast application for iPhone® users. It is also accessible via 

Google Play.TM

Major General Leslie Smith receives a briefing about training efforts in support of a unit 

defense chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear response force mission.