9

MANAGING DESIGN AND 

CONSTRUCTION

Although the Europe Division (EUD) evolved as an organization 

under a succession of commanders between 1977 and 1988, 

the engineer mission in Europe remained constant. John Blake, 

who served as chief of construction during most of that decade, 

trenchantly defined that mission: “The real reason we are here is to build 

things, [to] repair things ... for the benefit of the soldiers and airmen in 

Europe.”1

Building things for soldiers involved EUD in an increasingly vast, 

volatile, and complex operation. By 1980 the division managed military 

construction in countries from the North Sea to the eastern Mediterranean 

and the Caspian Sea, a land mass roughly one-third the size of the United 

States that stretched over a distance slightly greater than that between 

New York and San Francisco. In 1977 EUD operated under eleven different working agreements in seven countries; by 1987 that had increased to 

twenty agreements with eight countries. (See Map 18.) Staff in the division 

conducted business daily in a variety of languages and under a multiplicity of national laws, regulations, and customs.2

Although the volume of work measured in dollars was not the largest 

in the Corps of Engineers, EUD workload, when measured by the number 

of projects, was larger than any other engineer organization in the world. 

In 1977 the division administered 1,800 projects in design and another 

300 in construction. Over the next decade the number of design projects 

remained in the same high range, while the volume of construction placement increased as design projects moved to the construction phase—from 

$130 million in 1977 to $492 million in 1986. The EUD leadership cadre 

judged its task in dealing with these projects, many of them quite small, 

as far more complicated than administering a handful of multimilliondollar contracts for a single customer, as the newly created Middle East 

Division seemed to be doing. By 1986 EUD had more than twenty customers, including the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and eight Department of 

Defense agencies. The division’s funds were drawn from fifteen sources, 
242

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

and it paid its bills in almost as many currencies, each of which had different and fluctuating rates to the dollar, a factor often ignored by Congress 

and planners in the Pentagon.3

Many of the Europe Division’s tasks demanded quick action and rapid 

completion. Design and construction frequently had to be executed in 

fewer than twelve months. On longer projects, initiation was often urgent; 

work had to be started before all the requirements had been defined. 

This meant that the scope of projects changed as the work progressed, 

Map 18

M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a

B l a c k S e a

N o r t h

S e a

Sardinia

Sicily

N

O

R

W

A

Y

NETHERLANDS

W E S T

G E R M A N Y

LUXEMBOURG

BELGIUM 

I T A L Y

T U R K E Y

G R E E C E

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1987

Area of Responsibility

0

0 500 Miles

500 Kilometers
243

Managing Design and Construction

complicating execution and increasing the costs of both design and construction.4

 This volatility had been characteristic of the engineer mission 

in Europe for much of the period since the end of World War II. It was 

not a characteristic of most civil works projects managed by the Corps of 

Engineers in the United States.

The vastness, complexity, and volatility of EUD’s work make it difficult to describe in simple and consistent terms. Indeed, a single descriptive framework cannot adequately portray the division’s many tasks. 

Several of the many ways in which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 

Europe Division, and its customers described and measured the division’s 

activities are explored below, including methods of contracting, sources of 

funding, and management of the work through the field offices.

Methods of Contracting

Like its predecessor organizations in Europe, EUD relied largely on 

contractors. Architect-engineer firms designed projects and construction 

companies built facilities ranging from missile sites, hardstands, and barracks to hospitals and bowling alleys.

In the European context the predominant method of contracting 

was indirect; that is, U.S. military engineers depended on host-government agencies to award contracts for design, construction, or both. 

Representing the interests of the U.S. government and the military user, 

EUD prepared the original contract package, whether for design 

or construction, and approved 

the final product.5 The process 

was called direct contracting when 

EUD awarded contracts without 

a host-government agency as 

intermediary.

Three options existed for a 

project assigned to the Europe 

Division. First, design and construction could be indirect, 

in which case the host nation 

awarded the design and construction contracts. Second, 

design and construction could 

be direct, in which case EUD 

awarded both contracts. Third, 

EUD could contract directly for 

design and indirectly for construction, meaning that EUD 

awarded the design contract and 

the host nation awarded the construction contract. Theoretically, 

The Europe Division generally relied on 

contractors to complete facilities, such as 

this prison in Mannheim.
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

a fourth option existed, but a 

project designed by a host nation 

would almost invariably be built 

by it as well.6

The process for handling 

any particular project was determined by one of the many country-to-country agreements under 

which EUD worked. Generally, 

those agreements specified that 

the host nation retained control 

of all construction within its territory. Each nation, of course, 

followed different rules and 

customs concerning the nature 

of the contract, contracting procedures, selection of materials, 

guarantees, and the like. A look 

at contracting in two countries, 

Turkey and West Germany, illustrates some of the complexities 

EUD’s management personnel 

handled.

Contracting in Turkey

Turkey was geographically remote from the center of the U.S. military 

presence in Europe, and its construction industry was less sophisticated 

than that of central and western European countries. These factors conjoined to make Turkey the focus of disproportionate attention from EUD 

personnel.

EUD inherited a difficult arrangement in Turkey. The United States 

had imposed an arms embargo in 1974 in response to Turkish action during a crisis over Cyprus. The government of Turkey thereupon cancelled 

the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement that regulated U.S. 

military construction in the country. In negotiations for a new agreement in 1975–1976, the Turkish government insisted on extensive control 

over contracting and construction. All projects had to be approved by the 

government of Turkey, which reserved the right to review all contractual 

documents. The Turkish government submitted names of approved bidders for contracts; bid openings and negotiations had to include official 

Turkish representatives; the government insisted on placing a resident 

engineer on each job; and, for projects prefinanced by the United States, 

the Turkish government received 3 percent of all funds recovered from 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).7

The new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement also committed the United States to foster Turkish economic development as well as 

Construction of even this simple warehouse 

near Ankara involved special measures to 

strengthen the Turkish construction 

industry.
245

Managing Design and Construction

joint defense. To the extent feasible, the United States agreed to procure all 

materials, labor, and all other services in Turkey. The Turkish government 

strictly enforced the limits on imports and insisted on approving lists of 

construction materials before construction could even begin. These procedures contributed substantially to delays in construction.8

To fulfill the United States’ commitment to foster economic development, EUD sought to introduce advanced methods into the Turkish construction industry whenever possible.9

 The United States Engineer Group 

(TUSEG) provided training for both contractors and workers, including 

on-the-job training, films, and seminars on topics such as contracting, 

construction methods, and asbestos removal. This special effort enabled 

more Turkish contractors to meet U.S. specifications.10

Contracting in West Germany

The authority that the Turks insisted on retaining over decisions 

concerning U.S. military construction graphically shows how important 

the issue of control is in any country. It was no less important in West 

Germany, where the Europe Division constructed the majority of its projects and where relations between the United States and Germany had a 

very different history from the relations between the United States and 

Turkey. The agreements governing contracting for military construction 

in Germany first took shape during the 1950s, when the Federal Republic’s 

sense of sovereignty was tentative and Soviet power threatened Western 

Europe. As West German self-confidence grew and as Germans began to 

discount the Soviet threat, the Federal Republic asserted its right to control military construction within its own boundaries.

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and West Germany signed 

the basic agreement, the Dollarbaukontrakt, (Dollar Construction Contract), 

in 1956. Modified in 1961, this agreement formed the basis for all dollar-funded design and construction executed in the Federal Republic. 

Coupled with the supplementary agreement to the NATO Status of Forces 

Agreement signed in 1959, these accords governed indirect contracting for 

U.S. military construction.11 According to the basic law (constitution) of 

the Federal Republic, the ten West German Länder (states) were the enforcing agencies of federal statutes. Under this decentralized system, federal 

laws were frequently interpreted differently at each building site, forcing 

Army engineers to prepare designs to meet the standards in different 

German localities.12

In the mid-1950s, when West Germany achieved sovereignty, new procedures replaced those governing U.S. military construction. With adaptations that strengthened German control, these procedures remained in 

force in 1974. Thus, EUD dealt directly with the Ministry of Defense or 

the Ministry of Construction in Bonn primarily to work out general agreements concerning construction programs. At the local level, where actual 

building took place, contracts with builders came under the jurisdiction 

of states and localities. The Bonn ministries signed contracts with the 
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

U.S. agency and issued federal construction orders to state construction 

offices (Oberfinanzdirektionen), which in turn passed the orders to local 

construction offices (called variously Landesbauämter, Staatsbauämter, or 

Finanzbauämter) for execution. EUD had only indirect contact—and no 

contracts—with the company executing the work. The division’s contracts 

for U.S. military construction were with the appropriate West German 

governmental agency.13

For reasons of coordination, contracts drawn up by EUD for the 

Ministries of Defense or Construction passed through the West German 

government’s Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical Working Group for 

Construction), created in 1956.14 This agency, which maintained its offices 

in Frankfurt, proved over the years an indispensable ally. In recognition 

of the value of its role, EUD presented the director of this German agency, 

Viktor Krupinski, with the U.S. Department of the Army’s Outstanding 

Civilian Service Award days before his retirement after a nineteen-year 

tenure. In a small ceremony on 26 February 1976, EUD lauded Krupinski’s 

role in facilitating construction for the Nike and Mace missile programs 

of the early 1960s, the Hawk program of 1965–1968, the TAB VEE (Theater 

Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise) aircraft shelter program, and 

the two German-financed programs of the 1970s to modernize U.S. facilities.15

As West Germany became more confident of its position in international affairs, it sought to bring U.S. (and other) military construction 

under its control. The effort culminated during the 1970s in negotiations concerning the Auftragsbautengrundsätze (ABG–75), the principles of 

contract construction formulated by the Federal Republic to replace the 

bilateral agreements of earlier years. In the negotiations for ABG–75, the 

West Germans maintained that one single accord ought to govern all six 

NATO countries with troops in Germany and that construction should 

be contracted through German government agencies, that is, through 

indirect contracting.16 These were all assertions of sovereignty that France 

had insisted upon thirty years earlier. Most of West Germany’s NATO 

partners signed ABG–75 in the late 1970s, but the United States resisted 

signing until 1982.17

The United States held out for several years because it continued to 

find advantage in the older agreements that permitted it to engage in 

direct design, without the intermediary of an official German agency, 

and some direct construction. In addition, U.S. law prohibited some of 

the financial arrangements accepted by the other nations. Over several 

years EUD’s experience showed that, compared to projects designed indirectly, projects designed directly encountered more frequent delays in 

the German review process and required an undue number of contract 

modifications, leading to missed schedules and increased costs. Brig. Gen. 

George Kenyon “Ken” Withers, Jr., concluded that the German administration of construction was doing “a good job,” and he favored signing 

ABG–75. He argued that implementing it would have a negligible effect 

on EUD’s internal operations. On 29 September 1982, the United States, 
247

Managing Design and Construction

represented by USAREUR, and the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Ministry of Construction, signed the agreement; it became 

effective on 1 October.18

Projects and the Process

Because managing the design and construction process from start to 

finish made up a major part of EUD’s day-to-day work, the process itself 

merits review. The division processed the idea for any project through 

three phases: (1) planning, which shaped the idea and secured funding 

for it; (2) design, which translated the plan into a constructible project; 

and (3) construction, which turned it into mortar, bricks, and boards, giving the original idea its three-dimensional reality.

Planning

If a project idea arose in a military community, the community commander turned first to his facilities engineer, who defined the idea in relation to the community’s mission and decided whether the local engineer 

staff had the resources to develop the concept design sufficiently to obtain 

congressional funding. The facilities engineer assessed the characteristics 

of the site in relation to the project, checked access to utilities and communications, and weighed any other economic or environmental factors that 

bore on the prospects of completing the project. If the local facilities engineer could not provide these basic design services, the military community turned to the next highest level, USAREUR’s Directorate of Facilities 

Engineering (reorganized and renamed the Directorate of Engineering 

and Housing [DEH] in 1976). Either the facilities engineer or the DEH 

could also decide to bring in EUD to help with this advanced planning.19

If the project originated as a part of a new weapons system or some 

other aspect of direct combat support, it would come to EUD at the end 

of the concept design or advanced planning stage, because the Europe 

Division acted as sole agent to manage design and construction for all 

Military Construction, Army (MCA), projects and, upon request, for the 

Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF), projects. By contrast, EUD 

might or might not manage Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA), 

projects or projects funded from other sources.

By the late 1980s, in an effort to improve customer satisfaction, EUD 

had instituted a predesign conference for each project as part of this planning phase. This became the initial and most critical point of interaction 

between the division staff and the originators of the project idea. At this 

meeting, the participants reviewed all documents, especially the initiating document (Department of Defense form 1391) and the project development brochure, and determined whether the scope of work accurately 

reflected the user’s needs.20

When completed, the planning phase brought the project to 35 percent completion of design. The Army engineers had calculated a current 
248

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

working estimate, the total cost of the project through final construction, required of any project included in the military budget presented to 

Congress. When Congress approved a project, it used the current working estimate as the program amount—the total funds authorized and 

appropriated for the project.21 EUD also used the working estimate when 

describing its workload; the volume of work was generally expressed as 

the total working estimate of all projects currently under design.

By the mid-1980s, an EUD-organized conference had evolved to review 

work before USAREUR proposed a project to the Department of the Army. 

The DEH, the user, the designer, and the EUD representative discussed the 

review comments received during the planning phase, resolved their differences, and approved the concept design. The assumption was that once 

concept review was completed, no further changes would occur in either 

the operational or the functional requirements for the project.22

Design

The design phase, managed by EUD’s Engineering Division, had its 

own three stages: preliminary design, which built on the earlier planning phase; prefinal design; and final design. Staff in the division might 

do direct design of a project, or EUD might engage an outside architectengineer firm to execute direct design. For indirect design, either a 

German government agency executed the work or the agency engaged an 

architect-engineer firm to complete the design. In these cases, EUD monitored, verified, oversaw, and cajoled to bring the work to completion on 

time and within the budget.23

The preliminary design phase carried the project from 35 to 50 percent design. EUD screened the project again to ensure that it conformed 

to statutory, regulatory, and administrative requirements and qualified 

for the designated funding category (OMA, MCA, and others). The staff 

verified that a project had a clearly defined scope of work and realistic cost estimates, checked the adequacy of the funding made available 

for design, and calculated EUD management fee as a percentage of the 

design costs. The division’s Technical Review Branch reviewed architectural drawings and functional layouts in detail to ensure the adequacy of 

electrical, mechanical, and other distribution systems. EUD review of the 

preliminary design stage also encompassed exterior utility systems, roads, 

parking areas, landscaping, and secure sources of power and water. Staff 

reviewed the project’s completion dates and coordinated necessary changes with the user. Completion dates were critical for projects funded by 

OMA, because these funds had to be returned if not obligated during the 

fiscal year in which the project was approved.24

Near the end of the preliminary phase, EUD coordinated a user 

review of the original cost estimates to refine and check them against the 

approved budget. All parties then checked the preliminary design again. 

When EUD received the signed approval of design and cost estimates 

from the user, the next stage—prefinal design—began.25
249

Managing Design and Construction

During the prefinal stage, EUD design staff or contractors prepared 

detailed drawings of the facilities involved in the project. This stage also 

included the final calculations and structural analyses, the preparation 

of complete specifications, and a detailed review of costs based on actual 

quantitative measurements taken from the drawings. The design team 

again checked all elements of the design for technical accuracy and completeness. When the prefinal stage was completed, a project was 90 percent through the design cycle.26

During final design, the division staff prepared or monitored a contractor’s preparation of construction drawings and specifications, again 

coordinating the work with the user. EUD also prepared any special 

statements relating to legal and administrative aspects of the contract as it 

put together the final contract documents. Staff assembled the completed 

drawings, the specifications, and the legal paperwork into a bid package 

for construction.27

The final review conference marked the culmination of the design 

phase. A project manager in the Engineering Division gathered the final 

design documents and sent them to all the participants with notice of the 

date for the design conference. One last review of the design was done to 

ensure that the facility as designed met the operational and functional 

needs of the intended user.28

If a revised working estimate for the project exceeded the program amount appropriated by Congress, EUD had to send an explanation to Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) in Washington, which administered the appropriated funds. 

USACE sent EUD an authorization to solicit bids or to award the construction contract. At the moment of approval, USACE transferred 

to EUD 85 percent of the amount appropriated by Congress for the 

project. Once the division received the money and all clearances, the 

bid package was distributed to construction contractors qualified to 

handle the work.29

Construction

With the design phase completed and the project funds received, the 

construction phase began, with EUD’s Construction Division monitoring the project. Much of the day-to-day work passed to the area offices, 

resident engineer offices, and project offices. The preconstruction conference brought together the representatives of the contractor (and principal 

subcontractors) and EUD area or resident engineer. The conference also 

frequently included representatives of the user and the community, the 

facilities engineer, or additional EUD personnel at the invitation of the 

area or resident engineer.30

Field personnel monitored progress at the construction site, including necessary testing, property administration, cost reporting, user 

liaison, record keeping, labor relations, safety, job site security, quality 

assurance, and personnel administration. When the volume of work 
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

or the remoteness of the site warranted, the Europe Division opened a 

project office at or near the job site. Throughout the construction phase, 

staff in the Construction Division in Frankfurt provided an array of 

support and technical expertise to solve the more difficult problems.31

Monitors ensured that the contractor stayed on schedule, adhered to 

the contract price, and executed the plan’s special and general conditions and specifications. Field office personnel also tracked funds and 

negotiated changes, within limits, while they forwarded to Frankfurt 

any changes that exceeded their authority.32

The Construction Division managed periodic inspections, controlled funds, and administered the contract to ensure that the contractor delivered high-quality work on time and within budget. 

Headquarters staff and field personnel worked in concert to conduct 

the prefinal inspection of the construction site before turning the facility over to the user. They also assessed and acted upon any deficiencies 

identified in the final inspection.33

Because the indirect method of contracting put a bureaucratic 

layer between EUD and the executor of the work, EUD had little 

leverage to delay payment to the contractor or to cancel the contract. The indirect method of contracting in the Federal Republic of 

Germany also fostered opportunities for delay. (Chart 12) The average 

time involved in seeing an indirect contract to completion was 24.5 

months.34 (See Chart 13.)

Europe Division personnel in Sinop, Turkey, monitored each construction project 

as it progressed.
251

Managing Design and Construction

Value Engineering

In addition to guiding a project through the various phases of design 

and construction, EUD administered a value-engineering program. Value 

engineering is a systematic approach to reducing costs in a project without changing its original function or scope. Designs for a project selected 

for value engineering might be reviewed by an in-house team or examined by an architect-engineer firm to see how savings could be achieved 

by changing aspects of the design or construction.35

In 1974, when the Europe Division was established, regulations set out 

by the Office of the Chief of Engineers located the value engineering function in the division’s Executive Office. Although value engineering was 

applied to direct design projects during the 1970s, the German construction industry never thought it necessary, asserting that they did it “in the 

Construction Authorization

European Division

Forward estimated basis

Title IA, II and III Contract to BAG

BAG (Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe)

Translation administrative action and forwarding contract(s)

to pertinent ministry in Bonn for acceptance and signature

Applicable Federal Republic of Germany Ministry

Coordination and contract signature

Issues construction order and contract(s) to applicable OFD

Returns signed contract(s) to the BAG

BAG

Return contract

OFD (Oberfinanzdirektionen)

Issue construction order to BAUAMT

EUD

Record contract obligation

concur with bidders

list review award

recommendation initiate

contract modifications

BAG

Coordinate bidders list

recommend construction

award sign and accept contract

modification issue revised

construction order

BAUAMT

(local contract office)

Prepare bidders list

Solicit, evaluate proposals

and recommend award to EUD

Award construction contract

Monitor

construction

BAUAMT

Perform Title II Services

Contractor

Execute Construction

Chart 12: Indirect Contracting Process in the Federal Republic of Germany
252

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

normal course of design.” In fiscal year 1983 the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, concerned about the rising costs of military construction, set a 

goal to save 2 percent of the total budget for military construction through 

value engineering. The Pentagon increased the goal to 5 percent in fiscal 

year 1984 and to 6 percent in fiscal year 1986.36

The committee established to oversee the value engineering program 

at EUD selected projects for examination that promised potential savings. 

This committee, headed by the deputy commander, tried to apply value 

engineering during the design phase of a project, before the concept review 

meeting. The value engineering report went to the original designer, who 

Chart 13: Indirect Method of Contracting and Project Milestones 

Proponent

Public Coordination by Bauamt

Europe

Division

Milestone

Start End

0 2

2 7 7 15 15 19

19 33

33 41

(MOC)

Ministry of

Construction

OFD

Oberfinanzdirektion

Bauamt

(local contract

office)

Using Agency

Architect/

Engineer (A/E)

Construction

Contractor Directorate of

Engineering

and Housing

Receive Design

Directive,

Criteria,

DD 1391 and

Design Funds

Process

ABG–3

ABG–3 to

MOC, OFD

and Bauamt

Bauamt

Contract A/E

Start Design

Receive Concept

Submission;

Reproduce and

Distribute for

Review

Concept

Review

Conference

41 44

Receive Concept

Approval;

Design

Authorization

and Design

Funds

44 49

Process

ABG–3

Modification

and Forward

to Bauamt

49 51

Bauamt

Direct A/E

to Start

Final

Design

83 93

Bauamt Advertise,

Open Bids, Evaluate

and Forward Package

with Recommendations

93 95

Receive ABG–4

Evaluate Bids

and Request Funds

ABG, Auftragsbautengrundsätze

Legend

(Weeks)

95 98

Process, ABG–4 and

Award to Industry

51 69

Receive Final

Submission;

Reproduce

and Distribute

for Review 69 77

Final

Review

Conference 77 83

Backcheck
253

Managing Design and Construction

reviewed it and incorporated appropriate changes into the design. During 

the construction phase, the contractor could initiate a value-engineering 

change proposal, documenting an alternate and more economical solution 

or method of accomplishing specific parts of the project. If the proposal was 

accepted, the contractor received 55 percent of the net savings.

In fiscal year 1984 the chief of engineering, Joe G. Higgs, took 

over responsibility for value engineering and located it in the Project 

Management Branch. During fiscal years 1985 to 1987, EUD doubled the 

number of its value-engineering studies from twenty-four to approximately fifty annually. More savings through the application of value 

engineering translated into more construction projects, because additional 

projects could be authorized from the savings on previous projects. In 

1989, to conform to USACE regulations, the division engineer returned 

value engineering to the Executive Office.

The elements of design and construction in EUD were long, laborious, and labor-intensive in ways peculiar to the European setting. The 

Engineering Division’s Project Management Branch tracked each project 

through the design phase, at which point responsibility for the project 

passed to the Construction Division. Effective communication between 

the two divisions was crucial to the process but not always achieved. 

People who worked in the Construction Division frequently complained 

that designers took too little account of constructibility and failed to 

incorporate into subsequent designs the lessons learned during construction. People in the Engineering Division claimed that those in construction lacked imagination, flair, and creativity.37

Projects and Funding

Money for design and construction, or for other technical activities such 

as design review or advice on master planning, came from one of three 

sources: the United States government, NATO, or the governments of the host 

nations. Each of these lines of funding supported a variety of programs.

Tracking the funds for any one project was complicated because, 

within legal limits prescribed by the funding authorization, EUD was 

able to combine funds from several sources to support projects. Hospital 

renovations, for example, used dollars from MCA and OMA appropriations, Deutschmarks from the Modernization of United States Facilities 

(MOUSF) program, and (or) other host-nation funds. Some funding 

arrangements were straightforward, such as MCA programs within 

USAREUR. Others were more convoluted: For certain facilities the United 

States initiated construction and then sought compensation from NATO, 

so that NATO monies became mixed with MCA funds.38

U.S. Funding

U.S. funds included several categories of monies appropriated by 

Congress: Military Construction, Army (MCA); Minor MCA (MMCA); 
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF or MCP); Military Construction, 

Navy (MCN); Operations and Maintenance, Army; Air Force family housing; Army family housing; Department of Defense contingency funds; 

and Department of Defense dependent schools. EUD also worked with 

nonappropriated funds and commissary surcharge monies. This list is 

suggestive, not exhaustive.

EUD managed all work in Europe funded under MCA (Table 6) and 

all work funded under the agreements with Germany to pay the costs of 

U.S. forces protecting their territory. During the 1970s USAREUR’s entire 

allotment of MCA money averaged less than $50 million annually.39

Still, within these limits EUD workload increased significantly between 

July 1975 and late 1977. Design workload, expressed as the programmed 

cost of building the projects in design, went from $279 million and 246 

projects in fiscal year 1974 to about $430 million and 554 projects in fiscal year 1975, then jumped to $1.3 billion by late 1977. The largest dollar 

increases came in work funded by MCA, but work to support facilities 

(OMA and family housing rehabilitation) supplied the greatest number 

of projects.40

Between May 1976 and August 1978, EUD completed $34.4 million of 

MCA construction.41 By the end of the decade, USAREUR’s annual MCA 

allotment had increased to over $200 million. EUD workload increased 

accordingly, and it continued to increase during the 1980s. The trend was 

not an uninterrupted progression, however; in the summer of 1979 EUD’s 

division engineer, Brig. Gen. Drake Wilson, notified the chief of engineers, 

Lt. Gen. John Morris, that his “most serious problem was the current 

shortage of MCA design funds.”42

In addition to projects such as ammunition storage and medical facilities, MCA funds paid for facilities modernization (the dollar-funded proTable 6

Military Construction, Army, Annual Allotments

Fiscal Years 1975–1986

 Program Funding Program Funding

 Fiscal Year ($ million) Fiscal Year ($ million) 

1981 201.0

1982 294.0

1983 262.0

1984 313.0

1985 255.0

1986 337.0

1975 $ 31.641

1976 58.188

1977 59.995

1978 185.675

1979 213.875

1980 113.0
255

Managing Design and Construction

gram that followed MOUSF), pollution control, storage of weapons and 

equipment, missile sites, energy production, training and training facilities, weapons facilities, physical fitness, barracks, and projects related to 

the combat mission of the forces. EUD also executed work for the Air 

Force and the Navy with funds appropriated for MCAF and MCN.

Funds allocated for OMA financed alterations, repair, and maintenance. 

Appropriated annually, OMA funds had to be obligated in the same fiscal 

year, and their use was restricted to specific purposes. During the 1970s, 

OMA funds were limited to new construction or alterations costing no 

more than $75,000 and to repair projects costing less than $300,000, as long 

as the costs of repair did not exceed half of the cost of replacing the facility. The secretary of the Army had to approve repair projects involving 

new construction that exceeded $300,000 and maintenance projects that 

exceeded $300,000. Practically speaking, such projects came within the 

approval authority of the community commander, because they were routinely approved in Washington.43 New programs initiated in the late 1970s, 

including maintenance, repair, and improvement (discussed in Chapter 12), 

increased EUD’s flexibility in using OMA funds.

MCA, MCAF, MCN, and OMA funds provided the largest part of 

EUD’s regular funding from dollar appropriations. Dollar funding for 

programs other than MCA and OMA was less predictable, and these programs were therefore less significant in EUD’s early years. Family housing, facilities modernization, schools, and other quality-of-life projects 

became a major focus of the division’s attention only in the 1980s. OMA 

and German-funded projects provided the basic workload during the first 

two years of the Europe Division.44

Host-Nation Funds

To cover some of the costs of stationing U.S. troops as a part of the 

NATO mutual defense pact, countries provided “host-nation funds.”45 By 

far the most important country for the support of USAREUR’s combat 

mission was the Federal Republic of Germany. Since the end of the occupation in 1955, the West German government had provided various forms 

of financial support to the United States to offset the costs of stationing 

troops in the Federal Republic of Germany. The MOUSF program, for 

example, was paid for through the agreements between the United States 

and the Federal Republic of Germany.46 (See descriptions of MOUSF projects 

in Chapters 6 and 10.)

Another program, Alternate Construction, was derived from practices 

begun before the end of the occupation. A series of bilateral agreements 

dating from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s formalized the program. In 

exchange for a facility occupied by U.S. forces, the government of the 

Federal Republic would construct an equivalent facility at a site agreeable 

to the United States. When the Germans wanted a facility returned, negotiations for an alternate facility revolved around the scope of work, the 

quality, and the location, but not the cost. German agencies and contrac-
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

tors did all the design work as well as the construction. USAREUR provided OMA funds to cover EUD’s costs of managing the program.47

NATO Funds

EUD had little to do with NATO construction when the U.S. forces did 

not use the facilities. When the United States was designated primary or 

exclusive user, the division reviewed plans and monitored construction 

for the project as requested by USAREUR or the United States Air Forces 

in Europe. NATO funding supported a diversity of construction projects 

and programs as a part of the common defense mounted by the countries 

of the Atlantic alliance. The largest category of NATO funds supported 

the Common Infrastructure Program, which financed such undertakings 

as airfields; facilities for petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); naval bases; 

communications facilities; navigational aids; training facilities; headquarters facilities; warning installations; surface-to-air and surface-to-surface 

missile sites; ammunition storage sites; forward storage sites; and reinforcement support.48

Projects in these categories could be funded in three ways. First, they 

could be funded solely by NATO under its annual budget, where an allotment is designated as a tranche in French and translated as a “slice” in 

English. These annual NATO allotments for construction began in 1950 and 

were numbered consecutively.49 The NATO program trends and slice numNATO provided funds to support the Common Infrastructure Program, which 

included this operations building in Incirlik, Turkey.
257

Managing Design and Construction

bers for fiscal years 1975–1981 are 

given in Table 7. Second, projects 

could be conjunctively funded; 

that is, the United States contributed funds to provide for features 

that NATO criteria would not 

allow. NATO criteria, drawn with 

wartime conditions in mind, were 

exceedingly austere. Because U.S. 

troops used the facilities extensively in peacetime, the United 

States upgraded NATO projects 

to provide more amenities. When 

an American project and a NATO 

project shared common features, 

usually utilities, the costs of such 

features were shared based on a 

ratio of projected usage. A project might have both conjunctive 

funding and cost sharing.50 Third, 

projects could be prefinanced; that 

is, the United States put up the money in the expectation that NATO would 

reimburse the advance. To ensure recoupment (the word used by both 

NATO and the United States), EUD personnel maintained detailed records 

during the project to satisfy NATO’s accounting requirements. The Europe 

Division continued the Recoupment Section established by the Engineer 

Command. The recoupment process was tedious, and there was no assurance that NATO would approve repaying the money. EUD received special 

funding from Congress to pay the overhead in monitoring projects funded 

by NATO or prefinanced by the United States.51

Construction Workload

The execution of EUD construction between May 1976 and August 

1978 is summarized in Table 8.

52 In this 28-month period, fiscal year statistics were skewed because the government created a fifth fiscal quarter (FY 

7T, 1 July to 30 September 1976) when it shifted the beginning of its fiscal 

year from 1 July to 1 October. Nonetheless, the table represents EUD’s 

activity in the years before the increased tempo of the 1980s.

The first seven programs listed, funded by U.S. dollars appropriated by Congress, constituted almost 60 percent of EUD construction. 

Modernization of U.S. Facilities, Alternate Construction, and the garrison 

in Garlstedt were funded by the Federal Republic and represented another 35 percent. NATO funded the A Priori program, and the government of 

the Shah of Iran paid for work in Iran.53

It is difficult to compare the workload of the Europe Division for 1976–

1978 with the EUD construction in fiscal year 1984 (see Table 9) because the 

Table 7

North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Annual 

Allotments

Fiscal Years 1975–1981

 Program 

 NATO Fiscal Funding

 Slice Year ($ million)

26 1975 $ 26.0 

27 1976 10.7 

28 1977 13.5 

29 1978 57.8 

30 1979 16.8 

31 1980 287.3 

32 1981 277.5 
258

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

division did not use comparable statistics. Only three categories—MCA, 

MCAF, and OMA—remain the same. As a result, the figures indicate trends 

and significant shifts in the quantity of work at hand; they cannot be a precise measure of specific categories of work from one period to the next.

By 1984 the volume of work handled by EUD had increased dramatically. In construction placement, the total dollar value for the first nine 

months of 1984 ($269 million) exceeded the total value for the twenty-eight 

months from May 1976 to August 1978 ($227.8 million). For the entire fiscal year of 1984, construction placement totaled $403 million.54 The share 

of funding for construction placement coming from dollar appropriations 

(72.8 percent) rose sharply. The NATO share for 1984 totaled $255 million. 

Host-nation funding does not appear in any identifiable category in the 

figures for 1984.

Projects and Area Offices

In addition to analyzing the types of contracts and sources of funds, 

the work of the Europe Division may also be reviewed in terms of where 

Table 8

Europe Division Construction Execution

May 1976–August 1978

 Number of Program Funding Percent

 Program Projects ($ million) of Total

Military Construction, Army 40 $34.4 15.1

Minor Military Construction, Army 17 2.76 1.2

Operation and Maintenance, Army 23 5.18 2.3

Military Construction, Air Force 32 82.0 36.0

Military Construction, Navy 11 7.1 3.1

Family Housing 27 3.4 1.5

Other 10 0.9 0.4

Modernization of U.S. Forces 59 44.9 19.7

Alternate Construction 7 8.0 3.5

NORTHAG [Garlstedt] 3 26.0 11.4

A Priori 1 3.2 1.4

Iran 7 10.0 4.4

Total 237 $ 227.84 100

Adapted from “EUD in Perspective, 1976–1978.”
259

Managing Design and Construction

the projects were located. In 1974 EUD territory was entirely within 

continental Europe, and the vast majority of work was in the Federal 

Republic of Germany. EUD initially established area offices in Stuttgart, 

Frankfurt, and Kaiserslautern, the cities in which USAREUR maintained 

headquarters for its three major commands—VII Corps, V Corps, and 

the 1st Support Brigade (later the 21st Support Command), respectively. 

Each area office maintained a resident engineer office in its home city 

and established other resident offices to serve clusters of military communities. In 1974 the division had resident engineer offices at Bad 

Kreuznach, Giessen, Nuremberg, Würzburg, Augsburg, Bitburg, and 

Heidelberg.

Table 9

Europe Division Construction Execution

1984

 Design Workload Construction 

 Number of all Programs Placement 

Program of Projects Fiscal Year 1984 (Fiscal Year 1984

 to June 30 Only)

 Program Program 

 Funding Funding 

 ($ million) Percent ($ million) Percent

Military Construction, 

Army 396 $1.428 41.8 $127.0 47.2 

Minor Military 

Construction, Army 418 795.0 23.3 15.0 5.6 

Operation 

and Maintenance, Army 221 202.0 5.9 45.0 16.7 

NATO 76 255 .0 7.5 52.0 19.3 

Department of 

Defense/National Air 

Force (NAF) 84 227 .0 6.6 21.0 7.8 

AFFH 2 63.0 1.8 -- --

AFH 112 296.0 8.7 -- --

FH -- -- -- 9.0 3.4 

Miscellaneous 45 151.0 4.4 -- --

Total 1,354 $3.417 100.0 $269.0 100.0

Source: Engineer Studies Center, “U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD), Organization Study,” 

April 1985, pp. 7–11.
260

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

From this basic structure of field offices, EUD opened and closed area 

offices, resident offices, and project offices as the construction workload 

shifted.55 The Northern Area Office opened in 1975. Located first in West 

Germany, it soon moved to Hoensbroek, Netherlands, just across the 

border from Aachen, West Germany. The Northern Area Office managed 

work in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and northern Germany, 

a geographic area equal to the combined area of all the other area offices 

in Germany.56

In February 1976 EUD assumed the responsibility for USAREUR and 

NATO construction in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. EUD took over office 

space from the Mediterranean Division at Camp Darby near Livorno, 

Italy, and incorporated some staff to create the Mediterranean Area Office. 

In addition to a resident office at Camp Darby, EUD established a resident 

office in Aviano and project offices in Vicenza, San Vito, and Sigonella in 

Italy, as well as a resident office in Athens, Greece, and a project office in 

Iraklion on the island of Crete. In Turkey, EUD inherited a resident office 

at Incirlik Air Base near Adana, the TUSEG Liaison Office in Ankara, and 

a project office in Sinop on the Black Sea.57

Although Iran was outside its defined geographic area of responsibility, 

EUD also accepted fully reimbursable construction work in Tehran.58 The 

Camp Darby

Aviano

Sigonella

San Vito

Vicenza

M e d

i

t e r r a n 

I T A L Y

P

O R T U G A L

Sardinia

Sicily

LISBON

ROME

MEDITERRANEAN AREA

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

Mid-1970s

Area Office Headquarters

Resident Office 

Project Office

Liaison Office

0

0 500 Miles

500 Kilometers

Map 19
261

Managing Design and Construction

Mediterranean Division had handled work in Iran in the 1950s and 1960s, 

and Brig. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., commander of the Europe Division in 

the mid-1970s, accepted the turnover of responsibility to the division, citing 

this work as an example of EUD’s ability to respond to challenges. In May 

1976 the work involved only design, but within two years EUD had placed 

over $10 million in construction funded by the Iranian government.59

Incorporating several Mediterranean countries into EUD in 1976 

marked the last major addition of territorial responsibility for the division. 

In 1980 responsibility for construction in Italy and Greece passed to the 

Navy, but within two years the Navy asked EUD to reassume management of construction in those countries.60

Volume of Work in the 1970s

Throughout the 1970s EUD’s five area offices supervised a growing 

number of construction projects for the U.S. military. The Mediterranean 

Area Office had the lightest construction load but a fairly large staff because 

of its far-flung resident offices and the requirement to retain locally hired 

Italians when the Mediterranean Division was inactivated. (Map 19) In 1980 

its construction placement was less than one-eighth that of the Southern 

Iráklion

Sinop

Ankara

Athens Adana

e a n S e a

B l a c k S e a

T U R K E Y

G R E E C E

Crete

ANKARA

ATHENS
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

Area Office in Stuttgart, which had 

the largest placement, and onefourth that of the Northern Area 

Office. The unevenness of work for 

the area offices is evident from the 

construction placement for fiscal 

years 1979 and 1980.61 (Table 10)

This unpredictability made 

planning and manpower assignments very difficult. For fiscal year 

1979, for instance, the Southwest 

Area Office had projected construction placement of $52 million; the 

office constructed only half that 

amount because the Air Force shifted projects to NATO.62

Projects in the 1980s

As construction placement increased, EUD headquarters recognized 

bottlenecks in the decision-making process. In 1980 EUD reorganized the 

Construction Division, redefining the relationship between area and resident offices and headquarters and establishing additional area offices in 

Nuremberg and Würzburg. A year later the division increased manpower 

and administrative support in the area offices and upgraded both TUSEG 

and Heidelberg to area offices. Under the influence of John Blake, chief of 

construction after 1981, the trend toward decentralization and increased 

support for the field continued as construction placement increased during the 1980s.

Throughout most of the 1980s the Frankfurt Area Office led other area 

offices in construction placement, with a full range of projects for V Corps 

military communities. In 1986 Frankfurt had as much work as several of 

the other area offices combined, but by the late 1980s its workload had 

decreased to $60 million annually.

In 1984 the Stuttgart Area Office had a relatively small staff of between 

twenty-eight and thirty-two people, some of whom worked in the area 

office and others in the Augsburg Resident Office. In the next four years 

construction placement jumped from around $24 million to $60 million 

annually, and Stuttgart opened a resident office in Garmisch. In 1989, 

when work in the Heidelberg area declined, that area office was downgraded to a resident office and put under the Stuttgart Area Office.

In the 1980s as much as 80 percent of the Kaiserslautern Area Office 

workload was for the Air Force. With resident offices in Bitburg and 

Hahn, this office served six air bases—Ramstein, Sembach, Zweibrücken, 

Spangdahlem, Hahn, and Bitburg—as well as Army installations in 

Kaiserslautern, Pirmasens, Worms, and Zweibrücken. In 1984 the 

Kaiserslautern Area Office’s construction placement was $36 million; in 

Table 10

Construction Placement 

by Area Office 

Fiscal Years 1979 and 1980

 Fiscal Year Fiscal Year

Area 1979 1980 Office ($ million) ($ million)

Northern $36.6 $32.1 

Central 38.3 58.5 

Southwest 25.8 48.5 

Southern 61.5 60.5 

Mediterranean 8.8 8.2 
263

Managing Design and Construction

1987 that amount more than doubled. In 1989 construction placement 

topped $100 million.

The Nuremberg Area Office’s major customers were the 1st Armored 

Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Seventh Army Training Center, 

and Department of Defense Dependent Schools. (See Map 20.) This office 

handled the programs to upgrade the firing ranges in Grafenwöhr and 

construction at the training areas of Hohenfels and Vilseck. In 1985 construction placement was $68 million; in 1986 it was $85 million; and by 

1989 it had risen to over $100 million. Staff increased from thirty-eight 

in 1985 to eighty in 1989. To manage this construction, the area office 

was organized with resident offices in Nuremberg and Vilseck and project offices in Ansbach, Nuremberg, Bamberg, Grafenwöhr, Vilseck, and 

Hohenfels.63

The EUD office in Würzburg supported the 3d Infantry Division 

and all of its subelements. The office also handled construction projects 

associated with the Wildflecken Training Area and supported an airfield 

in Giebelstadt. In 1980 EUD upgraded Würzburg from a resident to an 

area office. The Würzburg office had eleven staff members; the number 

increased to twenty-three by 1982 and continued to rise until 1990. EUD 

also established resident offices in Schweinfurt and Würzburg and project 

offices in Wildflecken and Aschaffenburg.

The Northern Area Office, the only area office to retain its geographic 

name after the reorganization of 1980, continued through the 1980s to 

The Nuremberg Area Office supervised the construction of Pinden Barracks 

in Nuremberg, Germany.
264

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

Bamberg

Grafenwöhr

Vilseck

Nuremberg

Ansbach

Hohenfels

A U S T R I A S W I T Z E R L A N D

C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

W E S T G E R M A N Y

E A S T

G E R M A N Y

Elbe R

Main R

Danube R

Isar R

Leipzig

Munich

Stuttgart

Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Kassel

Erfurt

Dresden

Pilsen

NUREMBERG AREA

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1980s

Area Office Boundary (approximate)

Area Office Headquarters

Resident and Project Office

Project Office

0

0 50 Miles

50 Kilometers

100

100

serve air bases in the Benelux countries. When the Ground Launched 

Cruise Missile program was introduced, construction was extended to air 

bases in Florennes, Belgium, and Woensdrecht, Netherlands; in 1986 resiMap 20
265

Managing Design and Construction

dent offices were established at both bases. The volume of work for fiscal 

year 1987, $79 million in construction placement, was 172 percent higher 

than the workload for fiscal year 1986.64 In 1988 the Rheinberg Resident 

Office opened, and a project office for the Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Powers Europe, opened in February 1989. In the late 1980s the Northern 

Area Office extended its territory when the Navy asked EUD to oversee 

construction of two NATO-funded contingency hospitals in northern 

Norway. Norway would not allow EUD to establish an office near the 

construction, so Northern Area Office personnel handled the projects 

from Hoensbroek on temporary duty assignments.65

In Turkey, the construction program that began with a single contract in 1980 grew rapidly as the Army, Air Force, and NATO sought to 

improve living and working conditions for soldiers and airmen and to 

strengthen Turkey’s ties to North Atlantic defense. Brig. Gen. James W. 

Ray, the commander of the Europe Division in the mid 1980s, observed, 

“From the overall perspective of the Europe Division, the construction 

program in Turkey was important, and more important than the amount 

of money would indicate.”66 The construction program in Turkey had four 

components: (1) upgrades of MCA facilities at five remote sites (Erzurum, 

Corlu, Ortakoy, Izmit, and Cakmakli) used by the Army group headquartered outside of Istanbul; (2) construction to improve working and living 

conditions for the Army intelligence command in Sinop on a spit of land 

jutting into the Black Sea; (3) construction for the Air Force at the main 

operating air base of Incirlik near Adana and at a second smaller air base 

The Northern Area Office was responsible for this headquarters building at an 

air base in Florennes, Belgium.
266

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

near Ankara used by airmen assigned to Turkey-U.S. Logistics Command; 

and (4) prefinanced construction for NATO of two air bases, one an 

entirely new base in Mus in eastern Turkey near Lake Van, and the other 

in Batman, a base built under austere NATO standards in the 1950s.67

(Map 21)

Although the Navy assumed responsibility in 1980 as the Department 

of Defense agent for construction in Greece, political turmoil and public 

objections to U.S. bases made it difficult to work on the projects approved 

in the fiscal year 1984 MCA budget. The U.S. European Command asked 

EUD to help, and in the autumn of 1985 William Camblor began new 

negotiations that led to an agreement signed with the Greek government 

in the summer of 1986. Camblor negotiated direct design, but all construction remained indirect.68 In the late 1980s the Greece Resident Office 

monitored work on seven special warehouses under programs designed 

to make stored ammunition secure against theft by terrorists.69

Concerns in the Field

Maintaining continuity of supervision in the field concerned EUD 

leaders. Although lengthy construction projects might have three or 

four American civilian project engineers, the locally hired employees 

(Germans, Turks, Greeks, and others) helped provide continuity. Military 

officers received three-year assignments as area engineers, although 

several serving in the 1980s arranged to stay longer. Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio 

Europe Division construction sites in Turkey included Sinop on the Black Sea.
Map 21













 





Tigris R Euphrates R

Lake

Van

B L A C K S E A

Ortaköy

Çorlu

Çakmaklı

Izmit

Izmir

Bandırma

Balıkesir

Cumaovasi

Karatas ̨

Afyon

Eskis ̨ehir Ankara

Merzifon

Sinop

Erzincan

Incirlik

Kayseri

Diyarbakır

Batman

Mus ̨

Erzurum

Sevastopol' BUCHAREST

Burgas

Istanbul

Köseköy

Denizli Konya

ANKARA

Trabzon

Gaziantep

Tbilisi

Adana

S Y R I A

I R A Q

I R A N

U N I O N O F

S O V I E T S O C I A L I S T

R E P U B L I C S

B U L G A R I A

R O M A N I A

G R E E C E

C Y P R U S

TURKEY

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1980s

Area Office HeadquartersResident OfficeU.S. Army Base U.S. Air Force BaseNATO Base



0

0

100 200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

300

300
268

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

served as Stuttgart area engineer from 1984 to 1990. Lt. Col. Grosvenor 

“Bud” Fish, Jr., remained in Nuremberg from 1982 to 1992, first as a community director of engineering and housing and then as EUD area engineer. Similarly, Lt. Col. Robert Mentell served as director of engineering 

and housing in Würzburg from 1982 to 1985 and then as area engineer 

from 1985 to 1988. Civilian Robert Rodehaver served in the Frankfurt Area 

Office as deputy from 1974 to 1980 and then as area engineer for more 

than a decade. In area offices where military commanders changed frequently, the civilian deputy provided continuity: Richard Grimm served 

in Turkey from 1982 to 1990; Wayne Lewis worked in Kaiserslautern as 

office engineer from 1975 to 1980 and as deputy from 1982 to 1990; Dave 

Cox was in Stuttgart from 1977 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1991; and Jim 

Mulford stayed in Würzburg from 1981 to 1990.

Headquarters in Frankfurt had trouble keeping in touch with the field 

offices. When EUD took over the Mediterranean area, General Prentiss 

argued in vain for an airplane to give him access to the far-flung territories. Prentiss did not get an aircraft, but his successors did; from 1976 to 

1988 the division had a twin-engine Beechcraft airplane and four pilots. 

The plane greatly facilitated travel for the commanders and program 

managers, particularly to Italy, Greece, Norway, and Turkey. John Blake 

made an effort to visit each area office at least quarterly.

Blake’s visits to Turkey were particularly important because the difficulties the TUSEG staff encountered when communicating with Frankfurt 

Europe Division’s acquisition of an airplane facilitated staff travel to and from the 

division’s far-flung offices. John Blake, Chief of Construction, is at right.
269

Managing Design and Construction

could be overwhelming.70 Military telephone service was uncertain and 

commercial service no better. Computers with modems were installed 

during the mid-1980s, but only when EUD introduced facsimile machines 

in the area office and in each resident and project office in the summer 

of 1989 did communications for the staff in Turkey become satisfactory.71 Veronica Rovero, an engineer who had worked at headquarters in 

Frankfurt before her tour in Turkey, observed that “the fax serves as both 

instant communications and an answering machine, since the one guy in 

the field is usually out of the office. Being able to send a message via fax 

saves making numerous unanswered phone calls.”72

Technology could not, however, change attitudes or alter feelings. 

Overall, the staff in area, resident, and project offices felt removed from 

the activities, tensions, and changes in Frankfurt. For many, work in the 

field meant action, excitement, independence, and satisfaction. But they 

also experienced isolation and, in some instances, hardship conditions.73

Veronica Rovero articulated the feelings of frustration felt by some EUD 

employees in the field: “The Phillips Building is EUD for those people. 

They forget about the people out on the fringes who are struggling, floundering, and doing the best that they can under whatever circumstances.”74

Throughout the organizational changes, fluctuations in funding, and 

turnover of personnel, the mission of the Corps of Engineers in Europe 

remained unchanged. To accomplish its mission, EUD needed people to 

move the projects through design to construction and to monitor contractors in half a dozen languages. The range and array of programs and projects managed by the Europe Division was vast.