SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5597-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CLARENCE WILLIAMS, 

a/k/a CLARENCE EDWARD 

WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted January 12, 2021 – Decided

Before Judges Haas and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 12-03-0728.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Kisha M. Hebbon, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief). 

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Hannah F. Kurt, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 29, 2021
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A-5597-18T4

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from a June 3, 2019 order denying his petition for postconviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

To provide context for our decision, we briefly recount the relevant facts 

and procedural history as detailed in our opinion affirming defendant's sentence: 

At approximately 5:30 p.m. on June 24, 2011, the 

victim, Mr. Vasquez, was at a gas station putting air 

into the rear, driver's side tire of his Infiniti G-35 

automobile. It was a clear, sunny day. The car was 

running and its windows were down. The driver's door 

was "slightly cracked" open. Vasquez's cell phone and 

other personal items were in the car.

Suddenly, Vasquez heard the driver's door close, 

and he stood up to see what was happening. The car 

"accelerated" away from Vasquez, but then "spun right 

in front of [him, and began] coming straight in [his] 

direction, coming quick." Because the car was coming 

at him, Vasquez testified that he "got a good look" at 

the driver . . . . 

As the car approached him, Vasquez stuck his 

hand in the driver's side window and held onto the car. 

The car continued to accelerate. Vasquez attempted to

grab the man's face in order to take control of the 

car . . . . However, he testified that, after he grabbed 

hold of the car, he "was most focused on the cars 

coming [his] way at like [sixty, seventy] miles an hour."

Vasquez estimated that his car was going eighty 

miles an hour. His right leg was in the air, while his 
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left leg dragged on the ground. Vasquez stated that he 

"was dragged about [forty, forty-five] yards onto the 

street." Once he saw traffic coming at him, Vasquez 

stated that he "decided to jump off the vehicle."

. . . .

At trial, Vasquez . . . identified defendant as his 

assailant in court before the jury. In addition to 

Vasquez's identification, the State presented DNA 

evidence linking defendant to the offense. On June 29, 

2011, the police located Vasquez's car on the side of a 

road, approximately two miles from defendant's house.

It had no tires or rims, and Vasquez's phone and 

personal effects were missing.

The police searched the car and found, among 

other things, a soda bottle and a partially-smoked 

cigarette. The police contacted Vasquez, who 

confirmed that these items did not belong to him. The 

police took DNA samples from the two items and sent 

them to the State Police DNA lab. The lab reported that 

the samples taken from the soda bottle and cigarette 

matched a known DNA sample from defendant that was 

already in the State's DNA database. Based upon this 

"investigative lead," a detective put together the photo 

array which was shown to Vasquez at his home by a 

second detective who was not involved in the 

investigation.

After Vasquez identified defendant, the police 

arrested him. In June 2012, a detective took a buccal 

swab from defendant during a court appearance in order 

to collect his DNA. The State Police DNA lab 

concluded that the DNA from defendant's buccal swab 

matched the DNA found on the soda bottle and the 

cigarette.
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Defendant did not testify at trial and did not call 

any witnesses.

[State v. Williams, No. A-5725-13 (App. Div. Apr. 1, 

2016) (slip op. 3-9).]

The jury convicted defendant of first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-

2. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison with an 85% period 

of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On 

direct appeal, defendant argued the in- and out-of-court identifications of 

defendant were unreliable and that his sentence was excessive. We rejected 

these arguments and the Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Williams, 

227 N.J. 133 (2016).

Defendant filed a timely PCR petition and brief in which he alleged, 

among other things, that the trial court should have, sua sponte, given a crossracial identification jury charge and that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to "present . . . [his] material witness," or argue unspecified mitigating 

factors that the victim did not suffer life threatening injuries. Appointed counsel 

filed an amended petition and brief alleging "trial counsel failed to conduct an 

adequate investigation" or "file[] a motion to suppress the DNA evidence" and 

appellate counsel "fail[ed] to argue that the evidence was insufficient to convict 

defendant of car[]jacking." 
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Judge Michael L. Ravin issued a June 3, 2019 order and corresponding 

opinion in which he concluded that defendant failed to establish a prima facie 

case that either his trial or appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 

The judge accordingly denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary 

hearing.

Judge Ravin concluded the trial evidence supported the carjacking 

conviction as the victim's leg injuries "w[ere] sufficient for the jury to find that 

[defendant] inflicted bodily injury or used force on the victim, or knowingly put 

the victim in fear of immediate bodily injury while [defendant] was taking the 

vehicle." Additionally, the judge explained any potential issue with the in-court

identification was already addressed by the trial court at defendant's 

unsuccessful Wade hearing.1

Judge Ravin also noted, contrary to defendant's contentions, that the trial 

court issued a cross-racial identification jury instruction. In addition, the judge 

explained that trial counsel argued for mitigating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(2) ("The defendant did not contemplate that the defendant’s conduct would 

1

 A Wade hearing is conducted for the purpose of determining whether an outof-court identification was made in unduly suggestive circumstances and, if so, 

whether or not any ensuing in-court identification procedure would be fatally 

tainted thereby. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 238 (2011); see United States 

v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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cause or threaten serious harm . . . ."). Further, Judge Ravin found defendant 

"d[id] not specify what investigatory steps he believe[d] trial counsel should 

have taken" or "who [the favorable] witness is, or what the witness would have 

testified to." Finally, the judge concluded defendant "failed to articulate any 

basis" upon which trial counsel could have challenged the admissibility of the 

DNA evidence.

Judge Ravin characterized defendant's claim that his appellate counsel's 

performance was constitutionally deficient as "meritless" because "there was 

sufficient evidence in the record to show that [defendant] stole the victim's car 

and caused him injury while doing so and also knowingly put the victim in fear 

of immediate bodily injury." 

Before us, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING 

HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO 

DETERMINE THE MERITS OF HIS CONTENTION 

THAT HE WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO THE 

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL AND 

APPELLATE COUNSEL.

A. [THE PEVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES 

REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY 

HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR POST 

CONVICTION RELIEF.
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B. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

LEGAL REPRESENTATION BY VIRTUE OF 

HIS FAILURE TO THOROUGHLY 

INVESTIGATE ALL POSSIBLE DEFENSES 

AND TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR 

TRIAL.

C. APPELLATE COUNSEL RENDERED 

INEFFECTIVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION 

BY VIRTUE OF HIS FAILURE TO ARGUE 

THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 

TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF 

CARJACKING.

D. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLTED TO A REMAND 

TO THE TRIAL COURT TO AFFORD HIM AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO DETERMINE 

THE MERITS OF HIS CONTENTION THAT 

HE WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE 

COUNSEL.]

We disagree with defendant's arguments and affirm substantially for the 

reasons stated by Judge Ravin in his written decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We offer 

the following additional comments.

II.

"[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may 

exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn 

from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 

(App. Div. 2014) (citation omitted). We review a PCR court's legal conclusions 
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de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004) (citing Toll Bros., Inc. v. 

Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)).

"Post-conviction relief is neither a substitute for direct appeal, R. 3:22-3, 

nor an opportunity to relitigate cases already decided on the merits, R. 3:22-5." 

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992) (citations omitted). A defendant 

raises a cognizable PCR claim if it is based upon a "[s]ubstantial denial in the 

conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the 

United States or the [c]onstitution or laws of the State of New Jersey." R. 3:22-

2(a). Because all criminal defendants have the constitutional right to the 

assistance of counsel in their defense, defendants may bring a PCR claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, para. 

10. 

A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part test 

pronounced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and State v. Fritz, 

105 N.J. 42 (1987), by demonstrating that "counsel's performance was 

deficient," that is, "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. This test extends to appellate 

counsel as well. State v. Loftin, 191 N.J. 172, 197-98 (2007).
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The first prong requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A 

defendant, however, must overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered 

reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. "The test is not whether defense 

counsel could have done better, but whether he met the constitutional threshold 

for effectiveness." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013). Further, the failure 

to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688. 

Under the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's 

errors prejudiced the defense such as to deprive defendant of a fair and reliable 

outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To prove this element, a defendant must 

demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 

Moreover, a defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing by simply raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) (citing Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462). An evidentiary 

hearing is required only when: 1) a defendant establishes a prima facie case in 

support of PCR, 2) the court determines there are disputed issues of material 
10 A-5597-18T4

fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record, and 3) the court 

determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted. 

State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10). 

"A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a 

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light 

most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Id. at 

355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). In other words, there are "material issues of 

disputed fact which cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record." 

State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998). Mere bald assertions 

are insufficient. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170; see also State v. Marshall, 

148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (holding "an evidentiary hearing need not be granted" 

if "the defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative"

(citations omitted)). 

Defendant argues that he established a prima facie claim that his trial and 

appellate counsels' performance were constitutionally ineffective because trial 

counsel "failed to conduct an adequate investigation and failed to file a motion 

to suppress the DNA evidence" and because appellate counsel "fail[ed] to argue 
11 A-5597-18T4

that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of carjacking." 2 We 

disagree as defendant's arguments are factually unsupported by the record and 

legally meritless. 

Here, defendant has failed to establish that either his trial or appellate 

counsels' performance was constitutionally defective, or that he suffered any 

resulting prejudice. In bare and conclusory fashion, defendant contends a more 

"thorough investigation" from trial counsel would have resulted in him being 

"acquitted at trial." As Judge Ravin correctly explained, defendant failed to 

identify what a more thorough investigation would have uncovered or what

specifically any "potential witnesses" would testify about. Similarly, defendant 

offers no support for his conclusory assertion that trial counsel should have 

"file[d] a motion to suppress the DNA evidence." He fails to detail the factual 

or legal basis for any challenge and how the failure to file such a motion 

prejudiced him. See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007) ("It is not 

2 On appeal, defendant does not challenge the following arguments addressed 

by the PCR court: 1) that the trial court should have sua sponte provided a crossracial identification jury charge and 2) that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to argue unspecified mitigating factors that the victim did not suffer life 

threatening injuries. As defendant has failed to brief these issues, they are 

deemed waived. See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. 

Div. 2011) (citations omitted). We have nevertheless considered the substance 

of these contentions and conclude they are without merit for the reasons 

expressed by Judge Ravin.
12 A-5597-18T4

ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless 

motion."). 

As the judge noted, the record before the jury was sufficient to convict 

defendant on carjacking as the victim identified defendant in court as the 

perpetrator who stole his car, defendant's DNA was found in the car, and the 

victim suffered leg injuries. See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1) (stating a person is 

guilty of carjacking "if in the course of committing an unlawful taking of a motor 

vehicle . . . he . . . inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon an occupant or person 

in possession or control of a motor vehicle"). There was therefore no basis to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the carjacking conviction 

on appeal and in this regard appellate counsel is not required to "advance any 

grounds insisted upon by defendant." State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 515 

(App. Div. 2007) (quoting R. 3:22-6(d)); see also Worlock, 117 N.J. at 625. 

Because we agree with Judge Ravin that defendant did not establish a 

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we likewise conclude he 

did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary 

hearing. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. To the extent we have not addressed 

any of defendant's arguments it is because we have concluded that they are 
13 A-5597-18T4

without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.