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~PRING 1974 
THE: E:NGINE:E:R
 

\JOLUME 4 NUMBER 1 )PRING 1974
 

FE~TURE)

2 Pipeline/News Items
 

4 Austerity Faces Engineers/MAJ Douglas K. Lehmann
 

8 Geology And The Corps/
 

CPT John J. Connor 

CPT Kevin J. Mahoney 

14 Beating Murphy/s Law/CPT Guy E. Miller 

16 Man: Key To Countermine Warfare/ 

CPT Richard Kanda 

19 Soviet River Crossing Tactics/CPT Richard E. Ashby 

22 It Was A Gallant Work/MAJ Alfred H. McDonald 

27 Guardians Of The Past/CPT John R. Mullin 

30 Troop Training/CPT Leonard J. Jagoda 

32 An Engineer In The Black Hills/ 

Eugene V. McAndrews 

38 Swords Into Plowshares/CPT James L. Keener 

39	 CESPR: First Ever/ 

CPT Walter J. Wells 

CPT James L. Campbell 

42 When The Cold Wind Doth Blow/ 

CPT Thomas J. Quigley 

44 Bridging The Gap/Career Notes 

DEPARTMENT)
 

Chief/s Briefs	 Pipeline Bridgi ng The Gap
 

,
 
Alexander Macomb, the U. S. Army's ninth Chief Engineer, 

was born April 3, 1782, in Detroit, Michigan. 

He entered the Army as Cornet of Cavalry in 1799 and was 

appointed as a second lieutenant in the Infantry in 1801. He was 

promoted to first lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers in 1802 and 

rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in eight years - 1810. In 

S12 Macomb became the Adjutant General of the U. S. Army and 

colonel in th e 3rd Artillery. 

Later, as a Brigadier General, he commanded the Lake 

Champlain Frontier Army and defeated the Duke of Wellington's 

Veterans at Plattsburg, N. Y. in 1814. The Congress voted its 

thanks to Macomb, awarded him a Gold Medal for his leadership 

and shortly after breveted him a Major General. 

In the reorganized Army, constituted by the act of March 1821, 

Maj Gen Macomb was appointed Colonel in the Corps of Engineers 

and named Chief Engineer in that same year. It was during his 

tenure as Chief of the Engineers that the birth of civil functions 

took place as part of the many other jobs undertaken by the 

military engineers. The act of April 1824 assigned civil functions 

to the Engineers to procure the necessary surveys, plans and 

estimates upon the subjects of roads and canals. 

On May 24, 1828, General Macomb relinquished command of 

the Corps of Engineers to become General-in-Chief of the Army as 

major gen eral. 

Wearers of the Engineer insignia may be intrigued to learn 

that Macomb made the earliest known drawing to resemble the 

Engineer Button in 1807. 

It also is interesting to note that Macomb was the Army's 

General-in-Chief when the castle insignia was designed 32 years 

later. 

Macomb died on June 25, 1841, at Washington and was buried 

with the highest military honors in the Congressional Cemetery. 
\

. 

·PIPELINE.PIR 

FAIR BOOSTS 

ENLISTMENTS 

FOR RESERVES 

"Popcorn, Peanuts, Crackerjacks - Try the Elephant Ride 

- Three darts for a Quarter, 

Everyone a winner! - Join 

the Army Reserve." 

Sure enough, on the Midway 

of the Mid-South Fa ir in Memphis, Tennessee, wedged between an eating stand and an 

elephant ride, was an Army 

Reserve Recruiting Booth. 

"We go where the people are. 

If we wa it for them to come to 

us, we're not doing our job," 

was First Sergeant Rick 

Keene's explanation of t he in ­

congruous loca t ion of the 467th 

Engineer Batta lion's Recruiting Booth. "If I were sitting in 

the USAR center I wouldn't 

have a chance to talk to the 50 

or 60 people a day that I' m 

averaging here." 

Sergeant Keene's feelings 

were echoed by Ma jor Rona Id 

Slayton, who was also assisting 

the recruiting effort. A fulltime technician with the unit, 

Slay ton expla ined, "In the 

467th, recruiting is everybody 'S business . We're all 

ready to come out to the Fa ir 

or any other gathering to tell 

the Army Reserve story." 

The story must be well told if 

recruiting f igur es are any indication. Since its formal activation in November, 1971, the 

Memphis based Combat Engineer Batta lion, part of the 

Army Reserve's 412th Engineer Command, Vicksburg, 

M iss., has reached 85 percent 

authorized strength . This 

means that in less than two 

years, the unit has recru ited 

600 personnel. 

First Sergeant Keene, a full- · 

time recruiting technician for 

the Army Reserve, led the 

crew at the fair and insured 

that the recruiting booth was 

ma nned as long as the Midway 

was open . This meant many 14 

and 15 hour days for the recruiters of the 467th, and for 

the personnel manning the 

other recruiting booths. For, 

in addition to the Army Reserve, the National Guard 

(Army and Air), Navy, Navy 

Reserve, Marines, Marine Reserve and Active Army were 

a II represented on the Midway. 

When questioned about the 

competition, Chief Warrant Off icer Bobbie Coleman, full-time 

Staff Ass ista nt with the 467th 

replied, " The more recruiters 

there a re the better the bus iness is. We refer young men 

a nd women to other bra nches 

and other units if we see that 

they have experience in areas 

that we can't use and where 

t hey desire to work . Likewise, 

we receive referra Is f rom the 

other recruiters when they find 

out that someone wants to be in 

an Engineer unit. Don't get 

me wrong. We don 't give up 

anyone without trying to sell 

the benefits of our program, 

but we do keep the individual 's 

interests at heart." 

First Sergeant Keene secconded Chief Coleman's motion 

for fairness. He said, "If we 

don' t do what's right for an 

individua I he's going to be unhappy . If he's unhappy w ith 

our unit and his job he's going 

to be a negative influencer and 

hurt mora Ie and retention. We 

know that we're fighting for 

numbers, but we have the full 

backing of everyone from our 

batta lion commander to GenAll prospects receive equal attention but 

som e receive more attention than others. 

First Sergeant Rick Keen e tells Jean 

Davis about th e.ben ef its of Armv Reserve 

service. 

era l Hamner (412th Engr Bde 

Cdr), in seeking quality. To us 

doing the recruiting, quality 

sta rts with satisfied individua Is. This may sound stran 

coming from a recruiter, b 

we've been successful and au 

recru iting figures speak for 

themselves." 

Major Slayton added, " It's 

like this Fair duty . We talk to 

a lot of young kids and to a lot 

of young women. They may 

not be ready to jo in our unit, 

but they do have older brothers 

a nd boyfriends. If they see us 

out here, meet us, ta lk to us 

and find out that we have their 

interest at heart, and that we 

won't pressure them into signing, we make friends, and cultivate future prospects . We're 

recruiting for the long hau l, not 

to fill up with anyone who can 

see lightning, hear thunder and 

eat jello." 

The week -long fai r gave the 

Reservists a chance to display 

their equipment and tell their 

story to many prior servicemen and to those with no ser . 

ice experience. 

2 
LINE.PIPELINE.
 

The results may be meaured 

in enlistments, a prospect list 

or the broader good extolled by 

all three of the men interviewed; the chance for the 

Reserve to tell its story and 

show itself to the public in a 

positive manner. 

By any standard the operat ion should be labeled success ­

fu I. 

CRREL SCIENTISTS 

MAKE GOOD USE 

OF SKYLAB PHOTOS 

The Sky lab crew took photos 

of the Connecticut River and 

Merrimack River basins in 

1973 as part of a study conducted by the U. S. Army Cold 

Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory and the 

England Division of the 

( my Corps of Engineers. 

The photographs taken by 

Skylab wil l be used to study the 

flood plain, vegetation distribution and land use of the two 

river basins. 

Information obtained will be 

used to characterize the environmenta I factors which are 

critical to the New England 

Reservoir System . Based on 

the imagery, flood plain, vegetation and land use maps will 

be developed for selected 

watershed areas . In conjunction wi th the Skylab photographs images will be obtained 

by aircraft flying at 3,000 and 

5,000 feet. Correlation will be 

made w ith Earth Resources 

Technology Satellite imagery 

taken during the same period. 

Ground level information 

will be obtained from 25 automatic data platforms throughNew England which are 

erated by the New England 

Division. These platforms, 

which transmit their information through the Earth Resources Technology Satellite 

twice da ily, give data on river 

stage, precipitation and tem ­

perature. 

LIGHT NAMED 

TECH DIRECTOR 

AT DMS 

Dona Id L. Light has been 

named Technical Director for 

the Defense Mapping School 

(DMS), according to an announcement made by Lieutenant General HowardW. Penney, 

Director of the Defense Mapping Agency. 

At the present time, Mr. 

Light is attending the Naval 

War College, Newport, R.I., 

and will assume his new duties 

upon graduation in June of 

1974. Prior to leaving for the 

War College, Mr. Light had 

been detailed to DMS. At that 

time his specific task was establishing top level technical 

and professional positions 

needed for development and 

execution of an improved mapping, charting and geodesy 

curriculum. Additionally, he 

has formulated a broad guidance on the probable impact of 

technology on the DMS curriculum. 

Mr. Light, prior to his new 

appointment, served with the 

Defense Mapping Agency 

Topographic Center (DMATC), 

Washington, D. C. Before that 

he was with the U.S. Army 

Topographic Command from 

1966 until it was incorporated 

into the Defense Mapping 

Agency in 1972. 

He is a graduate of George 

Washington University, with a 

B.S. in Geodetic Science, and 

has attended courses at the 

University of Illinois, and 

UCLA, in CaIifornia. 

ENGINEER DINNER
 

DATE SET
 

This year marks the 107th 

Anniversary of the traditional 

Annual Engineer Dinner. The 

event will take place at 6:30 

pm , April 26, 1974, at Mackenzie 

Hall, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 

The theme for this years dinner is " T H E CORPS-SUPPORTING THE ARMY AND 

SERVING THE NATION." 

Request for reservations 

must be made not later than 

April 15, 1974 by writing to The 

107th Annual Engineer Dinner, 

Post Office Box 107, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060 or call ing 

Fort Belvoir 664-3939 (Autovon 

354-3939) 

3 
,
 

4 
reduction. It is austerity within individual TOE. 

Less known now, it will become obvious and 

remain with us long after the initial force reductions have been made. 

Austerity is being ushered in by development 

.. d publication of the Il-series TOE from the 

curr ent G-series TOE. The full impact will be felt 

as units are required to submit MTOE based on 

these new H-series TOE. These conversions have 

started. After being reorganized under an 

H-series TOE, organization austerity will no longer 

be obscure, but a keyword of the Seventies. For 

example, the H-series TOE was published in 

November 1970. for the Engineer Battalion in the 

Infantry and Armor/Mechanized Infantry Division 

and the Engineer Company organic to each of the 

five type separate brigades. 

of the two battalions were: 

The strength changes 

G-Series H-Series 

Engr Bn, Armd/lnf 

Mech Div, 

TOE 5-145 

Engr Bn, Inf Div, 

TOE 5-155 988/990 

1017/1019 

776/793 

984/1001 

(The two strengths within each series depend on 

the bridging version authorized - either MAB or 

M4T6). 

Before examining other TOE facts of austerity. 

. is important to understand the basic philosophy 

out the current austerity program. Austerity is 

not new and has been prominent at the end of 

every wartime mobilization period. What makes 

organization austerity unique for the Seventies is 

its interaction with the Volunteer Army concept. 

Each concept had separate origins, but now shares 

branches of the same tree. The underlying drive 

behind the Volunteer Army is improving significantly the quality and professionalism of the 

Army. 

The new TOE austerity is geared to reducing 

the number of positions and specialties requiring 

unique training. knowledge and experience. This 

results in organizations with only the personnel 

needed to accomplish the mission and stated 

capabilities. It can only be done with quality 

personnel who have increased opportunities. challenges and satisfactions. When the latter is 

obtained, Volunteer Army goals are complimented 

as service is more attractive beyond initial obligations. A "grassroots" explanation might be 

easier to understand. 

The Volunteer Army concept removes service 

irritants and "make-work" details to provide 

meaningful training and duty. The TOE previously 

sorbed this non-productive effort. Any effort 

at cannot be transferred from non-productive time to productive time (which includes 

dynamic training) is organizational "fat" and must 

be trimmed. This is the why of TOE austerity. In 

order to work, it must have full support of the 

Army's leadership in concert with the goals of the 

Volunteer Army concept. 

What is the methodology of TOE austerity? 

The traditional peacetime method is to organize 

under reduced strength levels of two (90%) or 

three (80%). The H-series divisional TOE have 

been carefully tailored in level two for realistic 

reduction and reflect actual experience. 

The H-series has inaugurated the use of placing 

in augmentation paragraphs entire capabilities 

completely divorced from Levels 1, 2 and 3 of the 

basic TOE. These paragraphs are designed only 

for wartime use or special MTOE applications. 

TOE 5-115H. Engineer Construction Battalion 

should see the entire second shift construction 

capability placed in augmentation. Variation 30, 

TOE 5-148H Bridge Company. Engineer Battalion 

already has the 3rd crewman of each MAB unit in 

augmentation. Certain individual positions are 

also being removed from all H-series TOE and 

placed in augmentation paragraphs. Unless your 

unit receives DA approval to use augmentation 

paragraphs, you will no longer have: 

•	 Cooks Helper, E-3, MOS 94AI0 m Company Mess Sections. 

•	 Chemical Staff NCO, E-6, MOS 54E40. in 

Battalion Operation Sections. 

Additionally the Unit Supply Technician, WO, 

MOS 761AO in Battalion Supply Sections has been 

placed in augmentation and will no longer be 

authorized when the Division Logistics System 

(DLOGS) has been implemented. This system 

removes the property book from battalion and 

consolidates it at division level. 

Another aspect of TOE austerity directly 

attacks the organizational "fat" previously mentioned. The best example of this can be shown in 

the communication personnel authorized a line 

company. The H-series are standardized at no 

more than three or four men. usually a "commo" 

chief, radio mechanic, and wireman. The company 

radio NCS and switchboard must be co-located and 

24-hour operation forces all personnel to hold 8 to 

12-hour shifts with no room for non-productive 

time. The G-series engineer TOE are in the 

process of being updated to authorize no more than 

four or five "comrno" personnel. In those units 

where only one or two commo personnel are 

authorized, the commander must seriously question the requirement for 24-hour operation or 

devise an alternate arrangement utilizing other CP 

personnel. 

5 
What is on the drawing board? The following 

list does not represent approved doctrine but 

indicates vividly the trend for future austerity ­

• The development of a light (10,000 man). 

heavy (12.000 man) and experimental divisi 

(similar to TRICAP). The first two envision 

engineer battalion with no organic bridging 00 

cated at Corps) or ADM (located at Brigade) and a 

strength as low as 425-532 men. The latter's 

forerunner is being evaluated at Fort Hood, Texas. 

This is the most versatile and complex division 

ever fielded. Yet its engineer battalion of 844 men 

is 140-175 below the strength of its counterpart in 

the Armored Division. The battalion is organized 

under TOE 5-185T (Tentative) with two of its four 

line companies converted from armored to airmobile under TOE 5-227T. These three divisions 

would replace the current six - Armored. Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, Airborne. Airmobile 

and TRICAP. 

• The development of an engineer equipment 

support company. This will revise TOE 5-58G to 

include an airmobile equipment platoon and a 20 

ton dump truck platoon to replace 

two of the 

existing three equipment platoons. This would 

delete the normal requirement for a (5 ton) Dump 

Truck Company in a type Corps. The result in a 

type Corps would increase capability and decrease 

strength by 194 (2 companies). 

• The development of a new panel bridge 

company. This/envisions replacing the curre 

Bailey Bridge .with the British inspired Mediu 

Girder Bridge. When developed, and compan 

with two or three sets, each 100 feet long, would 

replace two existing Panel Bridge Companies, TOE 

5-77. In a type Field Army this would save 375 

personnel spaces (3 companies). 

How can you help to see that austerity 

measures are properly identified in TOE? First an 

understanding of the TOE/MTOE system is re ­

quired. The basic structure is only modified to 

achieve a quality product incorporating restraints 

and additional austerity measures as appropriate. 

Since 100 percent of Army units are organized 

under an MTOE, how do TOE changes affect the 

Army in the field? The answer lies in the 

TOE/MTOE relationship. TOE are developed 

under a concept which visualizes wartime employ

­

ment of a unit anywhere in the world. MTOE may 

be used during wartime or peacetime situations for 

adaptation to a specific geographical area of the 

world or to meet special missions or operational 

requirements. About 10 percent of MTOE are the 

same as the basic TOE; the other 90 percent, while 

different, must follow line by line the format of the 

basic TOE. MTOE increases and decreases must 

be documented, justified and forwarded to t 

Department of Army. The impact of the basie 

6 
TOE is therefore considerable since changes are 

few in number for most units. 

Supplementary information in this article 

shows examples of constraining regulations of the 

OE/MTOE system. In brief, personnel authorizaons are based upon AR 570-2 and operational 

requirements. Grades for all personnel are found 

in the AR 611 series. Equipment requirements are 

based upon AR 310-34, basis of issue plans (BOIP) 

and operational needs. BOIP are not available at 

unit level. 

Certain equipment is not shown as required in 

'rOE. For example, expendable equipment is 

generally not included and is found in SB 700-50, 

Expendable Items (Except Medical, Class V, Repair Parts and Heraldic Items) and SB 8-100, Army 

Medical Department Expendable Supplies. Common Tables of Allowances (CTA) authorize certain 

other types of equipment your unit would need. 

For example, CTA 50-914, authorizes Individual 

Safet y and Protective Clothing and Equipment. 

This CTA is the authorization to get your wireman 

or electrician a set of tree and pole climber s. 

Likewise, AR 840-10, Description and Us e of Flags, 

Guidons, Tabords and Automobile Plates authorizes your unit guidon. 

These documents are all listed in Section I of 

your TOE. MTOE documents will not r epeat 

information in Section I, but will list significant 

changes from the basic TOE. Both documents are 

equired to get a clear picture of the mission and 

pabilities of your organization. 

Army Regulation AR 310-31, Management System for Tables of Organization and Equipment (the 

TOE System) gives general guidance on all other 

areas of the TOE. This includes the provision that 

suggestions for changes be submitted through 

command channels. An "ad" in Section I of the 

TOE extends this pr erogative. 

People who work with TOE are receiving 

suggestions on improvements that add people and 

equipment. This information is required but of an 

equal need is information on what is not needed. 

What equipment or skill can be removed and 

pooled at the higher he adquarters TOE? Where 

are over trained personnel functioning in positions 

in which less skilled personnel would suffice? What 

positions and equipment can we simply do without? 

If the TOE developer doesn't get this information, austerity will force deletions based on the 

best information available from only a few field 

users. A requirement that MTOE developers 

usually must follow is useful knowledge for all. All 

MTOE additions r equire an equal number of 

deletions. Trade offs are the name of the game at 

A. For example, if your unit has the PLL Clerk 

augmentation, and it is not augmented, you can 

still place the PLL Clerk in the basic table if you 

can identify another position for deletion, such as 

the dispatcher. 

Suggestions should be based on the knowledge 

that the TOE reflects only the normal mission of 

the unit. Regulations require that only minimum 

essential personnel and equipment be authorized. 

Where personnel changes must result in the same 

or lower strengths, equipment changes also should 

be less expensive. TOE's must be cost effective. 

An example is TOE 5-77H which is now approved 

to delete 19, five-man', Cook Sets w/Stove while 

adding only one, 70-man Cooking Outfit at a 

savings of $84. (Prices of equipment can be found 

in SB 700-20, Army Adopted/Other Selected Item 

and List of Reportable Items). Nor does the TOE 

have to be self-sufficient. 

Each new H-series TOE places more dependency upon other units for certain capabilities. For 

example, TOE 5-157G, Engineer Combat Company 

is being changed to show tracked vehicle organization maintenance dependency upon TOE 5-156G, 

HHe, Engineer Battalion, Infantry Division. Recently TOE 5-77H, Engineer Panel Bridge Company, was reduced by 25 spaces since its normal 

mission requires other Engineer units to erect the 

Bailey Bridge. 

Austerity in Engineer Organizations will be the 

keyword for TOE development of the Seventies. 

General Lesley J. McNair (1883-1944), an organizational genius, demanded that all units be functional 

without excess personnel or materiel, and he 

questioned ever ything that went into a TOE. The 

same is tr ue today and the Volunteer Army 

concept is embodied in the same terminology of 

General McNair's time where he strived for "lean 

and mean" organizations. 

The Engineer has always been challenged to 

use manpower and equipment resources efficiently. He must now do so with even more austere 

forces than before, using basic management principles that demand no undo strain on a soldier's 

time as a part of "Today's "NEW" Army." 

Major Douglas K . Lehmann holds a BS degree 

in For estry from Syracuse University and a MSA 

degree in Systems Manag ement from George 

Washington University. He has been a Company 

Commander in the 97th Engineer Battalion (Construction), Germany and 26th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat), Vietnam. He also has held additional 

staff positions in the 8th Engineer Battalion (Combat), Korea, 9ist Engineer Battalion (Combat), Ft. 

Belvoir, and 32nd Engine er Group (Construction), 

France and Ft . Hood. Since 1969, the major has 

held succes sive assignments at Ft. Belvoir of 

EOAC student; Office of the Director of Instruction, USAES; "Bootstrap "; and USA cnG. 

7 
8 

GEOLOGY 
"Prepares military geologic maps; 

. . . acts as consultant on . . . 

location and evaluation of natural 

construction materials, . . . water 

supplies, . . . (and) foundation conditions; (and) interprets terrain features and aerial photographs for 

preparation of military intelligence 

reports." 

The use of geology by the U. S. Army under 

combat conditions began in France in 1917 and has 

expanded through three succeeding wars. The 

Corps of Engineers has, however, been involved 

with geology almost from its beginning, spanning 

200 years and millions of miles, from colonial times 

to the space age, from the western frontiers to the 

highlands of the moon. 

One of the first major applications of geology 

within the Corps of Engineers came as a result of a 

$5,000 allocation by Secretary of War John C. 

Calhoun in 1820 for a survey of the Ohio and 

Mississippi Rivers from Louisville to New Orleans. 

Although the primary concern of the expedition 

was steamboat navigation, it also included an 

evaluation of the stratigraphy and geologic formations encountered along the way. Soon another 

expedition set out to survey Michigan and the 

Upper Mississippi. Engineer officers were joined 

civilian scientists, among them a mineralogist, 

enry R. Schoolcraft who documented the rich 

lead deposits of the Upper Mississippi and the vast 

copper reserves of the Lake Superior region. 

Amid this increase in western exploration, a 

separate Corps of Topographical Engineers 

(1838-1863) was formed to survey western rivers, 

locate wagon routes, build roads, and investigate 

geologic resources. The work of Army Engineers, 

including a series of expeditions led by Lieutenant 

George M. Wheeler, greatly increased the knowledge of the geology, zoology, and botony of the 

growing nation. These and other early surveys 

revealed the importance of geology in America's 

future and led to the creation of the United States 

Geological Survey in 1879. 

The construction of the Panama Canal stands as 

perhaps the greatest engineering feat of the past 

century, and geology and the Corps of Engineers 

are two integral elements in that story. Geologic 

considerations were, in fact, very instrumental in 

the selection of the canal's route, and were of great 

significance throughout its construction. 

For years a worldwide debate had raged among 

isthmian canal advocates as to whether to build it 

across Nicaragua or at its ultimate location-across 

anama. International politics effectively resolved 

e argument. But the unstable geologic conditions along the proposed Nicaraguan route were 

also influential. Geologists pointed out that 

Nicaragua was an "active" geologic region and that 

on its eastern coast 169 earth tremors had been 

recorded from January 1901 to April 1904. They 

classified 35 of these tremors as "strong." During 

the same period only 10 movements were recorded 

in Panama; none of them of significant force. Additionally, the Nicaraguan route passed close to an 

active volcano, Ornetepe, which had violently 

erupted as late as 1883. 

Even after the choice of route was made, and 

construction begun, geology was still of prime 

concern to the American engineers in charge. 

Major General George Goethals, Chief Engineer of 

the Isthmian Canal Commission, gave ample treatment to geologic problems in his treatise that was 

published in 1916. 

The most awesome element in the construction 

of the Canal was the excavation of the immense 

CuJebra Cut through the Continental Divide. Officially designated the Gaillard Cut by Executive 

Order in 1915, its eight and one-half mile length 

required 26 years of work and the removal of 100 

million cubic yards of material, mostly solid rock 

that required drilling and blasting. Excavation of 

"The Cut" was plagued by frequent and massive 

rock slides that accounted for nearly 30 percent of 

the material which was removed. In order to solve 

this unanticipated problem, geologists were asked 

to recommend ways of stopping the slides. But 

there were complex geologic conditions which 

required a variety of measures at various locations 

since the slides were the result of four different 

conditions. 

Some slides were caused by saturated clay 

sliding on inclined layers of hard rock, while other 

slides occured where rock was broken by faults. 

Still others were the result of ordinary weathering 

and erosion. A fourth type of slide, called a 

"break," was the result of the weight of overlying 

rock acting on weaker rocks which were exposed 

in the cut far below the surface. This caused banks 

to slide and forced the bottom of the excavation to 

rise. Geologists felt the only way to overcome this 

latter situation was to remove additional material 

from upper levels and check the other slides by 

driving piles through the troublesome material 

into solid ground or by dumping large pieces of 

blasted rock on loose surfaces. 

The first ship passed through the Panama 

Canal on August 3, 1914, six days after Austria's 

declaration of war against Serbia which triggered 

the beginning of World War 1. Less than three 

years later, the United States entered the war, and 

for the first time American geologists were on the 

front lines overseas. At home, geologists were 

busily engaged in finding mineral resources needed 

9 
for the war effort. And overseas, because of the 

very nature of trench warfare, geologic considerations often proved to be a factor. In many cases, 

however, the geologists' efforts were directed 

toward overcoming ignorance and prejudice. 

Few high-ranking officers on either side had an 

adequate conception of the applications of geology 

to military problems and the results of geologic 

investigations were very often ignored. For example, at one point during the Battle of Verdun, 

French troops were ordered to "dig-in" on a 

plateau where less than a foot of soil covered the 

bed rock. The task was impossible and resulted in 

a large and needless loss of life. 

British engineers shipped road aggregate from 

England. even though geologists could have found 

available sources in the theater of operations. 

German troops used water witches to locate well 

points. And right after its arrival in France, the 

American Expeditionary Force used no method at 

all to locate well points. However, because of the 

earlier follies of her Allies. the AEF soon learned 

to pay heed to organized geologic work. A geology 

section comprised of two officers was established 

as a part of the Office of the Chief Engineer of the 

AEF in September 1917. In July 1918, positions 

for geologists were authorized on the staffs of the 

Chief Engineers of each of the Field Armies. and in 

August the section at AEF headquarters was 

increased to six. This brought the total of 

authorized geologist positions to 18, although only 

nine were ever filled at anyone time. 

Major applications of geology in the war 

included the construction of field fortifications. 

trenches and tunnels, and the location of sources of 

water and road aggregate. In the construct ion of 

trenches, knowledge of geologic conditions proved 

to be a vital necessity. The type of material to be 

expected dictated what equipment and how much 

time would be needed if revetments would be 

required and if drainage would present a serious 

problem. Therefore it was of great value to know 

if one would encounter hard rock, impervious 

clays, or sand and gravel. 

In the Moselle Valley a military geologist 

pointed out that bedrock was generally covered by 

just a foot or two of soil. making trench construction impossible except where the so-called Limon 

Formation was found. Therefore this formation 

was marked on tactical maps and used accordingly. 

Knowledge of the depth of the ground water table 

was also important, and when excavations were 

made without due regard for it. flooding often 

resulted. 

Tunnelling was used in World War I to a 

degree never equalled before or since, and in this 

regard, geology again proved most helpful. At the 

battle of Sebastopol, the Allies quickly tunnelled 

10 

through a layer of soft shale after being initially 

slowed in their advance as they began the gallery 

in a layer of tough sandstone. It was by accident 

that the softer layer was discovered because a 

geologic study had not been employed. Such 

study could have avoided the initial waste of ti 

and effort. All along the western front, allie 

geologists identified areas where horizontal sedimentary layers would afford easy tunnelling and 

warned against areas where tough igneous rock 

would form a barrier or where ground water would 

be a problem. 

As the war progressed, the Americans prepared new geologic maps to supplement older 

French and Belgian issues. Some of the maps 

showed only the general geology and the distribution of various types of rocks. Others were 

specifically designed to delineate areas where 

trench construction or tunnelling would be feasible. Befor e the end of the war. the American 

geologists had prepared 1:50,000 scale geologic 

maps of t he entire western front to include much 

territory behind enemy lines. Additionally they 

were called upon to evaluate areas for troop 

movement, determine river bottom and bank 

conditions, fluctuation of stream levels, and for the 

first time, choose routes for advancing tanks (the 

forerunner of the modern trafficability studies). 

They also located urgently needed natural resources such as water and rock for macadam roads. 

The American geologists produced eight special 

maps showing the surface distribution of suitabaJ!.. 

hard rock, the location of existing pits a~~

quarries. as well as potential sources of sand and 

gravel. Due to the limited manpower and the 

broad scope of the task, maps and reports on 

locations of both surface and sub-surface water 

were scant in detail and covered only a portion of 

the theater. However, when possible, the geologists furnished information on the location of 

springs. areas feasible for shallow dug wells, areas 

of deeper sub-surface water, as well as available 

data on stream flow. Their maps also showed 

known wells and reservoirs and included data on 

water supplies developed by local towns. 

By their performance on the western front, the 

geologists of the AEF and the other waring 

nations showed the vital role the knowledge of 

geologic conditions would play in modern warfare. 

Just twenty-three years later when the United 

States once again went to war, American geologists again went with her. A total of 88 of our best 

found themselves working along with soils 

scientists and other specialists in a newly created 

organization. the Military Geology Unit. It was 

formed in June 1942 by a special agreement 

between t he U.S. Geological Survey and the Corps , 

of Engineers. ) 
The complexities and geographic extent of the 

war made such an agency a necessity. It was 

charged among other things with identifying 

terrain suitable for use of armor and with selecting 

sites for new airfields. It was, in short, in the 

business of terrain intelligence. The bulk of the 

unit's work was done from Washington but in 1944 

small teams went overseas and accompanied the 

Army into combat to assist in finding water, siting 

and constructing roads and airfields, and locating 

construction materials. These teams also checked 

the accuracy of predictions made in the rear before 

U.S. forces entered the hostile areas. 

The main product of the unit was a series of 

"Strategic Engineering Studies" consisting of information and maps on rock types, soils, vegetation, water resources, rainfall, and locations of 

possible airstrips, roads, and construction materials. Most of this information came from library 

research and air photo interpretation. Immediate 

attention centered on the Pacific islands for which 

more than 120 studies were prepared. Later 

attention was shifted to North Africa and Europe. 

In addition to the generalized SES's, the unit 

p a very detailed material, including terrain 

iagr ams, trafficability studies, in-depth airfield 

site selection, water supply maps, and construction 

materials maps. 

Terrain diagrams, which give a true-to-life 

perspective of terrain features, were used to guide 

pilots bombing the oil center at Ploesti, Romania. 

Using only ordinary topographic maps, the bombers could not locate the heavily camouflaged 

facilities, but on a second attempt the realistic 

drawings enabled them to locate and destroy the 

site. 

With the increased use of armor, trafficability 

studies became a necessity. Their compilation 

involved geologists, soils engineers, foresters, and 

others. Very often soil characteristics could only 

be approximated because they were based on 

knowledge of geologic conditions. In many respects the unit's work was the same as its World 

War I counterpart but on a greater scale and with 

more sophistication. 

Learning a lesson from two world wars, the 

United States kept on with terrain intelligence 

work after the end of World War II. The Military 

Geology Unit was redesignated the Military 

Geology Branch (MGB) of the U.S. Geological 

Survey and supplied material to the newly formed 

Central Intelligence Agency for inclusion in a new 

series of strategic studies that covered the world. 

11 
These "National Intelligence Summar ies" took 

nearl y 20 years to compl ete . 

The MGB also prepared a series of te rrain 

anal yses of selected militar y reservation s in the 

Continental United States including Forts Benning, Campbell, Hood, and Knox, and an EIS 

covering the Sixth Army Ar ea . Today the MGB is 

concerned with small, specific projects for other 

government agencies that include the Office of the 

Chief of Engineers for which it recently did a study 

on permafrost. 

Th e pioneer work done in the field of t err ain 

intelligence during World War II pr oved to be of 

gr eat value in our recent exper ience in Vietnam. 

The t echniques used at the Combined Intelligence 

Center, in Saigon, were similar to t hose used 25 

year s earlier - a combination of research, photo 

interpretation, and professional judgment. One of 

the severest tests of this system came in the 

pr eparation of te rra in intelligence information to 

suppor t the allied incursion into Cambodia in the 

spri ng of 1970. 

Geologists, several of them memb ers of the 

Corps of Engineers, played a significan t role in this 

historic effort. P erhaps less spectacular, but 

significant, was the day -to-day work of soldiergeologists in the preparation of geologic maps, 

tr afficability studies , and ot her terrain r elat 

items. Terrain Detachments, working out of Lon 

Binh, Nha Trang, and Phu Bai, transferre d geologic 

data from French-made maps of the 1930's to 

1:50,000 scale topographic bases. Geologists from 

th ese units also went to forward areas to help site 

airfields and roads, make observations to aid in 

pr eparing cross-country movement studies, and to 

locat e quarries and borrow pits. 

Again going back to World Was II, durin g the 

Allied invasion of Europe, engineer s were often 

called upon t o "get the water off and th e rocks on." 

But firs t someone had to find those "rocks.' This 

mission of locatin g and expl oiting rock deposits 

more often than not fell to th e soldier-geologist. On 

June 8, 1944, just 48 hours after "D-Day" began , 

an Armore d En gineer Battalion was operating a 

quar ry on Omaha Beach. And 30 days later, other 

Armore d En gineer Battalions were ope rating 

quarries all across western France to pr ovid e the 

mobility required by th e armored spearhead. 

Oper ati ons in the Pacific Theater during that 

peri od placed eve n greater demands on geologists 

because t hey had to locate sufficient construction 

mat erial to support the island-h opping adva nce 

towar d Japan. Conventi onal construction materials were virtually unavailable on most of th 

12 
Pacific islands that were chosen as airbases. So 

the ge ologist was called upon to locate coral in 

sufficient quantity for the massive runways, while 

the engineer sought me thods of improving upon 

he basic qualities of cor al to make it suitable as a 

nstruetion aggregate. Since reconnaissance aircr aft were at a premium, geologists from Aviation 

Engineer Battalions trained the pilots of singleseat fighters to conduct aerial engineer reconnaissance while on combat missions. 

Later, wh en more aircraft became available, 

geologists themselves took to the air in an effort to 

hasten the location of construction material. In 

one instance, a geologist from the 836th Aviation 

Engineer Battalion spotted a deposit of 500,000 

cubic yar ds of high grade coral while flying a 

"r econ mission" over Saipan. Construction of a 

coral runway started there on June 15, 1944, and 

on Nov ember 24, 1944, B-29 heavy bombers took 

off to r aid Tokyo. Similar significant contributions 

to military engineering by geologists were made 

during both the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts. 

One of the highest priority missions given to 

the Corps of Engineers in Vietnam was the 

constr uction and upgrading of lines of communications (LOC). Vast quantities of rock in th e form of 

aggregate were required, and geologists were 

tasked with locating, developing, and in many 

cases. actually operating quarries in support of the 

LOC mission. The record here speaks for itself ­

27 million tons of ag gregate was produced and 

56 kilometers of highway was constructed! 

( Today, t he principal domain of geologists within th e Corps of Engineers is in the Civil Works 

area. Still others are engaged in research and 

developmen t efforts for the Waterways Experiment Station, the Cold Regions and Engineering 

Laboratory, the Nuclear Cratering Group, and 

other activities. Wi thin OCE's Directorate of Civil 

Works, Engineering Divison, is the Geology 

Branch from which a vast array of geologic talent 

is managed, The 15 men who occupy the Corps' 

top geologists' positions across th e country have an 

average tenure with the Corps of better than 23 

years. Their areas of e xper tise include such fields 

as arctic geology and permafrost, clay mineralogy, 

envir onmental geology, explosives ex cavation, 

formation design, remote sensing, and seismology 

and earthquake engineering. 

The Corps' Civil Works activities continued, 

though at a reduced pace, even during the war 

years. but have steadily grown since the end of 

World War II. One estimate is that by 1980 as 

many as 500 geologists might be required to meet 

the Corps' needs. 

The Civil Works program is presently or was 

ecently engaged in more than 4,300 projects at a 

t al authorized cost of 35-billion and appropriaLions for new work totalled 16-billion dollars at the 

end of 1972. Geologists are frequen tly called upon 

during the course of these projects; especially 

when they involve stratigraphic of subsurface 

investigations. Recently, nearly 100 Corps geologist s were involved in one single project; the 

Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study (1964­

1971) which investigated 23 possible routes for a 

new sea-level canal across the American isthmus. 

The Corps of Engineers has be en an active 

participant in the new field of lunar geology. As 

early as 1960, the Military Geology Branch, under 

the direction of th e Office of the Chief of Engineers, prepared a study and map of the surface 

geology of the moon. The text included a concise 

description of the various materials. information of 

landing and movement characteristics, as well as 

excavation and construction potential. Other 

geologic work progressed through the unmanned 

Ranger and Surveyor programs and continues 

today with the evaluation of the data from Apollo 

and the new Earth Resources Technology Satellite. 

So we see that geologists of the Corps of 

Engineers have been a vital force in both war and 

peace. As we look to the future, we hope that 

their talents will be called upon to aid peaceful, 

const r uct ion pursuits. We must however be prepared for all possibilities. Therefore, because of 

the expanded use of geology in military applications over the last 50 years, the United States 

Army Engineer School presents instruction in this 

subject to various officer, non-commissioned officer, and enlisted specialist courses. A total of 11 

hours of instruction is given to all students of the 

Engineer Officer Advanced Course, while enlisted 

Soils Analysts receive 22 hours of instruction 

which includes eight hours of field work. 

Whatever the future may hold in store, geologists of the Corps of Engineers stand ready to 

meet the challenge! 

Captain Kevin J . Mahoney is currently assigned as Commander, Company A, 30th Engineer 

Battalion (Topo) and was formerly an instructor at 

the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He 

is a Vietnam veteran, a 1968 Engineer OCS 

graduate and holds a BS in Geology from Villanova. 

Captain John J. Connor is a graduate of Engineer OCS. and has a degree in Geology from 

Boston College. He is a former instructor in th e 

Department of Engineering Sciences, Foundations 

and Mat erials Division, Soils and Geology Branch 

at the Engineer Scho ol. He is currently assigned 

as Proj ect Manager for th e Pacific Ocean Division, 

Corps of Engineers, on Majuro Atoll in the 

Marshall Island s in th e Pacific. 

13 
Captain Guy E. Miller 

Mur phy's Law states simply, "If anything can go 

wrong. it will." This natural law is one of the 

irrefutable facts of life. Murphy is the gremlin 

present in every human undertaking, always 

looking for some opportunity to disrupt a smooth 

operation. The military profession, primarily concerned with administering violence, is especially 

susceptible to Murphy and his law. In the military, 

with far more consistency than in the civilian 

world, when things go wrong the results can be 

tragic. 

If we don't want to join Murphy, we have got to 

beat him. For this purpose, safety rules have been 

devised to frustrate his law. These rules have two 

main origins - experience and foresight. While 

experience may be the most effective teacher, in 

the demolition business it is also the most expensive. We just can't afford to let our people learn 

demolitions by their own mistakes. 

In demolition training. safety is always given 

maximum emphasis. Right from the very beginning, everyone is taught the safety rules. and 

proper procedures are stressed throughout the 

training phase. Because of this attention. school 

and training environments have maintained almost 

perfect safety records. So our main concern is 

Murphy's success outside the school situation. 

Murphy has two favorite victims for his dirty 

work - inexperienced personnel and the very 

experienced - hence overconfident ones. In the 

military demolitions field inexperienced personn 

are seldom a critical safety problem, primarily 

because of the tremendous emphasis on safety in 

their training. If anything, the inexperienced 

soldier is far more likely to be overly cautious. 

However. in the combat support mission, inexperience and unfamiliarity can become a critical 

factor, not for the personnel handling the demoli ­

tions as much as for the troops they support. All 

too frequently in Vietnam, Infantry commanders, 

unfamiliar with the dangers of demolitions, failed 

to brief or account for their personnel properly, 

resulting in needless friendly casualties. 

By far Murphy's favorite victims are the socalled "experienced" personnel. Why is this so? 

The safety rules are made to beat Murphy and 

they work. For the most part, everyone knows 

what the rules are and how to apply them. So 

every time someone gets hurt unnecessarily it is 

because an individual who should have known 

better ignored one or more of the rules. 

Safety procedures are made to be completely 

Murphy-proof, closing off every loophole open to 

him. As people gain more experience they begin 

to learn that there is much more safety built into 

the rules than is required and they start cuttin 

corners. But the often heard words, "It wi 

14 
I 

probably be OK," ta ke on a special spin e-chilling 

significance wh en the name of the game is "You 

Bet Your Life ." The word "pr obably" announces 

an invitati on to disaster. 

If anything can go wr ong, it will, but not 

necessar ily immediately. Since Mur phy fre quently 

t akes his time catching up , t he pr actice of cutting 

cor ners grows into a habit. People decide they can 

get away with ignoring th e rules and begin cutting 

more corners, compounding Murphy's opportunities. And sooner or later he takes adva nt age of 

this and str ikes . 

One particularl y gr ues ome case happened at 

Fort Bragg, North Car olina, several years ago 

when a large number of experienced Special 

For ces per sonnel were training in a "demo" pit as 

40 pounds of C-4 detonated, killing and wounding 

several men. Alt hough the resul tin g investigation 

never conclusively established exactl y how the 

accide nt occurred, t he fact r emains that if all the 

safety procedur es had been followed pr operly, 

there would ha ve been no such disaster. 

The comba t experience our soldiers roll ed up in 

Vietnam has provided innumerable examp les of 

the old adage th at "familiarity br eeds contempt." 

Man y sa fety conscious, new ar rivals , coming incountry for the first time, r eceived the traditional, 

combat veter an's code from the old-timers . "No 

sw eat. We don't both er with doing it that way 

here." But with Murph y around all t he t ime 

aiting for his chance to strike, it is best to play it 

safe - - by th e book. F or insta nce, a freak accident 

hap pened at a quarry near Cam Ranh Bay during 

the ea rly yea rs of the war t hat would never have 

happ ened if safety rules had been followed. A 

trooper was killed by a large rock when he stuck 

his head up to ph otograph an enormous blast. 

As leaders, how can we go about beating 

Murphy's Law? Anything we can do to ke ep the 

odds in our favor rather than his will help fru strate 

him. Our first responsibili ty, obviously, is to 

insu re that safety rules and procedures are 

properly followed. How many times in a tactical 

situation hav e leaders ignored safe principles by 

carrying caps and explosives together? It is true 

that usu alJy nothing happ ened. But considering 

the poss ible consequences and the sad fact th at 

Murph y was certainly lurking close by. was t his a 

r easonabl e side to take? 

Some procedu res may seem silly in a combat 

operation but if they can pr event unneces sary 

fri endl y casualties t here is no justification for 

disregarding th em. For exa mple, shou tin g, "Fire 

in t he hole!" three times is never wrong. 

Getting ba ck to Murphy, another way to beat 

him is to use systems with maximum reliability. 

ne example is to avoid the use of the time fuse 

herever possible to se t off an explosive charge. 

Numerous t echnique s are available but perhaps 

the most r eliabl e is to use detonation cord and 

electric caps as far as possible fr om t he char ge 

when setting it off. 

Probably the most important th ing for leader s 

to do if th ey are to beat Murphy is to constantly be 

aware of th eir troops and what th ey are likely to 

be doing or not doing. A good example of this 

involves an En gineer unit t hat wa s clearing a ro ad 

of mines in Vietnam. As mines were located, they 

were blown in place and th e r esultin g craters were 

filled before the unit could continue up t he road . 

After several hours of this tedious pr ocedure, the 

unit commander was horrified to see one of his 

men car ry a mine he had jus t dug out of the road 

over to a vehicle and dr op it on the hood, sayi ng 

"Sir, we're tired of filling up those damn holes." 

Not so fortunate was t he troop who t hrew an 

ammunition crate into a pile of burning C-4. The 

r esul ting det ona tion unn ecessarily add ed mor e 

per sonnel to Murphy's casualty Jist. Just as in t he 

case of th e soldier wh o was killed whil e photographing t he quarry blast, t he lesson shown here 

is t hat personnel are likely to get themselves hurt 

when they are not always mad e conscious of the 

dangers of demolitions. 

Follow the safety rules and Murphy will never 

get his cha nce at you. Many safety rul es are so 

obvious t hat to disregard th em is ridiculous. 

Example: some time ago at Fort Belvoir , Virginia, 

a small au tomobile wa s dam aged wh en its owner 

disregarded clearl y posted warnings about minimum safe distance from a demolitions demonstration. Result: debris from t he deton ation crushed 

t he parked car. Fortunately no one was near it 

when disaster struck. 

Demolitions is conside re d to be a dangerous 

busin ess. However, if pr oper procedures are 

correctly followed, there is no r eason why "de mo" 

should be any mor e dangerous than an y other 

military program . If lead ers will enforce established safety rules, employ systems with maximum 

reliability, and sta y one ste p ahead of th e troops, 

then Murph y will never have the opp ortunity to 

use his law to hurt our personnel or jeopardize our 

mission. 

Captain Guy E. Miller is a recent graduate of 

the Engineer Officer Advanced Course at Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia. He received a R egular Army 

commission in A rmor from the USMA in 1969. 

Following Airborne and Ranger schools and 

A OEC, he ser ved as a Platoon L eader in 1/1 7th 

Cavalry of the 82d Airborne Division. He grad ­

uated from the Rotary Wing Fligh t School in 1971, 

and fo llowing a branch transfe r to the Corps of 

Engineers, completed a tour in Vietnam with the 

1st Aviation Brigade. 

lS 
•• 

The Henry Larcom Abbot Award 

ZKEY TO 

-eco TERMINE WARFARE Captain Richard Kanda 

Data released by the Office of the Surge on 

General a nd R. H. Stolfi, Ballistic Research 

Labor ator y (1972), indica tes mines and boobytraps 

ca used two percen t of all U. S. casua lties in World 

Wa r II, four percen t in Kor ea an d mor e t han 13 

percen t in So uth Vietnam. Th e percentage for 

Vie t.nam may be conservative. 

A U. S. Army Mobilit y Equipmen t Research 

and Development Cent er office memorandum 

stat es that, "Many combat uni ts in RVN had 

cas ua lt ies (attr ibu tab le) to mi nes and boob ytr aps 

of 30 to 50 percent, and approximately 80 percen t 

of all vehicles destroyed we re du e to mines. " 

Th e literature ab out the ser ious ness of t he 

mine threat faced by U. S. forc es is r eplet e with 

s uc h stat istics. So what has t.he Unit ed States 

Army don e to count er t his ever increasing prob ­

lem? 

In 1970, Department of th e Army established a 

more formal, long term countermine systems 

de velopment program. As part of this program, 

th e United St ates Ar my Mobility Equipmen t 

Res earch and Development Cen t er (USAMERDC) 

was desi gn a ted Lead Laborat or y for coor dination 

and implem enta ti on of th e en tire program. 

Th e US AMERDC response to this obligation 

cons ists of many ongo ing r esearch and deve lopment projects - all of which are oriented and contro lled t hr ough use of syst ems a nalysis t echniques . 

This program is kn own as "Counterrnine System Definition and Analysis." It provides for th e 

sys tem atic organiza tion and processing of all face ts 

of t he counter-mine effor t . Previously, counte rmine hardware, doctrine and per so nnel we r e not 

systematically conside red en toto. The to tal syst em s appr oach sur faced a new question con cerning 

the mine detection hardware/ personn el (equipmen t/ equipment ope r ator) int erface. Just how 

mu ch impact does th e man using a portable mine 

det ector have on th e effe ct ive ne ss of that mine 

detector ? Th e fact t hat an inte rface exists is 

obvious; bu t, how does one qua ntify it ? 

USAMERDC need ed t his infor mation to tr uly 

ev alua te its r esear ch and development projects 

dea ling with hardware. It is an easy ma tter to 

measure th e intelligence and state of traini ng of 

t he man. However, are t hese the only pa ramet ers 

wort.hy of inves tigati on? 

Befor e del vin g furth er in the counter m ine man/ 

eq uipme nt interface, cons ide r past ex per ience 

wh ere de velopm en t of hardware was treated in a 

r elative ly singu lar manner. 

His tori cally, counter rnine r es ear ch and develo 

m e ri t has be en predicated on the de tect ion and/ or 

ne utralization of mines t hr ough use of hardwar e. 

In t he mine-count ermine con fr on tat ion, t he min er 

has the adv antage. 

To illustrate, examin e t he family of man 

portable mine detectors. Det ectors have been developed which sense metallic mines, nonmetallic 

mines, or the trace gases ema nating from t he explosive content of t he mine itself. 

The viability of the metallic mine detector is 

negated by nonme tall ic min es. In t urn, use of the 

nonme tallic de tec t or is disrupted by ene my use of 

ine rt mat erial which duplica t es t he signature of 

nonmetallic min es. Wh y not "s niff 'em out" with 

the tr ac e gas detector? Th e miner jus t sprinkles 

th e mined area with particles of explos ives. The 

operator of th e gas detector is then confr ont ed 

wit h a verita ble sea of mines. Will t his vicious 

cycle of graduated technica l r esp ons e be broken? 

Realistically, probably not. 

Th ere has been no appreciable gai n in U. S. 

coun te r m ine effectiveness since Wor ld War II . 

Fi eld commanders need not hold their brea th s for 

t ha t si ngle technological break throu gh. Th e 

ene my miner will always ha ve the advantage. H ' 

ma y be forc ed to us e a t echnically inferior min . 

However, just t he knowledge that th e min e is PJ 

16 
emplaced at a cer tain location assures the miner of 

his historical edge. 

Reliance on perceptual detection of mines by 

man is empirical fact. Reports from Sou th Vietam and previous conflicts indicate that 70 percent 

o 80 percent of all mine detections are attributable to unaided personnel. 

In the pa st, combat troops have received a 

modicum of tr aining in countermine tech niqu es . 

This training was ba sed on techniques proven by 

past experience. How ever, no conc erted or formal 

effort was made to identify and train specific 

individuals with exceptional ability to detect 

mines. Such individ uals do exist. 

Query any combat soldier who operated in an 

area th e enemy actively min ed. He will inv ariably 

r elate a war story concerning some individual who 

was most adept at locating mines. 

What makes som e individuals more eff ective? 

Is it basic intelligence or innate practicality? Is it 

an inh erent or acquired skill? Is it his visual 

search mode? Exactly what are the parameters 

embodied in a man who is an effective mine 

detector? Is it possible to quantify. those parameters? 

USAMERDC commissioned th e Human Re ­

sources Research Organization (HumRRO) in 1972 

-t o answer these questions. Th e initial scop e of th e 

t ask wa s to derive a more formal empirical base. 

The HumRRO approach was to test and 

terview 78 combat veterans. Criterion for selecon was ba sed on th e proven proficiency of the 

.

test subject s as mine detectors. Th ey were 

nominated by peers and superiors who verified 

proficiency during personal association with th e 

men in combat. Th e test subjects cam e from 

infantry, armor, mechanized infantry and engineer 

units. 

E valuation of the empr ical base established by 

HumRRO (August 1972) indicates the following for 

highly ex pert subjects: They r elied on unaided 

means (visual or tactile) 80.6 percent of th e time to 

detect mines. Use of a mine detector accounted for 

only 5.6 percent of th e time . A very high number, 

97.2 percent of the subjects, reported use of a 

"special feelin g" (emotional r eaction) which se emed 

to warn them of danger. Interestingly, subsequent 

detections or e nemy contact confir me d th e validity 

of the special feeling 65 percent of the time. While 

movin g at the normal speed of th eir unit, over 80 

percent felt confident or very confident of their 

abilit y to detect mines. Infan try subjects indi cated 

that dogs (40 percent) or a small, ligh t mine 

detector (27 percent) would be th e best way to 

augment unaided means of detection. Significantly, they wanted dogs or detectors only as a 

upplement - not as a r eplacement for th e 

naided meth od of mine detection . 

All subjects were r equested to make recommendations or comme nts conc erning min e detection. A high percentage felt that individuals with 

exceptional apti tude for mine detecti on could be 

identified . Th ey r ecommended more r ealistic 

tr aining be instituted. They felt that tracker-type 

training would be beneficial. 

In late 1972, on request and contract by 

USAME RDC, HumRRO turned from its study of 

experien ced personnel. A total of 104 combat 

nai ve ind ividu als (r ece nt AIT graduates) were 

inv estigated t o dev elop, quantify and validate 

parameters involved in the human detection of 

mines. Resul ts were iden tifi cation and validation 

of human characteristics indi cative of high aptitude 

for unaided det ection of min es. 

Th e condu ct of this research was prefaced by 

extensive que stioning and testing of the subjects 

t o de velop th eoretical predicti ve measures. Predictive measures were preconceived to be grouped 

as follows: physical character istics, personal history , personality characteristi cs and native aptitud e. 

The followin g factors were conside red in detail. 

Visual acuity was tested. A personal his tory was 

take n with emphasis on prior countermine knowled ge and level of civilian education. Personality 

characteristics were noted by formal testing of 

individual dogmatism, manifest anxiety, team 

orientation and stress r esistance. Individual 

awareness factors or nati ve aptitudes in the area 

17 
of visual stimulation/reaction were tested. 

After the inventory of information was completed, the subj ects were taken to a field site for 

proficiency testing. Prior to going through the 

test lanes sown with all types of mine and booby 

trap simulaters, the individuals were given a 

briefing. Th ey were reminded of previous training 

received in AI'r on detection procedures. Next, 

specific information on the devices and employ ­

ment techniques used in the test lanes was given. 

The sp ecifi cs giv en were an approximation of 

the intelligen ce a soldier would likely re ceive prior 

to a combat operation. The subjects were then 

allowed to proceed individually down th e lan es. 

They proceeded at their own speed. HumRRO 

observers e valuated the performance of each tes t 

subject. 

Test result evaluation by HumRRO (May 1973) 

indicates that, "the highly proficient (combat 

naive) de tector ca n be characterized in the following manner: During th e test he spent more time 

and exp ended more effort; he graduated fr om high 

school (and) completed more civili an educati on; he 

wa s less dogmatic (mor e open-minded); finall y, his 

visual acuity was better than tha t of less proficient 

detectors." 

What conclusion can be drawn from the preceding? Man is th e key to countermine warfare. 

Man in this context is not th e operator of a 

sophisticated detection device. Unaided man has 

been and will continue to be the most efficient, cost 

18 

effective min e detector in our inventory. With 

judicious application of recently acquired knowlled ge, new ori entation in doctrine and tr aining 

should be dev eloped . 

A r ecent change in doctrine fits nicely. Cou 

ter mining effort has been a traditional responsibility of the Corps of Engineers. Revised doctrine 

now states that the combat arms as well as their 

supporting combat engineers must take deliberate 

counter mine measures in the field . 

What about the soldier? Individual soldiers 

should be identified early in th eir careers as 

possibl e mine detectors of high effectiven ess using 

th e HumRRO ba ttery of tests as a basis. 

Once th e individual is identified, he should 

r eceive detail ed, realistic training. The end result 

would be an indi vidual with high detection proficiency wh o was not developed through a bloody 

tri al and erro r process on an actual battlefield. 

This soldier should be awarded r ecognition in th e 

form of a spe cific military occupational specialty 

(MOS). Th e MOS should be secondary in na ture or 

be a suffix much like those awarded to airborne 

qu alified personnel. He should be assigned a 

primary MOS in the combat or combat support 

ar ms. Developmental work sh ould be initiated to 

specifically equip him for his duti es. P ossibilities 

are special vision devices , more compact detectors, 

ligh ter weapons, more use of dogs and bett er bod y 

armor. 

It is not proposed that unaided man displact... 

th e other elements of counterrnine warfare, i.~;.~.. 

materiel and technique. It is pr oposed that his 

presence be optimized - that his role be upgraded 

from that of an equipment operator or visual 

observer endowed only with broadbrush training 

and that he be selected and tr ain ed through use of 

definitive criterion statements. In this way the 

historical edge of the e ne my miner may be 

trimmed to an acceptable limit. 

Captain Richard Kanda is a 'recen t graduate of 

the Engineer Officer A dv anced Cours e At Fort 

Belvoir, Virgin?a. Commissioned in the Army aft er 

graduation fr om the Colorado S chool of Mines in 

1967, he has served both overseas and in the U S. 

Captain Kanda was firs t assign ed to the 24th 

Engineer Battalion, 4th Armored Division in 

Germany as a demolition platoon leader and as a 

company commander from 1967 to ) 969. He also 

served in Vietnam later in 1969 and 1970 as a 

Compan y Commander with th e 20th Engineer 

Battalion (Com bat), and the 937th Engine er Group 

(Combat ) as Assistant S3. A graduate of the 

Co lorado School of Mines, he was an Instructor and 

Senior In structor, Nu clear Weapons Employment 

Division, at th e U. S. A rmy Field A rtillery Schoo 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from 1970 to 1973. 
19
 
to recogni ze and exploit. This evaluation of 

Russian river crossing capabilities was the result 

of a post-World War II study t hat r eceived the full 

endorsement of Generaloberst A. D. Franz Halder, 

Chief of the German Army General Staff. 

As a re sult of successful broad-front, river 

cr oss ing operations during WWII, the Soviets have 

concentr ated on the development of bridging 

equ ipment that would enhance this technique. 

Today, mor e than ev er, it is vital th at armored and 

me chan ized infantry mobility be re stricted as little 

as possible by te rrain features. Th er efore, the 

Soviets place emphasis on the co-development of 

armored and engineer equipment. This ensure s 

that sophisticated and advanced engineer equipment is available to properly support the ir new er, 

armored and mechanized vehicles. 

Sov iet Engineer Tactical Bridging has ernphasized three basic design principles: 1) spee d of 

constr uction, 2) simplicity of design and, 3) minimal 

additional constr uct ion support. 

With th ese concepts in mind, in 1961, the 

Soviets develop ed and introduced the Heavy 

Folding Ponton Bri dge , PMP, int o th eir engineer 

inventories. 

De signed to carry Class 60 loads, th e PMP float 

bridge has a construction rate of 60 feet per 

minu te and r equires a construction cr ew of appr oximately 35 personnel. Consisting of 16 cent 

pon tons, two end or ramp pontons, and on 

anchor/repair tr uck, the PMP Set has a sp anning 

capability of mor e than 320 feet. Each ponton is a 

self-contained, mechanically operated unit with th e 

ponton superstructure servin g as th e ro adway 

surface. 

The KRAZ-214 Truck transpor ts, launches, and 

r etrieves t he folding pont on. 

To minimi ze the requirement for additional 

supporting construction equipme nt such as cranes , 

the Sovie ts developed th e BMK-150 Power Boat 

with integral tr avel struts! Th ese struts are folded 

along side after the boat is afloat. 

The Brid ge Erection Boat is us ed in conjunction 

with PMP bridging and raftin g operations. Using 

a tra veling arm connected to t he AFT section, the 

BMK-150 is towed to t he bridge site by a 

KR AZ-214 ve hicle. Upon arrival, the truck backs 

up to th e river's edge and pushes the boat out into 

the water. A crew memb er disconnects the 

traveling arm which releases the integral st r utlocking devices. The wheels swing forward into 

storage wells and th e boat is r ead y for ope ration. 

While t he U. S. has eliminated the need for a 

cr ane in bridge constr uction by developing a 

ribbon bridge. A crane or liftin g vehicle is sti ' 

r equired for our section alized bridge errection 

20 
oats. Perhaps we should consider de veloping a 

new bridge erection boat that would compliment 

our Ribbon Bridge se t. 

To pr ovide Engineer support during the assault 

phase, the Soviets have developed and introduced 

the Tank-Launched Bridge MTU. This class 60 

bridge span consists of two box-truss treadways 

mounted on and launched from the T-54 tank 

chassis. 

The cantilever launching technique was specifically used to minimize t he bridges exposure to 

enemy fir e. In addition, th e span is launched by a 

mechan ical drive system rather than a hydraulical 

one. The primary shor t coming of this bridge is its 

limit ed spanning capability of only 40 feet . Ther efore, the Soviets will probably develop a similar 

bridge with a greater spanning capability. 

To improve th eir bridging ver satility, the 

Sovi ets have developed and introduced into their 

Engineer Inventory the Heavy Truck-Mounted 

Scissors Bridge. This bridge consists of at least 

t hre e (3), class 60, 3D-foot spans mounted on a 

modified KR AZ-214 Truck. Using a mechanically 

dri ven launchin g ar m and cable system, t he span is 

raised to the ve rticle position. The cable system 

unfolds t he bridge and begins to lower it into 

lace. While the bridge is being lowered, t he 

adjustable trest les that are mounted beneath the 

span, are rel eased and locked into position. When 

th e lowering operation is compl eted, t he spa n is 

married to a previously emplaced bridge section. 

The intergal trestles can be adjusted up to 10 feet 

in height. However this limitation could be 

overcome easil y by cr ibbing beneath the footers. 

With a construction crew of 12 personnel, this 

set can be erected over a 100-foot dry or wet gap 

within 45 minutes . To incr ea se this spanning 

capability, two TMM Sets could be employed 

togethe r. 

As you can see, the Soviet Army En gineer 

units are equipped with modern, sophistica ted , 

tac tica l bridging to ensur e t hat they can provide 

the necessary suppor t to their armored and 

mechanized infan try units. They have had more 

th an 10 years to gain the necessary experience to 

understand its capabilities and limitations. Therefore, th e Soviet Engineer's capability cannot be 

passed over lightly. 

With th e modern concept of nuclear tactics and 

its emphasis on ba ttlefield mobility the advantages 

of havin g this type of bridging equipment av ailable 

is self evident. 

Captain Richard E. Ashby is a former graduat e 

of th e En gineer Officer Advan ced Course at Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia . 

21 
, ­

I 

I 

, 

, 

,I

Although a heavy Union bom bardment sets houses afire in the 

town of Frederick sbu rg, across th e Rapolum nock River, 

federate riflemen cling tenaciously to th eir positions an tr 

deadly volleys into th e ranks of Federal enginee ring tr I 

building a pon toon bridge to span tl e icy stream . After suffMfr,g 

many losses, Burnside's troops managed to complete th e bridge. 

Volunteers drove the Confede rates out so th nt mass crossings 

could he accomplished. 

T he Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), September 

17, 1862, brought an unsuccessful end to th e 

Confedera te invasion of Maryland, and th e Army 

of Northern Virginia retreated into Virginia to 

recuper ate. The Union Army also was in need of 

r eorganization, recruitment, and refittin g and did 

not resume the offensive until th e end of October. 

In early November of 1862, the Army of the 

Potomac und er General George B. McClellan was 

concentrated abou t Warrenton, within 20 miles of 1 

General Longstreet's corps at Culpepper, and still 

'\ 

nearer the shortest road wh ere General Jackson's 

$7200 EACH WEEK.- Jl~.b1cUl~ Partlclll& 

I. WOIl1H, 

AOENTll, wi otherCu 

worle, C:II1 Ieun !low tol RO~ KCOa>e 18&wffi,: (-.l.II1'
Halleck, General-in-Chief, r eques ted that he 

submit a plan of operat ions - that same evening 

Burnsid e forwarded his plan. He was going to give 

up t he Oran ge and Alexandria Railway as his line 

of communications; make Aquia Creek his base for 

supplies; make the enemy beli eve he was going to 

attack Culpepper but instead move his whole forc e 

to Falmouth; cross th e Rapp ahannock River and 

take Fredericksburg before the Confederate force 

could concentrate, and th en continue to his obje ctive - Richmond. 

For this operation Burnsid e requested that a 

wagon train of subsistence store s, preceded by a 

train of pontons, "enough to spa n the Rappahannock with two tracks," be dispatched from Alexandr ia to Falmouth. He also requested t hat 

pr ovisions and forage be se nt to Aqu ia Creek . 

Bur nside's plan r eceived P reside nt ial approval 

on November 14. His first step was to reorganize 

the Arm y of the Potomac into thr ee Gra nd 

Divisions and a Reserve Corps. Ea ch Grand 

Division was mad e up of two Army Corps. 

On t he morning of the 15t h, the Righ t Grand 

ivision und er General Sumner starte d for Fal­

. nout h and arrived there on the 17th. The oth er 

two Grand Division followed a da y or two later. 

But the Army could not cross Rappahannock ­

there wer e no pontons! 

One might ri ghtly say that it was here that t he 

Battle of Fredericksburg was lost; howev er, I am 

of the opinion t hat th e battle was lost when 

Burnsid e made his request for pontons, He, like 

McClel1an, had been und er politica l pressure to 

move at once. Without requesting th e bridging to 

be forwarded to him at Warrenton or either 

waiting to be sure that it was on its way to 

Falmouth, he started his move , a move entirely 

based on surpr ising the enemy and which required 

the ability to rapidly cross the Rappahannock. In 

othe r word s, t his was an operation wholely dependent upon th e bridgin g capability of his enginee rs; a capability impossible with out pontons. 

Th e story of the pontons is an interest ing one 

to inv estigate. In Ge neral Halleck's report, he 

wrote: 

"It has been infe rred fr om the testimony of General 

Burn side .. . tha t his plan of marching his whole arm y 

fr om Warrent on to Falm outh had been appro ved by the 

authorities in Washington, and that he expe cted, on his 

arri val ther e, to fin d supplies and pontoons . . . That plan 

was ne ver approved . . . 

\. "It was alleged at the time that th e loss of this bat tle 

r ~tt WUltel'l'DIG ....ONEY' AOKNTlI'oat:elftM. J.1I. 

resulted / rom ne glect to order forward the pon toon trains 

f rom Wa.shmgto n. This order telegraphed by 

take n forma l comm and on the 9th, Gener al was me 

fr om Warr enton to Brigadier General Woodb ury then in
 

Washington, "" the 12th of November, and was ; romptly
 

acted on by General Burnside had supposed that the
 

Oll to tram was then in Wa.shington or A lexandria,
 

while it was st ill on the Potomac, at Berlin and Harp er's
 

Ferr y . . . General Burnside had only alloused time for
 

transporting bis pontoons from Alexandria . . . ..
 

General Burnside stated in his report that 

when his plan was submitted to Washington, 

General Hall eck t elegraphed him to meet for a 

confere nce on t he 12th of November, at Warrenton. At t his meeting, General Halleck agreed t o 

give his atte ntion to everything required for the 

operation; and "that he would at once ord er , by 

telegr aph, th e ponton trains spoken of in the plan, 

and upon his r eturn to Washington , see that the y 

wer e promptly forwarded." On th e 14th Burnsid e 

r eceived a telegram from General Halleck statin g 

that t he Presid ent had appr oved his plan . 

On that same day, Novemb er 14, Burnside wa s 

notified that Captain Ira Spaulding had arrived in 

Washingt on with 36 pontons and 40 more were 

expected the next day. One ponton tr ain was 

scheduled to start overla nd toward F almouth on 

the 16th or 17th . Apparently, this notification was 

what prompted Burnsid e to start his move on t he 

15th from Warrenton to Falmouth. 

On Novemb er 17, the same day that General 

Sumner arrived at Falmouth, Burnside was notified t hat the ponton train had not been abl e to 

leave Washington. 

The following day, November 18, Burnside was 

notified th at "Major Spaulding (apparently he had 

been promoted) has been delayed in obtaining 

harness, te amsters, and etc., for 270 new hors es. 

He ex pects to leav e tonight." However, th e train 

did not get off until the after noon of the 19th. 

As Major Sp aulding pushed his overland tr ain, 

it commenced raining and t he r oads became very 

bad. Upon arriv ing at Occoquan Creek he decided 

to raft his boats tow ard Aquia Cr eek and se nd the 

an imals overl and. He arrived at Aquia Creek with 

the pontons on t he 24th, teamed t he wagon s, and 

by nightfall of t he 25th arrived at General 

Burnsid e's headquarters. 

When Gen eral Sumner arrived at Falmouth 

(17th). Fredericksburg was weakly defend ed . General Lee was sur prised at Burnside's move, but 

had consider ed it a possibili ty and pr eviously 

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"It is certainly importan t to tleceioe the enemy u.s wn g 

as pos sible as to 0 ur position and intention, provided it is 

rendere d certain tha t a junction can be made before a 

battle: and this latter point we must always keep in view 

as nece ss ary to enable u« to re sis t the large force now on 

the Rappahannock , As tv the place where it may be 

necessary or bes t to fig ht, I canno t now state , as this 

mus t be det erm ined by circumstance s which may arise . , , 

Longstreet's corps is moving tv Fredericks burg, opposiie the place where Sumner's corps has arrived. As 

before sta te d, you can remain in the Valley as lonq as you 

see that your pr esence there cripple s and em barrasses 

the qeneral movement of the enemy, and yet leaves you 

fr ee to uni te wi th Lonqstreet for a battle, . , I shall wai t 

to hear ngain from Stuart today and will then star t for 

Fr edericks burq if circumstances warrant," 

orde re d the bridge from Aquia Creek dest royed. 

On November 18, Lee confir me d the movement of 

Burnside's entire army by a r epor t from General 

Stuar t , and orde red Mcl. aw's divisi on of Longstreet's corps to Fredericksburg. The nex t day the 

r emainder of Longstreet's corps headed for Freder icks bur g and the ent ir e cor ps closed there on t he 

21st, while Burnside's Army watch ed from the 

nort h side of th e river. 

To the military student it is interesting to note 

how Lee combined his ar my for t he battle and the 

fact that he had not or iginally intended to r esi st at 

F redericksburg. In a lett er to Gen eral Jackson on 

November 19, Le e wrote: 

th e north bank of the Rappahann ock and cause him 

to make another change of base, or to stand fast 

until winter suspe nded his operations. I believe 

either of these eve nts would have caused great 

dissatisfaction in the North, as well as a retreat. 

In consolidating the Confederate army, Lee had 

give n J ackson th e extreme limits of discretion; not 

or dering him to join Lon gstreet un til November 

27. J ackson display ed, once again , his dependab ility and sw ift movement by joining Longstreet 

on the 30t h, while Burnside still hesitated . At this 

point, the Army of the Potomac, containing 

approximately 122,000 men, faced Lee's army of 

78,000 Confe derates over a riv er 400 feet in width . 

As pr eviously menti oned, the pan tons had 

arr ived on November 25, bu t Burnsid e seeing his 

surprise plan defeated , hesitated and se arc hed for 

another plac e t o cross. He had to do something as 

th e pr ess and political press ur e dem anded acti on. 

He figured he must forc e a cr oss ing at Fredericksburg, or, by maneuvering, t urn Lee's posit ion and 

cross t he ri ver elsewhere. He mad e preparation s, 

on December 1, for a tu rn ing movement by way of 

Skinkers Neck (12 miles south of Fredericksburg), 

but th e appear ance of D. H. Hill's division on th e 

southsid e of the ri ver caused him to abando n t his 

project. Burnside finally decid ed to cross at 

Fred ericksburg in fro nt of Lee. He r easoned t hat 

Lee 's line was too far away from t he river to make 

any effective r esi stance to the actual passage of 

the ri ver and that th e r eal fight would be made 

after his army got across. Ano ther fact or in t his 

decision seems to have been misinformation, some 

of whi ch was obtained by balloon observation, 

where by Burnside th ought Lee 's ar my wa s 

stretched over a long distan ce, guar ding t he river 

crossi ngs below Fredericksburg. 

Burnsid e's plan of crossing wa s to span the 

river with five ponton bridges, three opposite 

Fredericksburg, and tw o ju st bel ow t he mouth of 

Deep Run. To accompli sh this mission, two 

enginee r organizat ions were available to Burn side: 

the Engineer Battalion , a Re gular Ar my unit 

commanded by Lieutenant Charles E. Cross, and 

the Volunteer Engineer Brigade commanded by 

Brigadier General Dani el P . Woodbury. (Gene r al 

Woodbury was also th e Army Chief of Engin eers 

havin g se rved in that capacity sinc e 1836. He 

would cont inue to se r ve as t he Chief un til he was 

killed near th e end of t he war in 1864). The 

Volunteer Brigade cons ist ed of two r egim ent s, the 

15th and 50t h New York. Th e Engineer Battalion 

(Regulars) and detachments of t he 15th New Yor k 

Regimen t, und er Major J am es A. Magruder, were 

Had Burnside's plan succeeded in sur prising directed to construct the two bridges downstream 

Lee, t he gener al would probabl y have made his with th e upp er three bridges to be thrown by 

main defense behind th e North Anna. Because of detachm en ts of the 50th Ne w York Regim ent, 

Burnsid e's hesitation, Lee r esolved to stop him on und er Major Ira Spauling. ,- t 

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I 
sec urity for ce. 

During the early cold hours of December 11. 

the oper ation commenced. By 3 a.m., bridge trains 

were in position along th e ea st ban k of t he river. 

At 6 a.m. , it looked as th ough t he upper crossings 

would be a success. Major Spauling and his 50t h 

Engineer s had two of the bridges two-thirds of t he 

way across and the other one-fourth of the wa y. 

Sudd enly, th e Confeder ates, from the ir we llconcea led positions, ope ned up with te rrific fir e 

upon the engineers who were working approxima t ely 80 feet from the water's ed ge. 

Burn side covering forc es were ineffective du e 

to t he r an ge of t he infan try fire and a thick fog 

that made tar gets difficult for t he art iller y. Alt houg h sev eral barrages were laid by the artillery 

batteri es, the Confeder ates would eme rge from 

cellar s and trenches after each ba r r age and pick off 

the enginee rs as they resumed their work. General Barksda le told one of his mess en gers to "t ell 

General Lee that if he wants a bridge of dead 

Yankees I can furni sh him with one. " Until 

Barksdale's men could be driven off, the work 

would remain at a stands till. 

Work on th e lower bridges at the mouth of 

Deep Run had been hampered by the cold and ice. 

but by 7 a.m. when th e bridges were nea ring the 

far shore, th e Confederates ope ned fire. LieuP onton bridges are buil t by placing 

(balk to enginee rs) between floating pontons 

(boa ts ). Th e balk spans from pon ton to ponton and 

is se cured t o the pan tons by lashings. Th e pontons 

used duri ng th e Civil War were simple wooden 

r ow boats trans ported by flat -bed wagons. Balk 

was undr essed lumber two inches or greater in 

thickness. The pontons wer e launched and floated 

int o posit ion and the balk was laid. Th e bridge 

was built by consecutive float fro m near sh or e to 

far shore and an chor s we r e use d on every seco nd 

or third ponton to hold th e br idge in place. 

Const ru ction of th e bridges was not an easy 

task, pa r tic ularly the three bridges opposit e the 

town. Lee's artill er y was placed on the hills abov e 

and t o th e rear of Fredericksburg and could not 

sweep the upp er bridging sites without damaging 

t he t own . How ever, Gen er al Barksdale's Mississippi Br igad e had been positioned in houses, 

cellars, and rifl e pits in front of the three crossing 

sites. Alt hough th e Rappah ann ock Riv er was only 

400 feet wide and th e Confederate artiller y could 

not fir e thro ugh the town, Barksdale's troops 

would make t he crossings costly. Gen eral Hunt, 

Burnside's Chief of Artillery, massed 147 guns on 

the high bluffs above the Rappahannock to suppor t 

th e crossings and a r egim ent of infantry was 

assigned to each of t he bridge detachm en ts as a 

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'U1' L. IUDlD.~<l0altw
tenant Cross lost t hree men - one wounded and Burnside's report of th e battle included th e 

two taken prisoner. As Major Magruder's men following statement about his engineers: "No 

were laying the balk in the last bay of th eir bridge, more difficult feat has been perform ed during the 

they also were at ta cked. This resulted in six War than the throwing of these bridges in th e face 

casualties and damage to several pontons. Then of th e ene my by these brave men . It was a gallant 

Hunt's artill ery opened fire on the Confederates work ." 

and repelled further attacks. By noon, both In my opinion, Burnside's decision to send 

bridges were completed with neither the Regular infantry across in ponton boats to secure the far 

battalion nor the 15th New York receiving serious shore has lead to pr esent military river crossing 

opposition. doctrine. No bridgin g effor t could now be atAt this time , with the upp er bridges still at a tempted as Burnside attempted it in the Civil War. 

standstill and Major Spauling's engineers suffering A small unit of well concealed men with modern 

50 cas ualties, Burn side called a staff meetin g with weapons could prevent any amount of men from 

Woodbury and Hun t. At t his meeting, it was building any type of bridge across a 400 foot gap in 

decided to ferry infantry across in the ponton this day and time, if attempted as Burnside did 

boats to pry the Confederates loose from their initially. 

strong holds. Th e engineers ferried 120 infantry­ Present day river cr ossings are conducted in 

men of the 7th Michigan across the river, followed two phases -

by 100 men of th e 89th New York. As the • Infantrymen are ferried across in pneuinfantrym en landed ashore, a scrapping fight took matic assault boats by enginee rs to secure a 

place that forced the Confederates to fall back br idge hea d. It is hoped that th e first wave will 

thro ugh the town. The bridges were t hen quickly surprise and catch the ene my off guard. However, 

finished by the enginee r s, and that evening this is not always possible. Once t he infantrymen 

Burnside's Gr and Divisions marched acros s. have secur ed the bridgehead, the engineers begin 

On the morning of December 12, Fredericks­ building footbridges to allow mor e infantrymen to 

: burg was occupied and by nightfall the Army of deploy across. Small vehicle rafts also are used to 

the Potomac was ready for battle. Burnside carry support vehicl es and ammunition across th e I 

I attacked Lee th e next da y but failed to dislodge water . 

him. After several futile charges against Lee's • As the infan try continues the fight and 

position on Marye Heights and 12,600 casualties , expands the bridgehead , th e enginee rs begin th e 

Bur nside ordered his troo ps to recross the bridges second phase - that of construct ing the large 

on the 11th . When they had cr ossed, t he engineer s ponton br idges capable of carrying the hea viest 

dism an tled the bridges. divisional loads. 

Fredericksburg had been a testing ground for The Combat Engineer of today is the same 

the combat engineers. Th e mission was accomp­ soldier as his counterpart at Fredericksburg. The 

lished in spite of cold wea th er, ice, and enemy fire. type of bridgin g equipment has chan ged but he 

Th e casuality rate had been relatively high, still works with pontons and balk and must exp ose 

particularly III Major Spauling's unit. In the himself to fire. 

I opinion of several of the high ranking officers, the Combat Engineers are some of th e U. S. Army 

I 50th Engineers had not stood up to th e Confeder ­ best soldiers. The y perform ed many courageous 

ate fire as they should. Even General Woodbury feats thro ughout the Civil War and have continued 

was displeased at first but after he visited t he far to perform t hem throug hout th e years. Of man y 

shore and had a better understanding of what the task s that they hav e performed, words like 

situation, he wr ote: General Burnside's have been sa id again and again 

"J was greatly mortified in the morning to find that - "IT WAS A GALLANT WORK." 

the pontoniers under my command wou ld not continue at 

ioork un til act ually shot down . . . Perh aps I was Major A lfred H. McDonald has served in a unre asonable. I found a loop-holed blockhouse, uninj ured num ber of engineer positions in this country and by our art illery. directl y opposite our upper brid ges. and 

only a few yards from t heir sout hern abutm ent. I also 

found in the neighborhood a rifle -pit behind a stone wall, 

overseas. He was with the 70th Engineer Battalion (Combat ), the Second R epublic of Korea 

some 200 f eet long, and cellars inclosed by heavy walls, Army, 9th Log Command (Thailand), Electronics w here th e enem y could load and fire in almost p erfect and Special Deuelopm enis Branch, U. S. Army saje ty. There were many other secu re she lte rs . . . It is Combat Decelopmenis Command In/an try Agency, gen eral.ly considered a brave feat to cross a bridg e of any 

length und er f ire altho ugh the tim e of danger may not 

last more than a minu te or t wo. How much more difficult 

to build a bridge exposed for hours to the same 

m urdero us f ire. the danger increasing as the bridge is 

ex tend ed." 

Headq uarters, Long Binh Post, and the 4th 

Inf antry Division . He has attend ed the Engineer 

Officers Career Co urse and holds a Masters 

Degree tn civil engineering from Texas A&M 

Uniuersitu. 

4.\ . 

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for ts in ge neral. Ame ricans who have followed the 

Bavarians, Fren ch, Prussians and Germans as 

occup an ts of "Ludwigsvor feste, ' hav e the impression that th e fort is Napoleonic. "Yep ," sa id a 

ma ster ser geant , "Old Napoleon came ri ght 

thro ugh here on his way to t he Battle of DIm 

agains t General Mack and the Austrians. " 

Actually, t he fort was built by Ludwig I of 

Bavaria in 1848 as part of a common defense 

agreement among t he Ger ma n states. Th e agreement was aimed at th wartin g a possibl e future 

Fren ch offensive against southern Germany. The 

German strategists felt that all attacks would be 

aimed at Mun ich and t he ea siest app roach to the 

city lay bet ween Karlsruhe and Strasbourg t oward 

DIm, and the defenses of DIm and New Ulm gr ew 

out of t his planning. 

Miles of tunnels run beneath these forts and 

they are the so ur ce of several legend s. Rumors 

circulate about the "booby trapping" t hat t he 

Germans supposedly arrange d dur ing t he last days 

of World War II. But an invest igation of five miles 

of tun nel uncovered no evide nce that t his was a 

fact. Neverthe less, the t unnels are not th e safest 

place in t he worl d. The gate guard at Wiley 

comm en t ed, "Th ere ain' t no way I would volunteer 

to go down the re." Th e t unnels are crumbling in 

some part s an d maze-like in others. 

Other rumor s conce rn the extent and design 

of the passagewa ys: Most of the German community believes that they were interconn ected at 

one time or another . Since the ae r ial bombardmen t of the war cause d many of t he t unnels to 

collapse and plans of the compl ex ar e incomplete, 

proof is hard to come by. Th e Bundesw ehr post 

eng ine er at Fort Wilh elm sb erg, one of t he nine 

original for ts, insists they were connected. Herr 

Helmut Pflueger, the city histori an and expert on 

fortificat ions , feels this was impossibl e because of 

th e sharp differences in land forms at r elatively 

shor t dist ances. Th ese tunnels are so wide in some 

pa rts th at a platoon could march en ma sse without 

difficulty. 

Herr P flueger, based on 25 years of r esearch in 

the ar ea, su ggests th at the tun nels were to have 

be en used by enginee r sapper troo ps to set 

ex plosive cha rges und er the adv ancing en em y. 

The massive t unnels we re constr ucted fro m t he 

center of the for t in a star-shaped pattern 100 

meters into the fields of fire beyond t he moats . 

During the periods when a battl e was about to 

begin, the sa ppe rs would be se nt into t he tunnels 

to list en. When t hey could hear t he enemy, a new 

tunnel, perpendicular to t he ma in tunnel, would be 

dug abo ut 10 yards deep. After the charge was 

set, th ey ned as far as possible , for with t he 

problems of timing cha r ges t hen, t he risk of injury 

was quite high. Th en to o, you could never be sure 

28 
that the enemy might not be countermining your 

own tunnel. 

These tunnels extend for miles under the forts. 

Som e are filled with bats and vermin. In the 

deepest tunnel, stalactites are growing on the 

ceiling. On the same level as the stalactites, a 

room carved out of rock was found with a CARE 

package dated 1947, evide nt ly left by displaced 

persons who used these tunnels for shelt er . 

Of the nine forts, Wiley Barracks is in the best 

condition, while others. including the Illir Kanal Fort and Fort Albeck, have been allowed to deteriorate. Fort Albcck probably has the most 

interesting heritage of the complex. Built on the 

site of an earthen fort occupied by the Aus trians 

during t he battle against Napoleon, it was partially 

destroyed by Alli ed airpower in World War n. 

After the war, it served as a detention camp for 

Nazi officials, a hom e for displaced persons, a home 

for the 

socially deprived and as a safe harbor for 

the "down and out." Coupled with the still visible 

war damages, t he drifters, hippies, bums and 

alcoholics give this fort a surreal aura. 

What a story one of th ese forts could tell of the 

history of Europe in the last 170 years. If we can 

give one of them, Fort Albeck, a voice for a 

moment . .. "I am Albeck. Built on the grave of 

another fort that wa s razed by Napoleon, I have 

prot ected, destroyed, served as a haven and a 

hell. 

"I ha ve commanded this hill against Frenchmen, 

Italians, Prussians, Austrians, Englishmen and 

Americans . . . occupy me and I will serve. My 

walls have muzzled the 

outspoken, aided the 

oppressed, sheltered the poor, protected my occupants and forced my enemies to go elsewhere. 

"I, the previous for t on this site, and my 

brother forts have served Napoleon, Ludwig, 

Hindenburg, Kaiser Wilh elm, Bismark, Hitler, 

Patton Adenauer and Brandt. 1, created for death, have lived. I am happy now for 1 am more needed 

than ever. I st ill hear crying, but now it is crying 

born of r elief and joy, for today I house those who 

have no other place to go. I am their new beginning. " Captain John R. Mullin is a professional city 

planner who served as chief of master planning at 

HQUSAENGCOMEUR from June 1970 through 

July 1972. 

During that period he researched the 

14 post-Napoleonic Forts that surround Ulm, 

Bavaria and fou nd they have been at least 

periph erally involved in wars from Napole on 

through the Cold War. He left active duty as a 

captain in Decemb er, 1972 and is 

now both in the 

Reserves in Buffalo , New York and a Ph .D. 

candidate at the Univ ersity of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada 

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29 
TROOP 

TRAINING 

Captain Leonard J. Jagoda, Jr . 

R ecent legislation has introduced new laws and 

government agencies to protect our environment. These new tools will help curb the disastrous effects of poor management and help 

protect our country from being destroyed by its 

own enthusiasm. But for many areas of our 

country these efforts have come too late. An 

example of this is the effects of strip mining on our 

environment. As of 1965 the United States Bureau 

of Mines estimated that surface mining had used 

3.2 million acres of land. At least ninety per cent 

of this acreage had been mined using the 'stripmine' method. Two-thirds of this acreage requires 

reclamation. These 2.1 million acres are not only 

unsightly but an even more alarming consequence 

has been imposed on our critical water resources. 

Many of these abandoned mines leave iron sulfide 

exposed. When these sulfides mix with water they 

form sulfuric acid. which drains into our streams. 

Th e hazardous affects on these streams are not 

'immediate' in terms of time or location. The 

tributaries which have not as yet, will eventually 

disturb our larger water sheds. 

The mining industry has, in certain locations, 

reclaimed some of the land. However, even if they 

reclaim all the acreage they are presently using, 

what about the 'pr e-law' land? "Substit ution" laws 

indicate some stability but cer tainly not pr ogress! 

This situation appears on the surface to be 

beyond hope, but it may be an opportunity for 

Corps of Engineers troops to receive some truly 

meaningful training of significant value not only to 

the Ecological State-of-the-Union', and to the U. S. 

Army, but to the Corps of Engineers in particular. 

The training of heavy equipment operators 

r equires a great deal of experience if the operator 

is to become capable of successfully accomplishing 

his required tasks in combat. Current Military 

Occupational Skills (MaS) training teaches the 

individual soldier the basic required skills, but 

experience is still lacking and necessary if the 

operator is to meet required Corps of Engineer 

standards. This 'experience' frequently referred t 
as "st ick-time" must come from our unit training. 

Unit trainin g se ldom provides the number and 

ma gnitude of worthwhil e earthmoving projects 

du e to restrictions limiting the use of military 

onstr uction units in CONUS. The nex t logical 

uestion that arises is: Can the Corps of Engineers use engineer troop units for land r eclamation 

- project s, allowing the projects to serve as teaching 

ve hicles? This question stimulates a series of 

qu estions, some of which are: Does th e Corps of 

Engineer s want to get involved in land r eclamation? Can selected land reclamation projects 

pr ovide an adequate teaching vehicle? Wh ich 

policies, laws, and r egulations need be investigated? Wh at ar e th e cost considerati ons? Wh at 

coor dina tion problems would be cr eated ? Wh at 

are t he technique s bein g used by industry in this 

field ? Certainly the re are many advantages and 

disad vantages and each of the m would r equire a 

detailed investigat ion, but let us speculate on some 

of th e advantages and identify one technique in 

land r eclamation. 

From the cost asp ect it may be worth y to not e 

who is paying for land r eclam ation. 

A more popular approac h curr ently being considered 

by some compa nies is that r eclamation costs be born e as a 

portion of t heir publi c r elations and advertising costs. 

A second interest ing it em is that on April 10th , 

1972 th e state of Ohio pa ss ed a se verance ta x on 

oal, Th e t ax charges four cents per t on, and the 

onies arc to be applied t oward t he reclamation of 

'pre-law' sur face mined land . 

Clearly th e most significant ex pe ns es for land 

recl amation are th e wages of the equipment 

ope r ators and the costs of the necessary equipment. On the other hand the MOS trained 

operator/soldier s will be paid whether they are 

operating t he ir equipment or not . 

Would t he state and fed er al gover nme nts agree 

to use fed er al troops wit h fundin g assistence from 

appropriate sta te taxes for land r eclamation? 

One tec hnique used for land r eclamation could 

intluence th e cost and possibly provide another 

ecological be nefit. This method makes use of fly 

ash, an industrial waste, to neutralize acidic 

surface mined areas. 

Exper iments in reclaiming acidic su rface- mine d coal 

lands wit h raw fly as h were conducted over a t hree-yea r 

peri od by th e Burea u of Mines at two sites in Norther n 

West Virginia. Pl ots at both sites wer e treated with 

vary ing tonnages of fly as h fr om three area power plan t s 

and wer e planted with a variety of grasses, legumes , 

trees a nd shrubs. Th e greatest promise for growt h und er 

harsh soil conditions we re sh own by Ke nt ucky 31 fesc ue, 

rye and red t op gra sses a nd bird 's foot trefoil, a legum e. 

Th e fly as h was alka line by nature a nd as a res ult tend ed 

to neutra lize t he a cidic soil whi ch wa s treated. Th e fly 

as h a lso improved the texture of t he soil and improved 

th e a vailable water of the r esulting mixture. 

Th e ex peri ments demonstrated th e feasibility of
 

disp os ing of lar ge quantities of th e fly as h on surface mine
 

s poil to r eclaim th ese areas. Gr oss yields on this
 

r eclaimed land equalled or exceede d the ave rag e value s
 

for t he sta te of West Virginia.
 

Th e use of th e land after reclamation would 

indicate t he age ncies that need be involved during 

the planning phases. Some of the concerned 

agencies might be the local chapt ers of the: 

Chamber of Commerce, Fish and Game and/or 

Wildlife Commission, Forestry Service , Future 

Farmers of Am erica, Boy Scouts, and Community 

Governments. By th e nature of th eir inv olvement, 

these agen cies could influ en ce the impact of this 

ty pe of und ertaking on socie ty, and perhaps allow 

the Army, spe cifically the Corps of Engineers, to 

r eflect th e favorable image that has be en so 

elusive in this decad e. Additionally the Corps of 

Engineers might be able t o influ ence communities 

to use appropriate sites as sani t ary land fills. if the 

Cor ps were grant ed final site se lection approval 

authority. 

Projects of t his nature would sh ow the Corps of 

Engineers "active" in conserving our environment 

and fulfillin g t he necessary development of combat 

r eady for ces in a pe ace tim e sit uation. Train ing in 

t his mod e could be a vehicle to fulfill even other 

goals as this endor se r suggests. 

If our volunt eer Army Concept is to be a success we 

must initia te pr ogr ams th at will ma ke se rvice life more 

a ttractive a nd se rve to enhance th e Armies image. This 

pro gram is among othe r things, an attempt to difuse the 

a nt i-milita ry fee ling that seems to have perm eated our 

society. This a nti-milita ry feeling ha s se r ved to re duce 

re enlistments, morale, and overall, military proficien cy. 

One major probl e m that everyone is concerned with is the 

environme nt. Th is program certainl y ca n be considered 

an enviro nmenta l endeavor and as such would give a 

great deal of meaning to the young men work ing on th ese 

projects. Th e realistic training va lue would be tremend ous, a nd reenl istm ents migh t cer ta inly sky roc ket. at 

least in th e concern ed units. 

This is th e type of training that should be 

welcomed with enthus iasm. In the words of L. 

Edwin Coate, P .E., Wh ite House Fellow, E xectuve 

Office of the Presid ent, Council on Environmental 

Quality, "If En gin eers are to stay r elevan t we 

must get involved." 

Captain L eonard J. Jagoda, who only rec entl y 

comple ted the Engineer Officer Advanced Course , 

USAE S, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, is a f ormer instruc ­

tor in demolitions at the Infantry School, Fort 

Benning, Georgia. He served in Vietnam with the 

34t h Engineers (Construction) and th e 26th Engineers, 23rd Infantry Dioision. (A MER ICAL ). The 

captain is a 1968 graduate of the Engineer Officer 

Candidate School program at Fort Belvoir. 

31 
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J'l!l aptain William L udlow, chief en gineer officer 

fo r the Department of the Dakotas from 1872­

1876, was sk eptical about what othe rs labeled 

"Custer 's L uck. " Ludlow, the second son of 

General William Ludlow 's six childre n, was an 1864 

Wes t Point graduat e who in only one year of 

fighting with Sherman in the South attained the 

rank of brevet lieu tenant-colonel. His frontier 

assignm ent was the result of Generals Alfre d 

Terry 's and Custer's request fo r traine d Army 

engineers to assist in defeating the Plains Indians, 

Engineers were ne eded to build forts, de termine 

exact map positions, and overcome enqinee rmq 

f eats posed by the rugged fron tier. 

Ludlow served as chief engineer on Cust er's 

famous Black Hills E xpedition, recording his own 

view s on the lands cape, th e Indians, and Indian 

policy. He also lat er explore d and charted parts of 

Yellowstone National Park, urgin g that it be 

protected from frontier fo lk who ra vaged its 

natural wonders. In 1874, he sugges ted that forts 

in Indian country would deter the hostiles. These 

rt s did not become important until after Custer's 

'defeat at the Lit tle Big Horn in June 1876. 

L ater in his career, L udlow served as Military 

Attache in London, as Chairman of th e 1895 

Nicaragua Canal Board, and as Chief Enginee r for 

th e Distric t of Columbia. He earned a brevet star 

and line comm and during the Spanish A merican 

W ar and becam e Military Governor of Ha vana. On 

Januar y 21, 1900, he re ceived a brigadier general's 

commission in the R egular Army. Afte r formulating plans for creation of a General S taff , he left 

for the Ph ilippine Islands following the start of the 

insurre ction against U. S. rule and while there 

became se riously ill. He died on August 3D, 1901. 

His j ournal of Cust er's 1874 Black Hills E xpedition provides living descriptions of th e Plains 

environment and its changing moods. It presents 

many of the frontier's dangers and portrays 

Ludlow as a pensive man not given to rash 

judgments. Ludlow felt th e U. S. was needlessly 

pus hing the Indians into a war. He f elt that 

m iners had not disco vered quantities of gold in the 

Black Hills as the y claime d - causing the fo rtuneseekers' stampede in to lands the U. S . had granted 

th e Sioux by treaty. The journal presents, in 

esse nce , an engine er 's view of the frontie r, u. S. 

rontier po licy and its ramifications, and military 

en gineering. Th e Edit or. 

Brigadier General William Ludlow 

Ludlow's J ournal follows ­

Order s: "Captain William Ludlow, chie f enginee r of the depar tment, will r eport to Lieu tenantColonel Custer as En gineer Officer of the ex pedition. He will be accompa nied by his civil assistant 

and three enliste d men of t he En gineer Battalion." 

July 2 - The immense r eservation secured to 

the various bands of Sioux, now t he most numerous and warlike of th e nor thern tribes, by treaty 

of April 29, 1868, lies between the one hundred th 

and fourth meridian of longi tude and the Missouri 

River . 

Th is immense trac t , inclosing nearly 43,000 

square miles, the greater portion of whi ch, howeve r , is bare and ofte n arid prairi e, destitute of 

every attraction for the settler , and only capabl e of 

supporting a sca nty population of hun ters. has for 

its choicest and most valuable por tion the Black 

Hills, which lie on its western borde r. All r eports 

agreed as descr ibing t his as a moun tainous, 

heav ily-timbered tract, abounding in game, and 

containing wit hin its unexplored interior an open, 

fertile, and well-wat ered r egion. 

In case, at any future tim e, complications with 

t he Sioux or the advancing need s of bordering 

civilization should mak e it neces sary to esta blish 

military posts upon this Indi an re se rv ation, indications all pointed to th e Black Hills as the suitable 

point .. . 

33 
It was th erefore considered desirable to ga in 

positive information ... 

Our personnel consist ed of 10 companies of the 

Cavalry, one each of th e 20th and 17th Infantry, a 

detachment of Indian scouts, togeth er with the 

necessar y guides. interpreters and teamsters. 

Th ere was a total of about 1,000 men. Th e wagon 

train consisted of about 110 wagons and ambulan ces and t he artillery had but three Gatlings an d 

a 3-inch rifle. 

For sur vey ing purposes my detachmen t of six 

engineer soldie rs was employe d. Th e two se rgean ts. J ohn Beck er and Geor ge Wilson, eac h with 

one man as an assistant, kept sep arat e trails, with 

prism atic compas s and odomet er - one with an 

odometer-cart, a two-whee led ve hicle spec ially 

constr ucted for t he purpose; the other in an 

ambulance. Two odometers were r ead on eac h 

vehicle , and t he compass-notes were kept as full as 

possibl e. Two chro nometers we re carried by t he 

fift h man in a bask et whil e a r ecord of the rmometer and anero id barometer readin gs were kep t by 

the sixth man durin g t he day. 

Th e additio na l instrumen ts we re a small Wurder mann transit , No. 94. and a Sp en cer, Browning 

& Co. sextant, No. 6536. Th e ge ne ral to pography 

dur ing the day was t ake n as t horo ug hly as possible 

.. . and nigh t observ ations were mad e whe never 

practical. Th e posit ions of all bu t 10 of the camps 

were astro nomically determined . 

Th e direct course to Bear Butte, a well-kn own 

point north of the Black Hills, is south 391/2° west. 

The air-line distance is 202 miles. As it was known 

the intervening country was dry and woodl ess, 

General Custer considered t ha t his people would 

find a better road by inclining westw ard toward 

the divide east of the Little Missouri and th en 

turning south, th an by pursuing the straight 

cours e. Prairie travel r esembles trave l by sea , 

which ind eed t he landscap e not unfrequen tly 

suggests. With the comp ass as t he guide, t he 

direct course is not always the best. and the 

probabilities of finding wood, wat er, and grass, and 

a good road , comp ar e with t hose of obtaining 

favorable and moderate winds and smooth sea. 

Th e Dakot a prairies have often described , but 

their ge ne ral char acteristics may be briefly state d. 

It is a ro lling and at times a hilly country, desti tu te 

of wood, except small qua nt it ies in t he erode d 

valleys of streams cove red with shor t grass. The 

horizon is bounded everywhe re by some mor e 

dominating elev ations which constitute t he landmarks for th e traveler and are called buttes. 

Th e summer sun shines from a generally cloud y 

sky and the purity of t he a ir gives its r ays great 

power. And t he t hermometer frequently rises 

above 100° in th e sha de . Water is sca rce , and 

almost infr equent ly alkaline, even in running 

streams, from the presen ce of a sa lt which forms a 

compone nt of the clay-lik e soil. Th e rivers are 

small streams of great comp ar ative length . which. 

from absorption and evaporation, shri nk in thei 

downward course, and are fr equently dry at t he 

mouth whil e flowing fr eely a 100 or so miles above . 

Th e whole country was once r an ged ove r by 

eno rmous herds of buffalo. whose trails are 

every whe re visible, but whi ch are now se ldom or 

never found east of t he Little Misso uri . Th e only 

game anima ls inhabitin g the vast waste are 

antelopes. numbers of whi ch have been seen 

during every day's march. Th e grasshoppe r , 

having pr oved himself to be one of the most 

serious obstacles t o t he future successful colonizatio n of the count ry, is worth brief mention. 

Previous to t he departure of the expedition . . . 

the grasshopper s were ve ry numerous. I counted 

25 ODe morning on what I judged to be an average 

sq uare foot of ground. A brief calculation at t hat 

r ate would add out t o over a million to the acre. 

As they are ofte n much more numerous t ha n t hen 

obser ved, and are exceedingly rapacious. t he ir 

capacity for des truction t o living vegetation may 

be imagine d. 

In descending thr oug h t he slanting r ays of t he 

sun, grasshoppe rs resemble a fall of huge snowflak es. In one of our camps t here must have bee n 

a hundred to the sq uare foot. Th ey were crowded 

as thickly as t hey could stand upon t he ground 

and eve ry blade of grass bore several. 

July 3 - Th e course pursu ed by 

Custer wa s successfully pursued. 

July 10 - Th e . . . march wa s still west, and a 

little north, up t he valley, in which we were 

camped. Th e grasshoppers were in immense 

numbers during th ese two days. 

July 17 - During the nigh t heavy clouds and 

lightning appeared, and, toward morning, a 

sever e wind-storm r outed us from sleep and 

covere d us wit h sa nd. 

July 19 - Th e command r emained in camp. The 

distance mar ched fro m Lin coln was 292 miles, an 

average of 18 and a qua rter miles per day. Heavy 

r ain fell until 4 p.m., and th e huge camp-fires were 

a luxury all day . 

July 20 - Th e first day's journey was mad e 

into the hills. Th e te mperature was de lightful; t he 

air lad en with sw eet wild odors; t he grass 

knee-deep and exceeding ly luxuri an t and fresh; 

whil e wild cherries. blueb erri es. and gooseber ries 

abounded. as well as man y varieties of flowers. 

July 22 - The cour se led southward up the 

Redwater va lley [sic], which is from four to 10 

miles in width , boun ded by high hills hea vily 

timbe red with pine. Th e gy psum appear ed i 

enormous quant it ies . One of t he guides t ook m 

34 
off to th e righ t to se e a hug e mas s of it, crystalized 

and shining beautifully in th e sun. The Indians, for 

generations, have, in passing, split off pieces for 

ornaments, and by degrees cut a shoulder several 

eet deep on it at th e level of th e ground ... A 

avy and well-marked pony and lodge tr ail led up 

he Redwater valley sout heaste rly to the Red 

Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies. 

July 23 - The command remained in camp 

while a party started out to make the ascent of 

Inyan Kara, about five miles distant. It resembles 

a lunar moun tain, having a rim in shape of a 

horsesh oe, one and a half miles across, with an 

elevated peak rising sharply from the center. The 

rim, 1,142 feet in hei ght above th e exterior base, 

has a sh arp edge at the summit, and falls steeply 

on both sides. 

July 26 - Still ascending Floral valley, the 

divide wa s r eached, and we almost insensibly 

passed into the hills of anoth er str eam, falling 

r apidly to th e southe ast. The hills became gradually high er and the valley wider. The beav er had 

made fr equent dams, and th eir labors occasion ally 

add ed to those of the pioneer s in making a road for 

th e wagons. In th e after noon we had our first 

encounter with Indians. A village of seven lodges, 

containing 27 souls was found in t he valley. The 

men wer e away peacefully engaged in hun ting; t he 

squ aws in camp dr yin g meat, cooking, and oth er 

camp avocation s. Red Cloud' s dau ghter was th e 

wife of th e headman, whos e name was "One Stab. " 

ener al Custer wanted th em to remain and 

introduc e us to th e hills. However, we had a party 

of Rees among our scouts who were constantly at 

war with th e Sioux. This made the Sioux very 

uneasy, and tow ard nightfall they abandoned th eir 

camp and made t heir escape. Old "One Stab" was 

at headquarters when t he the flight was discover ed and wa s retained as both a guide and 

hostage. 

July 27 - The command r emained in camp, to 

give time to examin e the neighboring country. 

The gold-hunte rs were very busy all day with 

their sho vels and pans exploring the streams. 

Several surveying-parties were sen t out in various 

directions . . . The grass in places was as high as a 

horse's sh oulder. This portion of the Black Hills 

evidently never suffers fr om drought. No arid 

places are seen except on th e summits of t he limestone ledges. Springs are numerous and very cold 

and pure. Th e soil is moist, and th e vegetation is 

marvelousl y luxuriant and fresh . .. The warm 

cur rents of air from the plains conde nse as th ey 

as cend the slopes of the hills, and ar e robbed of 

their moisture in the fog, r ain, and heavy dews 

t hat occur nightly. The clouds almost invariably 

ar med in t he aft ernoon and interfered gr eatly 

ith astronomical obse rvations . 

Bloody Knife, General Custer, Captain William 

Ludlow, and standing is Trooper Private Noonan. 

July 28 - The valley below us was almost too 

marshy for the wagons ... 

Harney's Park was visible from the top of a 

high, bar e hill. The sun had just se t and in a few 

minutes we were well r ewarded for the five mile 

rid e .. . A patch of bright blood-red flame was first 

se en , lookin g like a brilliant fir e, and soon after 

that there was anoth er so far from the first it wa s 

difficult to connect the two . A portion's of the 

moon's disk soon became visible and th e origin of 

the flame was app arent. While it lasted t he sigh t 

was superb. The moon's mass looked en ormous 

and blood-re d with only portions of its surface 

visible. On the ot her hand th e clouds just abov e 

and to the left, color ed by th e flam e, resembled 

smoke drifting from an immense conflagr ation. The 

moon soon buried herself compl etely in the clouds , 

and under a r apidl y darkening sky we returned to 

camp. 

July 31 - The command r emained in camp, 

while survey parties were sent out and th e 

gold-hunter s redoubled their efforts. Escorted by 

a company of cavalry Gene ral Custer, myself, 

Professors Winch ell and Conald son and Mr. Wood, 

set out to ascend Harney ... Leaving the horses at 

the foot of th e clear granite, t he ascent was mad e 

on foot. Halting to r est and lunch, we saw another 

summit , tw o or three mile s wes t, rising high er 

t han th e one we wer e on. Reaching the summit of 

this one, still anot her , several hundred feet higher, 

and a mile mor e west, showed that we had more 

work to do. A stiff climb br ought us to th e top, 

wh ence nothing more lofty could be seen. Here we 

stood on th e most elevated portion of the hills 

some 9,700 feet abov e th e sea , except that 

alongs ide us rose a mass of granite 40 feet in 

height, with perpendicular sides that forb ad e an 

35 
attempt to sca le them without th e aid of ropes and 

ladders . .. The view was s uper b, extending over 

the intervening peaks and hills to a broad ex panse 

of prairie from north by ea st round to southwest. 

The course of the forks of the Cheyenne could 

be distinctly traced , and a dim line visible to the 

southeast was eve n th ought to be the hills of 

White River, 50 or 60 miles distant. Bear Butte, 

40-odd miles to the north , was again seen over th e 

wooded ranges , and all but Inyan Kara of the 

principal peaks were in view. Two of th e pro minent ones I ha ve names for General Terry and 

Gen eral Custer. 

Th e r eturn to camp was a st r uggle against 

almost ever y possible obstacle - rocks, creeks, 

marshes, willow and aspen t hickets, pipe timber, 

dead and fallen trees, steep hillsides and pr ecipitous ravin es . With all t he difficulties multiplied by th e darkness and only the stars for a 

guide. we still reached camp a t 1:30 a.m. 

August 2 - Command is still in camp. Th er e is 

much talk of gold and the industr ious search 

everyone is making for it. In General Custer's ten t 

I saw what the miner said he had obtained during 

the day. Und er a strong r eading-glass it r esembled small pin-heads, and fine scales of irregular 

shape , perhaps t hir ty in number. Th e min ers were 

quite condifent that if th ey could r each bed -rock in 

t he vall eys at a favorable pla ce, plenty could be 

obtained by use of the pan. 

Gen eral Custer decided to ta ke a scouting party 

south to the South Fork of the Cheyen ne, for the 

purpose of examining the int ervening count ry and 

se nd another party eastward, following the creek 

wh ere we we r e encampe d to its juncti on with th e 

same stream. Th ese two ex plor at ions would cove 

considerable country and complete th e examin 

tion of the sout h and southeast portion of the hills. 

August 3 - Th e headquarters, with five 

compa nies of cav alry and a few pa ck-mules started 

on the r econn aissan ce. Lieutenant Richard Godfr ey, with an es cort of two compani es, left at th e 

same time to follow down the creek. Th e headquart ers trail led south and southwest through 

park country, until it r eached the he ad of a creek 

that flowed so ut hw ardly. This was pursued all 

day, leading us at first into a narrow valley, 

hem med in by th e wooded hills. Th e characte r of 

th e countr y changed gradually as we went sout h. 

Th e vall ey grew broad er, the hills lower, grass 

drier, and timber mor e and more sca rce . . . 

Emergin g fro m this into smoother country, we 

halted for t he nigh t a few miles fr om the Sout h 

Fork after accomplishing a march of 45 miles. No 

instrumen ts were take n on this trip, as t he column 

moved without wagons and the sextant was 

needed in the permanen t camp. 

George Re ynolds, a white scout, was dispatched lat e at nigh t with t he mail. He had about 

75 miles in an airline to mak e it to Laram ie alone, 

thro ug h country infested wit h Indi an s. He als o 

had t he additional disad vantage of crossing thei 

probabl e ro utes at ri gh t angles where he coul 

suddenl y run across t hem. We were gre atl y 

reli eved to learn aft erward tha t his trip had been 

successfully mad e, thoug h not with out privation. 

Augu st 6 - Camp was broken for the r eturn 

trip. General Custer decided that inst ead of going 

eastwar d on the prairie to partly retrace his st eps 

and examine the practicality of trying a route 

nor th ward thro ugh th e hills whi ch would br ing us 

out somewhere near Bear Butte. This plan would 

complete t he examination of them . . . A heavy 

thunder stor m came up during th e night and the 

echoes among the hills were exc eedingly grand. 

August 7 - The storm of the night be fore had 

swelled the br ooks but t he old trail furnish ed a 

good road . .. Two grizzly bears were killed near 

this camp and the first gr asshoppers seen in the 

hills in any numbers were swarming in both creek 

valleys. 

August 11 - Whil e General Custer made 

explor ati on for a road eas twar dly, I r eturned to 

the camp of the day befor e with a surveyin g-party 

to mea sure a base line and locate th e impor tan t 

elevations with a transit . . . Re turning to camp. I 

found that se veral elk had been killed during th 

da y by the hunters. 

36 
August 13 - Lieutenant Godfrey was dispatched down the creek to determine its course 

and ascertain his position from bearings to Bear 

Butte and Harney after clearing the hills. 

August 14 - The scorching sun and hot, dry 

eath of the prairie, covered with yellow grass, 

ore instant witness to the change in our former 

surr oundings. Th e coolness of air and freshness of 

vegetation, the abundance of pure, cold water, the 

noble, camp -fires, and quantities of game that had 

made our stay in the hills a daily delight, 

compelled us to contrast it with the dry, dusty 

journeys, the warm alkaline water, and scanty 

wood which awaited us on the return march of 

over 3,800 miles. 

August 16 - When crossing the Belle Fourche 

we found it to be a rapid stream, in a shaley and 

gravelly bed, 80 feet wide and a foot deep; the 

banks low, and cottonwood abundant. We met 

four Chey enne Indians enroute to the agencies 

from the hostile camp on Tongue River who 

reported that Sitting Bull was preparing to 

intercept us at the Short Pine Hills with 5,000 

warriors. 

August 20 - Traveled north and west across 

several heads of Grand River, and over a rolling 

prairie, which had been burned by the Indians to 

harrass our march. We could find no camp on the 

prairie because it was black as far to the 

northward as the eye could see . This forced us to 

make a rapid descent into the valley of the Little 

Missouri, where we found wood, water, and grass 

among the bad lands. 

August 23 - The course was north and east, 

over a high rolling prairie, until we encountered 

the Yellowstone expedition trails .. . 

August 30 - Fort Lincoln was reached at 4:30 

p.m ., of August 30, the 60th day of the trip. The 

wagon-train had traveled 883 miles, and, adding 

the various reconnaissances, we had surveyed a 

total of 1,205 miles. 

No matter what may ultimately be determined 

as to how much precious metal is in the Black Hills 

from the evidence that was gathered on the trip I 

conclude there is little. The real wealth and value of 

the country is, beyond doubt, very great. Utterly 

dissimilar in character to the remaining portion of 

the territory in which it lies, its fertility and 

freshn ess, its variety of resource and delightful 

climate, the protection it affords both against the 

torrid heats and artie storms of the neighboring 

prairies, will ev entually make the Black Hills the 

home of a thronging population. 

To this, however, the final solution of the 

Indian question is an indispensable preliminary. 

The region is cherished by the owners both as 

hunting-grounds and asylum. The more far ­

sighted have anticipated the time when hunting 

buffalo, which is now the main subsistence of the 

wild tribes, will no longer suffice. So they are 

looking forward to settling in and abou t the Black 

Hills as their future permanent home. There they 

will await the gradual extinction of their race 

which is their fate. For these reasons, no occupation of this region by whites will be tolerated ... 

Hostile incursions would not be infrequent, nor an 

occasional massacre unlikely, and these are conditions unfavorable to a rapid and permanent 

increase of population. The Indians have no 

country farther west to which they can migrate ... 

Ludlow had great vision but the Indians have 

retained much of their land in the Black Hills. And 

although a century has passed since Ludlow made 

his observation, the American Indian is far from 

extinct as a race. 

Eugene V. McAndrews, an authoritative source 

on the hietori; of the Medal of Honor, was a historian, Office of the Chief of Engineers, US Arrny, 

Baltimore, Md. Mr. McAndrews considers his 

collection of historical material, diaries and memorabilia of us Army winners of the Medal of Honor 

among the most complete in existence. Credit ed 

'with a B.A . in history from Carroll College, 

Helena, Mont., and an M.A. from th e University of 

Oregon, Eugene, Ore., he is presently preparing a 

Ph.D. dissertation for Kansas State University, 

Manhattan, Kansas. 

37 
''"1'' I 

SWORDSINl 

PLOWSH~R€S!

"The introduc tion of powe r mechinery, such as steam shovels 

during railway construction in the 

last century and large earthmoving 

plants, such as D8 tractors and 12 

cubic yard scoops in the late 1930's, 

brough t about a change in sc

Excavations of some hundreds of 

fee t in depth became relatively 

common. In effec t, the scale of 

eve ryday construction was increased tenf old. The Plowshare 

dev ices at present available show 

up at scales ten times greater 

again." 

ThUS was the enhancement of man's ability to 

change the earth with nucl ear explosives as 

described a decade ago. Two events, the development of a thermonuclear explosive device and th e 

establishment of the Plowshare Program in Livermore, California in 1957, provided the genesis of a 

t esting and evaluation program that has awakened 

scient ists and engineers to the possibility of usin g 

nucl ear ex plosives for pe aceful purposes. As could 

be re adil y ima gin ed , a major limitation on th e 

employm ent of nuclear devic es is the ir great 

power potential, not their lack of it . 

Engineers tod ay for esee th e possibility of using 

nuclear de vices in three genera l ar eas: mineral 

and gas exploitatio n, vast und erground storage 

ar eas, and massiv e constr uction project s. 

By far, th e most productive work to da te has 

been in t he ar ea of mineral and gas ex ploitat ion. It 

is well known that the Unit ed States will face a 

cr itical shor tage of natural gas within this decade. 

Already in some ar eas industries and homebuilders 

are rest ricted in their installation of equipment or 

ap pliances r equiring natural gas as a fuel. Tests 

have been conducted and are under way that could 

provide the basis whereby the nation's useable 

natural gas r eserves would be markedly increased. 

Th e use of und erground nuclear detonations in 

ar eas previously too difficult t o tap is now 

economically feasible. Of interest to the militar y 

enginee r is th e possibility of using ther monuclear 

devices to creat e quarries large enough to support 

massive construction projects. 

Much investigative work and experimentation 

has been devoted to determine th e feasibility of 

usin g nucl ear explosiv es t o construct transport ation facilities by excavation. Applications of nuclear ex plosive exca vations could range an ywhere 

from a transithsmian canal in Central Am erica t 

th e constructi on of a de ep water harbor on alma 

any coast . Nucl ear devic es also could be detonated 

deep underground to provide reservoirs for water 

stor age or solid waste disposal. 

Th e effects of blast, ground shock, and nuclear 

r adiati on limi t the employment of nucl ear devices 

in cons tr uction projects. Th e specific limits are 

fairly well defined , and the information concerning 

t hem is availabl e in Atomic Energy Commission 

publications. The primary limitations to the use of 

nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes ar e 

politi cal. Th e nucl ear test ban treaty and local 

popular concern ar e two major restrictions. But 

with th e energy crisis mounting each pa ssing day 

it would seem likely that these restrictions will be 

lifted. 

It is likel y t hat underground nucl ear explosions 

will be used t o relea se na tural ga s deposits in this 

decad e. Use of nucl ear expl osiv es for surface 

enginee ring is possible and economi cally feasible. 

Scien ce and engineeri ng have give n us th e 

capabilit y of turning our nuclear swor ds int o 

plowshares. 

Captain Jam es L. K eener is a graduate of the 

Engineer Officer A dvanced Course at Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia. 

38 
The Combat Engineer System Program Review 

(CESPR) was conducted at Fort Belvoir, Virginia last April. Each year a series of System 

Program Reviews are conducted for the Vice Chief 

of Staff of the Army. These reviews cover specific 

areas of interest such as aviation, infantry, signal, 

9r artillery. 

The purpose of the System Program Reviews is 

to provide the Vice Chief of Staff and other senior 

Department of the Army officials an overview of a 

particular Army system. These reviews are not 

intended to be decision briefings; rather they 

provide a forum where attendees can contribute 

their ideas and air their views on the system under 

consideration. 

The 1973 CESPR was the first review of the 

combat engineer system. The one-day event was 

attended by over 40 general officers and key 

civilian officials. Engineer general officers from 

the DA Staff and major commands were among 

those attending the review. The full day of 

activity at Fort Belvoir included eight forma] 

presentations and two demonstrations. 

Lieutenant General Fred E. Clarke then Chief 

of Engineers, welcomed the participants to CESPR 

and stated that the objective was to "stimulate 

discus suion and receive guidance on those engineer 

actions required to increase the mobility, survivability. effectiveness. and combat power of the 

Army." 

General Clarke indicated that a major concern 

on the engineers is that "we may not be keeping 

up with the rest of the Army, particularly in 

mobility." He pointed out that while strategic 

39 
40
 
mobility has increased by a factor of 50 and 

battlefield mobility by a factor of 20, the engineers' 

capability to enhance mobility has not increased 

accordingly. He noted that significant advances in 

cti cal bridging have been made with the developent of the ribbon bridge and medium-girder 

ridge, but that countermine warfare capability 

has not increased significantly. 

The thread of resources tied CESPR together. 

A viewgraph showed the engineer slice of the 

PEMA (Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, 

Army) pie to have averaged about five percent 

over the last decade - not a lot of money for a 

branch that contributed significantly to improving 

and maintaining the Army's fighting power and 

has historically made up over 10 percent of the 

Army. 

Army-wide information and expertise was 

sou ght and utilized at CESPR. The directorate of 

Military Engineering and Topography of the Office 

of the Chief of Engineers had primary responsibility for the planning and coordination of the 

many diverse efforts that went into CESPR 

pres entations. The briefers were drawn from 

outside of OCE as well as from within. Outside 

ag encies included the Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Intelligence (ACSI), the former Combat Developments Command, now part of TRADOC and the 

Engineer School, the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Personnel (DCSPER), as well as the Army Mariel Command . 

The two demonstrations that were conducted 

- during CESPR included a morning demonstration 

using a combat engineer company with additional 

supporting equipment from the battalion headquarters, the light equipment and bridge companies assembled in a "D" formation. The demonstration vividly emphasized several points that 

could not have been so uniquely made in formal 

briefings. The afternoon equipment display was a 

roll-by of a construction engineer company and its 

augmenting equipment from the battalion headquarters. 

The acute need to develop and implement an 

integrated countermine capability doctrine was 

noted and it was emphasized that doctrine for 

command and control of scatterable min es remains 

to be developed. It also was noted that the key to 

improved cam ouflage discipline is command interest and individual training. It has been stated 

that further examination of repair parts support 

for low-density equipment is warranted. 

Experts agreed with a key point made in the 

base development presentation that more realistic 

construction standards must be established for the 

ase Development Plans presently being prear ed. The excellent results of the Commercial 

Constuction Equipment (CCE) program were 

noted and the continued infusion of this was 

endorsed as the way to go. Finally, the need to 

place engineer representation on several of the key 

Army programing and planning groups such as the 

Material Procurement Priorities Review Committee (MPPRC) and the Research and Development Board was emphasized. 

The first CESPR proved a valuable experience 

for the Army Engineers. CESPR required considerable preparation and hence compelled the 

engineer community to come together to define 

objectives and priorities. CESPR has successfully 

put engineer concerns and problems before the 

most important men in the Army, resulting in a 

better appreciation of engineer problems by Army 

leaders at the highest levels. Seeds were planted 

at CESPR and the fruits of the trees to grow will 

continue to be harvested for many years hence in 

the form of improved engineer understanding and 

decision at higher levels. The continuation of 

Engineer System Reviews is essential to insure 

exposure of high-level officials to engineer problems as they develop. It is anticipated that the 

next CESPR will be conducted in April 1975. 

Captain Walter J. Wells 1$ presently assigned 

as a senior analyst in the Engineer Strategic 

Studies Group (ESSG). While at ESSG he has 

worked on a number of significant studies which 

dealt with the organization and equipment for 

major enginee r unit s in the near future. Prior 

assignments include command in Korea, Fort 

Belvoir and Vietnam as well as experience in the 

Sacramento Engineer District. Captain Wells 

graduated from WestPoint in 1965 and served two 

years in the armor branch before transferring to 

the Engineers. He is a graduate of EOA C and 

obtained a Mast ers degree in Civil Engineering 

Management from Purdue University in January 

1972. 

Captain Jam es L. Campbell is currently with 

the Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Office of 

the Chief of Engineers. Prior to this assignment, 

Captain Campbell served with the Lines of Communication Division of the US Army Engineer 

Command, Vietnam. A previous tour of duty in 

RVN as a company commander with the 589th 

Engineer Battalion (Construction) provided him 

with first hand construction experience. Other 

highlights of his military career include assignments as a platoon leader and company commander with the 54th Engine er Battalion (Combat) 

in Germany. He r eceiv ed a B.S. degree from the 

South Dakota School of Mines and a Masters 

degr ee from Texas A & M University. He is also a 

graduate of the Engineer Officer Advanced 

Course. 

41 
s long as Alask a remains an integral part of the AUnited States of Ameri ca possessing natural 

resources and strategic importance, elements of 

t he U.S. Army and th e Corps of Engineers will be 

in dir ect contact with th e debilitating temper atures of the subarctic cold. 

Winter lasts for about eight months in Alaska. 

During that time, one might experience 166 inches 

of accumulated snowfall; 156 consecutive days 

below 32 degrees fahrenheit; temperatures dropping 40 degrees in one hour after a day of two 

hours sunlight. Longtime r esidents of these extremes point out that the harsh weather is nothing 

to fear. However, it is never to be disrespected. 

With these thoughts in mind, consider the abysmal 

differ ence between operating equipment in Alask a 

as opposed to Fort Belvoir , Birginia. The challenge is peculiar and distinct. 

Colder weather brings increasing impact on t he 

importance of maintenance at all levels. particular ­

ly oper ator maintenance . It is no r evelation that 

water fr eezes at temp eratures below 32 degr ees 

fa hre nheit. Fluctua ting temperatur es ca use 

noticably poor er performance in vehicles due to 

the condensed moisture in fuel lines which subsequently fre ezes. F ailure to drain the fuel 

filters or fill fuel ta nks each night invariably 

results in inoperable equipment. Antifreeze must 

be add ed to the fuel as well as t he cooling syste m. 

Condensation occur s r eadily in t he engine compartment where temperatures normally r each 200 

Captain Thomas J. Quigley 

degrees. The night temperatures often excee d 

-60 degrees. cooling each vehicle as much as 260 

degrees. 

Motor vehicles equipped with wint erization kits 

have a gasoline fir ed heater in the cab. The. 

heaters can dire ct heat to the engine or th 

passenger compartment. Prior to starting the 

engine in the cold the crankcase oil must be heated 

since its viscosity decreases decidedly in cold 

weather. The battery's efficiency is also halved. 

These two factors coupled with the refusal of the 

fuel to atomize and combust makes starting an 

engine difficult. Noncumbusted fuel accumulation 

can result in hydrostatic lock in diesel engines or 

dilution of the crankcase oil in gasoline engines. 

Hydrostatic lock ocurs when too much fuel is 

r etained in the cylinder which prevents the piston 

from traveling to top dead center, possibly br eaking th e piston or the head. Similarly, in gasoline 

engines, uncombusted fuel may wash down th e 

cylinder walls and dilu te th e cr ankcase oil which 

r edu ces proper lubrication when the engine is 

subseq uently started. 

Away from the engine. other pr oblems may 

arise . Wise use of the gas personnel heater must 

be stressed. Natur ally any fuel combusting 

pro cess produces carbon monoxide. Ventilation is 

a must. Defrosters cannot be dir ected on the 

winsh ield until it is heated by the ambient 

temperature of th e cab, or the gla ss will cr ack due 

to the rapid change in t emperatur e. 

Refueling can present problems to th e care less. 

42 
A five gallon can of fuel is a definite threat of 

stbite to the unaware. This threat was best 

rlustrated to newcomers in the form of a short 

__ tory of three soldiers who were having a great 

time administering themselves doses of "antifreeze" until their supply dwindled. One remembered his bottle under the seat of his car outside. 

He dashed out in the sub-zero temperatures, 

retreived the stock and rushed back inside. To the 

praise of all he uncaped the bottle, took a great 

swallow, and was abruptly reminded that alcohol 

does not freeze at -40 degrees, unlike the interior 

of his mouth. Booze, like fuel, remains liquid at all 

naturally occuring cold temperatures and can 

freeze human skin on contact. 

While operating in the field in the absence of 

warm storage facilities the cold and accompanying 

chill factor tends to "colds oak" vehicles in approximately three hours, rendering them impossible to 

start. The only remedy to this lies in a procedure 

of starting each vehicle on a two hour interval, 

allowing them to warm up, then shutting them off 

after 20 minutes. This procedure is a 24 hour task 

that must be observed to maintain ready vehicles. 

Another bothersome phenomenon resulting 

from frigid temperatures is ice fog, formed at 

minus 29 degrees by frozen particles of moisture 

spended in the air. It is similar to ordinary fog 

nd decreases visibility proportionally. Moisture is 

readily produced as a by-product of combustion in 

engines and therefore can be expected to remain in 

the area of operations and present a hazard to 

movement. In tactical situations it acts as a dead 

giveaway of concealed positions. The wind rarely 

blows in the interior of Alaska during cold snaps 

making ice fog a problem. Thus, the speed of 

motor movements must be reduced . 

Engineer equipment such as bulldozers must be 

expecially cared for during nonuse in the field. A 

living example presented itself when, after the 

day's clearing operation ceased, the dozer was 

parked near the bivouac in the muskeg. Next 

morning a herman-nelson heater was directed on 

the engine to preheat the D-8. After the engine 

was started and allowed to warm, the operator 

engaged the clutch and first gear only to have the 

engine nearly stall while the dozer remained 

immobile. During the night the dozer had frozen 

to the ground! An enterprising squad leader 

insisted the operator put the transmission and 

transfer in the lowest combination, raise the idle 

and pop the clutch. Naturally the weakest link of 

the chain gave, in this case, the transmission. 

Similarly reverse gear also failed. 

The result of the underestimation of mother 

natures forces was an immobile dozer stuck to the 

ground. The situation was eventually solved by 

erecting a GP medium tent over the dozer, heated 

and supervised by our favorite squad leader. From 

that location the D-8 was eventually hauled away 

to depot maintenance. The waste in time, equipment and money could have been prevented by 

merely parking the dozer on logs or other non-frost 

suseptible material. 

Armed with the knowledge of these few perils 

of cold weather operations and a healthy respect 

for the forces nature has at its disposal. a unit 

commander or maintenance officer will be able to 

gauge the capability of his unit and the possible 

problem areas cold weather may present. Emphasized above all is the fact that the soldier must 

endure the extreme elements as well as his 

equipment. Advance planning and thorough forethought will pave the way for successful completion of the mission. 

Captain Thomas J. Qu.igley is a graduate of the 

Engineer Officer Advanced Cours e at Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia. He also is an ROTC graduate of Eastern 

Washington State College and has served a tour in 

Korea with the 36th Engineer Group (Combat) and 

was Detachment Commander of the 109th Engineer Battalion (Combat ROKA). Later the Captain 

served as Maintenance Officer, 8-4 Officer, and 

Commanding Officer of Company A, 808th Engineer Battalion (Construction) Fort Wainwright, 

Alaska. 

43 
SENIOR NCOs SUPERVISE 80 PERCENT 

OF ARMY PERSONNEL RESOURCES 

THE REQUIREMENT FOR NCOES stems directly from the basic needs of the U. S. Army for more 

effective leadership, at all levels. The senior noncommissioned officer supervises or controls 

approximately 80 percent of the Army personnel resources. He is, therefore, the key man in the 

m ili ta ry management structure. The success of the NCO depends on his technical knowledge as well 

as his ability to effectively direct people toward an assigned objective. The senior NCO has been 

fu lf ill ing his role as "backbone of the Army." Over the years, he has been the doer, and the price 

exacted has been in terms of his progressive professional development. Today's Modern Volunteer 

Army cannot deny the importance of tradition in the military service but neither can today's leaders 

dispute the need for enlightened leadership, personalized to the individual and the situation, balanced 

by professiona lism and confidence. 

EOAC OFFERS STUDENTS ELECTIVES 

FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

IT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED that the varied needs and interests of individuals enrolled in 

each of the professional development courses at the US Army Engineer School cannot be 

accommodated by an inflexible core curriculum. One partial solution to this problem is the continual 

modification of a program of instruction to reflect both the generalized changed requirements of ­

changing student population and the revised job requirements of course graduates. Another solutio 

is the partial individualization of a program of instruction by providing a heterogeneous group 0 ', 

students with a series of elective optlons , the student is afforded an opportunity to complement a core 

curri culu m with courses or programs which suit his desires. 

LEONARD WOODIS 4TH AIT BRIGADE 

LAUNCHES TWO NEW COURSES 

AND CHANGES TWO OLD ONES 

T HE 4TH ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING (A1T) Brigade at Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri 

which has long been the major source of highly trained construction engineers has started two new 

courses and changed two of its old ones. The two courses added are the Plumbers Course, 51 K20, and 

Electricians Course, 51 R20. In the past the Army has had to rely on civilian school or on-the-job 

trained plumbers and electricians. These two new Courses should eliminate the Army's shortage of 

tra ined personnel in these MOSs. One of the courses being changed is the CSOC (Crane Shovel 

Operators Course). The Crane Shovel Operators Course has been split to allow training in two MOSs, 

62F20 and 62F30. The 62F20 course trains personnel in handling material using a hook block. These 

personnel are designated Crane Operators. The other course will orient personnel in handling 

materia Is but will tra in them in the use of construction attachements for the crane. Graduates wi II 

be designated 62F30, Crane Shovel Operators. Both MOSs will allow progression through grade of 

E-5 without change in MOS sk ill level designation. The other course that is being changed is the 

Engineer Equipment Maintenance Apprentice Course. The change affects the kind of courses being 

taught. Instead of being taught the maintenance of each piece of equipment, they are being taught 

maintenance of engines, power trains, brakes, etcetera as a system. A crawler tractor may be 

different from a scooploader but the principles will remain the same. All indications are that the ne 

approach will provide a better trained engineer mechanic to the field. 

I 

44 
MANY EM ARE ELIGIBLE 

TO ATTEND ENCOES 

MEMBERS OF THE ACTIVE ARMY or of a Reserve Component in the grade of E4 with less than 

eight years service or E5 w ith less than 12 years service who have demonstrated leadership potential 

for noncommissioned officer positions are eligible to attend the ENCOES Basic Course provided they 

are qualified in one of the listed prerequisite MOS's, have an MOS test score of 100 or more, and 13 

months or more of active duty service remaining upon completion of the course. No security 

clearance is required. There is a one time eligibility as E3 at completion of Advanced Individual 

Training (AIT). Individuals who are selected for MOS training in an MOS that is a prerequisite for 

this course and who demonstrate exceptional leadership abilities during Basic Combat Training (BCT) 

and AIT may be selected to attend ENCOB immediately after AlT. These are the prerequisite MOS 

for ENCOB: 12A10, 12B20, 12B30, 12C20, 12C30, 12020, 12E20, 12F20, 51A10, 51 B20, 51C20, 51C30, 

51020, 51F20, 51G20, 51J20, 51J30, 51L20, 51M20, 51N20, 51R20, 52A10, 81AlO, 81B20, 82A10, 82B20, 

62020, 62E20, 62F20, 62F30, 62G20, 62G30, 62H20, 62J20, 62J30, 62K20, 62L20, 62M20, 64B20, 81C20, 

51Q20, 81020, 81030, 41 B20, 41 B30, 82A10, 82D20, 82D30, 82E20, 82E30, 83A10, 83D20, 83E20, 83F20, 

41 K20, 52B20, 52B30, 52C20, 52D20, 62B10, 62B20, 62B30, 62C20, and 62C30. 

EPD ESTABLISHES CAREER ORIENTED 

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR EM 

,E ENLISTED PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE is in the process of establishing a career oriented 

nanagement system similar to the system that is used by the Officer Personnel Directorate. Within 

this new career management organization - Management of Enlisted Careerist Centrally 

Administered - assignments will be made in accordance with specific career management guidlines 

and objectives for each military occupational specialty. As an integral part of this program three 

levels of military education have been established under the Non-Commissioned Officer Education 

System - Basic, Advanced, and Senior. The NCOES Advanced and Senior Courses will be viewed 

with equal importance for enlisted personnel as the Command and General Staff College and Wa r 

College courses, respectively, are viewed for officers. 

LOSING COMMAND MUST FURNISH 

EACH OFFICER LOCALLY REPRODUCED 

COPY OF HIS OER 

ONE NEW AND SIGNIFICANT provision of the new Officer Evaluation Report (OER) system is that 

each officer will receive a locally reproduced copy of his completed OER (DA Form 67-7). In some 

cases, however, the OE R is not completed until after he departs to a new assignment. It is the 

responsibility of the losing command to forward a copy of the OER to his new address. This system 

is not perfect because the report can get lost after it is forwarded. Individuals should query their old 

command after a reasonable time has elapsed to determine if a copy was, in fact, forwarded. If the 

report was forwarded but "lost" in the mail, the unit personnel officer should be able to furnish 

another copy. He is required to keep a copy for 120 days after the cutoff date of the reporting period. 

To minimize the chance of not receiving his copy of the OER, each individual should make sure he 

provides his personnel officer an accurate forwarding address prior to departing the command. 

lso, it should be noted that under the new OE R system, appeal action must be initiated prior to the 

econd anniversary of that report. 

45 
ENGINEER) 

ARE: . 

PP

'BIRTHDAV! 1775-19