N OTE : This order is nonprecedential

. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

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In re : ZHEJIANG CRYSTAL

- OPTECH CO. LTD., Petitioner

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2023

- 111

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:21

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cv

- 00378

- JRG, Chief Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap.

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ON PETITION

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Before D YK , R EYNA , and C HEN , Circuit Judges

. D YK , Circuit Judge

. O R D E R
Zhejiang Crystal

- Optech Co. Ltd. (“Crystal”) petition s for a writ of mandamus directing the United States District Court for the Eastern District of T exas to vacate its order denying Crystal’s motion to transfer and transfer the caseto the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Viavi Solutions Inc. (“Viavi”) opposes. For the following reasons, we deny the petition

. Vi avi sued Crystal in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging that Crystal was actively inducing others to infring e three of i ts patents. Viavi’s complaint a sserts that Crystal, Case: 23-111 Document: 18 Page: 1 Filed: 03/01/2023IN RE : ZHEJIANG CRYSTAL

- OPTECH CO

. LTD

. 2

a foreign

- based corporation

, was subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Texas b ecause it knowingly sold the accused optical filter products with theexpectation that they would be incorporated into mobile devices that would be sold in Texa s

. Appx031.
Crystal moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Crystal also moved to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Northern District of California, though Crystal “dispute[d] that it is subject to personal jurisdiction by any United St ates District Court.” Appx183

. The district court denied both motion s. It first found that“Crystal, through its sales of Filters for application in Samsung Galaxy phones, knew (or should have reasonably known) the likely destination of the products, an d their conduct and connections with the forum state were such that they should reasonably have anticipated being brought into court here.” Appx010. On that basis, the court denied Crystal’s motion to dismiss.

As to § 1404(a)

, t he court found that Crys tal had failed to establish the threshold requirement that the action “might have been brought” in the Northern District of California

, noting Crystal ’s own insistence that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction the re and explaining that it was “not n ecessarily true” that personal jurisdiction in Northern California would follow from i ts reasoning as to why jurisdiction existed in the Eastern District of Texas

. Appx012. In the alternative, the court analyzed the private and public interest factors th at govern transfer determinations and concluded that Crystal had failed to establish that the Northern District of California was clearly more convenien t

. Crystal then filed this petition challenging only the district court’s no

- transfer determination.
We follow regional circuit standards governing motions under § 1404(a). See In re TS Tech USA Corp ., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under Fifth Circuit l aw, Crystal, as the § 1404(a) movant, b ore the burden of Case: 23-111 Document: 18 Page: 2 Filed: 03/01/2023IN RE : ZHEJIANG CRYSTAL

- OPTECH CO

. LTD

. 3

demonstrating that transfer was appropriate

. See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc ., 545 F.3d 304, 31 4 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)

. Our limited task here is to determine whether the district court clearly abused its discretion in concluding that Crystal failed to satisfy that burden

. See In re Juniper Networks, Inc. , 14 F.4th 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

We see no such clear abuse. Crystal insists that the district court’s finding that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Texas also compels the conclusion that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California. Pet. at 7. But th e core premise of Crystal’s petition— that the court relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to conclude that personal jurisdiction exists , Pet. at 11; Reply at 3— is wrong

. T he district court indicated that its conclusion was based

on an analysis of Crystal’s “connections with the forum state,” i.e., Texas, Appx010, a s opposed to its contacts with the United States as a whole. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) ( establishing personal jurisdiction only where “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction”). Because Crys tal has not otherwise clearly shown that this case “might have been brought” in the transferee forum, we deny its mandamus petition.
Accordingly

, I T I S O RDERED T HAT : The petition is denied.

March 1 , 202 3 Date F OR THE C OURT

/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner Peter R. Marksteiner Clerk of Court Case: 23-111 Document: 18 Page: 3 Filed: 03/01/2023