U.S. ARMY

IN THE

COLD WAR

BUILDING FOR PEACE

U.S. ARMY ENGINEERS IN EUROPE

1945–1991
U.S. Army in the Cold War

BUILDING FOR PEACE

U.S. ARMY ENGINEERS IN EUROPE

1945–1991

by

Robert P. Grathwol

Donita M. Moorhus

Center of Military History

and 

Corps of Engineers

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2005

01Front(634).indd i 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Grathwol, Robert P., 1939–

 Building for peace : U.S. Army engineers in Europe, 1945–1991 / Robert 

Grathwol, Donita M. Moorhus.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 1. United States. Army. Corps of Engineers—History. 2. Reconstruction (1939

1951)—Europe. I. Moorhus, Donita M., 1942– II. Title. 

UG23.G73 2005

358.4’73’0973—dc2

CMH Pub 45–1–1

01Front page ii_soft cover withoi i 
iii

Contents

Chief Historian

Chief, Histories Division

Editor in Chief

Jeffrey J. Clarke

Richard W. Stewart

Keith R. Tidman

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) John S. Brown, Chief of Military History

U.S. Army in the Cold War Series

Jeffrey J. Clarke, General Editor

Advisory Committee

(As of October 2005)

Jon T. Sumida

University of Maryland

Col. Lance Betros

U.S. Military Academy

Col. Robert Dalessandro

U.S. Army War College

Adrian R. Lewis

University of North Texas

Brian M. Linn

Texas A&M University

John H. Morrow, Jr.

The University of Georgia

Sean D. Naylor

Army Times

Reina Pennington

Norwich University

Steven A. Raho

Records Management and 

Declassification Agency

Col. Timothy R. Reese

U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College

Ronald H. Spector

The George Washington University

James T. Stensvaag

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command

Brig. Gen. Volney Warner

U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College

James H. Willbanks

U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College
01Front(634).indd iv 
v

Contents

FOREWORD

Most of the large wars between the end of World War II in 1945 

and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were fought in 

Asia and the Middle East. Europe, where no war was fought, 

ironically was the epicenter of the Cold War. The stakes were 

highest there for both sides as two fundamentally opposed ideologies and 

political systems confronted each other across the so-called Iron Curtain. 

Both sides saw war in Europe as an Armageddon that could bring total 

victory or catastrophic defeat, and both sides focused and shaped their 

strategies and military forces to fight that war. By the time the Cold War 

ended in 1989 with the destruction of the Berlin Wall—the Iron Curtain 

incarnate—both sides had spent huge sums of money and devoted vast 

human resources to preparing for a war that never came.

A major fraction of the resources expended during the Cold War were 

devoted to the physical infrastructure that housed, trained, fed, armed, 

protected, and diverted the soldiers of the United States and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for almost half a century. The U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers played a central role in building and maintaining that infrastructure. This history examines the engineers’ work in 

detail, chronicling their design and construction activities in support of 

the U.S. and NATO forces that stood on the front lines of the Cold War.

Building for Peace tells the story of the often unglamorous but nevertheless critical missions of engineer officers and civilians and private contractors. It reflects the twists and turns of the Cold War’s history and the 

effect these had on the engineering itself. Engineers, like their counterparts in other branches and services, worked tirelessly and often against 

great odds to defend the West. 

CARL A. STROCK JOHN S. BROWN

Lieutenant General, USA Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)

Chief of Engineers Chief of Military History
vi

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

THE AUTHORS

I

n 1988 Robert P. Grathwol, Ph.D., and Donita Moorhus formed a partnership to conduct historical research and provide services in organizational development. They are coauthors of Berlin and the American 

Military, A Cold War Chronicle (1999); American Forces in Berlin, Outpost 

of the Cold War, 1945–1994 (1994); and Oral History and Postwar GermanAmerican Relations: Resources in the United States (1997, with Douglas J. 

Wilson). They are also are coauthors of “Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Military Construction in the Mediterranean and 

Middle East, 1947–1991.” 

Grathwol has more than thirty years of experience as a professional 

historian and publishing scholar. He has worked extensively with archival documents in Europe, as well as in the National Archives, federal 

records centers, and the Library of Congress. He taught twentieth century 

European history at Washington State University, Johns Hopkins School 

of Advanced International Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and the 

University of Arkansas. Academic publications include Stresemann and the 

DNVP and numerous scholarly articles and book reviews in both English 

and German. Grathwol studied in France on a Fulbright Scholarship and 

spent two years as an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Research 

Fellow in Germany. He holds a Diplôme Supérieur from the Centre des 

Hautes Études Européennes, Université de Strasbourg, and a Ph.D. from 

the University of Chicago. 

Donita Moorhus is an oral historian, researcher, and writer. In addition to managing several historical research projects, she has written 

historical reports on the activities in Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, 1988–1992 and 1992–1996. For the U.S. Army Criminal 

Investigation Command (USACIDC), she was coauthor of the “Annual 

Historical Review, Fiscal Years 1991–1992,” the “Annual Historical Review, 

Fiscal Years 1992 through 1995,” and sole author of a “Historical Report 

of the Investigations of Sexual Misconduct in the Army, September 1996 

through July 1997.” Ms. Moorhus has interviewed senior officers of the 

U.S. military, civilians in government service, members of Congress, 

business leaders, foreign nationals, and journalists. She has an M.S. from 

Fordham University.
vii

Contents

PREFACE

This book traces the activities of the American military engineers 

in Europe from the construction that began immediately after the 

end of the war in 1945, through the increase in construction necessitated by the buildup of American troops during the Cold War, 

to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The book would not exist 

if not for the forethought of Maj. Gen. James W. “Bill” Ray, commander 

of the Europe Division of the Army Corps of Engineers in the mid-1980s, 

who set aside funds for a history of the division. 

We began our research in 1988, and the timing could not have been 

more propitious. In that year the Europe Division expected to award 

between $650 and $700 million in contracts for design and construction. 

Before we completed the project, the Cold War had ended; two-thirds 

of U.S. forces had left Europe, some for the war to liberate Kuwait, some 

to return permanently to the United States; and American military construction in the region had shrunk to a small fraction of what it had been. 

Within a few short years the personnel, documents, and photographs 

that could tell the story of American military engineering in Europe 

were widely dispersed and the Europe Division had given way to a much 

smaller Europe District. 

The story of the years between 1945 and 1991 has a straightforward 

outline. By mid-1945 the U.S. Army that had fought Nazism occupied the 

defeated German nation in cooperation with the three wartime Allies 

that had led the victorious coalition. The occupying army required engineering support to reconstruct even the minimum essential elements of 

the civic and economic structures necessary to conduct its business. The 

German government financed this construction as a part of reparation 

payments, providing for American military projects under American 

direction built by Germans and financed with German marks. Engineer 

activity was administered under the command structure of the U.S. Army 

of Occupation.

Within a few years, the occupying army’s role changed. The Berlin 

Blockade of 1948–1949, the Korean War of 1950–1953, and the intensification of the Cold War between the Western allies and the Soviet Union 

turned the American military from occupier of a defeated Germany into a 

protective force contributing to a common European defense. By the mid1950s the newly created Federal Republic of Germany became a valued 

ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

Military construction expanded with this changing role, and new 

engineering organizations were created to manage it. The Department 

of Defense formed the Joint Construction Agency (JCA) in 1953 to han-
viii

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

dle military building in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa for 

the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The U.S. Army Construction Agency, 

Germany (USACAG), took on a similar role starting in 1956 with U.S.-

financed construction in the Federal Republic of Germany. Within a year, 

an organization similar to USACAG, the U.S. Army Construction Agency, 

France (USACAF), succeeded JCA to supervise U.S. military construction in France. In 1964 the Engineer Element replaced both USACAF and 

USACAG. 

By 1966 the role of the U.S. military had evolved further and construction activities were consolidated in the Engineer Command under 

the commander in chief of the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). For the 

first time in Europe, a single engineer officer commanded all the Army’s 

European construction elements: troop construction, contract construction, and support to the military communities known as facilities engineering.

It was only in 1974 that engineering construction activities in Europe 

came directly under the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D.C. In July 

1974 USAREUR disestablished the Engineer Command and redistributed 

its responsibilities. The contract construction function transferred to the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which established the European Division 

(EUD). With only a minor change of name, from European to Europe 

Division, this organization lasted until the end of the Cold War.

Over four years we pieced this story together from documents at the 

National Archives in Washington, D.C.; the Research Collections of the 

Corps of Engineers at the Humphreys Engineer Center in Alexandria, 

Virginia; the records-holding area of the Europe Division/District 

in Frankfurt, Germany; the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 

Washington, D.C.; the Europe Division’s area offices in Germany and in 

Turkey; and other locations. We interviewed more than 125 active and 

retired military personnel, American civilians, and German and thirdcountry nationals. The interviews, of which more than 100 were recorded 

and transcribed, were a particularly valuable source. They are located at 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Office of History Research Collections, 

Alexandria, Virginia.

We gratefully acknowledge that many people—civilian and military, 

in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Turkey, and the 

United States—contributed to bringing the story of the Army engineers’ 

service in Europe to these pages. We thank all the individuals who took 

the time to talk with us candidly about their experiences. Their memories 

and insights make this study more accurate and more interesting. We 

received professional support from dozens of librarians, archivists, and 

staff in offices and agencies in the United States and Europe. Our research 

in Europe was particularly aided by Anita Morsman, Linda Tompkins, 

Elaine Lawson, and Paul Nelson; but countless others helped us locate 

documents, schedule interviews, and arrange site visits. Elizabeth Miller 

and Douglas J. Wilson contributed intelligence and insight during the 

research and writing phases; Doug’s assistance with photographs and 

viii
maps was invaluable. At a very early stage of the project, David Goldman 

helped with research at the National Archives. The initial drafts of 

the manuscript benefited from review by members of the Historical 

Committee of the Europe Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

Several people in the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, provided assistance and support. We are especially 

grateful to Dr. William C. Baldwin, who administered the contract. From 

our first day of research, he gave us encouragement laced with good 

advice and tempered by good humor. Dr. Martin Gordon facilitated our 

search for documents both in the Research Collections at the Humphreys 

Engineer Center and at the Washington National Records Center. Drs. 

Martin Reuss, Frank N. Schubert, and John Greenwood read versions of 

the manuscript and offered criticism. Patricia Taylor helped us reshape 

and improve the manuscript. The late Marilyn Hunter, as well as Jean 

Diaz, offered editorial guidance and suggestions. 

Staff at the U.S. Army Center of Military History under the leadership of Keith R. Tidman and Beth MacKenzie guided the manuscript 

to publication. Diane M. Donovan carefully reviewed the text to assure 

consistency of style; she worked closely with Teresa Jameson, who 

designed the layout of the text, maps, and illustrations. S. L. Dowdy prepared the maps, and Glenn Schwegmann and Susan Carroll contributed 

their editorial talents.

We give special recognition and appreciation to General Ray, who 

made the decision to fund the initial contract for this study. Like General 

Ray, we hope the information we have gathered will allow others to 

appreciate the role that the Army engineers, civilian and military, played 

in Europe after World War II. 

29 September 2005 ROBERT P. GRATHWOL

 DONITA M. MOORHUS

ix

Preface
01Front(634).indd x 
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Contents

CONTENTS

Part One

Postwar Reconstruction, 1945–1949

Chapter Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

 1. Combat to Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 Organizing the Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 Army Engineers in the U.S. Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 The Office of the Theater Chief Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

 Construction Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

 Priorities and Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 Redeployment of Troops and Materiel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 Securing a New Line of Communications and Supply . . . . 21

 Rebuilding the Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 2. From Occupation to Mutual Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 Engineer Activities in Occupied Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 Supporting the U.S. Army in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 Supporting the Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 Juggling Competing Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

 Construction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

 Dealing with Excess Materiel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

 The Hanau Depot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

 Repair and Rebuild Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

 Reasserting Order and Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

 Engineer Management Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

 Tactical Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

 Administration Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

 The First Berlin Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

 The Blockade and U.S. Forces in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

 Standardizing Engineer Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Part Two

For a Common Defense, 1950–1973

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
xii

Chapter Pag

 3. Defending the West, 1950–1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 The Troop Base in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 The American Zone in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 Troop Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 Bachelor Officers’ Quarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 Troop Training Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 Dependent Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 The Helping Hand Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 Building West of the Rhine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 Air Force Infrastructure in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

 New Lines of Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

 4. Construction in the Mid-1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 Deutschmark Construction in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 Dependent Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 Bachelor Officers’ Quarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 Community Support Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 Troop Training Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 Joint Construction Agency in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 Administrative Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 Personnel Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 Dependent Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 Securing the Line of Communications across France . . . . . 11

 Joint Construction Agency outside France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

 The Phaseout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

 5. Managing Construction in Germany, 1956–1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 The German Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 USACAG Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 USACAG Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 The Berlin Crisis of 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 From USACAG to Engineer Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 6. Engineer Command, 1966–1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 Structure and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 Military, Civilian, and German Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 Engineer Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 Facilities Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 The Changing Environment in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 FRELOC Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 Rethinking the Commitment to Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 Workload and Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 The Boiler Conversion Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 Stem to Stern Renovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

01Front(634).indd xii 
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Chapter Page

6. Engineer Command, 1966–1974 (Continued)

 TAB VEE Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

 ENGCOM Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

 Ammunition Storage Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

 Challenges in the 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

 Modernizing U.S. Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

 Upgrading Remote Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

 The Phaseout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Part Three

The Europe Division, 1974–1991

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

 7. The Transition Period, 1974–1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

 New Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

 Area Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

 Staff Continuity and Morale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

 Adjustments in the Comptroller’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

 In-House Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

 Support for Facilities Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

 Assessing the First Two Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

 Change of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

 The Projects Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

 Addressing Personnel Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

 Visiting TUSEG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

 8. Decade of Consolidation and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

 Balancing Manpower and Workload, 1978–1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

 Personnel Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

 Managing Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

 Organization Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

 Addressing EUD Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

 Persistent Manpower Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

 Developing the Engineering Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

 Managing the Workload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

 Construction in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

 Tightening Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

 Shifts in Emphasis and Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

 The Air Force as Customer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

 EUD Wartime Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

 Assessing EUD Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

 Change of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

01Front(634).indd xiii 
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Chapter Pag

 8. Decade of Consolidation and Growth (Continued)

 Organizational Structure and Data Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 Stability Achieved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 Organizational Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 Intergovernmental Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 Focus on Customers and Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 9. Managing Design and Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Methods of Contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Contracting in Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Contracting in West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Projects and the Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Value Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 Projects and Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 U.S. Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 Host-Nation Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 NATO Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 Construction Workload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 Projects and Area Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 Volume of Work in the 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

 Projects in the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

 Concerns in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

 10. Programs and Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 Holdover Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 Modernizing U.S. Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 Air Force Aircraft Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 Naval Facilities in Sigonella, Sicily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 New Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 Ammunition Storage Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 Pre-positioned Materiel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 11. Supporting the Combat Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 Redeploying U.S. Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 Garrison in Garlstedt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 Forward Stationing in Vilseck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 Supporting New Weapons Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 Upgrading the Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

 Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels . . . . . . . . 31

 Modernizing Operational Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

 Patriot Missile Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

 Cruise and Pershing Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

01Front(634).indd xiv 
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 12. Improving the Community Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

 Family Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330

 Existing Housing Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

 Factory-Built Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

 Attic Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

 Barracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

 Schools and Child Care Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

 Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

 Community Support Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

 Commissaries and Post Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

 Sports and Recreational Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

 Chapels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

 13. Europe Transformed, 1988–1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363

 Prelude to Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

 Emphasizing Affirmative Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

 Currents of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

 Political Revolution in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370

 EUD and the European Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372

 Manpower Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374

 Reorganization Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376

 Seeking Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

 Steps toward Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381

 Changes in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384

 The Impact on Morale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

 The Europe District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

 Appreciating Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

 Recognizing Cultural Differences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390

 An Absence of Scandal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390

 Continuity amid Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

 The Legacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 

Tables

No. Page

 1. Personnel Receiving European Command Support, 

 1950 and 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

01Front(634).indd xv 
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No. Pag

 2. Workload of the U.S. Engineer Group, Turkey, 1955 and 1956 . . . 11

 3. Military Construction for the Army, June 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 4. Engineer Command Construction Placement and Staffing, 

 1965–1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

 5. Engineering Division Staffing, Europe Division, Fiscal Years 

 1976–1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

 6. Military Construction, Army, Annual Allotments, Fiscal 

 Years 1975–1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 7. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Annual Allotments, 

 Fiscal Years 1975–1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 8. Europe Division Construction Execution, 

 May 1976–August 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 9. Europe Division Construction Execution, 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 10. Construction Placement by Area Office, Fiscal Years 

 1979 and 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

 11. Long Range Security Program, 1976–1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 12. Europe Division Design Accomplishments, Fiscal Years 

 1980 and 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Charts

 1. Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 2. Organization of the Joint Construction Agency, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . 10

 3. Joint Construction Agency Construction Procedure in France . . 10

 4. Organization of the Joint Construction Agency, September 

 1955, Depicting the New Eastern and Southern Districts . . . . . 11

 5. Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 

 30 June 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 6. Organization of U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany 

 (USACAG), ca. 1961, Depicting the New Legal Branch

 and Eleven Resident Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 7. Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1963, Just 

 before the Dissolution of USACAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 8. Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and 7th 

 Army, 1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 9. Organization of U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe, 

 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 10. Organization of the Europe Division, 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

 11. Organization of the Europe Division, July 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 12. Indirect Construction Process in the Federal Republic 

 of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 13. Indirect Method of Contracting and Project Milestones . . . . . . . . 25

 14. Organization of the Europe Division, February 1989 . . . . . . . . . . 36

15. Organization of the Europe Division, May 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

01Front(634).indd xvi 
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Figures

No. Page

 1. Converted Apartment in the Bindermichl Complex . . . . . . . . . . . 49

 2. Annual Construction Placement of the U.S. Army Construction

 Agency, Germany, and the Engineer Element, 1957–1966 . . . . . 137

 3. New Masthead of the Europe Division Newsletter . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

 4. Drawing of a Proposed Ammunition Storage Site, 1981 . . . . . . . . 283

 5. Site Plan of the Garrison in Garlstedt, 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Maps

 1. Zones of Occupation: Germany, August 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 2. Berlin Occupation Sectors, August 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 3. Zones of Occupation: Austria, June 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 4. U.S. Army Zone of Occupation, Military Districts and Posts: 

 West Germany, 1 August 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

 5. European Signatories, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

 April 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

 6. U.S. Army, Europe: West Germany, 1 December 1952 . . . . . . . . . . 60

 7. U.S. Army, Europe, Family Housing: West Germany, 

 30 June 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

 8. The U.S. Army Engineer Group (TUSEG): Turkey, 1950s . . . . . . . 85

 9. Lines of Communication: France, 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

 10. U.S. Military Housing Construction: France, 1957–1963 . . . . . . . . 110

 11. U.S. Army, Europe, Engineer Command: West Germany, Late 

 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

 12. U.S. Army, Europe, Theater Army Support Command: 

 West Germany, 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

 13. U.S. Army, Europe, Engineer Command: West Germany, 1970 . . 170

 14. U.S. Army, Europe: West Germany, 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

 15. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: Field Organization, 

 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

 16. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Northern Europe: 

 Field Organization, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

 17. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, January 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . 214

 18. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Military Construction, 

 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

 19. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Military Construction:

 Mediterranean Area, Mid-1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

 20. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: Nuremberg Area, 

 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

 21. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: Turkey, 1980s . . . . . . . . . . 267

 22. U.S. Army, Europe: West Germany, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

 23. U.S. Army, Europe: Italy, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

01Front(634).indd xvii 
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No. Pag

24. U.S. Army, Europe: Greece, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 25. U.S. Army, Europe: Turkey, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 26. U.S. Army, Europe: Netherlands, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 27. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: POMSS Locations, 

 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 28. Upper Weser Region, West Germany, 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 29. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: Netherlands, 1986 . . . . . . 32

 30. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Field Organization: 

 Northern Europe, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

 31. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Field Organization: 

 Northern Europe, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Illustrations

War Destruction in Munich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Destroyed Bridge over the Rhine River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Power Station in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Mess Hall under Construction in Frankfurt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Constructing a Railway Bridge between Germany and Belgium . . . . 2

Training in Grafenwöhr in Early 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Engineer School Activities in Murnau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Refurbished Reinhardt Caserne, Neu Ulm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Enlisted Men’s Club in Pirmasens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Mock Village for Training near Hohenfels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Family Apartments and a Theater in Bremerhaven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Ribbed-Concrete Floor Construction for Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Warehouse Construction near Kaiserslautern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Family Housing Complex in Vogelweh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Medical Facility Construction in Landstuhl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Tent Life in Trois Fontaines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Railroad Locomotives for Heating an Apartment Complex . . . . . . . . 9

High School in Furth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapel at Downs Barracks in Fulda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Utilities Construction for Camp Roeder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

William Camblor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Col. Robert P. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

School in Heidelberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Depot in Hanau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Lt. Gens. Kenneth W. Kennedy and William F. Cassidy . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Coal-fired Boiler in Bamberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Brig. Gen. Carroll N. LeTellier and Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Brig. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

General Prentiss and John Tambornino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

01Front(634).indd xviii 
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Page

Brig. Gen. Norman G. Delbridge, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Brig. Gen. Drake Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Build-to-Lease Family Housing in Hanau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Phillips Building in the Mid-1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Brig. Gen. George K. Withers, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Army Engineer Projects in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Brig. Gen. Scott B. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

Brig. Gen. James W. van Loben Sels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Brig. Gen. James W. Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

Recreational Facilities in Garmisch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

Prison in Mannheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Warehouse Construction near Ankara, Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Construction Project Meeting in Sinop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

Operations Building Construction in Incirlik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Pinden Barracks, Nuremberg, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Headquarters Building at an Air Base in Florennes, Belgium . . . . . . . 265

Europe Division Construction Site in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

Europe Division Airplane for Transport between Offices . . . . . . . . . . 268

Enlisted Men’s Barracks under Renovation in Bremerhaven . . . . . . . . 275

Atomic-Resistant Aircraft Shelter in Jever, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Atomic-Resistant Aircraft Shelter in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Guard Tower for Ammunition Storage Site in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . 290

Heavy Door Protecting Ammunition at an LRSP Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292

Vehicle Shelter in Mönchengladbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

Family Housing in Osterholz-Scharmbeck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

Newly Constructed Facilities in Vilseck, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

Helicopters in a Maintenance Hangar in Crailsheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

Pop-up Target at the Grafenwöhr Training Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

MOUT Village in Hohenfels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

Washrack for Tanks, Trucks, and Other Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

Hardstand Construction in Kitzingen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319

Patriot Missile Facility in Hanau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

GLCM Site in Florennes, Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

Housing Unit in Germany with Signs of Structural Cracking . . . . . . 331

Renovated Housing in Nuremberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

Prefabricated Housing for Wildflecken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

Prototype of Prefabricated Housing on Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

Family Housing in Soesterberg, Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

Attic in Extant Building Being Converted into an Apartment . . . . . . 339

Exterior of Housing Unit with Attic Apartments Added . . . . . . . . . . . 340

Two-Person Barracks Room in Kaiserslautern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342

Elementary and High School in Stuttgart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

Contractor in Asbestos Protection Suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

Child Development Center in Bad Kreuznach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

Youth Activity Center in Wiesbaden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

Page

Addition to Army Hospital under Construction in Würzburg . . . . . . 352

Front Lobby of Hospital in Bremerhaven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353

NCO Club in Göppingen under Construction in 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

Exchange Mall in Nuremberg Completed in 1988. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

Gymnasium in Stuttgart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

Bowling Facility in Hanau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

Custom-Built Chapel in Cakmakli, Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361

Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

Illustrations courtesy of the following: 81, Ingenieur- U Architekturbüro 

Robert Löffert; 97, H. Jace Greene; 158, U.S. Army, Europe; 189, Louis 

Brettschneider; 224, Defense Visual Information Center. With the exception of p. 224, these and all other illustrations can be found in U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers’ Office of History Research Collections, Alexandria, 

Va.
PART ONE

POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION 

1945–1949

02A_PartI Intro_Final.indd 1 
02A_PartI Intro_Final.indd 2 
INTRODUCTION

World War II changed world politics in ways that few people 

fully understood in 1945. By the end of that war, for the first 

time since the sixteenth century, European states were no 

longer the arbiters of the world’s balance of power. Indeed, 

the destruction of German military and economic might created a vacuum 

of power in the center of Europe. Although Germany was occupied and 

governed by a coalition of powers that included Great Britain and France, 

its ultimate fate would be in the hands of the two extra-European powers 

that emerged from the war wielding unprecedented military force—the 

United States and the Soviet Union.

Over the course of the half-decade between 1945 and 1949, these two 

superpowers became locked in a struggle for world supremacy that dominated the next forty years. Europe was a theater of conflict and tension in that 

struggle—the West European states on one side as participants by assent in 

an alliance led by the United States and the East European states on the other, 

coerced into satellite status in a system dominated by the Soviet Union.

Between 1945 and 1948 the Grand Alliance that linked the United 

States and the Soviet Union during World War II came apart. In a speech 

in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, former British Prime Minister 

Winston Churchill used the metaphor of an iron curtain descending 

across Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic, behind which reigned 

oppression and disregard for individual freedom. In a book published 

late in 1947, the American journalist Walter Lippmann applied an equally 

memorable label—Cold War—to the struggle between the United States 

and the Soviet Union.

The United States assumed its new role as a world leader in this struggle only gradually. At the end of the war the country expected to demobilize its military and return to a normal, peacetime existence. By degrees, 

however, it took the initiative in overcoming the impasse concerning 

German economic recovery. In the eastern Mediterranean, where Western 

policymakers saw Communist insurrection threatening the government 

of Greece and Soviet pressure threatening the government of Turkey, the 

United States assumed responsibilities historically exercised by Britain. In 

March 1947 President Harry S. Truman asked Congress for $400 million in 

military and economic aid to help Greece and Turkey resist internal and 

external threats and remain “free peoples.” In his address to Congress 

presenting the policy that became known as the Truman Doctrine, the 

president expressed a willingness to extend similar assistance to any 

nation that faced a comparable threat.

02A_PartI Intro_Final.indd 3 
4

The Marshall Plan of 1947 represented another step on the Unite

States’ path to leadership. Outlined by Secretary of State George C

Marshall in June 1947, the plan offered American economic aid t

European countries willing to cooperate in the economic reconstruction o

Europe as a whole. The proposal represented an invitation to create a new 

alignment based on shared economic principles.

In Eastern Europe, Communist parties began as minority partner

in putatively pluralistic coalitions but progressively took dictatori

control of governments—Poland in January 1947, Hungary in June, an

Czechoslovakia in February and March 1948. Soviet intentions seeme

increasingly more threatening. On 17 March 1948, France, Britain, an

the three small countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembour

signed the Brussels Pact, an agreement for their mutual defense. O

the same day across the Atlantic in Washington, District of Columbi

President Truman sent a special message to Congress asking for autho

rization to reinstitute peacetime conscription for military service. Th

two events, taken together, marked the starting point for a regional secu

rity system linking Western Europe and North America. The Vandenber

Resolution, adopted in the U.S. Senate on 11 June 1948, affirmed America

participation with West European states in a common military defense. 

reinforced Truman’s decision earlier in the spring to commit the America

public to bear the burden of a standing army in peacetime. These individ

ual steps confirmed a new direction in American foreign policy—resi

tance to and containment of the extension of Soviet power in Europe an

around the globe.

The new policy received an immediate test in defeated Germany

historic capital city, Berlin. When the four powers divided Germany, th

city of Berlin lay completely within the Soviet zone of occupation. Eac

of the four powers received a sector of occupation within the city an

established a military presence. To gain access to the city from the re

of Germany, the Western allies had to cross territory controlled by th

Soviets. The Soviets occasionally obstructed traffic over highways and ra

routes through their zone into Berlin, but they agreed with the Wester

Powers for reasons of safety to establish unobstructed air passage throug

three designated air corridors. As tensions increased among the occu

pying powers over how to deal with defeated Germany—and with on

another—the Soviet ability to isolate Berlin from overland communic

tions became crucial. In 1948 the Soviet Union put Western resolve to th

test when it blockaded land access to Berlin from the three Western se

tors of Germany. Only through the air could the West gain access to Berli

without directly confronting the Red Army.

The clashes between the Western allies and the Soviet Union emerge

slowly, and it was not the framework that conditioned military plan

ning for the occupation of Germany in 1945 and for the reconstructio

of Europe. The devastation of war and the collapse of society in Europ

rather than ideological conflict, drove the U.S. military to develop pra

matic solutions to immediate problems.

02A_PartI Intro_Final.indd 4 
5

The war itself had challenged the technical ingenuity of the American 

military, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been an integral element in meeting the wartime challenges. The Army engineers had provided technical expertise to sustain the campaign to defeat Germany. The 

Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) in Washington provided knowledge, equipment, and supplies to the combat engineer units. Engineer 

troop units participated in the Allied invasions of North Africa, Italy, 

and northern France at the Normandy beaches, and in the occupation 

of a defeated Germany. Technical experts attached to OCE devised new 

solutions, plans, techniques, and equipment for the massive problems of 

logistics and combat in the war. When the war ended, the U.S. Army had 

323,677 engineer troops on active military duty in the European Theater, 

almost 11 percent of total troop strength in Europe.1

In 1945 the retiring chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Eugene Reybold, 

observed that “American engineering capacity was the one factor of 

American strength which our enemies most consistently underestimated. 

Without American construction talent we could not have won the war.” 

Recognizing that the challenges of peacetime reconstruction would be 

equally great, General Reybold added, “it is doubtful that without all of 

America’s construction talent we can win the peace.”2

Reybold’s remarks were both a fitting tribute to the past and a prophetic comment on the future. In May and June 1945 the engineers had 

to address the immediate needs of the U.S. Army as it changed its mission from combat to peacetime occupation. In addition, they had to help 

reconstruct civil society, especially in defeated Germany, so that the 

army could function as an occupying force. The Army engineers undertook these tasks in an environment as challenging as the war. Indeed, 

the theater chief engineer in Europe at the end of the war, Maj. Gen. 

Cecil R. Moore, reflected two decades later that his engineers had faced 

circumstances after May 1945 that were “far more trying than those arising during combat.”3

02A_PartI Intro_Final.indd 5 
02A_PartI Intro_Final.indd 6 
1

COMBAT TO OCCUPATION

The Army engineers attached to U.S. forces in Europe faced gargantuan tasks in 1945, and their work was rendered dramatically 

more complex by the extent of the destruction that Europe had 

suffered. During the last months of the war, retreating Germans 

had devastated northern France and Belgium from the coast of Normandy 

to the German border. In Holland, broken dikes allowed major sections of 

the land to flood. In Italy, traditional centers of the country’s economic 

strength, Milan and Turin, lay paralyzed. In Central Europe, business 

and residential communities had given way to barren landscapes, piles 

of debris, craters from bombs, stinking heaps of rubble, and ruins. 

Throughout Germany, a large portion of civilian housing was uninhabitable. Eighty-one percent of all lodging units in the U.S. zone were either 

destroyed or severely damaged. In Frankfurt, the city that the Americans 

chose for the headquarters of their postwar military command, only 

44,000 of 177,000 residences remained standing.1

Famine was a stark reality throughout Europe. The war had eroded 

the farm economy and had destroyed machinery, fertilizers, and seed; 

breeding livestock had been killed. After 1945 production of food grain in 

France was less than half what it had been before the war. Food rationing 

was absolutely necessary throughout Europe. An estimated 100 million 

Europeans existed at a level of 1,500 or fewer calories a day, a diet inadequate to support heavy work or sustain growing children. Even that level 

of nutrition proved impossible to maintain. In 1946 authorities in both the 

British and American zones of occupation in Germany had to cut rations 

to 1,000 calories a day, a level of consumption that the British commander 

in chief, Field Marshal Bernard Viscount Montgomery, described as equivalent to slow starvation.2 Clothing and shoes were as scarce as food; tools 

and domestic amenities were nonexistent.

Throughout much of Europe, the transportation system had ceased 

to operate. France’s stock of locomotives was at 35 percent of prewar 

numbers. In the American and British zones of Germany, 740 out of 958 

important bridges had been destroyed. The debris of war clogged inland 

waterways and ports, making them unusable.

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 1 
8

The theater chief engineer in Europe, Maj. Gen. Cecil R. Moore, exe

cised staff responsibility for advising the American theater commande

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, on all engineering matters and for estab

lishing the basic plans and policies for the Army engineers. In practic

Moore served as a part of the staff of Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, commande

of the Communications Zone (COMZ), the European Theater’s rear are

command.3

 Headquartered first in England and then in Paris after its lib

eration, COMZ managed the flow of supplies and support services to th

combat forces at the front and, after hostilities ended, to the occupatio

forces in the American sector of Germany.4

As it advanced, the U.S. Army set up ad hoc civil affairs units o

military government in the German communities. Their main task was t

ensure the security of the armed forces on the move. Without any viab

indigenous government in place, the conquering troops assumed powe

far beyond the conventional responsibility to maintain law and order. Th

Army inherited by default the responsibility to house and feed the popu

lation and to rebuild the German economic, social, and political structure

needed to sustain civilized life in the postwar era.

During the final phase of the war, Moore’s office provided technic

support to combat forces. Command of engineer units—officers and men—

remained in the hands of the field commanders in the combat zone, wher

the action was, or with COMZ section commanders in charge of the libe

ated areas. These commanders exercised considerable freedom in the fiel

in the use of their engineer troops and resources.5

 When the war ended, th

War Destruction in Munich

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 2 
9

Army engineer organization at COMZ headquarters continued to provide 

technical support for all military operations within the European Theater. 

Command of engineer troops remained with the field commanders.

Organizing the Occupation

In the summer of 1945 the U.S. Army settled in Germany in the role of 

occupying power. On 5 June the commanders in chief of coalition forces 

in the European Theater met in Berlin and issued a joint statement on 

“Arrangements for Control of Germany.” The Soviet Union, Great Britain, 

the United States, and France declared that German centralized government had ceased to exist and that all governing authority rested with 

them. They divided Germany into four zones of occupation (see Map 1) 

and established the Allied Control Council in which the commanders of 

the four occupying armies acted for Germany as a whole. Decisions of the 

Allied Control Council had to be reached by unanimous consent. Within 

his own zone each commander exercised complete authority. Berlin was 

similarly divided into four sectors (see Map 2), with its own citywide 

administration, the Kommandatura, composed of the four sector commanders. Under the terms of the surrender, the Germans were to bear the total 

costs of the occupation.

The U.S. zone of occupation in Germany encompassed the southwestern states (Länder) of Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, and Hesse; the northern ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven; and the southwestern sector of 

Destroyed Railway and Highway Bridge over the Rhine River in Cologne, 18 May 1945

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 3 
Map 1

FRANCE

SWITZERLAND

DEN

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOURG

UNITED

KINGDOM

Marne R

Meuse R

M osel R

Rhine R

E

N

G

L I S

H

C

H

A

N

N

E

L

Seine R

Loire R

BRITISH

F

R

E

N

C

H

AME

JOINT

AMERICAN-BRITISH

Metz

Luxembourg

PARIS

BRUSSELS

AMSTERDAM

Cologne

Kaiserslautern

Hannover

Stuttgart

Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Kassel

Bremerhaven

Ham

Mulhouse

Dijon

The Hague

GERMANY

ZONES OF OCCUPATION

August 1945

0

0 150 Miles

150 Kilometers

Zone Boundary

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 4 
LITHUANIA

EAST PRUSSIA

AUSTRIA

HUNGARY

POLAND

SWEDEN

C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

R

Elbe R

Oder R

B A L T I C

S

E

A

Danube R

OVIET

UNDER

POLISH

ADMINISTRATION

SOVIET

A N

FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION

Leipzig

Munich

Stettin

BERLIN

Dresden

PRAGUE

WARSAW

Breslau

VIENNA

BUDAPEST

Pilsen

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 5 
12

Berlin. The U.S. zone covered about 47,000 square miles, roughly the siz

of the state of Mississippi; it contained few industrial resources and on

two major cities—Frankfurt and Munich. One-fourth of the land was ar

ble, one-fourth was mountains and forest, and the remainder was pastur

or swamp land. In July 1945 the zone contained about 19 million peopl

including many refugees from Eastern Europe.6

Austria presented an anomaly for the occupying powers. Annexed b

the German Reich in 1938, it had fought the war as part of Nazi German

Upon defeat it was occupied and, like Germany, divided into four zone

Arguably, Austria was not a defeated enemy state but a victim of Na

aggression. On the other hand, it was not a liberated state either. Its pecu

liar situation marked it for special treatment. After Germany’s surrende

the four occupying powers quickly turned political and economic autho

ity over to the Austrians, who formed an indigenous central governmen

in Vienna. All four powers retained a military presence both in Vienna—

wholly within the Soviet zone and divided like Berlin—and in their fou

zones. (Map 3) In June 1946, when the occupying powers recognized th

Austrian government, the Allied military government—but not the fou

power occupation—ended.

Map 2

BRITISH

FRENCH

SOVIET

SOVIET

AMERICAN

HQ

HQ

HQ

HQ

The area on the western edge of Berlin was transferred to 

Soviet Occupation in 1945 in exchange for a part of the 

Gatow Airport transferred to British Occupation.

Potsdam

August 1945

OCCUPATION SECTORS

BERLIN 

0 5

Miles

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 6 
Map 3

Danube R

Danube R

Mur R

BRITISH

FRENCH

SOVIET

AMERICAN

FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION

Augsburg

Bolzano

Landeck

Innsbruck

Kitzbühel

Salzburg

Bad Ischl

Linz

Regensburg

Krems

Waidhofen

VIENNA

Villach

Klagenfurt

Munich

Bruck

LIECHTENSTEIN

SWITZERLAND

ITALY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

YUGOSLAVIA

GERMANY

AUSTRIA

ZONES OF OCCUPATION

June 1945

0

75 0 Miles

75

Zone Boundary

Kilometers

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 7 
14

Army Engineers in the U.S. Zone

On 1 July 1945, Eisenhower reorganized his forces in Europe an

established a new command, United States Forces, European Theate

(USFET), with its headquarters in the I. G. Farben Company building i

Frankfurt.7

 For a brief time Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionar

Force (SHAEF), the headquarters of the retiring wartime command

the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA

and its subordinate command, COMZ, all coexisted with USFET; by 

August SHAEF and ETOUSA had been inactivated. General Eisenhowe

left Europe on 11 November 1945; on 26 November General Joseph 

McNarney took command of USFET and the military government o

Germany. The Army had begun to move support services provided b

COMZ from France into occupied Germany. It redesignated the suppo

command as the Theater Services Forces, European Theater (TSFET), wit

a main headquarters in Frankfurt and a rear headquarters in Paris. I

Germany, American military personnel were dispersed over the entir

U.S. zone, often in small, isolated units.8

As the U.S. Army shifted its headquarters staff to Frankfurt, a new 

center of engineer activities developed there. Over the summer Gener

Lee, the commander of COMZ and its successor, TSFET, assigned ke

personnel to Frankfurt while maintaining logistical and redeploymen

activities at Headquarters (Rear) in Paris.9

 Lee decided to divide his staf

He retained General Moore in Paris as theater chief engineer; but he sen

Moore’s deputy, Col. John R. Hardin, and Moore’s chief of construction

Col. Paul D. Berrigan, to Frankfurt, where they worked under Lee’s chi

of staff, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder.10 The new structure perpetuate

Moore’s dual role as technical adviser to both the theater commander an

the commanding general of the Theater Services Forces; this duality exis

ed until TSFET was inactivated in February 1946. By March 1946 all eng

neer planning and coordination functions were consolidated in Frankfu

as a part of Headquarters, USFET.11

In Germany and Austria, the U.S. Army engineers had a wide rang

of tasks. The occupying army units needed liquid fuels and petroleum 

products, so Army engineers continued to operate the pipelines, pump

ing stations, and storage facilities that they had constructed to suppo

the conquest of Germany.12 To support the soldiers who remained i

Europe, the Army engineers had to build and maintain barracks, ho

pitals, airfields, and the attendant infrastructure. For the Army to exe

cise its control over the population, transportation lines choked by th

destruction of war had to be cleared. Roads, railways, canals, bridge

rivers, and ports all demanded attention from the engineers, as did min

fields and obstructions.13

In accomplishing their many tasks, the Army engineers operate

under two related but separate command structures. Engineer troop

remained under Army field commands and operated in support of th

occupying army units dispersed throughout the American zones in bot

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 8 
15

Germany and Austria. The theater chief engineer, who served on the 

USFET general staff, supervised area engineer officers assigned to the 

military districts and subdivisions of the U.S. zones. These area engineers 

acted as field agents to execute operations prescribed by the theater chief 

engineer but remained under the authority of the local commander of the 

military district in which they served. The structure resembled the division and district structure maintained by the Corps of Engineers in the 

United States, except that it existed in what had been a combat theater 

where Army field commanders retained overriding authority. The Army 

engineers in the theater were commanded neither by the chief of engineers in Washington nor by the theater chief engineer. The theater chief 

engineer served under the authority of the commander of USFET, not the 

chief of engineers in Washington. The traditional primacy of combat field 

commanders carried over into the period of occupation in ways that complicated the theater chief engineer’s mission.14

The dual structure of command under which the engineers operated 

had a parallel in the two interdependent but separate missions faced by 

the occupying army—civil administration of Germany and military command of the occupying troops. As a means of separating civil administration from issues of troop command and other military concerns, the U.S. 

Army transferred administration of its occupied territory from the hands 

of the tactical commanders, who had directed the invasion, to the Office of 

Military Government United States (OMGUS). On 1 October 1945, OMGUS 

became the official executive authority for American military government 

in Germany. Headquartered in Berlin, OMGUS created local offices in the 

three German states in the U.S. zone. Essentially in place by the end of 1945, 

OMGUS retained its authority in Germany until 1949.15 OMGUS handled 

civil administration, whereas USFET and its successors exercised command 

authority over military affairs and over the troops organized into military 

districts and military posts throughout the U.S. zone.16

United States Forces, Austria (USFA), established headquarters for the 

American zone in Salzburg on 10 August 1945 but remained dependent 

upon USFET headquarters in Frankfurt for supply and administration. 

For matters concerning civil governance and political issues, USFA’s commander operated directly under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

in Washington.17 Once the postwar division of Austria was in place in 

1945, the U.S. Army planned to reduce its presence to a minimum within 

ninety days and to provide a military government that could support 

and encourage Austrian political and economic recovery. In keeping with 

these objectives, the USFA engineer’s tasks in 1945–1946 were to reduce 

and reorganize personnel, to dispose of excess property, and to conduct 

necessary rehabilitation and very limited construction using troop labor.18

By July 1947 USFA abandoned the practice of charging costs to Austria 

as a burden of the occupation. The USFA staff engineer’s office had contracting experience, so the commander designated the engineers to convert all real estate occupied by the Army to lease arrangements; to close 

rail service contracts; and to institute new systems for procurement, cost 

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 9 
16

accounting, and budget preparation. During a single month of transitio

in 1947, the engineers managed a team of personnel from all services th

transferred 2,000 properties being used by American personnel from req

uisition status to lease arrangements.19

The Office of the Theater Chief Engineer

As administration of the occupation became the dominant mission fo

the U.S. Army, the need for coordination and overall planning supersede

the need for immediate decision and quick execution that had prevaile

in the immediate aftermath of Germany’s surrender. To meet this chang

the Army reorganized engineer resources. Throughout the balance of th

1940s, the chief engineer in Europe and his staff acted as the headquarte

instrument, if not always the master, of activity for the engineers.

Throughout 1945 and early 1946 the Office of the Chief Enginee

USFET, contained seven divisions: control, administration, intelligenc

troops, supply, construction, and real estate.20 The theater chief enginee

continued to support the Army’s military mission in Europe, includ

ing support to the Army Air Forces. He advised the theater commande

concerning engineering needs, established basic engineer plans and pol

cies, and supervised the engineer activities in the European Theater. H

authority was limited in practice, however, by the structure of comman

in the theater. In 1945 USFET had nine subordinate commands: Thir

Army; Seventh Army; the Bremen Port Command; United States Force

Austria; the Western and Continental Base Sections; the Berlin Distric

U.S. Air Forces in Europe; and the Office of Military Government Unite

States. A general officer headed each of these commands, and an enginee

officer served on each of the general staffs. This decentralized structur

coupled with the recent combat experiences in which field commande

operated with a great deal of autonomy, created difficulties for Gener

Moore as he sought to plan, coordinate, and supervise overall enginee

activities throughout the theater.21

By the end of 1945 OMGUS had taken over authority for constructio

related to waterways, railways, highways, and bridges. OMGUS turned t

the Office of the Chief Engineer, USFET, only when it needed to suppl

ment its own resources.22 Still, as the headquarters engineer for USFET, th

theater chief engineer retained a full agenda. His office supervised acqu

sition of real estate, construction and maintenance of all military stru

tures not otherwise assigned, establishment of building standards, an

allocation of building materials among major commands. He reviewed a

building projects. He was also in charge of maintaining the water supp

and other utilities, as well as surveying and mapping. He ran the procur

ment system for the theater and was in charge of the disposition, storag

and security of supplies within the theater, including captured enem

materiel. Finally, he was responsible for fire fighting, camouflage, an

the training of U.S. forces in Europe.23 This profile of activities remaine

essentially the same through the decade.24

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 10 
17

Most of the responsibilities of the Office of the Chief Engineer, USFET, 

involved planning, administration, and supervision. The office played 

a managerial and professional role in preparing architectural and engineering plans and in supervising their preparation by architect-engineer 

firms. Contractors, generally hired by subordinate levels of command 

under USFET, frequently executed construction and other tasks involving 

physical labor.25

To supplement the cadre of officers and professional specialists on the 

staffs of the Army engineers, the chief engineer’s office sought to train 

military personnel in engineering skills. After the liberation of France the 

Army established the Engineer Training Center (later called the Engineer 

School) in Epernay. In 1946 the Army moved the school to Butzbach, 

Germany (north of Frankfurt), and then in early 1947 to Murnau, near 

Oberammergau in southern Bavaria. The training suffered markedly 

from the demobilization of skilled personnel; the school needed qualified instructors, but requests for occupational specialists in engineering 

from the United States yielded disappointing results. The chief engineer 

described the new instructors arriving in 1946 as “18-, 19- and 20-year old 

boys with no instructional ability and practically no technical background 

other than that obtained during a six-week course in a given subject.”26

As the occupation lengthened, Moore and his successor sought to 

recover authority from the field and to consolidate it in the Office of the 

Chief Engineer at theater headquarters. They argued that a centralized 

staff could balance the competition between local, more parochial interests and the overall needs and responsibilities of the occupation forces. 

The change they sought came slowly. For most of the four-year period, 

central planning and coordination looked no more than one year ahead.27

Construction Personnel

Since the earliest days after the cross-Channel invasion, U.S. Army 

engineers faced labor shortages for any construction they undertook. The 

pool of civilian labor fell far short of the estimates made during planning 

for the rehabilitation of liberated and occupied areas. While still in France, 

General Moore’s office received War Department authorization to recruit 

civilian laborers and set up an organization to supervise them as separate mobile units, using engineer labor procurement offices to recruit the 

needed personnel. As local governments in France stabilized, they provided both the recruitment and payment of some civilian labor. In addition 

to the civilians, 2,228 French engineer troops were organized in May and 

June 1945 into construction companies to assist the U.S. Army construction units.28

Employing prisoners of war (PW) helped alleviate the labor shortage 

in liberated areas and in the zones of occupation. In May 1945 prisoners of 

war working for the U.S. military numbered 54,223, many of them supervised by engineer troops.29 Organized as 250-man companies, PW units 

relieved the shortage of troops for construction, depot operation, equip03B_Chap01_Final.indd 11 
18

ment maintenance, and lumbering operations. These workers prove

highly competent and eager to perform. Displaced persons also suppl

mented the labor pool that served the Army in 1945.30

The shortage of labor for the rehabilitation and construction program

remained a significant problem during the early years of the occupation

In July 1945 the U.S. Army employed about 625,000 prisoners of war, di

placed persons, civilians from Allied and neutral countries, and Germa

civilians (local nationals in the Army’s vocabulary), many of them supe

vised by engineer personnel.32 By the first quarter of 1946 these sources o

labor were declining because Army policy within the theater mandated th

rapid reduction of the use of prisoners of war and displaced persons wer

repatriating. For the first quarter of 1946 the average number of Germa

prisoners of war working on construction or rehabilitation for the U.

Army remained about 60,000, although the engineers released more tha

42,000 prisoners from labor service during this period. The German civilia

labor force exceeded 25,000. By the third quarter of 1946 the PW labor forc

fell below 20,000; by February 1947 all PW labor had been eliminated.33

At the end of the war the military employed very few American civi

ians in Europe in either supervisory or professional positions; but as PW 

labor declined and military personnel left, the Army had to recruit civi

ians to supplement its workforce.34 Restrictions on employment of German

made it extremely difficult to attract qualified personnel. To overcom

that, and to encourage stability in the workforce, the chief engineer’s offic

recommended during the first year of the occupation that USFET provid

more liberal allowances in clothing, food, and housing for German civilia

employees working for the U.S. forces. While the number of prisoners o

war dropped under 20,000 by the third quarter of 1946, the German civi

ian labor force rose to over 35,000, in part because the Army immediate

rehired as many as 55 percent of the released prisoners as civilian workers

The turnover of military personnel brought particularly negative con

sequences to financial record keeping where attention to detail and vigo

ous accuracy were crucial. Employees did not stay long enough to benef

from any training, and accurate record keeping suffered as a result. Th

Office of the Chief Engineer, USFET, promulgated training guidelines, bu

these had little prospect of bringing about improved accuracy until th

employment situation stabilized.35

Professional personnel were hardest to find. Occasionally, an eng

neer officer leaving military service chose to stay in Europe as a civilia

employee. But the chief engineer’s office could not depend for staffin

only on military officers mustering out. To identify the positions wher

it needed civilian specialists and administrators, the office solicited pe

sonnel requests from the engineer offices of USFET’s subordinate com

mands. It then forwarded the list to the Office of the Chief of Engineers i

Washington, which recruited personnel in the United States. The recrui

ment program began in 1946, and by late that year 156 American civilian

had signed on to serve with the engineers in the European Theater. By th

first quarter of 1947 the number had increased to 380.36

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 12 
19

On 1 July 1946, the civilian personnel serving the Army in Germany 

had numbered 375,466; one year later the figure had dropped to 278,479. 

By 1 July 1947, of all civilian employees of the U.S. Army in Europe, 71 

percent were Germans, 17.3 percent were displaced persons, 4.3 percent 

were Austrians, and 3.6 percent were U.S. citizens.

The share of this civilian workforce employed by the Office of the 

Chief Engineer, USFET, was small. By late 1947 the chief engineer’s office 

employed about 5,000 civilians of all nationalities—or under 2 percent of 

the 1 July total—working in its headquarters office and all its field agencies in the American zones in Germany and Austria.37

During this same period the availability of soldiers for engineer work 

continued to decline precipitously. In early 1946 the engineers could still 

muster over 45,000 troops for construction assignments, but by the final 

quarter of 1946 that number had fallen to 16,000. In the first quarter of 

1947 troops available averaged 6,700; only 2,200 were available in the last 

quarter. Germans still contributed the greatest numbers to the Army engineer workforce, but their numbers dropped from 33,764 (excluding prisoners of war) to 15,500 over the same period.38 To compensate for the losses, 

the Army organized displaced persons—third-country nationals—into 

labor service units, provided uniforms and equipment, and paid them in 

much the same manner as U.S. troops. The special labor service units continued to serve the American forces for decades.39

Priorities and Problems

After the German defeat the U.S. Army had to change the focus of 

its activities. For three years, Eisenhower observed in retrospect, the 

nation had mobilized all its energies “to push men and supply forward 

into the heart of Germany.” Suddenly, in May 1945, “the entire machinery ... had to be thrown into reverse.”40 Troops had to be pulled out of 

Europe and redeployed to the war against Japan or returned home to 

the United States. Units remaining in Europe had to shift their mission from combat to control and governance, to occupying and administering conquered enemy land. The troops needed to maintain law 

and order, disarm and demilitarize a population whom they feared 

might be belligerent, and organize the U.S. military government in the 

defeated states.41

In these circumstances the Army engineers faced three military 

imperatives. First, they had to handle redeployment of troops. Second, 

they had to open German ports on the North Sea to move supplies to 

the U.S. forces concentrated in southern Germany. A third mission arose 

out of necessity. Massive material destruction had brought civil society 

in Europe to near total collapse by the end of the war, and the U.S. Army 

engineers needed to marshal their personnel and equipment to revitalize 

national civilian infrastructures in both liberated and occupied countries. 

As theater chief engineer, General Moore in Frankfurt remained responsible for coordinating these engineering tasks.

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 13 
20

Redeployment of Troops and Materiel

The greatest engineer effort in the first months after the war ende

in Europe involved redeployment—reducing troop strength in Europ

shipping men and materiel to the Pacific, and readjusting the total comb

force to allow the soldiers with the longest service in combat and wit

dependent children to return to the United States. Rotation home depend

ed upon an elaborate point system that took into account length an

nature of service. The War Department’s plan called for reducing troop

in Europe from 3,071,000 in May 1945 to about 405,000 by June 1946. Th

meant shipping out more men each month than the maximum numbe

that had arrived in any one month during the war. Fifteen percent o

the troops to be redeployed, with their equipment, were destined for th

Asiatic-Pacific Theater.42

Relocating 2.6 million men in one year—the War Department’s targ

number—was equivalent to moving the entire population of a city the siz

of Baltimore halfway around the globe. To accommodate transient troop

the engineers constructed holding camps near ports of embarkation t

handle 250,000 people at a time. They also had to package and crate all th

goods and equipment that accompanied the troops. Army engineers con

structed camps at Rheims; near the French ports of Marseille, Le Havr

and Cherbourg; and near the Belgian port of Antwerp. Accommodation

in these camps ranged from tents that provided a rudimentary bivoua

level of shelter to more solid, wooden-sided tents designed for the winte

of northern Europe.43

Constructing the camps and the packing crates necessary to mov

belongings and equipment required enormous quantities of lumber. In th

spring of 1945 General Moore’s staff calculated an immediate and imper

tive need for about 95 million board feet. Much of this was available a

sawn lumber in the U.S. zone in Germany. In June Moore’s engineers i

Frankfurt began to set monthly production targets for the German fores

ry organizations that handled the logging and milling of lumber. Moor

estimated that by July the Germans could produce about 35 million boar

feet a month. To move that much lumber by rail required about 350 rai

road cars a day, straining the capacity of a rail system already worn dow

by the war. Moving anything by truck meant seeking help from fiel

armies that had the very few trucks available; field commanders were di

inclined to part with any of them.44

The availability of lumber for crating and packaging remained a majo

concern throughout the summer of 1945. Although the Army turned t

Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia to supplement sup

plies, most of the lumber came from Germany. The German lumber th

reached the engineers arrived unsorted and unclassified, making deliv

ery of the proper stock to the appropriate locations much more difficu

When ordering boxes and crates, the engineers had to spread the contrac

among small producers. The wide dispersion of these producers cause

serious problems in the distribution of lumber, nails (also in short sup

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 14 
21

ply), and hardware and complicated getting the finished products where 

needed. Despite the myriad of problems, supplies had become sufficiently 

regular by early autumn 1945 to keep up with the demand for shipping 

crates and boxes.45

The engineers had orders to prepare redeployment camp facilities for 

294,000 troops in the assembly area for debarkation. By 1 July, just seven 

weeks after the end of the war, they had constructed space for 287,125. 

By December 1945, as the flow of redeployment passed its peak, the engineers began to dismantle the camps, starting in France. This task continued until it was completed in October 1946.46

All this work had to be coordinated and accomplished even though 

the most experienced engineer personnel were simultaneously being 

redeployed. Within a week of the German surrender, General Moore 

began to see the severe impact on engineer units of the loss of key people. 

He complained that he would “lose 75 percent of our [engineer] troops in 

the Communications Zone within the first four months.” Years later he 

recalled, “[I] reorganized my units every damn week because my units 

were decimated as the best men got their points to go home.”47 Moore 

wanted authority to determine which engineer officers and units would 

be demobilized, but the command structure gave that authority to the 

field commanders in Europe, who implemented the rotation system.48

Securing a New Line of Communications and Supply

Ensuring a secure supply line to transport materiel to the troops figured prominently among the tasks facing the occupying forces. After the 

successful breakout from Normandy in 1944, most of the supplies needed 

by the U.S. Army had flowed across France. After liberation, France’s sensitivity concerning foreign military authority within its sovereign territory made this route unsuitable. The port of Bremerhaven became the port 

of entry and the northern end of a new line to bring supplies to the U.S. 

occupation forces in southern Germany.

To construct the new line of communications and supply, Army 

engineers had to clear the seaports and establish rail connections to the 

south. Clearing the Bremerhaven seaway began in April 1945, before the 

end of the war. The work included removing underwater mines from a 

point upstream (south) of Bremerhaven to the river port in Bremen, about 

thirty-five miles away. There the waterway also needed mine clearing and 

dredging. Fortunately, the rail yards in both port cities had suffered only 

light damage. On 28 June 1945, both Bremerhaven and Bremen opened 

and the first four American supply ships were unloaded. Preparations 

continued to ready the ports to receive forty ships within the next 

month.49

Theoretically, the military’s formal responsibility toward the civilian 

population was limited to only what was necessary to attain its military 

objectives and to prevent widespread disease.50 In reality, the devastation and paralysis in Germany made the Army totally responsible for the 

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 15 
22

civilian population. When the war ended, the Army faced the prospe

of housing and at least partially feeding 8 million people in Europe: U.

troops and civilian personnel, recovered Allied military personnel, di

placed persons in camps, and prisoners of war. More than 5 million o

them were in the U.S. zones of occupation in Germany and Austria; U.

troops made up 3 million.51 In addition, the Army commanded the on

structure capable of providing general relief, with goods drawn largel

from theater stocks, to the rest of the civilian population in need.52

The occupying armies had no choice but to address the pervasiv

chaos and despair of civilian society. Normal economic activity ha

totally broken down in the last days of the war. Most shops were empt

In postwar Germany, it was impossible to find such commodities as fab

ric, soap, electric light bulbs, or window glass on the open market. On

the black market functioned, and on it the common medium of exchang

was American cigarettes, which soldiers had in abundant supply. About 

third of the meager production in Germany found its way onto the blac

market. Trading in the black market was a court-martial offense, but few 

soldiers could resist it. A lieutenant who made his entire cigarette allow

ance available on the black market could pocket $12,000 in four month

the equivalent of well over $100,000 in current values.53

The Army engineers encountered situations in which only the blac

market offered the goods necessary to carry out military assignment

Because the domestic economy in the United States strained to meet th

shift to peacetime production, the engineers faced severe restrictions o

Power Station in Germany

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 16 
23

what they could requisition from home. On occasion Col. Robert Fleming, 

who served in the Construction Division in General Moore’s office from 

1945 to 1947, received calls from Col. Howard A. Morris, the district engineer in Frankfurt, saying that he had exhausted all possibilities for supply. 

Only the black market had the supplies that he needed to complete his 

mission. Fleming recalled that he would reply, “Okay, I’ll donate a carton 

of cigarettes.” Neither man faced a court-martial; indeed, both retired as 

general officers.54

Rebuilding the Infrastructure

Many of the underlying problems presented engineering challenges. 

Transportation had to be restored; industry had to be restarted; and basic 

utilities such as water, sewers, and electricity had to be made operational 

again.

In Le Havre, Cherbourg, Marseille, and other French cities and villages, 

the Army engineers repaired the mains that distributed water within the 

cities. In Le Mans, Cherbourg, Saint Quentin, Rheims, and the Belgian cities 

of Liège and Namur, they chlorinated the water systems as well as cleansing them. They restored 155 miles of power lines in the Normandy peninsula and another 21 miles of lines west of Aachen, Germany. Military personnel completed 65 to 85 percent of construction tasks in the first months after 

the Normandy landing, but prisoners of war and civilians also provided 

labor as the armies moved across France and into Germany.55

Mess Hall under Construction in Frankfurt, Germany, ca. 1945

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 17 
24

Coal, the principal fuel for heating and power in Europe, was on

of the resources essential for recovery. Even before hostilities ended, th

engineers of the Advance Section (ADSEC) of COMZ received orders t

take over the coalmines in the captured parts of Germany and to restor

them to operation under U.S. military control to alleviate the critical shor

age of coal. ADSEC engineers secured control of 177 mines in the Ruh

Cologne-Aachen area between 1 April and 15 May 1945 and immediate

began to mine and ship coal.56

Restoration of the German mines by the ADSEC engineers illustrate

the wide range of interlocking engineering problems created by th

destruction of war. First, the coalmines needed electrical power to operat

To meet this need, the ADSEC engineers restored an 110,000-volt powe

grid for the Ruhr and a generating plant near Cologne. These system

provided more than adequate power for the mines, leaving a surplus fo

transmission elsewhere, including into Frankfurt.57

Second, the Army engineers had to find a labor force to work th

coalmines. The Nazi regime had used slave labor to provide about 4

percent of the wartime workforce in the mines. This labor source disap

peared with the war’s end. To recruit mine workers, the engineers had t

provide food, clothing, and shelter, all elements in markedly short supp

in the spring of 1945. In the absence of a diet that would support strenu

ous labor, the mines were chronically understaffed and worker productiv

ity was low. ADSEC engineers described the problem clearly: “In orde

to obtain large-scale production, working and living conditions must b

made attractive to the miner.” The Army engineers wanted a diet of 3,50

calories a day for miners to sustain production.58 If it had been approve

(it was not), this diet would have given the miners three times the calorie

afforded to millions of other Europeans.

Third, the restoration of production and distribution of coal was ham

pered by the near paralysis of the rail, truck, and barge network. Ha

transportation been available to deliver essential supplies, such as timbe

to shore up the mineshafts and galleries, effective production from th

mines could have quadrupled in June 1945. In the Ruhr, where the lev

of production was about 5 percent of prewar quantities, that increas

would have been dramatic! Even when newly reconstructed railroad line

became available, ADSEC engineers faced an “exceedingly acute” shortag

of coal cars, which meant that coal could not move to the markets where 

was needed.59

The Allies had to rebuild the transportation system that the war ha

disrupted and destroyed. Even as the troops advanced through Europ

engineers began to reconstruct railroad lines just behind the front. Th

Army repaired or rebuilt the equivalent of about 10,000 miles of singl

track lines between June 1944 and May 1945. Nearly all of these had bee

turned back to civilian control by the time Germany surrendered. In occu

pied areas, the military retained control of railways, and reconstructio

continued in the U.S. zone after the surrender. In the Stuttgart-Augsbur

Munich area, engineers started rebuilding the local electric rail system o

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 18 
25

17 May, nine days after the German surrender. In less than two months 

trains were operating on the entire line. By January 1946, 96 percent of the 

rail lines in the American zone were operating again. German workers 

supplied most of the physical labor to rebuild and operate the railways. 

During the period immediately after American forces crossed the Rhine, 

the Germans were neither paid nor given food, but later the military government provided food for the laborers.60

Waterways constituted a vital part of the German transportation network. After the surrender, Army engineers assumed the tasks of clearing the Rhine for navigation and replacing the temporary bridges with 

more permanent structures.61 River clearing began in May 1945 under the 

direction of the Construction Section of the Office of the Theater Chief 

Engineer.62 Lt. Col. John Connally commanded the 1057th Engineer Port 

Construction and Repair Group that handled the actual work. To remove 

obstructions, engineers fabricated a floating crane mounted on a barge, 

providing a lift capacity of over 250 tons. By the end of June Connally’s 

crews had completely removed only one of the twenty-six major obstructions between Koblenz and Karlsruhe and had begun work on thirteen 

others. A month later they opened a navigational channel through seven 

of the fourteen demolished bridges; by September the task was completed.63 Connally’s unit also worked to reconstruct bridges on the Rhine and 

the Main Rivers with the same barge and crane, using German prisoners as laborers. As of 1 January 1946, responsibility for inland waterways 

In April 1945 engineers worked on an important railway bridge that linked 

Germany and Belgium.

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 19 
26

in Germany passed from the Office of the Theater Chief Engineer t

OMGUS. Army engineers completed work on the bridges across the Rhin

and the Main in Mainz shortly thereafter.64

In the early months of the postwar era the Army engineers began th

process of rebuilding Western Europe, especially defeated and devastate

Germany. In the face of the pervasive destruction, economic collapse, hun

ger, and paralyzing despair that prevailed in 1945–1946, each engineerin

problem solved, each building rehabilitated, each roadway reconstructe

or river cleared represented a major triumph. Beyond these discrete tr

umphs lay the larger task of supporting the U.S. Army in southwester

Germany for a duration that remained undefined.

The Soviets blockaded Berlin in 1948, which marked a significan

change in the role of the U.S. forces in Germany. The supposedly pro

visional division of German territory took on a new character, one th

reflected the tension growing between West and East in the Cold Wa

conflict. The U.S. Army engineers stationed in Germany and throughou

Europe adjusted their tasks and priorities accordingly.

03B_Chap01_Final.indd 20 
2

FROM OCCUPATION TO 

MUTUAL DEFENSE

Amid the dislocation of the immediate postwar period, the theater chief engineer, Maj. Gen. Cecil R. Moore, organized Army 

engineer services to meet the needs and priorities of the army of 

occupation in Germany. As he adjusted his engineer resources 

to support and sustain the civilian administration of German communities, Moore also had to remain responsive to the challenges that developed as the wartime alliance gave way to the tensions of the Cold War.

The army of occupation in Germany and Austria needed shelter for 

men and equipment; and the engineers had to locate—and then relocate, as new exigencies emerged—headquarters, housing, and real estate 

for both ground troops and aviation units, the latter organized in the 

Army Air Forces. After April 1946 an ever-increasing number of military 

dependents required a different kind of housing and support facilities. 

The German infrastructure and economy were in shambles. Competing 

demands for both material goods and labor, combined with the widespread physical destruction and social dislocation, created scarcities that 

disrupted normal markets and caused persistent problems for the chief 

engineer’s office in managing work and setting priorities. The engineers 

faced only one area of oversupply: Vast quantities of equipment and materiel shipped into the European Theater to support the war remained on 

hand. Disposing of this excess materiel became a major concern for the 

chief engineer’s office through the end of the decade.

Over the three years following Germany’s defeat, the entire atmosphere in Europe changed. In 1948–1949 the engineers had to cope with 

the possibility of an armed conflict when the Soviet Union cut off free 

access to Berlin. This confrontation over Berlin between the Soviet Union 

and the three Western occupying powers posed incredible challenges to 

the engineering ingenuity of the U.S. Army.

All these responsibilities coincided with the tasks that carried over 

from immediate postwar imperatives. At the same time they accentuated 

a new range of engineer activities that marked a transition from concern 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 1 
28

with occupying a defeated nation to developing a community of intere

with a potential ally.

Engineer Activities in Occupied Germany

During the early years of the occupation the engineers pursue

projects to secure and provide adequate housing, office, and oper

tional facilities for the U.S. military—headquarters buildings, comman

schools, hospitals, depots, shops, special installations, bridges, railway

highways, utilities, and ports.1

 The United States Forces, Europea

Theater (USFET) Office of the Chief Engineer coordinated planning fo

these projects. When the occupation began, the U.S. military alread

held more than 50,000 real properties in occupied territory in German

Czechoslovakia, and Austria, including private houses, apartment build

ings, hotels, schools, office buildings, factory buildings, warehouses an

depots, retail stores, and barracks.2

 The largest part of the engineer

work went into rehabilitating buildings that the Army had confiscate

or requisitioned. New construction accounted for only 1 percent of th

work in the summer of 1946 and less than 5 percent in the next sever

years.3

Supporting the U.S. Army in Europe

After the war with Japan ended in August 1945, many soldiers—

frequently officers but also the small number of enlisted troops th

were married—wanted to bring their families to the European Theate

Housing in Germany was in a deplorable state. Overcrowding in the U.

zone created continued pressure to requisition more facilities, and th

military government’s list of requisitioned properties grew during th

first year of occupation. In Württemberg-Baden, for example, U.S. troop

occupied 29,394 rooms in November 1945, 42,002 in December, and 43,36

in January 1946.4

In spring 1946, Headquarters, USFET, decided to allow dependen

into the theater. The Army began active planning for the change i

September 1945, when USFET created a board to define “standards fo

accommodations in military communities.” In early October the plan

ning board sent proposed standards to the theater’s major command

for review by the commanding generals, who were responsible for hou

ing in their areas. In early December the major commands were directe

to prepare plans for establishing and maintaining military commun

ties. At the same time, the commanding general of the Theater Servic

Forces, European Theater, was directed to submit technical standard

to Headquarters, USFET, “for all types of housing and installation

including recreational facilities.”5

 General Moore proposed setting u

an Engineer Planning Office “with German engineers, architects an

draftsmen somewhere outside the Frankfurt enclave.”6

 An office suc

as he described evolved within the chief engineer’s office in Frankfur

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 2 
29

where staff officers devised standards for housing and prepared a guide, 

translated into French and German, that both military communities and 

contractors could consult.7

Because inflation had disrupted normal pricing mechanisms, for several years after 1945 the Army measured the value of all work in hours 

of labor. During January 1946 the chief engineer’s office formulated a 

set of general estimates of the amount of work necessary in the theater 

over the next two years. The January 1946 projection called for 92 million 

worker-hours. Seventy-seven percent of the labor and almost 74 percent of 

the spending—but only 24 percent of the supplies—were allocated to the 

establishment of military communities. By late 1946 USFET had selected 

permanent locations for the military communities, which would include 

soldiers, dependents, and an array of service buildings to house commissaries, post exchanges, chapels, and administrative offices. As work on 

the facilities progressed, it accounted for 60 percent of the construction 

program and 47 percent of supplies, almost double the quantity projected 

earlier.8

During the first winter of the occupation the chief engineer’s office set 

out relatively simple rehabilitation plans to prepare facilities for soldiers. 

The American zone contained requisitioned and confiscated barracks 

or casernes that needed only minimal work to bring them to standards 

acceptable to the occupying army.9

 Many of these casernes had been built 

before the First World War, and most had been damaged during the recent 

fighting. Still, even with no repair at all, these buildings offered more 

comfort than tents.

The engineers were allowed to rehabilitate barracks only to austere 

standards. The chief engineer’s office planned a first phase to repair facilities so that they would be “somewhat better than the wartime scales of 

accommodations.”10 As work progressed, the plan for rehabilitation foresaw improving accommodations to a level “somewhat less than is allowed 

in comparable posts ... within the continental United States.”11 No one at 

the time imagined that U.S. military personnel would use many of these 

facilities for more than forty years.

Accommodating dependents was more complicated than housing 

troops. Virtually all the apartments and private homes available for confiscation or requisition were in terrible condition as a result of neglect 

and damage during the war. Most facilities required extensive repair 

to be considered livable.12 The program for rehabilitating quarters for 

dependents ran into a delay when the War Department ruled that neither permanent nor temporary construction funds could be devoted to 

housing dependents. In the face of protests from the theater, the War 

Department reconsidered and subsequently ruled that only appropriated 

funds could not be used for dependent housing. Surplus materials and 

money from reparations could be used to repair or to construct housing 

for dependents. Further, in contrast to earlier regulations, materials absolutely essential but not obtainable in the theater could be purchased in the 

United States. The reinterpretation made it possible to proceed. German 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 3 
30

construction firms performed the work; German civilians, displaced pe

sons, and prisoners of war supplied the labor; and costs and materia

were charged to the Germans under the occupation budget.

Supporting the Air Forces

The U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) enjoyed the same measure of suppo

from the theater chief engineer’s office as the field armies in German

The AAF had played a significant part in the war and needed appropr

ate facilities in occupied Germany. It chose as its command center th

German airfield at Rhine-Main, seven miles southwest of Frankfurt. Th

U.S. troops had captured the field in April 1945 and put it at the dispos

of an American fighter squadron for the last month of the war. Enginee

battalions began rebuilding facilities at the airfield almost immediatel

By midsummer the engineers had completed nearly all of the initi

work, and by autumn Rhine-Main began operating as a major AAF bas

Expansion of facilities continued over the next several years.13

The AAF formulated no construction plan for 1946, although U.S. for

es retained control of over forty former German air bases and a few activ

bases in France and Britain. Even without major plans, the Office of th

Chief Engineer, USFET, allocated over 12 million worker-hours of labor t

AAF projects for the year—13 percent of its total two-year allocation. Fift

percent of the work scheduled for the AAF went into facilities at Rhin

Main, in part because it also opened for limited commercial use in Ma

1946. Seven months later a large passenger terminal opened for gener

commercial traffic. The remaining 50 percent of the engineer workloa

for the AAF for 1946 went into projects for housing, facilities, and routin

maintenance.14

Berlin’s main airport, Tempelhof, also became a locus of Army eng

neer activity immediately after the war ended. The airport’s design ha

been avant-garde when planned in the mid-1930s, and 80 percent of i

facilities had been completed by the time construction was suspended i

1943. Bombing and systematic destruction by the invading forces had le

it nearly useless. When U.S. forces took control of Tempelhof in July 194

the terminal and field were in shambles and needed immediate attention

The 473d Air Service Group assessed the damage at Tempelhof an

immediately set about reconstruction.15 Troops cleared away debris an

restored utilities. The airfield’s one runway was sod, so the 862d Enginee

Aviation Battalion began work on a new 6,000-foot runway. Over a bas

of crushed brick taken from the rubble of Berlin, the engineers poured 

two-inch layer of concrete and then topped the concrete with pierced ste

planks. When the airfield opened for military use, planes landed on th

pierced plank runway and took off from the sod strip.16

By 1947 the Army engineers had begun work on other airfield

in Frankfurt, Giebelstadt, and Munich and on AAF depots in Erdin

Oberpfoffenhofen, and Roth. Work at Rhine-Main accounted for one-thir

of an estimated 51 million worker-hours that the engineers provided fo

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 4 
31

the AAF in 1947.17 When the U.S. Air Force emerged in September 1947 

as an independent military service, decisions in Washington ordained 

that the Army engineers, not its own engineer component, provide support. The Army engineer units detailed to the Air Force were designated 

Special Category Army with Air Force units.18

Juggling Competing Demands

During the first three years of the occupation, construction supplies 

were never adequate and certain materials were always lacking, particularly electrical fixtures and switches, plumbing supplies, paint, and 

plaster.19 Because the engineers could not supply all essential projects, 

the chief engineer’s office contrived a special category of hot projects that 

received preferential distribution of supplies. The office’s list of hot projects, based on the staff’s judgment of relative importance and on information from construction officers in the field, changed from month to month. 

The definition of hot was, to be sure, unofficial, and frequently at variance 

with the judgment of the using services, each of which tended to consider 

its own projects the most important.20

One of the earliest hot projects was the creation of facilities at RhineMain Air Base for the USFET’s Air Transport Command (ATC) and the 

European Air Transport Service. The ATC began limited service from 

Rhine-Main in May 1946, but construction became more urgent later 

that year when the ATC received orders to relocate from Orly Field 

near Paris to Rhine-Main. The move had a ripple effect, pushing work 

at the neighboring Wiesbaden military community into the hot project 

category, because Wiesbaden became the new headquarters of the ATC. 

The only way to liberate space for the ATC at Wiesbaden was to move 

other units out of that city; each such move provoked another hot project. Similarly, construction in the Frankfurt area became a hot project by 

late 1946 when authorities chose the city as the administrative center for 

the merged British and American zones of occupation, renamed Bizonia. 

The overwhelming wartime devastation in Frankfurt put the city behind 

all other areas in the U.S. zone in providing dependent housing. As 

administrative services expanded, drawing ever more people to the city, 

securing adequate facilities for U.S. military personnel became increasingly difficult.

As a step toward resolving the situation, the chief engineer’s office 

created a liaison team to work with the city’s mayor to adjust space, labor, 

and supplies. Army engineers made supplies available from their stocks 

to speed the rehabilitation. The engineers concentrated labor in Frankfurt 

by transferring labor service companies—third-country nationals paid 

by the Army—from Stuttgart and Nuremberg and German workers from 

projects at Rhine-Main and in Griesheim.21 By 1 January 1947, military 

housing in Frankfurt had first demand on materials. In the first three 

months of 1947 work crews completed 106 housing units—far short of the 

7,000 additional units needed for civilians and officers.22

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 5 
32

The designations of hot projects by the chief engineer’s office illustra

that even in late 1946 decisions concerning engineer issues were based o

immediate need and amid shortages. Expedient solutions displaced coo

dination. With both operations and project approval decentralized, execu

tion of a coherent construction program remained beyond the reach of th

chief engineer’s office. As with nearly all construction, the real respons

bility for the housing projects lay with the major subordinate command

and they operated more or less independent of the efforts of the chi

engineer to coordinate planning, procurement, and supply.

Examples abound of uncoordinated solutions to urgent problems. I

the American military community in Bad Nauheim, north of Frankfur

getting power to the residents superseded concerns about standardiz

tion. Direct current and alternating current served the same block of res

dence units, so the purchasing of appliances could not be standardize

Similarly, in the Höchst compound west of Frankfurt, some houses ha

110-volt circuits installed in one room and 220-volt circuits in anothe

When a power failure hit the compound in October 1946, some houses lo

power while others did not. Some houses lost power on only one floo

Col. Robert Fleming, chief of construction in the chief engineer’s offic

commented in a staff briefing that he “tried to explain to a friend of min

why only his second floor lights were out, but I don’t think he yet believe

me.”23

The tension between the chief engineer’s vast responsibility and h

very limited authority—he operated through only technical and no

command channels—constituted a vexing administrative issue. U.

military construction and procurement proceeded on an ad hoc basi

command by command, with disturbingly little attention to overa

theater needs.24 For example, the Third Army’s plans to construct a

ice rink with a roll-back roof in Garmisch received approval by th

commander over the objections of the chief engineer’s staff, particu

larly Cols. Robert Fleming and Louis W. Prentiss, Sr., the deputy chi

engineer in 1946. The engineer colonels in Third Army gloated publicl

that they had humiliated their counterparts in Frankfurt. Their arro

gance thoroughly angered Fleming. Five years later, he “settled som

scores.” Fleming had become assistant chief of engineers for militar

operations, and Prentiss headed the Personnel Branch in the Offic

of the Chief of Engineers in Washington. As Fleming remembered, 

got General Prentiss to go along—and two careers got ended becaus

the two men involved [had been] too stupid to realize that cooperatio

was an asset.”25

Fleming, too, had had problems with unreasonable projects. He ha

“hit the ceiling” upon learning that the engineers had received orde

to provide the wife of the USFET commander in chief, General Joseph 

McNarney, with a cow barn so that she could have fresh milk daily. Whe

he calmed down, he reasoned that “a cow barn was a small price to pay

for the good will of the four-star theater commander and let the proje

proceed. 26

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 6 
33

Construction Costs

As the occupation continued, money to support the U.S. military presence in Germany became ever scarcer. After four years of war Americans 

were ill disposed to invest in any military needs at all, much less in new 

facilities to house the U.S. Army in Germany. At the end of the war in 

1945, military spending garnered 39.1 percent of the U.S. gross national 

product; by 1948 military spending had fallen to 3.7 percent.27 Politically 

imposed budget constraints meant that troop strength in Germany 

dropped steadily from 342,000 in July 1946, to 135,000 in July 1947, to just 

over 100,000 by the end of 1948. In this climate, resources available to the 

military, and to the Army engineers, declined drastically. In the first quarter of 1947 major and minor construction, already down sharply from wartime levels, required 10 million worker-hours; by the same quarter of 1948 

that figure was down to just under 6 million worker-hours. The reduced 

engineer budget for 1948 imposed “a drastic curtailment of expenditures” 

on both construction and other activities for the year.28

Budgetary concerns led commanders to make penny-wise but poundfoolish decisions. In mid-1946 the theater chief engineer’s office warned 

that the effort to hold down expenses in rehabilitating troop facilities was 

false economy. Commanders were incorporating “less desirable buildings requiring more labor and materials per unit” into their inventory.29

In late 1947 the engineers observed repeatedly that maintenance costs 

had increased because of the “serious deterioration of the facilities constructed during the last two years.”30 Indeed, funds “saved” from the budget through sparse rehabilitation went increasingly toward maintenance 

and repair. By 1 January 1948, maintenance consumed 90 percent of the 

total engineer labor, supplies, and funds. The early decisions during the 

occupation to build cheaply and for the short term haunted the Army for 

decades.31

Another factor increased the European Command’s (EUCOM) expenditures for maintenance: the decision to shift an ever-greater burden 

away from the German government. Because of the escalation of tensions 

between the United States and the Soviet Union, German public opinion 

became more important to American strategists. Accordingly, in 1947 the 

U.S. military began to reduce “as much as possible the financial, manpower, and production burden of the occupation upon the indigenous 

economy.”32 This policy reflected the changing relations between the U.S. 

Army and the German polity developing with the active encouragement 

of the Western Powers in their zones of occupation. As the military sought 

to detach itself from dependence on German payments, it had to assume 

more of the costs of maintenance and repair directly.

Dealing with Excess Materiel

The eminent nineteenth century British historian Thomas Macaulay 

described the essence of war as violence, but in modern times the essence 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 7 
34

of war has become logistics. In World War II the industrial and logistic

system developed by the United States created the conditions for victor

by pumping the materiel of war into the European Theater at a prodigiou

rate. By May 1945 over 5 million tons of war supplies were on hand i

Europe. Solving the quandary presented by the volume of war materiel n

longer needed became one of the most difficult and persistent problem

that the Army engineers faced. Resolving the problem involved four yea

of intense effort.

Immediately after the victory, General Moore’s Office of the Theate

Chief Engineer received the assignment to clear the liberated countries a

rapidly as possible of the thousands of tons of war supplies that remained i

depots behind the advancing combat troops. About 90 percent of the mat

riel was in depots in rear or intermediate areas (France and Belgium) rathe

than forward in Germany. Moore’s orders were to concentrate these supplie

in Germany, where the army of occupation could draw upon them.33

The Army engineers began consolidating war supplies by constructin

new depots and transferring materials to them. Before hostilities ende

the Army had established its forward engineer depot in an encampmen

formerly used by German military engineers near the town of Hanau i

the Frankfurt area. Within months the engineers had added major sup

ply depots in Fürth, Bremen, Mannheim, and Berlin in the U.S. zone i

Germany and in Linz in Austria. Thirteen supply depots (1 in Britain, 5 i

Belgium, and 7 in France) remained active throughout the Western Bas

Section.34 As American military involvement in the liberated countries o

France, Belgium, and the Netherlands decreased, these supplies could b

transferred to Germany.

The Hanau Depot

To prepare for the influx of materiel from the Western Base Section

particularly from France and Belgium in 1946, the chief engineer’s offic

began a substantial program to expand the depot in Hanau. The goal—t

establish stabilized open storage, closed storage, shops, access roads, util

ties, and railroad facilities—created a long catalog of projects: improv

drainage; provide new latrines, a heating plant, a water system, and 

supply of potable water for the depot; pave motor pool areas; and buil

rail spurs and related railroad facilities. The engineers also needed t

build an electrical distribution system and additional warehouse spac

winterize lubrication racks, put a fire prevention system in place, stabiliz

streets and open areas, and create hardstands for processing and par

ing vehicles. Cols. Paul D. Berrigan and Robert Fleming, successive head

of the Construction Division in the Office of the Theater Chief Enginee

supervised the Hanau project from Frankfurt.35

Not only did construction of new facilities fail to keep pace with th

influx of goods from areas outside Germany, but the arrival of mat

riel often got in the way of construction. As an additional complicatio

requirements changed in the summer of 1946. Anticipating an increas

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 8 
35

in the number of displaced persons in the U.S. zone in Germany, officials 

ordered the materials to construct prefabricated huts for 40,000 persons 

from storage areas in Belgium and France. The officials set 1 September 

1946 as the target date for completing the transfer, without realizing that 

facilities for unloading and storage at the existing depots in Germany 

were inadequate to handle the volume of material involved.36

Management of the movement of excess war supplies broke down in 

part because redeployment removed trained engineer personnel. Lack of 

proper controls contributed to pilferage. The engineers did not have personnel in France or Belgium with sufficient experience to select the materials most adaptable to salvage and reuse. When a shipment of 20,000 tons 

of miscellaneous parts for prefabricated huts arrived in Hanau unlabeled 

and unsorted, Colonel Fleming observed that “it would have taken a battalion a year to sort them out” and build the huts.37

By 1 July 1946, inadequate facilities in Hanau left 1,800 railcars waiting to be unloaded. By late summer several hundred barges lined the 

Main River because the depot had insufficient personnel to unload them 

and insufficient facilities to store their cargo. To alleviate the backlog, the 

engineer’s office established temporary construction supply dumps in 

each of the seven major commands and opened a new engineer supply 

depot in Gelnhausen.38 By late 1946 the Hanau depot had become not only 

the storage point for all supplies from the Western Base Section but also 

the main depot for the U.S. zone of occupation in Germany.39 In March 

1947 all engineer supply depots in Germany were officially redesignated 

as subdepots of Hanau.40

Harsh weather during the winter of 1946–1947 brought more difficulties for the overburdened operators of the Hanau depot. To husband limited supplies in the face of the severe cold, they rationed electrical power 

and gasoline, substantially disrupting construction to expand the depot’s 

storage facilities. Pressure on the depot increased when the Mediterranean 

Theater was inactivated in early 1947 and 9,800 long tons of supplies 

moved from Italy to the U.S. zone in Germany. In April, May, and June an 

additional 6,940 long tons of supplies—cement, lumber, and materials for 

electrical and plumbing work—arrived from the Mediterranean Theater.41

Although the Army engineers employed German contractors, construction throughout 1947 at the depot in Hanau remained inadequate 

to accommodate the incoming supplies. In Giessen, the Army built 

500,000 square feet of new covered storage for a quartermaster depot. In 

Griesheim contractors rehabilitated and added to an I. G. Farben Company 

plant and buildings to adapt them as an ordnance depot. Projects at these 

sites included hardstands and rail, road, and other service connections, as 

well as warehouses. In spite of additional facilities, the depots still could 

not absorb all of the materiel arriving in Germany. By the summer of 1947 

the target date for gathering all engineer supplies at the depot in Hanau 

had been pushed back well into 1948.42

Although its facilities and its personnel were both overtaxed, the 

Hanau depot provided a central point of distribution for the amassed 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 9 
36

materiel. Designating a central distribution point enabled the chief eng

neer in Frankfurt to manage construction materials more effectivel

throughout the U.S. zone. In early 1947 the chief engineer’s office bega

issuing lists that specified the quantities of each item of reserve stock

in Hanau so that engineers and commanders in the communities woul

know what was available in the theater.43 At the same time, depots close

in the Western Base Section and supplies left France and Belgium fo

Hanau. Within Germany, as the movement of goods passed its peak, th

engineer construction dumps in Kassel and Landsberg no longer ha

to provide overflow space; their stocks could be transferred to Hanau

By June stocks from Illesheim and Schwandorf were moved to Hana

and the facilities at Illesheim passed to the Ordnance Corps for use as 

vehicle reserve park.44 By September the supply point in Stuttgart wa

empty and supplies from Berlin had also been transferred to Hanau. Th

last shipment from the Mediterranean Theater—3,000 tons—was en rou

from Italy. By March 1948 about 3,190 tons of engineer supplies remaine

to be moved from subdepots to Hanau. Six months later all comman

stocks had been removed from the other subdepots, which were the

closed, leaving Hanau as the only engineer service depot in the U.S. zon

in Germany.45

Construction of storage space continued in Hanau. The depot gaine

usable space when in 1948 the Army turned over tens of thousands of ton

of supplies to a new semipublic German corporation under the program 

called Bulk Transfer of U.S. Army Property.46 As consolidation of supplie

progressed and the inflow of goods lessened, the command of the Hana

depot began to gain control of the materiel in the warehouses. In the fin

quarter of 1948 the Hanau depot undertook an inventory of its entire stoc

of general engineer and spare parts. The chief engineer’s office considere

this “the biggest step forward that has been made since the depot wa

activated.”47 In January 1949 the Hanau depot passed inspection with 

rating of excellent, in sharp contrast to its unsatisfactory rating just eleve

months earlier.48

Fleming remembered the situation at the Hanau depot as “th

biggest single problem” that the engineers faced in the years imme

diately after the war. The evolution of the Hanau depot illustrates sev

eral aspects of the immediate postwar years. The engineers had to fulfi

assignments with limited resources and insufficient time to plan. T

some degree, these limitations led to mistakes, inefficiencies, waste, an

confusion. In retrospect, Fleming called the hasty consolidation of sup

plies in Hanau “one of the best examples in our Army of wand-wavin

and wishful thinking.” Despite the problems, a substantial quantity o

materiel was actually gathered and warehoused in Hanau, and a goo

percentage of it was salvaged and used. By early 1949 the engineer

could claim some success in Hanau. That success came at personal cos

Fleming considered the whole process “a tragedy because several ver

fine officers trying to do a job were harassed to the point that the

careers were ended.”49

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 10 
37

Repair and Rebuild Program

The Repair and Rebuild program at the Hanau depot offers another 

example of engineer success. In 1947 the 485th Engineer Heavy Shop 

Company (later designated the 507th Engineer Shop Company) was 

attached to the depot. This unit’s mission was to repair and maintain 

mechanical equipment for the Army. Because the quantity of equipment 

needing work was more than the company could handle, the engineers 

turned to the German economy.

In 1947 the Hanau command awarded contracts to eleven German 

firms to repair U.S. military equipment. Arranging the contracts was 

not easy. German industrialists were reluctant to invest their capital, 

and German workers were reluctant to take payment for their labor 

in the worthless German Reichsmark. To overcome these obstacles, 

the depot put up the basic materials required for production out of its 

stocks and made special arrangements with Army agencies to provide 

the workers with one hot meal a day. With these inducements in place, 

three plants opened during the spring of 1947: a Daimler-Benz plant in 

Uhingen-Göppingen, where heavy cranes were rebuilt; the Kaeble plant 

in Backnang, which rebuilt tractors, rollers, and graders; and the FMA 

Porkorny plant in Frankfurt, which rebuilt air compressors. By July 1947 

eight more firms had joined the list of contractors for the Hanau depot’s 

rebuild program: Beinhorne Electrical Shop in Hanau, Sabel & Scheurer 

in Oberursel, Vulcan Diesel in Bremen, Karl Wolfe in Göppingen, another 

Daimler-Benz plant in Stuttgart, Alfred Teves in Frankfurt, Karl Schmitt 

in Fulda, and Fritz Leitz Machine Works in Oberkochen.

For almost a year these eleven plants could not keep up with the 

demand from U.S. military units for rebuilt equipment. By late 1948 the 

Repair and Rebuild program moved ahead of demand, and in the first 

quarter of 1949 it had made so much progress that a Heavy Equipment 

Storage Section had to be opened in Hanau to house and maintain the 

reconditioned equipment until it was requisitioned.50

H. Jace Greene, one of the civilian engineers recruited from the United 

States, became involved in the Repair and Rebuild program early in 

1947. He had arrived in Germany in October 1946 and had first served as 

the operations officer of the 333d Engineers in Rüsselsheim, outside of 

Frankfurt. The following February Greene was reassigned to Stuttgart to 

carry on the work of the 555th Engineers. This new assignment, to supervise reconstruction of five German factories as Army shops to recondition 

jeeps, trucks, and tractors, began what became a thirty-year career for 

Greene with the Army engineers in Germany.51

Over the winter of 1948–1949 the Army reduced the number of service contractors involved in the rebuild program. By that time tremendous quantities of heavy engineering equipment had been salvaged and 

repaired. In 1950 the rebuild plants produced an average of 200 major and 

150 minor items of equipment a day, from rebuilt earthmovers to chainsaws and water pumps for engines. By 1952 the program had produced 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 11 
38

substantial quantities of such items as tanks, trucks, weapons, jeeps, tra

tors, cranes, radio equipment, light and heavy construction machiner

smoke generators, flamethrowers, and household furniture. The cost o

the program represented about 30 percent of the replacement value o

the equipment reconditioned. The German economy benefited throug

increased employment and expanded industrial capacity, important fa

tors in the early phases of Germany’s recovery.52

Reasserting Order and Discipline

A year after the occupation began it was clear that the rapid demob

lization of the U.S. Army in Europe, coupled with difficult living cond

tions and frequent changes in command, had led to a decline in mora

and discipline among the troops. The U.S. forces in Germany had degen

erated into what one of the engineers called “almost an unruly mob

and had ceased to exist as an effective tactical fighting force.53 The U.

Constabulary, formed early in 1946 to act as a mobile military police forc

for the U.S. zone, rated only 65 percent on a measure of combat readines

The 1st Infantry Division, the other unit available in event of comba

rated just 20 percent.54

In August 1946 Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commander of the 1

Infantry Division during the war, became chief of staff, USFET, with th

assignment to reassert discipline and to restore the Army’s tactical read

ness.55 By the time Huebner assumed his position in Frankfurt, the sens

of urgency associated with combat had long since disappeared. The occu

pation force had assumed a “supervisory rather than operational” rol

and the challenge had shifted to meeting the duties of the occupatio

with an ever-shrinking troop base and budget.56

At the center of military planning in Washington, the Joint Chiefs o

Staff recommended and the president approved a reorganization th

had two objectives. One goal was to reconfigure U.S. forces overseas to 

structure attuned to peacetime and to the mission of the occupation, wit

a single commander responsible for the operations of all military service

in each overseas command. A second goal was to unify the armed force

under a new Department of Defense (successor to the War and Nav

Departments) that would command four separate services: the Army, 

newly independent Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.57

In Europe, these reforms led to the elimination of the wartime de

ignation “theater” and the reorganization of U.S. forces under the new 

European Command (EUCOM), established in Frankfurt on 15 Marc

1947. On 15 November a separate Army command, the U.S. Ground an

Service Forces, was created and then redesignated as the United State

Army, Europe (USAREUR).58 General Lucius D. Clay assumed comman

of EUCOM while retaining his position as U.S. military governor i

Berlin. Huebner remained in Frankfurt as deputy commander in chief fo

Europe and EUCOM’s chief of staff. In early 1948 EUCOM moved its head

quarters from Frankfurt to Heidelberg. Clay operated from Berlin unt

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 12 
39

15 May 1949, when he returned to the United States and retired. All of 

Clay’s successors as EUCOM commander in chief resided in Heidelberg.59

As a part of the reorganization in early 1947, the occupied areas of 

Germany and Austria were reorganized. The military districts were divided into military posts and subposts, which became logistical and administrative commands. Post commanders assumed responsibility for training 

and discipline. They also took over from the engineers the responsibility 

for supply. This became a more manageable task after the 1948 economic 

reforms in West Germany, which made procurement from the German 

economy more feasible. Within a year the military districts were eliminated and the sixteen military posts—nine in the German state (Land) of 

Bavaria and seven in the states of Württemberg-Baden and Hesse—became 

major subordinate commands under EUCOM.60 (See Map 4.)

Huebner quickly made his presence known to the engineers in 

Frankfurt. In an attempt to boost morale, someone had ordered the 

Frankfurt district engineer, Col. Howard A. Morris, to convert the rotunda of the I. G. Farben building—a beautifully balanced architectural 

blend of interior and exterior space separated by tremendous two-story 

curved glass windows—into a fully furnished Main Street–style soda 

fountain. The new attraction opened about two weeks before Huebner 

took command. When Huebner arrived, he closed it down immediately 

and began looking for those responsible. Fingers pointed to the engineers, 

so Huebner called in the chief of construction from the chief engineer’s 

office, Colonel Fleming. In truth, Fleming also found the project outrageous, and both he and Morris had unsuccessfully opposed the project as 

frivolous. At his meeting with Huebner, Fleming presented all the memoranda that he had written objecting to the project and orally protested 

against the soda fountain and similar projects, including the skating 

rink and the cow barn. After listening for a few minutes, Huebner asked 

Fleming whether he had other examples of such “unreasonable demands.” 

When Fleming said that he did, Huebner replied, “I want to see them.” 

From that day onward, the extravagant projects stopped.61

On 19 November 1946, Brig. Gen. Don. G. Shingler succeeded General 

Moore as theater chief engineer in Frankfurt. When EUCOM superseded 

USFET the following March, the label “theater” ceased to exist, and 

Shingler’s title was shortened to “chief engineer.” Over the next three 

years, as the changes Huebner initiated modified the character of the U.S. 

forces in Germany, Shingler led a similar effort to increase efficiency and 

discipline among the engineers.62

Engineer Management Efficiency

Huebner backed Shingler in asserting the authority of his office in 

all engineer matters. In late 1946 Shingler’s staff submitted to the USFET 

general staff a plan to concentrate all construction activities under the 

operational control of the theater chief engineer.63 The proposal became 

the basis for reforms in the management of engineer assets.

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 13 
Map 4

Heidelberg

Darmstadt

Frankfurt

Munich

Augsburg

Bad Tölz

Garmisch

Regensburg

Stuttgart

Wiesbaden

Würzburg

Bamberg

Nuremberg

Wetzlar

Fulda

Grafenwöhr

Rhine R

Elbe R

Erfurt

Kaiserslautern

Innsbruck

Dresden

Berlin

Hannover

Pilsen

Leipzig

FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT

SECOND MILITARY

DISTRICT

EAST GERMANY

CZECHOSLOVAKI

AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND

LIECHTENSTEIN

FRANCE

WEST GERMANY

MILITARY DISTRICTS AND POSTS

U.S. ARMY ZONE OF OCCUPATION

1 August 1947

District Boundary (approximate)

Post Boundary (approximate)

Post Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 14 
41

After the reorganization in March 1947, EUCOM had seven major commands: the First and Second Military Districts; U.S. Air Forces, Europe; 

U.S. Forces, Austria; the Berlin Command (Office of Military Government 

United States); the Continental Base Section; and headquarters command 

(Frankfurt). EUCOM issued directives affirming that the commanding 

general of each major command retained responsibility for construction in 

his area. Simultaneously, these directives reemphasized the pivotal role of 

the chief engineer as the central planner for all construction, with authority to approve all major projects, that is, those involving more than 10,000 

worker-hours of labor and supervision.64

As a result of this mandate the chief engineer’s office reviewed 266 

projects in the first quarter of 1947. Of these, the office approved 200 but 

rejected 66, leading to a substantial decrease in the construction program, 

in some areas a drop of as much as 50 percent. In the following quarter 

the major commands seemed to get the message. The chief engineer’s 

office received only 84 projects to review; of these, they approved 54, 

rejected 2 outright, and returned 28 “for further study.” By the third quarter of 1947 the commands submitted only 79 projects, less than one-third 

of the number proposed at the beginning of the year. Of these, the chief 

engineer’s office turned back or deferred 40 percent. Many years later 

Col. Alan J. McCutchen, who succeeded Fleming as chief of construction, 

referred to this as the “prevention-of-construction phase” of engineering 

activity in Europe.65

The chief engineer’s office continued to strengthen its role. By the 

last quarter of 1948 the engineers at military posts within the major 

commands no longer had the discretion to budget for projects requiring 

5,000 or more worker-hours. Only projects “approved by Headquarters, 

EUCOM” received funding through the chief engineer’s office. In other 

words, the chief engineer’s office had the final word.66

Under Shingler’s leadership the chief engineer’s office developed other 

ways to manage engineer projects more efficiently. In the summer of 1947 

the staff set up a post engineer training team made up of people from the 

central office trained in real estate, solid fuels, construction and utilities, 

cost accounting, engineer supply, repair and maintenance of engineer 

equipment, and fire prevention. The First and Second Military Districts, 

under which the military posts were organized, each formed a district 

team that was trained by the team in the chief engineer’s office. The three 

teams worked simultaneously and completed visits to all sixteen military 

posts by the end of September.67

The renewed emphasis throughout EUCOM in 1947–1948 on military readiness, efficiency, and the elimination of unnecessary staff positions created a new activity for the engineers. The office began to engage 

German and third-country personnel to substitute for soldiers in nonmilitary duties. The Engineer School in Murnau assumed the task of preparing these local workers for new responsibilities; in May 1947 the school 

admitted the first German students to its training courses. Seven Germans 

graduated from training courses in June, and by September another 146 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 15 
42

German engineer specialists graduated. The school trained increasin

numbers of local nationals in technical specialties through the 1940s.68

Tactical Readiness

General Huebner’s efforts to bring order and discipline to U.S. mil

tary forces in Europe stimulated other projects for the Army engineer

To address tactical readiness and troop training, Huebner made fiel

exercises mandatory. He ordered elements of the 1st Infantry Division

still scattered in early 1947 throughout the entire U.S. zone, to assemb

at a training area formerly used by the German army near Grafenwöh

about twenty miles southeast of Bayreuth. Here he put company-siz

units through combat training. During 1947 and 1948 a total of about 1

million worker-hours went into renovation and construction of train

ing facilities at the Grafenwöhr summer training camp. Although ten

served the troops as shelter in the field, engineers constructed mor

durable wooden huts for kitchen, sanitary, recreational, and administr

tive facilities. During late spring 1948, eight separate camps were con

structed at Grafenwöhr, with access roads, latrines, water systems, light

mess and headquarters facilities, and floors for the tents. Headquarter

26th Infantry, oversaw the preparations; and the Construction Branch o

the chief engineer’s office provided materials and trained engineers a

supervisors.69

The U.S. military has used training facilities in Grafenwöhr since their construction 

in the late 1940s. Members of the 43d Antiaircraft Battalion are training with the 

.30-caliber M2 carbine in Grafenwöhr in early 1956.

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 16 
43

Huebner also ordered extensive rehabilitation for Vilseck Caserne, 

where the U.S. Constabulary was slated for special combat training under 

the plan to revitalize American ground forces. The caserne consisted of 

about 120 buildings damaged by war and three years of occupancy by 

displaced persons. Because Vilseck was isolated from other U.S. military 

installations, recreational facilities for soldiers received special attention.70

Other than Grafenwöhr and Vilseck, the U.S. zone contained very 

limited areas for military exercises. The U.S. Army had permission to use 

training facilities in the British and French zones, but this involved greater 

travel for the troops, so EUCOM sought more training space within its 

own zone. In 1949 the command obtained another small training area for 

regiment-size units in Wildflecken in northern Bavaria. Like Grafenwöhr, 

it lay very close to the German-Czech border.71

Administrative Reorganization

In the summer of 1946 the United States invited the three other occupying powers to merge economic administration of the zones of occupation 

in Germany. The French and the Soviet Union declined the invitation, but 

the British accepted. The new administrative authority, Bizonia, took formal shape on 1 January 1947. Later that year the two powers decided to 

consolidate the administrative offices of their combined zones in Frankfurt. 

To make room, the EUCOM headquarters staff and the staff of the chief 

engineer’s office moved to Heidelberg, a city spared from bombing during the war because of the historic and cultural associations it held for the 

British and Americans. To accommodate EUCOM, the U.S. Constabulary 

moved from Heidelberg to Stuttgart. EUCOM located its headquarters in 

Grossdeutschland Caserne, which in August 1948 was renamed Campbell 

Barracks. This sequence of moves began in February 1948 but was not completed until early 1949.72 Beginning in 1948 the Army engineers supervised 

military engineer activity in Europe from Heidelberg.

The movement of headquarters to Heidelberg demanded a major commitment of labor. The construction program to prepare the area involved 

widening roads, providing office space and a new command post, preparing hardstands for parking military vehicles and five new parking lots for 

passenger cars, and building a new quartermaster gas station and a new 

engineer supply point.73

Although largely undamaged by air attacks, Heidelberg had not 

escaped the effects of the shortages prevalent throughout Germany before 

and during the war. Many of the city’s buildings and homes suffered from 

years of neglect and the absence of such basics as paint, heating fuel, and 

utilities. The Army engineers had to carry out substantial rehabilitation on 

requisitioned property, which included over a thousand German homes 

and every hotel in Heidelberg, as well as military installations. Patton and 

Campbell Barracks were completely renovated, but the most intricate and 

delicate work went into the private homes that housed the general officers 

at EUCOM headquarters.

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 17 
44

One of these facilities was the 72-room mansion of the Robert Bosc

family on Schloßwolfsbrunnenweg. Sgt. Stanley Sikirica of the 252

Engineer Combat Battalion received orders to coordinate and supervis

the carpentry, masonry, painting, and related work to repair the deterio

ration attributable to the lack of materials going back to the 1930s. “Th

wallpaper was terrible. Everything was falling down. The fresco work wa

breaking off the ceilings and deteriorating to the point [that] there was n

adhesive, and everything was just mildewing ... and the floors—the pa

quet floors—were warped. The heating systems were out; there was n

coal or coke to burn for years to heat these large mansions.”74

To restore the quarters as faithfully as possible to their original sta

of artistic beauty, the engineers engaged local people, including a fresc

craftsman in Heidelberg. The parquet floors provided the greatest cha

lenge. Finding wood to match the three tones in the original was difficu

in an economy that had faced wood shortages for several years. But th

engineers succeeded, and Sikirica recalled the work with pride. Durin

the 1950s the Army returned the homes in Heidelberg to their Germa

owners.75

The First Berlin Crisis

The work in Heidelberg took place as political tensions reached 

public crescendo over Berlin. Shortly after the end of the war the Unite

States and Britain moved to create autonomous German economic an

political administrations within their zones. In January 1947 the two allie

merged their zones and created Bizonia. The Marshall Plan followed i

June. By 1948 France added its zone, and the Western allies prepared t

introduce reforms for their unified zones—political autonomy for th

German inhabitants, an economic reform program, and a revaluation o

the German currency. All four powers recognized that economic fusion o

the three Western zones would ultimately lead to a politically united We

Germany.

For the Soviet Union, such a development seemed to contradict th

results of its victory in battle. Economic recovery under an American-le

capitalistic system threatened Soviet ideological and political control o

both East Germany and Eastern Europe. In diplomatic meetings in ear

1948, the four powers failed to agree on how to deal with Germany. Th

Western Powers continued to prepare for the introduction of the new 

German currency, and the Soviet Union prepared to do what it coul

to make the West Germans pay dearly for their acceptance of Wester

patronage. Soviet leaders chose to squeeze Berlin.

On 20 June 1948, the Western Powers introduced the new Deutschmar

(DM). Four days later the Soviet Union closed all access to Berlin by ra

Within six weeks Soviet military officials stopped all road and canal tra

fic and shut off electricity to the Western sectors. The 2.5 million inhab

itants of West Berlin—formed from the sectors occupied by the Unite

States, Britain, and France—were thereby cut off from the supplies the

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 18 
45

needed to survive. The Western allies viewed saving Berlin from slow 

starvation or from being swallowed up within the Soviet system as a test 

of their willingness to defend freedom. President Harry S. Truman was 

determined to see that Berlin survived.

General Clay favored confronting the Soviet armies on the ground by 

trying to force a convoy across the land routes to Berlin. Clay estimated 

that the city’s civilian population would need a minimum of 4,000 tons of 

supplies per day and that the allied military forces would need another 

500 tons a day. Without a convoy, all these supplies would have to reach 

the city by air. Clay expressed doubts that such a logistical feat could be 

sustained. Rather than force a confrontation on the ground, President 

Truman chose to order the supply of Berlin by air.

The Berlin Airlift began in late June 1948 as a short-term expedient to 

supply the allied forces. Within weeks it expanded into Operation VITTLES, 

an unprecedented and much more demanding operation to supply the 

city’s entire civilian population. The airlift involved split-second timing 

as planes formed an “air bridge” between West Germany and Berlin, 

taking off and landing at all hours of the day in all kinds of weather. By 

December 1948 the airlift was delivering more than Clay’s projected minimum of 4,000 tons per day. During January and February average daily 

tonnage climbed to 5,500. At its peak in the spring of 1949, the air bridge 

to the city delivered 8,000 tons of supplies per day.76

The moorings of the allied air bridge lay firmly on the ground—on 

the airfields from which the planes took off and on which they landed. 

Maintaining airfields in Berlin and in the U.S. zone was the responsibility 

of the Army engineers. Engineer work for the Air Force had declined late 

in 1947 and in the first half of 1948, but it jumped sharply with the airlift. 

Between 1 July and 30 September the chief engineer’s office recorded 1.5 

million hours of work for the Air Force, of which 80 percent went into airfield construction in Berlin. Much of the remainder went into the air base 

at Rhine-Main—dubbed Rhine-Mud by those who worked there—the 

starting point for airlift flights.77

Work on the airfields in Berlin involved keeping the limited runways 

open despite the heavy pounding by a steady succession of planes packed 

to the maximum. It also meant increasing the number of runways available. When the blockade began, Tempelhof Airfield in the U.S. sector had 

only one runway suitable for landing cargo planes. It was evident within 

days that this runway could not stand up to repeated use by heavily loaded C–47 and C–54 class aircraft. The weak base constructed in 1945 from 

Berlin rubble gave way, the layer of concrete broke, and the hooks of the 

pierced-steel landing mats tore off, causing the metal mats to warp and 

bend. In response, teams of workers took up positions along the runway. 

Wherever a fault appeared, a team would rush onto the runway, lift the 

plank surface, fill the cavities with a sand-bitumen mixture, bend back the 

planks to their correct positions, and weld steel straps between them. The 

crews had only a few minutes between landings, so they used a lookout 

to call out to workers as the next plane began its approach. The emergency 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 19 
46

repairs on the runway went on around the clock and made continuou

landings possible. The teams worked unceasingly until the first of th

new runways was completed.78

In the first week of July 1948, Col. Reginald Whitaker, engineer off

cer at the Berlin Military Post, received orders to build a new runway i

Tempelhof. On 8 July work began on an airstrip that was to be 5,500 fe

long and 140 feet wide. Two months later, on 8 September, planes bega

landing on the new runway. A third runway in Tempelhof, started o

23 August, opened in November.79

Even with the additional runways, the facilities in Tempelhof wer

not adequate to sustain the airlift. The airfield’s location among tall build

ings made landings difficult and dangerous. The recommended approac

angle for landing aircraft was one vertical unit for every forty horizont

units. The best angle that could be achieved in Tempelhof was one to si

teen! The glide angle was so sharp that as a safety measure engineers du

a trench at the end of the principal runway so that planes overshooting 

would sheer off their landing gear and thus slow down enough to preven

them from crashing into the administrative buildings.80

In addition to the liability of the glide angle, the facilities could no

accommodate the high volume of air traffic. Because Gatow Airfield i

the British sector could not be expanded, the pressures of the blockad

made a completely new airfield necessary. An engineer team ident

fied an appropriate site in the Tegel area of the French sector, near ra

facilities and unobstructed by tall structures. The French agreed to let th

Americans build, staff, and maintain a field for the duration of the Berli

Blockade. General Clay approved the construction of the new airport o

31 July 1948. Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the U.S. Air Forc

in Germany, set in motion plans to complete the new field by Februar

1949. When Clay learned of LeMay’s projected date of completion, he sen

a terse message: “I don’t accept the February 1949 estimate for Tegel. It 

much too long.”81 LeMay pushed the opening date to December 1948.

Very little heavy machinery was available in the city, so the enginee

applied labor-intensive methods. Clay, who had observed the value o

hand labor during a visit to China in 1943, put out an appeal for civi

ian workers in Berlin. Thousands of Berliners, men and women in almo

equal numbers, responded by volunteering to work on the runways for 

nominal wage plus one hot meal a day. At the peak of the activity som

17,000 people worked three shifts a day around the clock. Rather than lay

ing a concrete base, because concrete was in short supply, the workers lai

the equivalent of ten city blocks of crushed rubble and bricks left from 

the wartime destruction of Berlin. Between the start of work and the en

of the year, German civilians put in almost 3 million worker-hours. Th

U.S. military managed this labor with 15 officers and 150 men assigned t

Tegel.82

Even with the multitude that volunteered to work on the airfields, th

engineers still needed heavy equipment for construction and to keep u

with runway maintenance. The appropriate equipment was available i

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 20 
47

Germany, but it was scattered. A call went out to the U.S. zone to send 

available tractors, graders, rollers, scrapers, asphalt distributors, crushing and screening plants, and generators to the engineer supply depot in 

Hanau. The engineers in Hanau disassembled the equipment to prepare it 

for transport. To fit larger items into the aircraft, the engineers sometimes 

had to cut the frames, so thirty engineers flew to Berlin, set up a reassembly shop, and welded the equipment together again as it arrived.83

One of the men who learned to operate that equipment was Lt. 

Norman G. Delbridge, Jr., a twenty-year-old from Michigan who had 

enlisted in the Army in 1946 after one year of university engineering 

studies. Fresh out of Officer Candidate School, Delbridge commanded 

a shift of workers in Tempelhof. Sgt. Joe Debco, a crusty World War II 

veteran engineer on the crew, taught Delbridge how to operate each 

type of equipment that arrived in Berlin. In 1949 Delbridge left the city 

to accept an appointment to West Point, where he graduated in 1953. In 

1976 he returned as a brigadier general and commander of the U.S. Army 

Engineer Division, Europe.84

The heavy equipment—about forty pieces in all—arrived only after 

work began, but its impact on the pace of construction was dramatic. 

The second runway in Tegel, begun in March 1949 and completed after 

the blockade had been lifted, required fewer than 400 civilian workers to 

complete, in contrast to the 17,000 who worked round the clock on the first 

runways in Tempelhof.85

The engineers also shipped fire extinguishers, generators to light 

night operations, and tons of coal to Berlin during the blockade. Coal was 

sacked at the Rheinau Coal Storage Point, shipped by rail to Rhine-Main 

or to Wiesbaden air base, and then flown to Berlin. In late November 1948 

a shortage of sacks temporarily slowed delivery to 100 tons a day; but 

beginning on 1 December, when more coal sacks became available, the 

engineers managed to load and ship 254 tons of coal a day, seven days a 

week.86

In mid-May 1949 the Soviets abandoned the blockade and reopened 

Berlin to land traffic, but the allies continued the airlift until September 

1949 to build up stocks of goods. In fifteen months allied pilots made a 

total of 279,114 flights into the city carrying 2,323,257 tons of supplies, an 

average of one flight every two minutes and over 5,000 tons of supplies a 

day. Keeping West Berlin free cost the lives of 39 British and 31 American 

military personnel as well as 9 civilians.87

The Blockade and U.S. Forces in Austria

American military planners were acutely aware that Vienna, located 

within the Soviet zone of Austria, was as vulnerable to a blockade as 

Berlin.88 Under the circumstances, the commander of United States 

Forces, Austria (USFA), Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, concluded that he had to 

reduce the number of personnel in Vienna and relocate them in the area 

of Austria occupied by U.S. forces, specifically in Linz and Salzburg.89

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 21 
48

Pulling people back from the exposed position would reduce the numbe

of people that could be held hostage in Vienna.

General Keyes tapped the engineers of USFA to execute the relocatio

from Vienna. In January 1949 the Army recalled Col. Hubert S. Mille

USFA engineer from 1946 to 1948, and assigned him to administer th

emergency program to create housing for troops and dependents. Th

engineer organization under Miller consisted of area engineers in Vienn

Linz, and Salzburg who reported directly to him. This centralized stru

ture served until the creation of post engineers under post commande

in July 1951.90

Near Salzburg and Linz, USFA found old garrisons for the troops t

renovate and occupy.91 Housing for dependents was much more difficu

to find, but the Army identified the Bindermichl apartment comple

just outside of Linz as one possibility. Its rehabilitation became an ear

example of the expanding role of the Army engineers in the changin

atmosphere of Europe.

The Bindermichl complex had been built in 1941 by the Nazi ste

conglomerate Reichswerke Hermann Göring to house the plant’s wor

ers. Originally it consisted of sixty-five connected blocks, rather like 

series of row houses. Each block formed a three-story unit with six sma

apartments, one on each side of the stairwell at every level. After the wa

the U.S. Army took over the sixty-one blocks that had survived inta

and passed them to the International Refugee Organization for housin

displaced persons. The complex quickly became a lively center for blac

market trade. When tensions began to mount during the Cold War, th

apartments were put at the disposal of the Army.92

In early 1949 Colonel Miller created a special position and appointe

Maj. William L. Starnes of his engineer staff as administrator for th

Bindermichl properties. Starnes hired an Austrian firm to design the ren

ovations and to advise on technical details once the project got under wa

Colonel Miller persuaded the chief of engineers in Washington, Lt. Gen

Lewis A. Pick, to send several experienced Corps of Engineers civilia

employees to Austria. The men were flown to Austria early in the proje

and contributed substantially to its ultimate success.93

Austrian contractors, selected on the basis of sealed bids, were to d

the renovation and construction. Because the buildings had been Germa

property, they were under the trusteeship of the Austrian governmen

as a “German external asset.” USFA removed them from trusteeship an

established a German external asset fund of 9.72 million Austrian schi

lings (ATS) (about $971,899 at the official rate of exchange) to rehabilita

the apartments for American families. USFA also arranged to evacua

the displaced persons in phases, and Starnes put together a constructio

schedule to follow the pace at which apartments were vacated. The stan

dard plan called for workers to break through the dividing wall behin

the stairwell landing, thus joining the two apartments on each floo

(Figure 1) The resulting five-room apartment contained a living room/din

ing room combination, a large bedroom, a small bedroom, a kitchen, 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 22 
49

storage room, a maid’s room, and two bathrooms. Six apartments were 

specially modified for senior officers to provide more space and central 

heating.

The apartments and grounds were in a deplorable condition when 

vacated by the displaced persons. Black marketers had removed plumbing 

fixtures, stoves, and anything sellable; floors had been ruined; doors and 

windows, including frames, were often missing; over half the windows 

that remained were without glass; and trash, dirt, broken bottles, feathers, 

old clothes, shoes, and spoiled food soiled many apartments. Courtyards 

and common areas were even more depressing. Drainage had broken 

down completely, so that rain and snow produced a sea of mud. Wooden 

shacks, variously used by the inhabitants as small stores, workshops, supply huts, churches, and night clubs, littered the once-open courtyards. All 

of this debris had to be removed before renovation could begin.

The bids for renovating of the first block, which consisted of four 

apartment units, were opened on 10 February 1949, and work began 

within days. From that point to the completion of the project, Starnes and 

a staff of five supervised a steady cycle of contracting and construction. 

Each week contracts were signed for another group of buildings and work 

 Figure 1: Converted Apartment in the Bindermichl Complex 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 23 
50

was begun on them. The engineers applied experience gained in the fir

round of contract negotiations to subsequent rounds of bidding. The late

contracts included interior parking areas, lawns, exterior sidewalks, fum

gating the buildings before actual construction, built-in storage units fo

bedrooms and kitchens, and—through the USFA quartermaster—furn

ture for the finished apartments. The four apartments begun in Februar

were completed two months later, and the first section of sixty-five apar

ments was finished in May.

By the middle of May 1949 all refugee residents had moved out an

renovation of the rest of the apartments began at an intense pace. Indee

the period from mid-May to early September became the busiest phas

of the project. Cost-saving measures, combined with declining costs i

the Austrian economy, meant that money stretched far enough to com

plete the project within budget. At one point, renovation was under wa

simultaneously in twenty-four blocks of apartments and two courtyard

The work involved about forty separate contractors. The American eng

neer supervisors relied heavily on Austrian engineers for inspection

Funds were dispensed at the rate of ATS 45,000 ($4,500 at the official ra

of exchange) a day on construction and ATS 25,000 ($2,500 at the offici

rate) a day on furniture.

By the middle of July American families began moving into the avai

able apartments at a rate of ten to fifteen a week, a pace that kept up wit

the construction crews’ progress. The arrival of families meant contend

ing with children and pets that found construction sites irresistible attra

tions. Apartment managers organized a Repair and Maintenance Sectio

for the complex consisting of seven men and one foreman. The janitori

staff, which had begun with just a few men as the initial apartments wer

completed and furnished, grew to fifty men under one superintendent.

By the end of the construction phase the Army engineers had renova

ed and furnished 182 apartments and created a post exchange. Most of th

apartments were occupied immediately. The bulk of the work was ove

by 15 November 1949; another twenty-four apartments were renovate

in subsequent months. The work in the complex included parking space

for 150 automobiles, landscaping for 3 lawn areas in courtyards, 5,50

square yards of sidewalk, and 10,000 square yards of concrete or aspha

road. The cost of the project by mid-November was just over ATS 10 mi

lion (about $1 million), with 90 percent coming from the German extern

asset account and the remainder from rent paid by families living in th

complex. About 60 percent of the total spent was for rehabilitation an

construction, with close to 30 percent devoted to apartment furnishing

The remaining money paid for landscaping and operating costs.

Even after the end of the Soviet blockade of Berlin, housing remaine

critically short for the U.S. Army in Austria. During 1949 and 195

Colonel Miller arranged to house troops in the Salzburg province in facil

ties taken over from the International Refugee Organization. On thre

sites—Saalfelden, Sankt Johann, and Riedenburg— ATS 12.5 million wa

expended from a special account set up for the purpose. In March 195

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 24 
51

Miller arranged a program with the Austrian government that established 

the Housing Administration Trust account, a fund of ATS 130 million 

made available by the Austrian government and administered by Miller 

to construct new apartment houses. Over the next two years, contractors completed new apartments in Linz (68), Wels (38), Salzburg (272), 

Saalfelden (72), and Sankt Johann (16). The Austrian government put up 

the land and the money for these buildings but insisted that Austrian 

building codes be observed. The arrangement was a marked change 

from the era of occupation when the U.S. Army had been able to insist on 

American standards. Still, it was practical because, in return for its contributions, the Austrian federal government received title to the apartment 

units once the Americans no longer needed them.94

Standardizing Engineer Operations

The positive support in American public opinion for the airlift to preserve West Berlin did not prompt a reversal of the declining troop levels 

in Germany. Nor did the blockade change the mission and underlying 

activities of the engineers. Still, after four years of struggling to draw 

management of engineering activity into a central agency, the chief engineer’s office had developed a set of procedures to standardize its operations. One sign of the change was how they calculated work. Until the 

stabilization of the German currency, paying an hourly wage in the vastly 

devalued German Reichsmark or in occupation marks had been impossible. After the introduction of the Deutschmark in June 1948, projects 

had to budget in worker-hours rather than in the money value for labor. 

In April 1949, for the first time since the occupation began, the Army 

engineers drew up their budget and projected their contracts for maintenance and construction in Deutschmarks using the cost per hour of labor. 

The establishment of an efficient German domestic market for goods also 

allowed the engineers to abandon their practice of furnishing to the contractor much of the material necessary for a job and to discontinue providing hot meals as an inducement to attract labor. By 1949 the marketplace 

had begun to take over some of these functions, and the conduct of business within the German economy by the chief engineer’s office took on a 

semblance of standard practice.95

The German economy was by no means fully reconstructed, but recovery was clearly under way. In the German fiscal year beginning 1 April 

1949 (fiscal year 1950), all projects contracted out by the Army engineers 

could be approved on a total-cost basis. Competitive bidding by German 

contractors became the norm; and in establishing guidelines for contracts, 

the chief engineer’s office introduced such features as bonus-and-penalty 

clauses, leading to economies in construction and to earlier occupancy for 

the user.96

The chief engineer’s office also made its technical authority felt in 

other ways. Drawing on the talents of its professional staff of engineers, 

the office assisted the post engineers in the most effective use of money, 

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 25 
52

labor, and supplies. For example, to enable post engineers to stretch th

limited funds available for rehabilitation, the chief engineer’s office deve

oped standard plans for several types of dependent housing units, a me

sure to help reduce unit costs.97

The European Command used the experience of the chief engineer

office with techniques of financial management to enhance the enginee

staff’s central role. In 1948 Shingler’s staff instituted cost-accounting pro

cedures in engineer operations. In 1949 EUCOM extended the financi

management system that Shingler’s staff had implemented to the entir

command, allowing commanders to match expenses to accomplishmen

whether funding came from appropriated dollars or from the Germa

government as part of the occupation obligations. The chief engineer als

sent out accountants from his office to audit the records maintained b

the post engineers.98

The chief engineer’s office also extended its influence by providin

assistance for facilities engineering. In the early years of the occupatio

routine maintenance involving repair and utilities had been manage

locally and executed by engineer units assigned to field commands (sub

sequently by the engineers of military districts). With the establishmen

and evolution of military posts in 1947 and 1948, post engineers too

over the tasks related to maintenance, repair, and utilities.99 By 1949 th

chief engineer’s office had refined its training program to help the loc

engineers establish a comprehensive maintenance program and allocate

sufficient funds from their own budgets for regular maintenance an

repair.100 The new program for 1949 emphasized preventive maintenanc

to reduce repair costs. The teams trained by the chief engineer’s offic

consisted of a carpenter, a plumber, and an electrician to inspect an

repair each building on a three-to-four-month cycle. The program allowe

the EUCOM Engineer Division to budget maintenance on a unit-co

basis—DM 0.186 per square foot per year for 1949.101 For the German fisc

year 1949, the total budget for engineer costs of the occupation amounte

to about DM 430 million. Of this, about 50 percent went to repairs an

utilities. Most of the remaining budget went to real estate activities, majo

rehabilitation, and custodial services.102

Other activities took a small percentage of the budget, but they illu

trate the areas in which the chief engineer’s office established its positio

as manager and supporter of engineer activity throughout the Europea

Command. For instance, starting in July 1948 the Office of the Chi

Engineer in Heidelberg supported teams in each of the military pos

to maintain the 5,500 pieces of engineer equipment in use throughou

the command. These field maintenance teams, which included a maste

mechanic certified by EUCOM’s chief engineer, could turn to the chi

engineer’s office for technical assistance. In addition, during 1949 th

EUCOM Engineer School, supervised and staffed by the chief engineer

office, trained 561 Americans and 502 Germans as operators, constructio

equipment mechanics, diesel mechanics, welders, and utility repairme

This training gave necessary personnel resources to the local command

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 26 
53

ers, who were responsible for the maintenance of engineer equipment. 

To supplement the local maintenance installations, the Office of the Chief 

Engineer prepared and issued a manual on field maintenance of engineer 

equipment and provided a maintenance assistance team, composed of 

personnel from the Hanau Engineer Depot, that visited each military post 

to assist and advise.103

The chief engineer’s office found that from a strictly mechanical point 

of view, problems related to the maintenance of engineer equipment were 

minimal but other aspects of maintenance created difficulties. There 

was a critical shortage of spare parts, making timely repair difficult. The 

language barrier that divided American soldiers from the Germans and 

displaced Europeans who actually operated and repaired the equipment 

created misunderstandings and mistakes. German translations of instructions and schedules for maintenance services provided by the chief engineer’s office were only a partial solution. More equipment was available 

in the field than could be effectively maintained by the people at hand. 

Lastly, field shops often attempted repairs beyond their capabilities.104

The engineer staff attached to the headquarters of the U.S. armed forces in Europe had moved from England to France to Germany in 1945 and 

from Frankfurt to Heidelberg in 1948. The name changed slightly with the 

reorganization of command in Europe, but the office’s function remained 

the same. After 1945 the army of occupation progressively reduced its 

troop strength. Not even the blockade of Berlin interrupted the decline in 

German and U.S. military personnel at the Engineer School in Murnau, Germany, 

learned engineering skills such as surveying and building bridges with ferries.

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 27 
54

the number of American troops in Germany. In December 1949 the num

ber of U.S. military personnel in Europe reached its lowest point—83,40

soldiers—since the war. Few people realized as events unfolded that th

commitment symbolized by the Berlin Airlift would become the dom

nant determinant of policy and would override in succeeding decades th

American inclination toward military disengagement from Europe.

By the end of 1949 the mission of the U.S. Army in Europe had shifte

dramatically. In early 1945 combat had driven all American military dec

sions. After Germany was defeated, military leaders concentrated on th

peacetime occupation and the need to maintain order. As the decad

ended, combat readiness and rapid response to outside challenges sup

planted static occupation duties. With its West European allies, the Unite

States prepared to meet possible aggression against Western Europe b

the Soviet Union.105

04C_Chap02_Final.indd 28 
PART TWO

FOR A COMMON DEFENSE

1950–1973

05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 1 
05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 2 
INTRODUCTION

I

n the summer of 1948, encouraged by the Truman Doctrine, the 

Marshall Plan, and President Truman’s initiatives to reinstitute conscription, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg 

entered discussions with the United States that led to the signing in 

April 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to the United States 

and the five countries that had initiated the discussions, Italy, Norway, 

Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Canada also signed the treaty. (See Map 

5.) The key provision of the pact was that each signatory agreed to treat 

an attack on any member state as the equivalent of an attack on its own 

soil and to render military assistance accordingly.

The establishment of NATO marked the recognition by West European 

statesmen, and the acceptance by American policymakers, that only the 

United States could counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union in 

Europe. The Europeans also realized that an alliance led by the United 

States would be based on consensus among independent, sovereign, and 

free states, whereas one dominated by the Soviet Union would involve 

coerced agreement.

NATO applied to Western Europe, but the next crisis of the Cold 

War occurred in Asia. In June 1950 the Soviet client state of North Korea 

attacked South Korea across the political line of demarcation that had 

divided the Korean peninsula since the end of World War II. Only 

American armed intervention saved South Korea from being overrun.

In the face of what they saw as open Communist aggression, the 

signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty underlined their determination 

to defend Western interests by creating a military command for NATO. 

In December 1950 the United States proposed and the North Atlantic 

partners accepted General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe. Over the next several months Eisenhower established the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) near 

Paris. Its mission was to defend the territory from the North Cape in the 

Arctic Ocean north of Norway to northern Africa and from the Atlantic 

coast of Western Europe to the eastern borders of Turkey.

Because SHAPE initially had no international funding, U.S. funds 

and support were channeled through the European Command in 

Heidelberg, which furnished budgeting, funding, and accounting for all 

of the national military elements. As units were assigned to NATO, the 

United States reorganized its own military headquarters in Europe to 

clarify lines of authority. In August 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff activated a new command, U.S. European Command, to coordinate American 

05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 3 
Map 5

A

T L A

N

T I C

O

C

E

A

N

M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a

North

Sea

Sardinia

Corsica

Sicily

ICELAND

DENMARK UNITED

KINGDOM

NETHERLANDS

LUXEMBOURG

BELGIUM 

FRANCE

ITALY PORTUGAL

N

O

R

W

A

Y

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

EUROPEAN SIGNATORIES

April 1949

0

0 500 Miles

500 Kilometers

European Signatories

Postwar Germany

Future Boundary between East and West Germany

05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 4 
59

support for SHAPE-NATO and to serve as the joint command for U.S. 

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel and activities in 

Europe.1

 What had been the European Command was redesignated 

on 1 August 1952 as United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), responsible for all functions related to the Army. (See Map 6.) Headquartered 

in Heidelberg, USAREUR took command of a small NATO planning 

unit, the Central Army Group, and operated through the Northern, 

Southern, Western, and Headquarters (Heidelberg area) Commands in 

Germany and the Communications Zone in France. (Chart 1) The Europe 

Command and its successor USAREUR also provided logistical support 

to other agencies, including the American elements of NATO forces, the 

United States Air Forces in Europe, and Military Assistance Advisory 

Groups in Europe and the Middle East.2

Implementing a policy of common defense for the signatories of the 

North Atlantic Treaty stimulated military construction on a scale that 

Army engineers had not known since World War II. Whether in Greece, 

 Chart 1: Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953 

Special Troops

Headquarters

USAREUR

Northern

Area

Command

Southern

Area

Command

Western

Area

Command

Seventh Army

88th Counter

Intelligence

Group

USAREUR

Communications Zone

32d Antiaircraft

Artillery

Brigade

Headquarters

Area Command

513th

Military

Intelligence

Group

Berlin

Command

Bremerhaven

Port of

Embarkation

* Technical and

Administrative

Divisions

Military

Assistance

Advisory

Group, Spain

USAREUR

Audit

Agency

U.S. Military

Liaison Mission to

Commander in Chief,

Soviet Occupied Zone

of Germany

* Office, U.S.

Commander

Berlin

Units

Major Commands

Subordinate Commands

Headquarters,

United states Army Europe (USAREUR)

Dependents

Education

Group

*Staff Divisions of Headquarters USAREUR having certain assigned and attached units under the

command of the respective heads of divisions: Adjutant General, Provost Marshall, Special Activities,

Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance,

Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation.

05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 5 
Map 6

Rhine R

Elbe R

EAST GERMANY

NETHERLANDS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

FRANKFURT DISTRICT

WÜRZBURG DISTRICT

NUREMBERG DISTRICT

AUGSBURG

DISTRICT

GARMISCH

DISTRICT

STUTTGART

DISTRICT

MUNICH DISTRICT

WESTERN

AREA

SOUTHERN AREA

NORTHERN AREA

HEADQUARTERS

AREA

WIESBADEN

MILITARY POST

BERLIN

Kaiserslautern Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Munich

Erfurt

Kassel

Würzburg

Bamberg

Nuremberg

Regensburg

Karlsruhe

Stuttgart

Augsburg

Wiesbaden

Dresden

Hannover BERLIN

Bremerhaven

Hamburg

Pilsen

Garmisch

Leipzig

WEST GERMANY

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1 December 1952

Area Command Boundary (approximate

District Boundary (approximate)

Area Command Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 6 
61

Turkey, Austria, Germany, or France, the fundamental responsibility of 

the Army engineers remained to expand the tactical and the support 

facilities necessary to meet the new American role.

05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 7 
05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 8 
3

DEFENDING THE WEST

1950–1953

The contest taking shape between the United States and the Soviet 

Union was a global struggle that involved Europe as one arena 

of conflicting interests. The United States’ policy of containing 

Soviet expansion reached beyond traditional European boundaries to the eastern Mediterranean and Turkey. President Harry S. Truman 

included Turkey in his speech of March 1947 and made the country one 

focus of Western defense against communism. The North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) included Turkey and Greece in its area of mutual 

defense and admitted them into the alliance in 1952.

The Berlin Blockade focused attention on Germany as the land in 

contention. In great measure the blockade had been the Soviet reply to 

an initiative to establish local government on a liberal democratic basis in 

the three zones in western Germany. The United States, Great Britain, and 

France had encouraged the Germans to draw up a constitution, hold elections, and create a representative government. The process culminated 

in September 1949 with the formation of the new Federal Republic of 

Germany. The Soviet Union responded with the declaration of a competing state, the German Democratic Republic, officially established just a 

month later.

All these events created a political framework for the presence of the 

U.S. military in Europe that was vastly different in 1950 than it had been 

in 1945. Beginning in 1950 the Army engineers had to develop airfields in 

Turkey and the support facilities to make flights from these bases possible. In Germany, they scrambled to find and construct facilities to accommodate the dramatic increase in troops stationed in there, an influx that 

also increased the need for dependent housing and support facilities. At 

the same time, the Army engineers had to adjust to the end of the occupation regime and to West Germany’s gradual assertions of autonomy, 

factors that influenced both the financing and the execution of military 

construction. The new relations translated into projects whereby the engineers contributed to the improvement of German communities in which 

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 1 
64

the soldiers lived and worked. To protect against possible Soviet aggre

sion from Eastern Europe, the European Command (EUCOM) also ha

to reconsider its lines of communication and logistical support. Adjustin

the lines of communication stimulated more military construction for th

Army engineers.

The Troop Base in Germany

The outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950 profoundly shocke

Europeans. They were acutely aware of the similarity between divide

Germany and divided Korea. In September 1950, with the North Korea

attack fresh in their minds, representatives of the NATO states met i

New York and announced that they would consider any attack on th

new West German state or on West Berlin as an attack upon themselve

They unanimously adopted a resolution that called for an integrate

military force under a unified allied command to defend Europe. The

also announced that they would increase the number of allied and U.

military forces in Germany and position them without regard to zon

lines.1

 This declaration—that the Western Powers in the coalition to defe

Germany just five years earlier would now defend the fledgling We

German state—illustrated the dramatic changes in political conditions i

Europe between 1945 and 1950. To accommodate the new strategic situ

tion, the three Western Powers agreed to relinquish their military righ

under the occupation regime and accorded the year-old Federal Republ

of Germany the right to maintain their troops in Germany by invitation.

The new situation required the Western alliance to convert its militar

presence in Germany into a credible defensive force capable of repulsin

an attack from the east. To achieve this status, the number of troops i

EUCOM—by 1949 reduced to around 80,000 combat soldiers—had to b

increased. Early in 1950 the Department of the Army authorized increase

for Europe to take place late in the year and throughout 1951. The com

mand anticipated a troop basis of 164,000 in four divisions plus suppo

units, a figure that was surpassed in the first year. Troop strength almo

tripled during 1950 and 1951; total military strength in EUCOM increase

from 106,610 to 255,721.2

 The personnel receiving support from EUCOM 

or United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), during 1950–1953 rapidl

increased as the U.S. military expanded its presence and assumed i

NATO responsibilities. Only among European civilian employees of th

U.S. forces did the numbers decline substantially. (Table 1)

In September 1950 the commander in chief of EUCOM, Gener

Thomas T. Handy, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to mobilize a field arm

to command the additional troops. The Seventh Army, activated earl

in the autumn of 1950 as part of the overall plan to establish an effe

tive NATO fighting force in Europe, set up headquarters in Stuttgar

Vaihingen.3

 By 1 December 1950, the Seventh Army, headed by Lt. Gen

Manton S. Eddy, became the first fully operational American field army t

exist in Germany since February 1947. General Eddy assumed the oper

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 2 
65

 Table 1 

Personnel Receiving European Command Support 

1950 and 1953

 Percent 

 Personnel 1 Jan 50 30 Jun 53 Change change 

U.S. Army 83,394 215,242 131,848 158

U.S. Air Force 19,244 37,453 18,209 95

U.S. Navy 400 1,115 715 179

U.S. civilian employees 6,681 6,257 –424 –6

European civilian employees 1,405 269 –1,136 –81

Labor service troops 22,664 26,449 3,785 17

Dependents 40,616 78,709 38,093 94

Total 174,404 365,494 191,190 210

Source: Historical Division, HQ USAREUR, “The U.S. Army Construction Program in Germany, 

1950–1953,” prepared by George Tays, p. 12.

tional authority of USAREUR over all Army units within the European 

Command. By the end of 1951 the Seventh Army contained two active 

corps—V Corps and VII Corps—with a total of five divisions. Between 

late 1950 and 1952 USAREUR continued to exist as the Army’s administrative command under EUCOM. Unlike the Seventh Army, the Twelfth 

Air Force remained independent of EUCOM, answering directly to the 

Department of the Air Force in the Department of Defense.4

Within the new command structure the engineers continued to operate as an element of the EUCOM general staff, but in a reduced status. 

When Brig. Gen. Don G. Shingler left his position as chief engineer in 

November 1949, troop levels in EUCOM had fallen below 100,000 and the 

position was downgraded. Shingler’s successor was Col. Willis E. Teale, 

who served as EUCOM staff engineer from 1949 to 1952. Only in the mid1950s, after the substantial buildup of troop strength to around 250,000, 

did EUCOM again designate the position for a one-star general officer.5

The American Zone in Germany

No command-wide construction program of any significant volume 

existed in EUCOM before the augmentation of troops began in late 1950. 

For several years the Engineer Division of EUCOM headquarters had 

engaged primarily in rehabilitating buildings and executing routine maintenance and repair. It had begun a modest program to construct family 

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 3 
66

housing in 1949. By the beginning of 1950 the need to expand constructio

to accommodate the changing requirements of the occupying forces clea

ly called for changes in the management of engineer activity.6

 America

military supplies stored in vulnerable positions near the borders of Ea

Germany and Czechoslovakia had to be shifted to more tenable location

west of the Rhine to make them more secure and to shorten lines of sup

ply. Both the repositioning of supplies and the increase in troop strengt

involved the Army engineers of the European Command in planning an

executing major building programs.

In April 1950 EUCOM set up a planning board to oversee the con

struction projected to accommodate the imperative to return requisitione

property to the Germans. Representatives from the relevant EUCOM 

headquarters divisions—Seventh Army, Twelfth Air Force, and Nav

Forces Germany—served on the board and set general guidelines fo

the construction program. In May the EUCOM Engineer Division too

construction out of its Operations Branch and established a Constructio

Branch. The Operations Branch retained the responsibility to draw u

review, keep current, and approve specifications for construction and t

establish policies, procedures, and standard specifications for the types o

buildings under consideration.7

Once the Operations Branch had processed guidelines formulated b

the planning board and approved by the EUCOM chief of staff, the plan

moved to the Construction Branch. Projects then passed to the appropr

ate post engineers, who let the contracts and managed the constructio

The Construction Branch supervised the execution of the contracts and s

up inspection teams to aid post engineers in obtaining satisfactory wor

from contractors in the field.8

For several months after the reorganization in 1950, one perso

commanded both the Operations and the Construction Branches; bu

construction activity intensified with the outbreak of the Korean Wa

and the anticipated augmentation of troop strength in Germany. A

a result, EUCOM assigned Col. David H. Tulley to take charge of th

Construction Branch in August 1950, a post he held for nearly two year

Contemporaneously, the Department of the Army assigned twelve eng

neer specialists to Tulley on temporary duty to equip EUCOM’s enginee

staff to deal with the increase in construction. The department also autho

rized him to hire fifteen civilian engineers.9

The occupation statutes stipulated that Germany pay all costs o

maintaining the U.S. forces, but the new partnership between the Unite

States and West Germany made new arrangements imperative. Durin

the early years of occupation, the Army had requisitioned private home

and state properties. American officials proposed that the German gov

ernment now pay instead the costs of constructing new facilities. EUCOM 

formulated a five-year budget for construction that the U.S. high commi

sioner, John J. McCloy, presented to the German Ministry of Finance. Th

Federal Republic agreed to fund the construction as a long-term capit

investment in real property that would revert to German use when th

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 4 
67

Americans vacated it. EUCOM agreed to submit budgets yearly through 

the high commission to the West German government.10

As the building program got under way, German federal and state 

construction agencies raised objections. U.S. Army engineers, they complained, were cutting them out of the planning and bidding processes and 

dealing directly and exclusively with private German contractors. During 

the summer of 1951, American military leaders, West German government 

authorities, and the U.S. high commissioner held talks to work out procedures to include the German Government Construction Agency (Deutsche 

Bundesbauverwaltung, or DBBV) in the solicitation of bids and in negotiating with German firms for design and construction. Over the next several years the practice of including the DBBV in the contracting process 

formed the basis of the contracting system, dubbed indirect contracting, 

that evolved after the Federal Republic attained full sovereignty in May 

1955. In the early 1950s a series of bilateral agreements between EUCOM 

and the new West German government left the major part of U.S. military 

construction under Deutschmark (DM) funding.11

Including German government agencies in the process of design and 

in construction programs represented a precedent-setting step in adjusting relations between the United States and the new Federal Republic. 

Equally as innovative, the Germans began formally to propose alternatives when the Army requested use of a facility. As early as 1949 associations of citizens and communities had offered to finance and build 

housing for American military families in exchange for the return of requisitioned homes to their German owners.12 The practice continued on an 

informal basis throughout the 1950s, and it eventually grew into a major 

program labeled alternate construction.

Troop Housing

The impending influx of Army officers and soldiers posed the most 

immediate concern for EUCOM’s commander, General Handy, in 1950. 

Handy proposed a four-part program to alleviate the prospective housing 

crisis. He wanted an increase in the density of troops in existing casernes, 

the immediate rehabilitation of all available casernes, an accelerated turnover of casernes still held by the International Refugee Organization, and 

the rapid construction of semipermanent barracks facilities.13 To ensure 

space for the arriving soldiers, McCloy directed the West German government to make available eleven casernes in the U.S. zone by 1 November 

and another twenty-five by 1 December. McCloy’s directive hastened 

the German government’s plan to move the displaced persons out of the 

casernes. Speeding up the process gave the construction crews more time 

to repair and rehabilitate the facilities before troops began to arrive in 

1951.14

Handy charged three separate elements to cooperate on planning, 

setting priorities, and executing the construction needed to accommodate the augmentation of forces. The three elements included the director 

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 5 
68

of logistics (G–4), the Construction Branch of the EUCOM/USAREU

Engineer Division, and the Logistics Division planning board that Hand

had established in early 1950. The director of logistics was responsible fo

the overall plan of construction for the command. The planning boar

prepared forecasts, reviewed requirements for projects submitted by th

military posts, settled priorities and locations for construction, and pr

pared the yearly construction budget submitted to the high commissione

for transmittal to the Federal Republic.

The EUCOM/USAREUR staff engineer, Colonel Teale, was respon

sible for establishing work procedures and specifications for projects. Th

Engineer Division approved projects, construction contracts, and constru

tion budgets coming from the military posts. It provided detailed techn

cal and administrative procedures for construction activities and pr

pared a master plan.15 Teale was the nominal superior to Colonel Tulle

who commanded the Construction Branch of the Engineer Division, bu

Teale was ineffective. The newly arrived Communications Zone (COMZ

commander in France described him as “a sad-sack [who] has slippe

immeasurably.” Under the circumstances, EUCOM’s chief of staff, Ma

Gen. Daniel Noce, an engineer officer, instructed Tulley to take charg

of the construction program and to report directly to him while keepin

Teale informed.16

With Noce’s active encouragement and support, Tulley visited ever

military post commander to explain the intensified construction missio

and to get authority to deal directly with the post engineer on constru

tion matters. Tulley also instituted emergency construction procedure

These emergency procedures specified that the bidding process includ

a minimum of three contractors and that the post engineer give contra

tors a tour of the project site, provide a written description of the projec

and solicit a lump-sum proposal from each contractor. Provided that 

post engineer observed these steps, the emergency procedures gave him 

authority to initiate contract negotiations and award the contract to th

lowest bidder. By reducing paperwork and levels of approval, the pro

cedure increased the tempo of activity and shortened the time it took t

rehabilitate a caserne from six to four months.17

To facilitate coordination, troop units deploying from the United State

sent advance parties to Germany to consult with the Construction Branc

concerning their anticipated requirements. This practice established soun

relations between the engineer staff and the eventual users of facilitie

which persisted once the units arrived on site.18 Post engineers organize

their staffs into branches for real estate, repairs and utilities, constructio

and troop supply and field maintenance. The post engineer offices drafte

their requirements and submitted plans to the Construction Branch of th

EUCOM Engineer Division, which incorporated individual post projec

into a master plan. Each project was identified as either new construction o

rehabilitation, but projects from both categories progressed simultaneously

When Handy issued his guidelines in September 1950, U.S. force

held about 100 former German army casernes. In addition to the facil

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 6 
69

ties provided by the German government, EUCOM received facilities 

from French occupation forces in their zone west of the Rhine, from the 

International Refugee Organization, and from the U.S. high commissioner 

for Germany.20

In February 1951 EUCOM headquarters requested through the Office 

of the High Commissioner that the German government make available for incoming troops fifty-two additional casernes located in the U.S. 

military posts of Augsburg, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Garmisch, Munich, 

Nuremberg, Stuttgart, and Würzburg. In March and April EUCOM 

requested still more casernes. Simultaneously, EUCOM engineers proceeded to rehabilitate the casernes already under American control. Of 

the 158 casernes and other installations under reconstruction in 1951, 80 

were completed and occupied by the end of the year. During 1951 and 

1952 EUCOM obtained 169 additional casernes from the Germans, all of 

which the command engineers rehabilitated and repaired using German 

contractors. The contractors qualified through a standardized bidding 

process managed at the local level by the post engineers with the participation of the Engineer Division in EUCOM headquarters.

Concurrently with rehabilitation of casernes, the engineers managed construction of tent camps and cantonments designed to accommodate troops while more permanent facilities were being completed. 

Wildflecken, thirty miles north of Schweinfurt, received one of the first 

tent camps, constructed between 8 January and 10 April 1951 at a cost of 

In the early 1950s, U.S. troops moved into the refurbished Reinhardt Caserne 

in Neu Ulm, near Augsburg.

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 7 
70

Despite austere guidelines for housing construction in 1952, Army engineers did 

build some amenities, including this enlisted men’s club in Pirmasens.

more than DM 5 million. A camp for 20,000 men served as a staging are

for arriving troops after it was constructed at Sandhofen near Mannheim 

in the summer of 1951. Similar camps were put up near Mainz, Fuld

Giessen, and Baumholder in the French zone.21

In Grafenwöhr, the training area thirty-seven miles northeast o

Nuremberg, an 8,000-man winterized tent camp constructed durin

1951 remained in use well into 1952. In Bremerhaven, construction on 

5,000-man temporary tent camp used as a staging area for arriving an

departing troops began 9 June 1952 and was completed on 1 Decembe

All together the engineers supervised construction of nine tent camps i

Germany between 1950 and 1953.22

The engineers also experimented in Grafenwöhr with another typ

of construction to house a division for year-round training. They use

pumice stone for exterior walls and corrugated iron for roofs. Conceive

as semipermanent and designed for rapid, inexpensive construction, th

experimental buildings proved more economical than tents, because the

cost less to maintain and could be upgraded for longer-term use. Th

buildings also improved sanitation. By June 1953 the engineers had use

concrete or pumice block construction on twenty-three cantonments.23

The engineers installed the utilities and services necessary to suppo

these developments. In Grafenwöhr, for instance, where the Army’s build

ing program erected 250 structures in 1950, the engineers also constructe

a reservoir and ten miles of sewer and water lines, installed water hea

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 8 
71

ing units to furnish hot water on demand, and provided a system of new 

hard-surface roads. The cost of rehabilitation, cantonments, and tentcamps came to DM 832,683,600, the equivalent of $198.3 million, which 

represented 35.2 percent of the total spent on all types of construction in 

Germany between 1951 and 1953.24

None of this construction was luxurious by any measure. Standard 

allowances under emergency regulations permitted about 100 square feet 

per person in barracks, one showerhead per 20 men, one toilet for each 

15 to 20 men, and one 2-foot urinal trough per 20 men. Post surgeons recommended that window and door screens, largely unknown in German 

buildings, be installed to keep insects out of medical dispensaries, kitchens, mess halls, and other selected facilities.25 Army austerity occasionally proved penny-wise and pound-foolish. Despite warnings from the 

Germans, the Army engineers decided to save money by not applying 

stucco to troop barracks in Baumholder, relying instead on a cement 

slurry. When wind-blown rain arrived with gale force and penetrated 

the walls, it gave “the appearance of a shower bath” to interior rooms. 

Embarrassed, the engineers applied stucco.26

As of September 1953, USAREUR controlled 282 Army and 16 Air 

Force installations in Germany with a total capacity of about 406,000 beds. 

At that time the facilities housed only about 329,000, including labor service troops and other nonmilitary personnel. To use all of the available 

spaces, commands would have had to split military units, undermining 

their tactical integrity. The apparent surplus of spaces also included unusable facilities and hundreds of requisitioned facilities scheduled to be 

returned to the Germans.27

Bachelor Officers’ Quarters

Although a less pressing priority, building bachelor officers’ quarters (BOQ) proceeded at the same time as the barracks. The command 

received approval for construction of the first 6 BOQ buildings on 

13 December 1950; more were authorized in February. Construction 

began in April on 12 buildings of 68 rooms each: 4 in the Heidelberg 

region; 2 each in Heilbronn, Kaiserslautern, and Stuttgart; and 1 each in 

Mannheim and Ansbach. By July construction was under way at another 5 buildings, and the list of cities extended to Nuremberg. Six BOQs 

were completed by the end of 1951, providing 408 spaces. In March 

1952 the director of EUCOM’s Logistics Division proposed constructing 

an additional 52 BOQ buildings with 2,448 spaces, half of them for the 

Air Force; a month later he recommended that 8 buildings be added to 

the plan. Sites were added in Munich, in the Western Area Command 

west of the Rhine, and in Schwäbisch Gmünd, Würzburg, Schweinfurt, 

Bamberg, and Amberg.28

In the period from 1 April 1950 to the end of June 1953, the Army 

engineers supervised completion of 4,914 BOQ spaces at a cost of DM 53.9 

million (the equivalent of $12.8 million). USAREUR still needed 12,300 

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 9 
72

Facilities constructed near Hohenfels in 1951 included this mock village 

for special training.

more spaces. Moreover, many of the facilities in use as bachelors’ quarte

were in family structures or located at a great distance from duty station

Thousands more spaces were earmarked for derequisitioning once We

Germany achieved full sovereignty, factors that increased the overall need

The task of providing BOQ housing became more complicated when 

problem arose with the existing standard designs. The four-story desig

used during 1950–1953 exceeded USEUCOM’s new regulations for floo

space per occupant. The two-story structures, while meeting the revise

regulations, took from two to two-and-a-half times as much land area pe

person as the four-story structure. Moreover, German authorities objecte

to constructing them in urban areas because they considered the semipe

manent cantonment design and corrugated roofs aesthetic eyesores.29

Troop Training Facilities

The augmentation of U.S. forces also imposed new requiremen

for troop training facilities. Even with the acquisition of Wildflecken i

1949 to supplement Grafenwöhr, the terrain limited action to regimen

size units. The Seventh Army needed space to train division-size unit

In October 1951, after long negotiations with the Federal Republic, th

Army secured the use of an area near Hohenfels, southeast of Nurember

Initially about thirty-eight square miles, this area could eventually b

expanded to seventy-three square miles. Further removed from th

Czechoslovakian border than Wildflecken and Grafenwöhr, Hohenfe

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 10 
73

was less vulnerable to sudden attack from the east and a less provocative 

location for large-unit training maneuvers.30

EUCOM had also entered discussions with the French to use jointly a large training area in Baumholder in the French zone west of 

Kaiserslautern. In March 1951 the two powers reached an agreement that 

allowed U.S. tanks and artillery to exercise in the area during specified 

periods. A part of the agreement provided that the Americans would 

build semipermanent camp facilities and permanent facilities for about 

500 soldiers, in addition to training facilities for use by soldiers from both 

nations.31

During 1952 EUCOM had major projects for construction or modification of training facilities active at five sites and smaller projects at 

over eighty locations in fifty different terrains in the French, British, and 

American zones.32 In Grafenwöhr, construction involved firing ranges for 

weapons from pistols to antiaircraft artillery, roads, hardstands for trucks 

and tracked vehicles, permanent quarters for 15,000 men, and concretefloored tents for another 7,000 soldiers. In Hohenfels, the construction 

plan provided for thirty-two ranges of various types; accommodations 

for 17,000 men (10,000 in semipermanent quarters and another 7,000 in a 

tent camp); a railroad terminal at Parsberg, about eight miles away; and 

surfaced roads from the terminal to the training area. By 30 June 1953, 

EUCOM had put over DM 35 million ($8.3 million) into the construction 

in Hohenfels.

More building went on in Wildflecken. Army engineers oversaw rehabilitation of facilities for 5,000 soldiers, upgrading of a 90-mm. stationary tank 

firing range, and construction of 30,000 square feet of hardstand. During 

1951 and 1952 in Baumholder, EUCOM constructed permanent housing for 

10,500 troops; semipermanent quarters for another 3,000; and firing ranges, 

roads, and courses for rocket launchers, rifle grenades, hand grenades, and 

close combat training. By 30 June 1953, EUCOM had spent about DM 17 million ($4 million) on construction in the Baumholder training area.

Late in 1952, by agreement with the British, EUCOM acquired the 

use of Todendorf, located in the British zone about 125 miles northeast 

of Bremerhaven. At this site, the Army engineers built firing ranges for 

tanks, a firing range and training area for antiaircraft units, and a semipermanent camp.33

These major areas dedicated to troop training, plus the eighty-two 

other small ranges and lesser facilities, cost about DM 93.3 million ($22.2 

million) between 1 January 1950 and 31 January 1953. This type of construction was particularly amenable to troop labor, and engineer troop 

units participated extensively, giving them training, speeding construction, and reducing the cost in Deutschmarks.34

Dependent Housing

During the early years of the occupation, American military construction in Germany, financed by the Germans as part of the cost of occupa06E_Chap03_Final.indd 11 
74

tion, emphasized facilities for combat troops. Although dependents wer

permitted into the theater after April 1946, construction to accommoda

them had been largely limited to rehabilitation and maintenance of exis

ing facilities. Before 1950 only 324 new family units were built for militar

personnel; most military families lived in requisitioned or confiscate

facilities—that is, private residences, including both houses and apar

ments. In 1950 American families, single officers, and civilians remaine

in possession of 20,000 units of housing scheduled for return to the

German owners. The dramatic augmentation of troops in Germany an

the concomitant increase in the number of dependents created an urgen

problem for EUCOM. As requisitioned facilities were returned, housin

needs became even more acute.35

By late 1950 the modest building program begun a few months befor

the outbreak of the Korean War had been overwhelmed by the change

in military planning, and EUCOM faced a critical shortage of housin

EUCOM was responsible for a long list of American civilians, includin

employees of Stars and Stripes, the Armed Forces Network, the dependen

schools, EUCOM Central Welfare Fund, the American Red Cross, Dougla

Aircraft Corporation, International Business Machines, the Esso Expo

Corporation, American Express, and other organizations that had som

official service-related role.36 To accommodate the large number of el

gible persons, the command placed arriving families in transient hote

or recreation centers in Bad Morgentheim and Bad Kissingen, both in th

Würzburg area, and in Chiemsee near Munich.37 During 1951 and 195

By the early 1950s, facilities in Bremerhaven for troops, dependents, and supplies 

included family apartments and a theater.

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 12 
75

dependent housing took 25 percent of the construction budget in Europe. 

This was substantially less than the 56.5 percent that went into troop 

housing and training facilities in the same period, but almost three times 

more than the next-largest category, which included shops, technical service facilities, and depots (9.1 percent).38

At the outset of the new construction program, EUCOM had no 

standard plans or criteria for family housing units, so the command’s 

Engineer Division drew up plans. Because the United States agreed to 

turn the new buildings over to the Germans when no longer needed to 

support U.S. military personnel, officials insisted that twelve-unit buildings be designed for easy conversion into eighteen apartments.39 Later 

designs had four stories rather than three, included sixteen to twenty-four 

family units rather than twelve, and offered somewhat smaller quarters 

(1,215 square feet as opposed to 1,371 square feet). The later designs incorporated a different roof and a different arrangement of kitchens, bathrooms, and quarters for domestic help, making them more economical to 

build. All building types were designed as permanent construction, with 

basements of reinforced concrete, exterior walls of hollow pumice blocks, 

and interior walls of brick. The floors were concrete with a parquet hardwood overlay.40

Although the command scheduled slightly more than 4,000 apartment 

units for construction during April 1950–March 1951 (corresponding to the 

German fiscal year), by September 1950 it became clear that EUCOM would 

Engineers used ribbed-concrete floor construction for housing in 

Mannheim, Germany.

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 13 
76

need another 4,000 units. In early 1952 another 5,000 units were adde

to the plans. The engineers hastened to capitalize on the availability o

Deutschmark funding before West Germany’s pending sovereignty ende

the country’s obligation to pay reparation costs, including construction

Translating the resolve into action meant that the building plan for depen

dent housing was revised several times during 1952 and the first half o

1953 to include as many projects as possible. By 30 June 1953, EUCOM eng

neers had supervised the construction of just over 17,000 family housin

units. (Map 7) In addition, between July and October 1953, Army enginee

built about 2,000 units for Air Force and Navy personnel.41

The Helping Hand Program

Not all the engineer activity during the augmentation of U.S. force

benefited only the military. The soldiers themselves worked in a program 

labeled Helping Hand—part training, part community relations. In 195

alone Helping Hand involved an estimated $500,000 of work that was i

effect donated to German communities.42

Wilhelmsfeld, a small community near Heidelberg, profited from 

Helping Hand project. The community wanted a sports field and play

ground for its young people. The community had land available, but clea

ing and leveling the terrain with traditional German hand labor woul

have taken more time and money than the local government could affor

Through a U.S.-German advisory council set up at the military post t

improve relations, the town requested the help of the Army engineers.43 I

March 1951 personnel of the 77th Engineer Construction Battalion and th

Engineer Field Service Center took heavy earthmoving equipment into th

forest at the edge of the town. The soldiers moved thousands of tree stump

and tons of earth, working through Good Friday to the surprise (and prob

bly the chagrin) of the Germans. On Saturday evening, with the work com

pleted, the townspeople held a festival-celebration for the Americans. Th

local choral society sang, children performed, and town leaders bestowe

honors on the men who had helped make their sports field a reality.

A more ambitious and far-reaching project took place in 1952 an

1953 in Weingarten, a small community east of Karlsruhe and south o

Heidelberg. The local government asked a unit of the 39th Engineer Grou

stationed in nearby Ettlingen to resculpt the farmland near the town. Fo

generations the land had been subdivided among family heirs succe

sively; small plots divided by hedges and shrubs severely limited the til

able area. Regional planners wanted to consolidate the strips into mor

efficient fields and settle new farmers on plots large enough to permit th

use of farm machinery. A key to the plan was the use of the earthmovin

equipment available to the Army engineers.

The project anticipated that the troops would survey the land, remov

the topsoil, level the hedgerows and terraces, and then replace the topso

The community of Weingarten agreed to feed the soldiers during the

workdays. The town mayor selected a local inn to provide food and drin

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 14 
Map 7

EAST GERMANY

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SWITZERLAND AUSTRIA

FRANCE

N E T

H E R L A

N

D S

DENMARK

WESTERN AREA

SOUTHERN AREA

H Q

AREA

NORTHERN AREA

WIESBADEN

MILITARY POST

Neubrücke

Idar-Oberstein

Baumholder

Zweibrücken

Landstuhl

Pirmasens

Vogelweh

Münchweiler

Kaiserslautern

Heidelberg

Mannheim

Karlsruhe

Worms

Frankfurt

Wetzlar

Giessen

Bad Nauheim

Büdingen

Gelnhausen

Hanau Bad Kreuznach

Oppenheim

Kirchheimbolander

Babenhausen

Darmstadt

Mainz

Fritzlar

Hersfeld

Würzburg

Aschaffenburg

Wertheim Kitzingen

Bamberg

Stuttgart

Vaihingen

Nellingen

Bad Cannstatt

Ludwigsburg

Möhringen

Böblingen

Heilbronn

Schwäbisch Hall

Crailsheim

Ellwangen

Schwäbisch Gmünd

Göppingen

Scheyern

Bad Tölz

Landshut

Munich

Garmisch

Straubing

Hohenfels

Regensburg

Schwabach Ansbach

Herzogenaurach

Fürth Nuremberg

Berlin

Bremerhaven

Neu Ulm

Leipheim

Gablingen

Augsburg

Erfurt

Dresden

BERLIN

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

Rhine R

Elbe R

WEST GERMANY

FAMILY HOUSING

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

30 June 1953

Area Command Boundary (approximate)

Family Housing Project Site

Other Project Site

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 15 
78

for the soldiers. The innkeeper’s daughter, who spoke good English, acte

as an interpreter for the enlisted man supervising the surveying, Robe

Rodehaver. Town officials communicated with Rodehaver through th

interpreter, and he informed the engineer troops of the jobs covered b

the plan. The troops moved equipment and earth over several hundre

acres, transforming the farmland in a revolutionary way. After his tour i

Germany, Rodehaver went home to Wisconsin accompanied by the inn

keeper’s daughter, whom he married. In 1959 they returned to German

where he built a long career as a civilian engineer for the Army.44

Not all Helping Hand projects ended as happily as Rodehaver’s stor

In the small town of Busenbach, also near Karlsruhe, the 291st Enginee

Company from nearby Ettlingen began work on 12 September 1954 t

help widen a footpath from the railroad station into town. A year earlie

this group had built a soccer field for the town.45 This time, four days afte

the work began, an Army bulldozer hit a tank mine left from the war; th

explosion killed the operator, Pvt. Roy L. Mattson. To honor the youn

soldier’s memory, the town erected a monument. Contributions from 

people in fifteen communities that had been assisted by the Army eng

neers helped finance the memorial, and the leaders of Busenbach invite

Mattson’s parents to Germany. Neither the Mattsons, who worked a dair

farm in Minnesota, nor the communities that funded the memorial coul

afford the cost of a transatlantic flight, but the Minnesota congression

delegation persuaded the Pentagon to arrange a flight for the family.

On 13 February 1955, Private Mattson’s parents attended the dedic

tion ceremony in Busenbach. The German county commissioner chara

terized the memorial as a symbol “for the peaceful and benevolent coop

eration and understanding between peoples, [a symbol] that will serve t

exhort us all to work together in peace, understanding, and freedom fo

the well-being and happiness of all peoples.”46

Peace seemed elusive in the early 1950s. The West Germans feare

an invasion, and East German propaganda played upon their fear. Afte

the fall of Seoul, the South Korean capital, East German leaders spoke o

the impending collapse of the “Bonn puppet government” and evoke

the prospect of trial in a “people’s court” for the pro-Western leaders

The construction managed by the Army engineers in Germany betwee

1950 and 1953 gave tangible expression to the formation of a commo

defense for Europe and West Germany. More than bricks and mortar, th

construction helped transform U.S.-German relations. The dollars spen

on military construction provided a visible sign that U.S. forces would b

present in Germany as long as a threat of invasion existed.

Building West of the Rhine

As more troops arrived in 1951 and 1952, construction of new insta

lations proceeded at a frenetic tempo. Creating an entirely new base o

operations in the Rhenish Palatinate (Rheinpfalz) typified the intensity o

effort that accompanied the expansion of U.S. forces.

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 16 
79

More remote from a potential attack and more defensible because it 

lay west of the Rhine River, the Rhenish Palatinate had become the French 

zone at the end of the war. By 1950 the cooperation among Western states 

had made such distinctions unnecessary, and diplomatic representatives 

worked out agreements to shift U.S. forces, depots, and installations into 

the area around the principal city of Kaiserslautern.48 The Army transferred tons of supplies into this area from the exposed depots east of the 

Rhine. Along with the movement of materiel came scores of service and 

headquarters units.49

To accommodate the shift, the Army established its biggest supply 

base outside the continental United States.50 Beginning in March 1951 and 

spending more than $1.19 million a month, the post engineer of the new 

post, Col. George E. Pickett, managed work on an unprecedented scale. 

This work included construction and rehabilitation of troop housing, 

training, support, and recreational facilities; nine major technical service 

depots with related tactical supply points; radio sending and receiving 

stations; landing fields for light aircraft; medical facilities; and a host of 

other military installations.51 The program also provided 4,800 family 

apartments for the Army and Air Force, shopping centers, gasoline stations, motor-repair shops, schools, chapels, theaters, and clubs for both 

enlisted men and officers. The Army engineers oversaw all this construction between the summer of 1951 and the summer of 1953.52

When Lt. Col. A. M. Eschbach arrived in June 1951 as chief of construction in the post engineer’s office, very little planning had been done 

for the pending construction in Rhineland. Men, supplies, and equipment 

were arriving; and he had no facilities in place to accommodate them.53

Because no established U.S. military headquarters existed in the Rhenish 

Palatinate, Franco-American procedures for cooperation had to be worked 

out on the spot. To further complicate Eschbach’s task, the area was 

sparsely populated, its towns and small cities had been badly damaged 

during the war, and it remained a distressed and depressed area even in 

1951. Kaiserslautern supported a population of almost 60,000 in structures 

with evident war damage.54

The size of the undertaking, the need for speed, and the expansion of 

demands as the program progressed all made the buildup in the Rhenish 

Palatinate a challenge. Troops of the 2d Armored Division, who arrived 

during the summer of 1951, found the facilities they were to occupy still 

under construction. Some troops had to spend the 1951–1952 winter in tents, 

but many more were housed in hastily constructed semipermanent barracks. The engineers also rushed construction of depot facilities for medical supplies. Contractors rehabilitated a commissary to serve about 200 in 

September 1951. In July 1952 a new building opened to serve almost four 

times as many troops. In January 1954 a commissary opened with eleven 

times the capacity of the original.55 Such was the pace of expansion.

Throughout Germany, local workers and managers had difficulty 

dealing with American imperatives in fast-paced construction programs. 

Eschbach explained that German craftsmen and professionals “well 

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 17 
80

understood what was meant by the word ‘rush,’ but not by [the concep

of] ‘expediency.’”56 The Germans wanted to build carefully, solidly, and fo

the long term, but the Americans were under pressure to get the job don

rapidly, economically, and with only semipermanent construction.

A lack of qualified personnel plagued the building program in th

Rhenish Palatinate from the outset. Engineer officers were in short sup

ply in 1951 because of a general shortage throughout the Army and th

demands of the Korean War. As in Austria and elsewhere in Germany, th

Army recruited civilians in the United States, but many were reluctant t

take up residence in Europe, especially in the depressed Palatinate. Low 

unemployment in the United States made it difficult for the Army to offe

salaries equivalent to those obtainable in industry and government. I

October 1951 the building program west of the Rhine employed only 1

percent of the American personnel deemed necessary for a project of i

size. Only 20 percent of the requisite German personnel were on han

Most of the laborers employed by German contractors came from outsid

the Rhenish Palatinate.57

To compensate for the chronically short supply of labor, Eschbac

obtained permission to use troop labor. Most of the soldiers had n

construction experience, but they proved willing workers. Teams wer

assigned on a ninety-day basis, but Eschbach requested several teams t

remain for six months. The engineers also used the labor service uni

made up of former displaced persons from East European countries.58

Construction of a Shipping and Receiving Warehouse near Kaiserslautern, 

March 1952

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 18 
81

The infrastructure of the Rhenish Palatinate could not support the U.S. 

military construction. The electrical network was barely adequate to serve 

rural villages and some small factories in larger communities. To upgrade 

the Mangin Caserne, an old facility in Mainz, the engineers increased the 

expected electrical utilization from 400 to 2,000 kilowatts and increased 

the water system by 400 percent. The family housing project in Vogelweh 

on the edge of Kaiserslautern used an average of 870,000 gallons of water 

a day and produced 609,000 gallons of sewage. In Vogelweh, they created 

a separate water supply system and paid subsidies to Kaiserslautern to 

enlarge its existing sewage disposal plant. The increased demand on the 

electrical grid that served the area necessitated expanding the generating 

capacity throughout the region and increasing the transmitting capacity 

of the main and feeder lines. Similar problems existed for the road network. The rail network provided adequate lines, but the Army engineers 

had to build special freight yards and access lines.59

The plan to relocate U.S. troops to the Rhenish Palatinate called 

for developing medical facilities west of the Rhine, to the rear of any 

expected attack. The engineers built 1,000-bed hospitals in Münchweiler, 

Neubrücke, and Landstuhl and a series of large dispensaries. They also 

rehabilitated a former German military hospital and increased its capacity 

from 150 to 500 beds.60

As usual, hospital construction imposed a myriad of special demands. 

Each facility occupied a large area. Crews grading the terrain had to 

ensure that the slope for ramps would not exceed the maximum of five 

New facilities west of the Rhine included this family housing complex in 

Vogelweh, near Kaiserslautern.

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 19 
82

Medical Facility under Construction in Landstuhl

degrees. The hospital structure—a central building with wings projectin

out from each side—required a specially designed heating plant. Medic

Corps personnel insisted that wards be oriented to achieve the mo

favorable conditions of light and air. Because hospitals operated with bot

German and American equipment, they had to be wired for both 110- an

220-volt electrical circuitry. The air, gas, and oxygen supply lines require

copper tubing. The terrazzo floors in surgery rooms had to be equippe

with special copper screens grounded to prevent static charges from cau

ing a spark that could ignite ether or other volatile substances. Cork floo

ing was installed in some therapy rooms to absorb and dampen soun

but the cork created maintenance problems. It could be cleaned only wit

a cold wet mop; the customary cleaning agent, hot soapy water, dissolve

the glue binding the cork particles.61

At the beginning of the construction program in the spring of 195

only a few hundred American military personnel served in the Rhenis

Palatinate. By the end of 1953 more than 40,000 soldiers crowded the prov

ince, and more than 70 percent of the buildings used by the U.S. militar

had been built from scratch in less than three years. The building program 

cost approximately $250 million—half of it new construction—and at i

peak employed an estimated 40,000 Germans. The construction program 

succeeded in creating the largest Army installation outside the continent

United States. It provided apartments for 6,000 families, schools for 4,00

dependent children, and facilities for the supplies that would flow from 

France in support of a force totaling more than 60,000 in the area.62

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 20 
83

Air Force Infrastructure in Turkey

In 1947 the U.S. government sought to implement the Truman Doctrine 

by sending military advisers to Turkey. Under the assistance program, the 

Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) coordinated the work of several service groups—The United States Army Group 

(TUSAG), The United States Air Force Group (TUSAFG), and The United 

States Navy Group (TUSNG). Each group pursued its own particular 

activity in support of the Turkish military.63

In 1948 the U.S. Air Force began an ambitious program to develop 

facilities and upgrade existing bases in Turkey and to train the Turkish 

air force. After a year of effort the progress on the construction was 

unacceptable. Moreover, the inclusion of Turkey in the Mutual Defense 

Assistance Program of 1949 meant additional construction would be 

planned for the Air Force. To execute the Air Force’s construction program, one of the officers of the American Military Mission in Turkey, 

Col. Thomas H. Lipscomb, recommended creating an Army engineer 

organization comparable to an engineer district in the United States. 

JAMMAT adopted his suggestion and on 10 May 1950 established The 

United States Engineer Group (TUSEG) with headquarters in Ankara, 

Turkey’s capital. (See Map 8.)

TUSEG began working directly under the chief of engineers in 

Washington, D.C., but quickly passed to other Corps of Engineer commands: North Atlantic Division in December 1950, East Ocean Division 

in November 1951, and Mediterranean Division in February 1952. In May 

1954 the Joint Construction Agency under the commander in chief of U.S. 

forces in Europe took over responsibility for construction in Turkey and 

Greece. Through all its changes in chain of command, TUSEG’s character 

and mission remained essentially the same: construction and engineer 

support of U.S. Air Force personnel, bases, and electronic listening posts 

in Turkey.

TUSEG began with a small number of dedicated personnel. In part 

because the customs, religion, and mores of the local population created 

a living situation vastly different from either Europe or the United States, 

Americans assigned to work in Turkey developed a strong esprit de corps. 

TUSEG’s Central Office in Ankara never had more than fifty people, and 

the number of the staff in the field waxed and waned as projects came 

into the program. From the outset TUSEG faced a vexing problem of 

communications. The group always had project sites scattered around 

Turkey; it also had nonengineer agencies in its chain of command. Mail 

and telegraph services within Turkey were rudimentary and unreliable. 

Telephone communications, both within and outside the country, were 

discouraging at best, so contact with the supervisory office in the United 

States was rare. Radio equipment for inland communications had the 

potential to solve one aspect of the problem, but the Turkish government 

was reluctant to concede radio channels to the group. Air Force airplanes 

acted only intermittently as couriers.

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 21 
84

TUSEG’s problems extended beyond difficulties of communica

tions. JAMMAT had established a general supply depot near Ismir i

Cumaovasi, to which construction equipment, much of it left over from 

World War II, was shipped in the late 1940s. When TUSEG’s enginee

tried to draw construction equipment from the depot to begin their job

in the early 1950s, they found that the American ambassador to Turke

had loaned essential pieces to the Turkish government’s Department o

Public Works. The Turks resisted returning the equipment to the U.

military engineers, and the chief of TUSEG had to struggle with Turkis

authorities to recover the equipment essential to his mission. Other equip

ment had been assigned to the Turkish Air Force for projects unrelated t

TUSEG’s priority tasks. When the engineers finally recovered it, much o

the equipment had been destroyed by misuse. In one instance, the Turk

had replaced brake fluid in a consignment of thirty trucks with norm

engine oil, which had dissolved all the rubber parts in the brake system

making the vehicles useless.

The plan that governed TUSEG’s work during the 1950s projected con

struction or reconstruction at eight locations across Turkey: Diyarbaki

Eskisehir, Kayseri, Bandirma, Erzincan, Balikesir, Afyon, and Merzifon

The projects in Erzincan and Afyon were never built; the project i

Kayseri, although begun, was quickly suspended and only complete

much later. Other construction was added to the original program, not

bly in Batman and in Incirlik near Adana. By the summer of 1952, TUSEG

work involved about $30 million in new construction. Subsequent add

tions brought the total for this phase to about $45 million.

From Truman’s speech in March 1947 through Turkey’s inclusion i

the NATO defensive perimeter for Europe in the early 1950s, the countr

assumed a special place in the Western military and diplomatic plannin

It lay on Russia’s border, and building bases there put U.S. military migh

within striking distance of the Soviet Union in the event of hostilitie

Still, Europe constituted the primary focus of conflict between the Unite

States and the Soviet Union during the early Cold War years, and th

Soviet blockade of Berlin demonstrated how vulnerable Germany was t

both military and political-psychological pressure.

New Lines of Communications

When Cold War tensions increased after the Soviet blockade of Berli

in the summer of 1948, the supply line for the U.S. Army of occupation i

Germany and Austria became strategically untenable. The line stretche

from Bremerhaven in northern Germany through Frankfurt into souther

Germany and to Austria. It paralleled the frontier with the Soviet zone i

Germany and the Czechoslovak border for its entire length at a distanc

of only about fifty miles. This location made it hard to defend even wit

large numbers of troops; reductions in U.S. troop strength made it impo

sible to defend the line of communications against any serious Sovi

aggression.64

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 22 
Map 8

Euphrates

R

Lake

Van

B L A C K S E A

Tigris R

Bandırma

Balıkesir

Afyon

Merzifon

Erzincan

Kayseri

Diyarbakır

Batman

Cumaovasi

Eskis ̨ehir

Izmir

Incirlik

Sevastopol' BUCHAREST

Burgas

Ortaköy

Çorlu

Çakmaklı

Istanbul

Köseköy

Izmit

Denizli Konya

ANKARA

Sinop

Trabzon

Adana

Erzurum

Mus ̨

Karatas ̨

SYRIA

IRAQ

IRAN

UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLICS

BULGARIA

ROMANIA

GREECE

CYPRUS

TURKEY

THE U.S. ENGINEER GROUP (TUSEG)

1950s

Construction SitesGeneral Supply Depots

0 100 200

0

Miles

100 200 Kilometers

300

300

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 23 
86

Military logic dictated a change in the lines of communications an

supply. The first relocation came in relation to Austria, where since 194

U.S. forces had been supplied from Bremerhaven through German

EUCOM shifted the line of supply by making the port of Livorno, Italy, i

starting point. From Livorno, the line ran through Verona and the Brenne

Pass into Austria. Italy and the United States signed an agreement in Jun

1951 to establish facilities to service this new line of supply.65

Similar concerns about the vulnerability of supply along the north

south line prompted the commander in chief for Europe, General Luciu

D. Clay, to seek authority in October 1948 to relocate his line of supply. H

proposed a line across France and instructed his staff, including his chi

engineer, General Shingler, to gather the information needed to begin con

structing such a new line.66 In early 1949 staff began studying a route from 

Bordeaux east through France into Germany. (Map 9) Although the rou

was 650 miles long and would involve extensive construction, it had th

advantage of being perpendicular to the projected front of battle in case o

any attack and thus less vulnerable.

In October 1949, when the Western allies met in Washington to discus

military requirements to implement the North Atlantic Treaty, they fo

mally endorsed a new line of communications and supply across Franc

In the spirit of cooperation that underlay the development of NATO, th

French were willing to approve the relocation of the major supply line

through their country. Late in the year the State Department began diplo

matic negotiations with France; a year later the two countries reached a

agreement to establish and operate U.S. military installations in France.

In the negotiations the French government expressed special sen

sitivity to potential domestic political protests against the introductio

of foreign military bases. German occupation during the war and crit

cism from the French Communist Party made any military presence 

touchy issue. As a result, both parties agreed to use “line of commu

nications” when referring to the buildup rather than Communication

Zone, the label used during the war. By the summer of 1951 the ploy ha

served its purpose and the command in France was redesignated as th

Communications Zone under the European Command.67 By mid-195

COMZ was a major command under USAREUR in charge of administe

ing construction in France for the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.68

From the beginning of the discussions, the French government insis

ed on sovereign control of activities on its soil. French contractors were t

execute all construction on the network of rail lines, waterways, airway

highways, and pipelines necessary to supply the U.S. forces in German

from ports in western France. The French government agreed to furnis

supplies, services, and facilities at cost. All installations would pass t

French ownership once the U.S. military no longer needed them. Th

Army would supervise construction—that is, establish specification

approve plans, let contracts, and conduct technical inspections—bu

it could neither use American contractors nor deal directly with loc

French contractors. It had to deal with French contractors through Frenc

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 24 
Map 9

Seine R

Seine

R Loire R

Marne R

Rh

ni e

R

hR

nô

R

e

Bay

o f

Biscay

Cherbourg

Le Havre Rouen

Dreux

Chartres

Orléans

Trois-Fontaines Strasbourg Nancy

Toul

Vitry-le-François

Verdun

Metz

Châlons

Reims

Fontainebleau

PARIS

Melun

Kaiserslautern

Saarbrücken Pirmasens

Lyon

Turin

Geneva

BERN

Dijon

Troyes

Le Mans

Tours

Chinon

Saumur

Angers Ingrandes

Nantes

Donges

Le Croisic

St. Nazaire

La Rochelle

Poitiers

Périgueux

Bussac

Rochefort Fontenet

Angoulême

Braconne Limoges

Brest

Caen

Mérignac

Captieux

Bordeaux

ITALY

SWITZERLAND

BELGIUM

WEST

GERMANY

LUXEMBOURG

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

FRANCE

1950s

POL (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricant) PipelineRailroad

0 50

150 0 50 100 Miles

150 100 Kilometers

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 25 
88

military and civilian agencies.69 This indirect contracting system antic

pated the similar arrangement that emerged in West Germany after 195

The establishment of sovereign control by the host nation became an issu

wherever the U.S. forces built during the Cold War.

The extensive work in France required the establishment of a new 

American military unit. On 1 December 1949, in anticipation of the su

cessful completion of negotiations then under way between France an

the United States, the European Command established the 7966th EUCOM 

Detachment. With headquarters in Paris, the detachment succeeded th

Graves Registration Command that had been active in France since th

end of the war. The detachment’s initial mission was to prepare, develo

and operate the line of communications across France.70 Because the A

Force would be involved in developing facilities in France, Air Force off

cers were added to the staff of the 7966th EUCOM Detachment in Januar

1950, making it almost from the start an interservice unit.71

Brig. Gen. Howard L. Peckham commanded the detachment initiall

with Col. Mason J. Young as his engineer. They organized the staff to han

dle and convey 100,000 tons of supplies arriving each month in Bordeau

and La Rochelle to Germany by rail or to depots in France. The detachmen

had to construct supply depots and other installations to receive these sup

plies. By the end of January 1950, U.S. military engineers working wit

French counterparts had selected sites in Bordeaux, Rochefort, La Rochell

Fontainebleau, Verdun, and Metz. Eventually, the line of communication

included installations in Orleans, Toul, Chinon, Angoulême, Ingrande

Saumur, and other locations. In April, Young became commander of th

7966th, and he was promoted to brigadier general shortly thereafter.72

From the start the detachment operated shorthanded. Although estab

lished with 1,000 military positions, it suffered personnel losses almo

immediately because of existing policies aimed at reducing militar

positions in Europe. The detachment did not reach full strength unt

late 1950. At year’s end, the 7966th moved its headquarters from Paris t

Orleans and received the additional mandate to provide logistical suppo

for the American contingent at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powe

Europe, just being organized in Paris.73

American military strategists were eager to start storing supplies i

France. They quickly ordered an ordnance company and a quartermaste

truck company from Bamberg and Mannheim, respectively, to form 

300-vehicle convoy to pick up rations and several hundred tons of ammu

nition from dumps in exposed positions in Germany and move them t

Bordeaux. The convoy arrived on 11 November 1950. Later that month, ju

days after the agreement with the French had been signed, the American

rerouted to Bordeaux three ammunition ships headed for Korea throug

the Panama Canal. Unfortunately, neither the port of Bordeaux nor a sto

age site for the supplies was prepared to receive the materiel or the 1,00

men from the convoy.74

The location chosen for the first ordnance depot was Captieux, abou

sixty miles south of Bordeaux. The site in Captieux had the politic

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 26 
89

advantage for the French government of being government-owned land. 

It had been a military base since World War I and therefore no local landowners had to be displaced. On the negative side, the terrain in Captieux 

was a huge bog. Because of the composition of the soil and a water table 

just two feet below the surface, ground water could not drain away. 

Access roads and rail lines were not yet in place, and the heavy rains of 

November 1950 threatened to wash out the roads that did exist. The buildings left from earlier military use were no more than stone shells. The 

roofs and interior appointments had been stripped off and sold by the 

Germans during their occupation of France in World War II.75

The rains continued through February, turning the area into a gigantic 

mud bowl. Despite water everywhere, drinking water for the men in the 

camp had to be brought in from twenty-four miles away. Although the 

site was inappropriate and preparations inadequate, Captieux received 

sixty railroad cars daily for the first six months of 1951, each loaded with 

ammunition. Much of the ordnance sat along the soggy roadside.

By summer a profusion of insects infested the area; Captieux became 

known as “the Siberia of France.” In September 1951 the 83d Engineer 

Construction Battalion, which had arrived in late May as the first construction battalion assigned to France, began to drain the area. With bulldozers, cranes, draglines, and a supply of mosquito netting, they dug over 

eight miles of drainage ditches; the principal ditch was over four-and-ahalf miles long. It took another year before the site began to resemble an 

adequate facility.76

Construction of the line of communications across France began badly 

in Captieux, and progress was distressingly slow. In January 1951 EUCOM 

learned that Congress had appropriated $51.5 million for the construction. 

By the end of the year, EUCOM had committed just over half ($29.4 million) to specific projects. More than eighty projects had been authorized 

for 1951; by year’s end, fourteen were completed and only fifteen others 

under way.77

To account for this unsatisfactory pace the engineer’s office in Orleans 

listed twenty-one factors that contributed to delays in construction. The 

list included differences in language and culture, absence of heavy construction equipment and power tools, limited experience of the French 

construction industry with large-scale projects, tardiness and absenteeism owing to poor local transportation and living conditions, excessive 

bureaucracy on both the American and French sides, and restrictions—

which the American engineers identified as “beaux arts”—imposed by a 

French government agency charged with the aesthetic protection of the 

French landscape. The engineers ventured a prediction: “It is doubtful 

that our program will be completed within time schedules thru contractual sources in France.”78 Two years later a journalist from the Saturday 

Evening Post visiting the line of communications found the same problems 

still evident.79

Delays continued during 1951 because the Americans kept expanding the scope of the line of communications. At the same time they hoped 

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 27 
90

In the early 1950s, U.S. troops in Trois Fontaines lived in tents and prefabricated 

barracks, often under snowy and muddy conditions.

to negotiate a new agreement with the French. The French refused t

renegotiate. Continuing American pressure on the French did nothing t

improve relations.80

Poor planning, inefficiencies, and delays meant that U.S. troops arriv

ing in France in 1950 and 1951 found only marginally adequate shelter. Fo

the first winter the men used tents; only one of the barracks made avai

able by the French had central heating. Even in the winter of 1951–195

nearly 10,000 soldiers still bunked ten to a tent. The Army engineers win

terized the tents with wooden floors, siding of wood and tarpaper, an

a stove at each end, but they were no substitute for permanent housin

Moreover, many tent camps were without conveniently located runnin

water. With inadequate paths and roads, the soldiers remained mire

in the mud.81 American military dependents in France fared little bette

They faced an almost total lack of housing and no schools, hospitals, o

service clubs. Because of the rapid influx of personnel, the rental mark

was tight and overpriced.82

In seeking to build the line of communications across France, th

Army engineers fought more than mud, insects, and tight French contr

of the construction process. They also faced interservice rivalry: The U.

Air Forces, Europe, had an agenda for construction in France that did no

always coordinate well with the agenda of the Army. Air Force person

nel participated on both the staff of the 7966th EUCOM Detachment an

the staff of COMZ, but the Air Force chafed under the arrangement th

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 28 
91

placed military construction in France in the hands of what they considered an essentially Army command. Starting in December 1950 the 

Air Force had done its own site surveys for airfields in France. In April 

1951 the Air Force announced that it planned to build its own line of 

communications and supply, raising the prospect that the two services 

would “collide and compete” for contractors, heavy equipment, materials, 

and supervisory personnel.83 Early in 1952 the Air Force opened its own 

Construction Office in Paris and engaged the services of an engineering 

company, Construction Management Engineering Associates, to manage 

the Air Force’s construction program in France.84

It was not just the Air Force that contributed to competition for personnel and supplies. In 1951 six independent U.S. military commands 

operated in Europe.85 All were participants in the rapid expansion of 

forces. All needed construction and needed it quickly. All wanted rapid 

responses from the builders, but they were incapable of setting firm 

programs for the engineers and contractors to follow. During 1951 and 

1952 COMZ’s engineers received ten revisions of the Army’s construction 

program. Air Force specifications changed as often. These constant redefinitions of requirements led to logistical confusion, escalating costs, and 

ever-increasing postponements of completion dates for specific projects.86

In addition, the COMZ engineers trying to push construction forward 

had to contend with the French. On many of the air bases, construction 

plans called for American engineers to build such elements as operational 

pavement and hangars for U.S. aircraft, barracks for U.S. troops, and similar support facilities. These were, however, supplementary to French construction, which provided the basic construction and facilities for the air 

bases being built for use by NATO. The U.S. construction was thus dependent on the progress of French construction, and American commanders 

had no power to hurry their French colleagues.87

The U.S. military construction in Europe and in North Africa, combined with the demands of the Korean War, strained the capacity of the 

Armed Services to manage the program and of the foreign economies to 

absorb it.88 In France alone, the American military had launched a halfbillion-dollar construction program. The line of communications was 

planned initially to store supplies for an army of 100,000 men for forty-five 

days and within two years to expand to supply 260,000 men for sixty days. 

In 1950 there were fewer than 10,000 U.S. military personnel in France to 

manage this extensive program. Unlike the situation in Germany during 

the occupation, the U.S. military had no authority in France to requisition 

land and facilities. The Americans viewed the French construction industry as stolid and uncooperative. It was certainly overtaxed by the construction load stemming from the expansion of U.S. forces. By April 1952 

forty-two projects, each worth more than $100,000, had been contracted, 

but not one had been completed on time.89

In the face of these obstacles, the line of communications was only 

haltingly taking shape across France. At Camp Bussac, twenty-nine miles 

northeast of Bordeaux, the 83d Engineer Construction Battalion built a 

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 29 
92

water system for 3,000 troops. The engineers established a water purif

cation point and laid out a system of pipes across the post to distribu

water. They repeated the work in Chinon, where they added a water ci

tern on a ten-foot tower that created enough pressure from gravity to di

tribute the water throughout the post.90 In Bordeaux, this unit converte

an old Ford Motor Company plant for use by the Air Force. The building

had been heavily damaged during the war and needed concrete floor

reinforcing for walls, and windows. At the Merignac Air Force Base ju

outside of Bordeaux, the 83d also furnished utilities and equipment fo

French prefabricated buildings that were used as mess halls and latrine

Its personnel surveyed about a dozen different campsites throughou

France for placement of prefabricated housing.91

Other sites also came on line: a tank farm at Toul, an engineer depo

at Chinon, ordnance storage at Angoulême, quartermaster facilities 

Metz, signal corps facilities at Saumur and Verdun, and a pipeline t

transport petroleum products from western French ports into German

When the military exercise COMBINE was held in West Germany in th

autumn of 1951, military materiel traveled along the line of communic

tions across France rather than along the Bremerhaven line.92 By 1952 ove

fifty American installations dotted the supply line from Bordeaux to th

German border.93

The results of two years of effort were not, however, commensura

with either the need or the money available for the line of communic

tions in France. With the confusion of the ever-changing constructio

programs, the waste and friction of the interservice rivalries, and th

slowness of progress traceable to problems with the French system

the enterprise was clearly floundering.94 Although EUCOM created th

Communications Zone in mid-1951 to manage the augmentation of U.

forces in France and to oversee the construction of the new line of com

munications, it failed to staff it adequately. When Maj. Gen. Samuel D

Sturgis assumed command of COMZ in early 1952, he found that th

officer contingent assigned to him represented only 5 percent of EUCOM

officer strength, but that it carried 40 to 45 percent of EUCOM’s office

shortage. In his judgment, COMZ was so understaffed that maintainin

a coherent construction program remained virtually impossible. He spen

the balance of the year working to correct the command’s shortcoming

In November 1952 Sturgis succeeded Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick as chief o

engineers and returned to Washington.95

The incessant delays in France prompted officials in Washingto

in 1952 to propose that they establish a single agency to act as th

Department of Defense’s executive agent for all construction within th

authority of the commander in chief for Europe. Beginning in 1953 man

agement of all military construction in Europe—except Germany—woul

be brought under one team with representatives from the Army, A

Force, and Navy working under the Secretary of the Army.

By the end of 1953 the U.S. Army engineers working under th

European Command had extended their support network into Turke

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 30 
93

They had begun to construct bases in France to oversee the new, more 

secure line of communications from the Atlantic into Germany. They had 

also established an American military presence of impressive dimensions 

within the French zone of occupation in the Rhenish Palatinate and, in 

the U.S. zone, built the facilities necessary to handle the rapid increase of 

American troops and personnel from fewer than 100,000 to over 250,000. 

Work in France would expand throughout the rest of the decade; in West 

Germany, the engineers would face the adjustment necessary to cope 

with the establishment of political autonomy, the lifting of the occupation 

regime, and, accompanying that change, the end of Deutschmark funding 

of the American military presence.

06E_Chap03_Final.indd 31 
06E_Chap03_Final.indd 32 
4

CONSTRUCTION IN THE 

MID-1950s

The military buildup in Germany and France and the periphery 

of the Soviet Union strained American military engineer resources. By 1953 the Engineer Division of the European Command 

(EUCOM) asserted sufficient management control of the expanding construction program in Germany to achieve orderly progress. In 

France, by contrast, progress was neither orderly nor satisfactory. The disarray prompted the U.S. defense establishment to reorganize management 

of the overseas construction program. In January 1953 the Department of 

Defense created the Joint Construction Agency (JCA) to oversee construction for all of the military services in Europe outside of Germany.

Despite progress in Germany, the Army faced challenges that 

impinged on the construction program. After the end of the war the 

German government had borne the costs of the occupation, including 

the costs of military construction. As the Federal Republic of Germany 

became an ally, arrangements to pay the costs of occupation changed. The 

Engineer Division’s budget now depended on the appropriations process 

in Washington and congressional review.

Deutschmark Construction in Germany

Germany was the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

country in Europe that fell outside the construction authority of the JCA. 

U.S. military construction between 1953 and 1957 continued under the 

procedures worked out with the government of the new Federal Republic 

of Germany. In contrast to all other construction, the West German government was still paying for construction in Germany in Deutschmarks 

(DM), an extension of its responsibility to bear the costs of the occupation. 

For the period 1 July 1953 to 31 December 1957, Deutschmark construction for the U.S. Army cost DM 1.64 billion, the equivalent of $390.9 million at the prevailing rate of DM 4.2 to the dollar. Between 1950 and 1953 

the Federal Republic of Germany had funded another DM 2.5 billion of 

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 1 
96

American military construction ($595.2 million at the exchange rate fo

the early 1950s).1

By 1953 the three Western Powers occupying Germany had mad

a clear commitment to extend full sovereignty to the Federal Republi

Sovereignty meant the end to Deutschmark funding, but negotiations o

sovereign status were delayed by their inextricable link to parallel nego

tiations among the West European states to include West Germany in 

European defense community. The negotiations influenced the Unite

States Army, Europe (USAREUR) construction program only insofar a

Army planners kept expecting the Deutschmark funds to end. Whe

the Federal Republic did attain full independence, it agreed to continu

Deutschmark funding through 1957 to allow orderly completion of exis

ing projects. During the transition, between 1953 and 1956, America

military construction in West Germany operated much as it had afte

the Federal Republic’s creation in 1949, preparing facilities for U.S. troop

positioned to defend Western Europe and for their dependents.2

Dependent Housing

Between 1950 and the end of 1952, the buildup of U.S. forces to sup

port NATO, with its dramatic increase in the numbers of U.S. troops, ha

produced a demand for dependent housing that far exceeded availabilit

Beginning in February 1951, dependents had been restricted from ente

ing West Germany because of insufficient housing. The flow of troop

into Germany slackened in 1953, but a backlog of requests for dependen

residence kept the demand for housing high.3

During the autumn of 1953, USAREUR’s commander, Lt. Gen. Charle

L. Bolte, called for construction of new dependent housing. He wanted t

enable the command to return to German proprietors all but a few essen

tial requisitioned properties. He also was determined to make govern

ment quarters available for dependents and reduce the time—an averag

of ten months by late 1953—that a serviceman’s family spent separate

from him. Bolte commissioned a survey that identified a need for a min

mum of twenty-five thousand new family housing units, most of whic

would involve construction funded with Deutschmarks.4

A three-year plan called for construction of about 19,000 family hou

ing units in the first year and 5,900 more over the final two years. Th

plan’s proposed construction anticipated slightly fewer housing uni

than Bolte’s survey had identified as the minimum need. Even at tha

it encountered obstacles that complicated its execution. In August 195

Congress and the Department of Defense limited floor space to an ave

age of 1,080 and a maximum of 1,250 square feet per unit.5

 In January 195

the Department of Defense temporarily froze all funds for construction o

new housing and directed that projects not yet initiated be resubmitte

for approval. The fear that Deutschmark funding would end in 1954 an

all the units would have to be funded with appropriated dollars also con

strained American military planners.6

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 2 
97

To take account of these pressures, as well as to meet the revised 

specifications on floor space, the Army engineers devised a new standard 

building with three stories and eighteen family units, equally divided 

among two-, three-, and four-bedroom apartments. Most of the buildings 

were furnished with central heating from a “district” plant that served 

several apartment buildings.

Providing such a heating source for a group of apartment buildings 

led in 1954 to one of the more unusual engineering solutions. The first 

22 buildings of a 45-building, 810-apartment family housing complex in 

Kornwestheim near Stuttgart were scheduled to be available for occupancy on 1 September, but Army engineers rejected the German contractor’s 

plans for the central heating plant as below acceptable standards of efficiency. The redesign of the heating plant delayed its completion, and the 

contractor was unable to provide heat in time for the scheduled arrival of 

dependent families.

H. Jace Greene, construction engineer for the Stuttgart military district, rented three train locomotives from the German National Railroad 

and attached them to the complex’s heating system while work on the 

central heating plant continued. The train engines became portable boilers. Mounted adjacent to the apartment complex on specially adapted 

bases, they provided heat to the buildings for sixty-six days, until the permanent heating plant was ready. The cost of this arrangement per day for 

each apartment was approximately 1 DM.7

The construction plan for 1954–1957 called for about 22,000 new family 

housing units to be completed by the beginning of 1958. Ninety percent 

of the planned housing was for U.S. Army personnel. Total cost of the 

Railroad locomotives provided heating to an apartment complex in Kornwestheim.

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 3 
98

construction came to just over DM 1 billion ($238 million at the exchang

rate). The average cost per apartment unit ran about DM 42,000 ($10,00

for fiscal year 1954 and about DM 54,600 ($13,000) for fiscal year 1955.8

From 1950 to 1957 dependent housing accounted for the largest sing

share of construction money (42.3 percent). During the early years, spend

ing was relatively high on troop housing and training facilities. As facil

ties for troops were completed, programs to provide dependent housin

took a greater part of the construction budget. Between 1953 and the en

of the Deutschmark construction program in 1957, spending on fami

housing more than doubled.

Bachelor Officers’ Quarters

A shortage of bachelor officers’ quarters (BOQ) characterized the ear

years of the buildup, and, in spite of the completion of over 4,000 BO

units, USAREUR still faced a substantial need in 1953. The comman

encountered complications with the standard design for the BOQs. Th

United States European Command (USEUCOM) guidelines had reduce

floor space per occupant, and the four-story design used during 1950

1953 exceeded the new regulations. The USAREUR engineer’s office ha

standard plans for another BOQ building that met the new regulation

on floor space, but this two-story structure required more than twice a

much land per person as the four-story building. It had a second liabi

ity: Local authorities considered it an eyesore. To resolve the problem

the USAREUR engineer sought and obtained from the Department o

the Army a modification of the USEUCOM criteria and thus was able t

continue to use the four-story structures, which the Germans accepte

without objection. Between mid-1953 and the end of 1957 a vigorous con

struction program created nearly 5,000 BOQ spaces and achieved a nea

balance between demand and supply.

Community Support Facilities

Engineer programs also addressed basic utilities. The chlorinatin

of water, an issue of public health in the minds of the American militar

authorities, had been imposed on German communities by the occupatio

authorities. Many of the German cities and towns from which the mil

tary purchased water strongly objected to chlorination. As West German

approached sovereignty, these communities made it known that the

would discontinue the practice. When the occupation statute official

ended in May 1955, USAREUR had to set up its own chlorination pro

gram to supply water to U.S. troops and to family housing complexes. Th

concentration of Americans in compact communities and casernes mad

implementing this program relatively simple.

Medical facilities for the U.S. military in West Germany expanded rap

idly during the 1950s. Between 1950 and 1953 Army engineers supervise

construction, rehabilitation, or enlargement of fifteen hospitals. In th

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 4 
99

next four years engineer programs put more emphasis on rehabilitation 

and extension than on new construction, although a new 250-bed hospital 

was built in Heidelberg. Of the ninety-seven Army medical dispensaries 

in Germany in 1957, thirty-two were new or newly rehabilitated. The program provided nine new dental clinics over the same four years.

All these health facilities—hospitals, dispensaries, dental clinics, and 

sanitary water supplies—absorbed relatively little of the overall construction budget. They all fell into the funding category of “administrative, 

maintenance, air navigation, medical, and other facilities.” Construction 

in this category accounted for only 7.3 percent of total Deutschmark funds 

spent between 1950 and 1957.

Miscellaneous work on facilities to support and serve the military and 

dependent communities throughout Germany accounted for 6.4 percent 

of the construction funding for the period. This work included schools. 

Before 1950 a modest school system for military dependents had existed. 

The funds expended between 1950 and 1957 financed the development of 

an entire school system for American personnel in Germany.

Planning for the expansion of schools for dependents was poorly handled. The overall program to accommodate arriving dependents had no 

comprehensive, long-range plan and did not take into account the needs 

of each community. USAREUR’s dependent school unit did an excellent job of forecasting the school population from year to year, coming 

within 2 percent of the totals of arriving schoolchildren, but the Logistics 

Planning Board and the comptroller refused to accept these estimates and 

The high school in Furth near Nuremberg was part of the extensive school 

system constructed in Germany.

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 5 
100

directed that they be revised downward. As a result, most school build

ings were overcrowded from the moment they opened. Even addition

proved inadequate to meet the existing demand. Between 1951 and 195

three-quarters of the schools built had from three to fourteen addition

rooms under construction by the time they opened or shortly thereafte

With construction costs increasing at a rate of 15–20 percent a year i

Germany, such poor planning cost money.9

By the end of the school year in 1953, USAREUR operated eight hig

schools and seventy-two elementary schools in Germany with an ave

age monthly enrollment of just under 15,000. By June 1957 there wer

twelve high schools; the number of elementary schools operated unde

USAREUR had decreased to sixty-nine as a result of the transfer of thre

schools to Air Force jurisdiction. Average monthly enrollment for elemen

tary and high schools had virtually doubled, however, to 29,500.10

In addition to schools and medical facilities, community sup

port facilities included chapels. From 1950 to 1957 Army engineer

built almost 100 of the 237 chapels available to service personnel i

Germany. The EUCOM Engineer Division, in consultation with th

chief of chaplains, developed four standard plans for chapels wit

capacities of 175, 350, 500, and over 500 seats. The engineers recom

mended that communities of fewer than 1,000 people rehabilitate a

existing building or build a simple chapel designed for the specific ci

cumstances of the community rather than construct a chapel based o

one of the standard designs.11

Community support facilities in Germany included chapels, such as this one 

at Downs Barracks in Fulda.

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 6 
101

Troop Training Facilities

Construction of training facilities had taken precedence over dependent communities in the early years of the buildup. Between 1953 and 

1957 it declined to less than 1 percent of the total spent on construction 

(DM 9.5 million [$2.3 million at the exchange rate] of a total expenditure 

of DM 1.64 billion [$39 million]).12 Still, the construction of a wide variety 

of training facilities—airstrips, liquid fuel dispensing facilities, communications and navigational aids, passive air defense structures, and tank and 

other firing ranges—continued.13

Joint Construction Agency in France

Activated on 15 January 1953, the Joint Construction Agency had an 

unenviable task. Although the United States Congress had supported the 

program to construct a line of communications across France and had 

appropriated substantial amounts of money, progress in placing construction had come to a standstill. The JCA’s mandate was to get construction 

moving. In practice, the JCA concentrated on construction in France; it 

assumed responsibilities in Austria, Italy, Greece, and Turkey only in 

1954.14

The Department of Defense expected the JCA to get the best buy for 

the American construction dollar by eliminating competition between the 

services, avoiding unnecessary duplication, and applying uniform criteria 

and standards in design and construction. Contradicting its insistence 

on rapid progress, the Department of Defense twice imposed freezes on 

construction in France during the JCA’s first two years of operation. These 

freezes undermined the JCA’s credibility and disrupted the agency’s 

efforts to overcome the bottleneck in construction placement developed 

between 1950 and 1952. With some success, the agency’s staff in both the 

central and field offices cultivated cordial relations with the French officials in the military and civilian agencies that made decisions concerning 

U.S. military construction. That success was undercut by the difficulty 

of explaining to these officials why projects on which the JCA had been 

pushing the French for urgent approval could be suspended so abruptly. 

In addition, the agency’s operations suffered from the tensions that developed between France and the United States over events in the Middle 

East. These factors, all of which lay outside the JCA’s control, substantially 

impeded the agency’s efforts; the JCA’s short history has the quality of 

a roller-coaster ride, plunging and rushing between absolute frustration 

and commendable success.

The organizational plan for Europe anticipated that the Joint 

Construction Agency would be directly subordinate to the U.S. European 

Command; but initially USAREUR, with headquarters in Heidelberg, 

exercised authority over the JCA through its Communications Zone 

(COMZ) in France. By April a revised command arrangement put the 

JCA’s commander directly under the USEUCOM commander and at the 

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 7 
102

same organizational level as the commanders of the command’s othe

component services.15 As a joint command involving all the services, th

JCA had three officers representing the Army, Air Force, and Navy an

acting as special staff assistants.16

Maj. Gen. George J. Nold took command of the JCA a month after i

activation, with Brig. Gen. Orville E. Walsh as his principal deputy. Bot

were Army engineers. Nold served until July 1955, when another Arm

engineer, Maj. Gen. Bernard L. Robinson, succeeded him. As in the Corp

of Engineers’ organization in the continental United States, on which th

JCA was explicitly modeled, military officers commanded the agency, bu

civilians held most of the staff positions. The structure—a headquarte

office with district offices close to the actual construction sites—permi

ted centralized control and decentralized operations.17

The JCA first opened offices in Paris, but within weeks the agenc

moved its headquarters to suburban Boulogne-Billancourt. Both the Arm

and the Air Force, drawing from existing military construction operation

scattered throughout France, provided startup staff for the JCA headqua

ters. On 1 April 1953, the new construction agency took over the thre

engineer districts that had existed under the Communications Zone an

incorporated them as the Port District, the Northeast District, and th

North District.18 (Chart 2)

The Port District had its office at Bordeaux, and the Northeast Distri

was located first at Verdun and later at Nancy; North District shared spac

with the central office in Boulogne-Billancourt. As the JCA’s activitie

spread to other countries, the agency organized additional geographic di

tricts to manage construction, but the three original districts concentrate

on reducing the backlog of work in France. The headquarters maintaine

general supervision, overall control, and liaison with the French govern

ment. The commanders of the using services remained responsible fo

identifying sites for construction, securing approval from the host natio

for the access to and use of the sites, and acquiring the land.19

Administrative Procedures

When the JCA began its work for the Army and the Air Force, th

combined programs in France involved about 2,500 individual projects 

some 120 sites from the Atlantic coast to the western frontier of German

By the end of 1953 about one-quarter of the $400 million constructio

program for the two services was value in place, that is, taking shape o

the ground although not necessarily finished. Less than 10 percent of th

overall construction scheduled for France had been completed.20

Explanation for the delays lay partially in the complexity of the con

tracting relationship with the French. Six agreements negotiated betwee

November 1950 and August 1952 placed all U.S. military construction i

France under the control of three French agencies: Génie, the army eng

neers for military installations; Ponts et Chausées, the civilian agency fo

bridges and roads for many of the supporting elements; and Service d

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 8 
Executive Office

Procurement

Branch

Legal

Branch

Administrative

Services

Comptroller

Division

Engineering

Division

Management

Branch

Budget and

Accounting Branch

Control

Branch

Structural Review

and Design Branch

Audit

Branch

Pavement, Soils and

Materials Branch

Army Plans

Branch

Planning

Division

Air Force

Plans Branch

Administrative

Branch

Operations

Division

Navy Plans

Branch

Real Estate

Branch

Construction

Branch

Programming and

Estimating Branch

North

District

Northeast

District

Port

District

 Chart 2: Organization of the Joint Construction Agency, 1953 

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 9 
104

l’Infrastructure, the infrastructure committee for work involving NATO

The French insisted that projects initiated by the JCA be presented to on

of these agencies at each stage from design through construction an

inspection. Normally, the U.S. military engineers could deal with loc

French contractors only indirectly through the appropriate French gov

ernment agency.22 (Chart 3)

The process was cumbersome at best and paralytic at worst. Numerou

differences in administrative approach provoked problems for whic

solutions had to be devised. For instance, the French insisted that mone

be committed for the construction of any project before they called fo

bids, even on its design. The U.S. Bureau of the Budget, by contrast, woul

not obligate funds until a construction contract had been awarded. Th

amounted to a situation in which the French would not start the contrac

ing process until the money was available to complete construction, whi

the U.S. government would not make the necessary money available unt

there was a satisfactory contract. This impasse was bridged by the creatio

of a special account from which the French government paid French con

tractors and into which the JCA paid the reimbursements that it receive

from the military services.23

The special account allowed the JCA to assure the French agency th

funds were available when presented with the proper form for bids o

design.24 Unfortunately, instances occurred in which U.S. military se

vices did not deliver funds that the JCA had guaranteed and on which 

had made good faith commitments to the French. These situations cause

acute embarrassment to personnel in the JCA and made French officia

mistrustful.25 The development of standard operating procedures fo

French bureaucrats working with the Americans was a painstaking tas

that continued throughout 1953.26

Lack of coherent and consistent planning by the U.S. military leade

contributed to disruption and delays in construction. Neither the Arm

nor the Air Force had firm construction programs when the JCA began i

work, and the services changed their requirements and criteria with di

tressing frequency. The Air Force, for example, drew up its first constru

tion program in January 1953, and the JCA began to implement it in March

Toward the end of June the Air Force submitted major revisions, not a

an integrated program but rather in a series of construction authorizatio

forms. A short time later the Air Force informed the JCA that its program 

would be “substantially altered.” Although the Air Force promised a new 

program each month from October to December, it did not deliver one t

the JCA until January 1954. Additional revisions arrived three months late

By the end of 1954 the Air Force had submitted six different constructio

programs to the JCA in fewer than twenty-four months.27 Changes in spec

fications or scope not only lengthened the process but also undermined th

confidence of the French government’s representatives in American asse

tions of urgency and commitment to specific projects.

The JCA also had to deal with delays in payment. The Air Force

supplemental funds for construction, scheduled for payment to the JCA i

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 10 
Predesign Design Obligation Approval Construction

U.S. European Command Joint Construction Agency District Engineer Ponts Et Chaussées or Génie

Ponts Et

Chaussées

or Génie

District

Engineer

French

Governmental

Approval

Include Signature

Foreign

Minister

French Construction

French

Liaison

Mission

Architect

Engineer

French

Service de

L'Infrastucture

NATO

Committee

French War

Economy

Committee

French Member

NATO

Committee

NATO

Technical

Review

 Chart 3: Joint Construction Agency Construction Procedure in France 

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 11 
106

April 1954, were not actually available until October. All the design wor

for the projects was completed between May and September, but the JC

could not solicit bids on construction until the money was in hand.28

Similarly, changes by the Army in the hospital construction program 

and lack of information on equipment to be installed increased cost

contributed to delays, and embarrassed the JCA. The whole pattern of la

changes, shifting criteria, and uncertain funding prompted the director o

the JCA, General Robinson, to make repeated demands that such practice

cease. He argued with staff in Washington that the JCA could make n

progress in France “under a staff policy which permitted continuing progra

and fund manipulation.” Washington assured General Robinson that chan

es would be minimized; but the changes continued, creating administr

tive headaches for the JCA right up to its closing hours in July 1957.29

Despite shifting criteria and frequent changes in program, th

JCA made progress. Even by late 1953, when the Office of the Chief o

Engineers in Washington ordered a study of the agency’s effectivenes

the JCA had made measurable strides. The study concluded that the con

struction program was making more rapid progress than it had earlie

under the Army or Air Force independently, and that operations wer

more efficient and economical.30

The JCA gained ground in processing the requests to build, but pu

ting construction into the ground remained far behind schedule durin

the agency’s first year. By the end of February 1954 the agency could claim 

construction starts on less than 15 percent of the jobs forecast just thre

months earlier.31

The agency did make headway in handling the bureaucratic aspec

associated with its mission, especially in developing effective work

ing relations with French agencies. The staff persuaded the Frenc

that the urgency of construction necessitated waiving or modifyin

standard administrative procedures. At the JCA’s request the Service d

l’Infrastructure suspended normal administrative procedures on work fo

seven air bases in France, one of which was in Dreux (about twenty mile

north-northwest of Chartres), where an Air Force unit was scheduled t

arrive in the autumn of 1954. Streamlining procedures allowed constru

tion to begin two months early, a critical saving that permitted the JCA t

take full advantage of the summer construction season.32

One incident illustrates how cooperation led to mutual benefit. I

November 1953 the commander of the French VI Military Region, Gener

Kauffeisen, encountered a chronic problem: He was seriously unde

staffed, especially considering the U.S. Army construction scheduled fo

the Northeast District. In a letter to Brig. Gen. W. W. Ford, commander o

COMZ’s Advance Section, Kauffeisen estimated that he would need add

tional six or eight well-qualified engineer officers to carry out the planne

program. He informed General Ford that he had initiated a request fo

these additional engineers through his own chain of command, but su

gested that a “tactful representation” of the situation from the command

ing general of COMZ to the chief of the French Liaison Mission might ad

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 12 
107

weight to his request. Ford contacted his commander, who passed the 

notice on to the JCA commander, General Nold.

Nold then wrote to the French army officer who directed the Génie to 

convey that almost $28 million of military construction was scheduled for 

the JCA’s Northeast District in 1954, all of which would be administered 

by the Génie of Region VI under General Kauffeisen. Nold diplomatically attributed to the JCA’s Northeast District Engineer—rather than to 

General Kauffeisen himself—the expression of concern about the adequacy of the French staff in the Region VI office. Did the office have sufficient 

staff to administer so large a construction program? Nold then asked the 

director of Génie to “inquire into the question of augmenting the present 

staff in Region VI with the additional engineering and administrative 

personnel to insure [sic] the successful and expeditious completion of 

these facilities.”33

The director the Génie thanked Nold for his observations and for the 

information on the magnitude of the construction program contemplated 

for the region. He assured Nold that the necessary provisions had been 

made to secure adequate civilian and military personnel to expedite the 

program that the JCA had outlined for the area. General Kauffeisen got 

the additional engineers he needed, and the work went forward.

The establishment of personal contacts at the highest levels of the 

French civilian and military bureaucracies constituted one of the major 

tasks of the JCA. Those personal contacts helped the agency reduce construction lead-time from the twenty-one months prevailing in early 1953 

to fifteen months by mid-1954. By 1 September 1954, for the first time in its 

operating history, the JCA enjoyed a thoroughly healthy situation, with a 

backlog of work under contract and an established flow of design completions and requests for bids on design under way. Over the next two years, 

the JCA reduced lead-time for construction projects to thirteen months. 

Given the environment, this compared favorably with the nine-and-a-half 

months of lead-time for construction projects in the United States.34

Personnel Recruitment

Although the JCA’s structure called for about 600 people, the organization began with just over 220 employees. This nucleus came from the 

Communications Zone’s construction districts, the Engineer Division 

at COMZ headquarters, and the Air Force construction organization in 

Europe.35 Recruitment became more difficult when, between January and 

April 1953, the Department of the Army froze all construction while it 

conducted an “essentiality review.”36 To fill positions, the JCA had to rely 

on COMZ staff that handled personnel in France through district offices. 

This meant that each JCA district engineer depended on the local COMZ 

personnel office to provide candidates for positions. Little exchange of 

information on available positions throughout France took place among 

the local offices, so hiring depended on who happened into any particular COMZ district personnel office.37 Not only could the JCA not recruit 

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 13 
108

its own personnel, but its staff had very little direct contact with COMZ

personnel office. It took as long as seven months to process an appointe

for a specific job.38

The JCA’s recruitment suffered because government pay was rel

tively unattractive in 1953, while demand for professional engineers wa

high in the United States. The agency’s experience with the employees o

Construction Management and Engineering Associates (CMEA), an asso

ciation of private contractors and construction management engineer

illustrates its competitive disadvantage. The CMEA had contracted in 195

to manage Air Force construction in France.39 With the creation of the JCA

the CMEA’s personnel faced unemployment when the contract expired i

September 1953. The JCA saw these employees as a potential pool of pro

fessionals and mounted a vigorous recruiting campaign, hoping to attra

half of the 196 CMEA employees facing layoff. Barely 10 percent even con

sidered joining the JCA. Most of the CMEA’s positions were in Paris, bu

the JCA needed staff in its district offices, far from the attractions of th

French capital. By their own admission, many who joined the JCA did s

to obtain an income tax exemption for overseas employment.40

The JCA had greater success attracting professionals who alread

had experience working for U.S. forces in Europe. Edward Zawisza, wh

had fought in the war and then worked in the military government i

Germany, joined the JCA in 1953. Over the next eight years he held a var

ety of positions with the JCA and its successors in France, assigned fir

to Bordeaux, then to the Chinon Engineer Depot project, then as residen

engineer in Poitiers and as area engineer in La Rochelle. When constru

tion in France slowed down, Zawisza relocated to Germany, where h

continued working with the Army engineers into the 1980s.41 Saul Frain

had worked in Austria and in Italy; his assignments for the JCA include

the Northeast District headquarters in Nancy, the North District, and th

headquarters office in Paris.42

By the end of June 1953, the JCA had managed to put together a sta

of between 750 and 800 employees, but even these numbers were insu

ficient.43 The JCA’s personnel authorization increased, and by the en

of 1953 it had filled just over 1,000 positions. Its personnel included 10

officers from the three services, 424 Department of the Army civilian

(DACs), 478 French employees, and 3 third-country (non-American an

non-French) personnel. In general, these proportions continued until th

end of 1956 when, in anticipation of the agency’s approaching dissolutio

the staff began to leave.44

Dependent Housing

From the beginning of the buildup of American troop strength i

France in 1950, finding adequate housing for military dependents ha

proved difficult. In 1952 Congress authorized contracts for housing wit

French construction firms, guaranteeing the builder 95 percent occupanc

for five years. The first contracts were awarded for 300 family housin

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 14 
109

units to be built in Orléans beginning in mid-1953. No additional housing 

contracts were awarded until December 1954, when provisions were made 

to construct up to 234 duplex houses in Nancy, Poitiers, Metz, Ingrandes, 

La Rochelle, and Bordeaux. In 1955 an additional 984 units, including 300 

at Orléans, were authorized. The housing program, with its guarantee 

of rental income to the builders, produced unsatisfactory results. The 

apartments built were very small, maintenance was poor, and rents were 

high.45

New legislation passed by Congress in August 1954 raised the possibility of another solution to the housing problem in France: the creation of 

rent-free housing financed by the sale of surplus commodity products on 

the international market. In September 1955 USEUCOM received orders 

to stop awarding contracts under the rental guarantee program and to 

begin building “surplus-commodity housing.” The new program involved 

a complicated series of interactions among independent agencies. The 

U.S. government accumulated surplus agricultural products as a result 

of its programs to support American farmers. The Commodity Credit 

Corporation, which handled these surpluses, made them available to a 

specially selected commodity trading company. The trader then sold the 

commodities on the international market through a complex bureaucratic 

process, and money from the sales became available to finance housing 

for military dependents.

To begin work on houses in France, the JCA contracting officer issued 

a certificate to a participating builder indicating an amount of money to 

be paid to him in dollars or French francs. The builder in turn submitted the certificate to the commodity dealer, who paid the contractor from 

the proceeds of the international sale of the commodities. The American 

military personnel who occupied the new housing lived in the facilities 

rent-free instead of receiving a housing allowance. Money they would 

have received for housing went directly to cover the cost of utilities and 

maintenance and to repay the Commodity Credit Corporation for the 

commodities delivered to the dealer.46

Surplus commodity housing provided a slow answer to the urgent 

need for housing in France. Negotiations between the U.S. military and 

the French over the arrangement lagged. Initial sales of surplus commodities produced limited funds for construction. Both factors delayed 

the JCA’s invitation for construction bids under the program. In July 1956 

the JCA’s North District solicited bids and received four viable responses. 

Negotiations with the bidders lasted until May 1957, when a consortium 

of the French construction firm Compagnie Immobilière Marc Rainaut and 

the commodity firm of Bunge Corporation in New York signed a contract 

to proceed with the housing. By the time the contracts were in operation, 

the JCA had ceased to exist and management of the construction fell to its 

successor organization, the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France. In 

total the surplus commodity program financed about 3,000 housing units 

in a score of French communities between 1957 and the early 1960s.47 (See 

Map 10.)

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 15 
110

Securing the Line of Communications across France

While the JCA struggled to bring the construction under contro

American leaders reevaluated strategic policy for the supply of U.

troops. The development of a supply line across France provided an alte

native to the line in Germany south from Bremerhaven. In August 195

the Department of the Army had asked USAREUR whether shipmen

Map 10

Seine R Seine R

Loire R

Marne R

Rhône R

Cherbourg Dieppe

Me

Reims

PARIS

Lyon

Dijon Nantes

Marseille

Évreux

Orléans

Toul

Chaumont

Vitry-le-François

Verdun

Étain

Fontainebleau

Paris

Saumur Chinon

Ingrandes

Poitiers

Bussac

Fontenet

Châteauroux

Braconne

Captieux

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOUR

U.S. MILITARY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION

FRANCE

1957–1963

Site of Surplus Commodity Housing

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 16 
111

through the Port of Bremerhaven could be reduced to make the French 

line the exclusive line of communications and supply. After an evaluation 

that lasted more than a year, the department adopted a recommendation calling for a shift of all supply to the line of communications across 

France. USAREUR’s plan, worked out in detail by March 1954, required 

additional construction in France and considerable augmentation in support personnel. The plan assigned top priority to preparing logistical 

support procedures and war plans; completing the pipeline for petroleum 

products; making depots operational; and developing the ports, communications networks, and command facilities necessary to sustain the military in the field. The goal was to provide USAREUR with 70 percent of its 

supplies through French ports by the end of 1957.48

This plan put additional pressure on the JCA to expedite construction, 

but Washington suddenly imposed another freeze on construction. On 

14 September 1954 the JCA received orders from the secretary of defense 

that, other than honoring previous commitments, all contracting activity was to cease as of 28 September.49 General Nold protested vigorously, 

predicting serious negative consequences for the construction program, 

which had a total anticipated value of $31 million. About $800,000 had 

already been spent on completed design for projects along the line of 

communications, and the JCA was poised to let contracts for construction. Design had required intensive and wide-ranging coordination with 

French government agencies, and their staffs had been augmented in 

anticipation of the coming construction load. Postponement would mean 

that these agencies would lose personnel again. Nold predicted that 

American military construction would suffer long after the freeze was 

lifted. The protest had no apparent effect; the freeze remained in effect 

until January 1955.50

The $60 million pipeline for petroleum products and fuel (petroleum, 

oil, and lubricants) was the JCA’s single most expensive project in France. 

The pipeline ran from Donges and Saint-Nazaire, north of the Loire 

River’s mouth, to Metz, a city near the German border just eighty miles 

west of the Rhine. When finished, the pipeline extended from the Atlantic 

across northern France for almost 400 miles and linked up with a similar 

pipeline into western Germany. In June 1953, after roughly two years of 

negotiations, France accepted both governmental and technical agreements covering the construction, operation, and maintenance of a pipeline, controlled by the United States, across the French countryside.51 Work 

began on the Donges-Metz pipeline in May 1954. The French showed a 

willingness to adjust to urgent demands when they allowed construction 

to begin completely at the contractor’s expense and with only the assurance from the French administrative officers that formal contracts would 

follow. About one-sixth of the segment between Donges and Melun was 

laid before any papers formally cleared French ministries.52

Building the pipeline was a complex undertaking, involving facilities 

for offshore unloading, pumping stations, and storage tank installations at 

intervals across France. The line itself consisted of ten- and twelve-inch pipe 

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 17 
112

(valued at more than $6.8 million) at a depth of 2.5 feet below ground an

protected under roadways by steel sleeves. An undersea segment connecte

the off-shore unloading operation to land; and eight booster pumping st

tions moved petroleum products through the line under pressure of a ma

imum 1,250 pounds per square inch, providing a capacity of 2,450 gallon

of gasoline a minute. The pump houses were blast- and splinter-resistan

and spaced at about forty-mile intervals. The system included storage tan

facilities with a capacity exceeding 5 million barrels. The tanks at each sto

age farm had to be dispersed and positioned to minimize destruction by a

attack using either atomic or conventional bombs. Forward area tank farm

were partially buried for added protection.53

The construction freeze of late 1954 hindered progress, but by mid

1957 the JCA had completed the work and the pipeline began operating. I

September 1957, by agreement with NATO, a linking of pipelines allowe

USAREUR to transport fuel from the Atlantic across France into German

and even to units east of the Rhine.54 With this line the U.S. military coul

transport fuel equal to the capacity of 6,000 railroad tank cars from th

Atlantic to West Germany in twenty-four hours.55

The JCA also supervised a $60 million program to construct medic

facilities for both the Army and the Air Force. In fact, the JCA inherite

the hospital program from the Communications Zone, which had bee

unable to complete it. Construction for the line of communications acros

France included a requirement for 15,000 fixed hospital beds as essenti

to support U.S. forces in Europe in the event of an armed conflict. T

meet this requirement, USEUCOM requested funds for standby hospit

facilities that could be used as troop billets in time of peace and converte

within forty-eight hours into fully operational field hospitals. Becaus

funds for troop barracks were more limited than for medical facilities, th

plan had the obvious advantage of putting readily available money to us

for less easily fundable facilities.56

The plan had less noticeable disadvantages that became factors i

retarding the development of adequate billets for the American soldie

assigned to France. The hospital housing program conflicted with th

appropriate placement of housing facilities for the troops. The majority o

troops were concentrated in twenty or more widely dispersed location

throughout France, whereas hospital space had to be concentrated awa

from military targets in locations not related to other operating facilitie

This put one-third of the housing spaces in the wrong place and made th

establishment of a coherent troop housing program a difficult problem

Moreover, the technical requirements associated with hospital desig

subjected the program to repeated delays, which under the dual-purpos

plan also delayed completion of troop housing. The French also had ver

definite issues of their own, including the desirability of locating the U.

military hospitals in places that gave them long-range value to the Frenc

economy and medical services. Additionally, duplication of Army and A

Force hospital programs provoked skeptical reviews in Washington an

prompted two suspensions of all work on the hospital/housing constru

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 18 
113

tion during 1952. Finally, Congress delayed fiscal year 1953 funds for the 

construction until it had reviewed all details of the plan for their dual utilization. These delaying factors were a primary cause in leaving fully 30 

percent of the troops assigned to the Communications Zone in tents during the winter of 1952–1953.57

The JCA received the directive to construct dual-purpose hospitals 

in March 1953, but it took until October to clear the way for the award 

of design contracts. Construction began in 1954 after the JCA awarded 

several multimillion-dollar contracts for the work. The Army program 

projected eleven military hospitals and three medical depots at intervals 

between the Atlantic and Germany’s western frontier. (A twelfth hospital, 

in the Paris area, was cancelled in 1956.) By July 1957 about 40 percent of 

the planned construction for the hospital program was completed, and by 

1958 six of the eleven hospitals were in use.58

The overall pace of construction under the JCA’s direction intensified 

late in 1955 because of political decisions in Washington. In July Congress, 

reacting against the accumulation of unspent money committed to the 

buildup of forces for NATO, passed Public Law 161 rescinding all authorizations for any construction approved before 1 October 1951 unless 

funds for these projects were obligated before 1 July 1956. In other words, 

if the U.S. military planners could not commit the money after nearly five 

years, they would lose it. The JCA had a substantial backlog of projects for 

which it stood to lose funding if it could not push them through the process of approval and contracting before the deadline. Approval, however, 

depended on the French.

The JCA’s director, General Robinson, met with the French Liaison 

Mission on 22 December 1955 to explain the implications of the new 

legislation. He presented a list of critical items with estimates of when 

architect-engineer plans and specifications could be ready. He asked 

the French whether they would take special steps to shorten the time 

involved in their normal review of these projects. The French agreed to 

cooperate fully, offered suggestions on how to accomplish the goal, and 

worked out a set of procedures to expedite the processing. As a result of 

this exemplary cooperation, the JCA was able to let work contracts for 

$29.5 million between 1 January and 30 June 1956; only $1.3 million in 

project funds was not obligated before the automatic cutoff imposed by 

Congress.

By the summer of 1956 the JCA was spending $8 million a month 

on construction for the Army and Air Force in France. The backlog of 

designed work waiting for award of construction contracts had been 

reduced from $73 million on 1 July 1955 to just $18 million a year later. 

The monies obligated for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1956 were the 

highest in the JCA’s history; and the amount for June, just over $60 million, exceeded that of any earlier month. In a letter to the U.S. ambassador 

in Paris, Robinson praised “the extraordinary efforts on the part of the 

French Services to assist the Joint Construction Agency” in completing the 

contracts before the deadline.59

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 19 
114

In late 1956, events beyond the JCA’s control damaged this spirit o

cooperation and the momentum it engendered in the construction pro

gram in France. The United States vigorously opposed the incursio

into the Suez Canal Zone by French and British military forces in ear

November 1956. When the United States embargoed oil shipments t

France to exert pressure on France to withdraw from the Canal Zon

the French government responded in kind, cutting off petroleum for U.

military construction projects. The American engineers made emergenc

arrangements so that French contractors working on other projects coul

receive fuel from local U.S. military sources. The French government the

established its own system of fuel rationing. Fortunately, delays on th

most important projects turned out to be minimal.60

Joint Construction Agency outside France

The Department of Defense had planned for the Joint Constructio

Agency to manage military construction in areas outside France. Althoug

nearly consumed with the construction program in France, the JCA bega

developing plans in March 1953 to undertake work in Austria, Ital

Greece, and Turkey.61

The Engineer Division of the United States Forces, Austria (USFA

had directed construction in Austria and Italy immediately after the wa

When the Berlin Blockade prompted the United States to redistribu

its troops to reduce the numbers in Vienna, USFA constructed housin

and rehabilitated facilities such as Bindermichl. (See Chapter 2.) As wor

in Bindermichl approached completion, USFA undertook another majo

project to build a regiment-size camp in the U.S. zone. The site, whic

eventually became Camp Roeder, was initially an empty field outside o

Salzburg with neither structures nor utilities, forcing the Army enginee

to build the camp from scratch. To manage the estimated $90 million i

contract work, USFA established the 7614th Construction Detachment, a

organization composed of American officers and enlisted men and mor

than thirty DACs and civilian Austrian nationals.

In 1951 the command assigned engineer troops to construct roads an

electrical lines. It consigned the majority of the construction to Austria

contractors. Over the following years there arose a small military cit

initially for 5,500 soldiers, consisting of roads, sewer lines, waterlines an

wells, electrical lines, barracks, mess halls, bowling alleys, theaters, club

warehouses, and similar facilities. Work on Camp Roeder progresse

satisfactorily, but it remained incomplete when the United States turne

the facilities over to the Austrian national government in 1955 as Austr

regained its sovereignty and the occupying forces of the four wartim

Allied powers withdrew from the country.62

When the JCA began operations outside of France in 1954, it propose

that construction in both Austria and Italy pass by stages to a distri

office to be set up in Livorno, Italy. In March 1954 the JCA assume

technical authority over construction for the Army and the Air Force i

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 20 
115

Italy and Austria, but the Engineer Division of USFA continued its management functions. In October the United States and Italy signed a new 

memorandum of understanding to govern U.S. military construction in 

Italy; in December the JCA opened the Southern District office in Livorno, 

incorporating much of the existing engineer detachment there into the 

JCA staff. (See Chart 4.) Because construction in Austria was already 90 

percent complete and declining rapidly as Austria moved toward full 

independence, the JCA opened no office there.63

The Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955 reestablished full Austrian 

sovereignty and provided for the evacuation of all occupying military 

forces from the country. To fulfill the terms of this four-power agreement, the Department of Defense decided to move U.S. military forces 

from Austria to Italy, making rehabilitation of facilities for the troops in 

Verona and Vicenza necessary. The Army command in Italy, called the 

Southern European Task Force (SETAF), received an allocation for rehabilitation and a small amount of new construction. USEUCOM directed 

the JCA to support SETAF by supplying technical assistance.64 In addition, the JCA monitored a modest amount of work in Italy for other 

services—five airfield sites for the Air Force and warehousing, maintenance shops, and community facilities in Capodichino and Sigonella for 

the Navy.65

The JCA took over responsibility for construction in Greece and Turkey 

about the same time it assumed its responsibilities to support SETAF in 

Building Camp Roeder involved installing and constructing all utilities, 

including a sewer system.

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 21 
116

Italy. In February 1954 the agency opened the Eastern District office i

Athens to supervise work in Greece and in Turkey (Chart 4); by year’s en

the office had 123 employees. By 1955 the Eastern District had contracts fo

$52 million in work, of which approximately two-thirds was under con

struction. (Table 2) Future contracts were projected at less than $2 million.66

The active projects in the eastern Mediterranean in 1956 included 

trailer park, a hospital, a school for dependents, a commissary to suppo

the Iraklion airfield on the Greek island of Crete, and additional work fo

the Athens airfield. The office in Greece also managed the programs th

had been set in motion by The United States Engineer Group (TUSEG) i

Turkey in 1950. With the reorganizations, TUSEG’s staff came under th

authority of the JCA and its work in progress, involving almost exclusive

programs for the Air Force, continued much as before. In all, twenty-tw

separate projects remained active in Turkey in December 1956, includin

communications facilities, personnel support facilities, and a variety o

other small undertakings.67 Through its management of construction i

Greece and Turkey, the JCA supported the American military mission t

the very borders of the Soviet Union.

The Phaseout

The JCA succeeded in resolving the confusion that had characte

ized the early development of the line of communications in France. I

 Table 2 

Workload of the U.S. Engineer Group, Turkey

1955 and 1956

 31 December 1955 31 December 1956 

 Project ($ million) ($ million) 

Design $22.901 $ 16.259

Out for bid 0 2.313

Under construction 13.143 19.960

Completed 16.210 18.631

Inactive 13.409 9.031

Current working estimate 71.696 66.731

Funds available 37.173 44.149

Source: James S. Arrigona and W. R. Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, Historic

Report, 15 January 1953–31 July 1957,” p. 120.

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 22 
Office of the

Director

Administrative and

Services Branch Advisory Staff

Shaded boxes indicate new districts.

Procurement

Branch

General

Inspector

Legal

Branch

Progress Reports

and Analysis Branch

Comptroller

Division

Engineering

Division

Advisory

Staff

Management

Branch

Budget and

Accounting Branch

Design and

Review Branch

Service

Branch

Service

Branch

Soil Mechanics and

Pavements Branch

Army Plans

Branch

Planning

Division

Air Force

Plans Branch

Construction

Operations Branch

French

Consultants

Political

Adviser

Service

Branch

Construction

Branch

North

District

Northeast

District

Southern

District

Port

District

Eastern

District

 Chart 4: Organization of the Joint Construction Agency, September 1955, Depicting the New Eastern and Southern Districts 

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 23 
118

early 1953, when the JCA took charge, American soldiers in France sti

lived in tents and moved about on muddy paths and roads. By 1957 th

tents had been replaced by barracks, the roads had been paved, constru

tion in place exceeded a half-billion dollars, and the JCA actively supe

vised a construction effort that stretched from the Atlantic to the easter

Mediterranean.68

By the mid-1950s the American military construction program i

Europe had stabilized. In France the JCA had asserted control over wh

had been a chaotic program. Air Force construction had slowed, and 

would all be under contract by 1958. West Germany had been grante

sovereignty and admitted to NATO, and Deutschmark funding wa

scheduled to run out at the end of 1957. In effect, construction for the U.

forces that flooded into France, Germany, and the European Theater ha

caught up with immediate needs.

As early as autumn 1955, talk circulated in Washington about reorg

nizing the Joint Construction Agency. The U.S. forces in Europe no longe

needed such a high level of management authority for construction

Strategic realities also had changed. As West German troops augmente

NATO forces and tactical nuclear weapons became available, the line o

defense moved east from the Rhine to the border with East Germany.70 

became clear that, with the development of more sophisticated Soviet weap

onry, the line of communications across France was vulnerable. Becaus

Soviet air superiority would prevail in the early days of any aggressio

from the east, the flow of supplies across France, dependent on French rai

road lines, could be disrupted and stopped from the air. Stock dispersio

also was insufficient to ensure preservation of the materials stored. In an

event, it was likely that the Soviets knew where supplies were.71

France’s objections to the presence or passage of foreign nuclear weap

ons in, over, or through its territory also threatened the viability of th

line of communications. Beginning in late 1955, the French governmen

sought to renegotiate the terms of the agreement for the line of commun

cations to exclude nuclear weapons from its territory. Simultaneously, ta

tical nuclear weapons took on increasing importance in NATO’s strateg

planning.72 Moreover, the Suez crisis of late 1956 had amply demonstrate

that American and French national interests did not always run paralle

The intense clash of interests over Suez reinforced the traditional Frenc

tendency to maintain an independent military posture.

Economic considerations also modified thinking about logistic

Supplying U.S. forces in Germany through France cost substantially mor

than through a North Sea port. In 1956 the United States made tempo

rary arrangements with the government of the Netherlands to open 

port facility in Rotterdam. From there, shipments could be made sout

at considerable savings by using the Rhine. The United States replace

this temporary arrangement with a permanent agreement in March 195

Using port facilities in both Rotterdam and Bremerhaven, military plan

ners revised the expectation that USAREUR would receive 70 percent o

its supplies through the line of communications across France. Instea

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 24 
119

they viewed France increasingly as a depot and storage area and as an 

alternative or emergency supply route. By the end of 1957 only 40 percent 

of U.S. military supplies—except petroleum products, of which all passed 

through the Donges-Metz pipeline—came through France. Perhaps equally important to American planning as the availability of alternate port 

facilities were signs that the Soviet Union had reduced its troop strength.73

Adding to this ferment, misgivings resurfaced in the Office of the 

Chief of Engineers in Washington and at the JCA headquarters about the 

joint nature of the agency. The assistant chief of engineers for military 

construction, Maj. Gen. David H. Tulley, believed that the JCA’s successes 

in Europe had come despite its joint nature, not because of it. The Army 

engineers had responsibility for all military construction in Europe, and 

Tulley argued that any construction agency executing that work ought 

to be controlled by the Army engineers; the JCA’s joint character should 

be ended and construction should return to an Army command. In correspondence with the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, 

General Nold (recently retired) argued that the JCA, which he had commanded between 1953 and 1955, “got along during my time primarily 

through your generosity in loans of personnel and your extraordinary aid 

in recruitment of all categories.” Nold concluded, “This situation cannot 

continue indefinitely.” Parallel recommendations that the agency be reorganized circulated during 1956 among the JCA staff, although they were 

never forwarded to higher levels of command.74

Given the progress made in constructing facilities for the Air Force 

and the Army in France, the sharp decline anticipated for construction 

budgets in the late years of the decade, and changes in the economic, 

diplomatic, and strategic situations, the dissolution of the JCA appeared 

likely. During the first quarter of 1956, the JCA consolidated its Southern 

and Eastern Districts into a single unit headquartered in Athens, Greece. 

Before the end of 1956 further consolidation left the Southern District, 

now in Livorno, Italy, as the only JCA office in the area. These moves eliminated eighty-seven positions and saved about $388,600 in salaries, allowances, and overhead costs. On 1 November 1956, the agency consolidated 

its three district offices within France into the North District, with offices 

located with the JCA headquarters near Paris. This move further reduced 

manpower by 199 spaces at an estimated annual savings approaching $1.1 

million.75

On 1 August 1957, the Joint Construction Agency was abolished. 

Responsibility for military construction in Italy, Greece, and Turkey 

passed to the Mediterranean Division under the Office of the Chief 

of Engineers in Washington. Responsibility for military construction 

in France passed to the United States Construction Agency, France 

(USACAF), a new agency under USAREUR constituted from the JCA’s 

North District. Col. Lynn C. Barnes, who had commanded the North 

District under the JCA, was named as the first director of USACAF.76

Construction for the U.S. military continued in France for several 

years, but at a greatly reduced rate. In 1958 USACAF awarded $24 mil07F_Chap04_Final.indd 25 
120

lion in contracts. The surplus commodity housing program that had bee

planned and contracted under the JCA accounted for a substantial part o

USACAF’s activity. In addition, USACAF supervised the construction o

Class V depots, designed for the storage of atomic weapons. By late 196

USACAF’s work was so reduced that its staff had decreased from 530 t

80. On 1 October 1961, USACAF was redesignated as the U.S. Army Fiel

Engineer Office, France, to handle administrative matters such as claim

and recoupment of funds arising from the earlier programs. Constructio

that needed to be done came under the purview of the Army engineers o

the Communications Zone.77

The U.S. Army engineers adjusted their definition of Europe in 195

to correspond to the reorganization of engineer assets. For constru

tion purposes, Italy, Greece, and Turkey came under the purview o

the Mediterranean Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers whe

the division relocated from Morocco to Livorno. The chief of enginee

in Washington had direct command authority over the Mediterranea

Division. The Communications Zone in France controlled constru

tion in France through USACAF. The commander in chief of USAREU

exercised command authority over the Engineer Division of his logistic

office and in 1956 created a distinct engineer organization, the U.S. Arm

Construction Agency, Germany, to supervise construction throughout th

country. It is through this agency and its successors under USAREUR th

the story of the management of U.S. military construction in the new

defined Europe continues.

07F_Chap04_Final.indd 26 
5

MANAGING CONSTRUCTION 

IN GERMANY, 1956–1966

Between 1950 and 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany financed 

the military construction program that supported the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the expansion of U.S. 

forces in West Germany. Once the Western Powers recognized 

the Federal Republic diplomatically in May 1955, the occupation officially ended and the West German government had no further obligation to pay the costs of the U.S. troops on its soil. To manage construction in Germany, the United States created a new entity, the U.S. Army 

Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG). Operating in a new fiscal 

environment, USACAG managed the continuation of the construction 

programs begun in the early 1950s. It also oversaw the design and construction requirements necessitated by the introduction of tactical and 

strategic missiles into Europe in the late 1950s. Then, when the Soviet 

Union threatened the independence of Berlin, USACAG managed urgent 

construction to defend the city.

The German Environment

For the first time since 1945 the U.S. military had to work with a fully 

sovereign German state that insisted on controlling construction within 

its territory. Direct contracts awarded by the Army during the early 1950s 

had overtaxed the German economic and social systems, provoking the 

extremes of excessive profit and bankruptcy among local construction companies. Similar economic and social consequences had troubled the French 

construction sector during the buildup of the line of communications.1

 Since 

1953—even before the formal end of the occupation of Germany—the West 

German government had insisted that its own Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung

(German Federal Construction Administration) participate in an increasing 

share of the construction financed with Deutschmarks. During 1953 about 

30 percent of the total value of United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), 

construction contracts went to the Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung, which 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 1 
122

then awarded the contracts to construction firms. During the 1954–195

program year, the amount approached 40 percent.2

 Once sovereignt

became a reality in 1955, all U.S. military construction became subject t

German law and the Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung became the conduit fo

both design and construction work for the U.S. military. In 1956 the Feder

Republic’s Ministry of Finance created the Bautechnische Arbeitsgrupp

(Technical Construction Working Group) to coordinate American and othe

allied military construction programs at the German federal, state, an

local levels.

As USAREUR’s agent, USACAG dealt directly with the Ministry o

Defense or the Ministry of Construction in Bonn to develop an agreemen

for each new construction program. The agreements were internation

and intergovernmental in character in that they were between agencies o

sovereign powers; but each one was specific to a particular constructio

program, such as Nike missile installations or housing for troops or mil

tary families. The construction agreements were subordinate to broade

diplomatic accords, such as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement or th

Dollarbaukontrakt (Dollar Construction Contract). USACAG’s role alway

depended upon a higher authority, such as USAREUR, and at the compl

tion of any formal discussions it submitted copies of accords for review b

the secretary of the Army and the Department of State. The need to nego

tiate an implementing agreement on each new program delayed the con

struction; at times each installation site had to be negotiated individuall

The negotiations were, however, an unavoidable consequence of doin

business in a host nation. William E. Camblor, the USACAG directo

proved particularly adept at managing these negotiations and remaine

involved in them with Germany and other NATO host countries for ove

four decades.3

Any implementing agreement between USACAG and the Feder

Republic’s ministries of defense and construction in Bonn was only th

beginning. Each agreement next passed through the Federal Ministr

of Finance’s Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe, which maintained its offices i

Frankfurt. The federal ministries then issued orders to state constructio

offices (Oberfinanzdirektionen), which in turn passed the orders for execu

tion to a local office (called Landesbauamt, Staatsbauamt, or Finanzbauam

depending on which state it was in). USACAG’s contracts for U.S. militar

construction were with West German government agencies at the feder

level, not with the firms executing the work.4

 By contrast, states and local

ties—rather than federal agencies—had jurisdiction over all contracts th

engaged architect-engineer firms or builders. The entire system gaine

the label indirect contracting.

The Dollarbaukontrakt, negotiated in 1956 and modified in 1961, cou

pled with the Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Force

Agreement signed with West Germany in 1959, governed the indire

contracting system and formed the basis for all U.S. dollar–funded desig

and construction executed in the Federal Republic.5

 During USACAG

early years the Germans still allowed many of the dollar-funded projec

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 2 
123

to be contracted directly. The new West German government progressively expanded the indirect contracting system so that by the early 1960s 

indirect contracting had become the standard operating procedure for 

construction in Germany. It remained for decades the aspect of engineer 

activities in Europe least understood by the people not directly involved 

with it.6

USACAG Organization

In organizing for the transition of U.S. forces from occupying power 

to ally, the U.S. commander in chief for Europe delegated execution of 

dollar-funded construction in Germany to USAREUR’s commander in 

chief. Well before Deutschmark financing ended, planners had contemplated creating a new construction organization.7

 They were motivated by severe budgetary pressure as well as by the change in West 

Germany’s international status and responsibilities. Although its obligation to support U.S. military construction was ending, the Federal 

Republic nonetheless agreed to provide Deutschmark funding for construction obligations contracted before May 1955 so long as projects were 

completed by the end of 1957. During fiscal year 1956, despite this commitment, German support for the U.S. military dropped by nearly $500 

million. Because the bulk of these Deutschmark funds had gone into 

wages and utilities, the U.S. military had to trim staff and consolidate 

services. Lacking the funds for pay, the Army released 24,000 German 

employees in fiscal year 1956.8

To manage contract construction for the U.S. Army, on 1 July 1956, 

USAREUR activated its Construction Agency. Within a short time the 

organization, subordinate to USAREUR’s Engineer Division but with 

headquarters in Frankfurt, settled on the name U.S. Army Construction 

Agency, Germany.9

 USAREUR removed responsibility for contract construction from the area and post commanders and placed it under this single agency. (See Chart 5.) Centralized administration for contract construction remained characteristic of U.S. forces in Europe from 1956 onward.

The new organization enabled USAREUR to reduce personnel. Of 

the 1,037 persons in construction employed in the area commands, by 

1 January 1957, these commands retained only 76. USACAG operated 

initially with about 210 employees, producing a net saving of more than 

750 places. USAREUR expected a central construction agency to manage 

the dollar-funded contracts more consistently than the area commands. 

Furthermore, USAREUR saw an advantage in being able to transfer many 

of the command and operating responsibilities of its Engineer Division to 

USACAG, thereby allowing the USAREUR engineer to concentrate on his 

staff responsibilities as adviser to the commander in chief.10

USAREUR appointed an American civilian, Camblor, to direct 

USACAG. Before World War II, Camblor had worked in the New York 

District of the Corps of Engineers. Mobilized as a reserve officer early 

in the war, he had landed at Normandy shortly after D-Day and moved 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 3 
124

through France and Belgium 

with the Communication Zone’s 

Advance Section engineers. 

In 1947 Camblor resigned his 

commission and took a position in the Office of the Theater 

Chief Engineer. By 1950 he had 

become deputy chief of the 

Construction Branch. He served 

under two European Command 

engineers, Brig. Gen. David H. 

Tulley and Brig. Gen. Frank M. 

Albrecht, during the years that 

U.S. forces expanded rapidly. As 

West Germany approached full 

sovereignty, Camblor’s proficiency in German, knowledge of 

Army engineer operations, and 

ability as a negotiator gave him 

a significant supporting role in 

the talks between the United 

States and the Federal Republic. 

He served as a resource person 

on engineering issues in discussions leading to the agreements governing U.S. military construction i

Germany—the Auftragsbauten Grundsätze 1955 and the Dollarbaukontra

in 1956.11

Although barely forty years old in 1956, Camblor had served as th

highest ranking civilian in the USAREUR Engineer’s Office for sever

years. Tulley, who esteemed Camblor’s talent and service, had move

to the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington; but he remaine

in close contact with affairs in Europe. Tulley and his successor a

USAREUR engineer, Albrecht, gave Camblor strong support for the pos

tion of director of USACAG, as did Camblor’s immediate military superio

in Heidelberg, Brig. Gen. Charles McNutt.12

Camblor’s appointment as director of USACAG made the organiz

tion noteworthy in four ways. First, he was the only civilian ever to com

mand an Army engineer agency of such scope. Second, because he wa

not subject to the military cycle of rotating assignments, Camblor brough

continuity during his seven-year service that gave him increased influenc

in dealing with his counterparts in the local German agencies responsib

for supporting U.S. military construction. Third, Camblor had an aptitud

for European languages. He conducted formal negotiations in Englis

aided by an interpreter and a legal adviser, but he established rapport wit

officials in Europe by conversing freely with them in either German o

French. Fourth, as a Cuban-American, Camblor commanded USACAG 

a time when it was unusual for persons from ethnic or racial minorities t

William Camblor, shown here in the 1970s, 

was the first director of USACAG.

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 4 
Chief of Staff

Commander in Chief

Office of the

Comptroller

Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–3 Operations

Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–4 Logistics

Secretary of the

General Staff

Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–2 Intelligence

Adjutant

General

Division

Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–1 Personnel

Provost

Marshal

Division

Chemical

Division

Ordnance

Division

Chaplain

Division

Engineer

Division

U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG)

Medical

Division

Armed Forces

Information and

Education Division

Finance and

Accounting

Division

Civil

Affairs

Division

Signal

Division

Quartermaster

Division

Transportation

Division

Headquarters

Commandant

Historical

Division

Special

Activities

Division

Public

Information

Division

Inspector

General

Division

Labor

Services

Division

Judge

Advocate

Division

Special Staff

Administrative Staffs

and Services Technical Staffs and Services

General Staff

Political Adviser

 Chart 5: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 30 June 1956 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 5 
126

hold executive positions in American institutions. It had been less than 

decade since President Truman ordered the military to integrate. Althoug

the military responded with greater speed than many other segments o

American society, it would still be many years before another member of 

minority group achieved a comparable position of leadership in the Corp

of Engineers.

Camblor set up headquarters for USACAG in Frankfurt in the sum

mer of 1956. He quickly selected fourteen people and took them to Par

to the headquarters of the Joint Construction Agency, where they spent 

week learning the regulations, rules, and procedures. He then returned t

Frankfurt and began recruiting personnel, drawing particularly on thos

who had served in the USAREUR engineer’s office in Heidelberg or wit

engineer offices in the area commands. USACAG’s staffing level fluctu

ated between 210 and 250, including both the Central Office staff and th

staffs of district offices.13

Camblor brought John Tambornino from Heidelberg to USACAG a

chief of engineering. Tambornino already had over twenty years in gov

ernment engineer positions, beginning in 1934 when he joined the Corp

of Engineers in the United States. From 1940 to 1942 he had worked i

Panama on the design of the third set of locks for the canal. He had com

to Germany in 1951 to serve in the post engineer’s office in Heidelber

and then in the USAREUR engineer’s office. Tambornino served as chi

of engineering in USACAG and successor commands until he retired i

late 1974.14

Camblor recruited H. Jace Greene from the Southern Area Comman

in Stuttgart.15 Active as an engineer in military communities in German

since 1946, Greene had turned Bundesbahn locomotives into a tempo

rary heating plant for military family housing in Kornwestheim. Green

moved from chief of construction for Southern Area Command to chief o

construction for USACAG.

Transfers came from other Army engineer offices throughout Europ

In 1957 Saul Fraint, who had worked in Austria, Italy, and France, left th

Joint Construction Agency and joined USACAG as Greene’s deputy in th

Construction Division. Fraint became head of the Technical Engineerin

Branch in 1958 and served in varying capacities before his retirement i

1974.16

Camblor also recruited engineers just arriving in Europe. Paul Friesch

for instance, had seen Germany at the end of World War II but harbore

a desire to see it again in better times. After completing his profession

education in the United States, he worked in the Detroit District of th

Corps of Engineers, spending a good deal of time on designs of facilitie

in support of new missile systems. He applied for a position in German

and was accepted; but when he arrived in September 1956, the job ha

been eliminated. He followed a suggestion and called Camblor, wh

immediately offered him a position with USACAG. Friesch spent most o

the rest of his career in Europe, working with USACAG and its successo

and then with NATO in Brussels, from which he retired in 1990.17

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 6 
127

Like Friesch, Louis Brettschneider had been looking for a way to 

work in Europe. After graduating from college in 1944, Brettschneider 

had joined the U.S. Merchant Marines. A job with the Joint Construction 

Agency in Paris disappeared, but he too found his way to Frankfurt; he 

joined USACAG in December 1956. A technical engineer of considerable 

ability, Brettschneider continued with USACAG’s successor organizations 

into the 1990s.18

For every Department of the Army civilian (DAC), USACAG’s staff 

included two Germans (local nationals) in professional and clerical support capacities. The Germans’ reasons for seeking jobs with the U.S. 

military varied. Some, like Hasso Damm, developed a sense of loyalty 

and a strong commitment to the organization. A young student already 

trained in classical Greek and Latin, Damm hoped to earn money to 

continue his studies in law when he took a job as an estimator with 

USACAG in mid-September 1956. In addition to his academic interests, 

Damm was also a qualified stonemason, which gave him a range of 

practical experience that served him well as USACAG’s first estimator.19 Because USACAG had no legal branch, Camblor asked Damm to 

research legal issues associated with applying the Dollarbaukontrakt

under which U.S. military construction operated. In addition to his estimating work, Damm conducted the legal research, although he never 

returned to his formal studies. He stayed with USACAG and came to 

head the Estimating Section that developed.20

Another young German who obtained employment with USACAG followed a different path. Georgi Reitzel received an engineering degree in 

1949. Because of the limited opportunities for professional employment in 

Germany, he spent several months working as a construction laborer and 

carpenter. Hired as a draftsman for the Army at Tompkins Barracks in 

Schwetzingen, Reitzel made a deal to teach one of his superiors German 

in exchange for English lessons. In 1956 he was working at Headquarters 

Area Command in Heidelberg, and he became one of the first appointees 

to USACAG’s Engineering Division. In March 1962 Reitzel left USACAG 

to form his own contracting firm. Over the next thirty-five years he won 

a variety of contracts from USACAG and its successors, from NATO, and 

from West German government construction agencies. Reitzel considered 

his experience at USACAG fundamental to his later success in business.21

Germans employed by the U.S. military came under different work 

rules than those applied to DACs. These work rules changed as West 

Germany emerged from the occupation. Between 1948 and 1952 post commanders were responsible for the salaries and social insurance surcharge 

for all personnel paid in Deutschmarks. Beginning on 1 July 1952, the 

United States paid each employee’s wages to the German Länder (states). 

The Länder then disbursed the funds.22 In 1954 the United States accepted 

an agreement that affirmed the right of German workers to belong to 

unions. The agreement exempted U.S. forces from German civil laws that 

mandated “works councils” in industry. USAREUR, however, authorized 

works councils for its organizations employing Germans, limiting their 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 7 
128

scope to the consultative role of making suggestions and presenting griev

ances and complaints on working conditions.23

USAREUR negotiated the terms of the local nationals’ employmen

with the Federal Republic for all its subordinate organizations, includin

USACAG. In 1955 allied forces in Germany agreed to establish uniform 

pay schedules and policies and a 48-hour, six-day workweek as standar

for all German employees. In August 1957 USAREUR introduced a 45

hour, five-day workweek.24

Because so many German nationals joined USACAG at the start, the

influence in the small organization was significant. Many stayed with th

Army engineers for their entire careers, despite improved employmen

opportunities in Germany. The German employees felt they were value

as an integral part of the organization. Many American professiona

viewed their German coworkers as the key to continuity in the organiz

tion and as a vital element in USACAG’s operation.

USACAG had offices in an old, two-story, wooden, prefabricate

building behind the officers’ club at the rear of the I. G. Farben buildin

in Frankfurt.25 Camblor set up the organization on the model of a statesid

Corps of Engineers district, where the office of director was comparable t

that of a district engineer. Camblor and his deputy, at the outset a lieuten

ant colonel and later a full colonel, were the only authorized contractin

officers. Camblor operated with a small special staff, an advisory an

administrative staff to support the organization as a whole, and a techn

cal staff to supervise design and construction.26 (Chart 6)

USACAG’s assigned task was to execute the Army’s (and later th

Air Force’s) construction programs within the entire Federal Republic o

Germany. This marked a contrast with the area commands, which ha

handled Deutschmark construction on a regional basis. For fiscal yea

1957 USACAG executed 35 percent of the construction projects budgete

by USAREUR. Repair and utilities agencies handled 60 percent of th

projects, and troops and combat engineer units handled the remaining 

percent. By 1960 USACAG, at the direction of the commander in chief o

USAREUR, had taken on responsibility for construction in other areas o

Europe beyond Germany.27

USACAG Projects

The projects under Deutschmark funding included community sup

port facilities and family housing.28 In fiscal year 1957, USACAG’s fir

year of operation, Congress cut the appropriated funds for Militar

Construction, Army, from a projected total of $11.5 million to around $2

million and reduced the number of projects from twenty-eight to nin

Total construction placement, including projects using Deutschmar

funds, amounted to around $5 million for the year.29

In December 1957, reacting to the military implications of the Sovi

launch of Sputnik, the NATO Council decided that “stocks of nuclear wa

heads would be established in Europe and ... nuclear delivery weapon

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 8 
Legal Branch

Office of the Director

Budget Branch

Property and

Supply Branch

Reports and Analysis Branch

Comptroller Division

Management

Services Branch

Engineering Division

Fiscal

Accounting

Branch

Construction Division

Planning and

Estimating Branch

Mechanical

Section

Technical

Engineering Branch

Civil

Section

Electrical

Section

Technical

Branch

Army and

Air Force

Section

Operations

Branch

Modifications

and Additions

Branch

Structural

Section

Advisory

Weapons

Section

Contract

Administration

Branch

Purchasing and

Contractng

Branch

Hahn

Kaiserslautern

Bitburg

Pirmasens

Frankfurt

Katterbach

Heidelberg

Nuremberg

Munich

Würzburg

Bad Kreuznach

Western

Projects

Section

Change Orders

and

Termination Section

Eastern

Projects

Section

Special Staff

Advisory and Administrative Staff

Technical Staff

Resident OFFICES

Office Services Branch

Estimating

Section

Legal Branch created in 1960. Command Technical Supervision

 Chart 6: Organization of U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG), ca. 1961, Depicting the New Legal Branch  and Eleven Resident Offices 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 9 
130

including intermediate-range ballistic missiles, would be placed at th

disposal of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe].”30 To impl

ment this decision, the United States increased its defense spending. Wor

on missile sites and installations became a main part of USACAG’s con

struction program. Construction placement more than doubled for fisc

year 1958, to $11.6 million, as the organization assumed responsibility fo

construction to support the new weaponry. In fiscal year 1959, the fir

year of the Nike air defense missile program, construction placement ros

to $13.6 million. By fiscal year 1961 it had reached about $19 million as th

Hawk and the Mace missiles were also introduced into Europe.31

By September 1961 USACAG’s backlog of authorized but unbuilt con

struction totaled $95 million, of which only $16 million was supporte

with appropriated dollars. The balance ($79 million) was funded by th

Germans, principally under the Alternate Construction Program, or b

NATO. The U.S. military budget initially funded construction for th

Nike, Hawk, and Mace missiles. Subsequently, a substantial portion of th

construction for the missile programs qualified for financing under th

NATO Common Infrastructure Program and funding for the Nike insta

lations shifted to the NATO budgets.32

NATO’s Common Infrastructure Program paid for construction o

fixed structures and elements of any military installation necessar

to support forces committed for the common defense of Europe. Th

expense was justified as a collective investment for all the nations of th

alliance. USACAG worked through the Common Infrastructure Program 

on projects where U.S. forces would use the facilities.33 The infrastructur

program paid for design and construction; the host nation (on whose te

ritory the installation would be located) acquired the land and provide

local utilities. The United States, whose forces assigned to NATO woul

occupy the facilities, took responsibility for maintenance and for finan

ing any construction features that exceeded NATO criteria.34

The construction program for the Nike missiles was the first larg

NATO program in Europe. The Nike missile, about a foot in diam

eter and twenty feet long and armed with an explosive warhead, wa

designed as an all-weather antiaircraft ground-to-air missile with 

range of about twenty-five miles. The Nike installation site had fou

components: the launching area, an electronic command and contr

center, a radar installation for tracking incoming aircraft, and housin

for the troops manning the facility. These components were locate

within a total area of about thirty acres, but the control area could be a

far as five miles away from the launching area. One of USACAG’s crit

cal responsibilities was site selection, because the control and launchin

areas required unobstructed line of sight between them.35 By the end o

the Nike program, USACAG had built some two dozen sites using defin

itive drawings developed by the Advanced Weapons Section headed b

Paul Friesch. These drawings provided the basis for all of the Nike site

eventually built by NATO in Norway, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Greec

and Turkey.36

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 10 
131

While construction of the Nike installations was still in progress, 

the United States began the Hawk missile program—also for NATO—

and USACAG had construction responsibility in Germany. The Hawks 

were ground-to-air missiles designed to bring down low-flying aircraft. 

Eventually about 100 installations were built.37 Hawk facilities required 

only about half the space of Nike sites because the structures were concentrated in one location. USACAG also supervised contracts with architect-engineer firms designing Mace missile sites for the Air Force. Airbreathing subsonic Mace missiles were designed for underground shelters 

capable of surviving an atomic attack and thus allowing a retaliatory 

strike. Despite the design, the first sites built in Germany were at ground 

level. Construction for all these weapons systems required attention to the 

special requirements of sensitive electronic equipment.38

In 1958 USACAG also began work on storage sites for atomic and 

chemical weapons. Other storage sites, built with a humidity control system, warehoused equipment pre-positioned for use by troops who would 

be flown from the United States to Europe in case of emergency.39 These 

new storage sites addressed a major tactical-logistical concern by providing dispersed depot facilities to replace storage heretofore concentrated 

west of the Rhine during the buildup immediately after the Korean War. 

The new depot complexes consisted of two major components: a large 

earth-covered warehouse with a storage area of about 20,000 square feet 

and a series of about fifteen 2,000-square-foot storage igloos that were 

highly blast-resistant and distributed over protective terrain. The original 

construction plan called for nine such depots.40

The warehouses created particular problems in community relations. 

To keep the potentially hazardous materials away from population centers, the warehouses were located in what amounted to public parks—

forest areas that Germans valued greatly. Of twenty-one sites considered 

for the warehouse facilities, eight were finally selected as appropriate. 

Selection did not mean final acquisition, however. The German state governments owned all the sites in question; they showed great reluctance to 

turn them over to the U.S. military because it meant a diminution of their 

forest areas. By October 1961 only two warehouses had been completed, a 

third was close to completion, and three additional facilities were scheduled for completion by March 1962. Two of the sites still had not been 

acquired because the community opposed the installations. The Army 

finally sought expropriation of the land in question, and the governments 

eventually acquiesced. Once a site became available, USACAG needed 

eight months to complete the construction.

In November 1960 the German government granted USACAG permission to survey sites for six groups of storage igloos. By grouping 

up to fifteen igloos in each site, USACAG achieved its goal of locating 

seventy-four igloos on only five sites. In June 1961 the German government gave permission to proceed with construction at the five sites with 

the condition that each site be secure from accident or intrusion. The Army 

agreed, and USACAG designed fencing and fire protection for each area. 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 11 
132

The security features added about $27,000 to the cost of each site. Cos

averaged another $350,000 each for the warehouses and about $870,000 fo

each igloo area.41

While USACAG supervised this work in Germany, the United State

Construction Agency, France (USACAF), managed construction of simila

storage facilities near Metz, France. An engineer captain, James C. Donovan

aided by a team of French and American technical specialists, supervise

construction.42 At each site, the French contractor excavated into the sid

of a hill, set out forms, and poured concrete over reinforcing steel rods. A

a young engineer, Donovan was impressed by the quantity of reinforcin

rod that went into the structure. “That re-bar was so close and there was s

much steel in those walls and in that roof” that it could withstand a signif

cant blast. In addition, the doors had a sensing device that would feel th

shockwave of a nearby explosion; trigger a release mechanism; and auto

matically close the mammoth steel doors, which were “12 or 16 inches dee

and extending clear across the entire opening.”43

USACAG received orders to include these sensitive storage sites in 

major electronic radio network called troposcatter, a vast communication

system that ran 8,300 miles from northern Norway to eastern Turkey. I

eighty-two sites were completed by 1963.44

A substantial share of USACAG’s work came from the Alterna

Construction Program, sponsored by the Federal Republic of German

In 1949 local communities had offered to construct alternate facilitie

for U.S. troops in exchange for the return to its German owners of prop

erty previously requisitioned.45 During the final years of the Deutschmar

construction, the Alternate Housing Program provided 3,228 units o

family housing for U.S. military personnel. Once the occupation ende

in May 1955, continued American use of requisitioned property becam

even more irritating to the Germans. The two countries resolved the issu

with an accord negotiated in 1957 and 1958, whereby the Federal Republ

agreed either to buy a requisitioned facility and make it available for us

by the U.S. forces or to construct an alternate facility.46 In August 196

USAREUR’s commander in chief, General Clyde D. Eddleman, and We

Germany’s defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, signed an agreement th

extended the Alternate Construction Program to facilities not acquired b

requisition but wanted by the Federal Republic. German governmen

agencies and contractors accomplished all work under the Alterna

Construction Program, with the U.S. military user setting specification

for the new facilities.47

The 1960 agreements covered five projects. The Germans constructe

about 1,000 family housing units at various locations in West German

in exchange for the release of about the same number of units. The

also rehabilitated and built new facilities at the Illesheim Caserne (com

pleted in 1969) and rehabilitated the former quartermaster installation i

Giessen for use by the European Exchange Service (later Army and A

Force Exchange Service). The 4th Armored Division vacated facilities i

Ulm for the Germans and received renovated facilities formerly used b

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 12 
133

the European Exchange Service in Katterbach. The Germans provided 

alternate facilities in the Nuremberg–Munich area for administrative and 

support units in return for American release of the Palace of Justice in 

Nuremberg and the main customs office and other facilities in Munich.48

The Berlin Crisis of 1961

USACAG, like other American military organizations in Europe, owed 

its very existence to the Cold War. This rationale was never more dramatically evident than in the intensity of USACAG’s involvement in Operation 

BAMBOO TREE in Berlin, a program designed to prepare West Berlin for an 

airlift if the Soviet Union imposed a second blockade.49

West Germany’s growing participation in NATO made the leaders of the 

Soviet Union exceedingly uneasy. Their unease only intensified when, after 

the Soviets launched Sputnik, West Germany agreed to station tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. Each time Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 

provoked a crisis over Berlin, he warned West European nations that they 

were risking nuclear annihilation in the event of a war between the United 

States and the Soviet Union. Far from disrupting NATO, as Khrushchev had 

hoped, the series of threats to Berlin prompted Britain, Italy, and Greece to 

authorize the installation of American medium-range missiles in their 

countries in the summer of 1959.

Two years later, in June 1961, Khrushchev met in Vienna with the 

new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy. At that meeting and in subsequent 

exchanges, Khrushchev demanded a German peace treaty, the end of 

allied occupation of Germany, recognition of East Germany as a state, 

and establishment of West Berlin as a “Free City,” undefended by Western 

military units. In the absence of a satisfactory settlement, Khrushchev 

threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic 

Republic on 1 January 1962 and turn over full control of Berlin to the East 

Germans. Kennedy responded by requesting that Congress appropriate 

an additional $3 billion for defense spending and by doubling draft quotas to increase the size of the Army.

As tension over Berlin mounted during the summer of 1961, thousands of East Germans fled from Communist rule simply by passing into 

the western sector of the city and asking for assistance to fly from there to 

the West. A total of 22,000 refugees fled in the first twelve days of August 

1961.

At 2:00 A.M. on 13 August 1961, under cover of darkness, the East 

German regime imposed its solution to this drain. Soldiers strung barbed 

wire barriers along the entire line separating the western sectors from 

East Berlin. Over the next several days, troops erected a formidable wall 

of concrete and barbed wire guarded by watchtowers, dogs, and soldiers 

who had orders to shoot anyone trying to escape. With all eyes on the 

Berlin Wall, the West and the East seemed poised on the brink of war.

President Kennedy’s overt reaction was limited to rhetoric and military mobilization, and he took no steps to remove the wall. Secretly, 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 13 
134

however, he ordered Operation BAMBOO TREE. In September 1961, as pa

of this covert operation, the Air Force instructed USACAG to improve th

landing and navigational facilities available at West Berlin’s three zon

airports—Tegel, Gatow, and Tempelhof—and at several specific airfield

in West Germany. The orders, attributed to Secretary of Defense Robe

McNamara, stated that nothing was to stand in the way of the “time

completion” of this mission. USACAG’s staff interpreted the charge qui

broadly.

Camblor immediately set up an office in West Berlin and surveyed th

needs of the airports. USACAG’s Engineering Division became the coo

dinating point for Operation BAMBOO TREE. Ignoring the normal process o

paperwork and requisition, USACAG engaged architect-engineer firms i

West Germany and construction firms in West Berlin. Design enginee

in Frankfurt worked through many nights that autumn preparing draw

ings and specifications. USACAG engineers literally pulled the design

off the designers’ drawing boards, flew to West Berlin, and handed th

project specifications to the construction companies mobilized for the jo

Bidding was done on the spot. For the most important building, the bas

for a tower that would house two large generators, Saul Fraint traveled t

Berlin with the design drawings. “I gave them these three sheets—that

all there were—and said, ‘We need bids on this building. It’s for a ver

important project’—and they knew what it was for—‘day after tomo

row.’” He remained in Berlin to receive the bids, compared them, an

awarded the contract to Philipp Holzmann, A.G., to start work the nex

day.50

USACAG managed construction at all three allied airfields wit

good cooperation but little material help from the French and the British

Air Force construction troops and American firms were also involve

Contractors worked around the clock. Support from the West Berliners—

who had a clear appreciation of what was at stake—was outstandin

As Khrushchev’s 31 December deadline approached, Fraint and Lou

Brettschneider sought a meeting with the director of Siemens and h

managers to appeal for their support and supervision of a very delica

installation of electrical cable. Fraint and Brettschneider explained th

completing the job on time would demand work straight through th

Christmas holiday. After listening to their appeal, the director of Siemen

replied, “I understand the need, and I will be there on Christmas Day

He then turned to his managers and asked, “Who will join me?”51

The same spirit of cooperation that prevailed in the Siemens’ board

room extended to the construction site. About two weeks after constru

tion began on the building to house the generators, Fraint learned th

the equipment ordered by the Air Force would not be available on sched

ule because of a labor dispute in the United States. The Air Force locate

substitute generators, but they were too long to fit into the building a

designed. Rather than take time to redesign, Fraint and Brettschneide

flew to Berlin and went to the construction site, where the contracto

was about to lay the foundation for the back wall of the building. The

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 14 
135

paced off an additional five meters and asked the construction crew to 

change the specifications on the spot. According to Fraint, the foreman 

said, “Yes, Sir!” To everyone’s relief, when the generators arrived they fit 

into the redesigned building. By 1 January 1962, the essential work was 

done. The crisis had also eased. Operation BAMBOO TREE remained in the 

memory of those involved as a period of intense activity and a source of 

great satisfaction.52

From USACAG to Engineer Element

In August 1962, after a record year in construction placement, William 

Camblor took a year’s leave to study at the Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. One of five civilian 

employees of the Department of the Army admitted into the program, he 

felt it would enhance his credentials. Already a GS–15, he had been recommended for promotion in 1959 but had not received the higher grade. 

The year at the Industrial College seemed to be an opportunity to advance 

his career.

About the time Camblor left for Washington, USAREUR reexamined 

its organization of engineer resources. (See Chart 7.) With work declining 

in France, the maintenance of separate construction organizations for 

France and Germany seemed a costly duplication. At the same time, some 

of the colonels who served under Camblor in USACAG bridled at being 

subordinate to a civilian. They made their feelings clear to the USAREUR 

engineer in Heidelberg and found a sympathetic ear when Brig. Gen. 

Howard A. Morris took over that office in January 1963. Morris, who had 

served as post engineer in Frankfurt in 1946–1947, felt strongly that an 

engineer officer should direct military construction.53

USACAG had been one of several distinctive agencies the Department 

of Defense organized in the 1950s to manage military construction. In 

addition to the Joint Construction Agency and its successor, the United 

States Army Construction Agency, France, the Army activated in 1956 

the United States Army Construction Agency, Korea (USACAK), and the 

United States Army Construction Agency, Japan (USACAJ). In the Pacific 

the experiment had been short-lived. In a scant year, control of the contract construction resources for the military passed from theater commanders to the chief of engineers in Washington. USACAK and USACAJ 

were inactivated in June 1957 and their functions taken over by the newly 

formed Pacific Ocean Division of the Corps of Engineers.54

The construction agency in France also disappeared. In October 1961, 

with the volume of construction declining, a smaller entity, the United 

States Army Field Engineer Office, France, replaced USACAF. Of the special organizations created in the 1950s to manage U.S. military construction, only USACAG in Frankfurt survived. As the workload in France 

declined, USACAG’s workload increased through the late 1950s, reaching 

its peak in 1962 at $40 million, more than five times its dollar volume in 

1957.55

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 15 
Communications

Zone

Headquarters

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR)

U.S. Army Signal

Brigade Europe

513th Intelligence

Corps Group

Special Troops

USAREUR

U.S. Army

School Europe

Southern European

Task Force

9th Hospital

Center

U.S. Army

Berlin

7th Engineer

Brigade

Northern Area

Command

U.S. Army Military

District, Europe

10th Special Forces

Group (Airborne)

1st Special Forces

Southern Area

Command

American Forces

Network, Europe

U.S. Military Liaison

Mission to CINC, Group of

Soviet Forces, Germany

U.S. Armed Forces

Institution, Europe

U.S. Army Construction

Agency, Germany

Stars and Stripes

Darmstadt

U.S. Army Dependents

Education Group

Karlsruhe

U.S. Army European

Exchange System

Nuremberg

U.S. Army Special

Services Depot

Aschaffenburg

Special Ammunition Support

Command, Europe

Units

Major Commands

Subordinate Commands

Seventh Army

 Chart 7: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1963, Just before the Dissolution of USACAG 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 16 
137

USACAG outlasted the other construction agencies, but as an organizational anomaly. It had always been unusual because a civilian served 

as director. Several factors conjoined to bring on its demise: Camblor’s 

leave of absence during most of 1962 and 1963, USAREUR’s study of engineer resources, a Department of Defense study urging consolidation of 

construction activities, the declining volume of work in France, and the 

elimination of all other construction agencies. Camblor’s deputy, Col. 

Paavo Carlson, became acting director of USACAG; by June 1963 Carlson 

was signing documents as director.56 USAREUR appointed another military officer, Col. Ed Streck, to succeed Carlson. Camblor completed the 

program at the Industrial College and continued his studies for several 

months in Washington, earning a master’s degree in business administration. By the time he was ready to return to Germany, USAREUR had 

decided to reorganize its engineer activities.57

Camblor returned to Europe in September 1963 to serve in the 

USAREUR engineer’s office in Heidelberg, not to his former position in 

Frankfurt. Camblor accepted a new position as Morris’ special assistant 

because he judged that serving at a higher headquarters might enhance 

Infrastructure Alternate

Construction

Military

Construction, 

Army

Military

Construction, 

Air Force

Nonappropriated 

Funds

Operations &

Maintenance, Army

PEMA

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Calendar Year

0

10

20

30

40

 Figure 2: Annual Construction Placement of the U.S. Army Construction 

 Agency, Germany, and the Engineer Element, 1957–1966 

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 17 
138

his opportunity for promotion; but many of his civilian colleague

viewed Morris’ offer as a device to remove him to install a military off

cer as USACAG commander.58 In February 1964 USAREUR consolidate

USACAG with the U.S. Army Field Engineer Office, France, to form a new 

entity, the Engineer Element.59 (Figure 2)

The Engineer Element inherited USACAG’s offices in Frankfurt and i

staff. A subordinate command of the USAREUR engineer, it supervise

dollar-funded military construction in Germany, France, and the Benelu

countries; monitored NATO construction and construction program

financed from other sources; and provided professional and technic

engineering services to other USAREUR elements. For USAREUR, th

Engineer Element managed Operations and Maintenance, Army, design

engineering projects costing between $25,000 and $200,000. USAREU

assigned projects costing under $25,000 or involving no design to i

post engineers. In October 1965 USAREUR transferred management o

real estate to the Engineer Element. Since the end of World War II, majo

subordinate commanders at the area level had handled real estate oper

tions. Late in 1964 USAREUR had centralized these responsibilities unde

the Army Area Command, with headquarters in Munich; a year late

the function and a staff of about eighty people passed to the Enginee

Element.60

The change from a civilian director of USACAG to an Army colon

commanding the Engineer Element made little difference in the day

to-day work on such activities as Nike and Mace missile installation

troposcatter, NATO infrastructure, Alternate Construction, and other pro

grams and projects. Many long-term employees hardly remembered th

Engineer Element as a distinct organization. When interviewed twenty

five years later, only one person other than Camblor could recall by nam

the colonels who commanded it from 1964 to 1966.

During an eight-year existence, USACAG achieved a distinguishe

history. It had overseen the installation of missile sites and constructio

of storage facilities to support atomic weaponry as NATO expanded i

military capabilities in the 1950s. It had responded to the challenge o

the Berlin Wall by preparing Berlin to receive supplies by air if the Sovi

Union tried to impose a second blockade. It had the unique distinctio

among military construction agencies of being commanded by a civilian

USACAG ceded place in 1964, but its successor, the Engineer Elemen

gave way in 1966 to the Engineer Command, a unique organization th

brought together all engineer resources in the European Theater for th

first time.

08G_Chap05_Final.indd 18 
6

ENGINEER COMMAND

1966–1974

The Engineer Command owed its origin to the determination 

of the commander in chief of the United States Army, Europe 

(USAREUR), General Andrew P. O’Meara. When O’Meara 

assumed command in March 1965, he brought a wealth of experience in postwar Germany to his new assignment. From 1948 to 1951 

he had served as chief of logistics planning at the European Command’s 

headquarters in Heidelberg; and in 1957, as commander of the 4th 

Armored Division, he had moved the unit from Fort Hood, Texas, to 

Germany, where he remained for a two-year tour of duty. O’Meara had 

developed strong opinions about what the Army engineers ought to be 

doing for USAREUR.

Soon after arriving in Heidelberg in 1965, O’Meara inquired about a 

project he had launched while commanding the 4th Armored Division: 

moving the rear elements of the division into the Nuremberg area. 

O’Meara learned that his plan had been approved in 1960, but the relocation had become stalled in negotiations for the Alternate Construction 

Program. Incensed by the lack of progress, O’Meara asked the USAREUR 

engineer, Brig. Gen. Howard A. Morris, for an explanation. Morris said 

that the district commanders were responsible for the delays; the district commanders put the blame elsewhere. O’Meara’s review of other 

engineer activities fueled his anger. Garrisons targeted for renovation 

during his tour in the logistics division fifteen years earlier had not been 

finished. USAREUR’s construction battalions had poor discipline and 

inadequate supervision. And O’Meara did not think that the labor service 

units of skilled German and Baltic craftsmen were being used appropriately. O’Meara dubbed the situation “a stinking engineering mess” and 

demanded accountability.1

While O’Meara questioned the deployment of engineer resources 

within USAREUR, his control of these assets was being challenged in 

Washington. Early in 1965 the Department of the Army asked the Office 

of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) to study the organization of military 

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 1 
140

construction in Europe, the only 

Army command where contract 

construction was not managed 

by the OCE. The OCE study 

concluded that contract construction currently assigned to 

USAREUR ought to be assumed 

by the Corps of Engineers and 

managed by the Mediterranean 

Division through a district office 

in Frankfurt. When these recommendations were announced in 

May 1965, O’Meara immediately 

dissented.2

O’Meara insisted that control of all engineer resources 

remain directly under his authority as USAREUR commander. The 

Department of the Army asked 

the Army Audit Agency (AAA) 

to review the OCE study and to 

present independent recommendations. The audit, completed in 

October 1965, concurred with the OCE analysis. Among the staff of th

Engineer Element, rumors began to circulate of “a power struggle for u

between USAREUR and the chief’s office.”3

Despite the consensus between the OCE and the AAA, O’Meara resis

ed. He wanted to consolidate all engineer personnel and resources direct

under the USAREUR commander. Months before O’Meara assume

command, USAREUR had consolidated its logistical support facilities i

Germany, creating a single logistical command to provide area support t

all Army forces in Germany except those in Berlin and Bremerhaven. Th

new Army Area Command, headed by a West Point classmate of O’Meara

Maj. Gen. Tom R. Stoughton, managed all stocks and logistical activitie

as well as installation support throughout Germany. Stoughton strong

opposed O’Meara’s proposal to create a competing engineer comman

as did most of O’Meara’s general staff, including the USAREUR enginee

General Morris. O’Meara realized that he needed to go outside his ow

staff to get another assessment of his idea. A personal friend and enginee

officer, Earl Peacock, recommended Col. Robert P. “Rip” Young, command

er of the 7th Engineer Brigade. In July 1966 O’Meara wrote Young—whom 

he had never met—instructing him to study the feasibility of organizing a

the engineer elements in Europe into an engineer command.4

Colonel Young had arrived in Frankfurt in September 1964 for his fir

tour in Europe. A 1942 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Young ha

served with an airborne engineer battalion in World War II, commande

an engineer battalion in Korea, and served as district engineer in th

General Young in 1970

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 2 
141

Seattle District of the Corps of Engineers. Assigned as V Corps engineer 

in 1964, Young was moved within weeks to deputy chief of staff of V 

Corps. In July 1966 Young had begun an assignment as commander of the 

7th Engineer Brigade. O’Meara’s letter arrived almost immediately.5

Concerned about the task given to him directly by O’Meara, Young 

discussed the situation with Brig. Gen. Craig Cannon, Morris’ successor as USAREUR engineer. He quickly learned that O’Meara’s idea was 

unpopular with the staff in Heidelberg and opposed by the area commanders. Nevertheless, Young began with the assumption that a feasible 

plan could be devised.

At the first briefing to discuss the feasibility of reorganization, the 

USAREUR staff was hostile, but O’Meara told Young to formulate an 

implementation plan. General Stoughton objected that the engineers could 

not supervise services such as snow clearing, packing and crating furniture, or other tasks that his Army Area Command provided to support 

U.S. military installations throughout Germany. General O’Meara agreed 

to leave the engineer positions assigned for facilities maintenance with 

the Army Area Command. When Young presented the implementation 

plan, O’Meara announced that the new command would be implemented 

as outlined and that Colonel Young would head it.6

In a brief ceremony on 1 November 1966, USAREUR activated the 

Engineer Command (ENGCOM). In the first phase of the implementation, 

ENGCOM merged the Engineer Element (contract construction and real 

estate) and the 7th Engineer Brigade (engineer troops and 6970th Labor 

Service/Civilian Labor Group [LS/CLG]). Young set up offices in the 

building in Frankfurt that had been used by the Engineer Element and 

its predecessor, the United States Army Construction Agency, Germany 

(USACAG). He moved headquarters of the 7th Engineer Brigade from 

Karlsruhe to Frankfurt. The second phase of ENGCOM’s consolidation 

entailed the transfer of the repairs and utilities mission from the Army 

Area Command to ENGCOM.

Beginning in May 1967, for the first and only time, the Army’s major 

engineer resources—contract construction, troop construction, and facilities 

engineering—operated under one headquarters as a subordinate command 

of USAREUR rather than as an element of the general staff office in charge of 

logistics (G–4). The reorganization preserved a unique aspect of the authority 

of the commander in chief, USAREUR; only in Europe did the theater commander control engineer resources directly. (See Chart 8.) In all other major 

Army commands, the OCE in Washington managed contract construction 

for the Army and Air Force. O’Meara had achieved what he wanted.7

Structure and Organization

In the face of overt opposition in the Heidelberg headquarters, 

Young’s task of pulling the various components together into one 

organization was not easy: “It was,” he recalled, “a tug of war all the 

way.”8

 The contract construction mission that ENGCOM took over from 

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 3 
142

USACAG and the Engineer Element encompassed the execution o

dollar-funded construction for U.S. military forces in Europe; the supe

vision and inspection of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO

construction undertaken for U.S. forces and of alternate constructio

provided by the Federal Republic; and the management of related re

estate functions.

ENGCOM also inherited from the 7th Engineer Brigade three mi

sions associated with engineer troops: execution of construction for th

Army and the Air Force using troop labor, maintenance of combat read

ness among the engineer troops, and readiness to execute contingency an

war plans. Throughout USAREUR (excluding Bremerhaven and Berlin

ENGCOM’s mission to support installations—facilities engineering—

covered the complex and essential tasks of maintenance, repairs, and pro

vision of utilities. All elements of ENGCOM shared responsibility for fu

nishing professional and technical engineering services to the commande

in chief, USAREUR.9

Young organized ENGCOM headquarters in Frankfurt with a

Executive Command Section and seven directorates: Engineering

VII

Corps

Headquarters,

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and Seventh Army

Special Forces

Detachment

(Airborne), Europe

15th Military

Police Brigade

Special Ammunition

Support Command,

USAREUR and

Seventh Army

U.S. Army

Berlin

U.S. Theater

Army Support

Command

Europe

U.S. Army

Engineer

Command,

Europe

U.S. Army

Southern

European

Task Force

U.S. Army

Medical

Command,

Europe

32d Army

Air Defense

Command

European

Exchange

System

U.S. Military Liaison

Mission to the CINC,

Group of Soviet

Forces, Germany

USAREUR

and Seventh

Army Troops

U.S. Army

School

Europe

Seventh

Army Training

Center

U.S. Army Reserve

Affairs, Europe

American Forces

Network, Europe

Armed Forces

Recreation Center

U.S. Dependents

Schools, European

Area

USAREUR

Class VI Agency

Assigned Activities

Major Commands

Assigned Units

V

Corps

 Chart 8: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and 7th Army, 1969 

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 4 
143

Construction, Operations, Facilities, Personnel, Logistics, and 

Comptroller. (Chart 9) The Operations Directorate coordinated military 

activities other than construction, and the Facilities Directorate managed 

the repair and utilities mission. The Logistics Directorate supported 

both troop units and the repair and utilities needs of the engineers serving military facilities (district engineers) and supervised the operations 

of the real estate offices.10 ENGCOM maintained five offices in West 

Germany to supervise the acquisition, disposal, and management of real 

estate for USAREUR.11

Resident engineers, operating out of ten (early 1967) and then nine 

(summer 1968) localities, executed the contract construction function. 

Eleven district engineers carried out the repair and utilities mission (see 

Map 11), supervising thirty-nine community engineers (also called post 

engineers, although posts had been replaced by military communities in 

USAREUR) and forty-five subcommunity engineers.12

Executive

Officer

Commanding General

Logistics

Directorate

Comptroller

Directorate

Personnel

Directorate

Chief of

Staff Deputy Chief

of Staff

Public

Information

Office

General

Council

Headquarters

Commandant

Special

Assistant

Engineering

Directorate

Troop

Operations

Directorate

Facilities

Engineer

Directorate

Headquarters

Company

Engineer

Groups

Engineer

Districts

Construction

Directorate

Resident

Engineers

Real Estate

Offices

Operational

Control

Local

Nationals

Office

 Chart 9: Organization of U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe, 1970 

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 5 
144

Military, Civilian, and German Personnel

During 1967 and 1968 some 700 to 800 people worked at ENGCOM 

headquarters, in district and resident engineer offices, and in real esta

functions. With nearly 7,000 soldiers and 14,000 civilians working on-si

Map 11

EAST GERMANY

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKI

AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T

H E R L A

N

D S

Erfurt

Dresden

Berlin

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

HESSEN

VOGELSBERG

FRANCONIA

NORTH BAVARIA

NORTH

BAVARIA

 7th ARMY

TRAINING COMMAND

TAUNUS

RHINELAND-PFALZ

NORTH

BADEN

SOUTH BAVARIA

PALATINATE

WÜRTTEMBERG

Kaiserslautern

Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Giessen

Hanau

Bad Kreuznach Würzburg

Stuttgart

Grafenwöhr

Nuremberg

Augsburg

Rhine R

Elbe R

District Boundary (approximate)

District Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

ENGINEER COMMAND

WEST GERMANY

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

Late 1960s

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 6 
145

at the installations, the Engineer Command had an overall force of about 

21,000.13

Personnel for the command consisted of military officers, Department 

of the Army civilians (DACs), and German nationals. In general, Army 

engineer officers headed major divisions in headquarters and in the 

field offices. Young named Col. A. Darby Williams, Jr., commander of 

the Engineer Element since the autumn of 1964, as chief of contract construction and deputy commander.14 A second colonel served as deputy 

commander and chief of troop operations with responsibility for the 24th 

Engineer Group (Construction) and the 6970th LS/CLG. In August 1967 

a third colonel assumed office as deputy commander and chief of facilities engineering. ENGCOM consistently had problems finding qualified 

officers to serve as engineers at the community level. The job called for 

officers with the experience commensurate with the rank of an engineer 

major; but competing demands, especially the war in Southeast Asia, left 

only lieutenants available for most assignments.15

Civilians who had served with USACAG and the Engineer Element 

provided both leadership and continuity in ENGCOM headquarters. John 

Tambornino became chief of engineering, and H. Jace Greene remained 

as chief of construction. William E. Camblor, former director of USACAG, 

returned to Frankfurt to serve as special assistant to the commander. 

Leonard L. Phillips, legal counsel in USACAG since 1960, became general 

counsel. Saul Fraint served as chief of technical engineering, and John 

Haugen continued as chief of planning. Adolph Faust, who had come 

to USACAG after working for the Army engineers in Austria and with 

USAREUR’s Northern Area Office, was named chief of civil engineering; 

he later worked as chief of structural engineering. Louis Brettschneider 

remained as chief of mechanical engineering (a section under USACAG 

but now a branch) and, when Fraint retired in June 1973, succeeded him 

as chief of technical engineering.16 When offices in France closed in 1966 

and 1967, Jacques Bouchereau, a naturalized American citizen from Haiti 

who had worked with the Joint Construction Agency and its successors in 

France, joined ENGCOM’s Engineering Division, as did John Shadday, a 

former Army engineer officer.17

Other experienced civilians came into the organization when 

ENGCOM assumed responsibility for facilities engineering. Randolph S. 

Washington, a budget analyst, transferred from the Army Area Command 

in 1967; he later served as deputy and supervisor of the Budget Office. 

Edward Zawisza, who had worked for the Joint Construction Agency, for 

the facilities engineer in Stuttgart, and with the Army Area Command, 

joined ENGCOM as deputy chief of facilities engineering. Robert 

Rodehaver first became chief of operation and maintenance programming 

in the new Facilities Directorate and then in 1972 was promoted to chief of 

buildings and grounds.18

Despite the continuity in leadership that these men provided, 

American civilians made up less than 3 percent of ENGCOM’s workforce 

and the command remained short of qualified engineers in mid-level 

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 7 
146

positions.19 Germans and third-country nationals held more than 90 pe

cent of the civilian positions as estimators, typists, translators, engineer

legal aides, and contract administrators. During the late 1960s and ear

1970s, ENGCOM had difficulty attracting Germans with profession

qualifications: Unemployment was low in the Federal Republic, and th

salaries offered by the Army were about one-third less than comparab

jobs in the West German economy. Although retaining qualified German

was even harder than recruiting them, some, including Hasso Damm

who had joined USACAG in 1956, continued under ENGCOM.20

Engineer Troops

The Engineer Command included the 24th and 39th Engineer Group

(Construction) and the 6970th LS/CLG.21 Engineer troops in the 24t

and 39th were assigned to heavy construction, including earthmovin

rehabilitation, and road building. The command also used troops fo

crash programs such as constructing forty school classrooms, work th

involved preparing foundations, laying concrete, setting up Quonset hut

and installing wiring.22

ENGCOM gained a unique resource in the 6970th LS/CLG. Each of i

six companies maintained a roster of about 150 men. Three companies—

civilian labor groups—were composed of Germans; the other three—

labor service—included displaced persons from East European nation

The 6970th Labor Service/Civilian Labor Group built this school in 

Heidelberg in 1967.

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 8 
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especially the Baltic states that had been absorbed into the Soviet Union. 

A headquarters company of about 200 men managed this organization 

under the 7th Engineer Brigade. Members of the labor service units wore 

uniforms and were commanded by officers from their own ranks who 

were experienced in planning and executing construction projects.23

The U.S. Army of occupation created labor service units in early 1947 

to augment its engineer units, and over the next twenty years the Army 

developed contractual relations with the groups. The labor service personnel in the 6970th LS/CLG served an average of ten years and maintained 

a high level of proficiency in crafts crucial to construction—carpentry, 

masonry, electrical wiring, heating, plumbing, and welding.

The standard workweek for the labor service personnel was fortythree hours on construction plus additional hours in training and improving skills. In 1950 the labor service men adopted the elephant as their 

emblem to symbolize strength and endurance; their nickname became 

Dickhäuter, “thick-skinned.”24 For their tremendous morale, pride, dedication, and discipline, as well as consummate skill, they won the praise of 

the Americans who worked with them.25

The ENGCOM structure permitted the labor service and civilian 

labor groups to be employed quickly and effectively to support contract 

construction, as they had previously supported troop construction. 

Furthermore, troop units and the labor service units could be assigned 

to a project together, with troops doing the initial site preparation and 

roughing in a structure and the labor service troops finishing the project.26

Facilities Engineers

Before the creation of the Engineer Command, district engineers, 

working under the eleven commanders of military districts in West 

Germany, provided support for the military installations used by the U.S. 

Army and Air Force. The district commanders in turn had reported to the 

Army Area Command in Munich, whose deputy chief of staff for installations had supervised all activities connected with facilities engineering. 

After 1966–1967, district engineers reported to the director of facilities 

at ENGCOM headquarters and came under the immediate authority of 

the ENGCOM commander, who endorsed their efficiency reports.27 The 

engineers liked the centralization of resources in the Engineer Command 

because it allowed them to establish uniform criteria for ranking projects 

across USAREUR. Moreover, the weight of ENGCOM’s authority made 

the resources needed to accomplish an approved task more readily available to the district engineer.

The Engineer Command set rationalization and standardization as its 

goals. At its recommendation, USAREUR approved a plan for establishing 

priorities among competing demands for work on repair and utilities projects. Facilities and activities were divided into four categories—operational, tactical, recreational, and administrative—and assigned priority to the 

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 9 
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first two categories. It then set six levels of urgency within each categor

which helped district engineers prepare annual work plans with som

uniform benchmarks. ENGCOM also set standards for materials used i

repair and replacement, whether the work was done by contract, in-hous

personnel, or engineer troops.28

ENGCOM’s efforts to centralize decision making and to standard

ize criteria were similar to the attempt launched in the late 1940s b

EUCOM’s chief engineer, Brig. Gen. Don G. Shingler, to centralize plan

ning for maintenance and repair throughout the his command. Lik

Shingler, ENGCOM organized mobile technical teams that included ele

trical, mechanical, and civil engineers. Teams in both periods traveled t

districts to offer assistance at the local level.29

The structure of the Engineer Command allowed its leaders to man

age the limited resources available to USAREUR during the 1960s an

early 1970s. The command combined engineer troops, contract authorit

and facilities engineers, thus bringing to military communities in Europ

a range of assets that facilitated effective organization, comprehensiv

planning, and standardization. The combination made possible mor

effective delivery of engineer services with fewer people and at lower co

than in the past.30

The Changing Environment in Europe

As Colonel Young worked to establish the Engineer Command

USAREUR wrestled with two major developments that conditioned i

operations. The first was dramatic and relatively short-lived: France’s dec

sion to leave NATO. The second was the growing American involvemen

in Southeast Asia and pressures from within the United States to reduc

the financial drain of a large troop commitment in Europe. This develop

ment proved to be more consequential and had longer-lasting effects.

FRELOC Mission

In March 1966 French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew a

French military forces from NATO and stipulated that any foreign force

remaining on French soil on 1 April 1967 would come under Frenc

military authority and command. Faced with subordination to Frenc

military authority, the United States and other NATO members decided t

relocate their military units from France. The U.S. removal bore the nam

Operation FRELOC, for Fast RELOCation.

A major element in the relocation was how to allocate management o

USAREUR’s stocks and logistical activities, all of which were being con

centrated in West Germany. The Communication Zone (COMZ) in Franc

had handled all logistical and area support for U.S. forces; USAREUR con

cluded that it should absorb the Army Area Command, which handle

similar functions in Germany from its headquarters in Munich. On 1 Ju

1967, COMZ headquarters moved from Orleans, France, to Worms, We

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 10 
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Germany, and took over the responsibilities of the Army Area Command. 

Exactly one year later, with no change of mission, COMZ was redesignated the Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM).31

The redeployment of American personnel and resources from France 

in FRELOC involved moving about 30,000 troops and 40,000 civilians 

from nearly 200 military installations. Both the Army and the Air Force 

required new or expanded facilities to accommodate the units and the 

equipment that would be transferred, principally to Belgium and West 

Germany.32 In preparation for constructing new facilities, ENGCOM 

dispatched staff members to France. The deputy chief of construction, 

Jacques Bouchereau, traveled with cost estimator Hasso Damm to see the 

buildings that would be vacated and to estimate the size and probable 

cost of replacement facilities.33

One especially tedious project that fell to ENGCOM involved taking inventory, segregating, packaging, and storing pieces of prefabricated buildings that had been dismantled and removed from locations in 

France. Command leaders protested that the costs involved would exceed 

the value of the materials salvaged, but the order remained in effect. The 

first assessment undertaken addressed 302 prefabricated ammunition 

storage huts shipped to Karlsruhe. As ENGCOM personnel predicted, 

the cost of the work was twice the value of the materials saved. Similar 

work indicated that parts from several types of buildings had been mixed 

together when they were disassembled and shipped.34

Army engineers built depots like this one in Hanau to store equipment arriving in 

Germany as U.S. troops moved out of France.

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 11 
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Initially, USAREUR assigned ENGCOM sixteen construction projec

funded at $18.6 million under the program for Military Construction

Army. This included $5 million to provide 873,000 square feet of storag

and other support facilities in Germany. To accommodate the supplie

and ammunition stored along the line of communications in France, th

command expanded depot facilities, including controlled-humidity sto

age warehouses in Germersheim, Nahbollenbach, and Pirmasens. Desig

and construction also proceeded on new command facilities in Stuttga

to accommodate the headquarters staff of the United States Europea

Command (USEUCOM) and in Worms for COMZ.

The relocation of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Power

Europe (SHAPE), to Brussels generated a number of construction project

including a house for the supreme allied commander, General Lyman L

Lemnitzer; a headquarters building; and a school complex for the childre

of U.S. military and civilian employees. The Belgians, eager to accommo

date the incoming military staffs and families, worked to make it possib

to open the school for the 1967–1968 academic year.

ENGCOM assigned Bouchereau, deputy chief of construction an

responsible for estimating, as project engineer for the school in Belgium 

because of his experience in both engineering and construction and h

fluency in French. To speed decisions, the Department of Defense sen

the assistant secretary for construction, Evan Harrington, to Frankfur

where Fraint and his staff rushed to draft design specifications and pr

liminary floor plans. Harrington approved the basic design on the spo

and Bouchereau delivered the plans to the Belgian government, whic

contracted with an architect-engineer firm to adapt the design to the sit

With the help of a Belgian realtor, Bouchereau located an appropria

site—an apple orchard outside the small community of Sterrebeek, fiv

miles from the center of Brussels—and then negotiated for and bought th

property on behalf of the U.S. government.

Clearing began on the site before the Belgian government realize

that Bouchereau had acquired title to the land in fee simple; that is, th

property owner had surrendered absolute possession of the fourtee

acres. Individuals do not exercise sovereignty over their property, but 

country does; thus sovereignty over this property passed with the tit

to the United States. It was an oversight the Belgians would not repea

In the government-to-government agreements negotiated in 1968, th

Belgian government insisted on a clause specifying that all land used b

the United States for its military forces remain the property of Belgium

As late as 1992 the acreage on which the American school sat in Sterrebee

remained the only piece of land in Europe that belonged in full title a

sovereign territory to the United States.

Bouchereau headed the ENGCOM resident office set up in Brusse

to oversee projects in Belgium, including the school complex and a den

tal clinic to be built at the same site. The school complex had to be mad

completely self-sufficient, with a heating plant, transformer station, wate

chlorinating station, and sewage plant. The school complex consisted o

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 12 
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a two-story elementary school; a high school building; a gymnasium; a 

sports field; and a one-story structure combining administrative offices, 

cafeteria, library, kitchen, and shops. The final design for the school was 

completed in two months. A Dutch company, Strabed, began construction 

in July 1967 and used 55,000 square feet of prefabricated reinforced concrete panels to hold construction costs to $1.6 million. The school opened 

in October.35

New construction for the relocation also involved creating a headquarters facility for the U.S. European Command, which since 1954 had 

been located in France with SHAPE. When SHAPE moved to Belgium, 

USEUCOM moved to Stuttgart and the Seventh Army headquarters 

moved to Heidelberg to share space with USAREUR. ENGCOM also managed the construction of the command center for USEUCOM at Patch 

Barracks in Stuttgart.

The command and control center—informally referred to as C2 (Csquared)—was a three-story building with wings to the east and to the 

west constructed with a welded steel frame and reinforced concrete. For 

reasons of physical and electronic security, the main building, 54,370 

square feet of floor space, had only one window. The electronic equipment 

needed for intelligence work and to exercise command and control was 

housed on the first floor and shielded to prevent hostile monitoring of 

electromagnetic signals. The main building also featured a two-story situation room with a command balcony and an eight-screen projection wall 

furnished with the most sophisticated audiovisual equipment available. 

The west wing contained the computers that processed intelligence information. The east wing contained the support systems. Pneumatic tubes 

connected all the stations within the building and other sites in the headquarters complex. To accommodate heavy demand for electronic support, 

the facility was equipped with two backup diesel generators.36

Design for the C2 project began in November 1966; ground was broken on 10 May 1967; and by 13 October ENGCOM and USEUCOM celebrated the “roofing-in” of the building with a Richtfest, the old German 

construction ceremony. The C2 Richtfest honored the construction crews, 

which included men from seven nations, and the engineers, all of whom 

had worked sixty-hour weeks to enclose the structure before winter. The 

workers installed the heating plant ahead of schedule, so work continued 

uninterrupted throughout the winter. John Shadday oversaw the project 

for ENGCOM. USEUCOM’s liaison officer for the project was an infantry 

colonel who insisted that the military users make prompt decisions and 

drove them by threatening to make the decisions for them if they delayed. 

The center became operational in July 1968, eliciting commendations for 

ENGCOM for rapid completion of the project.37

On 31 March 1967, eight hours before de Gaulle’s deadline, U.S. forces 

completed the evacuation of personnel and materiel from France. With 

the approval of the French, a small residual force remained behind to 

complete the liquidation of U.S. assets and to support U.S. dependents 

authorized to remain until the end of the school year or until completion 

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 13 
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of facilities in Belgium. By the end of 1967 the U.S. Army had closed a

installations in France except facilities associated with the oil pipelin

Under agreements negotiated in April 1967, the pipeline remained avai

able for both American and French use. Civilian contractors operated th

facility, and the French government provided security. The United State

retained the right to inspect the pipeline, accompanied by French official

four times a year.38

The work that resulted from the movement of U.S. forces was no

over once the troops were relocated. Nor was all of it as satisfying a

the American school in Belgium or the command and control center fo

USEUCOM in Stuttgart. Still, Colonel Young was proud of his command

efforts. “We really did a great job.... Because we had put everybody, a

the engineers, under one commander ... we could move fast and effe

tively in using resources.”39

Rethinking the Commitment to Europe

While ENGCOM struggled to integrate the various enginee

resources into an effective command and responded to the challenge

of FRELOC, political pressures in the United States mounted that woul

influence Army engineer activities for many years. Since the beginnin

of the 1960s the United States carried a balance-of-payments defic

with the Federal Republic of Germany, prompting a growing America

political sentiment that the Germans ought to bear a greater share o

the financial burden for their own defense. Senator Mike Mansfiel

(D-Montana) advanced this argument in August 1966 when he fir

introduced his Sense of the Senate Resolution calling for a reductio

in U.S. forces in Germany. For the next several years the call to remov

U.S. troops from Germany sounded annually in the Senate, intensifie

by the increasing burden of the conflict in Vietnam. These pressure

led the Department of Defense to withdraw about 35,000 U.S. troop

and 28,000 dependents from Germany between late 1967 and the en

of 1968. The West German government, although nervous about th

troop withdrawals, acquiesced.40

Concerned that the withdrawals not send a message of weakness o

lack of resolve to either the Europeans or the Soviets, the Departmen

of Defense devised a strategy called dual basing. Under this arrang

ment troops stationed in the United States would be airlifted each yea

for training in West Germany with NATO army groups. The REFORGE

(REturn of FORces to GERmany) exercises were designed both to enhanc

the military capabilities of the U.S. and allied forces and to reassure th

NATO participants of the firm U.S. commitment to the alliance.41

While the withdrawals took place and U.S. defense planners init

ated REFORGER, the West German government accepted an arrangement t

help offset the costs of the U.S. military presence in Germany by buyin

$500 million in medium-term treasury certificates. The arrangements t

fund modernization of facilities used by the U.S. military represented on

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 14 
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additional effort in a long line of offset agreements. Undertaken by the 

West German government, these arrangements became a recurring part 

of USAREUR’s operations and provided substantial Deutschmark (DM) 

funds for military construction during the 1970s. (See below in this chapter, 

as well as Chapter 11.)

Workload and Funding

ENGCOM applied the combined resources of troop construction, 

contract construction, and facilities engineering to manage work under 

the NATO Common Infrastructure Program, a full array of military construction for the Army on projects ranging from airfields to schools to 

washracks, and work under the Alternate Construction Program.

In summer 1968 ENGCOM had more than 400 active projects with an 

estimated value of $198 million under contract in various stages of design 

and construction. Forty contracts were for Air Force projects and seven 

for NATO infrastructure projects; twenty contracts represented facilities 

under the Alternate Construction Program with funds provided by the 

Federal Republic of Germany.42 Army construction occupied the largest 

percentage of ENGCOM’s efforts, a total of ninety-two projects with an 

estimated value of over $20 million.43 (See Table 3.)

Troop construction under ENGCOM accounted for 196 projects that 

had a value of only $5.7 million. This did not include the operation and 

maintenance work performed by troops in support of the district and 

community (post) engineers. Although the dollar value of this work was 

low, the involvement of troops in construction gave the command flexibility in carrying out its mission.44

Dozens of ENGCOM construction projects qualified for funding under 

the NATO Common Infrastructure Program. These projects included 

some of the facilities built in Belgium to accommodate the move of NATO 

headquarters from France; many of the Hawk missile sites built in the 

1960s and 1970s; aircraft shelters; and facilities for U.S. forces assigned to 

NATO in Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.45

During the 1950s the United States had willingly advanced the money 

for the construction of military facilities rather than waiting for NATO 

budgetary approval. In the 1960s the practice of prefinancing declined, 

because of U.S. concern about gold outflow and the financial demands of 

the Vietnam War. The U.S. government wanted NATO to finance infrastructure projects from the start, but the NATO funding process involved 

long and very complicated negotiations to get the unanimous approval of 

the NATO member states required for each project.

In 1969 ENGCOM established a branch in the Office of the Comptroller 

to recover funds from NATO for projects that had been prefinanced with 

U.S. dollars. Headed by an American civilian, the NATO Recoupment 

Branch initially included three German civilians, although this number grew as the volume of work increased. The work of this group was 

enormously complicated by a fire in November 1968 when papers were 

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 15 
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charred, damaged by water, or lost entirely. The recoupment staff had t

develop regulations, policies, and procedures to govern its work. The

also had to pay painstaking attention to detail and complete numerou

NATO forms. It took years before the staff’s efforts led to the recovery o

significant amounts of money.46

ENGCOM also discharged the task of developing and negotiatin

all the alternate construction agreements for USAREUR. Once German

and the United States signed an agreement, ENGCOM provided th

German construction agency, the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technic

Construction Working Group), with a scope of work on which to bas

design and construction. Lower-echelon offices such as the Landesabteilun

(State Construction Division) or the Finanzbauamt (Office of Finance fo

Construction) eventually produced preliminary designs for review b

ENGCOM’s Engineering Directorate, a construction contract, and a fin

ished project. The process involved two parallel operations: a contra

between ENGCOM and the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe and then contrac

between the Finanzbauamt and an architect-engineer firm (for design) an

a contractor (for construction). The process demanded significant sta

time.47

All of ENGCOM’s programs involved real estate. To monitor th

dimension of the projects, the command maintained a Real Estate Divisio

with regional offices covering Germany, France, Italy (excluding Naple

and Sicily), and the Benelux countries. After the relocation of U.S. force

from France, responsibilities there consisted only of leases with priva

French contractors to manage and operate the petroleum pipeline that th

United States had built across France.48

Securing real estate became an ever more difficult task. We

Germany’s booming economy, the presence of armed forces from sever

nations, and a growing environmental sensitivity all created pressures o

 Table 3 

Military Construction for the Army

June 1968

 Project Type Number 

Operational facilities 10

Commercial facilities 31

Maintenance 1

Storage 15

Airfields (Army) 9

Administrative and community 26

Total 92

Source: “Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 June 1968.

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 16 
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land use. During the early 1970s continued talk in the U.S. Senate about 

reducing forces in Europe, as well as meetings of the major powers to 

discuss detente in international politics, also made it difficult for many 

Germans to understand why the Americans needed more land.49 By 1973 

the Real Estate Division was hampered by having German employees in 

positions where a familiarity with U.S. policies, procedures, and concepts 

constituted major criteria for the work. ENGCOM lacked the funds to discharge its real estate mission. Indeed, it faced a budget gap for fiscal year 

1974 of $115,000 just to cover the salaries of existing staff.50

Projects

The pressures created by Operation FRELOC strained the Engineer 

Command’s capabilities; but the elements drawn into the new command worked effectively together, and Young won the confidence of the 

employees. General O’Meara, who left USAREUR in March 1967, pressed 

to have Young promoted to brigadier general, intending that he remain as 

ENGCOM commander.51 Young’s name appeared on the promotion list, 

but he did not remain in Europe. The chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Frederick 

J. Clarke, selected him to organize the new Huntsville Division of the 

Corps of Engineers, which was to design and construct the Sentinel/

Safeguard ballistic missile systems. Young was promoted to brigadier 

general in September 1967 and left Europe the next month.52

Young’s successor as commander, Kenneth W. Kennedy, 

was also on the August 1967 

promotion list, but he arrived 

in Germany on October 17 as 

a colonel. Kennedy had served 

two tours in repairs and utilities positions; ENGCOM was 

his first assignment in Central 

Europe. Kennedy’s promotion to 

brigadier general came in March 

1968.53

The Boiler Conversion Program

Upon assuming command, 

Colonel Kennedy immediately 

received directions to give high 

priority to a specific problem. 

On his first day in Germany, he 

received a message from General 

James H. Polk, O’Meara’s successor as commander in chief 

of USAREUR, instructing him 

General Kennedy (right) with Chief of 

Engineers Lt. Gen. William F. Cassidy in 

June 1968

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 17 
156

to make a special effort to improve troop facilities. Ten days later th

USAREUR engineer, Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley, wrote Kennedy about th

heating systems in the barracks. An attachment to Kelley’s letter bor

the typed message, “It can be expected that the commander in chief wi

verify completion status during field trips throughout the command

To that Kelley added the handwritten note, “Strong CINC [commander i

chief] interest!”54 The need to modernize heating equipment in America

facilities in Europe was the first of several major maintenance problems th

Kennedy faced.

Most of the buildings used by U.S. troops since the occupatio

had been built for the German Army before World War II; many o

them dated back to the turn of the century. Heating equipment in th

facilities dated from the 1930s. By the 1960s the cast-iron boiler desig

typical of these systems was antiquated, and repairs were difficult an

expensive. Although the boilers were designed to burn Ruhr coal, b

the early 1960s they were all fired with anthracite coal imported from 

the United States, which had different mineral properties. Political pre

sures from the American coal lobby and economic pressures over th

outflow of gold reserves from the U.S. Treasury combined to persuad

President John F. Kennedy to order the U.S. Army to use America

coal in Europe. Kennedy’s presidential order added about $1 million 

year to USAREUR’s maintenance budget and, because the anthraci

coal—owing to its properties—burned poorly in the German boiler

further decreased the efficiency of the existing heating systems. Becaus

USAREUR consistently received inadequate money for routine main

tenance, the equipment continued to deteriorate. In 1964 the Enginee

Element had proposed converting to oil-burning furnaces throughou

Germany. The Department of the Army rejected the proposal but sug

gested that USAREUR submit requests to convert individual heatin

plants.55

In addition to the boilers, the military in Europe also used hundred

of single-room coal-fired space heaters to warm troop billets, latrine

mess halls, and work areas. In September 1964 USAREUR authorized 

“repair by replacement” plan to systematically eliminate all space hea

ers over a five-year period. In March 1967 General O’Meara declared th

he wanted the job completed before the next winter. In addition to bein

inefficient, the space heaters were a major cause of fires in Europea

buildings.56

Kenneth Kennedy inherited a replacement plan for space heaters bu

had no comparable plan for replacing the central heating boilers. In fac

ENGCOM did not even have an accurate count of how many boilers th

military operated. Kennedy therefore ordered an inventory of almost 80

U.S. installations and learned that the military operated some 10,000 low

pressure boilers of various capacities. The equipment included forty-fou

different German makes and models, 90 percent of them outmoded

With this new information, ENGCOM launched a plan early in 1968 t

modernize all heating equipment used in USAREUR installations. Th

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 18 
157

command centralized approval 

of boiler replacement and used 

salvage stock on hand, including 

oil-fired boilers recovered from 

France during FRELOC to replace 

worn-out coal-burning boilers in 

Germany.58

Coal-fired boilers had the 

additional disadvantage of being 

labor-intensive in a scarce labor 

market. Because coal-fired boilers needed to be stoked, they 

required 60 percent more hours 

of labor than oil-fired boilers. 

The ENGCOM roster listed 

5,000 boiler-firemen, jobs filled 

primarily by Germans. The 

older German firemen who had 

worked since the 1940s were 

retiring by the late 1960s, and 

few younger men wanted the 

backbreaking job. Budgetary 

pressures persuaded Kennedy 

to mandate that the number 

of Germans on his payroll be reduced by 20 percent. To achieve the 

reduction and still keep the boilers heated, Kennedy persuaded Polk in 

September 1968 to allow the use of troops to fuel the boiler fires.59

ENGCOM personnel were not surprised when inexperienced troops 

damaged the antiquated boilers. Once damaged, a coal-burning boiler 

automatically became eligible for replacement with an oil-burning boiler. 

Replacing the old German boilers with steel boilers manufactured in the 

United States increased efficiency and economy in heating, eliminated the 

need for firemen, helped the American balance of payments, modernized 

heating facilities, and reduced long-term expenditures for maintenance.60

The 6970th LS/CLG played a key role in the entire program to convert heating plants. Kennedy organized U.S. soldiers into teams to work 

with the labor service units. By April 1970 ENGCOM had thirteen boiler 

conversion teams in the field, nine made up of enlisted men on loan 

from USAREUR troop units.61 The teams made good progress, but cuts in 

ENGCOM’s maintenance budget and a congressionally mandated moratorium on conversion to oil-burning boilers imposed on 12 October 1972 

made completion of the program impossible.62 The program had converted less than half of the 8,755 boilers still in use when it was suspended.63

In 1972 Kennedy’s successor had to procure a small stock of U.S.-manufactured coal-fired boilers to replace those that inevitably broke down. In 

late 1973, in the face of the oil crisis brought on by the Arab-Israeli War, 

USAREUR’s staff considered converting back to coal.64

Coal-fired boilers, like this one at Warner 

Barracks in Bamberg, were prevalent in the 

1960s and 1970s.

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 19 
158

Stem to Stern Renovations

The high priority that General Polk placed on boiler conversion on

highlighted the antiquated state of the facilities out of which the U.S. mil

tary operated in Germany. The newest buildings, constructed specifical

to accommodate the augmentation of U.S. forces in the early 1950s, ha

been designed as temporary structures. Built to austerity standards, wit

a life expectancy from five to fifteen years, they were at the end of the

functional usefulness. The balance of the facilities, taken over from th

German military, dated from before 1939 and was even more run down.

For years USAREUR had lacked the money and the personnel fo

routine building maintenance. The repair and utilities budget equaled th

programmed requirements in only one year between 1956 and 1964; th

engineers could not even maintain the minimum standards prescribed b

Army regulations.65 As resources increasingly flowed to Vietnam, facil

ties in Europe deteriorated further. While the Pacific Theater spent $52

per square foot for repair and utilities and posts in the continental Unite

States averaged $384 per square foot, USAREUR had only $193 per squar

foot for Germany.66

By the late 1960s troop barracks in Europe were in shockingly deplo

able condition. Electrical systems and heating equipment failed regularl

The high mineral content of the water clogged the plumbing systems, fr

quently leading to broken pipes. Mildew was rampant in the dank showe

rooms. Latrines drained through piping embedded in masonry wall

When a leak developed in a latrine pipe, the entire barracks smelled o

urine. One officer recalled wryly, “you never had to tell the new recrui

where the latrines were.... [Conditions were] worse than a prison.”67

In March 1966, to address the worst casernes, General O’Meara ha

earmarked about $5 million of year-end funds for use by the Enginee

Element. Because the Army engineers received the funds late in the fisc

year, they had no chance to plan the repairs or to target the most critic

situations. As a result, only eleven casernes received piecemeal attention.

General Kennedy resolved to attack the problem more systemat

cally, and he developed a plan to renovate troop barracks and mess hal

sequentially. When he discussed the plan with one of the colonels in th

USAREUR engineer’s office in Heidelberg, the officer agreed that th

command needed to repair barracks and casernes “from stem to stern

a characterization that became the label for the program.69 To launch th

Stem to Stern program, ENGCOM asked the district engineers to assem

ble data on their facilities and prepare plans to renovate latrines, shower

and mess halls. To keep costs down, he instructed them to use their ow

in-house design capabilities. Kennedy then committed year-end fund

from fiscal 1967 to carry out these plans.70

The construction engineers from ENGCOM headquarters conducted 

complete survey of Sullivan Barracks in Mannheim, and Kennedy ordere

labor service troops to gut the building—replumb, rewire, and rebuild 

floor by floor.71 ENGCOM’s Engineering Directorate identified Lucas an

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 20 
159

Associates in Rome as an architect-engineer firm with experience doing 

work on repair and utilities for the military. In January 1968 ENGCOM 

contracted with this firm to survey six other casernes—three from the 

Seventh Army’s V Corps area and three from VII Corps—and prepare 

designs for their complete renovation. With year-end funds from fiscal 

year 1968, ENGCOM began renovating four casernes. ENGCOM signed a 

second contract with Lucas to survey another nine casernes.72

By December 1968 the Stem to Stern program was far enough along 

that, ironically, Kennedy began to get criticism about its slowness. The 

commanding general of V Corps complained about the slow pace of work 

in his area, but Kennedy replied that projects in V Corps were “the first to 

be let for construction.” He explained that to take advantage of year-end 

funds, surveys of conditions, design, and the award of $6 million in contracts had to be completed in only four months. The Army’s program to 

limit the outflow of U.S. gold also required contractors to order such items 

as floor tiles from the United States, further delaying the work. Despite 

these problems, Kennedy cited progress on the mess halls at Rivers 

Barracks in Giessen and at McPheeters Barracks in Bad Hersfeld and on 

four barracks buildings at Downs Barracks in Fulda.73 Kennedy hoped 

that commanders would understand that a systematic program such as 

Stem to Stern meant that at some point all facilities would be renovated. 

Of course, the U.S. military operated nearly 800 installations throughout 

Germany. At the rate of three—or even ten—a year, it could be a long 

wait.

As work under the Stem to Stern program continued, the ENGCOM 

staff codified their experiences. Kennedy asked the design engineers to 

prepare standard plans and specifications room by room so that the plans 

could be given to district and community (post) engineers for adaptation 

at any facility. ENGCOM headquarters also prepared lists of materials for 

faster and more accurate procurement. These standardizations had only 

limited value, because buildings varied from caserne to caserne and even 

within a single caserne.74

With the war in Southeast Asia continuing, money remained a problem for ENGCOM. By early 1969 the backlog of essential maintenance 

and repair reached $150 million, and Kennedy expected a reduction in 

the ENGCOM budget for fiscal year 1970. The staff continued to dwindle, 

making it difficult even to maintain the utility systems in place.75

Given the process for financing Stem to Stern work, ENGCOM could 

not make the best use of the money it received. Most of the money came 

at the end of the year from segments of USAREUR that wanted to commit 

unspent money before it reverted to the U.S. Treasury. ENGCOM always 

had a backlog of unfinanced projects, but it received the supplementary 

money very near the end of the fiscal year (30 June). This timing meant 

that the summer construction season was already well under way, activity 

was intense, and prices for contracts were correspondingly high. Year-end 

dollars thus produced fewer improvements than the command could have 

gained if it could have placed contracts during the winter.76

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 21 
160

By the end of fiscal year 1969, the program had undertaken work 

seventy-seven barracks buildings and nineteen mess halls, less than 1

percent of the facilities that needed attention. Nine months later, by th

spring of 1970, Stem to Stern had spent $32 million for projects at abou

twenty casernes. Kennedy estimated that, at the current rate of repair, co

recting two decades of neglect would take at least another fifteen year

He calculated that the program would require an additional $240 millio

for standard renovation and an additional $333 million to improve sup

porting utility systems. Kennedy readily acknowledged that Congres

was unlikely to approve the money, certainly not “until the permanenc

of U.S. forces in Germany is settled once and for all.”77 It is startling in re

rospect to realize that, after twenty-five years of the U.S. military presenc

in Germany, permanency remained an issue.

The Stem to Stern program and the deplorable conditions in the ba

racks began to attract attention in Washington. On a command visit in th

spring of 1971, the Army chief of staff, General William C. Westmoreland

inspected renovated barracks. After the tour Westmoreland turned t

Kennedy and asked, “Why don’t you do this faster?”78 At one point th

general saw huge quantities of black smoke belching from the heatin

plant at Ferris Barracks in Erlangen. The scene convinced him of the nee

for remedial action, and he directed that ENGCOM convert the hea

ing plant from coal to oil in spite of existing congressional restriction

Within weeks of Westmoreland’s visit, ENGCOM received orders from 

USAREUR’s deputy commander in chief, Lt. Gen. Arthur S. Collins, J

“As a first priority ... undertake a massive project for the rehabilitation o

troop facilities to include messhalls [sic], sanitary facilities, and heating.”

Between June 1968 and April 1972 USAREUR put more than $50 millio

into ENGCOM’s Stem to Stern program.80

TAB VEE Program

A third priority program for ENGCOM grew out of experiences i

Vietnam and in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 that highlighted the vulne

ability of aircraft parked on the ground. If the Soviet Union launche

an attack, even conventional weapons could destroy a good portion o

American air power in Europe. The Air Force therefore initiated a new 

building program that ENGCOM managed. Called TAB VEE (Theater A

Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise), the program aimed to improv

runways and provide shelter for aircraft at air bases in Germany, Hollan

and Turkey.81 The designers assigned one fighter aircraft to each hanga

which consisted of simply constructed concrete walls on three sides an

a slightly arched concrete roof. The hangars did not have doors, but the

were located in a nonuniform pattern to minimize flak and blast damag

Earthen berms were placed against the walls in some instances, and roo

were painted in camouflage colors.82

TAB VEE construction began as a crash program in June 1968. Th

first projects involved improvements to the pavement in Ramstein

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 22 
161

Bitburg, and Hahn. Seven months after the start, the first aircraft shelters began to go up at Ramstein Air Base. By late 1968 the Air Force had 

won strong support in Washington for TAB VEE, and the estimate for 

future construction placement under the program jumped from $10 million to $50 million for fiscal year 1969. At that volume it constituted more 

than 60 percent of ENGCOM’s scheduled construction placement for the 

year. TAB VEE remained a high-volume project for all of 1968 and 1969. 

It contributed to a record-breaking workload in design for February 1969, 

embracing 153 projects and an estimated construction cost of $129 million.83 By January 1971 the TAB VEE program had accounted for $64.6 million in construction contracts for work at air bases in Ramstein, Sembach, 

Bitburg, Spangdahlem, Hahn, Erding, and Zweibrücken in Germany; 

Soesterberg in Holland; Aviano in Italy; and Incirlik in Turkey. By April 

1972 ENGCOM had constructed 324 TAB VEE aircraft shelters.84

In high-priority programs such as TAB VEE it is commonplace to award 

contracts before final drawings and specifications are available. Although 

accustomed to that practice, the engineers still found the Air Force’s initial specifications for TAB VEE distressingly imprecise. Furthermore, 

the requirements changed frequently as the program progressed, delaying completion dates and escalating costs.85 ENGCOM’s Construction 

Directorate had to respond to the Air Force’s objections to these delays at 

the same time that it tried to maintain surveillance over construction projects and manage the indirect contracting. When the Air Force complained 

about the charges that ENGCOM levied to manage the program, General 

Kennedy flew to Washington to explain the complexities of indirect contracting and to defend ENGCOM’s management of the program.86

ENGCOM Headquarters

An unexpected event interrupted ENGCOM’s activities. In midNovember 1968 the two-story wood-frame building that housed command headquarters burned to the ground.87 Built immediately after the 

war on the grounds of the I. G. Farben complex in Frankfurt, Annex B 

was designed with a central spine and six wings off the back of the spine. 

Although up to four people shared an office, every room had a window 

and trees surrounded the building. Some staff considered it a pleasant 

working environment; many regarded the building as a firetrap.

In November 1967 there had been a fire on the first floor beneath 

Kennedy’s office. Flames burned through the floor between stories, and 

the desk used by Kennedy’s sergeant major fell through to the floor below. 

After the fire was extinguished, gas cans were found in the area. Kennedy 

and others suspected arson, but there was no proof.88

A year later contractors were performing routine maintenance in the 

building. About 8:00 P.M. on 13 November, Kennedy received the news at 

his residence in Bad Vilbel of a fire. When he arrived at ENGCOM headquarters, one end of the building was blazing; fire fighters from Frankfurt 

had an inadequate supply of water and were losing the battle to extin09H_Chap06_Final.indd 23 
162

guish the flames. As the fire burned, Kennedy and other staff membe

ran ahead of the flames, throwing files and office equipment out the win

dows. Local newspapers called it the biggest fire in Frankfurt since Worl

War II. By 4:00 A.M. the building was gone; workers who arrived in th

morning saw only the shell.

A skeleton staff crowded into a few rooms in V Corps headquarte

and hurriedly arranged to lease an abandoned four-story factory buildin

near the Messe (market building) in Frankfurt as temporary headquarter

Labor service troops cleaned the leased building and installed new boile

so operations could continue.

Kennedy wanted a new building for the command. USAREUR’s com

mander, General Polk, was skeptical that the Department of the Arm

would approve funds. To make his case, Kennedy flew to Washingto

and met with the chief of engineers and officials at the Pentagon. The

approved a new building that was somewhat smaller than Kennedy ha

wanted. Jacques Bouchereau coordinated design and construction of th

building, a three-story rectangular design featuring large open spaces an

few private offices. German contractors were encouraged to “do som

thing good for Engineer Command” in calculating costs.89 The complete

building of pre-cast concrete cost about $12 per square foot, a reasonab

rate at the time.

Groundbreaking for the new headquarters was held on Thursda

3 July 1969. Building 31 was completed, except for outside paving an

landscaping, on 15 January 1970. The day after an opening ceremony th

staff moved in. For the first time the Army engineers in Europe had a new 

building that they did not share with any other organization.

Ammunition Storage Projects

One of the programs that continued under ENGCOM involved sa

storage for ammunition. Attention to ammunition storage intensified a

economic and demographic pressures moved the German populatio

closer to U.S. military facilities.90 By early 1968 seven storage projec

approved as a part of the NATO budget for 1963 had reached varyin

stages of completion. One site remained behind the rest because of prob

lems between the Federal Republic and the state of Hesse concerning th

real estate rights for an access road.91 Work on ammunition storage site

frequently involved removing and disposing of old ammunition, an ope

ation that the German government insisted on controlling and for whic

its officials could find only one willing contractor.92

Incidents of terrorism in West Germany in the early 1970s prompte

both NATO and the United States to consider the vulnerability of the

ammunition storage facilities and to launch a program to improve secu

rity. The 59th Ordnance Brigade, commanded by Maj. Daniel Waldo, J

surveyed the storage sites in Europe north of the Alps and recommende

installation of new security towers and fences. In late 1972 ENGCOM

commander anticipated needing $1 million in fiscal year 1973 to addre

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 24 
163

the critical requirements identified by the Ordnance Brigade’s surveys. 

When planning began for the fiscal year 1974 budget, the command projected a construction program of nearly $13 million. Construction would 

extend into fiscal year 1977 and equip fifty-one sites with anti-intrusion 

devices, special fencing, guard towers, and lighting. The program, which 

continued to grow after 1974, was subsequently labeled the Long Range 

Security Program.93

Challenges in the 1970s

General Kennedy completed his tour as commander of the Engineer 

Command in June 1971 and retired. His successor, Brig. Gen. Carroll 

N. LeTellier, a graduate of the Citadel, had served in Germany between 

1956 and 1959 and again in 1966 and 1967 when he commanded the 10th 

Engineer Battalion in Kitzingen.94 ENGCOM’s first commander, Colonel 

Young (later Major General), recruited LeTellier to replace the retiring 

Col. A. Darby Williams as deputy commander and chief of contract construction of ENGCOM. LeTellier arrived in Frankfurt in October 1967, just 

as Young was leaving. LeTellier served first as chief of the Construction 

Directorate of ENGCOM and then from May to August 1968 as director of troop operations. In August 1968 LeTellier volunteered for a tour 

in Vietnam. In June 1971 he was promoted to brigadier general; the next 

month he assumed command of ENGCOM.95

When LeTellier returned to ENGCOM as commander, he found an 

organization that had more than 570 design and construction projects 

General LeTellier and His Staff in the Early 1970s

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 25 
164

with an in-place construction value of $434 million. The Vietnam Wa

budget restrictions, and difficulties in recruiting, however, had reduce

the workforce to about 19,000 (a drop of about 2,000).96

The command continued to face strong outside criticism. Communit

commanders still resented having to go outside their own staff fo

approval of construction on their installations. LeTellier believed strong

in ENGCOM’s centralized authority and in its consolidation of enginee

resources. To counter the criticism and promote a more positive self-imag

within ENGCOM, LeTellier used the command’s fifth anniversary as th

occasion to set up an ad hoc committee to review the past and project 

five-year plan. He observed that ENGCOM had “developed habits an

procedures through managing one crisis after another, sudden release

and sudden withdrawals of funds, [and] continuous reorganization stud

ies involving roles and missions.”97 LeTellier hoped that the long-rang

plan would help the command move beyond crisis management.

During 1965–1972 ENGCOM’s overall workload and the numbers o

staff increased. (Table 4) By early 1972 ENGCOM had more than thirt

NATO infrastructure projects under design, including missile install

tions, radio relay stations for the Nike and Hawk systems, special ammu

nition storage sites, controlled-humidity storage warehouses, and tactic

and training sites. Ten other infrastructure projects with a value of abou

$2 million were already under construction.98

Between 1967 and 1970 the Alternate Construction Program, funde

by the Federal Republic, had grown from $3.4 million to $11.8 mi

lion annually. In 1972 seven alternate construction projects were unde

design, including housing units in Mainz, Fürth, and Katterbach (nea

 Table 4 

Engineer Command Construction Placement and Staffing 

1965–1972

 Placement and 

 Personnel 1965* 1966* 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 

Placement

($ million) 26.0 30.0 19.9 20.0 48.2 75.7 69.7 100.0

Staff (actual) 77 82 87 92 93 104 127 141

Temporary duty 0 0 0 0 27 25 20 0

Temporary and

over-strength 0 0 0 0 0 32 40 47

Source: EUD Graphics file

*Work conducted by the Engineer Element.

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 26 
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Nuremberg); an access road near Giessen; and an airfield in Bonames 

near Frankfurt. Another thirty active construction projects had a value of 

about $31 million.

Modernizing U.S. Facilities

By early 1972 ENGCOM managed nearly thirty separate construction programs.99 One of the newest and largest was renovation of U.S. 

military facilities paid for by the Federal Republic of Germany. 100 From 

1945 until the activation of the Engineer Command more than twenty 

years later, improving facilities used by U.S. forces had low priority 

because of scarce resources and the predilection of local commanders 

for high-visibility projects. LeTellier termed the inclination of commanders for projects that showed visible results during their tours 

the “eighteen-month syndrome.” Plumbing, wiring, heating plants, 

and sewage lines—invisible maintenance projects that failed to garner 

much notice and thus little credit for anyone—received little attention. 

The Stem to Stern program tried to address these mundane needs, 

but it took care of one caserne at a time, with never enough money to 

improve more than a small fraction of the casernes in any one year. 

LeTellier called it a “never catch up” program.101

On 10 December 1971, the United States signed an accord with the 

Federal Republic whereby the West German government agreed as part 

of the burden sharing to contribute DM 600 million for the renovation of 

U.S. military facilities in West Germany (almost $170 million at the official exchange rate). The agreement for Modernization of U.S. Facilities 

(MOUSF) formed part of the recurrent West German effort to respond 

to pressures from the United States to offset the costs of the American 

military presence. Of the DM 600 million made available by the West 

German government, DM 576 million, or 96 percent, was designated for 

USAREUR. As a result, ENGCOM had two similar programs to administer simultaneously—Stem to Stern, which used dollars from USAREUR’s 

budget for Operations and Maintenance, Army, and MOUSF, which was 

funded with Deutschmarks.102

The Army engineers had far more freedom in using MOUSF money 

than in using appropriated dollars.103 The congressional mandate that halted the conversion of boiler/heaters from coal to oil under Stem to Stern, 

for instance, did not apply to MOUSF work. Starting in 1972 the Federal 

Republic began renovating boilers and heating plants in accordance with 

specifications and technical instructions supplied by ENGCOM.104 The distinction between dollar-funded and Deutschmark-funded work remained 

important into the 1990s. Improvements funded by dollars have residual 

value. As the U.S. military turned facilities over to the Germans, the U.S. 

government could claim compensation for dollar-funded improvements 

but not for improvements made under the MOUSF program.105

Payments for work contracted in Deutschmarks were complicated 

by the changes in the international system of exchange rates for cur09H_Chap06_Final.indd 27 
166

rencies. In early August 1971 the United States abandoned gold pay

ment on foreign-held dollars; and the value of the dollar on intern

tional money markets suddenly dropped, meaning that the dolla

bought considerably less in German money or services. By 16 Augu

ENGCOM’s comptroller, Lt. Col. John L. Buxton, had calculated th

the command needed an additional $1.5 million to cover the increas

in outstanding obligations and commitments associated with th

decline in the dollar’s value.106 A second difficulty arose from th

Army regulation that ENGCOM had to convert any money that it hel

into dollars. Because of this requirement, the command lost mone

twice when settlement of the obligation would be in Deutschmarks—

once on the exchange from marks to dollars and again on the exchang

from dollars back to marks to pay the bill. Buxton’s deputy, Randolp

S. Washington, proposed creating a limited deposit account for mark

in a local bank; ENGCOM could use that account to pay German con

tractors doing work under any program that involved only mark

LeTellier supported the idea, and ENGCOM opened an account despi

resistance in Washington.107

The tempo of modernization of facilities increased and came to repr

sent the dominant program during most of General LeTellier’s comman

By April 1972 ENGCOM had managed the partial renovation of 226 ba

racks and 26 mess halls under Stem to Stern and had placed contracts fo

another 160 barracks and 31 mess halls. In the first two years of MOUS

the command completed designs on 283 barracks and 91 mess halls an

awarded contracts for the renovation of 77 barracks. Designs were read

on another set of contracts for work on 251 more barracks and 74 mes

halls under a later phase of MOUSF.108

ENGCOM quickly initiated the renovations supported by MOUS

funds using available designs prepared under the Stem to Stern program

Construction on the first MOUSF project began in January 1972, just twenty

two working days after the agreement was signed. Saul Fraint, chief o

technical engineering, established procedures for the program, coordinate

design development, and worked with installation personnel on constru

tion schedules. Two architect-engineer firms (Louis Berger with offices i

Frankfurt and McGahey, Marshall, and McMillan with offices in Italy) wer

the principal designers.109

The MOUSF program, which concentrated on barracks and dinin

facilities, did more extensive renovations than Stem to Stern, includ

ing suspending acoustical ceilings in dining facilities; completing new 

shower and latrine facilities; and installing partitions in building

facilities for washers and dryers at a ratio of one per thirty soldier

and mail boxes. Utility systems were totally replaced. The dining hal

received all new equipment, funded with dollars and purchased in th

United States to help counter the unfavorable balance of payments. T

minimize disruption for the troops who continued to live and wor

at the casernes during the renovations, supervisors and contractor

had to maintain a continuous supply of utilities and shift the men an

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 28 
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their equipment from one facility to another as the renovations progressed.110

As the work under MOUSF increased, Stem to Stern tapered off; 

in 1974 the program ended officially. As the money made available in 

December 1971 was progressively committed, design for future MOUSF 

projects also began to slow. In late April 1974 a second MOUSF agreement 

between the United States and the Federal Republic made DM 600 million 

available for additional renovations ($203 million at the official exchange 

rate); USAREUR received DM 503 million, about 84 percent.111

Upgrading Remote Sites

Attention shifted in the 1970s to U.S. military sites located in remote 

areas. These installations included communications sites (listening posts), 

monitoring stations along strategic borders, and missile-launching sites. 

Generally, the locations were secret as well as remote. Both staff and materials usually had to be flown in by helicopter, and regulations prohibited 

the ENGCOM staff from taking photos of the construction. The sites were 

small and their facilities sparse: a building for living quarters, sometimes 

a separate dining facility; warehouses or preparation buildings; and concrete slabs at the missile launching sites. In some locations a perimeter 

fence was not necessary. Initially, many sites did not have commercial 

power.112

Located as they were, these installations were not part of a community and did not have a network of support. ENGCOM tried to furnish 

them with modular prefabricated structures that could be transported by 

helicopter and assembled in a variety of configurations, depending on site 

conditions and need. Starting in 1968, ENGCOM began erecting low-cost 

prefabricated structures from Yugoslavia. On eight sites for the armored 

cavalry stationed around Fulda, ENGCOM erected twenty-five buildings. 

The work was deemed minor construction, and each project had a limit 

of $25,000. To stay within budget, ENGCOM eliminated floor tiles, paint, 

and other items considered optional. This sort of expedient compromise 

produced facilities sufficient to complete the mission but severe enough to 

prompt complaints from the users once the sense of urgency had passed.

In the first half of 1973, MOUSF money became available to improve 

thirty-five remote sites. ENGCOM solicited bids through the Bautechnische 

Arbeitsgruppe for prefabricated buildings at several sites; other sites called 

for construction to be done by labor service units and engineer troops. 

The improvements included barracks, dining facilities, administrative 

buildings, recreational facilities, portable toilets where there were no 

residents, and construction of external sewage and water supply systems. 

MOUSF made $16 million available to ENGCOM to acquire relocatable, 

prefabricated, air-transportable units and to install them and the utilities 

to support them. By the end of 1973 work had begun at several sites, but 

almost 90 percent of the 302 remote sites remained to be upgraded under 

later programs.113

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 29 
168

The Phaseout

Consolidation of engineer resources under ENGCOM continued t

meet resistance into the 1970s. The negative attitude emanated from th

staff at USAREUR headquarters, commanders of military commun

ties, TASCOM, and Washington. In August 1968 a member of a system

analysis team from the Office of the Secretary of Defense remarked o

the “general difficulties that were being experienced in accepting th

Engineer Command.”114 Continuing skepticism and outright hosti

ity—often cloaked in “data” and presented in lengthy studies—could b

traced to three facts. First, community commanders in USAREUR resen

ed ENGCOM’s authority over engineer resources that had been availab

to them previously for work on their installations. They complained th

they could not execute their mission effectively when important mem

bers of their staff answered to another command. Second, because th

Office of the Chief of Engineers did not manage contract construction i

Europe—as it did for military commands elsewhere around the globe—

ENGCOM had no advocate in Washington. Third, the distinction

between the services provided by ENGCOM and by TASCOM were no

clearly delineated.

Both ENGCOM and TASCOM offered support for base operation

ENGCOM concentrated on the engineering functions associated with repa

and maintenance, and TASCOM assigned facilities and retained the logistic

and procurement functions of the earlier Communications Zone in France.

Initially, each command operated through eleven districts in West German

In late 1968 TASCOM reduced the number of its support districts by ha

to six. (Map 12) In 1970, under pressure to conform, ENGCOM grudging

reduced the number of its engineer districts, using the same boundaries a

TASCOM. (See Map 13.) The reorganization focused on simplifying the mil

tary communities’ access to support; it also placed the headquarters of th

support and engineer districts in the same city and, with two exceptions, i

the same barracks or caserne. The simplification did not work. Local com

manders complained that they never knew whom to call when they had 

problem. The confusion was compounded because ENGCOM also main

tained resident engineer offices to handle contract construction.116

None of ENGCOM’s positive achievements—FRELOC, barracks reno

vation, boiler conversion, TAB VEE, remote site upgrades—changed th

negative attitude toward the organization. In addition, a larger issu

remained: Did USAREUR need two separate commands providing sup

port services?

In 1971 USAREUR’s deputy chief of staff, operations, published 

study, “Project FENDER: An Examination of the Missions, Organization, an

Functions of the U.S. Army Engineer Command,” concluding that TASCOM 

could effectively incorporate ENGCOM’s functions. The study reluctant

recommended retaining ENGCOM because of work in progress on Stem t

Stern and the ongoing negotiations with the Federal Republic concernin

what some months later became the MOUSF program.

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 30 
169

During 1972, discussions on the future of ENGCOM intensified. The 

recommendations of FENDER II, issued 22 March 1972, proposed reducing ENGCOM’s role to that of an agency assigned to TASCOM while 

retaining the coordination of the three major engineer functions—facilities engineering, troop construction, and contract construction—under 

Map 12

EAST GERMANY

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T

H E R L A

N

D S

Erfurt

Dresden

Berlin

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

HESSEN

NORTH BAVARIA

NORTH

BAVARIA

RHINELAND-PFALZ

SOUTH BAVARIA

BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG

 7th ARMY

TRAINING COMMAND

Kaiserslautern

Frankfurt

Stuttgart

Grafenwöhr

Nuremberg

Augsburg

Rhine R

Elbe R

WEST GERMANY

THEATER ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1970

District Boundary (approximate)

District Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 31 
170

one headquarters. USAREUR deferred any decision on subordinatin

ENGCOM to TASCOM, but it did direct the USAREUR engineer an

ENGCOM to eliminate redundant positions and reduce their staffs b

twenty-seven and fifty-three positions, respectively.117 In April, coincidin

with the circulation of the FENDER II recommendations, Maj. Gen. Franc

Map 13

EAST GERMANY

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKI

AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T

H E R L A

N

D S

Erfurt

Dresden

Berlin

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

HESSEN

NORTH BAVARIA

RHINELAND-PFALZ

SOUTH BAVARIA

BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG

 7th ARMY

TRAINING COMMAND

Kaiserslautern

Frankfurt

Stuttgart

Grafenwöhr

Nuremberg

Augsburg

Rhine R

Elbe R

WEST GERMANY

ENGINEER COMMAND

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1970

District Boundary (approximate)

District Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 32 
171

P. “Frank” Koisch arrived in Heidelberg as USAREUR engineer. Koisch 

quickly concluded that USAREUR did not have the kind of organization 

that could accomplish its tremendous construction workload. He decided 

that Europe needed the equivalent of an engineer district.118 In November 

USAREUR ordered a study of the structure of the military communities in 

the Federal Republic. The far-reaching Project RED WHEEL study coincided 

with Department of Defense demands that the Army reduce the size of 

“management headquarters.” The conjunction of pressures prepared the 

way for a major reorganization of the U.S. Army in Europe.119

General LeTellier vigorously defended the ENGCOM integration of 

contract construction, troop construction, and facilities engineering in 

a vertical structure of command. Like his predecessors, Generals Young 

and Kennedy, LeTellier thought it the most efficient and effective way to 

provide engineer services to the U.S. forces in Europe. In August 1973 

LeTellier was reassigned to the United States to head the South Atlantic 

Division. As he prepared to leave Europe, he composed a ten-page report 

for the commander in chief of USAREUR, General Michael S. Davison. In 

addition to addressing a number of general topics related to the engineer 

mission, LeTellier expressed concern about the future of the Engineer 

Command. He observed that ENGCOM had been “a step-child during the 

allocation of resources and the ‘whipping boy’ when supported organizations evaluate the style of life to which they believe they are entitled.”120

Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan succeeded LeTellier at the Engineer 

Command. Donovan had served as area engineer in Metz, France, and as 

chief of the Design Branch in the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France, 

from 1959 to 1962. He came to 

Germany as a new general officer after three years as district 

engineer in Sacramento.121

By t h e t i m e D o n ova n 

arrived in Europe, ENGCOM 

was under siege from several 

directions. The insistence in 

the Senate to reduce the presence of U.S. forces in Europe 

and a general retrenchment as 

the Vietnam War wound down 

created pressure for change in 

USAREUR. Secretary of Defense 

James Schlesinger’s mandate to 

increase the ratio of combat forces to support forces—the “toothto-tail” ratio—was a manifestation of the changing atmosphere. 

The increase in the volume of 

ENGCOM’s work, shortages in 

the officer ranks, difficulties in General Donovan

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 33 
172

recruiting German employees, and budget constraints added to admin

istrative problems. As 1974 approached, the command faced the prospe

of running $14 million short of covering its salaries, utility bills, hea

and other fixed costs.122

In September 1973 two operating principles crystallized in th

Department of the Army: Community commanders should contro

their own resources and personnel committed to all support activitie

and USAREUR should cut its headquarters and management person

nel sharply. In response, the USAREUR staff prepared a report titled th

“Consolidation of Headquarters and Area Support Elements” (Proje

CHASE), which outlined a major reorganization in Europe. Project CHA

recommended the abolition of both TASCOM and ENGCOM. To giv

community commanders in Europe greater control over resource

the plan transferred ENGCOM’s responsibilities for facilities enginee

ing to the regional commands: V Corps in Frankfurt, VII Corps i

Stuttgart, and 1st Support Brigade in Kaiserslautern. To reduce head

quarters, ENGCOM’s contract construction functions passed to the OC

in Washington. TASCOM’s responsibilities were distributed among th

military communities, the USAREUR engineer, and the new 1st Suppo

Brigade (later 21st Support Command).123

On 7 February 1974, the USAREUR commander in chief, Gener

Davison, approved the basic proposals outlined by Project CHASE for reo

ganization of engineer resources in Europe. With ENGCOM’s three majo

responsibilities removed, the core of the organization disappeared. Th

Office of the Engineer in USAREUR could assume authority over troo

construction, real estate, and the U.S. Army Topographic Center.124 Th

pressures that General O’Meara had successfully overcome in 1965 an

1966 won out in 1974.

As soon as General Davison made his decision to redistribut

engineering resources in Europe, USAREUR in Heidelberg, OCE i

Washington, and ENGCOM headquarters in Frankfurt initiated plannin

to implement the new arrangement. Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. William 

C. Gribble, Jr., created a new division and named General Donovan t

command it, with Donovan’s chief of staff, Col. Edwin S. Townsley, t

serve as deputy division engineer. Townsley took charge of establish

ing policies and coordinating procedures for the transition, appointin

the deputy comptroller, Randolph S. Washington, as action officer. Th

chief of engineers assigned members of his Washington staff to wor

with Townsley on administrative and managerial tasks such as draw

ing up support agreements with USAREUR and drafting organization

plans and procedures so that the new division would conform to Corps o

Engineers structure and practice.125

To reassign the 25,000 people from the support commands being ina

tivated, the receiving organizations had to write provisional description

for the transfer positions, develop tables of distribution and allowance

and prepare formal job descriptions to be processed through the Civilia

Personnel Office. The process was tedious and laborious.126

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 34 
173

The positions associated under ENGCOM with contract construction 

passed to the new Engineer Division. Administrative support positions 

attached to ENGCOM headquarters were transferred to the three regional 

USAREUR commanders to provide manpower for base support functions.127 These transfers left the new division without the positions necessary to support contract construction, its principal mission. Although the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers authorized a manpower level of 438 for 

the division, USAREUR transferred only 310 spaces from ENGCOM and 

the division received only 280 people who had experience or training in 

contract construction.128

OCE’s deputy chief of engineering, Frederick B. McNeely, headed a 

team of nine people who worked in Frankfurt during April and May 1974 

to set up the administrative structure for the new Corps of Engineers. 

They reviewed staff functions and procedures and wrote job descriptions. Despite their efforts, many employees waiting for new assignments 

worked the summer of 1974 without knowing to which position, at which 

grade, or in what branch they would be assigned.129

Special attention was given to the Germans who had worked in 

the Engineer Command. They were indirect-hire employees paid in 

Deutschmarks by the Federal Republic. USAREUR reimbursed the 

Federal Republic for their salaries and benefits and paid an administrative 

surcharge.130 Over the years USAREUR had signed a series of tariff agreements with the Federal Republic which affirmed that U.S. forces employing local employees would comply with German labor laws on issues 

of pay, annual leave, sick leave, maternity rights, hours, holidays, and 

termination procedures.131 USAREUR and the OCE agreed that the OCE 

would not negotiate an independent agreement with the Federal Republic. 

Germans hired to work in the new division would continue to be included 

with the USAREUR budget and work under USAREUR agreements. Thus, 

the Germans working at the Engineer Division were not employees of the 

Corps of Engineers.

On 1 July 1974, the OCE activated the United States Army Engineer 

Division, Europe, and a new chapter in the organization of engineer 

functions for Europe began. The Engineer Command had undertaken 

major new projects, including FRELOC construction, facilities rehabilitation 

under Stem to Stern and MOUSF, and TAB VEE. It had also continued 

projects begun under predecessor organizations—converting heating 

plants; building missile and weapons sites; providing hardstand parking for tanks and other military equipment; securing ammunition storage facilities; and building schools, chapels, and recreational facilities. 

Construction placement in 1974 totaled $152 million, a 50 percent increase 

over 1972. Although the Engineer Command ceased to exist, the construction mission continued.

09H_Chap06_Final.indd 35 
09H_Chap06_Final.indd 36 
PART THREE

THE EUROPE DIVISION

1974–1991

10I_PartIII Intro_Final.indd 1 
10I_PartIII Intro_Final.indd 2 
INTRODUCTION

The Europe Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began 

its activities in a geopolitical environment in which the status quo 

was more settled than at any time since 1945. The relative stability occurred because the four powers that had occupied Germany 

had reached an agreement in September 1971 on the status of Berlin. In 

the agreement the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet 

Union all recognized the right of each power to remain in Berlin in its 

respective sector. The accord affirmed the special relations between West 

Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany without, however, conceding 

that the city was a part of West Germany.

The four-power accord formed part of German Chancellor Willy 

Brandt’s new policy toward the East, Ostpolitik, which he had pursued 

with energy since assuming leadership of West German’s government 

in 1969. Using the concept of “two states within one nation,” Brandt 

linked the Berlin settlement to a formal accord, the Basic Treaty, signed 

in December 1972 with East Germany. The treaty gave de facto acknowledgment of the German Democratic Republic without granting the full 

diplomatic recognition that the East German regime wanted. Still, in 

September 1973 the two German states were admitted to the United 

Nations as separate sovereign entities. West German Ostpolitik included 

not only the stabilization of Berlin and the intra-German Basic Treaty, but 

also a series of agreements that the West German government signed with 

eastern neighbors: the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These 

agreements confirmed West German acceptance of the territorial status 

quo of the post-1945 settlement in Eastern Europe and thereby resolved 

one of the most potentially troubling aspects of the postwar settlement.

Ostpolitik did not mean that the Cold War was over, only that political 

conflict between East and West in Europe had become less volatile and 

that the tensions surrounding Berlin, long a flashpoint, had diminished. 

The military threat represented by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 

nations remained the focus of the strategies and tactics that dominated 

the thinking of U.S. military planners. Nonetheless, the more stable territorial situation allowed these planners to rethink issues such as troop 

deployment, training, and the relative strength of combat forces to support forces, a debate that came to be labeled the tooth-to-tail ratio. The 

reassessments led to the rotation of combat brigades from the United 

States to West Germany, construction of a new garrison in northern 

Germany near Bremerhaven, and construction of storage facilities for 

equipment and ammunition needed to support the rotation exercises and 

U.S. combat units stationed in Europe. During the 1970s military planners 

10I_PartIII Intro_Final.indd 3 
178

also had to pay increasing attention to the vulnerability of ammunitio

and weapons stored in Europe to terrorist attacks. This attention led to th

long-range security program, a design and construction effort to enhanc

the security of storage facilities.

While the United States and its NATO allies sought to improve th

readiness of their military forces, so did the Soviet Union. One of the mo

significant developments of the 1970s involved the deployment by th

Soviet Union of the SS–20, a new generation of intermediate-range missil

This missile was a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle with 

range of 3,000 to 5,000 miles. The SS–20 carried several nuclear warhead

that were released at the height of its trajectory; each warhead was ind

pendently programmed to hit a different target, thus increasing the di

ficulty of defending against them. The missiles were also easily move

and therefore hard to detect and track. Furthermore, the missiles release

their warheads much closer to their destination than to their launchin

point and thereby increased the probability that at least some nuclea

devices would reach their targets.

The SS–20 worried West European statesmen. Its range made all o

Europe’s major cities susceptible to nuclear attack—German cities could b

struck twenty minutes after launch—and locations in the Middle East, Sout

Asia, and China were equally as vulnerable. West European leaders feare

that the Soviet tactical superiority, even if temporary, would create pressure

to make political concessions unless the United States could take counterme

sures. German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt vigorously promoted deploymen

to Western Europe of U.S. missiles—the Pershing II and ground launche

cruise missiles—comparable to the SS–20. At a mid-December meeting of th

NATO Council in 1979, the member states approved the deployment but cou

pled the decision with a resolution to seek a negotiated removal of the Sovi

missiles. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December, only tw

weeks after the decision of the NATO Council, hardly encouraged optimism

Nonetheless, NATO policy throughout the 1980s followed the two track

of negotiation and preparation for deployment. Thus, U.S. Army enginee

prepared to install the new U.S. intermediate range missiles while diploma

representing NATO pursued negotiations with the Soviet Union to remov

the SS–20s and reduce the level of arms in Europe.

When the threat of the Soviet SS–20s arose, U.S. commanders i

Europe, particularly in Germany where the largest number of troop

served, became acutely aware of the abysmal living conditions that the

troops faced in barracks and in family housing. The effort to improv

morale and welfare by funding remedial and new construction of ba

racks and housing greatly expanded the construction activities of th

Europe Division during the 1980s.

The Europe Division managed construction in Europe for the U.

military from the early days of 1974 though the 1970s and 1980s. The div

sion succeeded in building the installations to support the new missile

while it handled the expansion of construction on housing, welfare, an

recreation facilities that developed in the 1980s. While its staff and wor

10I_PartIII Intro_Final.indd 4 
179

load expanded to deal with the growing volume of construction, the diplomatic efforts toward arms reduction also bore fruit. In December 1987 

the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces—the INF Treaty—that called 

for the elimination of these missiles from the arsenal of both powers. The 

success in reducing the level of armaments aligned across Cold War barriers in Europe presaged even more dramatic changes that overtook the 

Continent during the following several years and that brought an end to 

the Cold War.

10I_PartIII Intro_Final.indd 5 
10I_PartIII Intro_Final.indd 6 
7

THE TRANSITION PERIOD 

1974–1978

The establishment of the United States Army Engineer Division, 

Europe (USAEDE), on 1 July 1974 marked the first time that the 

chief of engineers rather than the theater commander controlled 

contract construction for U.S. forces in Europe. Although the 

line of authority and command governing engineer services was new, 

the tasks remained much the same. On both sides of the Atlantic, people 

worked to make the transition from the United States Army, Europe 

(USAREUR), to the Corps of Engineers successful, to redistribute the 

resources of the Engineer Command (ENGCOM), and to reorganize 

USAREUR’s other support services. The organizational changes affected 

thousands of Americans and Germans working in Europe.

The Corps of Engineers introduced a new culture and a different way of 

doing business. The people working in Frankfurt and throughout the area 

covered by USAREUR already had years of experience doing business in 

Europe and thought that their experience would be valued. In spite of the 

tensions that developed, division personnel provided the services expected 

of them. On a purely administrative level, the reassignment of people and 

distribution of resources was completed quickly; but the transition period 

persisted through 1978, and turbulence and dislocation remained the dominant feelings recalled by those who lived through it.

Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan, serving under the USAREUR commander in chief, commanded the new division only until mid-August 

1974, when he was reassigned.1

 It fell to Donovan’s successor, Brig. Gen. 

Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., to shape the new entity as an operating division of 

the Corps of Engineers. And it was the task of his successor, Brig. Gen. 

Norman G. Delbridge, Jr., to forge a cohesive organization from the “oldtimers” who remained and the “newcomers” from the United States.

New Management

General Prentiss, whose father had been deputy theater chief engineer under United States Forces, European Theater, in 1946–1947, report11J_Chap07_Final.indd 1 
182

ed in Frankfurt on 1 September 

1974. He was the first division 

engineer to serve under the chief 

of engineers in Washington. 

Prentiss came to Frankfurt from 

Stuttgart, where he had served as 

commander of the 7th Engineer 

Brigade, VII Corps engineer, and 

community commander since 

July 1973.2

 Prentiss graduated 

from the U.S. Military Academy 

in 1950 with Donovan. As a new 

lieutenant, Prentiss served three 

years in Germany with an artillery unit. When he returned to 

Europe in 1973 as the staff engineer for the VII Corps commander, Lt. Gen. George S. Blanchard, 

Prentiss heard firsthand the dissatisfaction of the corps commanders with the Engineer 

Command.

The agreement of April 1974 transferring engineer functions from 

the commander in chief of USAREUR to the chief of engineers define

USAEDE’s responsibilities very generally: to plan, direct, and supervis

design and construction of new military construction and family hou

ing programs; to inspect and supervise design and construction carrie

out for the Army by host-nation agencies under indirect contractin

and to furnish design and construction services on a reimbursable bas

as requested by USAREUR.3

 Because USAEDE was an operating div

sion, headquarters incorporated both the oversight and review function

assigned to a stateside division and the contracting and project manag

ment functions assigned to a stateside district. Civilian administrato

from the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) had worked with th

organization’s deputy division engineer, Col. Edwin S. Townsley, an

other staff to create the structure.4

 (Chart 10) Prentiss found the new eng

neer organization still in its formative stages.

Exactly how the USAEDE would fulfill the terms of the April agre

ment became one of Prentiss’ major concerns. Between April 1974 an

January 1976, the division negotiated a dozen supplemental or implemen

ing agreements covering such matters as USAREUR’s provision of civi

ian personnel and real estate services, base support, funding and billin

and the services that the division would provide to USAREUR regardin

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) construction and recoup

ment, Alternate Construction, and project development.5

Prentiss and division staff also had to establish internal operating pro

cedures and mold the organizational pieces of the division into a function

General Prentiss

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 2 
183

ing whole. Adding to the challenge, the division was understaffed; and 

Prentiss faced low morale, changes in senior leadership, additions in territorial responsibility, and growth in the workload. Years later he recalled 

his tour as “a very difficult period, because nothing was normal.”6

The issue of what name the new organization would use was symptomatic of the need to define everything. Although officially designated 

the United States Army Engineer Division, Europe, the organization’s 

common names became European Division and EUD. After the Corps of 

Engineers became a major command in 1979, headquarters asked the division in Frankfurt to use the name Europe Division. EUD continued to be 

the most frequently used short designation.7

Administrative tasks in the early weeks included organizing recruitment, drafting procedural documents, implementing Corps of Engineers 

reporting systems, establishing field offices, and purchasing equipment. 

This work was complicated by uncertainties regarding levels of funding 

and staffing and by changes in mission assignments.8

Area Offices

The 1974 reorganization of USAREUR created three regional commands—V Corps, VII Corps, and 1st Support Brigade (later 21st Support 

 Chart 10: Organization of the Europe Division, 1974 

U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe

Executive Office

Division Engineer

Office of the

Comptroller

Personnel

Office

Construction

Division

Contract

Administration Branch

Office

Engineering Branch

Supervision and

Inspection Branch

Procurement and

Supply Division

Contract

Branch

Supply

Branch

Automated Data

Processing Office

Office of

Administrative

Services

Office of

Council

Area Office

Frankfurt

Area Office

Stuttgart

Area Office

Kaiserslautern

Engineering

Division

Project

Management Branch

Budget and

Reports Branch

Design

Branch

Technical

Review Branch

Special

Assistants

Boards and

Committees

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 3 
184

Command)—and each region became the focal point for the base suppo

functions and the facilities engineering support previously provided b

the Theater Army Support Command and ENGCOM. The headquarte

of each region provided utilities and maintenance and limited enginee

ing design to the community commanders who managed installation

within the regions. (Map 14) The Europe Division provided support whe

engineering tasks exceeded the professional skills available through th

regional staffs.9

By terms of the agreement between USAREUR and the chief of eng

neers, the Europe Division located area offices with V Corps headquarte

in Frankfurt, with VII Corps headquarters in Stuttgart, and with the 1

Support Brigade headquarters in Kaiserslautern. During the first year th

division headquarters struggled to provide personnel and administrativ

assistance for the area offices and their subordinate resident and proje

offices. Because of other priorities, the division gave staffing and suppo

of the three area offices secondary consideration.10

Initially, military and civilian personnel who had served i

ENGCOM’s resident offices staffed EUD’s field offices.11 Many of th

positions previously held by military officers were converted to civilia

slots. Nevertheless, the division had considerable difficulty stabilizing th

military leadership in the area offices. In late 1974 Lt. Col. John L. Buxton

former comptroller of ENGCOM, was named area engineer in Frankfur

Lt. Col. M. R. Carson served in Stuttgart. A civilian, E. M. Grigsby, serve

as acting area engineer in Kaiserslautern until Maj. Robert M. Faxon too

over early in 1975. In July 1975 Maj. Brian W. Teates, Jr., replaced Faxo

and on 1 August Lt. Col. T. L. Doherty replaced Carson in Stuttgart.12 Th

rapid turnover of leadership in the area offices complicated the effort t

achieve stability.

Despite the organizational changes in Frankfurt, field offices contin

ued to oversee construction projects, even with inadequate administrativ

support. Jim Wise, a civilian from the Fort Worth District on temporar

duty in Bad Kreuznach, reported that the secretary in the field office ther

had established a barter arrangement with local German contractors:

I was just flabbergasted, coming from a structured and long-standing organization in the States, [where] logistics is something you 

don’t even think about. Simple things like supplies—typewriter ribbons, paper, pencils, paper clips, all that type stuff—we couldn’t beg, 

borrow, or steal within the organization. Our people were typing letters for contractors in exchange for supplies!13

Dave Cox, assigned to the Würzburg resident office in late 197

recalled the chaos of new procedures, the limited support, and difficultie

acquiring and maintaining vehicles.14

The creation of a fourth area office severely taxed the division’s resour

es. In May 1975 EUD activated the Northern Area Office in Dortmun

to manage two growing construction programs—aircraft shelters an

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 4 
Map 14

V CORPS

VII CORPS

1ST SUPPORT

BRIGADE

1ST SUPPORT BRIGADE

Frankfurt

Kaiserslautern

Stuttgart

BERLIN

Rhine R

Danube R

Elbe R

Main R

Rhine R

B A L T I C S E A

NORTH

SEA

FRANCE

SWITZERLAND AUSTRIA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

EAST GERMANY

POLAND

DENMARK

SWEDEN

BELGIUM LUXEMBOURG

LIECHTENSTEIN

N E T H

E

R

L

A

N

D S

WEST GERMANY

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1975

Regional Boundary (approximate)

Regional Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 5 
186

ammunition security—centered in the Netherlands, Belgium, and norther

Germany. The chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. William C. Gribble, Jr., denie

Prentiss’s request for an additional lieutenant colonel, but Prentiss obtaine

a transfer for Lt. Col. Roy A. Brown, who was already in USAREUR an

eager to change assignments.15 When the new office opened, the other thre

area offices were renamed with geographic designations: the Central Are

Office (Frankfurt), the Southern Area Office (Stuttgart), and the Southwe

Area Office (Kaiserslautern).16 (Map 15)

EUD established a fifth area office when the Corps of Engineers reo

ganized military construction activities in the Mediterranean. Beginnin

in 1952 the Mediterranean Division had performed design and constru

tion for U.S. forces and other U.S. agencies in Africa and the Middle Eas

Since 1957 it had also supervised construction for U.S. forces in Ital

Greece, and Turkey. By the mid-1970s, 90 percent of the division’s wor

had shifted to Saudi Arabia and work in Italy and Greece had decline

The work in Turkey all but stopped as a result of the reaction of th

Turkish government to an arms embargo imposed by the U.S. Congre

in the wake of the Turkish-Greek clash over Cyprus in 1974.17 In Januar

1975 the Office of the Secretary of Defense circulated a draft audit repo

recommending a general reorganization in which the Mediterranea

Division would merge with the Europe Division.18

OCE strongly objected to this suggestion and cited political, logistica

and economic reasons against the merger. Politically, Saudi Arabia wante

to have the engineer headquarters in its own capital. Logistically, EU

would be strained “beyond its capabilities” if it tried to supervise wor

from the North Atlantic to the Arabian Peninsula. Economically, OC

argued, the savings that had been predicted from consolidation wer

“greatly overstated.”19 USAREUR responded that while it had no pa

ticular interest in how the Corps of Engineers organized its work aroun

the world, it had a strong interest in any change that would “bring a

NATO construction functions under EUD cognizance.” USAREUR als

expressed opposition to the transfer of any functions to Europe Divisio

not related directly to NATO.20

Out of this exchange, the Corps of Engineers developed a plan t

retain two divisions but to redistribute responsibilities. In 1976 th

Mediterranean Division was inactivated and a new Middle East Divisio

was established with its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. EUD too

over responsibility for military construction in NATO member state

south of the Alps and established the Mediterranean Area Office at Cam

Darby, near Livorno, Italy, with Lt. Col. Kermit Oelberg as area engineer

Personnel from the inactivated division staffed the office, which include

a design section of about twenty Italians. By June 1976 EUD assume

management of the personnel and projects of the Mediterranean Divisio

for work in Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Portugal.22

The volume of work that EUD inherited south of the Alps was no

large—construction placement between $10 million and $20 million annu

ally in the 1970s—but the geographic expanse was considerable. Prentis

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 6 
187

knew that supervising that work in the new countries added expenses 

and problems of communications and transportation to EUD’s budgetary 

and management responsibilities. He requested help from OCE to facilitate travel and communications, arguing that “bluntly, we cannot perform 

Map 15

Giessen

Stuttgart

Heidelberg Kaiserslautern

Bitburg Bad Kreuznach

Frankfurt

Würzburg

Hoensbroek

(relocated site)

Dortmund 

(original site)

Jever

Nuremberg 

Augsburg

NORTHERN AREA

CENTRAL

AREA

SOUTHWEST SOUTHERN AREA

AREA

E N G L I S H

C H A N N E L

FRANCE

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WEST GERMANY

EAST

GERMANY

DENMARK

SWEDEN

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOURG

LIECHTENSTEIN

Leipzig

Hannover BERLIN

Hamburg

Zürich Dijon

BRUSSELS

AMSTERDAM

The Hague

FIELD ORGANIZATION

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1975

Area Office Boundary (approximate)

Area Office Headquarters

Resident Office

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 7 
188

the mission down there without an aircraft.” EUD finally received an ai

plane in late 1976, several months after Prentiss had left.23

Staff Continuity and Morale

A constellation of problems in the Europe Division’s headquarte

confronted Prentiss during his first months at EUD. The division had fou

major categories of employees: military personnel, Department of th

Army civilians (DACs), Germans, and dependents of other military an

civilian personnel serving in Europe (dependent hires). The division ha

only a few military officers, all in supervisory positions. Some position

had been designated for German citizens, and these employees provide

stability in the work force. Employees carried over from the Enginee

Command initially occupied the positions designated for DACs, but div

sion leaders had the most flexibility of recruitment and selection in th

category.

In the transition from the Engineer Element to the Engineer Comman

in 1966, experienced civilian personnel had been encouraged to stay on

but in 1974 leaders at OCE in Washington thought that the transitio

offered “the opportunity to make some needed personnel changes in th

engineer hierarchy then in Europe.”24 A 1973 study had suggested th

personnel with long service who occupied top management position

in ENGCOM be encouraged to retire or to seek positions in the Unite

States.25 The old-timers had experience in dealing with the unique prob

lems of overseas construction, and many were fluent in German and othe

European languages; but they were entrenched in positions and at salarie

that blocked new employees.

The first major personnel change came quickly. In the summer of 197

John Tambornino, chief of engineering since 1956, decided to retire on 3

November. OCE drew up the list of candidates for his position and includ

ed no one with experience working in Europe. Ralph Wheeler, assistant t

the chief of construction at OCE, Frederick McNeely, emerged as the lead

ing candidate; and General Donovan appointed him as chief of enginee

ing. Other people from the Corps of Engineers subsequently filled to

vacancies in Frankfurt; the lists that OCE prepared seldom included EU

staff or persons with experience in Europe.26 OCE’s priority was place

on familiarity with Corps procedures.27 Washington recruited employee

from Corps districts and divisions in the United States to help institu

the “Corps system” in Europe, and in the first several months forty-on

persons took temporary duty assignments of ninety or more days in EUD

The newcomers to Europe received no briefing or orientation befor

they arrived.28 The incoming chief of the Office of Administrative Service

R. L. Rousseau, described the situation in Frankfurt as “chaotic.”29 Jim 

Wise, who later returned to a permanent position in EUD, recalled th

“there were a lot of people in a very limited space.... They were sittin

out in hallways; where they were inside offices, you could barely wal

between the desks.”30 Notwithstanding the confusion, many who cam

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 8 
189

from the United States described their experience in the new organization 

as “exciting.”31

Those who had been working in Europe viewed the transition period 

differently.32 American civilians who had been recruited for work in 

Europe by the Corps in the 1950s and 1960s thought that they had always 

been a part of the Corps of Engineers “family.” William E. Camblor, who 

had served as director of the U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany 

(USACAG), beginning in 1956, drew attention to this attitude during a 

1961 inspection tour by the visiting chief of engineers. Camblor explained 

that he had organized USACAG “along the basic lines of a normal stateside Corps of Engineers district.”33 The attitude of the newcomers distressed the old-timers, who felt their professional competency and their 

patriotism were being challenged. The choice of Wheeler—rather than 

someone already in Europe—to succeed Tambornino increased suspicions 

that Tambornino had been targeted for removal.34

Most of the several thousand Germans who had worked for the 

Engineer Command had served in facilities engineering. Those who 

joined the Europe Division worked in military communities, where they 

provided the new organization with valuable continuity in managing 

projects and in estimating, indirect contracting, real estate, NATO recoupment, and legal affairs. The attitudes of the newcomers also distressed 

these employees: “They said, this is not the way the Corps does it. They 

didn’t pay any attention to the fact that they are not in the States, [that] we 

are working under entirely different rules and conditions.”35

General Prentiss (left) with John Tambornino in November 1974

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 9 
190

The newcomers had little knowledge of indirect contracting, litt

regard for the experience and knowledge of the old-timers, and litt

disposition to learn from their new colleagues. Almost two decades afte

the activation of the division, long-term employees spoke of the 1974 tran

sition as “traumatic” and “horrible.” The adversarial atmosphere remaine

one of the strongest memories of the period.36

Division leaders soon realized that they did not have adequate staf

ing for their mission. General Prentiss thought that OCE had failed t

take into account the difficulties of doing business in Europe, where sta

had to observe both American and European design criteria. Also, ind

rect contracting required project managers to coordinate with layers o

host-government agencies, and the language differences made translato

and interpreters essential. These factors made EUD’s work more labo

intensive than managing construction in the United States. The div

sion pressed its recruiting effort to fill vacant positions with permanen

employees. By March 1975 EUD’s staff had increased from the 280 wh

transferred from ENGCOM to just over 400. By the end of the year th

staff numbered almost 500.37

In September 1975 the chief of engineers, General Gribble, told Prenti

to expect “some reduction in military spaces” in fiscal year 1976 becaus

of ceilings that Congress had placed on the military. Prentiss proteste

that EUD needed more employees.38 A manpower survey conducted i

mid-October confirmed that the division’s workload justified nearly 60

employees, but Gribble informed Prentiss that the staff would remai

below 500 for the foreseeable future. OCE suggested the continued use o

personnel on temporary duty.39

In addition to the shortage of personnel, Prentiss had to deal with th

growing concern in OCE over the position of women and minorities i

the Corps. The command inspection team visiting EUD in September 197

advised the division to create an equal employment opportunity (EEO

function and a race relations program. Prentiss had begun to implemen

such programs, but he had so few people that he chose to staff the EE

position only part time. Because USAREUR’s Civilian Personnel Offic

in Frankfurt served EUD, the division prepared only a supplement to th

USAREUR Equal Employment Opportunity Action Plan.40

Prentiss began to make personnel changes. As he came to realiz

the importance of establishing and maintaining good relationship

with international leaders, Prentiss involved William Camblor mor

extensively, especially in contracting. Commensurate with Camblor

rank (GS–15), his experience, and his skills as a negotiator, Prentis

changed his title from “assistant to” the division engineer to “assistan

division engineer for intergovernmental affairs.”41 After appointing th

comptroller, Colonel Buxton, as area engineer for the Frankfurt Are

Office, Prentiss promoted Buxton’s deputy, Randolph S. Washington, t

the position of comptroller. Prentiss believed that this promotion mad

Washington the only African American civilian managing an admini

trative division in the Corps of Engineers.42 Another African America

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 10 
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civilian, Jacques Bouchereau, served as deputy chief of the Construction 

Division.

Prentiss was not satisfied with the chief of construction, H. Jace Greene. 

Greene had served in Frankfurt since the beginning of USACAG, and his 

involvement in military construction in Europe went back to 1946. Prentiss 

asked his deputy, Colonel Townsley, to monitor Greene’s performance; 

Greene found this supervision insulting, and a contest of wills continued 

for months. In November 1976, after an extended medical leave, Greene 

retired. By that time both Prentiss and Townsley had left the division, leaving it to the next commander to select a new chief of construction.43

Adjustments in the Comptroller’s Office

When the command inspection team submitted its report, it acknowledged that “the transition from the administrative and command procedures 

of Engineer Command to those of the Corps of Engineers” created major 

problems for the Europe Division. These difficulties were compounded by 

the “shortage of experienced personnel in the administrative activities.” As a 

result, the team concluded, “full and effective support of the operational mission” was lacking.44 Harmonizing practices in the new Comptroller’s Office 

presented special challenges for the Europe Division. The dissolution of 

ENGCOM had shifted employees who had little accounting experience into 

the Finance and Accounting Branch. Turnover among staff in the basic clerical positions was exceedingly high—at times over 100 percent a year—which 

made it especially difficult to maintain continuity, to train, or simply to get 

the work done.45 Several key positions in the Comptroller’s Office—chiefs 

of finance and accounting, budget and programs, and cost accounting—

remained vacant for several months.46

OCE sent people on temporary assignments from other Corps offices 

to work with EUD staff while recruitment continued. They were not prepared for the complexity of tracking costs of projects in seven countries 

and seven currencies, each at varying rates of exchange for the dollar. 

Furthermore, each project might use funds from a mix of two or more 

sources or appropriations.

In EUD all posting was done by hand. Comptroller Washington and 

the deputy division engineer, Colonel Townsley, had expanded the standard five-column account sheet used in the United States to fourteen 

columns. The additional columns allowed them to monitor fluctuations 

of the exchange rate between the day EUD awarded a contract and the 

actual payment for work, delays arising from the indirect system of contracting through host-nation agencies, and a half-dozen other variables 

that stateside offices never had to worry about. One of those variables—

inflation—compounded the comptroller’s headaches: In 1975 inflation 

amounted to 20 percent on dollar purchases and 7 percent on purchases 

in Deutschmarks, the worst rates in over twenty years.47

OCE’s plan to implement the Corps of Engineers Management 

Information System (COEMIS) encountered serious problems. Overall, 

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 11 
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COEMIS was ill suited to the European environment: It could neithe

handle multiple currencies nor maintain the personnel records of a labo

force that included German employees, DACs, and locally hired depen

dents. EUD’s computers, installed in 1974, turned out to be incompatib

with COEMIS.

The command inspection team that visited EUD in August 1975 di

not appreciate the ingenuity of the system that Washington and Townsle

had cobbled together. They saw only that the system was complex an

unwieldy, the general ledger frequently did not correspond with sub

sidiary records, and the records proliferated in “distressing” ways

Townsley and Washington cooperated with the Comptroller’s Offic

at OCE to reconcile the two systems and to recruit new employees, bu

progress in the Comptroller’s Office was painfully slow. Incompatibilitie

between COEMIS and EUD’s needs took many years to resolve.49

In-House Design

Tensions arising from the clash of old and new personnel and pro

cedures were exacerbated by the OCE decision to establish an in-hous

design capability to EUD. None of the Europe Division’s predecesso

organizations had maintained such a capability, although stateside Corp

districts generally accomplished from 25 to 50 percent of their design in

house. This practice helped maintain the technical proficiency of enginee

personnel and saved money. Thinking to apply the same logic to Europ

the transition team wrote a design branch into the Engineering Divisio

in EUD’s organization chart.50

When Ralph Wheeler arrived in Frankfurt as the chief of th

Engineering Division in the autumn of 1974, he intended to develo

a Design Branch capable of handling about a quarter of the division

design requirements. He expected the remaining 75 percent of the work t

be passed to architect-engineer firms either under direct contract to EU

or as indirect contracts through a host-government agency.51 Wheele

received approval from OCE for an authorized strength of more tha

eighty people for the Design Branch and began recruiting when not

fied of his appointment as chief of engineering. By the time he arrived i

Frankfurt, more than twenty people from all over the United States wer

committed to the Design Branch.52

Wheeler was conscientious and enthusiastic, but neither he nor h

recruits understood the international agreements and conventions th

governed indirect contracting and limited the division’s ability to d

design work in-house. Neither were they equipped to prepare desig

documents in metric measurements and in both English and the languag

of the host country.53

Wheeler also failed to appreciate that the Europeans took a radical

different approach developing a design package from Americans. As 

result, his arriving personnel would have to learn a totally new system o

preparing contract specifications. American design engineers put every

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 12 
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thing that the design demands on the drawings (plans) for the project. 

Specifications then define how or according to what standards various 

jobs are to be accomplished, for example, how to mix the concrete, prepare 

a surface before painting, and lay roofing. Construction contractors, working from the drawings, determined the scope of services, quantities of 

materials, and type of equipment needed to complete the work. Then they 

submitted a bid based on their own calculations.54

Specifications in the German design package had to contain a detailed 

list of the materials and services required by the project. American engineers expected the contractors to generate their own list. For standards on 

the quality of work—the “how to” set out in American specifications—

Germans turned to the Deutsche Industrie-Normen (DIN). The Germans 

had a DIN on roofing, a DIN on painting, and a DIN on structural steel, 

and so on, each of which tells how to do specific tasks in every phase of 

construction.55

The German specifications became an expanded bill of materials so 

that all bidders started with the same definition of how much work was 

to be done. This approach placed the responsibility and the risk on the 

designer rather than on the contractor. Europeans “didn’t want construction firms going broke because somebody had underestimated the job.”56

The American approach placed greater responsibility and risk on the construction contractor. He had to calculate how much material to purchase 

and risk losses if his estimates were wrong. Joe G. Higgs, who succeeded 

Wheeler as chief of engineering at EUD, explained: “In the United States 

you look at the plans and then you read the specs. In Germany they read 

the specs, and they don’t even look at the plans until they start construction.... In Germany, if it is not in the specs, it doesn’t count.”57

Wheeler put a tremendous amount of personal effort into making in-house design succeed, but there were too many obstacles. The 

learning curve for the new staff was steep, and the backlog of design 

increased. In-house design never exceeded 11 percent of the workload of 

the Engineering Division and averaged below 5 percent.58 Wheeler had 

compounded the problems when he put almost twenty of the long-time 

employees who could have helped the new design engineers—they had 

experience with the DIN, metrics, and local materials—into a Technical 

Review Branch.59 After less than two years he recombined the Design 

Branch and the Technical Review Branch into a technical engineering 

branch headed by Lou Brettschneider, the engineer who had served as 

chief of that branch after Saul Fraint retired in 1973.60

Support for Facilities Engineers

The April 1974 agreement signed by the chief of engineers and the 

commander in chief of USAREUR provided that the new Corps organization would “furnish engineering design and construction services to the 

regional commanders ... as requested,” and referred specifically to “OMA 

[Operations and Maintenance, Army] and minor military design and con11J_Chap07_Final.indd 13 
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struction projects,” which EUD was to execute “on a reimbursable basis

Although USAREUR expected this support for the facilities engineers, 

could offer EUD no staff positions to cover the work.61

In the inactivation of the Engineer Command and the establishmen

of the Europe Division, the regional corps commanders assumed th

function for installation support. The transfer of responsibilities did no

go smoothly, and relations between the EUD staff and facilities enginee

were not cordial. No one had a very clear idea which new tasks or projec

would go to the regional Directorates of Facilities Engineering and whic

would go to EUD. People at EUD doing work very similar to the wor

done in facilities engineering positions had been given higher grades an

salaries. The facilities engineering personnel in the regions saw no reaso

to channel new work to Frankfurt.62

The division’s first challenge was to complete projects left unfinishe

Brettschneider recalled that ENGCOM’s Facilities Directorate had a larg

number of projects under way in 1974, and the departing staff “dumpe

cartons into Mr. Tambornino’s office.... It took months and months o

tremendous effort to clear the decks.”63 To complete design work on thes

projects, the division turned to stateside districts for help and intensifie

recruiting for additional personnel.64

General Prentiss placed a high priority on establishing good relation

between EUD and the facilities engineering organizations. He did no

want to be criticized, as ENGCOM commanders had been, for failing t

provide adequate engineering support to the military communities. I

early October 1974 he met with the regional directors of facilities enginee

ing for V Corps, VII Corps, and the 1st Support Brigade to outline EUD

capabilities and to offer assistance with architect-engineer contracts an

with the supervision of construction and design.65 From his experience i

Stuttgart, he thought that facilities engineers in the communities neede

EUD’s technical expertise and help in managing contracts. He also knew 

that the facilities engineering workforce had little capability for eve

minor new construction or inspection.66

Prentiss and Wheeler told the commanders that EUD would hel

them with their operations and maintenance program.67 Division person

nel met monthly with facilities engineers. The three directors of facilitie

engineering began asking the division to assist with design and supervis

construction. Project funding came from family housing maintenanc

nonappropriated funds, and OMA budgets.68

EUD also devised a new way to obligate year-end OMA funds th

might otherwise have reverted to the U.S. Treasury. The procedur

involved encumbering funds by using reimbursable orders—a form o

purchase order between government agencies—for work to be done in th

next fiscal year. Once obligated, the funds were carried over into the nex

fiscal year to finance work in progress.69

Prentiss and Wheeler’s efforts succeeded almost too well: The wor

load increased rapidly. In April 1975 Wheeler created the Facilitie

Engineering Support Section to handle the influx of work. Headed b

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 14 
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Tom Conner, the section began with just three project manager positions; 

by June the regional Directorates of Facilities Engineering had given them 

300 projects with a value of $47 million. By August they had more than 

450 projects with a total value of $54 million; some single projects were as 

low as $1,700. The section grew to six people, and by the end of 1976 the 

number of projects had more than tripled.70

A severe backlog of design work developed in the Engineering 

Division and attracted the attention of OCE’s Directorate of Military 

Construction. OCE warned the division against taking on “too much 

work” in facilities engineering. The command inspection team that visited the Europe Division in August 1975 recommended that USAREUR be 

“requested to provide adequate manpower spaces to EUD to undertake 

the work [for facilities engineering].”71 To General Prentiss, this advice 

exemplified OCE’s lack of understanding of the division’s mission. He sent 

the director of military construction, Maj. Gen. Bates C. Burnell, a copy of 

the USAREUR agreement with pertinent passages underlined. Calling 

USAREUR’s requests for engineering services “legitimate,” Prentiss questioned whether the people in OCE had read the agreement.72

Work for the facilities engineers remained an important part of EUD’s 

operation and a concern for each successive commander. Army auditors 

ruled that the division’s device of obligating the year-end money through 

special purchase orders violated government regulations, but the division 

developed other instruments such as open-ended contracts that allowed 

the communities to group small jobs into larger bid packages. The division 

also established guidelines that eliminated the very small contracts. Both 

of these steps eased some of the pressure on the Engineering Division.73

Assessing the First Two Years

In May 1976 General Prentiss moved to the position of deputy chief of 

staff, engineer, in USAREUR.74 In his final letter to the chief of engineers 

from Frankfurt, Prentiss boldly addressed his difficulties with OCE. He 

protested against “those on your staff with great authority and no responsibility,” against inspection teams who arrived in Frankfurt with “an obvious bias,” and against the lack of information in headquarters about “indirect contracting and about our support agreement with USAREUR.” He 

called OCE’s control of referral lists for staff openings a “major irritant” 

and cited his search for a new chief of construction. The list he received 

included “only three names that I recognized, two OCE long-timers and 

another former OCE member who refused my offer of a job a year ago.” 

He was “amazed” to find neither of the two names he had recommended 

on the list. Prentiss had registered these complaints months earlier in correspondence with OCE, and many of his successors echoed them.75

For all the problems, Prentiss had a sense that the division had made 

progress. Although there were many procedures and administrative 

guidelines to be worked out, he felt that EUD’s energetic support of facilities engineers at the community and regional levels and its acceptance of 

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 15 
196

expanding responsibilities in the Mediterranean had earned the organiz

tion credibility throughout the Army.76

The assessment Prentiss presented to his own staff was more critic

than that in his report to OCE. In one of his last staff meetings he pointe

four administrative shortcomings: missed deadlines, failure to suppl

interim responses alerting customers to delays, poorly written corre

spondence, and failure to record policy decisions. He commented on th

tendency to conceal problems so as to avoid criticism and urged just th

opposite, that civilian employees bring problems into the open for discu

sion.77 Two years after its activation, the division had dissatisfied peop

and sloppy procedures.

Change of Command

General Delbridge arrived at the division a few days after Gener

Prentiss moved to Heidelberg. At the end of the war Delbridge, just eigh

teen, had enlisted in the Army and had gone from the ranks to Officer

Candidate School. As a young lieutenant he supervised airfield constru

tion in Berlin from 1947 to 1949. He then won an appointment to th

U.S. Military Academy, where he graduated in 1953. Delbridge serve

three years (1958–1961) with the U.S. Engineer Group in Turkey. In 1975

1976, just before taking over at EUD, he had commanded the Suppo

Command of the 3d Armored Division in Frankfurt.

Delbridge was gregarious, and he wanted to create an atmosphere 

EUD in which the staff would feel they were part of a large family an

share in “the closeness and professionalism” associated with the Corps

From his first days at the division, however, he was troubled by the cliqu

ishness among the staff and the absence of cordiality toward him an

his family. Delbridge concluded that there was something “desperate

wrong.”79

The new commander began to work on staff morale immediatel

During a command inspection, Delbridge asked for pictures he could us

for a briefing, emphasizing that he wanted photos not only of constru

tion projects, but also of division personnel at work: “secretaries typin

inspectors inspecting, supervisors supervising, reviewers reviewing.”

He also went “shopping” for a full-time public affairs officer, someon

to take responsibility for the internal issues of staff morale and cohesiv

ness as well as the public image of the division. He remembered a youn

woman from the San Francisco District who had given “a magnificen

presentation ... full of fire and humor.” Early in the summer of 197

Delbridge contacted Shirley Kappa, and she agreed to come to Europe.81

Kappa took over editorship of the division’s newsletter and put it on 

monthly publication schedule. She filled it with news about staff membe

and division activities. The newsletter featured pictures of both militar

and civilian employees, with prominent attention to German employee

Initially, the publication used the title EUD Bulletin, but Kappa asked fo

suggestions for a more imaginative name. The July 1977 issue featured th

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 16 
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new masthead—a woodcut print 

of ten hard-hatted men linked 

shoulder to shoulder, each with 

one very large shod foot kicked 

high in the air. (Figure 3) Across 

the soles of the shoes appeared 

the letters “c-o-r-p-s-’-l-i-n-e.”82

Kappa also organized “Kastle 

Keepers,” a group of American 

and German staff members who 

planned activities for employees and their families, including 

ski trips, holiday parties, sports 

teams, and “Meet and Mingle” 

afternoon get-togethers. To welcome new employees, Kappa put 

together a photo brochure on the 

division and set up a program 

matching an employee “sponsor” with each new employee. 

She promoted the idea of business cards for staff and had them 

printed. Delbridge believed that 

Kappa’s “little things” helped to 

foster an identity for EUD and to 

improve staff morale.83 Her energy and enthusiasm mirrored Delbridge’s 

style of management: His deputy, Col. Carlyle “Chuck” Charles, said, “I 

don’t think there was a person he didn’t know by first name—and what 

they did.”84

The Projects Board

Delbridge wanted people at EUD to see themselves as part of a team, 

to look beyond their particular jobs, and to develop a sense of the entire 

organization. In his first meeting with the staff, on 25 May 1976, he 

described this philosophy and quoted the renowned English physicist 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers European Division Frankfurt, Germany Vol II No. 6

July 77

c

o

r p

s

l

i

n

e

 Figure 3: New Masthead of the Europe Division Newsletter 

General Delbridge

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 17 
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and novelist C. P. Snow: “Judgment is the ability to look at many thing

at once in their interdependence, their related importance, and their con

sequences.” In his first weeks at the division, Delbridge found that “to

many people were making judgments by looking down a straw.”85

When he looked at the EUD workload, he found that the staff was no

able to report on all of the active projects and contracts. He concluded th

the division needed a tracking and reporting system to monitor expen

ditures and keep work on schedule. Such a system could also encourag

everyone to take a broad view of the work and activities. Delbridge aske

each division to prepare reports for staff meetings. He also asked them 

to devise a method to “permit monthly review of ‘key’ projects ... [to b

conducted] as part of a monthly review by the entire EUD staff in the new 

conference room, which will be designed to present the total workload o

this division in a visible manner.”86

“The board” became a fixture of Delbridge’s tenure. Three walls of th

conference room were hung with large magnet-sensitive display board

each of the nearly 1,400 projects under contract within EUD was listed o

a separate magnetic card about ten inches wide. The cards contained th

pertinent information for the project, including project manager, contra

tor, amount spent, and current status; they were arranged on the board

by funding source, and they could be updated in grease pen. Delbridg

made the “board review” a monthly event, and just before the review th

comptroller put a red flag next to any project on which reports showe

overspending or deviation from the schedule.87

The review sessions were detailed and time-consuming, becaus

Delbridge asked the project managers to report on every project. Whe

Delbridge judged an explanation inadequate, he bore down hard an

demanded answers. John Lewis, who had arrived from the Huntsvil

Division on 1 September 1976 to succeed Greene as chief of constructio

managed about 250 projects in his division and acquitted himself wel

Ralph Wheeler’s task was much more difficult: The Engineering Divisio

had to track more than 1,000 projects. Preparing for board reviews too

hours of work, and the reviews could last all day. Heated exchange

among the participants were frequent, and the whole exercise was ver

controversial. Some staff found the demands of accountability person

ally exhilarating and invigorating for the organization. Others resiste

complained that they were drowning in detail, and labeled Delbridge 

micromanager.

Few people in the division understood the board review as a devic

Delbridge wanted to jolt people into seeing the various individual projec

“in their interdependence, their related importance, and their consequen

es.” Despite the staff time required to keep the board updated, Delbridg

thought that on balance the board succeeded. Several people who worke

with him agreed: Lt. Col. Roy Brown, Northern Area engineer, describe

the period as “a most dynamic time,” in which the organization improve

because Delbridge put “many people’s feet to the fire.” The division coun

sel, Allan B. Aaron, observed that Delbridge “pushed us to do things w

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 18 
199

probably didn’t think we could do in the time frames that were demanded, but we managed because our commander pushed us.” Delbridge’s 

deputy, Colonel Charles, said “the esprit de corps was super in the organization unless you were a slackard [sic].... It was probably a high point of 

my career to see an outfit work like we were doing.”88

From the monthly reviews, evidence mounted that the Engineering 

Division could not handle the increasing design workload. The review 

of 24 January 1977 revealed that 70 percent of the projects in the division were behind schedule; the prediction for February was 80 percent slippage. Delbridge exploded! Although he acknowledged that the 

Engineering Division was understaffed, he held the chief of engineering, 

Wheeler, personally accountable for the delays.89

Addressing Personnel Shortages

Division and branch chiefs reported to Delbridge the same personnel 

shortages about which Prentiss had complained. The new commander 

quickly concluded that the shortages hurt EUD’s ability to accomplish its 

mission.90 To address the problem, Delbridge took two courses of action. 

First, to make the division more attractive to potential employees, he 

requested both an increase in authorized positions and an increase in the 

average grade structure. Second, he ordered internal reviews to evaluate how EUD was using people. Completed in October 1976 and January 

1977, these studies showed that if the division carried its locally hired 

dependents as temporary rather than permanent full-time staff, as many 

as thirty-five additional spaces could be regained and filled with DACs. 

Although most of the dependents worked in clerical and secretarial positions, the recovered spaces could be set at a higher level, making it possible for the division to recruit additional professional staff. Delbridge 

directed that the spaces be reallocated internally to the Engineering 

Division, particularly for project management.91

Delbridge ran into trouble when OCE reviewed his requests for an 

increase in authorized strength. In a visit to Frankfurt in March 1977, the 

chiefs of engineering and construction, Lee Garrett and Fred McNeely, 

respectively, challenged the purported needs and EUD’s recruiting ability, noting that the division had not filled all its authorized positions. 

They proposed that EUD use stateside districts to do more of its design 

work and that the division contract out other work. They also questioned 

the “alleged” need to use indirect contracting for design. Overall, they 

seemed unsympathetic to EUD’s problems; OCE turned down Delbridge’s 

request.92

Delbridge won modest support from the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. 

John W. Morris, when the two met at NATO headquarters in Brussels in 

May 1977. Delbridge returned to Frankfurt with assurances from Morris 

of limited increases in the authorization for senior-level civilian positions, 

an increase of thirty-two positions in overall professional strength (seven 

military and twenty-five DACs), and an increase in the average grade, all 

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 19 
200

to be added to the authorization for fiscal year 1978. The new authoriz

tion was less than the forty-five positions Delbridge had requested, but 

was a start.93

The new spaces, plus the spaces recovered by internal reallocatio

and openings created by normal attrition or rotation, allowed Delbridg

to bring in more people with Corps experience. In the summer of 197

Delbridge had to select a new chief of construction to replace Joh

Lewis, who accepted a comparable position with the new Middle Ea

Division in Saudi Arabia. McNeely at OCE did the recruitment and pr

liminary selection for this position. His choice, Jose Cruz, had twenty

five years of experience in the Corps of Engineers, most recently a

assistant chief of construction in the Fort Worth District, but had neve

worked in Europe. Cruz started work in Frankfurt in September 197

allowing a brief overlap with Lewis, who remained with EUD until earl

October.94

In this same period General Delbridge decided not to renew Wheeler

three-year contract as chief of engineering. After a national search durin

which he returned to the United States to interview candidates, Delbridg

selected Joe G. Higgs, chief of engineering in the Savannah Distric

During his career with the Corps of Engineers since 1954, Higgs ha

worked in the Huntsville Division and Mobile District but had not worke

overseas. Higgs and his family arrived in Europe late in February 1978.95

The decision to replace Wheeler, the selection of Higgs, and the batt

over authorized positions took place while Delbridge struggled with 

delicate issue involving the personal links among his superiors in th

chain of command. Delbridge’s predecessor, General Prentiss, had joine

a close-knit team of engineer officers serving under USAREUR com

mander, General George S. Blanchard. Lt. Gen. Kenneth B. Cooper, deput

commander in chief, had graduated from the U.S. Military Academy wit

Blanchard in 1944. The chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Richard H. Groves, clas

of 1945, was Prentiss’s immediate superior. General Burnell, also class o

1945, served as director of military construction in OCE. Burnell initiate

an exchange of letters with Prentiss, and in early 1977 Prentiss reinstitute

“the practice of informally updating” the chief of engineers each quarte

on the engineer activities of USAREUR.96

From his arrival at EUD in May 1976 to the end of 1977, Delbridg

exchanged letters with Prentiss and Burnell about the policy direction

EUD should pursue. As the junior officer, Delbridge felt uneasy. Suppo

for him at OCE seemed equivocal—the response to his removal o

Wheeler and his selection of Higgs being examples—and he thought, a

Prentiss had, that the senior civilians in Washington were undercuttin

him. Some at EUD, including Delbridge, thought that he might be relieve

as commander.97

Delbridge’s concerns increased when in September 1977 Prentiss gav

Burnell a series of “suggestions” for revising EUD procedures, particu

larly urging that the division turn more work over to host nations unde

the indirect contracting system. Delbridge prepared a lengthy reply. H

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 20 
201

reiterated the division’s challenge of “executing an extremely large program with a disproportionately small staff”; but he concluded that “the 

Corps and its European customers would best be served by retaining 

present EUD flexibility which allows us to go either directly to industry, 

indirectly to the host nation, or to any CONUS [Continental United States] 

district for services.”98

Delbridge’s defense reached a new team of military leaders at OCE. 

Brig. Gen. Richard M. Connell had replaced Burnell as director of military 

construction, and Maj. Gen. Ernest Graves, deputy chief of engineers from 

July 1977 to March 1978, emerged as a supporter. Graves helped to resolve 

the impasse over manpower, and he shored up Delbridge’s authority to 

make decisions for EUD.

General Graves was particularly well prepared to judge whether the 

Europe Division needed the workforce that Delbridge had been requesting. In 1970, while serving as deputy director of military construction, he 

had devised a formula for calculating the appropriate ratio of employees 

to any given level of work in military construction.99 In December 1977 

Graves, accompanied by Garrett and McNeely, made the first of two visits 

to Frankfurt to discuss the division’s personnel issues. About two-thirds 

of the way through Delbridge’s briefing, “Graves slammed his hand down 

on the desk—scared everybody to death—and said, ‘Dammit! You needed 

100 people six months ago!’” Delbridge’s initial reaction was anger, but 

then he realized, “[Graves] wasn’t talking to me, he was talking to the 

guys on either side of him.”100 Graves told Delbridge to have his staff prepare a detailed statement of the division’s manpower requirements.

In March 1978 Graves returned to EUD with Garrett and McNeely 

to review the manpower requests. Higgs, who had recently arrived to 

head the Engineering Division, took Garrett and McNeely aside and 

asked them to “leave us alone. Give us a chance ... give me time to work.” 

Within weeks EUD received authorization to recruit 120 new employees, 

and in the ensuing months the frequency of visits from OCE declined.101

His confidence bolstered, Delbridge launched a broad recruitment 

campaign to fill the new positions. In May 1978 the division sent a fiveperson recruiting team, headed by Shirley Kappa, to the United States. 

Team members visited Washington, Baltimore, Kansas City, New Orleans, 

Sacramento, Portland, and Seattle. They gathered several hundred applications from Corps employees, and more than 70 percent of those who 

received offers accepted. This success was especially satisfying because 

Garrett and McNeely had predicted that fewer than half the people 

offered positions would actually accept. With the new positions, routine 

departures at the end of contracts, and an authorized “overhire” of 70 

DACs, EUD added about 120 new employees in the summer and autumn 

of 1978. In the division’s initial year, 1974, its staff numbered 280. That 

increased to 589 by October 1976, five months after Delbridge had taken 

command. In the fiscal year ending October 1977, staff size increased by 

less than 5 percent, but the rate of expansion tripled in Delbridge’s final 

year, bringing the total to about 700 by October.102

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 21 
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Visiting TUSEG

During his tour as commander of EUD, General Delbridge took sp

cial pleasure in returning to Turkey, where an old acquaintance, Her

Wooten, represented U.S. Army engineer interests.103 After musterin

out of his all–African American unit at the end of World War II, Woote

had stayed in Paris to indulge his love of classical music. He had hel

various government positions in Europe before joining The United State

Engineer Group (TUSEG) in Turkey in 1955.104 Wooten had remained i

Ankara through many organizational changes. When the Mediterranea

Division was inactivated and TUSEG transferred to the Europe Divisio

in 1976, Wooten used his contacts in the government of Turkey and wit

the Turkish General Staff to the advantage of EUD. He had also traveled t

Frankfurt to help plan EUD’s takeover of responsibilities and had worke

at the area office in Italy to arrange the final transfer of equipment an

vehicles from the Mediterranean Division.105

As a captain in Turkey in the early 1960s, Delbridge had know

Wooten as a GS–5 office manager. By 1977 Wooten had hardly advance

in grade, but the general saw immediately the advantages that his longev

ity brought to EUD.

When I landed in Turkey Herb came out on the tarmac to meet me 

and had a retinue of people and a car.... About 50 yards away was 

an airliner that had landed with several Air Force generals.... They 

were all standing in line going through customs and getting the traditional hard time.... We just bypassed it all! When [Wooten] flashed 

his ID cards, they were all the ID cards we had in the ’50s.... They all 

thought he was a spook, a CIA guy.... And since he knew so much 

about the area, the ambassador would call him in on occasion, which 

again added to the mystery and mystique of Herb Wooten.106

Although U.S. military construction in Turkey declined in the afte

math of the Cyprus dispute, Wooten remained in Ankara even afte

Delbridge left EUD. When work picked up again in 1979, he helped reope

the TUSEG office.107

During the second year of General Delbridge’s tenure EUD achieve

a degree of stability. New procedures were helping incoming employee

adjust to life in Europe, and increased social activities improved sta

morale. Much of the tension between the newcomers and the old-time

had dissipated. Joe Higgs and Jose Cruz, the new chiefs of engineerin

and construction, appeared to be getting the workload under contro

Their cooperation helped to dispel friction between their divisions an

get staff members to work together to review projects, thereby reducin

the late modifications to contracts.108

Whereas General Prentiss had spent his eighteen-month tour as div

sion engineer struggling to put the new organization into operation

General Delbridge had sought to gain control of the workload, establis

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 22 
203

regular procedures, and improve morale. Their efforts brought results. By 

1978 Delbridge began to feel that EUD had become a “hard-charging organization” made up of enthusiastic people who enjoyed working together. 

His gregariousness put some people off but engaged others and, in their 

view, changed the atmosphere dramatically. Though the review board 

was onerous, it helped establish more effective project management and 

control of funds.109 By the summer of 1978 EUD had moved through its 

transition period.

11J_Chap07_Final.indd 23 
11J_Chap07_Final.indd 24 
8

DECADE OF CONSOLIDATION 

AND GROWTH

I

t took only the stroke of a pen in 1974 to establish the United States 

Army Engineer Division, Europe (Europe Division or EUD) of the Corps 

of Engineers, but almost four years—until 1978—to develop a cohesive 

organization. Brig. Gen. Norman G. Delbridge, Jr., who succeeded Brig. 

Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., as commander of the Europe Division, felt that he 

had overcome the tensions that characterized the transition to management 

of military construction in Europe by the Corps of Engineers. Taking leave 

of EUD in July 1978, Delbridge observed: “The last two years have been a 

challenging period; challenges will continue, but ... flowers are now ready 

to bloom. We have procedures, more people on the way ... [a] closer and 

warmer relationship between everyone here in EUD.”1

From the base that Prentiss and Delbridge had established, their 

immediate successors concentrated on the challenges facing a growing 

but fundamentally stable organization. In the five years after Delbridge’s 

departure, two commanders (Brig. Gens. Drake Wilson and George K. 

Withers, Jr.) strove to adjust the division’s personnel allotment to fit its 

workload, to balance its management responsibilities, and to address 

and meet the needs of the division’s customers. All of the division commanders’ management decisions had to be made in light of changes in the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategic thinking, shifts in 

the European political order, and new U.S. military weapons.

After five years of relative stability in leadership, in fewer than thirty 

months between June 1983 and the autumn of 1985, three brigadier 

generals—Scott Beecher Smith, James W. van Loben Sels, and James W. 

Ray—commanded the division in swift succession. The rapid turnover 

of leaders and their varying styles of management challenged division 

personnel. This period of turmoil coincided with a marked expansion of 

workload in the 1980s, which in turn prompted a tightening of management control. By 1986 balance had returned once again, and the division 

enjoyed a few years of stability and a sense of confidence in their future 

as the end of the decade approached.

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 1 
206

Delbridge’s successor, Brig. 

Gen. Drake Wilson, arrived on 

15 August 1978 to assume command of the Europe Division. 

Before this assignment Wilson 

had served as deputy director of civil works at the Office 

of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) 

in Washington, but he was no 

stranger to Frankfurt. As an 

Army dependent, Wilson had 

lived in Germany and had graduated from the Department of 

Defense’s Frankfurt High School 

in 1947. He attended the U.S. 

Military Academy, graduated in 

1952, and returned to Germany 

as a junior officer assigned to the 

United States Army Construction 

Agency, Germany (USACAG), 

from 1958 to 1961. Wilson also 

served with NATO’s Central 

Army Group in 1970–1971 and in 

Stuttgart on the engineer staff of VII Corps from 1971 to 1973.2

In his first staff meeting at EUD, General Wilson emphasized h

desire to be kept informed of issues and his intention to let people d

their work without intervening. Wilson’s subordinates described him a

comparatively formal, straightforward, and decisive. They remember h

two-year tour as a relatively quiet period despite the division’s uneve

workload.3

Balancing Manpower and Workload

Like Prentiss and Delbridge, Wilson confronted a personnel situatio

characterized by sharp fluctuations in the number of staff and in the vo

ume of work. Unfortunately, staff size and workload frequently moved i

opposite directions. Most American civilian employees signed contracts t

work three years in Europe. Because of the time needed for processing i

and out and for learning how the division functioned, only two years o

a term proved to be fully productive. Frequent turnovers contributed t

the ongoing need to recruit experienced Corps employees from the Unite

States.4

The recruiting trip that Delbridge organized to the United State

in May 1978 had been very effective. At the end of October, howeve

President Jimmy Carter announced a hiring freeze. Although the freez

was lifted at the end of January 1979, ceilings for new hires were set i

line with the overall reduction in numbers for the Army. These ceiling

General Wilson

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 2 
207

were below those anticipated when the hiring had taken place under 

Delbridge, and General Wilson had to manage the size of his staff and the 

workload within these new limits.5

Personnel Manipulation

Throughout 1978 Joe G. Higgs and Jose Cruz, EUD’s chiefs of engineering and construction, respectively, worked to reduce the huge backlog 

of contracts that had accumulated during the division’s initial years. By 

the spring of 1979, as the workload came under control, Wilson realized 

that EUD had too many people. As one way to reduce staff, Wilson told 

his managers to facilitate the return of willing U.S. civilian employees to 

the United States as they completed employment contracts.6

The departure of Americans caused German and third-country employees to worry about a possible reduction in personnel in the field offices. 

The matter caught the attention of EUD’s Works Council, the body elected 

to represent local employees as authorized by USAREUR and the NATO 

Status of Forces Agreement (1963 supplement).7

 Hasso Damm, who had 

served since 1974 as the full-time chairman of the Works Council, noted 

that the increases in personnel at EUD between 1975 and 1979 were primarily in positions for Department of the Army civilians (DACs). Accordingly, 

he argued, the personnel cuts should come from this group and not disproportionately from the Germans and third-country nationals.8

Europe Division workload included build-to-lease family housing projects for 

the Hanau community.

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 3 
208

After meeting with Damm, Wilson authorized a memorandum statin

that the total number of local national employees would not be reduce

although geographic shifts of personnel might be made. On the broade

issue of the proportion of these workers in the division’s workforc

Damm obtained an oral commitment from General Wilson that redu

tions, when necessary, would be taken first and more heavily from th

DAC roster of employees. This oral agreement, which Damm confirme

with each successive EUD commander, produced a core group of local

hired workers who provided continuity for the organization.9

 As a fu

ther gesture of support for the non-American workers, Wilson designate

the chairmanship of the Works Council a full-time position, even thoug

German law did not require a full-time chairman for a council represen

ing fewer than 300 local national employees.10

During 1979 and 1980 the number of employees at EUD continued t

fluctuate, even though the workload was increasing—an irony noted b

Wilson. For most of fiscal year 1979 the division averaged 860 employ

ees. Between January and June the division cut twenty-five positions a

a result of Army-wide cutbacks.11 More cuts were made in August 197

and by 30 September EUD had reduced its staff to 707, the same level a

before Delbridge’s recruitment campaign in 1978. The number of employ

ees increased to an average of 780 throughout most of fiscal year 1980 bu

dropped back at the end of the year to 690. The division operated in effe

with one level of staffing throughout most of the fiscal year and then, t

meet authorized levels, reduced its staff by releasing temporary employ

ees and leaving positions unfilled. Once the division reported the sta

numbers, the temporary positions could be refilled quickly.12

Wilson and his management team worked hard to build a strong cor

staff. In the spring of 1979 Wilson requested authorization from OC

for thirty-one new upper-grade positions (GS–13 to GS–17) to improv

middle management and to enhance the level of technical proficiency i

the division. OCE eventually approved fourteen positions, most of them 

in the Engineering Division, where Higgs tried to create a grade structur

that would attract people from districts in the United States.13 To provid

more continuity and to reduce turnover, Wilson changed his earlier polic

guideline and began actively encouraging American civilians to remai

in Europe for up to five years.14 Recruiting continued to be a major activit

for the division.15

To promote efficiency and accountability, Wilson revised the roles o

the two colonels serving as deputy division engineers by assigning eac

deputy a principal area of responsibility. He gave Air Force programs an

special projects, particularly schools, to Col. Glen Smith. Col. Valentin

Carrasco oversaw all work for the Army, which was the bulk of EUD

program. Wilson explained the arrangement by saying, “The heaviest do

lar volume, Carrasco had; the most problems, Smith had.” Both deputie

and the commander had authority to sign contracts.16

Under Wilson’s command William E. Camblor finally received th

promotion that he had first sought while director of USACAG in 195

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 4 
209

While assigned in USACAG as a junior officer, Wilson worked closely 

with Camblor and appreciated his administrative skills. Early in his tour 

at EUD, General Wilson requested approval to upgrade Camblor’s position, assistant division engineer for intergovernmental affairs, to a GS–16. 

He then recommended Camblor for the position, and in 1980 Camblor was 

promoted to SES–4, a ranking in the Senior Executive Service equivalent 

to GS–16.17 That promotion gave the organization two SES positions; Joe 

Higgs had been promoted in July 1979 when the Senior Executive Service 

was established.

Managing Resources

In October 1979 an OCE command inspection team suggested that 

EUD needed to rethink how it managed construction, particularly the 

structure of field offices that reported to the Construction Division. For 

several months the staff examined workload and flow of work at headquarters and in the area offices. The area offices had been established in 

1974 as coordinating and reporting offices, while resident offices handled 

direct project oversight. The military officers and civilian staff in both the 

area and resident offices expressed frustration and dissatisfaction with 

the multiple levels of review that they faced and with the delays in getting decisions from headquarters.18 To address these concerns, the chief of 

construction, Jose Cruz, established a task force led by Dwight Beranek, 

chief of the Construction Management Section. The reorganization recommended by the task force—intended to improve communications and to 

speed decision making within headquarters in Frankfurt—took effect at 

the beginning of the new fiscal year, 1 October 1980.19

Several measures implemented along with the reorganization were 

designed to respond specifically to the issues raised by field personnel. The Supervision and Inspection Branch was split into two sections, 

and the number of staff positions was increased to augment technical 

support to the field. Personnel were also added in office engineering to 

improve management of funds, troop construction, and accountability 

for real property. The Contract Administration Branch was reorganized 

into three sections, each handling projects for a specific geographic area. 

Construction managers were assigned to serve specific area offices rather 

than specific programs.

The field offices themselves underwent significant change. The division redefined the old Central, Southern, and Southwest Area Offices 

and closed the Mediterranean Area Office. The new area offices had 

larger workloads and a greater number of personnel. Several area offices 

took the name of the city in which they were located: Kaiserslautern, 

Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Nuremberg, and Würzburg. Only the Northern Area 

Office kept its name and location. (See Map 16.) The division set up resident offices in Vicenza, Italy; in Sigonella, Sicily; and in Athens, Greece, 

and retained The United States Engineer Group (TUSEG) Resident Office, 

which had been reestablished in 1979 in Incirlik, Turkey.20 All area and 

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 5 
210

resident offices reported directly to the Construction Division. The reo

ganization centralized legal services in headquarters, and lawyers Terr

Trowbridge from the Mediterranean Area Office and Carl Korman from 

Stuttgart moved to Frankfurt.21

Map 16

NORTHERN AREA

FRANKFURT

AREA

STUTTGART

AREA

HEIDELBERG

AREA

WÜRZBURG AREA

KAISERSLAUTERN

AREA NUREMBERG

AREA

Teveren

Mönchen-Gladbach

Giessen Fulda

Schweinfurt

Stuttgart

Karlsruhe

Heidelberg

Kaiserslautern

Landstuhl

Baumholder

Wildflecken Bitburg Hahn

Bad Kreuznach

Frankfurt

Aschaffenburg

Würzburg

Hoensbroek

Bremerhaven

Bamberg

Grafenwöhr

Vilseck

Nuremberg

Augsburg

E N G L I S H

C H A N N E L

FRANCE

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WEST

GERMANY

EAST

GERMANY

DENMARK

SWEDEN

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOURG

LIECHTENSTEIN

BRUSSELS

AMSTERDAM

Leipzig

Hannover

BERLI

Hamburg

Zürich Dijon

The Hague

FIELD ORGANIZATION

NORTHERN EUROPE

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1983

Area Office Boundary (approximate)

Area Office Headquarters

Resident Office

Project Office

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 6 
211

The permanent orders signed by General Wilson stated that changing 

the status of any unit to or from an area office or resident office would 

no longer require additional permanent orders. The basic field structure established in 1980 changed little during the following decade. As 

changes in workload dictated, the division closed the Sigonella office and 

upgraded Heidelberg and TUSEG to area offices. The new administrative 

arrangement allowed EUD to establish other resident offices and project 

offices as needed.22

Organization Headquarters

In 1979 General Wilson agreed to mandate a single form for the organization’s name. Rather than continue the vacillation between the use 

of European Division and Europe Division, Wilson ordered that Europe 

Division be used consistently; it was the form that Headquarters, United 

States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), in Washington preferred.23

Because this decision required a new sign on the building and new letterhead, it seemed an appropriate moment to give the headquarters building 

a commemorative name.24 The division counsel, Allan B. Aaron, proposed 

that the headquarters building be named in honor of Leonard L. Phillips, 

who had served with USACAG, Engineer Command (ENGCOM), and 

EUD between 1962 and his death in February 1976. Before serving with 

the Corps, Phillips had participated in the Nuremberg war crimes trials. 

In 1960 he joined the Corps of Engineers as a trial attorney while remaining an Army reserve officer. As general counsel for ENGCOM and division 

counsel for EUD, Phillips worked on legal issues surrounding the relocation 

of U.S. forces from France; helped negotiate the first construction agreement 

with the government of Belgium; drafted and negotiated the prototype 

Guarantee Rental Housing Agreement that became the United States Army, 

Europe (USAREUR), standard; and helped create the legal basis for implementing the Stem to Stern program.25 Colleagues praised his precise legal 

mind, integrity and loyalty, wit, and reserved demeanor.26

Wilson supported the request to name the building after Phillips—a 

civilian—noting that more than 60 percent of the personnel working in 

the division were American civilians. At the annual awards ceremony on 

11 July 1980, the headquarters building on the former I. G. Farben property in Frankfurt was officially named the Phillips Building.27

Addressing EUD Customers

In mid-September 1980 Wilson, by then promoted to major general, 

left EUD and returned to Washington. As of 16 June 1979, the Corps had 

a new status as an Army major command; its headquarters became U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers. Wilson became director of military programs 

at the newly designated Headquarters, USACE (replacing the Office of the 

Chief of Engineers), and General Withers succeeded Wilson as commander of the Europe Division.

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 7 
212

General Withers, a 1956 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, serve

in Europe from 1974 to 1976 as commander of the 24th Engineer Grou

predecessor to the 18th Engineer Brigade. Before being assigned to EUD

Withers served in the Department of the Army’s Office of the Deput

Chief of Staff for Operations. He projected a quiet, reserved, and scholar

demeanor.

During his tour as commander of the 24th Engineer Group, Withe

perceived a “general dislike of EUD among much of the U.S. Army i

Europe.” This attitude disturbed him, and he set out to develop a new 

climate. He particularly hoped to fulfill the needs of the commanders o

V Corps, VII Corps, and 21st Support Command—who did not think the

were getting enough support from the engineers in Frankfurt—and th

Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH) in each of the militar

communities. His other management priority was to keep up with th

greatly expanding military construction mission.28

The substantial growth in the defense budgets in the late 1970s create

a burgeoning workload. New weapons systems and the improvement o

facilities in Europe scheduled under these enlarged budgets increased th

design and construction activity for EUD. To emphasize his commitmen

to better service for the communities, Withers raised the managerial lev

at which EUD handled this support. He created the position of assistan

division engineer for DEH support and appointed Lt. Col. Robert Tame

to the position in January 1981. Tames, who reported to the chief of eng

neering, Higgs, was expected to meet individually and frequently wit

Phillips Building in the Mid-1980s

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 8 
213

the facilities engineers in their 

communities. Under the concept 

of “one-stop installation support,” Tames was the person in 

EUD to whom community commanders and engineers could 

turn for help. By all accounts this 

strategy worked, and the division retained the position, filling 

it successively through the 1980s 

with Lt. Cols. Robert O’Toole, 

John Moravec, Ray Powell, and 

Douglas Lamothe.29

In his first weeks on the job, 

Tames visited every one of the 

more than thirty USAREUR 

communities. As Congress began 

to fund improvements in living conditions for soldiers, and 

as Operation and Maintenance, 

Army (OMA), money began to 

arrive, the community commanders and DEHs realized that 

they did not have the capacity to do either the requisite design or the construction themselves. They gave the work to EUD—somewhat reluctantly 

according to General Withers—and the division responded. Technical 

assistance to the facilities engineers for projects to maintain and to repair 

barracks came from the Facilities Support Section in the Engineering 

Division.30 In 1981 Higgs appointed Steve Kupec as chief of the Facilities 

Support Section. By the end of fiscal year 1982, Kupec’s section had grown 

from nine to thirty-six people and handled over $50 million of work on 

134 projects.31 (See Map 17.)

In another effort to promote better cooperation between the Army 

engineers and the military communities, General Withers joined the 

deputy chief of staff, engineer (DCSENG), at USAREUR, Maj. Gen. Henry 

J. Hatch, Jr., in convening two-day meetings to review the OMA projects. 

The meeting location varied: EUD headquarters, an area office, or Hatch’s 

office in Heidelberg.32 Both Hatch and Withers attended, and they urged 

commanders from VII Corps, V Corps, 21st Support Command, 26th 

Support Group, and Seventh Army Training Command to attend. The 

generals chaired the meetings as an inducement for the colonels to attend. 

According to Higgs, he and Withers wanted to engage and work directly 

with unit commanders rather than with subordinates.33

The effort succeeded in expanding the EUD workload. In recognition of Higgs’ efforts in leading the Engineering Division through this 

expansion, the Society of American Military Engineers awarded him the 

1981 Wheeler Medal, named in honor of Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, 

General Withers

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 9 
214

Map 17

a former chief of engineers. The award recognized Higgs’ leadership i

managing a “sixfold increase in the Military Construction Program fo

Europe,” in achieving the substantial reduction of the design backlog, an

in increasing contract awards.34

Giessen Fulda

Schweinfurt

Stuttgart

Karlsruhe

Heidelberg

Heilbronn

Göppingen

Neu Ulm

Mannheim

Worms

Kaiserslautern

Zweibrücken Pirmasens

Baumholder

Wildflecken

Bad Kreuznach

Frankfurt Wiesbaden

Mainz Hanau

Darmstadt

Aschaffenburg

Würzburg

Bremerhaven

Bamberg

Grafenwöhr

Nuremberg

Ansbach

Hohenfels

Augsburg

Bad Tölz

Munich

Garmisch-Partenkirchen

Brussels

NATO/SHAPE

Rheinberg

E N G L I S H

C

H

A

N

N E L

FRANCE

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WEST GERMANY

EAST

GERMANY

DENMARK

SWEDEN

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOURG

LIECHTENSTEIN

Reims

Leipzig

Hannover

Erfurt

BERLI

Hamburg

Zürich Dijon

AMSTERDAM

The Hague

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

January 1983

Directorate of Engineering 

and Housing (DEH)

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 10 
215

Persistent Manpower Problems

General Withers faced one of the cyclical discrepancies between staff 

numbers and workload that beset EUD. Continuing problems in recruiting and retaining qualified people hindered Withers’ ability to keep up 

with the volume of work and meet schedules. In reports to Headquarters, 

USACE, he repeatedly argued that EUD had an inadequate number of 

staff positions, inappropriately graded positions, poor leadership in some 

key divisions and branches, and too much turnover.35

In March 1981 EUD had 730 people, just slightly above the year-end 

levels maintained by Delbridge and Wilson from 1978 to 1980. Turnover 

continued, particularly in the lower grades, where the rate was about 

120 percent a year.36 Many of the clerical workers were military dependents and subject to frequent moves. To combat turnover in the Resource 

Management Office (formerly Comptroller’s Office), Withers upgraded 

positions to make them more attractive to Corps employees working in 

the United States.37

Anticipating the higher workload projected for fiscal years 1982 and 

1983, Withers asked Headquarters, USACE, for more officer spaces and 

about 100 additional civilian spaces.38 Because EUD had about 75 vacancies, he also organized a recruiting trip to the United States. In April 

1981 a recruiting team went to districts in Norfolk, Mobile, Fort Worth, 

St. Louis, Omaha, and Seattle and to headquarters in Washington.39 The 

team contacted 1,000 potential candidates, but only 42 signed on. By the 

autumn of 1981, EUD had 855 authorized spaces but only 740 employees.40

To attract strong civilians to the division, Withers requested approval 

to upgrade two positions—chief of resource management (to GS–15) and 

chief of construction (to SES). With approval of the new grades, Withers 

took the opportunity to search for candidates outside his current staff. He 

explicitly told the comptroller, Randolph S. Washington, and the chief of 

construction, Jose Cruz, that the promotions were not necessarily theirs. 

For both positions Withers chose applicants new to the division and to 

Europe.

Withers selected Ray Walker from Picatinny, New Jersey, as the new 

chief of resource management. Although offered the position of deputy 

comptroller, Washington did not want to serve as a subordinate in a division that he had headed since 1974. In mid-May 1981 he left for a job with 

the U.S. Support Command to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers 

Europe, in Belgium.41

Withers selected John Blake as the new chief of construction, and Cruz 

returned to the Fort Worth District. Blake had a wide range of experience 

managing overseas construction for the Corps. He had served in Korea, 

in the Marshall Islands, in the Mediterranean Division, in Saudi Arabia, 

and, before his arrival in Frankfurt, in Israel, where the Corps built two 

air bases that were part of the Camp David settlement between Israel and 

Egypt. Blake liked to be in the field, and he knew firsthand the difficulties of working with sovereign nations and managing both people and 

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 11 
216

projects in remote locations. In November 1981, just after arriving at EUD

Blake received the Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the Army’s secon

highest civilian honorary award, for his work in Israel.42

The effort that Withers and his staff devoted to stateside recruitin

finally began to pay off by early 1982. Both Blake and Walker were o

board, and Withers reported to the chief of engineers that overall strengt

had grown from 740 in September 1981 to 830 in January 1982. Withe

was pleased with the successes but frustrated by continuing problems i

recruiting. Corps district leaders in the United States let employees mov

to overseas assignments only grudgingly, and coworkers resented employ

ees who went overseas but retained reemployment rights in the statesid

district. Nevertheless, in May 1982 EUD’s authorized strength reache

906. German and third-country employees made up 276 of the total.43

The continuous growth in personnel created overcrowding at EU

headquarters. In 1978 the division began leasing space a few blocks from 

the I. G. Farben complex. In 1979 EUD constructed the first annex to th

headquarters building; work began in the spring of 1982 on a secon

annex. Completed by October 1982, the second annex accommodate

ninety employees.44 This, too, was insufficient, so EUD rented a build

ing in the Dornbusch area of Frankfurt. Initially, the Civil Section of th

Technical Engineering Branch and the master-planning unit shared th

Dornbusch offices with the Frankfurt Area Office, but soon the area offic

moved to leased space in Fechenheim, another area of Frankfurt.45

Developing the Engineering Division

Master planning developed as a significant new activity in EU

efforts to provide services to the military communities in Europe. Whi

serving as the USAREUR engineer in Heidelberg, General Prentiss cam

to recognize the possibilities for the division to help the military commu

nities develop individual master plans for their complexes and facilities. I

January 1977 he raised the issue with the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Joh

W. Morris, by reporting that there was no entity in Europe able to review 

and comment on master plans developed by the communities. Becaus

he knew that EUD did not have the capacity to handle the assignmen

Prentiss began to search for assistance from a private sector contractor.46

Joe Higgs, who arrived at EUD in February 1978, grasped this situ

ation as an opportunity. Higgs wanted to expand the capability of h

Engineering Division so staff could develop master plans for USAREU

communities and then help them prepare the project descriptions an

paperwork to submit projects to Congress for funding. Master plan

ning at EUD was still handled by only one man, Vic Schulman, so Higg

looked for help. The chief of engineering at headquarters approved th

EUD request for funds from the OMA budget to hire three people for s

months.47

By the time General Withers took command in late 1980, the divisio

had six people in master planning and support from USAREUR to expan

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 12 
217

this service. By the end of 1982 the Master Planning Section had grown to 

thirty-eight. Work had increased from eight contracts involving thirty 

projects, representing architect-engineer fees of $600,000, to a program of 

eighty contracts covering nearly 600 projects and totaling $50 million in 

architect-engineer fees.48 Master planning had indeed become a major service provided by EUD to USAREUR’s military communities.49

As chief of the Engineering Division’s Planning Section, Terry 

Emmons coordinated the provision of master planning and other planning services to USAREUR, its six major subordinate commands, and their 

forty-eight communities and planning areas. At the beginning of 1981, his 

first full year at EUD, Emmons’ section handled 40 projects. By the end of 

the year the number was 250, and Emmons was named Employee of the 

Year for 1981. Under his leadership the division developed a two-week 

master-planning course, prepared planning reference manuals and handbooks, and set up a program to provide definitive drawings for improvements that the military communities routinely requested.50 On 1 July 1982, 

the Planning Section became the Planning Branch with three sections: 

Engineering Systems, Future Development, and Project Support.51

Beginning in the mid-1980s, EUD contracted with U.S. architect-engineer firms to develop master plans for all USAREUR communities. The 

results were mixed. The first firms hired had experience in master planning; but as the workload grew larger, EUD had to use firms with less 

experience in planning and often with only minimal familiarity with 

Europe. In hope of furnishing their customers in the U.S. military communities with better service, Higgs and Emmons turned to German architect-engineer firms.52

At a minimum, the planning studies conducted under EUD auspices 

provided an inventory of the eight hundred installations that USAREUR 

maintained. USAREUR kept very poor records of its facilities: the number 

and condition of the rooms, the capacity of electrical plants, where sewer 

lines ran, and so forth. EUD’s goal was to provide each user with a plan 

that described existing conditions and assigned projections for three phases 

of development: the first year, over five years, and over twenty years.53

In the summer of 1985 EUD hired a new chief of the Planning Branch, 

Kristine Allaman. Having worked for the Installation Support Activity, 

Europe, the agency that combined all the installation support activities 

that came under USAREUR’s deputy chief of staff, engineer, Allaman 

viewed planning as a service and a supplement to the communities’ own 

engineering work. Reflecting her strong commitment to customer service, she reorganized the staff, combining people with different technical and planning skills to form teams to provide comprehensive services 

to specific communities. She encouraged the teams to get into the field, 

attend local master-planning meetings, and show the participants what 

EUD could offer. A GS–14, Allaman remained for several years as EUD’s 

highest-graded female manager.54

By 1987 the Planning Branch had grown to fifty-six people. It covered 

all its costs with fees paid by the customers requesting its services. By 

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 13 
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then the services also included interior design, energy studies, and sewe

studies. EUD offered customers three phases of analysis and projections: 

computer-aided design and drafting system that generated basic inform

tion maps and analyzed existing conditions; tabulations of existing an

required facilities, as well as plans and analyses oriented toward futur

development; and comprehensive studies of both existing and require

utilities. The planners also offered communities a land-use plan, a tot

plan for future development, and a master-plan report that even someon

who had no background in planning could understand. In the late 1980

the branch annually handled more than 450 projects and $50 to $60 mi

lion in contracts. The Planning Branch also managed an environment

program for USAREUR involving over ninety contracts with an estimate

programmed amount of $12 million. The environmental program service

dealt with concerns such as asbestos, soil and ground-water contamin

tion, hazardous waste, landfills, and radon gas.55

In June 1988 master planning received additional impetus from a new 

program, Army Communities of Excellence, sponsored by General Carl E

Vuono, the Army chief of staff. This program promoted consistency in 

community’s physical appearance and function, the establishment of stan

dards for all construction, and the use of installation design guides, a

elements that EUD’s master planners emphasized in their approach to th

military communities.56

The expansion of master planning illustrates EUD’s commitment t

provide its customers with comprehensive engineering services. In add

tion, Higgs oversaw growth in other sections in the Engineering Division

Like planning, the Foundations and Materials Branch had only one eng

neer when Higgs arrived. Over time he increased this branch to seventee

people, and EUD used the added manpower to broaden the range an

quality of services that the division could provide to customers.57 Durin

1976–1988 the Engineering Division staff strength fluctuated but grew 

steadily overall. (Table 5)

Managing the Workload

Although the Construction Division had been reorganized in th

autumn of 1980, John Blake made additional changes after he arrived t

head the division. Projecting a large increase in the number of constru

tion projects and acting in accordance with his philosophy of decentra

ized management, Blake moved to streamline headquarters further and t

give area offices even more authority. He saw that the division headqua

ters combined contract administration and construction managemen

Blake believed that the two jobs demanded totally different personal tem

peraments, making it difficult for one person to do both well:

The guy who is the contract administrator has got to be someone 

who loves detail, who is willing to sit down and very meticulously 

write a mod[ification], go through the details, chapter and verse, 

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 14 
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checking numbers, making sure everything is lined up in the right 

order. A construction manager, on the other hand, is normally an 

out-going young fellow who is full of vinegar, runs around and 

makes arrangements for everything, pulls it all together.58

Blake moved the functions and staff concerned with contract administration to the area offices and retained a strong group of construction 

managers in Frankfurt. He also received approval to strengthen the 

area offices by upgrading the civilian position of deputy area engineer 

to GS–14, the grade equivalent to the military rank of lieutenant colonel 

held by the area engineers. Revised procedures reduced duplication of 

effort among project offices, resident offices, the area offices, and headquarters, particularly in preparation of contract modifications. Additional 

technical support positions strengthened area offices, and headquarters 

provided supplementary support.59 Richard Grimm, who had served in 

the Stuttgart Resident Office in the late 1970s and who returned to EUD 

as deputy area engineer in Turkey in 1982, recalled that the changes made 

the division “a lot more streamlined, a lot more efficient. You could get 

[things] done so much faster.”60 Withers supported the decentralization 

because he too felt that deferring decisions to Frankfurt and the headquarters staff led to delays that added costs to construction contracts.61

Blake also had Withers’ support in transferring responsibility for 

negotiating and awarding construction contracts from the Construction 

Division to the Procurement and Supply Division (later called the 

Contracting Division). Blake experienced firsthand the pressures of an 

end-of-year contracting cycle within a few weeks after his arrival when 

almost a dozen people were brought in from the area offices to handle 

 Table 5 

Engineering Division Staffing, Europe Division

Fiscal Years 1976–1988

 Year Personnel* Year Personnel* 

 1976 161 1983 402

 1977 184 1984 399

 1978 271 1985 419

 1979 230 1986 419

 1980 230 1987 421

 1981 261 1988 389

 1982 363

 *Year-end figures

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 15 
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the paperwork. After that experience, which he described as a “three-rin

circus,” Blake wanted contracts handled by the Procurement and Supp

Division as they were in other Corps offices. The current system ha

evolved because of dissatisfaction with a chief of procurement and sup

ply that had since departed. The incumbent chief, Theresa Watson, wa

competent and respected; both Blake and Withers were confident that sh

could handle the contracting responsibility. Accordingly, the Constructio

Division returned authority to award construction contracts to th

Procurement and Supply Division.62

Construction in Turkey

The construction program developing in Turkey presented Blak

with one of his first major challenges in the field. EUD had assume

responsibility for construction in Turkey in 1976 but had little to do. Th

government of Turkey had put U.S. military forces under provision

status in July 1975 because it felt that the U.S. Congress had broken th

bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey by imposing th

arms embargo after the Turkish-Greek clash over Cyprus. The provision

status curtailed American intelligence gathering, banned U.S. flights an

cargo shipments through Turkey, and prohibited most new constructio

projects.63

In 1978 Congress lifted the arms embargo, and the two governmen

began negotiations for a Defense Economic Cooperative Agreemen

signed in March 1980. In the new atmosphere, both the Army and th

Air Force decided to undertake projects for the U.S. military assigned t

Turkey. To support that decision, EUD sent a team led by General Wilson

Jose Cruz, and Joe Higgs to assess the extent of the work needed i

Turkey and to establish the necessary diplomatic relations. After Congres

approved funds for new construction to improve the living and work

ing conditions and the security at Incirlik Air Base and five remote site

(Erzurum, Cakmakli, Corlu, Izmit, and Ortakoy) occupied by Army cu

todial artillery personnel, Wilson requested an Army captain to staff th

TUSEG Resident Office.64

The designated officer, Capt. M. Stephen Rhoades, received a briefin

in Frankfurt and arrived in Incirlik in July 1979 “with a set of plans unde

one arm and specifications under the other.”65 He had been sent to Turke

to identify contractors, solicit bids, and start a project. Rhoades had 

bachelor’s degree in systems engineering and a master’s degree in civ

engineering from the University of Florida but no prior experience in con

tracting and no experience in the Corps of Engineers.

With assistance from Herb Wooten, the long-time TUSEG employe

serving as liaison at the Joint U.S. Military Mission Aid to Turkey, Rhoade

located the office on the air base in Incirlik that TUSEG had abandone

when construction ceased. Rhoades reclaimed the quarters from the Re

Cross, retrieved the office equipment and vehicles, and he hired a secr

tary. It took almost a full year to get TUSEG back into operation.66

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 16 
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The first site scheduled for an upgrade was in Erzurum, a difficult 

place to start. The city’s name means the eastern edge of Rome, that is, the 

boundary of the old Roman Empire. Located on a high plain in the mountains, it is close to the Turkish-Russian border and east of Moscow. The 

weather is very severe—long, cold winters with abundant snow. The first 

contract called for bachelor officers’ quarters, bachelor enlisted quarters, 

a multipurpose building, and interior refurbishing of a number of existing buildings, all designed with features to protect the troops from the 

extreme weather and to make the buildings solid and well insulated. The 

isolated location made troop comfort and recreation especially important. 

Over time the construction came to include a new dining hall, a racquetball court, a gymnasium, and covered walkways between buildings to 

avoid the snow that drifted to depths over ten feet.67

Rhoades had difficulty finding a contractor willing to go to Erzurum. 

In 1980 he awarded the first contract for construction. There was no local 

labor market, so the contractor had to bring in workers and build a dormitory to house them. Within months the project was behind schedule. 

EUD’s Construction Division sent people on temporary assignment to 

help Rhoades process contract modifications. To help resolve persistent 

problems, the division’s deputy commander, Col. Philip Cowles, and 

the assistant division engineer for intergovernmental affairs, William 

Camblor, went to Turkey in October 1981. On 5 October Cowles, Camblor, 

and Rhoades met with a Turkish colonel from the Ministry of Defense 

to review the construction problems in Erzurum and to discuss ways to 

facilitate construction contracting in Turkey.68

In a report of the trip, Colonel Cowles wryly described work in 

Erzurum: “The history of this project is at times amusing and at other 

times sad.” The design package had been prepared in English by the division’s design group in Italy. Only after problems arose did the contractor 

in Erzurum admit that neither the foreman nor any of the workers could 

read English or understand the plans or the specifications. Moreover, the 

designers projected a construction period for the contract of 600 days, 

despite the fact that Erzurum’s severe weather limited construction to 

about 180 days a year.69

Cowles’ report listed a number of requests that Rhoades had made, 

including cold-weather gear for his employees and racquetball kits. He 

also asked for semiweekly telephone calls placed from Frankfurt to Turkey, 

because long-distance telephone service from Turkey was unreliable. The 

report suggested revised procedures and concluded with an admonition:

In the future we should plan and tailor our procurement, we 

should pre-qualify contractors if we are not sure of them, we need 

strong capable field people to deal with a problematic contractor and, 

in Turkey, we need government assistance to ensure materials are 

available to the contractor.... The entire project gives one the impression of building according to a standard prevalent in Korea in 1965 or 

in America, perhaps 50 years ago.70

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 17 
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John Blake’s experience with construction in Saudi Arabia and i

Israel gave him a good understanding of Rhoades’ problems. Some exp

rienced and willing construction managers, including Richard Grimm

became available for the work in Turkey when the air base projects i

Israel ended. Grimm had worked under Blake on the missile sites i

North Dakota in 1972 and had been a resident engineer in the Stuttga

Area Office in the late 1970s before he worked in Israel. As the program 

in Israel wound down, Grimm contacted Blake, who offered Grimm th

position as deputy area engineer in Turkey.71 Grimm arrived at Incirli

in January 1982, when EUD upgraded TUSEG from a resident office to a

area office. During the 1982 calendar year the number of people at TUSE

increased from nine to twenty-one. The workload increased from fou

projects under construction to ten ready for advertisement and an add

tional twenty-four under design.72

With improved procedures and more experienced staff, the TUSE

office awarded contracts for work at four other remote sites: Corlu

Ortakoy, Izmit, and Cakmakli. EUD had lump-sum allocations to rebuil

these sites; over time he supervised complete rehabilitation, includin

underground utilities, at all five installations.73 TUSEG managed to awar

contracts at about 50 percent of the estimates and as a consequence foun

that they had ample money to get the work done.74

By all accounts Captain Rhoades was exceptionally mature an

energetic—“one of those outgoing people that just thrived on adve

Army engineer projects in Turkey included the barracks in Cakmakli and this water 

tower (inset) under construction in Izmit.

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 18 
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sity.” Rhoades, his wife, and two children lived on the Incirlik base 

in an eight-by-forty-foot house trailer. Other TUSEG staff lived on the 

economy, frequently in buildings without central heating, sometimes 

without hot water. Electricity was unreliable, which meant that the 

availability of water was unpredictable. There was a long waiting list for 

commercial telephones.75 The Society of American Military Engineers 

awarded Rhoades the 1981 Sverdrup Medal established in memory of 

distinguished military engineer Maj. Gen. Leif Sverdrup. The award 

recognized Rhoades’ extraordinary achievements in building the area 

office and in directing construction in remote sites throughout Turkey. 

In July 1982 Rhoades left Turkey to work with the Construction Branch 

of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer, at USAREUR in 

Heidelberg.76

Tightening Organizational Control

Withers completed his tour as division engineer early in June 1983, 

and Brig. Gen. Scott B. Smith succeeded him. Smith had graduated from 

the U.S. Military Academy in 1956, the same year as Withers, and had 

served in Europe with the 12th Engineer Battalion from 1962 to 1965. 

Smith was assigned to OCE in 1973–1974 and served as district engineer 

in Huntington, West Virginia, from 1974 to 1977. Unlike any of his predecessors at EUD, he had experience as a division engineer: From 1980 

to 1983 he commanded the North Central Division with headquarters in 

Chicago, Illinois.

By his recollection, Smith arrived at EUD with a definite management philosophy and what he characterized as a “fair amount of 

skepticism” that the organization was “on track.” He asked a lot of 

questions, found that the answers were “not totally comforting,” and 

concluded that EUD needed to shift its direction. Smith set for himself 

three principal tasks: shift the management attention of the division to 

the customer; improve relations with the Air Force; and improve internal procedures.77

For General Smith, all of his specific actions formed part of a plan to 

tighten the reins on the organization. To this end, he challenged a wide 

range of practices and procedures that he felt were hindering timely 

completion of work, detracting from achieving the mission, undermining discipline, or obstructing relationships with customers. He displayed intense concern about fraud, waste, and abuse, particularly in the 

procurement process and in the administration of contracts. An internal 

investigation revealed more than seventy-five instances of procedural 

irregularities that the division needed to send to Washington for review 

by USACE. Most were procurement irregularities, including unauthorized contract modifications that probably resulted from attempts by 

midlevel managers to get work done in a rush; none involved statutory violations. Revised procedures, training, and a greater emphasis on 

detail improved the situation.78

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 19 
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Shifts in Emphasis and Direction

From conversations with the 

chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph 

K. Bratton, Smith perceived a 

need to change the overall operating strategy of the division from 

an emphasis on architect-engineer selection boards and design 

reviews to construction that satisfied the customer. He believed 

that the elements of process, 

which are a necessary part of 

any project, ought not to be evident to the consumer, whose real 

concern was with the final product. He found that attention in 

EUD focused on the Engineering 

Division, which measured productivity in terms of design 

placement, rather than on the 

Construction Division, which 

emphasized completed projects.79

General Smith took several immediate steps to shift the division

emphasis and direction. He reinforced efforts General Withers had star

ed to give the chief of construction and the area engineers more authorit

resources, and independence. He wanted area offices to have a procur

ment operation, legal support, and some capability to work with the gov

ernment agencies in the host nations.80

Smith also changed the rating procedure for area engineers. In EUD

first two years, the area engineers reported to the EUD Executive Offic

During General Delbridge’s tenure, the deputy division engineer, Co

Carlyle “Chuck” Charles, instructed the area engineers to report direct

to the chief of the Construction Division, although Charles and his su

cessors continued to give the area engineers their performance ratings

In 1983 Army regulations changed to permit the division commander t

delegate the rating function to a civilian. Smith thought that it made sens

to give responsibility for rating area engineers to the chief of constructio

because it was Blake who regularly met with them. The change meant th

Blake, who as an SES held the civilian rank equivalent to general office

would do the officer’s efficiency rating for the area engineers who wer

military and comparable performance evaluations for the civilian are

engineers. Whatever apprehensions the area engineers had, the chang

was implemented without protest. The commander of EUD, a general off

cer, remained the senior rater.82

General Smith broadened the division’s senior leadership group t

include the equal employment opportunity (EEO) officer, the personn

General Smith in 1987

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 20 
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officer, division counsel, and the chief of procurement and supply. He 

encouraged each participant in staff meetings to draw from his or her 

professional and life experiences solutions to the problems and challenges 

of the division. Smith also asked Blake to make sure that he took support 

elements, especially Joanne “Jodie” Close, the EEO officer, with him to the 

area offices, particularly the remote offices in Turkey and Greece.83

The Air Force as Customer

Shortly before General Smith assumed command at EUD, he attended 

a professional meeting with General Bratton, who was known for his lowkey, soft-spoken style. According to Smith, Bratton drew him aside and 

said, “There’s a guy here that I want you to meet, and it’s very important 

to me that you get to know him.” Introducing Smith to Air Force Brig. 

Gen. Joseph “Bud” Ahearn, Bratton said, “You and Bud are going to get 

to be good friends.” Smith concluded, “That was his way of telling me, 

‘Make sure the Air Force knows you love them, and make sure the Air 

Force gets prime support.... Don’t forget the guys in blue.’”84

About the time that Smith was assigned to head the Europe Division, 

Ahearn took over as base civil engineer at Ramstein Air Base in Germany 

and as chief of engineering services for United States Air Forces in Europe 

(USAFE). The Air Force had been a major customer of centralized contract 

construction in Europe since the days of USACAG. Over many years an 

attitude had developed that one division engineer summarized: “The Air 

Force is a very difficult customer in general for the Corps of Engineers.” 

A chief of contracting admitted: “You’d be hard-pressed to find somebody 

[in EUD] that’s a real fan of the Air Force.”85 Differences in procedure 

between the two services in handling both contracts and money and the 

Air Force’s latitude in shifting funds from one project to another gave the 

“appearance of [their] not having a long-range, coherent program.”86

General Withers had encountered difficulty with his counterpart in 

the Air Force, Brig. Gen. Sheldon J. Lustig. As chief of engineering services for USAFE, Lustig “indicated a strong desire” to get EUD out of 

NATO projects for the U.S. Air Force. In May 1982 Withers reported that 

execution of Air Force work continued to be late because of “late receipt 

of design instructions and criteria,” conditions for which he held the Air 

Force, not EUD, responsible.87

General Smith strove to overcome the prevailing negative attitude 

toward the Air Force and to develop a good working and personal relationship with General Ahearn. Smith reinstituted the system of assigning 

one EUD deputy solely to the Air Force work and the other to the Army 

projects, a measure designed to establish that work for the Air Force 

was as important as what the division did for the Army. Col. Donald E. 

Hazen became “Mr. Air Force,” and Smith again offered Ahearn the services of the division in support of Air Force construction under the NATO 

Common Infrastructure Program. Smith held team-building sessions with 

both USAREUR and USAFE to demonstrate that EUD had valuable servic12K_Chap08_Final.indd 21 
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es to offer the “total military family.” Within six months Smith reporte

notable improvement in the relationship.88

EUD Wartime Responsibilities

One of several agreements signed in 1974 by the commander i

chief of USAREUR and the chief of engineers stipulated that the Europ

Division would provide engineering services to USAREUR in the even

of war. Variously referred to as contingency planning or mobilizatio

planning, the function received little attention during EUD’s early year

The issue of mobilization became a major concern of strategic thinkers i

the late 1970s. Their debate turned around whether the next war woul

be a quick, short engagement, such as the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, o

a longer, more protracted campaign that would require total mobiliz

tion of the enormous economic and industrial resources of the Unite

States.89

Most of this debate bypassed EUD as the division focused on th

expansion of design and construction activity, although stateside division

had been involved in planning and exercises for mobilization. Gener

Smith, having served as commander of the North Central Division befor

coming to Frankfurt, addressed this concern. In October 1983, withi

weeks of his arrival, Smith established a separate staff element to develo

and coordinate mobilization and wartime planning.90

General Smith’s emphasis on planning for mobilization and wartim

coincided with his broader intent to reinforce EUD as an Army unit. From 

the conduct of division staff, he concluded that EUD employees were “pre

ty lax in the way they thought about war.” USAREUR personnel wore batt

dress uniforms and engaged in field exercises, but EUD never participate

He also objected to the way the division’s military personnel dressed:

[They wore] their green uniforms like it w[as] Chicago or Vicksburg 

or San Francisco.... It just seemed to me a complete incongruity not to 

be aware of the fact that things could go wrong. I had been in Europe 

during the first Berlin crisis as a captain. I was aware of the fact that 

things could go pretty wrong without a whole lot of warning.91

In March 1984 General Smith went to Washington to develop wit

the USACE staff a detailed mobilization plan for EUD. In June he wen

to Heidelberg for similar meetings with the USAREUR staff. By Jul

the Europe Division, USAREUR, and USACE had a draft agreemen

to implement a mobilization plan.92 The military personnel serving i

EUD would be bound by any mobilization order; certain civilian pos

tions were designated “emergency essential” so the incumbents woul

remain in service in the event of mobilization. During mobilization

EUD would place its operations at USAREUR’s disposal “so that w

would use our expertise to contract with the host nation for constru

tion supply services.”93

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 22 
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Assessing EUD Management

Without doubt it was General Smith’s personal style, rather than 

any organizational changes he instituted, that had the most significant 

impact on the people at EUD. He was intense, demanding, and abrupt. 

He worked very long hours, and some called him driven. The people he 

met with regularly became familiar with his impatience and intolerance 

for imprecise answers. Some staff members were angered or frightened by 

his aggressive style; from others it elicited respect.

The division counsel, Allan Aaron, was one of the latter. Aaron had 

worked in Corps district and division offices in the United States (North 

Central, Albuquerque, and Detroit) before he came to the Counsel’s Office 

in the Engineer Command in 1973; after the death of Leonard Phillips in 

1976, Aaron was promoted to division counsel. Aaron worked with Smith 

on cleaning up the procurement irregularities and won Smith’s confidence. Smith gave him other special assignments, such as chairing a task 

force on automation. Aaron was often the target of Smith’s outbursts of 

frustration, but with a distinct purpose:

In a public forum, when I wanted to jerk somebody’s chain so that 

everyone else would get a certain message, Al’s chain would get jerked. 

Normally it was about something that many people besides Al had 

had a hand in. Maybe Al didn’t even know what it was all about. But 

others would see [him as] the good-hearted and constructive recipient 

of a spur to the flank and would, I believe, be impressed and themselves motivated by his unfailingly positive responses.94

Aaron apparently understood Smith’s intentions and his own role. He 

later affirmed that he “would go anywhere and do anything [for General 

Smith].... I really feel very strongly that General Smith was one of the 

high points in my career with the Corps of Engineers.” Hasso Damm, 

long-time chairman of the Works Council, felt that Smith never acted 

capriciously and that he respected workers’ rights. Damm thought that 

USACE “did the right thing by sending General Smith [to EUD].”95

By contrast, most of EUD’s personnel failed to see the vision for the 

division that Smith had formulated so clearly in his own mind. With the 

expectation that he would be at EUD for two, possibly three years, Smith 

applied intense pressure at the outset. The commander expected to be able 

to ease that pressure once he had the entire staff moving as a team in the 

proper direction. Smith reflected:

It is infinitely more suitable to be fairly rigorous and demanding 

up front, and then, as the situation allows, to become comradely and 

more relaxed, as opposed to coming in, being everybody’s friend, 

and then finding out that something is not being done as well as 

everyone would wish—and then trying to turn up the heat on that 

particular part of the operation.96

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 23 
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Smith and the Europe Division never had the luxury of time that migh

have allowed the organization to settle down after his harsh intervention

After less than a year in Frankfurt, Smith was promoted to major gener

and reassigned to Heidelberg as USAREUR’s deputy chief of staff, enginee

He left behind an organization in which most of the staff felt profound

discomfited by his aggressive management style and actions.

Change of Command

Smith’s successor, Brig. Gen. James W. van Loben Sels, who cam

directly from commanding the North Pacific Division of the Corps o

Engineers, arrived in July 1984. Van Loben Sels’ European experience ha

begun with the 23d Engineer Battalion, to which he was assigned from 

1960 to 1963. In 1975 he had returned to West Germany, to the office o

DCSENG. During that assignment he participated in planning the new 

Army garrison in Garlstedt in northern Germany. He remained in Europ

from 1977 to 1981 as commander of the 18th Engineer Brigade, whic

included the combat heavy engineer battalions and a labor service grou

A majority of the brigade’s troop construction was done in support of th

DEH, but the brigade also assumed a major responsibility in the plannin

and preliminary work on the range upgrade in Grafenwöhr. Van Lobe

Sels had asked that his tour with the 18th be extended to a third year s

he could complete a full phase of the work in Grafenwöhr.97

Soft-spoken, gentlemanly, and reserved, General van Loben Sel

demeanor was a relief from the intensity of General Smith. The sta

quickly recognized his keen intelligence and excellent memory; the

appreciated his directness, precision, and calm authority, which the

perceived as a sharp contrast with Smith’s volatility.98 He approached h

command quite differently from his predecessor, because of basic diffe

ences in personality and because he took into account Smith’s impact:

I found an organization that had had its socks pulled up.... I came 

in with a different style. I came in with a view of going for the longterm, a three-year commitment, to build on the energy, if you will, 

that [Smith] had built up. Then [I] attempted to shape the organization, heal the wounds that seemed to be around the battlefield, and 

focus on the long-term.

He focused his attention on morale, organizational structure, and th

need to develop a sense of identity for this large and geographically di

persed organization. He wanted to promote the organization, to “buil

a team from this group of folks, some of whom were fighting with on

another ... and to cope with this huge workload.”99

To improve morale and the organization’s self-image, Gener

van Loben Sels arranged social events, such as dances, parties, and 

Christmas ball, to which every member of the staff was invited. Such ga

gatherings had not taken place in recent experience. “We brought them 

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 24 
229

all together,” van Loben Sels 

recalled, “and we had our uniforms on—dress uniforms. Most 

of them had never seen us in our 

military dress uniform.”100

Van Loben Sels’ promotion 

to major general offered another opportunity to build up the 

division’s self-image. Like several of his predecessors, he was 

promoted during his command 

at EUD, but, as Damm noted, 

“He was the first one to make 

it into a great ceremony.”101 Van 

Loben Sels asked the V Corps 

commander for a parade, and he 

invited representatives from the 

German government and military, German construction agencies, and U.S. military commanders, including General Ahearn 

from the Air Force. At the ceremony on the parade grounds, the 

chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. E. R. Heiberg III, pinned on van Loben Sels’ 

second star. After the parade and ceremony General van Loben Sels and 

his wife hosted a reception at their quarters in Bad Vilbel.102

Organizational Structure and Data Systems

In addition to ceremony as an enhancement to self-image and morale, 

van Loben Sels turned his attention to the structures through which 

EUD operated: the division’s organizational framework and its use of 

information processing systems. Shortly after he arrived at the division, 

van Loben Sels launched a study of the division to identify an organizational structure best suited to accomplish its mission. A study team 

from the U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center (ESC), an agency of USACE 

located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, worked with an advisory group at the 

division to consider a wide range of issues: goals, problems, current and 

projected peacetime volume of work, geographical boundaries, operating 

environment, host-nation responsibilities, potential wartime mission, and 

requirements for interacting with customers. After the division’s executive committee reviewed the ESC study in February, the final report was 

published in April 1985.

The study concluded that EUD’s problems could be “summed up in 

three words—it’s too big.” The report continued: “No internal reorganization will resolve its physical space problems; no centralized operating 

division structure can service so many varied clients responsively. [EUD 

General van Loben Sels

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 25 
230

should adopt] the traditional USACE decentralized division HQ/distri

structure, but with some modifications.”103 Specifically, the report recom

mended that EUD have a division headquarters in Frankfurt with distri

offices in Frankfurt, Kaiserslautern, and Stuttgart. Only Turkey woul

remain as an area office.

General van Loben Sels rejected the recommended organization

structure. He was not convinced that the volume of work would remai

high enough to make the costs of reorganization acceptable, and he re

soned that the overhead required by the district structure would be ver

high. Instead, he continued to decentralize by giving more authority an

additional resources to the area engineers. By enhancing the authority o

the division’s area offices, van Loben Sels hoped to eliminate admini

trative bottlenecks and achieve greater productivity, thus accomplishin

what the report recommended without the costs of the reorganization.1

General van Loben Sels also established a study group of senio

division personnel to address automation. He saw this effort as build

ing on the study by the ESC that had identified the paucity of auto

mated data processing (ADP) in the division as a serious problem

The ESC study was particularly critical of support to the area office

noting the “minimal utilization of ADP capability and communica

tion from the division offices to the field.” Furthermore, “The [ADP

environment is archaic, even compared to Corps standards. AD

equipment is scheduled to be placed in the field in the near futur

but there does not appear to be any plan to provide standard pro

grams, the required ADP skills to utilize the equipment, or specif

guidance on utilization.”105EUD’s experience with data processing ha

been unsatisfactory long before van Loben Sels initiated his stud

The division’s first commander, General Prentiss, had had little su

cess in bringing the new organization into conformity with Corps o

Engineers use of two automated reporting systems, COEMIS (Corps o

Engineers Management Information System) and AMPRS (Automate

Management Progress Reporting System). The systems had bee

designed with no regard for the division’s unique requirements, an

their implementation was complicated because of EUD’s distance from 

Washington and the frequent turnover of branch chiefs and operators.1

COEMIS recorded accounting data and produced reports on th

financial results of operations and on current or updated financial con

ditions. In investigating possibilities for implementing COEMIS in 197

EUD staff learned that the computer hardware on hand was incompatib

with the software. Furthermore, it was not feasible to change hardwar

and retrain staff, nor was COEMIS able to handle the division’s speci

requirements, particularly tracking the different categories of employee

(DACs, local nationals in several countries, local hires) and the multip

currencies in which the division conducted business. EUD decided to us

the Measurement Information Data Acquisition System project manag

ment software developed at the Fort Worth District and to set up an inte

im finance and accounting system. EUD’s commander in the late 1970

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 26 
231

General Wilson, planned to complete conversion to the COEMIS system in 

fiscal year 1979, but the division did not meet the target date.107

Discussions of the applicability of AMPRS, a system for monitoring 

execution of the total construction program, paralleled the discussions of 

COEMIS. Implementation of AMPRS did not begin until 1977. EUD staff 

supplied managers in Washington with information showing the modifications needed to make the software usable in Europe. When the division 

finally began to use AMPRS in 1978, the system failed to meet its needs. 

The software’s shortcomings were not restricted to EUD. Fewer than half 

of the seventeen districts using AMPRS—those that already had a strong 

in-house computer staff—reported finding it useful.108

In the summer of 1980, as General Withers prepared to take command 

of EUD, the deputy director of resource management in Headquarters, 

USACE, told him that the Europe Division was the only part of the Corps 

that had not been integrated into COEMIS’s finance and accounting module. Withers decided that he needed to upgrade the position of chief of 

the Resource Management Office and to recruit civilians from the United 

States who had experience with this software. During the next two years, 

Withers emphasized implementing COEMIS, a goal the division finally 

achieved by the end of fiscal year 1982. When Withers completed his tour, 

the division had also installed an automated funds control system.109

When General Smith took command of EUD, he also perceived the 

value of automation, particularly as a tool to connect the area offices with 

division headquarters in Frankfurt. The staff had widely divergent levels 

of computer expertise, and Smith did not want the most computer-competent persons to dominate the EUD decision-making process. He asked the 

division counsel, Allan Aaron, to convene a task force to weigh the best 

uses of the technology for EUD. The committee continued after Smith’s 

departure to develop a plan for purchasing and installing IBM-compatible 

microcomputers at headquarters and in the field offices.110

The information systems planning team formed by General van 

Loben Sels continued studying COEMIS and AMPRS. In 1985 it articulated a new level of insight: EUD’s problems implementing the Corps of 

Engineers software programs stemmed from the character of the systems 

themselves. They were reporting systems, not management systems. The 

systems collected information only for reporting up the chain of command; the data were not used in the day-to-day management of projects 

or personnel or to assess trends and anticipate needs. Thus EUD’s project and construction managers had little practical use for AMPRS and 

COEMIS and little incentive to make reporting a priority. Van Loben Sels’ 

study team also acknowledged that “there is, and always has been ... a 

perceived lack of data integrity in AMPRS.”111

When General van Loben Sels reviewed the status of automation at 

the division in 1985, computer hardware consisted of an in-house Harris 

800 super-minicomputer and an assortment of microcomputers acquired 

in 1984 and distributed throughout the division, including to the field 

offices. Under the supervision of the ADP office, EUD was using standard 

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 27 
232

Corps of Engineer software applications, including AMPRS and COEMI

The microcomputers had word processing, spreadsheet, and databas

software. The word processing center, established by General Delbridge i

1977 with the Wang hardware-software system, remained under the pu

view of the Office of Administrative Services, rather than the ADP cente

and it was not heavily used. New technology had made the very idea of 

dedicated word-processing “typing pool” out of date.112

To assess EUD’s data processing needs, General van Loben Se

decided to use the IBM Information Systems Plan, a structured plannin

approach by which organizations examined their business processes t

determine what data were needed before they looked at automation. Th

objective was to develop a plan that would satisfy the short- and long

term requirements for information within the organization. Van Lobe

Sels conjectured that this process would engage the staff throughout th

organization and facilitate planning. The information systems plannin

study did help the staff understand business processes, but General va

Loben Sels did not find that it significantly improved automation. Near

a decade later he expressed disappointment in the results of the study pro

cess.113 Nonetheless, the team’s recommendation and a Department of th

Army directive prompted EUD to establish an Information Managemen

Office that combined ADP operations, programming functions, and word

processing activities, and included communications, records manag

ment, visual arts, libraries, and printing and publications. The new offic

opened on 1 April 1986, months after van Loben Sels’ departure.114

Despite a desire to stay at EUD for three years, General van Lobe

Sels was reassigned after only fifteen months. In late September 1985 h

assumed command of Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. On the short tenure

of Smith and van Loben Sels, Hasso Damm reflected: “The sequence o

the two made out of the shapeless organization a formed organization

first shaking up, and then [taking] the shaking portions and put them 

together again in one body.”115

Stability Achieved

The chief of engineers, General Heiberg, tapped Brig. Gen. Jame

W. “Bill” Ray, commander of the Middle East Division, to fill the une

pected vacancy in Frankfurt, making Ray the fourth division enginee

at EUD in as many years. The mammoth construction program man

aged by the Corps in Saudi Arabia was drawing down, and Gener

Ray had received orders to move to the division’s rear headquarte

in Winchester, Virginia. Instead of returning to the United States, h

moved to Frankfurt.116 Ray’s previous assignments included distri

engineer in Omaha; assistant commandant, U.S. Army Engineer Schoo

commander, 35th Engineer Battalion in Vietnam; and assistant directo

for civil works in Headquarters, USACE. He had also served as chie

Forces Modernization Division, and as secretary of general staff o

USAREUR.

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 28 
233

From the outset, EUD staff perceived General Ray as open, friendly, and 

outgoing—someone “you could talk to.” He had a good sense of humor and 

was very sociable; he and his wife participated frequently in ski trips and 

outings organized by a volunteer committee in the division. Although not a 

forceful public speaker, Ray had good communication skills; area engineers 

and field staff respected his knowledge of construction.117

One segment of the staff felt especially close to General Ray—the people who had worked for the Corps on the construction program in Saudi 

Arabia. During the drawdown in Saudi Arabia, General van Loben Sels 

had encouraged EUD to hire people leaving the Middle East Division; as 

a result, the division had several dozen “Saudi people.” A special camaraderie existed within this group, and they included General and Mrs. Ray 

in the “Saudi parties.” Some division staff resented the close social circle 

maintained by the people from Saudi Arabia.118

As a manager, General Ray disliked ad hoc actions and pressed 

the staff to develop systems. He practiced participatory management, 

respected the opinions of his staff, and paid special attention to working conditions and staff morale. General Ray adopted the two goals that 

General van Loben Sels had articulated for the Europe Division: (1) construct excellent facilities that are on time, within budget, attractive, and 

maintainable; and (2) be an excellent organization. Ray wanted to make 

EUD a place where people would want to come to work every day; his 

long-term goal was to develop a plan for the division for the 1990s.119 With 

these goals and his systematic approach to management, General Ray 

guided the Europe Division through several organizational changes and 

instituted an innovative program that focused staff attention on quality 

and excellence.

Organizational Changes

Several significant organizational adjustments occurred during 

General Ray’s tenure at EUD. Following Army directives, the division established the Information Management Office and the Logistics 

Management Office, which handled transportation services and 

some functions previously performed by the Office of Administrative 

Services.120 Ray redefined the responsibilities of the division’s deputies 

in an attempt to consolidate and clarify contracting authority within the 

division. He also redistributed the activities related to intergovernmental 

affairs when long-time employee William Camblor retired.

General van Loben Sels had asked the chief of engineering, Joe Higgs, 

to reorganize the Project Management Branch in his division by geographic 

areas. Van Loben Sels wanted project managers to work more closely with 

individual directors of engineering and housing. He also wanted each 

director of engineering and housing to have a single point of contact in 

engineering at EUD.121 Higgs resisted the reorganization because this structure made balancing the workload among project managers more difficult. 

Nonetheless, during General Ray’s tour, Higgs effected the changes.122

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 29 
234

In January 1987 General Ray 

approved a reorganization of the 

Construction Division aimed at 

placing responsibility for dayto-day problems with midlevel 

supervisors, allowing branch 

managers to concentrate on longrange planning. (Chart 11) The 

chief of construction, John Blake, 

served as the catalyst for this 

reorganization, which finally 

took place after a year of consultations with USACE headquarters 

in Washington. The reorganization established three branches 

within the Construction Division: 

Office Engineering, Construction 

Management, and Supervision 

and Inspection. Except for medical facilities, certain unique projects, and contract modifications 

of more than $100,000, the division gave the field offices authority to administer these contracts without referring issues back to head

quarters for decisions.123

Soon after General Ray arrived, he began to examine the roles of th

two deputies, particularly in reference to their authority over contractin

From the beginning of the division, both deputies had contracting autho

ity; since 1983 one deputy had handled contracts for the Army program

the other for the Air Force program. The 1985 report by the Enginee

Studies Center identified the involvement of two deputies in contractin

as a management problem. Because each deputy processed over 1,000 con

tracts each year, both were overwhelmed by their operational responsibil

ties. The report observed, “No one is planning because they are too bus

performing operations.”124

The system also created potential conflicts of interest, because 

deputy worked with the customer/user and then signed the contrac

involving the same clients. After consulting with Division Counsel Aaro

Higgs, Blake, and the chief of contracting, Richard Wisdom, General Ra

decided only one deputy and the chief of contracting should have con

tracting authority. In June of 1986 Ray appointed the deputy division eng

neer, Col. John Moravec, with contracting authority. Moravec had alread

served for fifteen months in EUD as assistant commander for DEH sup

port. General Ray gave his other deputy, Col. Dennis Culp, responsibilit

for management and planning.125

Ray also transferred additional contracting authority to the area eng

neers and put lawyers in five area offices: Stuttgart, Kaiserslautern, an

General Ray

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 30 
 Chart 11: Organization of the Europe Division, July 1988 

U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe

Executive Office

Commander and Division Engineer

Resource

Management

Office

Personnel Office

Public Affairs Office

Construction

Division

Construction

Management

Branch

Office

Engineering

Branch

Supervision and

Inspection

Branch

Safety and

Occupational

Health Office

Contracting

Division

Mobilization

Planning Office

Office of Council

Audit Office

Policy and

Compliance

Branch

Acquisition

Branch

Host Nations

Contractraing

Branch

Information

Management

Office

Logistics

Management

Office

U.S. Air Forces

Europe Liaison

Officer

Heidelberg Area Office

Camp Darby, Italy

Nuremberg Area Office

Nuremberg, Germany

Würzburg Area Office

Würzburg, Germany

The U.S. Engineer Group

Area Office

Incirlik, Turkey

Kaiserslautern Area Office

Kaiserslautern, Germany

Engineering

Division

Project

Management

Branch

Technical

Engineering

Branch

Special

Assistants

Boards and

Committees

Planning

Branch

Special

Assistants

Foundations

and Materials

Branch

General

Engineering

Branch

Frankfurt Area Office

Frankfurt, Germany

Northern Area Office

Hoensbroek, Netherlands

Stuttgart Area Office

Stuttgart, Germany

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 31 
236

Frankfurt in Germany; TUSEG in Turkey; and the Northern Area Office now 

located in the Netherlands. The lawyer in Stuttgart also served the area offi

es in Nuremberg and Würzburg. This reorganization reversed the centraliz

tion that had taken place in 1980 when the lawyers from the Mediterranea

and Stuttgart Area Offices were reassigned to headquarters in Frankfur

Ray assigned supervision and oversight of the Office of Counsel and its sup

porting elements in the area offices to Moravec.126 This reorganization gav

EUD’s area offices independence in contracting comparable to the autho

ity of districts in the United States. Because it was an innovation within th

Corps of Engineers, the measure required USACE approval.127

General Ray sought to add flexibility to contract administration b

promoting and improving the use of indefinite delivery (open-ended

types of contracts. The division negotiated prices for various services wit

selected architect-engineer firms and signed contracts up to a maximum 

of $500,000. When a community had a project costing less than $50,00

the director of engineering and housing only specified the services h

needed on a delivery order to the firm under contract and the firm bega

the work. The indefinite delivery contracts eliminated the need to nego

tiate a separate contract for each small job. The architect-engineer firm 

could deliver services on individual projects up to the maximum amoun

of the contract.128

In 1986 the division received permission to allow a second-year exten

sion to the contracts with architect-engineer firms, and the directors o

Construction of recreational facilities provided opportunities for social outings, 

such as ski trips to Garmisch.

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 32 
237

engineering and housing received permission to write delivery orders up 

to $85,000. These new procedures reduced administrative labor, particularly the hundreds of hours of overtime normally expended to prepare 

and place contracts at the end of a fiscal year. In 1988 EUD held seminars 

to bring together architect-engineer firms and the engineering staffs from 

military communities to familiarize everyone with the regulations governing the indefinite delivery contracts.129

Intergovernmental Affairs

The retirement on 4 July 1987 of Camblor, deputy division engineer 

for intergovernmental affairs, necessitated a reorganization. Camblor had 

served in Europe continuously since 1944, first as an Army officer and 

then for forty years as a civilian in the military construction organizations 

that had preceded EUD. During this long career, Camblor won a number 

of awards, including designation as a distinguished post member of the 

Society of American Military Engineers in Frankfurt in 1977, a decoration for Meritorious Civilian Service in 1985, and the Exceptional Civilian 

Award from the Secretary of the Army in 1987. From 1983 until his retirement he served as chairman of the Sending States Construction Group, 

which included representatives of the six NATO nations that had troops 

in the Federal Republic of Germany. In recognition of his extraordinary 

career, Camblor was honored with a formal retirement ceremony on the 

grassy area in front of the Phillips Building. Officials from USAREUR, V 

Corps, and a number of the NATO host nations attended the ceremony. 

U.S. military units marched, and a German army band played. At his 

retirement dinner, Camblor received medals from several nations, including the Federal Republic of Germany, whose minister of construction presented him with Das Grosse Deutsche Verdienstkreuz (The German Grand 

Service Cross). After the ceremony, EUD hosted a retirement dinner at the 

officers’ club.130

General Ray and others described Camblor as “a unique asset to the 

organization” and “essentially irreplaceable.”131 Because the division could 

not fill the SES position that Camblor had held nor replace his years of experience, Ray chose to divide Camblor’s responsibilities three ways. The chief 

of engineering, Higgs, was named deputy division engineer for intergovernmental affairs and designated to attend meetings of the Sending States 

Construction Group. Camblor’s former assistant, Michael Mele, reported to 

Higgs. The chief of construction, Blake, took over responsibility for activities in the technical area, and the division counsel, Aaron, conducted the 

negotiations with foreign nations required to implement new programs, in 

addition to interpreting the intergovernmental agreements.132

Focus on Customers and Quality

Early in his tour at EUD, General Ray took up the 1986 USACE theme, 

“Leaders in Customer Care.” Generals Smith and van Loben Sels had 

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 33 
238

emphasized the importance of satisfying customers by delivering a high

quality product, but neither commander had established a specific pro

gram. General Ray chose Total Quality Management (TQM), a program 

developed by the 3M Corporation, as the vehicle for making custome

care a top priority for the division. Ray proposed that EUD develop 

TQM program and appointed Colonel Moravec as quality director t

spearhead the effort.133

At a three-day conference of the division’s managers in January 198

General Ray reminded them that President Ronald Reagan had issued 

directive requiring all federal government agencies to become 20 percen

more productive by 1992. Ray stressed that the division could be a leade

in customer care while meeting the president’s goal. A spokesman fo

3M Corporation explained the Total Quality Management concept. A fe

weeks later thirteen supervisory-level employees from EUD attended 

five-day workshop on TQM at 3M headquarters in St. Paul, Minnesot

They returned to Frankfurt as trained facilitators, eager to implemen

a modification of the program they dubbed EUD Quality Managemen

(EQM).134

In 3M’s terminology, quality management is a process that focuses o

people, not on products:

EQM is designed to provide a new culture to the Division and 

every employee who works here. Its deceptively simple process is to 

do right things right. And at the basis of the program is the goal of 

100 percent conformance to customer’s expectations. That is, if our 

customer expects us to be able to do it, we will do it—100 percent of 

the time. If we cannot do it, we will change our customer’s expectations.135

Total Quality Management defines a customer as any person withi

an organization who expects work products from other employees.1

EQM challenged the very nature and orientation of the personnel at EUD

The organization has been product-oriented for so long that to 

talk about being customer-oriented is a major change. That doesn’t 

mean you ignore the product, but there is more to meeting customer 

expectations than delivering the product. It’s the manner in which 

we deliver the product.... It’s how we explain to the customer what 

we can and what we cannot do.137

During 1987 and early 1988 articles in every issue of the Corps Lin

explained EQM, gave the reactions of staff, and reiterated the importanc

of quality. General Ray asserted often that training employees was “th

most important thing we are going to do in EUD in the next two years.”1

In the first phase of EQM’s implementation, every employee participate

in a mandatory full-day session. The first group of facilitators traine

others; in August 1987 a second group of facilitators was trained. B

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 34 
239

September, more than 800 people had participated in a session that covered the concepts, principles, and skills of EQM. Personnel throughout 

the organization responded enthusiastically, discovering that the program 

generated a lot of energy by providing all employees with an opportunity 

to be included in the management of the organization.139

To explain the need for EQM, General Ray used a parable, the story 

of the frog in a pot of water. The frog, Ray recounted, is an adaptable 

creature that adjusts his body temperature to his environment. Whether 

the water is hot or cold, the frog adjusts until he is comfortable. In a pot 

of water over a fire, the frog is a slave to his proven routine and continues with the same response as the heat increases. By the time the water 

reaches a boil, the frog has adjusted himself right into oblivion. “The heat 

is on for organizations that want to succeed in these changing times,” Ray 

told his staff. “To be successful, organizations must change with the environment” and find new ways to adjust or risk ending up like the boiled 

frog. The frog became the unofficial emblem of Ray’s leadership, and he 

was inundated with gift frogs. The story of the frog conveyed a serious 

message—what worked in the past might not work in changing times. 

Productivity and its ability to attract customers would be the measure of 

EUD’s success in an increasingly competitive environment.140

By the autumn of 1987 the EQM initiative attracted the attention of the 

deputy assistant secretary of defense for installations, Robert A. Stone, 

who singled out the division for special commendation. The following 

January EUD provided a display describing EQM for the Department of 

Defense’s Productivity Month celebration in the Pentagon. In his spring 

1988 visit to Frankfurt, the chief of engineers, General Heiberg, praised 

the program, saying, “General Ray did not invent the word quality, but 

[he] has put new meaning into the word.”141 In May 1988 Ray was able 

to report that Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci had signed up for the 

TQM process, “and he has ordered this division to continue working on 

total quality management.”142

General Ray strove to make EUD a place where people wanted to 

work. To advance this goal, he introduced physical changes in the working environment. He had the division replace the old gray metal desks 

and file cabinets with space-saving modular office furniture.143 To emphasize his belief in the importance of the division’s work, and to record 

division activities and work in a tangible and easily accessible form, Ray 

allocated funds for this history of the Europe Division and its predecessor 

agencies.

General Ray perceived the implementation of Total Quality 

Management as the most far-reaching change he would make as Europe 

Division engineer.144 The concept incorporated his values by emphasizing 

the positive, building team spirit, and engaging everyone across departments, nationalities, and civil service grades. The energy, enthusiasm, and 

cooperation generated by participation in EQM added to the loyalty and 

confidence General Ray personally inspired in those who served with 

him at EUD.

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 35 
240

In the spring of 1988 the Europe Division was operating smooth

and the staff felt optimistic. Construction placement for the fiscal yea

ending 30 September 1987 had been an all-time high of $527 million

leaders expected placement for fiscal year 1988 to be even higher. EU

workforce numbered nearly 1,200 in headquarters and in eight are

offices: Frankfurt, Northern Area, Stuttgart, Kaiserslautern, Nurember

Würzburg, Heidelberg, and Turkey.

12K_Chap08_Final.indd 36 
9

MANAGING DESIGN AND 

CONSTRUCTION

Although the Europe Division (EUD) evolved as an organization 

under a succession of commanders between 1977 and 1988, 

the engineer mission in Europe remained constant. John Blake, 

who served as chief of construction during most of that decade, 

trenchantly defined that mission: “The real reason we are here is to build 

things, [to] repair things ... for the benefit of the soldiers and airmen in 

Europe.”1

Building things for soldiers involved EUD in an increasingly vast, 

volatile, and complex operation. By 1980 the division managed military 

construction in countries from the North Sea to the eastern Mediterranean 

and the Caspian Sea, a land mass roughly one-third the size of the United 

States that stretched over a distance slightly greater than that between 

New York and San Francisco. In 1977 EUD operated under eleven different working agreements in seven countries; by 1987 that had increased to 

twenty agreements with eight countries. (See Map 18.) Staff in the division 

conducted business daily in a variety of languages and under a multiplicity of national laws, regulations, and customs.2

Although the volume of work measured in dollars was not the largest 

in the Corps of Engineers, EUD workload, when measured by the number 

of projects, was larger than any other engineer organization in the world. 

In 1977 the division administered 1,800 projects in design and another 

300 in construction. Over the next decade the number of design projects 

remained in the same high range, while the volume of construction placement increased as design projects moved to the construction phase—from 

$130 million in 1977 to $492 million in 1986. The EUD leadership cadre 

judged its task in dealing with these projects, many of them quite small, 

as far more complicated than administering a handful of multimilliondollar contracts for a single customer, as the newly created Middle East 

Division seemed to be doing. By 1986 EUD had more than twenty customers, including the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and eight Department of 

Defense agencies. The division’s funds were drawn from fifteen sources, 

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 1 
242

and it paid its bills in almost as many currencies, each of which had diffe

ent and fluctuating rates to the dollar, a factor often ignored by Congre

and planners in the Pentagon.3

Many of the Europe Division’s tasks demanded quick action and rapi

completion. Design and construction frequently had to be executed i

fewer than twelve months. On longer projects, initiation was often urgen

work had to be started before all the requirements had been defined

This meant that the scope of projects changed as the work progressed

Map 18

M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a

B l a c k S e a

North

Sea

Sardinia

Sicily

N

O

R

W

A

Y

NETHERLANDS

WEST

GERMANY

LUXEMBOURG

BELGIUM 

ITALY

TURKEY

GREECE

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROP

1987

Area of Responsibility

0

0 500 Miles

500 Kilometers

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 2 
243

complicating execution and increasing the costs of both design and construction.4

 This volatility had been characteristic of the engineer mission 

in Europe for much of the period since the end of World War II. It was 

not a characteristic of most civil works projects managed by the Corps of 

Engineers in the United States.

The vastness, complexity, and volatility of EUD’s work make it difficult to describe in simple and consistent terms. Indeed, a single descriptive framework cannot adequately portray the division’s many tasks. 

Several of the many ways in which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 

Europe Division, and its customers described and measured the division’s 

activities are explored below, including methods of contracting, sources of 

funding, and management of the work through the field offices.

Methods of Contracting

Like its predecessor organizations in Europe, EUD relied largely on 

contractors. Architect-engineer firms designed projects and construction 

companies built facilities ranging from missile sites, hardstands, and barracks to hospitals and bowling alleys.

In the European context the predominant method of contracting 

was indirect; that is, U.S. military engineers depended on host-government agencies to award contracts for design, construction, or both. 

Representing the interests of the U.S. government and the military user, 

EUD prepared the original contract package, whether for design 

or construction, and approved 

the final product.5

 The process 

was called direct contracting when 

EUD awarded contracts without 

a host-government agency as 

intermediary.

Three options existed for a 

project assigned to the Europe 

Division. First, design and construction could be indirect, 

in which case the host nation 

awarded the design and construction contracts. Second, 

design and construction could 

be direct, in which case EUD 

awarded both contracts. Third, 

EUD could contract directly for 

design and indirectly for construction, meaning that EUD 

awarded the design contract and 

the host nation awarded the construction contract. Theoretically, 

The Europe Division generally relied on 

contractors to complete facilities, such as 

this prison in Mannheim.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 3 
244

a fourth option existed, but a 

project designed by a host nation 

would almost invariably be built 

by it as well.6

The process for handling 

any particular project was determined by one of the many country-to-country agreements under 

which EUD worked. Generally, 

those agreements specified that 

the host nation retained control 

of all construction within its territory. Each nation, of course, 

followed different rules and 

customs concerning the nature 

of the contract, contracting procedures, selection of materials, 

guarantees, and the like. A look 

at contracting in two countries, 

Turkey and West Germany, illustrates some of the complexities 

EUD’s management personnel 

handled.

Contracting in Turkey

Turkey was geographically remote from the center of the U.S. militar

presence in Europe, and its construction industry was less sophisticate

than that of central and western European countries. These factors con

joined to make Turkey the focus of disproportionate attention from EU

personnel.

EUD inherited a difficult arrangement in Turkey. The United State

had imposed an arms embargo in 1974 in response to Turkish action du

ing a crisis over Cyprus. The government of Turkey thereupon cancelle

the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement that regulated U.

military construction in the country. In negotiations for a new agre

ment in 1975–1976, the Turkish government insisted on extensive contr

over contracting and construction. All projects had to be approved by th

government of Turkey, which reserved the right to review all contractu

documents. The Turkish government submitted names of approved bid

ders for contracts; bid openings and negotiations had to include offici

Turkish representatives; the government insisted on placing a residen

engineer on each job; and, for projects prefinanced by the United State

the Turkish government received 3 percent of all funds recovered from 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).7

The new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement also commi

ted the United States to foster Turkish economic development as well a

Construction of even this simple warehouse 

near Ankara involved special measures to 

strengthen the Turkish construction 

industry.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 4 
245

joint defense. To the extent feasible, the United States agreed to procure all 

materials, labor, and all other services in Turkey. The Turkish government 

strictly enforced the limits on imports and insisted on approving lists of 

construction materials before construction could even begin. These procedures contributed substantially to delays in construction.8

To fulfill the United States’ commitment to foster economic development, EUD sought to introduce advanced methods into the Turkish construction industry whenever possible.9

 The United States Engineer Group 

(TUSEG) provided training for both contractors and workers, including 

on-the-job training, films, and seminars on topics such as contracting, 

construction methods, and asbestos removal. This special effort enabled 

more Turkish contractors to meet U.S. specifications.10

Contracting in West Germany

The authority that the Turks insisted on retaining over decisions 

concerning U.S. military construction graphically shows how important 

the issue of control is in any country. It was no less important in West 

Germany, where the Europe Division constructed the majority of its projects and where relations between the United States and Germany had a 

very different history from the relations between the United States and 

Turkey. The agreements governing contracting for military construction 

in Germany first took shape during the 1950s, when the Federal Republic’s 

sense of sovereignty was tentative and Soviet power threatened Western 

Europe. As West German self-confidence grew and as Germans began to 

discount the Soviet threat, the Federal Republic asserted its right to control military construction within its own boundaries.

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and West Germany signed 

the basic agreement, the Dollarbaukontrakt, (Dollar Construction Contract), 

in 1956. Modified in 1961, this agreement formed the basis for all dollar-funded design and construction executed in the Federal Republic. 

Coupled with the supplementary agreement to the NATO Status of Forces 

Agreement signed in 1959, these accords governed indirect contracting for 

U.S. military construction.11 According to the basic law (constitution) of 

the Federal Republic, the ten West German Länder (states) were the enforcing agencies of federal statutes. Under this decentralized system, federal 

laws were frequently interpreted differently at each building site, forcing 

Army engineers to prepare designs to meet the standards in different 

German localities.12

In the mid-1950s, when West Germany achieved sovereignty, new procedures replaced those governing U.S. military construction. With adaptations that strengthened German control, these procedures remained in 

force in 1974. Thus, EUD dealt directly with the Ministry of Defense or 

the Ministry of Construction in Bonn primarily to work out general agreements concerning construction programs. At the local level, where actual 

building took place, contracts with builders came under the jurisdiction 

of states and localities. The Bonn ministries signed contracts with the 

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 5 
246

U.S. agency and issued federal construction orders to state constructio

offices (Oberfinanzdirektionen), which in turn passed the orders to loc

construction offices (called variously Landesbauämter, Staatsbauämter, o

Finanzbauämter) for execution. EUD had only indirect contact—and n

contracts—with the company executing the work. The division’s contrac

for U.S. military construction were with the appropriate West Germa

governmental agency.13

For reasons of coordination, contracts drawn up by EUD for th

Ministries of Defense or Construction passed through the West Germa

government’s Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical Working Group fo

Construction), created in 1956.14 This agency, which maintained its office

in Frankfurt, proved over the years an indispensable ally. In recognitio

of the value of its role, EUD presented the director of this German agenc

Viktor Krupinski, with the U.S. Department of the Army’s Outstandin

Civilian Service Award days before his retirement after a nineteen-yea

tenure. In a small ceremony on 26 February 1976, EUD lauded Krupinski

role in facilitating construction for the Nike and Mace missile program

of the early 1960s, the Hawk program of 1965–1968, the TAB VEE (Theate

Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise) aircraft shelter program, an

the two German-financed programs of the 1970s to modernize U.S. facil

ties.15

As West Germany became more confident of its position in intern

tional affairs, it sought to bring U.S. (and other) military constructio

under its control. The effort culminated during the 1970s in negoti

tions concerning the Auftragsbautengrundsätze (ABG–75), the principles o

contract construction formulated by the Federal Republic to replace th

bilateral agreements of earlier years. In the negotiations for ABG–75, th

West Germans maintained that one single accord ought to govern all s

NATO countries with troops in Germany and that construction shoul

be contracted through German government agencies, that is, throug

indirect contracting.16 These were all assertions of sovereignty that Franc

had insisted upon thirty years earlier. Most of West Germany’s NAT

partners signed ABG–75 in the late 1970s, but the United States resiste

signing until 1982.17

The United States held out for several years because it continued t

find advantage in the older agreements that permitted it to engage i

direct design, without the intermediary of an official German agenc

and some direct construction. In addition, U.S. law prohibited some o

the financial arrangements accepted by the other nations. Over sever

years EUD’s experience showed that, compared to projects designed ind

rectly, projects designed directly encountered more frequent delays i

the German review process and required an undue number of contra

modifications, leading to missed schedules and increased costs. Brig. Ge

George Kenyon “Ken” Withers, Jr., concluded that the German admini

tration of construction was doing “a good job,” and he favored signin

ABG–75. He argued that implementing it would have a negligible effe

on EUD’s internal operations. On 29 September 1982, the United State

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 6 
247

represented by USAREUR, and the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Ministry of Construction, signed the agreement; it became 

effective on 1 October.18

Projects and the Process

Because managing the design and construction process from start to 

finish made up a major part of EUD’s day-to-day work, the process itself 

merits review. The division processed the idea for any project through 

three phases: (1) planning, which shaped the idea and secured funding 

for it; (2) design, which translated the plan into a constructible project; 

and (3) construction, which turned it into mortar, bricks, and boards, giving the original idea its three-dimensional reality.

Planning

If a project idea arose in a military community, the community commander turned first to his facilities engineer, who defined the idea in relation to the community’s mission and decided whether the local engineer 

staff had the resources to develop the concept design sufficiently to obtain 

congressional funding. The facilities engineer assessed the characteristics 

of the site in relation to the project, checked access to utilities and communications, and weighed any other economic or environmental factors that 

bore on the prospects of completing the project. If the local facilities engineer could not provide these basic design services, the military community turned to the next highest level, USAREUR’s Directorate of Facilities 

Engineering (reorganized and renamed the Directorate of Engineering 

and Housing [DEH] in 1976). Either the facilities engineer or the DEH 

could also decide to bring in EUD to help with this advanced planning.19

If the project originated as a part of a new weapons system or some 

other aspect of direct combat support, it would come to EUD at the end 

of the concept design or advanced planning stage, because the Europe 

Division acted as sole agent to manage design and construction for all 

Military Construction, Army (MCA), projects and, upon request, for the 

Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF), projects. By contrast, EUD 

might or might not manage Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA), 

projects or projects funded from other sources.

By the late 1980s, in an effort to improve customer satisfaction, EUD 

had instituted a predesign conference for each project as part of this planning phase. This became the initial and most critical point of interaction 

between the division staff and the originators of the project idea. At this 

meeting, the participants reviewed all documents, especially the initiating document (Department of Defense form 1391) and the project development brochure, and determined whether the scope of work accurately 

reflected the user’s needs.20

When completed, the planning phase brought the project to 35 percent completion of design. The Army engineers had calculated a current 

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 7 
248

working estimate, the total cost of the project through final constru

tion, required of any project included in the military budget presented t

Congress. When Congress approved a project, it used the current wor

ing estimate as the program amount—the total funds authorized an

appropriated for the project.21 EUD also used the working estimate whe

describing its workload; the volume of work was generally expressed a

the total working estimate of all projects currently under design.

By the mid-1980s, an EUD-organized conference had evolved to review 

work before USAREUR proposed a project to the Department of the Arm

The DEH, the user, the designer, and the EUD representative discussed th

review comments received during the planning phase, resolved their di

ferences, and approved the concept design. The assumption was that onc

concept review was completed, no further changes would occur in eithe

the operational or the functional requirements for the project.22

Design

The design phase, managed by EUD’s Engineering Division, had i

own three stages: preliminary design, which built on the earlier plan

ning phase; prefinal design; and final design. Staff in the division migh

do direct design of a project, or EUD might engage an outside architec

engineer firm to execute direct design. For indirect design, either 

German government agency executed the work or the agency engaged a

architect-engineer firm to complete the design. In these cases, EUD mon

tored, verified, oversaw, and cajoled to bring the work to completion o

time and within the budget.23

The preliminary design phase carried the project from 35 to 50 pe

cent design. EUD screened the project again to ensure that it conforme

to statutory, regulatory, and administrative requirements and qualifie

for the designated funding category (OMA, MCA, and others). The sta

verified that a project had a clearly defined scope of work and reali

tic cost estimates, checked the adequacy of the funding made availab

for design, and calculated EUD management fee as a percentage of th

design costs. The division’s Technical Review Branch reviewed archite

tural drawings and functional layouts in detail to ensure the adequacy o

electrical, mechanical, and other distribution systems. EUD review of th

preliminary design stage also encompassed exterior utility systems, road

parking areas, landscaping, and secure sources of power and water. Sta

reviewed the project’s completion dates and coordinated necessary chan

es with the user. Completion dates were critical for projects funded b

OMA, because these funds had to be returned if not obligated during th

fiscal year in which the project was approved.24

Near the end of the preliminary phase, EUD coordinated a use

review of the original cost estimates to refine and check them against th

approved budget. All parties then checked the preliminary design again

When EUD received the signed approval of design and cost estimate

from the user, the next stage—prefinal design—began.25

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 8 
249

During the prefinal stage, EUD design staff or contractors prepared 

detailed drawings of the facilities involved in the project. This stage also 

included the final calculations and structural analyses, the preparation 

of complete specifications, and a detailed review of costs based on actual 

quantitative measurements taken from the drawings. The design team 

again checked all elements of the design for technical accuracy and completeness. When the prefinal stage was completed, a project was 90 percent through the design cycle.26

During final design, the division staff prepared or monitored a contractor’s preparation of construction drawings and specifications, again 

coordinating the work with the user. EUD also prepared any special 

statements relating to legal and administrative aspects of the contract as it 

put together the final contract documents. Staff assembled the completed 

drawings, the specifications, and the legal paperwork into a bid package 

for construction.27

The final review conference marked the culmination of the design 

phase. A project manager in the Engineering Division gathered the final 

design documents and sent them to all the participants with notice of the 

date for the design conference. One last review of the design was done to 

ensure that the facility as designed met the operational and functional 

needs of the intended user.28

If a revised working estimate for the project exceeded the program amount appropriated by Congress, EUD had to send an explanation to Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) in Washington, which administered the appropriated funds. 

USACE sent EUD an authorization to solicit bids or to award the construction contract. At the moment of approval, USACE transferred 

to EUD 85 percent of the amount appropriated by Congress for the 

project. Once the division received the money and all clearances, the 

bid package was distributed to construction contractors qualified to 

handle the work.29

Construction

With the design phase completed and the project funds received, the 

construction phase began, with EUD’s Construction Division monitoring the project. Much of the day-to-day work passed to the area offices, 

resident engineer offices, and project offices. The preconstruction conference brought together the representatives of the contractor (and principal 

subcontractors) and EUD area or resident engineer. The conference also 

frequently included representatives of the user and the community, the 

facilities engineer, or additional EUD personnel at the invitation of the 

area or resident engineer.30

Field personnel monitored progress at the construction site, including necessary testing, property administration, cost reporting, user 

liaison, record keeping, labor relations, safety, job site security, quality 

assurance, and personnel administration. When the volume of work 

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 9 
250

or the remoteness of the site warranted, the Europe Division opened 

project office at or near the job site. Throughout the construction phas

staff in the Construction Division in Frankfurt provided an array o

support and technical expertise to solve the more difficult problems

Monitors ensured that the contractor stayed on schedule, adhered t

the contract price, and executed the plan’s special and general cond

tions and specifications. Field office personnel also tracked funds an

negotiated changes, within limits, while they forwarded to Frankfu

any changes that exceeded their authority.32

The Construction Division managed periodic inspections, con

trolled funds, and administered the contract to ensure that the con

tractor delivered high-quality work on time and within budge

Headquarters staff and field personnel worked in concert to condu

the prefinal inspection of the construction site before turning the faci

ity over to the user. They also assessed and acted upon any deficiencie

identified in the final inspection.33

Because the indirect method of contracting put a bureaucrat

layer between EUD and the executor of the work, EUD had litt

leverage to delay payment to the contractor or to cancel the con

tract. The indirect method of contracting in the Federal Republic o

Germany also fostered opportunities for delay. (Chart 12) The averag

time involved in seeing an indirect contract to completion was 24

months.34 (See Chart 13.)

Europe Division personnel in Sinop, Turkey, monitored each construction project 

as it progressed.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 10 
251

Value Engineering

In addition to guiding a project through the various phases of design 

and construction, EUD administered a value-engineering program. Value 

engineering is a systematic approach to reducing costs in a project without changing its original function or scope. Designs for a project selected 

for value engineering might be reviewed by an in-house team or examined by an architect-engineer firm to see how savings could be achieved 

by changing aspects of the design or construction.35

In 1974, when the Europe Division was established, regulations set out 

by the Office of the Chief of Engineers located the value engineering function in the division’s Executive Office. Although value engineering was 

applied to direct design projects during the 1970s, the German construction industry never thought it necessary, asserting that they did it “in the 

Construction Authorization

European Division

Forward estimated basis

Title IA, II and III Contract to BAG

BAG (Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe)

Translation administrative action and forwarding contract(s)

to pertinent ministry in Bonn for acceptance and signature

Applicable Federal Republic of Germany Ministry

Coordination and contract signature

Issues construction order and contract(s) to applicable OFD

Returns signed contract(s) to the BAG

BAG

Return contract

OFD (Oberfinanzdirektionen)

Issue construction order to BAUAMT

EUD

Record contract obligation

concur with bidders

list review award

recommendation initiate

contract modifications

BAG

Coordinate bidders list

recommend construction

award sign and accept contract

modification issue revised

construction order

BAUAMT

(local contract office)

Prepare bidders list

Solicit, evaluate proposals

and recommend award to EUD

Award construction contract

Monitor

construction

BAUAMT

Perform Title II Services

Contractor

Execute Construction

 Chart 12: Indirect Contracting Process in the Federal Republic of Germany 

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 11 
252

normal course of design.” In fiscal year 1983 the Office of the Secretary o

Defense, concerned about the rising costs of military construction, set 

goal to save 2 percent of the total budget for military construction throug

value engineering. The Pentagon increased the goal to 5 percent in fisc

year 1984 and to 6 percent in fiscal year 1986.36

The committee established to oversee the value engineering program 

at EUD selected projects for examination that promised potential saving

This committee, headed by the deputy commander, tried to apply valu

engineering during the design phase of a project, before the concept review 

meeting. The value engineering report went to the original designer, wh

 Chart 13: Indirect Method of Contracting and Project Milestones 

Proponent

Public Coordination by Bauamt

Europe

Division

Milestone

Start End

0 2

2 7 7 15 15 19

19 33

33 41

(MOC)

Ministry of

Construction

OFD

Oberfinanzdirektion

Bauamt

(local contract

office)

Using Agency

Architect/

Engineer (A/E)

Construction

Contractor Directorate of

Engineering

and Housing

Receive Design

Directive,

Criteria,

DD 1391 and

Design Funds

Process

ABG–3

ABG–3 to

MOC, OFD

and Bauamt

Bauamt

Contract A/E

Start Design

Receive Concept

Submission;

Reproduce and

Distribute for

Review

Concept

Review

Conference

41 44

Receive Concept

Approval;

Design

Authorization

and Design

Funds

44 49

Process

ABG–3

Modification

and Forward

to Bauamt

49 51

Bauamt

Direct A/E

to Start

Final

Design

83 93

Bauamt Advertise,

Open Bids, Evaluate

and Forward Package

with Recommendations

93 95

Receive ABG–4

Evaluate Bids

and Request Funds

ABG, Auftragsbautengrundsätze

Legend

(Weeks)

95 98

Process, ABG–4 and

Award to Industry

51 69

Receive Final

Submission;

Reproduce

and Distribute

for Review 69 77

Final

Review

Conference 77 83

Backcheck

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 12 
253

reviewed it and incorporated appropriate changes into the design. During 

the construction phase, the contractor could initiate a value-engineering 

change proposal, documenting an alternate and more economical solution 

or method of accomplishing specific parts of the project. If the proposal was 

accepted, the contractor received 55 percent of the net savings.

In fiscal year 1984 the chief of engineering, Joe G. Higgs, took 

over responsibility for value engineering and located it in the Project 

Management Branch. During fiscal years 1985 to 1987, EUD doubled the 

number of its value-engineering studies from twenty-four to approximately fifty annually. More savings through the application of value 

engineering translated into more construction projects, because additional 

projects could be authorized from the savings on previous projects. In 

1989, to conform to USACE regulations, the division engineer returned 

value engineering to the Executive Office.

The elements of design and construction in EUD were long, laborious, and labor-intensive in ways peculiar to the European setting. The 

Engineering Division’s Project Management Branch tracked each project 

through the design phase, at which point responsibility for the project 

passed to the Construction Division. Effective communication between 

the two divisions was crucial to the process but not always achieved. 

People who worked in the Construction Division frequently complained 

that designers took too little account of constructibility and failed to 

incorporate into subsequent designs the lessons learned during construction. People in the Engineering Division claimed that those in construction lacked imagination, flair, and creativity.37

Projects and Funding

Money for design and construction, or for other technical activities such 

as design review or advice on master planning, came from one of three 

sources: the United States government, NATO, or the governments of the host 

nations. Each of these lines of funding supported a variety of programs.

Tracking the funds for any one project was complicated because, 

within legal limits prescribed by the funding authorization, EUD was 

able to combine funds from several sources to support projects. Hospital 

renovations, for example, used dollars from MCA and OMA appropriations, Deutschmarks from the Modernization of United States Facilities 

(MOUSF) program, and (or) other host-nation funds. Some funding 

arrangements were straightforward, such as MCA programs within 

USAREUR. Others were more convoluted: For certain facilities the United 

States initiated construction and then sought compensation from NATO, 

so that NATO monies became mixed with MCA funds.38

U.S. Funding

U.S. funds included several categories of monies appropriated by 

Congress: Military Construction, Army (MCA); Minor MCA (MMCA); 

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 13 
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Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF or MCP); Military Construction

Navy (MCN); Operations and Maintenance, Army; Air Force family hou

ing; Army family housing; Department of Defense contingency fund

and Department of Defense dependent schools. EUD also worked wit

nonappropriated funds and commissary surcharge monies. This list 

suggestive, not exhaustive.

EUD managed all work in Europe funded under MCA (Table 6) an

all work funded under the agreements with Germany to pay the costs o

U.S. forces protecting their territory. During the 1970s USAREUR’s entir

allotment of MCA money averaged less than $50 million annually.

Still, within these limits EUD workload increased significantly betwee

July 1975 and late 1977. Design workload, expressed as the programme

cost of building the projects in design, went from $279 million and 24

projects in fiscal year 1974 to about $430 million and 554 projects in fi

cal year 1975, then jumped to $1.3 billion by late 1977. The largest dolla

increases came in work funded by MCA, but work to support facilitie

(OMA and family housing rehabilitation) supplied the greatest numbe

of projects.40

Between May 1976 and August 1978, EUD completed $34.4 million o

MCA construction.41 By the end of the decade, USAREUR’s annual MC

allotment had increased to over $200 million. EUD workload increase

accordingly, and it continued to increase during the 1980s. The trend wa

not an uninterrupted progression, however; in the summer of 1979 EUD

division engineer, Brig. Gen. Drake Wilson, notified the chief of engineer

Lt. Gen. John Morris, that his “most serious problem was the curren

shortage of MCA design funds.”42

In addition to projects such as ammunition storage and medical facil

ties, MCA funds paid for facilities modernization (the dollar-funded pro

 Table 6 

Military Construction, Army, Annual Allotments

Fiscal Years 1975–1986

 Program Funding Program Funding 

 Fiscal Year ($ million) Fiscal Year ($ million) 

 1981 201.0

 1982 294.0

 1983 262.0

 1984 313.0

 1985 255.0

 1986 337.0

 1975 $ 31.641

 1976 58.188

 1977 59.995

 1978 185.675

 1979 213.875

 1980 113.0

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 14 
255

gram that followed MOUSF), pollution control, storage of weapons and 

equipment, missile sites, energy production, training and training facilities, weapons facilities, physical fitness, barracks, and projects related to 

the combat mission of the forces. EUD also executed work for the Air 

Force and the Navy with funds appropriated for MCAF and MCN.

Funds allocated for OMA financed alterations, repair, and maintenance. 

Appropriated annually, OMA funds had to be obligated in the same fiscal 

year, and their use was restricted to specific purposes. During the 1970s, 

OMA funds were limited to new construction or alterations costing no 

more than $75,000 and to repair projects costing less than $300,000, as long 

as the costs of repair did not exceed half of the cost of replacing the facility. The secretary of the Army had to approve repair projects involving 

new construction that exceeded $300,000 and maintenance projects that 

exceeded $300,000. Practically speaking, such projects came within the 

approval authority of the community commander, because they were routinely approved in Washington.43 New programs initiated in the late 1970s, 

including maintenance, repair, and improvement (discussed in Chapter 12), 

increased EUD’s flexibility in using OMA funds.

MCA, MCAF, MCN, and OMA funds provided the largest part of 

EUD’s regular funding from dollar appropriations. Dollar funding for 

programs other than MCA and OMA was less predictable, and these programs were therefore less significant in EUD’s early years. Family housing, facilities modernization, schools, and other quality-of-life projects 

became a major focus of the division’s attention only in the 1980s. OMA 

and German-funded projects provided the basic workload during the first 

two years of the Europe Division.44

Host-Nation Funds

To cover some of the costs of stationing U.S. troops as a part of the 

NATO mutual defense pact, countries provided “host-nation funds.”45 By 

far the most important country for the support of USAREUR’s combat 

mission was the Federal Republic of Germany. Since the end of the occupation in 1955, the West German government had provided various forms 

of financial support to the United States to offset the costs of stationing 

troops in the Federal Republic of Germany. The MOUSF program, for 

example, was paid for through the agreements between the United States 

and the Federal Republic of Germany.46 (See descriptions of MOUSF projects 

in Chapters 6 and 10.)

Another program, Alternate Construction, was derived from practices 

begun before the end of the occupation. A series of bilateral agreements 

dating from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s formalized the program. In 

exchange for a facility occupied by U.S. forces, the government of the 

Federal Republic would construct an equivalent facility at a site agreeable 

to the United States. When the Germans wanted a facility returned, negotiations for an alternate facility revolved around the scope of work, the 

quality, and the location, but not the cost. German agencies and contrac13L_Chap09_Final.indd 15 
256

tors did all the design work as well as the construction. USAREUR pro

vided OMA funds to cover EUD’s costs of managing the program.47

NATO Funds

EUD had little to do with NATO construction when the U.S. forces di

not use the facilities. When the United States was designated primary o

exclusive user, the division reviewed plans and monitored constructio

for the project as requested by USAREUR or the United States Air Force

in Europe. NATO funding supported a diversity of construction projec

and programs as a part of the common defense mounted by the countrie

of the Atlantic alliance. The largest category of NATO funds supporte

the Common Infrastructure Program, which financed such undertaking

as airfields; facilities for petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); naval base

communications facilities; navigational aids; training facilities; headqua

ters facilities; warning installations; surface-to-air and surface-to-surfac

missile sites; ammunition storage sites; forward storage sites; and rein

forcement support.48

Projects in these categories could be funded in three ways. First, the

could be funded solely by NATO under its annual budget, where an allo

ment is designated as a tranche in French and translated as a “slice” i

English. These annual NATO allotments for construction began in 1950 an

were numbered consecutively.49 The NATO program trends and slice num

NATO provided funds to support the Common Infrastructure Program, which 

included this operations building in Incirlik, Turkey.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 16 
257

bers for fiscal years 1975–1981 are 

given in Table 7. Second, projects 

could be conjunctively funded; 

that is, the United States contributed funds to provide for features 

that NATO criteria would not 

allow. NATO criteria, drawn with 

wartime conditions in mind, were 

exceedingly austere. Because U.S. 

troops used the facilities extensively in peacetime, the United 

States upgraded NATO projects 

to provide more amenities. When 

an American project and a NATO 

project shared common features, 

usually utilities, the costs of such 

features were shared based on a 

ratio of projected usage. A project might have both conjunctive 

funding and cost sharing.50 Third, 

projects could be prefinanced; that 

is, the United States put up the money in the expectation that NATO would 

reimburse the advance. To ensure recoupment (the word used by both 

NATO and the United States), EUD personnel maintained detailed records 

during the project to satisfy NATO’s accounting requirements. The Europe 

Division continued the Recoupment Section established by the Engineer 

Command. The recoupment process was tedious, and there was no assurance that NATO would approve repaying the money. EUD received special 

funding from Congress to pay the overhead in monitoring projects funded 

by NATO or prefinanced by the United States.51

Construction Workload

The execution of EUD construction between May 1976 and August 

1978 is summarized in Table 8.

52 In this 28-month period, fiscal year statistics were skewed because the government created a fifth fiscal quarter (FY 

7T, 1 July to 30 September 1976) when it shifted the beginning of its fiscal 

year from 1 July to 1 October. Nonetheless, the table represents EUD’s 

activity in the years before the increased tempo of the 1980s.

The first seven programs listed, funded by U.S. dollars appropriated by Congress, constituted almost 60 percent of EUD construction. 

Modernization of U.S. Facilities, Alternate Construction, and the garrison 

in Garlstedt were funded by the Federal Republic and represented another 35 percent. NATO funded the A Priori program, and the government of 

the Shah of Iran paid for work in Iran.53

It is difficult to compare the workload of the Europe Division for 1976–

1978 with the EUD construction in fiscal year 1984 (see Table 9) because the 

 Table 7 

North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Annual 

Allotments

Fiscal Years 1975–1981

 Program 

 NATO Fiscal Funding 

 Slice Year ($ million) 

 26 1975 $ 26.0 

 27 1976 10.7 

 28 1977 13.5 

 29 1978 57.8 

 30 1979 16.8 

 31 1980 287.3 

 32 1981 277.5 

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 17 
258

division did not use comparable statistics. Only three categories—MCA

MCAF, and OMA—remain the same. As a result, the figures indicate trend

and significant shifts in the quantity of work at hand; they cannot be a pr

cise measure of specific categories of work from one period to the next.

By 1984 the volume of work handled by EUD had increased dramat

cally. In construction placement, the total dollar value for the first nin

months of 1984 ($269 million) exceeded the total value for the twenty-eigh

months from May 1976 to August 1978 ($227.8 million). For the entire fi

cal year of 1984, construction placement totaled $403 million.54 The shar

of funding for construction placement coming from dollar appropriation

(72.8 percent) rose sharply. The NATO share for 1984 totaled $255 millio

Host-nation funding does not appear in any identifiable category in th

figures for 1984.

Projects and Area Offices

In addition to analyzing the types of contracts and sources of fund

the work of the Europe Division may also be reviewed in terms of wher

 Table 8 

Europe Division Construction Execution

May 1976–August 1978

 Number of Program Funding Percen

 Program Projects ($ million) of Tota

Military Construction, Army 40 $34.4 15.1

Minor Military Construction, Army 17 2.76 1.2

Operation and Maintenance, Army 23 5.18 2.3

Military Construction, Air Force 32 82.0 36.0

Military Construction, Navy 11 7.1 3.1

Family Housing 27 3.4 1.5

Other 10 0.9 0.4

Modernization of U.S. Forces 59 44.9 19.7

Alternate Construction 7 8.0 3.5

NORTHAG [Garlstedt] 3 26.0 11.4

A Priori 1 3.2 1.4

Iran 7 10.0 4.4

Total 237 $ 227.84 100

Adapted from “EUD in Perspective, 1976–1978.”

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 18 
259

the projects were located. In 1974 EUD territory was entirely within 

continental Europe, and the vast majority of work was in the Federal 

Republic of Germany. EUD initially established area offices in Stuttgart, 

Frankfurt, and Kaiserslautern, the cities in which USAREUR maintained 

headquarters for its three major commands—VII Corps, V Corps, and 

the 1st Support Brigade (later the 21st Support Command), respectively. 

Each area office maintained a resident engineer office in its home city 

and established other resident offices to serve clusters of military communities. In 1974 the division had resident engineer offices at Bad 

Kreuznach, Giessen, Nuremberg, Würzburg, Augsburg, Bitburg, and 

Heidelberg.

 Table 9 

Europe Division Construction Execution

1984

 Design Workload Construction 

 Number of all Programs Placement 

 Program of Projects Fiscal Year 1984 (Fiscal Year 1984 

 to June 30 Only) 

 Program Program 

 Funding Funding 

 ($ million) Percent ($ million) Percent 

Military Construction, 

Army 396 $1.428 41.8 $127.0 47.2 

Minor Military 

Construction, Army 418 795.0 23.3 15.0 5.6 

Operation 

and Maintenance, Army 221 202.0 5.9 45.0 16.7 

NATO 76 255 .0 7.5 52.0 19.3 

Department of 

Defense/National Air 

Force (NAF) 84 227 .0 6.6 21.0 7.8 

AFFH 2 63.0 1.8 -- --

AFH 112 296.0 8.7 -- --

FH -- -- -- 9.0 3.4 

Miscellaneous 45 151.0 4.4 -- --

Total 1,354 $3.417 100.0 $269.0 100.0

Source: Engineer Studies Center, “U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD), Organization Study,” 

April 1985, pp. 7–11.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 19 
260

From this basic structure of field offices, EUD opened and closed are

offices, resident offices, and project offices as the construction workloa

shifted.55 The Northern Area Office opened in 1975. Located first in We

Germany, it soon moved to Hoensbroek, Netherlands, just across th

border from Aachen, West Germany. The Northern Area Office manage

work in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and northern German

a geographic area equal to the combined area of all the other area office

in Germany.56

In February 1976 EUD assumed the responsibility for USAREUR an

NATO construction in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. EUD took over offic

space from the Mediterranean Division at Camp Darby near Livorn

Italy, and incorporated some staff to create the Mediterranean Area Offic

In addition to a resident office at Camp Darby, EUD established a residen

office in Aviano and project offices in Vicenza, San Vito, and Sigonella i

Italy, as well as a resident office in Athens, Greece, and a project office i

Iraklion on the island of Crete. In Turkey, EUD inherited a resident offic

at Incirlik Air Base near Adana, the TUSEG Liaison Office in Ankara, an

a project office in Sinop on the Black Sea.57

Although Iran was outside its defined geographic area of responsibilit

EUD also accepted fully reimbursable construction work in Tehran.58 Th

Camp Darby

A

Vicenza

M e d

i

t e r 

ITALY PORTUGAL

Sardinia

Sicil

LISBON

ROME

MEDITERRANEAN AREA

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

Mid-1970s

Area Office Headquarters

Resident Office 

Project Office

Liaison Office

0

0 500 Miles

500 Kilometers

Map 19

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 20 
261

Mediterranean Division had handled work in Iran in the 1950s and 1960s, 

and Brig. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., commander of the Europe Division in 

the mid-1970s, accepted the turnover of responsibility to the division, citing 

this work as an example of EUD’s ability to respond to challenges. In May 

1976 the work involved only design, but within two years EUD had placed 

over $10 million in construction funded by the Iranian government.59

Incorporating several Mediterranean countries into EUD in 1976 

marked the last major addition of territorial responsibility for the division. 

In 1980 responsibility for construction in Italy and Greece passed to the 

Navy, but within two years the Navy asked EUD to reassume management of construction in those countries.60

Volume of Work in the 1970s

Throughout the 1970s EUD’s five area offices supervised a growing 

number of construction projects for the U.S. military. The Mediterranean 

Area Office had the lightest construction load but a fairly large staff because 

of its far-flung resident offices and the requirement to retain locally hired 

Italians when the Mediterranean Division was inactivated. (Map 19) In 1980 

its construction placement was less than one-eighth that of the Southern 

Iráklion

Sinop

Ankara

Athens Adana

e a n S e a

B l a c k S e a

TURKEY

GREECE

Crete

ANKARA

ATHENS

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 21 
262

Area Office in Stuttgart, which had 

the largest placement, and onefourth that of the Northern Area 

Office. The unevenness of work for 

the area offices is evident from the 

construction placement for fiscal 

years 1979 and 1980.61 (Table 10)

This unpredictability made 

planning and manpower assignments very difficult. For fiscal year 

1979, for instance, the Southwest 

Area Office had projected construction placement of $52 million; the 

office constructed only half that 

amount because the Air Force shifted projects to NATO.62

Projects in the 1980s

As construction placement increased, EUD headquarters recognize

bottlenecks in the decision-making process. In 1980 EUD reorganized th

Construction Division, redefining the relationship between area and res

dent offices and headquarters and establishing additional area offices i

Nuremberg and Würzburg. A year later the division increased manpowe

and administrative support in the area offices and upgraded both TUSE

and Heidelberg to area offices. Under the influence of John Blake, chief o

construction after 1981, the trend toward decentralization and increase

support for the field continued as construction placement increased du

ing the 1980s.

Throughout most of the 1980s the Frankfurt Area Office led other are

offices in construction placement, with a full range of projects for V Corp

military communities. In 1986 Frankfurt had as much work as several o

the other area offices combined, but by the late 1980s its workload ha

decreased to $60 million annually.

In 1984 the Stuttgart Area Office had a relatively small staff of betwee

twenty-eight and thirty-two people, some of whom worked in the are

office and others in the Augsburg Resident Office. In the next four yea

construction placement jumped from around $24 million to $60 millio

annually, and Stuttgart opened a resident office in Garmisch. In 198

when work in the Heidelberg area declined, that area office was down

graded to a resident office and put under the Stuttgart Area Office.

In the 1980s as much as 80 percent of the Kaiserslautern Area Offic

workload was for the Air Force. With resident offices in Bitburg an

Hahn, this office served six air bases—Ramstein, Sembach, Zweibrücke

Spangdahlem, Hahn, and Bitburg—as well as Army installations i

Kaiserslautern, Pirmasens, Worms, and Zweibrücken. In 1984 th

Kaiserslautern Area Office’s construction placement was $36 million; i

 Table 10 

Construction Placement 

by Area Office 

Fiscal Years 1979 and 1980

 Fiscal Year Fiscal Yea

 Area 1979 1980 

 Office ($ million) ($ million

 Northern $36.6 $32.1 

Central 38.3 58.5 

 Southwest 25.8 48.5 

 Southern 61.5 60.5 

 Mediterranean 8.8 8.2 

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 22 
263

1987 that amount more than doubled. In 1989 construction placement 

topped $100 million.

The Nuremberg Area Office’s major customers were the 1st Armored 

Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Seventh Army Training Center, 

and Department of Defense Dependent Schools. (See Map 20.) This office 

handled the programs to upgrade the firing ranges in Grafenwöhr and 

construction at the training areas of Hohenfels and Vilseck. In 1985 construction placement was $68 million; in 1986 it was $85 million; and by 

1989 it had risen to over $100 million. Staff increased from thirty-eight 

in 1985 to eighty in 1989. To manage this construction, the area office 

was organized with resident offices in Nuremberg and Vilseck and project offices in Ansbach, Nuremberg, Bamberg, Grafenwöhr, Vilseck, and 

Hohenfels.63

The EUD office in Würzburg supported the 3d Infantry Division 

and all of its subelements. The office also handled construction projects 

associated with the Wildflecken Training Area and supported an airfield 

in Giebelstadt. In 1980 EUD upgraded Würzburg from a resident to an 

area office. The Würzburg office had eleven staff members; the number 

increased to twenty-three by 1982 and continued to rise until 1990. EUD 

also established resident offices in Schweinfurt and Würzburg and project 

offices in Wildflecken and Aschaffenburg.

The Northern Area Office, the only area office to retain its geographic 

name after the reorganization of 1980, continued through the 1980s to 

The Nuremberg Area Office supervised the construction of Pinden Barracks 

in Nuremberg, Germany.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 23 
264

Bamberg

Grafenwöhr

Vilseck

Nuremberg

Ansbach

Hohenfels

AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WEST GERMANY

EAST

GERMANY

Elbe R

Main R

Danube R

Isar R

Leipzig

Munich

Stuttgart

Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Kassel

Erfurt

Dresden

Pilsen

NUREMBERG AREA

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1980s

Area Office Boundary (approximate)

Area Office Headquarters

Resident and Project Office

Project Office

0

0 50 Miles

50 Kilometers

100

100

serve air bases in the Benelux countries. When the Ground Launche

Cruise Missile program was introduced, construction was extended to a

bases in Florennes, Belgium, and Woensdrecht, Netherlands; in 1986 res

Map 20

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 24 
265

dent offices were established at both bases. The volume of work for fiscal 

year 1987, $79 million in construction placement, was 172 percent higher 

than the workload for fiscal year 1986.64 In 1988 the Rheinberg Resident 

Office opened, and a project office for the Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Powers Europe, opened in February 1989. In the late 1980s the Northern 

Area Office extended its territory when the Navy asked EUD to oversee 

construction of two NATO-funded contingency hospitals in northern 

Norway. Norway would not allow EUD to establish an office near the 

construction, so Northern Area Office personnel handled the projects 

from Hoensbroek on temporary duty assignments.65

In Turkey, the construction program that began with a single contract in 1980 grew rapidly as the Army, Air Force, and NATO sought to 

improve living and working conditions for soldiers and airmen and to 

strengthen Turkey’s ties to North Atlantic defense. Brig. Gen. James W. 

Ray, the commander of the Europe Division in the mid 1980s, observed, 

“From the overall perspective of the Europe Division, the construction 

program in Turkey was important, and more important than the amount 

of money would indicate.”66 The construction program in Turkey had four 

components: (1) upgrades of MCA facilities at five remote sites (Erzurum, 

Corlu, Ortakoy, Izmit, and Cakmakli) used by the Army group headquartered outside of Istanbul; (2) construction to improve working and living 

conditions for the Army intelligence command in Sinop on a spit of land 

jutting into the Black Sea; (3) construction for the Air Force at the main 

operating air base of Incirlik near Adana and at a second smaller air base 

The Northern Area Office was responsible for this headquarters building at an 

air base in Florennes, Belgium.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 25 
266

near Ankara used by airmen assigned to Turkey-U.S. Logistics Comman

and (4) prefinanced construction for NATO of two air bases, one a

entirely new base in Mus in eastern Turkey near Lake Van, and the othe

in Batman, a base built under austere NATO standards in the 1950s

(Map 21)

Although the Navy assumed responsibility in 1980 as the Departmen

of Defense agent for construction in Greece, political turmoil and publ

objections to U.S. bases made it difficult to work on the projects approve

in the fiscal year 1984 MCA budget. The U.S. European Command aske

EUD to help, and in the autumn of 1985 William Camblor began new 

negotiations that led to an agreement signed with the Greek governmen

in the summer of 1986. Camblor negotiated direct design, but all con

struction remained indirect.68 In the late 1980s the Greece Resident Offic

monitored work on seven special warehouses under programs designe

to make stored ammunition secure against theft by terrorists.69

Concerns in the Field

Maintaining continuity of supervision in the field concerned EU

leaders. Although lengthy construction projects might have three o

four American civilian project engineers, the locally hired employee

(Germans, Turks, Greeks, and others) helped provide continuity. Militar

officers received three-year assignments as area engineers, althoug

several serving in the 1980s arranged to stay longer. Lt. Col. Lloyd Col

Europe Division construction sites in Turkey included Sinop on the Black Sea.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 26 
Map 21



















Tigris R Euphrates R

Lake

Van

B L A C K S E A

Ortaköy

Çorlu

Çakmaklı

Izmit

Izmir

Bandırma

Balıkesir

Cumaovasi

Karatas ̨

Afyon

Eskis ̨ehir Ankara

Merzifon

Sinop

Erzincan

Incirlik

Kayseri

Diyarbakır

Batman

Mus ̨

Erzurum

Sevastopol' BUCHAREST

Burgas

Istanbul

Köseköy

Denizli Konya

ANKARA

Trabzon

Gaziantep

Tbilisi

Adana

SYRIA

IRAQ

IRAN

UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLICS

BULGARIA

ROMANIA

GREECE

CYPRUS

TURKEY

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1980s

Area Office HeadquartersResident OfficeU.S. Army Base U.S. Air Force BaseNATO Base



0 100 200

0

Miles

100 200 Kilometers

300

300

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 27 
268

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

served as Stuttgart area engineer from 1984 to 1990. Lt. Col. Grosvenor 

“Bud” Fish, Jr., remained in Nuremberg from 1982 to 1992, first as a 

community director of engineering and housing and then as EUD area 

engineer. Similarly, Lt. Col. Robert Mentell served as director of engineering and housing in Würzburg from 1982 to 1985 and then as area 

engineer from 1985 to 1988. Civilian Robert Rodehaver served in the 

Frankfurt Area Office as deputy from 1974 to 1980 and then as area engineer for more than a decade. In area offices where military commanders 

changed frequently, the civilian deputy provided continuity: Richard 

Grimm served in Turkey from 1982 to 1990; Wayne Lewis worked in 

Kaiserslautern as office engineer from 1975 to 1980 and as deputy from 

1982 to 1990; Dave Cox was in Stuttgart from 1977 to 1979 and from 1983 to 

1991; and Jim Mulford stayed in Würzburg from 1981 to 1990.

Headquarters in Frankfurt had trouble keeping in touch with the field 

offices. When EUD took over the Mediterranean area, General Prentiss 

argued in vain for an airplane to give him access to the far-flung territories. Prentiss did not get an aircraft, but his successors did; from 1976 to 

1988 the division had a twin-engine Beechcraft airplane and four pilots. 

The plane greatly facilitated travel for the commanders and program 

managers, particularly to Italy, Greece, Norway, and Turkey. John Blake 

made an effort to visit each area office at least quarterly.

Blake’s visits to Turkey were particularly important because the difficulties the TUSEG staff encountered when communicating with Frankfurt 

Europe Division’s acquisition of an airplane facilitated staff travel to and from the 

division’s far-flung offices. John Blake, Chief of Construction, is at right.
269

could be overwhelming.70 Military telephone service was uncertain and 

commercial service no better. Computers with modems were installed 

during the mid-1980s, but only when EUD introduced facsimile machines 

in the area office and in each resident and project office in the summer 

of 1989 did communications for the staff in Turkey become satisfactory.71 Veronica Rovero, an engineer who had worked at headquarters in 

Frankfurt before her tour in Turkey, observed that “the fax serves as both 

instant communications and an answering machine, since the one guy in 

the field is usually out of the office. Being able to send a message via fax 

saves making numerous unanswered phone calls.”72

Technology could not, however, change attitudes or alter feelings. 

Overall, the staff in area, resident, and project offices felt removed from 

the activities, tensions, and changes in Frankfurt. For many, work in the 

field meant action, excitement, independence, and satisfaction. But they 

also experienced isolation and, in some instances, hardship conditions.73

Veronica Rovero articulated the feelings of frustration felt by some EUD 

employees in the field: “The Phillips Building is EUD for those people. 

They forget about the people out on the fringes who are struggling, floundering, and doing the best that they can under whatever circumstances.”74

Throughout the organizational changes, fluctuations in funding, and 

turnover of personnel, the mission of the Corps of Engineers in Europe 

remained unchanged. To accomplish its mission, EUD needed people to 

move the projects through design to construction and to monitor contractors in half a dozen languages. The range and array of programs and projects managed by the Europe Division was vast.

13L_Chap09_Final.indd 29 
13L_Chap09_Final.indd 30 
10

PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

The changes in the management and organization of the engineer 

resources that led to the creation of the Europe Division (EUD) 

in 1974 did not halt work on projects begun under the Engineer 

Command. EUD continued to execute the Modernization of 

United States Facilities (MOUSF), funded by the Federal Republic of 

Germany; the aircraft shelter program begun as TAB VEE (Theater Air 

Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise); and work for the U.S. Navy 

in Sigonella, Sicily, inherited from the Mediterranean Division. During 

EUD’s early years these holdover programs constituted a substantial 

part of the division’s workload. Late in the decade new programs began 

to emerge to improve the security of stored ammunition (the Long 

Range Security Program, or LRSP) and to position materiel to support 

rapid deployment and combat readiness (Pre-positioned Organizational 

Materiel Configured to Unit Sets, or POMCUS).

Holdover Projects

Just as the engineering mission remained constant through the transition in 1974 from the Engineer Command (ENGCOM) to the Europe 

Division, so too did the execution of programs and projects. Programs and 

contracts initiated under ENGCOM or transferred from the Mediterranean 

Division continued under the Europe Division. Only later in the decade 

did new programs begin to dominate EUD’s work.

Modernizing U.S. Facilities

The transition from the Engineer Command to the Europe Division 

slowed progress on the MOUSF program, which the Federal Republic of 

Germany had first funded in December 1971. In April 1974, in ENGCOM’s 

last weeks of existence, the United States and West Germany signed 

a second MOUSF agreement. To supervise and administer the 1971 

MOUSF projects, ENGCOM had depended on Military Construction, 

Army (MCA), funds appropriated by Congress in 1972. The Engineer 

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 1 
272

Command had no similar appropriation for the projects envisioned unde

the 1974 MOUSF agreement. Moreover, the projects in the first phase ha

advanced quickly because ENGCOM had a backlog of projects alread

designed under its Stem to Stern program for the rehabilitation of ba

racks. With the reshuffling of personnel and resources that accompanie

the transition from ENGCOM to EUD, the funds that had supported bot

design and supervision for the MOUSF program, taken from USAREUR

Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA), budget, either ran out o

remained tied up in ENGCOM accounts. These factors threw the admini

tration of work under MOUSF into question.1

In the summer of 1974 the administrative home of MOUSF remaine

undecided. Renovation of barracks and mess halls was closely aki

to the maintenance and repair work discharged by the facilities eng

neers whose chain of command shifted in mid-1974 from ENGCOM t

USAREUR community commanders. EUD’s first commander, Brig. Ge

James C. Donovan, and his successor, Brig. Gen. Louis Prentiss, Jr., bot

argued forcefully that the Europe Division should supervise the MOUS

work. Only EUD had the personnel and structure to perform constructio

agency services, including estimates, technical review, and engineerin

assistance. The facilities engineers and USAREUR had little capacity i

these areas.2

When ENGCOM began its work on MOUSF in the summer of 197

it received authority to requisition forty engineer officers assigned to th

24th Engineer Group to serve as MOUSF project officers. By late 197

because the work had slowed down so substantially, only twenty-si

MOUSF officers remained active on the projects. To support the MOUS

projects, EUD needed about forty clerical and technical personnel in res

dent offices and at least twenty more in area offices and headquarters, bu

the division had very few people at its disposal.3

 The tight staffing situ

ation limited the division’s ability to initiate work on the projects sched

uled for the second MOUSF program, and just five new MOUSF desig

contracts were awarded in its first months.4

In October 1974 EUD’s situation improved when the Federal Republ

agreed to pay for secondary services that the division provided on othe

construction projects. The division could then use these monies to pa

for design for MOUSF projects. EUD’s principal negotiator in this, as i

all discussions of MOUSF with the Germans, was the assistant divisio

engineer for intergovernmental affairs, William E. Camblor. The de

that Camblor negotiated was so delicate that it “cannot be put in writin

because of the political aspect, i.e., the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany

will not pay any direct cost for the forces because it smells of occupation

Indeed, the agreement was so politically sensitive that Prentiss chose t

eliminate the detailed description of it, including the phrase just quote

from his report to the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. William C. Gribble, J

in October 1974.5

The extent of USAREUR’s support for MOUSF remained unclea

throughout 1974. Prentiss did not learn until December that the proje

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 2 
273

officers previously assigned would continue to be available to EUD, “subject to Department of Army personnel policies.”6

 In March 1975, under 

pressure to “free” officer spaces, USAREUR began to reduce by attrition 

the number of engineer officers assigned to MOUSF. Instead of providing personnel to supervise this construction, USAREUR proposed to 

pay EUD, and in July 1975 the command signed an agreement with EUD 

governing MOUSF work.7

 Progressively, as USAREUR removed engineer 

officers from MOUSF, the division hired civilian engineers to take their 

places. It was not until January 1976 that General Prentiss deemed that 

the MOUSF program had recovered the momentum it had lost during the 

transition.8

Whether civilian or military, the MOUSF project officer was the key 

to effective coordination with the German construction agencies and 

contractors who, through indirect contracting, renovated the U.S. facilities. The MOUSF agreements provided that the Federal Republic would 

perform all the program’s supervision and administration functions.9

Project officers served as the link between the construction agencies and 

the user in the U.S. military community. They worked with the contractors to ensure compliance with the criteria and monitored requests from 

the users for additional work, verifying whether the work qualified under 

MOUSF regulations.10

Experience in executing the 1971 MOUSF agreement demonstrated 

that German construction agencies did not always hold contractors to the 

required contract standards. The agencies sometimes approved major 

deviations from the plans and specifications as stipulated in the design, 

accepting what the project officers considered substandard equipment and 

materials. The American side of the operation was no easier for the MOUSF 

project officer to handle. Users initiated numerous requests for change, typically four or five small changes per week, and an average of four changes 

per project, which exceeded the 10 percent limitation on cost overruns. The 

German agencies frequently accepted user requests for changes uncritically; 

they had no particular interest in distinguishing between “nice to have” 

items and permissible inclusions. The MOUSF project officer monitored 

requests for changes and negotiated reasonable charges. Contractors often 

levied excessive charges. The German agencies had little incentive to limit 

overall costs; the contractors had great incentive to raise them, because their 

profit margins increased along with costs.11

The MOUSF project officer influenced the final quality of the work 

by inspecting the construction as it progressed. On 70 percent of the construction undertaken, German authorities exercised little or no inspection. 

When they did inspect, officials at times sided with the contractors in 

disputes over whether the quality of materials or of the construction itself 

met the required standards.12 In general, EUD judged the level of technical staffing maintained by the agencies of the Federal Republic inadequate 

to the task of monitoring MOUSF construction and saw no indication that 

government inspection services would improve or expand under the second agreement.13

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 3 
274

Regulations to buy American products complicated the process fu

ther. For instance, government-procured mechanical kitchen equipmen

had to be installed in the renovated dining facilities, but the equipmen

delivered often did not meet the specifications listed on the orders. EU

might order equipment that burned liquid petroleum but receive equip

ment engineered for natural gas. Despite specifying the standard fo

European electrical equipment at 220 volts and 50 cycles, the divisio

often received standard American materials at 110 volts and 60 cycles. I

several instances such equipment was shipped with 220V/50 cycle spec

fication plates simply attached in place of the accurate description, a fa

discovered “unfortunately only after energizing the equipment.”

These problems with the kitchen equipment led to extensive delay

for which EUD was blamed, although the division had no control ove

the mandate to buy American. In frustration, Brig. Gen. Norman G

Delbridge, Jr., commander of the Europe Division, appealed to the com

mander in chief of USAREUR in 1977 to convene “a meeting of all con

cerned and responsible personnel to establish a corrective action program 

that will assure timely delivering of operationally correct MKE [mechan

cal kitchen equipment].”14

Despite all of the administrative reshuffling and the difficulties o

supervision, EUD did make progress in renovating and improving th

living conditions of U.S. military personnel. During 1975 EUD supe

vised twenty-two projects completed under the first MOUSF program

bringing the total of completed projects to fifty. Of the Deutschmar

(DM) 576.4 million allocated to USAREUR in 1971 (roughly $176.8 mi

lion), ENGCOM and EUD obligated 99 percent by the end of 197

and the value of in-place construction financed by the 1971 agreemen

amounted to DM 538 million ($165 million). By the end of 1976 the div

sion had essentially finished work under the first MOUSF agreemen

Renovation had taken place at 54 casernes, accounting for about 590 ba

racks buildings and 136 dining facilities serving 55,000 troops.15 In spi

of inadequate management and monitoring, the results were satisfacto

ry. An Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) command inspection team 

that visited EUD in August 1975 singled out the quality of the MOUS

work for special mention.16

The second MOUSF agreement of 1974 yielded less spectacular stati

tics because it involved smaller jobs at more remote facilities. By the en

of 1975 German construction agencies had awarded contracts for renov

tion at only 16 casernes under this agreement; another 3 projects awaite

contract and 19 remained in design.17 By the end of 1976 contractors ha

completed work on only 12 of the 38 casernes programmed for renov

tion. The program completed improvements at 12 remote sites durin

the same year, and the remaining sites included in the plans were unde

contract. Thirty percent of the 1974 allocation remained to be dispense

Inflation and exchange rate fluctuations had cut into the buying power o

the money allocated. The scope of work had increased at individual site

particularly for utilities such as electrical and water systems; many of th

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 4 
275

barracks involved higher outlays than originally programmed.18 Such factors translated into fewer projects for the money expended.

By the end of 1978 the MOUSF program had nearly run its course. 

Funds from the Federal Republic had financed the renovation of nearly 

800 barracks buildings housing about 90,000 U.S. troops and the reconditioning of about 200 dining facilities. The program had also renovated 

or enhanced facilities at 35 remote sites in West Germany, ranging from 

8-person border posts to company-size air defense sites. By late 1979 only 

about 5 percent of the original DM 1.1 billion ($482.2 million) allocation for 

MOUSF remained unspent. Over the next several years that money went 

into new facilities. By the end of 1984 only about 1 percent of the total 

funding remained to cover costs associated with projects still under way.19

The MOUSF program won consistent praise for its tangible and visible improvements to the facilities for U.S. troops in West Germany. It 

took several more years before the U.S. government began to fund similar 

improvements in the living facilities used by the troops on a daily basis.20

Air Force Aircraft Shelters

Just before the establishment of the Europe Division, the U.S. Air 

Forces in Europe engaged the Engineer Command to build atomic-resistant shelters to protect fighter aircraft at three North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) airfields in Germany and at two airfields in the 

MOUSF projects included renovating military housing, such as the enlisted 

men’s barracks in Bremerhaven, Germany.

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 5 
276

Netherlands. Like the MOUSF program, the Air Force’s program suffere

during the transition. The Air Force was impatient to proceed and aske

for a special meeting in late June 1974, several days before EUD’s offici

activation, with representatives of EUD and the German constructio

agencies that would be involved.21

To accommodate the Air Force’s sense of urgency, Camblor set u

a meeting on 21 June. He persuaded representatives from the Germa

Ministry of Defense to meet in Mainz rather than in Bonn, where protoc

dictated that such meetings take place. The meeting included represent

tives from the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical Working Group fo

Construction) and the state financial and construction offices that woul

be involved in the project from the German side. Two lieutenant colone

represented the Air Force, while Camblor and two staff members repr

sented EUD.22

The Air Force spokesman outlined the program for three site

in Germany: Lahr, in Baden-Württemberg, just north of Freiburg

Spangdahlem, near the Luxembourg border in the west; and a third si

undetermined at the time of the meeting (eventually Jever in the nort

between Wilhelmshaven and the Dutch border). The Air Force planne

two sites in the Netherlands: Soesterberg and Gilze-Rijen. The facilitie

at all the sites would be the same: aircraft shelters and the paved apron

surrounding them; storage for conventional ammunition and liquid oxy

gen; and petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage facilities. Only th

number of shelters or ammunition storage igloos would differ from si

to site.

The shelters, third-generation modifications of aircraft shelters alread

in use, would protect the aircraft in the event of very severe extern

explosions and allow the pilots to start the engines in the shelter itself t

speed takeoff. A design existed for a shelter seventy-one feet wide an

forty-eight feet high. Concrete was to be poured to a uniform thicknes

around double corrugated metal liners. The shelter needed doors th

could withstand the kind of attack envisioned and open even if debr

were strewn around. The doors had to close quickly in the event of a

attack and reopen quickly to allow the plane to taxi out and take off. A

the time of the meeting in June 1974, the door-operating mechanisms an

the doors themselves had not been designed. The Air Force anticipate

that design drawings scheduled for delivery by 1 October would bring th

project to 80 percent design completion; the final 20 percent of the desig

work would be left to the contractor to complete with his site adaptation

The Air Force planned to use an existing design for the ammunition sto

age structures.23

At the meeting in Mainz, Camblor negotiated a streamlined procedur

with the German construction agencies and the West German Ministry o

Defense to expedite handling of the initial bid solicitations. He also poin

ed out that although this was a NATO project, the United States was pref

nancing the design. In general, the Germans responded well to the appe

for urgent treatment of the project; but they were concerned about coord

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 6 
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nation with the German military, with local German construction agencies, with the Canadians who also used Lahr Air Base, and with NATO.24

When General Prentiss took command of EUD three months after the 

June meeting in Mainz, he identified the aircraft shelter project as “our 

most pressing mission.”25 Because Ralph Wheeler had arrived in Frankfurt 

before EUD’s incumbent chief of engineering, John Tambornino, retired, 

Prentiss assigned Wheeler to spearhead the project from October 1974 

until he took over as chief of engineering on 1 December. Wheeler recognized that one overwhelmed project manager could not monitor the 

program. He chose to form a team of three men—Gary Sturman, John 

Tsingos, and Tom Nissen—to work under his direct supervision, saying, 

“You have nothing else to do except execute this program, and you have 

six months to do it!”26 Camblor continued to be involved in all negotiations with the German and Dutch officials.27

Wheeler and his team arranged weekly meetings with the Air Force’s 

point man for the project, the base civil engineer at Ramstein Air Base, 

Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Clifton D. “Duke” Wright. In late December 1974 

EUD issued a notice to proceed on a contract that called for design of 

the standard aircraft shelter with closure. The contract also included the 

fabrication and erection in Ramstein of a prototype to test the closure. 

As finally constructed, two doors, each weighing about eighty tons, were 

installed at each shelter. About the same time the Dutch authorities, under 

contract with EUD, began design on the two projects for Gilze-Rijen and 

Soesterberg. The Dutch proved very cooperative and allowed the work 

on design to begin even though they did not yet have a signed agreement to station both U.S. and Dutch forces on the air bases in question. By 

March 1975 EUD received for review the final design for the facilities in 

Spangdahlem in West Germany.28

Pesky little problems kept cropping up for the aircraft shelter program. 

Much of the work on the shelters would take place in northern Germany, 

Belgium, and Holland, so Prentiss wanted to establish a Northern Area 

Office to monitor activities in the region; OCE had no extra personnel it 

could assign him. The program started so quickly and with such indefinite criteria that as late as September 1975 EUD had no current working 

estimates for individual projects. Comptroller Randolph S. Washington 

reported to Prentiss that he could not release funds for the work under 

these conditions without violating funding guidelines.29

To complicate matters, NATO refused to fund the storm-drainage system designed for the aircraft shelters. When NATO officials indicated that 

they would support only a small oil separator and a dry well, EUD sent a 

letter requesting that the German agency handling the project seek the necessary changes from the contractor. Congress reduced the appropriation for 

the program in fiscal year 1975 from $62 million to $54.5 million, an action 

that disrupted EUD’s planning. The funding program included no provisions for increases in wages, although the Dutch contracts explicitly included as a standard feature an escalation clause for wages. Because wages 

represented a third of the costs in those contracts, this was a serious omis14M_Chap10_Final.indd 7 
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sion. Furthermore, the Air Force did not always respect Army Enginee

procedures. Through a German project manager on one project, Air Forc

personnel directed a contractor to begin a project, over the EUD residen

engineer’s protests, for which a contract had not yet been awarded.30

Despite the snags, the aircraft shelter program progressed. EU

approved advertising construction contracts for Lahr and Spangdahlem i

April 1975 and advertised contracts for Jever, Soesterberg, and Gilze-Rije

in May. Because bidding was lower than expected, EUD programmed fiv

additional shelters in both Soesterberg and Spangdahlem. Prentiss com

mitted the Engineering Division to work on project management for th

additional aircraft shelters, although he recognized that Congress migh

cancel the program or reduce its scope.31

During construction, problems arose regarding the liners used i

all of the initial aircraft shelters. The liners came as U.S.-governmen

furnished property from stocks left over from Vietnam. EUD took sp

cial steps to inform the German government that government-furnishe

materials were being used. EUD kept unusually strict inventory on th

equipment and all its parts, and both the Engineering and Constructio

Divisions maintained careful records and segregate expenditures on thes

items.32

When the materials arrived in Bremerhaven, the major issue becam

how to get the liners to the five sites. Rail lines ran directly to Lahr an

Spangdahlem in southwestern Germany and to the two Dutch sites i

Gilze-Rijen and Soesterberg, but no rail line ran to the Jever base in north

A helicopter squadron transported metal liners needed in remote Jever, Germany, to 

construct atomic-resistant aircraft shelters equipped with doors weighing eighty tons.

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 8 
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ern Germany. The area engineer for the Northern Area Office, Lt. Col. 

Roy A. Brown, heard that a Chinook helicopter squadron was looking for 

flying time. He contacted the squadron, and the commander agreed to 

ferry his liners from Bremerhaven to Jever in slings under the Chinooks. 

The operation was a success: The helicopter crews got their training and 

Brown got the liners delivered to the site.

Brown might have been happier had the Chinooks actually lost the 

liners in transit, because they proved a headache to install. Each liner had 

to be reshaped to fit the design of the new shelters. Because reshaping left 

all the existing bolt holes misaligned, new holes had to be bored to bolt 

sections of the liner together. Years later Hasso Damm, who had long service with EUD as a cost estimator, observed that the division had “paid 

more for reboring the holes than the whole sheet metal would have cost 

new!”33

Eight months after the construction contract was awarded, Colonel 

Brown’s team in the Northern Area Office took the final steps to complete 

the first shelters. On 14 January 1976, working from 5:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. 

in 45-degree weather with occasional showers, crews poured concrete 

around the liners in Gilze-Rijen. About a week later they placed concrete 

in Jever.34 The first placement went in Spangdahlem on 21 April, and 

from that point completions proceeded rapidly. Contractors transferred 

completed facilities—the shelters, taxiways and aprons, ammunition 

storage igloos, and the POL storage and pumping facilities—to the Air 

Aircraft shelters resistant to atomic attacks were constructed in 1976 and 1977 

in Gilze-Rijen in the Netherlands.

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 9 
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Force in Gilze-Rijen and Jever in January and February 1977, respectivel

Construction in Soesterberg continued throughout 1977, although the A

Force used the base while construction progressed. By the end of the yea

the Northern Area Office had supervised construction of fifty-one ai

craft shelters. In aggregate, the construction placed by the Northern Are

Office between 1975 and 1977 totaled $40 million.35

All in all, the program to build aircraft shelters and the attendan

ammunition storage facilities succeeded. Wheeler and Prentiss establishe

good working relations with the Air Force. Even though funds had bee

erratic and personnel short, they delivered the shelters and supportin

facilities in a reasonable time. Camblor maintained effective commun

cation and cooperation with the governments involved. Planning an

design for the Air Force project had started in 1974, in the midst of th

changeover from the Engineer Command to the Europe Division, and a

five air bases had the new facilities in place by 1977. Those who worked o

the projects felt their share of frustration but also felt satisfaction becaus

they had delivered on a short fuse, high-profile project.36

Naval Facilities in Sigonella, Sicily

Construction at the Naval Air Facility in Sigonella, Sicily, becam

one of EUD’s most sensitive projects in the early months of the div

sion’s existence. In April 1971, three years before EUD’s activation, th

Mediterranean Division had begun work in Sigonella on a multimillion

dollar project. Construction encompassed a naval airfield, runway ligh

ing, POL storage facilities, dormitories, warehouses, terminals, photo

graphic-processing laboratories, a gymnasium, and roads.37 The work di

not progress satisfactorily. Two contractors failed to perform adequatel

and their contracts were terminated. For fiscal year 1975 Congress autho

rized an increase in funds to complete the construction. In June 197

the Mediterranean Division readvertised the work and awarded new 

contracts amounting to $1.1 million.38 Less than a year later the Europ

Division inherited the seven contracts for Sigonella, worth about $4.62

million in construction placement.39

In May 1976 the commander at the Sigonella Naval Base prepared 

forty-page report detailing the deficiencies of construction at the facilit

and had it hand-delivered to the Naval Command in Norfolk to prote

what he considered inferior and unsatisfactory work. EUD dispatched th

deputy chief of construction, Jacques Bouchereau, to Sigonella to examin

the work on site and to cooperate with the Navy’s engineers. Fortunatel

the naval officer in charge of construction in Spain, whose area of respon

sibility included the work in Sigonella, was more interested in resolving th

problems and securing adequate construction than in an interservice fight

In early June the Engineering Division at EUD examined the foun

dations of fuel tanks and the photographic laboratory in Sigonella. Th

EUD commander, General Delbridge, requested a complete analysis o

problems related to the lighting system for the taxiways at the Sigonel

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 10 
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airfield. He also scheduled a trip to Sicily in July with OCE’s chief of military construction, Maj. Gen. Bates C. Burnell, “to demonstrate to the Navy 

that we want this problem resolved.”41 Delbridge was prepared to replace 

the entire lighting system if that was what it would take to satisfy the 

Navy. As a further sign of his resolve to “get it right,” he called on OCE 

in Washington for help. OCE dispatched engineers from the Waterways 

Experiment Station in Vicksburg, Mississippi, who specialized in soil 

analysis and other matters under investigation in Sigonella.42

Delbridge’s attention to the Navy’s needs in Sigonella paid off, and 

the Navy awarded EUD a contract to correct deficiencies. EUD also won 

a contract to manage construction for the Navy of a satellite communications terminal in Naples. Between 1976 and 1978 EUD placed over $7 

million in construction in Sigonella. In that time the division completed 

an air passenger terminal, taxiways, POL storage and fueling facilities, 

maintenance hangars, storage buildings, a base exchange, barracks, gymnasiums, officers’ clubs, and several water treatment plants.43

Construction in Sigonella continued into the 1980s on new bachelor 

officers’ quarters, a mess hall, and modernization of the bachelors’ enlisted quarters. The fuel tanks that had been programmed in 1971 and had 

run into foundation problems were completed and put into operation on 

24 May 1979. This was the last of the projects from the ill-fated construction contracts of fiscal years 1971–1974.44 By correcting inferior work, EUD 

redeemed the Corps’ reputation with the Navy.

New Programs

MOUSF, the aircraft shelter program, and the facilities in Sigonella 

dominated EUD’s workload in design and construction during 1974–1977. 

In 1977 the division’s focus began to change as prospects improved for 

increases in appropriated funding for military construction in Europe.

ENGCOM’s annual placement rate for design had been about $100 

to $150 million a year. By comparison, EUD’s design placement went 

from $430 million in July 1975 to $1.3 billion by late 1977, a 300 percent 

increase in a little over two years and roughly a tenfold increase over the 

ENGCOM annual average. During fiscal years 1977–1978, the amount of 

MCA money coming to USAREUR more than tripled, from just under $60 

million to over $185.6 million. In 1979, 1980, and 1981, MCA funds alone 

averaged more than $170 million each year. In 1982 MCA funding reached 

$294 million and continued at that level through fiscal year 1986.45 This 

dramatic increase in funds available for military construction in Europe 

began in the latter half of the administration of President Jimmy Carter 

and continued under President Ronald Reagan. The new funds made 

possible two complementary developments in military construction in 

Europe: the intensification of work on projects already under way and the 

introduction of several new weapons systems.

The tempo of work at EUD picked up as more money became available. Projects related to the military infrastructure of the U.S. and NATO 

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 11 
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forces in Europe (for example, ammunition storage and the improvemen

of warehousing facilities for pre-positioned equipment) received $160 mi

lion between 1976 and 1980. This translated into a dramatic increase i

construction.46

Ammunition Storage Facilities

In the late 1970s EUD initiated new projects directly related to th

infrastructure that supported the combat mission of U.S. troops—ammu

nition storage and the Long Range Security Program. Work on ammun

tion storage was hardly new. During the 1950s in France and the 1960

in Germany, Army engineers had managed construction programs t

improve storage facilities for ammunition.47 In the 1970s, however, terrori

organizations, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, began to direct hostilit

in particular against the United States and its military presence in Europ

The imperative to increase security for U.S. nuclear weapons and missile

intensified with this growth of terrorism in Germany and in Europe.48

At the beginning of the decade, the 59th Ordnance Brigade, com

manded by Maj. Daniel Waldo, Jr. (later a deputy commander and the

commander of EUD), conducted a survey of ammunition storage sites th

the Engineer Command used to formulate plans for improving facilitie

ENGCOM’s planning and design, designated as the Special Ammunitio

Storage (SAS) program, initially dealt with fifty-one sites and projected 

number of measures to delay terrorists long enough to permit addition

security forces to respond. The construction program, scheduled to begi

in 1974, called for special fencing, a clear zone both beyond and inside th

security fence, guard towers, special lighting, and an intrusion-detectio

alarm that would alert the security force on site to any attempted penetr

tion of the secure area. Within the area, the security measures called fo

special bunkers or reinforcement of existing bunkers to store the mun

tions. The basic design for the bunker used the Stradley igloo that ha

been used in relocating munitions from France in 1966–1967. The bunke

was a fully reinforced concrete structure, normally built above groun

and covered with two feet of dirt and grass. The earthen cover wa

designed for camouflage, to limit the damage from any accidental intern

explosion, and to lessen the impact of any external explosion.

ENGCOM initiated limited construction early, using OMA funds avai

able in 1973, to correct security deficiencies at existing ammunition storag

sites. Work on design for the larger part of the program funded by the MC

budget ran through late 1973 and early 1974, with the award of constru

tion contracts scheduled for May 1974. Attention to the program intensifie

when, during 1973, the Department of Defense’s Explosives Safety Boar

called upon the Corps of Engineers to furnish drawings and specification

to improve magazines for the storage of explosives.49 (Figure 4)

The schedule that ENGCOM had projected in 1973 could not b

maintained through the early months of the transition to the Europ

Division. Only in October 1974 did EUD receive the directive from OC

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 12 
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in Washington authorizing final design for special ammunition storage. 

The authorization expanded the list by about a dozen from the earlier 

total of sites included in the ENGCOM special program. OCE designers 

also added a new building to the project that incorporated entry-control 

facilities, a site security control and alarm center, and quarters for a combined response force of thirty-five soldiers. EUD adjusted its design and 

site adaptations for the new building. Design specifications also mandated a new intrusion-detection alarm system for the storage igloos and 

the perimeter fencing, improvements in perimeter lighting and fencing, 

standby power and communications systems, and improvements in utilities.50 Some rudimentary construction began in late 1974 when the 24th 

Engineer Group (later the 18th Engineer Brigade) received an assignment 

to improve the security of an ammunition dump near Kaiserslautern. The 

group repaired fences and secured bunkers, but without the benefit of 

newly designed systems.51

EUD’s revised schedule for the new ammunition-storage program 

targeted spring 1975 for the award of initial design contracts, with construction anticipated in fiscal year 1976. In a public debate in the spring of 

1975, Senator John Pastore raised the need for enhanced security for U.S. 

weapons. He revealed a hitherto secret two-year-old report that detailed 

deficiencies in the system to secure atomic weapons in Europe. The report 

indicated that during 1972 more than 200 security-force soldiers had been 

relieved of duty for a variety of infractions, eighty-three of them for drug 

abuse. Discussions of the report in the press evoked general concern about 

 Figure 4: Drawing of a Proposed Ammunition Storage Site, 1981 

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 13 
284

the security of U.S. weapons and ammunition, as well as about the com

bat readiness of equipment stored in depots throughout Europe. The U.

Army faced further embarrassment when in June 1976 a weapons depot i

Wildflecken was robbed of fifteen light antitank weapons that had a rang

of over 300 yards. The thieves got in and out without a trace, and exper

concluded that they had detailed knowledge of both the location and th

security procedures of the storage site.52

Even before Pastore’s revelations, USAREUR had urged that th

United States promote secure storage by prefinancing increased securit

measures for NATO ammunition-storage sites where the United State

was the sole user. The increasing public scrutiny turned the work 

ammunition-storage sites into high-priority projects.53

During 1976 OCE contributed the support of its engineering sta

to EUD’s work. The OCE engineers prepared plans and specification

to upgrade ammunition-storage facilities and evaluated proposals fo

procuring and installing intrusion-detection alarm systems at forty-si

storage sites in West Germany. The United States had about 7,000 nuclea

weapons in West Germany distributed among 100 sites.54

As often occurred with high-pressure projects, the program t

enhance secure storage of ammunition began with no more than dra

criteria. As criteria evolved, they were not always consistent, and co

recting the inconsistencies caused delays. As previously noted, OCE

concept design had introduced a new building at each site to house th

entry control facilities and to provide living space for the alert forc

This clashed with the Secretary of Defense’s directive that EUD use t

the extent possible existing structures at or adjacent to the sites. Anothe

problem arose because the design specified a minimum of thirty fe

of separation between the perimeter fence and any interior structure t

accommodate a specific intrusion-detection alarm system. Because th

fences at all the existing sites had only about twenty feet of clearanc

the requirement would have forced construction crews to move ever

fence.55

Changing criteria also disrupted design work at OCE. When Gener

Prentiss asked the chief of engineers, General Gribble, about the definitiv

designs for ammunition storage facilities in early 1975, Gribble replied th

the designs were being held up because OCE had “not yet been provide

with an anticipated change to the criteria manual.”56 All this translate

into repeated deferral of the deadline for awarding contracts. Nonetheles

by late May 1975 EUD had awarded design contracts for all sixty-fou

sites. With the money available, Prentiss estimated that EUD could coun

on construction at twenty-eight sites during fiscal year 1976.57

In July 1975 Prentiss asked his staff to differentiate between secu

rity programs for storing conventional and nuclear ammunition. By th

autumn of 1975 the Engineering Division began to use the designatio

Long Range Security Program in place of the earlier project title, Speci

Ammunition Storage. The records do not make clear whether this new 

label applied to enhanced security for conventional or for nuclear weap

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 14 
285

ons in storage, the ammunition storage shelters (igloos) or the security 

devices surrounding them, or any or all of the above.58

In fiscal year 1976 EUD’s Engineering Division completed its design 

for projects with a construction value of $34 million on seventeen sites 

labeled LRSP. In the following fiscal year the division completed design 

for another twenty-six sites at an estimated construction value of $38.6 

million and awarded construction contracts on eleven of these. In fiscal 

year 1978 EUD finished design on six more sites, but only one went to 

construction contract. Adding to this work, EUD awarded a contract late 

in the year worth $13.9 million for intrusion-detection alarms.

The vocabulary used at EUD in describing the projects remained 

internally inconsistent, with the Construction Division and the 

Engineering Division using different terms. The Construction Division 

described three different activities. First, storage facilities worth $34 

million were completed under the “ammunition program” (in Italy 

at Camp Darby and in West Germany in Bernbach, Bad Hersfeld, 

Fulda, Hohenfels, Bindlach, Schwabach, Schweinfurt, Wildflecken, 

Bad Kissingen, Miesau, and Weilerbach). Second, construction was 

under way for what the Construction Division labeled the Long Range 

Security Project at twenty-eight sites. Third, the project for conventional 

“Ammunition Storage Facilities” in Koeppern had a listing separate from 

that for the work on LRSP.59 The labels make it difficult to assess which 

construction activities belonged to which programs.

It is nonetheless clear that by late 1978 construction had begun under 

EUD supervision on new ammunition storage igloos and on improvements in security for ammunition storage facilities in five different 

European countries, with work concentrated in the Federal Republic of 

Germany. During that year EUD reached the final stages of design for 

seventy other NATO sites, so that it had work continuing on more than 

100 ammunition storage projects.60 The LRSP, prefinanced with MCA 

funds, was supplemented beginning in 1979 by NATO funding, as shown 

in Table 11. The original program for 132 sites had been consolidated to 103 

sites, of which one was not eligible for NATO financing.61

Managing the construction for ammunition storage projects 

involved unusual annoyances. Security at the sites was tight, and 

everyone had to have an armed escort inside the secure area, including 

all personnel employed by the contractor and even EUD representatives from the area or resident offices. Concerns for security imposed 

limits on how many people could be admitted to the area at a time, 

thus affecting the size of work crews. Security also dictated that pertinent information, such as the location of the utility lines, could not 

be given to the host-nation contractors directly. This led to delays in 

construction and occasionally to damage to existing utilities. Projects 

prefinanced by the United States for NATO had to conform to NATO 

criteria to be eligible for full recoupment of costs, but many of the 

change orders issued on these projects either overlooked or ignored 

NATO criteria. Additional complications arose because no one at EUD 

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 15 
286

had the responsibility to keep the project managers current on NAT

requirements. EUD provided no clearinghouse for sharing experience

with change orders or other lessons learned so that any project man

ager could draw on the information.62

Jose Cruz, who had become EUD’s chief of construction in late 197

recalled the difficulties associated with the ill-defined and shifting crit

ria typical of the LRSP projects. When criteria were issued in 1977, EU

came up with “what we thought were pretty elaborate plans”; but thes

measures never quite satisfied the Army’s planners. “They’d come bac

and say, ‘Well, that’s not going to do. This control tower has to have bulle

proof windows,’ and then they’d say, ‘Well, those are bullet-proof but the

scratch—you can’t have anything that scratches.’ ... They kept changin

the criteria.”63

General Wilson had similar memories of the work on LRSP: “We coul

never get that right.... There were too many cooks ... [too many] exper

from USAREUR” who urged EUD to “upgrade the sensor system, chang

from the design we’d already approved, and go on to the next gener

tion.” Fence sensors were so delicate that the wind could set them off; an

despite EUD’s rodent fences, small animals occasionally set off the motio

 Table 11 

Long Range Security Program, 1976–1982

 Military Construction, 

 Army Other NATO Number 

 Year ($ thousand) ($ thousand) ($ thousand) Total of Sites 

Fiscal year 1976 $340 -- -- $340 17

Fiscal year 1977 419 7,500 -- 7,919 26

Fiscal year 1978 68 3,200 -- 3,268 5

Slice 28b -- -- 1,800 1,800 1

Slice 29 -- -- 57,400 57,400 27

Slice 30 -- -- 5,700 5,700 3

Slice 31 -- -- 40,500 40,500 24

TOTAL $827 $10,700 $105,400 $116,927 103

Source: Briefing Book, Europe Trip, Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr.

a

Congress specified funds to purchase intrusion detection system (IDS) components.

b

North Atlantic Treaty Organization allocations (Slice 28 and following) overlap with U.S. fisc

years 1977 and fol lowing.

a

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 16 
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sensors inside the ammunition storage igloos. Wilson termed the program 

“frustrating”; Cruz called it “a nightmare.”64

It was frustrating for other personnel associated with the projects, too. 

The Dutch complained that EUD assigned different project managers to 

every little project.65 Within the division the volume of LRSP paperwork 

and the frequent claim that it was a high-priority endeavor generated a 

complaint from the Office of Administrative Services. The paperwork for 

LRSP began to interfere with the timely completion of other work. The 

director of the office asked that those requesting office support for LRSP 

use the “urgent” designation with greater discretion.66

Because of the scope and complexity of the LRSP, USAREUR established a task force in June 1979 to coordinate the program’s development 

and progress. The deputy commander in chief, Lt. Gen. Pat W. Crizer, 

took charge. Under Crizer’s personal supervision, the deputy chief of staff 

for operations established a “master milestone chart” to track progress 

on LRSP projects. Also in 1979, NATO finally approved criteria for the 

program. In September 1980 Brig. Gen. George Kenyon “Ken” Withers, Jr., 

successor to General Wilson as commander of the Europe Division, recognized that responsibilities were becoming more clearly delegated and that 

systems existed to correct deficiencies. Withers attributed the improvements in management of the LRSP to “the fact that someone finally took 

charge of this program.”67

Storing ammunition involved more than providing sufficient storage space. It also meant putting the ammunition in the right place to 

support the troops in the initial phase of an all-out attack. In the late 

1970s USAREUR began a program called Ammunition Upload to furnish its tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces with the 

initial basic load needed to operate in an emergency. To accomplish this, 

USAREUR requested construction of additional paved parking areas and 

storage surfaces and more fencing for forward ammunition storage sites. 

This added another dimension to EUD’s work on ammunition storage and 

security. The United States financed projects to upgrade storage and to 

secure parking for the basic load and construction connected with the forward storage of ammunition, whereas NATO financed similar construction for reinforcement forces.68

In March 1981 Withers reported on the progress of LRSP to the chief of 

engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph K. Bratton, who was visiting EUD. The United 

States had prefinanced forty-eight LRSP sites and had drawn up designs 

for thirty-eight others to be funded by NATO. Host nations had designed 

another twenty-one sites, also for NATO funding. Thus, EUD supervised 

work in progress at a total of 107 sites ranging across West Germany, Italy, 

Greece, Turkey, and the Netherlands. (See Maps 22–26.) Eight different 

NATO nations (the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Italy, 

Belgium, Greece, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Britain) operated these 107 

sites as user nations. Construction had progressed in two phases. First, the 

civil works package consisted of the site security control center or the entrycontrol building with living quarters, one or more guard and observation 

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 17 
BERLIN

Danube R

Elbe R

Rhine R

B A L T I C S E A

NORTH

SEA Meyn

Kellinghusen

Höhenkirchen

Dornum

Wiesmoor Rodenkirchen

Schönemoor

Lahn

Varrelbusch

Duesen

Syke

Barme

Liebenau

Barnstorf Vechta

Vörden Wagenfeld-Hasslingen

Westerscheps

Schöppingen

Münster-Nord

Borgholzhausen

Westkirchen

Sennelager

Buchhagen

Büren

Soest

Werl

Unna

Dülmen Hamminkeln

Datteln

Sonsbeck

Kapellen Hemer

Marienheide

Hinsbeck

Arsbeck

Pütz

Geilenkirchen

Düren

Wahnerheide Nutscheid

Lipper Höhe Giessen

Treysa

Alten Buseck

Steinbach

Münster-Dieburg

Aschaffenburg

Kitzingen

Lehmgrube

Feucht

Hemau

Günzburg

Gross-Engstingen

Inneringen

Pfullendorf

Leeder

Landsberg

Lechfeld

Wurmberg

Gross-Sachsenheim

Heilbronn

Siegelsbach

Dallau

Hardheim

Hanau am Main

Billiger Wald

Herborn

Montabaur Obersayn

Kemel

Wüschheim

Baumholder Miesau

Oberauerbach

Clausen

Fischbach

Landau

Philippsburg

Quirnheim

Dexheim

Wackernheim

Kriegsfeld

Salzwoog

Hontheim

Dichtelbach

Finthen

FRANCE

SWITZERLAND AUSTRIA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

EAST GERMANY

POLAND

DENMARK

SWEDEN

BELGIUM LUXEMBOURG

LIECHTENSTEIN

N E T H

E

R

L

A

N

D S

WEST GERMANY

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1981

Long Range Security Program (LRSP) Site

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

Map 22

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 18 
ADR IAT IC

SEA

Bovolone

Montichiari

Bressanone

Portogruaro

Cordovado Codognè

Oderzo

Ceggia

Chioggia

Conselve

Longare

Zelo

Parma

Milan

Bolzano

Venice

Vicenza

Verona

YUGOSLAVIA

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

ITALY

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1981

Long Range Security Program (LRSP) Site

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

A

E

G

E

A

N S E

A

IONIAN

SEA

Dráma

Perivoláki

Yiannitsá

Erithraí

Elefsís

Koropí

Keratéa

ATHENS

TIRANE

ITALY

ALBANIA

YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA

TURKEY

GREECE

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1981

Long Range Security Program (LRSP) Site

0

0 100 200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

Map 23

Map 24

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 19 
290

Map 25

towers, fences, and other general 

work. Second, the security and 

communications package included the intrusion-detection alarm 

system, lighting for the grounds, 

and communications facilities.

At the time of Bratton’s visit 

to EUD, the schedule called for 

the original civil works part of 

the construction on all fortyeight of the U.S. prefinanced sites 

to be completed by July 1981. The 

supplementary towers, recently 

approved by NATO, were to be 

erected at twenty-one of the sites 

by June, and lighting and communications facilities were to be 

installed at all sites by August 

1982. The intrusion-detection 

alarm system remained under 

testing in March 1981.69

Late in 1981 ammunition storage and weapons security again 

Facilities at ammunition storage sites includ

ed guard and observation towers, 

such as the tower in Heilbronn, Germany.

Tigris R

Euphrates R

B l a c k S e a

Ortaköy

Çorlu

Köseköy

Erzurum

Çakmaklı

Istanbul

Balıkesir

Afyon

ANKARA

Merzifon

Adana

Kayseri

Diyarbakır

Mus

Izmir

SYRIA

BULGARIA

CYPRUS

TURKEY

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1981

Long Range Security Program (LRSP) Site

0

0 100 200 300 Miles

100 200 300 Kilometers

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 20 
291

Map 26

became the focus of intense attention. Two spectacular terrorist attacks on 

U.S. military personnel occurred in the autumn: one in Ramstein, which 

resulted in several deaths, and a second against USAREUR’s commander 

in chief, General Frederick J. Kroesen, in Heidelberg. These attacks heightened concern about security, particularly at the ammunition-storage facilities. The incidents put increased pressure on EUD to install the intrusiondetection alarm systems at weapons storage sites.

Steenwijkerwold

Harde

WEST

GERMANY

BELGIUM

Rhine R

BRUSSELS

The Hague

AMSTERDAM

Cologne

Düsseldorf

Ter Apel

Almelo

NETHERLANDS

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1981

Long Range Security Program (LRSP) Site

0

0 50 Miles

50 Kilometers

100

100

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 21 
292

In June 1980 the Weapons Access Denial System (WADS) had emerge

as an addition to LRSP.70 After the terrorist attacks, work on WADS intens

fied; construction began during the summer of 1982. The program provide

special security devices at thirty sites in West Germany and one in th

Netherlands. The components for WADS included exterior cages aroun

doors, deadbolt locks for the ammunition igloo doors, concertina wire blan

kets over weapons as interior barriers, a smoke-generating system, sound

deterrent systems, and weapons security cages and tiedowns. The Unite

States prefinanced much of the early work, as it had done for LRSP.71

To implement the WADS components as quickly as possible, EU

formed teams of engineers to work directly with designers of the alarm 

system in American test laboratories. One of the participants, Jim Wis

described the teams as having a range of expertise that allowed EU

to “pull [an idea] off the drawing board and come to Europe and buil

it,” making design changes as construction progressed. Project manag

ers from the Engineering Division and construction managers from 

the Construction Division worked together on a particular project as 

whole—design and construction working in tandem rather than sequen

tially.72 Reflecting on the urgency of the program, the EUD chief of con

struction, John Blake, noted that “construction agents are not supposed t

do research and development, [but] it was unavoidable with LRSP.”73

The ammunition-storage program remained a nettlesome manag

ment problem well into the 1980s. When Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Jame

To protect ammunition at LRSP sites, the Europe Division fitted bunkers 

with heavy doors, like these in Miesau, Germany.

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 22 
293

W. van Loben Sels commanded EUD in 1984–1985, he also wrestled with 

LRSP:

Either [designs] were done very poorly or we kept changing our 

mind. I think both. You know, towers with blind spots. Lighting with 

dark spots and areas not covered.... And just about the time you got 

it done, then they’d have another vulnerability analysis and decide 

that they would get another set of barriers.... It seemed like a neverending program.74

Blake called LRSP “maybe the most troublesome [program] that I ever 

dealt with in my whole career.”75 The LRSP went on despite the headaches 

that it caused. In June 1990 EUD finally completed a construction package 

in Kaiserslautern that it had begun in November 1986.76

Pre-positioned Materiel

Caring for ammunition was but one of the storage problems that the 

U.S. forces in Europe faced. Since the early 1960s American and NATO 

military strategy had depended on materiel stored in warehouses across 

Western and Central Europe. American military units stationed in the 

United States, but designated for service with NATO, trained on the same 

equipment at home. During the REFORGER (REturn of FORces to GERmany) 

exercises begun in 1969 or in the event of an emergency, these units 

would be airlifted to West Germany and locate the necessary equipment 

pre-positioned for them. The official label for the stored equipment was 

Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Configured to Unit Sets. One of 

the major construction programs of the 1970s involved the improvement 

of the POMCUS storage facilities.

Pre-positioned materiel had been drawn down sharply during and 

immediately after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. During that conflict the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, overruling protests by the Army, 

ordered the most modern and battle-ready equipment withdrawn from 

warehouses in Europe and sent to resupply the Israeli Army. To comply, 

the U.S. Army shipped 400 tanks, 900 armored vehicles, and 100 howitzers to Israel from stocks in Germany. By the mid-1970s little of this equipment had been replaced.77

In May 1975 a General Accounting Office (GAO) report sharply criticized the condition of equipment maintained and stored in Europe. Eight 

arsenals in West Germany contained materiel that according to regulations 

was to be ready for use in six hours. The GAO concluded that the six-hour 

deadline was a fantasy under existing conditions. The report also acknowledged the enormity of the problem that the Army faced in caring for vast 

quantities of materiel. While recognizing the difficulties involved, the GAO 

judged that the situation had reached crisis proportions. Indicative of the 

problem, GAO reported that over 36 percent of the vehicles and trailers 

examined had missing, faulty, or improperly installed parts.78

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 23 
294

The Army knew that its storage facilities needed attention, but it ha

no money even to pay for removal of the World War II ammunition an

equipment that still clogged its warehouses. In 1976 Congress funde

the POMCUS program, permitting the removal of the obsolete mater

als. The program also made $200 million available to expand USAREUR

controlled-humidity storage space for pre-positioned equipment. Th

appropriation covered improvement of existing warehouses and constru

tion of new ones with as much as 40,000 square feet of storage space eac

Humidity control, achieved by lining Quonset-type buildings with a viny

skin, reduced rusting significantly and slowed other deterioration, suc

as the cracking of rubber seals, that could reduce the readiness of equip

ment.79

Congress approved an additional $33.5 million in fiscal year 197

MCA money for eight POMCUS projects in West Germany. At the sam

time, the source of support for POMCUS began to shift, with less mone

coming from MCA and more from the NATO Common Infrastructur

Program. In subsequent years the United States convinced its NAT

partners that new funding categories for NATO infrastructure project

including strategic stockpiling of equipment and ammunition, were ne

essary to increase the early readiness of the forces in Central Europe. B

the late 1970s USAREUR obtained “significantly more construction fund

ing from NATO than from Congress.”80 In May 1979 the NATO ministe

approved funding for POMCUS; in the following year’s budget POMCU

received the equivalent of $108.6 million, and more than double that fi

ure was programmed for 1982.81 By 1981 the Europe Division complete

storage for sets of equipment for three divisions and had warehouse

nearing completion for a set of equipment for a fourth division. Desig

had begun for a fifth set in Belgium, and plans called for a sixth set in th

Netherlands.82

Stored equipment must be cleaned and maintained, and the program 

to enhance storage facilities included improvements in maintenance area

and storage space. Program managers found it necessary to upgrade util

ties to take into account the new equipment and new conservation an

environmental concerns. Connections with existing water-distributio

and sewer-collection facilities were therefore incorporated into the new 

facilities for washing vehicles. Heating plants and distribution lines wer

augmented. Fueling stations were installed.83

Because vehicles and field equipment had to be thoroughly washe

after use, the new construction provided facilities such as tank washrack

paved areas (hardstands) for parking vehicles out of the mud, and appro

priate maintenance buildings for draining equipment of gasoline an

oil.84 In the new tank and vehicle washing facilities, nozzles spraye

water under pressure onto tanks and other vehicles to blast the mud o

of the tracks, wheels, and undercarriages. Water from retaining basin

could be drained off and used again, and the mud could be scooped ou

and trucked away. Oil separators recovered petroleum waste for prope

disposal. In the late 1980s EUD began to “sandblast” using pulverize

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 24 
295

walnut shells as the abrasive element. The shells degraded biologically, 

eliminating cleanup and disposal.85

New maintenance equipment and facilities included battery storage shops, sandblasting rooms, spray-paint apparatuses, and work areas 

designed to accommodate other equipment such as radio sets, hand weapons, and helmets.86 With the introduction of these sophisticated facilities 

beginning in the late 1970s, effective maintenance and proper storage of 

equipment became possible. Batteries could be removed from vehicles for 

separate storage, checked, and charged in special shops adjacent to the 

controlled-humidity warehouses in which the vehicles remained stored. 

Equipment that needed repair after a REFORGER exercise could be removed, 

fixed, painted, and stored. As the maintenance facilities expanded, it became 

possible to handle in phases the vast array of items in use during an exercise. 

Items went first to outdoor storage, where maintenance crews inspected each 

piece, taking those that needed attention through the shops and then placing 

them in controlled-humidity storage until the next exercise. The sites also 

included lubricating stations and fuel-storage areas, utilities, and roads.87

By the early 1980s NATO was the predominant source of funding for 

construction of storage facilities, and the program came to be referred 

to by a new name, Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Storage Sites 

(POMSS). Although many of the early sites had been built in the area 

around Heidelberg, much of the construction during the 1980s took place 

in northern Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.88 (See Map 27.)

Vehicle shelters, like this one in Mönchengladbach, Germany, were an integral part of the 

POMCUS and POMSS construction programs.

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 25 
Map 27

FRANCE

WEST GERMANY

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOURG

Meuse R

Mosel R

Main R

Rhine R

Rhine R

Metz

BRUSSELS

The Hague

AMSTERDAM

Liège

Cologne

Hannove

Bremen

Stuttgart

Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Kassel

Kaiserslautern Mannheim

Germersheim

Karlsruhe

Heilbronn

Pirmasens

Miesau

Ter Apel

Coevorden

Almelo

Twisteden

Herongen

Mönchen-Gladbach

Brunssum Zutendaal

Grobbendonk

POMSS LOCATIONS

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1981

Pre-positioned Organizational

Materiel Storage Site (POMSS)

0

0 50 Miles

50 Kilometers

100

100

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 26 
297

In 1981 Al Opstal of EUD’s Northern Area Office became involved 

with POMSS projects as plans took shape for construction at sites in 

Belgium and the Netherlands. A naturalized American citizen and Air 

Force veteran, Opstal had been born in the Netherlands. His fluency in 

the Dutch language gave him an advantage in the Flemish-speaking areas 

of Belgium, as well as in working with Dutch construction crews and government officials. Opstal monitored POMSS construction at more than a 

half-dozen sites, including Brunssum.

The POMSS site in Brunssum in the Netherlands, nicknamed Hendrik 

Caserne by the 350 American and Dutch personnel who served there, presented a range of problems typical of such projects. The building site was 

on a heap of coal slag that had to be leveled into a plateau before work 

could begin, and work had to respect a concrete batch plant that could 

not be moved. Construction began in April 1982 and was completed in 

December 1984 at a cost of $18.5 million. The twenty warehouses covered 

116 acres and were maintained by a score of Americans and over 300 

Dutch. In 1989 NATO anticipated expanding the site in Brunssum by adding five additional storage warehouses.89

Opstal also monitored work at other sites in the Netherlands, including Ter Apel, Almelo, and Coevorden, all completed in 1984 and 1985 at 

a total cost of just over $50 million. Similar POMSS construction took 

place in Zutendaal and Grobbendonk, Belgium. Several of the sites also 

incorporated “unit basic load” storage projects. Unit basic load sites consisted of earth-covered bunkers arranged to provide the various types of 

ammunition to supply a specific unit whose equipment was stored in the 

controlled-humidity warehouses on the same site.90

The POMCUS construction that continued throughout the 1980s 

improved equipment readiness dramatically. During the GAO survey of 

equipment in Germany in 1987, only 18 of the 8,654 wheeled and tracked 

vehicles brought out of the Brunssum storage site in the Netherlands for 

REFORGER 87—about 0.2 percent of the total—were inoperable.91

Throughout the 1970s EUD had steadily pursued its mission to build 

for the U.S. soldier. The MOUSF program addressed the living conditions 

for the troops in the barracks, but MOUSF funds were largely spent by 

1980. In Sigonella, Sicily, work for the Navy and the Air Force under the 

aircraft shelter program declined. Only LRSP and POMCUS projects carried into the new decade. As the 1970s ended, the focus of EUD’s work 

began to shift to projects involving new weapons and the facilities to support them, projects intended to enhance the U.S. military’s ability to meet 

the combat mission of the 1980s.

14M_Chap10_Final.indd 27 
14M_Chap10_Final.indd 28 
11

SUPPORTING THE COMBAT 

FORCES

During the 1970s the Federal Republic of Germany made increasingly significant military contributions to the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO). This allowed U.S. military planners to reassess the strategic positioning of U.S. troops in West 

Germany and to conclude that they could redeploy combat elements to 

improve the Western alliance’s defenses. As the plans for redeployment 

developed, new weapons systems came into production, making sophisticated technologies available. Both of these trends created new work for 

the Army engineers. Redeployment led to construction of a new garrison 

in northern Germany, and new weapons systems stimulated construction 

of new support facilities. These developments significantly increased the 

workload of the Europe Division in the late 1970s and throughout the 

1980s.

Redeploying U.S. Forces

The REFORGER exercises (REturn of FORces to GERmany) began in 

the late 1960s to deflect political pressures and reduce the number of 

American soldiers in Europe. Balance-of-payment problems, exacerbated 

by overseas spending to sustain the Vietnam War, intensified political 

demands to reduce troop levels and shift the burden of mutual defense 

to European nations, especially Germany. In response, the West German 

government accepted minor withdrawals of U.S. troops in the late 1960s, 

increased its financial contribution by accepting a series of agreements to 

offset U.S. costs, and initiated the Modernization of United States Facilities 

(MOUSF) program.1

As American military strategists faced the 1970s, they undertook a 

reexamination of the geographic position of U.S. forces, realizing that 

troop deployment had more to do with history than with current strategic needs. U.S. troops remained concentrated in southern Germany, the 

area assigned in 1945 as the U.S. zone of occupation. By the 1970s West 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 1 
300

German military forces could assist in an effective defense of that regio

Moreover, if an attack came, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces might just a

readily strike at the north German plain as at positions in the south. In th

north, British forces had been reduced out of economic necessity, and the

and the Belgian forces responsible for defending the region were thin

stretched. The open northern terrain invited a rapidly moving mech

nized attack that might overrun Western Europe before U.S. and othe

NATO forces had time to deploy.

The new line of strategic thinking contended that the United State

could enhance its contribution to NATO and simultaneously reinforce th

credibility of its commitment to defend against a Soviet attack by station

ing troops where a potential attack was most attractive.2

 The strateg

plan that grew out of this reconsideration led to two major events. First, 

prompted the redeployment to Germany of elements of two divisions st

tioned in the United States under the dual-basing plan. Second, it brough

about the construction of a new garrison in the northern German commu

nity of Garlstedt to accommodate one of the redeployed units.

Garrison in Garlstedt

Planning to reposition Army combat forces in northern German

began during the “tooth-to-tail” debate in the early 1970s. Secretary o

Defense James Schlesinger decided to redeploy combat brigades from 

the United States to Germany beginning in fiscal year 1975. The Arm

assigned one brigade of the 2d Armored Division to Germany in 197

(Brigade 75) and one brigade of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) i

1976 (Brigade 76). In March 1975, Brigade 75 deployed to temporary pos

tions in the major training areas controlled by the United States Arm

Europe (USAREUR)—Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken—all i

the area over which NATO’s Central Army Group exercised responsibilit

Brigade 76 moved into Wiesbaden Air Base, which was also in the Centr

Army Group’s area.3

Between 1974 and 1976, and paralleling the repositioning of the br

gades, the United States engaged in multilateral discussions with the We

Germans, the British, and the Belgians that led to the decision to constru

a new garrison. The location chosen, near Garlstedt, thirty miles sout

of Bremerhaven in the area defended by NATO’s Northern Army Grou

would become the permanent home for Brigade 75 from the 2d Armore

Division. (Figure 5) It would include a brigade headquarters and headqua

ters company as well as a support battalion that would be permanent

reassigned from the United States to West Germany. The plan called fo

several other units to be deployed on a temporary basis and rotated ever

179 days with replacement units from the United States. Ultimately, th

plan for units on temporary assignment was dropped, and all elements o

the brigade took permanent station in Garlstedt.4

The project had high political visibility and endorsement. Presiden

Gerald Ford and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt signed 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 2 
301

cost-sharing agreement in mid-July 1976 for the construction of the new 

facilities in Garlstedt. The Federal Republic agreed to pay Deutschmark 

(DM) 171.2 million (about $68 million at the prevailing exchange rate) 

for the construction of permanent facilities such as troop billets; dining 

halls; officers’ quarters; and facilities for supply, maintenance, administration, and utilities. This represented about half the anticipated costs of the 

complex. The United States agreed to pay the costs for facilities that the 

German Army would not normally construct for its soldiers, who were 

stationed close to home where community facilities existed. Amenities 

such as an open mess hall; a chapel; and athletic, recreational, and community service facilities received the label “U.S. peculiar” and were 

financed with appropriated funds. In addition, USAREUR programmed 

1,027 units of housing for the families of U.S. soldiers, to be funded by the 

United States and built by German civilian contractors under a build-tolease arrangement.5

During the negotiations for the Garlstedt garrison, the Europe Division 

(EUD) provided technical assistance to USAREUR concerning the planning. 

In October 1975 EUD arranged meetings with the Oberfinanzdirektion (State 

Financial Office) of Hanover to discuss plans for housing U.S. troops temporarily in renovated structures. Late that month EUD received $4.3 million 

in construction authorization from the secretary of defense’s contingency 

funds to begin design on facilities for Brigade 75.6

Priorities kept changing. In April 1976, when USAREUR and the West 

German military decided to put Brigade 75 into the area permanently 

TO BREMERHAVEN

1977

1 : 7,500

Site Plan

GARLSTEDT GARRISON

 Figure 5: Site Plan of the Garrison in Garlstedt, 1977 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 3 
302

rather than temporarily, the master plan that EUD developed had to b

modified. Revisions included eliminating several maintenance complexe

but adding a club for noncommissioned officers, an elementary schoo

and a high school.7

 At the end of April 1976, the West German ministrie

in Bonn sent a letter to the Land (state) government of Niedersachse

(Lower Saxony), where the construction would take place, requestin

approval to solicit bids for the project.8

From the start, planners were conscious of the importance of publ

relations to the success of their project. Although the Garlstedt area ha

long been a military range and training site, the German populatio

prized the heath around it for recreation and open-air activities. U.

troops had never been present in the area, and the West German gov

ernment expected resistance to the new military installation. Officia

therefore chose to reveal the plans for the garrison by degrees to give th

local population time to adjust. The concern was justified. By spring 197

German opponents of the planned garrison had gathered 40,000 sign

tures on a protest petition, and in May a human chain containing 75,00

to 100,000 protesters formed around the proposed construction site.9

Plans went forward. On 23 September 1976, the Oberfinanzdirektio

of Hanover opened the first bids on construction contracts for the troo

facilities in Garlstedt. A month later the state legislature in Lower Saxon

formally approved the stationing of a U.S. brigade in the region, the la

formal endorsement that the project needed. Sensitive to the oppositio

that the project had generated, the legislature directed the state govern

ment to ensure that “the legitimate rights of the population of the countr

are safeguarded to the greatest extent possible.” As a spokesman for th

government put it, the stationing depended upon “safeguarding the env

ronment and ensuring the continued utilization by the people of adjacen

recreational areas.”10

Mindful of public concern regarding the environmental impact o

the construction, the contractors erected special fences, ten feet high, t

protect two well-known prehistoric graves located near the new install

tion. They also spent more than DM 4 million ($1.6 million at the prevai

ing exchange rate) to restore open areas to more general use by removin

undetonated ammunition, some of which dated back to World War I. Th

removal, begun in August 1976, eventually covered areas adjacent to th

installation at an estimated cost of an additional DM 16 million ($6.35 mi

lion). Workers removed more than thirty tons of dud ammunition from 

the sands of the surrounding heath.11

Both design and construction were handled by indirect contractin

Local officials approved the first construction contracts for the project i

late January 1977, and workmen began preparing the site in Garlstedt i

February. In April construction actually began on the largest single pro

ect, fourteen enlisted men’s barracks and three dining facilities for 2,80

soldiers. On 5 May 1977, West German Minister of Defense Georg Lebe

hosted U.S. Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander in a formal co

nerstone-laying ceremony at the construction site.12

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 4 
303

In July 1977 the Oberfinanzdirektion of Hanover announced that 

Osterholz-Scharmbeck, a town of 2,400 just a few miles east of the 

Garlstedt installation, would become the site for the 1,027 build-to-lease 

housing units and one of the schools for U.S. dependents. As anticipated, 

some elements of the community protested the concentration of so many 

Americans in such a small town. To address local concerns, community relations groups from both the American and the German sides met 

together. To gather information about living near large concentrations 

of U.S. troops, representatives from Osterholz-Scharmbeck traveled to 

other communities in Germany where U.S. troops were permanently stationed and to Washington, D.C., and Fort Hood, Texas, the home of the 2d 

Armored Division.13

These early contacts fostered good relations, and in early November 

1977 the Sports Club of Osterholz-Scharmbeck hosted a group of brigade officers and their wives at the traditional club ball. As a sign of 

honor and acceptance of the new residents of the community, the club 

flew the American flag outside the hall where the ball was held. The 

wife of Osterholz-Scharmbeck’s city manager organized “Operation 

New Neighbor” and used computers to match German and American 

families based on common interests. Many of the local families “adopted” 

incoming families and entertained them. Nearly every new family that 

expressed an interest in having a local sponsor received one. English lessons became popular with the townspeople.14

On 5 December 1977, officials laid the cornerstone for the housing 

units in Osterholz-Scharmbeck. (See Map 28.) The new accommodations 

Family Housing in Osterholz-Scharmbeck, Germany

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 5 
Map 28

A27

A27

A1

A1

A28

A29

A29

We s e r River

Bremerhaven

Nordenham

Osterholz-Scharmbeck

Garlstedt

Bremen Oldenburg

Delmenhorst

0

0

20 Miles

20 Kilometers

WEST GERMANY

UPPER WESER REGION

1978

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 6 
305

(589 apartments, 425 row houses, 12 duplexes, and 1 single-family house) 

were interspersed among existing housing at six locations in the community. To avoid creating an American “ghetto,” the planners selected 

designs similar to the German houses in each neighborhood.15

To limit the impact of the U.S. military presence on the community of 

Osterholz-Scharmbeck, USAREUR planned a minimum level of support 

for the new living area. Troops and families could use the shopping facilities in nearby Bremerhaven, including a post exchange and a commissary. 

The build-to-lease program in Osterholz-Scharmbeck included a multiuse 

building containing an Army Community Service office, child care and 

dependent youth activity centers, a commissary annex, an Army and Air 

Force Exchange Service (AAFES) pickup point, a Stars and Stripes bookstore, 

and limited facilities for the sale of beverages and merchandise. The complex also had four outdoor multipurpose recreational courts (for basketball 

and tennis) and a fifty-car parking lot adjacent to the community center.16

At the Garlstedt installation, the soldiers and their families could find 

a bowling alley, a chapel, a theater, a barber and beauty shop, and a bank. 

Garlstedt also had its own recreation center and indoor and outdoor athletic facilities. All these facilities, which USAREUR approved for construction in December 1977, were built with U.S. funds as enhancements to the 

quality of life for U.S. service personnel.17

By August 1978 EUD’s Northern Area Office, working through a resident office in Garlstedt, had supervised the completion of $26 million of 

construction, including the fourteen barracks buildings. Despite delays 

occasioned by an unusually wet summer, the prefinal inspection of the 

first barracks building occurred on 5 July 1978. Communications facilities for telephone and television advanced as planned, and in September 

a microwave link between Garlstedt and Bremerhaven was fully operational. That same month the Armed Forces Network Television began 

transmitting its programs to the area. Telephone circuits connecting the 

caserne with Fort Hood, Texas, became available after the advance elements of Brigade 75 took up residence.18

The decrease in the value of the dollar from DM 2.56 to DM 1.85 

between 1976 and 1978 created financial problems for the construction in Garlstedt. To cover the shortfall at the end of the 1978 fiscal year, 

USAREUR had to apply about $5.5 million from funds earmarked for base 

operations directly to the U.S.-funded part of the construction. With funding secure, the brigade headquarters and headquarters company and the 

498th Support Battalion began moving into their new permanent facilities 

in Garlstedt. The first units of the 2d Armored Division, about 200 people, 

moved into the installation in September 1978. The first dependent family moved into one of the newly constructed housing units on 16 October. 

The following day, German Defense Minister Hans Apel and Secretary of 

Defense Harold Brown participated in a formal ceremony transferring the 

facility to the United States.19

The mayor of Osterholz-Scharmbeck personally greeted the first 

American family with traditional German gifts: a loaf of brown bread, 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 7 
306

a filled shaker of salt, and a new one-pfennig piece for good luck. B

the end of 1978 a total of 282 family housing units were occupied an

410 more were ready for occupants. Interim support facilities opened i

Garlstedt, and AAFES, Europe, opened a snack bar in a truck. The com

munity center that eventually housed these and other activities opened i

1979.20

Because of construction delays, special arrangements had to be mad

to have schools for the American children by the opening of the academ

year in the autumn of 1978. A leasing arrangement with a local Germa

school provided eleven rooms in Osterholz-Scharmbeck for grade scho

classes during the autumn term; high school students had to travel to th

Department of Defense dependent school in Bremerhaven for the fir

semester. On 1 January 1979, an elementary and high school complex o

six buildings officially opened in Osterholz-Scharmbeck.21

American medical facilities were expanded to accommodate the grow

ing community. Construction of a clinic at Garlstedt Caserne fell behin

and opened only in March 1979. In the early 1980s the military hospital i

Bremerhaven increased its staff, and its capacity rose from twenty-five t

seventy-five beds.22

Several unique characteristics distinguish the Garlstedt project, ma

ing it difficult to use as a model for any other undertaking. From th

outset it had the entire weight of the West German political and militar

establishments behind it. Few projects commanded the level of attentio

evident in the very fact that the U.S. president and the West German chan

cellor signed the agreement authorizing the project in July 1976. Fundin

came directly from the Federal Republic, a factor that gave the proje

two advantages in the early phases. First, German-funded elements wer

easier and faster to initiate, execute, monitor, and release to the America

users than dollar-funded projects. Second, the American statutory, regul

tory, administrative, and technical legal requirements that often delaye

dollar-funded work did not apply where Deutschmarks were used.

The project also benefited because most buildings in Garlstedt use

existing, off-the-shelf designs, a one-time advantage that facilitate

early start of construction. From the beginning the Oberfinanzdirektio

of Hanover had sufficient personnel to handle the volume of work th

Garlstedt entailed. USAREUR’s middle- and top-level managemen

devoted time and talent to the project, underscoring the importance an

urgency of the endeavor in the minds of the German authorities. EU

also gave top priority to the project, assigning its most experienced an

qualified German engineers and its most proficient German-speakin

American employees to the work. All the construction took place in 

relatively limited geographic area and consisted of repetitive structure

The combination of these factors certainly contributed to the Garlsted

project’s success.23

By February 1979 the coordination between EUD, USAREUR, Germa

government agencies, and civilian contractors had produced facilities fo

4,000 troops of the 2d Armored Division, Forward. Establishing the ne

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 8 
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home for the brigade took less than two years from the start of construction, though not all the support facilities were complete. In October 1978 

the installation had been formally dedicated as General Lucius D. Clay 

Caserne in memory of the former commander in chief of U.S. forces in 

occupied Germany and Berlin. General Clay’s efforts on behalf of the 

Germans, especially during the Berlin Airlift of 1948–1949, made him 

revered in Germany; naming the caserne after Clay paid fitting tribute 

to the cooperation between German and American authorities in the creation of Garlstedt.24

Forward Stationing in Vilseck

The repositioning of American combat units to northern Germany 

was one manifestation of new strategic thinking that developed in the 

1970s. An extension of that thinking, forward stationing, became evident in the 1980s. The concept was simple: Move U.S. troops out of areas 

west of the Rhine to positions close to the border with East Germany and 

Czechoslovakia, points at which the Soviets might launch a preemptive 

ground attack. Although formulated in the mid-1970s, the strategy of 

forward stationing gained allied and West German approval only in the 

early 1980s.25

The new strategy and repositioning of troops meant increased construction to support the consolidation of armored and infantry units 

around Vilseck and Hohenfels, northeast and southeast of Nuremberg, 

respectively. Design began in the early 1980s on operational and support facilities. When the chief of construction, John Blake, first visited 

Vilseck in 1981, he saw “Sleepy Hollow,” a quiet, rural community with 

little activity. All that changed with the beginning of construction in 1985, 

starting with two buildings for battalion headquarters.

In 1987, as a part of USAREUR’s Total Force Modernization program, 

the first elements of a planned five battalions of VII Corps (2 armored, 1 

mechanized, 1 field artillery, and 1 forward support) began to move into 

Vilseck. One of the innovative construction techniques applied during the 

work in Vilseck involved a school begun in March 1987 and completed 

in August of 1988. The building contained about forty classrooms, but 

according to Walt Bogdanow, chief of EUD’s Vilseck project office, they 

were “not at all your standard square classrooms.” The building “looks 

like a ship’s screw” and used cast-in-place concrete, a technology that 

Bogdanow described as “very time-consuming” but one that allowed 

construction of an unusual design. The school also had masonry work 

exposed on exterior and interior walls.26

By 1989 EUD had completed or had plans for sixty projects related to 

Vilseck with a construction value exceeding $300 million. In the Vilseck 

project office an on-site force of eleven engineers and technicians supervised 30 projects, including 6 headquarters buildings; 7 maintenance 

facilities; 8 barracks buildings; chapel; fire station; police station; 5 recreational facilities; and 882 factory-built housing units, of which 225 were 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 9 
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already occupied. Projections called for an increase in the size of th

Vilseck military community from 3,000 to more than 10,000 people b

1992.27

All this activity in Vilseck took place in an area of about two squar

miles, making the coordination of contractors and work crews a majo

concern. The Vilseck military community, which had to continue in ope

ation throughout the construction, had to be included in the coordinatio

effort. Because there was essentially only one way into and out of the pos

the construction turned people’s lives upsidedown.28

One of the most difficult and disruptive aspects of the constructio

was the installation of district heating, a system that had not been a pa

of the original design. The introduction of this heating system rathe

than coal-fired boilers involved changing all the specifications. Vilseck

director of engineering and housing started supervising the district he

system, but EUD took it over midway through the work. The district he

lines were two feet wide and ran in all directions from the boundary o

the post to a main heat substation. Excavations for them cut across near

every road on the complex.29

With its potential for disruption of daily living, construction in Vilsec

could have been a public relations disaster, but it was not. According t

the area engineer in the Nuremberg Area Office, Lt. Col. Grosvenor W

“Bud” Fish, Jr., much of the credit for making the Vilseck project wor

smoothly belonged to Capt. Kent Henson, the project office’s liaison off

cer to the military community.30

In 1987 U.S. military personnel moved into newly constructed facilities in Vilseck, 

Germany, northeast of Nuremberg.

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 10 
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Henson met daily with Vilseck community officials to keep them 

apprised of the status of construction. He participated in weekly community staff meetings and a monthly meeting with the community commander; Blake frequently traveled from Frankfurt to participate in the 

monthly meeting. Henson also attended meetings with each of the housing communities on the post to give the soldiers and their families the 

latest information about road closures or utilities disruptions. Henson’s 

efforts notably improved EUD relations with the military community.

Problems arose in coordinating the construction with the surrounding German community. As Bogdanow noted, “The forest belongs to the 

German government even though it is on a U.S. post. We just basically 

rent the land.... They’ve got rights to say what happens to their trees, what 

happens to their soil.” The Germans also exercised the right to say what 

happened to their birds. When shore swallows—birds on the German 

endangered species list—were found nesting in one of the open storage 

areas, construction stopped until the fledglings had left the nest. The stoppage delayed the project and the contractor became eligible for payments 

to cover his costs.31

As the tempo of construction increased through 1989 and into 1990, 

Blake observed that Vilseck had changed from Sleepy Hollow to “probably the biggest concentration of work that we’ve had since I’ve been in 

Europe.... We have overhauled every square inch of Vilseck.” One of the 

Vilseck project officers, Doug Sommer, marveled, “Vilseck has gotten one 

new of about everything that you can think of.”32

Supporting New Weapons Systems

Late in the 1970s the Army began to introduce a series of major 

new weapons systems that required enhanced facilities—the AH–64 

Apache attack helicopter, the Black Hawk troop transport helicopter, the 

Abrams M1 tank, the Bradley armored personnel carrier, and the Patriot 

air defense missile. Nearly simultaneously, planning also began for the 

Air Force’s Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and the Army’s 

Pershing II missile. The EUD commander, Brig. Gen. George Kenyon 

“Ken” Withers, Jr., knew that one of the division’s main tasks early in 

the 1980s would be “to prepare the training ranges, the barracks for the 

soldiers who would man those systems, and any other facilities necessary to accommodate [the weapons’] introduction into Europe.”33 Withers 

had no doubt that this is what the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph K. 

Bratton, wanted. He drew his conclusion from an offhand comment that 

Bratton had made during a visit to EUD in March 1981: “Ken, the CINC 

USAREUR [commander in chief, USAREUR] mentioned to me that he 

didn’t want the Corps of Engineers responsible for the delay in fielding 

any major weapons system in Europe.”34

In fiscal year 1980 USAREUR received $1.7 million from Congress to 

provide realistic practice firing ranges in Grafenwöhr and Wildflecken to 

train crews manning the Abrams tank and the Bradley armored personnel 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 11 
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carrier. EUD acted as the construction agent; Louis Berger Internation

designed the new ranges; and the 18th Engineer Brigade provided troo

labor for construction.

Upgrading the Ranges

EUD planned to procure materials for construction at the Grafenwöh

range in April 1981, with completion of design programmed for the fo

lowing autumn. USAREUR scheduled the 18th Engineer Brigade, unde

command of Col. James W. van Loben Sels (who became EUD commande

in 1984), to begin construction in April 1982. Aside from the valuab

training for engineer troops that the project offered, the 18th received th

assignment because EUD could not find at a reasonable price a priva

contractor willing to work on the range given the danger of unexplode

ordnance.35

Working in the Grafenwöhr live-fire range necessitated removing th

unexploded ammunition that had accumulated. Continuous use of th

range during the renovations prompted Louis Berger International to lim

its soil investigation to topographical studies from the air. Ground verif

cation could only be done on Sundays, when the range was not in us

Once on site, the 18th Engineer Brigade found shortcomings in the desig

Apache Attack Helicopters in a Maintenance Hangar in Crailsheim, Germany

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 12 
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based on its own analysis of the soil. Much of the area occupied by the 

Grafenwöhr range was a peat bog with a high water table. The engineer 

brigade’s inspection showed that the ground, a mixture of peat and sand, 

flexed considerably under weight. Any rupture of the peat layer caused 

the sand to liquefy and the ground to sink. The brigade requested design 

modifications and recommended a geotextile fabric, generally called a filter fabric, which would allow water to pass through yet contain and stabilize the sand. The designers incorporated the filter fabric, allowing much 

of the bog to be reclaimed and used for roads, target areas, defilade firing 

positions, and parking.36

In September 1981 other changes in design for the range arrived, 

adding roads at two ranges, changing the elevations of target pits, and 

modifying the orientation and location of buildings. These changes had 

not been adequately coordinated with the German forest service, which 

disapproved many of the relocations when construction began. The 18th 

Engineer Brigade received the changes so late that delays in construction 

were inevitable.37

The procurement of materials and equipment ran particularly smoothly in Grafenwöhr because, starting early in the planning process, the 18th 

Engineer Brigade and EUD cooperated to develop effective procedures 

for tracking procurement of materials. As they identified problems, they 

moved quickly to avoid possible bottlenecks. They also prevailed upon 

the deputy commander in chief of USAREUR to keep the U.S. Army 

Contracting Agency, Europe, working overtime to maintain the procurement schedule. Despite the quantity of materials involved, worth about 

$17 million, procurement always kept pace with construction, and the 

appropriate supplies remained available at each stage of the work.38

Between 1 April and 30 November 1982, the 18th Engineer Brigade 

placed seventeen moving target systems totaling more than 14,500 feet 

across six ranges. It created 549 concrete target pits that held electrically 

operated targets depicting vehicles and personnel that popped up automatically. The brigade also lay over thirty miles of gravel roads for use 

by tanks practicing firing and for maintenance of the targets themselves. 

Wherever tanks turned on the roads, the engineers installed concrete 

pads to limit damage. The brigade furnished the Grafenwöhr range with 

7 buildings for billeting troops, 4 dining facilities, and 5 target maintenance buildings with running water and latrines. These facilities reduced 

the time that soldiers spent commuting to the range and made maximum 

use of their training time. Five range control towers and one observation 

tower helped soldiers monitor range activity. Five parking areas, each providing 8,900 square feet of concrete surface, accommodated the tracked 

vehicles, and nine gravel parking areas took care of wheeled vehicles. The 

engineers installed 13,000 feet of fencing, 1,600 feet of concrete roads, and 

more than 200 culverts for drainage.

Grafenwöhr was the largest troop construction project ever attempted 

in peacetime. At its peak the project employed over 4,000 soldiers in seven 

reinforced engineer battalions.39 Private contractors handled work too 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 13 
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technically sophisticated for the troops, and EUD project staff coordina

ed the construction to minimize the time that the range would have to b

closed.40 The contractors built water wells, programmable control units t

regulate the targets, self-propelled trolleys for carrying targets at speed

from ten to twenty-five miles an hour, and electrical transformer station

They also made the automated targets sensitive to the thermal-imagin

night sights that the combat vehicles used. The targets popped up accord

ing to a command and control system that could be programmed for 

variety of situations.41 The moving targets provided more realistic gun

nery training than in the past. Stationary firing positions and roads fo

firing while moving provided training for both defensive and offensiv

situations. Combat commanders reported that their range training eff

ciency improved by 50 percent during the first year of exercises on th

upgraded range.42

EUD made adjustments for 1983 based on the experience gaine

during the first year. A single supplier was chosen for the targetry an

computer-based control units, reducing costs and eliminating problem

of installing differing systems. By 1985 Grafenwöhr had become the mo

modern firing range for tanks and the largest training area in Europe. I

addition to improving the range, the redesign aimed to conserve energ

wherever possible and to reduce noise levels.43

In 1987 EUD initiated work on a prototype for a test firing range th

would use space efficiently and employ a new material. Standard rif

Pop-up targets were a part of the modernization of the Grafenwöhr training 

range during the 1980s.

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 14 
313

ranges in the United States, where space was plentiful, were built thirty 

yards wide. In a test conducted between 17 November and 10 December 

1987, EUD set up the prototype of the new range with four firing lanes, 

each 5.5 yards wide. The prototype used shock-attenuating concrete to 

cover the target banks instead of the customary wooden covers. This substance consists of an aerated concrete mixed with small steel fibers, developed for use in facilities designed to train for military operations in urban 

terrain. It offered four advantages over wood. First, it limited ricochets, a 

critical factor with ranges set so close together. Second, it withstood the 

repeated impact of ammunition much better than wood. Third, it was 

easier to replace than shattered wooden panels. Fourth, it absorbed more 

sound. These tests prepared the way for contracts in 1988 and 1989 to 

build eleven new rifle ranges at a cost of $30 million.44

The Army invested large sums of money during the 1980s in a second firing area, Wildflecken, northeast of Frankfurt and directly north 

of Würzburg. The local populace’s objections to the noise level at the 

firing ranges held up work in Wildflecken for years, but in early 1989 

EUD began work, combining troop construction—battalions of the 18th 

Engineer Brigade—with contract construction for the more sophisticated 

work.

The work in Wildflecken—to provide training areas for Bradley 

personnel carriers and Abrams tanks—included 7 moving targets, 73 

stationary vehicle targets, and 136 personnel targets, plus defilade firing 

positions and the associated roads and turning pads. With the approval of 

the West German government, tree cutting for the project began in March 

1989. By April EUD engineers had discovered serious design flaws: All 

five of the new Bradley battle positions and three of the defilade positions 

left the vehicle without a clear line of sight to the moving targets. The 

design had to be changed. By the end of the 1989 fiscal year, the project 

was only 20 percent completed.45

USAREUR needed to continue development of Grafenwöhr and 

Wildflecken because so many of its forces were stationed in urban areas 

and had no training space. As German cities expanded, they enveloped 

installations that had once been in the countryside. Because Grafenwöhr 

remained one of the few relatively open areas, more rifle firing ranges 

were concentrated there, in addition to the tank ranges. EUD continued to 

oversee work related to Grafenwöhr to the end of the decade, and similar 

work in Wildflecken extended into the 1990s.46

Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels

The Army was well aware that not all future combat would take place 

from tanks and armored personnel carriers; much of it was likely to occur 

in urban settings. To provide the troops in Europe with training to prepare 

them for street-to-street fighting, USAREUR developed the combat maneuver training center in Hohenfels, a small town situated at the southern apex 

of a triangle formed with Nuremberg and Grafenwöhr as the western and 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 15 
314

northern apexes, respectively. USAREUR hoped to offer through the train

ing center force-on-force training under conditions closely resembling thos

at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. The center in Fo

Irwin had 640,000 acres, allowing it to put about thirty-six battalions a yea

through training. The training terrain in Hohenfels extended over on

40,000 acres, 6 percent the size of Fort Irwin, but the program for Hohenfe

called for training fifty-two battalions a year.47

To overcome the lack of space in Europe, USAREUR decided to concen

trate sophisticated facilities for training combat maneuvers in Hohenfel

just as it had concentrated facilities in Grafenwöhr and Wildflecken fo

training the gunners and crews in armored vehicles. Hohenfels becam

a complex that provided realistic, stressful training at the level of the ba

talion task force. It combined an “opposition force” permanently statione

at the facility with the use of the multiple integrated laser engagemen

system and the integration of combat support and combat service suppor

The opposition force’s familiarity with the terrain and the exercises coul

make the training forces “pay” for any mistakes that they made durin

the exercises. Each commander received a detailed, computerized asses

ment of how soldiers performed at any given point in a mock battle. Th

assessment, which included tapes of the radio traffic during the battl

could be reviewed in detail to improve future performance.48

As a key element in the training in Hohenfels, USAREUR projecte

the creation of a mock village called the MOUT (military operations i

Training at the MOUT village in Hohenfels, Germany, prepared troops for 

urban combat.

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 16 
315

urban terrain) site. The village, constructed in 1989, resembled a typical 

German town, complete with a church, a cemetery, a city hall, a barn, and 

even buildings in rubble as if they had been bombed. The design called 

for hideaways, corners, and creep-through sewers to allow soldiers to 

infiltrate from one area of the town to another. The architecture and the 

landscaping of the mock city won it an honorable mention in the chief of 

engineers’ Design and Environment Awards Program for 1989. The buildings were also attractive enough from the outside that the local media 

described them as ready to occupy. Nuremberg’s area engineer, Colonel 

Fish, under whose office the project was executed, claimed that “all the 

local mayors offered to trade their buildings” for those in the MOUT village. They were only shells, however, designed to present the training soldier with situations that might arise in urban combat.49

In addition to the MOUT village, construction in Hohenfels included a 

storage and maintenance warehouse, also completed in 1989, that featured 

24 covered loading docks, 32 concrete vehicle parking areas, and more 

than 1,400 square yards of storage space. From this facility the vehicles 

and personnel from incoming units were to be outfitted with the equipment that allowed laser tracking of their movements during exercises. 

The operations center for the range housed DM 18 million ($11.14 million) 

worth of high-tech equipment in a DM 5 million ($3.09 million) building. 

Completed during the summer of 1990, it controlled the field exercises 

over the entire range. Using the sensor equipment carried by the troops 

and vehicles, the operations center could monitor and record all movements and provide a record of the training. USAREUR anticipated another 

75 percent growth in the program in Hohenfels during the early 1990s.50

Modernizing Operational Facilities

The training facilities necessary to develop proficiency in the new 

weaponry had to be supplemented by new and improved operational 

facilities that directly supported the deployment and day-to-day activity 

of combat and combat support units. Such operational facilities involved 

surfaced parking areas, airfields and associated buildings, ammunition 

and equipment storage areas, specialized troop housing such as that 

needed for rotating border duty, and operations control buildings.51

The poor quality of such facilities, in which the service personnel 

worked every day, and the inadequacy of maintenance facilities throughout Europe had contributed to the deterioration of equipment during the 

1970s. Even simple maintenance could not be performed in the mud; as 

a result, soldiers deferred routine maintenance until problems became 

serious and costly to correct. A survey conducted in 1976 of 1,800 maintenance facilities in USAREUR indicated that 98 percent were substandard 

because they lacked space, running water, heat, toilets, and lift capacity. 

Many of them also failed to meet Army safety standards.52

Since the late 1970s, EUD had been involved in efforts under a program called Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Configured to Unit 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 17 
316

Sets (POMCUS) to provide enhanced maintenance facilities. During th

1980s USAREUR undertook to assure adequate maintenance facilities fo

its new and complex modern equipment. The Facilities Modernizatio

Program formed one part of this effort. USAREUR initiated it in the la

1970s for the rehabilitation, modernization, and alteration of substandar

maintenance facilities. Under this program, Military Construction, Arm

(MCA), funds could be used for any and all maintenance and repair wor

not just for work that involved new construction, as had been the cas

with earlier programs. In other words, MCA money could be applied t

reduce the backlog of maintenance and repair, normally funded only b

money for Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA). In addition, th

program permitted facilities to be completely replaced when estimate

suggested that to be more economical than rehabilitation. Money from 

the Facilities Modernization Program could also be used to satisfy safet

environmental, or energy conservation requirements.53

Even this special program was not enough to counterbalance all th

years of neglect. During his first two years as commander in chief o

USAREUR, General Frederick J. Kroesen became convinced that mor

had to be done to fund operational facilities. On 1 April 1981, Kroese

sent a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee titled “Livin

and Working Conditions in United States Army, Europe.” The bookle

prepared by USAREUR’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Enginee

detailed the deplorable conditions of the facilities in which U.S. troop

lived and worked. General Kroesen underscored his concern and frustr

tion in a cover letter to a member of that committee, Senator Gordon 

Humphrey:

Senator Humphrey, I thank you for your interest, but I want you 

to know also that many of us in Europe remember any number of 

reports of this nature which have been submitted in the past years. 

I was personally responsible for one which was prepared five years 

ago. Each of those past reports was either staffed to death, filed for 

future reference, or ignored when budget formulation time arrived. 

We cannot afford to have that happen many more times or we will 

have no facilities left for sustaining the Army.54

The report had the intended effect, and Congress began to mak

money more available. The work undertaken under the Facilitie

Modernization Program continued, but additional programs now suppl

mented it. During the 1980s Kroesen’s contention that proper facilitie

played a vital role in making both troops and modern equipment effectiv

won increasing support among the leadership of the U.S. defense estab

lishment.55

The new support generated by Kroesen’s appeal to the Senate mad

possible the expansion of building programs, such as five new maint

nance shops at Smith Barracks in Baumholder. The facilities provide

over 9,500 square yards of space; drive-through capability for machiner

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 18 
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overhead cranes; carbon monoxide exhaust systems; and systems for heating and ventilation, compressed air, lighting, and power. The construction 

included access roads; paved parking areas; and an extension of the distribution lines of the existing heating, electrical power, and sewer and water 

systems. The design incorporated drainage and oil separators so that rain 

water running off the vehicle parking areas could be processed to safeguard the quality of the local ground water.56 New construction included 

tank washracks that used high-pressure water nozzles to blast mud and 

grime off tank treads and undercarriages, high-pressure wash facilities 

for helicopters, and hot-point fuel spots that allowed helicopters to refuel 

without shutting off their engines.57

These modern facilities presented varying degrees of engineering 

challenge. Pouring acres of concrete holds little fascination, although its 

impact on troop morale was potentially high. Designing and constructing 

wash facilities that incorporated the pumps and pressurized water sprays 

to clean a tank or helicopter presented a greater challenge. Still, the greatest challenge frequently lay in making the facility truly usable. Richard 

Birner, a German engineer employed by EUD in the Nuremberg Area 

Office, explained the challenge: “[The average soldier] doesn’t know anything about watts and volts and amperes ... [or] the strength of concrete. 

He knows how to push a button. But there [the challenge] starts already, 

because [one] soldier pushes the button with his foot and the other operates it the right way.”58 Designers had to ensure that the facility would 

operate even if misused, and designs were modified as the equipment 

Army engineers also constructed washracks for tanks, trucks, and other vehicles.

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 19 
318

changed. In April 1982 EUD had to adjust its designs for washracks t

accommodate the new Abrams tank and allow for more effective cleanin

under the skirt. General Withers instructed his design staff also to inco

porate suggestions from the commander of the 3d Armored Division

whose men were using the equipment.59

Overcoming the long-standing neglect took more than a few program

and a few years. In 1984, although a third of the U.S. Army was statione

in Europe, only 40 percent of the combat battalions maintained the

vehicles in motor pools “with adequate hardstands; the rest were in th

mud.” The vice chief of staff of the Army proposed using troop labor t

speed construction to change that condition. USAREUR quickly formed 

“hardstand attack group” and gave it the mission of “getting the troops i

Europe out of the mud.” By late 1987 USAREUR had eighty-one projects i

the hardstand-building program, construction valued at $147 million.60

In an effort to stretch the construction dollar and as a part of its mi

sion to use new construction technologies, EUD experimented with rolle

compacted concrete pavement as a new method of providing hardstand

The method, though new to Europe, had been used in Canada for abou

a decade and in the United States since the early 1980s. The name derive

from the technique. Over a prepared surface a machine resembling th

equipment used to lay asphalt dispenses under pressure a relatively dr

coarse concrete mix. Vibrators and rollers then pass over the concrete t

compact it in place. Because the resulting surface is not as smooth as trad

tional methods yield, it cannot be used for highways or airfield runway

but is perfectly adapted to hardstands. In its use, speed was not only 

virtue but also a necessity. The integrity of the concrete was compromise

when the time between the preparation of the mixture and its applicatio

exceeded an hour. The process also promised cost savings up to 30 pe

cent, attributable in part to the limited manual labor needed.61

In July 1986 engineers from the Europe Division and the Corps o

Engineers Waterways Experiment Station in Vicksburg, Mississipp

supervised the pouring of a 2,400-square-yard test section of roller-com

pacted concrete in Kitzingen, West Germany, as part of a 19,000-squar

yard hardstand. Because this was a relatively new process, it was no

recognized by German construction regulations; and the West Germa

government would not allow it to be incorporated into the standard bid

ding process when EUD let contracts. For months after the experiment i

Kitzingen, EUD’s staff worked with contacts in the German governmen

ministries to devise procedures that would establish criteria to allow 

routine use of roller-compacted concrete in contracts for U.S. militar

construction in the Federal Republic. Initially, they could win no better a

arrangement than to permit this process as a change order or as an alte

nate bid on a contract. Bureaucratic resistance to the new method slowe

its application to construction projects. By 1989, however, EUD negotiato

had gained new guidelines and the use of this method began to increas

The combined total of roller-compacted concrete used from fiscal yea

1986 to 1988 amounted to over 58,500 square yards. In the first ten month

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 20 
319

of fiscal year 1989, EUD awarded contracts totaling 340,000 square yards. 

All these contracts were awarded under the alternate bid procedure.62

In all, between 1981 and 1987 USAREUR spent approximately $766 

million from its military construction budget and its operation and maintenance budget to improve the Army’s maintenance facilities.

Patriot Missile Program

Like the Abrams tank and the Bradley armored personnel carrier, the 

Patriot missile represented a new level of technology with several advantages over its predecessors. The Patriot system offered medium- to highaltitude air defense using mobile ballistic missiles that could operate in all 

weather conditions. It required fewer pieces of equipment to operate than 

the systems it supplanted and therefore demanded less logistical support. 

It also required fewer people. The Nike Hercules had more than 1,000 

soldiers in its basic firing unit, and the improved Hawk had 878 soldiers; 

whereas the Patriot battery was operated by 765 persons, although the 

number might vary depending on the number of firing positions at any 

given site. Being a missile with a conventional warhead, the Patriot also 

demanded fewer security and safety measures.63

Planning for the installation of the Patriot began in the late 1970s. By 

1981 EUD and its NATO counterparts had initiated design and developed a schedule that called for construction to begin in 1984. General 

Roller-compacted concrete was used to construct hardstands in Kitzingen, Germany,

 in 1986 and 1987.

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 21 
320

Withers closely supervised the Patriot schedule because of the admon

tion from General Bratton not to let the Corps be the cause of any delay

Construction began in Giessen, north of Frankfurt, then in Hanau to th

east, and later in Ansbach to the southeast. The program reached a mil

stone on 7 April 1982, when the first bids were opened for Patriot facilitie

the first construction package was awarded at the end of May. Dexheim

Kaiserslautern, Giebelstadt, Illesheim, and Bitburg all eventually ha

Patriot batteries installed.

Design for the support facilities—the launching area, the administr

tive area, and the control area—in Giessen, Dexheim, and Kaiserslauter

went to the architect-engineer firm of Georgi Reitzel. A former USACA

employee in the 1950s, Reitzel became a private contractor and won con

tracts on Nike and Hawk installations during the 1960s and 1970s. Lou

Berger International, another company that worked on Nike and Haw

facilities, designed Patriot installations in Hanau and Babenhausen, 

missile storage area in Münster-Dieburg, and administration and suppo

facilities in Grossauheim.64

NATO and the United States conjunctively funded all the Patriot facil

ties. That is, NATO paid for the elements it deemed essential for war: th

readiness and operations buildings; the systems maintenance buildin

the generator buildings with converters; paving, earthwork for the prote

tive berms, and electrical systems for the control, radar, and launcher; th

central missile storage area; and the facility for the direct support uni

NATO also paid for about 86 percent of the costs of a maintenance sho

at each site and about two-thirds of the costs of the battery administratio

and battalion headquarters buildings. The United States funded the ba

racks and dining facilities for the enlisted soldiers manning the system

the remaining costs for the maintenance shop and the battery administr

tion buildings, the nuclear-biological-chemical decontamination cell, sto

age for the basic load of ammunition, and defensive fighting positions.65

Unlike the older Hawk installations, which had very rudimentar

facilities, the Patriot installations were built as fully functioning, almo

independent posts. Each new Patriot facility had a small shop wher

soldiers could buy items for their immediate needs and living quarte

that provided far more comfort than the open-bay barracks with cots 

the Hawk sites. The facilities consisted of an engagement control station

a battery control group, emergency power equipment, radar equipmen

and unmanned launchers. Each Patriot missile was mounted on a si

teen-wheeled articulated transport vehicle called a Hummtee (HEMTT, o

heavy expanded mobility tactical truck), in which power passed to ever

wheel, making the transporter effective in almost any terrain. At the in

tial readiness point on the site, the missiles and transporters were pos

tioned behind dense earthen berms with reinforced concrete walls. In th

missile’s raised and ready firing position, only a lightning rod rose highe

than the missile itself.66

The Patriot installations required multiple contracts for design. Fo

instance, EUD issued eighty contracts to architect-engineer firms for th

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 22 
321

Patriot facility at the Bitburg Air Base. Design began in 1985, and the 

contractor broke ground for the construction in 1987. EUD turned over 

the facilities on 5 July 1989.67 That same summer EUD turned over several other Patriot installations in Kaiserslautern. By the end of the decade, 

EUD had provided facilities for seven Patriot air defense artillery battalions and one brigade headquarters at a cost of $230 million, of which 

NATO paid about $130 million (56.5 percent) and the United States paid 

the rest.68

The introduction of other new weapons systems provoked animated 

protests in Germany, but installing the Patriot air defense system caused 

hardly a ripple within the local population.69 The radar systems that 

governed each battery overlapped to provide a missile-defense umbrella 

for much of the West German territory. Although the American planners intended that the Patriot missile system replace the older Hawk air 

defense system, not enough Patriots had been installed by 1990 to blanket 

West Germany entirely; so NATO decided to upgrade and renovate selected Hawk emplacements as well. EUD continued to work on Hawk sites 

into the 1990s in close coordination with USAREUR and NATO.70

Cruise and Pershing Missiles

In contrast to the Patriot air defense system, the introduction into 

Europe of a new generation of intermediate range, surface-to-surface misPatriot missile facilities, like this one in Hanau, were eventually located 

throughout Germany.

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 23 
322

siles during the 1980s attracted widespread public attention and voc

protest. Two systems caused a dramatic uproar: the Air Force’s Groun

Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and the Army’s Pershing II, a secon

generation of the Pershing missile stationed in the Federal Republic o

Germany since about 1969. Unlike the Patriot, both the GLCM and th

Pershing II were designed to carry nuclear warheads. The Pershing II wa

an improved version of an earlier ballistic missile, whereas the Cruis

represented quite a different technology. The Cruise missile was a sma

relatively inexpensive, self-guided, pilotless, miniature aircraft that coul

be programmed to fly low, underneath Soviet radar coverage, to a pred

termined target. The GLCM, like the Pershing II and Patriot missiles, wa

a mobile system with two basic elements, a control module and a tran

porter-launcher.71

The pressure to station GLCMs and Pershing IIs in Europe came no

from the U.S. government but from the member states of the Atlantic all

ance acting through NATO. During the second half of the 1970s, the Sovi

Union had modernized its arsenal with a powerful land-based surface-to

surface nuclear missile—the new Soviet SS–20, which had a 3,000-mi

range and multiple warheads that could be independently targeted. It wa

also mobile and therefore more difficult to locate and destroy than earlie

systems. From its new forward positions in Eastern Europe, the missi

could reach targets in West Germany in twenty minutes. NATO allie

particularly the West Germans, became uneasy about possible Soviet ta

tical nuclear superiority over the United States in Central Europe.

To counter the Soviet threat, the NATO Council voted on 12 Decembe

1979 to deploy several hundred Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Britain

Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany. If the Soviet Unio

failed to agree to an accord eliminating its SS–20 threat to Europe, th

American missiles would be put into place beginning late in 1983.72

The Europe Division began preparing for the deployment of thes

intermediate range nuclear weapons in three of the five countries int

which the weapons were to be introduced—Belgium, West Germany, an

the Netherlands. On 27 July 1982, the division signed a technical agre

ment for the construction of the first GLCM installation. At an estimate

cost of $50.2 million, NATO and the United States conjunctively funde

the GLCM installation. EUD funded all support facilities (about sev

enty individual projects) and operational facilities, particularly those th

NATO did not fund, such as fire protection, safety, and welfare facilities.

The GLCM program lagged in fiscal year 1983 because of congres

ional delays in approving the design program for permanent facilitie

The Air Force had made contractual commitments on the basis of th

original schedule, and it asked EUD to help meet them. The deputy div

sion engineer, Col. Donald E. Hazen, and the Northern Area Office eng

neer, Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Kvam, suggested that the division establis

a program management office to concentrate exclusively on the GLCM 

projects. Kvam, in whose area much of the GLCM work would be con

structed, would head the office. The division engineer, Brig. Gen. Scott B

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 24 
323

Smith, accepted the idea, even though it meant taking the unconventional step of dividing the Northern Area Office into two elements. Kvam 

would oversee the GLCM work and report to Smith through Hazen; 

Kvam’s civilian deputy, Charles Schneider, would manage all other work 

and report to the chief of the Construction Division.74

Hazen and Kvam began to organize the new GLCM office in October 

1983. Smith announced that “LTC Kvam is now a senior member of 

the EUD Staff. He is no longer speaking through Construction as the 

Northern Area Officer. He is now the Creek [code word for GLCM] Project 

Officer. Give him your full support.”75 During November and December 

Kvam selected people from headquarters and from the area offices to fill 

positions in the program management office and in resident offices at 

the GLCM sites. In February 1984 General Smith reported to the chief of 

engineers, General Bratton, that the “program management concept will 

successfully deliver a quality project to one of our most important customers, the Air Force.” He added that the project “enhances NATO preparedness and has the potential to strengthen USACE’s [U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers] relationships with the Air Force.”76

By the summer of 1984 the GLCM office established a “cradle-tograve” tracking system that followed projects through design and construction on a monthly basis, analogous to what Brig. Gen. Norman G. 

Delbridge, Jr., commander of the Europe Division in the mid-1970s, had 

hoped to promote with his “big board.” Each month the staff saw whether 

they were ahead, keeping pace, or falling behind the schedule established 

by the Air Force for completion of facilities. After the end of June 1984, 

project managers had 5 percent of the program completed or in construction, 55 percent in design, and 40 percent awaiting initiation of design.77

The GLCM projects continued to have both high public visibility and 

geopolitical sensitivity, factors that made keeping them on schedule of 

paramount importance. In fiscal year 1984 EUD performed 23 percent 

($795 million) of its design workload and 6 percent (about $22 million) of 

its construction placement for the Air Force. The volume of work increased 

as the GLCM project progressed.78

Work began first in Belgium, then in West Germany, and finally in 

the Netherlands, all between 1983 and 1986. In 1983 engineers from the 

Europe Division began traveling to Belgium to work with local officials 

on the first GLCM site. Early in 1984 the division opened a resident office 

in Florennes, and in June the Belgian government formally signed the 

authorization for construction of the GLCM site in Florennes adjacent 

to a Belgian Air Force base. Starting with a staff of three, the Florennes 

Resident Office expanded over the next two years to thirteen people—

nine engineers, two translators, a secretary, and a procurement clerk.79

The Florennes Resident Office first built prefabricated temporary living quarters, administrative offices, a dining hall, and shopping facilities 

for Air Force personnel. In July 1985 a security fence went up around the 

permanent GLCM site, and in August the first of the permanent construction began. In January 1987 EUD turned over to the 485th Tactical Missile 

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 25 
324

Wing the first permanent building completed at the site, the recreatio

center. Its opening provided the 1,000 personnel of the wing, already o

site in the temporary living quarters, with a snack bar, a library, a weigh

room, a basketball court, and racquetball courts. By the end of 1987 th

resident office had completed about thirty facilities, including dormito

ries, the electrical distribution system, and other facilities directly relate

to the missile’s mission. EUD expected to award contracts for a commi

sary, a post exchange, a bank, a medical facility, and 600 off-base housin

units with a child care center and school. Diplomatic discussions betwee

the United States and the Soviet Union made the future of the Cruise mi

siles uncertain, prompting EUD to delay these awards.80

In the same period the GLCM work in Germany at Hahn Air Bas

lagged, and it became clear that the Air Force’s 38th Tactical Missile Win

would not have the necessary facilities on schedule. To avoid disruptin

the mission of the missile wing, resident engineer Rod Markuten secure

permission to renovate an old aircraft hangar for the new GLCM system

Markuten had to work with a hastily prepared design, but the temporar

construction began in March 1985 and was completed by Septembe

allowing the missile wing to meet its mission deadline. In the spring o

1986 the Society of American Military Engineers gave Markuten the 198

Tudor award, its highest prize, for his work at Hahn Air Base.81

When GLCM work in West Germany continued to encounter delay

EUD persuaded the government of the Federal Republic to let the divisio

issue contracts directly. With the special attention given to these GLCM 

projects, the division overcame the delays, kept the program on trac

and continued to meet the Air Force’s deadlines. As the end of the 198

fiscal year approached, EUD’s 1987 design program for GLCM was abou

90 percent complete. The work in Belgium neared completion; the work i

the Netherlands was just beginning and programmed to last until 1991

(Map 29)

The Air Force chose to furnish the GLCMs from the start with ad

quate service and maintenance areas and with newly constructed or reno

vated barracks, all designed specifically for the support of the weapon

and the people who operated them. The units assigned to GLCM insta

lations had family housing, schools, commissaries, and similar amenitie

explicitly conceived and programmed by the Air Force. By contrast, fo

the initial deployment of the Pershing II missile—which fulfilled a com

parable military mission, had the same lethal characteristics, and enjoye

(or suffered from) the same political sensitivity—the Army made ver

few special preparations. The missiles, which had mobile launchers ver

similar to the GLCM, were simply deployed with existing military unit

There was, as General Smith recalled, “a dramatic difference between th

security support and permanence of the one compared to the other.”83

The first battery of nine Pershing II missiles had been flown into We

Germany and stationed in Mutlangen on 23 November 1983, just twenty

four hours after the West German Parliament had approved deploymen

In the next year a total of fifty-four missiles arrived in the country, mo

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 26 
Map 29







Hoensbroek

Ter Apel

Steenwijk

Coevorden

Almelo

Harde

Soesterberg Project Office

Volkel

Woensdrecht

Brunssum

Gilze-Rijen

WEST

GERMANY

BELGIUM

Meuse R

Rhine R

BRUSSELS

The Hague

AMSTERDAM

Liège

Düsseldorf

NETHERLANDS

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1986

Northern Area Office Headquarters

Netherlands Resident Office and 

U.S. Air Force Ground Launched Cruise Missile Site

Pre-positioned Organizational

Materiel Storage (POMSS) Site 

Long Range Security Program (LRSP) Site

U.S. Air Force Base 0

0 50 Miles

50 Kilometers

100

100

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 27 
326

stationed in southern Germany. To achieve the rapid deployment schedule

by NATO in response to the threat of the Soviet SS–20 missiles that wer

already in place in Eastern Europe, the Army introduced the Pershing 

without extensive new design and with no construction of support facil

ties. EUD had very little involvement with their initial deployment, but th

division’s commitment of effort jumped dramatically after an accident i

1985. Three U.S. soldiers died and sixteen others were injured on 11 Januar

in a fire involving one of the Pershing II rocket propulsion units. The weap

on, stationed in Heilbronn, north of Stuttgart on the Neckar River, had n

been armed with its nuclear warhead, but the fire was still the most seriou

incident associated with the ballistic missiles.84

Investigators from the Office of the Secretary of the Army conclude

that the Army’s own inadequate maintenance and support facilities ha

contributed to the accident. In what General Smith characterized as “

blinding flash of the obvious,” the Army sought to redress the situatio

by upgrading the support facilities for the Pershing II. Lt. Col. Lloyd Coli

area engineer in Stuttgart, the region in which most of the work for th

Pershing IIs took place, remembered that “within weeks money just cam

pouring in.” For months thereafter EUD worked to design and constru

shelters to protect and cover the missiles and the troops who maintaine

them.85

In December 1987 President Ronald Reagan and Premier Mikha

Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty. Both powe

GLCM sites in Western Europe, such as Florennes, Belgium, included 

support and operational facilities.

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 28 
327

agreed to eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges between 

300 and 3,500 miles—the Cruise and Pershing II missiles and the Soviet 

SS–20 missiles. The mutual removal of the weapons realized the goal 

behind the original NATO decision to deploy the missiles. In mid-April 

1991 USAREUR removed the last Pershing II launcher from Europe; five 

weeks later commanders inactivated the 56th Field Artillery Command, 

which had operated the Pershing missiles in West Germany. Like many at 

EUD, John Blake felt proud that the division’s execution of the GLCM program for the Air Force and the upgrade of the Pershing II for the Army 

“convinced the Russians that they had better not try” a military confrontation in Europe.86

While the Army focused attention on new weapons systems and on 

upgrading operational and support facilities to improve morale and performance by the troops, it began to address the facilities in which the 

soldiers and their families lived. Just as the Europe Division became heavily involved in building to improve quality in operational and support 

facilities during the 1980s, it also extended its efforts to the facilities that 

supported everyday life for American military personnel and their dependents. Construction for quality of life became a major enterprise for the 

division in the 1980s and constitutes another important facet in the history of the Army engineers in Europe.

15N_Chap11_Final.indd 29 
15N_Chap11_Final.indd 30 
12

IMPROVING THE COMMUNITY 

ENVIRONMENT

F

or three decades after 1945, budget planners and politicians in 

Washington asserted that the U.S. military presence in Europe 

was temporary and that no long-term investment in permanent 

amenities for the soldiers and their families was either necessary 

or justified. During the American involvement in Vietnam, military budgets neglected the maintenance and repair of facilities in Europe. Between 

1969 and 1977 increases in overall military spending failed to keep pace 

with the rate of inflation.1

With the change to an all-volunteer army in 1973, the quality of facilities became a significant component of military life. To a large extent, the 

Army’s decision to improve the quality of life for U.S. forces in Europe 

grew out of self-interest. The characteristics of the soldiers serving in 

Europe changed quickly. The new recruits were better educated than conscript recruits and had higher expectations and ambitions. A far greater 

percentage of enlisted soldiers were married and had children. A growing 

percentage of soldiers were women, and in some families both husband 

and wife were in uniform. Single parents, especially, were concerned 

about care for their children during the working day.2

To attract and retain the best recruits, the Army had to offer better facilities than the run-down, barely adequate facilities that housed the conscript 

Army during the 1950s and 1960s. Despite programs such as Stem to Stern 

and Modernization of United States Facilities (MOUSF), living facilities desperately needed improvement. The Army began to understand that it could 

not retain the most qualified soldiers unless the soldiers and their families 

could see some hope of change. An Army publication asserted:

If a soldier and family are forced to move into a cramped and 

dilapidated apartment in a shabby, ill-kempt military housing unit, 

and are then required to make do with inadequate heating and poor 

electrical and plumbing systems, the soldier is going to be miserable, 

and morale—and job motivation—will suffer.3

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 1 
330

In both the short and the long terms, the Army also suffers. The so

dier performs poorly, the Army appears unattractive as a career option

and the Army loses its investment in training during the soldier’s initi

tour.

In the late 1970s the U.S. military in Europe launched a series of pro

grams designed to improve the quality of life for its service personne

hoping that more comfortable living conditions would enhance mora

and improve the commitment and productivity of its soldiers in the

primary combat mission. Congress appropriated funds to improve an

modernize both family housing and troop quarters. Other facilities serv

ing soldiers and their dependents also received new monies. The Arm

and the Air Force expanded and improved medical and dental clinic

schools, day care centers for children, and recreation facilities. All thes

programs became a major part of the work of the Europe Division (EUD

in the 1980s.

Family Housing

By the late 1970s the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), admin

istered 53,000 family housing units in Europe, with properties in Britain

Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, and West Berlin. Th

Army leased 9,000 of these from local owners and maintained the othe

units as landlord for the soldiers who occupied them. Most of the hou

ing units were in the Federal Republic and had been constructed wit

German funds in the early 1950s. Although sound at the time of constru

tion, they had had thirty years of high occupancy and turnover—a new 

family moved in every twenty-one months on average—and had suffere

from years of inadequate and underfunded maintenance. Over thos

years the expectations of soldiers had risen, and occupants expresse

increasing frustration over the lack of amenities and the Spartan characte

of the 1950s construction. The electrical systems, for example, could no

accommodate televisions, stereo systems, hair dryers, electric razors, an

the host of small kitchen appliances that had become commonplace.

Ninety-five percent of the housing in USAREUR had been built a

three-story structures with a center stairwell and two apartments o

each floor. Such stairwell apartments were home to 155,000 residents. Th

design of the units created a high-density population; poor sound insul

tion and limited privacy compounded the problems inherent in integra

ing residents with diverse backgrounds and styles of life. Army Researc

Institute studies comparing the residents of duplexes with residents o

stairwell apartments showed that the latter suffered from higher levels o

stress; more medical problems that required treatment at a hospital or di

pensary; and a higher incidence of alcohol and drug abuse, marital prob

lems, child abuse, and general dissatisfaction.4

Pressure to continue using these housing facilities remained high

In 1981 USAREUR faced an immediate need for 5,000 additional hou

ing units, and enlisted soldiers with families waited up to two years fo

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 2 
331

appropriate housing, by which time their tours might end. This undersupply did not even take into account those soldiers who lived with their 

families on the West German economy. The local housing market had a 

shortage of about 1.5 million units, which made affordable, conveniently 

located housing scarce and expensive for Americans. In the early 1980s a 

rent of $800 a month—more than twice the housing allowance most soldiers received for off-base living—was not uncommon, often for family 

quarters that Army inspectors judged to be substandard or even uninhabitable.5

Existing Housing Units

The Maintenance, Repair, and Improvement (MRI) program funded 

by the Department of the Army helped alleviate some of the housing 

problems. The program provided money to improve existing facilities; 

and USAREUR allocated a part of these funds to renovate existing family housing units, specifically targeting repair and replacement of bathrooms, kitchens, windows, and utilities.6

 Although the program was 

initiated in 1977, the architectural and engineering pilot studies were 

completed only in 1980. At that point, Headquarters, United States Army 

Corps of Engineers (USACE), approved an MRI engineering and architectural design guide for USAREUR that incorporated references and 

standards derived from the pilot 

studies. This allowed USAREUR 

to begin design work in 1981 

on an MRI pilot project at the 

Adlingerstrasse housing area in 

Stuttgart.7

The MRI program enabled 

USAR EU R to apply more 

resources to its existing backlog 

of maintenance and repair for 

family housing, but that backlog 

still stood at $246 million in 1981. 

USAREUR’s overall backlog for 

all facilities other than housing 

amounted to $1.28 billion, or 54 

percent of the Army’s worldwide 

backlog.8

 The backlog for troop 

housing was even greater. An 

article that appeared in February 

1984 noted “the troop-housing 

backlog in June 1982 was worth 

about $3.6 billion,” an amount 

“21 times what the Army had 

been allowed to spend for troop 

housing in 1982.” Faced with this 

Housing suffered from a backlog of delayed 

repairs. This family housing unit in Giessen, 

Germany, shows signs of severe structural 

cracking.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 3 
332

backlog of repair work, in the absence of a clear indication of increa

ing support to reduce it, the commander in chief of USAREUR, Gener

Frederick J. Kroesen, decided to press Congress more directly for funds.9

In 1982 General Kroesen followed up his first special report t

Congress, which emphasized the need to fund facilities that supporte

the deployment and day-to-day operations of the combat troops, with 

second report titled “Family Housing Facilities in United States Arm

Europe.” The report urged Congress to provide funds for the Army t

improve those facilities that enhanced the quality of life for the troops.10

In the report and in personal appearances before Congress, Gener

Kroesen argued forcefully that Congress should shift its attention to a new 

set of priorities. Over the years congressional leaders had responded to th

argument for combat readiness that field commanders of front-line uni

had presented: Because the Soviets may come across the border at any tim

I need money for training and weapons. General Kroesen transformed th

argument to his advantage—and to catch the attention of the senators—b

saying “If someone told me that the Russians were coming New Year’s Da

I would still say our biggest problem is family housing.” Kroesen’s remar

stuck in the memory of his contemporaries, who recalled his statemen

before Congress almost verbatim a decade later.11 More important, it kep

the pressure on Congress to provide additional funds.

In the 1982 report on family housing, Kroesen let the soldiers spea

for themselves, quoting extensively from interviews with enlisted person

nel and officers.12 These residents of Army housing offered graphic an

detailed testimony concerning the deplorable circumstances in whic

they lived.

Broken vapor seals made mold and mildew a constant problem. On

officer’s wife described her family’s quarters:

My son jokes about his pet slime, but it is terrible, really. My 

daughter hates sleeping near it and I don’t blame her. You feel dirty 

even after you have worked hard all day to clean. I air all the rooms 

daily but now it is starting up there on the corner of the dining room 

ceiling over the dish hutch. The family eats with it.

Some situations were dangerous as well as uncomfortable. Inch-thic

plaster that detached from ceilings because of moisture fell down in larg

pieces. Showing her bathroom in which plaster had already fallen, on

sergeant’s wife lamented, “I can’t let my kids use [the bathtub] anymor

What if the ceiling falls on their heads?”

The only thing predictable about the heating systems was th

they would fail sometime during the year. Despite efforts made by th

Engineer Command under Stem to Stern and its boiler replacemen

efforts, the heating units for most USAREUR family housing had neve

been converted from the hand-fired coal boilers typical of the constru

tion of the early 1950s. Residents put up with overheating on lower floo

and inadequate heating on upper floors. Both the supply and the distribu

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 4 
333

tion of hot water were inadequate. Many water lines were nearly closed 

by the scale deposits because of corrosion and Germany’s naturally hard 

water.

Shortages of personnel contributed to the backlog of maintenance and 

repair. The additional money in the early 1980s was not accompanied by 

an increase in personnel for the community-level engineering staffs. EUD 

alleviated the burden at the local level by acting as design agent for much 

of the new work. The assistant division engineer for the Directorate of 

Engineering and Housing, a position EUD commander General George 

K. Withers, Jr., established in January 1981, handled the division’s efforts.13

USAREUR also made adjustments to take account of the new volume of 

work: The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer, divided engineer 

staff functions with the Installation Support Activity, Europe.14 In January 

1983 the Department of the Army authorized USAREUR to establish a 

Senior Executive Service position in the Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff, Engineer, to manage the programs in facilities engineering and 

housing.15

In 1982 the Department of the Army responded to the need for more 

housing by approving an extension of the MRI program called the wholehouse concept, which allowed the complete renovation of entire housing units. The Army provided over $19 million for fiscal year 1983 to be 

used for the military communities of Stuttgart (Adlingerstrasse, 72 units), 

Frankfurt (Gibbs, Betts, and Atterbury housing areas, 494 units), and 

Nuremberg (Pastoriusstrasse, 162 units). In February 1983 Headquarters, 

USACE, funded an upgrade of laundry rooms throughout USAREUR by 

shifting $9 million from the current year MRI program, thus delaying 

construction of three-quarters of the dwelling units in Frankfurt.16

As the workload for maintenance, repair, and renovation through new 

construction increased within USAREUR, the Europe Division aided the 

communities in two ways. First, because the communities lacked personnel with sufficient technical experience, EUD assisted in the very early 

stages to bring the concept design to the 35 percent level, making a project 

eligible for inclusion in USAREUR’s budget request. Second, EUD acted as 

the design and construction agent once Congress approved the concept 

design in the Army’s budget. Between 1983 and 1985 EUD completed 

designs and began some construction under the MRI program for housing 

in Stuttgart, Nuremberg, and Frankfurt. By 1985 the MRI program encompassed 1,250 family housing units at a cost of about $34 million.17

Initially, EUD processed MRI projects in its usual manner, beginning 

in the Engineering Division with work on design. As the volume of work 

increased and construction began, delays caused a bottleneck of design 

for fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985. Because facilities were old, design 

assumptions about the rehabilitation often did not match what contractors 

found behind the walls. Many of the earliest designs required extensive 

changes and redesign.18

In response to the growing program, the Engineering Division 

increased its Facilities Support Section from nine people to thirty-six in 

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 5 
334

1982.19 To deal specifically with MRI projects, EUD formed special team

each consisting of a project manager from the Engineering Division, 

construction manager from the Construction Division, a representativ

from the field office who knew the existing facilities and the local insta

lation personnel, and engineers from the Technical Branch. Through th

team approach the division hoped to apply lessons learned from eac

project and to maximize cooperation at every stage between the designe

and builders.20

EUD’s team approach proved highly successful. The division man

aged design and construction for renovations involving the installation o

energy-efficient thermo-pane windows, additional insulation, new electr

cal wiring and plumbing, new kitchen cabinets and appliances, paint an

plaster, and, in some cases, replacement of entire sections of interior an

exterior walls and roofs. The greater efficiency of the units led to conside

able savings in utility costs. By the end of fiscal year 1985, USAREUR ha

reduced the backlog of maintenance and repair from the high in 1981 o

more than $1.25 billion to about $600 million.21

Factory-Built Housing

USAREUR also pressed Congress for money to build new off-po

housing because only slightly more than 25 percent of the military fam

lies eligible for and requesting on-post housing in Europe could be accom

Family housing was renovated in communities throughout Germany, 

including Nuremberg.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 6 
335

modated.22 During earlier years new housing for U.S. troops and their 

families had either been financed under the occupation or through the 

Alternate Construction program; in both cases, the West German government paid the costs.

In 1983, for the first time, Congress authorized funds for the construction of new family housing in Europe with the stipulation that the housing be manufactured in the United States for on-site construction in West 

Germany. The program for fiscal year 1984 called for 771 prefabricated 

housing units, with construction to begin in Wildflecken, Bayreuth, and 

Kitzingen. Quarters for two general officers were also authorized for 

Vicenza, Italy.23

On 21 September 1984, EUD awarded a contract for the first factorybuilt housing. The contract called for 153 two-bedroom units to be manufactured in modules in the United States by Corlite Building Systems 

of Weslaco, Texas, and delivered for final assembly and construction in 

Wildflecken. This was to be the start of work on 18,000 dwelling units 

constructed in twelve communities over the next four years. The contract for the housing in Wildflecken totaled $8.35 million, or $54,620 per 

unit. Philipp Holzmann, A. G., of Frankfurt won the contract to place 

the buildings on site; build roads, sewers, and playgrounds; and provide 

landscaping.24

The housing design incorporated new technology to manufacture relatively lightweight panels made of fiberglass-reinforced gypsum bonded 

to galvanized steel frames. Once assembled, the exterior of the panels 

Modules manufactured in the United States were used to construct prefabricated 

housing in Wildflecken, Germany.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 7 
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received a stucco coating. Designers worked closely with German officia

to ensure that the structures would fit well aesthetically with their su

roundings. To demonstrate the quality and practicality of the produc

Corlite constructed a prototype of the Wildflecken housing units at i

plant in Texas that USAREUR officials and engineers from EUD inspecte

in October 1985. Corlite shipped the panels and complete bathroom an

kitchen modules to Europe, where Holzmann constructed a second proto

type on site in Wildflecken. Work on the prototype in Wildflecken bega

in November 1985; Holzmann constructed a tarpaulin-covered shelter t

protect the structure from winter weather. Work then began on thirty

eight two-story buildings, each housing four two-bedroom apartment

and on one freestanding single-family dwelling.25

The Holzmann Company encountered numerous problems with th

project. Because the module units were measured and manufacture

to standard American scale, Karen Lippert, EUD’s project manager o

site, became an instructor to the German work crews, teaching them 

how to use tape measures calibrated in feet and inches. The modula

design required many change orders. As the delays increased, the chi

of construction, John Blake, finally insisted on a face-to-face meetin

with Holzmann’s chief executive officer to get the project on track. Onc

Holzmann’s chief executive became personally involved, the proje

moved forward.26 Straightening out the project cost the company dearl

Faced with financial and legal complications but eager to honor its com

mitments, Holzmann finally bought out the American provider, Corlit

Prototype of Prefabricated Housing on Site in Wildflecken, Germany

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 8 
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Although they completed the contract, Holzmann chose not to bid again 

on contracts for factory-built housing.27

Despite the problems, the first twenty-five buildings in Wildflecken, 

containing 100 apartments, were ready for occupancy in January 1987. 

Wiring and electrical outlets accommodated both 110- and 220-volt current, so that either German or American electrical appliances could be 

used. Each unit contained built-in closets, a dishwasher, a clothes washer 

and dryer, and a kitchen furnished with American equipment.28

As construction began in Wildflecken, EUD awarded contracts for 

six other communities scheduled for factory-built family housing; by late 

1986 site work was under way in Kitzingen, Bayreuth, Dexheim, Vilseck, 

and Mainz in Germany and in Livorno, Italy, in preparation for assembly 

of more housing units. Waiting to occupy these new facilities were 3,890 

families eligible for military housing and living in substandard private 

rental units.29

Construction began on 186 townhouses for noncommissioned officers 

in the Mainz military community in September 1986. A new company, 

the RADVA Corporation of Radford, Virginia, provided the modules to 

the German consortium of Zueblin/Aegis. Like Corlite, RADVA built 

a prototype for inspection at its plant before shipping the materials to 

Germany. The townhouse designs included three- and four-bedroom 

apartments as well as two-bedroom units. RADVA used expanded polystyrene bonded to galvanized steel frames in a patented process, creating 

a structure that was stronger than conventional wood-frame construction 

and provided excellent thermal insulation. The units had double-paned 

thermal windows for added energy efficiency, hardwood floors in the living and dining rooms, and built-in hardwood cabinets and closets with 

adjustable shelves. Each unit had a patio, a carport with a storage room, 

and a laundry utility room furnished with a washer, dryer, and laundry 

sink. The kitchen equipment and other features such as the wiring for 

both European and American appliances were comparable to the units in 

Wildflecken.30

At each of the subsequent communities that received factory-built 

housing, EUD applied lessons learned from the previous project. At 

Marshall Heights in Kitzingen, where 103 units went up in 1988, EUD 

insisted that the contractor replace the softwood handrails used for stairwells in the homes in Mainz with hardwood rails for better durability. 

Responding to suggestions by the occupants, the contractor installed two 

peepholes in each entrance door, one at a child’s eye level.31

Projects in the new communities included the earthwork, roads, and 

landscaping. About 40 percent of the costs went into infrastructure built 

to local German construction standards—electrical service, street lights, 

plumbing and sewers, and district heating for the houses, all with underground conduits. The communities also received recreational and playground facilities. By the summer of 1988 EUD had awarded a total of $380 

million in factory-built housing projects and had another $320 million still 

under design, of which $75 million (23 percent) was for the Air Force.32

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 9 
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In constructing factory-built housing in Germany, EUD engineer

became convinced that they could save time and money and reduc

maintenance difficulties by using more German products and technique

Some of the adaptations were easy, such as using German-style interloc

ing paving stones in carport driveways. But others required reinterpretin

the congressional mandate to have the units manufactured in the Unite

States. Scott Bearden, who took over as chief of the division’s housin

team in 1988, became an important catalyst for changing procedures t

facilitate construction. He learned that in four out of five projects release

for bid, German contractors had submitted proposals averaging 144 pe

cent of the amounts authorized for construction. Bearden thought that 

contractors had more latitude to use local products for interior finishe

cabinetry, and fixtures, they would bid more aggressively. He also con

tended that the program ought to present the companies with designs th

were 90 to 95 percent complete rather than only 35 percent complete. B

so doing EUD could avoid the cushion—as much as Deutschmark (DM

1 million ($569,000 at the prevailing exchange rate)—that contractors ha

been adding to their bids to cover the remaining costs of design.33

Bearden’s suggestions caught the attention of the deputy assistant se

retary of defense for installations and logistics, Robert A. Stone, who gav

Bearden a chance to present his ideas at the U.S. European Comman

Conference in February 1989. Stone approved Bearden’s proposal to allow 

EUD more flexibility in accepting local fixtures, as long as the constructio

stayed within the intent of the law that all feasible effort be made to us

Family housing projects in Soesterberg, Netherlands, included landscaping.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 10 
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American products. Bearden also won approval to modify the procedures so 

that contracts would be awarded with 90 percent of the design complete.34

Bearden’s efforts earned him honors as EUD Engineer of the Year for 

1988, and the changes brought the desired response from the contractors—more competitive bids. By incorporating German fixtures, cabinets, 

doors, and windows and eliminating the cost of shipping furnishings 

from the United States, bidders could lower their contract estimates. The 

change also contributed to lower maintenance costs, because items for 

repair or replacement could be purchased locally.35

Attic Conversion

One innovative idea used in USAREUR to create new housing units 

involved converting attic areas in multiple-apartment housing facilities 

into small apartments. An idea advanced in 1984 by the director of engineering and housing in Göppingen, the plan called for renovating a standard stairwell apartment building and redesigning the space under the 

roof to create two-bedroom apartments. These small apartments, 772–933 

square feet each, would be suitable for a family with one child under 

five years of age. The work involved raising sections of the roof to add 

headroom, but buildings retained their original footprint and much of 

the original profile. The conversions began in 1987, and by the end of that 

fiscal year EUD had awarded contracts for the creation of 260 attic apartments in seven different communities.36

Attics in existing apartment buildings, like this one in Aschaffenburg, Germany,

were converted into two-bedroom apartments.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 11 
340

Each of the new apartments contained a clothes washer and dryer, 

convenience unavailable to occupants of the lower apartments, who use

a common basement laundry room. The attic apartments also had loggia

inset balconies, that offered a measure of private access to the outdoor

The loggias also represented an important safety feature: In the event of 

fire, they provided level space accessible to rescue equipment mounted o

fire trucks on the ground below. The additional amenities and the on-po

location served as inducements to soldiers and their families to accept th

small attic apartments. USAREUR calculated that by 1990 attic conversio

could add over 1,700 apartment units to the military’s housing inventor

in Germany at a cost of about $60,000 a unit.37

Attic conversions were awarded as an additional contract to MR

renovations of entire buildings. Because the West German governmen

allowed the U.S. military to contract for maintenance work directly rathe

than requiring indirect contracting, EUD intended to handle attic con

version the same way. The initial design for attic apartments anticipate

completely removing the roof, constructing a full wall under it, and the

replacing the roof. The German government objected that this reall

represented building a new top story on each of the buildings and thu

constituted new construction, which required indirect contracting. T

avoid having to award separate contracts for the renovation of building

(direct) and the conversion of the attics (indirect), EUD redesigned th

attic plans. The new design raised the walls less than three feet, expande

the existing dormers to provide more interior space, and kept the orig

Although the roof line of this housing unit in Mannheim, Germany, was altered to 

add apartments in the attic space, the footprint of the building remained the same.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 12 
341

nal slope and general outline of the roof. With these modifications, the 

German government agreed to consider the attic apartments as conversions rather than as new construction. All the attic conversion projects 

were thus completed under direct contracting procedures except the work 

in Bremerhaven, where EUD placed the contracts indirectly as a stimulus 

to the depressed local economy.38

Despite all of this construction and special new programs such as the 

government rental housing program that allowed landlords to contract 

directly with the U.S. government, as late as 1989 USAREUR still reported 

a shortage of over 8,000 housing units out of a total need for nearly 100,000 

units.39

Barracks

Although family housing represented a major concern for USAREUR 

in the 1980s, fully half the troops lived in barracks; the backlog on maintenance and repair of troop housing was substantial. Despite programs such 

as Stem to Stern and MOUSF, many of the barracks still suffered from 

deterioration due to lack of adequate maintenance over many years; they 

remained in embarrassingly bad condition even into the 1980s. Leaking 

roofs, faulty wiring, inadequate heating and plumbing, and overcrowding 

were the normal conditions in barracks. Time magazine reported in July 

1981 that American service personnel in Europe “live and work in conditions that could cause riots in U.S. prisons.”40

John Blake arrived at EUD as chief of construction about the time 

this article appeared, and he voiced to a colleague his irritation about 

the tendency of American journalists to exaggerate for dramatic effect. In 

reply, the colleague brought Blake a thick folder of photographs he had 

assembled. The pictures illustrated the claims in the article in Time. Blake 

recounted:

The ground floor of this three-story barracks could not be used at 

all; four inches of water were standing in the total ground floor. Only 

half of the second floor could be used because only half of it had 

[running] water.... Only half of the third floor could be used because 

only half of it had electricity.... [Where] there were supposed to be 

nine urinals, there were only two or three; the rest of them had been 

broken off the wall.41

In barracks constructed in the 1950s, sixteen to twenty men slept in 

a single large room and used a common bathroom with one shower, one 

urinal, and one toilet for every twenty men. Committed to improving living conditions, USAREUR sought to provide the authorized minimum of 

ninety square feet per enlisted soldier in four-person rooms in existing 

facilities or in two-person rooms in new barracks. Each of the two- and 

four-person rooms designed for the 1980s had adjacent toilet and bath; 

two-person units shared these facilities with no more than one other 

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 13 
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room.42 Through new construction and renovation the command set out t

assure structurally sound, weather-tight buildings with comfortable an

healthy heating and ventilation, as well as sufficient electrical wiring t

allow safe operation of modern appliances. Design and construction als

took into account the growing number of women soldiers in USAREUR

either with accommodations on floors separate from the men or in sep

rate areas at the ends of floors. Even the name used to designate the facil

ties changed, from bachelor enlisted quarters to unaccompanied enliste

personnel housing (UEPH).43

With over $50 million available through USAREUR in 1984, EU

awarded twelve contracts for housing construction for unaccompanie

personnel—two for modernization of existing barracks and ten for con

struction of new barracks. In the next two years contracts were awarde

for similar housing at twenty-eight sites, including five projects in Greec

and one in Turkey. The need was pressing: As late as December 198

100,000 USAREUR soldiers still lived in barracks classified as inad

equate.44

In March 1986 a project valued at $1.38 million began in Karata

Turkey, about forty-five miles south of Adana, to provide a 71-perso

three-story barracks with associated access roads, utilities, and othe

support services. The construction contract went to Kolin Insaat in ear

May. Five months later a contract modification added a new sewage di

posal system and a separate, roofed trash and wash space. In October 198

Construction of the barracks in Kaiserslautern, Germany, included two-person 

rooms for unaccompanied personnel.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 14 
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construction started at Hahn Air Force Base on five UEPH units, ranging from 96- to 288-person buildings. The German contracting group of 

Hochtief, A. G.; Wiemer und Trachte; and P. A. Budau worked on the barracks units for two years, completing the facilities in 1990.45 EUD supervised 100 similar barracks renovation projects for the Army and the Air 

Force and had about thirty more in design by March 1989.46

Schools and Child Care Centers

The dependents of the military communities in West Germany needed schools and child care facilities as well as hospitals and clinics. The 

Europe Division managed design and construction for the Department 

of Defense dependent schools and for child care centers, presenting military communities with a succession of school buildings, additions, and 

renovations. In October 1976 the Southwest Area Office (Kaiserslautern) 

turned over to the 21st Support Command a new 80,000-square-foot 

middle school facility for Patrick Henry Village in Heidelberg. The new 

facilities contained a classroom building with cafeteria, two gymnasiums 

with showers and locker rooms, and multipurpose rooms.47 Two new 

schools opened in Würzburg and one in Nuremberg in 1977; school projects continued in West Germany in Sembach, Ludwigsburg, Heilbronn, 

Schweinfurt, Neu Ulm, Kitzingen, Augsburg, Stuttgart, Hohenfels, Hahn, 

Bremerhaven, and Ramstein and in Italy in San Vito. By the summer of 

1979 EUD had twenty-five school projects under construction or design 

The Patch elementary and high school in Stuttgart, Germany, incorporated 

a variety of materials and almost no right angles.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 15 
344

and expected from $30 to $40 million a year for school construction begin

ning with fiscal year 1980.48

One of the projects completed in time for the opening of school i

1979 was the Alexander M. Patch Elementary and High School comple

in Stuttgart. This facility accommodated about 1,500 students in mor

than seventy classrooms and had unusual design elements. Two building

occupied a nine-acre wooded plot of land donated by the West Germa

government and adjacent to U.S. European Command headquarters. Th

design used brick, galvanized steel, stone, and concrete with a great de

of glass; and the buildings were constructed with almost no right angle

A waterfall, a small zoo, a barbecue area, and vegetable gardens surround

ed the physical plant. The landscape encouraged the designers to mak

one whole side of the gymnasium in glass, opening the room visually t

the woods. The gardens gave students an opportunity to plant fruits an

vegetables as a part of their educational experience. The zoo was designe

in harmony with a greenhouse and included three rabbit houses for chi

dren to learn the responsibilities associated with caring for animals. Th

entire complex was designed and constructed in just over fifteen month

by a consortium that included the German-U.S. Architect Group and fou

construction firms—Klee, Holzmann, Zueblin, and Wachter—all from th

Stuttgart area. Construction cost about $6.5 million.49

To end overcrowding, EUD broke ground for a new middle scho

in the Pattonville Housing Area in Ludwigsburg, near Stuttgart, o

4 September 1979. The company handling construction of this $6 mi

lion school was M. F. Wachter, one of the builders of the Patch school

Financial limits on the project mandated omitting the sports ground

from the initial phase of the construction, and the gymnasium was erec

ed only as an improved structural shell.50

Similar construction in other communities continued throughout th

1980s. By 1982 the expectation of funding for the school improvement pro

gram in USAREUR had risen to between $40 and $60 million a year. EU

had twelve new school projects in West Germany programmed for fisc

year 1983 and seven more for fiscal year 1984, including additions to th

elementary and high schools in Incirlik, Turkey.51 In 1985 EUD had fifty

eight active projects involving schools.52

One project from 1985 illustrates the critical deficiencies that threa

ened USAREUR schools with possible loss of accreditation. The elemen

tary school in Wiesbaden held its special education classes in storag

rooms. A DM 1.8 million ($611,000) addition to the school, begun i

September 1985 and completed the following August, provided new spac

for a library, a speech therapy room, an administrative office, and a sup

ply storage room. All utilities were renovated in the same project, as wer

the playground and the intercommunications and bell system. The prim

contractor, Fillibeck and Sons, also landscaped and repaved around th

school.53

Improvements at the Frankfurt American High School on the former 

G. Farben property cost about $5.1 million and provided new laboratorie

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 16 
345

for classes in chemistry, physics, biology, and industrial arts. The project 

began in June 1986. Contractors completed renovations in the existing 

building in 1987 and a new 22-room facility in 1988.54

Construction for the schools program suffered in the mid-1980s 

because of the declining value of the dollar against European currencies. Many of the school construction projects authorized by Congress 

remained unfinanced; in 1986–1987 the program had more than $108 million worth of deferred projects and at prevailing rates of exchange needed 

almost $500 million to address the full needs of the schools.55

In fiscal year 1988 EUD awarded $62.6 million in contracts for 

eighteen schools projects—new buildings, additions, and renovations—in 

Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Turkey.56 The elementary school 

in Soesterberg, Netherlands, was one of these projects. Before the construction of the new $2.33 million elementary school, one building served 

all students, mostly dependents of personnel of the Air Force’s 32d Tactical 

Fighter Squadron stationed at the Soesterberg Air Base. The elementary 

school provided 53,750 square feet of new space, and an alteration to the 

high school provided another 4,800 square feet. The project, handled indirectly through the Dutch government’s construction office, engaged five 

different contractors: a general contractor and one each for mechanical, 

electrical, civil (paving and sewers), and landscape work. Although the 

Dutch construction office coordinated the work, EUD provided oversight 

of the multiple contractors. Construction began on the elementary school 

in 1987, and the school was transferred to the users in February 

1989.57

In 1988 EUD confronted a 

new problem concerning work 

for the schools in Europe—the 

need to mount an aggressive 

asbestos abatement program. By 

December preliminary assessments had identified twenty situations that required asbestos 

abatement, many involving ongoing design contracts and indirect 

construction projects. Because 

OMA money funded the renovation and expansion projects, EUD 

had to review concept and final 

design, advertise projects, and 

award contracts for the asbestos 

abatement within the fiscal year. 

Initial estimates forecast that 

between 80 and 100 schools in 

the Netherlands, Belgium, West 

Germany, and Turkey might 

Contractors wore special protective 

suits while removing asbestos from 

school buildings in Europe.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 17 
346

need the work; additional testing established that asbestos problems wer

more widespread. In Germany alone, construction materials containin

asbestos were found in 145 of 166 schools and offices and in 415 of 67

buildings tested. The division’s immediate concern was removal of asbe

tos-bearing materials that had become damaged and friable; the asbesto

abatement program in school construction and renovation occupied th

division’s attention for several years.58

School construction did not slacken because of the problems wit

asbestos. Using preengineered, precast, reinforced concrete, EUD com

pleted schools and school additions at a rapid pace through the end of th

decade. Early in 1990 work began on a new kindergarten at the elemen

tary school in Baumholder. Contractors completed the elementary/junio

high school at Robinson Barracks in Stuttgart in the summer of 199

In September 1990 EUD held a ribbon-cutting and turnover ceremon

for a $5.4 million project at the junior high school at Kessler Field i

Schweinfurt. The new $9 million middle school at Leighton Barracks i

Würzburg, begun in October 1988, celebrated its completion with a ce

emony in October 1990.59

The Army’s concern about facilities for school-age children parallele

its growing concern for preschoolers. Child care always existed withi

the military communities, but it had been handled informally, with n

direct Department of Defense responsibility. Officers’ wives often org

nized programs of day care.60 When Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy com

manded the Engineer Command between 1967 and 1971, for instance, h

wife headed the board for the Frankfurt nursery for children of servic

men. Child care had been priced at 35 cents an hour, plus an addition

15 cents an hour for a second child, and she insisted on maintaining th

price throughout her four years as board president. New board membe

coming from the United States and other military communities pointe

out that the cost of babysitting had risen to 75 cents an hour, but Mr

Kennedy argued that the Frankfurt nursery could provide the servic

at its 35-cent rate and still break even. She was concerned because man

people using the service were working wives of enlisted men who wer

having a hard time making ends meet.61

In the absence of any formal program, babysitting services, pre

schools, and child care centers sprang up according to need, finding spac

in housing areas, chapels, and hospital wards. The engineers assiste

but often unofficially; a post engineer might build or paint somethin

as an act of community goodwill. Col. Claude Roberts, who served wit

the Training and Doctrine Command in the mid-1970s, recalled havin

been “laughed out of the Pentagon” in 1976 when the command propose

building a nursery.62

By late in the decade the Army’s attitude changed and EUD ha

design contracts for child care centers. Blink housing area in Bremerhave

was scheduled to receive a new child care center that would take th

place of facilities located in a hospital ward. A child care center that EU

designed for Katterbach Caserne in Ansbach allowed the existing cen

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 18 
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ter to move out of the chapel where it had operated. Such projects were 

financed in the early 1980s by nonappropriated funds.63

As the Army began to address the well-being of its troops in the barracks, in family quarters, and in the schools, child care facilities came 

under greater scrutiny. In the 1980s the Army began to see its role in 

the matter of child care as minimizing the conflict between the responsibilities of soldiers as parents and the requirements of their mission. 

Inspections of day care facilities revealed that many of them failed to meet 

even rudimentary safety regulations or fire codes. USAREUR took on 

more and more responsibility for the facilities, and EUD became increasingly involved in their design and construction.64

Safety in the child care facilities remained a major concern. When 

engineers learned that paint used in two of the centers under construction in 1984 contained unacceptable levels of lead, the division alerted the 

commander of the Installation Support Activity, Europe, and suggested 

random testing of paints used in residential facilities to ensure compliance 

with U.S. government specifications. The commander also initiated paint 

sampling programs for those facilities where EUD had acted as construction agent, with priority given to facilities used by small children.65

By the mid-1980s USAREUR began to reinterpret its responsibility: 

Child care meant not just providing babysitting services but furnishing 

nutritious food and a certain amount of instruction. The Army’s changing 

attitude influenced its vocabulary: Child care and day care centers became 

child development centers.66 By the end of the decade a Department of the 

The changing role of child care led to the building of child development 

centers during the 1980s, like this one in Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 19 
348

Army spokesman described “reliable, affordable child care” as a “read

ness issue.” USAREUR adopted the position that “the knowledge th

one’s child is receiving professional, concerned care in an adequate faci

ity is perhaps the single most important factor in determining the individ

ual’s long-term job performance.”67

When litigation in the United States focused attention on allege

sexual abuse in child care centers, the centers in Europe received add

tional scrutiny. The rapidly changing standards created problems fo

EUD, including cost increases and complications in administration an

execution of the contracts. Each time the standards for child developmen

centers changed in the United States, the centers in design or under con

struction through EUD had to be modified. This became a particular

vexing problem in the late 1980s as the number of projects increased an

as tighter standards were applied.68

The child care center at Patrick Henry Village in Heidelberg was a

example of the delays that could develop. Although completed in Januar

1988, the facility could not be turned over to the community until Augu

because transparent observation panels had to be fitted to bathroom doors t

allow the staff to monitor activity in toilet stalls. At the same time, contracto

added an additional sink and a sprinkler system for fire protection.69

Some regulations proved redundant in Germany. For exampl

the requirement to raise wall plug sockets to fifty-four inches off th

ground was designed to reduce the possibility that a child woul

receive a shock by jamming something into the socket. In German

however, all electrical outlets in classrooms had to be equipped wit

ground-fault interrupters. Similarly, U.S. guidelines stipulated th

radiators, if present, should be covered. This provision prevente

injury from steam radiators, but German construction used only ho

water radiators that never achieved the same intensity of heat. If th

regulations addressing wall outlets and radiators were too specifi

others were too vague. One EUD engineer observed that the regul

tion that playground equipment “should be ‘appropriate for the child

age’ wasn’t helpful if you didn’t have a playground specialist at ever

office.”70

Even late in the 1980s, USAREUR recognized that it was short of i

goal of alleviating soldiers’ concerns about their children and that “man

of our child care facilities are widely held to be inadequate at best.”71 A

a result, child development centers remained a focus of construction int

the 1990s. A $1.6 million center for 145 children opened at East Cam

Grafenwöhr, in April 1990. A center at Wetzel Barracks in Baumholder ce

ebrated a grand opening on 11 July. The facility at Old Argonner Casern

in Hanau opened on 14 September to serve 198 children. The Panze

Housing Area in Böblingen near Stuttgart opened its center for 145 chi

dren late in 1990.72

EUD also supervised construction in the late 1980s of a growing num

ber of youth activity centers for school-age dependent children from s

to nineteen years old. These centers provided space for dance, karate, an

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 20 
349

other recreational classes; TV and teen lounge areas; stages for theater 

productions; video game rooms; and gymnasiums for sporting events 

such as gymnastics, volleyball, basketball, and public gatherings. All 

facilities built in the late 1980s were fully equipped for access and use by 

physically disabled persons.73

Medical Facilities

Like the family housing and the barracks, many of the medical facilities that served the U.S. Army in Europe dated from before the war or 

from the period of rapid and austere construction in the early 1950s; 

by the 1970s they needed repair and modernization. The hospital in 

Nuremberg, for example, served the German military during World War 

II. The facility in Landstuhl was built as a 1,000-bed U.S. Army emergency 

field hospital in 1952. Beginning in the 1970s the Europe Division managed major renovations at both facilities.

The Nuremberg Army hospital provided medical support for sixty 

thousand service personnel and dependents in northern Bavaria. During 

the summer of 1975 EUD estimated the cost of renovation between $35 

and $43 million. Design moved forward, and on 12 July 1978 contractors 

broke ground on the planned 250-bed facility. The construction provided 

an emergency clinic; a food service division; new facilities for radiology, 

physical therapy, and pathology; a sixteen-bed intensive/coronary care 

unit; a central materials section; an operating suite; and a nursery.74

Youth activity centers in Germany included this facility in Wiesbaden.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 21 
350

In Nuremberg the engineers adapted a facility designed and con

structed in the 1930s to new specialized medical equipment. Oxygen ha

to be readily available, as did steam for sterilization, and electrical capa

ity had to be adjusted to accommodate the new machines. When the U.

medical community insisted on 110-volt, 60-cycle equipment, designe

initially solved the problem of converting from the 220-volt net to the 110

volt equipment by using several small step-down transformers. As th

hospital began to operate the new equipment, the users discovered th

these transformers delivered consistently higher voltages at less than fu

load, exceeding the maximum that the medical equipment was designe

to handle and damaging the equipment. EUD returned to the America

company that had designed the electrical system, demanded a solution

and insisted on greater involvement by the parent company in the design

prepared by its German affiliate.75

Cost estimates for the renovations proved woefully inadequat

Because the hospital remained open to care for patients throughout con

struction, designers used very little destructive testing to determine th

material composition of the walls and ceilings. When the constructio

workers in Nuremberg found plaster bound to the ceiling with a wove

mesh of straw, a “minor ceiling repair” turned into a major job of repla

ing the entire ceiling with wire mesh and plaster.76

The Nuremberg hospital renovation project was fully under way b

1979 at a cost of over $31 million, making it the largest single constru

tion project, measured in dollar value, undertaken to that date for the U.

Army in Europe. By 1981, when Blake arrived at EUD, change orders an

contract modifications had elevated the costs and delayed the work. H

gave the project his personal attention and brought the work back withi

budget. Construction continued in Nuremberg throughout the 1980s.77

The U.S. military hospital in Landstuhl dated from the 1950s, but it to

needed renovation. The hospital’s basic construction was sturdy enough

even though it had been built with a life expectancy of only fifteen year

but the design was outmoded. Built as an emergency-care field hospit

to handle up to one thousand casualties at a time, it evolved into a ful

care hospital for soldiers and their dependents. Additional facilities wer

haphazardly patched together, much like Nuremberg, rather than adde

according to any systematic plan. Late in the 1970s EUD began a compr

hensive renovation of Landstuhl, starting with the dining hall. The wor

undertaken in 1979, increased food service to eighteen hundred meals 

day and incorporated tables and seating for wheelchair-bound patients.78

In 1980 a German project engineer from the Kaiserslautern Are

Office, Hartwig Braun, took over management of the renovation i

Landstuhl. Braun had worked on the construction of the hospital i

1952 in his first position with the U.S. Army engineers. He recalled th

American insistence that the construction be temporary, so he found 

certain irony in assuming responsibility almost thirty years later for man

aging a six-phase expansion and addition to the hospital to prepare it t

serve future generations of U.S. military personnel.79

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 22 
351

The original Landstuhl hospital had a long central hallway from which 

six wings extended at right angles on each side of the axis. Converting 

several patient wings at the center of the structure created a central core 

that included operating amphitheaters, obstetrics/gynecological facilities, 

and radiation laboratories. Contractors increased the electrical capacity 

and added an emergency generator. This work in 1983 opened the way to 

more extensive interior renovation through 1987. During all of this construction the Landstuhl hospital continued to provide medical services; 

by the end of the decade it resumed full operation as a medical center.80

Braun’s involvement with the Landstuhl hospital in the 1950s and 

again in the 1980s illustrates the important role that German employees 

played in the Europe Division’s work. Braun and scores of others provided continuity and stability, an intimate knowledge of German standards 

and methods of construction, and an understanding of U.S. specifications 

developed in years of experience in the field. They were particularly effective at the construction sites.

In the 1980s USAREUR programmed renovations for the 97th General 

Hospital in Frankfurt, the Army hospital in Würzburg, and the hospital 

in Bremerhaven. In Augsburg a new $22 million addition was completed 

in early 1989.

The 97th General Hospital in Frankfurt was built in 1938–39 for the 

German Luftwaffe. Since taking control of the hospital in July 1945, the 

U.S. military had kept it in constant use. Supplementary facilities and 

wings were added in the 1950s. Patchwork repairs kept the hospital running during the 1960s and 1970s, but by 1982 the overall deficit of standard maintenance that plagued military facilities in Europe brought the 

hospital to a crisis.81 Water, heat, and sewage lines, clogged with mineral 

deposits from the local water, delivered only 20 percent of their intended 

capacity. Valves within the system were not locatable, inoperable, or nonexistent where they were needed. The entire roof needed repair, and 15 

percent of it had to be replaced completely.

The hospital had a staff of over one thousand people and a daily 

average of more than two hundred overnight patients and nearly eight 

hundred outpatients; the needs of the U.S. military community dictated 

that staff work and patient treatment continue uninterrupted throughout 

the renovations. In addition, the Germans insisted that construction at 

Frankfurt General preserve the building’s architectural integrity and interior features such as wall murals and marble work. Exterior renovation 

had to preserve historical and architectural features, including the marble 

work and tiling on porches.82

EUD planned the construction in six phases over seven years, but 

work continued for more than a decade. The construction program added 

a new wing for the hospital’s intensive care and coronary care units. All 

utilities were replaced, including electrical wiring and plumbing. Interior 

rooms were stripped to the frame and then refurbished. Contractors 

restored doors that had original marble frames and replaced other doors 

and windows; thermal-pane windows helped control interior tempera16O_Chap12_Final.indd 23 
352

tures. The development of new medical equipment and procedures du

ing the project led to redesign of some aspects of the construction. B

mid-1988 work on the Frankfurt hospital had grown to a $58 millio

project, using Military Construction, Army (MCA), and Operations an

Maintenance, Army (OMA), funds.83

Similar work on the hospital in Würzburg was conceived in 1984 as 

renovation/repair project to modify the existing building. When the Arm

learned, however, that the old building could not meet the certificatio

standards for the U.S. Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospital

plans changed to construction of a new six-story building that would b

linked with the old one by a passageway. The EUD team reviewing th

design found twelve hundred objectionable items in the original desig

and rejected it. Karl Schaffner, an engineer in the Würzburg Area Offic

chairing the team, was a native German who emigrated to Chicago i

the 1950s and returned to work at EUD as an American citizen. Schaffne

described the original design as “a total mess.” It lacked standard el

ments of military hospital construction and detailed specifications con

cerning sterile installations and the purging of oxygen, nitrogen, an

other gasses from the tube and pipe system. Designers overlooked th

need for training to operate and maintain specialized equipment. Th

second submission was not much better. After the second rejection, th

Europe Division commander, Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, personally calle

the president of the design firm to emphasize the division’s dissatisfa

Construction began in March 1987 on the addition to the Army hospital in 

Würzburg, Germany.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 24 
353

tion. Ray’s intervention brought the desired results. After 4,820 comments, 

the division accepted the third design package.84

With a satisfactory design in hand, EUD let the construction contract 

for $49.4 million, the largest direct contract that the division awarded to 

that date. Construction began in March 1987. The contractor, a joint venture of Philipp Holzmann, Dyckerhoff-Widmann, and Wayss-Freytag, 

won an award under the value-engineering program for suggesting 

an alternate treatment of the surgical gas columns that saved almost 

$30,000 in the construction. In addition to the recognition, the joint venture received a cash return of more than $16,000 for the innovation. The 

contractor transferred the addition to the hospital administration in late 

September 1990.85

Contractors completed a comprehensive six-phase renovation at 

Bremerhaven hospital in 1989 at a cost of $22 million. Designers incorporated original stained glass windows depicting vintage German airplanes, 

battleships, blimps, and trains into the remodeled facility.86 Construction 

plans to rearrange partitions in large rooms changed when the walls 

turned out not to be wood but rather peat moss that had been cut in 

bricks, dried, and then plastered over.87

Renovation of USAREUR hospitals in the 1980s was spurred by challenges to the facilities’ accreditation. By 1984 the U.S. Joint Commission on 

Accreditation of Hospitals had revoked or denied accreditation to seven 

hospitals. In the hospital construction program, the command sought to 

correct the most blatant structural and mechanical defects and to provide 

Front Lobby of the Hospital in Bremerhaven, Germany, in September 1988

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 25 
354

up-to-date medical services—modern emergency treatment centers an

operating rooms, semiprivate patients’ rooms to replace the open-ba

wards, and support services that incorporated the most current technolo

gies.88 Despite the construction program, USAREUR reported in 1988 th

“there are many Army installations in Europe that sorely need update

medical facilities if they are to adequately serve their communities.”89

Community Support Projects

The Europe Division also supervised design and construction fo

facilities to provide food, clothing, and recreational outlets for America

military personnel and their families. Commissaries and specialized facil

ties such as bakeries provided food; post exchanges for the Army and bas

exchanges for the Air Force offered clothing, necessities, and amenities suc

as appliances, tools, toys, and day-to-day supplies. The wide range of th

construction projects included movie theaters; libraries with audiovisu

centers; bookstores; officers’ and enlisted personnel clubs; gymnasium

bowling alleys; courts for tennis, racquetball, and basketball; physical fi

ness centers; swimming pools; rod and gun clubs; outdoor obstacle course

playing and sports fields; and roller-skating rinks. In addition, EUD supe

vised construction of chapels to support the spiritual life of the community

The money for these facilities came from a variety of sources, prima

ily nonappropriated funds generated as the profits from activities ru

Community support facilities for U.S. troops, such as the NCO club in 

Göppingen, Germany, under construction in 1985, remained a consistent 

part of the division’s workload.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 26 
355

by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), which paid a fee 

to the Armed Services, or from the profits of the Stars and Stripes bookstores. In certain circumstances community support facilities received 

funding from the MCA or the Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF, 

often referred to as MCP), budgets, and even occasionally from the OMA 

budget. The West German government also provided funds under the 

Alternate Construction program.90

The percentage of any annual budget that went to these community 

facilities remained small. In projections for fiscal year 1976, less than 0.5 

percent of the dollar value of EUD design effort went into projects supported by nonappropriated funds. By contrast, EUD projected over 80 

percent of the dollar value of its design effort to go for MCA, MCAF, and 

MOUSF. The Construction Division showed the same pattern in its projections for fiscal year 1976: 25.9 percent for MCA, 20.5 percent for MCAF, 

42.6 percent for MOUSF, and only 2.7 percent for nonappropriated funds 

and OMA combined.91

The effort to supply communities with facilities that enhanced the 

quality of life for soldiers and their families increased dramatically in 

the mid-1980s, but even in fiscal year 1984—a high point for programs 

devoted to projects such as schools, commissaries, post exchanges, day 

care centers, clubs—neither in design nor construction did this part of 

EUD workload reach 9 percent.92 The design work for fiscal years 1980 

and 1984 indicate that even as the tempo of work for recreational or community support programs increased during the 1980s, the design work 

accomplished on these projects remained a small part of the division’s 

overall budget, even if one assumes that some of the design work charged 

under MCA or MCAF went to such programs.93 (Table 12) Between fiscal 

 Table 12 

Europe Division Design Accomplishments

Fiscal Years 1980 and 1984

 Precent of Total Budget 

 Program Fiscal Year 1980 Fiscal Year 1984 

Military Construction, Army 61 41.7

Military Construction, Air Force 13 23.2

Modernization of U.S. Forces 2 0

Operation and Maintenance, 

Army, family housing, and other 3 *5.9

Nonappropriated funds 0 1.8

 *Operation and Maintenance, Army, only.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 27 
356

years 1984 and 1987, work on projects involving nonappropriated fund

increased from 1.8 percent to about 3.5 percent of the EUD workload

Though still small in relation to EUD’s overall commitment of funds, th

money expended on upgrading facilities to serve soldiers and their fam

lies had enormous potential for improving morale.

Commissaries and Post Exchanges

In 1969 AAFES entered into an agreement with the Office of the Chi

of Engineers (OCE) to have Corps districts provide supervision an

inspection of AAFES construction. In August 1977 AAFES Europe an

EUD signed a similar protocol. The first two projects under this arrang

ment were shopping centers in Ramstein and Vogelweh, scheduled fo

award in 1978. The two parties anticipated one or two shopping cente

a year. Within the year, projects began for new or enlarged post and bas

exchanges in Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Spangdahlem, and Hahn.95 Eve

before this agreement, EUD had been overseeing the construction of 

modern post exchange at Perlacher Forest Caserne in Munich, financed b

the West German government under the Alternate Construction program

Between 1976 and 1978 the Alternate Construction program funded $

million of completed community service construction where EUD pro

vided technical review of the design and the construction. The program 

included an addition and an automobile service station in Augsburg, 

rod and gun club, and facilities in Wildflecken and Karlsruhe.96

In May 1976 EUD accepted the task of supervising a commissary pro

ect in Iran, completed in 1977–1978 at a cost of $5.6 million. This was pa

of a much larger project that included a theater, an administrative build

ing, and an Army Post Office facility. Work continued until the politic

upheaval of the 1979 revolution in Iran.97

In Europe EUD continued to supervise work on commissaries an

post exchanges. In 1979 AAFES requested designs for new facilities i

Schweinfurt and preliminary planning for a $4 million exchange i

Stuttgart and an $8 million consolidated bakery in Grünstadt. AAFE

plans also called for two additional base exchanges near Kaiserslauter

and commissaries in Erlangen, Hanau, and Kitzingen.98 In 1985 Lou

Berger International prepared designs for a new commissary and add

tions to the post exchange at Smith Barracks in Baumholder and for th

modernization of the exchange facilities in Frankfurt and Babenhausen.9

In September 1985 EUD awarded a contract for the first complete

new building to house a main post exchange store outside the Unite

States. The contract went to Wilhelm Druecker for a facility in Heilbron

valued at over $3 million. The decision to build a new facility rather tha

renovate a building designed for other use represented a new policy i

keeping with the Army’s growing concern with the quality of life avai

able to soldiers and their dependents.100 The same policy led to the con

struction between November 1986 and February 1991 of ten commissarie

and to the expansion and renovation of more than a score of others. In fi

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 28 
357

cal years 1989 to 1991, EUD programmed twelve post exchanges that used 

technology such as the electronic scanner checkout system introduced at 

the commissary in Hanau in 1986. The new facilities generally replaced 

commissaries housed in much older buildings: The Hanau commissary 

had operated from a building constructed in 1938 as a training area for 

horses, and the commissary in Würzburg’s Leighton Barracks had operated from an aircraft hangar built in 1936. New construction afforded more 

modern and energy-efficient refrigeration, heating, and cooling systems, 

leading to economies in operation and maintenance. The added facilities 

also increased the space for shopping; the new commissary in Garlstedt 

provided an air-conditioned sales area six times the size of the previous 

commissary, itself hardly a decade old. To accommodate increased traffic, 

parking areas were resurfaced and furnished with designated spaces for 

disabled drivers.101

Sports and Recreational Facilities

Recreational facilities offered another avenue to enhance the quality of 

life for soldiers of the modern volunteer Army. Living standards for U.S. 

soldiers had seriously declined because of the erosion in the early 1970s of 

the value of the dollar in comparison with the Deutschmark. As a result, 

soldiers found the cost of living mounting each year and outstripping 

their pay. Because they could not afford to leave the military community 

to seek recreation and entertainment, on-post facilities became increasConstruction of this exchange mall in Nuremberg, Germany, was completed in 1988.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 29 
358

ingly important. When troops found gymnasiums, theaters, and clubs ru

down and overcrowded—where they existed at all—morale suffered.102

In fiscal year 1974 the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washingto

launched a major effort to replace standard drawings used since the 1960

for outdoor sports facilities. The Corps issued sixteen new standard draw

ings containing layouts and construction details for twenty-one differen

sports fields and courts. As the drawings were distributed, EUD bega

preparing a technical manual on outdoor sports facilities.103

Gymnasium projects had long been a part of engineer activity i

Europe; almost forty gymnasiums were erected in the 1950s.104 In th

1960s and early 1970s the Engineer Command erected gymnasiums to

but these were under inflatable bubbles with an asphalt base covered wit

rubberized flooring. The construction had not always gone well. After 

windstorm blew away the $10,000 inflatable cover being installed ove

the gymnasium at a Frankfurt school in 1972, ENGCOM’s commande

Brig. Gen. Carroll LeTellier, learned that the troops installing the structur

had failed to tighten the bolts on the anchor lines attached to the concret

LeTellier lamented, “A 15-minute job left undone will now cost us about 

week’s construction time.”105

EUD built gymnasiums throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, includ

ing one at the Sigonella Naval Air Base in Italy, but for the most pa

athletic facilities were patched and expanded haphazardly on a year-by

year basis.106 Funding was uncertain. In December 1981 Congress delete

funds for gyms from the construction program, thereby disrupting th

Gymnasiums, like this one in Stuttgart, Germany, helped to improve morale of 

U.S. troops stationed overseas.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 30 
359

EUD schedule for awarding contracts in the subsequent months.107 In 1982 

gymnasiums figured in the plans for five sites in Turkey, and a separate 

contract was let in June 1983 for an addition and renovations to the gymnasium at the Ankara Air Station.108

In the mid-1980s USAREUR began to use money more systematically under programs aimed to enhance morale, welfare, and recreation. 

Bowling alleys gained renewed support. Between 1983 and 1988 the 

Frankfurt Area Office supervised construction of 100 bowling lanes at 

five locations. The bowling facility at Wolfgang Caserne in Hanau included automatic pin-setting equipment and automated scoring monitors 

manufactured by the AMF Company. It also featured a roof design that 

allowed an unsupported span of 165 feet under a dome 44 feet high, placing the facility “at the very forefront of the state of the engineering arts.” 

Similar facilities went up in Bamberg, Baumholder, Dexheim, Kitzingen, 

Schweinfurt, and Vilseck between 1988 and 1990, incorporating equipment for automated pin-setting and electronic scoring.109

Racquetball courts became a major part of the sports and recreation 

program in the 1980s with the introduction of a project to build thirtythree courts throughout Europe, including Turkey. EUD wrestled with 

many frustrations managing the construction of these courts. USAREUR 

had ordered a large shipment of prefabricated racquetball court equipment from the United States and stored it at various places around 

Europe. Given the task of gathering the materials and erecting the courts, 

The Frankfurt Area Office managed the construction of this modern bowling 

facility in Hanau, Germany.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 31 
360

EUD recovered mostly broken and weather-damaged pieces and discov

ered that much of the material was lost.110

Recreation centers became more prominent in the division’s con

struction program as the military recognized the contribution of fi

ness activities to morale. In December 1985 EUD turned over to the 1

Infantry Division (Forward) at Göppingen a multipurpose recreatio

facility that included an outdoor recreation center, a bowling alley, 

game room with video games, a sports shop, a rod and gun facilit

locker rooms, and a snack bar and bar area. The outdoor recreation cen

ter rented skis and boots, bicycles, and tents and other camping gear. 

few months later the U.S. Air Force took over a new physical trainin

center in Incirlik, Turkey. At a cost of $1.1 million, the facility provide

13,749 square feet of space for basketball, exercise rooms and equipmen

separate saunas and locker facilities for men and women, and admini

trative space.111

A similar multipurpose recreation center at the Carl Schurz Casern

in Bremerhaven reopened in late 1988 after extensive renovation of 

pre–World War II aircraft hangar. The contractors replaced all electrica

heating, and plumbing systems; remodeled stage and seating space i

the theater; repartitioned the interior space; replaced metal siding wit

masonry; changed all windows and doors to energy-efficient product

remodeled the bowling alleys and gymnasium facilities; and create

entrance vestibules. When completed, the center also featured a snack ba

a food shop, arts and crafts shops, a travel agency, a billiards hall, and 

music studio.112

Chapels

Just as the Army’s far-reaching effort to improve the community li

at military bases in Europe sought to provide modern shopping facilitie

and leisure-time activities, it also encompassed chapels for religious wo

ship. Building and renovating chapels had been a part of the enginee

responsibility in Europe since the 1940s. In the early 1950s the Army eng

neers built or renovated about 250 chapels for the military communitie

in Germany. These chapels were based on standard designs drawn u

by Army engineers at European Command (later USAREUR) headqua

ters. In 1973–1974 OCE issued a new set of standard designs for chapel

Planned for a capacity of 200–300 persons, the design was simple, flexibl

and appropriate for multidenominational use.113

In the 1970s EUD built chapels that served as centers for social se

vices as well as religious observances. The chapel at Katterbach Casern

near Ansbach, for instance, housed the child care center until EUD bui

a new child care facility in the community.114 In 1983 the Würzburg Are

Office completed work on a chapel for Wildflecken; this chapel also ha

classrooms.115

EUD’s services included interior design and planning for use o

space in the chapel. In the early 1980s Sherry Sizemore served as an int

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 32 
361

rior designer on a new chapel at the Army base in Cakmakli, Turkey. 

Her responsibility was “to select all the material, from the stained glass 

windows to light fixtures and the designing of furnishings.” The task 

required special creativity because the Turkish government insisted that 

all furnishings and decorative items be purchased in Turkey. In 1987 the 

Southern European Task Force’s design office received a design award for 

this project; contractors completed the chapel the following year.116 In that 

same year the division also finished a chapel for the Air Force community 

at Hahn Air Base. A larger facility than the chapel in Cakmakli, it used 

construction materials such as slate shingling on the roof, an oak ceiling, 

oak cabinetry, and marble floors.117

Chapels, recreational facilities, and shopping centers all figured as 

part of efforts intensified in the 1980s and extended into the 1990s to 

provide U.S. military personnel in Europe with a satisfying community 

environment. With increased funding in the first half of the decade, the 

military commanders had the resources to improve and expand facilities that supported the morale, recreational needs, and welfare of the 

soldiers and airmen to a degree beyond anything achieved in earlier 

years. Still, the expenditures for such amenities never amounted to more 

than 5 percent of the annual budget for military construction programs 

in Europe.

The momentum from funding for community improvements sustained EUD’s construction activities into the late 1980s. Many of the diviIn the 1980s the division abandoned stock designs and built more custom chapels, 

like this one completed in 1987 in Cakmakli, Turkey.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 33 
362

sion personnel expected the intense pace of construction to continue int

the next decade. Budget pressures in the United States, already eviden

in the mid-1980s, worked against that. A totally unanticipated geopolit

cal revolution at the end of the decade completely changed the division

future.

16O_Chap12_Final.indd 34 
13

EUROPE TRANSFORMED

1988–1991

Between 1981 and 1988 the U.S. military spent more than $3 billion on construction in Europe and more than $100 million in 

master planning programs among the forty-two United States 

Army, Europe (USAREUR), communities. This effort, made 

necessary by new weapons systems and several decades of inadequate 

funding for maintenance, was spurred by a special report to Congress 

submitted by the commander in chief of USAREUR, General Frederick 

J. Kroesen, in 1981. The construction projects of the 1980s encompassed 

operational and training facilities; maintenance, storage, and supply 

facilities; barracks, dining halls, family housing units, and child care 

centers; hospitals and medical and dental clinics; sports fields and 

recreation facilities; and the heating, cooling, electrical, and sewer 

infrastructure.1

By 1988 USAREUR administered about 34,000 buildings located at more than 820 sites in countries from the Baltic Sea to the 

Mediterranean. The building and maintenance program of the 1980s 

brought about vast improvements in the living and working conditions of U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe. American leaders 

in Europe anticipated that similar work would continue well into the 

1990s. The USAREUR commander’s special report to Congress for 1988 

noted in its conclusion:

For every soldier who sleeps in comfortable barracks or every 

family that lives in decent housing, others continue to live in 

crowded, unsightly, and unacceptable buildings. For every soldier 

who maintains a weapon or vehicle in a safe, well-lit, properlyequipped workshop, many others must still attempt to perform the 

most intricate and exacting maintenance tasks outside, exposed to 

the elements, or inside dilapidated, unsafe, and totally inadequate 

converted horse stables. We must be allowed to continue what we 

have begun.2

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 1 
364

The construction projects dedicated to improving the quality of li

for soldiers in the 1980s brought to the Europe Division (EUD) of the U.

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) years of intense activity and organ

zational growth. Following the rapid turnover of division commande

in the mid-1980s, Brig. Gen. James W. “Bill” Ray’s three-year tenure gav

the division’s employees a sense of stability and motivation to achiev

excellence. As spring turned to summer in 1988, the staff learned th

Ray would be promoted and reassigned to Headquarters, USAREUR, i

Heidelberg as deputy chief of staff, engineer. The Europe Division wa

functioning smoothly, and morale was high. In Ray’s final monthly co

umn in the Corps’ Line, he reminded the division to “expect a future fu

of change.”3

 Neither he nor anyone else had any idea how much chang

the next three years would bring.

EUD’s new commander had his own agenda for the division. H

efforts to reorient the division became swept up in currents of chang

that brought a veritable revolution to the politics of Europe. That revolu

tion challenged the Europe Division’s existence and forced cancellatio

of much of its construction. The dramatic developments in East-West rel

tions that provoked a restructuring of Europe overwhelmed efforts t

bring modest changes to the Europe Division that General Ray’s successo

launched in 1988.

Prelude to Change

Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell arrived as division engineer and com

mander of the Europe Division on 18 July 1988, having served mo

recently as commander of the Ohio River Division. He had previousl

commanded the 2d Engineer Group in Yong San, Korea; led enginee

units in Okinawa, Thailand, and Vietnam from 1965 to 1968; and com

manded the 43d Engineer Group at Fort Benning, Georgia. From 196

to 1964 Harrell had been a platoon leader and company commande

in an engineer battalion at Nelligen Barracks in West Germany. Bor

in Selma, Alabama, and a graduate of Tuskegee Institute, Harre

was one of the few African American general officers in the Corps o

Engineers.4

At his first staff meeting, General Harrell praised EUD’s reputatio

and assured division personnel that he would not be “making change

for change’s sake.”5

 He emphasized the division’s connectedness to th

military commands. He liked to visit EUD’s customers in the militar

communities, welcomed opportunities to mix with the soldiers, and ofte

went to training exercises in the field.6

 General Harrell also expressed h

dissatisfaction that as EUD commander he commanded only the execu

tive staff. He was concerned that not all the area engineers were militar

officers and that they reported to the chief of construction rather than t

him directly.7

 (Chart 14)

Several of General Harrell’s actions in the early months of his tou

prompted the staff to suspect that he had come with a charge to g

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 2 
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe

Executive Office

Commander and Division Engineer

Resource

Management

Office

Human Resources Office

Public Affairs Office

Construction

Division

Safety and

Occupational

Health Construction

Management

Branch

Office

Engineering

Branch

Supervision and

Inspection

Branch

Contracting

Division

Mobilization

Planning Office

Office of Council

Audit Office

Policy and

COmpliance

Branch

Acquisition

Branch

Host Nations

Contractraing

Branch

Information

Management

Office

Logistics

Management

Office

Heidelberg Area Office

Camp Darby, Italy

Nuremberg Area Office

Nuremberg, Germany

Würzburg Area Office

Würzburg, Germany

The U.S.Engineer Group

Area Office

Incirlik, Turkey

Kaiserslautern Area Office

Kaiserslautern, Germany

Engineering

Division

Project

Management

Branch

Technical

Engineering

Branch

Special

Assistants

Boards and

Committees

Planning

Branch

Special

Assistants

Foundations

and Materials

Branch

General

Engineering

Branch

Frankfurt Area Office

Frankfurt, Germany

Northern Area Office

Hoensbroek, Netherlands

Stuttgart Area Office

Stuttgart, Germany

 Chart 14: Organization of the Europe Division, February 1989 

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 3 
366

General Harrell

the division more in tune with 

the rules and procedures of 

Headquarters, USACE. One of the 

division’s deputies characterized 

the impetus as directed “to get 

things back in line, [so that EUD 

would] act more like a division 

under USACE instead of a lone 

wolf.”8

 Staff members were disappointed that he did not embrace 

EQM (EUD Quality Management), 

the Total Quality Management 

program General Ray had initiated. In an early policy letter to the 

staff, Harrell reminded employees 

to use government quarters on 

division travel whenever possible, 

“to be sure that each of our many 

customers recognize EUD ... as 

a prudent and reliable steward of 

the nation’s resources.”9

 A subsequent policy letter mandated that 

the Logistics Management Office 

make no travel arrangements for commercial flights to the United State

without first attempting to book travel through the less expensive Militar

Air Command.10 In February 1989 General Harrell reported to the chief o

engineers, Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch, Jr., that the division had established 

formal command inspection program to assess the division’s complianc

with regulations, the effectiveness of established procedures and manag

ment practices, and the adequacy of internal controls.11

Emphasizing Affirmative Action

Affirmative action and equal employment opportunity (EEO) wer

of particular concern to General Harrell, and he repeatedly expressed h

commitment to extending opportunities for minorities and women in th

Army, in the Corps, and at EUD.12 In 1988 the division had few women o

African Americans in any grade higher than a GS–12 and no Germans o

third-country nationals in supervisory positions.13 In forums with wome

employees, through his commander’s suggestion box, and in general con

versation, Harrell raised the issue of affirmative action and questione

appointments and promotions. He met with groups such as Federall

Employed Women, Women in Science and Engineering, and Superviso

Equal Opportunity Liaison, and he encouraged all personnel to talk wit

him about their concerns.14

Affirmative action efforts in the Europe Division dated to the estab

lishment of the division, but the first full-time equal employment office

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 4 
367

Joanne “Jodie” Close, did not arrive until mid-1984. Close had the full 

support of the Europe Division commander, Brig. Gen. Scott B. Smith, 

and attended senior staff meetings, participated in recruitment and 

personnel actions, and traveled to area offices.15 When her employment 

contract came up for extension, the division advertised the position and 

selected Laverne Love, an African American woman with more than 

twenty years of experience in the federal government, including several 

years in the Ohio River Division. Love arrived in Frankfurt in early May 

1989.16

General Harrell’s concerns about improving employment opportunities extended to German and third-country national employees. 

Although these workers had held supervisory positions such as branch 

chief in the Engineer Command, regulations kept them out of such positions after the Corps established EUD in 1974, a situation which rankled 

many of them.17 During his tour as division engineer, Brig. Gen. Drake 

Wilson had advocated dual recruitment, by which selected higher-grade 

and managerial positions would be open to all employees, regardless of 

nationality; in 1980 the division promoted three German engineers to 

C–10 positions (equivalent to GS–13).18 Subsequent commanders emphasized recruiting American civilians as the workforce grew. Although the 

Works Council chairman, Hasso Damm, reported in 1987 that General 

Ray supported dual recruitment, a year later Damm stated flatly, “The 

program has died.”19 General Harrell, informed by Damm of ongoing frustration on the part of German employees, saw this as an issue 

of affirmative action. On 31 March 1989, he circulated a policy letter 

endorsing dual recruitment: “In those instances where high grade positions (GS–11 and C–7 and above) can be filled by a member of either 

workforce, I want selecting officials to conduct dual recruitment.”20

During the next year the division advertised almost ninety positions for 

dual recruitment.21

In the spring of 1989 General Harrell had another opportunity to 

underscore his commitment to affirmative action. A selection committee forwarded five names to him with a recommendation for the position 

as chief of the Information Management Office, a GM–15 slot. Skeptical 

that the committee had applied affirmative action guidelines, Harrell 

reviewed all the candidates, the selection criteria, and the selection procedure. He then selected Virginia Conway, another of the top three candidates. Conway had a strong technical background, extensive management 

experience, and experience working in Europe; she arrived in Frankfurt 

on 2 August 1989.22

When the new affirmative action officer, Laverne Love, took up her 

duties at EUD, she found numerous EEO complaints that had never 

received action. She set out to resolve the complaints, institute adherence 

to the law, and raise the visibility of her office. To reinforce Love’s efforts, 

and in light of his experience with the selection of Conway, General 

Harrell issued a policy letter that addressed both equal employment 

opportunity and prevention of sexual harassment. In the 28 August 1989 

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 5 
368

letter, Harrell pledged that EUD would “establish and implement a div

sion-wide Affirmative Employment Plan which will be integrated int

every element of our staffing process.”23

Currents of Change

In July 1988, at the time that General Harrell arrived, the Europ

Division was a busy and vigorous organization. Construction placemen

in 1987 had been $527 million and was expected to top $557 million in fi

cal year 1988. Scores of designs were on drawing boards; personnel num

bered more than 1,150; and morale was high. At an open staff meeting i

mid-October, the new commander predicted that construction and proje

design and contract awards would continue at similar levels:

What can we expect from this next fiscal year that has just begun? 

... Our bottom line expectations are to award between $650 and $700 

million in contracts.... We anticipate placing about $530 million in 

construction this year. So for both construction and project design 

and contract award, the numbers should be similar to what we experienced this year. This solid foundation for our programs should 

extend over the next several years.24

Despite EUD’s vigorous program, changes were occurring in th

environment in which the division operated. In early 1987 General Ra

had identified four factors that, he said, put EUD “on notice” as an org

nization. First, the Gramm-Rudman amendment to the 1986 federal bud

get mandated a reduction in the budget deficit. Second, reductions i

the value of the dollar meant reduced buying power in Europe. Third, 

directive from President Ronald Reagan ordered that all federal agencie

become 20 percent more productive by 1992. Fourth, new Department o

Defense regulations allowed installations to choose where they woul

obtain design and construction management services. General Ra

responded to these pressures with a multiphase effort to make the div

sion a more efficient, more productive, and more attractive organizatio

by improving service to customers and increasing customer satisfaction.2

Ray’s efforts did nothing to stem the tide of events in the United State

and abroad that portended change so profound that EUD would not b

able to adjust simply by making the organization operate more efficientl

In December 1987 President Reagan and Premier Mikhail Gorbache

signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the first genuin

disarmament treaty of the nuclear era.26 The treaty provided that th

United States withdraw the Pershing II and Cruise missiles that EUD wa

installing. The budget Congress passed for fiscal year 1989 (beginning 

October 1988) included only $78 billion for the Army, a total that force

the service to reduce the number of both military personnel and civilia

employees.27 In December 1988, in a speech before the United Nation

Gorbachev reinforced the impetus for change by announcing that th

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 6 
369

Soviet Union would begin unilateral demobilization of 500,000 Red Army 

troops and 10,000 tanks.28

In February 1989, a few weeks after Gorbachev’s announcement on 

demobilization, EUD’s executive staff held a three-day conference to 

assess the division’s future and the implications of these changes. General 

Harrell reviewed the changing geopolitical environment. He noted that 

the division had more than $100 million in projects not yet approved by 

the German government because of environmental concerns. At the same 

time, American and Soviet diplomats were pursuing negotiations on conventional forces that might produce a drastic reduction in the number of 

U.S. forces in Europe. Finally, Harrell gave his own assessment that, given 

the substantial improvements in facilities since his tour in the early 1960s, 

there were no large projects left to pursue.29 In total, EUD’s leaders had to 

look carefully at the division if the organization were to remain viable.

One prospective change in the division emanated from Corps headquarters: The chief of engineers, General Hatch, was committed to implementing lifecycle project management, a management approach the 

Army’s civilian leadership favored.30 The concept of using a single project 

manager to follow a project from “cradle-to-grave” had been discussed 

in EUD for several years. In a letter of 11 February 1983 to the chief of 

engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph K. Bratton, the Europe Division commander, 

Brig. Gen. George K. Withers, Jr., had noted that the lack of coordination between the Engineering Division and the Construction Division 

resulted in delays and reduced efficiency. Withers acknowledged that an 

organizational change might be necessary, but he was not “at the moment 

ready to embrace the Project Management Division Concept.”31 A panel 

on construction quality convened by headquarters in 1983 reported that 

the problems of passing projects from the Engineering Division to the 

Construction Division at EUD were similar to those experienced elsewhere in the Corps, though perhaps a little bit more intense.32 The organizational study conducted by the Engineer Studies Center in April 1985 

pointed out the duplication of project managers, funds management, 

and technical engineering elements in the Engineering and Construction 

Divisions.33

In January 1987 EUD addressed the issue of project management 

directly when senior managers devised an organizational plan to carry 

the division to 1992. The plan acknowledged implicitly the persistent difficulty in the turnover of a project from design to construction, a cause of 

dissatisfaction among both employees and customers for years.34 The plan 

called for a major reorganization of EUD, creating the position of chief 

of program management, and adopting cradle-to-grave project management.35 A task force chaired by the deputy division engineer prepared a 

concept paper with a new organizational structure. General Ray, however, 

chose not to reorganize because he wanted EQM firmly established before 

undertaking a structural change that would disrupt the design and construction program.36 In contrast, General Harrell appeared eager to reorganize to implement life-cycle project management.37

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 7 
370

In the summer of 1989 General Harrell obtained a copy of the 198

concept paper on the reorganization.38 In October he assembled a staff tas

force and named his deputies, Cols. John Moravec and Daniel Waldo, J

as cochairs.39 In November the task force proposed a Program and Proje

Management Directorate comprised of project managers from the exis

ing Engineering and Construction Divisions, as well as an Engineerin

and Construction Directorate that would include the supervision an

inspection function from the Construction Division and the Technic

Engineering Branch from the Engineering Division. The reorganiz

tion would create a Contracting Directorate in which contract specialis

would handle all contracting negotiations. Only preselection and selectio

of architect-engineers for direct design would remain in the Engineerin

Division. The plan redistributed some other functions and changed th

name of divisions to directorates and of branches to divisions.

General Harrell requested approval for the reorganization from 

Headquarters, USACE. He asked Joe G. Higgs to head the Program an

Project Management Directorate and John Blake to head the Engineerin

and Construction Directorate.40 Work groups began developing a detaile

table of distribution and allowances (TDA) to assign personnel spaces t

the new structure. A Corps-wide directive from General Hatch, issue

21 December 1989, mandated maintaining separate Engineering an

Construction Divisions; and EUD staff learned informally that the senio

civilians in Washington opposed their plan.41

Political Revolution in Europe

While General Harrell and the EUD staff planned the reorganizatio

of the division, revolution swept over the political landscape of Europ

Remarkable for its limited bloodshed, the turn of events was the most pro

found and far-reaching evolution on the continent since the end of Worl

War II.

In December 1988 Premier Gorbachev pledged unilateral demob

lization. On 25 April 1989, he announced that the Soviet Union woul

begin removing 1,000 Red Army tanks from Hungary.42 On 2 May th

Hungarian government began to dismantle the barbed-wire fencing an

other barriers along its border with Austria. Removing these obstacles i

effect opened the border between East and West for the first time sinc

the Berlin Wall went up in 1961. East Germans, who had a right to citizen

ship in West Germany under the terms of the constitution of the Feder

Republic, could suddenly move through Czechoslovakia and Hungary t

Austria and into West Germany.

In July, in an appearance at the Council of Europe in Strasbour

France, Gorbachev indicated that he was prepared to go even farther wit

arms reduction if the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizatio

(NATO) would cooperate. He also signaled that the Soviet Union woul

not intervene to stop the political ferment in Hungary and Poland. Th

next day, at the annual meeting of the Warsaw Pact nations, Gorbache

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 8 
371

called for “independent solutions of national problems” within the 

Eastern Bloc.

As the summer of 1989 advanced, a trickle—and then a torrent—of 

East Germans began to emigrate to West Germany. On 19 August more 

than 900 East German “vacationers” in Hungary succeeded in fleeing 

into Austria during a picnic held near the Austro-Hungarian border. On 

10 September the Hungarian government announced that it would no 

longer keep East German citizens from traveling through Hungary to 

Austria.43 The East German government responded by rescinding travel 

rights to Hungary for its citizens. Within the next thirty-six hours 10,500 

East Germans fled into Austria. Other East Germans sought asylum 

in West German missions in Eastern Bloc countries. On 30 September 

the 5,500 East Germans who sought asylum on the grounds of the West 

German embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia, received permission from 

the East German regime to pass into the Federal Republic. By 2 October 

over 30,000 had fled to the West from Hungary.

During the first week in October, East German citizens demonstrated 

in East Berlin, Dresden, and Leipzig against their Communist-controlled 

government. The security police attacked the demonstrators and broke up 

the crowds, but the effect was only temporary. On 10 October a crowd of 

50,000 East Germans took to the streets in Leipzig. On 11 October the East 

German Politburo met and announced its willingness to discuss reforms. 

The demonstrations continued: 100,000 protestors marched in Leipzig on 

16 October, while another 30,000 marched in Dresden. On 18 October the 

East German Politburo announced the retirement of Erich Honecker and 

named Egon Krenz, chief of security police, as his successor. The demonstrations increased. On 23 October more than 200,000 people marched 

in Leipzig; three days later 100,000 protested in Dresden. Similar crowds 

appeared again in Leipzig on 30 October.

Between 2 and 9 November 1989, over 50,000 East Germans fled to the 

West. On 9 November, faced with massive defections it could not contain 

and street protests it dared not suppress, the East German government 

announced that it would grant immediate exit visas to all who requested 

them and opened all border points with West Germany, even the Berlin 

Wall. On that night, television images beamed around the world showed 

young Germans dancing and drinking on the top of the Berlin Wall that 

had symbolized since 1961 the partition of Germany and Europe between 

the Communist East and the democratic West.

The Iron Curtain had been irrevocably breached. Within weeks 

the Communist parties lost control in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, 

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Rumania. Through all these changes, the Soviet Union refrained from intervening to maintain control of 

Eastern Europe. The postwar order had shattered abruptly.

Had the Cold War also ended? For American policymakers and for 

U.S. forces in Europe this became the key question. Was the Soviet Army 

still a menace? Surely, Eastern Europe experienced a revolution that no 

one had anticipated, but its very unexpectedness opened endless pos17P_Chap13_Final.indd 9 
372

sibilities for speculation about what the coming months and years migh

bring. The Warsaw Pact had virtually dissolved by the end of 1989, but th

Soviet Army still maintained substantial forces in East Germany. If Sovi

forces withdrew, what would be the fate of U.S. and other NATO force

The answers to these monumental questions would condition every dec

sion made within the U.S. Army, Europe, and U.S. Air Forces in Europ

after November 1989. Meanwhile, because no one could answer any o

these questions, EUD operations continued.

EUD and the European Revolution

At the end of September 1989, with political turmoil in Europe ev

dent but the outcome unclear, EUD had authorizations for 1,031 position

and staff on board numbered 1,011. This represented a reduction of abou

10 percent from the authorized level of 1,151 the year before. The budg

for fiscal year 1990, which projected a slight reduction in military con

struction in Europe, would produce income for EUD sufficient to suppo

941 positions. This meant that the division needed to reexamine its fiel

organization (Map 30) and reduce its workforce by 70 positions befor

30 September 1990. The division expected to accomplish the reduction b

attrition, that is, by not filling vacancies. In his “Commander’s Comment

column in the October 1989 issue of the Corps’ Line, General Harre

wrote: “Maybe we’ve seen the last $500 million-plus construction year, 

don’t know. However, if our program is indeed on the downside, I’m sti

expecting a ‘soft landing’ that projects a gradual rather than precipitou

decline in our workload.”44

Before the Corps’ Line printed this column the Berlin Wall opene

During November and December 1989 the leadership of the Europ

Division made plans to implement the reorganization to lifecycle proje

management (not yet approved by USACE), to initiate cost-savings me

sures, and to reduce the number of staff.45

In December Harrell spoke of a “transitional period at EUD” and th

“challenges of the new year.”46 In the January 1990 Corps’ Line, he wrote:

There are momentous changes in the East that many of us would 

never have guessed were possible. The ramifications are uncertain 

and the immediate future is still a little hazy as the military experts 

and political leaders determine in what direction we are going. I 

would be off base if I said that those decisions won’t affect us. Time 

will tell. It may be some years down the road or not at all.47

At a meeting of all staff on 11 January 1990, Harrell quoted Napoleon

who in 1802 during a brief respite in the wars that surrounded th

French Revolution had announced, “Peace has been declared.” Harre

affirmed that EUD’s mission of managing construction in Europ

remained unchanged. He also reminded staff that the division’s fund

came from fees charged for work performed and early projections ind

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 10 
373

Map 30

cated that the division did not have the resources to support 941 positions. Harrell acknowledged that a formal reduction in force (RIF) for 

American civilian employees might be required if indeed the declared 

peace held.48

NORTHERN AREA

FRANKFURT

AREA

STUTTGART

AREA

HEIDELBERG

AREA

WÜRZBURG AREA

KAISERSLAUTERN

AREA NUREMBERG

AREA

Teveren

Mönchen-Gladbach

Giessen

Fulda

Schweinfurt

Stuttgart

Karlsruhe

Heidelberg

Kaiserslautern

Landstuhl

Baumholder

Wildflecken Bitburg Hahn

Bad Kreuznach

Frankfurt

Aschaffenburg

Würzburg

Hoensbroek

Bremerhaven

Bamberg

Grafenwöhr

Vilseck

Nuremberg 

Augsburg

E N G L I S H

C H A N N E L

FRANCE

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WEST

GERMANY

EAST

GERMANY

DENMARK

SWEDEN

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOURG

LIECHTENSTEIN

Reims

BRUSSELS

AMSTERDAM

The Hague

Leipzig

Hannover

Erfurt

BERLIN

Hamburg

Zürich Dijon

FIELD ORGANIZATION

NORTHERN EUROPE

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1989

Area Office Boundary (approximate)

Area Office Headquarters

Project Office

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 11 
374

Manpower Reduction

The division could not reduce the workforce of German and third

country employees in the same way that it could deal with America

civilians. Tariff agreements between the Federal Republic and USAREU

governed all aspects of their employment, and the Termination Protectio

Law regulated any reduction in force.49 The Works Council, electe

under the authority of the tariff agreements, existed to ensure that EU

observed all applicable laws and regulations. The council and manag

ment cooperated for the benefit of employees, and management consulte

with the council, particularly with the chairman, Hasso Damm.50 Harre

respected Damm both personally and professionally and included him i

many meetings on the proposed reorganization and possible reductions.

Damm, who had worked for the U.S. Army in military constructio

since 1956, sensed that the organization was shrinking even before th

Berlin Wall was breached. In August 1989 he projected that the Germa

and third-country workforce would have to be reduced from the 198

level of 325 to around 250. Following his intuition, he encouraged employ

ees to take any opportunity that arose outside the Europe Division; b

October 1989 the number of local national employees had fallen to 289.52

On 11 January 1990, as Harrell briefed EUD personnel, Secretary o

Defense Richard B. Cheney announced a hiring freeze throughout th

Department of Defense. This freeze complicated the division’s effor

to reduce staff by attrition, because people who wanted to return to th

United States could not be hired by any agency in the Department o

Defense.

Because of the hiring freeze, General Harrell accelerated the tempo o

management action within EUD. The division sharply curtailed trainin

and temporary duty, eliminated overtime, froze purchases of dataproces

ing equipment, and terminated nonessential temporary employees.53 Th

Office of Human Resources began working with USAREUR’s Civilia

Personnel Office (CPO) to develop placement and furlough program

Managers were asked to propose early retirement for employees, t

encourage American employees to return to their jobs in stateside di

tricts, to freeze hiring, and to encourage job sharing. They were also tol

to consult counsel’s office, the EEO Office, and the Works Council befor

taking any action. To keep employees informed about fast-paced develop

ments, the division instituted a one-page temporary employee newsle

ter scheduled for release twice a month; the first issue appeared on 2

January 1990.54

On 24 January 1990, Secretary Cheney announced a moratorium o

new construction under the budget for Military Construction, Arm

in light of pending changes in troop strength and possible closure o

military bases. The freeze was to continue until 30 April. Initially, it wa

unclear what effect, if any, the three-month moratorium would have o

EUD’s plan to reorganize, on its budget, or on the projection of position

EUD could afford for the next fiscal year. In retrospect, Harrell describe

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 12 
375

the impact of the freeze on the division’s workload as “like sticking a pin 

in a balloon.”55

In early February, in an effort to help the division reduce manpower, 

Harrell requested permission from Headquarters, USACE, for three 

actions: (1) conduct a RIF of 100 American employees from federal service; (2) furlough American civilians for two days per month from March 

until the end of the fiscal year (or to implement a continuous furlough of 

not more than thirty days per person); and (3) offer early retirement to an 

estimated forty American employees. Harrell argued for these actions by 

saying, “It seems totally inconsistent that we tell this loyal and committed 

group of employees that their reward for successfully achieving U.S. and 

free world objectives is a RIF notice.”56

A formal reduction in force affecting civil service employees is a complex personnel action governed by law and regulation. For any RIF involving more than fifty people, EUD needed approval from both USACE and 

the Department of the Army. According to the agreement signed in 1974 

between USAREUR and the chief of engineers, the division had to work 

through USAREUR’s CPO in Frankfurt to conduct a RIF.57

To encourage voluntary departures among the German and thirdcountry national employees, Hasso Damm favored offering a buyout 

option. This involved a cash settlement that would support the worker 

from early retirement to the date when the German social security system would begin payments; the buyout was a common practice in the 

Germany economy. General Harrell accepted Damm’s proposal that the 

Europe Division conduct a buyout using the authority of a relatively 

recent special USAREUR initiative that gave individual commanders discretion to decide issues up to Deutschmark 50,000 in labor cases (about 

$30,000).58 In February 1990 Damm and others began advising the employees nearing retirement age of the buyout option. In line with prior settlements awarded by the German labor court in Frankfurt, EUD offered the 

German and third-country employees one-half month of salary per year 

of employment. The division chose not to put the offer in writing because 

of the legal implications of such an offer for future settlements. The commander reserved the right to deny any specific request to leave. About 

twenty-two people took this option before USAREUR stopped the program in June 1990, fearing a precedent should the entire European command face a RIF.59

To calculate the division’s income, the Resource Management Office 

tried to project workload for the coming fiscal year. After the Department 

of Defense announced the moratorium on military construction on 

24 January, the major commands and agencies such as the Army and Air 

Force Exchange Service and the Troop Support Agency began reviewing 

their construction projects, particularly in Europe. EUD customers canceled projects with increasing frequency.

As projections of workload and income decreased, the number of 

people that the division could support for the year beginning 1 October 

1990 also declined. On 11 January Harrell reported 941 as the EUD target 

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 13 
376

number for employees. A month later, when the meeting was reported i

the Corps’ Line, the writer inserted a parenthetical addition: “(At last wor

EUD officials estimated a year-end manpower strength of 865.)”60 At th

staff meeting on 1 March, Harrell emphasized that the decline in wor

for EUD was “not a temporary situation” and projected 857 staff position

for the division.61 By 31 March the number of personnel in the divisio

had dropped to 959, but the number that managers thought EUD coul

support in the coming fiscal year had fallen to 689. This meant a furthe

reduction of 270 people in addition to the 52 employees who had recent

left. Managers trying to cope with the changing numbers began to fe

that “long-term planning is one week.”62

While the Resource Management Office tried to project workload

income, and affordable staff strength for the coming fiscal year, th

division’s leaders argued over the allocation of positions in a new, smalle

structure that incorporated lifecycle project management.63 When divisio

chiefs argued why they could not reduce instead of submitting plans fo

fewer positions, General Harrell reacted angrily. Thereafter, he personal

decided how many positions would be assigned to each division rathe

than giving that task to the division chiefs.64

Reorganization Approved

In the last week of March 1990 the chief of engineers, General Hatch

traveled to Frankfurt with a team from Headquarters, USACE, for Focu

’90, a headquarters briefing on the themes of environment and partne

ships.65 Just before the briefing, Hatch gave Harrell a memo approvin

the reorganization that EUD had requested three months earlier.66 Harre

targeted April to implement the new organizational structure. (Chart 1

Some staff objected to the timing of the reorganization, but Harrell hel

firm. He argued that General Hatch had mandated implementation of lif

cycle project management and that the new organization would be mor

efficient.67

The convergence of the reorganization and the need to reduce person

nel complicated the division’s situation. Using the latest available figure

on affordable manpower, a new structure was built on an allocation o

689. In a memo to Hatch dated 5 April, General Harrell emphasized th

need to RIF American civilians to reduce staff to 689 by 1 October.68 T

conduct a RIF, however, EUD needed an approved organizational stru

ture.69 Employees tried to determine where—or whether—their position

would be located in the new structure and how they would be affected i

a RIF action; but without an official, approved allocation, that was impo

sible.

On 12 April 1990, the Department of Defense lifted the internal pa

of its worldwide hiring freeze, and eligible EUD employees could registe

for priority placement into open positions within the department.70 At th

end of April Secretary Cheney extended the moratorium on new constru

tion in Europe to 15 June, causing EUD customers to cancel more projec

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 14 
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe

Executive Office

Commander and Division Engineer

Directorate

of Resource

Management

EEO Office

Value

Engineering

Office

Directorate of

Engineering and

Construction

Safety and

Occupational Health

Directorate of

Human Resources

Public Affairs

Office

Construction

Management Branch

Office

Engineering Branch

Supervision and

Inspection Branch

Directorate of

Contracting

Security Plans and

Operations Division

Office of Council

Audit Office

Policy and

Compliance Division

Acquisition

Division

Host Nations

Contractraing

Division

Plans and

Operations Branch

Security and Law

Enforcement Branch

Directorate of

Information

Management

Directorate of

Logistics

Management

Nuremberg Area Office

Nuremberg, Germany

Würzburg Area Office

Würzburg, Germany

The U.S.Engineer Group

Area Office

Incirlik, Turkey

Kaiserslautern Area Office

Kaiserslautern, Germany

Directorate of

Programs and

Project Management

Project

Management

Division

Program

Support Division

Boards and

Committees

Special

Assistants

Frankfurt Area Office

Frankfurt, Germany

Northern Area Office

Hoensbroek, Netherlands

Stuttgart Area Office

Stuttgart, Germany

 Chart 15: Organization of the Europe Division, May 1990 

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 15 
378

and further reducing anticipated income for the division. On 15 May, fiv

weeks after he requested it, General Harrell received authorization t

implement a RIF of U.S. civilian employees.71 Approval had been slow i

coming. The threat of widespread elimination of Corps positions in th

United States had produced political pressures, and the Army command

had to seek permission from the Secretary of the Army for any RIF th

involved more than fifty people.72

The announcement that EUD would conduct a formal reduction i

force increased uncertainty and anxiety among the staff. U.S. laws an

regulations governing a RIF had been developed in the 1940s. Althoug

revised over the years to increase the protection for employees with goo

performance appraisals, no revisions had been made to take into consid

eration any aspect of EEO programs; only veterans received preferenti

treatment. Because RIF rules stated that the last hired would be release

first, the impact was especially hard on minorities and women. No on

had any experience implementing a RIF on as large a scale as EUD need

ed, nor had one been implemented outside the United States.73

To prepare for the RIF at the Europe Division, Michael Vajda from 

the Frankfurt Civilian Personnel Office worked closely with the chi

of human resources, Irv Scherman, EEO Officer Laverne Love, Gener

Harrell, and Colonel Waldo.74 They set up briefings, seminars, and coun

seling sessions for staff to explain the procedures and to inform them o

their rights.75 Notices were mailed to 162 EUD employees on 10 July; 8

persons were told they would be separated as of 22 September and th

rest were offered reassignment at the same or lower grades. The divisio

abolished a total of 128 jobs.76

This RIF did not include the German and third-country employees. B

attrition the number of these employees had dropped from 289 in Octobe

1989 to 272 on 28 February 1990.77 It was clear that deeper cuts would b

required, and on 22 March General Harrell asked the commander in chi

of USAREUR, General Crosbie E. Saint, for authority to reduce the numbe

of German and third-country employees. On advice from Hasso Damm

Harrell also requested a formal determination from the commander i

chief that the action was based on military necessity, that is, troop reloc

tion or withdrawal.78

In early April Damm called USAREUR for clarification of the termin

tion process.79 German law provides that the employer can terminate fo

operational reasons but he must weigh the employee’s “social factors

including position, grade, age, health, financial obligation (indebtedness

and distance to travel for a new position.80 A termination of significan

impact (that is, a large reduction in force) requires that the German Labo

Office be notified. Damm pressed for concurrence by USAREUR th

termination would be for military necessity. USAREUR agreed, and th

German Federal Ministry of Finance concurred. Under these condition

the Tariff Agreement for Social Security could cover the terminations

Signed by USAREUR in 1971, this agreement provided that, for employ

ees over forty years of age who had been employed more than ten year

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 16 
379

the Federal Republic would pay the difference between the salary of the 

terminated position and any other employment for which the employee 

received less money.82

The EUD Works Council had to approve the proposed termination 

of each employee. If the Works Council disapproved, the division commander could refer the case to the USAREUR Works Council, which 

would review the case and decide whether to approve the termination.83

The agreements and laws did not set forth procedures for implementing 

a major termination, and USAREUR did not move quickly to establish 

them.84

Seeking Relief

The moratorium on new construction in Europe that Secretary Cheney 

imposed in January 1990 and extended to 15 June was a temporary emergency measure to meet the changing strategic situation as the Soviet system in Eastern Europe collapsed. By summer it was clear that the Soviet 

Union was collapsing internally as well. On 21 June Cheney recommended that Congress take more permanent action and cancel sixty-eight military construction projects and withdraw more than $327 million in funds 

already appropriated to pay for them. Congress agreed to cancel sixty-five 

of the sixty-eight projects.85

Although the Europe Division had a $491 million construction program in fiscal year 1990, the cancellation of funding for proposed projects 

further clouded EUD’s future; General Harrell sought budgetary relief.86

The division had built a staff to support the military mission in Europe; it 

was not just an EUD problem that the mission had changed and projects 

were canceled. He wanted the Army and the Department of Defense to 

recognize it as “our problem.” Specifically, he wanted the agencies that 

canceled projects to share the cost with EUD by making payments from 

funds already appropriated. This type of payment—in effect a penalty 

payment for breaking the contract—is accepted practice in the private sector when a project is canceled. Harrell’s argument did not win support 

in Washington; only one of EUD’s customers, the Community Family 

Support Center, agreed to fund a phase-out of construction contracts for 

projects they terminated.87

The division engineer also pressed Headquarters, USACE, to allow 

him to develop a budget using projected income from all sources and 

fixed costs to calculate the number of positions the division could afford. 

Customarily, Corps headquarters allocates personnel positions to each 

division from a computer model that calculates personnel needs based on 

projected design and construction placement. Harrell argued with John 

Wallace, chief of resource management in headquarters, that EUD did not 

fit the USACE model because the computer program did not include all 

the division’s customers. He also objected to the practice of subtracting 15 

percent from the model’s allocation because EUD used indirect contracting. Harrell had argued before the financial crunch for a change in EUD 

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 17 
380

allocation of personnel positions; in the spring of 1990 he finally receive

approval for his budget.88

The division sought to cut costs in several ways. In August 1990 th

division vacated leased office space in the Dornbusch area of Frankfur

Without funds for a moving van, employees literally moved their ow

things in private vehicles.89 The division also gave up the lease on th

warehouse and offices in the Frankfurt suburb of Bonames. The Frankfu

Area Office planned to move into the Phillips Building (division head

quarters) as space became available.

EUD’s budget situation worsened as customers canceled project

On 17 July 1990, one week after RIF notices were mailed, EUD had 84

employees on staff with a projection of 710 as of 30 September. Despi

the self-imposed budget restraints and the RIF, it was apparent that th

division would be $7.4 million short by the end of the fiscal year and th

it could not support even 689 positions in the coming year. Discussion

continued between division and headquarters staff about probable incom

and the number of affordable personnel for the coming year. The divisio

recalculated the number of positions it could afford as 535.90

In late July a team from headquarters led by the deputy chief of eng

neers, Maj. Gen. Richard S. Kem, met with division leaders in Frankfur

The Europe Division briefing for that visit included a review of recen

events, decisions, and actions; detailed projections of income for the com

ing year; the division’s plan to reduce staff to 535; and an explanation o

why EUD was running a deficit.91 General Kem and John Wallace agree

to provide supplemental funding of $7.342 million to cover the deficit i

the current fiscal year.92 EUD and headquarters agreed that headquarte

would fund a “wedge”: the cost of the difference between the numbe

of people on staff at the beginning of fiscal year 1991 and the numbe

thought to be affordable for the whole year, based on workload.93

Working from the agreements reached during these meetings, Harre

distributed a memo, dated 24 July 1990, to division leaders with a tim

table of actions, dates for completion, and assigned responsibility.94 T

speed the reduction in personnel, on 6 August Harrell instituted a “n

extension” policy for U.S. civilian employees; the next day he official

asked Corps headquarters for authority to conduct a second RIF.95 Eve

without clarification of procedures from USAREUR, EUD also made plan

to proceed with a termination of German and third-country employee

pending Works Council approval of an overall organization of 535.96

Despite the agreements Harrell thought he had reached durin

General Kem’s July visit, communiqués from headquarters staff i

the following weeks questioned, challenged, or contradicted EU

plans. Harrell was particularly disturbed to receive drastically revise

projections of affordable EUD manpower for fiscal years 1991 an

1992: 330 and 200, respectively. His letter of 13 August to the chief o

engineers, General Hatch, questioned the revised manpower proje

tions, requested clarification on the number of positions at EUD th

headquarters would fund, and noted that the staffing levels of 330 an

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 18 
381

200 would not support either a general officer or two Senior Executive 

Service (SES) positions.97

In another effort to plan the future for the Europe Division, General 

Harrell suggested a merger between EUD and the Corps’ Middle East/

Africa Projects Office (MEAPO), a district-level element of the South 

Atlantic Division. From headquarters in Winchester, Virginia, MEAPO 

managed U.S. military construction throughout the Middle East and 

in Africa. Harrell thought that the missions of EUD and MEAPO were 

compatible and that consolidation would produce more efficient organizations. General Hatch approved a small task force with people from 

both organizations to consider this suggestion. Maj. Gen. John Sobke, 

commander of the South Atlantic Division, proposed an alternate plan: 

Consolidate EUD and MEAPO under his organization.98

The pressures on the Europe Division increased. General Hatch 

imposed a hiring freeze for all military-funded positions in the Corps 

of Engineers as of 20 August, making it more difficult for employees in 

Europe to return to Corps positions in the States.99 At a staff meeting on 

29 August, General Harrell announced that Headquarters, USACE, had 

ordered the division to reduce its staff strength to match its budget by 

1 October 1991. In line with that requirement and the projection of $247 

million in construction placement for fiscal year 1991, the division would 

have to develop a structure for 330–410 people.100

Harrell also reported on the possibility of the merger of EUD and 

MEAPO, but events in the Middle East had already intervened. On 

2 August Iraq invaded Kuwait. Kuwait’s neighbor, Saudi Arabia, the 

United States, and the NATO allies feared an invasion of Saudi Arabia. 

Backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution, on 7 August the 

United States and its allies launched Operation DESERT SHIELD. Worldwide 

military attention shifted from the political changes in Europe to the liberation of Kuwait and the protection of Saudi Arabia.101

Steps toward Stability

During September and into October discussions continued between 

headquarters and EUD over how to project the division’s income for fiscal 

year 1991, how to calculate the affordable workforce, and how much in supplemental funding EUD would require. The Resource Management Office 

in Frankfurt sent to headquarters briefings and plans for matching the workforce to budget by 1 October 1991; headquarters sent back counterproposals.102

On 10 August Maj. Gen. C. Ernest Edgar III replaced General Kem as deputy 

chief of engineers, altering the working relationship established at the July 

meeting in Frankfurt. A message from General Edgar on 5 October informed 

General Harrell that his plans to draw down the division represented “too 

slow a ramp.” EUD should be prepared to issue a second round of RIF notices 

by 15 November. A faster reduction in staff would of course reduce the 

wedge funding that USACE would have to provide.103 Harrell found the message “troubling,” and his response to Edgar concluded:

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 19 
382

These are the procedures (rules) I thought we had agreed to. We 

can’t manage both ways (manage to budget and end strength). If 

the rules have changed or there are understandings different than 

explained, please advise.... We will do as you direct. However, if 

allowed to manage as described above, we can accomplish the drawdown with less pain.104

The USACE outplacement program, Defense Department priorit

placement, voluntary departures, and the first RIF of U.S. civilians ha

some success. As of 30 September 1990, EUD manpower had dropped t

663; by 10 October the workforce numbered 625.105 Using income proje

tions acceptable to headquarters, Harrell proposed an organization of 21

as of 1 October 1991. At this point EUD would match workforce to bud

get for the first time since October 1989, just before the fall of the Berli

Wall.106 Achieving the 218 level required a second RIF of U.S. civilian

and a reduction in the number of German and third-country employee

Harrell proposed to go to a 50:50 ratio between the two categories o

employees, a change from the ratio of 70:30 (Americans to Germans) th

had prevailed only a year earlier.107 Without any information to the con

trary, Harrell planned for a stand-alone division.108

In late October General Harrell, Hasso Damm, and the EUD huma

resources director, Irv Scherman, went to Washington. Harrell pre

sented plans for the organization of 218 with the 50:50 ratio of America

and German employees, a more gradual timeline for the reductions i

force, and agreement that headquarters would pay his division’s exces

labor costs for 1990 and provide the wedge funding needed for 1991. H

received the approvals and support he sought.109 The proposed organiz

tion did not include either a general officer or an SES position.

Scherman and Damm pressed USAREUR on the issue of cuttin

local national employees. USAREUR assigned responsibility to its CP

in Frankfurt, but this office had jurisdiction only over a very limite

geographic area in Germany and not over employees in the area, res

dent, and project offices. Because each personnel office operated ind

pendently within a designated geographic area, it was not clear how 

the Frankfurt office alone could implement the RIF. In the face of th

impasse, Scherman suggested that EUD try to bring together all the offi

es involved.

While Scherman and Damm were working with USAREUR to figur

out how to terminate the local nationals, other managers within EU

were working to identify positions to cut. The experience of Virgin

Conway as chief of the Information Management Office (IMO) typifie

the challenge that managers faced. When Conway arrived in August 198

she found a staff of 59 and plans to increase to 70. Within weeks she wa

told to cut her budget and eliminate 11 positions. She handled that cut b

not extending the employment contracts of Department of Army civi

ians up for renewal. In the plan for the first RIF in the spring of 199

Conway had a target of 36 staff; the office had 37 on board, and Conwa

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 20 
383

made a case for keeping the additional person. Then 2 people left voluntarily. When she had to cut staff to 22 people, she drew a line through her 

own name on the organizational chart because the smaller office did not 

require a GM–15 manager. The organization plan for 218 people assigned 

only 11 positions to IMO, and 5 would be German employees.110

People throughout the organization who could see that their positions would be cut made plans. Anticipating his own departure, General 

Harrell designated his deputy, Colonel Waldo, as commander. Waldo had 

been intimately involved in planning for the reorganization, preparing 

briefings, and pulling elements of the staff together on personnel reduction. As deputy commander, he had an overview of the organization and 

“the trust of the people.” Harrell worked closely with him on the transition.111 Several division chiefs departed, and others started looking for 

new positions. In early November 1990 Joe Higgs, chief of engineering, 

received an offer to become chief of engineering and planning in the Ohio 

River Division; John Blake, chief of construction, became chief of construction in the South Atlantic Division.112

Outside EUD, decisions were made that affected the organization. Days before the freeze on construction projects was to expire on 

15 November 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney extended it; no contracts 

financed by military construction appropriations could be awarded 

before 16 April 1991.113 On 3 December 1990, General Hatch announced 

that EUD and MEAPO would be assigned to the South Atlantic Division. 

Within weeks headquarters announced that the Europe Division would 

become the Europe District, reporting to a new operating division, the 

Transatlantic Division, with headquarters in Winchester, Virginia. The 

Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office and other Corps offices in the Middle 

East would also be under the Transatlantic Division, which would report 

to the South Atlantic Division.114

In mid-December a team made up of Ken Griggs of the South Atlantic 

Division, A. O. “Ollie” Werner of MEAPO, and Louis Brettschneider of 

EUD began meeting with division chiefs in Frankfurt to discuss the transition. Their tasks included defining the district’s workload and preparing 

a revised structure without positions devoted to division-level management tasks.115 The Europe District would be activated on 1 March 1991 

with Colonel Waldo as district commander.116

It was not until 20–21 January 1991, one year after Cheney imposed 

the freeze of military construction in Europe, that Scherman, Damm, and 

staff from the EUD Human Resources Office and from USAREUR met in 

Garmisch, Germany, with officials from almost twenty civilian personnel 

offices to plan the reduction in force of non-American employees. Using 

information from EUD, the group identified specific employees whose 

positions would be abolished and calculated their dates of notification.

By German law the terminations had to take effect at the end of a fiscal quarter (31 March, 30 June, 30 September, or 31 December). Employees 

with less than 5 years’ service had to be notified 6 weeks before the end 

of the quarter. After 5 years of employment, employees received notice 

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 21 
384

3 months before the end of the quarter; after 8 years, 4 months’ notice; an

after 10 years, 5 months. The maximum notification was 6 months. It wa

finally clear that the earliest termination notices, for the local nationa

employed less than 5 years, would go out 15 February—that is, six week

before the end of March. Most of the employees to be terminated had bee

employed more than 12 years; their terminations could not take effe

until the end of September 1991.117

Changes in the Field

Planning was done in division headquarters in Frankfurt, but it wa

in the field offices that employees felt the cessation of projects and th

falloff of the workload. From the time of the moratorium on military con

struction, area engineers frankly warned employees about the uncertai

employment situation; many employees did not wait to receive form

notices. Construction managers in the Corps moved with the work; the

expected to pick up and leave when a construction project was complete.

Geopolitical events had a particular impact on the Stuttgart Are

Office, the primary point of support for USAREUR’s VII Corps. In Jun

1990 Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio, the area engineer, projected that his staff woul

be reduced from its current level of over 40 to 18 or 20 by the beginning o

the new fiscal year on 1 October. He also projected that Stuttgart woul

absorb the Würzburg Area Office when the area engineer there, Lt. Co

Leslie Rose, retired in November 1990.118

In July 1990 Lt. Col. Douglas Lamothe succeeded Colio in Stuttgart. 

number of big projects had been scheduled for the Stuttgart area, but th

moratorium shelved or canceled most of them. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwa

and the launch of Operation DESERT SHIELD in August changed the situ

tion entirely. Most of VII Corps moved to the deserts of Saudi Arabia, an

construction in the Stuttgart area came to a standstill. “Within six month

we went from having a robust construction program, keeping almost 5

people in the area office going, to having no construction program at a

and we were down to 8 people by January 1, 1991.”119

On 1 December 1990, the Northern Area Office closed and the divisio

transferred personnel and property to the Hoensbroek Project Office. Tw

weeks later the Würzburg Area Office closed and personnel and propert

went to the Würzburg Resident Office.120 Within weeks the Stuttgart Are

Office also closed.

The construction moratorium affected the Frankfurt Area Offic

less severely, and Frankfurt took over responsibility for the Hoensbroe

Project Office. In the spring of 1991 the twelve employees of the Frankfu

Area Office—down from thirty-five—moved into the Phillips Building.1

The construction program of the Nuremberg Area Office declined, bu

not drastically, and Nuremberg took over responsibility for projects from 

both the Würzburg and the Stuttgart Area Offices. (See Map 31.) The U.

Engineer Group office in Turkey remained open, although at a reduce

staff level; the Greece Resident Office closed.

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 22 
385

The Impact on Morale

A recitation of falling numbers in the workforce and the rapid succession of unprecedented events cannot convey the sense of confusion, 

uncertainty, and sadness that many of the staff at the Europe Division, 

particularly in Frankfurt, experienced during this period. The suddenness 

of the events contributed to the dismay of even experienced managers like 

Virginia Conway:

Normally, when you are closing out something, whether it is a 

project or an office, it is a planned process with a date and you are 

able to plan all the steps to happen.... You are able to prepare people.... You have time to organize and close out those activities that 

you need to do and you have a sense of accomplishment.... When 

something like this happens, it is like everything gets thrown to the 

wind.122

Individuals reacted differently. Some decided quickly to leave the 

organization voluntarily. Others left only when all other options had been 

exhausted. EEO Officer Laverne Love counseled employees before and 

during the RIFs. She recalled:

There were people who sat in here with the door closed and cried, 

who went through every kind of emotional state that you can believe. 

It was a bad time.... The RIF and the reorganization ... smashed into 

each other ... like an explosion. It was just unbelievable, so depressing for the employees. People hated to come to work. Everybody had 

a cold. Stress brings on all sorts of physical ailments.123

Long-time employees who were virtually untouchable in the reductions were not immune to the stress. Louis Brettschneider had been in 

Europe since 1956 and had experienced many organizational changes 

and fluctuations in workload, but he called the drawdown in 1990–1991 

“a confusing period” and “most trying.”124 Hasso Damm, an employee 

of the U.S. Army since 1956, had seen many organizational changes and 

numerous colleagues come and go. When asked about the drawdown, he 

said: “This was really the sad part for all of those who are still here. One 

day you talk to somebody in the hallway and the next day he wasn’t 

there anymore. He left. It was impossible to keep up with people who 

left.”125

The transition created an emotional roller coaster for Debra Dale, a 

landscape architect. She received three RIF letters and bumped her best 

employee but kept a position at EUD, although her husband lost his. 

Months later she admitted that she was “still stumbling.”126 It was a peculiar irony that the end of the Cold War and the prospect of a more peaceful Europe brought so much dislocation and pain to the people working 

in the Europe Division.

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 23 
Map 31

FRANCE

SWITZERLAND

GE

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOURG

UNITED

KINGDOM

DE

Giessen Fulda

Frankfurt

Hoensbroek

Teveren

Karlsruhe

Baumholder

Bitburg

Hahn

Heidelberg

Kaiserslautern

Soesterberg

W

Aschaffen

Stuttgart

Rhine R

Meuse R

Marne R

Seine R

Loire R

E

N

G

L

I

S

H

C

H

A

N

N

E

L

Metz

Reims

PARIS

BRUSSELS

Hanno

Bremen

Kassel

Bremerhaven

Dijon

AMSTERDAM

The Hague

FIELD ORGANIZATION

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE

1991

Area Office Boundary (approximate)

Area Office Headquarters

Project Office

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

NORTHERN EUROPE

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 24 
UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLICS

ANY

AUSTRIA

HUNGARY

POLAND

K

C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

amberg

Grafenwöhr

Vilseck

mberg

Elbe R

Oder R

Warthe R

Oder R

anube R

Danube R

Isar R

B A L T I C

S E

A

Leipzig

Munich

Stettin

BERLIN

Dresden

PRAGUE

WARSAW

Breslau

VIENNA

BUDAPEST

Innsbruck

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 25 
388

The Europe District

By the end of February 1991, fifteen months after the Berlin Wall wa

breached, the construction mission in Europe had been transformed. Th

Corps of Engineers continued to manage contract construction for the U.

military but for a much smaller force. The organization that handled th

engineering responsibilities, now the Europe District, was less than ha

the size of the Europe Division at its maximum. Through attrition and 

formal reduction in force applied to American employees, the number o

personnel had been reduced to 462; plans called for reducing the wor

force to fewer than 300 by 1 October. A major reorganization had put lif

cycle project management in place. Scores of projects had been cancele

The division realigned field operations and cut the number of area office

in half—from six to three. During these fifteen months the division’s lead

ers struggled to manage rapid change and employees struggled to adju

to the personal impact of world events.

In a simple, thirty-minute ceremony on 1 March in a large room at th

Abrams Complex in Frankfurt, Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell cased the colo

of the Europe Division and Maj. Gen. John F. Sobke, commander of th

South Atlantic Division, accepted responsibility for the Europe Distric

Sobke then passed the command of the district to Col. Daniel Waldo, Jr.1

In his final column in the February issue of Corps’ Line, General Harre

wrote:

EUD workers may have had to leave, but they never had to quit. 

EUD can be proud of the legacy of service and quality design and 

construction it leaves behind. It is a fine record.... When we case the 

colors of the Division for the last time, we can do so with our heads 

held high and with a spirit of celebration for the job well done.128

A year later Harrell reflected on the changes in Europe that he ha

experienced. In 1961, as a young officer in a construction battalion, he ha

lived and worked in sparse and difficult conditions; in 1988 he had toure

new barracks, maintenance facilities, and recreation areas constructed b

the Army engineers. A lieutenant in Germany when the Berlin Wall wen

up, he was a general officer in Germany when it came down in 1989. H

emphasized: “We won the Cold War. We’ve accomplished our mission

and so we ought to celebrate that.”129

The broad mission of the engineers, to support U.S. forces in Europ

had not changed; but as its Cold War adversary collapsed, the focu

of American military strategy in Europe blurred. The Army Corps o

Engineers had established the Europe Division in 1974 to respond to new 

challenges, new programs, and growing demands. Now, for the first tim

since the late 1940s, Army engineers faced the challenge of doing les

rather than more.

17P_Chap13_Final.indd 26 
EPILOGUE

When World War II ended in 1945, Europe lay in ruins; 

Germany was a conquered enemy; and the United States, 

Britain, France, and the Soviet Union were uneasy allies. 

Within a decade, Germany became an ally with the United 

States, Britain, and France. In the following decades Western Europe, in 

alliance with the United States, created and maintained a credible defense 

against Soviet expansion. By 1991 the Warsaw Pact of Eastern European 

countries dominated by the Soviet Union had collapsed, Germany was 

reunified, and the Cold War had ended, essentially eliminating the threat 

of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe. The rationale for stationing 

American forces in Europe largely disappeared. 

From 1945 to 1990 the United States invested more than $5 billion in 

military construction in Europe, from Norway in the north to Turkey in 

the east, in support of U.S. forces. This figure does not reflect the changing value of the dollar, and it does not include the German contribution to 

the support of American forces.1

 It appears unlikely that the United States 

will ever again maintain as significant a military presence in Europe. This 

study of nearly half a century of military construction in Europe serves to 

record both the achievements of the past and some key lessons learned. 

Appreciating Sovereignty

Time and again the United States confronted the reality that in 

peacetime the U.S. military operates overseas with allies who are sovereign. France, having been battered severely by war, jealously guarded 

her sovereignty. Despite having joined NATO in 1949, the French were 

unwilling to cede control over U.S. military construction on their soil in 

the 1950s. Germany, defeated in World War II and occupied in the 1940s, 

resumed its sovereign status when the new government was established. 

Not unexpectedly, the Germans asserted increasing control over military 

construction within their borders. In 1988 Allan Aaron, division counsel 

at the Europe Division in Frankfurt, articulated the American position in 

Europe: 

We are guests.... Sometimes we are guests of necessity. Sometimes 

we are honored guests. Sometimes the honored guest gets to be a little 

bit stale. And sometimes the necessity that brought the guest in the first 

place goes away. We have to be sensitive to these political nuances.... 

We are dealing with a sovereign. We don’t have rights—we have privileges.2

18Q_Epilogue_Final.indd 1 
390

One manifestation of sovereignty is indirect contracting. Personn

in the Department of Defense, in the Department of the Army, and 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, were slow to grasp th

impact of indirect contracting. Over five decades, international agre

ments rather than standard Corps of Engineers procedures increasing

came to govern contracting for U.S. military construction. From the 1950

to the 1980s Army engineers in Europe had to explain indirect contractin

to first-time visitors from Washington. Even at the end of the 1980s, ind

rect contracting remained the aspect of command in the Europe Divisio

for which the incoming commander felt least prepared.3

Indirect contracting increased the cost of design and construction

because monitoring required more time and more personnel. There wer

other cost factors over which Army engineers in Europe could exe

no control, including the higher costs of benefits for local national an

third-country employees and the need to employ negotiators and tran

lators. Sometimes congressional mandates, such as the requirement t

use expensive and inefficient American coal in German boilers, furthe

increased construction costs overseas. 

Recognizing Cultural Differences

Differences in culture and business practices between Americans an

Europeans strained relationships, led to administrative errors, and cr

ated conflicts. Interpersonal and interagency misunderstandings resulte

from strictures prohibiting U.S. government personnel from acceptin

gifts. In most European countries and in other parts of the world, it is a

accepted practice for contractors to present holiday gifts to clients an

business associates. Contractors were insulted when American colleague

returned their gifts. The Richtfest is a traditional party that Germans hol

to celebrate completion of the skeleton of a building, but Americans wer

told that they could not partake in the food and drink that the contracto

provided to honor the workers. In Turkey, construction workers balke

when The United States Engineer Group assigned a woman as proje

engineer. Environmental laws in Germany had an impact on both desig

and construction, as well as on military training. The examples of clash

ing cultural values are numerous, and they point to the need for sensitiv

ity, understanding, and respect for others’ customs. 

An Absence of Scandal

Considering the billions of dollars spent on construction, execute

through thousands of contracts with hundreds of companies over th

course of forty-five years, the documentary records contain few inciden

of fraud or abuse, particularly after the mid-1950s when contract constru

tion was centralized and the German political structure and econom

stabilized. There were instances of misconduct—irregular procurement

overcharges and substitution of inferior materials by contractors, and fi

18Q_Epilogue_Final.indd 2 
391

ing of improper travel vouchers by employees—but the irregularities were 

minor when weighed against the number of projects and the total amount 

of money spent. 

Continuity amid Change

The Army engineers in Europe supported the Army and the Air 

Force in the face of political changes in the United States and in Europe 

and through shifts in U.S. military strategy. They continued to work as 

the demand for engineering services fluctuated and as organizational 

structures changed. They adjusted to external events and pressures, from 

Soviet saber-rattling to new weapons systems, changing construction 

standards, and budgetary restraints emanating from the U.S. Congress. 

Despite numerous changes from 1945 to 1991, there was continuity. 

Many of the places that were the focus of engineer activity in the late 

1940s continued as focal points of engineer effort through five decades; 

names such as Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, Heidelberg, and Rhine-Main Air 

Base, recur year after year in the records of engineer activities. American 

civilians such as Lou Brettschneider, William Camblor, and Herb Wooten 

and local workers including Hasso Damm provided continuity. Their 

careers mirrored and were shaped by the evolving mission of the U.S. 

forces in Europe. 

The Legacy

The Army engineers who managed and executed U.S. military construction in Europe after World War II were asked to carry out their mission in difficult circumstances, where time was short, money was inadequate (except for a few years in the mid-1980s), and personnel were scarce. 

Military and civilian, Americans and local nationals, the Army engineers 

demonstrated commitment and an awareness that their efforts contributed to a larger cause. Individually and collectively, they saw themselves 

as a part of the Atlantic alliance’s common defense; they knew that they 

were on the potential firing line in the Cold War. 

What is the legacy of almost five decades of the American military 

presence in Europe, particularly in Germany—former enemy, then ally? 

The bricks and mortar of renovation and new construction is one legacy of 

Army engineer activity. Entire installations have been turned over to—or 

returned to—the governments of the countries in which they were located. French families in a housing development outside Orleans, France, 

appreciate the floors that are warmed by the conduit ducts for the district 

heating system. Refugees from Eastern Europe enjoy housing in Germany 

that was constructed for American military families. 

Another legacy of the U.S. military presence is manifest in the lives of 

German nationals like Helga Preuss Butschan and Hartwig Braun. Helga 

was eighteen years old in the spring of 1945 when she fled East Prussia 

with her father, mother, brother, sister, and grandmother. When the fam18Q_Epilogue_Final.indd 3 
392

ily arrived at Osterholz-Scharmbeck near Bremen, they were sent to 

refugee camp. She recalled:

It was hard for us at first. Nothing to eat. My father didn’t have a job; 

nobody had a job so we had to live from what the government gave 

us. In 1946 I started working for the Americans because we got a meal 

there.... I only ate part of it and the rest I brought home.... It was my 

intention [to work] only for a few months.4

In fact, she worked for the U.S. Army in Europe almost continuously unt

she retired in 1987.

Hartwig Braun was a student in a military boarding school for Arya

elite during World War II. Near the end of the war seventeen-year-ol

Braun was sent to the Russian front, where he became a prisoner of wa

He escaped back to Germany but was held for three years as a prisoner o

war in the French zone. As a prisoner he began training as a mason; afte

his release he completed an engineering degree and worked briefly fo

a German construction company. In February 1952 he accepted a job a

project engineer with the U.S. Army at Ramstein Air Base. Interviewed 

the Europe Division’s Kaiserslautern Area Office in June 1990, he contem

plated his approaching retirement after almost forty years with the U.

Army in Europe:

When I go out I can say it was nice from the first moment to the 

last with real hard work in between.... Work I was not even asked to 

do I did because I was happy to do it. That is what I call a worked life, 

with foreign people like former war enemies, then growing together 

and later on friends to a point where I can say I worked better for the 

American people than I would have worked for my own house at home. 

Because they gave me so much by being friendly, by being open and 

telling their needs—and human relations were developed.5

Listening to Hartwig Braun, Helga Butschan, or scores of other

describe their personal experiences as employees of the U.S. Army i

Germany makes clear anecdotally the profound professional and emo

tional impact of the American military presence. 

In October 1990 Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell, the last commander of th

Europe Division, presided over a tree-planting ceremony. The ceremon

took place at the rear of the Phillips Building on the grounds of the I.G

Farben property in Frankfurt, Germany, from which Army engineers ha

operated since July 1945. The occasion was the dedication of an employe

patio, but General Harrell asserted that the tree represented a great de

more than one construction project. The plaque at the base of the tree read

This tree was planted to commemorate the dedicated work of the 

military and civilian personnel—American, German, and third-country nationals—of the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD). May 

18Q_Epilogue_Final.indd 4 
393

it grow and flourish in an era of peace their devoted efforts have helped 

make possible.6

A few years after this ceremony, the United States returned the former 

I.G. Farben property to the city of Frankfurt, which converted it into a 

university campus. In the early years of the twenty-first century the former Phillips Building sat empty, abandoned, and surrounded by weeds, 

an ironic tribute to the success of the Army engineers. The generation of 

Helga Butschan and Hartwig Braun is passing. The investment of time, 

money, and energy contributed by the Army engineers—military, civilian, 

and local national—remains as part of the legacy of the peaceful triumph 

of Western democracy that helped sustain more than a half-century of 

peace in Europe. This story is worth remembering.

18Q_Epilogue_Final.indd 5 
18Q_Epilogue_Final.indd 6 
NOTES

19R_EndNotes.indd 1 
19R_EndNotes.indd 2 
Part I Introduction

1

Alfred M. Beck et al., The Corps of Engineers: The War against Germany (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), offers a comprehensive history of 

engineer activities during the war. Lewis A. Pick, “Expanded Role of Engineers,” Military 

Engineer 41 (July/August 1949): 271; “Annual Historical Review, 1 July 1975–30 September 

1976,” Office of the Chief of Engineers, Gen Files, Box 8, File 4 (hereafter cited as Gen 

Files 8–4), Research Collections, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Alexandria, Va. (hereafter cited as OH HQUSACE). Statistics from Beck, The 

Corps of Engineers: The War against Germany, p. 565. 2

Eugene Reybold, “Engineers in World War II: A Tribute,” p. 10, Unpubl Ms, 1945, OH 

HQUSACE. A copy of this typescript, dated 30 September 1945, is located in Engineering 

Society Library, New York, N.Y. 3

Ltr, Cecil R. Moore to Karl C. Dod, 18 February 1974, commenting on an early 

draft of “Overseas Military Operations of the Corps of Engineers, 1945–1970,” Unpubl 

Ms [1973?], Military Files, XI, Box 3, File 3 (hereafter cited as Mil Files XI–3–3), OH 

HQUSACE. 

Chapter 1 

1

See Walter Laqueur, Europe Since Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe (New York: Penguin 

Books, 1982), pp. 15–20, for this and subsequent paragraphs describing Europe in 1945. 

See also Alfred Grosser, Germany in Our Time, A Political History of the Postwar Years (New 

York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 35, and Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation 

of Germany, 1944–1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), pp. 

351–53. 2

A. J. Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany: From Bismarck to Brandt (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1973), p. 466. 3

Final Report of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, 1942–1945, 2 vols. 

(Paris: Herve et Fils, n.d.), I: 264–65. 4

Karl C. Dod, “Overseas Military Operations of the Corps of Engineers, 1945–1970” 

(hereafter cited as Dod Ms), 1: 4, 6, Mil Files, XI–1–1, OH HQUSACE. 5

Ibid., 1: 30–32, 264–68, 320.

6

Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945–1953

(Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), p. 12. 7

Billy A. Arthur, “Tracing the Roots of the U.S. Army Europe,” Heidelberg Herald Post, 

19 Nov 82. 8

“Reorganization of Tactical Forces, VE-Day to 1 Jan 1949” (Historical Division, 

European Command, 1950) (hereafter cited as “Reorganization of Tactical Forces”), p. 7, a 

59–page typescript in Mil Files, XII–26–5/1, OH HQUSACE; Campbell Barracks: The Story of a 

Caserne (Heidelberg: Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, Military History Office, 1987), p. 13. 9

Cir “GCT/322.01 (Theater),” 26 May 45, and Cir “AG 322 GCT–AGO,” 21 Jul 45, 

National Archives (NA), Record Group (RG) 332, European Theater of Operations, (ETO), 

Hist Div, Admin History Rpts 1942–January 1946, Box 73. 10Interv, John T. Greenwood with Brig. Gen. Paul D. Berrigan (USA, Ret.), 15, 17, 19 

Nov 80, San Francisco, Calif., pp. 279, 285, 253, OH HQUSACE. 11“Report of Operations of the Theater Chief Engineer, 1 January–31 March 1946,” p. 

4, NA, RG 338, Historical Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts Jan–Sep 46, Box 

2761. 

19R_EndNotes.indd 3 
398

12Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 54. For a definition of “general construction,” s

p. 318; for other categories of construction, see p. 265. See also Dod Ms, 1: 3. 13Dod Ms, 1: 3, 9; Bernard W. Poirier, “The Forward Edge: An Overview of th

Army Engineers in Europe, 1945 to 1980,” p. 17, Iroquois Research Institute, 1980, O

HQUSACE. 14“Report on the Operations of the Chief Engineer, 1 January–31 March 1947,” p. 

NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 15“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” pp. 30–31; Frederiksen, American Milita

Occupation, pp. 29–31. 16The Third Year of the Occupation, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, vol. 

(Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command), 34: 2–7, typescri

at U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C.; Frederiksen, Americ

Military Occupation, pp. 29–32, 41; “Report on the Operations of the Chief Engineer, 

January–31 March 1947,” pp. 1–5, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarter

Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 17On Austria, see Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 29–32. 18H. S. Miller, “American Engineers in Austria,” Military Engineer 46 (May/June 1954

177–79; Dod Ms, 1: 6, 38. 19“The USFA Engineers,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Jul 51, includes th

retrospective information. See the files of clippings in the Stars and Stripes Librar

Darmstadt, Germany; Miller, “American Engineers in Austria,” pp. 177–79. 20Final Report of the Chief Engineer, II: app. 1–M; almost the identical organization 

of July 1946 is given in the typescript report The Second Year of the Occupation, Occupatio

Forces in Europe Series, vol. 4 (Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, Europea

Command), 31: 51. The Fiscal Division had been added by July 1946 and Real Estate ha

been subsumed under the Construction Division. 21Second Year of the Occupation, vol. 4, 31: 65. 22Ibid.

23“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1946,” pp. 2–3, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Fil

Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts January–September 46, Box 2761. 24See the list of sixteen elements of the “Basic Administrative Plan” assigned as th

responsibility of the theater chief engineer in “Report ... 1 July–30 September 1946,” p

3–5, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 25“Report, 1 October–31 December 1946,” p. 12, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Fil

Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 26Ibid.

27“Annual Report of the Chief Engineer, 1 January–31 December 1949,” com

Capt. James F. Holly and Diana M. Newcomb, p. 23, NA, RG 338, European Comman

(EUCOM), Engr Div, Annual Historical Report 1949, Box 2765 (hereafter cited as EE

AHR 1949). 28Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 368–69; Harold W. Brown, “The Physical Plan

Procurement, Construction and Maintenance” (Frankfurt: Chief Historian, Europea

Command, 1947), typescript, p. 30. 29Brown, “The Physical Plant,” p. 30.

30Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 144; Interv, Greenwood with Berrigan, p. 285. S

also Poirier, “The Forward Edge,” p. 12, citing a Tele Interv with John R. Hardin, 14 Dec 79

31Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 368. 32“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” p. 11.

33Unless otherwise noted, the figures and the information on the labor forces in th

and the next two paragraphs are derived from the quarterly reports for 1946, NA, RG 33

Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Boxes 152, 152A, 2761, 2763.

19R_EndNotes.indd 4 
399

34“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” p. 11. 

35See also NA, RG 332, Hist Div, Program Files, United States Forces European 

Theater (USFET) Engr Sec, Quarterly Rpts, Box 340. 36Dod Ms, 1: 19. “Report ... 1 January–31 March 1946,” pp. 15, 22–23, 38; “Report ... 1 

July–30 September 1946,” p. 23, 34; “Report ... 1 October–31 December 1946,” p. 8; “Report 

... 1 January–31 March 1947,” p. 5; and “Report ... 1 April–30 June 1947,” p. 4. All in NA, 

RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts, Box 152 for the first three, Box 

152A for the last. 37“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” p. 11; for the figures concerning civilians 

employed by the engineers, see the quarterly reports for 1947, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, 

Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts, Boxes 152 and 152A. 38The numbers on troops, POWs, and civilians serving with the engineers are 

extrapolated from the quarterly reports for 1947, as in the note above. Because the 

numbers are scattered throughout the several reports, it is very difficult to tell if they are 

complete or comparable from quarter to quarter, thus they should be read as orders of 

magnitude rather than as exact statistics. 39Bruce H. Siemon and Roland E. Wagberg, The Employment of Local Nationals by the 

U.S. Army in Europe, 1945–1966 (Heidelberg: Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and 

Seventh Army, Military History Branch, 1968), pp. 46–47, 52–53. 40Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 

1950), p. 430. 41“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” p. 7.

42Ziemke, U S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946, pp. 44–46. Under this 

point system, the magic number for demobilization was 85 for men and 44 for women. 

The figures for American military personnel in the European Theater and for the rate of 

redeployment come from “Hearing before Members of U.S. House of Representatives, 11 

June 1945,” NA, RG 332, Eng Sec, Opns and Project Rpts, 1945, 8–3, pp. 32–33, 39. 43See “Hearings before Members of U.S. House of Representatives, 11 June 1945,” pp. 

37–44, for the description of the redeployment camps. 44HQ Communications Zone (COMZ) Command and General Staff Conference 

[minutes], 21 May 45, NA, RG 332, Admin Rpts 1942–January 1946, Box 101, File 461–

continued, pp. 6–7, for the information on railroad equipment and trucking needs. For 

target production figures, see “Activities of the Production Division, Office of the Chief 

Engineer,” 3 Jul 45, for the week ending 30 June, p. 2, NA, RG 332, ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs, 

Bulletins, and Rpts, 1943–1945, Box 1, File 4. For a mention of the problems with other 

commands, see minutes for the meeting of 13 August 1945 in the same series. 45The problem of lumber and crating arose for discussion at COMZ staff meetings in 

May, June, and July 1945. See the appropriate minutes, NA, RG 332, ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs, 

Bulletins, and Rpts, 1943–1945, Box 1, File 4. 46For the relevant discussions, see Command and General Staff Conference minutes 

for 5 June, 1 July, and 15 December 1945, NA, RG 332, ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs, Bulletins, and 

Rpts, 1943–1945, Box 1, File 4. 47The three quotations, in order, are from “Weekly Report of Activities ... 21 May 

1945,” p. 1, NA, RG 332, ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs, Bulletins, and Rpts, 1943–1945, Box 1, File 4; 

Command and Staff Conference minutes dtd 19 Jun 45, p. 15, RG 332, Admin Rpts, 1942–

January 1946, Box 101, File 461–continued; and Tele Interv with Moore, 14 Dec 79, cited in 

Poirier, “The Forward Edge,” p. 8. 48Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 30–32. 49“Notes on Command and Staff Conference, 29 June 1945,” pp. 8, 11, NA, RG 332, 

ETO, Hist Div, Admin Hist Rpts, 1942–January 1946, Box 101, File 461–continued. 50Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 364.

19R_EndNotes.indd 5 
400

51Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 119. 52Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 54. 53Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany, p. 467. The current dollar value is derived usin

tables and a formula proposed by James C. Cooper and Karl Borden, “The Interpretatio

of Wages and Prices in Public Historical Displays,” Public Historian 19 (Spring 1997): 9–29

54Fleming’s comments are in his response (undated) to Karl C. Dod’s letter of 

Oct 73, in which Dod asks for comments on his manuscript, in Mil Files, XI–3–3, O

HQUSACE. 55See the tabulation of military, civilian, and POW labor given in Final Report of t

Chief Engineer, II: ann. 39. 56Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 350. 57Ibid.

58“Advance Section Engineer Report on German Coal Mine Operation,” 21 Jun 4

NA, RG 332, ETO, Records of Hist Div, Admin Hist Rpts, “ETO Administrative Fil

1942–Jan 1946, Box 2, File 8, “Advance Section, General”; quote from p. 3 of a seven-pag

summary. 59Ibid., quote from p. 2. 

60Floyd D. Gibson, “Railway Electrification in Germany,” Military Engineer 4

(July–August 1949): 288–89; see also The First Year of the Occupation, Occupation Forc

in Europe Series, vol. 3 (Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, EUCOM), 1

101–02, See also “German Railway Operations under the United States Army, 8 May–

December 1945,” Hist Div, HQ USFET, Frankfurt, Dec 45, p. 6, CMH. 61Interv, Greenwood with Berrigan, pp. 244, 254, 259, 260, 262, OH HQUSAC

Berrigan headed the Construction Division of the Office of the Chief Engineer for th

European Theater. 62“Reports on Activities,” 28 May 45, covering the week 21–27 May 45, NA, RG 33

ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs, Bulletins, and Rpts, 1943–l945, Box 1, File 4. 63“Notes on Command and Staff Conference, 29 June 1945,” p. 8, and “Notes ... 

July 1945,” p. 8, NA, RG 332, ETO, Hist Div, Admin Hist Rpts, 1942–January 1946, Box 10

File 461–continued. See also Dod Ms, 1: 10. 64Interv, Greenwood with Berrigan, p. 255. See also Poirier, “The Forward Edge,” p

12–13, quoting his Tele Interv with Berrigan, 14 Dec 79. “Report ... 1 April–30 June 1946

p. 40, NA, RG 332, Hist Div, Program Files, USFET Engr Sec, Quarterly Rpts, Box 340.

Chapter 2 

1

Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 122. 2

The First Year of the Occupation, vol. 3, 14: 99–100; Frederiksen, American Milita

Occupation, p. 120. 3

“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1946,” pp. 25–27, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Progra

Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts Jan–Sep 46, Box 2761. See also subsequent quarterly repor

in Box 152; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 122; Second Year of the Occupatio

vol. 4, 31: 64. 4

Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946, p. 351. 5

Harold W. Brown, The Physical Plant: Procurement, Construction and Maintenanc

Occupation Forces in Europe Series (Frankfurt: Office of the Chief Historian, 1947

typescript, p. 47. 6

Min, “Command and General Staff Conference,” HQ [Paris] TSFET, 16 Nov 45, p. 

NA, RG 332, Admin Rpts 1942–January 1946, Box 101, File 461–continued. 7

Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973, Mil Files, XI–3–3, OH HQUSACE.

19R_EndNotes.indd 6 
401

8

“Status of Theater Construction Program,” presentation by Col. Robert J. Fleming, 

Engr, Notes of G–4 Semi-Weekly Staff Conference, 5 Nov 46, Mil Files, XII–1–15, OH 

HQUSACE (hereafter cited as Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46). Fleming was chief of construction 

in the Office of the Chief Engineer, USFET, at the time. See also “Report ... 1 October–31 

December 1946,” pp. 23, 27, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 

1946–1947, Box 152; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 122–23. 9

Interv, Greenwood with Berrigan, p. 279. 

10Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 1. 

11Ibid. 

12For this and the following paragraph, see Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 

pp. 122–23; Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 1. 13 A Special Study of Operation “Vittles,” published by Aviation Operations Magazine

(New York: Conover Mast, 1949), pp. 56–57; Dod Ms, 1: 11, 23; Second Year of the Occupation, 

vol. 4, 31: 65. 14See the references in the preceding note and in addition, “Report ... 1 January–31 

March 1946,” pp. 23–24, Quarterly Rpts Jan–Sep 46, Box 2761; “Report ... 1 July–30 

September 1946,” p. 24, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. Both in NA, RG 338, Hist Div, 

Program Files Engr Div. 15Dod Ms, 1: 15–16.

16Special Study of Operation “Vittles,” p. 58; Dod Ms, 1: 15–16. 17“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1947,” p. 21, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files 

Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 18Dod Ms, 3: 3–4. 

19Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 3. The quarterly reports from this period also testify to a 

chronic shortage of critical supplies. 20Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 2. 

21“Report ... 1 April–30 June 1947,” p. 1, 18, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr 

Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. 22 Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 2; “Report ... 1 January–31 March 1947,” p. 20, NA, RG 

338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 23 Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 3.

24See the comments on procurement in the General Summary (“Irregular 

Procurement,” p. 5) of “Report ... 1 October–31 December 1946,” NA, RG 338, Hist Div, 

Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. See also Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46. 25Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973. The quotes used in describing his “settling of 

scores” come from this handwritten letter. 26Ibid.; again, the quoted passage is from Fleming’s letter.

27“The Peace Dividend: Myth and Reality,” Time (12 February 1990): 26. 28“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1948,” p. 16, and “Report ... 1 July–30 September 

1948,” p. 13, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, 

Box 152A; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 50, 163. 29“Report ... 1 July–30 September 1946,” p. 23, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files 

Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 30“Report ... 1 October–31 December 1947,” p. 12, and similar report for 1 January–31 

March 1948, p. 15, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 

1947–1950, Box 152A. The quote is from the latter. 31For a comment on this decision, see Berrigan’s comments to Poirier cited in “The 

Forward Edge,” p. 12. 32The phrase is from “Report ... 1 October–31 December 1947,” p. 13, NA, RG 338, Hist 

Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A, but it reappears in 

almost identical form in every subsequent quarterly report.

19R_EndNotes.indd 7 
402

33“Hearing before Members of U.S. House of Representatives, Jun. 11, 1945,” p. 47, NA

RG 332, Engr Sec, Opns and Project Rpts 1945, Box 8, File 3 of 13; Interv, Greenwood wi

Berrigan, pp. 244, 259, 260, 262. 34See Final Report of the Chief Engineer, II: app. 20–A for a map of “Engineer Supp

Installations in the European Theater, May 8, 1945”; the rest of the information in th

paragraph is drawn from “Report ... 1 January–31 March 1946,” p. 20, NA, RG 338, Hi

Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts Jan–Sep 46, Box 2761. 35EED AHR 1949, p. 24, See also Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973. 

36“Report ... 1 July–30 September 1946,” p. 36, in NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Fil

Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 37See Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973.

38“Report ... 1 July–30 September 1946,” pp. 36–37; Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 197

39“Report ... 1 October–31 December 1946,” p. 24; and corresponding report for 

January–31 March 1947, p. 16, both in NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Di

Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 40“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1947,” pp. 16–21, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Progra

Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 41Ibid., and corresponding report for 1 April–30 June 1947, p. 14, NA, RG 338, Hist Di

Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. 42“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1947,” pp. 16–21.

43Ibid., and corresponding report for 1 April–30 June 1947, p. 14.

44“Report ... 1 October–31 December 1946,” p. 20, and “Report ... 1 April–30 Jun

1947,” p. 14. 45“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1948,” p. 11, and corresponding report for 1 July–

September 1948, p. 10, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletin

1947–1950, Box 152A. 46“Report ... 1 April–30 June 1948,” pp. 10–11, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Fil

Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. 47“Report ... 1 October–31 December 1948,” p. 11, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Fil

Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. 48“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1949,” p. 11, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Fil

Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. 49Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973.

50For information on the rebuild program, see the quarterly reports starting wi

1 April–30 June 1947 and continuing thereafter through 1949, NA, RG 338, Hist Di

Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1947–1950, Box 152A, and EED AHR 1949. 51Interv, authors with H. Jace Greene, 1 Jun 90, Liège, Belgium, pp. 10–11. A

interviews conducted by the authors and cited herein are deposited in OH HQUSACE. 52EED AHR 1949.

53The description is from Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973; for confirming evidenc

see also the discussion of the demoralization of the Army in “Reorganization of Tactic

Forces, VE-Day to 1 Jan 1949” (Historical Division, EUCOM, 1950, hereafter cited 

“Reorganization of Tactical Forces”), particularly pp. 4–5, 7–8, 20–21, Mil Files, XII–26

5/1, OH HQUSACE. 54“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” p. 14. 

55On the reforms, see ibid., pp. 20–24; on Huebner’s personal assertion of control, s

Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973. 56“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” p. 12.

57Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 32. 58Ibid., pp. 32, 41; Billy A. Arthur, “Tracing the Roots of the U.S. Army Europe

Heidelberg Herald Post, 19 Nov 82, and Campbell Barracks, p. 3.

19R_EndNotes.indd 8 
403

59Campbell Barracks, p. 13n. 60Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 41. 61Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973.

62“Report ... 1 October–31 December 1946,” p. 7, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files 

Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152, and Second Year of the Occupation, vol. 4, 31: 

51. 63Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 4.

64“Report ... 1 January–31 March 1947,” pp. 4, 19–20, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program 

Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152. 65McCutchen is quoted in Dod Ms, 3: 11. The figures on projects reviewed and 

rejected come from the quarterly “Report ... 1 January–31 March 1947,” p. 20, and 

corresponding reports for 1 April–30 June 1947, p. 18, and for 1 July–30 September 1947, p. 

19, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 1946–1947, Box 152 (first 

quarter), and Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A (second and third quarters). 66“Report ... 1 April–30 June 1948,” NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, 

Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. 67The description of the post engineer training teams is from “Report ... 1 July–30 

September 1947,” p. 3. 68Second Year of the Occupation, vol. 4, 31: 57; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 

p. 173; “Report ... 1 July–30 September 1947,” p. 8; EED AHR 1949. 69“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” pp. 22–27; “Report ... 1 April–30 June 1948,” 

p. 22, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 

152A; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 172–74. 70“Reorganization of Tactical Forces,” pp. 27–31; “Report ... 1 April–30 June 1948,” p. 15.

71Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 181. 72Campbell Barracks, pp. 3–4; Arthur, “Tracing the Roots of the U.S. Army Europe,” 

p. 6. 73“Report ... 1 April–30 June 1948,” p. 15, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr 

Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. 74Interv, authors with Stanley Sikirica, 29 Aug 90, Frankfurt, pp. 2–9.

75Ibid.

76Information in this section is from William C. Baldwin, “Engineers and the Berlin 

Airlift, 1948,” OH HQUSACE, current files. 77The label for the Rhine-Main air base comes from Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 

a pamphlet prepared by Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, xeroxed portions of 

which are in the Europe Division’s Record Holding Area (EUD-RHA) in Frankfurt. The 

statistics on hours worked are in “Report ... 1 July–30 September 1948,” p. 16, NA, RG 338, 

Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. 78Herbert J. Gall, “Flugplatz Tempelhof,” Military Engineer 52 (July/August 1960): 

289–90. 79Ibid. 

80“Completion Report, OAF Field R–95, Tempelhof, Berlin, Germany,” 10 Sep 45, p. 4, 

HQ, 852d Engineer Aviation Battalion, printed by Deutscher Verlag (Berlin/Tempelhof: 

Sep 1945), Mil Files, XII–1–18, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Norman G. 

Delbridge, Jr. (USA, Ret.), 14 Feb 91, Washington, D.C., pp. 17–18. 81Ltr, General Lucius Clay to Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, 20 August 1948, Mil Files, 

XII–1–13, OH HQUSACE. 82Baldwin, “Engineers and the Berlin Airlift, 1948,” p. 5, and Dod Ms, 3: 30, 31; 

“Report ... 1 October–31 December 1948,” p. 18, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr 

Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A. See also Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 

14–18, for his description of runway construction.

19R_EndNotes.indd 9 
404

83“Report ... 1 July–30 September 1948,” p. 11, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Fil

Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 1947–1950, Box 152A; Dod Ms, 3: 29, 35; Gall, “Flugpla

Tempelhof,” p. 290. 84Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 5–6, 18–24, 74–77.

85“Report ... 1 July–30 September 1948,” p. 11; Dod Ms, 3: 29, 35; Gall, “Flugpla

Tempelhof,” p. 290. 86“Report ... 1 October–31 December 1948,” p. 14.

87Gall, “Flugplatz Tempelhof,” p. 290; the information on the lives sacrificed com

from André Fontaine, History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean W

1917–1950 (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 365. 88Memo, Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer to Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Bailey, 4 Aug 48, su

Airlift Support of Vienna, Mil Files, XII–27–2, OH HQUSACE. 89Dod Ms, 16: 37.

90Miller, “American Engineers in Austria,” pp. 177–79; Dod Ms, 3: 19.

91Dod Ms, 16: 37–42.

92On displaced persons in Austria, see Ltr, Hubert S. Miller to Karl C. Dod, 

August 1976, citing a report dated June 1949 in Miller’s possession, Mil Files, XII–27–

OH HQUSACE. More generally, see William L. Starnes, Jr., “The Renovation of th

Bindermichl Apartments,” typed Rpt dtd Apr 50, Mil Files, XII–27–3, OH HQUSACE. Th

information on this project comes from Starnes’ report unless otherwise indicated. 93Ltr, Miller to Dod, 24 August 1976.

94Dod Ms, 16: 40–42; H. S. Miller, “Special Engineer Report,” 22 Jun 52, p. 2, Mil File

XII–27–1, OH HQUSACE; Miller, “American Engineers in Austria,” pp. 177–79. 95EED AHR 1949, p. 23.

96Ibid.

97Ibid., pp. 23–24.

98Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 164; Interv, authors with Stua

Wagman, 11 Jan 94, Alexandria, Va., pp. 10–14. 99Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 41. 100See ibid., p. 58. 101EED AHR 1949, pp. 32–34.

102Ibid., p. 61.

103Ibid., p. 56.

104Ibid., p. 56–57.

105Headquarters, European Command, “Annual Narrative Report, 1 January–

December 1950” (Karlsruhe: Historical Division, EUCOM, [1951]), pp. 27–28 (hereaft

cited as EUCOM Annual Report 1950.

Part II Introduction 

1

Truman R. Strobridge, History of the United States European Command (Stuttgar

History Office, Headquarters, USEUCOM, 1989), pp. 1–9. 2

Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 155–61; D. J. Hickman, The Unit

States Army in Europe, 1953–1963 (USAREUR Operations Division Historical Sectio

1964), p. 150, typescript Rpt held at CMH.

Chapter 3 

1

William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, An International History (Ne

York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 290; see also “Annual Narrative Report, U

19R_EndNotes.indd 10 
405

Army EUCOM, 1 January–31 December 1950” (Karlsruhe: Historical Division, European 

Command, [1951]), hereafter cited as EUCOM Annual Report 1950, p. 9; Frederiksen, 

American Military Occupation, p. 198. 2

Campbell Barracks, p. 15; G. Tays, “The U.S. Army Construction Program in Germany, 

1950–1953,” typed Ms (Historical Division, HQ USAREUR, 1955), p. 11 (hereafter cited as 

Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53”), CMH archives. 3

EUCOM Annual Report 1950, pp. 34–36; Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 

1950–1953,” pp. 11–12. 4

EUCOM Annual Report 1950, pp. 34–37. The EUCOM and USAREUR staffs were 

manned by the same personnel, so that separating the functions or actions of each was 

difficult. See “Annual Narrative Report, HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, 1 January–31 December 

1950” (Karlsruhe: Historical Division, European Command, [1951]), pp. 4–12 (hereafter 

USAREUR Annual Report 1950), for a sketch of the history of USAREUR as a command 

entity. See also Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 150, 198. 5

Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 205. 6

Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” p. 9; Dod Ms, 16: 5–9. 

7

Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 19–20.

8

Ibid. 

9

Ibid., pp. 19–20, 47–50.

10Ibid., p. 9.

11Ibid., pp. 9, 48–50; Historical Division, HQ USAREUR, “The U.S. Army Deutsche 

Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” prepared by David A. Lane, James J. Borror, and 

George W. Tays ([Heidelberg]: 1958), pp. 9–10 (hereafter cited as “U.S. Army Deutsche 

Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957”). Both these sources discuss the various 

agreements that regulated Deutschmark construction between 1950 and 1957. 12“Wiesbaden Housing Project Opens First of 400 Units” and “City Offers To Build 

Housing for Yanks,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Oct 49 and 12 Feb 50, respectively. 13USAREUR Annual Report 1950, pp. 106–07.

14“Kasernes Taken Over for Troops,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 Oct 50. 15On the lines of command, see USAREUR Annual Report 1950, p. 28; Tays, “U.S. 

Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 21, 25–26, 46; Frederiksen, American Military 

Occupation, p. 165. 16Quote from Ltr, Maj. Gen. S. D. Sturgis, Jr., to Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, 3 April 

1952, Folder 210, Personal Papers of Lt. Gen. Samuel Davis Sturgis, Jr., 1897–1964, 

Chief of Engineers, Jan 53–Mar 56 (hereafter Sturgis Papers), OH HQUSACE. Sturgis’ 

contemporary observations concerning the relationships among Teale, Noce, and Tulley 

are echoed in Interv, authors with General Andrew P. O’Meara (USA, Ret.), 18 Jan 91, 

Arlington, Va., pp. 27–28, 32–34, 36. O’Meara served as chief of logistics planning on the 

EUCOM staff in Heidelberg during this time. 17Interv, authors with O’Meara; Ltr, David H. Tulley to Karl C. Dod, 21 July 1974, Mil 

Files, XI–3–3, OH HQUSACE. 18Ltr, Tulley to Dod, 21 July 1974.

19USAREUR Annual Report 1950, p. 28; Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 

1950–53,” pp. 21, 25–26, 46; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 165. 20Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 165; Tays, “U.S. Army Construction 

Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 67–73. 21Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 73–74. 

22Ibid. 

23Ibid. Tays refers to the construction as “cinder block,” but it was more likely the 

German equivalent, Bimsstein, or pumice stone, according to Louis Brettschneider, EUD’s 

expert in technical engineering.

19R_EndNotes.indd 11 
406

24Ibid., pp. 59–60; “U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” p

43–44; “Billet Project Nears Finish in Grafenwöhr,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

Sep 52. The article reviews previous construction at the site. 25Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 63–68. 

26Ltr, Tulley to Dod, 21 July 1974.

27“U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” pp. 43–44; chart 

p. 61.28Ibid., pp. 40–43.

29Ibid.

30Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” p. 85; Frederiksen, Americ

Military Occupation, p. 181, says late 1950 but appears to be in error. 

31Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” p. 86–92.

32Information on these projects at Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, Wildflecken, an

Baumholder is drawn from ibid., pp. 90–92.

33Ibid., pp. 90–92.

34Ibid., p. 92; “U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” p

47–48.

35Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 165–66; Tays, “U.S. Arm

Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 81–82.

36“EUCOM Plans Enclave To Cope with Housing,” Stars and Stripes, Europea

Edition, 22 Jul 49.

37Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 169; USAREUR Annual Report 195

pp. 107–08. 38Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” p. 157.

39Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 166. 40Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 78–80.

41Ibid., pp. 81–83.

42“Engineer Aid for 1953 to German City: Projects in ’53 Put at $500,000 b

USAREUR,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Jan 54. 43See E. P. Hanifan, “The Army Lends a Helping Hand,” Military Engineer 43 (July

August 1951): 279, for the details of this story. Stars and Stripes issues for the 1950s car

dozens of similar stories. 44Interv, authors with Robert Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt.

45“First Game Ball Tossed from Copter,” Stars and Stripes, 16 Jun 53. 46The documentation concerning the memorial to Mattson, including a copy of th

speech, is in the Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, Germany. 47Alexander Rudhart, Twentieth Century Europe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Ha

Inc., 1986), p. 288. 48Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 150–51. 49Maj. Gen. Bernard L. Robinson, “Base Development in Joint Logistic Planning

presentation to Industrial College of the Armed Forces, [22 Apr 54], pp. 16–17, Mil File

XII–3–8, OH HQUSACE. 50Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 169, 170, 199; Hickman, The Unit

States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, p. 151; “America Digs in on the Rhine,” Picture Po

15 Nov 52, pp. 13ff, Mil Files, XII–26–8; Ltr, Col. George E. Pickett to Lt. Col. A. M

Eschbach, 27 June 1953 (letter of commendation for Eschbach’s personnel file), Mil File

XII–27–9; A. M. Eschbach, “Construction in Germany, U.S. and French Zones,” 138-pag

typed report prepared as a student project at the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, [19

or 1954], Mil Files, XII–27–8, Last three OH HQUSACE. 51“America Digs in on the Rhine,” p. 14.

19R_EndNotes.indd 12 
407

52Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953; Col. Eugene B. Ely, Deputy Commander, 

Western Area Command, “Report on Construction,” 18 Dec 53, prepared for 

CINCUSAREUR, Mil Files, XII–27–9, OH HQUSACE; Frederiksen, American Military 

Occupation, p. 156–61. 53Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953; A. M. Eschbach, “Construction in Germany, 

U.S. and French Zones,” p. 1. 54“Report on Construction,” 18 Dec 53; “America Digs in on the Rhine,” p. 14.

55“Report on Construction,” 18 Dec 53.

56Eschbach, “Construction in Germany, U.S. and French Zone,” p. 19.

57Ibid., p. 9. 

58Ibid., pp. 12–13, 18; Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953.

59Eschbach, “Construction in Germany, U.S. and French Zone,” pp. 20–26.

60Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953; Eschbach, “Construction in Germany, U.S. 

and French Zone,” pp. 103–04. 61Eschbach, “Construction in Germany, U.S. and French Zone,” pp. 103–04.

62Ibid., p. 1; Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953; Frederiksen, American Military 

Occupation, p. 170. 63This section is based on Lewis W. McBride, “A Brief History of The U.S. Engineer 

Group (TUSEG), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Ankara, Turkey, 1950–1954,” [1965], 

pp. 1–2, typed Ms, EUD Record Holding Area (RHA), Frankfurt/Bonames, Box M–2–2. 

McBride was chief of the engineering-Construction Division of TUSEG. 64David H. Tulley, “The Military Construction Program,” Military Engineer 46 

(November/December 1954): 404–05; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 50. 65H.S. Miller, “Special Engineer Report,” 22 Jun 52, p. 5, Mil Files, XII–27–1, OH 

HQUSACE; Dod Ms, 16: 40–41, 44–45. See also Miller, “American Engineers in Austria,” 

Military Engineer 46 (May/June 1954): 177–79. 66Tulley, “Military Construction Program,” pp. 404–05.

67The information is derived from two annual historical reports, one covering 

EUCOM, the other covering USAREUR—which for much of 1950 was an operational 

command: EUCOM Annual Report 1950, pp. 118–19; USAREUR Annual Report 1950, 

pp. 60–63, both in Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, History Office, Heidelberg. See 

also Tulley, “Military Construction Program,” p. 405; Frederiksen, American Military 

Occupation, p. 150. 68James S. Arrigona and W. R. Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, 

Historical Report, 15 January 1953–31 July 1957” (hereafter cited as Arrigona and 

Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency”), p. 76, Mil Files, XII–30–2, OH 

HQUSACE. 69Dod Ms, 17: 2, 3, 7–8.

70“Report of Operations of Engineer Section,” Headquarters, 7966th EUCOM 

Detachment, Office of the Engineer, 28 May 51, covering 1950 (hereafter Report of 

Engineer Section 1950), Mil Files, XII–27–6, OH HQUSACE; USAREUR Annual Report 

1950, pp. 60–61. 71Dod Ms, 3: 45–46. 

72Ibid., pp. 44, 48. 

73EUCOM Annual Report 1950, pp. 34–36, 63.

74 “COMZ Completes 2d Year of Manning Vital Supply Line,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 8 Nov 52. 75“We’re All Fouled Up in France,” Saturday Evening Post, 11 Apr 53, p. 96; Report of 

Engineer Section 1950; Robinson, “Base Development in Joint Logistic Planning,” p. 17; 

“Captieux Depot Lives Down Early Reputation To become One of Com Z’s [sic] Most 

Modern Bases,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Apr 53.

19R_EndNotes.indd 13 
408

76For this and the preceding paragraph, see “Yanks Wage War on Mud To Set U

Captieux Depot,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 May 52, File “COMZ 1952,” an

“Building Sights [sic] of the 83d Engineers,” fifteen-page newsletter printed June 1952 b

the 83d Engineer Construction Battalion (Bordeaux: Imprimerie Delmas, 1952), p. 11, 

file “US Army Engineers 1947–1954,” both in Stars and Stripes Library, Darmstadt; an

“We’re All Fouled Up in France,” p. 96. 77“We’re All Fouled Up in France.”

78For the list and this quotation, see “Factors Bearing on Construction Programs 

France,” 1 Feb 51 (document provided to Dod by Col. Hubert Klemp (USA, Ret.), form

staff engineer for the brigade responsible for constructing the LOC across France) M

Files, XII–27–6, OH HQUSACE. 79Ibid.

80Dod Ms, 17: 17. 

81Ibid., pp. 16, 21; “Engineers Beat Schedule on Com Z Tent Project,” Stars and Strip

European Edition, 27 Sep [52]. 82Tulley, “Military Construction Program,” pp. 407–08. 

83“Memos and Letters on LOC, 1950–52,” Mil Files, XII–27–7, OH HQUSACE; Dod M

17: 14. 84Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 27ff.

85Dod Ms, 17: 20–21.

86Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” p. 76. 

87Memo, Frank Pace, Jr., for the Secretary of Defense, 25 Nov 52, sub: Problems 

Military Construction in France, Sturgis Papers, Folder 218, OH HQUSACE. 88For a discussion of the construction of American military air bases in th

Mediterranean basin, see Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, “Sand, Bricks, an

Marble: U.S. Military Construction in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Afri

during the Cold War,” Unpubl Ms, 1998, OH HQUSACE. 89Tulley, “Military Construction Program,” pp. 407–08; Frederiksen, American Milita

Occupation, p. 169; Dod Ms, 17: 3, 10, 28. 90“Building Sights of the 83rd Engineers,” p. 14.

91Ibid., pp. 12–13.

92Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 182. 93Tulley, “Military Construction Program,” pp. 407–08; “We’re All Fouled Up 

France,” p. 99; Dod Ms, 17: 12, 15, 16; “Com Z Hq at Orleans Directs Huge Supply Setup 

France,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 May 52. 94On the background to the creation of Joint Construction Agency (JCA), see Arrigon

and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency.” 95Ltr, Maj. Gen. S. D. Sturgis, Jr., to Maj. Gen. A. Bradshaw, Jr., 12 May 1952, Folder 21

and Ltr, Sturgis to Brig. Gen. G. E. Textor, 10 June 1952, Folder 211, both in Sturgis Paper

OH HQUSACE. The Sturgis papers contain good information on the problems COM

faced in 1952.

Chapter 4 

1

“U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” p. 57–59.

2

Ibid., p. 59. 

3

Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” p. 11.

4

“USAREUR Speeds Housing Program,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 15 Se

53; “U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” pp. 14, 29–30. 5

Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” p. 34.

19R_EndNotes.indd 14 
409

6

Ibid., p. 32.

7

“Locomotives Solve Housing Project Heating Problem,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 25 Aug 54; “History of Construction of Central Heating Plant in Kornwestheim,” 

paper in the private collection of H. J. Greene; Interv, authors with H. Jace Greene, 1 Jun 

90, Liege, Belgium. 8

Figures are derived from information in “U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction 

Program, 1953–1957,” pp. 34–35, 58. Information in the following six paragraphs comes 

from the same report, pp. 40–61. 9

Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 125–30.

10“U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” pp. 50–51.

11Ibid., p. 51; Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 143–47.

12“U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” p. 58.

13Ibid., pp. 47–48.

14James S. Arrigona and W. R. Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, 

Historical Report, 15 Jan. 1953–31 Jul. 1957,” pp. 18–24, Mil Files, XII–30–2, OH HQUSACE, 

outlines the reorganizations that extended JCA’s authority. See also Hickman, United 

States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, pp. 64–66. 15Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 5–8; “Brief 

History of JCA,” three-page typescript, n.d. [but mid to late May 1955 from internal 

evidence], no author, Mil Files, XII–30–6, OH HQUSACE. 16Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 9–10.

17Ibid., p. 53.

18Ibid., p. 9. For the formation of other districts, see ibid., pp. 18, 20–22, 24, 27. See also 

“Brief History of JCA.” 19Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 9, 18, 20–27, 37.

20Ibid., p. 172–73; see also R. B. Warren, “Double Purpose Hospitals in France,” 

Military Engineer 52 (September/October 1960): 402 21For a summary of each of the six agreements in question, see Arrigona and 

Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 30–32, and more generally on 

the process of contracting, pp. 40–47; see also “Construction Lead Time in France,” Staff 

Study by the Command Construction Group, Assistant Chief of Engineers for Military 

Construction, 1 Jun 54, pp. 2–3, Mil Files, XII–30–6, OH HQUSACE. 22A good, short description of the process, listing nine stages, exists in “Brief History 

of JCA,” pp. 2–3. 23Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, pp. 154–55. 24Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” p. 126.

25Arrigona and Karsteter list several such incidents in which funds were withdrawn 

after JCA had made commitments to the French; see especially pp. 96, 164–65, 239, 250–52. 26Ibid., pp. 283–84.

27Ibid., pp. 94–96, 164–65, and 253 for this and the subsequent paragraph. See also pp. 

287–88 and, on the freeze of late 1954, pp. 239–41. 28Ibid., p. 249.

29Ibid., p. 253. To emphasize the point in the original, Robinson underlined the entire 

paragraph from which the passage here is taken. 30“Brief History of JCA,” p. 1; “Construction Lead Time in France,” Staff Study by the 

Command Construction Group, Assistant Chief of Engineers for Military Construction, 1 

Jun 54, p. 1, Mil Files, XII–30–6, OH HQUSACE. 31Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” p. 362; for the 

reasons, see Parts IV (pp. 158–226) and V (pp. 227–355). 32Ibid., pp. 166–67, 286 (on Dreux), 363, 373; dates for the work at Dreux are derived 

from the citations rather than from the text.

19R_EndNotes.indd 15 
410

33Ibid., pp. 284–85, for both this and the preceding paragraph, including the quotation

34For this and the preceding two paragraphs, see ibid., pp. 250–52; on lead time, s

pp. 363–64, 373. 35Ibid., p. 48.

36Ibid., p. 231.

37Dod Ms, 18: 26, Mil Files, XI–2–3, OH HQUSACE.

38Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 318–21.

39Ibid., pp. 27–29.

40Ibid., pp. 321–23.

41Interv, authors with Edward Zawisza, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 1–2.

42Interv, authors with Saul Fraint, 9 Jun 90, Vienna, Austria, pp. 10–11. 

43Tulley, “The Military Construction Program,” Military Engineer 46 (Novembe

December 1954): 408. 44Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” figures from p

48–57. 45Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, pp. 156–57. 46Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 206, 213, an

the chart of the system of payments on p. 207. 47Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, p. 157; Arrigona and Karstete

“USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 208–14. 48Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, pp. 153–54. 49Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” p. 239.

50Ibid., p. 240; “Brief History of the JCA.”

51Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, p. 152. 52Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” p. 284.

53On the construction of the pipeline, see Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joi

Construction Agency,” pp. 196–203. 54Ibid.; on the agreement with NATO, see Hickman, United States Army in Europ

1953–1963, p. 156. 55James E. Walsh, “Engineers in the USAREUR Today,” Military Engineer 5

(September/October 1958): 331–33. 56R. B. Warren, “Double Purpose Hospitals in France,” Military Engineer 5

(September/October 1960): 402; Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Constructio

Agency,” pp. 204–06. 57“Memorandum on Hospital-Housing,” unsigned and hand-dated “about 14 Dec 52

and Memo, Lt. Col. Arthur J. Fallen to CG, USAREUR Communications Zone, 25 Nov 5

both in Sturgis Papers, Folder 218, OH HQUSACE. 58Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” p. 204–05, 307–0

James S. Arrigona, “Construction Progress in France,” Military Engineer 50 (Septembe

October 1958): 334. 59Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 89–93, 110–1

300–301. Quote from p. 301. 60Ibid., pp. 168–69.

61Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 78–79.

62H. S. Miller, “Special Engineer Report,” HQ, U.S. Forces in Austria, Office of th

Engineer, U.S. Army, 22 Jun 52, pp. 3–5, Mil Files, XII–27–1, OH HQUSACE; Inter

authors with Fraint, pp. 1–12; Interv, authors with Adolph Faust, 11 Aug 89, Frankfurt, p

2–4; Dod Ms, 16: 40–41, 44–45. 63Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 18, 47, 7

“Construction Progress–JCA,” Mil Files, XII–30–6, OH HQUSACE. Internal eviden

suggests that the latter document is from May or June 1955.

19R_EndNotes.indd 16 
411

64Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” p. 128.

65“Construction Progress–JCA.”

66Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 20–24, 118.

67Ibid., pp. 118–20.

68Dod Ms, 20: 27; Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” 

p. 167, speaks of “the 502 million dollar Army and Air Force program in France” as of 1 

October 1956. 69Ltr, Sturgis to Nold, November 1955, and Nold’s reply, 11 December 1955, both 

in Sturgis Papers, Folder 307; Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction 

Agency,” pp. 381ff. 70Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, pp. 75–76. 71Dod Ms, 18: 55–56.

72Ibid., 18: 57–58; Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, pp. 72–74, 140–41. 73Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963, pp. 161–65. 74Dod Ms, 18: 58, citing Tulley to Sturgis; Ltr, Sturgis to Nold, November 1955, and 

the quoted passage comes from Ltr, Nold to Sturgis, 11 December 1955, both in Sturgis 

Papers, Folder 307; Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 

381–82. 75Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,” pp. 20–24, 382.

76Ibid., p. 383.

77Dod Ms, 20: 29.

Chapter 5 

1

“U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” pp. 9–13. On the 

concerns in France, see Chapter 3 of this study and Arrigona and Karsteter, “USEUCOM 

Joint Construction Agency, pp. 30–33. 2

“U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” pp. 9–13. 

3

On the unique character of this aspect of operating in Europe, see Interv, authors 

with Terry Trowbridge, 10 Dec 91, pp. 40–43. See also, more generally, Interv, authors with 

Camblor, 11 Dec 91, pp. 2–6. 4

“West German Governmental Infrastructure,” 15 Jul 82, pp. 3–4, Europe Division, 

Records Holding Area, Frankfurt/Bonames (hereafter EUD-RHA), Box M–2–1. 5

Ibid., pp. 2–3; Materials for Gribble Visit, “US Forces–Federal Republic of Germany 

(US-FRG) Proposed Engineer-Construction Agreement (1975),” 17 Mar 75, p. 1, EUDRHA, Misc Docs. 6

“Briefing by Director USACAG,” 13 Oct 61, pp. 10–12.

7

“Annual Historical Report, Headquarters, USAREUR, 1 Jul. 1956–30 Jun. 1957,” pp. 

285–87, CMH (hereafter cited as USAREUR AHR, FY 1957; “Brief History of JCA.” 8

Siemon and Wagberg, Employment of Local Nationals, p. 85. 9

USAREUR AHR, FY 1957, pp. 285–87; “U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction 

1953–1957,” p. 9; USACAG Functional Manual [1960], p. 1, furnished by Reimer Delpin of 

EUD; see also Memo, William E. Camblor for Col. LeTellier, 2 Aug 68, sub: Chronological 

History of Construction Responsibilities in France and Germany, EUD-RHA, Box M–2–4, 

which gives a slightly different date for the change of name. 10USAREUR AHR, FY 1957, pp. 285–87; “U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction 

1953–1957,” p. 9; Interv, authors with Greene, pp. 20–21. 11For the agreements themselves, see Ministerialblatt des Bundesministers der Finanzen, 

7, no. 40 (1 December 1956): 895–926; on Camblor’s role, see Interv, William C. Baldwin 

and Paul K. Walker with William E. Camblor, 20, 28 May 87, Frankfurt, pp. 2–3, 33–35, 58, 

19R_EndNotes.indd 17 
412

and Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 9 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 2–4, as well as Interv

authors with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 5–6, and 9 Aug 89, pp. 2–4, 7–9, 19–2

22–23. Camblor’s career is sketched in Corps’ Line, September 1987, and in an orientatio

issue (undated) for 1988. Copies of Corps’ Line can be found in EUD-RHA or the EU

Public Affairs Office. Issues cited in this book are at OH HQUSACE. 12The account in this paragraph depends on information contained in the Baldw

and Walker interview with Camblor, pp. 12–13, 46, 58, and authors’ interview with Frain

pp. 13–14. See also authors’ interviews with Washington and Prentiss. 13“USACAG Functional Manual,” p. 2–4.

14Biographical Sketch of John Tambornino, prepared on his retirement (late 1974

provided by Louis Brettschneider, EUD. 15On consolidation, see Intervs, authors with Greene, pp. 20–21, and with Faust, p

17–18; on reduction of personnel, see Siemon and Wagberg, “The Employment of Loc

Nationals,” pp. 85ff. 16Intervs, authors with Greene, pp. 17–18, and with Fraint, pp. 12–13, 24–25.

17Interv, authors with Paul Friesch, 22 Aug 89, Brussels, Belgium, pp. 2–7. 

18Interv, authors with Louis Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 10–1

“Hagana Veteran,” Corps’ Line, October 1982. The assessment of Brettschneider’s talen

derives from uniformly positive comments by other interviewees. 19“Works Council Chairman Pens Children’s Books,” Corps’ Line, May 1989. 20Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 1–4, 58; Interv, Paul K. Walker wi

Hasso Damm, 21 Jun 88, Frankfurt, pp. 3–4, OH HQUSACE. 21Interv, authors with Georgi Reitzel, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 1–9, 18–19.

22Siemon and Wagberg, “The Employment of Local Nationals,” pp. 41–45, 91.

23Ibid., p. 93.

24Ibid., pp. 43–46, 92.

25Intervs, authors with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, p. 29, and with Greene, pp. 28–29.

26“Briefing by Director USACAG,” 13 Oct 61, for visit 9–22 Oct 61 by Lt. Gen. Walt

K. Wilson, Jr., to USAREUR, Mil Files, XII–43–1, OH HQUSACE; Dod Ms, 20: 38. 27USAREUR AHR, FY 1957, p. 269; “USACAG Functional Manual,” p. 2; Inter

Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, p. 52; Interv, authors with Brettschneider, pp. 8–9. 28Intervs, authors with Damm, pp. 4–5, and with Greene, pp. 41–42.

29 USAREUR AHR, FY 1957, p. 267; “Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, Offi

of the Commanding General, ENGCOM, EUD-RHA, Box M–2–2. The figure 

extrapolated from the bar graph used in the briefing to show annual constructio

placement, 1957–1969. 30Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–63, p. 73. 31The figures for 1958 through 1961 are those given by Camblor in his “Briefing b

Director USACAG,” 13 Oct 61, p. 9. More generally on USACAG, see Dod Ms, 20: 7–8, 3

Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–63, pp. 73–74. Intervs, authors with Damm

pp. 4–5, 52–53; with Greene, pp. 30–31; with Brettschneider, pp. 88–89; with Friesch, p

8–12.32“Briefing by Director USACAG,” 13 Oct 61, p. 7. See also “Welcome to the USAREU

Engineer’s Conference,” [1965], section on NATO Infrastructure, provided by Lou

Brettschneider. 33See “Briefing by Director USACAG,” 13 Oct 61, and “Welcome to the USAREU

Engineer’s Conference.” 34For this definition, see note above and USAENGCOMEUR, “Information Brochu

for OCE Inspection, 14–26 Feb 1972,” p. I–4, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; also Stanley W

Dziuban, “NATO Tour of American Infrastructure, Military Engineer 53 (Septembe

October 1961): 341–42.

19R_EndNotes.indd 18 
413

35On the area needed, see Intervs, authors with Karl Greulich, 15 Jun 90, Frankfurt, 

pp. 19–20, and with Georgi Reitzel, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 18–19. 36Interv, Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, p. 18; Intervs, authors with Friesch, pp. 

12–13, with Greulich, pp. 10–13, and with Damm, pp. 4–5. 37Intervs, authors with Friesch, p. 12, and with Greulich, pp. 18–20; Dod Ms, 20: 38; 

Joseph J. Corey, Jr., “Soldiers and Builders,” Military Engineer 67 (November/December 

1975): 331–32. 38Dod Ms, 20: 38. Intervs, authors with Brettschneider, pp. 88–89, with Fraint, pp. 30–

31; with Arthur Textor, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 4–6. See also Hickman, United States Army 

in Europe, 1953–63, pp. 73–74; Interv, Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, May 1987, p. 18. 39Interv, authors with John L. Shadday, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, p. 4; Hickman, United 

States Army in Europe, 1953–63, pp. 147–49, 169–70; Interv, Baldwin and Walker with 

Camblor, May 87, p. 25; “Pirmasens Depot Complex,” 16 Oct 61, Briefing [for the visit of 

Lt. Gen. Walter K. Wilson to USACAG], five-page typed report with chart and diagram, 

Mil Files XII–36, OH HQUSACE. 40The description of the warehouse project is taken from “Pirmasens Depot 

Complex,” 16 Oct 61. The timing of Wilson’s visit to Germany is given in Dod Ms, ch. 20. 41See “Class V Depot—Verdun, Alternate Solution, Warehouse, Multipurpose 

20,000 Sq. Ft.,” a technical proposal submitted to USACAF on 2 June 1959 by Ammann 

& Whitney, Architect-Engineers, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE. See also Intervs, 

authors with Shadday, p. 4; with Friesch, p. 15; with Camblor, p. 25. 42Construction Justification Data Sheet, 6 Nov 62, Mil Files, XII–43–1, OH HQUSACE; 

“Class V Depot—Verdun.” See also Intervs, authors with Shadday, p. 4; with Friesch, p. 

15; with Camblor, p. 25. 43Interv, authors with Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan (USA, Ret.), 20 Nov 90, Arlington, 

Va., pp. 6–12. The site was near Thionville in the region near Metz. 44“History of TUSEG, 1958–1965,” provided by the TUSEG Area Office, Incirlik, 

Turkey. Intervs, authors with Faust, pp. 76–77; with Textor, pp. 2–4; with Friesch, pp. 

14–15; with Greulich, pp. 28–29. 45“Wiesbaden Housing Project Opens First of 400 Units” and “City Offers To 

Build Housing for Yanks,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Oct 49 and 12 Feb 50, 

respectively. 46On Alternate Construction, see “U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 

1953–1957,” pp. 36–40, 55; “Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities and Host Nation 

Negotiations,” p. III–E–13–1, Unpubl Ms, Real Estate Division, Office of the Deputy Chief 

of Staff, Engineer, Headquarters, USAREUR and Seventh Army, Sep 88, preface by J. L. 

Fuentes, Chief, Real Estate Division. 47“Welcome to the USAREUR Engineer’s Conference,” [1965], section on Alternate 

Construction. 48Ibid.; “Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities.”

49The information on this operation is drawn primarily from Intervs, authors with 

Brettschneider, pp. 78–100, and with Fraint, pp. 21–23. 50Quote from Interv, authors with Fraint, pp. 21–23. 

51Interv, authors with Brettschneider, pp. 81–84.

52Ibid., pp. 84–85, and Intervs, authors with Fraint, pp. 21–23, and with Camblor, 9 

Aug 89, pp. 39–41. Brettschneider recounts several other incidents of cooperation during 

operations in Berlin. 53Tele Intervs, authors with Col. Paavo Carlson (Ret.), 28 Sep 90; with Col. C. B. 

Lyle, Jr. (Ret.), 26 Oct 90; with Col. John Driskill (Ret.), 5 Nov 90; with Brig. Gen. Gilbert 

W. Kirby, Jr. (USA, Ret.), 9 Nov 90; with Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson (USA, Ret.), 29 Oct 90, 

Alexandria, Va.

19R_EndNotes.indd 19 
414

54Erwin N. Thompson, Pacific Ocean Engineers: History of the U.S. Army Corps 

Engineers in the Pacific, 1905–1980 (Honolulu: Pacific Ocean Division, n.d.), ch. 6. See al

William C. Baldwin, “Engineer Echelon-above-Corps Organization in the Pacific sin

1941” (Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1990). 55Office of the CG, ENGCOM, “Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 1968,” attached cha

of annual construction placement 1957 to 1969, and p. 11, EUD-RHA, Box M–2–2. 56See USACAG Organization and Functions Manual dtd 1 Jun 63, EUD-RHA, Bo

H–2–2. 57Interv, authors with Col. Carlyle Charles (Ret.), 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 3–5.

58See authors’ interviews with Fraint, Friesch, Brettschneider, and others.

59This account emerges from authors’ interviews with people who served 

USACAG, USAREUR, or the Engineer Element during the early 1960s. They includ

interviews with Maj. Gen. Robert P. Young (USA, Ret.), 30 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va., wi

Wilson, and with Greulich; also, authors’ Tele Intervs with Lyle, with Carlson, wi

Driskill, with Kirby, and with William B. Dawes, 26 Oct 90. In addition, see author

interviews with others who served with USACAG between 1961 and 1964: Brettschneide

Butschan, Charles, Faust, Fraint, Friesch, Damm, Greene, Rodehaver, and Shadda

Camblor passed over his return to USAREUR in Heidelberg in his interviews wi

Baldwin and Walker and with the authors. In comments on the manuscript addresse

to the authors in February 1991, Camblor explained his reasons for accepting Gener

Morris’ invitation to serve in Heidelberg as a special assistant. On the incorporation 

USARFEOF, see Memo, Camblor for Col. LeTellier, [2 Aug 68], sub: Chronological Histo

of Construction Responsibilities in France and Germany”; Interv, authors with Charle

pp. 3–5. 60Memo, Camblor for Col. LeTellier; “USAREUR Engineer Element Responsibilities

29 Sep 66, Mil Files, XII–43–1, OH HQUSACE.

Chapter 6 

1

Interv, authors with General Andrew P. O’Meara (USA, Ret.), 18 Jan 91, Arlingto

Va., pp. 1–12. 2

“Study of Proposed Consolidation of Military Construction Activities in Europe,” 

Oct 65, HQ, U.S. Army Audit Agency, Washington National Records Center, Access n

86–0008, Box 6, RC 10–27–03–5–5, File 207–01. 3

Ibid. Quote from Ltr, Jack O’Neill (Frankfurt) to William B. Dawes, 11 October [196

O’Neill was serving in the Engineer Element in Frankfurt; Dawes had recently returne

from service in Frankfurt to a Corps of Engineers position in California. Dawes provide

the letter to the authors. 4

Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Robert P. Young (USA, Ret.), 30 Oct 90, Alexandri

Va., for this and subsequent paragraphs. Also, Interv, Donita M. Moorhus with M

Gen. Robert P. Young (USA, Ret.), 9 Oct 91, Arlington, Va. See also Intervs, authors wi

Randolph S. Washington, 31 May 90, Chièvres, Belgium, pp. 1–4, and with Zawisza, p. 

Concerning the creation of the Army Area Command, see “Military Community Stud

Project RED WHEEL,” prepared by ODCSCOMPT, USAREUR, May 73, ann. B, pp. 4–5, O

HQUSACE. Stoughton’s first name was Tom, not Thomas. 5

Interv, Moorhus with Young, 9 Oct 91, pp. 1–4.

6

Intervs, authors with O’Meara, p. 23, and Moorhus with Young, 9 Oct 91, p. 8–10.

7

“Engineer Outfits Merging,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 Jun 67; William 

Baldwin, “Engineer Organization in Germany, 1945–1990,” Future Army Peacetime Engine

Operations in Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center, 1991), pp. C–

19R_EndNotes.indd 20 
415

to C–12; Col. Brian B. O’Neill, “History of Eng Com Traces Back to ’44: Eng Com’s Role—

Duties Far, Wide,” two-page article attached to memoranda dtd 8 Nov 77, 1 Dec 77, and 

15 Dec 77 regarding history of EUD, EUD-RHA, Box P–1–11. See also “Study of Proposed 

Consolidation of Military Construction Activities in Europe,” 19 Oct 65, p. 7. As this study 

indicates, some construction is performed by the Navy in “selected locations.” 8

Interv, Moorhus with Young, 9 Oct 91, pp. 8–10.

9

“Briefing for LTG [William F.] Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, Ofc of the CG, ENGCOM, p. 2, 

EUD-RHA, Box M–2–2. 10Ibid., pp. 4–5.

11Ibid.

12Ibid.

13Ibid., pp. 5, 8. 

14Interv, Moorhus with Young, 9 Oct 91, pp. 8–10. Williams completed his tour in 

Europe at ENGCOM and left in the summer of 1967. 15“Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, pp. 4–5.

16See interviews by authors with the individuals named in the text; see also 

“Organizational Charts for USACAG, 1960,” EUD-RHA, Box P–7–11; for ENGCOM, see 

the chart in “USAENGCOM Information Brochure, OCE Inspection, 14–26 Feb. 1972” 

(hereafter cited as “Information Brochure,” 1972), EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. Also Intervs, 

authors with Donovan, pp. 41–42; with Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy, 26 May 91, 

Newark, N.J., p. 11; with Fraint, pp. 7–8. See also Memo, Kennedy to Brig. Gen. Kelley, 24 

Jul 68, sub: Infrastructure Program, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11, which uses the term “troubleshooter” in referring to his special assistant, Camblor. Interviews with ENGCOM and EUD 

commanders indicate that Camblor performed similar tasks for all of them. 17Interv, authors with Friesch, pp. 17–18.

18Intervs, authors with Washington, p. 1–4; with Zawisza, p. 2; with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 

90, pp. 38–39. Interv, Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin with Robert Rodehaver, 24 

Jun 87, Frankfurt, p. 6. 19“Civilian Personnel Management in U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe: 

Survey Report Mar. 1973,” p. 5, conducted by HQ USAREUR DSCPER CPD, EUD-RHA, 

M–1–11. 20Comptroller of the Army, “Program/Command Analysis of U.S. Army Europe,” 30 

Jun 71, pp. III–A–12 and –13, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 9 

Aug 89, pp. 19–20. 21During Kennedy’s tour, the 39th was inactivated and its battalions put under the 

command of the 24th. Interv, authors with Kennedy, p. 24. 22Intervs, authors with Kennedy, p. 16, and with Col. Claude Roberts, 12 Feb 91, 

Washington, D.C., pp. 35–36. 23Frank U. Lahde, “Construction Assistance in Germany,” Military Engineer 59 

(March/April 1967): 117. See also “Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, p. 3; Intervs, 

authors with Young, with Maj. Gen. Carroll LeTellier, 19 Nov 91, Arlington, Va., and with 

Camblor, 9 Aug 89. 24“German Labor Service Celebrates 20th Anniversary,” Sword and Castle, Oct 68. 25William M. Kennedy, “Civilian Labor Group, Germany,” Military Engineer 59 

(September/October 1967): 368. Intervs, authors with Kennedy, pp. 22–23; with Young, 

30 Oct 90; with Roberts, pp. 8–9; with LeTellier, pp. 42–45; with Fraint, pp. 19–21. Interv, 

Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, p. 65. 26Interv, authors with Roberts, pp. 6–8; Cargill, “Shoulder to Shoulder,” Military 

Engineer 65 (November/December 1973): 414. 27The description of the changes is most clearly delineated in “Briefing for LTG 

Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, pp. 14–15; concerning the unpopularity of the changes with local 

19R_EndNotes.indd 21 
416

commanders, see Interv, Lynn Alperin with Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy, 23–24 A

84, Austin, Tex., pp. 345ff. 28“Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, pp. 17–18.

29For this feature of ENGCOM’s activity, see ibid., p. 26.

30Ibid., pp. 16–20.

31“Military Community Study Project RED WHEEL,” ann. B, pp. 4–6. 32Dod Ms, 20: 33–34.

33Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 31, and with Jacqu

Bouchereau, 3 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 12–13. 34Ltr, Kennedy to Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley, USAREUR Engineer, 21 October 196

EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 35Intervs, authors with Bouchereau, pp. 25–27, 56–57; with Fraint, pp. 23–24; wi

Hasso Damm, 9 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 53–55. “Building Miracle at Brussels School

Army Times Europe, 27 Mar 68. Concerning title and sovereignty over the property, s

“Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities and Host Nation Negotiations,” p. F–7–1. 36William M. Kennedy III, “A Joint Effort for a Joint Command,” Military Engineer 

(January/February 1969): 43. 37Intervs, authors with John Shadday, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 13–18, and with Erw

Grimm, 6 Jun 90, Nuremberg; Kennedy, “Joint Effort for a Joint Command,” p. 43; Milita

Engineer 59 (September/October 1967): 368; “New EUCOM Nerve Center Is Dedicated 

Stuttgart,” Stars and Stripes, 8 Nov 68. 38“Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities.” See also Dod Ms, 20: 33–34. 

39Interv, Moorhus with Young, 9 Oct 91, pp. 10–12.

40See Daniel J. Nelson, A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany (Boulder, Col

Westview Press, 1987), pp. 78–82, 88, 98. 41Ibid., pp. 147–51.

42“Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, p. 10. 

43Ibid. 

44Ibid., p. 11. 

45Interv, Greenwood with Penney, p. 27. 

46Intervs, authors with Kusiowski, pp. 30–31, and with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, p

44–46. 47USAENGCOMEUR, “Information Brochure,” 1972, pp. I–6 to I–7, EUD-RHA, Mi

Docs.48“Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities,” pp. I–A, III–E–13–1, VI–C–1. S

also Memo, Camblor for LeTellier, 2 Aug 68, sub: Chronological History of Constructio

Responsibilities in France and Germany, EUD-RHA, Box M–2–4. 49Delpin, “Fact Sheet,” 1 Nov 73, sub: To Answer the Chief of Staff’s Request for 

Description of Real Estate Acquisitions and Disposal Procedures and To Identify Maj

Problems, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 50“US Army Engineer Command Europe, Command Operating Budget, FY 1974,” M

73, prepared for Carroll LeTellier and signed by Col. John C. Bell, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–7. 51Interv, authors with O’Meara, p. 17.

52Young’s departure is dated from material in his scrapbook. Interv, Moorhus wi

Young, 9 Oct 91, pp. 12–13. 53Kennedy’s arrival from his “Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, p. 17; Inter

authors with Kennedy, p. 1–3; Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 344. Kennedy’s promotio

is dated according to letters in EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 54Ltr, Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley to Kennedy, 27 Oct 67, Tab M, EUD-RHA, Misc File

also “Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, p. 20, for Kennedy’s observation concernin

Polk’s remarks to him on his first day in Germany (17 October 1967).

19R_EndNotes.indd 22 
417

55For this and the following paragraph, see Daniel E. McDonald, “Briefing Remarks 

for [Lt.] General [Walter K.] Wilson’s Visit to Engineer Division,” 7 Dec 64, and Ltr, Kelley 

to Kennedy, 27 October 1967, Tab L, both in EUD-RHA, Misc Files. 56Ltr, Kelley to Kennedy, 27 October 1967, Tabs L, M; Cargill, “Shoulder to Shoulder,” 

Military Engineer 65 (November/December 1973): 414. 57“Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, pp. 22–23, for this and the subsequent 

paragraph. Kennedy gives the figure for boilers as 9,000 in this briefing. A figure of 

10,087 is given for the date 1 July 1967 in Memo, Brig. Gen. Carroll LeTellier, 25 Apr 72, 

sub: Summary of USAENGCOMEUR Briefing Data, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 58“Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, p. 22. 

59Ltr, Kennedy to Polk, 4 March 1970, p. 2, referring to the meeting in September 

1968, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. Also, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, Living and 

Working Conditions in the United States Army, Europe, Special Report to Congress of the 

United States, 1 May 84, fig. 39. 60Intervs, authors with Kennedy, pp. 6–7; with Zawisza, pp. 14–18; with Washington, 

pp. 18–19. Ltr, Kennedy to Polk, 4 March 1970, p. 3, mentions the damage caused by 

unskilled troops manning boilers. See also Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 361; Intervs, 

John T. Greenwood with Lt. Gen. Howard W. Penney, Dec 80–Dec 83, p. 26. “Briefing for 

LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, pp. 22–23. 61Ltr, Kennedy to Maj. Gen. Charles C. Noble, 15 April 1970, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11.

62“ENGCOM Chronicle for Facilities Engineering Directorate,” Jul 74, p. 7, EUD-RHA, 

Box M–1–4/6; Annual Historical Summary, HQ USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 Jan–31 

Dec 72, p. 91, CMH. On the strength and influence of the coal lobby, see Interv, Donita M. 

Moorhus with Allen M. Carton, 14 Mar 97, Potomac, Md., pp. 113–19. 63On budget cuts, see Ltr, Kennedy to Noble, 28 July 1969; on the congressional 

moratorium that suspended the program, see “Budget Execution Review, FY 1973,” 

signed by LeTellier, 15 Nov 72, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–7. On the percentage completed, see 

“Summary of Questions and Answers Covered at the Breakfast for Honorable Robert F. 

Froehlke Hosted by Commander, V Corps, on Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1973”; for the number of 

boilers replaced, see Ltr, LeTellier, 25 April 1972. Both in EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 64“Summary of Questions and Answers, Feb. 13, 1973”; “Items Discussed at OENGR 

Staff Meeting, Nov. 19, 1973,” notes by Capt. Edward D. Hammond, Liaison Officer, EUDRHA, Box M–1–7. Interv, authors with Kennedy, pp. 6–7. For a firsthand account of the 

boiler conversion program in the early 1970s, see Interv, authors with Ken Wunsche, 19 

Nov 93, Frankfurt, passim. 65“Briefing for Maj. Gen. Fred Clarke’s Visit to Engineer Division, 9 Nov. 1964,” p. 3, 

EUD-RHA, Misc Files. 66The figures on dollars per square foot come from Kennedy’s “Briefing for LTG 

Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, p. 34. Kennedy took the information from statistics maintained by 

OCE. 67See Intervs, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 351; Greenwood with Penney, pp. 25–26; 

authors with LeTellier, p. 18. 68The information on the $5 million from O’Meara is in “Briefing for CINC,” 26 Aug 

66, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 69Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 352.

70“Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, pp. 20–21.

71Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 353.

72“Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 Jun 68, pp. 20–21.

73Ltr, Kennedy to Lt. Gen. Andrew J. Boyle, CG V Corps, 16 December 1968, EUDRHA, Box M–1–11. 74Ltrs, Kennedy to Noble, 12 May 1969, 21 April 1970, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 

19R_EndNotes.indd 23 
418

75Ltr, Kennedy to Maj. Gen. Howard W. Penney, 21 March 1969, EUD-RHA, Bo

M–1–11. 76LeTellier, Debriefing Rpt to CINC USAREUR, 14 Aug 73, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–7. 

77The figures are taken from two sources: Ltr, Kennedy to Maj. Gen. E. H. Almqui

CG, 8th Infantry Division, 2 April 1970, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11, and “Fact Sheet, Subjec

Summary of Stem to Stern Program,” 24 May 1971, prepared by Col. Shelton B. Biles, DC

Contract Construction, EUD–RHA, Misc Files. Each source uses a slightly different ba

period for the figures. 78Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 353.

79Ltr, Kennedy to Collins, 28 June 1971, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11.

80MFR, LeTellier, 25 Apr 72, sub: ENGCOM Briefing Data, EUD-RHA, M–1–11; th

figures for the facilities engineering budget for 1968 to 1972 are derived from anniversa

addresses by Kennedy, 1 Nov 69, and LeTellier, 1 Nov 71, both in EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11

81Glossary of Terms, Military Publications Pamphlet #310–1–3, 25 May 76.

82Interv, authors with Kennedy, p. 15; Interv, Carroll Purcell with Col. John 

Mattina, 9 May 88, Oxnard, Calif., OH HQUSACE. See also the description of one of th

revetments that failed in MFR, Lt. Col. James M. Johnston, Executive Officer [ENGCOM

6 May 70, sub: Visit to USAENGCOMEUR by CINCUSAREUR, p. 3, EUD-RHA, Bo

M–1–11. 83For TAB VEE as a “hot” project in Washington, see MFR, sub: Meeting with Mr. 

A. Rogner, OSD, Systems Analysis Team ... Frankfurt, Germany, 9 Aug 68, p. 4, whe

the cited passage is a paraphrase of Rogner’s remarks; for figures for late 1968, see L

Kennedy to Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley, 25 November 1968, both in EUD-RHA, Box M1–1–1

for the February 1969 record, see USAENGCOMEUR, “Information Brochure,” 1972, 

III–9.84Ayling, “Briefing, Air Force I G Team, TAB VEE Program,” [Jan 1971], EUD-RHA

Misc Docs; “General Discussion of USAREUR DCSOPS Study (Project FENDER): A

Examination of the Mission, Organization, and Functions of the U.S. Army Engine

Command,” [Apr 72], EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 85“Briefing, Air Force I G Team, TAB VEE Program,” [Jan 71].

86Interv, authors with Kennedy, pp. 12–13. For additional evidence of problem

between the Air Force and ENGCOM, see Col. Niels H. Lund, USAF, “Solicitation of Bid

TAB VEE,” 14 Jan 71; Memo, Col. Shelton B. Biles for Chief of Staff, 14 Jan 71, sub: A

Force Letters Concerning TAB VEE Construction; MFR, Biles, 19 Jan 71, sub: Telephon

Call from Colonel Lund, Director, Engineering and Construction AEFRC, USAFE; MF

Biles, sub: General Polk’s Briefing by USAREUR Engineer on 20 Jan 71. All in EUD-RHA

Misc Docs. See also Memo, William E. Camblor to Dept of the Air Force, Col. Steel

17 Dec 71, sub: Time Losses and Added Costs on Projects Due to Air Force Delays 

Approval of Funding, which mentions fifteen case summaries as being sent; and Mem

LeTellier to Col. Robert C. Thompson, DCS–Civil Engineering, USAFE, 22 Feb 72, su

Approval and Funding of Changes to Air Force Construction Contracts. Both in EUD

RHA, Misc Docs. 87For the description of the fire in following paragraphs, see Intervs, authors wi

Kennedy, pp. 9–11; with Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 1990, pp. 39–40, 42–43; with Friesc

pp. 69–70; with Greene, p. 29; with Textor, pp. 32–34; with Inge Kusiowski, 9 Aug 8

Frankfurt, pp. 30–31; with Fraint, pp. 27–28. Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Has

Damm, 21 Jun 88, Frankfurt, pp. 33–36; Ltr, Kennedy to CG, HQ V Corps, 26 May 196

Memo, Kennedy to CINC USAREUR, 27 Jan 69; Ltr, Kennedy to Col. Burke, 27 June 196

Ltr, Kennedy to CINC USAREUR, 5 January 1970; Ltr, Kennedy to Oberburgermeist

Prof. Dr. Willi Brundert, 16 May 1969. All in EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 88Interv, authors with Kennedy, pp. 9–11.

19R_EndNotes.indd 24 
419

89Ibid., p. 11.

90Interv, Martin Reuss with Brig. Gen. Charles C. Noble, 22–23 Sep 81, OH HQUSACE. 

91Ltr, Kennedy to Kelley, 21 March 1968, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11.

92MFR, Lt. Col. James M. Johnston, Exec. Officer [ENGCOM], 6 May 70, sub: Visit to 

USAENGCOMEUR by CINCUSAREUR, p. 5, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 93Interv, authors with Col. Daniel Waldo, Jr., 31 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 2–5; 

USAENGCOMEUR, “Budget Execution Review FY 1973,” signed by LeTellier, EUD-RHA, 

Box M–1–7; “Ammo Storage Improvement Program—MCA,” n.d., EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 94Interv, authors with LeTellier, pp. 6, 18.

95Ibid., pp. 19, 21–23, 28–29; Interv, authors with Kennedy, p. 12.

96LeTellier’s 5th Anniversary Msg, 1 Nov 71, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.

97“Instructions for Engineer Command Long Range Plan Ad Hoc Committee,” 13 

Mar 72, signed by LeTellier; “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Long Range Plan 

for the Engineer Command Europe, Jun. 15, 1972,” ann. A, both in EUD-RHA, Box M–2–4. 98USAENGCOMEUR, “Information Brochure” 1972, pp. I–4 to I–6, III–24, V–2 to V–6, 

and VI–2 to VI–6, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 99For the full list, see Memo, LeTellier to CINCUSAREUR and Seventh Army, 10 Apr 

72, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 100The dollar figures from 1967–1970 come from the ENGCOM Long Range Plan. 

Other dollar figures come from USAENGCOMEUR, “Information Brochure” 1972, pp V–2 

to V–5. 101For a good summary treatment of the tension between commanders and ENGCOM, 

see LeTellier, Debriefing Rpt to CINC USAREUR, 14 Aug 73, pp. 3–4, EUD-RHA, Box M–

1–7. Interv, authors with LeTellier, pp. 34–37. 102“Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities,” pp. III–E–21ff.

103Ibid.

104USAENGCOMEUR, “Information Brochure” 1972, p. IV–3.

105“Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities,” pp. III–E–21ff.

106Buxton, Comptroller, Decision Paper to Commanding General, 16 Aug 71, sub: DM 

Revaluation, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 107Interv, authors with Washington, pp. 42–44.

108Memo, LeTellier, 25 Apr 72; see also attachment to “General Discussion of 

USAREUR DCSOPS Study (Project FENDER),” 10 Apr 72, p. 2, both in EUD-RHA, Box M–

1–11, 6G. For slightly different figures, see USAENGCOMEUR, “Information Brochure,” 

1972, p. III–23. 109Intervs, authors with Fraint, pp. 26–27, and with LeTellier, pp. 57–60.

110Ltr, LeTellier to Maj. Gen. F. P. Koisch, 19 July 1973, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11; William 

E. Camblor, “Amplified Record of Engineering Experience,” 9 Sep 77, Bouchereau Papers, 

OH HQUSACE. 111“Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities,” p. III–E–21–1. The slowdown in 

work under MOUSF I is noted in Ltr, Donovan to Maj. Gen. D. A. Raymond, 25 Jan 74, 

EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 112Ltr, Kennedy to Brig. Gen. H. R. Aaron, V Corps, 21 July 1971, EUD-RHA, 

Misc Docs Kennedy’s description in this letter parallels the description of remote site 

construction given in an earlier document. The description in this and the following 

paragraph is a composite of the two. The earlier document (see esp. p. 2) is MFR, Lt. Col. 

James M. Johnston, 6 May 70, sub: Visit to USAENGCOMEUR by CINCUSAREUR, EUDRHA, Box M–1–11. 113The information concerning remote sites derives primarily from three documents: 

Memo, LeTellier, 25 Apr 72, sub: Summary of USAENGCOMEUR Briefing Data, EUDRHA, Box M–1–11; Ltr, LeTellier to Maj. Gen. F. P. Koisch, 19 July 1973; table of projects 

19R_EndNotes.indd 25 
420

with notes entitled “Border Camps,” and dated “as of 15 Nov. 1973,” EUD-RHA, Mi

Docs.114MFR, Letellier, 9 Aug 68, sub: Meeting with Mr. E. A. Rogner, OSD, System

Analysis Team, EUD-RHA, M–1–11. 115ODCSCOMPT, USAREUR, “Military Community Study Project RED WHEEL,” Ma

73, ann. B, pp. 4–5, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors with Kennedy, pp. 3–5. 116“USAREUR Area Support Service Activity Study, Subject: District Engine

Reorganization, ENGCOM,” 27 Jan 70, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; “Report of the Ad H

Committee on the Long Range Plan for the Engineer Command Europe,” 15 Jun 72, p. 81

117Decision Paper, Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Bartley, DCSCOMPT, to Chief of Staff, 27 Apr 7

sub: Review of the DCSOPS Engineer Command Study (FENDER II), EUD-RHA, Misc Doc

118Interv, Martin A. Reuss with Maj. Gen. Francis P. Koisch, 5–6 Mar 90, San Antoni

Tex., pp. 2–9, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors with LeTellier, pp. 39–42. 119“Review of the DCSOPS Engineer Command Study (FENDER II).” 120LeTellier Debrief Ltr to CINCUSAREUR, 14 August 1973, p. 3, provided to th

authors by LeTellier. 121Interv, authors with Donovan, pp. 1–30.

122Ltr, Donovan to Brig. Gen. Milton E. Key, Cdr., 56th Artillery Brigade, EUD-RHA

Box M–1–11. 123DF, Col. James G. Campbell, 19 Mar 74, sub: Consolidation of Headquarters an

Area Support Elements, Tab J of Decision Paper to Chief of Staff [USAREUR] fro

Project CHASE, OH HQUSACE (see also Tab A); Memo, Maj. Gen. Harold I. Hayward f

Commander in Chief, 22 Mar 74, sub: Project CHASE, OH HQUSACE, current files; L

Col. John L. Buxton, “EUD History,” typescript Ms, n.d., EUD-RHA, Box P–7–9 (hereaft

cited as Buxton History); “Annual Report of Major Activities, HQ, U.S. Army Europe an

Seventh Army, 1 Jan. to 31 Dec. 1974,” 7 Apr 76, pp. 13–17, CMH (hereafter cited as Annu

Report USAREUR, 1974). 124The U.S. Army Topographic Center had been put under Engineer Command in F

1973.125Buxton History; Briefing Materials for Visit by Lt. Gen. William C. Gribble, 23–

Mar 75, “Formation of EUD, Fact Sheet,” 20 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs (hereafter cite

as Materials for Gribble Visit, with reference to the particular document). 126Buxton History; Annual Report USAREUR, 1974, pp. 13–17. 

127Annual Report USAREUR, 1974, p. 17.

128Materials for Gribble Visit, “Personnel Status,” 21 Mar 75, and “Formation of EU

Fact Sheet, 20 Mar 1975.” 129For a firsthand commentary on this uncertainty, see Interv, authors with Reim

Delpin, 9 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 13–14. For a description of the work carried out by th

team led by McNeely and the attitudes that prevailed in OCE, see Interv, Donita M

Moorhus with David A. Spivey, 25 Oct 96, Alexandria, Va., pp. 39–52, OH HQUSACE. 130ESC Studies Center, “EUD Organization Study,” Apr 85, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–8.

131Interv, authors with Terry Trowbridge, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 10–12.

Chapter 7 

1

Interv, authors with Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan, 20 Nov 90, Arlington, Va., p. 40.

2

Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., 14 Sep 90, Indian Beach, De

pp. 1–9. 3

Memorandum of Agreement between the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europ

and the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, 1 Apr 74, EUD-RHA, P–7–11.

19R_EndNotes.indd 26 
421

4

Buxton History; Briefing Materials for Gribble Visit, “Formation of EUD, Fact Sheet,” 

20 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 5

The agreements are in EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, and Boxes M–1–10 and M–1–11.

6

Interv, authors with Prentiss, pp. 10, 18–19, 56.

7

Min of Staff Mtg, 11 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, M–1–11; Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. 

Drake Wilson, 29 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va., pp. 10–11. We have chosen to use Europe 

Division; early documents use European Division. 8

Memo, Prentiss to HQDA (DAEN-EPA-U), 12 Sep 75, sub: Proposed Civilian 

Manpower Reduction, p. 3, EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 9

Annual Report USAREUR, 1974, pp. 2–4, 15, CMH.

10Ibid.; Fact Sheet, “Analysis of USAEDE Organization,” 15 Aug 74, p. 5, EUD-RHA, 

Misc Docs. 11“Analysis of USAEDE Organization,” 15 Aug 74, p. 3.

12Organizational Charts from 1 Aug 74, 1 Sep 74, 1 Dec 74, 1 Feb 75, 1 Jun 75, and 1 

Aug 75, all provided by Reimer Delpin, EUD; “Analysis of USAEDE Organization,” 15 

Aug 74, p. 3. 13Interv, authors with James Wise, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, Germany, pp. 4–7.

14Interv, authors with Dave Cox, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany, pp. 11–14.

15Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 17 January 1975, and Gribble’s reply, 18 February 1975, EUDRHA, M–1–12 and M–1–9, GO Corresp, respectively; Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Roy 

Brown, 25 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, Netherlands, pp. 16–18; see also an incomplete draft of 

Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974, EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 16EUD, Gen Orders Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 5 May 75, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; for the change 

of name, see Staff Summary Sheet, 30 Apr 75, “Organization of Area Offices,” EUD-RHA, 

P–7–11. 17Memo, Maj. Gen. Warren C. Moore, HQ TUSLOG (USAFE) to American Personnel, 

7 Nov 77, sub: Background Information, provided by TUSEG Area Office, Incirlik, Turkey. 18Talking Paper, DAEN-ECM, [Robert] Hall, 15 May 75, sub: “OSD Draft Audit Report 

on Consolidation of EUD and MDD Headquarters,” NA, RG 77, Access no. 86–0008, Box 

6, RC 10–27–03–5–5(hereafter cited as Talking Paper, 15 May 75); “Realignment Fact 

Sheet: Transfer of Design and Construction in Italy, Greece, and Turkey to US Army 

Engineer Division, Europe,” n.d., but attached to a memo dtd 30 Sep 75, EUD-RHA, P–7–9 

(hereafter cited as “Realignment Fact Sheet”). 19For a summary of the OSD position and OCE’s counterarguments, see Talking 

Paper, 15 May 75. See also “OCE Comments on OSD ‘Draft Report on Review of 

Consolidation of Army Engineer Divisions in Europe,’” 28 Feb 75, p. 12 (hereafter cited as 

“OCE Comments on OSD Draft Report,” 28 Feb 75, NA, RG 77, Access no. 86–0008, Box 6, 

RC 10–27–03–5–5; and “Realignment Fact Sheet.” 20Talking Paper, 15 May 75.

21For information concerning the area offices of EUD, see Annual Rpt USAREUR, 

1974, p. 2, and EUD Briefing for Command Inspection, 1977, Bouchereau Papers, OH 

HQUSACE. 22“Annual Historical Review, 1 Jul. 1975–30 Sept. 1976,” p. 65, Office of the Chief of 

Engineers (hereafter cited as OCE AHR, with appropriate dates), Gen Files, 8–4, OH 

HQUSACE; “Engineer’s Corner,” EUD Information Bulletin, 1 Apr 76; see also MFR, 9 Jun 

76, sub: MDD-EUD Milcon Transfer, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 23Memo, Prentiss to HQDA (DAEN-EPA-U), 12 Sep 75, sub: Proposed Civilian 

Manpower Reduction, pp. 1–3, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; for the quotation, see Prentiss to 

Gribble, 11 May 76, EUD-RHA, M–1–7. 24MFR, E. Scott Chronister, 17 Aug 84, sub: EUD Request for Assistance—USAREUR 

Request for Organizational Justification, based on documents and conversations with 

19R_EndNotes.indd 27 
422

Fred McNeely and other OCE personnel involved in the transition, Civil Works File

I–20–1, OH HQUSACE. Chronister was chief of the Organization and Studies Branc

Management and Program Analysis Division, Directorate of Resource Management, 

OCE. See also Interv, authors with Frederick B. McNeely, 15 Feb 91, Arlington, Va.; Inter

Moorhus with David A. Spivey, 25 Oct 96, Alexandria, Va., pp. 39–64; and Ltr, O’Ne

to Dawes, 11 October [1965], provided by William B. Dawes, archived with documen

related to this manuscript at OH HQUSACE. 25“Civilian Personnel Management in U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europ

Survey Report,” Mar 73, survey conducted by HQ, USAREUR DCSPER CPD, p. 3, EUD

RHA, M–1–11. 26Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 9 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany, pp. 15–16. O

Tambornino’s retirement, see Intervs, authors with Greene, pp. 46–47, 55–56, and wi

Col. Edwin S. Townsley, 15 Feb 91, Alexandria, Va., p. 14. On Wheeler’s appointment, s

Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 18–19, and with Ralph Wheeler, 12 Feb 91, Arlingto

Va., pp. 1–2; Interv, Moorhus with Spivey, p. 59. 

27For the quotations in the paragraph, see “OCE Comments on OSD Draft Report,” 

Feb 75. 28Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 7–8, 59–61.

29MFR, R. L. Rousseau, 18 Apr 79, sub: OAS Accomplishments, EUD-RHA, M–1–1

The document provides a two-page summary of the history of Office of Administrativ

Services’ accomplishments under Rousseau’s leadership beginning 6 November 1974. 30Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 2–4.

31Interv, authors with Wheeler, pp. 2–5, 44. See also Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Fe

90, passim. 32The personal dislocation felt by employees is not reflected in official document

See Intervs, authors with Richard Birner, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, pp. 20–22;with Lou

Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 33–38; with Brown, pp. 44–46; with Damm, 

Aug 89, pp. 14–17; with Reimer Delpin, 29 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 13–14; with Saul Fraint, 

Jun 90, Vienna, Austria, pp. 33–36; with Karl Greulich, 15 Jun 90, Frankfurt, pp. 31–32; wi

Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, pp. 41–47; with John Shadday, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 6–7, 14; wi

Stanley Sikirica, 29 Jul 90, Frankfurt; with Washington, pp. 36–37; with Ralph Wheeler, 

Feb 91, Arlington, Va.; with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 2–5; with Zawisza, pp. 21, 29–34. 33Briefing, Dir, USACAG, for Lt. Gen. Walter K. Wilson, Jr., 13 Oct 61, Mil Files XI

43–1, OH HQUSACE. 34Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 15–16.

35Interv, Paul K. Walker with Hasso Damm, 21 Jun 88, Frankfurt, pp. 16–17.

36On the persistence of the tension, see Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Norman 

Delbridge, Jr., 14 Feb 91, Washington, D.C., pp. 40–44. 37Materials for Gribble Visit, “Personnel Status,” 21 Mar 75, and chart dated 1 Jan 

among EUD charts and graphics for briefings; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 Oct 75, quarter

report, and Gribble’s reply, 8 Dec 75, both in EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 38Ltr, Gribble to Prentiss, 11 September 1975, EUD-RHA, M–1–9. Memo, Prentiss 

HQDA (DAEN-EPA-U), 12 Sep 75, sub: Proposed Civilian Manpower Reduction, p. 

EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 39Ltr, Gribble to Prentiss, 8 December 1975, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; for the suggestio

of temporary help, specifically for the Office of Administrative Services, see Comman

Inspection, Aug 75, p. 18, EUD-RHA, M–1–9. 40Command Inspection, Aug 75, p. 14, and Prentiss’ reply of 11 Nov 75 to this Rpt, 

11–12, both in EUD-RHA, M–1–9. 41Interv, authors with Prentiss, pp. 10–12, 40–41, quotation from the latter pages; s

also Min of EUD Staff Mtg, 2 Sep 75, EUD-RHA, M–1–11.

19R_EndNotes.indd 28 
423

42Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 30–31, and with Washington, pp. 37–38.

43A number of sources contribute to this account of the struggle over Greene’s 

retirement. See Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 12, 40–44; with Cox, pp. 10–11, 17–19; 

with Greene, pp. 46–53; with McNeely, pp. 15–16, 21–23; with Townsley, pp. 21–22; with 

Washington, pp. 33–34, 63–64, 77–78. See also Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976; Min of 

Staff Mtg, 2 Sep 75. 44Command Inspection, Aug 75, pp. 2, 4, 13. 

45On the problems of turnover, see ibid., pp. 11–12, and Prentiss’ Memo of November 

1975 responding to this Rpt, pp. 8–9, EUD-RHA, M–1–9; see also Interv, authors with 

Kathleen Johnson, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 6–8, and “Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to 

Employees during Mar. 1981,” p. 3, provided by General Withers. 46“Finance and Accounting Systems,” [n.d., probably between May and August 1975], 

EUD-RHA, M–1–9; EUD Organizational Charts, 1 Aug, 6 Sep 74, 1 Jun 75. 47On the fourteen-column ledgers, see Interv, authors with Townsley, p. 20; see also 

Interv, authors with Washington, pp. 35–36, and with Johnson, pp. 13–14; Annual Report 

USAREUR, 1974, p. 122, chart 4. 48Materials for Gribble Visit, “Management Information Systems,” 18 Mar 75, pp. 1–2; 

Command Inspection, Aug 75, pp. 11–12. 49On Washington’s recruiting in the United States, see Intervs, authors with Johnson, 

p. 5, and with Washington, pp. 57–58; more generally, see Interv, authors with McNeely, 

pp. 10–15; EUD Briefing for Command Inspection [n.d., but a Delbridge briefing], EUDRHA, M–1–9. 50Draft functions manual, 6 Mar 74, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. See also Interv, authors 

with Wheeler, pp. 3–9, 19, and Debriefing Rpt, Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan to CINC 

USAREUR and Seventh Army, 22 Aug 74, p. 3, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 51Interv, authors with Wheeler, pp. 3–9, 19; Donovan to CINC USAREUR and Seventh 

Army, 22 Aug 74, p. 3; Msg, Maj. Gen. [D. A.] Raymond to Donovan, 19 Aug 74, EUDRHA, M–1–11. 52Interv, authors with Wheeler, pp. 3–5. See also a draft of Prentiss’ first Ltr to chief of 

engineers [September/October 1974], p. 7, EUD-RHA, M–1–12, and Fact Sheet, “Analysis 

of USAEDE Organization,” 15 Aug 74, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 53“Peculiarities of the Europe Division,” 29 Sep 82, in a briefing book for Maj. Gen. 

Ames S. Albro, Jr., European Trip, 22 Oct 82, Mil Files XIV–1–8a, OH HQUSACE; see also 

the citations for the next several paragraphs, all of which bear on this issue of the Design 

Branch. 54Intervs, authors with Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, pp. 45–48, and 12 Dec 91, pp. 

5–14.55Ibid.

56Ibid.

57Interv, Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin with Joe G. Higgs, May 87, 

Frankfurt, pp. 150–52. 58“Design Workload: Inhouse, Indirect, & Direct,” graphics chart for briefings, EUDRHA, unmarked box of graphics and transparencies; Intervs, authors with Brettschneider, 

26, 30 Jan 90, pp. 47–48. 59“Analysis of USAEDE Organization,” 15 Aug 74, p. 3; Intervs, authors with Wheeler, 

pp. 3–11, 19, 22–23; with Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, pp. 35–36; with Faust, pp. 49–51; 

with Shadday, pp. 6–7; with Prentiss, pp. 17–18. 60Intervs, authors with Wheeler, pp. 8–9; with Delbridge, pp. 57–58; with Prentiss, pp. 

16–17. Delbridge Briefing on EUD, n.d. [late 1977?], Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE. 

Organization charts for EUD provided by Reimer Delpin show that the Design Branch 

existed in May 1976 but no longer existed in September.

19R_EndNotes.indd 29 
424

61Quoted passages are from Ltr, Prentiss to Maj. Gen. B. C. Burnell, 13 February 197

which includes a copy of the original agreement, EUD-RHA, M–1–9. See also Ltr, Prenti

to Gribble, 10 October 1974. 62Intervs, authors with Zawisza, pp. 33–34; with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, pp. 43–44; wi

Prentiss, p. 10; with Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, pp. 28–29. 63Interv, authors with Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, p. 29.

64Ibid.; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974.

65Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974.

66“Debriefing Report, [Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan] to Commander in Chief , U

Army, Europe, and Seventh Army,” 22 Aug 74, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Ltr, Prenti

to Burnell, 13 February 1976 with attachments, and handwritten notes, “Problems T

Discuss w/ Gen. Morris,” [August 1975], both in EUD-RHA, M–1–9; Ltr, Prentiss 

Gribble, 10 October 1974. 67Interv, authors with Wheeler, p. 19.

68Briefing graphics, “The European Division, The Cutting Edge of New Ideas! A Ca

Study on FE Support,” [1975], EUD-RHA, P–7–11; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 Octob

1974; Fact Sheet prepared for the visit of Gen Gribble, 23–26 Mar 75, “Support to Faciliti

Engineers,” 21 Mar 75, for this and the preceding paragraph, EUD-RHA, M–1–7. 69Interv, authors with Washington, pp. 84–88, and with Prentiss, pp. 19–22.

70The quoted passages are from Interv, authors with Wheeler, pp. 19–22. See also M

of Staff Mtg, 7 Jan 75, p. 2, EUD-RHA, M–1–11; “OCE Comments on OSD Draft Report,” 

Feb 75, p. 5; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 14 July 1975, Quarterly Rpt, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; EU

Briefing [by Delbridge], n.d. [late 1977], pp. 18–21, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSAC

“EUD Bulletin,” January 1977, p. 1; “EUD Facilities Support to USAREUR,” FY 1976 1

Quarter Briefing, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 71For the quotations, see Command Inspection, Aug 75, p. 11–12, 20, EUD-RHA

M–1–9. 72Quoted passages are from Ltr, Prentiss to Maj. Gen. B. C. Burnell, 13 February 197

and the attachments thereto, respectively, EUD-RHA, M–1–9. See also “Problems T

Discuss w/ Gen. Morris,” EUD-RHA, M–1–9. General Morris headed the inspection team

73Intervs, authors with Washington, pp. 84–88, and with Prentiss, pp. 19–22.

74In late 1975 the position formerly titled engineer, USAREUR and Seventh Arm

was redesignated deputy chief of staff, engineer, USAREUR. Quotations and materi

for this paragraph are drawn from Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976, EUD-RHA

M–1–7. 75Ltr, Prentiss to Burnell, 13 February 1976. See also “Problems To Discuss w/Ge

Morris”; Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 40–46. 76Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976.

77Min of Staff Mtg, 11 May 76, pp. 1–2, EUD-RHA, M–1–9.

78Min of Staff Mtg, 25 May 76 [Delbridge’s first meeting], pp. 1–2, and simil

minutes, 7 Jun 76, p. 1, EUD-RHA, M–1–9. 79Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 40–41.

80Min of Staff Mtg, 22 Jun 76, p. 1, EUD-RHA, M–1–9. 

81Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 52–54, 65–67.

82Unmarked box of old bulletins and editions of Corps’ Line, EUD-RHA. Befo

Kappa’s arrival, several issues of an “EUD Information Bulletin” had appeared. Kapp

dropped “Information” from the title and began renumbering issues with Volume 

Number 1, in November 1976. 83Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 65–68; see also minutes of staff meetings for 19

and 1977, especially Gary Loew’s handwritten notes from the meetings. Loew was hire

by Prentiss as administrative assistant and continued under Delbridge. The notes a

19R_EndNotes.indd 30 
425

among a set of handwritten minutes to staff meetings that Loew recorded, in EUD-RHA, 

M–1–12. Also Interv, authors with Schempp, pp. 18–25. 84Interv, authors with Col. Carlyle Charles (Ret.), 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 23–24.

85Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 99–102; the same rendition of the quotation 

from Snow appears almost word for word in Gary Loew’s handwritten notes, EUD-RHA, 

M–1–12. 86MFR, Delbridge, sub: Fund Accountability, 28 May 76, EUD-RHA, M–1–9.

87The description in this and the next several paragraphs is derived from the minutes 

of the weekly staff meetings and from Intervs, authors with Charles, pp. 23–25; with 

Shadday, p. 11; with Delpin, pp. 19–20; with Birner, pp. 13–14; with Wheeler, pp. 31–34; 

with Brown, pp. 57–58; with Trowbridge, pp. 16–18; with Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio, 6 Jun 90, 

Stuttgart, pp. 48–51; with Jose Cruz, 19 Nov 91, Hurst, Tex., pp. 41–44. 88The comments quoted are from Intervs, authors with Brown, pp. 57–58, and 

with Charles, pp. 23–25; Interv, William C. Baldwin with Allan B. Aaron, 21–22 Jun 88, 

Frankfurt, p. 106. Delbridge’s retrospective assessment of the board’s usefulness may be 

found in his interview by authors, pp. 99–102. 89Min of Staff Mtg, 24 Jan 77 (not in Loew’s handwriting), EUD-RHA, M–1–12.

90For this and the following paragraph, see Ltr, Delbridge to All Employees, 20 June 

1977, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, which traces the history of Delbridge’s efforts concerning 

personnel. 91Ibid. See also EUD Briefing by Delbridge, n.d. [late 1977], Bouchereau Papers, OH 

HQUSACE. 92Min (handwritten) of Staff Mtg, 21 Mar 77, point C, “Garrett/McNeely Observations 

on Trip,” and 19 Apr 77, EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 93Min of Staff Mtg, 23 May 77, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; Ltr, Delbridge to All Employees, 20 

June 1977; Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 49–52. 94“Hail to Our Chiefs,” Corps’ Line, March 1978; Min of Staff Mtg, 3 Oct 77, EUD-RHA, 

M–1–12; Info Bulletin, EUD, 1 Nov 76; Interv, authors with Cruz, pp. 1–8. 95Intervs, authors with Delbridge, pp. 45–46, 56–58, and with Joe G. Higgs, 23 Jan 90, 

Frankfurt, p. 10, and 6 Jan 91, Cincinnati, Ohio, pp. 11–15; Interv, Walker and Baldwin 

with Higgs, pp. 111, 134. 96The quoted phrases are respectively from Ltr, Burnell to Prentiss, 25 May 1976, 

EUD-RHA, M–1–9, and Ltr, Prentiss to Morris, 26 January 1977, Mil Files XII–41–12, OH 

HQUSACE. Examples of Prentiss’s correspondence with Delbridge, Burnell, and Morris 

may be found as follows: Ltrs, Prentiss to Delbridge, 1 June 1976, and to Burnell, 21 June 

1976, both in Mil Files X 11–41–12, OH HQUSACE, and Prentiss to Morris, 8 Nov 76, NA, 

RG 77, Access. no. 86–0008, Box 6, RC 10–27–03–5–5. 97In addition to the correspondence among Prentiss, Burnell, and Delbridge 

mentioned in the preceding footnote, the description of this situation is derived from 

comments in authors’ interviews with Delbridge, pp. 49–52; with Charles, pp. 18–19, 

24–27, 43; with Wheeler, pp. 31–34; with Wilson, pp. 55–58; with Prentiss, pp. 53–55. 98The quoted phrases in this paragraph and the passage in the next paragraph 

concerning Delbridge’s position come from his lengthy letter of 4 November 1977, 

“USAREUR Suggested Changes in the Way EUD Does Business,” EUD-RHA, M–1–9. This 

is a reply to Prentiss’ proposals, contained in Prentiss’ letter to Burnell, 8 September 1977, 

referred to in Delbridge’s letter. 99Interv, Frank N. Schubert with Lt. Gen. Ernest Graves (USA, Ret.), Mar, Apr 85, 

Arlington, Va., pp. 114, 117–18, 123, 185, OH HQUSACE. 100Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 49–52.

101Ibid.; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 132–35, quotation from pp. 

177–78.

19R_EndNotes.indd 31 
426

102Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 78; Memo, Gary Loew, 25 May 78, su

In-Processing Procedures, EUD-RHA, Hist Files; Ltr, Delbridge to Brig. Gen. Richard M

Connell, OCE, 9 December 1977, EUD-RHA, M–1–9; Ltr, Brig. Gen. Drake Wilson to L

Gen. John W. Morris, 2 October 1978, EUD-RHA, M–1–12. For figures on staff strengt

see also Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1975, Quarterly Rpt Ltr, EUD-RHA, M–1–1

and “EUD in Perspective, 1976–78,” a spiral-bound survey of EUD’s programs (no pa

numbers) which the division put out in 1978. 103Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 1, 32–36, 38–39.

104Interv, authors with Herbert Wooten, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt/Bonames, pp. 3–7, 13–1

16–19. The quotation is from p. 22. 105The quotations are, respectively, from MFR, William E. Camblor, 29 Dec 75, su

Conference with Mediterranean Division (MDD) on Procedures in Italy, Turkey, an

Greece, p. 3, and Min of Staff Mtg, 27 Jan 76, both in EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. For th

paragraph in general, see also “Arrivals and Departures,” and “MED Area,” in “EU

Information Bulletin,” 1 Mar, 1 Dec 76, respectively; Intervs, authors with Wooten, p

6–7, 13–14, 16–17, and with Delbridge, pp. 1, 32–36, 38–39. 106Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 32–36.

107Interv, authors with Wooten, p. 13; TUSEG History, 1965–1984, unpaginate

provided by TUSEG Area Office, Incirlik, Turkey. 108Interv, authors with Cruz, pp. 46–54.

109Intervs, authors with Birner, pp. 16–18; with Brown, pp. 57–58; with Helg

Butschan, 16 Jun 90, Kriftel, Germany, pp. 48–50; with Charles, pp. 25, 43; with Damm

9 Aug 89, p. 17; with Delpin, pp. 19–20; with Dodd Rufe, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, p. 29; wi

Zoltan Varga, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany, p. 10. 

Chapter 8 

1

“Delbridge Bids Farewell,” Corps’ Line, July 1978. 2

[Press Release], n.d. [Aug 78], sub: Brig. Gen. Delbridge Reassigned, EUD-RHA

unmarked box, on file with documents from this project at OH HQUSACE; “Biography

Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson, 29 Aug 80, OH HQUSACE. For a discussion of Wilson’s positions 

1971–1973 with VII Corps and the 7th Engineer Brigade, of which he was “assistant engineer

see Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson, 9 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va., pp. 29–32. 3

Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, pp. 110–11; also Intervs, authors with Hasso Damm, 

Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 18, 23–24, and with Wilson. Staff Mtg notes, 1 Aug 78, EUD-RHA

M–1–11; Interv, Walker with Damm, pp. 19–28; Intervs, authors with Terry Trowbridge, 

Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 16–18, and with Jose Cruz, 19 Nov 91, Hurst, Tex., pp. 44–45. 4

For this and the next paragraph, see chart on “Personnel Trends” in the pamphl

“EUD in Perspective, 1976–1978,” [1978 pamphlet, no page numbers]; “Engineers Bui

Up on Personnel,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 78. 5

Min of Staff Mtg, 30 Oct 78, EUD-RHA, M–1–11, comments by Tom Turner 

Personnel; Min of Staff Mtg, 12 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 6

Interv, authors with Wilson, pp. 48–49; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, 2

21, 27 May 1987, pp. 134–36; Min of Staff Mtg, 12 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 7

Bruce H. Siemon and Roland E. Wagberg, Employment of Local Nationals, p. 93–9

Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 6–8. 8

Interv, Walker with Damm, pp. 28–29; Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 6–11

9

Interv, authors with Wilson, pp. 48–49; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, p

134–36; Min of Staff Mtg, 12 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; Interv, authors with Damm, 

Dec 91, pp. 9–10; Interv, Walker with Damm, pp. 50–52.

19R_EndNotes.indd 32 
427

10Interv, Walker with Damm, pp. 30–32.

11“EUD Program Review & Analysis, 4th Quarter FY 79,” chart on personnel strength 

for FY 79, with explanations, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, and with EUD/Glasgow Documents, 

OH HQUSACE. 12Ltr, Wilson to Lt. Gen. Morris, 27 June 1979, sub: Status of Projects, with EUD/

Glasgow Docs at OH HQUSACE; Min of Staff Mtg, 14 Aug 79, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; “EUD 

Program Review & Analysis, 4th Quarter FY 79,” chart on personnel strength for FY 79; 

“EUD Program Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter, FY 80,” chart on personnel strength, p. 

21, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 13Min of Staff Mtgs, 12, 20 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; Interv, authors with Joe G. 

Higgs, 6 Jan 92, Cincinnati, Ohio, pp. 89–92. 14Min of Staff Mtg, 13 Nov 78, EUD-RHA, M–1–11.

15Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD) Organization Study, Apr 85, p. 86, EUDRHA, M–1–8. 16Interv, authors with Wilson, pp. 12–13.

17Intervs, Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, pp. 20–21, and with Wilson, pp. 21–25, 

41–44. 18Discussion paper, R. Washington, “Elimination of the Area Offices,” 5 May 80, 

EUD-RHA, M–1–8. For this and subsequent paragraphs, see Intervs, authors with Dave 

Cox, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 7–10, and with Cruz, pp. 34–41. 19For this and the next paragraph, see Disposition Form (DF), J. Bouchereau, 14 

Jul 80, sub: Field and Construction Division Reorganization, Bouchereau Papers, OH 

HQUSACE. 20EUD Permanent Orders 5–1, 8 Sep 80, and 6–1, 9 Sep 80.

21Interv, authors with Trowbridge, pp. 3–4.

22Ibid. 

23Interv, authors with Wilson, p. 10.

24Ibid.

25Memo, A. Aaron, 28 Mar 80, EUD-RHA Misc Docs, see also similar documents in 

M–1–12; “Phillips Memorial,” Corps’ Line, June/July 1980. 26Intervs, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 36; with Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, p. 36; 

with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, p. 7; with Trowbridge, pp. 22–24; with Jakoba Schempp, 12 Dec 

91, Frankfurt, pp. 36–37, 41–43. 27Ltr, Wilson to American Battle Monuments Commission, 6 June 1980, EUD-RHA, 

M–1–12; Interv, authors with Wilson, p. 10. 28Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. George K. Withers, Jr., 11 Feb 91, Washington, D.C., 

pp. 4–6, for this and the following paragraph. 29Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 28 January 1981, EUD-RHA, M–2–1; Withers Command 

Briefing to EUD Employees, Mar 81, and Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 13 May 1981, OH 

HQUSACE; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 184–86; Interv, authors with 

Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 94–96. The most complete description of this staff officer’s work is in 

Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Douglas Lamothe, 3 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 2–7, 25–26. 30Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 11–12, and with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 25–26; 

Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 184–86. 31“FY 82: Success & Smoother Sailing,” Corps’ Line, October 1982; Interv, Walker and 

Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 184–86; Interv, authors with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 94–96. 32Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 11–12. 

33Interv, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 25–26.

34“SAME Announces Engineering Awards,” Engineer Update, May 1982; “Employees 

Receive S.A.M.E. Awards,” Corps’ Line, July 1982. The quoted passages are from the award 

citation; Interv, authors with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 30–38. Higgs also received a Meritorious 

19R_EndNotes.indd 33 
428

Civilian Service Award in 1983, the Presidential Meritorious Executive Rank Award 

1985, and the Presidential Distinguished Executive Award in 1988. 35MFR, 16 Mar 81, sub: LTG Bratton Europe Visit, 1–12 Mar 81; see also Ltr, Withers 

Bratton, 28 January 1981, both in EUD-RHA, M–2–1. 36Withers to EUD Employees, Mar 81, p. 3, typescript copy provided by Withers.

37Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 13 May 1981, EUD-RHA, M–2–1; Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 

September 1981, provided by Withers; Interv, authors with Kathleen Johnson, 10 Dec 9

Frankfurt, pp. 10–11. 38Ltrs, Withers to Bratton, 13 May, 17 September 1981.

39EUD CONUS Recruiting Team Report, [internal dating, Mar–Jun 81], EUD-RHA

M–2–1. 40Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 17 September 1981.

41Ibid.; Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 29–32, and with Washington, pp. 37–4

77–78; Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 13 May 1981. 42Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 16–20, and with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfu

pp. 37, 85; “Special Award,” Corps’ Line, November 1981. 43Ltrs, Withers to Lt. Gen. Bratton, 20 January, 3 May 1982; MFR, Seitz, 20 Apr 82, a

in EUD-RHA, M–2–1. 44Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 2 October 1978; Min of Staff Mtgs, 5, 26 Mar 79; Ltr, Wilso

to Morris, 27 June 1979, sub: Status of Projects, all in EUD-RHA, M–1–12; DF, Col. R. 

Abbott, 19 Apr 82, sub: New EUD Annex, EUD-RHA, M–2–1; also “More Space Comin

Up,” Corps’ Line, August 1982. 45Interv, authors with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, pp. 30–32.

46Ltr, Prentiss to Lt. Gen. Morris, 26 January 1977, sub: DCSENG USAREUR Quarter

Report, p. 6. 47Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 144–45; Interv, authors with Higgs, 

Jan 90, pp. 32–35. 48Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 35–36; Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 3 May 1982, p. 2

49Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 3 May 1982, p. 2.

50Corps’ Line, July 1982. 51DF, Records Management Office (RMO), Walker, 1 Jul 82, sub: Establishment 

Planning Branch, Engineering Division, p. 2, EUD-RHA, M–1–6. 52Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 121, 189; Interv, authors with Maj. Ge

James van Loben Sels, 12 Apr 91, Fort Monroe, Va., pp. 64–65. 53The description of master planning services comes from U.S. Army Corps 

Engineers, Europe Division, “Customer Handbook,” 10 Nov 86 (draft), pp. 38–3

(hereafter cited as “Customer Handbook”); see also Interv, authors with Debra Dale, 

Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 4–7. 54Intervs, authors with Dale, pp. 7–15, and with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 35–36.

55“Customer Handbook,” 10 Nov 86, pp. 38–39; “Comprehensive Planning Yield

Better Design,” Corps’ Line, May 1986; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higg

pp. 145–46; Ltrs, Harrell to Hatch, 10 February, 7 August 1989, EUD-RM (Record

Management). 56“Facilities, Services Receive Push,” Engineer Update, December 1988. 57Interv, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 32–35; Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 3 May 8

Information Paper, “Master Planning in USAREUR and EUD,” 22 Oct 82, tab 22; Briefin

Book, Europe Trip, Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., Mil Files XIV–1–8a, OH HQUSAC

Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 142–49. 58Interv, authors with Blake, pp. 86–88; see also “Construction Placement Histo

Supports Mission, Quality of Life,” Corps’ Line, September 1990. 59Interv, authors with Cox, pp. 19–21, 26–28.

19R_EndNotes.indd 34 
429

60Interv, authors with Richard Grimm, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 10–13; Ltr, 

Withers to Bratton, 3 May 1982. 61Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 44–45.

62Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 89–93.

63Memo, Maj. Gen. Warren C. Moore, HQ TUSLOG (USAFE), to US Personnel in Turkey, 

7 Nov 77, sub: Background Information, provided by TUSEG Area Office, Incirlik, Turkey. 64U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, 

“Hearings on Military Construction Appropriations for 1982,” 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981, 

p. 551; TUSEG History, 1965–1984; Intervs, authors with Cruz, pp. 21–29, and with Maj. 

Gen. James W. Ray, 5 Feb 90, Heidelberg, pp. 32–37. 65The story of Rhoades’ efforts in Turkey in the following paragraphs can be found in 

TUSEG History, 1965–1984; Interv, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 6–8; Corps’ Line, July 1982. 66TUSEG History, 1965–1984; Intervs, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 6–8, and with 

Veronica Rovero, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 17–18. 67Interv, authors with Julia Pat Hensley, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 3–4.

68Memo, Col. Cowles for the Commander [EUD], 8 Oct 81, sub: Trip Report, Turkey, 

October 1981, p. 2, TUSEG Area Office Files. 69Ibid., p. 1, including the quotation concerning work at Erzurum.

70Ibid. p. 4.

71TUSEG History, 1965–1984; Interv, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 4–5.

72TUSEG History, 1965–1984.

73Intervs, authors with Ray, pp. 32–37; with R. Grimm, pp. 39–42; with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 

90, pp. 66–68. 74Interv, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 39–42.

75Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 66; with Rovero (from which the quotation in the 

first sentence is taken), pp. 8–10, 14–16; with R. Grimm, pp. 6–8; with Hensley, pp. 12–13. 76“Employees Receive S.A.M.E. Awards,” Corps’ Line, July 1982, p. 3; Ltr, Withers to 

Bratton, 3 May 1982. 77Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Scott B. Smith, 29 Apr, 2 May 91, Golden, Colo., pp. 

128, 132–33. 78Intervs, authors with Smith, pp. 41–45, and with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 26–27; Interv, 

Baldwin with Aaron, pp. 116–18. Aaron described the procedures as “sloppy.” See also 

Interv, authors with Trowbridge, pp. 18–19, 24–25, 30–32. 79Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 20–24.

80Ibid., pp. 105–06.

81DF, 29 Apr 76, sub: Decentralization within EUD, EUD-RHA, M–1–9; Intervs, 

authors with Col. Carlyle Charles, 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 28–30, and with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 

90, pp. 4–7. 82Intervs, authors with Smith, pp. 105–07, and with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 4–7.

83Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 115–18.

84Ibid., pp. 20–24.

85The quotations come respectively from Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 56–58, 

and with Richard Wisdom, 29 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 19–20. 86Interv, authors with Wisdom, pp. 19–20.

87For the first quotation, see Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 20 January 1982; for the second, 

see Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 2 May 1982, both in EUD-RHA, M–2–1. For additional 

indications that all was not well, see Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 56–58; with 

Wilson, pp. 12–13, 58; with Smith, pp. 20–24; with van Loben Sels, pp. 45–49. 88Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 24–26; Ltrs, Smith to Bratton, 19 February 1984, and 

Smith to Wells, 19 February 1984, both in Civil Works File I–20–1, OH HQUSACE; see also 

“Plan for Design and Construction of USAFE Facilities,” 29 Mar 85, EUD-RHA, M–1–10.

19R_EndNotes.indd 35 
430

89“Memorandum of Agreement,” attached to Ltr, Prentiss to Burnell, 13 Februa

1976, EUD-RHA, M–1–9; William C. Baldwin, The Engineer Studies Center and Arm

Analysis: A History of the U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center, 1943–1982 (Washington, D.C

Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 245–51. 90Ltr, Smith to Bratton, 19 February 1984; Interv, authors with Andrew Constantara

30 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 33–34. 91Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 28–29.

92MFR, 2 Apr 84, sub: Mobilization Planning for EUD [on a meeting conducted wi

Smith on 30 Mar 84]; Fact Sheet [prepared by Lt. Col. Harvey T. Kaplan], 24 May 8

“Mobilization Planning and Exercises for EUD”; Memorandum of Agreement draft, 17 J

84 [on Regional Wartime Construction Manager organization]. All in Civil Works File

I–20–1, OH HQUSACE. 93Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 54–56; see also Interv, authors with Lt. Co

John Carson, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 8–9. 94Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 136–38.

95Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, pp. 118, 119; Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 8

pp. 18–20, 26–27. 96Interv, authors with Smith, p. 132. 

97Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 1–30.

98On van Loben Sels, see particularly Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 21–2

and Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, p. 119; see also Intervs, authors with Lt. Col. Lloyd Coli

6 Jun 90, Stuttgart, pp. 33, 34; with Lt. Col. Grosvenor W. Fish, Jr., 11 Jun 90, Nuremberg, 

30; with Constantaras, pp. 31–32; with Moravec, 19 Jan 90, pp. 38–39; with Russell Minto

18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex., pp. 19–21; with Schempp, pp. 61–63. 99Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 34–36, 77–78.

100Ibid., pp. 72–74.

101Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 28–29.

102Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 77–78; see also Intervs, authors wi

Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 27–30, and with Minton, pp. 39–45. 103Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD) Organization Study, Apr 85, p. 86, for th

two quoted passages, and pp. xiii–xiv for the recommendations, EUD-RHA, M–1–8. 104DF from van Loben Sels, 12 Feb 85, EUD-RHA, M–1–101; Interv, authors with va

Loben Sels, p. 37–41; Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, p. 121. 105WRSCC Memo, Don Spiegelmeyer to Ray Walker, 16 Aug 84, sub: EU

Organization Study, EUD-RHA, M–1–10. 106Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985], pp. 5–6, sec. 5.2e. 107Ibid., p. 3–4; Materials for Gribble Visit, “Management Information Systems,” Fa

Sheet, 18 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Staff Mtg Notes, 23 Oct 78, pp. 2, 5, EUD-RHA

M–1–11. 108Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985], p. 3–4; Min of Staff Mtg, 22 Oct 7

p. 4, EUD-RHA, M–1–11; Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 2 October 1978; Min of Staff Mtg, 3 Apr 7

EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 109Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 39–44; Ltrs, Withers to Bratton, 20 January, 3 Ma

1982, both in EUD-RHA, M–2–11; Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985], p. 1–1. 110Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 38–41.

111Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985], p. 5–7. 112Ibid., pp. 1–1, 3–1, 5–17.

113Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 58–62.

114Ibid., p. 2–1; Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 58–62; Brig. Gen. Ray, Openin

Remarks to the Local National Assembly, 19 Jun 86, printout of speech furnished by th

EUD Executive Office, now with project materials at OH HQUSACE; “EUD Will Hav

19R_EndNotes.indd 36 
431

Information Management Division,” Corps’ Line, February 1986; Interv, authors with 

Minton, pp. 28–34. 115Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, p. 20.

116Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, 22, 27 May 87, Frankfurt, 

pp. 15–17, 67–69. 117Intervs, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, p. 30; with Minton, pp. 60–61; with Dale, p. 

54; with Constantaras, pp. 31–32; with Carson, pp. 35–36; with Schempp, pp. 63–71; with 

Col. Dan Waldo, 31 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 71–72; with J. Dodd Rufe, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, 

p. 28.118Interv, authors with Minton, pp. 49–59; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, p. 175.

119Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, p. 124; Interv, authors with Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 

56–57; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Ray, pp. 67–69. 120“EUD will have Information Management Division,” Corps’ Line, February 1986; 

General Ray’s Remarks to Local National Assembly, 19 Jun 86; Interv, authors with 

Minton, pp. 28–34. 121Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 41–45.

122Interv, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, p. 44; “Assistant Commander Stresses 

Communication with Customers,” Corps’ Line, January 1987; “Engineer Officials Discuss 

Construction Snags in Germany,” Corps Line, May 1986; Interv, authors with van Loben 

Sels, pp. 41–43. 123General Ray’s Remarks to Local National Assembly, 19 Jun 86; “Construction 

Division Reorganization Is Effected,” Corps’ Line, February 1987. 124Memo, WRSCC to EUD, 16 Aug 84, EUD-RHA, M–1–10.

125Interv, authors with Moravec, 19 Jan 90, pp. 1–4. “New Command Assignments in 

Division Executive Office,” Corps’ Line, August 1986. 126General Ray’s Remarks to Local National Assembly, 19 Jun 88; Intervs, authors with 

Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 48–50; with Trowbridge, pp. 3–7; with Moravec, 19 Jan 90, pp. 3–4; 

Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, pp. 125–26. 127Interv, authors with Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 57–59. 128Interv, authors with Lamothe, pp. 3–5; “Employees Urged To Contribute to Model 

Division Program,” Corps’ Line, November 1986. 129Ltr, Van Loben Sels to Heiberg, 16 August 1985, EUD, RM; “Employees Urged To 

Contribute to Model Division Program”; “Operation Cleanup: Model Division Initiative 

Program Gets New Emphasis,” Corps’ Line, December 1987; “Contracting Seminar: Europe 

Division Instructs Community Staff Members,” Corps’ Line, May 1988. 130Intervs, authors with Minton, pp. 45–49, and with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, pp. 17–20; 

Interv, Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, May 87, pp. 105–06. 131The quotations come respectively from Interv, authors with Minton, pp. 45–49, and 

Walker and Baldwin with Ray, pp. 70–71. 132Intervs, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 241–42; with Camblor, p. 96; with Ray, 

pp. 70–71. Interv, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 74–78. 133Intervs, authors with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, p. 18–21, and with van Loben Sels, pp. 41–43; 

“Dedication to Excellence Enhances Working Relationships,” Corps’ Line, January 1986; 

Interv, authors with James Wise, 11 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 12–14. 134“Europe Division Adopts 3M ‘Total Quality Program,’” Corps’ Line, February 1987. 135General Ray Command Briefing, 30 Sep 87, EUD, current files.

136“Commander’s Comments: EQM Means Total Quality,” Corps’ Line, October 1987. 137Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Ray, pp. 85–87.

138“Commander’s Comments: EQM Means Total Quality.”

139“Phase Two of EQM Process To Begin in New Year,” Corps’ Line, January 1988; 

James Thomasson, Jr., Chief of Project Management Branch, quoted in “Division Staff 

19R_EndNotes.indd 37 
432

Works Long Hard Hours To Close Out the Books,” Corps’ Line, December 1987; Dani

Farrand, Wiesbaden Resident Office, “Speaking Out,” Corps’ Line, July 1988; Inter

Walker and Baldwin with Rodehaver, p. 15; Staff in Reprographics, “Reprographic

The Art of Working at Art,” Corps’ Line, August 1988; Intervs, authors with Lou

Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 68–70; with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 18–2

with Dale, pp. 53–54; with Minton, pp. 38–39; with Trowbridge, pp. 32–33; “Tot

Quality: New Management Process Stresses Customer Needs,” Corps’ Line, Septemb

1987.140“Commander’s Comments: Successful Organization Must Change with th

Environment,” Corps’ Line, February 1988. 141“Division’s EQM Gains National Spotlight,” November 1987; “Total Quali

Management Process Debuts at Pentagon,” February 1988; “Corps Chief Address

Europe Division Staff,” May 1988. All in Corps’ Line. 142“Commander’s Comments,” Corps’ Line, May 1988. 143Corps’ Line photo, January 1986; Interv, authors with K. Johnson, 10 Dec 91, p. 6. 144Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Ray, pp. 71–76.

Chapter 9 

1

Interv, authors with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, p. 63.

2

For the situation in 1977, see Delbridge Briefing, marked in longhand “Sep

78 revised briefing,” with longhand additions, pp. 2, 3, 6–7, provided by Delbridg

EUD Command Management Briefing, with attached note from Delbridge to th

Construction Division asking for comments, n.d., p. 3, Bouchereau Papers, O

HQUSACE; “No Work Shortage for EUD Engineers,” in “EUD Information Bulletin

1 Dec 76. For the situation in 1987, see Command Briefing by J. W. Ray, 30 Sep 87, p. 

EUD computer files. 3

Delbridge, “Sept. 78 Revised Briefing,” pp. 2, 3, 6–7; [Delbridge], EUD Comman

Management Briefing, p. 3; “No Work Shortage for EUD Engineers”; for 1986, s

Command Briefing, Brig. Gen. Harty Visit, 24 Jul 86, p. 3, EUD computer files. 4

[Delbridge], EUD Command Management Briefing, p. 3; Engineer Studies Cente

“U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD): Organization Study,” Apr 85, pp. 14–1

EUD-RHA, M–1–8 (hereafter cited as ESC, “USAEDE [EUD]: Organization Study”). 5

“Customer Handbook,” pp. 6–7.

6

ESC, “USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study,” 1985, p. 11–13.

7

MFR, William Camblor, 29 Dec 75, sub: Conference with Mediterranean Division o

Procedures in Italy, Turkey, and Greece, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 8

Ltr, Smith to President, TEMET USA, Inc., 19 Dec 83, EUD-RHA, M–1–6; Interv

authors at sites in Turkey, 20 Jun 90, pp. 47–51; Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. James W

Ray, 5 Feb 90, Heidelberg, p. 38–40. 9

Interv, authors with Richard Grimm, 19 Jun 91, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 1–3.

10Intervs, authors with Ray, p. 38–40; with Julia Pat Hensley, 19 Jun 90, Incirli

Turkey, pp. 19–20; with R. Grimm, pp. 1–3. 11EUD Engineering Division, “West German Governmental Infrastructure and I

Relationship with Europe Division Construction Mission,” 15 Jul 82, pp. 2–3, EUD-RHA

M–2–1; Materials for Gribble Visit, “US Forces–Federal Republic of Germany (US-FRG

Proposed Architect-Engineer-Construction Agreement (1975),” 17 Mar 75, p. 1, EUD

RHA, Misc Docs. 12“West German Governmental Infrastructure,” pp. 3–4. 

13Ibid.

19R_EndNotes.indd 38 
433

14Ibid.

15“Presentation of the Department of the Army Outstanding Civilian Service 

Award to Dipl[om].-Ing[enieur]. Viktor Krupinski, Director, Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe, 

Frankfurt,” 26 Feb 76, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 16Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, p. 97.

17Ltr, Withers to Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., HQ USACE, n.d. [Sep 82?], for this and 

the next several paragraphs, EUD-RHA, M–2–1. 18Intervs, authors with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, pp. 4–5, and with Terry Trowbridge, 10 

Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 25–30; Ltr, Withers to Albro [Sep 82?], for Withers’ quoted remarks; 

Ltr, Withers to Albro, HQ USACE, 2 Oct 81, provided by Withers; “ABG 75 Outlines 

German Involvement in U.S. Projects,” Corps’ Line, July 1986. 19“Customer Handbook,” pp. 11–12.

20Ibid. 

21ESC, “USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study,” ann. F, p. F–5.

22“Customer Handbook,” pp. 10, 12–13.

23See Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Robert Baldinger, 23 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, 

Netherlands, p. 25–31; see also “Briefing on EUD’s Mission,” [Delbridge, probably 

prepared in summer 1976], pp. 13–15, 17–18, 25–27, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, and “Users’ 

Manual, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe,” 1 Apr 78, pp. 25–27 (hereafter cited as 

“Users’ Manual”). 24“Briefing on EUD’s Mission,” [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 13–15, 17–18, 25–27; “Users’ 

Manual,” pp. 23–25. The “Users’ Manual” parallels Delbridge’s briefing on process, but 

contains more on other topics. For the 1980s, see “Customer Handbook,” p. 30. 25“Briefing on EUD’s Mission,” [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 17–18, 25–27.

26Ibid. 

27Ibid. 

28“Customer Handbook,” p. 14.

29Ibid., pp. 16–17; ESC, “USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study,” pp. F–5, F–6.

30“Customer Handbook,” pp. 15–16. 

31“Users’ Manual,” pp. 39–41.

32“Briefing on EUD’s Mission,” [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 17–18; “Customer Handbook,” p. 

10; Interv, authors with Baldinger, p. 32–33. 33“Briefing on EUD’s Mission,” [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 17–18.

34“Users’ Manual,” p. 36; ESC, “USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study,” p. 13.

35On value engineering, see MFR, Jacques Bouchereau, 1 Nov 83, and draft Ltr, 

30 September 1983, prepared by Fred Wissel for William Camblor’s signature, both in 

Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; “Customer Handbook,” pp. 47–50; Interv, authors 

with Dave Cox, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 48, and with Joe G. Higgs, 6 Jan 92, Cincinnati, 

Ohio, pp. 67–74. The discussion in subsequent paragraphs is drawn from these sources. 36“Customer Handbook,” p. 48.

37Intervs, authors with Ray, pp. 46–48; with Col. John Moravec, 19 Jan 90, Frankfurt, 

pp. 33–35; with Lt. Col. C. Leslie Rose, 14 Jun 90, Würzburg, pp. 27–32. 38“Briefing on EUD’s Mission,” [Delbridge, 1976], p. 12.

39Historical Review, USAREUR, 1985–1986. Ltr, Prentiss to Morris, 26 January 1977, 

Mil Files XII–41–12, OH HQUSACE. 40Delbridge, incomplete draft for a briefing paper, prepared for delivery after October 

1977, pp. 18–21, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; Materials for Gribble Visit, “Fact 

Sheet: Volume of Projects in Programs,” 20 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, M–1–7. 41Europe Division, “EUD in Perspective, 1976–1978,” section “Construction 

Execution,” spiral-bound pamphlet, 1978, page bearing the subhead “MCA Program 

Execution,” EUD, current files. 

19R_EndNotes.indd 39 
434

42Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 27 June 1979, sub: Status of Projects, Gen Files, Box 59–3–

OH HQUSACE. 43“Briefing on EUD’s Mission,” [Delbridge, 1976], p. 13. 

44Ltr, Prentiss to Morris, 26 January 1977.

45“Users’ Manual,” p. 19; “Briefing on EUD’s Mission,” [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 11–1

On U.S. Special Programs money, see Memo, Maj. Gen. Richard Groves to Prentiss, 5 M

75, sub: NATO Infrastructure: OFFSET, EUD-RHA, M–1–9. 46Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 101–02. 47Interv, authors with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, pp. 14–16.

48The list of eligible categories comes from a pamphlet issued by NATO entitle

“NATO Common Infrastructure.” 49“LTG Bratton Europe Visit 1–12 Mar. 1981,” p. 398.

50ESC, “USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study,” p. 15; “West German Government

Infrastructure”; and Interv, authors with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 68–70. 51ESC, “USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study,” p. 15; “West German Government

Infrastructure”; Interv, William C. Baldwin and Paul K. Walker with William E. Camblo

20, 28 May 87, Frankfurt, p. 86. 52“EUD in Perspective, 1976–78.” 

53In addition to “EUD in Perspective 1976–78,” see telex communiqué, 18 May 7

sub: Support of Construction for USSA-I, Teheran, Iran, Conversation between Gener

Delbridge and Connell, Week of 8 May 78, Transatlantic Program Center Records Holdin

Area, Hist Files, location E–5–2, Winchester, Va. 54ESC, “USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study,” p. 9.

55Interv, authors with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, p. 3.

56In general on this office, see “History of the Northern Area Engineer Office (1975

1988),” updated 1 Sep 88, typescript provided by the Northern Area Office. 57EUD General Order 1, 7 Jan 76, Action to Organize Mediterranean Area Offi

Effective 1 Feb 76, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 58Ltrs, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976, and Prentiss to Burnell, 21 June 1976, both 

EUD-RHA, M–1–7. 59See Min of Staff Mtgs, 20 Apr, 4, 18 May, 7 Jun 76, EUD-RHA, M–1–9; “Annu

Report of Major Activities, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1 Jul. 1974–30 Jun. 1975,” p

54–55, and “Annual Historical Review, 1 Jul. 1975–30 Sept. 1976,” p. 37, both in Gen File

Box 8, File 1, OH HQUSACE; “EUD in Perspective 1976–78,” sections on “Current Desig

Programs: Iran” and “Construction Execution: Iran.” 60“Med Area to Navy,” Corps’ Line, September 1980; “Memorandum of Agreeme

between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineerin

Command,” 26 Jan 80, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; Interv, Baldwin with Camblo

pp. 80–82. 61The figures in Table 10 are for 1979 “Program Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter F

1979,” U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, and for 1980 fro

“Program Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter FY 1980,” U.S. Army Engr Div, Europ

EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 62“Program Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter FY 1979,” U.S. Army Engine

Division, Europe, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 63Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Grosvenor Fish, Jr., 11 Jun 90, Nuremberg, p. 12.

64Memo, Col. Robert Baldinger to all Members of EUD-NO [Northern Area Office], 

Jan 88, sub: FY 87 Review–Northern Area, p. 1, provided by the Northern Area Office. 65“History of the Northern Area Engineer Office (1975–1988)”; Periodic Rpt, Ray 

Heiberg, 27 Feb 86, EUD, RM, current files. 66Interv, authors with Ray, pp. 38–40.

19R_EndNotes.indd 40 
435

67Ibid., pp. 32–37; EUD Engr Div, briefing item for Withers, 22 Sep 82, sub: FY 84 

MCAF Airbase Upgrade, various locations, Turkey, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Interv, authors 

with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 65–66. 68Ltrs, Heiberg to Gen. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, 20 December 1984, EUD-RHA, M–1–6, 

and Ray to Heiberg, 15 August 1986; Interv, authors with Ray, pp. 42–43; Interv, Baldwin 

and Walker with Camblor, pp. 80–81; Interv, William C. Baldwin and Paul Walker with 

Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, 22, 27 May 87, Frankfurt, pp. 82–84, Intervs at OH HQUSACE. 69“Greece Resident Office: Another Bad Day in Paradise,” Corps’ Line, February 

1988. The programs involved in the 1980s, the Long Range Security Program (LRSP) and 

Weapons Access Denial System (WADS), are discussed in Chapter 10. 70Interv, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 9–10.

71Interv, authors with Hensley, pp. 18–19.

72Interv, authors with Veronica Rovero, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 16–17.

73Interv, authors with Cox, pp. 40–41.

74Interv, authors with Rovero, pp. 26–30.

Chapter 10 

1

The information for this and the following paragraph comes from Debriefing Rpt, 

Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan to CINC USAREUR and Seventh Army, 22 Aug 74, EUD-RHA, 

Misc Docs; Draft Fact Sheet, prepared by Lt. Col. [George] Miller for Prentiss’ Signature, 31 

Oct 74, EUD-RHA, M–1–7. The final version of the Fact Sheet is dated 1 November and is 

signed by Prentiss, EUD-RHA, Misc Files. See also Materials for Gribble Visit, “Fact Sheet: 

S&A MOUSF Funding,” 17 Mar 75, and “Fact Sheet: Formation of EUD,” 20 Mar 75, both in 

M–1–7; Ltr, Maj. Gen. F. P. Koisch, [USAREUR] Engineer, to Ministerialdirektor Schmunk, 

Abteilungsleiter U, Bundesmininsterium der Verteidigung, Bonn, 21 Jun 74, Misc Docs, 

all in EUD-RHA; and Fact Sheet, Office Engineering Branch, 13 Mar 75, “Supervision and 

Administration, MOUSF Funding,” Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE. 2

Draft Fact Sheet prepared by Miller for Prentiss’ signature, 31 Oct 74. 

3

“Personnel Requirements for the MOUSF Program,” n.d., attached to material filed 

with MFR, Camblor, 17 Oct 74, sub: MOUSF, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; DF, USAREUR 

Engineer [Maj. Gen. R. H. Groves] to Chief of Staff [USAREUR], 5 Mar 75, sub: MOUSF 

Construction Surveillance, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE. 4

Annual Report, USAREUR, 1975, pp. 154–56.

5

Compare Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974, to an incomplete draft marked 

“Lieutenant General William C. Gribble, Jr.” Whole passages indicate that the latter is a 

preliminary draft of the letter for 10 October 1974. The dated letter is in EUD-RHA, M–1–

12. See also Interv, Baldwin with Camblor, pp. 25, 66–67, 86. 6

The quotation is from Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 17 January 1975, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; 

see also Ltr, Maj. Gen. William R. Kraft, Jr., to Div. Engr., 16 December 1974, ann. B to 

“Supplementary Agreement between the USAREUR Engineer and the Division Engineer, 

USA Engineer Division, Europe (EUD) on the Modernization of US Facilities (MOUSF),” 

signed by R. H. Groves and Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., 23 Jul 75, EUD-RHA, M–1–10. 7

DF, MOUSF Construction Surveillance; “Supplementary Agreement between the 

USAREUR Engineer and the Division Engineer, EUD, on MOUSF,” 23 Jul 75. 8

Min of Staff Mtg, 21 Jan 76, EUD-RHA, M–1–9.

9

Materials for Gribble Visit, Fact Sheet, Ofc Engr Br, 13 Mar 75, sub: Supervision and 

Administration, MOUSF Funding, Bouchereau Papers. 10Additional Remarks Keyed to Attachment to Fact Sheet, 23 Oct 74, sub: Duties of 

MOUSF Project Officers US FRG Construction Agencies, EUD-RHA, M–1–7.

19R_EndNotes.indd 41 
436

11Ibid.

12Ibid.

13Untitled attachment to MFR by Camblor, 17 Oct 74, sub Conference—MOUS

Design Procedures, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 14Memo, Delbridge to CINC USAREUR, 7 Jan 77, sub: Mechanical Kitchen Equipme

(MKE) MOUSF Renovation Projects, EUD-RHA, P–7–11. 15Annual Report, USAREUR, 1975, pp. 154–56; USAREUR AHR, 1976, p. 155.

16Memo, Maj. Gen. J. W. Morris, OCE, Deputy Chief of Engineers, to HQDA throug

Div Engr, Europe, 26 Sep 75, sub: Command Inspection, U.S. Army Engineer Divisio

Europe, 18–22 August 1975, p. 5, EUD-RHA, M–1–9. 17Ibid.

18Annual Report, USAREUR, 1975, pp. 154–56; USAREUR AHR, 1976, p. 155.

19USAREUR AHR, 1984, pp. 253–54.

20Typescript, “Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981

[Command Briefing], provided by Withers. 21MFR, Louis J. Tinnerello, 3 Jul 74, sub: FY–75 Physical Protection Program, VARLO

Min from Mtg in Mainz on Aircraft Shelter Program Held 21 Jun 74, p. 1, EUD-RHA, Mi

Docs (hereafter cited as MFR, 3 Jul 74, Mainz Mtg). 22Ibid.

23Ibid. See also Interv, authors with Louis Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 32

24MFR, 3 Jul 74, Mainz Mtg.

25Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974, EUD-RHA, M–1–12; Intervs, authors wi

Brig. Gen. James Donovan, 20 Nov 90, Arlington, Va., pp. 56–58, and with Maj. Gen. Lou

Prentiss, Jr., 14 Sep 90, Indian Beach, Del., pp. 34–36. 26Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 34–35, and with Ralph Wheeler, 12 Feb 9

Arlington, Va., pp. 11–16. 27See Memo, Camblor to Prentiss, 10 Dec 74, sub: Meeting with Brigadier Gener

Cortenraad, Director of Works, Ministry of Defense, Netherlands, 1000–1200 hrs, 12 D

74, EUD-RHA, M–1–7. 28Interv, authors with Wheeler, p. 11–13; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 17 January 197

EUD-RHA, M–1–12; Memo, Camblor for Prentiss, 10 Dec 74; Materials for Gribble Vis

“Fact Sheet: Aircraft Shelter Project—Spangdahlem Air Base,” 13 Mar 75, EUD-RHA

M–1–7. 29Ltr, Gribble to Prentiss, 18 February 1975, EUD-RHA, M–1–9; Min of Staff Mtg, 

Sep 75, EUD-RHA, M–1–11. 30Materials for Gribble Visit, “Fact Sheet: Aircraft Shelter Project—Spangdahlem A

Base”; “Annual Report,” [OCE], 1975, p. 41; MFR, Camblor, 12 Aug 75, sub: Netherland

EUD Conference on Procedures for Execution of Gilze-Rijen and Soesterberg Aircra

Shelter Projects, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; Min of Staff Mtg, 22 Oct 75, p. 

EUD-RHA, M–1–11. 31Materials for Gribble Visit, “Fact Sheet: Aircraft Protective Facilities, Lahr Air Bas

Germany,” 20 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, M–1–7; Ltrs, Prentiss to Gribble, 18 April, 14 July 197

EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 32Min of Staff Mtg, 22 Jul 75, EUD-RHA, M–1–11. 

33Intervs, authors with Hasso Damm, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 32; with Col. Ro

Brown, 25 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, Netherlands, pp. 22–23, 32–36, 86–87; with Johan

Kersbergen, 24 Aug 89, Soesterberg, Netherlands, pp. 2–4. 34Min of Staff Mtgs, 13, 21 Jan 75, and Msg, Brown to Col. N. Rhodes, sub: Contra

no. DACA 90–75–c–0180, Airfield Shelters ..., both in EUD-RHA, M–1–9. 35For the progress of construction, see Min of Staff Mtgs, 18 May, 1 Jun 76, EUD

RHA, M–1–9; and “EUD Information Bulletin,” August, November, and December 197

19R_EndNotes.indd 42 
437

“History—Northern Area Office, EUD, May 1975–Aug. 1978” [Aug 78], p. 1, EUD-RHA, 

M–1–12; EUD Bulletin, March 1977. 36Intervs, authors with Brown, pp. 83–87; with Kersbergen, pp. 2–4; with Wheeler, pp. 

11–16; with Prentiss, pp. 34–36. 37EUD Briefing for Command Inspection, 1977, p. 10, Bouchereau Papers. 

38“Annual Historical Summary, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1 Jul. 1970–30 Jun. 

1971,” p. 35, Gen Files, 6–5, OH HQUSACE; “Annual Report of Major Activities, Office of 

the Chief of Engineers, 1 Jul. 1974–30 Jun. 1975” (hereafter cited as Annual Report, OCE, 

1975), p. 46, Gen Files, Box 8, File 1, OH HQUSACE. 39Fact Sheet, 20 Nov 75, sub: Transfer of Construction Responsibility South of the 

Alps, p. 2, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 40Min of Staff Mtg, 7 Jun 76, EUD-RHA, M–1–9.

41Min of Staff Mtgs, 7, 29 Jun 76, quotations from the latter, EUD-RHA, M–1–9.

42Ibid.; OCE AHR, 1976, pp. 8–9.

43Delbridge, Incomplete Draft for a Briefing Paper Prepared for Delivery after 

October 1977, (hereafter cited as Briefing, Delbridge, late 1977), p. 15, Bouchereau Papers, 

OH HQUSACE. 44See Europe Division, “EUD in Perspective, 1976–78,” n.d., sections on “Current 

Design Programs: Navy,” and “Construction Execution,” EUD current files; “Engineers 

Build Up on Personnel,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 78; “Maturing from 

Minor to Major,” Corps’ Line, February 1979; Ltr, Wilson to Lt. Gen. Morris, 27 June 1979, 

sub: Status of Projects, Gen Files, 59–3–1, OH HQUSACE. 45The figures used derive from two different sources that are not quite comparable 

but that overlap for just two fiscal years, 1980 and 1981. The figures used for the 1970s 

to 1981 come from Attachments to MFR, 16 Mar 81, sub: LTG J. K. Bratton Europe Visit, 

1–12 Mar 81 (hereafter cited as Attachments, Bratton Visit). Attachments have no page 

numbers, but the figures on MCA dollars come from a chart on what would be page 397, 

Mil Files XIV–1–B2, OH HQUSACE. The figures for the 1980s come from USAREUR AHR, 

1985 and 1986, p. 4.22. 46Engineer Studies Center, “U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD): 

Organization Study,” Apr 85, p. 2, EUD-RHA, M–1–8 (hereafter cited as ESC “USAEDE 

(EUD): Organization Study”); EUD Briefing, Delbridge, late 1977, p. 18; Attachments, 

Bratton Visit, p. 397. 47“Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during Mar. 1981.” 

48Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 115. 49Information for this and the preceding paragraph is drawn from “Upgrade & 

Rehabilitation of Ammunition Storage Facilities (ASP’s and PSP’s),” 16 Oct 73, copy 

provided by Col. Claude Roberts; Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan, Cdr, USAENGCOMEUR, 

to Brig. Gen. Paul M. Timmerberg, PM, HQ USAREUR & 7A, 16 Nov 73, sub: Site Criteria, 

EUD-RHA, M–1–11; Annual Report, OCE, 1 Jul 73–30 Jun 74, pp. 32–33; Interv, authors 

with Carl E. Nelson, 12 Jun 90, Ansbach, pp. 43–46. 50[Fact Sheet], 20 Mar 75, sub: Improvements for the Reaction to the Terrorist Threat 

to Nuclear Weapons (FY 76 MCA), EUD-RHA, M–1–7. 51Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. G. K. Withers, 12 Apr 91, Washington, D.C., pp. 1–2, 

27–28. Withers commanded the brigade at that time. 52Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 167–71. 53On Pastore’s provision of the report to the press and for general information, see 

Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 167–71; on USAREUR’s earlier request 

to prefinance, see Record by John L. Shadday, EUD, Chief, Army Section, of a telephone call 

made to Lt. Col. Focht, OCE, sub: FY 76 MCA Project Security Improvements, SAS Sites, 

31 Oct 74, and Memo, William E. Camblor to Chief, Engineer Division, 6 Dec 74, sub: FY 

19R_EndNotes.indd 43 
438

76 MCA Project, Security Improvement, SAS Sites—Coordination and Approval throug

German and Other Host Nation Agencies, both in EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. 54The figures on nuclear weapons are from Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forc

in Germany, p. 164; for information on OCE’s support, see OCE AHR, 1976, pp. 8–9, Ge

Files, Box 8, File 4, OH HQUSACE. 55OCE AHR, 1976; [Fact Sheet], sub: Improvements for the Reaction to the Terrori

Threat to Nuclear Weapons (FY 76 MCA). 56Ltrs, Prentiss to Gribble, 17 January 1975, and Gribble to Prentiss, 18 February 197

EUD-RHA, M–1–12 and M–1–9, respectively. 57Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 18 April 1975, EUD-RHA, M–1–12.

58For Prentiss’ request that the staff find terms to differentiate, see Min of Staff Mt

29 Jul 75, EUD-RHA, M–1–11; the imprecise use of terms emerges from looking at an arr

of documents for the period. 59“EUD in Perspective, 1976–78,” see page headed “LRSP” in section “Current Desig

Programs” and page headed “EUD Construction Execution, May 76 to Aug. 78, MC

Program Execution,” for the comparison of terms and amounts. In a letter to Lt. Ge

John W. Morris, 26 January 1977, General Prentiss, by then DCSENG in Heidelberg, giv

slightly different numbers and a slightly different timetable. 60“EUD in Perspective, 1976–78,” page headed “LRSP”; Briefing, Delbridge, late 197

p. 13; Delbridge Briefing, marked in longhand “Sept. 78 revised briefing,” with longhan

additions, p. 10, provided by Delbridge. 61Information Paper, sub: Long Range Security Program, 29 Sep 82, tab 16, Briefin

Book, Europe Trip, Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., Mil Files XIV–1–8a, OH HQUSACE. 62“Report of Lessons Learned as Related to Design and Construction in EUD

Oct 78, pp. 5–11, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Interv, authors with Wayne Lewis, 4 Jun 9

Kaiserslautern, p. 9. 63Interv, authors with Jose Cruz, 19 Nov 91, Hurst, Tex., pp. 70–73.

64Wilson’s comments are from Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson, 29 O

90, Alexandria, Va., pp. 51–54; see also Min of Staff Mtg, 15 Jan 79, EUD-RHA, M–1–1

Cruz’s comment is from his interview with authors, 19 November 1991, p. 70. 65For the information and the comment concerning the Dutch reaction, see Min 

Staff Mtg, 3 Apr 79, EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 66Min of Staff Mtg, 5 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M–1–12. 

67Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 27 June 1979, Gen Files, Box 59–3–1, OH HQUSACE; Ltr, Withe

to Bratton, 28 Jan 81, p. 3, EUD-RHA, M–2–1; Attachments, Bratton Visit, 16 Mar 81, n.p. [

407], Mil Files XIV–1–32, OH HQUSACE. General Crizer’s name is Pat, not Patrick. 68Interv, authors with Col. Daniel Waldo, Jr., 31 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 6–7; “Bri

Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981,” p. 2, EUD-RHA, Misc Doc

Attachments, Bratton Visit, 16 Mar 81, chart, [p. 432]. 69Attachments, Bratton Visit, 16 Mar 81.

70Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 185; Interv, authors with Wis

1 Feb 90; “Project Data and Justification—NATO Common Funded Infrastructure,” n.

[1983?], p. 2, EUD-RHA, M–1–10. 71Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 3 May 1982, EUD-RHA, M–2–1; “Project Data an

Justification—NATO Common Funded Infrastructure.” 72Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 17–21; “Project Data and Justification—

NATO Common Funded Infrastructure.” 73For the first quotation, see Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 17–21; for th

second, see Interv, authors with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 22–23. 74Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. James W. van Loben Sels, 12 Apr 91, Fort Monroe, V

pp. 52–54.

19R_EndNotes.indd 44 
439

75Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, p. 22.

76“Project Highlights in Kaiserslautern,” Corps’ Line, August 1990. 77“Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981”; see also 

“REFORGER,” Military Engineer 67 (January/February 1975): 28, and “Airlift Is Key to 

Commuter Army,” Military Engineer 68 (July/August 1976): 308. 78Ibid., and Interv, Hendricks with Cooper, pp. 9–10.

79“Providing Quick-Reaction in Crisis,” Corps’ Line, February 1979; “Engineers, 

Designers, Diplomats,” in Engineer Update, July 1979; Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 27 June 1979, 

Gen Files, Box 59–3–1, OH HQUSACE. 80Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 171–80; the MCA figures for 

FY 1978 are from USAREUR AHRs, 1977, pp. 172–76, and 1978, pp. 158–60, quotation from 

p. 159, both at CMH. 81Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, “Historical Review, Calendar 

Years 1979–1980,” p. 303, CMH; Attachments, Bratton Visit, table listing “NATO Supported 

Systems in EUD,” 16 Mar 81, [p. 430]. 82“Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981.”

83Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [6], periodical brochure without page numbers 

printed by Louis Berger International, Inc., one of the contractors on POMCUS 

construction. 84Ibid. 

85Interv, authors with Arthur Textor, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 14–16; “Prepositioned 

Materials Kept in Readiness for Time of Need,” Corps’ Line, September 1989. 86Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [6]. 87Interv, authors with Textor, pp. 14–16, describes the process of preparing equipment 

for storage. For descriptions of the sites, see “Prepositioned Materiel Storage Sites 

Strengthen NATO Defense Capability,” Corps’ Line, May 1986. 88“Prepositioned Materiel Storage Sites Strengthen NATO Defense Capability.”

89Ibid.; “Prepositioned Materials Kept in Readiness for Time of Need.”

90“Prepositioned Materiel Storage Sites Strengthen NATO Defense Capability.”

91For the 1987 figures, see “Northern Area Briefing, as of 1 Aug. 1989,” p. 23, Northern 

Area Office Files.

Chapter 11 

1

Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 78–82, 88, 98, 147–51. 2

Ibid.

3

HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO: Stationing of the 2nd Armored Division (Forward) 

in Northern Germany, May 1980. On the early discussions and deployment of Brigades 75 

and 76, see pp. 1–7. 4

Ibid., p. 7; Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 156. 5

HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, p. 7. 6

Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1975, Box M–1–12; Min of EUD Staff Mtgs, 22 

Oct, 18 Nov 75, Box M–1–11; Ltr, Gribble to Prentiss, 8 December 1975, Box M–1–12. All in 

EUD-RHA. 7

Min of EUD Staff Mtgs, 21 Jan, 20 Apr 76, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–9.

8

Min of EUD Staff Mtg, 27 Apr 76, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–9.

9

See HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, passim, and Nelson, History of U.S. Military 

Forces in Germany, pp. 151–61. 10The quotation is from HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, p. 53; on the bid 

openings, see “Construction News,” in “EUD Information Bulletin,” 1 Nov 76, p. 7.

19R_EndNotes.indd 45 
440

11HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 12–13, 54–56. 12Ibid., pp. 11, 15, 23, 54.

13Ibid., pp. 23, 55–56.

14Ibid., pp. 15, 27; Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 160; Inter

authors with Prentiss, pp. 65–68. 15HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 15, 27; Interv, authors with Prentiss, p

65–68. 16HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 15, 27, 28. 17Ibid.

18Ibid., pp. 15–17, 23–24; Europe Division, “EUD in Perspective, 1976–78,” n.d., s

sec. “Construction Execution” for a description of NORTHAG construction, EUD curre

files; Corps’ Line, August 1978, p. 5. 19HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 15–17, 23–24, 30, 42; Corps’ Line, August 197

p. 5. The figures for the value of the dollar are from “Dollar Dip Means Slight Allowan

Increase,” Corps’ Line, January 1988, which published a chart covering 1976–1987.

20HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 15–17. 

21Ibid., p. 30.

22Ibid., p. 33.

23Ltr, Delbridge to Director of Military Construction, OCE, 4 November 1977, EUD

RHA, Box M–1–9. 24“Maturing from Minor to Major,” Corps’ Line, February 1979; HQ, USAREU

Strengthening NATO, pp. 17, 58. 25Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 147–48, 171–76, 178–87; see al

William C. Baldwin, The Engineer Studies Center and Army Analysis: A History of the U.

Army Engineer Studies Center, 1943–1982 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Offic

1985), pp. 256–57. 26“Building a City from the Ground Up: Vilseck To Get 5 New Battalions,” Corps’ Lin

March 1989. 27Ibid.; Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, “Commentary: ‘The Path to Excellence Is Throug

Our People,’” Corps’ Line, December 1986; Ltr, Harrell to Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch, 7 Augu

1989, EUD, RM, current files; “Vilseck Force Modernization Program,” 14 Apr 88 [briefin

outline], EUD-RHA, current files. 28“Building a City from the Ground Up.” 

29Ibid.

30Quotations from Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Grosvenor W. Fish, 6 Dec 9

Nuremberg, pp. 10–11; see also “Building a City from the Ground Up.” 31“Building a City from the Ground Up”; Weekly Staff Mtg Notes, Week Ending 7 J

89, EUD, RM, current files. 32Quotations from Intervs, authors with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 77–8

and with Douglas Sommer, 11 Jun 90, Vilseck, pp. 18–19. 33Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 5–6, 24–25.

34Ibid.; see also Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 20 Jan 82, p. 3, in which he alludes to the sam

incident, EUD-RHA, Box M–2–1. 35For this and the preceding paragraph, see Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, p

16–22, 25–27; “Engineer Task Force Range Upgrade Program, After Action Report, 3 Ja

83,” cover letter signed by Williams, Mil Files XIV–1–9, OH HQUSACE; see also Inter

authors with Smith, pp. 53–56; Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [4–5]. 36Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [4–5]; Attachments, Bratton Visit, table listin

“NATO Supported Systems in EUD,” 16 Mar 81, [p. 434]; “Engineer Task Force Rang

Upgrade Program, After Action Report, 3 Jan 83,” pp. 9–10. 37“Engineer Task Force Range Upgrade Program, After Action Report, 3 Jan 83,” p. 1

19R_EndNotes.indd 46 
441

38Ibid., p. 11; “Graf ’82 Project Going Strong,” Corps’ Line, August 1982; Ltr, Withers to 

Bratton, 20 January 1982, EUD-RHA, Box M–2–1. 39E. R. Heiberg III, “Engineer Missions Support the Total Army,” Military Engineer 77 

(January/February 1985): 7; “Engineer Task Force Range Upgrade Program, After Action 

Report, 3 Jan 83,” p. 2–3. 40“Engineer Task Force Range Upgrade Program, After Action Report, 3 Jan 83,” 

p. 2; Intervs, authors with Smith, pp. 53–56, and with van Loben Sels, pp. 16–22; Berger 

World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [4–5]; George B. Fink, Jr., “Learning by Building ‘The Movers,’” 

Military Engineer 73 (September/October, 1981): 340–42. 41The quotation and description come from Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 53–56.

42Ltr, Smith to Maj. Gen. Richard M. Wells, 19 February 1984, pp. 4–5, Civil Works 

Files I–20–1, OH HQUSACE; Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [3]. 43Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [3–5]. 44“Officials Conduct Testing at Grafenwoehr Prototype Range,” Corps’ Line, January 

1988.45Weekly Staff Mtg Notes, 24 Feb, 28 Apr 89, EUD, RM, current files; “Wildflecken 

To Get New Tank Range,” Corps’ Line, June 1989; Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 7 August 1989; 

Interv, authors with Konrad Lochner, 13 Jun 90, Würzburg, pp. 13–15; Interv, Walker and 

Baldwin with Ray, pp. 87–90. 46“EUD Project Helps Army To Modernize Training,” Corps’ Line, December 1986. 47“Hohenfels Center To Enable ‘Force-to-Force Maneuvers,’” Corps’ Line, December 

1986.48Ibid.

49“Doing Business in Hohenfels,” Corps’ Line, January 1990; “Hohenfels Simulated 

City Takes Corps Design Award,” Corps’ Line, March 1990; “Simulated City Takes 

Award,” Corps’ Line, May 1990; Interv, authors with Fish, 6 Dec 91, p. 16. 50“Operations Center Links Computers, Training Areas,” Corps’ Line, August 1990; 

Interv, authors with Fish, 6 Dec 91, pp. 17–18; Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 10 February 1989, EUD, 

RM, current files. 51Commander in Chief, USAREUR, “Living and Working Conditions in United States 

Army, Europe,” 1 Feb 88, Special Report to Congress, p. 5. 52Ibid., p. 8; on the implications of this for the overall deterioration of maintenance 

and its increasing costs, see Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 168. 53“Maturing from Minor to Major”; Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, pp. 178–79.

54For a general discussion and the quotation from Kroesen’s letter, see Historical 

Review, USAREUR, 1981, pp. 189ff. 55Ltr, Bratton to van Loben Sels, 12 September 1984, Civil Works Files I–20–1, OH 

HQUSACE. 56Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [6]. 57Interv, authors with Carl E. Nelson, 12 Jun 90, Ansbach, pp. 1–12.

58Interv, authors with Richard Birner, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, pp. 41–43.

59Commander’s Staff Mtg, 20 Apr 82, p. 4, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–2.

60The first quotation is from “Living and Working Conditions,” pp. 1, 7; the second is 

from Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, p. 239. 61“Europe Division Tests Money-Saving Way To Lay Concrete,” Corps’ Line, August 

1986; “New Challenge to Europe: Roller Compacted Concrete,” Corps’ Line, February 1989. 62Ltrs, Harrell to Hatch, 10 August 1988, 10 February, 7 August 1989, EUD, RM.

63Information Paper, sub: PATRIOT Program Status, EUDED-MO, 6 Dec 84, EUDRHA, Box M–1–6; Interv, authors with Andrew Constantaras, 30 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 

8–10; Attachments, Bratton Visit, table listing “NATO Supported Systems in EUD,” 16 Mar 

81, [pp. 426–27], charts on Patriot.

19R_EndNotes.indd 47 
442

64Ltrs, Withers to Bratton, 20 January 1982, p. 3, and 3 May 1982, p. 3, both in EUD

RHA, Box M–2–1; Attachments, Bratton Visit, table listing “NATO Supported Systems 

EUD”; Interv, authors with Georgi Reitzel, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 19–20; Berger World 1

no. 2 (June 1981): [6]. 65Information Paper, sub: PATRIOT Program Status.

66Berger World 15, no. 2 (Spring 1985): [2]; Interv, authors with Nelson, pp. 29–3

36–42. 67“Patriot Facilities at Bitburg Upgrade Defense Capability,” Corps’ Line, Decemb

1989. 68Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 7 August 1989, EUD, RM, current files.

69Intervs, authors with Constantaras, pp. 8–10, and with Nelson, pp. 1–12; “Arm

Beefs up USAREUR Weapons Systems,” Corps’ Line, December 1986. 70“NATO Infrastructure Program Remains Top Priority for Dedicated Division Staff

Corps’ Line, April 1990; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Common Infrastructu

1989, EUD Brussels Docs, OH HQUSACE. 71William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World, An International History (New Yor

Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 411; “Northern Area Briefing, as of 1 Aug. 1989,” p

24–25, OH HQUSACE. 72Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 191; Keylor, Twentieth Centu

World, pp. 411–12.

73Information Papers, sub: Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), 19 O

82, tab 13, and sub: Status of Air Force Program in Europe, 19 Oct 82, tab 14, bo

in Briefing Book, Europe Trip, Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., Mil Files XIV–1–8a, O

HQUSACE. 74Intervs, authors with Smith, pp. 57–63, and with Frank Montenberg, 23 Aug 8

Hoensbruek, Netherlands, pp. 14–15; “Northern Area Briefing, as of 1 Aug. 1989,” p

23–24; MFR, Tom Harron, “IOC [Initial Operational Capability] Beddown Requiremen

Creek Plan–Ramstein AB, Meeting of 19 Jul. 1983,” 21 Jul 83, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–1

CREEK was the code word for GLCM work.

75Min of Staff Mtg, 17 Oct 83, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–10.

76“History of the Northern Area Engineer Office (1975–1988),” updated 1 Sep 8

OH HQUSACE; “CREEK Program Management Office Activation Schedule and Statu

Week 5 Ending 18 Nov 83,” five-page schedule of completed and projected activities an

developments, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; quotations from Ltr, Smith to Bratto

19 February 1984, p. 3, Civil Works Files I–20–1, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors wi

Wayne Lewis, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 9–10. 77Ltr, Smith to Bratton, 20 June 1984, Civil Works, I–20–1, OH HQUSACE.

78Engineer Studies Center, “U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD

Organization Study,” April 1985, p. 7, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–8 (hereafter cited as “USAED

(EUD): Organization Study”). 79“Belgium Resident Office Tackles Multi-year Construction Program for U.S. A

Force Tactical Wing,” Corps’ Line, September 1986. 80Ibid.; “Florennes, Belgium: Building an Air Force from the Ground Up,” Corps’ Lin

October 1987; “Customer Feedback,” Corps’ Line, February 1988; “Northern Area Briefin

as of Aug. 1, 1989,” OH HQUSACE. 81“Resident Engineer Recognized for Superior Work on GLCM Project,” Corps’ Lin

April 1986. 82Briefing by General Ray Concerning Air Force Programs, 1986, and Ltr, Ray 

Heiberg, 15 August 1986, p. 2, both in EUD, RM current files; “Netherlands Reside

Office,” Northern Area Briefings, 1 Dec 87, OH HQUSACE. 83Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 87–88.

19R_EndNotes.indd 48 
443

84James Markham, “3 G.I.’s Die at German Base When Missile Catches Fire,” New York 

Times, 12 Jan 85; “U.S. Army, Contractors Investigate Pershing 2 First-state Propellant Fire 

in Germany,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (21 January 1985): 23. 85Intervs, authors with Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio, 6 Jun 90, Stuttgart, pp. 3–11, and with 

Smith, pp. 62–65, 88–98. 86Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 20–22; William Joe Webb et al., Department 

of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Years 1990–1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1997), p. 19.

Chapter 12 

1

“Arming for the ’80s,” Time 118 (27 July 1981): 8, provides an excellent sketch of 

defense establishment deficiencies and of the prospects of support for the 1980s. 2

Commander in Chief, USAREUR, “Living and Working Conditions in United States 

Army, Europe,” Special Report to the Congress of the United States, 1 Feb 88, Foreword, 

p. 5. 3

“Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, Foreword, p. 5, quotation from p. 25; 

Historical Review, USAREUR, 1985–1986, pp. 5.35, CMH. 4

Special Report, “Family Housing Facilities in United States Army, Europe,” pp. 

5–15ff., as filed with Historical Review, USAREUR, 1982–1983. 5

Ibid.; “Arming for the ’80s,” p. 14.

6

Historical Review,USAREUR, 1985–1986, p. 5.39. 7

Historical Review, USAREUR, 1982–1983, pp. 294–95.

8

Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, pp. 189–91.

9

Steve Hara, “Building Quality into Army Life,” Soldiers (February 1984): 6–9. 10For the second report and Kroesen’s championing of family housing, see Historical 

Review, USAREUR, 1982–1983, p. 295. 11Krosen, personal communication to Donita M. Moorhus, 7 Apr 00. Interv, authors 

with Delbridge, pp. 60–62; Interv, Charles Hendricks with Lt. Gen. Kenneth B. Cooper 

(USA, Ret.), 23 May 91, p. 39. Both Cooper and Delbridge refer to Kroesen’s remark in 

words that closely parallel his own. 12Special Report, “Family Housing Facilities,” [1982]. Quotations in subsequent 

paragraphs are from this source. 13Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 28 January 1981, Misc Docs, and 13 May 1981, Box M–2–1, 

both in EUD-RHA. 14Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, p. 11–12; “Briefing Book—European Trip—Maj. 

Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr.,” 22 Oct 82, tab 9, “Restructuring the Director of Engineering 

and Housing Organization in USAREUR,” Mil Files XIV–1–8a, OH HQUSACE; see also 

William C. Baldwin, “Engineer Organization in Germany, 1945–1990,” Future Army 

Peacetime Engineer Operations in Europe (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Engineer Studies Center, 1991), 

pp. C–17 to C–18. 15Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, p. 7.

16Ibid., 1982–1983, pp. 294–95.

17“Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981,” OH HQUSACE. 

Historical Reviews, USAREUR, 1984, p. 238; 1982–1983, pp. 294–95; 1985–1986, p. 5–39. 18Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 72–74; see also Interv, authors with Joe G. 

Higgs, 23 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 13–15. 19“FY 82: Success and Smoother Sailing,” Corps’ Line, October 1982. 20The quotation is from Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 72–74; see also Interv, 

authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 13–15.

19R_EndNotes.indd 49 
444

21Historical Review, USAREUR, 1985–1986, p. 5.35; “Living and Working Conditions

1988, p. 25. The dollar figures are based on an accounting exchange rate of 3.2

Deutschmarks to the dollar. 22“Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, p. 30. 

23Historical Review, USAREUR, 1982–1983, pp. 278–79, 286–88. 

24Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, pp. 252–53, gives the American compan

as Dimension Building Systems of Wildwood, Fla. “Military Engineers and Busine

Representatives Meet for Conference of All Europe SAME Posts,” Corps’ Line, Janua

1986, identifies the builder as Corlite. 25“Military Conference of All Europe SAME Posts.” 

26Lippert’s comments from “Wildflecken Project Engineer Challenged by Uniqu

Work,” Corps’ Line, January 1986; Blake’s comments from Interv, authors with Blake, 

May 92, Fort Belvoir, Va. 27Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 30–31. See also “Families Move into Fir

New Army Housing in Europe,” Corps’ Line, February 1987. 28Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, pp. 234, 252; “Living and Working Conditions

1988, p. 31; Ltrs, van Loben Sels to Heiberg, 16 August 1985, and Ray to Heiberg, 

February, 15 August 1986, EUD, RM Files; Historical Review, USAREUR, 1985–1986, 

5.36; “Families Move into First New Army Housing in Europe.” 29Ltr, Van Loben Sels to Heiberg, 16 August 1985; “Living and Working Conditions

1988, pp. 30–31. 30“First Mainz Housing Unit Now Under Construction,” October 1986; “Fami

Housing at Mainz Nears Completion,” March 1987; “People Spotlight,” April 1988. All 

Corps’ Line. 31“New Family Housing Nears Completion In Kitzingen,” Corps’ Line, July 1988. 32Ibid.; “Command Briefing,” p. 4, 15 Jul 88, OH HQUSACE.

33Tele Interv, authors with Scott Bearden, 27 May 92.

34“Family Housing Chief Named Engineer of Year,” Corps’ Line, February 1990; Te

Interv, authors with Scott Bearden, 27 May 92. 35“Family Housing Chief Named Engineer of Year.”

36Several articles in the Corps’ Line discuss attic conversions: “Master Plannin

Increased Housing Addressed by Gen. Otis at Conference,” November 1987; “Divisio

Takes Installation Support Award,” May 1988; “Europe Raises Roof for New Apartme

Space,” June 1988; and “Corps Raising the Roof To Expand Housing” and “Att

Conversions Help Ease Housing Shortages,” both in September 1989. 37“Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, p. 31, gives the estimate. John Blak

discusses the safety feature of the loggias in his interview with authors, 1, 6 Feb 90, p. 82

38Tele Interv, authors with Scott Bearden, 27 May 92.

39“New Rental Plan Offers Benefits to German Landlords,” Corps’ Line, Decemb

1989.40The quoted passage is from “Arming for the ’80s.” The Time article is quoted 

“Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, p. 18. 41Blake’s comments are from Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 37–42. 

42Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” pp. 63–68. 

43“Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, p. 18; Intervs, authors with Carl E. Nelso

12 Jun 90, Vilseck, pp. 30–32, and with Adolph Faust, 11 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 42–43. 44Historical Reviews, USAREUR, 1984, p. 235, and 1986, pp. 5.37 and 5.38 (the latt

for the list of sites); “Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, pp. 18, 25. 45“Building Up New Barracks,” Corps’ Line, January 1990. 46“Remote Site: Managing Projects in Southern Turkey,” December 1987, and “Ne

Barracks at Fulda Improve Quality of Life,” March 1989, both in Corps’ Line.

19R_EndNotes.indd 50 
445

47“Construction News,” p. 7 of “EUD Information Bulletin,” 1 Nov 76.

48“EUD in Perspective, 1976–78,” n.d., EUD Briefing for Command Inspection, 1977; 

“Engineers Build Up on Personnel,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 78; 

“Engineers, Designers, Diplomats,” Engineer Update, July 1979. 49“Corps Completes Dream School in Stuttgart,” Corps’ Line, August 1979; “New 

Schools Dedicated at EUCOM Patch Site,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Oct 79. 50“Pattonville Middleschool,” Corps’ Line, October 1979. 51MFR, A. E. Wanket, SPD Chief of Engineering, 31 Jan 83, sub: Blue Ribbon Panel on 

Construction Quality–MED & EUD Visits [29 Oct–10 Nov 1982], EUD-RHA, Box M–1–6; 

“FY 81 Banner Year at EUD,” Corps’ Line, November 1981. 52Berger World 15, no. 2 (Spring 1985): [4]; Engineer Studies Center, “USAEDE (EUD): 

Organization Study,” Apr 85, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–8. 53“Wiesbaden Youths Benefit from New School Additions,” October 1986, and 

“Numerous, Diverse Projects Were Completed in Past Couple of Months,” November 

1986, both in Corps’ Line. 54“Project Profile: Upgrading a High School,” Corps’ Line, December 1987. 55“Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, p. 40.

56Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 10 February 1989, EUD, RM.

57“Elementary School Opens Its Doors at Soesterberg,” March 1989, and “Elementary 

School Served Vital Need,” August 1990, both in Corps’ Line. 58EUD Weekly Staff Mtg Notes, 30 Dec 88, 6 Jan 89, EUD, current files. 

59See the following Corps’ Line articles: “Report from the Field: Wuerzburg Area,” 

October 1989; “Elementary School Renovation Starts in Baumholder,” July 1990; 

“Robinson Barracks School Addition Nears Completion,” March 1990; “Junior High 

School Opens at Schweinfurt,” December 1990; “Leighton Barracks Middle School To 

Ease Student Overcrowding,” November 1989; “School Opens,” November 1990. 60Interv, authors with Faust, pp. 37–41.

61Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, pp. 389–90, OH HQUSACE.

62Interv, authors with Col. Claude Roberts (Ret.), 12 Feb 91, Washington, D.C., pp. 

33–34. 63“Engineers Announce ’79 Construction Plans,” Corps’ Line, February 1979; Engineer 

Studies Center, “USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study,” April 1985, pp. 6–12. 64Intervs, authors with Faust, pp. 37–39, and with Sommer, 11 Jun 90, pp. 20–21; see 

also “Army Officials Call Child Development Centers a High Priority,” Corps’ Line, March 

1989.65Ltr, Smith to Commander, Army Installation Support Activity, Europe, 30 January 

1984, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–6. 66“Child Development Centers Present Numerous Challenges,” Corps’ Line, December 

1988.67Department of the Army Comment from “Army Official Calls Child Development 

Centers a High Priority,” Corps’ Line, March 1989. 68See Intervs, authors with Fish, 11 Jun 90, pp. 21–24; with Colio, pp. 11–12, 23–25; 

with Sommer, pp. 20–21; with Wayne Lewis, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 7–9; see also 

“Child Development Centers Present Numerous Challenges.” 69“Child Development Centers Present Numerous Challenges.”

70Ibid. 

71See USAREUR’s position in “Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, p. 41.

72See Corps’ Line articles: “Child Center Opens at Graf,” July 1990; “Child Care: New 

Center Offers Expanded Service,” September 1990; “Hanau Opens Child Center,” October 

1990; “Completing a Child Center,” September 1990; “Report from the Field: Frankfurt 

Area,” November 1990.

19R_EndNotes.indd 51 
446

73Interv, authors with Carl Nelson, 12 Jun 90, Ansbach, pp. 13–24.

74Memo, Maj. Gen. J. W. Morris to HQDA, sub: Command Inspection, U.S. Arm

Engineer Division, Europe, 18–22 Aug, 26 Sep 75, par. 6.a.(4), EUD-RHA, Box M–1–9; Ltr

Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1975, and Gribble to Prentiss, 8 December 1975, both 

EUD-RHA, M–1–12; OCE AHR, 1 Jul 75–30 Sep 76, Gen Files, Box 8, File 4, OH HQUSAC

Staff Mtgs 21 Jan, 27 Apr 76, both in EUD-RHA, Box M–1–9; “Regional News,” Corps’ Lin

July 1978. 75“Lessons Learned, No. 81–5, Feb 82, Project: Nuernberg Hospital Improvements

EUD-RHA, Box M–2–1; “Corps Renovates Old Nuernberg Hospital,” Corps’ Lin

September 1979. 76Intervs, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 13–15, and 6 Jan 92, Cincinnati, Ohio, p

87–88. 77“Corps Renovates Old Nuernberg Hospital”; MFR, 16 Mar 81, sub: Lt. Gen. J. 

Bratton Europe Visit (1–12 Mar 81), Mil Files XIV–1–B2, OH HQUSACE; Interv, autho

with John Blake, 26 May 92, Fort Belvoir, Va., pp. 37–38. 78“Corps Renovates Old Nuernberg Hospital.” 

79“Engineers, Designers, Diplomats,” Engineer Update, July 1979; Interv, authors wi

Hartwig Braun, 5 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 3–6, 31–37, 45–50, 61–63. 80Ltr, Smith to Wells, 19 February 1984, Civil Works Files I–20–1, OH HQUSAC

MFR, A. E. Wanket, 31 Jan 83, sub: Blue Ribbon Panel on Construction Quality–MED 

EUD Visits, p. 2, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–6. 81“Visit to ENGCOM by CINCUSAREUR,” 6 May 70, and Ltr, Koisch to LeTellie

June 1973 [day illegible], both in EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11; “97th General: EUD Takes o

Tremendous Task To Renovate Vital Health Facility,” Corps’ Line, October 1982; Staff Mt

5 Jan 75, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–9; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers AHR, 1 Jul 75–30 Sep 7

pp. 20–21. 82“97th General: EUD Takes on Tremendous Task To Renovate Vital Health Facility

and “Modern Yet History Preserved,” both in Corps’ Line, October 1982. 83“Renovating a Hospital ‘Down to the Bare Brick,’” Corps’ Line, March 1988. 84Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, p. 253; Interv, authors with Karl Schaffne

13 Jun 90, Würzburg, pp. 21–22; [EUD] Commander’s Call, 27 Oct 86, EUD-RMO

current files; “Wuerzburg Engineer Named Division ‘Hard Hat’ of Year,” Corps’ Lin

May 1989. 85“Engineering Partnership,” and “Augsburg Hospital Dedication Held,” Novemb

1990; “Contractor Given DM 28,000 for VE Change Proposal,” May 1989; “New Hospit

To Be Constructed at Wuerzburg,” August 1986; “Hospital Contract Awarded,” Octob

1986; “‘Richtfest’—Hospital Project Is One-third Complete,” April 1988. All in Corps’ Lin

86“Augsburg Community Gets a $22 Million Hospital Addition,” February 198

“Bremerhaven Hospital Renovation Improves Soldier, Family Member Quality of Life

May 1989; “Report from the Field: The U.S. Engineer Group,” September 1989. All 

Corps’ Line. Interv, authors with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 88–89; Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 

August 1988, EUD, RM. 87Intervs, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 13–15, and 6 Jan 92, pp. 87–88.

88Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, p. 25.

89“Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, pp. 34–36.

90This summary is drawn from all the documents cited in notes 91–93 for particul

projects. 91The figures for “design accomplishment” are contained in Materials for Lt. Ge

Gribble Visit of March 1975, Fact Sheet, “Impact of Volume of Projects in Programs,” 

Mar 75, [Mr. Pinol]; see also Fact Sheet, “Supervision and Administration Analysis,” 

Mar 75, both in EUD-RHA, Box N–1–7.

19R_EndNotes.indd 52 
447

92The figures for 1984 come from Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD) 

Organization Study, April 1985, pp. 6–11, EUD-RHA, M–1. Figures for 1980–1981 appear in 

MFR, sub: Lieut. Gen. J. K. Bratton Europe Visit 1–12 Mar. 1981, 16 Mar 81, Attachments 

(tab S), chart titled “FY 80 Design Accomplishment, $442 Million Construction Value,” 

Mil Files XIV–1–B2, OH HQUSACE. 93The figures for design accomplishment in 1980 are found in MFR, sub: Lieut. Gen. 

J. K. Bratton Europe Visit 1–12 Mar. 1981, Attachments (tab S), chart titled “FY 80 Design 

Accomplishment, $442 Million Construction Value,” Mil Files XIV–1–B2, OH HQUSACE. 

Those for 1984 are in Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD) Organization Study, April 

1985, pp. 6–11. 94The NAF percentage for 1987 comes from F. W. Wied (CEEUD-RM-M, “Talking 

Paper on Overseas Stovepipe Organizations,” 17 Oct 87, provided by W. J. Lynch, copy 

with EUD documents at OH HQUSACE. 95Annual Report, OCE, 1 Jul 73–30 Jun 74, p. 60, Gen Files, Box 7, File 5, OH 

HQUSACE; “Memorandum of Understanding between the Army and Air Force Exchange 

Service–Europe (AAFES-EUR) and the United States Army Engineer Division, Europe 

(USAEDE),” signed by Brig. Gen. Delbridge for EUD, 5 Aug 77, and by Walter H. Weber 

for AAFES, 16 Aug 77, EUD-RHA, unmarked box; “EUD in Perspective, 1976–78,” sec 

titled “Current Design Programs ... AAFES”; EUD Briefing for Command Inspection, 

1977, p. 8, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE. 96“Information Bulletin,” EUD, 1 Dec 76; “EUD in Perspective, 1976–78,” sec titled 

“Construction Execution.” 97On EUD’s work in Iran, see EUD Staff Mtgs, 18 May, 7 Jun 76, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–

9; see also “Maturing from Minor to Major,” Corps’ Line, February 1979. 98“Maturing from Minor to Major.”

99Berger World 15, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 4. 100“Heilbronn Community Gets First All New PX Overseas,” Corps’ Line, January 

1986. 101“Troop Support: New Store Serves Vital Need,” February 1991; “New Commissary 

Opened at Wolfgang Complex in Hanau,” December 1986; “Wuerzburg’s Leighton 

Barracks Get Fully Modern Commissary,” September 1989; “Expanded PX at Edward 

Barracks To Offer Much More to Schweinfurt Residents,” November 1989; “Commissary 

Opens at Garlstedt,” August 1990. All in Corps’ Line. 102Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, pp. 189–91.

103Annual Report, OCE, 1 Jul 73–30 Jun 74, p. 7. 

104Tays, “U.S. Army Construction Germany, 1950–53,” p. 138; Lane, Borror, Tays, “U.S. 

Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957,” pp. 51–52. 105Ltr, LeTellier to Col. Griffith, 30 March 1972; see also “Status of Projects,” 24 Sep 71. 

Both in EUD-RHA, Box M–1–11. 106EUD Briefing by Delbridge, [after Oct 77], Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; HQ, 

USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, p. 9. 107Ltrs, Withers to Bratton, 20 January, 3 May 1982, OH HQUSACE. 

108European Trip Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., Briefing Book, 22 Oct 82, Mil Files XIV–

1–8a, OH HQUSACE; “TUSEG: Ankara History, June 1983 to date,” [21 May 85], TUSEG 

Area Office, Incirlik, Turkey. 109Interv, authors with Fish, 11 Jun 90, pp. 24–25. Corps’ Line articles “Award 

Winner,” October 1982; quotation from “Area Office Will Place 100 Bowling Lanes,” 

July 1988; “New Bowling Center To Open in Wuerzburg Area [Kitzingen],” April 1988; 

and “Bowling Center Opens [Dexheim],” and “Report from the Field [Schweinfurt],” 

both in June 1990. Interv, authors with Rudolf Stretz, 11 Jun 90, Nuremberg, pp. 6, 

11–13.

19R_EndNotes.indd 53 
448

110Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, p. 179; “1979 Construction Plans,” Corps’ Lin

February 1979; on the confusion, see Ltr, John Blake to William C. Baldwin, 19 May 199

commenting on a draft of this manuscript. 111Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, p. 179. “1979 Construction Plans,” Februa

1979; “Stuttgart Area Office: Recreation Facility Active in Goeppingen,” June 198

“Customer Feedback,” March 1988; all in Corps’ Line. 112“Rec Facility Renovation Completed ... in Bremerhaven,” Corps’ Line, Februa

1989.113Annual Report, OCE, 1 Jul 73–30 Jun 74, pp. 8–9.

114Delbridge Briefing, 1978, p. 10. “AF Section: Pleasing a Tough Customer,” May 197

and “79 Construction Plans,” February 1979, both in Corps’ Line. 115“Würzburg Area Engineer Office,” pp. 12–13, prepared by the Area Office f

FOMIS Assistance Visit, 6–9 Jun 88, OH HQUSACE. 116“Interior Design: The Psychology of Architecture,” March 1982, and “Cakmak

Projects Completed,” March 1989, both in Corps’ Line. 117“Chapel Center Opens at Hahn Air Base,” Corps’ Line, September 1988.

Chapter 13 1

Commander in Chief, USAREUR, “Living and Working Conditions in United Stat

Army, Europe,” 1 Feb 88, Special Report to Congress, passim. Text of speech by Brig. Ge

James W. Ray, 1 Jun 88, typescript copy supplied by EUD-RMO. 2

“Living and Working Conditions,” 1988, p. 47.

3

“Commander’s Comments: ‘Good-bye’ to a Winning Team,” Corps’ Line, June 198

For an explanation of the frog’s role in EQM, see Chapter 8 of this book. 4

“Harrell To Assume Division Command July 18,” Corps’ Line, July 1988; Inter

authors with Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell, 30 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 3–5. 5

“New Commander Meets EUD Staff,” Corps’ Line, August 1988. 6

Intervs, authors with Col. Daniel Waldo, 31 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 36–37, and wi

Jakoba Schempp, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 69–71. 7

Intervs, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 51–52; with Virginia Conway, 15 Nov 9

Alexandria, Va., pp. 70–71; with Col. John Moravec, 19 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 33–35, 39–4

and 18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex., pp. 70–72, 79–85; with Hasso Damm, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p

22–24; with Fish, 11 Jun 90, p. 31; with Wise, 11 Dec 91, pp. 20–21; with Harrell, 30 Aug 8

pp. 49–50; with Waldo, 31 Aug 89, pp. 58–59; with Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, pp. 70–7

with Russell Minton, 18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex., pp. 68–70. 8

Intervs, authors with Waldo, 31 Aug 89, pp. 81–83, 99–104, and 4 Dec 91, pp. 23–24.

9

Memo, Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell to Distribution, 31 Oct 88, sub: Policy #4, Use 

Government Quarters When Performing TDY Travel,” EUD-RM, current files. 10Memos, Harrell to Distribution, 23 Nov 88, sub: Policy #6, Internal Reorganizatio

and 30 Nov 88, sub: Policy #8, CONUS Travel, both in EUD-RM, current files. 11Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 10 February 1989, EUD-RMO.

12Corps’ Line, May 1990. 13Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Aug 89, pp. 61–64, and 30 Jan 92, pp. 33–35.

14Intervs, authors with Dale, pp. 54–58, and with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 33–39.

15Interv, authors with Terry Trowbridge, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 33–36.

16Intervs, authors with Minton, pp. 86, and with Laverne Love, 5 Dec 91, Frankfu

pp. 1–3. 17Intervs, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 11–12; with Prentiss, pp. 24–26; wi

Ursula Pfefferlein, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, pp. 12–13; with Reimer Delpin, 29 Jan 9

Frankfurt, pp. 31–34. 

19R_EndNotes.indd 54 
449

18Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Damm, 21 Jun 88, pp. 62–66; “Three LN Employees 

Promoted,” Corps’ Line, February 1980. 19“Works Council Chairman Addresses EUD Local National Employees,” Corps’ Line, 

November 1987; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Damm, 21 Jun 88, pp. 62–66. 20Memo, Harrell to Distribution, 31 Mar 89, sub: Policy Letter No. 18, Dual 

Recruitment for High Grade Positions, EUD-DE (Ofc of Div Engr), current files. 21“Local Nationals: Employees Raise Questions on Key Issues,” Corps’ Line, February 

1990.22Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Aug 89, pp. 61–64, and 30 Jan 92, pp. 33–35; with 

Conway, pp. 1–6; with Love, pp. 23–24. 23Memo, Harrell to Distribution, 28 Aug 89, sub: Policy Letter No. 23, Commander’s 

Policy Statement on Equal Employment Opportunity and Prevention of Sexual 

Harassment, EUD-EO (Exec Ofc), current files. 24“Division Commander Raises Issues, Addresses Concerns,” Corps’ Line, November 

1988.25Interv, authors with Ray, pp. 11–14, 34–38; “EUD Executives Devise Methods for 

Improving Production and Responsiveness to Customers,” Corps’ Line, February 1987. 26Donna Miles, “Goodbye Pershing II,” Soldiers 46, no. 8 (August 1991): 45–46; Daniel 

Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Who Won the Cold War?” Foreign Policy 87 (Summer 

1992): 128. 27“Army’s ’89 Budget Represents Negative Growth Say Officials,” Corps’ Line, April 

1988.28Jim Hoagland, “Europe’s Destiny,” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 1 (1990): 43. 29Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 6–8.

30“Assistant Secretary Page Discusses Association with Corps,” Engineer Update, 

August 1989; Intervs, authors with Wise, 11 Dec 91, pp. 30–36, and with Moravec, 19 Jan 

90, pp. 33–35; “Headquarters Reorganization: Change Emphasizes Project Management,” 

Engineer Update, August 1989. 31Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 11 February 1983, EUD-RHA, Box M–2–1.

32MFR, Wanket, 31 Jan 83, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–6.

33Engineer Studies Center, “USADE (EUD): Organization Study,” April 1985, p. 28.

34Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Camblor, pp. 147–49.

35Concept Paper on Reorganization of EUD, 27 Feb 87, OH HQUSACE.

36Interv, authors with Ray, pp. 11–14, 43–48.

37Intervs, authors with Waldo, 31 Aug 89, pp. 49–52, 78–79; with Delpin, pp. 37–38; with 

Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 53–54; with Moravec, 19 Jan 90, pp. 33–35, 39–40; with Ray, pp. 46–48. 38Interv, authors with Waldo, 31 Aug 89, pp. 49–52.

39The task force and its recommendations are discussed in Intervs, authors with 

Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, pp. 16–19; with Damm, 1 Feb 90, pp. 18–21; with Moravec, 19 

Jan 90, pp. 30, 39–40, and 18 Nov 91, pp. 1–4; with Ray Mellard, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 

2–3; with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 98–101. 40Intervs, authors with Mellard, pp. 2–3; with Damm, 1 Feb 90, pp. 18–21; with 

Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 1–4. 41Intervs, authors with Mellard, pp. 2–3, 7–8, and with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 1990, pp. 94–97.

42“Chronology 1989,” ed. Peter Hayes, Foreign Affairs 69, no. 1 (1990): 230. Other events 

mentioned in this paragraph may be verified in the same source. 43In addition to “Chronology 1989,” cited above, see Jim Hoagland, “Europe’s 

Destiny,” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 1 (1990): 40. 44“Commander’s Comments,” Corps’ Line, October 1989. 45Interv, authors with Mellard, pp. 3–4.

46“Commander’s Comments,” Corps’ Line, December 1989.

19R_EndNotes.indd 55 
450

47Ibid., January 1990.

48“Commander’s Call Addresses Reorganization, Force Reduction,” Corps’ Lin

February 1990. 49Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 4–13, 25.

50Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 6–8; Siemon and Wagberg, Employment 

Local Nationals, pp. 93–94. 51The discussion of local nationals is drawn from Intervs, authors with Harrell, 

Jan 92, pp. 59–60; with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 2–3; with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 4–5; wi

Trowbridge, pp. 10–12. 52Interv, authors with Damm, 1 Feb 90, pp. 7–10, 22–24.

53Memo, Harrell to Staff, 17 Jan 90, EUD-EO, current files. Many of the documen

used to create this and following sections were gathered in close proximity to the

creation. Copies of these materials are on file, with other materials associated with th

EUD history, at OH HQUSACE. 54“Need To Know,” 26 Jan–20 Apr 90, OH HQUSACE and EUD-PAO, current file

EUD’s “Need To Know” was a temporary newsletter published irregularly (about twi

a month) beginning January 1990 during the height of the drawdown. The Public Affai

and Human Resources Offices produced the newsletter to keep employees informed 

rapidly changing developments that affected their employment status. 55Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, p. 10.

56Msgs, Harrell to Commander, USACE, 7 Feb 90, EUD RMO, current files. 

57Civilian Personnel Servicing CINCUSAREUR/CIE Agreement, 6 May 74, EUD

RHA, Box M–1–10; Intervs, authors with Mellard, pp. 3–4, and with Conway, pp. 40–4

“Second RIF Faces EUD,” Corps’ Line, October 1990. 58Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 18–20.

59Ibid., pp. 18–20, contains the passage quoted; Intervs, authors with Konrad Lochne

13 Jun 90, Würzburg, pp. 19–21, and with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 30–33. Figures on LN

who took the buyout option are from an RMO briefing, n.d., “21 Buy-Outs dropped o

Oct. 1, 1990,” EUD-RMO, current files. In his interview on 30 January 1992, p. 30, Harre

says that “22 or 23” were bought out. 60“Commander’s Call Addresses Reorganization, Force Reduction,” Corps’ Lin

February 1990. 61“Commander Addresses Hiring Freeze, Priority Placement,” Corps’ Line, Marc

1990.62Quote from Ltr, Virginia Conway to authors, 16 April 1990. 

63Intervs, authors with Harrell, Conway, Wise, Mellard, Minton, Moravec, Blak

Higgs, Dale, and Brettschneider. 64Quotation from Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 28–29, 15–17.

65“Commander’s Comments,” Corps’ Line, April 1990. 66Interv, authors with Mellard, pp. 6–7, 10–12.

67Intervs, authors with Minton, pp. 72–75; with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 40–44; wi

Robert Rodehaver, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 2; with Moravec, 18 Nov 91, p. 4; with Wise, 

Dec 91, pp. 21–23; with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 2–3; with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 19–21. 68Memo, Harrell to Commander, USACE, 5 Apr 90, EUD-EO, current files. 

69Intervs, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 2–3, and with Conway, pp. 40–45.

70“DoD Hiring Freeze Lift Doesn’t Void Outplacement Program,” Corps’ Line, May 199

71“Commander’s Comments” and “Reduction in Force Procedures Show Employe

Their Standing,” both in Corps’ Line, June 1990. 72Interv, Moorhus with Allen M. Carton, 14 Apr 97, Potomac, Md., p. 322.

73Intervs, authors with Kathleen Johnson, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 3–6; with Dale, 

65; with Love, pp. 14–18. “Reduction in Force Procedures Show Employees Their Standing

19R_EndNotes.indd 56 
451

74Interv, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 4–5.

75“Reduction in Force Procedures Show Employees Their Standing.”

76Briefing Chart dtd 13 Jul 90, EUD-RMO, current files.

77Ltr, Anita L. Morsman to Donita M. Moorhus, 16 April 1990, original with EUD 

documents at OH HQUSACE. Morsman’s numbers came from the EUD Human Resources 

Office. 78Memo, Harrell to Commander, USACE, 22 Mar 90, sub: RIF at U.S. Army Engineer 

Division, Europe (EUD), EUD-RMO, current files. 79Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 4–13, 25.

80Ibid., pp. 1–2.

81Ibid., p. 3; Interv, authors with Damm, 1 Feb 90, pp. 16–17.

82Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 1–3.

83Interv, authors with Trowbridge, pp. 10–12.

84Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 4–13.

85“Military Construction Prohibition Continues,” HQ USACE Internal News Briefs, 

26 Nov 90, HQ USACE, current files. 86“Commander’s Comments: Despite Reduction, Freeze, Division Has Important 

Mission,” Corps’ Line, July 1990. 87Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 90, pp. 8–12.

88Ibid. Also, “Facing Declining Projects, Budget Cuts: Good News Arrives for Europe 

Members,” Engineer Update, May 1990. 89Interv, authors with Dale, pp. 22–23.

90Briefing dtd 13 Jul 90, EUD-RMO, current files; Interv, authors with Mellard, pp. 

4–6, 15–18. 91Briefing, 17 Jun 90, updated to 17 Jul 90, EUD-RMO, current files.

92MFR, CERM-ZA, 23 Jul 90, sub: Review of EUD FY90 and FY91 Budget, Manpower 

and Workload; Memo, Harrell to Hatch, n.d. [early October 1990], both in EUD-RMO, 

current files. 93Intervs, authors with Johnson, 10 Dec 91, pp. 3–6; Memo, Harrell to Hatch, n.d. 

[early October 1990], EUD-RMO, current files. 94Memo, Harrell to Distribution, 24 Jul 90, sub: Tentative Authorizations/Budget 

Guidance for FY91, EUD-RMO, current files. 95Memo, Harrell to Hatch, 13 Aug 90, EUD-RMO, current files; “Second RIF Faces 

EUD,” Corps’ Line, October 1990. 96Memo, Harrell to Distribution, 24 Jul 90.

97Memo, Harrell to Hatch, 13 Aug 90, EUD-RMO, current files. 

98Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 12–13, 21, and with Mellard, pp. 17–18.

99“Corps of Engineers Establishes a Partial Hiring Freeze,” Corps’ Line, October 

1990.100“Commander’s Call: Reduction, Merger Addressed,” Corps’ Line, September 1990; 

“Commander’s Comments,” Corps’ Line, November 1990. 101“Commander’s Call: Reduction, Merger Addressed.” For more information on 

DESERT SHIELD, see Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War : The 

United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1994). 102Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 26–28; Briefing, n.d. [late October 1990], 

EUD-RMO, current files. 103DCG MSG, DTG 050005Z, October 1990, EUD-RMO, current files.

104Msg, Harrell to Edgar, n.d. [mid-October 1990], EUD-RMO, current files.

105“Second RIF Faces EUD.”

106Ibid.

19R_EndNotes.indd 57 
452

107Interv, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 5–6; “Harrell Discusses Reductions wi

Local National Workers,” Corps’ Line, November 1990. 108Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 13–15; with Mellard, pp. 15–20; wi

Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 3–4, 7–9, 24–26. 109“Commander’s Comments: Agreements Allow for More Orderly Transition,” Corp

Line, November 1990; Intervs, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 5–6, and with Mellar

pp. 15–16. 110Interv, authors with Conway, pp. 37–45.

111Quotation from Interv, authors with Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 12–14; see also Interv

authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 91, pp. 17–18, 22–23, and with Minton, pp. 75–77. 112Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 23–24; with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 7–

with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 53–58; with Conway, pp. 44–45. 113“Military Construction Prohibition Continues,” HQ USACE Internal News Brie

26 Nov 90, EUD PAO, current files; “Cheney Continues Temporary Prohibition o

Military Construction,” Corps’ Line, December 1990. 114“Europe Division To Merge with MEAPO,” Corps’ Line, December 1990. 115“Roles Shift as Europe Division Reorganizes,” HQ USACE Internal News Briefs, 

Jan 91; Interv, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 6–7. 116“Corps of Engineers Europe District To Be Activated Mar. 1,” Corps’ Lin

February 1991. 117Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, p. 14.

118Interv, authors with Colio, pp. 28–31.

119Interv, authors with Lamothe, pp. 8–10.

120“Division Organizational Reassignments Mean Better Efficiency,” Corps’ Lin

February 1991. 121Interv, authors with Rodehaver, 10 Dec 91, pp. 13–15.

122Interv, authors with Conway, pp. 67–68. 123Interv, authors with Love, pp. 14–16, 28–29.

124Interv, authors with Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, pp. 19–20.

125Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 14–15.

126Interv, authors with Dale, pp. 65–67.

127Interv, authors with Minton, pp. 93–96. 128“Commander’s Comments: Final Chapter on Division No End to Mission,” Corp

Line, February 1991.

129Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 3, 28–29, 43–44.

Epilogue 

1

The $5 billion figure does not reflect the changing value of the dollar over tho

forty-five years. Money spent in the 1940s must be multiplied by a rough factor of 6.25, 

the 1950s by 5.5, in the 1960s by 4.5, in the 1970s by 3, and in the 1980s by 1.5, to reflect th

value (buying power) of the dollar in 1994. 2

Interv, Paul K. Walker with Allan B. Aaron, Jun 88, Frankfurt, Germany, pp. 138–41

3

“Briefing by Director, USACAG,” 13 Oct 61, for visit by Lt. Gen. Walter K. Wilson, J

to USAREUR, 9–22 Oct 61, Mil Files XII–43–1, OH HQUSACE. For similar reflections, s

Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976, EUD-RHA, Box M–1–7; Interv, authors with Harre

30 Aug 89, pp. 29–30. 4

Interv, authors with Butschan, pp. 2, 7.

5

Interv, authors with Hartwig Braun, 5 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 36–37.

6

“Dedication Marks Corps Contributions,” Corps’ Line, December 1990.

19R_EndNotes.indd 58 
ACRONYMS

AAA Army Audit Agency

AAFES Army and Air Force Exchange Service

AAF Army Air Forces

ABG Auftragsbautengrundsätze

ADA Automated data processing

AMPRS Automated Management Progress Reporting System

ATC Air Transport Command

ATS Austrian shilling

ADSEC Advance Section (COMZ)

BOQ Bachelor officers’ quarters

CINC Commander in chief

COEMIS Corps of Engineers Management Information System

COMZ Communications Zone

CPO Civilian Personnel Office

DAC Department of the Army civilian

DBBV Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung

DCSENG Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer

DEH Directorate of Engineering and Housing

DIN Deutsche Industrie-Normen

DM Deutschmark

EEO Equal employment opportunity

ENGCOM Engineer Command

EQM EUD Quality Management

ESC Engineer Studies Center

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, United States Army

EUCOM European Command

EUD Europe Division

GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile

JAMMAT Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

LRSP Long Range Security Program

MCA Military Construction, Army

MCAF Military Construction, Air Force

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 1 
454

MCN Military Construction, Navy

MEAPO Middle East/Africa Projects Office

MOUSF Modernization of U.S. Facilities

MOUT Military operations in urban terrain

MRI Maintenance, Repair, and Improvement

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OCE Office of the Chief of Engineers

OMA Operations and Maintenance, Army

OMGUS Office of Military Government United States

POL Petroleum, oil, and lubricants

POMCUS Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Configured to 

 Unit Sets

POMSS Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Storage Site

PW Prisoner of war

RIF Reduction in force

SAS Special Ammunition Storage

SETAF Southern European Task Force

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

TAB VEE Theater Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise

TQM Total Quality Management

TSFET Theater Services Forces, European Theater

TUSEG The United States Engineer Group

UEPH Unaccompanied enlisted personnel housing

USACAF United States Construction Agency, France

USACAG United States Army Construction Agency, Germany

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers

USAEDE United States Army Engineer Division, Europe

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

USAREUR United States Army, Europe

USEUCOM United States European Command

USFA United States Forces, Austria

USFET United States Forces, European Theater

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 2 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Materials

Most of the historical evidence for the study of the Europe Division 

and its predecessors comes from primary documentation contained in 

archival and records repositories in the United States and Europe. These 

repositories are listed below with a description of their relevant holdings. 

Descriptions relate to the repositories as they existed during the period of 

intensive research, 1988 to 1991. As noted, some archives have been reorganized, moved, or closed.

Records Holding Area, Europe Division (EUD-RHA), Frankfurt/Bonames, 

Germany

The records holding area that held EUD’s documents contained about 

2,000 records center boxes in 1988. In 1991 the records holding area closed 

and the records were moved. A survey and a preliminary finding aid 

prepared by James R. Arnold and Roberta Weiner, “Inventory of Records 

Materials Pertaining to the Europe Division and Predecessor Agencies” 

(available from the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers), permitted the authors of this study to focus on the boxes that 

appeared most relevant to the historical narrative. 

National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.

The archival holdings relating to the operations of the U.S. Army in 

Europe contained in the collections of the National Archives are voluminous. The material from the National Archives concentrated particularly on 

the period from the end of World War II to the formation of the Engineer 

Command (1967), years poorly documented in the records in Frankfurt/

Bonames. When consulted, these documents were at Suitland, Maryland. 

They have since been moved to the National Archives at College Park, 

Maryland, and reorganized. The major holdings consulted included:

Record Group (RG) 332, Records of U.S. Theaters of War, World War II: 

European Theater of Operations

• Records of the Historical Division, Administrative Historical Reports, 

1942–January 1946

• Engineering Section, Circulars, Bulletins and Reports, 1943–l945

• Engineering Section, Operations and Project Reports, 1945

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 3 
456

RG 338, Records of United States Army Commands, 1942– : Europea

Command (EUCOM)

• Engineer Division

• Historical Division, Program Files Engineer Division, Report

Letters, Bulletins 1947–1950

RG 338, Records of United States Army Commands 1942– : U.S. Force

European Theater (USFET)

• Historical Division, Program Files Engineer Division, Quarterl

Reports January–September 1946

• Historical Division, Program Files Engineer Division, Quarterl

Reports 1946–1947

Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (O

HQUSACE), Alexandria, Va.

The Office of History, located in Alexandria, Virginia, maintain

research facilities to support the work of its staff historians. It has a ric

supply of documentary material and historical papers prepared by Arm

historians for limited circulation (so-called gray literature) that bears upo

the history of the Army engineers in Europe during and since World Wa

II. These materials can be found in the following research collections:

 General Files

 Civil Works Files

 Military Files

In addition, the personal papers of Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr

Chief of Engineers from 1953 to 1956, were particularly useful on con

struction in France and regarding the creation of the Joint Constructio

Agency in the early 1950s. Materials from the papers of Lt. Gen. Walter K

Wilson, Jr., Chief of Engineers from 1961 to 1965, and from General Bruc

C. Clarke, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, from 1960 to 196

also proved helpful.

The Office of History also has an extensive oral history collection th

contains many interviews relevant to this project. The interviews used ar

listed in the Oral Histories section of this bibliography.

Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), Heidelber

Germany

The office has a limited amount of unclassified information and 

wealth of reports and gray literature that provide background and con

text for the work of the Army engineers in Europe. Especially valuab

are many of the studies completed in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s by sta

historians. 

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 4 
457

U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C.

The Center of Military History holds staff reports and historical studies similar to those held in the Office of History, USAREUR, 

and the collections complement one another. CMH also has annual 

reports and the detailed multivolume histories of the occupation 

prepared by the European Command’s Historical Division. They are 

listed by year below in the Governmental Historical and Staff Studies 

section. 

Star and Stripes Library, Darmstadt, Germany

In addition to its own back files of the European Edition of the Stars 

and Stripes newspaper that serves the local American military community, 

the Stars and Stripes Library has materials in its collection that may exist 

nowhere else in accessible form.

Other

Several repositories provided valuable primary documentation and 

information.

• Generallandesarchiv, Karlsruhe, Germany: The Generallandesarchiv 

responded to an inquiry made of local German archives by providing the documentary information on the death and commemoration of Private Roy L. Mattson mentioned in Chapter 3.

• Engineering Society Library, New York, N.Y.: This facility closed in 

the mid-1990s.

• Northern Area Office, Europe Division, Hoensbroek, Netherlands

• TUSEG Area Office, Europe Division, Incirlik, Turkey

In addition, several individuals interviewed for this study provided 

documents that they held personally. 

• Bouchereau, Jacques, private papers, comprising several boxes, which 

were offered to the authors and are now included in the research 

collections at the Office of History, HQ USACE, as the Bouchereau 

Papers.

• “History of Construction of Central Heating Plant in Kornwestheim,” 

paper provided by H. Jace Greene.

• “LeTellier Debrief Letter to CINCUSAREUR,” 14 August 1973, provided by Maj. Gen. Carroll LeTellier (USA, Ret.). 

• Kennedy, Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. (USA, Ret.), personal scrapbook. 

• O’Neill, Jack (Frankfurt) to William B. Dawes, 11 October [1965], provided by Mr. Dawes.

• “Upgrade & Rehabilitation of Ammunition Storage Facilities (ASP’s 

and PSP’s),” 16 October 1973, provided by Col. Claude Roberts 

(USA, Ret.). 

• “USACAG Functional Manual,” [1960], provided by Reimer Delpin. 

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 5 
458

• “USACAG Organization and Functions Manual,” 1 June 1963, pro

vided by Reimer Delpin.

• “Welcome to the USAREUR Engineer’s Conference,” n.d. [1965], pro

vided by Louis Brettschneider.

• Young, Maj. Gen. Robert P. (USA, Ret.), personal scrapbook. 

Books and Published Articles Cited

Aviation Operations Magazine. A Special Study of Operation “Vittles.” New 

York: Conover Mast, 1949. 

Baldwin, William C. The Engineer Studies Center and Army Analysis: 

History of the U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center, 1943–1982. Washingto

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985.

Beck, Alfred M., et al. The Corps of Engineers: The War against German

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985.

Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary. Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces i

Europe.

Brown, Harold W. The Physical Plant: Procurement, Construction an

Maintenance. Occupation Forces in Europe Series. Frankfurt: Office o

the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947.

Campbell Barracks: The Story of a Caserne. Heidelberg: Headquarters, U.

Army Europe, Military History Office, 1987.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe. Living and Working Condition

in the United States Army, Europe. Special Report to Congress of th

United States, 1 May 1984.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City: Doubleday 

Company, 1950. 

Final Report of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, 1942–194

2 vols. Paris: Herve et Fils, n.d. [1945]. 

Fontaine, André. History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to th

Korean War, 1917–1950. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

German Railway Operations Under the United States Army, 8 May–3

December 1945. Frankfurt: Historical Division, Headquarters, USFE

December 1945.

Grosser, Alfred. Germany in Our Time, A Political History of the Postwa

Years. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.

Hayes, Peter. Chronology 1989. New York, Foreign Affairs, 1990.

Healey, Denis. The Time of My Life. New York: W. W. Norton & Co

1990.

Keylor, William R. The Twentieth Century World, An International Histor

New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Laqueur, Walter. Europe Since Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe. New Yor

Penguin Books, 1982.

Nelson, Daniel J. A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany. Boulde

Colo.: Westview Press, 1987.

Rudhart, Alexander. Twentieth Century Europe. Englewood Cliffs, N.J

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1986.

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 6 
459

Ryder, A. J. Twentieth-Century Germany: From Bismarck to Brandt. New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1973.

Schubert, Frank N., and Theresa L. Kraus, gen. eds., The Whirlwind 

War: United States Army Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995.

Strengthening NATO: Stationing of the 2nd Armored Division (Forward) in 

Northern Germany. Heidelberg: Headquarters, USAREUR, 1980.

Strobridge, Truman R. History of the United States European Command. 

Stuttgart: History Office, Headquarters, USEUCOM, 1989.

Thompson, Erwin N. Pacific Ocean Engineers: History of the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers in the Pacific, 1905–1980. Honolulu: Pacific Ocean Division, 

n.d.

Ziemke, Earl F. The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975.

Governmental Historical and Staff Studies Cited

“Annual Historical Report, Headquarters, USAREUR, 1 July 1956–30 June 

1957.” 

“Annual Report of Major Activities, HQ, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh 

Army, 1 January to 31 December 1974,” 7 April 1976.

Baldwin, William C. “Engineer Echelon-Above-Corps Organization in the 

Pacific Since 1941.” Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, 1990.

———. “Engineer Organization in Germany, 1945–1990.” Future Army 

Peacetime Engineer Operations in Europe. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Engineer Studies Center, 1991.

First Year of the Occupation. Occupation Forces in Europe Series. Frankfurt/

Main: Office of the Chief Historian, EUCOM, n.d. 

Frederiksen, Oliver J. The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945–

1953. Karlsruhe: Historical Division, HQ USAREUR, 1953.

Grathwol, Robert P., and Donita M. Moorhus. “Sand, Bricks, and Marble: 

U.S. Military Construction in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, 

and Africa during the Cold War.” Unpublished Manuscript, Office of 

History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998.

Headquarters, 852d Engineer Aviation Battalion. Completion Report, OAF 

Field R–95, Tempelhof, Berlin, Germany. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 10 

September 1945.

Hickman, D. J. The United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963. USAREUR 

Operations Division Historical Section, 1964.

Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985].

Lane, David A., James J. Borror, and George W. Tays. U.S. Army Deutsche 

Mark Construction Program, 1953–1957. [Heidelberg]: HQ USAREUR, 

Historical Division, 1958.

The Physical Plant: Procurement, Construction and Maintenance. Occupation 

Forces in Europe Series. Frankfurt: Chief Historian, European 

Command.

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 7 
460

Reybold, Eugene. “Engineers in World War II: A Tribute.” Unpublishe

Manuscript, 1945. A copy of this typescript, dated 30 Septembe

1945, was located in the Engineering Society Library, New York

N.Y.

Second Year of the Occupation. Occupation Forces in Europe Serie

Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, EUCOM, n.d.

Siemon, Bruce H., and Roland E. Wagberg. The Employment of Loc

Nationals by the U.S. Army in Europe (1945–1966). Heidelberg: H

USAREUR and Seventh Army, ODCS-Operations, 1968.

Tays, G[eorge]. U.S. Army Construction Program in Germany, 1950–195

[Heidelberg]: HQ USAREUR, Historical Division, 1953.

Third Year of the Occupation. Occupation Forces in Europe Serie

Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, EUCOM, n.d.

USAEDE (EUD) Organization Study. Engineer Studies Center, 1985.

U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, “Historical Review, 1 January 1985

31 December 1986,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Militar

History.

Webb, William Joe, et al. Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fisc

Years 1990–1991. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Militar

History, 1997.

Articles Cited from Periodical Publications

“Airlift Is Key to Commuter Army.” Military Engineer 68 (July/Augu

1976): 308.

“America Digs in on the Rhine.” Picture Post, 15 Nov 52.

“Arming for the ’80s.” Time (27 July 1981).

Arrigona, James S. “Construction Progress in France.” Military Engineer 5

(September–October 1958): 334.

Arthur, Billy A. “Tracing the Roots of the U.S. Army Europe.” Heidelber

Herald Post, 19 Nov 82.

“Assistant Secretary Page Discusses Association with Corps.” Engine

Update, August 1989.

Berger World, June 1981 and Spring 1985. Published by Louis Berge

International, Inc. 

“Billet Project Nears Finish in Grafenwöhr.” Stars and Stripes, Europea

Edition, 20 Sep 52.

“Building Miracle at Brussels School.” Army Times Europe, 27 Mar 68.

“Building Sights [sic] of the 83rd Engineers.” Newsletter printed i

June 1952 by the 83d Engineer Construction Battalion. Bordeau

Imprimerie Delmas, 1952, in a file “US Army Engineers 1947–1954,” i

the Stars and Stripes Library, Darmstadt, Germany.

“Captieux Depot Lives Down Early Reputation To Become One o

Com Z’s Most Modern Bases.” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

Apr 53.

Cargill, Kenneth W. “Shoulder to Shoulder.” Military Engineer 6

(November–December 1973): 414.

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 8 
461

“City Offers To Build Housing for Yanks.” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 12 Feb 50.

“Com Z Hq at Orleans Directs Huge Supply Setup in France.” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 3 May 52.

“COMZ Completes 2d Year of Manning Vital Supply Line.” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 8 Nov 52.

Cooper, James C., and Karl Borden. “The Interpretation of Wages and 

Prices in Public Historical Displays.” The Public Historian 19 (Spring 

1997): 9–29. 

Corey, Joseph J., Jr. “Soldiers and Builders.” Military Engineer 67 

(November–December 1975): 331–32.

Corps’ Line (EUD’s internal newsletter), 1978–1993.

Deudney, Daniel, and G. John Ikenberry. “Who Won the Cold War?” 

Foreign Policy 87 (Summer 1992): 128.

Dziuban, Stanley W. “NATO Tour of American Infrastructure.” Military 

Engineer 53 (September–October 1961): 341–42.

“Engineer Aid for 1953 to German City: Projects in ’53 Put at $500,000 by 

USAREUR.” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Jan 54.

“Engineer Outfits Merging.” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 

Jun 67.

“Engineers, Designers, Diplomats.” Engineer Update, July 1979.

“Engineers Beat Schedule on Com Z Tent Project.” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 27 Sep 52.

“Engineers Build Up on Personnel.” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 

Aug 78.

“EUCOM Plans Enclave To Cope with Housing.” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 22 Jul 49.

“Facilities, Services Receive Push.” Engineer Update, December 1988.

“Facing Declining Projects, Budget Cuts: Good News Arrives for Europe 

Members.” Engineer Update, May 1990.

Fink, George B., Jr. “Learning by Building ‘The Movers.’” Military Engineer

73 (September–October, 1981).

“First Game Ball Tossed from Copter.” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

16 Jun 53.

Gall, Herbert J. “Flugplatz Tempelhof.” Military Engineer 52 (July–August 

1960): 289–90.

“German Labor Service Celebrates 20th Anniversary.” Sword and Castle, 

October 1968.

Gibson, Floyd D. “Railway Electrification in Germany.” Military Engineer

41 (July–August 1949): 288–89.

Hanifan, E. P. “The Army Lends a Helping Hand.” Military Engineer 43 

(July–August 1951): 279.

Hara, Steve. “Building Quality into Army Life.” Soldiers (February 1984).

“Headquarters Reorganization: Change Emphasizes Project Management.” 

Engineer Update, August 1989.

Heiberg, E. R., III. “Engineer Missions Support the Total Army.” Military 

Engineer 77 (January–February 1985): 7.

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 9 
462

Hendricks, Charles. “Corps Built WWII Airfields.” Engineer Updat

November 1990.

Hoagland, Jim. “Europe’s Destiny.” Foreign Affairs 69 (1990): 43.

“Kasernes Taken Over for Troops.” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

Oct 50.

Kennedy, William M., III. “A Joint Effort for a Joint Command.” Militar

Engineer 61 (January–February 1969): 43.

Kennedy, William M. “Civilian Labor Group, Germany.” Military Engine

59 (September/October 1967): 368.

Lahde, Frank U. “Construction Assistance in Germany.” Military Engine

59 (March/April 1967): 117.

“Locomotives Solve Housing Project Heating Problem.” Stars and Stripe

European Edition, 25 Aug 54.

Markham, James. “3 G.I.’s Die at German Base When Missile Catche

Fire.” New York Times, 12 Jan 85.

Miles, Donna. “Goodbye Pershing II.” Soldiers 46, no. 8 (August 1991): 45–4

Miller, H. S. “American Engineers in Austria.” Military Engineer 46 (May

June 1954): 177–79.

“New EUCOM Nerve Center Is Dedicated at Stuttgart.” Stars and Stripe

European Edition, 8 Nov 68.

“New Schools Dedicated at EUCOM Patch Site.” Stars and Stripe

European Edition, 5 Oct 79.

“Peace Dividend: Myth and Reality,” Time (12 February 1990): 26.

Pick, Lewis A. “Expanded Role of Engineers.” Military Engineer 41 (July

August 1949): 271.

“REFORGER.” Military Engineer 67 (January/February 1975): 28.

“SAME Announces Engineering Awards.” Engineer Update, May 1982.

Schubert, Frank N. “Corps Got WWII Construction Mission.” Engine

Update, November 1991.

Tulley, David H. “The Military Construction Program.” Military Engine

46 (November–December 1954): 404–05.

“U.S. Army, Contractors Investigate Pershing 2 First-State Propellan

Fire in Germany.” Aviation Week and Space Technology (21 Januar

1985).

“USAREUR Speeds Housing Program.” Stars and Stripes, Europea

Edition, 15 Sep 53.

“USFA Engineers.” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Jul 51.

Walsh, James E. “Engineers in the USAREUR Today.” Military Engineer 5

(September–October 1958): 331–33.

Warren, R. B. “Double Purpose Hospitals in France.” Military Engineer 5

(September–October 1960): 402.

“We’re All Fouled Up in France.” Saturday Evening Post, 11 April 1953.

“Wiesbaden Housing Project Opens First of 400 Units.” Stars and Stripe

European Edition, 17 Oct 49.

“Yanks Wage War on Mud To Set Up Captieux Depot.” Stars and Stripe

European Edition, 10 May 52.

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 10 
463

Oral History Interviews

Interviews Conducted by the Authors

Unless otherwise indicated, both authors participated in the following 

interviews. All interviews were transcribed; both tapes and transcriptions 

are deposited in the Oral History Holdings, Office of History, HQ USACE, 

Alexandria, Virginia. 

Baldinger, Lt. Col. Robert, 23 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, Netherlands.

Bearden, Scott, by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 27 May 92.

Birner, Richard, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.

Blake, John, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, Germany; 27 May 92, Fort Belvoir, Va.

Bouchereau, Jacques, 3 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.

Braun, Hartwig, 5 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, Germany.

Brettschneider, Louis, 26, 30 Jan 90, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Brown, Col. Roy (USA, Ret.), 25 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, Netherlands.

Butschan, Helga, 16 Jun 90, Kriftel, Germany.

Camblor, William E., 9 Aug 89, 11 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Carlson, Col. Paavo (USA, Ret.), by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 28 

Sep 90.

Carson, Lt. Col. John, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, Germany.

Carton, Allen M., by Donita M. Moorhus, 14 Mar, 14 Apr 97, Potomac, Md.

Charles, Col. Carlyle (USA, Ret.), 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Colio, Lt. Col. Lloyd, 6 Jun 90, Stuttgart, Germany.

Constantaras, Andrew, 30 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.

Conway, Virginia, 15 Nov 91, Alexandria, Va.

Cox, Dave, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Cruz, Jose, 19 Nov 91, Hurst, Tex.

Dale, Debra, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Damm, Hasso, 9 Aug 89, 1 Feb 90, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Dawes, William B., by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 26 Oct 90.

Delbridge, Maj. Gen. Norman G., Jr. (USA, Ret.), 14 Feb 91, Washington, 

D.C.

Delpin, Reimer, 29 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Donovan, Brig. Gen. James C. (USA, Ret.), 20 Nov 90, Arlington, Va.

Driskill, Col. John (USA, Ret.), by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 5 

Nov 90.

Faust, Adolph, 11 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.

Fish, Lt. Col. Grosvenor W., Jr., 11 Jun 90, 6 Dec 91, Nuremberg, Germany.

Fraint, Saul, 9 Jun 90, Vienna, Austria.

Friesch, Paul, 22 Aug 89, Brussels, Belgium.

Greene, H. Jace, 1 Jun 90, Liege, Belgium.

Greulich, Karl, 15 Jun 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Grimm, Erwin, 6 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.

Grimm, Richard, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey.

Hensley, Julia P., 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey.

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 11 
464

Higgs, Joe G., 23 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany; 6 Jan 92, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Johnson, Kathleen, 25 Jan 90, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany. 

Kennedy, Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. (USA, Ret.), 26 May 91, Newark, N.J.

Kersbergen, Johann, 24 Aug 89, Soesterberg, Netherlands.

Kirby, Brig. Gen. Gilbert W., Jr. (USA, Ret.), by Telephone with Robert 

Grathwol, 9 Nov 90.

Kusiowski, Inge, 9 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.

Lamothe, Lt. Col. Douglas, 3 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

LeTellier, Maj. Gen. Carroll (USA, Ret.), 19 Nov 91, Arlington, Va.

Lewis, Wayne, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, Germany.

Lochner, Konrad, 13 Jun 90, Würzburg, Germany.

Love, Laverne, 5 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany. 

Lyle, Col. C. B., Jr. (USA, Ret.), by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 2

Oct 90.

McNeely, Frederick B., 15 Feb 91, Arlington, Va. 

Mellard, Ray, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Minton, Russell, 18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex.

Montenberg, Frank, 23 Aug 89, Hoensbruek, Netherlands.

Moravec, Col. John, 19 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany; 18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex

Nelson, Carl E., 12 Jun 90, Ansbach, Germany.

O’Meara, Gen. Andrew P. (USA, Ret.), 18 Jan 91, Arlington, Va. 

Pfefferlein, Ursula, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.

Prentiss, Maj. Gen. Louis W., Jr. (USA, Ret.), 14 Sep 90, Indian Beach, Del.

Ray, Maj. Gen. James W., 5 Feb 90, Heidelberg, Germany.

Reitzel, Georgi, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.

Roberts, Col. Claude (USA, Ret.), 12 Feb 91, Washington, D.C.

Rodehaver, Robert, 31 Jan 90, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Rose, Lt. Col. C. Leslie, 14 Jun 90, Würzburg, Germany.

Rovero, Veronica, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey.

Rufe, J. Dodd, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Schaffner, Karl, 13 Jun 90, Würzburg, Germany.

Schempp, Jakoba, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Shadday, John, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Sikirica, Stanley, 29 Aug 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Smith, Maj. Gen. Scott B. (USA, Ret.), 29 Apr, 2 May 91, Golden, Colo.

Sommer, Douglas, 11 Jun 90, Vilseck, Germany.

Spivey, David A., by Donita M. Moorhus, 25 Oct 96, Alexandria, Va.

Stretz, Rudolf, 11 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.

Textor, Arthur, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Townsley, Col. Edwin S. (USA, Ret.), 15 Feb 91, Alexandria, Va. 

Trowbridge, Terry, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Van Loben Sels, Maj. Gen. James, 12 Apr 91, Fort Monroe, Va.

Varga, Zoltan, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.

Wagman, Stuart, 11 Jan 94, Alexandria, Va.

Waldo, Col. Daniel, Jr., 31 Aug 89, 4 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Washington, Randolph S., 31 May 90, Chièvres, Belgium.

Wheeler, Ralph, 12 Feb 91, Arlington, Va.

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 12 
465

Wilson, Maj. Gen. Drake (USA, Ret.), 29 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va.

Wisdom, Richard, 29 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Wise, James, 1 Feb 90, 11 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.

Withers, Maj. Gen. George K., Jr. (USA, Ret.), 11 Feb 91, Washington, D.C.

Wooten, Herbert, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt/Bonames, Germany.

Young, Maj. Gen. Robert P. (USA, Ret.), 30 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va.; by 

Donita M. Moorhus, 9 Oct 91, Arlington, Va.

Zawisza, Edward, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.

Interviews from the Oral History Holdings, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Va.

Aaron, Allan B., by William C. Baldwin, 21, 22 Jun 88, Frankfurt, 

Germany.

Berrigan, Brig. Gen. Paul D. (USA, Ret.), by John T. Greenwood, 15, 17, 19 

Nov 80, San Francisco, Calif.

Camblor, William E., by William C. Baldwin and Paul K. Walker, 20, 28 

May 87, Frankfurt, Germany.

Cooper, Lt. Gen. Kenneth B. (USA, Ret.), by Charles Hendricks, 23 May 91.

Damm, Hasso, by Paul K. Walker, 21 Jun 88, Frankfurt, Germany.

Graves, Lt. Gen. Ernest (USA, Ret.), by Frank N. Schubert, Mar, Apr 85, 

Arlington, Va.

Higgs, Joe G., by Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin, May 87, 

Frankfurt, Germany.

Kennedy, Brig. Gen. Kenneth W., by Lynn Alperin, 23, 24 Apr 84, Austin, 

Tex.

Mattina, Col. John C., by Carroll Purcell, 9 May 88, Oxnard, Calif.

Noble, Brig. Gen. Charles C. (USA, Ret.), by Martin Reuss, 22, 23 Sep 81.

Penney, Lt. Gen. Howard W. (USA, Ret.), by John T. Greenwood, Dec 

80–Dec 83.

Ray, Brig. Gen. James W., by Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin, 22, 

27 May 87, Frankfurt, Germany.

Rodehaver, Robert, by Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin, 24 Jun 87, 

Frankfurt, Germany.

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 13 
20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 14 
AAA. See Army Audit Agency (AAA).

AAFES. See Army and Air Force Exchange 

Service (AAFES).

Aaron, Allan B., 198, 211, 227, 231, 237, 389

Abrams M1 tank, 309, 313

Accreditation of schools, 344

Ad hoc civil affairs units, 8

ADSEC. See Advance Section, COMZ 

(ADSEC).

Advanced Weapons Section, USACAG, 130

Advance Section, COMZ (ADSEC), 24

Affirmative action, 366–68

Affirmative Employment Plan, 368

AH–64 Apache attack helicopter, 309

Ahearn, Brig. Gen. Joseph “Bud,” 225, 229

Aircraft shelters, Air Force, 275–80

atomic-resistant shelters, 275

doors, special design of, 276–77

funding for, 277–78

helicopter transport of liners, 279

liners, reshaping of, 278–79

sites in Germany, 276

storm-drainage system for, 277–78

Airfield reconstruction, 1945–1948

Army Air Forces (AAF), 30–31

Berlin Airlift, 45–47

civilian volunteers, 46–47

heavy machinery requirements, 46–47

Rhine-Main, 30, 45

Tempelhof, 30, 45–46

Air Force as customer of EUD, 225–26

Air Transport Command (ATC), 31

Albrecht, Brig. Gen. Frank M., 124

Alexander, Clifford L., 302

Alexander M. Patch Elementary and High 

School, Stuttgart, Germany, 344

Allaman, Kristine, 217

Allied air bridge, 45

Allied Control Council, 9

Alternate Construction program, 67, 130, 

132, 153, 164, 255–56, 257, 335, 355, 356

Alternate Housing Program, 132

American products, for construction

kitchen equipment, 274

INDEX

American products, for construction—

Continued

in prefabricated units, 338

American zone in Germany, 65–67

Ammunition storage projects, 162–63, 

282–97

conventional ammunition, 284

igloos, 282, 285

Long Range Security Program, 284

nuclear ammunition, 284

security on sites, 282–84, 285, 286, 290, 

292

Special Ammunition Storage, 284

Weapons Access Denial System, 292

Ammunition Upload program, 287

AMPRS. See Automated Management 

Progress Reporting System (AMPRS).

Ankara Air Station gymnasium, 359

Apel, Hans, 305

A Priori program, 257

Arab-Israeli War, 157

Area offices of Europe Division

1st Support Brigade, 184, 259

V Corps, 184, 259

VII Corps, 184, 259

Augsburg Resident Office, 262

closings of, 1990–1991, 384

Frankfurt Area Office, 262

Germany, 259–60

Greece Resident Office, 266, 384

Hoensbroek Project Office, 384

Kaiserslautern Area Office, 262

Mediterranean Area Office, 260–60

Mediterranean Division, 186, 261

Mediterranean Division, Iran, 260–61

Middle East Division, 186

Northern Area Office, 184–86, 263–65, 

280–81, 384

Nuremberg Area Office, 263

reorganization, 236

Rheinberg Resident Office, 265

Southern Area Office, 262

Southwest Area Office, 262

Stuttgart Area Office, 262, 384

21T_Index(634).indd 1 
468

Area offices of Europe Division—Continued

Würzburg Area Office, 384

Würzburg Resident Office, 384

Army and Air Force Exchange Service 

(AAFES), 355, 356, 375

Army Air Forces (AAF), 16

Army Area Command, 138, 140, 147

Army Audit Agency (AAA), 140

Army communities in occupied Germany, 

1945–1948

barracks rehabilitation, 29–30

housing for dependents, 29–30

pricing mechanisms for construction, 29

standards for housing, 28–29

Army Communities of Excellence, 218

Army engineers in the U.S. zone, 14–17

civil administration in Germany, 14, 19

construction costs, 1945–1948, 31–32

construction demands, 1945–1948, 31–32

infrastructure, maintenance of, 14, 19

Office of the Theater Chief Engineer, 

16–17

supporting soldiers, 28–30

supporting the U.S. Army Air Forces 

(AAF), 30–31

troop command in Germany and Austria, 

15

Army Research Institute studies, 330

“Arrangements for Control of Germany,” 9

Asbestos abatement program, 345–46

ATC. See Air Transport Command (ATC).

Atomic-resistant aircraft shelters, 275, 276

Attic conversion in housing units, 339–41

design of, 340–41

direct contracting, 340–41

Göppingen, Germany, 339

indirect contracting, 340

Auftragsbautengrundsätze (ABG–75), 246

Austria

and Berlin Blockade, 47–51

housing reconstruction, Vienna, 47–51

special treatment of by occupying 

powers, 12

Austrian State Treaty of 1955, 115

Automated data processing (ADP), 230

Automated funds control system, 231

Automated Management Progress 

Reporting System (AMPRS), 230–32

Baader-Meinhof Gang, 282

Bachelor officers’ quarters (BOQ), 71–72

Backlogs in construction, 113, 198–99, 207, 

215–16, 272, 331–34

Barnes, Col. Lynn C., 119

Barracks improvement, 341–43

deterioration, 341

Hahn Air Force Base, Germany, 343

Karatas, Turkey, 342

women soldiers, 342

Basic Treaty, 177

Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical 

Construction Working Group), 122, 

154, 167, 246, 276

Bearden, Scott, 338

Beranek, Dwight, 209

Berlin Airlift, 45–47, 54, 307

Berlin Blockade, 44–47, 63, 114

Berlin Crisis of 1961, 133–35

Berlin Wall, 133, 371, 372, 374, 388

Berrigan, Col. Paul D., 14, 34

Bindermichl apartment complex, Linz, 

Austria, 48–50, 114

Birner, Richard, 317

Bizonia (British-American zone of 

occupation), Germany, 31, 43, 44

Black Hawk troop transport helicopter, 30

Black market in Germany, 22–23

Blake, John, 215–16, 218, 224, 234, 237, 241

262, 268, 292, 293, 307, 309, 327, 336, 

341, 350, 370, 383

Blanchard, Lt. Gen. George S., 182, 200

Blink housing area, Bremerhaven, 

Germany, 346

“Board review” monthly event, EUD, 198

Bogdanow, Walt, 307

Boiler conversion program, Germany, 

155–57

Bolte, Lt. Gen. Charles L., 96

BOQ. See Bachelor officers’ quarters (BOQ

Bosch, Robert, 44

Bouchereau, Jacques, 145, 149, 150, 162, 19

280

Bradley armored personnel carrier, 309, 31

Brandt, Willy, 177

Bratton, Lt. Gen. Joseph K., 224, 225, 287, 

290, 309, 320, 323, 369

Braun, Hartwig, 350, 391–92

Bremen port, Germany, 21

Bremerhaven hospital, 353–54

Bremerhaven seaway, Germany, 21

Brettschneider, Louis, 127, 134, 145, 193, 

194, 383, 385, 391

21T_Index(634).indd 2 
469

Bridge reconstruction in Germany, 25–26

Brigade 75 redeployment, 300, 301, 305

Brigade 76 redeployment, 300

Brown, Harold, 305

Brown, Lt. Col. Roy A., 186, 198, 279

Budget projections, 1991–1992, 379–80, 381

Build-to-lease program, OsterholzScharmbeck, 305

Bulk Transfer of U.S. Army Property, 36

Bunge Corporation, 109

Bunker construction in Germany, 282

Burnell, Maj. Gen. Bates C., 195, 200, 281

Butschan, Helga Preuss, 391–92

Buxton, Lt. Col. John L., 166, 184, 190

Buyout option, manpower reduction, 375

Cakmakli, Turkey, 361

Camblor, William E., 122, 123–24, 128, 134, 

135, 137, 145, 189, 190, 208–09, 221, 

233, 237, 266, 272, 276, 391

Camp Bussac, Bordeaux, France, 91

Camp Roeder, Austria, 114

Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany, 

43

Cannon, Brig. Gen. Craig, 141

Captieux, France, 88–89

Carl Schurz Caserne, Bremerhaven, 360

Carlson, Col. Paavo, 137

Carlucci, Frank, 239

Carrasco, Col. Valentine, 208

Carson, Lt. Col. M. R., 184

Carter, Jimmy, 206, 281

Central Army Group, 59

Changes of command, 196–203, 228–29

Chapels, 360–62

designs of, 360–61

funding, 361–62

Hahn Air Base, Germany, 361

new and renovated, 360–61

social service centers, 360–61

in Turkey, 361

Charles, Col. Carlyle “Chuck,” 197, 199, 224

Cheney, Richard B., 374, 376, 379, 383

Child care, informal, 346

Child development centers, 347–48

Chinon, France, 92

Chinon Engineer Depot project, 108

Chinook helicopter squadron, 279

Chlorination of water, Germany, 98

Civilian personnel. See Department of the 

Army civilians (DACs).

Civilian Personnel Office, ENGCOM, 172

Civilian Personnel Office (CPO), 

USAREUR, 374

Clarke, Lt. Gen. Frederick J., 155

Clay, General Lucius D., 38, 45, 46, 86, 307

Close, Joanne “Jodie,” 225, 367

Closings of area offices of Europe Division, 

384

Coal-fired boilers in Germany, 156–57

Coal-fired space heaters in Europe, 156

Coalmines, restoration of in Germany, 24

COEMIS. See Corps of Engineers 

Management Information System 

(COEMIS).

Cold War collapse, 388, 389

Cold War lines of communication and 

supply

Air Force construction program, 91–92

Bremerhaven, Germany, 84, 86

Communications Zone, 92, 112–13

France, 86–93, 110–14

Livorno, Italy, 86

Merignac Air Force Base, France, 92

Colio, Lt. Col. Lloyd, 266, 326, 384

Collins, Lt. Gen. Arthur S., Jr., 160

Commodity Credit Corporation, 109

Common Infrastructure Program, 256

Communications Zone (COMZ), 8–9, 14, 

21, 107–08, 112–13, 120, 148–49, 168

Community Family Support Center, 379

Community support projects, 354–62

chapels, 360–62

commissaries and post exchanges, 

356–57

funding, 354–56

recreational facilities, 357–60

Compagnie Immobilière Marc Rainaut, 109

Comptroller’s Office, EUD, 191–92

COEMIS, 191–92

personnel shortage, 191

tracking costs of projects, 191–92

COMZ. See Communications Zone 

(COMZ).

Conjunctive funding, 257

Connally, Lt. Col. John, 25

Connell, Brig. Gen. Richard M., 201

Conner, Tom, 195

Construction contracting, Turkey, 221–22

Construction costs, Germany, 1945–1948, 33

Construction Division, EUD, 249–50

Construction Division reorganization, 234

21T_Index(634).indd 3 
470

Construction industry in Turkey, 

strengthening of, 244–45

Construction Management and 

Engineering Associates (CMEA), 91, 

108

Construction mission, 1988–1991, 363–88

Construction personnel, Germany, 17–19

civilians, 18–19, 46–47

displaced persons, 18–19

prisoners of war, 17–18

professionals, 18

soldiers, 19

Construction phase-out, 379

Contracting changes, EUD, 234–37, 273

Contracting Directorate, 370

Contracting in France, 102–06

Génie, for military installations, 102, 107

Ponts et Chausées, for bridges and roads, 

102

Service de l’Infrastructure, with NATO, 

104, 106

Contracting methods

ABG–75, 246

combined direct and indirect, 243

Defense and Economic Cooperation 

Agreement, 245

direct, 243, 246

Dollar Construction Contract, 245

Germany, 245–47

indirect, 243, 245, 246

NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 245

Technical Working Group for 

Construction, 246

training for contractors and workers, 245

Turkey, 244–45

Contracts, extension to, 236

CONUS (Continental United States) 

districts, 201

Conway, Virginia, 367, 382, 385

Cooper, Lt. Gen. Kenneth B., 200

Corlite Building Systems, Weslaco, Texas, 

335, 336

Corps’ Line, 197, 238, 364, 376, 388

Corps of Engineers Management 

Information System (COEMIS), 

191–92, 230–32

“Corps system” in Europe, 188

Cost-cutting budget, 379–80

Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, 370

Cowles, Col. Philip, 221

Cox, Dave, 184, 268

Cradle-to-grave project management, 369

Crizer, Lt. Gen. Pat W., 287

Cruise missiles, 321–27, 368

Cruz, Jose, 200, 202, 207, 209, 215, 220, 286

Culp, Col. Dennis, 234

Cultural differences, problems from, 390

Customer satisfaction in project planning, 

247, 368

Customer service, EUD, 217–18, 225, 237–

DACs. See Department of the Army 

civilians (DACs).

Dale, Debra, 385

Damm, Hasso, 127, 146, 149, 207, 208, 227, 

232, 279, 367, 374, 375, 378, 382, 385, 

391

Davison, General Michael S., 171, 172

DBBV. See Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung

(DBBV).

de Gaulle, Charles, 148

Debco, Sgt. Joe, 47

Defense and Economic Cooperation 

Agreement, 244

DEH. See Directorate of Engineering and 

Housing (DEH).

Delbridge, Brig. Gen. Norman G., Jr., 47, 

181, 196–97, 198, 199, 200–202, 205, 

215, 224, 232, 280, 323

Demobilization in Europe, 368–69

Department of Defense, 38

form 1391, 247

Productivity Month, 239

Department of the Army civilians (DACs)

108, 215–16, 266–69, 273

Dependent housing, 1950–1953, 73–76

Deutschmark funding, 76

family units, 74–75

requisitioned housing, 74

service-related civilians, 74

Dependent housing, 1953–1957, 96–100

bachelor officers’ quarters (BOQ), 98

basic utilities, 98–99

chapels, 100

health facilities, 99

heating sources, 97

new family housing units, 96–98

schools, 99–100

standard building specifications, 97

Design and construction process, 247–69

area offices, 258–69

construction, 249–51

21T_Index(634).indd 4 
471

Design and construction process—Continued

design, 248–49

funding, host nation, 255–56

funding, NATO, 256–57

funding, U.S., 253–55

planning, 247–48

projects, 262–66

supervision in the field, 266–69

value engineering, 251–53

workload, 257–58, 261–62

Design Branch, EUD, 192–93

American design specifications, 192–93

German design specifications, 193

Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung (DBBV), 67, 

121–23

Deutsche Industrie-Normen (DIN), 193

Deutschmark (DM) construction, 44, 51, 67, 

95–96, 99, 121–23, 128, 132, 153, 165, 301

DIN. See Deutsche Industrie-Normen (DIN).

Direct contracting system, 243, 246, 340–41

Directorate of Engineering and Housing 

(DEH), 212, 247, 333

Directorate of Military Construction, OCE, 

195

Directorates of Facilities Engineering, 

regional, 194, 195

District heating system, Vilseck, Germany, 

308

Doherty, Lt. Col. T. L., 184

Dollarbaukontrakt (Dollar Construction 

Contract), 122, 124, 127, 245

Donges-Metz pipeline, 111–12, 119

Donovan, Brig. Gen. James C., 132, 171, 

181, 188, 272

Dual-basing plan, 300

Dual-purpose housing/hospital plan, 

France, 112–13

Dual recruitment, 367

Dyckerhoff-Widmann firm, 353

18th Engineer Brigade, 310

83d Engineer Construction Battalion, 89, 91

862d Engineer Aviation Battalion, 30

East Camp, Grafenwöhr, Germany, 348

East German demonstrations, 1989, 371

East German Politburo, 371

Eddleman, General Clyde D., 132

Eddy, Lt. Gen. Manton S., 64

Edgar, Maj. Gen. C. Ernest, III, 381

EEO. See Equal employment opportunity 

(EEO).

Efficiency management in engineer 

activities, 39–42

chief engineer, role of, 41

Engineer School, Murnau, 41–42

nonmilitary personnel, 41–42

post engineer training teams, 41

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 8, 14, 19, 

57

Electric rail system, Germany, 24–25

Electronic radio network (troposcatter), 

132

Emmons, Terry, 217

Engineer Command (ENGCOM), 1966–

1974, 139–73

ammunition storage projects, 162–63

boiler conversion program, 155–57

construction challenges, 163–67

C2

 (command and control) project, 

Belgium, 151

engineer troops, 146–47

facilities engineers, 147–48

FRELOC, 148–52, 155

headquarters fire, Frankfurt, 161–62

labor service units, 147

military personnel, 144–46

Modernization of U.S. Facilities, 165–67

phaseout, 168–73

REFORGER, 152–53

school complex, Belgium, 150–51

SHAPE headquarters, Belgium, 151

standardization of criteria, 148

Stem to Stern, 158–60

structure and organization, 141–48

troop reduction in Europe, 148–53

workload and funding, 153–63

Engineer Division, EUCOM, 65–66

Construction Branch, 66

Operations Branch, 66

Engineer Element, 138

Engineer Field Service Center, 76

Engineering Division, EUD, 248

Engineering operations standardized, 

51–54

cost-accounting procedures, 52

Deutschmark, 51

German economy, 51

language barriers, 53

maintenance of utilities and equipment, 

52–54

Engineer School, Murnau, Germany, 41–42

Engineer Studies Center, 234, 369

21T_Index(634).indd 5 
472

Engineer Training Center, Epernay, France, 

17

EQM. See EUD Quality Management 

(EQM).

Equal Employment Opportunity Action 

Plan, USAREUR, 190–91

Equal employment opportunity (EEO), 

366–68, 378

Erzurum, Turkey, 221

ESC. See U.S. Army Engineer Studies 

Center (ESC).

Eschbach, Lt. Col. A. M., 79, 80

ETOUSA. See European Theater of 

Operations, United States Army 

(ETOUSA).

EUCOM. See European Command 

(EUCOM).

EUD Bulletin, 196

EUD Quality Management (EQM), 238, 

366, 369

Europe District, 388

Europe Division, Corps of Engineers, 

1974–1978, 181–203

area offices, 183–88

change of command, 196–203

Comptroller’s Office, 191–92

Engineering Division, 195

facilities engineering operations, 193–95

German employees, 173

in-house design, 192–93

morale of staff, 188–91

personnel and procedures, 181–92

personnel shortages, 199–201

Europe Division, Corps of Engineers, 

1978–1988, 205–40

and the Air Force, 225–26

Construction Division, 209, 218–20

construction in Turkey, 220–23

Contract Administration Branch, 209

customer service, 217–18

defense budget growth, 212–14

Engineering Division, 216–18

headquarters, 211

intergovernmental affairs, 237

organizational structure, 227–37

Planning Branch, 218

quality management, 237–40

recruitment of manpower, 215–16

revising procedures and training, 223–25

staff size and workload, 206–11

Supervision and Inspection Branch, 209

Europe Division and European revolution

372–88

cost cutting, 379–80

field office reductions, 384

hiring freeze, 376, 381

manpower reduction, 374–76

mergers of offices, 381

morale, 385

moratorium on new construction, 1990, 

374, 375, 376, 379–80, 383

reduction in force, 376–79, 381–82, 383

reorganization, 366–70, 376–79

workload restructuring, 383

European Air Transport Service, 31

European Command (EUCOM), 33, 38, 41

64

Engineer Division, 100

Engineer School, 52

European Exchange Service, 132

European Theater of Operations, United 

States Army (ETOUSA), 14

Exceptional Civilian Award, 237

Exercise COMBINE, 92

Explosives Safety Board, Department of 

Defense, 282

1st Infantry Division, 38

4th Armored Division, 132, 139

56th Field Artillery Command, 327

59th Ordnance Brigade, 162–63, 282

485th Engineer Heavy Shop Company, 37

485th Tactical Missile Wing, 323–24

473d Air Service Group, 30

Facilities Engineering Support Section, 19

Facilities Modernization Program, 316

Facilities Support Section, Engineering 

Division, 333

Factory-built housing

bids from contractors, 339

funding, 334–35, 337

infrastructure with, 337–38

maintenance reduction, 338

for noncommissioned officers, 337

prefabricated units, 335–36

prototype in Wildflecken, 335–36

townhouse designs, 337

Family housing

backlog of maintenance, 331–32

existing units, 331–34

heating units, 332–33

laundry rooms, 333

21T_Index(634).indd 6 
473

Family housing—Continued

mold and mildew, 332

shortages of personnel, 333

team approach to renovation, 334

whole-house renovation, 333–34

Faust, Adolph, 145

Faxon, E. M., 184

Federal Republic of Germany, 63, 95, 121, 

299–327

Federally Employed Women, 366

FENDER II, 169–70

Ferris Barracks, Erlangen, Germany, 160

Field offices, structure of, 259–60

Fillibeck and Sons, 344

Finanzbauamt (Office of Finance for 

Construction), 154

First Berlin Crisis, 44–47

Fish, Lt. Col. Grosvenor “Bud,” Jr., 268, 

308

Fleming, Col. Robert, 23, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39

Florennes, Belgium, 323

Focus ’90 briefing, 376

Ford, Brig. Gen. W. W., 106

Ford, Gerald, 300

Fort Hood, Texas, 303, 305

Forward stationing, 307

Fraint, Saul, 108, 126, 134, 145, 150, 166, 

193

France, 1948–1953, 86–93

Air Force construction program, 91

Captieux ordnance depot, 88–89

funding for military construction, 91

storage of American supplies, 88–89

tent housing for U.S. troops, 90

terrain difficulties, 89

U.S. supply line construction, 86–93

France, 1953–1957, 102–14

construction contracts, 102–07

dependent housing, 108–09

Joint Construction Agency, 101–14

recruitment of construction personnel, 

107–08

streamlining construction procedures, 

106–07

surplus-commodity housing, 109

U.S. supply line construction, 110–14

Frankfurt American High School, 344–45

French Communist Party, 86

French Liaison Mission, 106

Friesch, Paul, 126

Fulda, Germany, 167

Funding for construction

host-nation, 255–56

NATO, 256–57

U.S., 253–55

Funding for missile systems, Germany, 

1961, 130

Funding special account, JCA, 104–05

Garlstedt garrison, 300–307

Armed Forces Network Television, 305

Brigade 75 redeployment, 300, 301

build-to-lease housing, 303, 305

design of buildings, 306

environmental impact of construction, 302

funding, 301, 305, 306

indirect contracting, 302

medical facilities, 306

multiuse facilities, 305

public relations planning, 302–03

school construction, 306

Garrett, Lee, 199, 201

Gatow Airfield, Berlin, Germany, 46

General Accounting Office (GAO), 293

General Lucius D. Clay Caserne, Berlin, 

Germany, 307

Georgi Reitzel firm, 320

German Democratic Republic, 63

German Federal Construction 

Administration. See Deutsche 

Bundesbauverwaltung (DBBV).

German Federal Ministry of Finance, 378

German Government Construction Agency. 

See Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung

(DBBV).

German Grand Service Cross, 237

German National Railroad, 97

German products, for construction, 338

German-U.S. Architect Group, 344

Gilze-Rijen, Netherlands, 276, 277, 279, 280

GLCM. See Ground Launched Cruise 

Missile (GLCM) program.

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 326, 368, 370

Grafenwöhr live-fire range, 310–13

moving target systems, 311, 312

pop-up targets, 312

procurement of materials and 

equipment, 311

soil analysis of, 310–11

sound absorption design, 313

tank firing range, 311, 312

troop facilities, 311

21T_Index(634).indd 7 
474

Gramm-Rudman amendment, 368

Graves, Maj. Gen. Ernest, 201

Graves Registration Command, 88

Greene, H. Jace, 37, 97, 126, 145, 191

Gribble, Lt. Gen. William C., Jr., 186, 190, 

272, 284

Griggs, Ken, 383

Grigsby, E. M., 184

Grimm, Richard, 219, 268

Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) 

program, 264, 309, 322–27

Groves, Maj. Gen. Richard H., 200

Gymnasium projects, 358–59

Hahn Air Base, Germany, 324, 361

Hanau depot, 34–38

displaced persons influx, 35

hardstands, 34

Heavy Equipment Storage Section, 37

influx of goods, 34–35

redeployment, loss of personnel to, 35

Repair and Rebuild, 37–38

subdepots, 35–36

unloading backlog, 35

Hanau Engineer Depot, 53

Handy, General Thomas T., 64, 67

Hardin, Col. John R., 14

Hardstands, 34, 318–19

Harrell, Brig. Gen. Ernest J., 364–67, 369, 

375–76, 381, 382, 383, 388, 392

Harrington, Evan, 150

Hatch, Maj. Gen. Henry J., Jr., 213, 366, 369, 

370, 376, 380

Haugen, John, 145

Hawk missile program, 130, 131

Hazen, Col. Donald E., 225, 322, 323

Heating sources for buildings in Germany, 

97

Heiberg, Lt. Gen. E. R., III, 229, 239

Heidelberg, Germany, 43–44

Heilbronn, Germany, 326

Helping Hand program, 76–78

39th Engineer Group, 76

77th Engineer Construction Battalion, 

76

Busenbach, Germany, 78

Engineer Field Service Center, 76

Weingarten, Germany, 76–78

Wilhelmsfeld, Germany, 76

Hendrik Caserne, Netherlands, 297

Henson, Capt. Kent, 308–09

Higgs, Joe G., 193, 200, 201, 202, 207, 208, 

209, 213–14, 216, 217, 220, 233, 237, 

253, 370, 383

Hiring freeze, Department of Defense, 374

376

Hochtief, A. G.; Wiener und Trachte; P. A. 

Budau contracting group, 343

Hohenfels combat maneuver training 

center, 313–15

mock village site, 314–15

opposition force for mock battle, 314

for street-to-street fighting, 313–15

Holdover projects, EUD, after 1974, 271–8

Air Force aircraft shelters, 275–80

American products, regulations to use, 27

funding, 272–73, 274

indirect contracting, 273

MOUSF construction, 271–75

naval facilities, 280–81

project officers, 273

remote sites, 274–75

Sigonella Naval Base, Sicily, 280–81

staffing difficulties, 272–73

Honecker, Erich, 371

Hospital/housing construction, France, 

112–13

“Hot” projects in Germany, 1945–1948, 

31–32

Bad Nauheim, 32

Frankfurt, 31

Garmisch, 32

Höchst compound, 32

Rhine-Main Air Base, 31

Wiesbaden, 31

Housing Administration Trust, Vienna, 51

Housing reconstruction, Vienna, 47–51

Huebner, Lt. Gen. Clarence R., 38, 39, 42

Humphrey, Gordon J., 316

Huntsville Division, Corps of Engineers, 15

I. G. Farben Company, 14, 35, 39, 161, 216, 

344, 392–93

IBM Information Systems Plan, 232

Igloo bunkers, 282, 285

Illesheim Caserne, Germany, 132

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, 220, 222–23, 360

Indefinite delivery (open-ended) contracts

236

Indirect contracting system, 122–23, 190, 

200, 243, 245, 246, 250, 273, 302, 340, 

379, 390

21T_Index(634).indd 8 
475

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 

Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 135

INF Treaty. See Intermediate Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty.

Information Management Office, EUD, 232, 

233

Information processing systems, 229, 

230–32

Inspection of MOUSF construction, 273

Installation Support Activity, Europe, 333, 

347

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 

Treaty, 179, 326, 368

International Refugee Organization, 48, 50, 

67, 69

Iran commissary project, 356

Iron Curtain, fall of, 371

JAMMAT. See Joint American Military 

Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT).

JCA. See Joint Construction Agency (JCA); 

Joint Construction Agency (JCA), 

France.

Jever, Germany, 276, 279, 280

Joint American Military Mission for Aid to 

Turkey (JAMMAT), 83–84

Joint Construction Agency (JCA), 95, 

101–20, 135

abolished, 119

Austria, 114–15

France, 101–14

Greece, 115–16

Italy, 114–15

Turkey, 115–16

Joint Construction Agency (JCA), France, 

101–20

administrative procedures, 102–07

central office, Boulogne-Billancourt, 102

dependent housing, 108–09

line of communications, 110–14

major tasks of, 104–07

personnel recruitment, 107–08

phaseout, 116–20

Suez Canal Zone, 114, 118

Kaiserslautern ammunition dump, 283

Kappa, Shirley, 196–97, 201

“Kastle Keepers,” 197

Katterbach Caserne, Ansbach, Germany, 

346, 360

Kauffeisen, General, 106

Kelley, Brig. Gen. Roy S., 156

Kem, Maj. Gen. Richard S., 380, 381

Kennedy, John F., 133, 156

Kennedy, General Kenneth W., 155, 156, 

157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 346

Kessler Field, Schweinfurt, Germany, 346

Keyes, Lt. Gen. Geoffrey, 47–48

Khrushchev, Nikita, 133

Klee, Holzmann, Zueblin, Wachter 

construction group, 344

Koisch, Maj. Gen. P. “Frank,” 170–71

Kolin Insaat firm, 342

Kommandatura, 9

Korean War, 64, 66

Korman, Carl, 210

Kornwestheim apartment complex, 97

Krenz, Egon, 371

Kroesen, General Frederick J., 291, 316, 363

Krupinski, Viktor, 246

Kupec, Steve, 213

Kvam, Lt. Col. Kenneth W., 322, 323

Lahr Air Base, Baden-Württemberg, 

Germany, 276, 277

Lamothe, Lt. Col. Douglas, 213, 384

Länder, disbursing wages, 127

Landstuhl hospital, 350–51

Leber, Georg, 302

Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 8, 14

Leighton Barracks, Würzburg, Germany, 

346

LeMay, Lt. Gen. Curtis E., 46

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., 150

LeTellier, Brig. Gen. Carroll N., 163–64, 171, 

358

Lewis, John, 198, 200

Lewis, Wayne, 268

Lifecycle project management, 369, 376, 388

Line of communications, France, 86–93, 

110–14, 121

Lippert, Karen, 336

Lipscomb, Col. Thomas H., 83

Live-fire practice ranges, 310–13

Livorno, Italy, 114–15

Logistics Management Office, 233, 366

Long Range Security Program (LRSP), 163, 

282, 284–93

Louis Berger International, 166, 310, 320

Love, Laverne, 367, 378

LRSP. See Long Range Security Program 

(LRSP).

21T_Index(634).indd 9 
476

Lucas and Associates, Rome, Italy, 158–59

Lustig, Brig. Gen. Sheldon J., 225

M. F. Wachter firm, 344

Macaulay, Thomas, 33

McCloy, John J., 66, 67

McCutchen, Col. Alan J., 41

Mace missile program, 130, 131

McGahey, Marshall, and McMillan firm, 166

McNamara, Robert, 134

McNarney, General Joseph T., 14, 32

McNeely, Frederick B., 173, 188, 199, 200, 201

McNutt, Brig. Gen. Charles, 124

Magruder, Maj. Gen. Carter B., 14

Maintenance, Repair, and Improvement 

(MRI), 331–34

Manpower projections, 1991–1992, 380–81

Mansfield, Mike, 152

Markuten, Rod, 324

Marshall Heights, Kitzingen, Germany, 337

Marshall Plan, 44, 57

Master Planning Section, EUD, 216–18

Mattson, Pvt. Roy L., 78

MCA. See Military Construction, Army 

(MCA).

MCAF. See Military Construction, Air Force 

(MCAF).

Measurement Information Data Acquisition 

System, 230

Medical facilities in Germany for military 

dependents, 306, 349–54

97th General Hospital, Frankfurt, 351–52

Bremerhaven, 353

cost estimates, 350

Landstuhl renovation, 350–51

medical equipment, specialized, 350

Nuremberg Army hospital, 349–50

value-engineering program, 353

Würzburg Army hospital, 352–53

Mediterranean Division, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, 119, 120, 186, 202, 260–61

Mediterranean Theater, 35, 36

“Meet and Mingle,” 197

Mele, Michael, 237

Mentell, Lt. Col. Robert, 268

Merger of EUD and MEAPO, 381, 383

Merignac Air Force Base, Bordeaux, France, 

92

Meritorious Civilian Service Award, 216, 237

Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF), 

231, 247

Military Construction, Army (MCA), 150, 

214, 247

Military operations in urban terrain 

(MOUT), 314–15

Miller, Col. Hubert S., 48, 50–51

Mine workers, Germany, 24

Minorities in the Army, 366

Mock village training site, 314–15

Modernization of U.S. Facilities (MOUSF)

165–67, 271–75, 299

Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard 

Viscount, 7

Moore, Maj. Gen. Cecil R., 8, 14, 17, 19, 21, 

27, 28, 34

Morale

in Europe Division, 1974–1976, 188–91, 

196–99

among occupation forces, 38–39

and reductions in force, 1990–1991, 385

Moratorium on military construction, 374

375, 376, 379

Moravec, Col. John, 213, 234, 238, 370

Morris, Brig. Gen. Howard A., 23, 39, 135, 

139, 140

Morris, Lt. Gen. John W., 199, 216, 254

MOUSF. See Modernization of U.S. 

Facilities (MOUSF).

MOUT. See Military operations in urban 

terrain (MOUT).

Moving target training ranges, 311–12

MRI. See Maintenance, Repair, and 

Improvement (MRI).

Mulford, Jim, 268

97th General Hospital, Frankfurt, 351–52

National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 

California, 314

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO).

New programs, EUD, after 1977, 281–97

ammunition storage facilities, 282–93

pre-positioned materiel, 293–97

New weaponry systems, Germany, 309–27

Cruise missile program, 321–27

Hohenfels combat maneuver training 

center, 313–15

live-fire training ranges, 310–13

operational facilities upgrade, 315–19

Patriot missile program, 319–21

Pershing missile system, 321–27

Newsletter, EUD, 196–97

21T_Index(634).indd 10 
477

Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), Germany, 

302

Nike air defense missile program, 130

Nissen, Tom, 277

Noce, Maj. Gen. Daniel, 68

Nold, Maj. Gen. George J., 102, 107, 111

North Atlantic Treaty, 57, 86

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 57, 63, 121, 205, 244, 300, 370

allotments for construction, 256–57

Common Infrastructure Program, 130, 

153, 225

Recoupment Branch, 153

responsibilities of U.S. military under, 

64–65

Status of Forces Agreement, 122, 207, 245

Nuremberg Army hospital

medical equipment, specialized, 350

renovation, 349–50

1057th Engineer Port Construction and 

Repair Group, 25

Oberfinanzdirektion (State Financial Office), 

Hanover, Germany, 301, 302, 303, 306

Occupying powers in Germany

organizing of, 9–12

responsibilities toward civilian society, 

21–22

special treatment of Austria, 12

U.S. Army as, 9

U.S. zone of occupation, 9–12

OCE. See Office of the Chief of Engineers 

(OCE), Washington, D.C.

Oelberg, Lt. Col. Kermit, 186

Office of the Chief Engineer, Heidelberg, 

52–53

Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), 

Washington, D.C., 106, 119, 182, 356

Office of the Chief of Engineers, USFET, 18, 

19, 28, 30

Office of the Engineer, USAREUR, 172

Office of Human Resources, 374

Office of Military Government United 

States (OMGUS), 15, 16, 26

Office of the Theater Chief Engineer, 25, 26

profile of activities, 16–17

responsibilities of, 17

Oil-burning boilers, Germany, 157

Old Argonner Caserne, Hanau, Germany, 348

O’Meara, General Andrew P., 139–40, 155, 

156, 158

OMA. See Operations and Maintenance, 

Army (OMA).

OMGUS. See Office of Military Government 

United States (OMGUS).

Operational facilities modernizing, 315–19

Facilities Modernization Program, 316

funding, 316

hardstands, 318–19

maintenance shops, 316–17

roller-compacted concrete, 318–19

Operation BAMBOO TREE, 133–35

Operation DESERT SHIELD, 381

Operation FRELOC, 148–52, 155

“Operation New Neighbor,” 303

Operation VITTLES, 45

Operations and Maintenance, Army 

(OMA), 193, 213, 247

Opstal, Al, 297

Organizational control, EUD, 223–26

Organizational structure, 1978–1988, 

229–30, 233–37

Osterholz-Scharmbeck, Germany, 303

Ostpolitik, 177

O’Toole, Lt. Col. Robert, 213

Outdoor sport facilities, 358

Outplacement program, USACE, 382

Outstanding Civilian Service Award, 246

Panzer Housing Area, Böblingen, Germany, 

348

Pastore, John, 283, 284

Patrick Henry Village, Heidelberg, 

Germany, 343, 348

Patriot air defense missile, 309, 319–21

funding, 320, 321

installations, 320

mounting, 320

troop facilities, 320

Patton Barracks, 43

Pattonville Housing Area, Ludwigsburg, 

Germany, 344

Peacock, Earl, 140

Peckham, Brig. Gen. Howard L., 88

Perlacher Forest Caserne, Munich, 

Germany, 356

Pershing II missile, 178, 309, 321–27, 368

Air Force sites, 324

elimination of American and Russian 

missiles, 326–27

Florennes, Belgium, site, 323

Hahn Air Base site, 324

21T_Index(634).indd 11 
478

Pershing II missile—Continued

Heilbronn, Germany, site, 326

Personnel recruitment, JCA, France

essentiality review, 107–08

professional engineers, 108

Personnel shortages, EUD, 199–201, 215–16

Phaseout of ENGCOM, 168–73

Philipp Holzmann, A.G., 134, 335, 336–37, 

353

Phillips, Leonard L., 145, 211, 227

Phillips Building, 211, 269, 380, 384, 392–93

Pick, Lt. Gen. Lewis A., 48, 92

Pickett, Col. George E., 79

Pipeline for petroleum products, France, 

111–12

Planning Branch, EUD, 217, 218

Political revolution in Europe, 1989, 370–72

Berlin Wall opened, 371

demonstrations by East Germans, 371

East German emigration to Western 

Europe, 371

Iron Curtain, fall of, 371

Red Army tanks removed from Hungary, 

370

Warsaw Pact dissolution, 372

Polk, General James H., 155, 158, 162

POMCUS. See Pre-positioned 

Organizational Materiel Configured 

to Unit Sets (POMCUS).

POMSS. See Pre-positioned Organizational 

Materiel Storage Sites (POMSS).

Pop-up target firing ranges, 312–13

Post exchanges, 356–57

Heilbronn, Germany, 356–57

Iran, 356–57

Leighton Barracks Würzburg, Germany, 

356–57

Perlacher Forest Caserne, Munich, 

Germany, 356–57

Ramstein, Germany, 356–57

Vogelweh, Germany, 356–57

Powell, Lt. Col. Ray, 213

Prefabricated housing, Germany, 334–39

Prefinanced funding, 257, 290

Prentiss, Brig. Gen. Louis W., Jr., 181–83, 

190, 194, 195–96, 199, 200, 202, 205, 

216, 230, 261, 268, 272, 284

Prentiss, Col. Louis W., Sr., 32

Pre-positioned ammunition storage, 293–97

Arab-Israeli War of 1973, 293

maintenance of stored equipment, 294–95

Pre-positioned ammunition storage—

Continued

new construction, 297

REFORGER exercises, 293, 295, 297

removal of obsolete materiel, 294

Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel 

Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS), 

293–94, 315–16

Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel 

Storage Sites (POMSS), 295–97

Priority placement, Defense Department, 

382

Prisoners of war, 17–18

Procurement and Supply Division, EUD, 

220

Program and Project Management 

Directorate, 370

Programs and projects, EUD

holdover projects, 271–81

new programs, 281–97

Project CHASE, 172

Project FENDER, 168

Project Management Branch, Engineering 

Division, 253

Project Management Division Concept, 36

Project officers, 273, 287

Project RED WHEEL, 171

Projects board, EUD, 197–99

Quality management, 237–40

RADVA Corporation of Radford, Virginia, 

337

Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 161, 225, 277

291, 356

Ray, Brig. Gen. James W. “Bill,” 205, 232–3

237–39, 265, 352, 364, 368

Reagan, Ronald, 238, 281, 326, 368

Real Estate Division, ENGCOM, 154–55

Reconfiguration of U.S. forces overseas, 

38–39

Recoupment Section, EUD, 257

Red Army tanks, removal from Hungary, 

370

Redeployment of troops and materiel, 194

19–26

communications and supply lines, 21–2

holding camps, 20–21

rebuilding the infrastructure, 23–26

Reduction in force (RIF), 375–76, 380–81

buyout option, 375

21T_Index(634).indd 12 
479

Reduction in force (RIF)—Continued

construction moratoriums, 384

field office closings, 384

German and third-country employees, 

374–75

hiring freeze, 374, 376, 381

morale, 385

moratorium on new construction, 374, 

375, 376, 379–80, 383

of non-American employees, 383–84

outplacement program, USACE, 382

priority placement, Department of 

Defense, 382

ratio between German and third-country 

employees, 382

tariff agreements, 374

termination of local nationals, 382, 

383–84

of U.S. civilians, 382

workload decrease, 375–76

Reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, 368–69

REFORGER, 152–53, 293, 295, 297, 299

Regulations for classroom design, 348

Rehabilitation of requisitioned property, 

Heidelberg, 43–44

Reichswerke Hermann Göring, 48

Reitzel, Georgi, 127

Remote site upgrading, 167

Repair and Rebuild, 36–37

Repositioning of troops and materiel in 

Germany, 299–309

cost-sharing agreement, 300–301

district heating system, 308

dual-basing plan, 300

funding, 305–06

Garlstedt garrison, 300–301

permanent structures required, 301–07

public relations during construction, 

308–09

school construction, 307

Vilseck, 307–09

Resource Management Office, EUD, 215, 

376

REturn of FORces to GERmany. See

REFORGER.

Reviews in design phase of construction, 

248–49

Rheinau Coal Storage Point, 47

Rhenish Palatinate (Rheinpfalz), Germany, 

78–82

hospital construction, 81–82

Rhenish Palatinate (Rheinpfalz), Germany—

Continued

infrastructure weakness, 80–82

Kaiserslautern, 81

Mangin Caserne, 81

Vogelweh, 81

Rhine River, clearing of, 1945, 25–26

Rhoades, Capt. M. Stephen, 220, 221

RIF. See Reduction in force (RIF).

River clearing, Germany, 25

Roberts, Col. Claude, 346

Robinson, Maj. Gen. Bernard L., 102, 106

Robinson Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, 346

Rodehaver, Robert, 78, 145, 268

Roller-compacted concrete, 318–19

Rose, Lt. Col. Leslie, 384

Rousseau, R. L., 188

Rovero, Veronica, 269

7th Engineer Brigade, 141

77th Engineer Construction Battalion, 76

6970th LS/CLG, 146–47, 157

7966th EUCOM Detachment, 88, 90

Safety in child care centers, 347–48

Saint, General Crosbie E., 378

SAS. See Special Ammunition Storage 

(SAS).

Saudi Arabia, 232–33

Scandal, absence of, 390–91

Schaffner, Karl, 352

Scherman, Irv, 378, 382

Schlesinger, James, 171, 300

Schmidt, Helmut, 178, 300

Schools and child care centers, 1980s, 

343–49

accreditation, loss of, 344

asbestos abatement, 345–46

child care centers, 346–48

design elements, unusual, 344

funding, 344–45

preschools, 346–48

youth activity centers, 348–49

Schools for military dependents, Germany, 

99–100, 306

Schulman, Vic, 216

Security at ammunition sites, 282–92

Sending States Construction Group, 237

Senior Executive Service, EUD, 209

Sense of the Senate Resolution, 152

SETAF. See Southern European Task Force 

(SETAF). 

21T_Index(634).indd 13 
480

Seventh Army, 64

Shadday, John, 145, 151

SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).

SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Shingler, Brig. Gen. Don G., 39, 41, 52, 65, 

86, 148

Shopping centers, military, 356

Siemens company, 134

Sigonella Naval Air Base, Sicily, 280–81, 358

Sikirica, Sgt. Stanley, 44

Sizemore, Sherry, 360–61

Smith, Col. Glen, 208

Smith, Brig. Gen. Scott Beecher, 205, 223–26, 

322, 323, 324, 326, 367

Smith Barracks, Baumholder, Germany, 

316–17

Snow, C. P., 198

Sobke, Maj. Gen. John, 381, 388

Society of American Military Engineers, 

213, 223, 237, 324

Soesterberg, Netherlands, 276, 277, 345

Soldier communities, after 1970, 329–62

barracks, 341–43

characteristics of, 329–30

community facilities, 354–62

family housing, 330–41

medical facilities, 349–54

schools and child care centers, 343–49

Sommer, Doug, 309

Southern European Task Force (SETAF), 115

Southwest Area Office, Kaiserslautern, 

Germany, 343

Sovereign status of Germany, 389

Soviet Union, 44, 389

Spangdahlem, Germany, 276, 277

Special Ammunition Storage (SAS), 282, 

284

Special Category Army, 31

Special security devices, 292

Sports and recreational facilities, 357–60

Ankara Air Station, Turkey, 359

bowling, 359

Carl Schurz Caserne, Bremerhaven, 

Germany, 360

1st Infantry Division (Forward), 

Göppingen, Germany, 360

gymnasiums, 358–59

Incirlik, Turkey, 360

multipurpose recreation centers, 360

Sports and recreational facilities—Continue

outdoor facilities, 358

racquetball courts, 359

Sigonella Naval Air Base, Sicilly, 358

Wolfgang Caserne, Hanau, Germany, 35

Sports Club of Osterholz-Scharmbeck, 

Germany, 303

Sputnik, 128, 133

SS–20 missile, 178, 322, 326–27

Starnes, Maj. William L., 48

Stars and Stripes bookstores, 355

Stem to Stern, 158–60, 165, 166, 167, 168, 

272, 332

Sterrebeek, Belgium, 150

Stone, Robert A., 239, 338

Storage igloos, 131–32

Storage sites for atomic and chemical 

weapons, 131

Stoughton, Maj. Gen. Tom R., 140, 141

Stradley igloo bunker design, 282, 285

Strauss, Franz Josef, 132

Streck, Col. Ed, 137

Sturgis, Lt. Gen. Samuel D., 92, 119

Sturman, Gary, 277

Suez Canal Zone, 114

Sullivan Barracks, Mannheim, Germany, 

158

Supervisors Equal Opportunity Liaison, 

366

Supplementary Agreement to the NATO 

Status of Forces Agreement, 122

Supply line construction, France, 110–14

Communications Zone, 113

Donges-Metz pipeline, 111–12

funding of construction, 113

medical facilities, 112–13

pipeline for petroleum products, 111–12

Suez Canal Zone, 114

USAREUR, 110–11

Supporting the Air Force, 30–31, 83–84, 22

225–26

Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 14

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 

Europe (SHAPE), 57, 88

Surplus-commodity housing, France, 109

Sverdrup, Maj. Gen. Leif, 223

Sverdrup Medal, 223

24th Engineer Group, 272, 283

38th Tactical Missile Wing, 324

21T_Index(634).indd 14 
481

39th Engineer Group, 76

291st Engineer Company, 78

3M Corporation, 238

TAB VEE. See Theater Air Base 

Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise 

(TAB VEE).

Tactical readiness training, 42–43

Grafenwöhr, Germany, 42

Vilseck Caserne, Germany, 43

Wildflecken, Germany, 43

Tambornino, John, 126, 145, 188, 189, 277

Tames, Lt. Col. Robert, 212–13

Tank firing ranges, 311, 312

Tariff Agreement for Social Security, 1971, 

378–79

Tariff agreements governing employment, 

374

TASCOM. See Theater Army Support 

Command (TASCOM).

Teale, Col. Willis E., 65, 68

Team approach to housing renovations, 334

Teates, Maj. Brian W., Jr., 184

Technical Construction Working Group. See

Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical 

Construction Working Group).

Technical Engineering Branch, Civil 

Section, 216

Technical Review Branch, EUD, 248

Tempelhof Airfield, Berlin, Germany, 45–46

Termination of German employees, 378, 380

Termination Protection Law, 374

Terrorist activity, Germany, 282, 291

Theater Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation 

Exercise (TAB VEE), 160–61

Theater Army Support Command 

(TASCOM), 149, 168–72

Theater Services Forces, European Theater 

(TSFET), 14, 15

Total Force Modernization, 307

Total Quality Management (TQM), 238–40, 

366

Townsley, Col. Edwin S., 172, 182, 191

TQM. See Total Quality Management 

(TQM).

Train locomotives, used to heat buildings, 

97

Transportation system, Germany, 

rebuilding of, 24–26

Troop base in Germany, 64–65

Troop housing in Germany, 1950–1953, 

67–78

Troop housing in Germany, 1950–1953—

Continued

Baumholder, 71

caserne rehabilitation, 68–69

German contractors, 69

Grafenwöhr, 70

tent camps, 69–70

Troop Support Agency, 375

Troop training facilities, Germany, 1951–

1953, 72–73, 100

Troposcatter (electronic radio network), 

132

Trowbridge, Terry, 210

Truman, Harry S., 45, 63, 84, 126

Truman Doctrine, 57, 83

TSFET. See Theater Services Forces, 

European Theater (TSFET).

Tsingos, John, 277

Tulley, Brig. Gen. David H., 66, 119, 124

Turkey, 83–84, 220–23, 359, 361

Air Force infrastructure, 83–84

communication difficulties, 83–84

construction equipment problems, 84

Defense Economic Cooperative 

Agreement, 220

Erzurum, 221

Incirlik Air Base, 220, 222–23

Joint American Military Mission for Aid 

to Turkey (JAMMAT), 83–84

Joint Construction Agency, 83

Mutual Defense Assistance Program of 

1949, 83

site upgrades, 220–23

TUSAG. See United States Air Force Group, 

The (TUSAG).

TUSEG. See United States Engineer Group, 

The (TUSEG).

Twelfth Air Force, 65

Unaccompanied enlisted personnel 

housing (UEPH), 342

Unified allied command, 64

Unilateral demobilization, 1988, 370

United States Air Force Group, The 

(TUSAG), 83

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), 

38, 59, 96

United States Army Construction Agency, 

France (USACAF), 109, 119–20, 132

United States Army Construction Agency, 

Japan (USACAJ), 135

21T_Index(634).indd 15 
482

United States Army Construction Agency, 

Korea (USACAK), 135

United States Army Engineer Division, 

Europe (USAEDE), 173, 181–203

United States Army Field Engineer Office, 

France, 135

United States Engineer Group, The 

(TUSEG), 83–84, 220, 202–03, 245

United States Forces, Austria (USFA), 15

United States Forces, European Theater 

(USFET), 14, 15, 16, 18, 19

Urban combat training ranges, 313–15

U.S. Air Force, 31

U.S. Air Forces, Europe, 90

U.S. Army Construction Agency, France, 

109

U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany 

(USACAG), 121–38, 189

Berlin Crisis, 1961, 133–35

organization, 123–28

phaseout, 135–38

projects, 128–33

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 

364, 366

U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center (ESC), 

229

U.S. Army Field Engineer Office, France, 

120

U.S. Army Topographic Center, 172

U.S. Constabulary, 38, 43

U.S. European Command, 57

U.S. European Command Conference, 1989, 

338

U.S. Ground and Service Forces, 38

U.S. Joint Commission for Accreditation of 

Hospitals, 352, 353

USACAF. See United States Army 

Construction Agency, France 

(USACAF).

USACAG. See U.S. Army Construction 

Agency, Germany (USACAG).

USACAJ. See United States Army 

Construction Agency, Japan 

(USACAJ).

USACAK. See United States Army 

Construction Agency, Korea 

(USACAK).

USACE. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE).

USAEDE. See United States Army Engineer 

Division, Europe (USAEDE).

USAREUR. See United States Army, Europ

(USAREUR).

USFA. See United States Forces, Austria 

(USFA).

USFET. See United States Forces, European 

Theater (USFET).

Vajda, Michael, 378

Value engineering, 251–53, 353

Value in place construction, 102

van Loben Sels, Maj. Gen. James W., 205, 

228–33, 292–93

Vietnam War, 152, 153, 158

Vilseck, Germany, 307–09

Vuono, General Carl E., 218

WADS. See Weapons Access Denial System 

(WADS).

Waldo, Col. Daniel, Jr., 162, 282, 370, 378, 

383, 388

Walker, Ray, 215, 216

Wallace, John, 379, 380

Walsh, Brig. Gen. Orville E., 102

Wang hardware-software system, 232

War Department, 20

War materiel, excess, 33–38

Warsaw Pact, dissolution of, 372, 389

Wartime planning and mobilization, 226

Washington, Randolph S., 145, 166, 172, 

190, 191, 215, 277

Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg

Mississippi, 281

Watson, Theresa, 220

Wayss-Freytag firm, 353

Weapons Access Denial System (WADS), 29

Werner, A. O. “Ollie,” 383

West Berlin, establishment of, 133

Westmoreland, General William C., 160

Wetzel Barracks, Baumholder, Germany, 

346, 348

Wheeler, Lt. Gen. Raymond A., 213, 277

Wheeler, Ralph, 188, 189, 192, 193, 198, 200

Wheeler Medal, 213

Whitaker, Col. Reginald, 46

Whole-house concept of renovation, 333

Wildflecken Training Area, 263, 284

for Abrams tanks, 313

for Bradley personnel carriers, 313

defilade firing, 313

Wilhelm Druecker firm, 356

Williams, Col. A. Darby, 145

21T_Index(634).indd 16 
483

Wilson, Brig. Gen. Drake, 205–06, 208, 211, 

215, 220, 254, 286, 367

Wisdom, Richard, 234

Wise, Jim, 184, 188, 292

Withers, Brig. Gen. George Kenyon “Ken,” 

Jr., 205, 211–13, 215, 216, 225, 231, 246, 

287, 309, 318, 320, 333, 369

Women in the Army, 342, 366–68

Women in management, 366–68

Women in Science and Engineering, 366

Wooten, Herb, 202

Workload, EUD, 1978–1988

area offices, 259–69

civilian personnel, 266–69

field supervision of, 266–69

Ground Launched Cruise Missile 

program, 264

Workload, EUD, 1978–1988—Continued

increases in, 257–58

locations of, 258–61, 262–66

in Turkey, 265–66

Workload efficiency, 1978–1988, 218–22

Works Council, EUD, 207, 208, 374, 379

Works Council, USAREUR, 379

“Works councils” in industry, 127

Wright, Maj. Gen. Clifton D. “Duke,” 

277

Würzburg Army hospital, 352–53

Young, Col. Mason J., 88, 148, 152, 155

Young, Col. Robert P. “Pip,” 140, 141

Zawisza, Edward, 108, 145

Zueblin/Aegis consortium, 337

21T_Index(634).indd 17 
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