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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant 

v. 

TERREL PATRICK DIXON : No. 1320 WDA 2018 

Appeal from the Order Entered, September 11, 2018, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0011754-2017. 

BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2019 

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Terre! Patrick 

Dixon's motion to suppress evidence obtained by police incident to a 

warrantless search conducted as part of a stop and frisk. We affirm. 

The suppression court stated its findings of fact as follows. 

[Officer] Michael Catanzaro, an 18[ -]year veteran of the 

Wilkinsburg Police Department, was assigned to pick up a [police] 

vehicle from a department mechanic on September 12, 2017. He 

was traveling in an unmarked vehicle and in plain clothes. 

At approximately 11:45 a.m., Officer Catanzaro was driving 

through the 900 block of Stoner Way when he observed two black 

males standing in the back yard [sic] of 921 Ross Avenue. Officer 

Catanzaro did not recognize either of the males, although 

subsequently it was determined that . . . Dixon . . . was from that 

area. 

As Officer Catanzaro approached, the two males walked away 

from the back yard [sic], so he radioed the patrol officers to stop 

and talk to [Dixon]. 
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Officer Catanzaro testified that he noticed [Dixon] "tap" his right 

side in a manner he thought was consistent with carrying a 

concealed weapon. 

There [were] no active calls for assistance in that specific area, 

and no recent known criminal activity. The only testimony was 

that there were several cases that were assigned to the Criminal 

Investigations Division, including burglaries and a robbery that 

occurred in that general area. Additionally, Officer Catanzaro 

testified that he executed a search warrant one block over 

approximately two months prior. 

When the patrol unit stopped [Dixon], [he] appeared nervous, and 

looked about the area from side to side. For this reason, Officer 

Catanzaro directed that Officer Granger conduct a pat down to 

determine whether [Dixon] was armed. 

It was unknown to Officer Catanzaro whether [Dixon] had a 

license to carry a concealed weapon, and [he] stated that [Dixon] 

"appeared to be someone that would not be eligible to possess a 

permit to carry a firearm concealed." Officer Catanzaro did not 

elaborate on this statement, but it is implied in the testimony that 

it was due to [Dixon] not attaining the age of 21 at the time of the 

offense. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/18, at 1-2 (citations to the record and formatting 

omitted). 

When Officer Granger performed the pat down on Dixon, he discovered 

a firearm in his waistband. The police arrested Dixon and charged him with a 

single count of firearms not to be carried without a license.' 

Dixon filed a motion to suppress the evidence. A suppression hearing 

was held on May 24, 2018, and on August 13, 2018, the suppression court 

orally granted Dixon's motion. The Commonwealth petitioned the court to 

issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, and filed a motion for 

' 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). 

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reconsideration. On September 11, 2018, the suppression court issued its 

written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered an order granting 

suppression on the basis that the facts, as provided by Officer Cantanzaro's 

testimony at the suppression hearing, did not establish "the requisite 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot to stop and frisk [Dixon]." 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/18, at 2. That same day, the suppression court 

denied the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration. 

The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal. Both the 

Commonwealth and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The 

Commonwealth raises one issue on appeal: "Whether the trial court erred in 

finding that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe 

[Dixon] was carrying an unlawful firearm, and therefore, lacked grounds to 

stop and search him?" Commonwealth's Brief at 4. 

When, as here, police have acted without a warrant, "determinations of 

reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on 

appeal." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). But "a 

reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only 

for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by 

resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Id. 

Because Dixon prevailed at the suppression hearing "we consider only 

the evidence of [Dixon] and so much of the evidence for the Commonwealth 

as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the suppression 

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hearing record as a whole." Commonwealth v. Lukach, 195 A.3d 176, 183 

(Pa. 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted). As for the subject matter, 

"our scope of review is limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions of 

the suppression court." In re L.1., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013). 

Additionally, citing to L.1., this Court has said "our scope of review from a 

suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the 

suppression hearing." Commonwealth v. Cruz, 166 A.3d 1249, 1254 (Pa. 

Super. 2017), appeal denied, 180 A.3d 1207 (Pa. 2018). 

Generally, "searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial 

process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically 

established and well delineated exceptions." Commonwealth v. Wilson, 

655 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

One recognized exception is where an officer has reasonable suspicion to 

believe that criminal activity is afoot, and that an individual might be armed 

and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, (1968). When this threshold 

is satisfied, the officer "is entitled for the protection of himself and others in 

the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 

persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 

him." Id. Such a "limited search" is commonly referred to as an investigatory 

detention or a Terry stop. 

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For an investigatory detention to be legal under Terry, the officer's 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity must be supported by specific and 

articulable observations "of suspicious or irregular behavior on behalf of the 

particular [individual] stopped." Commonwealth v. Martinez, 588 A.2d 

513, 515 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion is a less 

stringent standard than probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Conrad, 

892 A.2d 826, 829 (Pa. Super. 2006). Nevertheless, in order to establish 

reasonable suspicion, the officer "must be able to articulate something more 

than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In 

order to determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to lawfully 

initiate an investigatory detention, we look to the totality of the circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Semuta, 902 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

The Commonwealth argues that the suppression court erred in finding 

that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory 

detention and the limited search of Dixon's person for weapons. 

Commonwealth's Brief at 21. According to the Commonwealth, the 

investigatory detention and search were supported by Officer Cantanzaro's 

testimony that (1) he had 18 years of experience as a police officer in 

Wilkinsburg; (2) he observed two unfamiliar males standing in the backyard 

of a "high crime area;" (3) while he drove past, he noticed, through his 

rearview mirror, one of the males "tap" his waistband in a manner consistent 

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with someone concealing a firearm; (4) after Officer Granger had stopped 

Dixon, Dixon appeared nervous and looked about the area from side to side 

indicating an intent to flee; and (5) Dixon appeared to be too young to possess 

a valid license to carry a concealed firearm. Id. at 23-24; see also N.T. 

Suppression, 5/24/18, at 57, 59, 60, 62, 63. 

In support of its argument, the Commonwealth relies upon several cases 

in which this Court determined that there was reasonable suspicion to justify 

an investigatory detention. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 

774-75 (Pa. Super 2014) (finding reasonable suspicion where police observed 

the defendant in a high crime area, walking away from a known drug corner, 

with a weighted and angled bulge in his coat pocket, and repeatedly 

attempting to conceal the bulge in his pocket once alerted to police presence); 

Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa. Super 2009) (finding 

reasonable suspicion where police received an anonymous tip that a man 

dressed in black possessed a firearm at a location known for its high volume 

of drugs and weapons, and upon arrival at the location, police observed a man 

dressed in black who engaged in evasive behavior by walking away from the 

police and looking over his shoulder before sitting down behind some 

females); and Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 894 A.2d 759, 764 (Pa. Super 

2006) (finding reasonable suspicion where police officers were standing 

behind an individual in a convenience store and observed that his pocket was 

bulging and weighted down as if it contained a firearm, and the individual 

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began to suspiciously adjust his clothing and contents of his pocket while 

continuously looking back over his shoulder at the officers) 

However, those cases are factually distinguishable from this case. Here, 

Officer Cantanzaro did not testify that he observed any bulge in Dixon's 

clothing, nor did he state that any aspect of Dixon's clothes appeared to be 

weighted down. Rather, Officer Cantanzaro testified that he became 

suspicious of Dixon because he placed his hand on "his front waist area." See 

N.T. Suppression, 5/24/18, at 66. Notably, Officer Cantanzaro conceded that 

Dixon was not carrying anything in his hands that was suspicious, and that he 

did not see Dixon commit any crime as he passed. Id. Officer Cantanzaro 

further conceded that he was not in the area to conduct any investigation, and 

the officers received no active calls or anonymous tips regarding suspicious 

individuals or activity in that area at that particular time. Id. at 73. 

Moreover, while the Commonwealth contends that Dixon was in a high 

crime area, the suppression court made no such finding.2 Additionally, the 

2 The suppression record does not reflect a high volume of cases in this area. 

Indeed, Officer Cantanzaro testified only that "several cases were assigned to 

the Criminal Investigations Division, including burglaries and a robbery that 

occurred in that general area." See N.T. Suppression, 5/24/18, at 58. He 

also testified that he made one narcotics related arrest and executed one 

search warrant nearby roughly two months prior to Dixon's arrest. Id. 

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suppression court made no finding that Dixon walked away in a suspicious or 

evasive manner.3 

Although the Commonwealth argues that Officer Cantanzaro's testimony 

regarding Dixon's nervous disposition and youthful appearance should be 

considered as part of the totality of the circumstances that justified the stop, 

we cannot include these observations in our analysis because they occurred 

after Officer Granger stopped Dixon. See Martinez, 588 A.2d at 516 

(holding that the totality of the circumstances analysis must be limited to the 

facts known to the officers prior to initiating the stop). 

Even if Officer Cantanzaro reported to Officer Granger that he saw a 

firearm protruding from Dixon's waistband, or what appeared to be the outline 

of a firearm concealed by Dixon's clothing, the officers would still lack 

reasonable suspicion in order to justify an investigatory detention. See 

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 949 (Pa. 2019) (concluding that 

there was no reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory detention where 

the police received a report that an individual exited his vehicle with a firearm 

visible in his waistband, and subsequently pulled his shirt over the firearm to 

3 The suppression record supports the absence of such a finding because 

Officer Cantanzaro merely testified that, as he was driving past Dixon in an 

unmarked police car, while in plain clothes, he saw "the lead male walk away 

first in a hurried manner." See N.T. Suppression, 5/24/18, at 59; see also 

Commonwealth v. Key, 789 A.2d 282, 289-90 (Pa. Super. 2001) (holding 

that merely walking away from the police does not provide reasonable 

suspicion). 

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conceal it as he walked into a gas station). According to Hicks, the mere 

possession of a concealed firearm in public is not enough to establish 

reasonable suspicion because such rule "allows a police officer to base the 

decision to detain a particular individual upon an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or hunch that the individual is unlicensed and therefore engaged in 

wrongdoing. Id. at 946 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

In our view, this case is factually similar to Martinez, where this Court 

determined that reasonable suspicion was not established where the facts 

known to the officers prior to initiating the investigatory detention established 

only "that Martinez was talking with a group of people on a street corner at 

12:20 A.M., she walked away quite rapidly after looking in the direction of an 

unmarked police vehicle, and her jacket appeared to have a bulge in it." Id. 

at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court held that these facts 

did not amount to reasonable suspicion that Martinez was armed and 

dangerous or that criminal activity was afoot. Id. The observations by police 

in this case are even less than those at issue in Martinez, since Officer 

Cantanzaro merely observed Dixon in a backyard, touch his waistband, and 

begin to quickly walk down the street. 

Limiting our analysis to the facts known to Officer Cantanzaro prior to 

directing Officer Granger to initiate an investigative detention of Dixon, we 

agree with the suppression court's determination that the evidence was 

insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 

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See Hicks, supra; Martinez, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the suppression 

court's order granting Dixon's motion to suppress the evidence. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

4 199 - Joseph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/1/2019 

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