Medal of Honor Recipients

rivate First Class Luther

Skaggs, Jr.'s Medal of Honor

citation reads as follows: "For

conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity

at the risk of his life above and beyond

the call of duty while serving as squad

leader with a mortar section of a rifle

company in the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces on

the Asan-Adelup beachhead, Guam,

Marianas Islands, 21-22 July 1944.

When the section leader became a

casualty under a heavy mortar barrage

shortly after landing, Private First

Class Skaggs promptly assumed command and led the section through intense fire for a distance of 200 yards

to a position from which to deliver effective coverage of the assault on a

strategic cliff. Valiantly defending this

vital position against strong enemy

counterattacks during the night, Private First Class Skaggs was critically

wounded when a Japanese grenade

lodged in his foxhole and exploded,

shattering the lower part of one leg.

Quick to act, he applied an improvised

tourniquet and, while propped up in

his foxhole, gallantly returned the enemy's fire with his rifle and hand

grenades for a period of 8 hours, later

crawling unassisted to the rear to continue the fight until the Japanese had

been annihilated. Uncomplaining and

calm throughout this critical period,

Private First Class Skaggs served as a

heroic example of courage and fortitude to other wounded men and, by his

courageous leadership and inspiring

devotion to duty, upheld the high traditions of the United States naval

service:'

rivate First Class Leonard

Foster Mason's Medal of

Honor citation reads as follows: "For conspicuous gallantry and

intrepidity at the risk of his life above

and beyond the call of duty as an automatic rifleman serving with the Second Battalion, Third Marines, Third

Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on the AsanAdelup Beachhead, Guam, Marianas

Islands, on 22 July 1944. Suddenly

taken under fire by two enemy

machine guns not more than 15 yards

away while clearing out hostile positions holding up the advance of his platoon through a narrow gully, Private

First Class Mason, alone and entirely

on his own initiative, climbed out of

the gully and moved parallel to it

toward the rear of the enemy position.

Although fired upon immediately by

hostile riflemen from a higher position

and wounded repeatedly in the arm

and shoulder, Private First Class Mason grimly pressed forward and had

just reached his objective when hit

again by a burst of enemy machinegun fire, causing a critical wound to

which he later succumbed. With valiant disregard for his own peril, he

persevered, clearing out the hostile position, killing five Japanese, wounding

another and then rejoining his platoon

to report the results of his action before consenting to be evacuated. His

exceptionally heroic act in the face of

almost certain death enabled his platoon to accomplish its mission and

reflects the highest credit upon Private

First Class Mason and the United

States naval service. He gallantly gave

his life for his country:'

Not until later that afternoon was the

1st Battalion sent another doctor.

On the right of the landing waves,

Major Bernard W. Green's 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, ran head-on into

a particularly critical hill mass (Hill

40) near Bangi Point, which had been

thoroughly worked over by the

Navy. Hill 40's unexpectedly heated

defense indicated that the Japanese

recognized its importance, commanding the beaches where troops

and supplies were coming ashore. It

took tanks and the support of the 3d

Battalion to claim the position.

Before dark on W-Day, the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, could see the 4th

Marines across a deep gully. The latter held a thin, twisted line extending 1,600 yards from the beach to

Harmon Road. The 22d Marines held

the rest of a beachhead 4,500 yards

long and 2,000 yards deep.

At nightfall of W-Day, General

15

Shepherd summed up to General

Geiger: "Own casualties about 350.

Enemy unknown. Critical shortages

of fuel and ammunition all types.

Think we can handle it. Will continue as planned tomorrow:'

Helping to ensure that the Marines

would stay on shore once they landed was a host of unheralded support

troops who had been struggling since

daylight to manage the flow of vital

supplies to the beaches. Now, as W-
The Taking of Chonito Ridge

T

he following is a dispatch written by Marine

Combat Correspondent Private First Class Cyril

J. O'Brien in the field after the combat action he

describes in his story. It was released for publication in the

United States sometime after the event (always after families were notified of the wounding or death of the Marines

mentioned.) This story is reprinted from the carbon copy

of the file which he retained of the stories he filed from

the Pacific

Guam July 24 (Delayed) —The first frontal attack on steep

Chonito Ridge was made one hour after the Marine

landing.

An infantry squad, led by Second Lieutenant James A.

Gallo, 24, 172 Broadway, Haverstraw, N.Y., approached

to within ten yards of the tip. The crest bloomed with

machine gun fire. In the face of it the Marine company tried

its first assault. The company was thrown back before it

had advanced forty yards.

For fifty hours the company remained on the naked

slope, trying again and again to storm the Jap entrenchments hardly one hundred yards away. Battered almost to

annihilation, the tenacious Marines finally saw another

company take the ridge from the rear.

Failing in the first rush the company had formed a flimsy defense line not fifty yards from the enemy. Cover was

scant. Some Marines had only tufts of grass to shield them.

The Japs were rolling grenades down the crest, and blasting the Marines with knee mortars from over the summit.

Under the cover of dusk the company commander led

a second attack. As the Marines rose machine gun fire

swept into them. The commander, and three Marines

reached the crest. The last fifty feet were almost vertical.

The attackers grasped roots and dug their feet into the soft

earth to keep from falling down the incline.

The commander went over the ridge. He never came

back. The remaining three Marines were ripped by cross

fire. One saved himself by jumping into an enemy fox hole.

Beaten again, the company retired to a small ravine, and

remained there all night. One Marine, shot through both

legs, was asking for morphine. Another's thigh was ripped

by shell fragments. A PFC, his dry tongue swollen, tried

to whisper the range of an enemy sniper.

At eleven in the morning of the 22d, with little more

than a third of their original number, the company rushed

the hillside again.

Lieutenant Gallo led an assault on the left flank of the

hill, but he was thrown back. Sergeant Charles V. Bomar,

33, 4002 Gulf St., Houston, Tex., with nine Marines attempted to take the right ground of the slope. Five were

killed as they left the ravine. The sergeant and three others

reached the top of the slope.

The Japs again rolled grenades down the incline. One

exploded under the chest of a Marine nearby, blowing off

his head. Another grenade bounced off the helmet of the

sergeant. It was a dud.

The Marines charged into the Jap entrenchment. The sergeant killed a Jap machine gunner with the butt of his carbine. The assistant gunner exploded a grenade against his

body. The blast threw the Marines out of the hole. They

jumped into vacated enemy foxholes. A lieutenant who had

come to join them was shot between the eyes by a sniper.

The sergeant killed the sniper with his carbine.

Unable to hold their positions, the sergeant and his companies returned to the shelter of the ravine. With the shattered remnants of the company they waited for nearly

another 24 hours, until darting Marines on the top of the

ridge showed Chonito had been taken from the rear.

Field commanders soon came to appreciate the effect

these so-called "Joe Blow" stories had on the morale of their

men. The stories were printed in hometown newspapers and

were clipped and sent to the troops in the Pacific who could

then see that their efforts were being publicized and appreciated at home.

16
4

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)91176

A Japanese cave position on the reverse slope of Chonito Ridge bardment and enabled them to reoccupy prepared positions

offered protection for the enemy from the prelanding bom- from which they could oppose the advance of the 3d Marines.

Day's darkness approached, the 4th

Ammunition Company, a black Marine unit, guarded the brigade's ammunition depot ashore. During their

sleepless night, these Marines killed

14 demolition-laden infiltrators approaching the dump.

Faulty communications delayed

the order to land the Army's 305th

Regimental Combat Team (Colonel

Vincent J. Tanzola), elements of the

assault force, for hours. Slated for a

morning landing, the 2d Battalion of

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Adair

did not get ashore until well after

nightfall. As no amtracs were then

available, the soldiers had to walk in

from the reef. Some soldiers slipped

under water into sheliholes and had

to swim for their lives in a full tide.

The rest of the 305th had arrived on

the beach, all wet, some seasick, by

0600 on W plus-i.

Colonel Tsunetaro Suenaga, commanding officer of the 38th Regiment, from his command post on

Mount Alifan, had seen the Americans overwhelm his forces below.

Desperate to strike back, he telephoned General Takashina at 1730 to

get permission for an all-out assault

to drive the Marines into the sea. He

had already ordered. his remaining

units to assemble for the counterattack. The 29th Division commander

was not at first receptive. Losses

would be too high and the 38th Regiment would serve better defending

the high ground and thereby

threatening the American advance.

Reluctantly, however, Takashina

gave his permission, and ordered the

survivors to fall back on Mount

Alifan if the attack failed, which he

was certain it would. Eventually

17

Colonel Suenaga was forced to share

the general's pessimism, for he

burned his regiment's colors to prevent their capture.

At the focal point of the enemy's

attack from the south, Hill 40, the

brunt of the fighting fell upon First

Lieutenant Martin J. "Stormy" Sexton's Company K, 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines. The enemy's 3d Battalion,

38th Regiment coming north from

reserve positions was still relatively

intact. In the face of Japanese assaults, the company held, but just

barely. Sexton recalls Lieutenant

Colonel Shapley's assessment of the

night's fighting: "If the Japanese had

been able to recapture Hill 40, they

could have kicked our asses off the

Agat beaches:'

Major Anthony N. "Cold Steel"

Walker, S-3 (operations officer) of the

3d Battalion, recalled that the

C

1 el Atcu
Japanese, an estimated 750 men, hit

the company at about 2130, with the

main effort coming to the left or east

of the hill. He remembered:

Finding a gap in our lines and

overrunning the machine gun

which covered the gap the enemy broke through and advanced toward the beaches.

Some elements turned to their

left and struck Hill 40 from the

rear. K Company with about

200 men fought them all night

long from Hill 40 and a small

hill to the rear and northeast of

Hill 40. When daylight came the

Marines counterattacked with

two squads from L Company

and two tanks . . . and

closed the gap. A number of

men from Company K died that

night but all 750 Japanese soldiers were killed. The hill

represents in miniature or symbolically the whole hard-fought

American victory on Guam.

Along the rest of the Marine front,

and in the reserve areas, the fighting

was hot and heavy as the rest of the

38th attacked. Colonel Suenaga

pushed his troops to attack again and

again, in many cases only to see them

mowed down in the light of American flares. No novice to Japanese tactics, General Shepherd had

anticipated this first night's attack

and was ready.

Enemy reconnaissance patrols

were numerous around 2130, trying

to draw fire and determine Marine

positions. Colonel Suenaga was out

in front of the center thrust which began at 2330 after a brisk mortar flurry on the right flank of the 4th

Marines. The Japanese came on in

full force, yelling, charging with their

rifles carried at high port, and throwing grenades. The Marines watched

the dark shadows moving across the

skyline under light of star shells from

the ships. Men lined up hand grenades, watched, waited, and then reacted. The Japanese were all around,

attempting to bayonet Marines in

their foxholes. They even infiltrated

down to pack-howitzer positions in

the rear of the front lines. It was the

same for the 22d Marines. A whole

company of Japanese closed to the vicinity of the regimental command

post. The defense here was held

18

largely by a reconnaissance platoon

headed by Lieutenant Dennis Chavez, Jr., who personally killed five of

the infiltrators at point blank range

with a Thompson sub-machine gun.

Four enemy tanks in that same attack lumbered down Harmon Road.

There they met a bazooka man from

the 4th Marines, Private First Class

Bruno Oribiletti. He knocked out the

first two enemy tanks and Marine

Sherman tanks of Lieutenant James

R. Williams' 4th Tank Company platoon finished off the rest. Oribiletti

was killed; he was posthumously

awarded the Navy Cross for his bravery. Enemy troops of the 38th also

stumbled into the barely set up

perimeter of the newly arrived 305th

Infantry and paid heavily for it.

After one day and night of furious

battle the 38th ceased to exit. Colonel

Suenaga, wounded in the first night's

counterattack, continued to flail at

the Marines until he, too, was cut

down. Takashina ordered the shattered remnants of the regiment north

to join the reserves he would need to

defend the high ground around Fonte

Ridge above the Asan-Adelup beachhead. The general would leave his
troops on Orote to fend for themselves.

The two days of fierce fighting on

the left of the 3d Division's beachhead in the area that was now

dubbed Bundschu Ridge cost the 3d

Marines 615 men killed, wounded,

and missing. The 21st Marines in the

center held up its advance on 22 July

until the 3d Marines could get moving, but the men in their exposed positions along the top of the ridge,

seized so rapidly on W-Day, were

hammered by Japanese mortar fire,

so much so that Colonel Butler

received permission to replace the 2d

Battalion by the 1st, which had been

in division reserve. The 9th Marines

met relatively little resistance as it

overran many abandoned Japanese

positions in its drive toward the

former American naval base at Piti

on the shore of Apra Harbor. The 3d

Battalion, after a heavy barrage of

naval gunfire and bombs, assaulted

Cabras Island in mid-afternoon,

landing from LVTs to find its major

obstacle dense brambles with

hundreds of mines.

General Turnage, assessing the situation as he saw it on the eve of 22

iii!!,

- MTALIFAN

-

FRONTLINE - W- DAY

AGAT BEACHHEAD

<' JAPANESE COUNTERATTACKS

Only Approximate Form Lines Shown

SCALE — YARDS

500 0 500

19

July reported to General Geiger:

Enemy resistance increased

considerably today on Div left

and center. All Bn's of 3rd CT

[combat team] have been committed in continuous attack

since landing. 21st CT less 1 Bn

in Div Res has been committed

continuously with all units in

assault. One of the assault Bn's

of 21st CT is being relieved on

line by Div Res Bn today. Former is approx 40 percent depleted. Since further advance will

continue to thin our lines it is

now apparent that an additional CT is needed. 9th CT is fully committed to the capture of

Piti and Cabras. Accordingly it

is urgently recommended that

an additional CT be attached

this Div at the earliest practicable date.

Turnage did not get the additional

regiment he sought. The night of W

plus 1 was relatively quiet in the 3d

Division's sector except for the 1st

Battalion, 21st Marines, which

repulsed a Japanese counterattack

replete with a preliminary mortar

barrage followed by a bayonet

charge.

On the 23d, III Amphibious Corps

Commander, General Geiger, well

aware that the majority of Japanese

troops had not yet been encountered,

told the 3d Division that it was "essential that close contact between adjacent units be established by later

afternoon and maintained throughout the night" unless otherwise

directed. Despite the order to close

up and keep contact, the 3d Division

was spread too thinly to hold what

it had seized in that day's advance.

When it halted to set up for the night,

it was found that the distance between units had widened. When

night fell, the frontline troops essentially held strongpoints with gaps between them covered by interlocking

bands of fire.

The 3d Marines reached the high

ground of Bundschu Ridge on the
* -

all-out counterattack, just as the Marines, north and south, were getting

ready to drive to the force beachhead

line (FBHL), the objective which

would secure the high ground and

link up the two beachheads.

23d and searched out the remaining

Japanese stragglers. It was obvious

that the enemy had withdrawn from

the immediate area and equally plain

that the Japanese hadn't gone far.

When patrols from the 21st Marines

tried to link up with the 3d Marines,

they were driven back by the fire of

cleverly hidden machine guns, all but

impossible to spot in the welter of undergrowth and rock-strewn ravines.

All across the ridges that the Marines

held, there were stretches of deadly

open ground completely blanketed

by enemy fire from still higher positions. On the night of the 23d, the

9th Marines made good progress

moving through more open territory

which was dotted by hills, each of

which was a potential enemy bastion. A patrol sent south along the

shoreline to contact the 1st Brigade

took fire from the hills to its left and

ran into an American artillery and

naval gunfire concentration directed

at Orote's defenders. The patrol was

given permission to turn back.

On the 24th, the 3d and 21st Marines finally made contact on the

heights, but the linkup was illusory.

There were no solid frontlines, only

strongpoints. No one could be certain that the Japanese had all been

accounted for in the areas that had

been probed, attacked, and now

seemed secure. Every rifleman was

well aware that more of the same lay

ahead; he could see his next objectives looming to the front, across the

Mount Tenjo Road, which crossed

the high ground that framed the

beachhead. Already the division had

suffered more than 2,000 casualties,

the majority in infantry units. And

yet the Japanese, who had lost as

many and more men in the north

alone, were showing no signs of

abandoning their fierce defense.

General Takashina was, in fact, husbanding his forces, preparing for an

Since the American landings,

Takashina had been bringing troops

into the rugged hills along the Mount

Tenjo Road, calling in his reserves

from scattered positions all over the

island. By 25 July, he had more than

5,000 men, principally of the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and the

10th Independent Mixed Regiment,

assembled and ready to attack.

The fighting on the 25th was as intense as that on any day since the

landing. The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert E.

Cushman, Jr., who was to become

the 25th Commandant of the Marine

Corps in 1972), was attached to the

3d Marines to bring a relatively intact unit into the fight for the Fonte

heights and to give the badly battered

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87239

Mount Alifan looms over the men of the 4th Marines as they move through the

foothills to the attack. In the background, a plane being used for observation keeps

track of the front lines for controlling the fire of ships' guns and supporting artillery.

Prior to the anticipated American landing on 21 July 1944, LtGen Takeshi Takashina, right, commanding general of the 29th Infantry Division, inspects defenses

on Agat Beach, with Col Tsunetaro Suenaga, who commanded the 38th Infantry.

20

ra

p

-4

a

'
1st Battalion, 3d Marines, a chance During the Japanese counterattack on the night of 21-22 July, this Japanese light

to rest and recoup. By nightfall, tank was destroyed at the Company B, 4th Marines, roadblock. Note the rubble

Cushman's men had driven a salient of the ground thrown up by U. S. artillery, aerial, and ships' gunfire bombardments.

into the Japanese lines, seizing the

Mount Tenjo Road, 400 yards short

of the Fonte objective on the left and

250 yards short on the right.

During the day's relentless and increasingly heavy firefights, the 2d

and 3d Battalions of the 3d Marines

had blasted and burned their way

through a barrier of enemy cave

defenses and linked up with Cushman's outfit on the left. About 1900,

Company C of the 9th Marines

pulled back some 100 yards to a position just forward of the road, giving it better observation and field of

fire. Company F had reached and occupied a rocky prominence some 150

yards ahead of Companies G and E,

in the center of the salient. It pulled

21

PENINSUL A

SOUTHERN BEACHHEAD

22—24 JULY 944

POSFTIOHS AT 1800

—22 IJULY

0000 23 JULY

24 IJUt,.Y

YARDS CONTOUR INTERL 100 FEET

MAGPO

APAcA

PELAGI

P

tnn ZDQO
In the aftermath of the Japanese counterattack, bodies of the attackers were strewn back a little for better defense, and

on a hillside typical of the terrain over which much of the battle was fought. held. Thus the scene was set for the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 91435 pitched battle of Fonte Ridge, fought

at hand-grenade range and in which

casualties on both sides were largely

caused by small arms fire at pointblank distances. It was in this action

that leadership, doggedness, and organizational skill under fire merited

the award of the Medal of Honor

to the Commanding Officer of Company F, Captain Louis H. Wilson, Jr.,

who became the 26th Commandant

of the Marine Corps in 1976, following in the footsteps of his former battalion commander.

Captain Wilson was wounded

three times leading his own attacks

in the intense crux of this Fonte action, and as his citation relates:

'Fighting fiercely in hand-to-hand encounters, he led his men in furiously

22

3D MARINE DIVISION PROGRESS

22—26 JULY 1944

POSITIONS AT 1800

o o 22 JULY

rmi 24 JULY

• . . 26 JULY

2000

CONTOUR INTERVAL tOO FEET

8UNDSCHU RIC

ITO CLIFF
— - P44;;

4

a

d :

14

waged battle for approximately 10

hours, tenaciously holding his line

and repelling the fanatically renewed

counterthrusts until he succeeded in

crushing the last efforts of the hardpressed Japanese . . . :'

Captain Wilson organized and led

the 17-man patrol which climbed the

slope in the face of the same continued enemy fire to seize the critical high ground at Fonte and keep it.

A half century later, Colonel Fraser

E. West recalled the engagement at

Fonte as bitter, close, and brisk. As

a young officer, he commanded

Company C, and reinforced Wilson's

unit. West joined on Company F's

flank, then reconnoitered to spot enemy positions and shared the night in

a common CP with Captain Wilson.

In late afternoon of the 25th, a platoon of four tanks of Company C,

3d Tank Battalion, had made its way

up to the Mount Tenjo Road and

gone into position facing the most

evident Japanese strongpoints. At the

height of the battle by Wilson's and

West's companies to hold their positions, First Lieutenant Wilcie A.

O'Bannon, executive officer of Company F, managed to get down slope

from his exposed position and bring

up two of these tanks. By use of telephones mounted in the rear of the

tanks to communicate with the Marines inside, Lieutenant O'Bannon

was able to describe targets for the

tankers, as he positioned them in

support of Wilson's and West's Marines. West recalled the tanks came

up with a precious cargo of ammunition. He and volunteers stuffed

grenades in pockets, hung bandoleers

over their shoulders, pocketed clips,

carried grenade boxes on their shoulders, and delivered them all as they

would birthday presents along the

line to Companies C and F and a remaining platoon of Company E.

Major West was also able to use a

tank radio circuit to call in naval gunfire, and guarantee that the terrain

23

before him would be lit all night by

star shells and punished by high explosive naval gunfire.

On the morning of 26 July, 600

Japanese lay dead in front of the 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines positions. But

the battle was not over. General Turnage ordered the military crest of the

reverse slope taken. There would be

other Japanese counterattacks, fighting would again be hand-to-hand,

but by 28 July, the capture of Fonte

was in question no longer. Companies E, F, and G took their objectives

on the crest. Lieutenant Colonel

Cushman's battalion in four murderous days had lost 62 men killed and

179 wounded.

It was not any easier for the 21st

Marines with its hard fighting in the

morning of the 25th. Only by

midafternoon did that regiment clear

the front in the center of the line. The

2d Battalion, 21st Marines, had to

deal with a similar pocket of diehards as that which had held up the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93106

Long Toms of Battery A, 7th 155mm Gun Battalion, III Corps 2 in the shadow of the mountain range secured by the 4th MaArtillery, were set up in the open 500 yards from White Beach rifles and the Army's 305th Infantry after heavy fighting.
General Robert E. Cushman

s a 29-year-old lieutenant

colonel commanding the 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d

Marine Division, on Guam, Robert E.

Cushman, Jr., was awarded the Navy

Cross for extraordinary heroism during

the period 21 July to 30 August 1944.

The medal citation states in part:

When his battalion was ordered

to seize and hold a strongly organized and defended enemy

strong-point which had been holding up the advance for some days,

Lieutenant Colonel Cushman

directed the attacks of his battalion and the repulse of numerous

Japanese counterattacks, fearlessly exposing himself to heavy

hostile rifle, machine gun and

mortar fire in order to remain in

the front lines and obtain first

hand knowledge of the enemy situation. Following three days of bitter fighting culminating in a heavy

Japanese counterattack which

pushed back the flank of his battalion, he personally led a platoon

into the gap and, placing it for

defense, repelled the hostile force.

By his inspiring leadership,

courage and devotion to duty, he

contributed materially to the success of the mission with the annihilation of one enemy battalion

and the rout of another . General Cushman became the 25th

Commandant of the Marine Corps on 1

January 1972. Interestingly enough, he

was succeeded four years later by General Louis H. Wilson, Jr., who commanded a company in Cushman's 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, on Guam.

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, on Fonte.

Holed up in commanding cave positions in the eastern draw of the Asan

River, just up from the beachhead,

the Japanese were wiped out only after repeated Marine attacks and

close-in fighting. The official history of the campaign noted that "every

foot of ground that fell to Lieutenant

Colonel [Eustace R.] Smoak's Marines was paid for in heavy casualties, and every man available was

needed in the assault

The 9th Marines under Colonel

Craig made good progress on the

25th from its morning jump-off and

reached the day's objective, a line

running generally along the course of

a local river (the Sasa) by 0915. The

9th Marines had taken even more

ground than was planned. General

Turnage was then able to reposition

the 9th Marines for the harder fighting on the beleaguered left. The 2d

Battalion pulled out of position to

reinforce the 3d Marines and the remaining two battalions spread out a

little further in position.

The determined counterattack that

hit the 3d Marines on the night of

25-26 July was matched in intensity

all across the 3d Division's front. It

wasn't long before there were enemy

troops roaming the rear areas as they

slipped around the Marine

perimeters and dodged down stream

valleys and ravines leading to the

beaches.

Major Aplington, whose 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, now constituted

the only division infantry reserve,

held positions in the hills on the left

in what had been a relatively quiet

sector. Not for long, he recalled:

With the dark came heavy

rain. Up on the line Marines

huddled under ponchos in their

wet foxholes trying to figure out

the meaning of the obvious activity on the part of the opposing Japanese. Around midnight

there was enemy probing of the

lines of the 21st [Marines], and

slopping over into those of the

9th [Marines]. . . . All was quiet

in our circle of hills and we

received no notification when

the probing increased in intensity or at 0400 when the enemy

opened. . . his attack. . . . My

first inkling came at about 0430

when my three companies on

24

the hills erupted into fire and

called for mortar support. I

talked to the company commanders and asked what was

going on to be told that there

were Japanese all around them

the Japanese had been close.

Three of my dead had been

killed by bayonet thrusts.

In the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines,

sector, Private Dale Fetzer, a dog handler assigned with his black Labrador

Retriever alerted Company C. The

dog, Skipper, who had been asleep

in front of his handler's foxhole suddenly bolted upright, alerting Fetzer.

Skipper's nose was pointed up and

directly toward Mount Tenjo. "Get

the lieutenant!" called handler Fetzer,

"They're coming:'

At about 0400, the Japanese troops

poured down the slopes in a frenzied

banzai attack. Japanese troops had

been sighted drinking during the afternoon in the higher hills, and some

of these attackers appeared drunk.

Marine artillery fire had immediately

driven them to cover then, but they

apparently continued to prepare for

the attack.

In the area of the 21st Marines,
C

aptam Louis Hugh Wilson,

Jr.'s Medal of Honor citation

reads as follows: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at

the risk of his life above and beyond

the call of duty as commanding officer

of a rifle company attached to the 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, in action against enemy

Japanese forces at Fonte Hill, Guam,

25-26 July 1944. Ordered to take that

portion of the hill within his zone of

action, Captain Wilson initiated his attack in midafternoon, pushed up the

rugged, open terrain against terrific

machine gun and rifle fire for 300 yards

and successfully captured the objective.

Promptly assuming command of other

disorganized units and motorized

equipment in addition to his own company and one reinforcing platoon, he

organized his night defenses in the face

of continuous hostile fire and,

although wounded three times during

this 5-hour period, completed his disposition of men and guns before retiring to the company command post for

medical attention. Shortly thereafter,

when the enemy launched the first of

a series of savage counterattacks lasting all night, he voluntarily rejoined

his besieged units and repeatedly exposed himself to the merciless hail of

shrapnel and bullets, dashing 50 yards

into the open on one occasion to rescue a wounded Marine laying helpless

beyond the front lines. Fighting fiercely

in hand-to-hand encounters, he led his

men in furiously waged battle for approximately 10 hours, tenaciously

holding his line and repelling the fanatically renewed counter-thrusts until he succeeded in crushing the last

efforts of the hard-pressed Japanese

early the following morning. Then organizing a 17-man patrol, he immediately advanced upon a strategic slope

essential to the security of his position

and, boldly defying intense mortar,

machine gun and rifle fire which struck

down 13 of his men, drove relentlessly forward with the remnants of his

patrol to seize the vital ground. By his

indomitable leadership, daring combat

tactics, and valor in the face of overwhelming odds, Captain Wilson succeeded in capturing arid holding the

strategic high ground in his regimental sector, thereby contributing essentially to the success of his regimental

mission and to the annihilation of 350

Japanese troops. His inspiring conduct

throughout the critical periods of this

decisive action sustains and enhances

the highest traditions of the United

States naval service."

'Daring Tactics' Gave Capt Wilson Medal of Honor

along a low ridge not far from the

critical Mount Tenjo Road, the human wave struck hard against the 3d

Battalion and the Japanese actually

seized a machine gun which was

quickly recaptured by the Marines.

The 3d Division was holding a front

of some 9,000 yards at the time, and

it was thinnest from the right of the

21st Marines to the left of the 9th

Marines. Much of that line was only

outposted. The 3d Battalion, 21st

Marines, held throughout. Some of

the raiders got through the weakly

manned gap between the battalions.

They charged harum-scarum for the

tanks, artillery, and ammunition and

supply dumps. The attack seemed

scattered, however, and unorganized.

The fighting was fierce, nonetheless,

and it shattered the hastily erected

Marine roadblock between the battalions.

Some of the attackers got through

the lines all along the front. A group

of about 50 reached the division

hospital. Doctors evacuated the badly wounded, but the walking wounded joined with cooks, bakers,

stretcher bearers, and corpsmen to

form the line that fought off the attackers. One of the patients, Private

First Class Michael Ryan, "grabbed

up the blanket covering me and ran

out of the building without another

stitch on." He had to run with a

wounded foot through crossfire to

reach some safety.

Lieutenant Colonel George 0. Van

Orden (3d Division infantry training

officer), on orders from General Turnage, assembled two companies of

the 3d Pioneer Battalion to eliminate

this threat. In three hours the pioneers killed 33 of the assailants and

lost three of their own men. The 3d

25

Medical Battalion had 20 of its men

wounded, but only one patient was

hit and he was one of the defenders.

For many men in the furious and

confused melees that broke out all

over the Marine positions, the experience of Corporal Charles E.

Moore of the 2d Platoon, Company

E, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, wasn't

unique. His outfit held a position

about a quarter mile from Fonte

Plateau. He recalled:

We set up where a road made

a sharp turn overlooking a

draw. It was the last stand of

the second platoon. There were

three attacks that night and by

the third there was nobody left

to fight, so they broke through.

They came in droves throwing

hand grenades and hacked up

some of our platoon. In the
morning, I had only ten rounds

of ammunition left, half the clip

for my BAR. I was holding

those rounds if I needed them

to make a break for it. I had no

choice. Everybody was quiet,

either dead or wounded. The

Japanese came in to take out

their dead and wounded, and

stepped on the edge of my foxhole. I didn't breath. They were

milling around there until dawn

then they were gone.

As Lieutenant Colonel Cushman,

evaluating the action later, said:

With the seizure of Fonte

Hill, the capture of the beachhead was completed. In the

large picture, the defeat of the

large counterattack on the 26th

by the many battalions of the

3d Division who fought valiantly through the bloody night

finished the Jap on Guam

What made the fighting

for Fonte important was the fact

that [the advance to the north

end of the island] could not take

place until it was seized.

The enemy attack failed in the

south also, and in the south it was

just as much touch and go at times.

The Japanese sailors on Orote were

just as determined as the soldiers at

Fonte to drive the Americans from

Guam.

The 22d Marines had driven up

the coast from Agat in a series of

hard-fought clashes with stubborn

enemy defenders. The 4th Marines

had swept up the slopes of Mount

Alifan and secured the high ground

overlooking the beachhead. By the

25th, the brigade was in line across

the mouth of Orote Peninsula facing

a formidable defensive line in depth,

anchored in swamps and low hillocks, concealed by heavy underSherman mediums from the 3d Tank Battalion lumber up the long incline from

the Asan beachhead towards the scene of battle around Fonte and X-Ray Ridges.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93640

26

The Colt .45-Caliber M1911A1 Pistol

T

he Colt M1911A1 pistol was standard issue to

Many Marine officers, noncommissioned

officers, and specialists not armed with either the

Ml carbine or rifle during World War II. From 1911, this

pistol served its Marine owners as well as members of the

other U.S. services armed with it.

The first M1911 pistols were issued to the Marine Corps

in 1912, and shortly afterwards the Corps was able to field

this pistol exclusively. Although Colt manufactured more

than 55,000 pistols by the time the United States entered

World War 1, not enough were on hand to preclude arming some units of the American Expeditionary Force with

revolvers. Subsequently, more than a half million M1911s

were produced before 1926, when the M1911 was modified and the revised pistol now dubbed the M1911A1.

These modifications included a shorter, and serrated,

trigger; wider sights; a contoured handgrip; and a longer

grip safety. Approximately 1.8 million of the newer

M1911A1s were produced and the M1911s also were upgraded to meet these new specifications during World War

II. The advent of World War II also meant further changes

for the pistol. Among these was altering the finish from

the common shiny blue-black to a dull gray, in the process

called "Parkerization7 which was designed to give the pistol

a nonreflective matte surface. Wartime M1911A1s also

sported checkered plastic grips instead of molded rubber.

Colt could not keep up with wartime demand, and the

following firms were licensed to produce the M1911A1:

Remington Arms Company, North American Arms Company Limited, Remington-Rand Company, Ithaca Gun

Company, Union Switch and Signal Company, and Singer

Sewing Machine Company. One curious note is that the

Remington-Rand Company actually outproduced Colt during the wartime years by approximately 500,000 pistols.

During the war, in its table of equipment, a Marine division rated 1,707 pistols, but the actual number it had was

in general substantially higher; a tribute to the popularity

of the M1911A1. A number of Marine aviators, given the

option, chose the .45-caliber Colt over the .38-caliber Smith

& Wesson "Victory" revolver. — Second Lieutenant G. M. Anthony, USMC
growth, and bristling with automatic

weapons.

The 77th Infantry Division had

taken over the rest of the southern

beachhead, relieving the 4th Marines

of its patrolling duties to the south

and in the hills to the west. The division's artillery and a good part of

the III Corps' big guns hammered the

Japanese on Orote without letup. Just

in case of enemy air attack, the beach

defenses from Agat to Bangi Point

were manned by the 9th Defense Battalion. There were not too many

Japanese planes in the sky, and so the

antiaircraft artillerymen could concentrate on firing across the water

into the southern flank of the enemy's

Orote positions. On Cabras Island,

the 14th Defense Battalion moved

into position where it could equally

provide direct flanking fire on the

peninsula's northern coast and stand

ready to elevate its guns to fire at enemy planes in the skies above.

The 5,000 Japanese defenders on

Orote took part in General Takashina's all-out counterattack and it began in the early morning hours of 26

July. The attackers stormed vigorously out of the concealing mangrove

swamp and the response was just as

27

spirited. Here, as in the north, there

was evidence that some of the attackers had fortified themselves with sake

and there were senseless actions by

officers who attacked the Marine

tanks armed only with their samurai

swords. There were deadly and

professional attacks as well, with

Marines bayoneted in their foxholes.

There was one attendant communications breakdown obliging Captain

Robert Frank, commanding officer of

Company L, 22d Marines, to remain

on the front relaying artillery spots

to the regimental S-2 and thence to

brigade artillery.

War Dogs on Guam

Marines made a point of getting them to the rear, to the

veterinarian, as quickly as possible. In the liberation of

Guam, 20 dogs were wounded and 25 killed.

From the end of the campaign to the end of the war in

the Pacific, Guam served as a staging area for war dogs,

of which 465 served in combat operations. Of the Marine

Corps war dogs, 85 percent were Doberman Pinschers, and

the rest mainly German Shepherds.

At the end of the Pacific War, the Marine Corps had 510

war dogs. Of this number, 491 were deprogrammed, a

process that could take a year, and returned to their owners, given to their handlers, or returned to the Army, which

had provided 41 to the Corps. Only four dogs could not

be returned to their masters because, even after extensive

retraining, they proved "incorrigible" and were considered

to be unsafe for civilian life.

n the late summer of 1942, the Marine Corps

decided to experiment with the use of dogs in war,

which may have been a new departure for the Corps,

but not a new idea in warfare. Since ancient times, dogs

have served fighting men in various ways. The Romans,

for instance, used heavy mastiffs with armored collars to

attack the legs of their enemies, thus forcing them to lower their shields.

On Guam, First Lieutenant William R. Putney commanded the 1st Dog Platoon and was the veterinarian for

all war dogs on Guam. First Lieutenant William T. Taylor

commanded the 2d Platoon. Both landed on the AsanAdelup beach on Guam, while the 1st Platoon under Gunnery Sergeant L. C. Christmore landed with the 1st Provisional Brigade at Agat.

Sixty dogs, 90 handlers, 10 NCO assistants, two war dog

corpsmen, and three kennelmen were distributed among

the regimental and division headquarters of the 3d Marine Division. Lieutenant Putney commanded the 36 handlers and 24 dogs out of division headquarters. Overall,

some 350 war dogs served in the Guam operation.

Handlers were trained dog specialists and skilled scouts

as well. Man and dog searched out the enemy, awaited his

coming, and caught him by surprise around the Marine

perimeter or while on patrol. In addition, they found

snipers, routed stragglers, searched out caves and pillboxes, ran messages, and protected the Marines' foxholes as

they would private homes. The dogs ate, slept, walked, and

otherwise lived with their masters.

The presence of dogs on the line could promise the Marines there a night's sleep, for they alerted their handlers

when the enemy came near.

Early on in the Guam operations, some dogs were

wounded or killed by machine gun and rifle fire, and incoming mortars were as devastating to the dogs as they

were to the Marines. When the dogs were wounded, the
IN j3i.

T

p.r 1

IJ4t,

It ?43* itt

The artillery response was intense

and effective. The fire was "drawn in

closer and closer toward our front

lines; 26,000 shells were thrown into

the pocket [of attackers] between

midnight and 3 a.m." The screaming

attacks came at 1230, then again at

0130, and at 0300. At daylight the

muddy ground in front of the Marine positions was slick with blood.

More than 400 Japanese bodies were

sprawled in the driving rain.

General Shepherd, secure in the

knowledge that his frontline troops,

4th Marines on the left, 22d Marines

on the right, had withstood the

night's banzai attacks in good order, directed an attack to be launched

at 0730. But first there would be

another artillery preparation. At

daybreak it opened with the 77th Infantry Division's 105s and 155s, the

brigade's 75s, the defense battalions

90s, and whatever guns the 12th Marines could spare. It was one of the

more intense preparations of the

campaign. Major Charles L. Davis,

S-3 of 77th Division Artillery,

recalled how, on the request of

General Shepherd, he had turned the

heavy 155mm battalion and two

105mm battalions around to face

Orote to soften the Japanese positions. The 155s and 105s battered

well-prepared positions, and ripped

the covering, protection, and

camouflage from bunkers and

trenches. Pieces of men soon hung in

trees. Marines saw that this fire

counted and made it a point to return

to congratulate and thank the 77th's

artillery section leaders.

The advance, when it came, only

went 100 yards before it was addressed by a blistering front of

machine gun and small arms fire.

Enemy artillery fire came falling

almost simultaneously with the cessation of American support,, leaving

the Marines to think the fire was

from their own guns, a favorite

Japanese ruse. For a moment there,

the Japanese return fire on the 22d

Marines disorganized its forward

move. It was about 0815 before the

attack was on again in full force,

spearheaded by Marine and Army

tanks.

Immediately to the front of the 22d

Marines was the infernal mangrove

28

swamp from where the banzai attack

had been mounted the night before.

It was still manned heavily by

Japanese, was dense, and the only

means of penetrating it was by a

200-yard-long corridor along the

regimental boundary which was covered by Japanese enfilade fire and

could only be navigated with the

cover of tanks. The armor gunners

and commanders directed their fire

just over the head of prone Marines

and into the gunports of enemy pillboxes. By 1245, Colonel Schneider's

regiment had worked its way

through all bottlenecks past the mangrove swamps, destroying bunkers

with demolitions and flamethrowers.

The 4th's assault battalions kept pace

with this advance, finding somewhat

easier terrain but just as determined

defenders. By evening the brigade

had advanced 1,500 yards from its

jump-off line. Both regiments, weary,

wary, and waiting, dug in with an allaround defense.

Again, there was a heavy preattack barrage on the 27th and the

Marines were stopped again before

they'd gone 100 yards. The 3d BatStretchers for wounded Marines lie scattered among the bodies of Japanese dead in the wake of the attack on the 3d Dlvision hospital the evening of 25-26 July. Doctors, corpsmen,

and wounded Marines joined in the fight to repulse the enemy.