By Major General Clalr F. GIII 

Commandant, U.S. Army Englneer School 

he expression Clear the Way is a symbol of 

pride to U.S. Army engineers. The expression 

ties us to the combat engineer mission of 

mobility operations during the offense and reflects 

our military doctrine, that only by offensive operations can we achieve decisive results. The expression has been used before. During our Civil War, 

the 28th Massachusetts Regiment (part of the famed 

Irish Brigade and one of several "Irish" regiments 

that fought on both sides), embroidered their 

standard with the Gaelic F6j an Bealac! (Clear the 

Way!) and adopted it as their battle cry. 

Today, the expression Clear the Way has a new 

connotation with the American soldiers of the NATO 

Implementation Force (IFOR) In Bosnia. Clearing 

the way refers to the dangerous mission of 

counterrnine and counter unexploded ordnance 

(UXO). Engineers have the lead to protect the entire 

force in an area that has been the contentious prize 

of three opposing organized forces and numerous 

other factions with narrow agendas. The result is a 

very thickly mined area of operations and a mixed 

bag of mine types and fuze combinations.The 

situation has focused attention on the countermine 

challenge to a degree of interest that was simply not 

possible during peacetime exercises and sirnulations.This issue of Engineer includes articles on 

counterrnine techniques and procedures (page 3) 

and countermine awareness (page 11). 

Recently, I was called upon to testjfy bebre the 

House Committee on National Security during joint 

sessions of the subtxlmmittees on Military Procurement and Military Research and Devebprnent. Let me 

share those key issues with you. In Bosnia, the 

countennine challenge is part of force protection rather 

than the normative mobility battlefield operating 

system. Our doctrine specifies breaching operations to 

clear a safe path through a minefield for the use of 

troops and vehicles. Our current equipment is 

optimized for rapid breaching operations. 

The Army also conducts clearing, which is the 

removal of mines within the minimum area required 

for immediate military use. An example would be to 

dear an area required for a forward supply point or a 

route, such as Route Arizona in Bosnia. The U.S. 

Army does not conduct demining, which is defined 

as the complete removal of all land mines and 'UXO 

from an area to safeguard civilian populations. 

Specifically for Bosnia, a provision of the Dayton 

Accords requires the former combatants to remove 

mines and rninefields. 

American forces in Bosnia have a complete 

toolbox to deal with the mine threat there, But, like 

the general mechanics' tool kits, there is no single 

tool or single set of component solutions to all 

counterrnine situations.There is no silver bullet. 

First, developing soldier awareness is key--it's 

impossible to overemphasize the importance of a 

"mine aware" soldier1 Soldiers receive mine and 

UXO identification and hazard training during their 

initial entry training-This training is reinforced for 

engineers during their advanced individual training 

to include additionat mine and UXO identification, 

marking, detection, and removal. As sergeants and 

lieutenants, our engineer leaders are trained in 

these same tasks, as well as in the mechanics of 

training, planning, and leading countermine operations, After schoolhouse training, soldiers conduct 

unit training on specific unit responses to mines and 

minefields. Finally, prior to a deployment, we 

conduct mission training on the particular mine 

threat and effective counternine responses within 

that area of operations (AO). 

The countermine equipment in Bosnia not only 

includes the detection, breaching, and protection 

items authorized on unit tables of organization and 

equipment but also developmental items rushed to 

the A0 by Army laboratories, academia. and industry. Such equipment as three types of remotecontrolled countermine systems, thermal-signature 
"Developing soldier awareness is key-it's 

impossibleto overemphasize the importanceof a 

'mine aware' soldier!" 

mine-avoidancesuites, miniflails, and a foamed 

plasticizer that disables fuzes are all part of the 

Bosnia countermine toolbox. Other promising stateof-the-art systems are on the way. 

The congressional committee members expressed their grudging satisfaction with the state of 

countermine and mine-awarenesstraining, but they 

were much less pleased with the current suite of 

countermine equipment. One congressman, 

expressing his dismay at the apparent lack of an 

Within the TRADOC community (and not necessarily as a direct responseto the Bosnia mission), 

Ihave asked the TRADOC commander to commission a Countermine Center of Excellence, with 

the U.S. Army Engineer School as the lead. The 

general responsibilities are: 

Serve as theTRADOC reviewingand integrating 

agencyfor countermine doctrine, training, leader 

development, organization, materiel, experiments, and demonstrations. 

effective single system, said. "Ifwe can put a man . Serve as the TRADOC representative for joint on the moon, we should be able to field an effective and combined countermine issues. countermine system!" One cannot fault the 

congressman's logicit reflects American faith in Serve as the single pointof contact on countertechnology and our desire for solutions. mine initiatives for the Army in the field. 

In the aftermath of the congressionaltestimony, 

several high-level problem-solvingorganizations 

have been established to focus countermine 

solutions in Bosnia and beyond.The senior of 

these temporary organizations is the Army 

Countermine Task Force.This task force will be 

co-chaired by Brigadier General Roy Beauchamp. 

from the Army Materiel Command (AMCISARDA), 

and myself, representing the Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC).The purpose of this task 

force is to accelerate the temporary fielding of 

promising equipment; effective doctrine; and the 

tactics, techniques, and procedures that will 

improve our capability to survey, reconnoiter, 

detect, avoid, clear, neutralize or breach land 

mines, minefields, or UXO that U.S. forces may 

encounter in Bosnia.The objectives are to make 

state-of-the-artequipment available to our soldiers 

in Bosnia, to move promising technology from the 

laboratory to the soldier in Bosnia as quickly as 

possible, to provide safe and effective tools, to 

unburden operational commanders from testing a 

host of raw countermine ideas, and to be prepared 

to transition the countermine experiences in 

Bosnia to future programs and operations. 

These organizations are not debating associations; they have the power to move large amounts 

of resources and to compel quick actions.The 

stakes are too high to do otherwise. 

Additionally, the Engineer Center and School is 

establishingthe Demolitionsand ExplosivesTraining 

Center to enhance our schoolhouse and exportable 

training in demolitions, countermine, booby traps, 

and UXO.This center will help us quickly transition 

the latesttechnology and lessons learned into 

doctrine. 

In conclusion, we must meet the challenge of 

countering mines in Bosnia and, while we cannot 

safeguard every footfall, each mine strike drives the 

messagehome. Every idea will receive consideration; nothing will be rejected! Congress has 

pledged the financial resources necessary to bring 

our countermine capability up to the challenge of 

Bosniaand beyond. Our countermine capability is in 

the integrated application of doctrine, training, 

leader development, organizations, and materiel. I 

solicit your good countermine ideas-we need them 

now! Countermine operations will be a big part of 

our upcoming senior engineer leadership training in 

April. But get your ideas to me now. FAjan Bealac! 

March 1996 Engineer I 
March 1996 Headquarters Departmentof the Army Wlume 26 PB 5-961 

UNITED STATES ARMY 


ENGINEER CENTER AND FEATURES 


FORT LEONARD WOOD 
 3 Techniques and Procedures for Route Clearance 

By Will~am C. Schneck, Jr and Brran M. Green 


COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 


Malor General Clarr F GrlI 11 Mine Awareness 


By Master Sergeant Steven Eberharter 


MANAGING EDITOR 1 Engineers in Bosnia: An Overview 

Catherrne Eubanks By Malor Dawd L. Treleaven 

FEATURES EDITOR 23 Engineer Roles in Stabilizing Haiti Shirley Bridges Interview with Brigadier General Phillip R. Anderson 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer C. Bolvard 30 Building a Bunkermench Live-Fire Complex in Korea 

By Captain Raymond E. Hart 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 34 Modernized Demolition Initiators 

DENNIS J. REIMER By Rebecca Johnson 

General, United States Army 35 The AVLB: Still aViable Concept 


Chief of Staff 
 By Second Lieutenant Rober Dieter 

Official: 39 Partnership in Preservation 

1 By Cecilia E. Young 

JOEL 6.HUDSON 


Acting Administrative Assistant to the 


Secretary of the Army DEPARTMENTS 


01515 

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 


Coverphotos: A U.S. Army combat engl- 


new sweeps for mines In a fleld in Bosnla. 16 Personal Viewpoint 43 Engineer Update 


A similar mine-clearing technique was used 28 CTC Notes 45 Bridge the Gap 


by soldiers in World War II,as shown on the 1 
 38 Letter to the Editor back cover. Front cover ~hoto bv SSG Brian 


Cumper. I 


ENGINEER (ISSN 004610880) is prepard quattedy by the US. Army 


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2Engineer March 1996 
In response to the mine threat in Bosnia, we have included two articles with information on route-clearance techniques. The first 

article expands informationpublished in the April 1995 issue of ENGINEER Intended for the indiuidual combat engineer and his 

leader, it describes countermine techniques used in earlier conflicts. The second artick is based on current doctrinal mine-awareness 

trainingprouided by the U.S.Army Engineer School. 

Techniques and Procedures 


for Route Clearance 


By William C. Schneck, Jr. and Brian M. Green 

and mines are the major threat to U.S. forces 

participating in Operation Joint Endeavor in 

Croatia and Bosnia. The belligerents have laid 

an estimated 4 million to 5 million mines in the 

former Yugoslavia during the four years of civil war. 

Frequently they emplaced mines randomly along 

lines of communication (LOC) through this rugged 

country. 

Overview 

This is not the fvst time that U.S. military 

engineers have been required to sweep routes 

for randomly emplaced mines. The United 

States learned many lessons about route clearance 

during the Vietnam War and had to relearn them a 

few years ago in Mogadishu, Somalia. While the U.S. 

can't eliminate all casualties or equipment damage 

from mines, leaders can take steps to reduce these 

incidents to a minimum. An aggressive mineawareness training program for all personnel in 

theater is an effective means of reducing casualties 

and equipment losses (see article, page 11). 

Mines placed along LOC are cleared by a combined 

arms organization. The sweep team usually consists 

of engineers, infantry, armor, andlor military police. 

Tanks and Bradleys should follow well behind the 

sweep team to cover them with fire and to move 

forward to destroy an ambush if one is initiated. 

Flank security of the sweep team should also be 

considered. 

A maneuver company commander or battalion 

commander normally commands a mine-sweeping 

operation and is responsible for synchronizing the 

various elements in the operation. The senior engineer 

present is responsible for advising the commander on 

engineer capabilities and weaknesses; he also 

supervises the subordinate engineer elements. 

March 1996 Engineer 3 
Threat Considerations 	 Route-Clearance Considerations 

The mine threat is real. To date, U.S. forces in hen participating in a route-clearance 

Bosnia have had 10 mine incidents involving mission, engineer soldiers should consider 

seven antitank (AT) mines, four anti- the following countermine functions. An 

personnel (AP) mines and one piece of unexploded asterisk (*) in these functions and throughout the 

ordnance (UXO). These incidents resulted in one rest of this article denotes techniques and indeath and seven wounded, as well as one destroyed formation derived &om nondoctrinal sources. 

HMMWV and seven damaged tracked vehicles. Detection. Mine detection is the most important 

To fully appreciate the mine situation, it is countermine function during route clearance. Hownecessary to understand and respect (as in do not ever, effective mine detection takes time. Do not 

underestimate) the fellow who emulaced the mines: sacrifice eneineers - because of someone else's uno 	He is as smart as you are and more creative. reasonable impatience! Do not take any more risks 

o 	 He is part of the Yugoslavian environment and than the situation requires. Nonengineers (outside 

culture. 	 the chain of command) may become unreasonably 

impatient at the delay caused by a mine sweep. In 

o 	 He is motivated to kill (not wound). that case, the senior engineer should advise them of 

a 	He is politically aware and will exploit the news the situation and let them determine whether or not 

media. to bypass the sweep team. 

Former combatants in the Yugoslavian civil war Several techniques may improve mine-detection 

employed some sophisticated mine-laying techniques efficiency: that are shown in Tables 1-3.Because of the threat 

o Thoroughly check all suspicious areas, including they pose, the individual combat engineer and his road craters, bypasses, potholes, culverts, fords, leader must maintain constant situational intersections, turn-around areas, abandoned 

awareness and be flexible enough to adapt their roadblocks, and choke points. 
 equipment and techniques to the nature of the mine Ohsel.ve people along the route, Increase alert. 


threat at any given time. U.S. combat engineers ness when a normally crowded area is aban- 


need to fully understand these mining techniques doned. If questioned, local civilians may provide 
 and should consider adopting some of them. In many critical information about mined areas. All such 


cases, the time required to employ them is not information, however, should be carefully 


excessive. verified. 


o 	 Use binoculars to scan the 

route ahead to identify hazardous areas where increased 

alertness is needed.* 

o 	 Use abandoned mined areas to 

practice locating mines visually. In Vietnam, 50 percent of 

the mines were detected visually and 33 percent were 

detected with metallic mine 

detectors (most of them had 

metal cases). Watch for mine 

packing materials such as 

wood boxes, metal cans, and 

6 	 cardboard tubes.* z

-

E 

o Ensure mine-detector opera- 

? tors and probers are highly 

ar trained and experienced. 

c 


& .. ..- "-	 Rotate them every 20-30 minutes. The average soldier can This 2 112-ton cargotruck from the568th Engineer Company isprotected with effectively operate a detector 114-inchmild steel plates, angle iron, plywood, and sandbags. for one turn every 4 hours.* 

4 Engineer 	 March I996 
o 	 Sweep the entire road, including shoulders, to a 

minimum of 5 meters from the edge of the road. 

This width allows most vehicles to do a U-turn or 

to pull off to the side to allow another unit to 

pass. Watch for trip wires along the shoulders. 

Note: Dirt and gravel shoulders, the easiest 

areas to mine, are the most commonly mined 

parts of any road in Bosnia. 

o 	 Consider supplementing the route-sweeping 

teams with mine-detection or explosive-snifting 

dogs with military police handlers. When 

employed, the handler and the dog must be considered an indivisible element. The dogs can 

work 3 to 4 hours in moderate climatic conditions, and this period may be extended if the 

dogs take a 10-minute break every hour. Dogs 

require special veterinary support to retain their 

effectiveness. They may not differentiate individual mines in heavily mined areas and may be 

affected by wind speed and direction. Multiple 

teams are needed to conduct sustained operations. The dog handlers may provide additional 

employment recommendations.* 

o 	 Do not assume that a road is cleared when it 

passes through a friendly village or outpost or if 

it has not been under continuous friendly observation since it was last swept.* 

u 	 When the probing methods usually employed are 

not sufficient to uncover mines in roadbeds of 

compacted rock and clay, use a knife or bayonet 

to chip and pry them out.* 

o 	 Remove all items on the road that cause a positive reading on a metallic mine detector in the 

initial phases of a sweep operation. Their 

removal will save time on subsequent sweeps by 

significantly decreasing the number of false positive readings on the mine detector.* 

o 	 Increase the size of the basic sweep team to allow 

one metallic mine detector for every 2 meters of 

road width (including the shoulders), plus two in 

reserve. Maintain an offset of about 25 meters 

between detector operators. If a positive reading 

is obtained, mark the location and have probers 

search the area with assistance from the two 

reserve detectors. This technique allows the primary detector operators to remain together and 

continue their sweep, thus ensuring complete and 

continuous coverage of the road.* 

0 	 When command-detonated mines are a threat, 

look for possible trigger points along the route 

and remove them if possible.* 

o 	 When command-detonated mines are a threat, 

position flank security well forward of the sweep 

element. They carefully search for wires and 

other signs of command-detonated mines or 

March 1996 

ambushes. If the flank element is close to a tree 

line, a security team should sweep the tree line 

ahead of the element that is checking for command firing wires. Look for disturbed earth or 

foliage used to cover firing wires. In Vietnam, 

engineers located these wires by having a soldier 

with each flank element drag a pick or bush hook 

along the ground while he moved in a zig-zag pattern between the flank element and the road.* 

Considering the large number of mines in Bosnia, 

this technique should be used only if the threat of 

command-detonated mines becomes significant. 

o 	 Use a leaf blower to remove light, dry snow before 

sweeping the ground with a metallic mine detector when conditions warrant. In this incremental 

process, a small patchof ground is cleared of snow 

before it is swept for mines, then the process is 

repeated. Note: The sensitivity ofpressure-fuzed 

AT and AP mines may be greatly reduced in snow 

and frozen ground. Therefore, ground that was 

crossed safely during the winter may become clangerous after the spring thaw begins.* 

Additional threat mine-laying techniques and 

detection considerations are shown in Table 1, 

page 6. 

Reporting. Timely, accurate reporting is critical 

to saving lives. Accurate reporting allows the battle 

staff to analyze and distribute information on the 

overall mine situation and to develop appropriate 

countermeasures. Consider the following guides: 

0 	Provide a situation report at designated checkpoints and after completing a mine sweep. 

0 	Send a spot report in a SALUTE format to the 

battalion tactical operations center immediately 

after a mine is discovered or detonates. The 

SALUTE report must contain an accurate location (coordinates) of the incident. Forward a 

written report (see figure, page 7) containing all 

facts and the commander's comments within 24 

hours of the incident. If possible, include 

sketches of the site showing where the mine was, 

road shoulders, center of road, crater dimensions, etc. Send recovered information and 

materials to the S2 within 24 hours. 

Neutralization. While many potential mineneutralization hazards are obvious, some are not. 

Neutralization teams must proceed with caution 

and patience. The following techniques may be 

employed: 

0 	Only one member of the sweep team will neutralize mines. All others will move a safe distance 

away. 
Table 1. Mlne-Detection Techniques 

Threat Effects Coumerrneasures 

Low-metal mines. 

' equipped ianks and follow with AN/ 

PSS-I 2 detectors. 

3) Lwk for visual indicators. 

4) Supplement sweep teams with infrared 

Very difficult to detect using the ANIPSS12 metal mine detector. 1 

(IR) sensors. 

1) Drastically reduce the sweep rate. 

2) Lead with orobers or mine-rollerAntitank (AT) m

between them. 

ines stackad with din Conceal presence of lower mines. Resweep the hole affer lif6ng or neubalizing a mine.' 

Stacked low-metal AT mines with only the 	 The only metal in some mines is in the 1) Lwk for visual indicators. 

bottom one fuzed. 	 fuze. The depth of the buried fuze makes 2) Supplement sweep teams with IR 

detection impossible. sensors.. 1

Melal debris (such as machine-gun links) Slows the sweep rate and makes operators Ensure operators are highly bained, 

scattered acmss mad surlace. mmplacent experienmd, and can differentiate metallic 

debris from a mine. 

Mela AT mtne (ether surface ,an0 or The metallic mine masks the presence of 1) Probe the area around the mine before 

D~nfm)s~noLndedwlLh a buriea 1ow.metat low-metal mines close to it. kneeling down to investigate a possible 

AP m ne cbster or our ed low metal AT detection.' 

mines 2) Prwf the entire width of a route as a 

routine part of mine sweeping.' 

Low-metal AT mine placed ow a metal The CUMmasks the presenm of iow- 1)Look for visual indicators. 

cuivert. metal mines. 2) Supplement sweep teams with IR 

sensors: 

AT mines placed at ford sites adjacent to Thoroughness of tne sweep decreasesdue 1) Maintain a disciplined sweep technique 

desboyed bridges. to me dtscombn of sweep ng a co<a wet in the cold water. 

ford site 2) Use divers if available. 

Mlnefidds emplaced with a mix of inert Sweepers become mmplacent alter 1)Trea each mine as live; the one mated 

mines. locsting several inen mines. as inert may be a live one with an antihandlina &vim (AHD). 

2)To n bohed ear, ihe kgoslavian-made 

V.senes kalnlng mlnes have a skongw 

signature on a mlne detector than a lhve 

mine 

Roadblocks consisting of a series of earth Sweepers become mmplacent ailer Maintain adisciplined sweep technique. 

berms with AT mines placed only in the last clearing several berms and finding no 

mines. I

1 The ANIPSS-12 can detect low.metai manes such as the PMA-3 and TMA-4 to a &pLh of awut 2 nches in a laboratory environment 

as ng a sow Sweep rate. One Canaa an veteran of U.N. operaaons In Bosnaa stated that they ed w th prooes or a mine roller 80 percent of 

the Ume 

Denotes nondoctrinal information 

0 	The common practice is to blow in place any technique pose little danger to personnel. To 

enemy mine detected. This action often creates a extract a mine, first check for stacked mines, 

large crater in the road that must be backfilled antihandling devices (AHD), and booby traps by 

and capped. For example, craters made by TMA-3 thoroughly searching the mine by hand. Then 

mines are usually 12-18 inches deep and 30-36 extract the mine using about 150 feet of parainches across. Since cratering is inevitable, mad- chute cord, an A-frame, and a grapnel. Pull the 

repair equipment and fill material must accom- mine at least 1.5 meters frum the hole and wait 

pany the sweep team. at least 5 minutes before approaching it. (See 

0 	In many situations, it may be preferable to STP 5-12B1-SM, Combat Engineer Soldier's 

extract mines located on a LOC. Removing mines Manual, Skill Leuel 1, dated December 1990, 

allows the road to be reopened immediately, page 2-200, for full details.) If multiple mines are 

eliminates the need to repair craters, and denies extracted frum an area, pick up the fuzed AT 

the enemy an excellent location for laying their mines by hand and move them to a single point 

next mine (in a road crater filled with loose for demolition to save both time and explosives. 

gravel). Additionally, mines removed using this Remember that these mines are still fuzed.* 

6Engineer 	 March I996 
-- 

MINE INCIDENT REPORTING CHECKLIST* 


(.Possible lormat for inclusion in Unit's SOP) 


Unit 	 Dale 

Name 	 Time 

Erect location (Include map gridlmep number) 

Site description (for example, crwk, jungle, path) 

Activlly (for example, patrol) 

How war mined diacoverad 

What detection equipment was used, if any 

Mine size 	 Mine switch 

Mine color 	 Mine marking. 

Mine casing Mine contents 

Crater size 

Color end condition of crater 

How camouflaged 

Front Back 


Sample Mine Incident Report 


This technique is not normally recommended for because all ordnance, including pressure-fuzed 

use against AP mines because of their sensitive AT mines, can be rigged for command detonafuzing. However, if necessary, rig the pull line so tion. If lead wires are found, he should cut one at 

that the mine can be dragged out of the way and into a time and shunt them, then continue searching 

a suitable area before destroying it with explosives. for the mine. 

Note: Do not use this technique against tilt-rod or Alternatively, one soldier may attach additional 

magnetic-fuzed mines.* firing wire to the wires leading into the road and 

o 	When the situation permits, much time can be then move to a safe position and try to fire the 

saved if the finding unit (usually the lead ele- mine electrically. If the mine does not detonate or 

ment) marks the mines and bypasses them, leav- if demolition in place is unacceptable, he sweeps 

ing demolition to the follow-on supporting along the wire toward the road until the mine is 

element. This technique reduces the sweep time. found; then he removes it hm the LOC using an 

If multiple mines are to be blown in place, use a A-frame and a grapnel. Remember that AP mines 

ring main or line main to reduce the demolition may be placed along the firing wire to protect it. 

time.* If the mine is not found, he sets a row of charges 

0 	When mines are blown in place, stand off about on the road and blows them all.* 

413 meters (preferably in an armored vehicle) in 

case stacked or boosted mines are present.* o 	When an unidentified explosive device is discovered, the commander (with his senior engineer or 

o 	Check both ends of all trip wires (both slack and EOD support present) must decide if a recovery taut) for "breakwire"-type fuzes before cutting attempt is warranted. This decision must be them. Breakwire-fuzed mines should only be based on the essential elements of information blown in place or neutralized with a grapnel.* specified in the operations order and guidance 

U After neutralizing a mine, check the hole again from higher headquarters. Photograph the 

with a metallic mine detector and a probe in case device before demolition if possible. If the decithe enemy placed more mines in the hole.* sion is to recover an unidentified explosive 

0 When firing wires or mines are detected, one sol- device, only one soldier attempts the recovery. 

dier will immediately search for lead wires He digs carefully around the explosive device 

March 1996 	 Engineer 7 
Table 2. Mine-NeutrallzatlonTechnlques 

' Threi 	 Effects Countermeasures 

Coupled mines (such as the Romanian May be used to destroy mine plows and Dismounted mine sweepers or standoff 


MC-71 or improvised mines) where the roller-equipped tanks. mine-detection vehicles should always 


fuze is separated from the mine body. precede mounted elements of a sweep 


force.' 

Sideattack mines (such as theYugoslavian May be used to deslmy mine plows and 1) Flank security elements should precade 

Cobra or improvised mines). roller.equ~pped tanks. mounted elements to detecl and 

neumlize this threat.' 

2) Neutralize vlsually detected side-attack 

mines using distruption by gunfire.' 

3) Check carefully for AP mines when 

approaching this type of mine.' 

AT mines fined with AHD. 1) Discourages manual lift techniques 1) Blow in place or use an A-frame or 


2) Deslmys mine plows. tripod to lin mines fmm a remote 


location. 


2) Precede mounted elemenls with 

dismounted sweepers or standoff minedetection vehicles.' 

3) A strong signal on the ANIPSS-12 for a 

normally low-metal mine may indicate 

the presence of an AHD: 

Breakwire-fuzed fragmenting AP mines. Cutfing what appearsto bea slack@ wire Check both endsof all tripwires (both slack 

activates the mine. and taut) for unusual fuzing before cutting 

them.' 

Low-metal AP mines laid along trip wires. Personnel tracing trip wires become 1) Pull me trip wire using a grapnel from a 

(This technique is used frequently in casualties. covered position a safe distance away 

Bosnia.) (Remember that the lethal range of some 

mines in Bosnia is 50 meters.) Then 

carefully sweeplprobe the ark that was 

under the bip wire. 

2) Probe along trip wires; do not become 

overfy focused on the wire.' 

Multi-impulse AT mine is improvised by Mine detonates after repeated vehicle 1)Employ good detection techniques. 

placjng a simple pressurefuzed AT mine mntacts fwce it to Uw bonom of the hole. 2) A circular depression is a visual indicator 

upside down in a conical hole. Mine mllers do not reliably clear this that this technique was employed. 

arrangement. 

Surface-laid AT mines fitted with AHDs 	 Soldiers grab the mines to throw them off 1) Assume allmines are fined with AHDs. 

the road. 

Surface-laid AT mines sumunded by trip- Soldiers activate the tri~ wires when thev Maintain sweep dscipline when 


wire fuzed Bouncing Bellys. walk up to grab the AT ;nines and throws approaching surface-laid mines. 


them off the road. 


'Denotes nondoctrinal information. 

until a grappling hook or wire can be passed o Follow each mine-sweep team with enough 

through or under it. Then he attempts to pull it proofing devices to cover the entire width of the 

with a line and a small A-frame. If the recovery route, including the shoulders. Proofing devices 

attempt becomes too dangerous, he blows the include mine-roller-equipped tanks, improvised 

device in place. Under no circumstances should mine rollers, other tracked vehicles (the heavier 

anyone attempt to disarm an explosive device if the better), and loaded 5-ton dump trucks driven 

the NCO in charge does not consider it safe. Do in reverse. (Driving in reverse reduces the possinot take unnecessary risks.* bility of serious injury to the driver if the truck 

detonates a mine.) The proofing vehicles mainAdditional neutralization techniques are tain a minimum distance of 25 meters &om all 

described in Table 2. 	 personnel in case an undetected mine detonates. 

Dump trucks loaded with gravel follow the minesweep teams and proofing devices to fill craters Proofing. Countermine operations are rarely or potholes in the road.' 

100 percent effective, and mines sometimes slip o To defeat magnetic-influence fuzed mines, fit a through. Proofing confirms the quality of a sweep. 	 magnetic mine countermeasure system such as Consider using the following proofing techniques: 	 the Improved Dog-bone Assembly to the mine8 Engineer 	 March 1996 
-- 

Table 3. Survlvablllty Techniques 

Threat 	 Effects Coun PS 

Boostea manes (stacned wtth addlbonai ncrease damage to van c es Lead w th mlne-restslant vehlaes or 

rn nes or explosl\ss beneath them, ven c~es lmed wlm rnlne-protechon luts' 

AT mines laid in the mad with AP mines Survivors of a mine-immobilized vehicle Dismount onto the mad. Do not move onto 

laid on the shoulders. dismount into an adjacentAP minefield. the shoulders without first looking for AP 

mines.' 

Clayrnore-type mines placed in frees. Shoot down into the kill zone through the Reinforce the top when improvising vehicle 

top of the vehicle. I 'Denotes nondocbinal inbrmation. 

roller-equipped tank or fit the Field Expedient 

Coil System to the lead armored vehicles. To 

date, there are no reports of magnetic-influence 

fuzed mines in Bosnia. 

o 	Mine rollers are extremely heavy (10 tons) and 

may damage unimproved roads. The heavy 

mine-roller-equipped tank (MLC 67) exceeds the 

capacity of many bridges and may be unable to 

negotiate choke points. Together, the task force 

engineer and the battalion S2 must identify 

bridging constraints during the planning process 

of a route sweep. If roller-equipped tanks are 

unsuitable or unavailable, improvised, lightweight expendable rollers may be used.* 

Protection As noted above, countermine 

measures are rarely 100 percent effective. The 

following procedures will reduce casualties if a mine 

detonates: 

Mounted Operations 

o 	Wear protective vests, helmets, and seat belts. 

o 	Keep vehicle speeds at less than 25 mph. The 

emotional surprise (of the driver) and physical 

damage (to the vehicle) caused by a mine detonation will cause a vehicular accident.* 

o 	 Store all loose articles because they may 

become high-speed projectiles if a mine detonates. Leave any unnecessary equipment at the 

base camp.* 

o 	Fill each tire with water about two-thirds of the 

way to the rim to help deflect a mine detonation. 

Add antifreeze to the water in cold weather.* 

o 	Place two layers of sandbags on the floor of the 

vehicle cab and on the cargo bed to help protect 

personnel hm the effects of a mine blast. Cover 

the sandbags with heavy conveyor belts or rubber matting to reduce secondary fragments. Do 

not put rocksin the sandbags because they could 

become secondary missiles if a mine detonates. 

Place sandbags on nonballistic windshields and 

protection.' 

on the hood above the dash to protect against flying glass and metal. 

o 	Strive for a uniform appearance of all vehicles. 

Cross load key personnel and equipment. 

o 	Follow the tracks of the vehicle ahead, but avoid 

old vehicle tracks because they may be mined.* 

o 	 Keep the hatches on armored vehicles open to 

vent the pressure pulse from a mine detonation.* 

Dismounted Operations 

o Maintain pmper intervaL 

0 Wear appropriate protective equipment (standard protective vest and helmet). When conducting countermine operations, also wear the Body 

Armor Set, Individual Countermine (BASIC). It 

includes a ballistic face shield and goggles, antifragment trousers, and blast overboots. 

o 	 Watch for visual mine indicators. 

o 	 DO not wear sunglasses because they signscantly decrease the ability to spot trip wires.' 

Mounted and Dismounted Operations 

o 	 Rehearse unit-developed battle driis. At a minimum, units should develop and rehearse drills to 

clear mines after they are detected, to evacuate 

casualties from a mined area, and to read to a 

mine detonation during convoy operations. 

o 	 After a mine incident, immediately establish allaround security and clear the area to the casualty with a sweep team. Do not cluster around 

casualties. A sweep team will approach casualties &st, followed by an aid and litter team. 

Note: Because dirt is driven into wounds and 

traumatic amputation isprobable, medical personnel supporting countermine operations must 

receive additional training on the treatment of 

mine casualties. 

o 	 Many units establish a procedure for mine 

sweeps and then never deviate from it. This 

practice assures the commander a thorough, 

March 1996 
well-controlled sweep, but it gives the enemy the 

advantage to predict movements. He is then able 

to place his mines to inflict maximum damage. 

o 	 A careless attitude breeds poor security. The 

enemy may observe this attitude and strike 

when a unit's guard is down. Physically check 

likely ambush places. Assume good, dispersed 

firing positions during halts. 

o 	Construct mine booms upstream of bridging and 

fording sites to counter drifting river mines. 

Additional survivability techniques are shown in 

Table 3, page 9. 

Closing 

tanding in the middle of a road with an AN/ 

PSS-12 mine detector is probably the most 

vulnerable position to place a soldier. Proper 

equipment, training, and smart leadership will 

reduce that risk. Remember, route clearance is a 

combined-arms operation that requires careful 

planning, coordination, and execution. Although 

equipment solutions have not evolved from the 

painful lessons of Vietnam and Somalia, solid 

training, patience, flexibility, practice, perseverance, 

and planning will reduce the loss of life and 

equipment caused by mined routes. Y 

References: 

Engineer Contingency Handbook (Former 

Yugoslavia), U.S. Army Engineer School, July 1993. 

Military Floating Bridge Equipment, TM 5-210, 

August 1970. 

Military Improvisations During the Russian 

Campaign, Center for Military History, CMH Pub 

104-1, 1986 reprint of DA Pam 20-201, August 1951. 

Mine and Tunnel Dog Detection/Employment, FM 

7-41, 1973. 

Mine Resistant Vehicles, South African Army 

Headquarters, September 1979. 

Sapper Countermine Guide, BRDEC Pamphlet 

350-4, Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center, November 1990. 

Vehicle Hardening and Convoy Operations, U.S. 

Army Transportation School, July 1994. 

Viet Cong Boobytraps, Mines, and Mine Warfare 

Techniques, TC 5-31, December 1969. 

Viitnam, Lessons Learned, Landmine and 

Countermine Warfare, Engineer Agency for Resource 

Inventories, Washington, D.C., August 1972. 

"After Action Report, Operation Restore Hope," by 

William C. Schneck, Belvoir RD&E Center, Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia, June 1994. 

"Desert Storm Countermine Improvisations," by 

William Schneck, Engineer Professional Bulletin, 

July 1992. 

'Detection of Land Mines in Somalia Using 

Commercial Infrared Cameras 0,"by Harry N. 

Hambric, AMSEL-NV-TR-0117, Night Vision and 

Electronic Sensors Directorate, Fort Belvoir, 

August 1994. 

Riverine Mines and Mine Countermeasures 0, 

Navy Science Assistance Program, Project EC-193, 

Defense Technical Information Center No. AD525124, 

March 1973. 

'Xoute-Clearance Operations," by Captain John 

Leighow, Engineer Professional Bulletin, August 

1995. 

"Tactics for Route Clearance," by William Schneck 

and Brian Green, Engineer Professional Bulletin, 

April 1995. 

William C. Schneck is a civilian seniorproject 

engineer in Countermine Systems Division, Night 

Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate, Fort Belvoir. 

He has provided countermine warfare training for 

troops deploying for Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia; 

Opemtion Restore Hope, Somalia; and the Gulf War. A 

registered professional engineer, Mr. Schneck holds a 

bachelor's degree from the Georgia Institute of 

Technology. He may be reached at (703) 704-2446; his 

e-mail address is wschneck@belvoir.army.mil. 

Brian M. Green is aproject management engineer for 

the Office of the Project Manager for Mines, Countermine, and Demolitions, Countermine Division, Fort 

Beluoir. During Operation Restore Hope, he deployed to 

Somalia to install vehicle-protection kits and to provide 

technical countermine assistance. A Marine Corps 

Reserve major, he is assigned to the Marine Corps Intel1igenceActivity as the subject matter expert on mine 

warfare and engineer equipment. Mr. Green holds a 

bachelor's degree in general engineering from the U.S. 

Naval Academy. 

10Engineer 	 March 1996 
By Master Sergeant Steuen Eberhurter 

With an ever-changing global environment, the probability of deploying U.S. 

troops to perform various stability and 

support missions (formerly known as operations 

other than war) is very real. The unit's need to 

be situationally aware is extremely critical 

because each flash point contains its own type of 

threat to the deployed unit. Like the mine 

threat that U.S. troops currently face in the 

former Yugoslavia, many of these threats can be 

neutralized or reduced through quality training. 

Quality mine-awareness training not only 

enhances the ability of the unit to perform its 

mission but also increases the soldier's con6-

dence that the mission will be accomplished successfully. Mine awareness consists of both 

individual skills and collective tasks. They are 

critical, perishable skills that must be trained 

effectively and sustained routinely. Many engineers learn about the tasks required to perform 

their wartime missions while attending basic 

institutional training courses. The problem 

emerging currently is that knowledge of the 

individual mine survivability skills required for 

stability and support operations is limited. 

We must go "back to the basics" to understand the current mine threat. There are more 

than 100 million mines deployed throughout the 

world, and about 5 million of them are in the 

former Yugoslavian region. More than threefourths of those mines are not marked or 

recorded. Along with the mines is the additional 

threat of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which is 

just as threatening as land mines and can be 

reduced with the same basic skills. Soldiers 

must understand how mines and UXO are 

employed, how to recognize minefield indicators, how to perform self-extractions from a 

minefield, and how to apply basic survival rules. 

Mine Employment 

ines and booby traps are not only 

employed conventionally by military 

forces organic to the host country or its 

.. 

A soldier probes for a mine after visually identifying the indicators. 

March 1996 Engineer 11 
enemies but also by terrorists against allied 

forces or the host country populace. In the latter 

cases, the threat increases because of the improvised methods terrorists use to emplace mines 

and booby traps. In conventional mine emplacement, a pattern emerges from the emplacing 

force's doctrinal guidance, and military forces can 

use that doctrine to reduce the threat. There is no 

pattern when improvised mining methods are 

used, which makes identification, removal, or 

breaching very difficult. Most of the improvised 

mining techniques discussed below apply to 

unexploded ordnance also. 

Coupling Mines. Mines are linked together, 

usually with demolition cord. Once the initial 

mine is detonated, it will detonate the linked 

mines. 

Boosting Mines. Buried mines are stacked 

one upon another with the farthest from the surface being fuzed. This reduces the probability of 

detection and increases the force of the blast. 

Sensitizing Antitank Mines. With nonmetallic mines, the pressure plate can be cracked, 

the spring removed, or the mine explosive cut 

into smaller mines and employed as powerful 

antipersonnel mines. If the pressure plate' is 

removed from metallic mines, they can be 

employed in the same manner. 

A soldier searches for mines using 

an ANIPSS-12 detector during a 

route-clearing exercise. 

Mixing Training and Liue Mines. Forces 

employ training mines in the minefield initially 

and live mines toward the end. The reducing 

element is led to believe that the minefield is 

phony and becomes complacent in its reduction 

activities. Usually the live mines are painted to 

resemble training mines. 

Daisy Chaining Mines. Command-detonated and antipersonnel mines are the most 

commonly used mines in daisy chaining. The 

employing force links them with trip wires or 

detonation cord. As in coupling, once the initial 

mine is Functioned the others will function as 

well. 

Minefield Detection 

With all mines, survivability depends on 

the soldier's ability to detect the threat 

before contact. FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, describes four methods of 

detecting mines and unexploded ordnance: 

w Visual. 

w Physical (probing). 

w Electronic (mine detector). 

a Mechanical (mine roller). 

12Engineer March 1996 
Minefield Indicators 

Loose dirt in roadway 

o Damagedvegetation 

o Exposed mines 

o Improvisedmarking 

o Road repairs 

o Local population avoidance 

o Out-of-place material 

o Damaged vehkles 

Deadanimals 

o Unusualsmell 

o Desirablewar trophies 

Trampledor vehicletracked area 

Figure 1 

Equipment availability for physical, electronic, or mechanical detection is limited, so the 

visual method is best for the individual soldier. 

The ability to understand and recognize minefield indicators can prevent the individual soldier from becoming a casualty from an unmarked mine or UXO threat. FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Operations (Airborne, Air Assault, Light), identifies 

the minefield indicators shown in Figure 1. 

Minefield Extraction 

Awell-developed and well-rehearsed evacuation drill is necessary to extract an 

individual or a unit from an unmarked 

minefield. A key individual skill in any evacuation driU is the ability to properly probe for 

mines. The probing techniques in Figure 2 are 

described in FM 20-32. 

Units must develop evacuation drills for both 

dismounted and mounted operations. Each type 

of operation should include a drill using a mine 

detector and one without. Examples of both 

methods are shown in Figures 3 and 4, page 14. 

Mlne-ProbingTechniques 

o Roll up your sleeves and removegloves 

and jewelry to increaseyour sensitivity. 

Wear aflak vest and a Kevlar helmetwith 

the chin strap buckled. 

o Visually inspectthe ares to be probed. 

o Move into a prone positionto reducethe 

effects of an accidentalblast. 

o Use sight and touch to detect trip wires, 

fuzes, and pressure prongs. 

o Use a slender, nonmetallicobject as a 

probe. 

o Methodicallyprobeevery 5 centimeters 

(2 inches) across a l-meter (39-inch) 

front. 

o Probethe ground at a 45-degreeangle 

by gently pushingthe probe intothe 

ground. 

o Apply just enough pressure on the 

probeto sink it slowly into the ground. 

o If an object is detected, carefully remove 

the surroundlng soil (uslng a "twofinger-sweep"technique) to Identify It. 

o if an object is IdentHIedas athreat, mark 

it aceordingto your local SOP and avold 

it. 

o Move forward into the cleared area and 

repeat the procedure.Stay in a prone 

position at all times. 

0 If two or more probersare required, they 

must be st least 25 meters (85 feet) 

apart.This createsan area betweenthem 

that Is safe from detonation by other 

probers. 

0 Probingis extremely stressful and 

tedious.The senior leader must set a 

limit to the time a prober is actually probing in a minefield.To determine a reasonabletime, the leader must not only 

consider the METT-Tfactors but also the 

weather conditions, the threat level, the 

unit's stress level, and the prober's sensory perceptions, fatigue level, and state 

of mind. As a rule, one hour isthe maximumtime an indivldual can probe, and 

that is under idealcondiiions. Mostof our 

allies and civilianagencies use 20 to 30-

minute limits, which is reasonableunder 

mostfield conditions. 

Figure 2 

March 1996 Engineer 13 
Dismounted Extraction Procedures 

Without Mine Detectors 

o Freezeand crouch into a low silhouetted 

position.Be cautious when makingthis 

movement to ensure that soldiers do not 

detonate another mine. If the protective 

mask is worn on the hip, do not allow itto 

come in contact with the ground because 

contact may detonatea mine. Overcomethe 

urge to help casualties; this will prevent 

you from becoming a casualty too. 

o Designate a security element and a soldier 

to assist in casualty evacuation. 

0 Extract soldiers alongthe path they 

entered, stepping in the same places as 

before if possible; if not, they probe their 

way out. 

o Set up the security element into a security 

position.This element should be individuals who are not in the minefield. 

0 Extractthe casualtiesas follows: 

- Probe a I-meter-wide path to the casualty, 

markingthe cleared path as it is probed. 

- Probe around the casualty to clear the area 

where first aid will be performed. 

- Performproper first aid. 

- Carry the casualty out of the minefield 

along the cleared path. (Do not let stretcher 

parties in unless a 2meter-wide path has 

been cleared to the casualty). 

Clear the minefleld, mark the threat, and 

reassemble the unit at a rally point. 

o Report the incident after all personnel are 

at least 50 to 100 meters away from the 

minefield. Do not use the radio in the minefield, becausethe signal could detonate a 

mine. if radio transmission is required 

when soldiers are in the minefield, move 

the transmitter at least 300 meters from the 

minefield before transmitting. This will prevent accidentalmine detonation from the 

radio signal. 

o MEDEVAC the casualties. 

Continuethe mission. 

Figure 3 

14 Engineer 

Mounted Extraction Procedures 

With Mine Detectors 

Halt the convoyand report to higher headquarters. 

Leavevehicles in positionand troops 

mounted unless directedotherwise. 

o Provide360degree securityfrom vehicles. 

o Maintainthe positionof troops thrown 

from vehicles if possible. Extract them, 

usingthe dismounted evacuation procedures with electronicdetectors. 

o If engineers are not available, the senior 

leader will assess the situation and direct 

vehicles to back along their entry route 

tracks. If vehicles are damaged, soldiers 

will evacuate through the rear of the vehicle along the vehicle entrytracks. 

o If engineers are available, they should 

sweep the area and provide a cleared lane 

for movement.The clearedarea will be 4.5 

meters wide for one lane or 19 meters 

wide for two lanes. 

o MEDEVACthe casualties. 

o Road guards will guide vehicles through 

the safe area to ensurethat no additional 

mines are encountered. 

o Mark, record,and reportthe threat if lt has 

not been done already. 

Continue the mission. 

Figure4 

Survival Rules 

n any convoy movement, some rules of 

thumb should be considered if at all possible. The lead vehicle should be one of the 

heaviest vehicles in the unit (for example, a 2 112-

ton or a 5-ton vehicle) and hardened against a 

mine threat. Heavier vehicles provide better protection against mine and UXO threats. If possible, do not lead a convoy with a HMMW or a 

HEMMT, because these vehicles are extremely 

vulnerable to mine and UXO threats and are difficult to harden without commercial products. 

Many of our allies have extensive experience 

in mine operations. Canada has produced several mine-awareness manuals and videos and 

has developed "Survival Rules" that U.S. soldiers will find useful (see Figure 5). 

March 1996 
Survival Rules 

o If you didn't drop it,don? pick it up. 

o All terrain and structures are potentially 

minedor booby-trapped. 

o Beware of areas associatedwith basic 

human needs.They could be mined or 

booby-trapped. 

o Report all confirmed or suspected mines 

immediately. 

Leave minedlaposalto explosive ordnance disposal personnel and combat 

engineers. 

o Avoid touching or removing foreign 

objects, no matter how attractivethey are. 

They could be mined or booby-trapped. 

o Stay on the traveledroadand avoidverges. 

They could be mined. 

o Mark and avoid UXOs if possible.Consider 

them unstable. 

o Develop and rehearse effectiveevacuation 

drills. 

Figure 5 

Mine awareness is a critical, perishable skill. 

It must be trained effectivelyand sustained on a 

continuing basis. If a unit properly trains its soldiers on mine awareness, it will maintain its 

force, boost the soldiers' confidence in their abilities, and accomplish the unit's mission more 

effectively.Mine awareness training is not a liability-it's an investment in the unit's future. 

Master Sergeant Eberharter is an instructor/ 

writer in the Department of Tactics, Leadership, and Engineering at the U.S. Army Engineer School. He is also the Mine Awareness 

Mobile Training Team NCOIC. MSG Eberharter 

was previously an Engineer Platoon Trainer/ 

Observer Controllor at the National Training 

Center and has experience in Southwest Asia. 

This article is based on information developed by the U.S. Army Engineer Center and 

the U.S Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

Center for the Mine Awareness Mobile Training Team. For more information on mlne 

awareness, contact MSG Eberharter at DSN 

676-5951; commercial (513) 596-0131, extension 3-5951; or e-mail EBERHARS@WOODVINES.-ARMY.MIL. 

For information about the Canadian films, 

contact Major DougIas Wright at the Canadian Liaison Office, U.S. Army Engineer 

School, (573)563-4017. 

References: 

FM 5-7-30,Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Operations (Airborne,Air 

Assault, Light), December 1994. 

FM 20-32,Mine /Countermine Operations 

(withlchange 1),30 September 1992. 

FM 21-16, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) 

Procedures, 30 August 1991. 

STP 21-24-SMCT, Soldiers Manual of 

Common !lhsks,1 October 1992. 

Engineer Contingency Handbook (Former 

Yugoslauia), July 1993. 

fl@/J 

Canadian Films: 

Mines & Explosives Awareness -Part 1:A 

Deadly Danger (DL93041VE.ENG). 

Mines & Explosives Awareness - Part 2: 

Survival inMined Areas (DL93044VE.ENG). 

March 1996 Engineer 15 
Personal Viewpoint 

Army Engineers: 

It's Time to Speak With One Voice 

n recent years, joint commands have deployed all 

over the world to conduct 

both combat and stability and 

support operations (formerly 

called operations other than 

war). In each instance, engineers played a major role and 

were essential to the suocess of 

the effort. Commanders, however, continually struggled to 

come to grips with how to best 

organize, command, and control 

the engineer forces. Each solution was a little different and 

while this afforded the joint task 

force commander maximum 

flexibility, it repeatedly violated 

the precept of ''train as you 

expect to fight." 

Now, as joint doctrine becomes more directive in nature, 

it is time for Army engineers to 

resolve the following issues in 

the joint arena: 

Who are the key players 

in writing and reviewing 

joint doctrine, and who has 

the lead? 

Where does the engineer 

element belong on the joint 

staff? 

How do we advise the joint 

commander regarding the 

task organization of his 

engineer elements to optimize support throughout 

the operational area? 

Joint Doctrine 

f we get the doctrine piece 

right, we have a greater 

chance for success in the 

other areas. As it stands now, 

it is unclear who is speaking 

. 

to get our act together. 

TRADOC has Army proponency to review and develop 

joint doctrine, but it lacks the 

expertise to adequately represent the Corps of Engineers. 

When seeking assistance, it 

linds that Army engineers have 

no standard pmdures to 

ensure that their position is 

clearly and correctly presented. 

Joint working subgroups tasked 

to develop or review doctrine 

contact different Army agencies 

depending on the issue. Sometimes they reach the right folks, 

but often they do not. 

Engineer doctrine is written 

at the Army Engineer School. 

We must take the lead in joint 

doctrine development and review. Doctrine developers at the 

for the Army in the joint doctrine arena. 

At a recent joint working 

group meeting to develop contingency engineer doctrine, 

numerous Army organizations 

participated, each with its own 

agenda. Engineer brigades and 

groups sent representatives 

who focused on joint task force 

operations. The engineer commands sent representatives 

with an echelons above corps 

orientation. U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers personnel were primarily interested in real 

estate acquisition and LOGCAP 

disconnects. The Engineer 

School's representatives tried to 

span the entire spectrum but 

tended to focus on the regimental side of the Corps. If this 

sounds confusing, you're absolutely right. It is, and the other 

services are not waiting for us 

The Staff Engineer 

Joint Warfighting Center, Fort 

Monroe, Virginia, and working 

subgroups must understand 

the process and route all material through the Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Doctrine at TRADOC, as the Army's single 

point of contact. They, in turn, 

should forward material to the 

Joint Engineer Issues Working 

Group (JEIWG) at Fort Leonard Wood for coordination 

among Army engineer organizations and agencies. It is 

incumbent upon the JEIWG to 

develop a consolidated response to ensure that pertinent 

organizations are included in 

the review process and that 

disconnects are resolved at the 

appropriate level. No other 

engineer agency or organization should speak for the Corps 

on doctrinal matters. 

The positioning of the 

engineer staff element, 

both at the joint staff 

level and within the warfighting CINC headquarters, is broken! We have allowed the staff 

engineer to be subsumed under 

the 54, and this is clearly not 

the most effective organization 

Gom the Army's perspective. 

While the engineer and the 

logistician are inextricably 

linked for idrastmcture repair and development, the 

engineer must have viribility 

am the entire J-staft He must 

also have a seat at the head 

table for planning and conducting joint operations. I believe 

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Llavis 

March 1996 
the engineer function is best Command of Engineer 1 And So... executed if the engineer is 

established as a separate staff 

element: the J9. 

The staff engineer plays a 

key role in terrain visualization 

and must have access to the 52 

throughout the planning process. Intelligence preparation of 

the battlefield OPB) and 

the engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) must be synchronized and conducted concurrently. Likewise, the staffengineer must work side by side 

with the 53 and 55 to execute 

today's campaign and plan 

tomorrow's. To be effective, the 

staff engineer must hear the 

commander's intent firsthand 

not receive a skewed version 

from the 54, who listened and 

noted the key elements with a 

logistician's ear. He must maximize engineers as a combat 

multiplier by massing scarce 

engineer assets at the decisive 

point($ on the battlefield and 

fully coordinating their efforts 

with the maneuver commander's intent. Most importantly, 

he must recommend priorities 

for engineer assets to support 

both combat and infrastructure requirements. 

While there is considerable 

debate regarding the utility of 

placing the staff engineer 

under the 53 instead of the 54, 

I believe those arguments are 

seriously flawed. Under the 

53, the staff engineer would 

still be denied a seat at the 

head table, and the pendulum 

would shift disproportionately 

toward combat operations at 

the expense of building 

and maintaining infrastructure. We must maintain balance and priorities based on 

the mission, and we can do 

that best when the staff engineer is independent. 

Units 

f we get the doctrine piece 

right and place the staff 

engineer where he can 

best support the warfighting 

CINC, then I believe any contentious issues regarding task 

organization and engineer command will logically resolve 

themselves. Joint warfighting 

commands frequently subordinate engineer elements to 

logistical support commands. 

Just as Army engineers vehemently resist efforts by logisticians to subordinate the Engineer Command to the Theater Army Area Command, 

engineers at all levels must 

maintain maximum flexibility 

and be equally responsive to 

both operational and logistical 

requirements. 

The spectrum of responsibility for logisticians is broad 

enough without adding the 

burden of commanding large, 

multifunctional engineer organizations. It is unrealistic 

to assume that logisticians 

possess either the technical 

background or the experience necessary to effectively 

command and control diverse engineer units. The 

tempo of modern combat 

operations and the associated 

information flow is increasing at an exponential rate. A 

flat, highly versatile organization is required to effectively respond to the myriad 

of engineer requirements facing the joint commander. 

Just as we seek maximum 

freedom and flexibility for 

the staff engineer, we must 

afford the same freedom and 

flexibility to the senior engineer commanders. 

o best support the warfighting CINC, Army engineers must make three 

adjustments to our current way 

of doing business: 

The lead for the development and review of joint 

engineer doctrine must 

reside in the Engineer 

School, and all other agencies and organizations 

must work through this 

medium to ensure that 

engineers speak with a single, united voice. 

The staff engineer requires the freedom to operate as a separate element 

across the entire staff. 

Command of engineer 

units cannot be relegated 

to the logisticians. 

Joint doctrine is being written and accepted at a breakneck pace. We must stand up 

now, speak with unity, and 

firmly defend our position. 

Otherwise, engineers will continually chafe at the result and 

struggle to "make do" when we 

can least afford it: during the 

execution of combat and stability and support operations. 

Lieutenant Colonel Davis is 

director of the Department of 

Tactics, Leadership and Engineering at the U.S. Army Engineer School and serves as the 

deputy chairman for the Joint 

Engineer Issues Working 

Group. As commander of the 

43rd Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy), he deployed the 

battalion on three occasions as 

part of a joint task force: once 

in support of Hurricane Andrew relief efforts and twice to 

Somalia. 

Engineer 17 
-- 

Engineers in Bosnia: 


An Overview 


By Major David L.Treleaven 

I

n his often-quoted address 

to a graduating Officer 

Candidate School class in 

1942, Major General Eugene 

Reybold, the Chief of Engineers, advised engineer officers 

to cultivate a sense of curiosity 

and an inquiring mind. "Never 

pass a bridge without giving 

thought as to its construction 

or as to how that particular 

piece of terrain might best be 

organized for defense, or as to 

g. . 

how it might best be attacked if 

it were organized by the 

enemy." 

As we learn more about 

engineer activities in Bosnia, it 

is clear that his advice is just 

as relevant today. The complexity of Operation Joint 

Endeavor has taxed engineer 

capabilities and resources, 

demanding more versatility 

than any other combat support 

force in the theater. 

... .. 

. . 

U.S.Army soldiers from the 502nd Assault Float Bridge Company construct afloating ribbon bridge on the 

Sava River during Operation Joint Endeavor. 

I 8 Engineer March 1996 
An Abrams MI tank,with a mine roller attached, searches tor mines in a field along Route Ostrich in the zone 

of separation.The field will be used for aloint military mission. 

An example is the 1st Engineer Brigade of the 1st Armored Division. This mechanized combat engineer brigade, 

which normally has a strength 

of 800, deployed with 2,400 

personnel! It received engineer 

unit attachments with widely 

different missions, including 

assault float bridge, combat 

support equipment, and power 

generating companies; fire 

fighting detachments; combat 

heavy and corps combat battalions; as well as two U.S.Air 

Force engineer squadrons and 

two U.S. Navy construction 

battalions. The brigade quickly bridged a major river, 

cleared hundreds of kilometers 

of supply routes, and employed 

its engineers in construction 

missions to sustain Task Force 

Eagle, the U.S.component of 

the Implementation Force 

OFOR). The challenges exMarch 1996 

tended to everyone in the command--every sapper, NCO, 

and officer. 

Clearly we cannot cover the 

breadth of engineer success 

stories in Bosnia to date nor 

most of the relevant lessons 

learned. The information is 

largely not available, because 

the key players are still overwhelmed with operational concerns. However, this article 

presents a summary of accomplishments in the engineer battlefield functions. 

Mobility 

Bosnia has tested engineers across the full 

range of mobility missions: bridging, route clearance, route maintenance, countermine operations, and obstacle reduction. Many of the 

lessons are fundamental. A 

moving army needs bridges, 

and engineers must build, reinforce, or classify them. Battlefields have fortifications that 

engineers must know how to 

destroy. In Bosnia, cold temperatures have made these 

tasks more difficult. Snow 

must be removed, and frozen 

ground has caused route proofing to be unpredictable. Bosnia 

reminds us to heed the basics 

and train for realism. 

Bridging. The greatest single engineer challenge to date 

was the crossing of the Sava 

River near Zupanja, Croatia 

(see map, page 20). This mission was the largest operationally required river crossing 

since World War 11. It was also 

the &st real contingency use of 

the ribbon bridge. The crossing 

was conducted under extreme 

conditions. As engineer equipment was poised to cross, a 

Engineer 19 
HERZEGOVINA 


thaw caused the Sava's width 

to swell from 300 to 600 

meters. The flood plain where 

most of the equipment was 

marshalled became flooded. 

Despite these handicaps, engineers used Chinook helicopters to deploy ribbon bridge 

sections into the river while 

other engineers rebuilt the 

approaches. Their efforts paid 

off when the bridge was finally 

completed at 1000 hours on 31 

December 1995. When the 

water receded, engineers built a 

causeway across the flood plain. 

Bridge-erection boats initially held the floating bridge 

against the current, but that 

was a temporary solution. Two 

float bridges are now anchored 

in place with a shore guy and 

boat combination to allow twoway traffic across the river. 

Work is ongoing to design 

a satisfactory semipermanent 

overhead cable system, but 

several anchoring systems 

have been tried already with 

limited success. Doctrinal and 

technical publications will be 

updated to reflect techniques 

learned and shortcomings identified during the Sava River 

operation. 

The 13Mh Engineer Brigade 

now controls the entire crossing operation from a command 

post in Camp Harmon, on the 

Croatian side of the Sava River. 

Two ribbon bridge companies 

(the 502d hm Hanau. Germany, and the 586th from Fort 

Benning, Georgia) and a platoon from the 535th Combat 

Support Equipment Company 

in Grafenwehr, Germany, operate the crossing site. 

The Cold Regions Research 

and Engineering Laboratory 

deployed a bridge team to 

Zupanja to research alternatives. Using historical data 

from the Croatian Hydrometeorological Institute, the lab is 

developing predictions for 

when the spring thaw will 

occur. It is also evaluating an 

objective method for predicting 

the thaw. 

There are several options 

for establishing a permanent 

Gxed bridge. One alternative is 

to hold the float bridge at 

Zupanja in reserve and construct a Compact 200 bridge at 

Brcko, Croatia. The Compact 

200 is a panel bridge manufactured in Great Britain. Similar 

in concept to the time-honored 

Bailey bridge, which is also 

a British design, it uses 
advanced alloys that give it 

greater strength. An interim 

solution is to construct a Bailey 

or medium girder bridge 

(MGB) at the site. But before 

new spans can be built, damaged spans must be removed. 

Sappers from BIZ3 Engineer 

Battalion have completed the 

explosive demolition and 

cleanup of two spans at Brcko. 

Another proposal under consideration is to hire a Hungarian contractor, Hidepito, to 

construct a combination rail/ 

one-lane-traffic floating barge 

bridge with a military load 

class of 100. The proposed site 

is about 20 kilometers west of 

Zupanja, at Bosanka Samac. 

The contractor has arranged to 

lease the barge system horn 

Hungarian Cold War stocks. 

To date, engineers have 

emplaced a seven.bay MGB 

and numerous armored vehicle-launched bridges (AVLB) 

throughout Bosnia. Additional 

bridges have been brought into 

the theater, enhancing freedom 

of movement for both civilians 

and IFOR units. The AVLB is a 

real workhorse that is being 

used to reinforce existing 

bridges, replace blown bridges, 

and span dry gaps. Engineers 

emplaced wooden decks in the 

open centerline of the AVLB to 

prevent small cars and horses 

from falling through. 

Engineer soldiers are heavily involved in classifying 

bridges. They identified bridge 

reconnaissance as an area that 

needs more emphasis during 

the predeployment training at 

the Combat Maneuver Training Center. 

Route Clearance. The 

engineers' biggest challenge in 

Bosnia at this time is clearing 

and proofing hundreds of kilometers of roads and supply 

routes. Mines continue to be 

"This operation 

has highlighted 

the need to give 

engineers a detection capability other than 

dismounted sappers with handheld mine 

detectors." 

the deadliest threat to our soldiers. Since the arrival of the 

IFOR, there have been 14 mine 

incidents in the theater, 10 of 

them involving U.S. forces. 

One incident was fatal, and 

four others produced serious 

injuries. Of these incidents, 

two occurred because soldiers 

failed to follow procedures outlined during their mine-awareness training. (See article on 

page 11.) 

Zone of Separation (ZOS). 

By far the most dangerous mission is the proofing of lanes 

through the zone of separation 

(ZOS), a no-man's-land along 

the con€rontation lines between 

the former warring factions. A 

commonly heard term is 

"punching a hole in the ZOS." 

This is a coordinated operation 

in which U.S. forces provide 

security and engineer expertise 

to the factions who actually 

clear the mines from roads that 

cross the ZOS between former 

front lines. The factions work 

from their respective sides but, 

due to distrust, often leave 

before completing the operations. When they are finished, 

M1 mine rollers proof the 

lanes. The "holele are essential 

to restore the normal prewar 

flow of civilian traffic. 

U.S. engineers are part of 

the clearing teams and provide 

expertise, detection capability, 

and demolitions. They advise 

the senior maneuver commander for the clearing operation and provide blades to 

collapse trenches and bunkers 

in the ZOS. Because most bunkers are squat, well-built structures that are reinforced by 

earth revetments, they are not 

easily reduced. The CEV is 

extremely valuable in this role 

since it is an ideal and survivable platform for reducing bunkers and other fortifications. In 

the 315 Cavalry sector alone, 

engineers have destroyed more 

than 262 bunkers with the 

CEV! It is also useful in removing debris in high-threat areas 

along main supply routes. 

Engineers have reduced fortifications with demolitions, but 

using the CEV's main gun has 

not been authorized. 

Countermine Operations. 

There are 30 sets of M1 mine 

rollers and 11sets of M60 mine 

rollers in Bosnia. Additional 

M60 chassis tanks have been 

deployed for IFOR engineers. 

When the soil is frozen, it acts 

as an ice bridge over buried 

mines, so rollers must make 

three passes to clear a route. 

The first pass disturbs or cracks 

the hozen soil, the second pass 

ideally detonates the mine, and 

the third pass proofs the area. 

However, some mines detonate 

after the proofing, sometimes 

even after several other vehicles 

have travelled the proofed 

tracks. It is apparent that many 

mines in Bosnia have deteriorated and their performance is 

very unpredictable. 

This operation has highlighted the need to give engineers a detection capability 

other than dismounted sappers 

with hand-held mine detectors. 
Vehicle-mounted detection systems and remote detection systems exist but are not yet 

proven. 

The Robotic Technology Insertion Activity (RTIA) at Fort 

Leonard Wood coordinated the 

deployment of several pieces of 

equipment for mobility support 

and validation in Bosnia. They 

also conducted predeployment 

train-ing with USAREUR engineers. The equipment includes: 

Panther-a robotic control 

package for M60 chassis 

tanks, which are used in a 

number of applications 

such as mine rolling and 

blading. 

Badger-a remotely controlled 5-ton truck with 

full-width mine-detecting 

coil and a standoff detection and marking system. 

Miniflail-a robotic flail 

that clears a footpath. This 

equipment has been used 

by Special Forces and is a 

veteran of such contingency areas as Afghanistan, 

Eritrea, and Kuwait. 

m Pointman-a remotely controlled robot equipped 

with cameras that allow its 

controller to manipulate it 

into tight places to remove 

or neutralize explosives. 

Barret .50-Caliber Sniper 

Rifle-a weapon for the 

long-range neutralization 

of exposed mines and unexploded ordnance. 

The 1st Armored Division 

has established a Mine Awareness Center (MAC), which consolidates faction minefield reports and publishes them for 

distribution. In the U.S. sector 

alone, more than 3,700 mine. 

fields have been reported. 

Most of them are concentrated 

in an area 2 to 3 kilometers 

wide along the ZOS. The MAC 

is tasked to plot untranslated 

minefield reports which appear 

on overlays using an entirely 

different grid system than that 

used on U.S. maps. Plotting 

requires a slow manual process 

of transferring minefields 

drawn on former warring faction maps to U.S. maps using 

terrain association. 

Snow Removal. In addition to organic graders and 

bucket loaders, snow plows for 

the small emplacement excavators (SEE) were sent to Bosnia. 

UNIMOGS, German trucks 

similar to the SEE, were also 

deployed from Germany. Salt 

spreaders, which mount on 5-

ton trucks, are being sent from 

CONUS. 

Countermobility 

Although the primary 

engineer focus in Bosnia has been on mobility, countermobility was an 

early force-protection priority 

for engineers. Checkpoints had 

to be built rapidly and manned 

by U.S. forces. Engineers were 

key in constructing barricades 

and mobile obstacles to control 

the flow of traffic at these 

checkpoints. 

Survivability 

orce protection is being 

done in tiers. Military 

engineers enhanced 

IFOR protection with an initial 

standard of triple concertina 

and berms around base camps, 

fuel farms, and key facilities. 

Towers and bunkers will follow. 

Engineers executed some sandbagging, but this is largely a 

unit responsibility. 

Sustainment 

Awide variety of engineer 

units have worked 

around the clock to construct life-support facilities at 

23 base camps in Hungary, 

Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A pattern similar to that 

used in Somalia and Haiti has 

developed. Military engineers 

quickly build essential facilities, and the Logistics Civilian 

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contractors under the 

Brown & Root Services Corporation take over the operation 

and improve them. LOGCAP 

contracting activities throughout the theater are managed 

by the Transatlantic Division 

of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. 

Many of the problems that 

have occurred elsewhere with 

LOGCAP are being repeated in 

Bosnia. Often Brown & Root 

competes with Department of 

Defense logistics for the same 

ports, roads, and airfields. 

Brown & Root personnel experience many of the same difficulties as military engineers. 

They need petroleum, oil, and 

lubricants; prescribed load 

lists; and security. A persistent 

problem is the lack of a civilian 

economic base to draw from in 

Bosnia. Departing United Nations units have often declined 

to sell their generators, 

pumps, tools, vehicles, furniture, and fixtures. As a result, 

Brown & Root has had to bring 

in equipment they thought 

would be available in country. 

In addition, required background checks have slowed 

Brown 8 Root's hiring of local 

nationals. 

Despite these problems, living conditions continue to 

improve for U.S. forces in 

(Continued on page 29) 
Engineer Roles in Stabilizing Haiti 


Rrigadier General Phillip 

R. Anderson spoke with 

Catherine Eubanks about 

his recent tour as Commander, 

U.S. Support Group Haiti, and 

Deputy Commanding General, 

U.S. Forces Haiti under United 

Nations control. 

Q. When were you in Haiti, 

and what were your responsibilities there? 

A. I was in Haiti from 12 

June until 28 November 1995. 

That was well after the 31 

March departure of the multinational forces, led by the 

United States. With their 

departure, the multinational 

forces turned over their duties 

to the U.N. Mission in Haiti 

(UNMIH). 

While there, I wore two 

hats. Under the U.N. flag, 1 

served as the Deputy Commanding General of U.S. 

Forces in Haiti. In that capacity I served as the principal 

advisor to Major General Joe 

Kinzer, who was both the 

United Nations and the United 

States Forces Commander. My 

duties for MG Kinzer focused 

on command matters of administration, logistics, engineering, discipline and internal 

organization. In my second 

job, as Commander of the U.S. 

Support Group Haiti, I was 

charged with setting up a selfsufficient organization capable 

of conducting U.S.IHaiti bilateral and U.S. unilateral support missions under an 

exercise called Fair Winds. 

Basically, if the United States 

wanted or needed to provide 

some type of support not 

readily endorsed by the United 

Nations, we tried to provide it 

through the U.S. Support 

Group Haiti and Exercise Fair 

Winds. 

Q. What was the United 

Nations' mission in Haiti? 

A. U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 940 stated that the 

U.N. mission was to assist 

the democratic government of 

Haiti in sustaining a secure 

and stable environment. This 

mission was accomplished by 

providing about 800 U.N.. 

sponsored civilian police from 

several nations, who assisted 

the interim public security 

force and the Haitian national 

police. Also, a 6,000-man 

multinational military force 

was used to secure the peace 

and help establish an environment conducive to the conduct 

of free and fair elections-free 

of intimidation, with readily 

identifiable polling places, and 

workable administrative and 

logistics support systems. The 

UNMIH mission also included 

protecting international personnel and key installations. 

For example, we protected 

ambassadors and consulates 

and key installations like the 

presidential palace, the international airport and the international seaport. Finally, the 

UNMIH mission included 

training a new Haitian national police force. That program eventually resulted in 

fielding about 5,000 new police 

officers. All of them were 

trained in Haiti and about 

2,900 also received training 

here at Fort Leonard Wood. 

Q. Can you explain the U.S. 

unilateral mission? 

A. The Support Group Haiti 

mission was to provide additional U.S. support, not sponsored or resourced by the U.N., 

through a METL (mission 

March 1996 Engineer 23 
a 


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7 


2 

h

-

0 

zL 

Air Force REDHORSE engineers renovated the outpatient clinic of the hospital in Port-au-Prince. 

These hardback tents were used by hospital personnel during the renovation.The same design was 

used to house engineers at their base camp. 

task oriented Stewart 46th 

overseas deployment-for-train- ' Engineer Battalion from Fort tribute to the U.N.mission? 

ing exercise called Fair Polk. Brown &Root, also under 

essential list) 1 and, later, the Q. How did engineers conWinds. The intent was to pro- the U.N. flag, provided addi- A. I should address the engivide appropriate units (like tional engineer expertise. They nee"' contributions in terms of 

engineer, medical or aviation were under contract with the phases. The first 

units from all services) with United Nations to perform engi- phase under the U.N. 

quality training opportuni- neering services and to provide flag largely focused On forceties while simultaneously as- logistical support to the de- pmtection measures. Engisisting the government of ployed force. neers made sure that the base 

Haiti in strengthening its fra- camps and key installations 

gile democracy. Under the U.S. Support were constructed properly to 

Group Haiti, there were signifi- protect the force with the right 

Q. What engineer capabili- cant engineer capabilities. The kind of guard posts and bunker 

ties were in Haiti to support joint engineer staff included an facilities. Force-protection meathese missions? Air Force lieutenant colonel, sures later included expedient 

who directed the engineer staff; . repairs to selected infrastrucA. Let me answer that in a Navy lieutenant commander, ture to avoid potential crisis sittwo parts. First, under the who handled all of the real uations. Repairs to the prisonin 

U.N. flag, there was the estate actions, design concepts, Port-au-Prince was one examCanadian-American Engineer Cost estimates, and contract ple. We found the prison to be in 

Battalion, called the Can-Am administration; and an Army a horrible state of repair. 

Engineer Battalion. In that major and several captains and Unless we improved the lightcombined unit, the United noncommissioned officers, who ing, security, and water and 

States provided the battalion- had project management re- sanitation systems, U.N. forces 

level command and control and sponsibilities. About 150 Air would constantly face the 

the horizontal construction ca- Force REDHORSE personnel potential for prison riots. Engipabilities while the Canadians provided both horizontal and neers under the U.N. flag were 

provided the vertical construe- vertical construction capabili- placed in that prison, where 

tion capability. The U.S. units ties; later they were joined by ' they made expedient and rudiin the Can-Am Battalion ini- about 100 Navy Seabees with mentary repairs to stabilize the 

tially included the 92d Engi- both horizonal and vertical con- situation and thereby reduce 

neer Battalion from Fort struction skills. the likelihood of a prison riot. 

24Engineer March 1996 
After force protection, the 

next phase focused on force 

beddown. The Can-Am Engineer Battalion did most of the 

force beddown construction at 

multiple base camps around 

the country. Their work was 

supplemented by Brown & 

Root under contract with the 

United Nations. Brown & Root 

personnel usually made improvements to the base camps 

built by the Can-Am engineers. For example, they improved water-distribution and 

sanitation systems and installed air conditioners in 

some dining facilities and recreation centers to improve our 

foxholes, so to speak, and 

make the base camps more 

liveable. 

The third and final engineer 

phase to the U.N. mission I 

should highlight is the contribution of civil-affairs projects. 

Engineers made significant 

improvements to roads, bridges, and water-distribution 

7 


2 

a' 


c
il
 & 

systems. They provided expert 

advice and counsel to officials 

of the Haitian government 

responsible for power generation, reforestation, sanitation, 

and public safety. After meeting the force-protection and 

force-beddown requirements, 

engineers completed many 

civil-affairs projects to support 

the long-term security and stability of Haiti. 

&. How did the tasks completed by the U.S. Support 

Group Haiti differ from those 

already discussed? 

A. Engineers not under the 

U.N. flag had a somewhat different mission. Recall, their 

mission was to provide U.S. 

support while hosting overseas 

deployment-for-training opportunities that would assist the 

emerging democratic government of Haiti. The first thing 

the U.S. Support Group Haiti 

did was to construct a base 

camp to accommodate incoming U.S. forces. They included 

engineers, aviators, and some 

logisticians, with plans to accommodate some follow-on 

medical units. 

After the base camp was 

constructed, projects to be performed were largely negotiated with the government of 

Haiti. For example, the Haitians would identify a candidate project to meet some 

emergency infrastructure requirement, such as a road, 

bridge, school, or hospital. The 

units scheduled to deploy and 

work under U.S. Support 

Group Haiti then compared the 

candidate projects with their 

training requirements. After 

matching a Haitian infrastructure requirement with a 

METL-oriented unit training 

requirement, we proceeded 

with preliminary designs and 

cost estimates. Eventually this 

led to a government-to-government agreement defi~ng 

U.N. engineers replaced the bridge on a road near Jacmel, which was destroyed in a hurricane. Here, 

soldiers from the 92nd Engineer Battalion, Fort Stewart, demolish the old bridge abutments to make 

way for the new construction. 

March 1996 Engineer 25 
project scope and funding 

requirements. 

As a result of this negotiated 

approach to projects for the 

Support Group to execute, engineers completed a $500,000 

hospital renovation in Port-auPrince. This renovation greatly 

improved the hospital's outpatient service. They also renovated six schools in Port-auPrince at a cost of $330,000. 

Incidently, materials for the 

hospital and the schools were 

funded by the U.S. Government. Once we demonstrated 

the capabilities of U.S. military 

engineers to assist the government of Haiti, we hoped that 

international donors would 

offer to fund future worthy 

projects to keep our military 

engineers gainfully employed. 

We were successful with this 

strategy. After demonstrating 

our skills in the hospital and 

school projects, the InterAmerican Development Bank 

contributed $1 million toward 

a four-lane concrete highway 

through one of the worst parts 

of Port-au-Prince, right along 

the waterfront. Other projects 

on the horizon for international 

funding included water wells 

and additional school renovations. So a combination of U.S. 

and international funding allowed the Support Group to 

make the best use of the military engineer talent sent to 

Haiti for training and to complete emergency infrastructure repairs. 

Q. Were you able to avoid 

mission creep while completing 

the additional projects? 

A. Mission creep was not a 

problem because the deploying 

engineer units typically rotated 

to Haiti for 6 months and 

therefore negotiated a 6-

month package of projects to 

complete during their deployment. When units had unexpected delays in acquiring 

materials or support, we 

would determine how to best 

complete that project-ither 

by extending the unit's time in 

country or by passing the 

remainder of the work to a 

follow-on unit. But units were 

able to complete most of their 

projects during their training 

period. 

Q. In other words, units 

could select the kinds ofprojects 

they wanted to accomplish? 

Air Force REDHORSE 

units renovated six 

schools in Haiti. Here, 

airmen construct the 

floor tor a new building at the Peru School 

after the old building 

collapsed. 

A. Exactly. The saying that 

"everything in Haiti is broken 

except for the human spirit" is 

true. With so many projects 

needing to be done, it was easy 

to match candidate projects 

with unit training requirements. The real issues became 

how to best fund projects and 

acquire the materials to accomplish them quickly. 

Q. Was the end state clear 

before you went to Haiti, or 

were you instrumental in deueloping it? 

k For the United Nations, 

the end state was very clear. 

As mentioned earlier, the 

U.N.'s mission statement was 

spelled out in a Security Council resolution. But there was no 

clear end state for the U.S. 

Support Group, because one of 

our objectives was to maintain 

a U.S. presence in Haiti after 

the United Nations' planned 

departure. Our intent was to 

demonstrate the continuing 

interest of the United States 

and our continuing concern for 

Haiti's growth and progress 

toward becoming a stronger 

and more self-sufficient 

democracy. 

26Engineer March 1996 
Q. Do you have some insights or lessons to help engineers involved with peacekeeping operations? 

A. I don't have any new lessons or new insights, but I 

have some relevant observations. The first deals with the 

importance of joint engineer 

doctrine and our need to 

clearly understand joint engineer operations. Here at the 

Army Engineer School, we are 

working hard with the other 

services to establish joint engineer doctrine for contingency 

operations. That doctrine 

must address command and 

control relationships as well 

as staff relationships. For 

example, should there be an 

independent engineer on every 

joint staff, or is it OK for the 

staff engineer to work for the 

senior staff logistician or 

someone in the staff operations chain? The consensus 

here tends to be that an independent engineer staff officer 

needs to answer to the commander and that we need to 

retain independent command 

and control of our engineer 

organizations to he more responsive to the commander. 

Another observation from 

Haiti concerns the value of 

multinational engineer operations. Canadian engineers 

brought fantastic talent to the 

construction requirements in 

Haiti. Their vertical construction skills far exceed those of 

our combat heavy battalions. 

That is largely because of the 

Canadians' intensive training 

programs and because they 

have journeyman-level expertise in their junior grades. 

Another observation pertaining to peace operations is 

the value of seeking coalition 

project support and sponsorship versus just national sponsorship. There are many opportunities to use the resources 

of organizations like the World 

Bank or the Inter-American 

Development Bank to fund 

military engineer training projects. In the future we could 

propose that the United States 

provide the military personnel 

and equipment, construct the 

base camp, provide the design 

and project management, but 

request a cost-sharing arrangement with non-U.S. sponsors to purchase required materials and fuel. That proved to 

he a cost-effective way of sponsoring some projects in Haiti. 

As a result, U.S. military units 

acquired significant training 

benefits without prohibitive 

costs to the U.S. Government. 

We should pursue this resourcing method in future 

operations. 

It was evident to me that the 

engineers always provided a 

visible measure of progress in 

Haiti. That was important as 

we tried to assess if we were 

making any progress in helping to establish a more secure 

and stable environment. 

Sometimes it was =cult to 

see something visible or tangible that signified a major 

improvement. Tangible results 

were evident after parliamentary elections were held, and 

we could see progress after a 

significant number of new Haitian national police were 

fielded. But on a regular basis, 

the Haitian people and many 

international observers measured progress through our 

engineer projects. They could 

see how a renovated hospital or 

school represented tangible 

and real progress. Frequently 

large crowds would surround 

our projects to watch the work 

in progress and imagine the 

I benefits they would gain in the 

future. 

I can't overemphasize the 

importance of prioritizing the 

engineer effort. With more projects in Haiti than we could ever 

complete, we had to evaluate 

mnstruction requirements and 

select projects with the greatest 

payoffs. We always focused on 

work we were capable of doing 

that had the greatest benefit to 

the overall mission. 

Let me speak briefly about 

preparing for military operations other than war or what 

we now refer to as stability and 

support operations. Army engineers must continue to train on 

their wartime METL. This is 

the training necessary to be 

successful in peacemaking, 

peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief operations. We hear a 

lot of discussion about the need 

to change our wartime METL 

to accommodate peacetime operations. I say "no." Simply 

continue to focus on the wartime METL and temper it with 

a good understanding of the 

rules of engagement and some 

appropriate situational training exercises. That regimen 

will best prepare engineers for 

all future contingencies. 

I might just conclude by saying that engineers really did 

make a major contribution 

toward the long-term security 

and stability of Haiti and that 

engineers are a major contributor in these kinds of contingencies toward winning and 

maintaining peace. Y 

Brigadier General Anderson is 

the assistant commandant of the 

U.S. Army Engineer School. He 

previously served as Fort Leonard Wood's chief of staff and 

director of training, and as commander, 36th Engineer Group, 

Fort Benning, Georgia. 
Battle CommandTraining Program 

By LieutenantColonel GregStanleyand Major Dave 

Snodgrass 

Assistant Dlvlslon Englneer (ADE) ResponslbllItles. The ADE is the division engineefs primary point 

of contact on functional matters concerning division 

plans and current operations cells. Many ADEs get 

drawn into fighting current close and rear operations 

and fail to ensure that engineers are integrated into 

future operations. Other ADEs are so focused on future 

operationsthat they fail to maintainadequate 

information on current operations.The ADE must 

determine how he will synchronize with the engineer 

brigade (orbattalion) main commandpost (EMAIN CP). 

One technique is for the EMAlN CP to maintain 

information on current operations and routinely update 

the ADE section (normally NCO duty). Often, ADE 

NCOs are valuable resources that are not used.Their 

duties should be defined and should include: 

Maintain overlays and status charts. 

Prepare graphics. 

Assist during war gaming. 

The EMAlN CP also can assist the ADE by 

providing current, routinely updated enemy and 

friendly capabilitiesand intelligence products. For 

example, the EMAlN CP may provide the ADE with 

current obstacle templates based on recent intelligence and enemy capabilities. Most units pass raw 

data, which forces each recipient to determine the 

enemy capabilities. 

Some units have integratedtheir EMAlN CP into the 

division main (DMAIN) CP. The advantage of this 

organization is that it allows the ADE to focus on plans 

while the EMAlN operationscell maintainscurrent 

operations. This organization maximizesthe 

efficiencies of both groups. It also has some 

disadvantages: 

It is personality dependent.The engineer commander may want a separate CP or the division 

may not want to expandthe size of the DMAIN. 

Once integrated,the capability and expertise of the 

EMAlN CP to operate as a separatecommand post 

are potentially lost when It is assigned a separate 

engineer mission, such as a division river crossing. 

lntelllgence Preparation of the Battlefield. Engineer units are expanding their capability to determine 

and template enemy engineer activity through use of 

the All Source Analysis System (ASAS).An intelligence 

information management system, ASAS allows S2s 

accessto intelligence reports from multiple sources. It 

allows engineer brigade S2s to conduct a word search 

through all reports received over a period of time. By 

identifying key words such as "engineer, "GMZ mine1ayers:'and "pontoon bridge"they get a list of all reports 

containing those words.Then the S2s conduct 

analyses to determine what enemy engineer units are 

in their sector and template their activities. 

28 Engineer March 1996 
maneuver force. FM 5-71-3 states that engineers need 

to take the lead in forcing this issue to successful 

resolution. The tasking for maneuver commanders and 

their supporting engineers to coordinate thoroughly 

must identify specific link-up times and locations in the 

main body of the higher headquarters' operations 

order. Engineer planners must ensure that maneuver 

planners insert this directive in the main body of the 

operations order. 

There is no substitute for making this tasking a 

written order of the higher headquarters' 

commander. Clearly stating this tasking will ensure 

that subordinate commanders and their engineers 

are on the ground early to develop the engagement 

National Training Center 	 area. The cost of not doing so is the loss of critical 

execution time needed for engineers to conduct 

countermobility and survivability work. When done 

By Major Tom Buning 	 correctly, engineers will create defensive preparation time lines that allow for the maximum use of the 

Defense Preparation. "Engineers execute while the time available. They will use this time to build an 

maneuver force they support prepares." As a result of engagement area where obstacles are properly 

this philosophy, the time lines prepared by engineers integrated and vehicle fighting positions are properly 

often are not synchronized with those prepared by the sited. 

(Continued from page 22) 

Bosnia. Through the combined doctrinally an engineer mission, condition. Additional wear and 

efforts of military engineers and engineers frequently become tear from convoys of heavy milLOGCAP, billeting and dining involved in hauling Class IV itary vehicles will accelerate 

facilities were constructed for supplies by default. If this mis- the damage. Maintaining our 

nearly 18,000 personnel. Billet- sion becomes the norm in con- ability to resupply our forces 

ing facilities range &om "hard- tingency operations, then we and enhancing freedom of 

back" general-purpose, med- must recognize that the engi- mobility for civilians will be a 

ium tents with plywood flooring neer's organic transportation critical engineer mission in the 

to fxed, permanent structures assets are inadequate. future. 

and modern modular living Y 

units housed in 20-foot shipping Conclusion 

containers. Showering and Major Treleaven is chief of 

ablution facilities range from u.S. Army engineer chal- the Combat Engineer Branch, 

those connected to existing lenges in Bosnia are Department of Tactics, Leadersewer systems and featuring enormous. We have de- ship and Engineering. He 

hot water to Australian showers monstrated tremendous versa- served as platoon leader and 

and outhouse-type latrines. tility in accomplishing a wide company XO in the 41st EngiAcross the U.S. sector, variety of missions, to include neer Battalion, 10th Mountain 

moving and resupplying Class bridging, route clearance, tech- Division. He commanded D/ 

IV construction materials is nical reconnaissance, counter- 9th Engineer Battalion during 

an engineer responsibility. mine operations, base camp Desert Storm and served in 

The 1st Armored Division's construction, snow removal, Somalia. He served with the 

main support battalion and Class IV resupply, and route U.N.$ Bosnia-Henegouina 

the brigade's forward support maintenance. command in Sarajevo. Major 

battalions have not been Even greater challenges are Treleaven holds a bachelor's 

actively involved in allocat- in store. After four years of war, degree in electrical engineering 

ing or transporting this class hsnia's roads, bridges, and from Carnegie-Mellon Univerof supply. Although not highways are in a deplorable sity, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

March 1996 	 Engineer 29 
Building a BunkerlTrench 

~ive-FireComplex in Korea 

By Captain Raymond E. Hart 

Within the 2d Infantry 

Division in Korea is 

a unique organization-the 2d Brigade Combat 

Team-onsisting of the 119 

Infantry Battalion (Mechanized) and the 11506th and 11 

503rd Infantry Battalions (Air 

Assault, Light). The mission of 

the two light battalions requires extensive dismounted 

operations that include clearing prepared enemy defensive 

positions, such as extensive 

trench lines and bunkers. In 

the past, situational training 

exercises of this type required 

recurrent construction of small 

trenches, which the infantry 

cleared with grenade simulators, blank ammunition, and 

percussion grenades. The small 

trenches caused several training problems that impacted on 

the unit's wartime readiness: 

Hastily dug trenches and 

bunkers were not suited to 

heavy use during multiple 

iterations by a battalionsized element. 

Temporary trenches required large amounts of 

manpower for construction 

and time for repairs, adversely affecting the training 

cycle. 

Practice trenches did not 

meet safety requirements 

necessary to conduct realistic live-fire exercises. 

Since the 2d Infantry Division needed a permanent facility to train bunker and trenchclearing operations, the 2d 

Brigade Combat Team was 

challenged to produce a conceptual design and overwatch the 

construction. The team commander wanted a tactical scenario that provided an enemy 

defensive position with trench 

lines and bunkers suitable for 

use by squad-sized through 

company-sized units. The complex would provide an opportunity to exercise small-unit 

command and control and 

direct-fire coordination and offer a safe environment for 

throwing live grenades. The 

facility would be located in 

Cherokee Valley, part of the 

Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) multipurpose range complex, approximately 17 kilometers west 

of Chongok. In February 1995, 

EUSA provided funds and resources for the construction. 

30 Engineer March 1996 
Post 

Deadman cable = 114" 

Deadman = 6" by 6" by 5' 

Post = 6" by 6" by7 

Pressureon deadman = 29 psi 

Cross section of a representativetrench 

Mission Objectives 

The complex was constructed by B Company, 

2d Engineer Battalion, 

2d Infantry Division, assisted 

by the 82d Combat Support 

Equipment (CSE) Company, 

elements of the 2d Korean Service Corps Company, and platoons from the 11506th and 

11503rd Infantry Battalions. 

The original specifications required two trench lines with a 

single interconnecting trench. 

The trench system included 

six bunkers and numerous target wells. To turn the concept 

into a reality, theyDeveloped a safe design 

for a live-firecomplex with 

interconnecting trenches. 

Used discarded vehicle 

tires as the primary construction material. 

Organized the soldiers to 

efficiently accomplish the 

mission. 

Because of the complexity of 

the project and the number of 

agencies and personnel involved, the mission objectives 

were divided into two phases. 

Phase I consisted of gathering 

information and conducting an 

initial reconnaissance. The information required included 

the conceptual design, the bill 

of materials, and the safety 

requirements outlined by the 

division safety office and range 

control. Phase I1 consisted of a 

detailed reconnaissance with 

all the key players to finalize 

the site layout, tactical scenario, structural design, and 

safety requirements. 

Design and Planning 

The design linked the 

requirements of the tactical scenario, training 

objectives, and safety requirements to the realities and constraints of the available terrain 

and material. The two main 

trench lines were on level 

ground, running along the hillside. The interconnecting 

trenches ran up and down the 

hill between the upper and 

lower trenches, an approximate elevation difference of 16 

feet. The bunkers were 5 feet 

by 4 feet, small enough to contain the blast of a fragmentation grenade. A small opening 

in each bunker allowed grenades to be thrown inside. 

Built with durable, blastresistant tires filled with soil, 

the bunkers will withstand 

numerous blasts. 

The trenches have 5-foothigh tire walls supported by 6-

inch by 6-inch posts and deadmen (see photo and figure). 

Used tires provide a readily 

available and free building 

material that will hold up 

under live fire. Conventional 

construction materials-lumber, plywood, nails, and boltswere unacceptable for several 

reasons. An extremely expensive building material in 

Korea, lumber splinters easily 

when hit by live grenades and 

small-arms ammunition and 

requires extensive and costly 

repairs. In addition, the nails 

and bolts holding lumber in 

place create a safety hazard 

from ricocheting munitions. 

Tire preparation was a critical task and a choke point. 

Work crews separated the tires 

by diameter and packed the 

tire walls with soil before putting them in place. Every third 

March 1996 Engineer 31 
View of upper trench with walls at one-half their finished height. Notice 

that every third stack of tires is supported by a post. 

stack of tires was supported by 

a 6-inch by 6-inch by 6-foot 

6-inch post. They were driven 

2 feet into the ground and 

secured with a 114-inch cable 

attached to a 6-inch by 6-inch 

by 5-foot deadman buried adjacent to the trench. Intermediate stacks had U-shaped 

pickets to provide rigidity and 

support to the wall. Using 16- 

gauge wire, a separate crew 

laced every tire to those above 

and below it and to the tire on 

each side. 

Since Korea receives heavy 

monsoon rains in the summer, 

adequate drainage was a major consideration in the facility 

design and construction. To aid 

with runoff, they built 

trenches on a 2-percent slope 

leading to french drains that 

transported water under the 

trench walls to a nearby 

stream. Each trench was lined 

with gravel to facilitate runoff 

and add solid footing. An intercepting ditch on the upper 

slope of the trench lines minimized runoff from the valley 

walls. 

The unit developed an initial 

activities list and an estimate 

sheet for each activity. Since 

standard work rates for this 

type of construction were not 

available, initial work rates 

were based on estimates and 

verified during construction. B 

Company discovered that troop 

efficiency fluctuated constantly because of weather, 

work-crew experience, terrain, 

and the length of work periods. 

The critical path method 

(CPM) required daily updating as time estimates were 

versed and variables changed. 

Design adjustments were 

made based on guidance from 

the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 

the division G3 and safety 

offices, and the materials 

available. The changes maximized safety and training 

benefits and resulted in a 

design that exceeded the original request. The final design 

included a 328-foot (100-

meter) upper trench, a 246-foot 

(75-meter) lower trench, seven 

bunkers, and more than 328 

feet (100 meters) of interconnecting trenches. The completed trench complex can 

provide scenarios for live-fire 

exercises for squad- through 

battalion-sized units. 

Challenges 

S

everal challenges unique to the project required innovative solutions. Fist, B Company had 

to complete a section of the 

trench and several bunkers by 

mid-April so the 11503rd 

Infantry and the 2d Infantry 

Division safety office could 

proof the design. Proofing 

went well because the sunken 

bunker floor greatly reduced 

the grenade blast angle, allowing very little shrapnel to exit 

the bunker. 

The next challenge was to 

interconnect the trenches. 

With the 16-foot elevation 

change, interconnecting the 

trenches required stairs. 

Because of the size, shape, 

and slope of the site, traffic 

required careful monitoring. 

The 82d Combat Support 

Equipment Company constructed several terraces between the upper and lower 

trenches to facilitate backfill 

operations and spoil removal. 

Equipment was kept away 

from the newly constructed 

trenches to avoid digging up 

the deadmen or collapsing the 

trench walls. The slope and 

limited work space required 

skilled supervisors and operators, who had to be cognizant 

of their location and objectives 

at all times. 

Using tires as the primary 

construction material presented 

the greatest challenge. Since 

32 Engineer March 1996 
no single tire size was available in sufficient guantity to 

complete the entire project, 

tires were sorted by size and 

serviceability. Tire availability 

constantly affected the work 

rate and occasionally caused 

minor design modifications. 

When the local supply fell 

short of the requirements, the 

Korean Army allowed access to 

its stockpiles. 

The construction site was 

characterized by rocky and 

often frozen soil. Since the 

small emplacement excavator 

(SEE) could dig in these harsh 

conditions with relative ease, 

it was used to dig the bunkers 

and backfill the trenches. It 

could maneuver into tight 

areas and dig with nearperfect precision. The SEE 

could backfill in the trench line 

with such speed that one hour 

of work with the SEE equalled 

one platoon hour of manual 

backfilling. 

The SEE'S pneumatic tools 

and front bucket were also 

valuable tools. The pneumatic 

clay spade dug postholes in 

rocky soil where it was 

almost impossible to dig by 

hand. Even though the front 

bucket is not capable of digging, it scooped up gravel, 

sand, and dirt from loose piles 

and transported them around 

the project site, eliminating 

numerous man-hours. On the 

job site, the bucket transported other construction materials, such as tires, wire, and 

lumber. 

Lessons Learned 

aCompany learned several lessons from this 

project that may apply 

in similar situations: 

Time Estimate. The limted time allocated for the 

~roject from conception to 

:ompletion was a hard obsta- 

:le to overcome. Planning time 

was insufficient to ensure that 

.he proper resources were 

available and the designs 

approved. The CPM must be a 

Sexible working document 

;hat is updated daily to relect work-rate changes. B 

Company was overly optimis- 

:ic about the work rates and 

:roop efficiency and should 

have devoted more time to 

snsuring accurate work-rate 

astimates. Activity estimate 

sheets and the CPM must be 

adjusted quickly so resource 

mnstraints can be identified 

immediately. 

Materials. Materials must 

be on-site quickly to avoid a 

resource constraint. Having 

the material early allows the 

flexibility to begin an activity 

sooner than planned. 

Crew Houm. Work-crew 

rest must be incorporated into 

the plan. Initially, B Company 

worked long hours to meet the 

completion date. Combined 

with night guard duty, this 

greatly reduced troop efficiency. Once identilied as a 

problem, adjustments were 

made and overall efficiency 

rose considerably. 

Customer Involvement. 

All key personnel-the constructing units, the user, the 

bill payers, the safety office, 

the unit responsible for ownership and maintenance, and 

higher headquarters involved 

in the approval decisionmust participate in both the 

reconnaissance and the site 

layout. The customer must be 

involved in the project from 

design to completion, since an 

involved customer is a satisfied 

customer. 

Design The bunkers and 

;renches were designed to 

~ithstand heavy use and 

*quire minimum maintelance. Although using tires as 

:he major construction mateial presented problems, they 

vere the best choice considerng the safety and maintenance 

:equirements. 

Conclusion 

From November 1994 to 

April 1995, the EUSA 

bunkerltrench complex 

went from concept to reality. 

From carving the site from a 

rugged, rocky valley to collecting the tires, no task proved 

insurmountable for the soldiers. The bill of materials 

included more than 16,000 

tires, 4,500 feet of cable, 250 

posts, and more than 3,000 

sandbags. The project consumed 35,000 man-hours and 

14,000 vehicle miles. In two 

months, a valley was turned 

into an extensive live-fire 

range that will help train the 

soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division. It was the sweat and muscle of a combined arms teamU.S. Army engineers and 

infantry and the Korean Service Corps-that successfully 

created the largest live-fire 

bunker and trench complex in 

the Army. Y 


Captain Hart serves as mmmander of Bravo Company, 2d 

Engineer Battalion, 2d Infantry 

Division, Korea. Frevious assigrmen& include lead analyst, 

Department of Construction Engineering, U.S.Army Engineer 

School; and construction officer, 

2d Infantry Division Engineer 

Brigade, Korea. CPTHart holds 

a bachelor of science degree from 

SouthernIllinois University. 
Modernized Demolition Initiators 

By Rebecca Johnson 

Modernized Demolition Initiators (MDT) is the 

project name given to a new field of nonelectric blasting caps and associated items being 

introduced this summer. MDI will be used to initiate 

standard military demolitions and special charges. It 

will supplement and partially replace the M7 nonelectric blasting cap, the M6 electric blasting cap, and 

the detonating cord. 

MDI, which is currently undergoing fmal testing 

and type classification, will give the soldier a safer, 

easier, and faster method of accomplishing demolition missions. The snap-together components of MDI 

simplify initiation systems and some types of explosive priming. MDI will also improve demolition initiation reliability and safety. One reason for the 

improved reliability is that all of the components are 

sealed and, unlike standard nonelectric-primingcomponents, cannot be easily degraded by moisture. 

The Modernized Demolition Initiators are: 

Nonelectric Blasting Cap, 30-Foot Shock Tube - XMll 

Nonelectric Blasting Cap, 500-Foot Shock Tube -

XM12 

m Nonelectric Blasting Cap, 1,000-FootShock Tube -

XM13 

Nonelectric Blasting Cap, Delay - XM14 

Nonelectric Blasting Cap, Delay - XM15 

Blasting Cap and Shock Tube Holder - XM9 

Time-Blasting Fuse Igniter With Shock-Tube 

Capability - XM81 

Shock Tube 

The shock tuhe is a thin, plastic tube of extruded 

polymer with a layer of special explosive material 

deposited on its interior surface. This 

special explosive dust propagates a 

detonation wave. The wave moves 

along the shock tube to a moistureresistant blasting cap that is factory 

crimped and sealed. The detonation is 

normally contained within the plastic 

tubing. The shock tuhe offers the 

instantaneous action of electric initiation without the risk of accidental initiation of the blasting cap (and the 

charge) by nearby radio transmitters 

or static electricity discharge. 

The XM11 nonelectric blasting cap with 

a 30-foot shock tube. Six XMlls are 

shipped in each box. 

Blasting Cap 

Military explosives require a substantial 

shock to be initiated. This shock is normally provided by a high-strengtb blasting cap, the nonelectric M7, or the electric M6. They will be 

replaced by three new high-strength MDI blasting caps-XM11, XM14, and XM15-and two 

low-strength blasting capsXM12 and XM13. 

Blasting Cap Holder 

Plastic blasting cap holders allow several 

shock tubes to be connected to a high-strength 

XMll or XM14 blasting cap. The XM9 holder 

helps secure up to five shock tubes to the highstrength detonation of an XMll or XM14 blasting cap. The XM9 holder also can be used to connect the XMll or XM14 blasting cap to the 

detonating cord. 

Time-BlastingFuse Igniter 

A new, more powerful igniter will initiate the 

shock-tube ends of the new blasting caps. The 

XM81 is almost identical to the older M60 

igniter, except that the XM81 has a screw-end 

cap and a shipping plug and accommodates 

either the thin shock tube or the M700 standarddiameter time-blasting fuse. 

With the type classification and doctrinal 

manuals finalized, new equipment training 

teams will train units from May through . August

1996. Y 

Mrs. Johnson is the chief. Combat Engineering 

Branch. . En~ineerine - Diuision. . De~artment . of Tactics, Leadership, and Engineering, U.S. Army Engineer School. She is agraduatc of the University of 

Missouri at Rolla, where she receiued a master's 

degree in engineering. 

34 Engineer March 1996 
The AVLB: 


Still a Viable Mobility Asset 


By Second Lieutenant Robert Dieter 

I

n July 1995, U.S. Army 

engineers provided support 

to the Marine Corps during 

Operation Freedom Banner in 

the Republic of Korea. Marines 

stationed in Okinawa traveled 

to the eastern seaport of 

Pohang to exercise their seastationed equipment. Army 

combat engineers from the 2d 

Engineer Battalion of the 2d 

Infantry Division provided 

mobility support along the 

routes used during the exercise. The mission proved to be 

an educational experience for 

both the Marine and the Army 

engineers. 

During the initial reconnaissance of the route to the MlAl 

training range, the 111 Marine 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) 

discovered a military load classification 18 bridge that had 

neither a bypass nor a ford 

site. An Army combat engineer 

team from Charlie Company, 

2d Engineer Battalion, conducted a bridge reconnaissance 

to determine the options available to cross the Marine's MlAl 

tanks and supporting equipment. The concrete bridge 

spanned a gap of 41 feet with a 

5-foot-2-inch abutment at each Top photo: The rehearsaCAn MI on the approach platform. The 


end. The bridge had an 8-inch rehearsal validated the cribbing and ramp design while building the 


rise in the center to allow Ml A1 crew's confidence. 


water to run off. The team Bottom photo: The crossing-An MI successfully mounts the AVLB 


determined that, if cribbed, an while Army engineers closely monitor the bridge. 


March 1996 Engineer35 
63 feet 

Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge 

*5'10"4 5' 2'+ 

AVLB 

* 41' 4-+ !5' 2"+ 5' lo"+ 

Width of 

overhang abutment Span of WP With of AVLB 

abutment OVefhang 

I Existing Bridge 

I I I 

Figure 1. AVLB versus existing bridge dimensions 

armored vehicle-launched 

bridge (AVLB) could span the 

gap, enabling the Marine 

detachment to cross. Figure 1 

shows a comparison of the 

existing bridge to the AVLB. 

The AVLB is a 15-tonaluminum alloy bridge mounted on a 

48-ton M60 chassis. It is 

designed to cross vehicles up to 

60 tons over a 60-foot gap. 

With the development of the 

67-ton MIA1 Abrams tank, the 

AVLB was approved to cross 

vehicles up to 70 tons in a "caution crossing" over a 50-foot 

gap. However, the following 

stipulations exist when crossing vehicles weighing more 

than 60 tons: 

Vehicles must not stop on 

the bridge. Movement 

prevents the full weight of 

the vehicle from occupying 

the same space, which 

could cause the bridge to 

buckle. 

Vehicles must not turn or 

adjust their alignment on 

the bridge. The ground 

guide must have the vehicle lined up properly before 

it drives onto the bridge. 

This is particularly important for tracked vehicles 

because steering them on 

the bridge might cause the 

turning tracks to tear up 

the bridge panels. 

m All four center pins of the 

bridge must be in place to 

provide additional stability. This stability is needed 

to decrease the amount of 

deflection that occurs as 

the vehicle approaches the 

bridge's center of mass. 

Two AVLB teams from 

Charlie Company, 2d Engineer 

Battalion, provided mobility 

support for the 111 MEF. After 

conducting their own evaluation of the bridge site, the 

AVLB teams linked up with 

the Marine engineer officer in 

charge to discuss the cribbing 

requirements. They determined the rise of the existing 

bridge then consulted the operator's manual and estimated 

that the AVLB would deflect 

from 2 to 5 inches when an 

MIA1 reached the bridge's 

center of mass. They decided 

that the cribbing should rise 16 

inches above the ground level 

to provide a 3-inch safety factor. Both ends of the AVLB 

required cribbing. The final 

cribbing was 3 feet wide and 

spanned the width of the 

bridge. Marine and Army engineers constructed two sets of 

cribbing by modifying 8x8~10, 

8x8~16, and 8x8~20 dressed 

timbers. They banded both sets 

together to *strict movement 

when the MWs entered and 

exited the bridge. Banding also 

allowed material-handling 

equipment to rapidly emplace 

and remove the cribbing. 

The next challenge was to 

get the Abrams tanks up to the 

level of the bridge, which was 

now elevated 16 inches. The 

AVLB operator's manual calls 

for a 3-foot gap between the 

beginning of the bridge and 

the cribbing. Using a straight 

ramp from the ground to the 

elevated bridge caused concern 

for two reasons: 

As a tank drove onto the 

bridge, it could shift the 

36 Engineer March 1996 
AVLB 

Approach platform 

(2 sections, each 6' long ) Cribbing 

Figure 2. Entrance ramp, platform, and cribbing dimensions 

bridge forward and create tank off the bridge at the same 

a gap between the ramp "Operation declination Both ramps were 

and the AVLB. The gap modified 8x8~10 lumber 

would grow larger as each Freedom planks stacked to an incline 

tank crossed. and decline, res~ectivelv. The 

exit ramp was 2 feet longer If a gap was created, the Banner clearly than the entrance ramp 

weight of an approaching because there was no exit plat- MlAl might use the crib- demonstrated form; the extra 2 feet were bing as a fulcrum and required to maintain the same 

cause the bridge to see- that the AVLB is declination slope. Figure 2 

saw. shows the final ulan for the 

To alleviate these concerns, cribbing, platform, and enthe engineers constructed an an effective trance ramp. 

approach platform long enough After the engineers comto hold most of a tank before tool for mobility pleted the construction, they 

it crossed the bridge. The ulat- conducted a rehearsal to meaform was slightly -higher than operations." sure the actual deflection of 

the 16-inch cribbing. They the AVLB as the tanks crossed 

incorporated the added height and to see how the MW crews 

for the approach platform so to prevent the lumber from handled entering and exiting 

the MlAl would come down on shifting and to assist in rapid the bridge. Front loaders 

the entrance ramp of the emplacement and removal. An moved and shifted the heavy 

AVLB instead of meeting the exit platform was not required cribbing bundles, approach 

forward edge of the bridge because the bridge would not platforms, and ramps into 

head-on. This reduced the risk shift as a tank exited. The com- place. Once the cribbing was 

of the tanks pushing the bridge pleted approach platform was set, the AVLB launched the 

forward and lessened the 12feet long and 17inches high bridge on the cribbing and 

shock on the tie-rods located at and spanned the width of the moved to a secure location so 

each end of the bridge. Based bridge. the platform and ramps could 

on these considerations, they The engineers constructed be emplaced. After the engiconstructed the approach plat- two ramps: one to bring the neers completed the set-up, 

form in two pieces. They tank onto the approach plat- they ground-guided each tank 

banded each section together form and a second to bring the across the bridge. They crossed 

March 1996 Engineer 37 
seven tanks during the The cmssing for the exercise at streams and rivers. Howrehearsal with an average of took place at midnight to mini- ever, crossing the Marine 

3.5 inches of deflection, mea- mize disruption to civilian traf- detachment gave them valusured with the tanks at the fic. Initial planning called for a able mobility experience. 

bridge's center of mass and the 4-hour window of operation. More importantly, Operation 

center pins inserted. The Due to the close coordination of Freedom Banner clearly degreatest deflection was 4 Army and Marine engineers monstrated that the AVLB is 

inches and the least was 2.75 and the full-scale rehearsal, it still an effective tool for 

inches. 

the planning 

The rehearsal 

factors 

verified 

and 

took 

emplace 

only 

the 

55 

cribbing, 

minutes 

launch 

to mobility operations. m

allowed the MlAl crews to the bridge, cross the MlAls, Second Lieutenant Dieter is 

gain confidence and experi- and remove the bridge and the Assault and Obstacle Platoon 

ence in cmssing a gap on an cribbing. The time was reduced Leader of C Company, 2d EngiAVLB. They detected no prob- to 41 minutes during the neer Battalion, Republic of 

lems during the rehearsal, return crossing. Korea. He is a graduate of the 

and the AVLB had no proh- Combat engineers of the 2d Engineer Officer Basic Course, 

lems launching and releasing Engineer Battalion were conAirborne School, and Ranger 

School. Second Lieutenant Dieter the bridge, in spite of having tinuously challenged by holds a bachelor's degree from to launch onto the 16-inch Korea's mountainous terrain Creighfon Uniuersity, Omaha, cribbing. 	 and the lack of fording sites Nebraska. 

provided a schematic of a fixed gun emplacement from 

their TACSOP The USMA engineer platoon, a combat 

heavy platoon with both horizontal and vertical construction capabilities, reviewed a composite design sketch 

synthesized from the source documents. Materials were 

ordered and a time schedule was set. The gun emplaceLetter To The Editor 	 ments needed to be complete by 30 May 1995, so summer training could start on schedule. The engineer 

platoon was ready to start their mission. 

Sand Grid Construction went better than projected and the four 

emplacements were done well ahead of schedule. It took 

"Fix the bunkers at Range 2 before cadet field training about 14 hours per gun emplacement with a work crew of 

19951"This was a recurring After Action Review comment seven soldiers, a small emplacement excavator (SEE), after cadet field training at the United States Military and two push-propelled compactors. We found that the 

Academy (USMA). Range 2 is used for the fire support sand grid for a 105 position, 30 pieces (8" x 11' x 5') eastraining committee, and the 10-year old sandbag gun ily fit in a 5-ton cargo truck. The nature of the sand grid emplacement bunkers had deteriorated past the point of also allows the emplacement to be taken apart and carrepair; a "new look" was needed. We had time to do this ried to the nea location. 

right, but the question was how and have a stated-the- With the demands of military operations other than 

art field fortification. A review of FM 5-103 (June 1985) war and low intensity conflicts, this is something that revealed no current design for a towed 105 mm howitzer every field artillery commander should include in his position. FM 1-15 (June 1972) has a series of sketches basic load of supplies for deployment. Sand grid would that depict such an emplacement from the Vietnam era. work well for base camp force-protection measures, It was a starting point. which eat up precious man-hours and are critical in the 

Then the December 1994 Engineer magazine arti- entry and lodgement phases of operations. The sand grid cle "Sand Grid: A Multipurpose Construction System" worked extremely well for us and we propose that all units 

caught our eye. This looked like the optimal solution for a look seriously at incorporating this time-saving, expedi- low-cost, long-life and quick fix to our problems. We ent, and economical force-protection method into their 

called the Engineer Center for a design for the 105 mm "go-to-war" bag of tricks. 

light Howitzer emplacements using sand grid. Addition- Major David L.Diedrich 

ally, Alpha Battery, 1-7th FA, lGth Mountain Division, United States Military Academy 

38Engineer 	 March 1996 
Partnership 


in Preservation 


By Cecilia E. Young 

A	s the Department of 

Defense budget continues to shrink, installations must cut the cost of doing 

business by reducing staffs, 

funds, and mission-support 

programs. So how can installations continue to maintain 

these programs when money is 

scarce? One way is to form 

partnerships. The Army Partnership Program has been 

amund for many years but is 

receiving a resurgence of attention as a way for installations 

to capitalize on existing assets. 

And Fort Leonard Wood is 

doing just that! 

The installation capitalized 

on the benefits of partnerships 

on a recently completed environmental project. The challenge was to complete geotechnical stabilization and 

preservation of an archaeologically sigruficant site, known as 

the Miller Cave Complex, at 

minimal expense. 

Fort Leonard Woods' pri. 

mary mission is to train 

soldiers-mainly engineer soldiers. The U.S. Army Engineer 

Center develops training manuals, products, and equipment 

required by the engineer force, 

and among these are materials 

on environmental awareness, 

training, and protection. Along 

with the rest of the Department 

of Defense, Army engineers are 

concerned with environmental 

preservation and conservation. 

Installation commanders are 

charged with the moral and 

legal obligations to preserve 

and protect our nation's environment and its natural and 

cultural resources. Special emphasis is placed on resources 

impacted by projects on military installations. 

This article highlights how 

the many players worked in a 

partnership to benefit their 

organizations, the installation, 

and the environment. 

The Players 

Fort Leonard Wood's 

resident archaeologist, 

working with University 

of Illinois staff, determined 

that the Miller Cave Complex 

is a significant archaeological 

and historical site that should 

be preserved. The complex 

includes both Miier and 

Sadie's Caves and a group of 

March 1996 	 Engineer 39 
Characteristic 

Soil classification (Unified) 

Soil classification (AASHTO) 

Characteristic 

Natural water content (sample) 

Liquid limit 

Plastic limit 

Shrinkage limit 

Plasticity index 

Liquidity index 

Optimum water content 

Swell potential 

Classification 


ML (sandy silt) 


A-4 (sandy loam) 


Percentage 


35 


39 


33 


28 


6 


37 


27 


18 


Figure 1. Gwtechnical Test Results, Miller Cave Soils 

prehistoric and historic rock 

carvings (petroglyphs). As 

both a geological wonder and 

an archaeological site with cultural remains dating from 

6500 B.C. to A.D. 1300, Miller 

Cave was extensively excavated in the 1920s by the 

Smithsonian Institution. Subsequenl digging by vandals 

and curious amateurs greatly 

reduced the site's archaeological integrity. In spite of the disturbances, recent archaeological investigations substantiated the presence of intact 

cultural deposits in both 

caves. Because of this, they are 

eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. 

A grant was obtained from 

the Legacy Resource Management Program (LRMP), which 

was created "to promote, manage, research, conserve, and 

restore the priceless biological, 

geophysical, and historical resources which exist on public 

lands, facilities, or property 

held by the Department of 

Defense. The Legacy challenge 

is to create a program of management, conservation, and restoration that encourages proactive stewardship of resources 

at the installation level. At the 

same time, these efforts will be 

coordinated across the military 

services, scientific disciplines, 

and geographic regions."' 

LRMP granted money to perform the analysis and purchase materials, but it did not 

cover manpower costs to perform the work. 

The scientific analysis, investigation, and design to 

determine the best way to preserve and protect the site were 

accomplished through a cooperative effort between Fort 

Leonard Wood, the U.S. Army 

Characteristic 

Corps of Engineers' Waterways 

Experiment Station, and Texas A&M University. A geological 

engineering professor and an 

engineering cadet froin Texas 

A&M collected soil samples from 

three areas in Miller Cave to 

determine the basic geotechnical 

properties of the soil for the soilcement mixture design. An undergraduate class of geotechnia1 engineering students at the 

university tested and analyzed 

the soil. Figure 1shows the laboratory results. 

In addition to the standard 

classification tests, two soilcement mixtures were prepared and tested. Samples containing 5 and 10 percent 

Portland cement by total 

weight (water content = 35 percent) were mixed and compacted in a Harvard miniature 

compaction mold. Samples 

were extruded and allowed to 

cure in a room with 100 percent humidity for 3 months 

before performing unconfined 

compression tests to mirror 

conditions in the field. Test 

results and recommendations 

by the Portland Cement Association (1992 and 1995) suggested the soil-cement design 

shown in Figure 2 for the floor 

of Miller cave.' 

The soil analyses indicated 

that in-situ (in-place) site 

preservation was the best 

Recommendation 

Minimum hardened thickness 4 inches 

Cement percentage (weight of soil) 10 percent 

Cement per square foot of cave floor 3.7 pounds 

Floor coverage per bag of cement 25 square feet 

Figure 2. SoiiCernent Design of Miller Cave Floor 

40 Engineer March 1996 
A BNCOC student uses a rototiller to prepare the floor of Miller Cave for soil-cementing 

option for Miller Cave. The 

irregular cave floor, brought 

about by . . vears of digging -- - and 

excavation. would be d reserved and hardened with 

the soil-cement mixture. The 

floor would look natural and 

would not interfere with educational exploration but 

would prevent further vandalism. Interpretive plaques 

would be installed to explain 

the historical and archaeological significance of the 

cave.3 In Sadie's Cave, 

which has been disturbed 

less by digging, they decided 

to close the entrance with an 

iron bar fence that allows 

egress to an endangered species of bats but 

human intrusion. 

With all of the 

archaeological, and 

research done and 

prevents 

historical, 

scientific 

the plan 

chosen, &ee labor was needed 

to complete the project. Fort 

Leonard Wood's Office of ExcelMarch 1996 

"The Miller cave 

project was a 

cooperative 

effort and a 'winwin' situation ...9' 

lence, which establishes mutually beneficial partnerships for 

the installation, coordinated 

with Libby NCO Academy to 

make the project a field training exercise for the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course 

(BNCOC). It offered students a 

practical hands-on experience 

with environmental training. 

Two classes from the Academy 

(the 62N Heavy Equipment Construction Supervisor and 

the 51H Construction Foreman) also participated. Both 

classes were given a description of the problem and the 

work to be performed; they 

were to determine how best to 

accomplish the missions and 

develop the bill of materials. 

62N Mission 

The 62N students' mission at Miller Cave was 

to stabilize the cave floor 

by soil-cementing it and camouflaging the trail leading to 

Sadie's Cave. First, they developed plans to get all the necessary equipment and cement 

into the cave. The most accessible entrance is a three-foot 

opening located about two feet 

above the ground. The BNCOC 

students transported 75 bags of 

Portland cement, weighing 95 

pounds each, over a rugged trail 

Engineer41 
to the cave site and into the 

cave. They also moved two 200-

pound plate tampers, two 100-

pound rototillers, and twentyfive 5-gallon containers of water 

to the cave. Because of the awkward size and shape of the rototillers, they were disassembled 

to fit through the narrow entrance into the cave and reassembled inside. 

Safety was an important element of this exercise. To protect themselves from noise and 

dangerous exhaust fumes generated by the tampers and 

rototillers, the students wore 

hearing protection and masks 

while working in the cave. 

Deep trenches left in the 

cave floor by amateur diggers 

required excavation with hand 

tools before rototillers could he 

used. The students applied 

basic information on soilcement preparation and application described in FM 5-410, 

Military Soils Engineering. 

This technology is used to give 

dirt roads the bearing capacity 

needed for convoys, an engineering task in wartime. The 

students usually train on level 

surfaces like roads and runways. But the hilly, rocky terrain around Miller Cave gave 

them training that will be 

useful in mountainous areas 

such as Bosnia. 

51HMission 

he 51H students' mission was to make the 

trail leading to Miller 

Cave safe and accessible to the 

public. They installed a rope 

handrail to guide visitors to 

Miller Cave and away from the 

trail leading to Sadie's Cave. 

The students also erected 

steps at treacherous drop-off 

points. 

The 51H mission was not 

free from problems and challenges. Obstacles they overcame included setting up 

power generators and selecting the correct drills and bits to 

drill through rocks to construct 

the stairs. 

TheWinners 

he Miller Cave Geotechnical Stabilization Project was a cooperative 

effort and a "win-win" situation 

for all involved. 

Fort Leonard Wood helped 

protect a culturally and 

archaeologically significant 

site at virtually no cost to 

the installation. 

BNCOC students received 

practical and unique handson training that brought 

U.S. history alive and allowed them to leave a legacy for future generations. 

Texas A&M students analyzed and examined soil 

samples from a signscant 

historic and archaeological 

site. 

These benefits would have 

been impossible without the 

cooperation and encouragement of installation commanders and employees. One goal of 

the LRMP is to form partnerships, and the Miller Cave 

project was a partnership in its 

truest sense. The LRMP is also 

about stewardship, and this 

project combined military missions with environmental stewardship. This cooperative effort 

sets the standards for the 

Army and the entire Depart. 

ment of Defense. Y 

Ms. Young is the installation marketing specialist in the Office of 

Excellence. Previous positions include that of instructor at Rutledge 

College, San Antonio, Texas. At the 

U.S. Army Engineer School, she 

has been a management analyst in 

the Directorate of Resource Management and a training and doctrine program specialist in the 

Directorate of Zkaining and Doctrine. Ms. Young holds n master 

of education degree from Boston 

Uniuersity. 

For more information, call Ms. 

Cynthia Mathews, chief of the 

Office of Excellence, at (573) 563-

6166 or DSN 676-6156. 

Project Participants: 

Dr. Steven Ahler, archaeologist, 

University of Illinois, UrhanaChampaign; Mr. Paul Nbertson, 

geologist, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi; Dr. Richard Edging, archaeologist, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri; Dr. Christopher Mathewson, engineering geologist, 

Texas A&M University, College 

Station. 

Libby NCO Academy: CSM 

Robert Robinson, Commandant; 

MSG John Mecalmon, BNCOC 

Chief; SSG Douglas Brandt, 62N 

Instructor; SSG David McBride, 

61H Instructor. 

Endnotes: 

' Legacy: Our Path lo Enhanced Stewardship, United States 

Department of Defense, Office of 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for the Environment. 

"Investigation and Design of 

Site Protection for Miller Cave 

(23PU2), Sadie's Cave (23PU235), 

and the Miller Petroglyphs 

(23PU256):' Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri, prepared by Christopher C. Mathewson, PhD, PE, 

REG, page 18. 

Ibid, pages 15 and 16. 
ENGINEER UPDATE 


Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System 

Nelwork (DSN) numbers are 676-xmunless otherwise noted. 

Director Welcomed. The Engineer School welcomed Colonel Philip 

Federie, the Director of raining, inJanuary 1996.He previously served 

as Commander. Division Engineer Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort 

Carson, Colorado. COL Federle may be reached at -4093. 

Fleld Manual (FM) 5-100 Dlsrlbuted. FM 5-100, Engineer Department of Training and Doctrine 

Operations, was distributed in February. This capstone manual develops (DOTD) 

the engineer aspects of doctrine described in FM 100-5, defines the 

engineer role within Army operations, and provaes broad principles for 

engineer employment throughout the theater of operations. It can be 

found on the Engineer School's home page on the World Wide Web: 

H~Pj/WOOD.ARMY.MIL. POC is MAJ Dave Brinkley, -7756. 

New Famlly of Cranes. A program is underway to replace Dlrectorateof Combat Developments 

obsolete cranes in the engineer inventory. A 7 112-ton crane replaced (DCD) the 3-, 5-, and 74011 cranes in the late 1980s. Beginning in 1998, the 

12 112-ton cranes will be replaced with Hydraulic Excavators, a 

commercial product that performs both as a crane and an excavator. 

About the same time, All-Terrain Cranes will begin to replace three 

cranes in the 20- to 25-ton class. The new 22-ton crane, called the 

ATEC, is capable of moving over a wide variety of ground surfaces. 

Funding to replace the old 40-ton cranes is expected in the year 2000. 

POC is Don Henderson, -6185. 

New ItschnerBturgls Award Regulation Fort Leonard Wood Engineer Personnel Proponency 

Pamphlet (FLW Pam) 672-1 estaMishes responsibilities, procedures, and Office (EPPO) 

guidance for nominating engineer units for the ltschner Award and enlisted 

engineer soldiers for the Sturgis Medal. The pamphlet is scheduled for 

distribution in March. Once fielded, users are invited to send comments 

and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 to: Commandant, U.S. 

Army Engineer School, Am: ATSE-EP, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473- 

6650. POC is MSG Michael Stephens, -4087. 

M939-Serles Tmck AccMents. Unit leaders are urged to enforce Englneer Branch Safety Office 

standards for M939-series operator training, which includes operators (EBSO) 

of M929 dump trucks. Since FY91, 157 accidents involving M939- 

series trucks have resulted in 37 fatalities and 127 injuries. Most of the 

accidents resulted from skidding, loss of traction due to braking, or 

driving too fast for conditions. The major areas of concern are braking 

and rollovers. Maintenance units are replacing the trucks' auto-limiting 

valves with relay valves, which will improve their braking capabilities by 

15 percent. A revised operatots manual, scheduled for distribution in 

June, states that the correct payload is 5 tons both on- and off-road. A 

new training video is available through local Training Support Centers. 

Request M939-series: Operating at Risk, NT 20-1088, PIN 708408. 

POC is SFC Charles Olsen. (334) 255-2695. 

March 1996 Engineer 43 
Llve Mine Vaining. A recent accident involving an M21 antitank 

mine seriously injured two soldiers. Restrictions for live mine training 

are in message HQDA, DAMO-TRIDACS-ST, 141237, dated 

December 1990, and in DA PAM 350-38, Standards in Weapons 

Training. A summary of these restrictions follows: 

No training is allowed with lie MI4 mines. 

- All approved mines will be armedldisarmed not more than 25 iter. 

ations per mine. 

No trip wires or booby traps will be used. 

Trainingwith an M16 antipersonnel (AP) mine will be done with the 

positive safety pin remaining in the M605 fuze. 

No pre-1957fuzes will be allowed in training with the MI6 AP mine. 

Live mine training and simulator training will not take place concurrently at the same location to preclude a live mine being mistaken 

for an inert mine. 

FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, provides guidance. 

Conduct all arming and disarming in the prone position. Units must 

adapt the basic risk assessment providedfor each of the above mines 

to account for local conditions. POC is Paul Rusinko, -4025. 

Libby NCO Academy Army Physical Fitness Failures (APFT)and Enrollment Criteria. 

Effective 1 April 1995, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) must pass 

the APFT and meet heighffweight requirements in Army Regulation 

600-9 prior to enrollment in any NCO Education System (NCOES) 

course. Effective 1 November 1995, these criteria also apply for 

entrance to the Drill Sergeant School (DSS). A total of 32 soldiers in 

FY95 and 13 soldiers to date in FY96 were denied enrollment to 

NCOES and DSS due to the APFT requirements. Soldiers who meet 

the "extenuating circumstances" criteria described in AR 351-1 and 

TRADOC Regulation 351-10 will be retested at a later date. Leaders 

are urgedto enforce these criteria at the unit level. POC is CSM Robert 

Robinson (573) 596-6942. 

Program of Instruction (POI) Change for the Advanced NCO 

Course (ANCOC). In December 1995, TRADOC approved the 

proposed POI change to the career management field (CMF) 12 

ANCOC. Implemented in Class 1-96, the new POI adds one week to 

the course length and integrates tactics in the instruction. As a result, 

ANCOC students are integrated w%hEngineer Officer Basic Course 

(EOBC) students in the classroom and during a tactical exercise 

without troops. The enhanced training provides an opportunity for 

potential platoon leaders and platoon sergeants to work with EOBC 

lieutenants prior to assignment at their first units. POC is CSM Robert 

Robinson (573) 596-6942. 

44 Engineer March I996 
By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, Jr. 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

Readiness in the Army Depends on the Enlisted Force 

A s my tour at Fort Leonard Wood comes to an end, 

Ican truly say that it has been a very rewarding 

assignment. As the Engineer Center and 

Regimental Command Sergeant Major, I have shared my 

energy and experiences with you to contribute to our 

readiness mission of training soldiers and taking care of 

families. 

During the past 38 months, many changes have 

affected our engineer force structure. We have 

consolidated several military occupational specialties 

(MOSs) and are working some possible realignments for 

equipment. MOS 12B (combat engineer) was consolidated with MOS 12F (engineer tracked vehicle crewman); it is now MOS 12B (combat engineer). MOS 83E 

(photo and layout specialist) was consolidated with MOS 

83F (printing and bindery specialist); it is now MOS 81L 

(lithographer). Between 1992 and 1995. our active component engineer force structure dropped from more than 

40K (thousand) to 24K. Despite this drawdown, we must 

continue to remain trained and ready; adhere to tough, 

realistic standards; and strive to adapt to rapid changes. 

While successfully realigning engineer MOSs, we 

continue to train soldiers to high standards so they will 

perform to the best of their abilities. Because of our 

continued emphasis on high standards and some 

innovative changes, training at Fort Leonard Wood has 

improved significantly. A few years ago, nobody thought 

that students in the Engineer Officer Basic Course 

(EOBC) would sit in classes with students in the 

Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC)+r that they would 

train together in field training exercises. We began 

integrating the first classes in January 1996, and I am 

confident that this program will be successful. Now 

NCOs will be taught tactics, which was not included in 

ANCOC curriculum before, and new officers will learn 

about NCOs' roles and how they are utilized in the 

decision-making process. 

We have also begun to replace outdated equipment 

with state-of-the-art equipment to help expand our 

technical and tactical skills. Soldiers are now testing the 

MI13 stretch vehicle (the combat engineer squad 

vehicle) and the digital reconnaissance system (DRS). 

We are testing new equipment such as the Grizzly and 

March 1996 

Wolverine, which will replace the combat engineer 

vehicle and the armored vehicle-launched bridge. The 

Hornet, now under developmental testing, is the first in a 

series of smart munitions for engineers. With proper 

training and this new equipment, engineer soldiers will 

provide the Army's maneuver forces with the support 

needed to win the next battle. 

We have also successfully implemented the 

Intersewice Training Review Organization (ITRO). This 

program effectively consolidates engineer training in the 

Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.The Army 

conducts civil engineer training, 51RIT and motor 

transport training, at Fort Leonard Wood.The Navy 

conducts the MOS 51 8 (carpenter) course at Gulfport, 

Mississippi, as well as the MOS 008 (divers) course at 

Panama City, Florida, and Port Hueneme, California.The 

Air Force conducts the MOS 51K (plumber) course at 

Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas. This joint effort allows 

engineer soldiers the opportunity to share their 

knowledge and expertise among the various branches of 

the U.S. military. Combining our skills will ultimately 

benefit all U.S. military forces. 

These are exciting changes and more are expected in 

the years ahead. As I leave for my new assignment with 

the 130th Engineer Brigade, I challenge you to remain 

trained and ready to deploy at a moment's notice.The 

training provided to the enlisted force is the basis of 

readiness, and it is vital to the success of our missions. 

Accept this challenge and do your part to ensure that 

changes are implemented successfully. 

I urge you to give your whole-hearted support to my 

successor, CSM Julius Nutter as he guides you through 

the next few years. CSM Nutter comes to the Engineer 

Center with a wealth of experience, including 

Commandant of the Libby NCO Academy. He most 

recently sewed as the 24th Infantry Division Engineer 

Brigade command sergeant major. A versatile, well 

rounded leader, he has considerable experience in both 

combat heavy and mechanized engineer brigades. 

In leaving Fort Leonard Wood, Itake with me the 

knowledge and experiences gained through your 

efforts, and Iwill continue to serve my country with 

pride. Essayonsl 
Enginua cddiuc search for mineswith a gaccclpbcovered mine detector (to keep it dry). Thlc photowas taken near 

Llgnauville, Belgium during World War 11. 

M: 07-