OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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AAAPPPRRRIIILLL222444,,,222000000666 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

April 24, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 

 OFFICE 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, 

 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

SUBJECT: Audit report on Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

 (SIGIR-06-001) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit 

in accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, 

which requires that we provide for the independent and objective conduct of audits, as 

well as leadership and coordination of and recommendations on policies designed to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of Iraq relief and 

reconstruction programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and 

abuse. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact in Baghdad, Iraq, Mr. Joseph T. McDermott at (703) 343-9440, or 

by email at joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil; or Mr. Clifton Spruill by email at 

clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil or at (703) 343-9275. For the report distribution, see 

Appendix G. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
i

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SIGIR-06-001 April 24, 2006 

Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System

Executive Summary 

Introduction. In June 2005, we initiated this audit to determine whether the information 

systems used by U.S. government organizations resulted in the effective management of 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs. Issuance of this audit report was 

delayed to take into consideration significant management improvement actions that took 

place in September 2005. At that time, the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office (IRMO), required a unified IRRF reporting system be developed and directed all 

agencies spending IRRF dollars to load and update project data in the system. 

Preliminary findings from this audit were used as input for the development of the 

requirements contained in the September 20, 2005, Action Memorandum issued by the 

IRMO Director (see Appendix B). 

This audit report is one of a series of reports addressing the information technology (IT) 

and management information systems being used to support IRRF programs and their 

ability to produce reliable and accurate information. This report discusses the 

development, management and evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

(IRMS). 

Objective. The objective of this audit was to determine whether information systems 

used by U.S. government organizations support the effective management of IRRF 

programs. Specifically, this audit focused on the development and evolution of the 

information management system intended to support all organizations for the reporting of 

IRRF project and funding information. 

Results. Although progress is being made, there were many delays during the twenty 

month period ending September 2005 in the efforts to develop and make fully operational 

a management information system to report on IRRF projects and funds. In developing 

the initial IRRF management information system (known as the “PCO Solution”), the 

Project and Contracting Office (PCO) did not follow some parts of the established 

leading practices or approved guidance used in the federal government for managing the 

design and development of an IT system. Because PCO did not assert sound 

management controls over this project, it did not provide adequate assurance that the 

PCO Solution would operate effectively and efficiently and comply with applicable laws 

and regulations. Further, neither PCO nor IRMO senior management took a pro-active 

role in ensuring that all government entities that receive IRRF monies utilized the PCO 

Solution for input of their project and fund information. As a result, this system took 

longer than necessary to develop, did not meet the full intent of the congressional 

mandate and hampered the work of others who relied upon the PCO data set for the 

management and reporting of IRRF activities as required by Section 2207 of P.L. 108-

1061

. 

 

1

 Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106 requires a report from the Office of Management and Budget to the 

Congress every three months that updates the proposed uses of all IRRF funds on a project by project basis, 

including estimates of the cost required to complete each project. 
ii 

One of the most important factors in the design and software application selection of the 

PCO Solution was the requirement that there be a joint-use U.S. and Iraqi government 

component that could be transferred to the Iraqi government (e.g. Ministry of Planning) 

as a fully operational life-cycle project management solution. This component was 

referred to as the Iraq Infrastructure Management System (IIMS). However, the 

following problems existed: 

• A detailed joint-use training and transition plan for the IIMS requirements 

existed in fragmented form and was not formalized. 

• There are multiple software applications which will require licensing transfers 

from the U.S. government to the recipient Iraqi ministry. 

• There are also a number of export controlled software components as a part of 

IIMS that will require special handling or removal prior to transfer to the Iraqi 

government. 

Preliminary findings from this audit were used by IRMO in developing actions to correct 

problems with the PCO Solution (see Appendix D for details). For example, in 

September 2005, the IRMO Director requested several actions to be taken, which 

included but were not limited to: 

• directing the development of a unified IRRF management information system 

(Iraq Reconstruction Management System - IRMS) 

• requiring all agencies currently spending IRRF dollars to load and keep current 

data in the system 

• development of a common data dictionary 

• development of timeline for transition strategy plan for IRMS turnover to the Iraqi 

government 

• utilize IRMS information to build the basis for the creation of the congressionally 

mandated Section 2207 Report

• discontinue the manual process in IRMO’s information management system 

Although some progress has been made, there continues to be delays in achieving the 

goals of the system and providing accurate data for reporting. As of December 30, 2005, 

data had not been fully loaded into IRMS in order to report on the IRRF dollars and 

reconstruction projects, for all organizations. Data refinement was still underway by 

several organizations where the data were being reviewed and verified. 

Conclusion. Investments in IT can have a dramatic impact on an organization's 

performance. A well-managed IT investment that is carefully selected and focused on 

meeting mission needs can move an organization forward, dramatically improving 

operations while reducing costs. Likewise, poor investments—those that are 

inadequately justified or whose costs, risks, and benefits are poorly managed—can hinder 

and even restrict an organization's performance. 

Progress had been made toward meeting the automated support requirements, as outlined 

by the IRMO Director, and complying with the original congressional mandate. 

Specifically, the U.S. government organizations are working together to develop the 

IRMS; a data dictionary has been developed; and each organization has signed a 
iii 

Memorandum of Understanding in which they each agree to discuss common issues such 

as data usage and security in the IRMS. 

While time consuming, the meticulous verification of the data is critical to ensure the 

completeness and accuracy of IRMS. IRMO and the Gulf Region Division-Project and 

Contracting Office (GRD-PCO)2

, in conjunction with the Information Technology 

Working Group, are working to resolve these problems, but as reported in the status 

update regarding IRMS initiatives (see Appendix C), many of the IRMO Director’s due 

dates were missed. Most significant, the original December 2005 date for using the 

unified system as the basis for the Section 2207 Report has now been revised to March 

2006. 

Recommendations. It is important for IRMO, in coordination with the GRD-PCO and 

the agencies utilizing IRRF, to continue to provide active leadership in assuring all 

organizations work together in correcting the problems identified with the IT system. A 

complete and accurate IRRF database that is accessible by the U.S. government activities 

and their respective management via an automated solution is the key to the success of 

the IRRF program. This effort must be maintained in order that a viable and unified IT 

management system is developed with sustained operability in order to provide an 

accurate and reliable picture of IRRF programs and funds for Congress, U.S. government 

organizations, and transition to the Iraqi government. 

As such, we recommend that the IRMO Director work in conjunction with the 

Commanding General, GRD-PCO, and the ITWG, to continue the development of the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System by ensuring all requirements identified in the 

IRMO Action Memorandum dated September 20, 2005, have been addressed and actions 

implemented. 

We further recommend that the IRMO Director develop the following: 

• a detailed plan to mitigate the presence (to the extent required at time of transfer) 

of all export control software and substitute, where appropriate, alternative 

solutions to retain overall solution integrity and functionality at time of transfer 

• a software maintenance and licensing transfer plan to ensure the value of the 

software and infrastructure investment is protected by maintaining appropriate 

levels of annual maintenance support, licensing agreements, and executing sound 

equipment maintenance practices. Further, as part of this plan, a formal turnover 

folder should be created containing all of the necessary documents to officially 

transfer this software from U.S. government to the Iraqi government. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. A combined response to the 

draft of this report was received from the U.S. Ambassador of Iraq and IRMO. The U.S. 

Ambassador to Iraq concurred in general with the findings of the audit and the 

recommendation relative to the transfer of the IRMS system to the Iraqi government, and 

states that corrective actions have been taken. An IRMS Migration Working Group has 

been authorized to look at the policies relating to transfer of IRMS to Iraqi authorities. 

Preliminary discussions have been held with the acting Iraqi National Chief Information 

Officer and the Ministers of Communications and Planning to define Iraqi management 

 

2

 Effective December 4, 2005, the PCO was merged with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region 

Division (GRD), to form GRD-PCO. 
iv 

requirements and transfer policies. IRMO is proactively working with implementing 

agencies to ensure that the IRMS program provides improved data collection, 

consolidation, standardization and reporting. Detailed comments provided by IRMO 

with this response were considered in the preparation of this final report. The comments 

received are fully responsive. 

Technical comments to the draft of this report were also provided by the Commanding 

General, Gulf Region Division, and have been incorporated into this final report as 

appropriate. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objective 2 

Finding 

Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System 3 

Conclusion and Recommendations 9

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 11 

B. IRMO Director’s Action Memorandum on Requirements 

 for an Integrated System 13 

C. IRMO Status Report on Requirements for the Iraq Reconstruction 

 Management System, as of December 30, 2005 16 

D. PCO Solution 17 

E. Acronyms 24 

F. Report Distribution 25 

G. Audit Team Members 27

Management Comments 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 28 

Commanding General, Gulf Region Division, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 29 
1 

Introduction 

Background 

This audit report is one of a series of reports addressing information technology systems 

reporting on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (IRRF) projects. This audit report focused 

primarily on the management of the development and evolution of the IT system intended to 

support the management and reporting of the IRRF. We reviewed the development of the IT 

system to determine if it was sufficiently coordinated within the organizations receiving 

IRRF monies, and to report on the operational status of the system. 

In November 2003, $18.6 billion was appropriated under the Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan (Public Law 

108-106). The law created the IRRF, of which $18.4 billion of the appropriation was 

designated for Iraq reconstruction. To fulfill reporting and monitoring requirements of the 

Act, Congress earmarked $50 million to remain available until September 30, 2005. In 

addition, the money was to be used for the preparation and maintenance of public records 

required by the Act. 

We are addressing the use of these funds, as well as the management controls to ensure 

accurate, complete, and timely reporting to senior government officials on the use of IRRF, 

in separate audits.3 

Section 2207 Report. Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106 requires a report from the Office 

of Management and Budget to the Congress every three months that updates the proposed 

uses of all IRRF funds on a project by project basis, including estimates of the cost required 

to complete each project. The most recent report, entitled, “Section 2207 Report on Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction” (Section 2207 Report), released in October 2005, was prepared by 

the Department of State. The Section 2207 Report is compiled by IRMO from data provided 

by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), and other agencies that use IRRF. 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). National Security Presidential 

Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, delegated 

responsibility for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq to 

the Secretary of State. The Directive also created a temporary organization within the U.S. 

Mission in Iraq, called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), to facilitate the 

transition in Iraq. 

Project and Contracting Office (PCO). National Security Presidential Directive 36 also 

established the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) and directed the PCO to provide 

acquisition and project management support for activities in Iraq. On June 22, 2004, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense established the PCO within the Department of the Army and 

directed the PCO to provide support for all activities associated with financial, program, and 

project management for both construction and non-construction IRRF activities. The PCO 

 

3 Fact Sheet on the Use of $50 Million Appropriation To Support the Management and Reporting of the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund, SIGIR-05-026, January 27, 2006; and Review of Data Entry and General 

Controls in the Collecting and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, SIGIR-06-003, April 

2006. 
2

was consolidated with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD); to 

form GRD-PCO on December 4, 2005. 

Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether information systems used by U.S. 

government organizations support the effective management of IRRF programs. 

Specifically, this audit focused on the development and evolution of the information 

management system intended to support all organizations for the reporting of IRRF project 

and funding information. 

For a discussion of the audit scope, methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix E. For a list 

of the audit team members, see Appendix G. 
3 

Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

System 

Initial Development of the IRRF Management Information System 

The mission of the Project and Contracting Office (PCO)4 is to contract for and deliver 

services, supplies, and infrastructure identified within the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund (IRRF). The PCO management structure consists of U.S. government employees, 

along with some representation from Iraq and other countries. Contractors are hired to 

provide the program management, both on an overall scale, as well as in each of the 

construction sectors. Other contractors are assigned work within those sectors to perform the 

construction tasks. 

To assist in monitoring IRRF projects and funds, the development of management reporting 

system was initiated by the PCO. PCO received start-up monies of $15.5 million, from the 

$50 million IRRF funds designated for this purpose, to purchase the software, configure the 

system, and employ technical consultants. This initiative was known as the PCO Solution. 

The PCO Solution was designed and deployed employing the capabilities of two different 

environments. The first environment, the Iraq Infrastructure Management System (IIMS), 

was a collection of designing, engineering, and construction applications that were deployed 

to provide for joint U.S.-Iraq use in managing programs and ultimate transfer to the Iraqi 

government. The second environment, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 

Information Technology suite of systems, was deployed to leverage existing legacy 

computing capabilities and to provide a technology platform on which to manage the 

inherently governmental functions of acquisition, financial, and construction management. 

The PCO Solution was planned to provide for data sharing between these two environments 

and data integration within each of these environments. For detailed information regarding 

the background, design, operating environment, cost, and preliminary results of this audit of 

the PCO Solution, see Appendix D. 

One of the key factors in the design and application selection of the PCO Solution was the 

requirement that it be a joint-use, U.S-Iraq, solution and that the IIMS component be 

transferable to the Iraqi government (e.g. Ministry of Planning) as a fully operational 

management information solution. However, the following problems existed: 

• A detailed joint-use training and transition plan for the IIMS requirements existed in 

fragmented form and was not formalized. 

• There are multiple software applications which will require licensing transfers from 

the U.S. government to the recipient Iraqi ministry. 

• There are also a number of export controlled software components as a part of IIMS 

that will require special handling or removal prior to transfer to the Iraqi 

government. 

 

4 The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) was consolidated with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf 

Region Division (GRD), on December 4, 2005. While currently referred to as GRD-PCO, the PCO function 

described here is still valid since events referred to occur prior to December 4, 2005. This report refers to PCO 

until events occur after the consolidation date. 
4

PCO did not follow some parts of the established leading practices or approved guidelines 

used in the federal government for managing the design and development and transfer to a 

foreign government of an information technology system, as defined by applicable federal 

regulations, policies, and procedures. The initial decisions by PCO for the requirements and 

applications selected for the PCO Solution relied on qualitative, judgmental data and analysis 

rather than quantitative measures. Quantitative measures are normally used in defining and 

developing system architecture plans for comparing and prioritizing alternative software 

applications; for developing user requirements; for prototyping prior to implementation; and 

for conducting pre- and post-implementation cost-benefit analyses to support ongoing 

management oversight processes and the eventual transfer of this technology to the Iraqi 

government. 

Transition to the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) 

Although progress has been made, we determined that for almost twenty months, until 

September 2005, there were many delays because both PCO and Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office (IRMO) senior management failed to take a more pro-active role in 

ensuring that all government entities that receive IRRF monies utilized the PCO Solution for 

input of their project and fund information. This lack of management attention in defining 

requirements resulted in a system that did not meet the full intent of the congressional 

mandate and hampered the work of others who rely upon the PCO data set for reporting 

purposes. 

In September 2005, USACE, Gulf Region Division (GRD) and PCO officials briefed the 

IRMO Director on the recommended solution to consolidate information from multiple data 

sources into a single database5

. The proposed integrated U.S. government IT solution, the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System, would leverage off the lessons learned and 

capabilities of the PCO Solution. The goal of this new solution was to provide a unified 

common operating picture of the reconstruction programs in order to synchronize and 

coordinate efforts across U.S. government agencies and from Iraqi national, provincial, and 

local government levels. The following figures illustrate the current operating practices and 

the intended transition of the data reporting from the original reporting practice (Figure 1); to 

an interim reporting practice using the IRMO Information Management Unit (IMU) Rollup 

Database in an extended roll (Figure 2); to the evolving U.S. government IT solution, the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) (Figure 3). 

According to the senior leadership of IRMO, GRD, and PCO, implementation of the PCO’s 

proposed U.S. government IT solution coupled with the additional requirements identified by 

the IRMO Director provides the best potential of a workable solution within the timeframe 

required. 

 

5

 Briefing presentation entitled, “Consolidated Reconstruction Database Update to Ambassador Speckhard,” 5 

September 2005. 
5

 Source: PCO Brief Figure 1. Original Reporting Practice 

 Source: PCO Brief Figure 2. Interim Reporting Practice

MNC-I 

Financial & 

Program 

Management 

Solution

Access

Excel

STANFINS

Electronic or 

Manual Data 

Transfer

Multiple Reporting Agencies and Formats

Electronic or 

Manual Data 

Transfer

Electronic or 

Manual Data 

Transfer

Electronic or 

Manual Data 

Transfer

USAID 

Financial & 

Program 

Management 

Solution

Excel

MACS

Phoenix

MNSTC-I 

 Program 

Management 

Solution

Access

Excel

CEFMS

PCO/GRD

Financial and 

Program 

Management 

Solution

Oricle Suite

ESRI

PCO Provides

Financial Management

Support

Additional

Data Collected to 

match new requirement

IMU Rollup

Database

Extended 

Dataset 

Reports

Current

IMU

Reports

On Demand

Adhoc

Reports

Extended

Data 

Collection

And

Cleanup

Data 

validation

Online reports

PCO

AID

CERP

Other

Additional

Data Collected to 

match new requirement

IMU Rollup

Database

Extended 

Dataset 

Reports

Current

IMU

Reports

On Demand

Adhoc

Reports

Extended

Data 

Collection

And

Cleanup

Data 

validation

Online reports

PCO

AID

CERP

Other
6

Source: SIGIR Figure 3. Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS)
7

To facilitate development of the U.S government IT solution, the IRMO Director and his 

staff, in consultation with SIGIR, GRD-PCO, and others identified a series of critical actions 

that should be taken to address the desired improvements to the PCO Solution. As a result, 

the IRMO Director, in September 2005, issued an Action Memorandum directing all 

agencies receiving IRRF dollars to load and update IRRF-funded project data into the IRMS. 

The memorandum’s intent was that GRD-PCO and the other agencies were to work with 

IRMO to develop the technical portions of the system to accept the additional records and to 

assure valid data was entered into the system. For the full text of the Action Memorandum, 

see Appendix B. 

The critical initiatives identified by the IRMO Director were: 

• development of a single unified IT system, with a common data dictionary, that all 

agencies currently spending IRRF dollars be required to load and keep current with 

IRRF-funded project data 

• GRD-PCO demonstrate the capability of the unified system in reporting information 

required in the congressionally mandated Section 2207 Report by mid-November 

2005 with the intent of the information being used in the December 2005 report 

• GRD-PCO and IRMO develop a transition strategy for transferring the unified 

system to the Iraqi government 

To assist in implementing the Action Memorandum initiatives, an interagency Information 

Technology Working Group (ITWG) was formed to help coordinate implementation of the 

unified system. The ITWG working group is comprised of representatives from IRMO, the 

PCO, GRD, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The ITWG has 

been proactive in coordinating implementation of several of the initiatives and has resolved 

numerous issues and problems which have arisen during the course of making IRMS a 

unified system. 

As of December 30, 2005, many of the initiatives discussed in the IRMO Director’s Action 

Memorandum were underway. Our review determined that the IRRF organizations, in 

general, are working well together. Some of the issues which have been addressed are: 

 

• A data dictionary was developed, providing common definitions of inter-agency data 

points, and is in place. 

• Organizations have signed a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing to discuss 

common issues such as data usage and security in IRMS. 

• Assessment and cost analysis of bandwidth requirements were completed which will 

facilitate interfacing to the IRRF agency unique systems. 

However, there are some initiatives that have been delayed or not completed: 

• The achievement of a complete IRRF database has not been realized. 

• Data have not been fully loaded into the IRMS regarding IRRF dollars, for all 

organizations. 

Data refinement is still underway in several organizations where the data are being reviewed 

and verified. The ITWG is working with these organizations and has established a revised 
8

timeframe for using IRMS to prepare the March 2006, Section 2207 Report. For details on 

the progress of these initiatives, see Appendix C. 

Additional Observations: IRMS Evolution and Transferability 

During our review, we and IRMO identified additional areas of concern that need to be 

addressed before IRMS can be effectively fully operational and transferred to the Iraqi 

government. Specifically the areas of concern we identified are: 

• In reviewing the plans to develop the transition of the IRMS component to the 

Iraqi government, we noted that the plan did not consider export control issues or 

identify alternative solutions for software that cannot be transferred because of 

export control regulations. 

• A software maintenance and licensing transfer plan with identified warranties has 

not been documented. 

Further, IRMO identified: 

• The linkage between financial information and projects is difficult to obtain. 

There is currently a $3 billion variance between construction project dollars in the 

database and the total IRRF apportionment of $18.4 billion. IRMO attributes this 

difference to items such as contingency, overhead, administrative costs, security, 

studies, etc. 

• Dollars were tied to “activities or initiatives” that did not result in a project. The 

GRD-PCO database does not report these costs in their standard reports if the 

“activity/initiative” never resulted in a project. GRD-PCO estimates there is less 

than $200 million associated with this issue. 
9

Conclusion and Recommendations 

Conclusion 

Investments in IT can have a dramatic impact on an organization's performance. A wellmanaged IT investment that is carefully selected and focused on meeting mission needs can 

move an organization forward, dramatically improving operations while reducing costs. 

Likewise, poor investments, those that are inadequately justified or whose costs, risks, and 

benefits are poorly managed can hinder and even restrict an organization's performance. 

Progress had been made toward meeting the IT requirements, as outlined by the IRMO 

Director, and complying with the original congressional mandate. Specifically, the U.S. 

government organizations are working together to develop the IRMS; a data dictionary has 

been developed; and each organization has signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 

which they each agree to discuss common issues such as data usage and security in the 

IRMS. 

While time consuming, meticulous verification of the data is critical to ensure the 

completeness and accuracy of the IRMS. IRMO and GRD-PCO, in conjunction with the 

ITWG, are working to resolve these problems, but as reported in the status update regarding 

IRMS initiatives (see Appendix C), many of the IRMO Director’s due dates were missed, 

including the original December 2005 date for using the unified system as the basis for the 

Section 2207 Report which has now been revised to March 2006. 

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response 

It is important for IRMO, in coordination with the GRD-PCO and the other agencies of the 

ITWG, to continue to provide active leadership in assuring all organizations work together in 

correcting the problems identified with the IT system. A complete and accurate IRRF 

database that is accessible by the U.S. government activities and their respective management 

via a common automated solution is the key to the success of the IRRF program. This effort 

must be maintained in order that a viable and unified IT management system is developed 

with sustained operability in order to provide an accurate and reliable picture of IRRF 

programs and funds for Congress, U.S. government organizations, and transition to the Iraqi 

government. 

As such, we recommend that the IRMO Director work in conjunction with the Commanding 

General, GRD-PCO, and the ITWG, to continue the development of the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management System by ensuring all requirements identified in the IRMO Action 

Memorandum dated September 20, 2005, have been addressed and actions implemented. 

We further recommend that the IRMO Director develop the following: 

• A detailed plan to mitigate the presence (to the extent required at time of transfer) of 

all export control software and substitute, where appropriate, alternative solutions to 

retain overall solution integrity and functionality at time of transfer. 
10

• A software maintenance and licensing transfer plan to ensure the value of the 

software and infrastructure investment is protected by maintaining appropriate levels 

of annual maintenance support, licensing agreements, and executing sound equipment 

maintenance practices. Further, as part of this plan, a formal turnover folder should 

be created containing all of the necessary documents to officially transfer this 

software from U.S. government to the Iraqi government. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. A combined response to the draft of this 

report was received for the U.S. Ambassador of Iraq and IRMO. The U.S. Ambassador to 

Iraq concurred in general with the findings of the audit and the recommendation relative to 

the transfer of the IRMS system to the Iraqi Government, and states that corrective actions 

have been taken. An IRMS Migration Working Group has been authorized to look at the 

policies relating to transfer of IRMS to Iraqi authorities. Preliminary discussions have been 

held with the acting Iraqi National Chief Information Officer and the Ministers of 

Communications and Planning to define Iraqi management requirements and transfer 

policies. IRMO is proactively working with implementing agencies to ensure that the IRMS 

program provides improved data collection, consolidation, standardization and reporting. 

Detailed comments provided by IRMO with this response were considered in the preparation 

of this final report. The comments received are fully responsive. 

Technical comments to the draft report were also provided by the Commanding General, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, and have been incorporated into this 

final report as appropriate. 
11 

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

In June 2005, we initiated this audit, Project No. D2005-DCPAAI-0004.3. We conducted 

our work in Baghdad, Iraq, at the: PCO Annex Building, Freedom Building, Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), USAID, and the U.S. Embassy Annex. 

The review focused primarily on the management of the development of the IRRF 

computerized information management systems and the data flow of this information in 

support of the production of the congressionally mandated Section 2207 Report. We 

reviewed computerized information systems used by U.S. government organizations to 

determine whether they were sufficiently coordinated among the organizations to ensure 

accurate, complete, and timely reporting to senior government officials on the use of IRRF 

Funds. 

To determine whether federal government rules and regulations were adhered to and whether 

adequate management oversight was used in the development of the information 

management systems reporting on IRRF funds, we reviewed documentation provided by 

PCO and IRMO pertaining to the purchase and development of the system. Key IT and 

contractor support personnel staffs were interviewed who were familiar with the 

development and operation of the system. We also identified and analyzed pertinent policies 

and regulatory requirements governing the acquisition and development of federal IT 

systems. We used Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) “Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government” (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, November 1999) as guidance. 

The following criteria was used in determining if the IT system was developed in accordance 

with all applicable federal regulations, policies and procedures: 

• Clinger-Cohen Act, formerly the Information Technology Management Reform Act 

of 1996, Division E of Public Law 104-106 

• Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13 

• The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Public Law 103-355 

• Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act (Public Law 101-576) 

• Executive Order 13011, "Federal Information Technology", dated July 17, 1996 

• OMB Circular A-11, Transmittal Memo # 4 “Management of Federal Information 

Resources” dated November 28, 2000 

• OMB Circular No. A-130, “Management of Federal Information Resources”, dated 

February 8, 1996 

• The 2005 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 39 “Acquisition of Information 

Technology” 

• Government Accountability Office (GAO) “Information Technology Investment 

Evaluation Guide”, web guide, http://www.gao.gov/policy/itguide/homepage.htm 

• Government Accountability Office (GAO) Strategic Information Planning 

“Framework for Designing and Developing Systems Architectures”, GAO/IMTEC92-51, dated June 1992 
12

We conducted this performance audit from June through December 2005, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not utilize any computer-processed data during 

this audit. 

Prior Coverage. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)

Reports issued by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction can be 

accessed on its website http://www.sigir.mil. 

SIGIR Audit Report Number SIGIR-05-027, dated January 27, 2006, “Methodologies for 

Reporting Cost-to-Complete Estimates”, concluded that U.S. Government agencies failed to 

effectively compile and report cost-to-complete information for IRRF projects – Facilities 

and Transportation (F&T) sector, as required by Public Law 108-106, thereby excluding 

important project visibility essential for project management and Congress to make informed 

management decisions during IRRF program execution. 

SIGIR Audit Report Number SIGIR-05-026, dated January 27, 2006, “Fact Sheet on the Use 

of the $50 Million Appropriation to Support the Management and Reporting of the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” presented the facts on how the funds earmarked for the 

preparation, maintenance, monitoring, or reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund information were used and our concerns as to the lack of information available to 

support the detail expenditure of this appropriation. 

SIGIR Audit Report Number SIGIR-05-021, dated October 24, 2005, “Management of Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs: Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting”, 

concluded the three organizations responsible for IRRF projects – PCO, USAID, and the 

MNSTC-I – have been required, since January 2004, to report cost-to-complete information 

for their IRRF projects in quarterly reports to the Congress. However, these organizations 

did not begin providing reasonably comprehensive cost-to-complete data to IRMO until the 

summer of 2005. 

SIGIR Audit Report Number SIGIR-05-011, dated July 26, 2005, “Cost-to-Complete 

Estimates and Financial Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund”, included a review of PCO’s input to the April 2005 Section 2207 Report and found 

that PCO did not provide cost-to-complete information to IRMO for the Section 2207 Report. 

PCO maintained that (1) project data was not sufficiently mature to develop reasonable 

estimates at completion; an (2) they could not consolidate information from their 

management information systems because they were not integrated. 
13

Appendix B. IRMO Director’s Action 

Memorandum on Requirements for an Integrated 

System 
14
15
16

Appendix C. IRMO Status Report on Requirements 

for the Iraq Reconstruction Management System, as 

of December 30, 2005 

Requirement Due 

Date 

Completed 

Yes/No 

Revised 

Date 

Status 

A complete data set to build the basic 

report for the “2207 report” 11/30/05 No 01/01/06 Each agency was/is still working on validating their data 

Discontinue IMU project roll-up 11/30/05 No 01/30/06 Will prepare duplicate reports 

through 01/30/06 

Common (non-agency specific) interface 

developed 

10/31/05 

Yes 

Completed. All agencies have their 

interfaces customized to their needs. 

Some requested enhancements. 

These adjustments are being made. 

Assessment and cost analysis of bandwidth 

requirements to facilitate agency interface 10/31/05 Yes 12/01/05 

PCO-IT did an initial assessment 

IRMO to include this information in 

supplemental 

USAID technical representative identified 

for system 9/30/05 Yes 10/31/05 Complete 

ITWG to demonstrate ability of system to 

meet “2207 report” requirements for Dec. 

rpt. 

11/15/05 Yes 

IRMO developed the appendix to 

2207 “accomplishments” 

Additional reports are being created 

Draft of a common data dictionary 10/30/05 Yes Complete 

GRD-PCO to provide funding and 

resources for IRMS system (to include 

transfer to Iraqi government and complete 

archive for USG use) 

ongoing 

GRD-PCO is providing some 

funding and resources for IRMS, 

Each agency must provide funding 

and resources to assure data is 

validated, entered, and updated 

Draft scope-of-work and cost analysis 

presenting options on inter-agency usage 

which includes direct data transfer to 

IRMS 

11/30/05 

No TBD 

IMU has hired a policy development 

specialist to meet this objective. 

USAID to provide technical requirements 

for MEPPS II to IRMO/IMU 9/30/05 Yes 

Complete 

Timeline, developed by ITWG, for a 

transition strategy plan for IRMS turnover 

to Iraqi govt. Plan would include the 

following: outline for the hand over of a 

complete data set; specifications for 

maximum utilization and pricing to include 

and assessment of current and required 

capability within Iraqi ministries; system 

sustainability costs. 

10/30/05 No TBD 

IRMO is leading a group of ITWG 

members in developing strategy for 

determining a timeline to meet all 

objectives related to IRMS turnover 

to the Iraqi government. 

IRMO to provide oversight and staff 

support for operation and maintenance of 

IRMS 

ongoing 

IRMO, IMU, Systems Administrator, 

is assigned to the IRMS Project 
17

Appendix D. PCO Solution 

Background 

On April 24, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Resource Requirements Board 

(RRB) approved $18 million for the development of the Program Management Office (PMO) 

IT reporting system, of which PMO received $15.5 million. The PMO system was to be 

designed to meet the mandated execution and fiduciary reporting requirements as specified 

by Public Law 108-106, as well as providing transparency and capacity building as part of 

the execution of the reconstruction program. The approval to build the PMO system was not 

a unanimous decision by the RRB, both the Department of State representative and the CPA 

Chief Financial Office voted not to fund the system. There still exist differences today on 

how the IT system to monitor the IRRF project should have been constructed. 

On May 11, 2004, President Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive 

(NSPD) Number 36 regarding USG operations in Iraq. The main emphasis of NSPD 

Number 36 was the termination of the CPA no later then June 30, 2004, and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq. The U.S. Mission 

in Baghdad and a temporary Department of State organization called IRMO assumed from 

the CPA those authorities and responsibilities that continue after CPA termination. In 

addition, another temporary organization within the Defense Department to replace the PMO 

was established called the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to provide acquisition and 

project management support for activities in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State and 

the heads of other agencies. PCO was to provide acquisition and project management 

support to the Chief of Mission. 

The disestablishment of the CPA and the concurrent establishment of the US Embassy to Iraq 

also impacted PMO. Prior to transfer of sovereignty, PMO was responsible for total IRRF 

program management reporting, to include those organizations that received IRRF funding 

directly from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The creation of the Department 

of State’s Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) resulted in the transfer of 

program management responsibilities to IRMO and retention of project management 

responsibilities with PCO. With this transfer of program management responsibilities went 

the PCO reporting responsibilities for the actions of non-Defense agencies who received 

funds from other than PCO, principally Department of State, and U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID). 

The mission of the PCO is to contract for and deliver services, supplies, and infrastructure 

identified within the IRRF. PCO management structure consists of U.S. government 

employees, along with some representation from Iraq and other countries. Contractors are 

hired to provide the program management, both on an overall scale, as well as in each of the 

construction sectors. The sectors are oil, electricity, public works and water, and facilities 

and transportation. Other contractors are assigned work within those sectors to perform the 

construction tasks. 

To assist in monitoring IRRF projects and funds, the development of an IT management 

reporting system was initiated by the PCO. PCO received the $15.5 million from PMO to 

purchase the software, configure the system, and employ technical consultants. PCO’s IT 

management system was called the PCO Solution. 

The PCO Solution was a collection of integrated commercial and government applications 

that, when properly configured to enable PCO approved processes, and populated with 
18

essential data, were to provide management oversight and reporting capabilities for each 

milestone and functional area in the life-cycle of a project or relief action. The Iraq 

Infrastructure Management System (IIMS) was the commercial and transferable component 

of the PCO Solution. It was a three-tier architecture with the layers being database, 

middleware, and application riding on a Window/Linux based wide-area network. When 

combined with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) computing 

environment, the combined technologies are considered to be the PCO Solution. 

Concept Design & System Architecture

According to the PCO Director of Information Technology, the PCO Solution was designed 

and deployed employing the capabilities of two different environments. The first 

environment, the IIMS, was a collection of market leader architecture-engineeringconstruction applications that were deployed to provide for joint US-Iraq use in managing 

this program and ultimate transfer to the Iraqi government. The second, the USACE 

Information Technology Architecture, was deployed to leverage existing legacy computing 

capabilities and to provide a technology platform on which to manage the inherently 

governmental functions of acquisition, Standard Procurement System (SPS), financials, 

Corps of Engineers’ Financial Management System (CEFMS), and construction 

management, Resident Management System (RMS). The PCO Solution was planned to 

provide for data sharing between these two environments and data integration within each of 

these environments. This collection of integrated commercial and government application 

suites that, when properly configured, enable approved business processes by collecting, 

storing, and presenting essential data and information necessary for management of the IRRF 

projects; and facilitates real-time oversight and reporting capabilities for each milestone and 

functional area in the life-cycle of a project or relief action. 

The PCO Solution was initially designed and configured based on the following: 

• The PMO operational construct was to build around the concept of providing a 

singular focal point for the distribution of and reporting on all the IRRF monies 

thereby providing for consolidated program management control over the entire 

program. The initial agreement between PMO and OMB called for the allocation of 

IRRF funds to the PCO for distribution to the various U.S. government agencies 

conducting relief and reconstruction projects including the Departments of State, 

Defense, and Treasury, USAID, and the U.S. Institute for Peace. However, this 

agreement was abandoned early in program execution with OMB allocating IRRF 

funds directly to the executing agencies. 

• Given the temporary nature of the organization, the more traditional IT investment 

board and associated processes were not instituted. Things such as: 

o Considering a broad range of alternatives (each discussing hardware, 

software, communications, data management, and security considerations) 

before selecting specific target architecture. 

o Conducting a cost-benefit analysis. 

o Prototyping prior to implementation. 

o Establishing oversight mechanisms to evaluate systematically and ensure the 

continuing security, interoperability, and availability of systems and their data. 

o Pre and post implementation reviews to determine project cost, benefits and 

returns. 
19

• Use of commercially available off-the-shelf applications provided PCO with the 

planned ability to transfer a fully operational system with associated licenses to the 

Iraqi government at the conclusion of the program, enabling continued legal use of 

the software. PCO would make no changes to the applications’ native coding and 

application selection was to consider the existence of these applications in the Middle 

East region as well as their ability to present information in a multi-lingual 

environment. 

• PCO was directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to use CEFMS for 

financial management of the program and SPS as the contract authoring/management 

application. At the request of USACE, PCO adopted RMS as the construction 

management tool given pre-existing USACE user familiarity and the anticipated 120-

day rotation of USACE personnel in and out of the program or Iraq. These three 

applications operate in the USACE.Army.mil domain, separate and disconnected 

from the commercial component of the solution. All data transfer between the two 

environments is accomplished using file transfer functionality. 

• System design and application selection focused on several key factors, not the least 

of which was application commonality between the PCO Solution and what was 

already endorsed by both DoD and commercial organizations. Likewise, applications 

that were previously integrated into the USG legacy program and project 

management environment were given priority consideration. The software deployed 

as part of the PCO Solution was selected given its existing alignment or actual use in 

the USACE enterprise IT architecture. As seen in Table 1, both systems employed 

the majority of the same applications. In addition, all of the commercial applications 

used in the PCO Solution have been previously deployed in the US Navy’s enterprise 

architecture to include Maximo, P3, Success, Oracle Projects, ESRI, and Oracle 

Portal systems at the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. Also, Oracle ebusiness (including Oracle Projects, Oracle Projects Contracts, Oracle Financial), the 

Primavera suite of applications, ESRI geospatial software, RS Means-based 

estimating applications, and Maximo are deployed extensively in the architecture, 

engineering and construction and infrastructure sustainability environment. 

Table 1: Alignment configuration between the USACE IT system and the PCO Solution 

Functional Area USACE PCO Solution 

Program PROMIS - P2 (not deployed) MAXIMO 

Financial CEFMS CEFMS 

Disbursing CEFMS CEFMS 

Acquisition SPS SPS 

Scheduling Primavera P3 Primavera P3 

Construction RMS RMS 

Project Controls RMS Primavera – Expedition 

Geospatial ESRI – Arc-Serve, Arc Info ESRI – Arc-Serve, Arc Info 

Estimating MCACES – Success (RS Means) Success (RS Means) 

Infrastructure (FEM) MAXIMO – Civil Works MAXIMO – Sustainability 

Information Delivery Oracle Portal Oracle Portal 
20

In addition, the USACE and Naval Facilities Engineering Command conducted a 

joint analysis of program and project management software that could be used for the 

PCO Solution and for the most part, came to the same software configuration as 

currently exists for the PCO Solution. 

• We were advised that the PCO Solution was designed to operate in both fixed priced 

and cost plus contracts, the type of contract dictating which environment (IIMS or 

USACE) would govern. It was an early program management goal of the 

government team that cost plus task orders would initially be negotiated with the 

contractors for the projects with an initial negotiated not to exceed amount (% of 

contract). It was envisioned that this approach would allow the contractor to do the 

site-survey work, mobilize, start design, and develop a sound project cost estimate. 

Upon completion of this work a fixed price contract would be negotiated and the 

contract would then be definitized providing for a more fixed accountability of funds 

then with a cost plus contract. 

This fixed price end-state was the operating format that USACE and the USACE 

legacy systems were most adapt at supporting. On the other hand, the PCO sector 

management contractors and design-build contractors, having executed a large 

proportion of their commercial work in a cost-plus environment, were well versed in 

operating in a cost plus environment. From a systems perspective, the fixed price and 

cost plus environments had to be supported. The IIMS architecture and application 

selection provided the cost plus management capabilities in the system. This shift to 

fixed priced contracts was never realized given the volatility of the environment and 

resulting inaccessibility of the site to the contractors, competition for resources that 

resulted in escalating costs, and the greater than anticipated deterioration of the Iraqi 

infrastructure. 

As a result of the above, the majority of the large projects which the PCO managed 

were cost-plus task orders. The impact of this is three-fold: 

1. “Cost loaded schedules” and inherent capabilities of the IIMS solution to 

project “cost to complete” based on earned value is now a critical component 

in managing program costs. 

 

2. The USACE legacy architecture and workforce accustom to supporting a 

fixed price contracting environment becomes less effective, forcing workarounds and a higher reliance on project management methods and tools 

(earned value, cost loaded schedules [with a focus on cost to complete]) 

foreign to most government employees associated with infrastructure 

construction or repair. As a result, the importance of this key performance 

indicator had not been realized and was not being reported into the PCO 

Solution given the lack of cost loaded contractor performance schedules 

loaded into the solution. 

3. USACE, as the construction manager, was not effectively utilizing this critical 

tool in monitoring costs and overseeing the construction program. 
21 

Operating Environment Constraints of the PCO Solution Development 

The PCO Solution was developed under certain constraints such as: 

• The funds necessary to design, procure, configure, and deploy the required 

management system were not authorized until May 2004, well after the management, 

and design and build contracts were awarded. The PCO sector personnel arrived in 

Baghdad to find their intended management system stalemated in the pursuit of 

funding, a lack of desks, desktop computing, and other normal services found in a 

traditional office environment. 

• Existing U.S. Central Command computing, network, data cabling, and bandwidth in 

Baghdad, Iraq, were insufficient to support the PMO organization or mission. Shared 

desktop hardware and desk space was not a reality for the workforce until fall 2004. 

Latency (system slowness) was at unacceptable levels. This continued infrastructure 

shortfall ultimately forced PMO to deploy its own infrastructure; increasing start-up 

costs, operating expenses, and further delay in deploying a computing environment 

that could serve a virtual workforce. 

• Rapid application deployment is difficult under even the most controlled 

circumstances. However, faced with a general reluctance of technologists to deploy 

to Iraq, an environment devoid of even the most basic off-the-shelf support and everchanging program goals, the difficulties in deploying an enterprise system capable of 

supporting an $18.4 billion program were considered, at best, severe. 

• Further complicating system configuration was the very nature of the PMO 

organization – a management team drawn from at least seven different project 

management firms combined with a rotating government staff drawn from at least as 

many different departments or agencies. Each came with their own vision of program 

management, application preferences, and standard operating procedures forcing 

extended consensus management sessions to deliver the most basic approach to 

managing the IRRF program. 

Costs for the PCO Solution 

Initial Start-up Costs (1st year). The CPA Requirements Review Board approved using 

$15.5 million of appropriated funds to pay for the PCO reporting system. The approval by 

the Requirements Review Board was contingent on the effort being financed from the $50 

million provided by Congress for IRRF reporting process. According to the senior PCO 

official responsible for the systems development and operation and maintenance of the 

system told us that the $15.5 million only represented the system start-up costs for the PCO 

Solution and excluded the operations and maintenance costs and the desktop infrastructure 

costs. We determined that most of the $15.5 million was disbursed under two contracts: 

FY5866-04-C-0001 and FY5866-04-C-0005. Both of the contracts were made with TKC 

Communications, LLC, of Anchorage, Alaska. Under Task Order Number 0001of contract 

FY5866-04-C-0005, undated, identifies under item 0001, services are for the Iraqi Ministry 

of Planning and Program Management Office Joint Use Facility and Document Management 

Solution. 
22 

Table 2 identifies how the majority of the $15.5 million was disbursed. Further, Table 3 

shows the estimates for annual budget from the operations and maintenance funds required 

for the annual operations and maintenance of the PCO Solution above the development costs. 

Table 2. Cost of PCO Solution by Purpose and Task Order Number 

Table 3. Estimated Annual Operating Budget for PCO Solution 

FY 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter Cumulative 

2005 $3,525,000 $3,733,000 $3,733,000 $3,733,000 $14,724,000 

2006 $3,733,000 $3,733,000 $3,733,000 $3,733,000 $14,932,000 

 

6

 Besides MAXIMO Task Order # 06 contained the following additional software: WebCEO ($87,500.), 

Acrobat ($105,978.26), Visio Professional ($76,521.74), AutoCAD ($167,119.57), MS project ($9,152.17). 

PURPOSE COST 

TASK 

ORDER # 

ITEMS ON 

TASK ORDER 

TOTAL 

COST 

Functional 

Consulting 

$805,869 

$1,368,023 

$1,965,879 

TO # 01

TO # 09

TO # 10

OCS and files management 

Software configuration 

Software configuration $4,139,771

Software $2,823,998 TO # 06

MAXIMO, Oracle 

applications/product support, 

and additional software6 $2,823,998

Application 

Infrastructure 

$124,407 

$1,678,704 

$819,768 

$1,609,600 

TO # 05

TO # 07

TO # 13

--

PCO Annex hardware 

Infrastructure 

Infrastructure 

Connally Contracting 

(satellite connectivity) $ 4,232,479

Reporting and 

Project 

Management 

$740,000 TO # 11 Portal expansion & maintenance 

$740,000

Database, Help 

Desk 

$3,082,577 TO # 17 Help Desk $3,082,577

 

TOTAL COST $15,018,825
23

Preliminary Results Discussed with IRMO Director 

The PCO did not follow established internal control criteria used in the federal government 

for managing the concept and development of an information technology system, as defined 

in accordance with applicable federal regulations, policies and procedures. The initial 

decisions for the requirements and applications that define the PCO IRRF information 

technology system (PCO Solution) relied on qualitative, judgmental data and analysis rather 

than quantitative measures. Quantitative measures are normally used in defining and 

developing system architecture plans for comparing and prioritizing alternative software 

application; for prototyping prior to implementation; for developing user requirements 

(software, hardware, communications, operating environment, and other pertinent technical 

constraints); and for conducting cost-benefit analyses to support continuing management 

oversight processes. 

Other Observations: 

• The system was not able to electronically link the major applications together to 

accomplish its mission. System applications, by design, are supposed to 

electronically share data, minimizing the requirements of manual data entry and 

enforce data standardization and quality. The key data element that enables the 

delivery of a singular data set across this system is the project number, referred to in 

the software application Maximo as the Unique Requirements Identifier. The 

capability is missing for capturing the Unique Requirements Identifier as a separate 

data field in Corps of Engineer’s Financial Management System. Consequently, a 

significant amount of labor is required to manually reconcile the financial and 

program management data sets. 

• Key data fields and information were not being maintained and critical management 

functions were not being accomplished within the system as deployed. This lack of 

data precludes PCO from meeting the full intent of the congressional mandate and 

hampers the work of others who rely upon the PCO data set for reporting purposes. 
24

Appendix E. Acronyms 

CEFMS Corps of Engineer’s Financial Management System 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DoD U.S. Department of Defense 

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 

GRD-PCO Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office 

IIMS Iraq Infrastructure Management System 

IMU IRMO Information Management Unit 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

IT Information Technology 

ITWG Information Technology Working Group 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PCO Project and Contracting Office 

PMO Project Management Office 

RMS Resident Management System 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SPS Standard Procurement System 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
25

Appendix F. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, 

and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 
26

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, 

and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 
27 

Appendix G. Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. 

McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to the report include: 

W. Dan Haigler 

Walt Keays 
28

Management Comments 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 
29

Management Comments 

Commanding General, Gulf Region Division, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers