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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

AMERICA E. EARL 

v. Record No. 0432-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

EDWIN O. EARL SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 

James H. Chamblin, Judge 

 (John M. DiJoseph, on brief), for appellant. 

 (D. Alan Nunley, on brief), for appellee. 

 America E. Earl (wife) appeals the decision of the circuit 

court awarding her $75,000 as her share of the marital property 

and awarding her $450 per month in spousal support. Wife argues 

that the trial court erred in finding that she made less 

contributions to the marriage than Edwin O. Earl (husband) and 

erred in failing to recognize wife's need for more support. Upon 

reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that 

this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm 

the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

Equitable Distribution

 "[T]he chancellor is necessarily vested with 

broad discretion in the discharge of the 

duties the statute [Code § 20-107.3] imposes 

upon him. Unless it appears from the record 

that the chancellor has abused his 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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discretion, that he has not considered or has 

misapplied one of the statutory mandates, or 

that the evidence fails to support the 

findings of fact underlying his resolution of 

the conflict in the equities, the 

chancellor's equitable distribution award 

will not be reversed on appeal." 

Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 244-45, 361 S.E.2d 364, 368 

(1987) (citation omitted). The trial court's letter opinion 

detailed its consideration of the factors contained in Code 

§ 20-107.3(E). Based upon those statutory factors, the court 

concluded that husband's monetary and non-monetary contributions 

to the marriage far outweighed those made by wife. The court 

specifically noted wife's "extensive absence from the marital 

home without good reason in the last six years of the marriage," 

and husband's extensive renovation of the marital home. 

 The evidence supports the trial court's findings. Wife was 

in Panama more than four of the last six years prior to the final 

separation. During this time, the parties' adopted son was in 

junior and senior high school. Wife did not return to the United 

States when the son faced criminal prosecution in 1991 and 1992. 

 The trial court found that the marital property was worth 

approximately $400,000. The trial court awarded wife $75,000 as 

her share of the marital property. We cannot say the trial 

court's decision was an abuse of discretion or unsupported by the 

evidence. Therefore, we affirm the court's equitable 

distribution award. 

 Spousal Support
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 Wife argues that the trial court's award of $450 in spousal 

support failed to recognize her needs and husband's ability to 

pay. It is true that "[i]n awarding spousal support, the 

chancellor must consider the relative needs and abilities of the 

parties." Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 

827, 829 (1986). However, "[w]hen the chancellor has given due 

consideration to [the statutory factors set out in Code 

§ 20-107.1], his determination will not be disturbed on appeal 

except for a clear abuse of discretion." Id.

 The evidence established husband's ability to pay support. 

However, the court questioned wife's claimed monthly expenses of 

$1,339, noting that wife "has chosen to spend most of her time in 

Panama being supported by her sister." The court also noted that 

wife's "current choice is remarkably similar to her choice during 

the last years of the marriage." The court then disallowed 

wife's claimed expense of $700 a month for rent because wife had 

been living in Panama with her sister. 

 The trial court specifically found that wife was voluntarily 

unemployed. Although wife was healthy and intelligent and had 

worked at a number of different jobs during the marriage, wife, 

despite prior admonitions by the court, failed to obtain 

employment to help contribute to her own support. Code § 20-

107.1 directs the trial court to consider as a factor, in setting 

the amount of spousal support, the earning capacity of the 

"parties." A plain meaning of the words "parties" indicates that 
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the legislature intended to include the earning capacity of the 

payee spouse as well as the payor. 

Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 734, 396 S.E.2d 675, 

678 (1990). Having found wife's claimed expenses equalled no 

more than $639, the trial court determined that wife had 

sufficient earning capacity and employment skills to earn at 

least $189 a month. 

 The trial court considered the statutory factors before 

determining that wife was entitled to $450 a month in spousal 

support. We cannot say the decision was an abuse of discretion. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.