By Major General Joe N. Ballard 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

I

t is with a deep sense of honor that I have assumed my duties as the Commanding General of 

the United States Army Engineer Center and 49th 

Commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer School. I am 

committed to continue the challenge of bringing the 

Army's most versatile branch into the 21st century. 

As policies change around the world, our Army 

changes to accommodate. No longer are we a forward deployed Army. Not only are we becoming a 

CONUS-based Army; we will be much smaller. The 

Total Army Analysis process has moved engineers 

from the FY 92 Force Structure of 40,025 (31 percent) in the Active Component (AC) and 89,908 (69 

percent) in the Reserve Components (RC) to a projected structure of 22,043 (27 percent) in the AC and 

58,867 (73 percent) in the RC by FY 96. With numbers that small, it is imperative that the total engineer 

force remains doctrinally sound and materially ready. 

As we move toward the 21st century, the Engineer 

Center's vision will remain focused in two areasdoctrine and modernization. Our warfighting doctrine 

is clearly articulated in FM 100-5, Operations. The new 

FM 100-5 (June 1993) keeps the core of the 1986 version and adds two phases. The first phase is precombat operations: mobilization, deployment, hostilities 

short of war, peacetime engagement, and contingency operations. The second phase is post-combat 

operations: demobilization, redeployment, conflict termination, and joint, combined interagency operations. 

As our Army faces the challenges of a changing strategic environment, engineers will play an instrumental 

role in these new facets of our warfighting doctrine. 

Modernization of the engineer force by leveraging 

technology is the key to better support the maneuver 

forces' control of battle space. This is essential under 

our national military strategy, which emphasizes winning decisively, swiftly, and with a minimum number 

of casualties. 

To ensure victory over any land force, engineers 

must use modernization "overmatch" to dominate maneuver, win the information war, and protect the force 

on a three-dimensional battlefield. Several force modernization initiatives now being fielded and more on 

the near horizon will enable engineer forces to be key 

players. The breacher, bridger, Volcano, wide-area 

mines and the DEUCE are a few of the major initiatives. 

Bottom line, engineers will not be left behind in the 

equipment modernization needed to survive on increasingly lethal battlefields. Our challenge is to continue to know our doctrine, make terrain an asset and 

a weapon, and be an integral part of the fire and maneuver team. 

The heavy engineer brigade provides an efficient 

way of getting engineer assets to maneuver commanders. This organizational initiative is now in place 

throughout our heavy divisions. It allows the engineer 

to contribute to the commander's decision cycle 

rather than react to it. 

Another initiative we will support is opening key 

troop assignments to females. It is clear that female 

officers can hold key positions as assistant division 

engineers on division staffs, as brigade engineers on 

brigade staffs, as staff members on the brigade staff 

in heavy divisions, and as commanders of bridge companies. Females have played an active role in military 

history. Now it's time to bring them into the 21st century with the rest of the engineer force. 

In summary, we will give you the doctrinal foundation engineers need to fight and win within the combined arms arena. We are committed to ensuring that 

all training conducted at the Engineer Center reinforces Army doctrine and gives leaders the confidence to be competent noncommissioned officers 

and officers. We will increase our operational tempo 

on force modernization through the use of existing 

technology and future program strategies. 

We expect you to be active in your branch and be 

a competent representative in the field. Be able to 

talk to the non-engineer community about all engineer 

battlefield mission areas, structure, equipment, and 

people. Communicate to your non-engineer peers, 

subordinates, and superiors what you as an engineer 

can bring to the battlefield. We must continue to demand respect in the warfighting community by being 

knowledgeable engineers. 

In addition, we solicit your ideas. it's only through 

constant dialogue that we at the Engineer Center can 

keep abreast of your concerns, solutions, or lessons 

learned. We are here to train modern engineer warriors. To do that and to improve our training processes 

we must hear from you. 

Our future promises to be as exciting as our illustrious past. No matter where you serve, you are a part 

of that future. ESSAYONS! 
November 1993 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 23 PB 5-93-4 

UNITED STATES ARMY 1 FEATURES

ENGINEER CENTER AND 2 Bosnia: Engineer Planning for Operations Other Than FORT LEONARD WOOD 

I 
 by Major David R. Brown 


COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 7 The Forward-Deployed, All-Contingency, Corps Engineer 

Major General Joe N. Ballard Brigade 

by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Craig 

14 Bold Shift: An Engineer Partnership MANAGING EDITOR by Major Allen C. Estes Catherine Eubanks 

20 Training NCOs: Libby Noncommissioned Officers Academy CONTRIBUTING EDITORS by Staff Sergeant Edgar A. Stitt Cindy Paterson 


James E. Woodbury 23 Battle Task Training Improves Performance 


by Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, Jr. 
 GRAPHIC DESIGNER i

Jennifer C. Bolyard 26 Keeping Our Nukes: Enforcing Unit Responsibilities 


by Sergeant First Class Donald H. Purinton 


30 Connecting a Three-way Switch 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: by Les Fortner 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN 32 The Value of NEPA 

General, United States Army 1 by Emily Brown 

Chief of Staff 

38 Advances in Mine Warfare: Antitank Mines 

Official: by William C. Schneck, Malcolm H. Visser, and Stuart Leigh I 

48 The Battle of Khe Sanh 

by Gray Wirth 

MILTON H. HAMILTON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army DEPARTMENTS 

i 

05536 Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

12 Book Review 53 Engineer Update 

Cover photo: Staff Sergeant Randall 13 Personal Viewpoint 55 Past in Review 

Duvall conducts Phase 111 testing for the 

Drill Sergeant School, Libby NCO Acad- 18 Engineer School Directory 57 Bridge the Gap 

emy Photo by Elizabeth Wessels. 46 Engineer Problem 

I 

ENGiNEER IISSN 0046~1S890) is prepared qusiterly by me US. Army Engi- views expressed ere those of me suthor and not moge d me Depsment of De~ 

nee? School. ATTN: ATSE-T~PD-EB, Eon Leonard Wood, MO 554734650, Sec- fense or ik elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect off8elal U.S. Amy 

ond Clas5 posta~e IS paid st Fort Leonard Wood. MO, end eddltlonal mailing positions, and do not change or supersede intormaton in other u S Any pubib 

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etln for Army Engneerr ATTN: ATSE-T-PO-EB Fon Leonam Wood. MO 65473- CONTENT is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit ie glven to 

ENGINEER and the author. 

CORRESPONDENCE, leftera to the edltor, menurcripts, photographs, omca! OFFICIAL DISTRiBmION is targeted la all eng~neer end engineer-related 

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PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS ere available by contaedng me Superintendent 

OISCWMER: ENGINEER presents pratesslonei informauan designed "1 of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pinsburgh. PA 15250-7050 Address chenges 

keep Amy engineers Informed of current and emerging develapmenb within their for persons subscriptions should also be sent to the Superlntendent of 

8,885 of expenise for me purpose of enhancing their professional development Documents, 

November 1993 Engineer 1 

6550 
Rosnirrn: Emqiinces @ - Pl'annin~ F~ for


Operati~nsOther Than war 


By Major David R. Brown 

m~vents in Bosnia-Herzegovina recently pro- 

- dvided an opportunity for the Center for Army 

Lessons Learned (CALL) to assess planning in an 

operations other than war (OOTW) environment. 

The CALL team consisted of TRADOC-provided intelligence, training, logistics, transportation, and 

engineer officers and a lawyer. The team visited 

seven planning headquarters: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, AFSOUTWJTF HQ, USAREUR HQ, 

21st TAACOM HQ, V CORPS HQ, 3rd COSCOM, 

and 1AD HQ. 

The observations gathered at each location were 

a "snapshot in time." Many issues pertaining specifically to Bosnia have been resolved and some are 

pending resolution. The intent of this article is to 

provide engineers an opportunity to "wargame" 

their own potential solutions to these issues. 

The planning requirement for engineering in 

OOTW missions is enormous. It includes a full 

range of engineer support for mobility (countermine and construction, repair and maintenance of 

roads, ports, rail systems, and bridges); survivability (force, facility, and humanitarian assets); sustainment (lines of communication (LOC), base 

camps, main supply routes (MSRs), airfields, pipelines, and utilities); and topography (specialized 

topographic products in multiple languages). 

Of the more than 60 engineer observations 

made, almost all of them can be categorized into 

one of six broad topics: communication and reaction 

to constant change, prestocked materiel shortages, 

engineer equipment maintenance challenges, 

minelcountermine operations, sustainability of 

lines of communication, and follow-on operations. 

This article identifies methods to improve and simplify planning for each topic. 

Communication and Reaction to 


Constant Change 


(01; nothing in thisplarlning is more constant 

than the changes.) 

c;everal constantly fluctuating, politically imposed limitations were placed on planners 

based on the changing number of pe~sonnel that 

could be introduced into the theater of operations. 

These constantly changing limits had a ripple effect on all planning efforts. Often the mission was 

vague. At many headquarters the mission received 

was: 'We think we have a job to do, we are not 

sure what it is, but we want you to plan and train 

for it based on taking 'x' number of engineers." 

As political limits were imposed and adjusted, 

senior headquarters had to adjust troop listings 

and the "tooth-to-tail" ratio of the engineer force 

package. This variable was also influenced by 

changes in the perceived mission (peacemaking, 

peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building) 

(Figure 1)in belligerent or nonbelligerent environments. This caused continual adjustments in the allowed number of engineers deploying and the ratio 

of combat to construction engineers. 

It is not necessary to have a well defined political end state in order to conduct engineer planning. 

November I993 
Many engineer missions may be extrapolated based 

on terrain analysis and specified, implied and essential tasks, constraints and restrictions. The engineer estimate (FM 5-100, Engineer Conzbat Operations, Appendix B) can assist planners in 

determining engineer-specific mission statements. 

Mission analysis based on the "Tenets of Army Operations" (FM 100-5, Operations, page 2-6) and the 

Trinciples of Operations Other Than War" (FM 

100-5, Operations, page 13-3 or Draft FM 100-23, 

Peace Operations, page 3-3) will assist in identifying specific engineer missions. These missions will 

then allow planners to determine the number and 

types of engineer forces required. For example, at 

the division level engineers may be required to fix 

and maintain 58 bridges along main supply route 

(MSR) 'X", with bridge "A" being the most important, bridge "Z" being the least important, and 

other bridge priorities being '3-Y". Planners must 

then determine what engineer force structure is required to do that mission. With an engineer force 

structure based on terrain, effects of fluctuations 

can be immediately identified and weighed based 

on costbenefit. 

Continual changes in troop limits caused generic 

engineer troop units to be added to or subtracted 

from the Time Phased Force Deployment List 

(TPFDL) without consideration of real world limitations. The changes in mission type caused changes 

in the mix of combat engineer and combat heavy 

units. Missions requiring engineers in low density 

skills (port construction, railroad repair, prime 

power, pipeline, well drilling and firefighting) were 

changed without considering call-up requirements for 

engineers in the Reserve Components (RC). 

Planners who prepare the TPFDL must consider 

the availability and deployability of the specific engineer units required to accomplish the mission. 

During preliminary planning for Bosnia-Herzegovina, many levels of command had direct access 

to the TPFDL and changed it without considering 

the ability of the engineer forces to support their 

changes. 

The total engineer force maintains more than 70 

percent of its capability in the RC. Railroad repair 

units are found only in the RC. Port construction, 

prime power and pipeline construction units are 

limited to one or two Active Component (AC) companies, with the remainder in the RC. The limited 

number of available AC combat and construction 

battalions would require alert and movement of 

CONUS-based AC or RC engineers to complete intheater missions and provide backfill for replacement and rotation. Considerable time is required to 

approve the call-up of reserve forces, prepare them 

for deployment, and move them into a theater of 

operations. Many of these engineer forces will be 

critical to theater opening operations during the 

first 30-45 days of operations. The Army's ability to 

place these units at the critical point during the 

critical time is based on decisions made at least 

120 days before on-the-ground operations begin. 

Types ofOOW Operations 

Peacemaking: The process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving 

issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, 

or other forms of peaceful settlement, including military peace operations. 

Peace Enforcement: Aform of combat or armed intervention that is 

pursuant to international license authorizing use of military power to compel 

compliance. 

Peacekeeping: Noncombat military operations undertaken by outside 

forceswith the consent of all major beilligerent parties, to monitor and 

facilitate implementation of an existing truce. 

Peace Bulidlng: Post-conflict actions to identity and support structures 

that would stregthen and solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict. 

- Excerpts from Draft Version 4, FM 100-23 Peace Operations 

Flgure 1 

In a fluid planning environment, all engineer planners must be able to immediately adjust their engineer force mixture. This 

can be achieved by categorizing the engineers as 

combat, combat heavy 

(vertical construction), 

combat heavy (horizontal 

construction), or specialized, and establishing decremental lists for each 

category. Once the categories are determined and 

decremented, any troop 

strength or mission 

change can be immediately factored, and the 

change in engineer capability can be identified. This 

removes the necessity of 

planning every possible 

task organization to the 

last detail. 

November I993 Engineer 3 
The Department of Defense must develop doctrine on theater opening operations in order to iden. 

tify engineer tasks that must be completed for 

every OOTW operation. This doctrine would substantially reduce the necessity for "reinventing the 

wheel" for every operation. The Army must review 

the current policy of maintaining many critical 

engineer assets in the RC. All levels must reverse 

plan the availability of engineers. Units must restrict the availability of, and access to, the TPFDL 

and require in-progress reviews of proposed 

changes. Units must provide limited low-density 

skill cross-training for combat and combat heavy engineers. In OOTW engineering, all engineers must 

be cross-trained and capable of performing engineer missions beyond their "normal" scope of duties. 

Prestocked Materiel Shortages 

(Or; do you know what is available forprestocked class Nand bridging?) - -

Ctocks of replacement bridging for both the 

h- Bailey and Medium Girder Bridge (MGB)are 

low due to shipments to Somalia and damaged 

bridging. In Bosnia, several critlcal questions relate to this issue: 

Will the bridges be repairedireplaced by imported contract labor, local contract labor, or 

military forces? 

Will sufficient bridging (civilian or military) be 

be available? 

Are sufficient engineer assets available to protect and control the bridges? 

In Bosnia, multiple bridge sites have been identified for repair; many of them are critical to the 

joint forces' ability to establish initial lodgements 

and maintain LOCs. Because many bridges have 

been damaged or destroyed, both civilian and military bridging assets will be required. U.S. forces 

will have difficulty completing the anticipated 

bridge missions because many Bailey bridge sets 

were deployed to Somalia and the supply of MGB 

assets is limited. Only a small number of AC personnel are proficient in Bailey bridge emplacement, 

and most of them are senior NCOs who trained on 

the Bailey when it was still in AC bridge companies. Engineers without bridge experience will provide assistance in bridging. Substantial contracting 

of bridge work is anticipated and many contractors 

have already been consulted. 

A review of the DOD policy and training decisions that have reduced bridging capabilities in the 

Army is indicated. Funding to produce and stockpile a newer generation of fixed bridging designed 

for more permanent (less tactical) use may be necessary This bridging should be placeable by military or civilian labor, easily and quickly emplaced, 

reasonably inexpensive, and capable of handling at 

least Military Load Class 25 traffic. This bridging 

would meet the needs of anticipated humanitariantypr, missions both abroad and in the United States 

for natural disaster relief. 

The limited supplies of prepositioned engineer 

class IV,bridging, and pipeline have low priority 

for movement into theater. Engineer prestocks of 

class IV items were found to be inadequate for planning OOTW missions. Military resupply demand 

gravitates toward '?Jeans and bullets," and most 

prestock materiels support this concept. Therefore 

tanks, artillery, and the ammunition to support 

them are scheduled to go first. During OOTW missions, large supplies of tanks, artillery, and ammunition may not be needed. Instead, these missions 

need "up front" equipment and personnel to repair 

infrastructure damage and utilities, and to provide 

food, shelter, medical treatment, security, and sanitation for large numbers of displaced military 

andlor civilian personnel. These missions require 

rations, fuel, engineer construction materiel, and 

medical supplies. 

Because large quantities of engineer materiel 

will be required for Bosnia (or any third world country), the Army must preposition engineer materiel 

as far forward as possible. All levels of command 

must unde~standthe scope of humanitarian assistance and evaluate the requirements to establish 

and sustain operations. Priorities for prestocked 

materiels must be reviewed at the theater level. 

This review will determine priorities for push package resupply and troop mixtures for the total deployment package. 

Engineer Equipment Maintenance 

Challenges 

(Or; do you have a plan to support engineer equipment maintenance for euervone?) 

aintenance requirements for U.S., coalition, and contracted engineer equipment in 

theater will be extremely frustrating. units will 

find it difficult to maintain all the types of equipment. Consider the mechanics' dilemma but limit it 

in this context to bulldozers. How many potential 

bulldozers might a heavy engineer equipment mechanic expect to see in a theater such as Bosnia? 

Besides the makes and models used by Army engineers, there will be those used by other DOD services as well as those used by U.S, contractors. Then 

add equipment used by coalition forces from four or 
five countries (possibly including former WARSAW 

Pact countries) and their contractors, plus those 

used by relief organizations. Considering the various models from each country, it is easy to believe 

that a mechanic may be required to work on 50 

types of bulldozers. 

Then consider the different types of engineer 

equipment (graders, scrapers, loaders, etc.). If we 

assume 100 bulldozers of each type, a little quick 

math places 5000 bulldozers in theater. Assuming 

an optimistic 85 percent readiness rate, an estimated 750 bulldozers may need repair on any 

given day. And the issue of evacuation for major repairs hasn't even been addressed. 

Commanders must determine what level of maintenance will be done in theater; major repairs probably will require evacuation. Engineer units must 

take only their best equipment-inoperable equipment or equipment with a history of being inoperable must be left behind. Units must replace all 

consumable service items (belts and filters) prior to 

deployment and stockpile replacements both in the 

equipment and in that secret conex every maintenance shop hides away Operators must learn troubleshooting skills and do as much internal maintenance as possible before going to a higher level of 

maintenance. When deploying for an OOTW mission, 

double the number of spares: two spare tires may 

mean the difference between getting equipment back 

to base camp or finding it stripped along the road. 

MineICountermine Operations 

10~are your personnel trained in mine detection, 

explosive breaching, and route clearance?) 

any soldiers have little confidence in the 

ability of nonmetallic mine detectors to detect nonmetallic mines. During predeployment 

training, users of mine detectors found they had difficulty detecting and neutralizing nonmetallic 

mines. The threat to U.S. soldiers from mines is significant. During predeployment training in sweeping, breaching, and clearing mines, many combat 

engineers experienced multiple failures while trying to detect nonmetallic training versions of nonmetallic mines. The multiple sensor mechanisms, 

anti-handling devices, and fail-safes incorporated 

into the current generation of mines makes breaching of minefields with mine detectors or by probing 

a costly, time-consuming, and excessively dangerous method. Approximately 750,000 mines are scattered throughout Bosnia. Most of them have stateof-the-art technology, and 75 percent are anti-personnel mines scattered in unrecorded minefields. 

The current mine detector has difficulty detecting 

these mines, and manual probing methods are 

costly in terms of injuries. 

The Army must continue effective training on 

the current mine detector while developing standoff 

and robotics capabilities to breach mines. Units 

should train in explosive mine removal or contract 

mine removal operations. All mine breachingiclearing operations must be done very slowly and carefully Time must not be a critical factor in neutralizing mines. For the majority of mines encountered, 

priority should be to identify, mark, record, and report. Emphasis must be placed on exposing the 

minimum possible number of personnel to a mine 

hazard and soldiers must be constantly reinforced 

with the policy of not touching mines 

Sustainability of Lines of 


Communication 


(Or, have you used the terrain rather than troop 

limits to plan force sustainment?) 

ngineer units may expect extreme difficulty 

in sustaining lines of communication (roads, 

railroads, airfields, canals) in Bosnia, in either a 

belligerent or nonbelligerent environment. Terrain 

and mission analyses indicate that massive 

amounts of logistical support will be required to 

support an operation in Bosnia. Conservative estimates reflect a requirement to use the roads, railroads, airfields, and canals at full capacity to support operations. Interdiction of any of these routes 

during relief operations would strain all other 

routes and may cause bottlenecks at ports and airfields both inside and outside the area of operations. Terrain analysis of area maps shows multiple tunnels (road and rail) easy to destroy; bridges 

(road and rail) easy to drop; steep, winding roads 

with no bypass easy to crater; canals easy to block; 

and airfields that could be easily denied to heavy, 

strategic aircraft. Sabotage and interdiction are 

both easy and likely. 

In Bosnia and most other potential OOTW mission areas, engineers should be perceived as a humanitarian force, in the country to provide humanitarian assistance to a starving and demoralized 

population. Engineers must complete projects that 

both support the deployed forces and benefit the 

country and the people. Ideally, operations that 

benefit the people are preferred over combat-related operations. To achieve these objectives, planners must consider circular, one-way routes that facilitate movement of materials inland. Additionally, 

engineers must move heavy construction materials 

and equipment into theater early A few days spent 

widening and repairing road and rail networks will 

November 1993 
expedite future operations. Sufficient engineer forces must be deployed at all levels to complete 

the mission. 

Follow-on Operations 

(Or, now that we are finally 

here, what do we do?) 

There were discussions at all 

levels to determine in-theater infrastructure repair requirements and who would do the 

work. Higher echelons made 

plans for lower echelon engineers, 

but the lower level engineers 

knew little about the requirements. Multiple plans were developed to contract substantial 

amounts of bridge and road work. In some cases, 

military operations were contingent upon the ability of private contractors to repair and construct 

bridges and roads. Plans did not address the engineer forces' need to construct facilities for refugee 

bed-down and sustainment. Engineer forces in support of maneuver forces were tasked to breach obstacles and minefields but no follow-on engineer 

units were identified to clear obstacles beyond the 

hasty breach. Responsibility for rapid runway repair and airfield damage repair was not 

established. 

The civilian command structure must determine 

the conditions for entry into operations (belligerent 

or nonbelligerent and type of operation). In essence, they must answer the "million dollar question" asked by all planners and described in Draft 

FM 100-23, Peace Operations, (page 2-3) as the commander's dilemma (Figure 2). The task force commander can then establish and prioritize engineer 

missions, and the task force engineer can assign 

work sectors (by capability) to allies and joint or 

separate services. 

If there is contradictory guidance, engineer planners must make assumptions based on the terrain 

and plan accordingly 

In planning OOTW missions, engineer planners 

will hce many other issues, such as: 

Commander's Dilemma 

The commander must be able to accurately assess his mission as one 

entailing combat, not entalling combat, or one in which combat is 

probabie. 

The commander must know if he is to be partial or impartial to the 

beiilgerent parties, or to which parties partiality exists. 

Without such fundamental understanding, it is impossible to appropriately structure forces or plan for and conduct operations, and difficult to 

develop military objectives to achieve the desired political end state. 

- Excerpts from Draft Version 4, FM 100-23Peace Operations 

- Flgure 2 

m Maps 

Airfield matting 

w Use of LOGCAP 

w Cross-leveling of planning 

w Environmental pollution restrictions 

p-neineer planners for OOTW missions face difI 

i UfGult challenges. In planning for a potential 

operation in Bosnia, all military personnel, regardless of their branch of service or country of origin, 

must be clearly dedicated to completing the planning mission to the best of their ability. The recommendations in this article are presented to facilitate planning efforts for Bosnia or other scenarios, 

and to strengthen U.S. Army engineer support for 

future OOTW scenarios. Y 

m Effects of the drawdown on engineer forces 

w Compartmentalization of planning changes 

and information 

w Rotation of in-theater forces 

a Training in sustainment capabilities 

Crisis and deliberate planning methods 

Major Brown is a diuision chief in the Department 

of Combat Engineering, U.S. Army Engineer 

School. He was the USAES engineer officer supporting the Combined Arms Assessment Team for the 

Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth) 

that conducted the Bosnian Predeployment Assessment in Europe. Major Brown holds a Masters' degree in public administration from Webster 

University. 

For additional observations related to Bosnia preplanning, send a blank 3.5 inch, high density disk 

to: Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer Schwl, ATTN: 

ATSE-T-CE-V,Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473. 

November 1993 
The Forward-Deployed, All-Contingency, 


Corps Engineer Brigade 


CH-47D Hellcopter sling-loadlng one rlbbon bay In support of 

full closure of the Rhlne River, vicinlty Karlsruhe, Armed 

Forces Day, June 1992. 

November 1993 

By Lieutenant Colonel John L.Craig 

Introduction 

ahe 130th Engineer Brigade is a unique brigade in the U.S. Army. It is the only engineer 

unit outside the U.S. Army Engineer school that encompasses the full spectrum of engineer capabilities--combat, vertical and horizontal construction, 

all types of bridging and topographic (Figure 1)-

and the only tactical unit with capabilities in all 

five engineer major mission areas: mobility, countermobility, survivability, sustainment engineering, and 

topographic engineering. With conversion of 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division engineer 

battalions to divisional engineer brigades under the 

Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI), the 130th is 

now both V Corps Engineer Brigade and the senior 

tactical engineer headquarters in Europe. It is one 

of the few eneineer - units above division level in 

NATO and one of two Corps Engineer brigades on 

active duty in the Army. (The other is 20th Engineer Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps.) 

In addition to V Corps, the 130th supports 

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) and the 

European Command (EUCOM). The brigade reflects all the changes the Army is absorbing as the 

'Wew World Order" emerges. Major changes that 

impacted USAREUR during the past four years included winning the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin 

Wall and German reunification, deployments to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and the 

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) drawdown. 

The 130th is no longer primarily General Defense 

Plan-oriented but focuses increasingly on missions 

outside Germany. 

This article addresses what the 130th is doing as 

a key element in V Corps' role as the Army's 

forward-deployed, fully capable contingency corps 

and how it is meeting the challenge of a wide variety of missions and responsibilities. 

Engineer 7 
(Bridge), and 649th (Topographic) (Figure 2). The 

54th and 565th are corps-level battalions; the 94th 

Brigade Capabii 	 and 649th are theater-level battalions. The new 

130th retains the 6970th Civilian Support Center 

(CSC) (Construction) and the 535th Combat Support 54th -	 MecP mbat Engineers: Provides Equipment (CSE) Company, which is attached to the 

the L, 	 ,.,. ,attle flexibility. 94th. 

9Ith -	 Reinlforced Con ibat Heavy Englneere Currently, the 130th has nearly 3,000 soldiers 

Responslble for all troop c:onstructiol and civilians. The brigade's present associated reUSA13EUR. serve units include nearly 8,000 soldiers and an informal association with former 7th Engineer Bri565th - Tactlcal Assault Bridging: The sole corps gade Capstone units. 
 crossing cabability. 
 The 130th'~ structure focuses on warfighting and 

MBth - Topographlc Engineer: Topographlt theater support, and its mission and mission essensupport to V Corps and USAREUR. tial task list (METL) reflect this. CI54 Engineer 

Battalion was part of the Allied Mobile Forces6970th - CSC Battallon: Complete design a Land (AMF-L),a NATO rapid-reaction force. 

istruction capablllty. 	 AMF-L has unique associated missions, equipment 

and training, its missions will revert to the 130th 

early in 1994. 

The brigade staff is augmented with a construcFigure 1 	 tion management section (normally part of theater), which coordinates and oversees all USAREUR 

troop construction including project development, 

Structure And Missions design, and quality control. The 94th and 6970th 

CSC do nearly all theater troop construction. DurFrom July to December 1992, the 130th transi- ing war, the 6970th transitions to Pionier Battalion 

- tioned to a new "end-state" structure through 491 as part of the German Territorial Army but conactivation, inactivation, redeployment, restationing, tinues to provide USAREUR the same high-quality 

or reconfiguration of many units. Restructuring construction. 

was achieved while conducting normal operations, As V Corps Engineer, the 130th Brigade Comtraining, force modernization, turn-in of excess mander also has an Assistant Corps Engineer Ofequipment, recovery from Southwest Asia deploy- fice, which is a key component of the V Corps staff. 

ments and many short-notice deployments. The This robust engineer staff is essential to synchroniz130th now consists of four engineer battalions: ing mobility, countermobility and survivability bat54th (Mechanized), 94th (Combat Heavy), 565th tlefield operating systems at the operational level. 

Iawn cnaineer br~gaoe 

Hanau 

I

llldtiecken 

-

Vtlseck 

I 

Karlsruhe Schwetzlng 

Figure 2 

8Engineer 	 Nouenzber 1993 
130th Engineer Brigade 

Geographical Dispersion in Germany 

.-

..: -. ,+ .' Wlldflecken

"atmu .\

':. . . 535th EN CO (C:SE) 94th ECB (H) 

unn Dtslamas 

565th EN EN 

93 CO AFB 502 CO AFB 

516 CO MGR 

649th EN BN 

- Karlsruhe 

. . 

Hohenfels 'F\ iR. 

Figure 3 

The 1301h's new structure presents some challene. Distances units must travel daily (Figure 3) 

impact significantly on support and on command 

and control, making coordination and synchronization at various levels more difficult Leaders work 

hard to overcome these distanrrs and the uncertainty of drawdown. Like all engineer units, the 

130th is challenged by low-density military occupational specialties and equipment. 

Drawdown Challenges

while conversions under ERI are nearly wmplete for divisional engineer brigades, the 

54th has only recently converted to a smaller corps 

combat engineer battalion under ERI. The 54th; 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 

(HHD), 665th Engineer Battalion; 93rd Engineer 

Company (Assault Float Bridge) (AFB); and 516th 

Engineer Company (Medium Girder Bridge) (MGB) 

have been notified of inactivation during winter 

1993-94. The 54th, with Bl94 attached, is part of 

Wildflecken's inactivation and turnover to German 

control. Bi94's inactivation is also part of an Armywide plan to inactivate the third line company in 

all engineer combat-heay battalions. The 38th Engineer Company (MGB) and 502nd Engineer Company (AFB) are moving from &rlsruhe to Hanau. 

16th Engineer Battalion, 3rd Infantly Division is 

moving from Erlangen to Bamberg and will resubordinate under the 130th in January 1994. 

November 1993 

As the drawdown progresses, there is a corresponding increase in the work needed to prepare 

facilities for turnover and in work requirements for 

Department of Defense schools. The 6970th CSC 

has assumed many of these additional tasks. 

Training And Exercises 

Since July 1992, the 130th has conducted or 

participated in a wide range of corps, brigade 

and lower-level exercises to upgrade and enhance 

skills and capabilities. Some examples follow. 

In-Country Exercises: 

- Central Fortress, July 1992. Corps train-up for 

Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER). Repeated March 1993 as train-up for April-May 1993 

REFORGER. 

- REPORGER 19921Certain Caravan, September 

October 1992. A wrps Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). (Read this as a corps external evaluation (EXEVAL).) Included four reserve Capstone 

engineer groups fmm U.S. Part of the largest computersimulated wargame to date. All battalions deployed, 

playing varied roles such as liaison officers, simulation center personnel, and hosts to reserve groups. 

- Sapper Lightning, August 1992. A complex 

exercise involving over 1,500 soldiers, a river crossing with 150 vehicles including MI tanks and M2 

Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and military police and 

signal assets. 
- Sapper Lightning, June 1993. This combined 

field exercise (CFX) integrated internal battalion 

training, a brigade-driven command past exercise 

(CPX), and EXEVALs for the 94th, 535th CSE, 

HHD 565th, and Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company (HHC) Brigade. This CFX challenged 

command and control of units spread over a 7,000 

square kilometer area with missions they might 

have to perform in various contingency scenarios. 

The exercise included air assets, a simulated river 

crossing and attachment of a combat heavy company as part of a combat maneuver training center 

rotation. Locations included Kitzingen, Wildflecken, 

Grafenwoehr, Schweinfurt, Hohenfels and Vilseck. 

An augmented Brigade Headquarters simultaneously operated an evaluator cell and its normal Tactical Operations CenterIAdministration and Logistics Operations Center. The Exercise Control Cell 

simulated Allied Command, Europe; USAREUR; 

412 Engineer Command and V Corps. 

Out-of-countryexercises: 

- Noble Shirley, Middle East, June 1993. Provided observers. This exercise generated interoperability training with a Marine Expeditionary 

Unit. 

- Intrinsic Action, August-October 1993. Provided 

support to Task Force 2-37 Armor, Kuwait. 

- Silent Endeavor and Roaring Lion, 1993. Sent 

terrain teams to United Kingdom, supporting Special Operations Command, Europe. 

Missions And Nation Assistance 

As part of its responsibility for all USAREUR 

troop construction, the 130th has completed 

numerous design and construction projects at the 

major training areas: Hohenfels, Grafenwoehr, 

Wildflecken. The George C. Marshall Center for International Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, dedicated 5 June 1993, is a high-visibility 

project. Construction projects are ongoing throughout Germany. 

During the past year the 130th has supported V 

Corps by deployments within USAREUR, to former 

Eastern-Bloc countries and the former Soviet Union, and to Africa and Southwest Asia as part of nation assistance. Operations the 130th supported 

by deploying and helping other units deploy 

include: 

- Provide Con~fort I,II,III. Sent two bridge engineers from 565th as technical supervisors for construction of a double-double Bailey bridge to replace the Gulf War-damaged bridge over the Habur 

River, Zakho, Iraq, April-May 1993. Provided two 

combat-heavy engineers as technical supervisors 

for erection of two clamshell tents, Incirlik, Turkey, 

10 Engineer 

April-May 1993. Sent two topographic engineers to 

support Joint Task Force Provide Comfort, Incirlik, 

June-December 1992. 

- Provide Hope II and III. Sent technical advisors and assistance in conjunction with 7th Medical 

Command to upgrade existing facilities and install 

medical equipment in hospitals in Tiblisi, Georgia 

(August-September 1992); Bishkek, Kyrgystan 

(March-April 1993) and Moscow, Russia (ongoing). 

- Provide Promise. Furnished technical assistance in constructing Harvest Falcon tents and providing utilities to 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital and U.S.Air Force as part of UN forces, 

Zagreb, Croatia, October-November 1992. Furnished two terrain analysts to Joint Task Force Provide Promise, Naples, Italy (ongoing). 

- Able Sentry, Skopje, Macedonia, June-July 

1993. Conducted recon to determine requirements 

for upgrading facilities for U.S. forces as part of 

UN forces. Provided topographic support to Macedonia, October 1993. 

- Southern Watch, Saudi Arabia. Provided individual fillen to 6-43 Air Defense Battalion, July 

1993-January 1994. 

- Restore Hope. Installed clamshell tents, 

Livorno, Italy to support deployment to Somalia, 

December 1992. Provided individual fillers in specific MOSS, Somalia, December 1992-ongoing. 

- Shared Endeavor, March 1993. Range facility 

upgrade project design for joint U.S.-Botswana defense forces. 

- Cyprus, July-Augwt 1993. Provided construction support for a State Department air bridge mission to Beirut, Lebanon. 

- Romania and Bulgaria, May 1993, repeated 

September 1993. Sent technical advisors on float 

bridging to relieve congestion at exit points from 

former Yugoslavia. 

- Uganda. Assessment of Ugandan Army engineer capabilities, July 1992. 

- Liberia. Assessment team for implementing 

Liberian peace plan, August 1993. 

The 649th continues to provide hundreds of thousands of maps and other terrain analysis products 

for operations in NATO, EUCOM and USAREUR. 

The 130th is heavily in demand because it has 

the only corps combat, construction, bridge and 

topographic engineers in USAREUR. Continued 

out-of-sector deployments to numerous "hot spots" 

and nation-assistance missions are anticipated. 

Our "Lessons Learned" 

This is only an interim report. What we have 

learned so far is not unique to the 130th Engineer Brigade. The biggest lesson learned is 

"Stick to the Basics" (physical fitness; weapons 

November 1993 
proficiency; well-trained, disciplined, deployable soldiers; solid family support groups; developing a brigade team). We have relearned the importance of 

supply accountability, maintenance and challenging 

training programs keyed to missions. Tasks must 

be performance-oriented and trained to standard, 

with compliance checked by EXEVALs and command inspections. 

As a result of recent out-of-sector missions' focus 

on upgrading and developing facilities, technical 

bridging advice and assistance and topographic support such as terrain analysis, surveying and map 

production, the 130th has developed routines including a "playbook" of deployment packages across 

the spectrum of engineer capabilities. This playbook allows the brigade to respond quickly with 

standard packages to short-notice deployments. 

Packages are developed based on real-world contingencies. Squad battle drills provide the same focus 

for quick response to events at that level. Battle 

drills have been established for combat, combatheay, bridge and topographic engineers to help provide uniform training on primaly tasks. 

For all missions, the importance of on-the-ground 

reconnaissance cannot be overstated. Knowledgeable 

soldiers must be placed on the ground and given 

sufficient resources and guidance so they can provide a concise, cogent report. The main body can 

then be tailored and trained to accomplish the assigned mission. 

Emerging lessons learned include increasing support to the UN, sustainment and mobility support, 

short-notice deployments, local national labor and 

construction standards, real estate management, 

foreign languages, legitimate mission taskings 

93rd Engineer Company (AFB) rafts an 

MI msln battle tank 

across the Main Rlver, 

Ellman, Germany, In 

May 1993. 

through operational channels, mine warfare and 

the versatility of and need for Bailey bridges. 

Summary 

The 130th'~ oroud historv and tradition bewn - JL when its fo;nding father unit, the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment, was activated at 

Camp Ellis, Illinois, 15 July 1943. The 1303rd 

played an important part in World War 11, with 

campaign credits for Normandy, Northern France, 

Ardennes-Alsace, the Rhineland, Central Europe 

and the Asian-Pacific Theater. Today that history 

is taking on exciting new dimensions. The brigade 

has been tasked with unique responsibilities borne 

by no other tactical unit in the U.S. Army. Engineer officers who desire "dirty-boot" experience and 

exposure to the full spectrum of engineer missions 

cannot find a better, more challenging assignment 

than with the 130th. Here, in addition to the normal stimulus of service in Germany, the high probability of deployments throughout the NATO and 

EUCOM areas of responsibility and beyond provides 

officers, warrant officers and NCOs with extraordinary opportunities for professional development. 

Y 


Lieutenant Colonel Craig is S3 of the 130th Engineer Brigade, USARE UR. Previous assignments in the U.S. and 

Kor.ea include battalion Sl, S3 and XO; command of four 

engineer companies; chief of a readiness group combat 

aTms division; research engineer and i-sorrrce management officer. A grzduate of the Command and General 

Staff College, LTC Craig holds Master of Science degrees 

fivm Cential Missouri State University and the Uniue~ 

sily of Alaska. 

November 1993 Engineer 11 
I 

Book Review 


Great Sieges of History, by William 

Seymour. Brassey's (UK), 1991. 338 

pages. 

Sieges and their associated engineering feats have long fascinated 

military historians. Executed in a methodical manner, pitting adversary 

against opponent in a contest of wills 

to gain the upper hand, sieges stimulate the imagination. 

Contemporary combat engineers can 

trace their lineage back to the sappers 

who conducted sieges throughout history. Most studies have focused on relatively recent and prominent sieges, 

such as those at Vicksburg, Leningrad, 

Dien Bien Phu, and Khe Sanh. This 

outstanding book chronicles, dissects, 

and assesses 16 historical sieges, including lesser known ones at Acre 

(1189-911, Constantinople (1453),Vienna (16831, Ladysmith (1899-1900), 

and Kut-el-Amara (1915-16). Each chapter is well researched, lucidly written, 

and concentrates on siege methodology, 

logistics, and the all-important human 

element of warfare. 

The author includes features that enhance the book's value to military readers. The first chapter, "The Mechanics 

of a Siege," provides an excellent overview of siege craft, techniques, and machines, and how they have evolved over 

the centuries. Detailed illustrations 

and maps supplement the text and permit the reader to visualize the course 

of each siege and place it within the 

proper strategic and historical r~ntext. 

Chapter 2, which describes the siege 

of Acre in 1189-91, is typical. It begins 

with a short narrative of the historical, 

religious, and social background of the 

crusades, then introduces the main adversaries-Richard "the Lionhearted" 

versus Saladin-and their armies' main 

weapons and tactics. The placement of 

fortifications, construction of siege engines, and sorties and attacks are assessed in rich detail. The crusaders' conquest of Acre after a ferocious 2-year 

siege paved the way for the Christian 

recapture of Jerusalem. The significance of this siege according to the 

author is that "it represents a classical 

example of early siege warfare, made 

all the more interesting by the fact that 

the besiegers were themselves besieged 

by a solid ring of Muslim troops." 

William Seymour, the author of 'Decisive Factors in Twenty Rattles of the 

\Vorld" and other superb books, has enhanced his reputation as a military historian with the publication of "Great 

Sieges of History." This informative 

book is enjoyable to read and provides 

engineers with a superb historical appreciation for their craft. It will be a 

welcome addition to your bookshelf. 

Major Harold E. Raugh, Jr., is an infantryman currently serving as XO of 

the 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division 

(light), at Fort Ord, California. He hus 

held command and staff nppointments 

in Berlin, Korea, and the United States, 

and with the United Nations in Egypt 

and Jordan. A graduate of the U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College, Major Rac~gh holds a doctorate in 

history from the University of Californza, Los Angeles. 

12 Engineer November 1993 
Personal Viewpoint 


Wake Up Again, Engineers! 


By Lieutenant Colotzel Don T.Riley 

The April 1993 issue of 

,,ENGINEER contains a Personal Viewpoint article by LTC 

Bill West with a similar title. 

LTC West states several good 

reasons why engineers have become a lesser member on the 

combined arms team. His prescription for getting us back on 

the first string in heavy divisions 

is to replace our MI13 arid combat. engineer vehicle (CEV) with 

the Bradley fighting vehicle (M2) 

and the Abrams tank (MI), respectively. This is a valuable 

step; however, it may be a slippery 

step as well. 

If we are not careful, it just. 

might load us down the path toward a structure with little or no 

engineers--an inf'antrylarmorheavy structure with "combat engineering" work accomplished by 

llMs (infantrymen) and 19Ks 

(tankers). If we don't perform well 

as engineers, we will never be of 

much value to the combined arms 

team-regardless of what type of 

equipment we have. 

Back to the Basics 

Tlr'd like to suggest that the 

- .best and quickest way for us 

to regain our stature on the team 

is to get back to the basics of 

combat engineering. The first 

step is good engineer staff work 

based on a solid knowledgr? of the 

Nouen~ber1933 

''The commander 

who has a good 

feel for the 

terrain and 

knows the best 

way to use it to 

his advantage has 

significant 

leverage." 

terrain and its implications. A 

thorough, insightful engineer estimate is the answer. 

The commander who has a good 

feel for the terrain and knows the 

best way to use it to his advantage 

has significant leverage. This 

knowledge translates directly to 

increased agility on the battlefield 

and, thus, greater combat power. 

Clearly, the proper use of terrain 

can be decisive in battle. It is our 

responsibility as engineer staff officers to know the terrainand then 

to communicate that knowledge to 

the commander so that he clearly 

undelstands its impacts on his 

operation. 

Over the past 10 years, we (and 

I include myself as a culprit in 

this) have unwittingly allowed the 

militarv intelli~ence - community 

to assume the role as the commander's primary terrain analysis 

experts. The Intelligence School 

developed a superb methodical 

and systematic approach to staff 

analysis, the intellience preparation of the battlefield (IPB). It includes an analysis of the terrain 

and its effects on operations (OKOKA) and how the enemy will 

likely use the terrain to hisadvantage. In addition, an engineer terrain detachment is assigned to the 

Division G-2 to support the IPB. 

As a result, the commander now 

looks to his S-2 or G-2 more often 

than not for terrain analysis. We 

cannot allow this to continueor we 

may be one of the "first to feel the 

knife in future budget cuts," as 

LTC West implies. 

In my experience (albeit limited), engineers don't analyze terrain well. This, however, is only a 

recent development. There are 

many historical examples of engineer staff officers who were adept 

at terrain analysis. Typically 

those engineers became essential 

to their commanders and one of 

the most, if not the most, trusted 

and important members of their 

staff Perhaps the best known examples are Napoleon Bonaparte 

and his chief of staff (a geographical engineer), Marshal Alexandre 

Berthier; General Winfield Scott 

(Corttini~edO?Lpage 52.) 

Engineer 13 
An Engineer Partmersbi~J? 

By Major Allen C. Estes 

aoday's Army requires that fully integrated In the past, the training and affiliation between 

force packages containing high-priority Re- AC and RC units was based on cold war-era war 

serve Component (RC) units be trained and ready plans for specific geographical areas. Today, the 

to go to war at any time. Bold Shift is the Army's Army is getting smaller and will be stationed to a 

initiative to create a single standard for RC and Ac- greater degree in the continental United States 

tive Component (AC) forces. General Edwin H. (CONUS). With the requirement to project power 

Burba, the former commander of Forces Command quickly in reaction to a variety of contingencies, 

(FORSCOM), has stated that the intent of the pro- the training relationship between AC and RC units 

gram is to "design those policies, procedures, and had to change. 

execution techniques that will ensure high levels of Rather than wait until 1993 for a polished and 

training and readiness." refined program, FORSCOM chose to implement a 

248th Engineer Company (Construction Support) 

Figure 1 

14 Engineer November I993 

I 
nlcal tasks 

Lane training 

Establish a platoon defense 

w 4-hour exercise: 8-9 June 1992 

Figur 

pilot program in 1992 and build the lessons learned 

into an improved effort for 1993. The guidance provided to participating units was deliberately vague, 

and partner units were left to implement the detaib themselves. 

Bold Shift in Action 

w Training exercise--not a test 

rn Tactical - vs - tech1 

=-I-- EstablishaPerimeter Defenslve OPFOR 

Attack 

Platoon 

OPORD 

-

The 43rd Engineer Battalion (Combat), an AC 

After Action 

Report 

I:Lcombat heah battalion stationed at Fort Benning, was linked with the 248th Engineer Company 

(Construction Support), an Army National Guard 

unit that trains at Stone Ranch, Connecticut. The 

idea was to link the RC unit with a similar AC 

unit. Since no construction support companies exist 

in the AC, a combat heavy battalion was the closest available match. 

Construction support companies are authorized 

151 soldiers, who are divided into maintenance, asphalt, quarry, headquarters, and equipment platoons (Figure 1).Because the 43rd (a typical combat heavy battalion) lacked rock-crushing or 

asphalt capabilities, it was able to provide only limited technical assistance. This partnership was 

probably the best available since a combat heavy 

battalion would probably be augmented with a construction support company during war. 

The first step in implementing Bold Shift was a 

series of monthly visits, starting in January 1992, 

when personnel from the 43rd visited the 248th 

during their inactive duty for training (IDT) weekends. They provided support ranging from initial assessments and evaluations to preparations for the 

rigorous two-week active duty for training (AT) in 

June. Their most valuable technical assistance was 

in NBC operations and material quality testing. 

Leader 

Reconnaissance 

Visits later in the year focused on preparations 

for the lane training exercise, which is an area of 

emphasis for Bold Shift. Lane training works superbly for a combat arms unit, where large numbers of similar platoons can be efficiently trained 

on the same critical, mission-essential task by using a heavily-resourced, well-planned lane. It is 

more difficult to develop lane training for construction support companies and other units that have 

platoons with diverse missions and no technical 

tasks in common. The 43rd chose to establish a defensive position as the lane training exercise because the tactical tasks were common to all platoons, which were coached and evaluated 

separately. 

The 43rd prepared and executed the same fourhour exercise for each platoon; this provided the soldiers with some combat-focused training (Figure 2). 

While the collective task was to establish a defensive position, the exercise tested individual and 

leadership tasks as well. These tasks ranged from 

clearing booby traps and establishing communications to preparing range cards and camouflaging 

fighting positions. Each platoon leader was required to start with a verbal operations order to 

his platoon. Leaders then conducted a rea nnaissance of the assigned area and set up a dr,bnsive 

perimeter. After reacting to a chemical attack and 

conducting demasking procedures, the exercise culminated with an attack by an opposing force (OPFOR) and reconsolidation. The final critical event 

was an after-action review in which the leaders, 

OPFOR,listening postlobservation post (LPIOP), 

soldiers, and evaluators provided immediate feedback on what occurred and what could be done 

better. 

The 248th had a busy AT. It incorporated lane 

training conducted by the 43rd, an ARTEP 

-+ 

Nouenzber 1993 
evaluated by the 76th Maneuver Training Command (MTC), and an operational readiness exercise (ORE) conducted by a FORSCOM team. The 

ORE rigidly tested the 248th'~ability to perform 

their mission. Evaluators from the 43rd assisted 

with the ARTEP, augmented the ORE team, and 

completed the training assessment model (TAM) 

The TAM is a new evaluation packet that replaces the 1-R evaluation traditionally given to 

RC units. 

Lessons Learned 

The first year of Bold Shift is over, leaving beL hind some comments and lessons learned for 

the future: 

Apparently, nobody fully understands the program. Units have interpreted the sparse guidance differently and have developed their own 

ideas about what Bold Shift should ammplish. More definitive guidance is needed after 

the experiences from the pilot tests have been 

compiled and evaluated. Nevertheless, the decislon to implement a partially complete program in FY 92 rather than waiting an extra 

year was sound. The valuable work that was 

acr~mplishedand the lessons learned on the 

ground could not have occurred in a planner's 

office. 

m Lane training is not necessarily efficient for 

construction support companies with different 

The 248th Construction suppon Cornpany produces 

asphalt, a crlllcal 

wartime task. 

platoon compositions. Lane training worked 

well during tactical tasks this year, but establishment of a platoon defense was not a critical task. On the battlefield, the 248th will be 

needed to produce asphalt, crush rock, and 

pave roads. The limited time available for unit 

training should be used for these essential wartime tasks,which do not lend themselves easily to lane training. 

m The requirements for Bold Shift (lane training, ARTEP, ORE, TAM) were so numerous 

that unit leaders in the 248th Engineer Company had no time to conduct their own training during the two-week annual training. 

m The 43rd Engineer Battalion sent different 

leaders on each monthly visit because of operational requirements and personnel turnover. 

This allowed more officers exposure to the 

Bold Shift program but resulted in a lack of 

continuity between visits and hampered planning effectiveness 

The Bold Shift partnership between AC and 

RC units is helpful. However, people, equipment, money, and time would help much more 

than assbtance visits. 

Moving Folward 

W~ththe first year of Bold shift experience 

recorded and evaluated, 1993 brought sevel.,il changes to the program. One important 
-- 

change is that a large number of AC officers and 

noncommissioned officers are now being assigned 

to Readiness Commands to work full time with 

RC units. Another important change is that 

many Bold Shift units have been replaced or 

realigned. 

The initial selection of units to participate in 

Bold Shift was done quicMy and was based on wartime mission, unit status, equitable regional distribution, and political considerations. The selection 

of units in 1993 focused on developing a pool of AC 

and RC units that could rapidly deploy in response 

to any number of potential regional contingencies. 

FORSCOM identified these units based on input 

from individual state Adjutants General and major 

army commands. They designated these units as 

"Contingency Force Pool One" units. The CONUSbased corps (I,111, XVIII) then aligned the AC and 

RC units in Directed Training Associations (DTAs) 

based on the RC unit's priority for deployment, the 

complexity of tasks to be trained, and the criticality of the unit. 

The corps tried to match RC units with similar 

AC units. As a result, the 43rd is currently aligned 

we tnlnK engineers take a special pride in their 

profession, and ENGINEER is always looking for < 

ticles from readers who want to share their expertise, experience and ideas. 

If you're a potential contributing writer, here are 

few 'Writer's guide" tips that should help steer you 

in a DTA with three Army National Guard units: 

the 133rd Engineer Battalion (Portland, Maine), 

the 653rd Engineer Utilities Team (Camp Blanding, Florida), and the 679th Engineer Utilities 

Team (Columbia, South Carolina). The 43rd has visited its new Bold Shift partners during IDT periods 

and is actively establishing a training 

relationship. 

As Bold Shift undergoes further refinements, 

units can expect more cjlanges. Nevertheless, the 

Army remains committed to integrating AC and RC 

unit training and emphasizing the Total Army 

concept. Y 

Major Estes is the Group S-3for the 36th Engineer 

Group. He previously served as the S-3for the 43rd 

Engineer Battalion. He hns taught in the Structures 

and Utilities Branch of the Engineer School and the 

Department of Mechanics at West Point. Major 

Estes graduated from West Point and has two 

masters degrees in civil engineering front Stanford University. He is a registered professional engineer in Virginia. 

, -. 

:he active voice. 

Length should range between 2,000 and 4.000 

rds, and the text should be typewritten and dou- 

-spaced. Generally, each such page will contain 

m 200 to 250 words. 

Articles containing attributabl, e informal :ion or qur 3-

3 ctnn, .2hr,,,Id r-rnr ons not references within thc ,. ,,,, ,, 

~ropriate footnotes. 

in the right direction: Manuscripts must b e original, unpublished, and 

Articles can cover engineer training, operations 

or doctrine, engineer equipment, history, or other areas of general interest to an engineer readership. 

We're especially interested in articles that have a 

"hc)w-to-do-It-better" tlieme. Foi r instance, we're no 

IOC)king for 2trticles tel ling read€!rs how yc)U condu cted a rot dtine field exerclse. But if yo11 think yot 

have a new-ana-~mprovea way or conduct~ng a 1:3ctical operation, training exercise, or other operational procedure that may prove helpful to other er 1-

gineers-that's what we need. 

Articles should generally cor ne from c, ontributor!i 

with first-hand experience with the subje' ct being presented. 

Avoid the atrical wri ting style! ;like: "It was a da~ 

and stormy night...." c)r "...the soldier bla: zed throu( 

the? jungle o n his lumtIering D7 , providinsJ a trail of ,.A,.... <-- . .-k:..,-- fre~uu~ll IUI the other vallltilas.. 


Articles sl soncise, s 


- k.. ^^^.LA. ....k,;, . hl^. ! under consideratio,, uy atluuoc;, puvllLauu11, ~VUO-

,,,ailly, you c: an expect a reply toI your sub mission 

within one month aftel ' we recei ve it. 

411 submicisions are - subject 113 editing. . .. . .... ., , L;onIrlDu1ors are encouraaea -
 ro lncluae ~lac~-anaite photos, artwork. and/or lirle diagran ns to help 

strate your article. 

Include your full name, rank, current unit and job 

title?. Also inc:lude a list of your F)ast assignments, e'xPel'ience anc1 education, your m ailing adc lress, and L.-. - .. . . ..A COInfrlerciai daytime prlurle rlurr~ber. Seno vuur arrlcles to: Editor, ENGIIVEER Professional 

ATTN: ATSI S-T-PD-El3, Fort Le onard Wo 

65473-6650. 

If you hav e questio~7s about ;3n article you're 

rking on- -or consid ering writing-~ve our edit01 

thy Eubar~ks,a call at DSN E i76-4104, or coni- ..:-a ,".., ?-" ..-

4. 

hearing fr om you. 
Engineer School Directory 

Telephone numbers for the U.S. Army Engineer School changed on October 1, 1993. The following numbers will 

allow callers to reach key offices on Fort Leonard Wood. Commercial numbers are (314) 563-xru( and Defense 

System Nehvork (DSN) numbers are 676-XXYX unless otherwise noted. 

Engineer Center Commandant 

MG Joe N. Ballard 


563-61 16 


Engineer Center Command Sergeant Major 

CSM Roy L. Burns, Jr. 


563-61 49 


Assistant Commandant 

COL Robert B. Flowers 

563-61 59 


Deputies Assistant Commandant 

Army Reserve 

COL Ben M. Colcol 


563-4033 


Army National Guard 

LTC Harry L. Bryan, Jr, 


563-4034 


Directorate of Training 

Director 

COL Phillip R. Anderson 


563-4093 


Sergeant Major 

SGM Richard Guieb 

563-4094 


Executive Officer 

CPT Moises Perez 

563-4095 


Engineer Hotline 

563-4098 


Engineer Professional Bulletin 

Catherine Eubanks 

Directorate of Combat Developments 

Director 


COL Robert J. Greenwait, Jr. 


563-4076 


Executive Officer 

MAJ David Lepley 

563-7234 


(DCD, continued) 

Sergeant Major 

SGM Robert Dattilo 


563-4087 


Engineer Personnel Proponency Office 

Chief 

Victoria Anthony 


563-4087 


DSN 676-5351 


Warrant Officer Branch 

CW4 Pete Rinehart 


563-4088 


Directorate of Evaluation and 

Standardization 

Director 

LTC Joseph Maher 


563-4006 


IET/Resewe 

SFC Baudin 


563-4004 


Analysis Division 

Ist Engineer Brigade 

COL Wvland Leadbetter 


596-0224 


DSN 581 -0224 


CSM Smith Cade 


596-0395 


DSN 581 -0395 


3rd Training Brigade 

COL Franklin Hagenbeck 


596-0750 


DSN 581 -0750 


CSM Paul Rock 


596-0750 


DSN 581-0750 


18 Engineer November 1993 

I 
Leading the Way 


Throuqhout our nations's historv, the 

LJ.s>rmy's onc commissioned Officers (NCOs) have had a special trust: 

While carrying forward the best traditions of 

the past. they help to shape an Army of Excellence for today and tomorrow. 

Today's NCOs lead the way! They serve 

as small unit leaders, whether that unit is 

an engineer squad breaching an enemy 

minefield or a clerical staff at a corps headquarters. NCOs also serve as trainers, 

ready to teach soldiers everything they 

must know-from the proper wearing of the 

uniform to marksmanship. They must understand military professionalism and be able 

to pass along to others whatever knowiedge is required to accomplish the mission. 

Addit~onally, NCOs guard our standards. 

When NCOs guard standards for their subordinates, they act as role models for future 

guardians of standards. And when NCOs 

seek to Improve themselves professionally, 

they act as role models for future professionals. The following articles show how 

NCOs successfully learn, train, and enforce 

standards-how they perform their dut~es 

on a daily basis. 

It 1s an honor for me to be part of the 

Army's NCO Corps-and I salute the proud 

men and women who help shape our 

Army of Excellence. 

CSM W.E. Woodall, 

US.Amy, TRADOC CommandSergeant Major 
Libby lVoncommissioned Officers Academy 


By Staff Sergeant Edgar A. Stitt 

The U.S. Army has undergone many changes 

during the past few years. The Army's mission. 

equipment. and doctrine are changing to ensure that 

we will be prepared to meet tomorrow's challengesand those of the 2lst century. However, the bedrock 

principles that guide noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

development and training have not changed. Course 

content may change to reflect a changing Army; the 

philosophy that shapes preparation of NCOs to train 

and lead soldiers remains the same. 

Libby Noncommissioned Otf~cers Academy 

(Libby NCOA), located in Fort Leonard Wood, is responsible for training NCOs at primary, basic, and 

advanced levels. Established in 1954 as Fort 

Leonard Wood NCOA under 5th Army, the academy was redesignated in July 1973 as Llbby 

NCOA and Drill Sergeant School under the Army 

Training and Doctrine Command. Since 1986 it has 

been siibordinate to the U.S. Army Engineer 

Center. 

20 Engineer ~Vovember1993 
Libby NCOA is named after Sergeant George D. 

Libby, a Medal of Honor winner in the Korean Conflict 

whose valor and resourceful leadership under fire exemplified the highest standards of professionalism 

expected of NCOs. (See article, page 55) 

The academy's headquarters staff consists of its 

commandant, assistant commandant, chief of training, an administrative center, operations center, and 

supply office. The commandant is Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Julius B. Nutter. 

"Our mission is to provide Noncommissioned Officers Education System training to qualified soldiers, 

to train selected NCOs in the fundamentals of recruit 

training in the Initial Entry Training environment, to 

provide leadership training to company-grade officers 

and senior NCOs, and to advise and assist selected 

U.S. Army Reserve Training Divisions,'' Nutter says. 

He adds that 15 courses are taught at the academy, 

which has 90 assigned permanent party instructors 

and trains approximately 3,000 soldiers each year. 

Courses are presented in the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), Basic Noncommissioned 

Officers Course (BNCOC), Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), and the Drill Sergeant School (DSS). 

PLDC. The PLDC trains soldiers selected to\ enter the Noncommissioned Officer Corps in their r6- 

sponsibilities and authority as NCOs. It is organized 

to give junior level NCOs the basic leadership skills 

they will need to be effective team and crew leaders. 

First Sergeant Israel Y. Mendoza, chief of PLDC, 

states that the PLDC is presented in three phases in 

an NCOA live-in environment. Students receive 397 

hours of training. The program ends with an 

PLDC students practlce leader reconnalssance skllls during a 

collective training 

evaluation. 

extensive field training exercise that allows students 

to apply lessons learned. Graduates must be able to 

train soldiers on individual tasks. 

BNCOC. The BNCOC trains sergeants to assume squad-leader responsibilities after they return 

to their units. The majority of BNCOC students are selected by their career branch. BNCOC students from 

Forts Leonard Wood, Riley, Carson, and Bliss who 

are combat engineers are selected by their units. The 

course trains NCOs from many engineer-related career management fields (CMF). Courses last from 3 

to 12 weeks depending on the CMF, First Sergeant 

Randal W. Willis, Chief of BNCOC, points out that 

NCOs from 15 military occupational specialties 

(MOS) are trained at BNCOC. "We are responsible 

for ensuring that BNCOC students are trained to the 

current doctrine on all critical tasks in their MOS. We 

also build on the leadership skills learned in PLDC," 

Wlllis says. 

ANCOC. The ANCOC trains staff sergeants selected by Department of the Army (DA) as platoon 

sergeants for CMFs in combat engineering, combat 

construction, and topographic engineering. Courses 

vary from 3 to 8 weeks depending on the CMF. First 

Sergeant Kenneth Merrill, Chief of ANCOC, notes 

that in addition to training NCOs to lead and train the 

soldiers who will work and fight under their supervision, ANCOC provides technical and tactical job training. The course increases unit proficiency by improving the individual competence of its graduates. 

DSS. The DSS is one of only three drill sergeant 

schools in the Army. Candidates for DSS are selected by DA or volunteer for drill sergeant duty. "DSS 

trains drill sergeant candidates using the insist-assist 

Engineer 21 
PLDC student SPC McCoy instructs squad members duri 

collectlve training evaluation. 

leadership strategy. Candidates must demonstrate 

competence in all areas taught at DSS and maintain 

high standards of military courtesy and bearing, fitness and leadership. Drill sergeant leaders provide 

candidates with a tough, positive learning environment and serve as role models and mentors," says 

First Sergeant Charles Burke, Chief of DSS. 

All candidates receive the basic training program 

of instruction regardless of their future drill sergeant 

assignment. New graduates are assigned to initial entry training, one-station unit training, or advanced individual training units for 2-year tours as drill 

sergeants. 

Instructor Trainina -

Aibby NCOA needs the best qualified NCOs as instructors and drill sergeant leaders because 

they are responsible for training our Noncommissioned Officer Cor~s. the "backbone" of the U.S. 

proficient, instructors must be effective communicators. Instructors at Libby NCOA use the 

small-group leader (SGL) process, which ensures that students get personal attention from 

their instructors. CSM Nutter believes the SGL 

process is effective because it allows students 

to input their personal experience into the learning process. The NCOs selected to become instructors must undergo a rigorous training program before they receive instructor certification 

and an additional skill identifier of "H."To qualify, instructor candidates must first attend the Instructor Training Course at the Engineer Center. They must pass all examinations and performance evaluations required of students and 

achieve final examination grades of 80 percent 

or higher. Next, instructor candidates practice 

teaching until they are comfortable with the 

course lessons. Then, they teach a lesson in 

front of a "murder board" consisting of the ANCOC, BNCOC, or PLDC first sergeant, the senior instructor, and another instructor, The murder board evaluates instructor candidates on 

their teaching ability, poise, and knowledge. 

Candidates must successfully complete the 

board before they are certified to teach at any 

level within the NCOES. 

1 

Drill sergeant leader candidates undergo a 

similar training program. These drill sergeants 

are the cream of the crop at the end of their 

ng a Pyear tours. Drill sergeant leaders are the top 

2 to 5 percent of the Army. It's harder to become a drill sergeant leader than a drill sergeant. "Not all drill sergeants can be drill sergeant leaders," says Staff Sergeant Stanley Porter, 

DSS Drill Sergeant Leader. Drill sergeant leader candidates must extend their tour as drill sergeants for 

one extra year and repeat the entire DSS training program. Certification as a drill sergeant leader follows 

successful completion of a 90-day self-paced training 

program. Candidates must demonstrate competence 

in all tasks required of a drill sergeant and give one 

or two presentations in each major area taught at 

DSS. They are graded on squad drill and the seven 

steps of marching. To graduate, candidates must 

pass all written examinations. 

Today, the Army is changing rapidly and its future 

structure and missions are still unclear. But at Libby 

NCOA it's nice to know that when it comes to professionalism, technical and tactical competence, and 

the standards of excellence that have made our 

NCO Corps the world's best ...some things never 

change! Id 

Army. as PLDCb BNCOC, and AN- Staff Sergeant Stiff is a PLDC instructor at Libby NCOA. A 

COC instructors are among the top NCOs in their combat engineer, he has completed tours in US., GerCMFs. In addition to being technically and tactically many, and Southwest Asia. 

22 Engineer November 1993 
Rattle Task Training 


improves Performance 


By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Bums,Jr. 

"Training is the cornerstone of 

readiness and the basis for credible deterrence and capable defense. Daining is the nzeans by 

which the Annyk quality soldiers 

and leaders develop their warfighting proficiency and exercise 

the collective capabilities they will 

require in conzbat. Training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units 

to fight and win in war-the 

Arnzy's basic mission." 

uring the first six months 

as command sergeant major of the Engineer ~rig-dde, 3rd 

Nouember 1993 

Infantry Division, I observed ma- 

' jor inadequacies in the conduct of 

equipment maintenance and op- . 

eration. As the Army's first unit to ; 

be reorganized under the Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI), 

growing pains were expected--hut i 

ions, had recently participated in 

Operation Desert Storm (ODs), 

while the 10th Engineer Battalion had supplied platoon-level 

teams to beef up ODs participating units. The 82nd was reorganized from a corps wheeled enginwr battalion into a mechanized 

division battalion. The poor condition of equipment returning 

from Southwest Asia and the 

new equipment provided under 

the reorganization, coupled with 

the intlux of modernization items, 

created a maintenance and training situation of significant 

proportions. 

Engineer 23 

not of the magnitude encounted. 

Training Needs 

A major concern was the 

melding of the engineer 

I 


I 


/


; 

' 

battalions that formed the brigade. Two battalions, the 16th 

and the 82nd Engineer Battal- , 
:Organlz 

As brigade CSM, I participated 

with the commander in many indepth discussions on how to overcome the problems facing the 

units. The battalion command sergeants major agreed that aserious 

problem existed which required 

immediate action. After deliberations, the CSMs developed a training program based on our collective experience. 

The objective was to fix problems associated with equipment 

maintenance and equipment utilization at the operator level. Our 

solution required NCO involvement at all levels. Of the equipment in the brigade, the majority 

of vehicle commanders (those riding shotgun) were NCOs. Because 

each of the brigade's vehicles had 

an NCO first-line supervisor, it 

only made sense to ensure that the 

NCO knew how to adequately 

maintain and operate each piece of 

equipment under his control. 

NCOs lead by example! To do that 

senior NCOs need to know more 

than just a little about selected 

pieces of equipment; they need to 

be familiar with the maintenance 

A WFOZ~/~~ 8 ,a

rrt Team Support Team 

OE) 

Figure 1 

of every piece they control. With 

this concept in mind, the content 

of the training program became 

clear: present a "train the trainer" 

(in this case, "supervisor") course 

in vehicle maintenance and operation. 

Battle Task Training 

T	he proposed battle task 

training (BTT) event brief -. to the engineer brigade commander resulted in a commitment to provide the resources 

needed to execute the plan. 

Training was to take place at 

three separate locations to allow 

supervisors t,o train on equipment actually under their control 

and to avoid too much pressure 

on any one unit. Those to be 

trained first included the command sergeants major and first 

sergeants. The goal was to ensure that the senior NCOs had 

the hands-on experience needed 

to supervise platoons, squads, 

crews, and teams in the proper 

maintenance and operation of 

unit equipment. This equipment 

ilon 

nance 

I 

ACE 

support TI 

included the armored combat 

earthmover (ACE), armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB), high 

mobility multipurpose wheeled 

vehicle (m,and armored 

pe~sonnel carrier (APC). 

The brigade commander briefed 

the division commander, who endorsed the event. The long-term 

goals were improved readiness 

through maintenance supervised 

by confident senior NCOs and the 

evaluation of battle drills. The 

short-term goals were improved 

maintenance, increased operator 

confidence in equipment utilization, battle drill execution, and 

trained trainers. 

The BTT was scheduled over 

four days. The filst three days focused on equipment maintenance 

techniques, including preventive 

maintenance checks and services 

(PMCS), safe vehicle operation, 

tactical employment, and battle 

drill execution. Training was conducted on each major piece of 

equipment assigned to the brigade. On the last day, each piece of 

equipment was used in its operational role as part of a breach 
~ 

through a complex obstacle comprLsed of wire, anti-tank ditch, and 

minefield. 

After Action Report 

he BTT was a success! It 

trained the NCOs to main-

!and utili;ration at 1 

Cc 

Fix equll 

operator 

Phase 1 Schweinfurt Equipmentorientation 

m PMCS 

m Operation 

TAC employment 

m Banle drills 

Phase Ii Eriangen m Equipment orientatlon 

m PMCS 

Operation 

m TAC employment 

m Banle drills 

Phase Ill Bamburg Equipment orlentatlon 

PMCS 

Operation 

m TAC employment 

m Banle dr~lls 

Phase IV Bamburg PC1 

- m Conduct breach operation 

m PMCS 

m mu 

~0000000~ 

X-X- X X 

BpZJ 

pg 

p=-

II: 

tain and operate assigned equipment in the same environment 

and fashion as the soldiers. It 

provided an opportunity for unit 

leaders to acquire the knowledge, 

confidence, and skills they 

needed to effectively supervise 

the maintenance, operation, and 

employment of the unit's assigned equipment. 

The BTT also provided an opportunity to address other problems common to the reorganized 

units. The senior NCOs worked together, each sharing from his store 

of knowledge, and their combined 

knowledge contributed to a first 

class event. Their collective 

strengths, shared in a noncompetitive environment, improved 

teamwork to master the tasks at 

hand. Benefits included unit esprit, which continued beyond the 

session's time limits. The training 

improved communications, promoted confidence and trust, and 

fostered a spirit of cooperation. 

Since that first session, the brigade has expanded the program to Figure 2 train platoon sergeants and squad 

leaders. More recently it was used 

November 1993 Engineer 25 

to train commanders and platoon 

leaders. 

Training is the Army's top priority To make training work, a commander must set specific training 

goals that are clearly articulated 

to and agreed upon by the unit's 

other leaders. To make training 

happen, a commander must allocate the time and resources necessary, shield each session from distractors, and be totally involved in 

its execution. To make training 

meaningful, a commander must 

truthfully evaluate each program 

and session, build on what worls, 

and discard what does not. 

NCOs are primarily trainers 

and they provide an essential link 

between commanders and soldie~s.To successfully discharge 

their training responsibilities, 

NCOs must understand mission 

requirements, communicate clearly, 

supervise aggressively, take immediate corrective action, and reward fairly They must be committed to excellence in all endeavors, 

lead by example, and accept full 

responsibility for their actions. 

The BTT event planned and executed by the engineer brigade of 

the 3rd Infantry Division, was a 

training tool. It can be modified to 

meet your unit's needs. I challenge 

you to make a similar BTT work in 

your unit. Proactive leaders can 

always detect training shortcomings and then develop safe, realistic, quality training to build competence and confidence. Tmining 

is the Army's top priority! Y 

CSM Bul.ns is ~0mmandsergeant 

ma~O' Of the U.S. Army Engineer 

Center and Fort Leonard Wood. He 

previously seived as command ser.. 

geant mejor ofthe Engineel.Bat-

$,lion and 3,.d ~~~i~~~~~ n in ~

Gelmany. CSM Burns has an associate degl.ee in applied science managment from Cent~alTQas College. 
Enforcing Unit Responsibilities 


By Sergeant First Class Donald H. Purinton 

If you have ever worked on an 

earthwork construction project site, chances are that you 

have seen two or three soldiers 

standing around a small, orange 

box. No, it is not a soft drink 

cooler. It is a very useful and 

timesaving piece of equipment 

used by Army engineering units 

to test soil for density and 

moisture. Those familiar with 

the equipment call it the nuclear 

densimeter or "the nuke," but its 

official name is the Tester, Density and Moisture Nuclear Method, 

Campbell Pacific Model MC-1. 

This article addresses the nature ofthe nuclear densimeter and 

lessons learned regarding its control. Specifically, it addresses recent regulatory violations that 

have caused potential enforceMC-1 Nuclear densimeter with components 

26 Engineer 

ment actions, such as fines or retraction of the Army license to operate this equipment. 

Nature of the Beast 

he nuclear densimeter is 

the primary tool for compaction quality control for earthwork construction. It is used by 

most combat-heavy engineer battalions, and the primary operator is the materials quality specialist, 

MOS 51G. The nuclear densimeter is relatively safe to 

operate when used properly-there is no danger to 

personnel or the general 

public when it is used, 

transported, stored, and 

maintained according to TM 

5-6635-386-12&P. 

The nuclear densimeter 

contains NRC-licensed radioactive material contained 

in two sealed sources: 10millicuries of Cesium (Cs) 137 

and a 50-millicurie mixture 

of Americium (Am) 241 and 

Beryllium (Be) powder. Both 

sources are reactor-produced 

isotopes that are double-encapsulated in stainless steel. 

These sources are unstable 
and are slowly decaying to a more 

stable state. The act of decay produces emissions that are either 

gamma rays or actual particles of 

atoms, called neutrons. 

The nuclear densimeter has two 

methods of operation. Backscatter 

is the technique of placing the 

source on the surface of the material to be tested. Transmission, the 

preferred method of soil measurement, is a technique of predrilling 

a small hole in the groundand then 

inserting the radioactive source 

through an extendable souroe rod. 

When testing soil density, operators drill a hole in a compacted 

soil layer and place the source rod 

at depths of 2, 4, 6, or 8 inches 

depending on the thickness of the 

soil layer. The gamma radiation detectors then measure the amount of 

gamma radiation transmitted 

through the soil. Gamma rays can 

penetrate dense materials such as 

compacted soil-the denser the 

soil layer, the fewer gamma rays 

that will be detected. These measurements are displayed electronically as an index of soil density. 

During soil moisture testing, 

the nuclear densimeter produces 

"fast" neutrons, and the neutron 

detectors measure "slow" neutrons. Thus, the fast neutrons 

must be slowed down to be detected, and they slow down by colliding with other objects of the 

same size. The only objects commonly found in soil that are the 

same size are the hydrogen atoms 

in water molecules. When more 

fast neutrons are slowed down by 

hydrogen atoms, more slow neutrons are measured by the slow 

neutron detectors and the soil's 

moisture content will be higher. 

These measurements are displayed electronically as an index 

of the soil moisture content. 

Lessons Learned 

robletns occur when units 

fail to properly handle, 

Nuclear Densimeter Modes of Operation 

Back8csner mol~ture meas~remenl Ba~k~eetter mol~t~remeasurement 

transport, or store their nuclear 

densimeters. The nuclear aspect 

of the nuclear densimeter makes 

it a controlled item of construction equipment. The U.S. Army 

Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) is issued a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (hTRC) license 

for Army use of the densimeter 

and is responsible for item management. TACOM recently found 

that many Army units are 

in violation or potential violation of NRC regulations. For 

example, personnel in several 

units returning from southwest 

Asia (SWA) after the Gulf War 

failed to follow appropriate 

regulations when they shipped 

densimeters back to their home 

stations. 

Incident 1: An Army reserve 

unit deployed to SWA before receiving a nuclear densimeter that 

was enroute from depot stock. The 

equipment was received at the 

unit's home station and forwarded 

to SWA, but the unit redeployed 

to the continental U.S. (CONUS) 

before it arrived. It remained 

amm. d.l.nrn 

a.nn..nlno - Dsrect Lransmisslondensity .am measummml 

Umpbell PeolOo Model MGi 

unacr~unted for in SWA for 17 

months. TACOM became aware of 

the lack of control 12months after 

it was shipped from the depot. After an investigation located the 

equipment in Kuwait, it was returned to CONUS. 

Lessons Learned: Nuclear densimeter shipments must be wntrolled and tracked to ensure accountability at all times. Any time 

accountability cannot be established, units must immediately 

notify the TACOM National Inventory Control Point (NICP) 

Item Manager and the TACOM 

Radiation Protection Officer 

(RPO). 

Incident 2: A unit deployed to 

SWA with two nuclear densimeters. Before redeploying to their 

home station, the unit turned the 

nuclear densimeters in to a POMCUS (pre-positioning of materiel 

configured to unit sets) facility in 

SWA. Both the unit and the POMCUS facility have since deactivated without notifying TACOM 

or accounting for the nuclear 

densimeters. 

November 1993 
Unit Responsibilitiesfor Nuclear Densimeters 

28 Engineer 

Safety 

Supervise implementalbn of me local radiation safe!y 

program, acmrdingto federal and Army Regulations 

(ARs). 

m Ensure'hat radiationleak tests are performedat inter 

MISnot to exceed six mon'hs. 

Establish an SOP mat has been coordinated with he 

radiation control officer (RCO) and local radiation protecb'on officer (LRPO). 

Suspend use of Ule nuclear densimeter 8a qual'lfied 

LRPO, ALRPO, or operator is not avaiiable. Notify me 

MACOM RCO and TACOM NiCP. 

Appoint a bained LRPO and ailernate LRPO 

(ALRPO),in addition tome bained operators assigned to units with tie nuclear densimeter. Notify'he 

major Army command (MACOM) RCO in wri6ng of 

any changes in LRPO, ALRPO, and operatw 

assignments. 

Know the locationof all nuclear densimeters as. 

signed under your mmmand at all times. If a nuclear 

densimeter is lost or stolen, report ilto TACOM imme. 

diarelp TACOM will 'hen informme NRC and appro. 

priate higher Army commands. 

NotifyTACOMof any radiationsafety defects or ha? 

ardsassociated wmi a nuclear densimeter, 

Conduct ail disposal actions amrding to regulation 

and under me directionof TACOM. Never turn a nu. 

clear densimeter in to a property disposalofficer. 

Do not authorize pregnantpersonnel to handle, operate, or maintain me nuclear densimeter or to serveas 

me LRPO. 

Ensure mat all personneiwho operate be nuclear 

densimeter or enter me nuclear densimeter storage 

area wear beta.gamma or thermoluminerznt 

dosimetry FLD) badges. 

Appoint a custodian of medical recordsto maintain 

personneldosimetry records per regulation. 

Nouember 1993 

Storage 

Class$ nuclear densimeter storage ares 

as restrictedareas. 

Keep me timemat pemnnel spend in Um 

storage areas to an absolute minimum. 

m AdMse the localfire depamnent of 

radioadivastorage locationsandhow to 

mntacthe LRPO. 

Conducta radiation sumy at least 

quarterly on all nuclear densimeter 

storage areas. 

Ensure mat the maximum dose 

equivalent? rate ouhide of storage areas 

mat are within occupied buildingsand 

occupied areas does not exceed 0.25 

miliirems per hour (mremthr). 

Ensure mat me maximum dose 

equivalents rate within unoccupied 

storage areas does not exceed 2.5 

mrernthr 

m Ensure matali occupied and unompied 

storage areas meet regulatory 

requirements. 

Transportation 

Obtain approml tom bom the MACOM 

RCOand meTACOM NiCP Item 

Manager before bansferring me nuclear 

densimeter between unks, even wimin me 

same command,from one location to 

anomer. 

ProMdea letter of instuction to 

acmmpany me nuclear densimeter 

whenever it is transported 

m Ensure drat me nuclear densimeter is 

packed and locked in its approved 

carrying case for tansport 

Ensuremat me shipment of nuclear 

densimeters meets reguiatory 

requirements. 

Do not aumorize the nuclear densimeter 

for shipment on commercial passenger 

alrcrait The nuclear densimeter is 

appromd for air transport by helicopter, 

rued-wingArmy aircraft, Air Force aircraft, 

and commercial nonpassenger-carrying 

aircratl when shipped per regulation. 

Never airdropme nuclear densimeter. 
~ 

Ihsons Learned: Again, 

accountability must be established for nuclear densimeters at all times. Commanders and local radiation 

protection officers (LRPO) 

must review their accountability procedures to ensure 

compliance with NRC license requirements. 

Incident 3: A unit completed a mission in Central 

America and returned to 

CONUS. In their haste to 

ship the nuclear densimeter 

back to the home station, 

they tasked an unqualified 

soldier to handle the shipmen'' hs a result' several This nuclear densimeter was damaged by mishandling. It poses potential hazards 

Department Of to personnel and the environmnt. 

Transportation (DOT) and 

NRC regulations occurred. comply with the NRC license, DSN 786-843716469 and the TAViolations included shipment of TM 5.6635-386-12&P, and DOT COM RPOat (313) 574-763516121 

the nuclear densimeter on a corn- regulations may result in crimi- or DSN 786-763516121. 

mercial passenger aircraft, im- rial prosecution and civil penal. 

proper packaging, improper label- ties, Violations such as those dising, improper shipping documents, cussed in this article may result Responsibilities of 

handling of the nuclear denshe- in fines and ~unishment under Using Unit Commanders 

ter by unqualified personnel, and federal and civil statutes (includlack of accountability These viola- ing the uniform code of ~ilit~~ 11 using unit commanders 

tions created a potential for DOT justice) or revocation of the re responsible for enforcandlor NRC enforcement action. Army license held by TACOM. In ing the information contained in Lessons Learned: Units must addition, recent revisions to NRC TM 5.6635.386-12&P2 the unit 

ensure that they have an adequate regulations include enforcement SOP, and the radiation 

unit standing operatingpmeedure .&inst individuals who know- program. B~ using the nuclear 

(SOP) covering shipping require- ingly commit violations of the densimeter properly, units will 

ments, and personnel must be NRC license (see chart for fur- have a timely, safe, and effective trained to comply with the SOP, ther guidence.) way to test soil moisture and 

The nuclear densilneter must The U.S. Army Engineer School density 

never be shipped aboard a corn- oKers information and training Y

lnercial Passenger aircraft or en- 0. the nuclear densimeter, includ- SFC Purinton is an instruc. trusted to unqualified personnel. ing a two-day operator's training tor, writer for the Engineer when in doubt, call the TACOM course presented by a mobile 

NICP Item &Tanager or the training team. For more informaSchwl's Department of construetion ~ ~ ~ H~previously i ~ TACOM RPO. tioil, call (314) 563-4042 or DSN served as technical engineering 

676-4042 or write to: Commander, supervisor for the 80Zncl EnDirectorate of Plans, Training, gineer gattalion (Combat) Compliance with and Mobilization, ATTN: ATZT- (H~~~~) and senior instructor 

Regulations PTM, Fort Leonard Wood, MO for the Materials Quality Spea 65473. cialist Course (VOS 51G). SFC 

ecause nuclear densimeters Additional information and as- Purington is a graduate of the 

pose potential hazards, all sistance concerning the safety, Advanced Noncommissioned 

personnel using them must com- transportation, and storage of nu- Officers Course and holds an 

ply with TM 5-6635-386-12&P clear densimeters is available associate's degree in construcand applicable federal, state, and from theTACOMNICP Item Man- tion managenzent front Park 

local regulations. Failure to ager at (313) 574.846716469 or College. 

November 1993 Engineer 29 
By Les Fortner 

Three-way switches control current-using de-

!.vices from two locations. When wiring these 

switches, it is easy to be intimidated by the many 

wires that protrude from the outlet or junction box 

installed between switches. As a result, making the 

connections is sometimes confusing. The following 

information can help soldiers in 51R and 51H (electrician) remember which wires (conductors)are 

connected to which terminals. 

Rules 

het's assume that you are to install a circuit 

in a house using two- or three-wire cable 

(commonly called ROMEX).You will comply with 

National Electrical Code (NEC) rules, which apply 

to all house wiring: 

Electrical power must be turned off before you 

work on the circuit. 

Wires must be color coded. The primary current-carrying wires have black protective coating, neutral wires are white, and grounding 

wires are green or bare metal. Other colors 

identify wires used for current-carlying secondary circuits. The NEC allows one exception to 

this rule: Current-carrying wires can be white 

in a switch loop if both ends of the white conductor are made black. Most electricians use black 

spray pint or electrical tap to mark the ends. 

Receptacle wires must be connected to the 

proper screws (terminals). Three-way switches 

are manufactured with three current-carrying 

terminals. In house wiring, these terminals 

are used to make connections between 

switches and receptacles. One is the common 

terminal and the other two are traveler tern+ 

nals. The common terminal is easy to identify 

because manufacturers make it a darker color 

than the other terminals. The terminals are 

darkbrassiblack and light/aluminum/silver in 

color. To connect wires to t,he receptacle, attach the primary current-carrying wire to the 

dark terminal and the neutral wire to the 

light terminal. 

w Three-way switches are used in tandem. A 

single three-way switch or a three-way switch 

used with a single pole switch will not function as desired. 

w When installing three-way switches, there 

must be three current-carrying wires between 

each switch. The grounding wire cannot be 

used to carry current. ROMEX cable, common 

in house wiring, contains three wires that are 

black, red, and white. (Electricians most often 

use 12-3 ROMEX cable.) Depending on the 

physical configuration of the circuit being installed, you may need to put black tape or 

paint on the ends of the white wire. 

Connection Procedure 

efore making any connections, remember 

that the neutral (white) wire originating at 

the power source continues directly to the using 

device. You may cut and reconnect inside an outlet 

or junction box to ensure that it does continue directly to the using device. Also, remember that traveler wires must provide a continuous circuit between the three-way switches. If necessary, pig-tail 

traveler wires together at the outlet or at junction 

boxes so that current will flow between the three-way 

switches. Use the following steps to connect the wires: 

Step 1. Disconnect the electrical current. 

Step 2. Identify which wire provides current 

from the power source. If the original circuit installer followed NEC rules, it will be black. 

Step 3. Connect the power source wire to the 

common terminal on the three-way switch that is 

closest to the power source. If both switches are the 

same distance from the source, either may be connected first. Connect the other two wires that run 

between three-way switches to the traveler terminals. If the white wire is used as a traveler, put 

black tape or paint on the ends to indicate that it 

carries a current. 

November 1993 
Power through switch 

-12-3 ROMEX sable 

\ 

power source 

-WhHe 

12-2 ROMEXEX cable lo 5wllCh 

Power through using device Bight) 

n 


&~whlle~ 12-2 ROMEX cable Example 2 

I"'""" From power source 

CommonStep 4. At the second three-way switch, connect Practice 

the black wire that comes from the using device 

(lights) to the common terminal on the switch. Con- Study the information in this article and the 

nect the white wire coming from the using device examples in Figure 1to ensure that you unto the available white neutral wire and the other derstand the process. I11 example 2, note that all 

two wires to the traveler terminals on the switch. three wires running between the three-way 

Again, if a white wire is used as a traveler, put switches are current-carlying conductors. In this 

black tape or paint on the ends. situation, you would connect the black wire to the 

That's it! It is easy to install three-way switches common terminal. The remaining wires are red 

if you remember these four steps: Disconnect the and white. Since the white wire will carry current, 


electrical current; connect the incoming power to put black tape on the ends. 


the common terminal on one switch; connect the Do you want to apply your knowledge? Figure 2 


black wire coming from the using device to the com depicts a situation encountered on many jobs. You 


mon terminal on the second three-way switch; and should have little difficulty accomplishing the task, 

connect the remaining wires to the traveler terminals. if you read and follow the above instructions as 

they are written. As you practice, 

I I remember that because you are usPraclice problem ing 12-3 ROMEX, all wires must 

pass through a box-no individual 

wires can bypass the box. Good luck! 

To check your work, the correctly 

wired circuit appears on pa@ 37. 

'KI 

pow~~~~urc~ d I L_--

- -- 7 

Figure 2 

White 

I---_-> 

common+ 

--- - I I

f& 

' uup I 1 (& , I Leonard Wood. He folmerly serued as a 

Y 

Mr. Former is a constructwn inspector 

for the Di?ectorateof Public Works,Fort 

training specialist, Directorate of 

Training, U.S.Arn~yEngineer School. 

November 1993 Engineer 31 
P 

.!$it-&-

*&?,. ..&== +&.* : ,#% By Emily Brown %x, .-$&.&< -* - F d.. a


32 Engineer November 1993 
'We huve contn~itted theh-nty to being R 71ctio11~i 

ledr in enuironn~entul and natulai resoi~ioestemrd 

ship for present a,nd future genemLions, a,& we infend 

to do that as an integral part of our hty mission." 

Michael I! W Stone, 

Secretary of the Army 

Amy commanders constantly search for ways 

to improve methods of operation-zspecially 

in these days of downsizing. Consolidation and site 

relocation, used frequently in this effort, can be enhanced by incorporating requirements of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) early 

in the planning and development phases of a project. NEPA establishes a mechanism for incorporating environmental considerations into the decisionmaking process and objectively evaluating them 

along with traditional engineering, technical, and 

financial considerations. In addition, the NEPA 

process can help planne~s anticipate problems 

early enough to minimize their effects or avoid 

them altogether. Although complex, NEPA is an important and mandatory part of any planning process involving land usage. This article explains the 

NEPA process and offers some solutions to common 

problems. The case study on page 36 is a typical 

example of the NEPA process. 

Overview 

uring the 1960s and the 19705, the U.S, began to emphasize environmental quality. Environmental legislation was developed and implemented to protect such resources as air and water, 

endangered species, and our cultural heritage. 

NEPA was enacted by President Nixon on January 

1, 1970. In drafting the act, Congress said the federal government should "use all practicable means . . . 

to mate and maintain conditions in which man and 

nature can exist in productive harmony" NEPA applies to all actions on lands partly or completely federally owned and to actions that are partly or completely federally funded Other countriff have developed 

similar requirements tlmt may apply to operations or 

installations outside the continental United Stah. 

The NEPA process is a planning tool that enables 

planners to select the most suitable alternative for 

an action. It describes the full scope and magnitude 

of a proposed action's effects (both positive and negative) on economic, environmental, and social concerns. The process and documentation are intended 

to achieve a balance between the merits of a proposal and associated environmental effects and the 

need for mitigating those effects. 

Under NEPA, proponents must consider the effects of a proposal on all alternatives, including the 

"no action" alternative. Additionally, an interdisciplinary team must prepare the assessment. This team, 

which usually consists of planners, scientists, engineers, and technicians, assesses the environmental 

effects of a proposal quantitatively, qualitatively, 

and in coordination with the public and the environmental regulatory community 

The process begins when a proponent identifies a 

requirement for either training or mission support. 

All projects, from major construction to renovations 

and minor modifications, undergo a cursory planning review to determine their constraints and benefits, such as mission suitability, safety, economics, 

environmental, and land-use compatibility Proposals are managed in several ways. At Fort Leonard 

Wood (FLW),all such proposals are presented to the 

Installation Planning Board, which includes the environmental coordinator. A working committee composed of the action proponent, environmental staff, 

and other installation officials is then assigned to 

work through the NEPA process. 

After viable alternatives are developed, the working group compares and screens all factors for the alternatives in detail. A weighted decision matrix is 

prepared for each alternative using generalized categories: commander's intent (project purpose), plus 

safety, environmental, and economic concerns. Depending on the scope of the proposal, additional factors such as travel time or distance to the site are incorporated in the matrix. The decision matrix 

depicts the general screening categories. Technical 

specialists then develop the factors and issues 

within each generalized category and present them 

to the working group. The working group presents 

their findings and recommendations to the Installation Planning Board (IPB) for concurrence. 

As a member of the IPB, the Staff Judge Advocate 

ensures that all legal requirements are met. The 

SJA provides valuable support and guidance 

throughout the process and recommends approval 

or disapproval of NEPA documents. 

Upon conmnce by theboard, rmmmendations are 

forwarded to the installation commander for final 

approval, incorporation into the installation master 

plan, and implementation. This mechanism affords 

technical experts in various disciplines an opportunity 

to provide input into the early development of a proposal. It ensures that viable alternatives are reviewed and 

the mast suitable alternative is mmmended 

The Process 

he NEPA process is documented for use by decisionmakers and consists of five steps: 
Step 1. Develop a detailed description of the 

project and its purpose. Planners must acquire 

this information before they can complete any other 

step. They must understand the scope of the proposed project before determining potential environmental impacts. 

Step 2. Describe the existingconditions of 

each site under consideration. The components 

of this description, collectively called "environmental," include economic, cultural, physical, and 

biological conditions. This description is used to establish a baseline to campare each alternative 

against. 

Documentation for steps 1and 2 is often prepared 

simuitaneously During this phase, the project description may be in draft form. Preparing a detailed 

project description while obtaining the information 

to describe the existing conditions gives the proponent more time to reassess the purpose of, need for, 

and scope of the proposal. Lack of a thorough evaluation often leads to numerous changes and delays in 

both action implementation and completion of the 

NEPA process 

Step 3. Assess orpredict the environmental 

effects of the action on each alternative. This 

step provides the analytical basis for comparing alternatives. Potential environmental effects must 

first be identified and then described as to their extent, magnitude, and significance. Determining the 

significance can be difficult. While quantitative 

measurements are used where possible to determine the significance of an effect, qualitative profeessional judgments are sometimes necessaly. Significant effects may be controversial, involve sensitive 

or unique resources (such as endangered species, 

historic structures, or floodplains), involve unknown 

risks, have a cumulative effect, or threaten to violate federal, state, or local environmental laws. 

In addition, the sensitivity of the environmental 

resource affects the threshold at which an impact is 

considered significant. For instance, sensitive resources such as endangered species or wetlands 

may be significantly affected by "normal" or "minor" 

actions such as tree or vegetation removal. This 

part of the document is often complicated, and impact matrices are nonnally included to help reviewers visualize and sort through the magnitude and 

significance of the impacts. 

Step 4. Select thepreferred alternative 

based on available inforntation. This step is the 

essence oCa NEPA document. Select,ion is made by 

comparing the analytical dat,a for each alternative 

documented in the previous step, including the "no 

action" alternative. The comparative discussion describes the issues and concerns from which the decisionmaker can select an alternative. 

Generally, the proponent identifies a preferred action either before initiating the proposal or early in 

the planningprocess. The initial preference may not 

be the same as the one identified from the analytical data presented in the environmental document, 

but the proponent is provided with an alternative 

that meets the project's purpose and intent. The selected alternative is often more suitable than the 

proponent's original preference. 

Step 6. Prepare the appropriate NEPA environmental document. NEPA documents chronicle 

the planning and decisionmaking processes presented in steps 1through 4. They form a record of 

the proposal and evaluations of the beneficial and 

detrimental environmental consequences of the alternatives. These documents are formal records of 

the proponent's procedural compliance with NEPA. 

Documents 

The NEPA process ends in acceptance of one of 

- + three documents: a Record of Environmental 

Co~lsideration (REC), an Environmental Assessment 

@A), or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 

An REC, the briefest document, is intended to 

minimize paperwork and agency coordination delays. To determine if REC is appropriate, action proponents and installation environmental specialists 

must first review the screening criteria to decide 

whether the proposed action meets the criteria for 

one of the Department of Army's 29 excluded categories. These categorical exclusions (CXs) are routine, 

very limited in scope, and have been predetermined 

not to significantly affect the environment. 

Under NEPA, each federal agency, in coordination 

with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, is 

allowed to identify CXs for their agency actio~ls. If 

an action meets the screening criteria, the proponent prepares a one-page REC that substantiates 

the decision to categorically exclude the action. The 

REC should contain a brief description of the proposed action, rationale for categorically excluding the 

action, and a list of lcey source documents or contacts. 

RECs are reviewed, approved, and signed by the 

installation environmental coordinator. This approval ends the NEPA process, and the proposed action may then proceed. Both the proponent and the 

installation environmental coordinator usually retain mpies of the REC. No public notification or involvement is required at this level of the NEPA prooess. 

When an action does not meet the criteria for a 

November 1993 
CX, the proponent, in conjunction with installation environmental specialists, begins an environmental assessment. This abbreviated docu- Document Preparation 

ment is generally a precursor to an 

environmental impact statement. It is usually Document Cost Duration 

prepared as part of the screening process to deencounter similar problems. Two common ones are rntent to prepare an EIS is filed in the ~ ~R~~- d ~ ~ ~ l

termine the extent and significance of environmental effects. An EA always concludes with 

either a Finding of No Significant Impact 

(FNSI) or a Notice of Intent NOI) to prepare 

an EIS. If the EA process identifies and documents that no significant environmental resources will be impacted, an FNSI is prepared 

and made available to the public for a 30-day 

review and comment period. At the end of that 

time, the NEPA process is complete and the 

proposed action can begin. When the EA identifies and documents significant or potentially 

significant environmental impacts, a Notice of 

$2,000to $3,OW 1 week 1 REC I


6 to 8 months ! 1 EIS $75,000to $500,000 12 to 18 months / 

Cost and duration vary depending on the proposal, its complexity andsignficance, and the amount of regulatory and public 

involvement. 

ister and the detailed EIS process be*ns. public in. -

volvement, such as meetings or newspaper articles 

describing the action and soliciting public input, is 

encouraged but not required during the EA process. 

Environmental Impact Statement 

An EIS is prepared when significant impacts are 

suspected or known. The degree of significance increases the technical detail of an EIS. This process 

requires extensive coordination with regulatory 

agencies and the public and can take years to complete. The level of public and agency coordination is 

considerably greater for an EIS than for an EA. For 

example, public meetings are encouraged during 

the preparation of an EA but are required during 

the EIS process. Cost and preparation time for an 

EIS are much greater than for an EA or an REC 

(see chart). To expedite the process, installations 

frequently hire contractors.who specialize in NEPA 

documentation to prepare EAs and EISs. 

When an EIS is complete, the public is given 45 

days to comment on it. Then, the proponent prepares and files a Record of Decision (ROD) in the 

Federal Register. The ROD summarizes the decision process to ensure that all practical means for 

minimizing harm to the environment were considered and that monitoring and enforcement actions 

were included where applicable. After publication of 

the ROD, the NEPA process is finished and the proposed action may commence. 

Problems and Corrective Actions 

nvironmental specialists or personnel tasked 

with preparing NEPA documents frequently 

lack of early staff involvement and staff shortages. 

Lack of early staff involvement 

Problent: Until recently, many installation staff 

members viewed the NEPAprocess as a paperwork 

exercise with little or no value beyond completing a 

legal requirement so funding could be requested. After civilian employees at several installations were 

criminally indicted and convicted of violat,ing environmental laws, attitudes began to change. 

Discussion: If the NEPAprocess is not initiated 

early enough, installation planners fail to develop alternate sites or address the positive and negative 

components of all alternatives. This prevents planners 

from making the most informed decision possible, 

Correctiue Actions: Planners must become more 

familiar with the benefits and use of the Geographic 

Resource Analysis Support System (GRASS) computer program. The GRASS program is operated 

and maintained by installation environmental and 

natural resources offices, but it is available Armywide for use by all installation planners. This sophisticated planning aid can assist planners in identifying resource opportunities or restrictions early 

in the process instead of during or just before an 

adion is implemented. 

Staff Shortages 

Problem: Frequent personnel changes promote a 

cycle of persistent refamiliarization with the benefits and legal requirements of NEPA. In addition, 

many environmental and natural resources offices 

are understaffed. Insufficient staff restricts the number of documents that can be initiated, prepared, and 

reviewed in-house. It also restricts the time available 

November 1993 Engineer 35 
for coordinating with military and civilian planners 

and informing them about NEPA requirements. 

Discussiotl: Compounded by dwindling budgets 

and overall military downsizing, these problems are 

difficult to overcome. Proponents and planners unaware of NEPA requirements often propose and 

plan actions that have not been environmentally assessed. This can lead to additional problems: NEPA 

may be overlooked completely, placing the installation in violation of federal law; the action may be delayed because there is insufficient time to conduct 

an assessment, prepare the document, and coordinate with the public; or funding to support the action may be delayed. As environmental legislation 

escalates and initiatives such as commercial activities contracts are implemented or Directorates of 

Public Works are established, increases in staff may 

not keep pace with requirements. 

Corrective actions: Several options are available: 

Establish permanent positions for an installation planner and a military training planner 

who are less mobile (civilians or soldiers in longterm military tours). Requirements should include familiarity with NEPA and/or environmental awareness training with periodic refresher courses. This option provides both shortand long-term benefits. 

m Establish a primary point of contact who is familiar with planning requirements and the 

value of NEPA This option will ellsure consistency during the planning process. On FLW, the 

installation master planner is established as a 

permanent civilian position, and soldiers in the 

training division assume the military training 

area planning duties. 

Develop environmental awareness training for 

all planners. The training being incorporated 

into military training now will partly remedy 

the problem, but comparable training for civilian 

planners is recommended. 

Contract out NEPA document preparation 

through agencies such as the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (COE). This is a successful and viable solution. However, proponents must be 

aware that documents prepared through contract may be more costly and take longer to complete. On FLW, RECs and minor EAs are generally prepared in-house by environmental and 

natural resources specialists who work closely 

with the proponent. More complex EAs and EISs 

are prepared through contracts administered by 

the Kansas City District, COE. 

Summary 

mhe NEPA process is here to stay. Soldiers and 

- .. civilians who plan land usage must incorporate NEPA in all land use plans. The process ensures that environmental concerns are considered 

along with financial, engineering, and technical aspects. NEPA enables installations to be proactive 

rather than reactive by anticipating problems and 

mitigating or avoiding them. It also incorporates 

the Army's environmental strategy into the 21st 

century, promotes environmental stewardship, and 

fosters positive public and environmental regulatory community relations. Most important in today's cost-saving environment, NEPA provides commanders with a tool for effectively and efficiently 

improving methods of operation. Y 

Emily Brown is an muironmental specialist with the Directorate of Public Works at Fort Leonard Wood She has 

a masters degree fmm SouthernIllinois University. 

Photograph by Jim Anderson. 

lnofana uar 

Case Study - NEPA in Action 

The FLW InstallationTraining Area Master 

Planning Board (ITAMPB) received a proposal to relocate several small-arms range complexes. The ITAMPB initially proposed that relocations to former "existing" ranges would be the 

most cost effective, easiest to implement, and 

h; mental impacts. The ranges 

w 70 and before implementation or most env~ronmentallaws, and no previous 

NEPA documents were available for review. 

Through compliance with the EndangeredSpecies Act, which is part of the NEPA process, the installation identified a cave occupied by a federally 

endangered species, the IndianaBat. The cave 

was near one of the proposed range relocation 

sites for the infiltration range. Close coordination 

betweenthe ITAMPB, the Directorate of Engineering and Housing-EnvironmentalDivision 

al environ 

before 19: 

November 1993 
(DEt 9 the Dire1 Plans, Tra 	lining, rces were ;ult, an en dann, :A*..&: -..-A,-- .. ," and i~t~~~~~~at~on-Trainin~ UVIDIU, 	 I (DPTM-Tu, IUSI 111-	 yweu ~~CLIVD wa~ ~IULSLL~;~,a ~udly EIS wa 1D 

fied lthis sensit ive resoul 'ce as a pc >tential sic lnificant avoid1?d, and th( 3 proposaI was doc1 Ian enimp2ct early irIthe planr ling phase ? of the ac tion. Be- vironnnental ass essment, which cor th a 

~,.,~~ ~. ~ .. . ,~ ~.. 	 ~~-~. ~...~ - cause or me porenrlal Tor significanr impacr, enwronmental specialists determined that the proposed action could not qualify for a categorical exclusion and 

that an environmental assessment would probably 

conclude with a Notice of Intent. Therefore, an environmental impact statement would probably be required. Because the cave posed an important range 

siting concern, DEH-ED and DPTM-TD invitoA G" L,,G 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to obs erve an 

actual infiltration operation and to visit the c, ave. The 

intent was to familiarize the FWS with the sc :ope of 

mDact. 

Thisj range relocation project is an example or tne 

NEPA.process used properly. Early involvement betweenI installation staff components and cooperation 

and CI ordination behveen installation organizations 

and e nvironmental regulatory agencies enabled planners t o select a suitable alternate location for the infil- trotinrI course. Efforts by the proponent and nsamnrous installa at ion staff elements to explain and 

demonstrate military range training to the FW'S paid 

off. Tt ie FWS determined that the range near the InFinding or NO significant I , 

-.-..&:.., 

r lack of ~UL~IILI~I 

forenvironmelital impac :ts and to identify the con- opera~tions and could be a viable r ange use' d com 

cerns and reqi ~irementsof the Fh IS. This coordina- patibly by both the milita ry and the ? endange!red ,< . -.	 tion errorr was invaluaole. Ine prlmary concern of 

milit;sry operations and Ilotential o A:-.-
uialla Bat cave could accl ~mmodatc ? most da) !time 

~ .
 . ..
 the FWS was the nighttime portion of the operation 

and its potential disturbance to the feeding and foraging of the bat, as well as the possible hindrance of ingress and egress to the cave. The ITAMPB a( 1-

dressed these concerns and followed the Arm Y 

policy to avoid impacts to sensitive resources when 

practical alten latives ex ist. 

The FWS dl dermined that it was not appropriate to 

relocate the in filtration r; snge to the proposed site --a ->. .A.. without additior~al sruuy concerning the potential impact to the Indiana Bat. Because the project could 

not be modified to eliminate nighttime operatic Ins, 

DPTM-TD proposed relocating the range to an arernate site. Proactive planning enabled a potential 

"show stopper" to be identified early in the planning 

process. It allowed an alternate course of action to 

be pursued before project design funds or other 

1. Stone, M.P.W., U.S. Army ELrvironmen tal Strategy into the 21st Century, 1992. 

2. Schoenbaum, Thomas J., Environment 

Law, The Foundation Press, Inc. 1982. 

National Environmental Policy Act, Public Law 

0, 1970. 

4rensberg, Walter, Country Environmental Studies: Pi Framework for Action, Environmental Impact 

Asses;sment Review, Vol 12 (1/2), 1992. 

?anter, Larry W., Environmental impactAssessMcGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977. 

Three-way switch solution, continued from page 31. 

Problem solution i 

12-3 ROMMFrom cable 

power source 

12-2 ROMEX cable f

By William C. Schneck, Malcolm H. Visser, 

and Stuart high 

This is the last of three articles 

in a series on developntents in 

mine warfare. 

Significant technical progress 

has been made in the design of antitank (AT) mines during the last several decades. 

Many of the technologies that 

have benefited antipersonnel 

(AP) mines (ENGINEER, August 

1993) have also been applied to 

the design of AT mines. These 

advances include scatterability, 

advanced electronic fuzing, improved blast resistance, reduction or elimination of metallic 

content, integral antihandling 

devices, and increased lethality. 

In addition, many AT mines are Figure 1. TMK-2 Antitank Mine 

now equipped with programmable self-destruct or self-neutrali- / follow-on combat support and 

zation options. 1 i combat service support units. 

While all these technologies 1 AT mines are employed in difcannot be combined into one de- ferent ways, depending on the obvice, it is possible for most nations jectives and resources of the user. 

to procure large numbers of AT In a counterinsurgency situation, 

mines with one or more advanced guerrillas will hide them in unexfeatures. Despite their sophisti- 1 pected places. The goal is to kill or 

cated designs, these weapons are disable as many vehicles as possiinexpensive and easily produced. ble while forcing the opposition to 

U.S.soldiers can expect to encoun- 1 commit major resources to keepter them in virtually every sce- j ingcritical routes and supply lines 

nario, from humanitarian relief 1 open. Thus, in a low-intensity conmissiom to high-intensity con- flict, U.S.soldiers may find AT 

flicts. Modern AT mines give en- mines almost anywhere a vehicle 

emy forces the potential to seri- can conceivably go, laid without 

ously hamper U.S,combat I pattern along roads and other 

operations. Even marginal oppo- mounted avenues of approach.' 

nenh with limited resources can 1 
 These tactics are effective: During 

use them to disrupt the movement the Vietnam War, AT mines acof U.S, maneuver units, as well a3 counted for 70 percent of the 

vehicles destroyed.3 Guerrillas 

also employ AT mines as part of a 

protective belt of obstacles around 

their base camps. 

In a conventional, mid-intensity 

conflict, threat forces will employ 

AT mines not just to disable or 

destroy vehicles, but also to canalize armored formations into kill 

zones. In this scenario, AT mines 

generally will be emplaced on a 

massive scale in tactical and protective minefields. It does not matter that most of the mines will 

never achieve kills. If the minefield delays or diverts the enemy 

so that other weapons can be effectively brought to bear, the mines 

will have achieved their purpose. 

AT mines are classified by the 

section of the tank they are designed to attack. The four general 

'

! types are: full-width attack (antihull), blast (anti-track), side at- I tack, and top attack. This article, I the last in a series of three, discusses the characteristics of each 

type of AT mine. 

I 

Full-Width Attack 

(Anti-hull) AT Mines I 

I 

he Germans developed and 

1 fielded the first full-width 

i attack AT mines toward the end 

i of World War 11. These mines 

I had tilt-rod fuzes and shaped 

! charge-kill mechanism^.^ Modern 

examples of this type (Table 1) 

Include the Russian TMK-2 (Fig- ' 1 ure 1)and the U.S.M-21. 

38 Engineer November 1993 
Full-Width Attack Antitank Mines 

Country of Origrn N ~ ~ ~ ~ Fuzed ~ Type , ~ ~ , Emplacement 

Technique , ~ ~ Remarks 

Chna Type 84C Soaltered by Vpe 81 MRL, range l8km (kilometers). 

Type 84A Employed with look-alike pressuiefvzed mine, 

scenered by rype 81 MRL, range 18km 

Czechoslovakia PT-Mi-P Till rod 

France 1 ::iF2 

I HPD 

TiH rod ' Influence 

1 

influence 

Manual 

' Manual, mine planter ' Manual, mine planter 

Biast mine normally used wth pressure lure. 

Germany 

i

i Lance 

1 AT-2 influence 

Artjllely, vshicle 

dispensed 

MmuaI, rocket, vehicb 

dispensed 

llaiy 

1 FFVa28 

I HCT-2 

! HCT 

infimnce 

Influence 

Influence 

Manuel, mine piantei 

I Mawd, mine pianter 

I Mmual, mine pianlei 

MsnufacOured in Swsdsn. 

I SeiMesVucts or sen-neutralizes for up to 128 days. 

Seitdertructr or self.neutralizes for up to 180 days. 

SBMVI1 1 lnflmnCe nine SBHdestwcts or self-ne~tmlizes for up to 180 days. 

Used by Austrafin. 

VS-HCL Range 22 km. 

i SATM 

U.K, %mine I Tlt rod mine planter Antihandiing devtce optional. alest mine normally 

used vnth pjessure fuze. 

I 

MK.7 XI1 rod Manual Andhandling device opt~onal. Blast mine normally 

used Wlth pressure fuze. 

1 HB-876 Influence Fixed.Wlng aircrsn Delivered by JP-233 HADES system. 

US. M-21 ; Tit rod 

i 

Manual Antihandling device optional. Best mine normally ! used with pressure fuze. 

i Manual 

I 

M-15 

I 

Manual ' Antihandling dsvce optional. Blast mine normally 

used with pressure fuze. 

Developmental. 

SBii de~thlct~: 4 - 48 hours: range 17 km. 

M-75 

dtspensed 

SeH desmcts: 4 - 48 hours: 5 - 15 days. 

USSR. 8 TMK.2 XI1 rod Manual 1 Antihandling device opiianal. 

Tilt rod Manual ! Antihandling device optional. Uses truncated tilt rod. 

; Blast mne normally used Wlth pressure fuze. 

i 

I TM-57 1 TM16 1 TM62 

Tilt rod 

Ti11 rod 

influence 

Manual 

Manual 

Mmusl, mine planter 

I Antihandling device optional. Uses truncated tilt iod. I Blast mine normally used Mlt pressurs fuze. 

I Antihandling device opbnel. Uses truncated tiit rod i Blst mine normdly used Mth pressure fure. 

1 Blast mine normally used with pressure fuze. 

i

i TM-72 influence Manual, mine pianter 

Yugoslavia TMRP-6 1 lit rod 

lnfluencs 

Manual 

Rocket 

AnDhandling device optional. 

Range 50km. 

Table 1 

November 1993 Engineer 39 
Figure 2. VS-HCT antitank mine (Itallan) 

Figure 3. TCE-6, T.C. 6 antitank mines (Italian, Egyptian) 

The shaped charge or explosively formed penetrator (EFP) 

employed with most full-width attack mines is designed to pierce 

the bottom of an armored vehicle 

and kill the crew. Their greater 

area coverage (as compared to an 

anti-track pressure fuzed mine) allows the emplacing unit to get the 

same effective coverage with significantly fewer mines per kilometer of front. Or, the unit can emplace a minefield with the same 

number of mines but achieve a significantly higher probability of 

encounter. 

Most recent advances for this 

type of mine relate to the fuze 

design. In the last 15 years, advanced influence fuzes have been 

combined with directional charges 

to produce several extreniely sophisticated anti-hull mines, such 

as the U.S. RAAM and the Italian 

VS-HCTseries (Figure2). Many of 

theseminesare satkrahle (Table 1). 

An influence fuze is designed to 

detect certain aspects of a target's 

signature, such as its magnetic, 

seismic, acoustic, or infrared characteristics, and to detonate when 

its initiation algorithms (computer programs) are fully satisfied. The most common arrangement uses a seismic cue to "wabe 

up" a magnetic sensor, which then 

detonates the mine if it "sees" a 

change in the magnetic field around 

it. Recognizable changes in the 

magnetic field are caused by large 

movingmetallic objects, like an armored vehicle. Some influence fuzes 

can distinguish the seismiclmagnetic signature of an arm-ored vehicle from the seismidmagnetic 

signatures of smaller wheeled vehicles, and only initiate if they 

"see"a tank or APC. Others use combinations of sensors. to impmve 

their target discrimination and reduce the effectiveness of mine countermeasures. All are extremely sophisticated and difficult to defeat. 

The effectiveness of influence 

fuzes has resulted in the development of add-on fuzes for older 

mines such as the U.S. M-21 (M609 fuze) and the Russian TM-62 

(MVN-72 fuze).' 

Because influence fuzes are extremely sensitive and can function 

as anti-handling devices, soldiers 

should never attempt to move or 

disarm a mine equipped with one. 

6 

If the situation warrants, the mine 

may be blown in place. But under 

no circumstances should the device be picked up or handled, except under the supervision of a 

qualified explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) technician. 

Many soldiers have expressed 

concern that mine detectors can 

activate magnetic influence fuzed 

mines. These concerns are not unjustified: during World War 11, 

both the Germans and the Russians developed and fielded devices that would detonate mines 

when detectors were used nearby. I 

However, there are no reports of 

such fuzes being used today. None 

of the hand-held mine detectors in 

the U.S. inventory can activate 

any of the magnetic influence 

fuzes currently on the world market. The high-frequency signals 

put out by U.S. mine detectors are 

rejected hy the algorithms within 

the mine fuzes as "spook" or deceptions, and the magnetic mines 

remain dormant. 
Flgure 4. Barmine (UK) 

Full-width attack AT mines pos- employed worldwide (Table 2, 1 

sess significant resistance to blast p. 42).They are intended to disable I overpressure. This makes them armored vehicles by damaging susdifficult to counter with explosive pension components such as tracks I 

systems such as the M-58 MICLIC and road wheels. The crippled vehi- ~ 

(Mine Clearing Line Cl~arge).~ cles can then be killed by some /

The overpressure must be suffi- other means, most likely ax1 anti- ; 

cient to cause sympathetic detona- tank missile or a tank. I 

tion of the main charge because The Italians have made the 1 

the fuze is not activated by pres- most significant advances in blast 1 

sure. Fortunately, the amount of ATmines. The Italian TCE-6 mine 

metal used in the shaped charge or (Figure3) can be turned on and off ; 

EFP liner makes this type of mine remotely by radio, which allows ~ 

fairly easy to locate with a mine friendly forces to pass through an 

detector. obstacle without creating a permanent 

.,

m~. . Another advanced ;

Blast (Anti-track) AT blast AT mine, the British ; 

Barmine (Figure 41, is designed to ~ Mines readily accept a wide variety of 

alast AT mines were first fuzes (Table 2).1° 
imnrovised bv the Ger-


mans toward the end of World . Side Attack AT Mines ; 


War I, usin 


lery shells. B high explosive artil- 
These were either 1 I[mprovised side attact AT 

pressure fuzed or wired for coin- 1 mines, sometimes called offmand detonation. Significant im- route mines, were first elnployed 

provements have been made by the ~ern~ansll and the Russince then. Advances include sians12 during World War 11. 

blast overpressure protection, They can employ a variety of 

low metallic content (the former fuzes, such as breakwire and inYugoslavia makes mines with n~ fluence, and can be command 

metal), scatterability, and inte- 1 detonated. Because these mines 

gral anti-handling devices. The 1 are not placed directly in the 

service lives of older, less ad- 1 path of a vehicle, they present 

vanced mines (such as the U.S. 1 unique challenges to breaching 

M15) have been extended operations. They are especially 

through the addition of tilt-rod, I challenging when equipped with 

influence, and multi-impulse / an advanced electronic fuze that 

fuzes. Multi-impulse fuzes re- ! hardens them against explosive 

quire multiple pressure applica- I

I breaching techniques. When 

Among the most advanced are 

those that use the British-made 

AJAX sensor Figure 5, page 431." 

Top Attack AT Mines 

The current thrust of ada vanced mine development 

is in the area of top attack or 

wide area AT mines (Tahle 3). 

Several examples of this emerging technology may be fielded in 

the near future. Top attack 

mines will employ multiple integrated sensors to identify and attack armored vehicles at ranges 

of up to 200 meters. This feature 

will make them extremely difficult to detect and defeat. An attack probably will be generated 

by a suhmunition that is ejected 

from the mine when a target 

that satisfies the launch algorithm is detected by its sensors. 

Top attack mines are expected 

to have multiple sensors, such 

as seismic, magnetic, acoustic, 

or infrared, to improve target 

discrimination. 

The submunition being developed for the U.S. WAM (wide area 

mine, Figure 6, page 44 ) consists 

of an EFP warhead and an infrared sensor. It vaguely resembles a 

large skeet. The WAM will be able 

to detect, classify, track, and engage target vehicles with its seismic and acoustic sensors. After the 

WAM identifies a target, it will 

launch a smart submunition, called 

tions to make them function, properly placed, these mines can a sublet, toward the target vehicle. 

They were developed as a counter- defeat a mine plow or mine roller An infrared sensor on the sublet 

countermeasure to explosive line ! equipped tank Side attack mines will search the ground, seeking 

charges and mine rollers. ( have been developed by several heat from the target vehicle's enBlast AT mines are widely i countries (Table 3, page 43). gine. When preestablished target 

November 1993 Engineer 41 
Blast Antltank Mines 

Fure Antlhandllng Devlce' 

Metal 

Content 

Blast 

Protectlon 

Emplacernenl 

Technique 

~ ~ ~~~~~~~~ 

Type 840 Pressure None High None Rocket 

Pressure Mernal High Yet Manual, mine 

planter 

Pressure Enernal Low None Manual, mine 

plsnter 

Prsssure Wernal Low Nome Manual 

Tilt rod Wernal Low Some Manuel 

Pressure Enernal Low None Manual, mine 

planter 

Pressure Wernal Low Norm Manual, mine 

planter 

Pressure NA High None Manual 

Pressure Wernal Low Yea Manual, mine 

planter 

Pressure ?.","$I1 LOW Yes 

Manual, 

heiicopter, mine 

planter 

Pressure F,","! Low Yo, 

Manual. 

helicopter, mine 

planter 

Low Yea 

Menual, 

helicopter, mine 

Dianttrr 

Barmine Pressure internal Law None Manual, mine 1 pianter 

h"bh 

impuise internal LOW Yes Manual, mim 

planter 

lnfiuence Internal Low Yes Manual, mine 

plsnter 

TI1 rod Internal Low Same Manual, mlm 

planter 

MK-7 Pressure Enarnal High Some Manual, mine 

planter 

Tit rod Wernal High Some 

Wsrnal High None Manual, mine 

planter 

External High Some Manual 

Pressure External Law Menual 

-

Pressure internal Varier Manual, mine 

planter 

Influence internal Varies Manual, mine 

planter 

Tit rod NA Varies 

External High Manual, mine 

planter 

Wernel High Manuel 

TM-46 Prsrsure Enernal High Manuel, mine 

planter 

Tlt rod Enernel High Same Manual 

PTM-1s Pressure None Low Helioopter, fixed 

wing

aircrafl 

TMD~B Pressure Wernal Low Manual 

'indicates the possibie presence of an AHD: only s few mines Hnll b so equipped. 

Remarks 

I 

Can use eiecvonlc 'Splds? fuze

Fmm Eeat Germany. 

TCEG hss remote onioii 

Used by iraq. 

Used by Iraq. 

Used by Iraq. 

Used by Baigium snd Canada. 

Pr0d"ced in South Korea and 

Chile. 

Made wth s variew of casings 

Metai is be moa common. 

Onv TMN-46 has secondav 

fuze ~811tor antihandling 
 de~res. 


Com nioo to PFM-I, 


seiid%ucls in up to 20 hwn. 


also called PGMDM. 


Common -den mine. 

Table 2 
Side- and Top-Attack Antltenk Mines 

Of Nomenclature Origtn 

France MIACAH Ft 

MAZAC 

cermany DM-12 

TAWNTAL 

UK AJAX 

U.S. M-24 

M66 

WAM 

Yworlsvla TMRP6 

NA = Deb mt avaclabie. 

detection and aim-point criteria 

are satisfied, the sublet's microprocessor will initiate the EFP. The high 

velocity metal slug will then defeat the target vehicle's top armor, 

most likely destroying the engine. 

Top attack mines will be either 

scatterable or emplaced by hand. 

Future upgrades may include the 

integration of anti-handling devices, IFF (identification friend or 

Range Fuze (m =meters) 

Sd8 command, 

Bieakwira. 

lnnusnce -


TOP lnlluencs t80m 

Side BreaLr*ire, oommed 461 

TOP lnfluancs NA 

Side Influence 2Wm 

Side Breakwire 3hn 

Side Infkmce 3Cm 

TOP lnnuence 1Mm 

Side Comrnsd 461 

Table 3 

foe) capability, remote control 

onloff, and the ability to move 

themselves to more optimal locations. The United States is not 

alone in developing this technology;14 Germany and France 15 are 

working on comparable systems. 

Similar sensor and processor 

technologies are being used by 

the U.S. (Figure 7, page 45)16and 

Great ~ritain'~ to develop antiRemarks 

In fuze 1s h!ghly meisIan1 10 explo=ive 

CIBB~B~EB. 

Dewloprnenlal, 

Also caW PARM or Storm 

Dswlapmenlal. 

Antihsdllng devica optianai. In ent: adapts lo AT*. LAW 80. 2?kKAS 

MIcumnlly In upe. 

Nbl wrmnlly in use. 

Developmental. 

menadling device op8onal. Normdly 

empbyed sr full-undfh ensck mine 

Wlth lilt md tuze. 

helicopter mines. These mines are 

intended to force low flying aircraft to abandon nap-of-the-earth 

flight, which will make them more 

vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). 

Summary 

The technological advances ' discussed in this article 

have significant implications for 

future U.S. combat operations. 

As discussed in other articles in 

this series IENGhVEER, April and 

August 1993), American muntermine equipment is becoming increasingly inadequate to deal 

with the threat, both in tern of 

capability and quantity. For example, the MICLIC does not reliably counter a new generation of 

blast resistant mines. The battalion countermine set, effective 

against most mines, is vulnerable to side attack and top attack 

mines. And many nations have 

fielded or procured scatterable 

mine systems that can be used to 

reseed breached obstacles or emplace new ones deep in the enemy rear (Table 4, page 44), 

where countermine resources are 

Figure 5. A British AJAX off-route mine fuze mounted on a French APILAS 

AT weapon system. traditionally limited. 

November 1993 Engineer 43 
Mine Delivery Systems 

Country of Emplacement 

Orig~n kilometers) 

Type 61 / Rocket 

Minotaur Vehicle disperned Antipnonneli I 


MIFF, MUSPA, 

MUSA 

FROS 25 Rockst VS-HCWS MKil 

FifiOS 30 Rocket 

il K. 

HE-786 

us. BLuBliS 

Volcano 	 Vehicle dispensed. M75 hoiieopror 

USSR 	 EM-21 Rocket 

BM-22 I Rocks! hrpenomeli mu,mk 

Anlilank 

Y"C051av8e 	 Racket 

*Many count" &have produced mechanical mine pl?nlen, including: 
 France. Germany. Itsly. Swedon, US, and Yugoslswa. 


NA = Data mt epplicable. 


Table 4 

8 	 / 

e* 

.,'?" 1 

. . ~.~ . ~.

,: 

Figure 6.U.S. Wlde Area Mine (WAM) 

44 Engineer 

Minefield 

Characteristics I

600 mines, 1.90 x 9m (merers). 

Rapidly coven lawe ares. 

Also celled HADES. 

600 mines in en area (approx.). 

950 mines in bm l.ll0-meter 

51"3, 35 melen dsep 4th 70 melen (air aeliveredj or 9 rnelen 

(ground d~rpnnsed) betwsen strips. 

Mine pian!ern, miner spaced 4 to 55m. 

The combat engineers' response 

to this threat should be the same 

as their response to other types of 

mines. As discussed earlier, they 

must know what types of devices 

are available on the world market, 

and they must understand which 

breaching techniques are effective 

against which types of mines. 

~boveall, combat engineers must 

be prepared to improvise. 18 

The burden of conducting countermine operations does not fall 

solely on the shoulders of combat 

engineers. Maneuver commanders must educate themselves on 

the complexity and severity of this 

threat. Reconnaissance elements 

should know how to acquire specific information on enemy ohstacles to support the preparation for 

U.S, breaching operations. They 

November 1993 
Mi: Leigh is a specialprojects officer at 

the Beluoir Research, Development, 

andEneineeiine Center. He isa retired " " 

Army ofper: Previous msignments include deputy TRADOC systems manager for minelcountermine warfare. 

MI: Leigh is a graduate of the U.S. 

Army Command and Geneinl Staff College and holds a bachelor's degrze from 

% Golclen Gate University, Sun Francisco. 

d 

f 

e 

k 

Endnotes 

-

'~ane'sMilitary Vehicles and Logistics, 1991.1992, Jane's Defence 

Data, 1991, pages 143-206. 

%C 5-31, Wet Cong Boobytraps, 

Mines, and Mine Warfare Techniques, December 1969, pages 5-7. 

L I 'sapper Countermine Guide, 8 BRDEC Pamphlet 350-4, Belvoir ReFigure 7.U.S.Anti-helicopter mine. search, ~evelb~ment and Engineering 

Center, November 1990, page 9. 

must identify the types of mines ) the soldier in the field. The soldier : 4~~ 5-223C, German Mine Warpresent and the approximate , must combine available technolo- ! fare Equlpmet~t, March 1952, pages 

depth and density of the minefield, ; gies with courage, good tactics, 118-122. 

Additionally, all soldiers must, at and sound judgement to achieve j 'Jane's, pages 190 and 200. 

a minimum, be familiar with the 1 an optimal balance. Combat engi- '~ineRecognition and Warfare 

types ofmines they may encounter. neers are one of the keys to pre- j Handbook, U.S. Army Engineer 

Events in the last half-century venting the disruption ofArlny op- . School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO. N& 

support this analysis. Since 1941, erations by a determined enemy j vember 1990, pag~s28,64, and66. 

mines have inflicted thousands of armed with mines. But they can ! 'TM 5-223A,Souiet Mine Warfare 

American casualties. 1ntel.est.- fulfill this role only if they are pre- ; Equip~nent,August 1951, pages 4547. 


ingly, in the same span, not one , pared. This means they must wn- '~ine Recognition and Warfare 


American soldier has been killed duct intensive, realistic training ! Handbook, pages 2,40, 44, and 45. 


in combat by chemical weapons. and acquire detailed knowledge i 'stiff, Peter, Tanling the Land- 


Yet the U.S. Army still devotes of the mine threat. Only then will ; mine, Galago Publishing Ltd., Alber- 


considerable time and resources combat engineers be ready to I ton, RepublicofS.Africa, 1986, page 15. 


toward chemical warfare training. ' save lives and accomplish their ''Jane's, pages 176, 177, 194, and 


This is appropriate, gven the na- I mission. y 195. 


ture of the chemical warfare : 'kM 5-223C, pages 113-116. 


threat. But given the nature of the ~WI:Schneeit is a cioilian pxject engi- 12westernEurope, World War 11,
 mine threat and the explosive pro- , nrer at the Relooir Researnh, Develop- : ,randrnine and countennine war. 


liferation of these devices world- n:PiLt, Engineeiiilg Centel: For* i fare, Engineer Agency for Resources 


wide. shouldn't mine warfare Beluoil: Dui.ing Dese~t ShieldlS~l7n, I Inventories. Washington, D.C., June 


training be heavily emphasized he trained 19 U.S. e.ngineer battalions 1973, pages'195 and 197. 


also? Otherwise, casualties due to in rnine u:arfare techniques and Iraqi 13Jaizek,page 167. 


these increasingly deadly devices mines. He holds a bachelorb degree 


in n~echanical engineering fiorn Geo~ 14~ane's,pages 199-200. 

can be expected to mount. gin Institute of Dchnolo~y. .. l%~~. - - - Area ~-Defense Weawn. A ~ ~ 

~ 

Technology provides only part oC Bruchure, MATRA Defense, undated. 

the answer to the mine warfare Mi: Visser is n ciciiianproject engineer 

nt the Reli;oirResearrh, Deuelopment, 16~anc's,page 198. 

problem. New countermine sys- and Engineering Center: tlepreviously 17Anti-~elicopterMine, Brochure, tems are in development but no seived as an iizst~~uctorat the U.S. Ferranti International, undated. 

silver bullets are on the horizon at Al.1n31 Engineer School. 1Vr: Visser is a '%chneck, William, "Desert Storm, this time. In the short term, the graduate of the U.S. military Acad- Countermine Improvisations," ENGI- mine problem must be solved by emy, West Point. NEER Magazine, June 1992. 

November 1993 Engineer 45 
Engineer Problem 


Reconnaissance missions oflen include the requirement to measure overhead clearance. For many soldiers, though, the question is how to measure the distance. The current FM 5-36, Route Reconnaissance and Classification does not include a method. 

The new reconnaissance manual, FM 5-170, will include the method described in this 

article but is not scheduled for publication until late 1994. 

Measuring overhead clearance can be dangerous. The April 1993 issue of ENGINEER, page 44, mentions a fatal accident that occurred when a soldier used a metal 

tape to directly measure the height of an electric power line. The news item recommends using a clinometer, NSN 6675-00-641-5735, to measure overhead clearance. 

While the clinometer facilitates safe and accurate measurements, some engineer units 

lack this equipment. 

The following field-expedient method of determining overhead clearance is safe and 

requires only a straight wooden or metal rod about 3 feet long. The Engineer School 

recommends leaders ensure their soldiers know and use this method. 

Method 

Assume you are conducting a road march where a crane must operate near a high 

voltage power line. You must determine the distance between the ground and the 

lowest point on the lowest cable that carries electrical current. In this situation, at least 

50 feet clearance between the ground and the lowest point on the cable is required to 

safely operate the crane around the power line. 

Complete the following steps to measure the distance: 

I. With your arm extended, mark a length of metal rod or wooden pole equal to the 

distance from the bridge of your nose to the first joint of your thumb. A camouflage pole 

works well. (Refer to letters A and F on the diagram). 

2. Extend your arm and hold the rod or pole in your hand so the measured length is 

held just above your hand and as vertical as possible. Keep your eyes parallel with the 

first joint of your thumb; keep the rod or pole perpendicular to the ground (F on diagram) 

NOTE: For steps 3, 4, and 5, keep your hand level (parallel) with your shooting eye. 

3. Face the object and site along the top of the rod or pole (see diagram) 

4. Move toward or away from the object until the point to be measured is just above 

the top of the rod or pole (A-Bon diagram). 

5. Measure the distance from where you are standing to the base of the object 

(E-D). For this example, assume it is 55 feet. 

6. Measure the distance from the ground at your feet (E) to the bridge of your nose. 

Add that figure to the result of step 5. Example: 55 feet t 6 feet = 61 feet. The sum 

is the height of the object. 

46 Engineer November 1993 
nginleer Pro 


7. CAUTION: Deduct 3 feet for safety. Example: 61 feet - 3 feet = 58 feet. 


In this situation, 50 feet clearance is required forthe crane. Thus, using caution 


you can operate the crane around the power line. 

Now use the field-expedient method to complete the following exercise: 

Problem 

You are conducting a route reconnaissance for your battalion and encounter a tunnel. You decide to use the field-expedient method to determine the overhead clearance. You are xfeet tall and have a distance of x inches between the lower joint of 

your thumb and the bridge of your nose. Find an object (without voltage) which has 

overhead clearance of 20 feet or more. For this exercise, use an object that you can 

measure directly--so you can check your accuracy. Follow steps 1 through 7, with 

the aid of the diagram. After you have mastered this technique, you can accurately 

determine the clearance of power lines without creating a hazard to life or limb. 

This ENGINEER Problem was submitted by Captain Frank T. Akins, instructor/writef 

in the Combat Engineering Division, Directorate of Training, U.S. Army Engineer 

School. 

November I993 Engineer 47 
7Le Battle 05 KLe Sad 


By Gray Wirth 

ay analyzing past battles, 

Army engineers can learn 

lnlportant tactical principles that 

have been incorporated into modern doctrine and can apply them 

to future operations. One such 

battle is the Battle of Khe Sanh, 

during the Vietnam War. At Khe 

Sanh, the allied forces of the 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

(ARVN) and the United States 

defeated the numerically superlor North Vietnamese Aqmy 

(NVA). The battle took place on 

the Khe Sanh plateau in the 

Quang Tri Province of northern 

South Vietnam (MAp 1). The three 

phases of the fighting lasted from 

April 1967 through April 1968. 

Analysis of four critical events 

during Phase I1 (January 20 to 

March 31, 1968) provides lessons 

that have become part of modern 

Army doctrine: First, it is important 

to seize tlie initiative in a battle. 

Second, proper use of terrainoftcn 

determines tlie victor in a confrontation. Third, synchronization of 

all battlefield activities is vital for 

success. 

Background 

o understand the battle of 

Khe Sanh, it is important 

to look at the factors that led up 

to and influenced the battle. The 

Khe Sanli plateau was critical 

terrain because the NVA used 

area routes to infiltrate into 

South Vietnam from Laos and 

the Demilitar~zed Zone (DMZ). 

To curtail that activity, the allied 

forces had maintained some form 

of a Khe Sanh combat base 

(KSCB) since 1962.' In 1967, 

the NVA started building up 

significant conventional forces in 

the area around Khe Sanh. 

Therefore, to deny the NVA control of this important terrain, the 

U.S, started increasing its own 

strength in the region. 

Phase I, referred to as "the Hill 

Fights," began in April 1967, when 

U.S. Marines successfully seized 

control of the hilltops surrounding 

the JSSCB. To binder the allied 

forces' logistical operations, the 

NVA demolished portions of Route 

9, which was the only road into the 

area. As a result, the allies had to 

resupply the KSCB by air until 

they could repair the road after 

the battle ended. NVA activity increased again just before Phase 11, 

known as "the Siege," began on 

~Janua~y 20, 1968. 

The allied forces made a major 

commitment to defend Khe Sanh 

for several reasons. The U.S. 

48 Engineer Nouentber 1993 
commanders saw Khe Sanh as an B-52 bombers. In addition, the 

excellent chance to engage an en- U.S, had more sophisticated inemy that had been elusive up to telligence collection measures 

that point. The battle provided a than did the NVA, including 

chance to exercise an economy of ground sensors, imagery equipforce operation by which a rein- ment, and night-vision devices. 

forced Marine regiment could op- These tools helped make the 

pose two NVAdivisions and keep allied forces aware of NVA 

them from launchingother offen- movements. 

sivesin~outh~ietnam.~ Also, the The weather also had a major 

allies realized that the NorthViet- impact on the battle. The monsoon 

namese would gain bargaining season caused low cloud ceilins 

power at future peace talks if they and early morning fog every day 

held a portion of South Vietna~n. This factor provided a critical adFinally, it was politically impor- vantage to the NVA because it did 

tant to President Johnson that not allow the allied forces to fully 

Khe Sanh did not become an exploit their air attack capability. 

"American Dien Bien Phu." The bad weather also greatly hindered U.S. resupply efforts to the 

KSCB and the hilltop outposts. FiInfluencing Factors nally, the NVA was able ta take 

advantage of the poor visibility Throughout the Vietnam when making assaults on allied

War, the allied forces main- ' positions. 

tained a major technological ad- Another element critical to the 

vantage over the North Vietnam- outcome of the battle was the terese, and this advantage was very rain. The densely vegetated, rugapparent at Khe Sanh. The al- ged terrain around Khe Sanh was 

lies' total air superiority allowed I well suited for infiltrations and 

them to use close air support I thus initially favored the NVA. 

(CAS), resupply with transport However, since key terrain favors 

aircraft, and pound NVA forma- ~ the element that controls each spetions from high altitudes with cific feature, the overall advantage 

would be decided during the battle. Because the KSCB sat on a 

plateau, the hilltops and ridges to 

the north and east were the most 

significant terrain. These high 

points were extremely important 

for observation and indirect firesupport coordination during the 

battle. 

The NVA had about a 3 to 1 

combat ratio advantage over the 

allied forces. Both sides had experienced leaders and well-trained, 

well-equipped soldiers. Artillery 

and mortar assets were approximately equal in type and quantity. 

Infantry weapons were also similar, but U.S. air assets gave the 

allied forces an overall firepower 

edge. 

The NVA had two divisions in 

the area around Khe Sanh. Although estimates vary, the communist forces' total strength was 

probably 20,000 at its peak.3 The 

NVA had two artillery regiments 

and organic mortars for direct 

supporting fires. Reinforcing fires 

from large guns located in Laos 

were also available. 

The allied forces' primary combat power consisted of five U.S. 

Marine battalions and the ARVN 

Map 1 

Area of operation for the 

Battle of Khe Sanh, in 

Northern Quang Trl 

Province. The Khe Sanh 

plateau was vital terrain 

to both sides because it 

provided routes where 

troops could infiltrate 

into South Vietnam. 
37th Ranger Battalion. The defenders also had many separate 

companies and detachments from 

the ARVN and all U.S. militaly 

branches. The 26th Marine Regiment commander, Colonel David 

Lownds, was in charge, with an 

overall troop strength of approximately 6,000. 

The 325th NVA Division occupied the area north of hills 881N 

and 861. The 304th hVA Division 

had entered South Vietnam 

through Laos and was west of Lang 

Vei. Headquartels, 26th Marine 

Regiment was at the KSCB, with 

its units manning the perimeter 

and hilltop outposts (see Map 2). 

Critical Events 

The North Vietnamese 

planned both supporting 

and main attacks to seize KSCB 

The supporting attack was to be 

along the three valleys in the 

north to seize the hills overlooking the KSCB. They would then 

use the hilltops as fire bases and 

conduct diversionary attacks on 

50 Engineer 

the northern KSCB perimeter. 

The plan called for the main attack to come from the west, 

along Route 9, and for the NVA 

to capture the Lang Vei and Khe 

Sanh villages en route to the assault on the KSCB from the 

southea~t.~ On January 20, a n

NVA lieutenant surrendered to 

the Marines at the KSCB and 

provided more detailed information about the enemy's plan. He 

told of a planned attack on hills 

881s and 861 that night and a 

later attack on the KSCB. This 

information proved accurate 

throughout the battle.' 

The allied plan was to hold the 

KSCB and surrounding outposts 

with the use of heavily fortified 

defensive positions and occasional 

search-and-destroy missions. The 

outposts would deny enemy access 

to key terrain features and provide an overwatch of the principal 

avenues of approach. 

Phase I1 of the battle began on 

January 20, 1968, when Marine 

Company 1/3/26 made contact 

with an NVA battalion while 

on patrol near hill 881N. The 

Map 2 

Locatlon of the Khe Sanh combat 

base and hilltop outposts. The 

Marines' successful defense of 

these hilltops proved to be decisive in the battle. 

company had been sent to that 

area after smaller patrols had detected NVA. The company made 

excellent use of maneuver and coordinated direct and indirect fires 

to overwhelm the enemy. Marine 

fighter/bombers dropped napalm 

to defeat an attempted NVA counterattack. Company 1/3/26 counted 

103 dead NVA during their withdrawal, compared to only seven 

friendly losses. 6 

The lesson learned from thiscritical event is that taking the initiative is vital to an effective defense. 

The use of initiative in attacking 

the NVA allowed the Marines to 

defeat an enemy element immediately, thus preventing the planned 

NVA assault that night on the defensive perimeter of hill 881s. As 

part of modern Army doctrine, FM 

100-5, Operations, recognizes initiative as one of the AirLand Battle tenets. Commanders should 

maintain an offensive mind-set 

even in static defenses and constantly exploit op ortunities to 

engage the enemy. $ 

The second critical event occured 

on the night of January 20-21, 

November 1993 
when an NVA battalion attacked 

hill 861. The Marines of Company 

W3126 had prepared strong bunkers and trenches that withstood 

the enemy artillery and mortar 

barrage. Use of interlocking fires 

and superb command and control 

enabled Kilo Company to withstand the assault. Because the 

NV.4 attacked only hill 861 that 

night, the allied forces could concentrate their indirect fires from 

all available sources on the enemy's advance and reserves. As a 

result of their successful defense, 

the Marines held control of that 

critical hilltop for the rest of the 

battle.' 

The third critical event took 

place February 5, when a battalion of the 325th NVA Division attacked hill 861A. Company Ei2126 

defeated the aggressors in yet another violent, close-in fight. Echo 

Company used primary and secondary fighting positions and the 

maneuver of a reserve element to 

defeat the attackers. The Marines' 

well-coordinated indirect fire support and excellent smali-unit leadership proved to be decisive. The 

result was that andher important 

hilltop surrounding the KSCB 

remained in allied forces'cnntrol. 

The results of the fights on Hills 

861 and 86lAdemonstrate the importance of controlling key terrain. The allied forces' control of 

the key hilltops overlooking the 

Khe SanhPlateau was essential to 

the successful defense of the 

KSCB. If the NVA had held that 

terrain, they would have enjoyed 

observed indirect fires on the 

KSCB, unobserved unit movements to within striking distance 

of the base, and increased opportunities for attacks on U.S. aircraft. Current Army doctrine embraces the concept of seizing and 

maintaining key terrain. Accordillg to FM 100-5, Operations,''Battles are won or lost by the way in 

which combatants use the terrain 

to protect their own forces and to 

destroy those of the enemyng 

The fourth critical event occurred on the night of February 

29, when the 37th ARVN Ranger 

Battalion and the 1st battalion of 

the! 26th Marine regiment defeat& an NVA regiment's attack 

against the eastern perimeter of 

the KSCB. Because U.S. intelligence had previously detected 

NVA movements toward the perimeter, allied forces were able to 

mass fire support from all artillery, close air support, and B-52's 

and to prevent a larger and more 

organized enemy offensive." The 

Khe Sanh defenders stopped the 

attack before enemy forces reached 

the perimeter wire. 

The lesson learned from this 

critical event is that effective synchronization of efforts is often the 

key to victory. In the defense of 

Khe Sanh, allied forces continually displayed the ability to synchronize battlefield activities. 

Despite the complex task organization, the Marine and South Vietnamese commnnders maintained excellent command and 

control of their units throughout 

the siege. They maximized use of 

local informants, ground sensors, 

night vision devices, and other intelligence sources to prepare for 

the assault. Also, the successful 

coordination and integration of 

the many sources of friendly fire 

support against NVA units proved 

to be decisive. As part of modern 

Army doctrine, FM 100-5 listssynchronization as one of the AirLand 

Battle tenets. By synchronizing 

battlefield activities, commanders can concentrate their available 

forces and fires at the point of 

decision.11 

Battlefield Success 

After the February 29 attack, 

the NVA never launched another large-scale effort against 

the KSCB. Shortly thereafter, 

U.S. intelligence observed a major withdrawal of NVA units out 

of the Khe Sanh areal2 Thus, 

Phase I1 of the Battle of Khe 

Sanh was an overwhelming tactical victory for the allied forces. 

By the end of Phase 111, NVA 

casualties were estimated to range 

from 10,000 to 15,000, compared 

Two Marines string barbed wire around their base at Khe Sanh. to only 205 for the allied forces.13 

November 1993 Engineer 51 
The allied forces conducted a 

very successful defense at Khe 

Sanh. Analysis of the battle is significant, however, because it emphasizes three basic military fundamentals: initiative, use of terrain, 

and synchronization. These tadical principles play an important 

role in modern U.S. Army doctrine, and prudent use of them will 

make the U.S. more successful in 

future wartime operations. Y 

Mr Wirth is a graduate student at 

Haruard University. While on active duty, he received the Engineer 

Officer Aduanced Course's Thomas 

Jefferson Writing Award for his 

Khe Sanh battle analysis. He 

served as a deployment liaison officer, S-I, company aecutiue officet; 

and platoon leader in the 536th Engineer Battalion, Fort Kobbe, Panama. MI:Mrth holds a bachelor of 

scimm degree fmm Cornell University. 

Endnotes 

'shore, Moyers. The Battle for 

Khe Sanh. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1969, p. 180. 

'shore, p. 47. 

'~onds,Ray The Vietnam War. 

NewYork Crown, 1979, pp. 156-157. 

4~onds,p. 157. 

'pipes, Kenneth. "Men to Match 

Their Mountains." Marine Corps 

Gazette. April 1974, pp. 18-24. 

'shore, pp. 37-39. 

7~hore,p. 15. 

'shore, p. 40. 

'shore, p. 25. 

''shore, p. 124. 

"shore, p. 17. 

''shore, p. 184. 

13Westmoreland, William. A 

Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976, p. 422. 

'Photographs fmm Vietnam:The Valor and 

the Sormw by Thomas D. Boettcher. Copyright (c) 1985 by Thomas D. Boettcher By 

permission of Little, Bmwn and Company, 

New York. 

52 Engineer 

~nalView, Additionally, the :Enginee r 

and cme of his brightesl School has m. ade great ;progresr3 

...J~~..?~.. L,. - 2 - -

-L-.... - ,.- .-~,~. in staff analyses aurlng rne last 

scan 	oIIlcers, baprain nooerr: fi 

Lee; ; c leneral "E 	 sew1.a1 years by developing the and ~t. ltonewall'; 

Jacks;on and hi is topographer, Ma heart of the engineer estimate, 

ior JF. .. . -- the tsngineer battlefield assess- ~bedlahHotchkiss. ment EBA). The EBA is a sim- Thorough staff work, joint study ple and straight-forward process of the terrain, and discussion of that includes an analysis of ter- the impacts of terrain on opera- 	 rain and weather and the capa- tions characterized the c)perations; 	 bilities of both enemy and friendly of each of these engii neer-wm. forces. The school teaches the mander teams. We must : return t c) 

-..-... EBA process in officer basic and the basics used by thaw en&- 

neers. Berthier and Napoleon 	 advaiced cou~ sesand in precomcrawled together over large maps 	 man(1 courses. 

WIlat the ..* fie!Id needs now is the 

on the floor and studied the area of > 


operations in detail to prepare for EBA coa~riea into a clear, easily 


used, systematic process similar the Grand Armee's movements. to the Military Intelligence Lee conducted a thorough route School's FM 34-130, Intelligence and enemy reconnaissance and Preparation of the Battlefield. 

even guided forces in the attack 	 The EBA appendix in FM 5-71- for Scott's army against SantaAna 	 100 is a good start. I propose that at Cerro Gordo. Hotchkiss con- the En gineer ISchool expand this ducted reconnaissance, drew 

maps and sketches with different appen(jix intc I a complete handbook f'or all engineer officers. colored pencils for clarity, and ,. The hanaoook should describe guided forces for Jackson in the each step of the EBA process in Shenandoah Valley. Each of these detail and include appropriate commanders was sure of his posi- examples. The means of graphi- tion and thus acted boldly in these cally portraying the analysis to operations. the commander would be the 

most valuable part of the I hancIbook. Develop Potential thorough knowlecIge of the 

in and a s .taff estim late of real ngineers have great, un. . ,. value co sne wmmanaer will do tapped potential. We have 

tremendous reconnaissance capamore for wmbat engineering in 

the short term and the long term bility with engineer forces de- than will Mls and M2s. We can do ployed throughout thl 3 area 01F better! operations. We know ha ~w to am 

lyze the terrain, we ha", --.----	

Lieutenant Colonel Riley is a nificent analysis potential with student at the U.S. Army War Terrcibase, WIB produce terrairL 

prod1	lets, andI furthermore, wc? College. Previous assignments 

. - ,, , ., . include Commander, 7th and 

can 	inpence tne terrain wltn 

engineer wmbat power. But we 	

17th Engineer Battalions; Deputy G3, 5th Infantry Division; must develop this potential with and Chief, G3 Plans and Exer- continued training on how to use cises, 3rd Armored Division. the terrain to our best advan- He has a masters degree from 

tage. This training must include the University of California, details such as weapons ranges, Berkeley, and is a graduate of how to determine intervisibility the Conintand and General lines, how to build an engage- 	 Staff College and the School of 

ment area, and how to conduct Advanced Military Studies. direct fire analyses. 

November 1993 
ENGINEER UPDATE 


Commerciel numbers are (314) 563-mx and Defense Sysfem 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-mx unless otherwise nofed. 

Telephone nurnbers for the U.S. Army Engineer 

School changed on October 1, 1993. A partial list of 

school offices and new telephone numbers appears on 

page 18. 

Directorate of Training (DOT) New Director Welcomed. DOT welcomed Colonel 

Phillip R. Anderson, their new director, in October. COL Anderson previously Sewed as Commander, 36th Engineer 

Group, at Fort Benning. He may be reached at -4093. 

Engineer Hotline. For hard-to-find information regarding militaly engineer issues, call the Engineer Hotline at 

(314) 563-4098. The service is available 24 hours a day, 

seven days a week. Most questions are answered within 

two work days-we are here to serve you! POC is Joe Lastrapes, 4097. 

Army Occupational Survey Program. Veteran operators and supervisors in MOS 62E (heavy equipment operator) and 62J (general equipment operator) recently participated in a survey to upgrade training at the Engineer 

School. Results will be used to analyze jobs/occupational 

fields, evaluate MOS consolidation, and develop/evaluate 

training. Specific areas the Engineer School will improve 

include: 

For 62E 

- More emphasis on dozer/scraper operations 

- More emphasis in M9161M920 tractor-trailer operations 

- More training on equipment other than that assigned 

- More hands-on training 

For 62J 

- Combine 62J and 62E training since 62J personnel 

frequently operate 62E equipment 

- More emphasis on PMCS 

- More training on the SEE tractor and attachments 

Comments are welcome. POC is CPT Steven Passey, 

-41 12. 

Directorate of Combat Developments New Director Welcomed. DCD welcomed their new director, Colonel Robert J. Greenwalt, Jr., in August. COL 

Greenwalt previously Sewed as Commander, 937th Engineer Group, at Fort Riley. He may be reached at -4076. 

November I993 Engineer 53 
Airborne Standoff Minefield Detection System 

(A-STAMIDS). A-STAMIDS is a developmental system to 

assist maneuver commanders in formulating battle plans 

and detecting mineslrninefields forward of friendly lines and 

along lines of communication. A-STAMIDS will fly on an 

Unmanned, Aerial Vehicle (Short Range) (UAV-SR) to detect mines and minefields. The program is now in Phase I 

(DemonstrationiValidation). Westinghouse and Raytheon 

Corporations have 32-month contracts to build prototypes, 

which will then compete for continuation into Phase 2. 

POC is Jim Smith, -4085. 

Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report Directorate of Evaluation and 

(AAR). Engineer observations from the Persian Gulf War Standardization (DOES) are described in an AAR distributed in September. The 

AAR provides short-term recommendations to help engineer units improve on-going training readiness and leadership development. Long-term recommendations are provided for combat and training developers to improve the 

total engineer force over time. Comments are welcome. To 

provide information or receive copies, write: U.S. Army Engineer School, Attn: ATSE-ESA, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

65473. POC is Vern Lowrey, -4007. 

Essential Library of Publications for Disaster Relief. Engineer units should add the following manual to the 

list of essential publications described in the August 1993 

issue of ENGINEER (page 56): 

- FM 5-422, Engineer Prime Power Operations 

These publications will assist engineer units responding 

to humanitarian assistance or disaster relief missions. POC 

is CW3 Francis Tyminski, - 41 15. 

M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) Surveys. 

Surveys were sent to Army and Marine engineer units owning the M9 ACE in October. Unit personnel who are to 

complete and return the five surveys to the Engineer 

School are: ACE operators, operator supervisors, ACE mechanics, mechanic supervisors, and unit commanders. 

Survey results will be used to improve resident and unit 

training and to develop equipment enhancements. Army 

and Marine units that have been issued an ACE but did not 

receive five surveys, or individuals with ACE experience 

who desire to participate, may request copies. POC is 

Peggy McAvenia, -4009. 

54 Engineer 
Pa.st in,Pilevier~l 


Sergeant George TI. Tbibbv,
 V 

Engineer NCO and Medal of Hon~rRecipient 

By Dr. Barry W. Fowle 

qergeant George D.Libby, leave Japan within 72 hours. The 

! Company C, 3d Engineer next day their advance party left 

Combat Battalion, 24th Infantry for Pusan, Korea. Companies B 

Division, was one of the first in and D, with elements of the Headthe United States Army to earn quarters and Service Company 

the Medal of Honor during the and the medical detachment, deKorean Conflict. Both Sergeant parted on landing ships on July 5; 

Libby and his commanding gen- Company A and the remainder of 

eral, General William Dean, re- H&S Company sailed on July 6; 

ceived the award for their ac- Company C left Japan on July 9. 

tions on July 20, 1950. The US. forces' first contact 

The day the Korean Conflict be- with the North Koreans occurred 

gan, on June 25, 1950, Sergeant on July 5,just north of Osan. Task 

Libby was stationed in Japan. He Force Smith, an element of the 

was assigned to Company C, 3d 24th Infantly Division, tried to 

Engineer Combat Battalion. With halt the flood of North Korean 

the rest ofhh unit, Sergeant Libby troops and tanks but lacked 

was in Korea two weeks later, in- proper anti-tank weapons and 

volved in a full-scale war. North Korean forces seized ammunition. They failed and fell 

Seoul on Wednesday, June 28. The back. 

retreating South Korean forces, The first good geographical deWfu. Begins and their American advisors, blew laying position for U.S. forces in 

bridges over the Han River south western Korea was at the Kum At 0400 on Sunday, June 25, of Seoul to contain the attacking River, north of Taejon, and troops 

the North Korean Army at- North Koreans. The South Korean were moved there as they entered 

tacked south of the 38th Parallel forces continued their withdrawal Korea from Japan. Companies A, 

into South Korea. The main oh- south of the Han, destroying B, and D, 3d Engineer Combat 

jective was Seoul, the rapital of bridges as they went. Battalion, moved to Taejon in supSouth Korea, with secondary at- The North Korean's main effort port of their regimental combat 

tacks to the west against continued south of Seoul toward teams on July 8 but withdrew 

Kaesong. In the center a column Taejon. Their secondary efforts south of the Kum River four days 

struck at Chunchon, and to the moved from Chunchon toward later 

east a second column struck Wonju and along Route 41, the Additional reversals and withdown the east coast road. Some east coast road. drawals of the 24th Infantry Divienveloping amphibious landings Early on the morning of July 1, sion occurred on July 14 and 15. 

from the Sea of Japan provided the 3d Engineer Combat Battalion Then, on July 19, Company C readditional support. received orders to be ready to lieved Company I) in support of 

November 1993 Engineer 55 
Koreans threw up a :heavy fus 

lade trying to wipe ou t Libby a 

his men. 

Finally an M-5 U.D.artillery 

Manchuria tractor came along, and Libby 

helped load the wounded men 

aboard. Although under intense 

enemy fire, he placed himself between the driver and the enemy. 

Sergeant Libby was shot in the 

arms and body as the tractor continued through a nearby town, 

stopping along the way to pick up 

more injured men. As they approached another North Korean 

road block, Libby refused first aid 

and joined the battle. Although he 

received additional wounds, Libby 

continued to hold his position until 

he collapsed from loss of blood. He 

Y~JJOW died later that day 

Medal of Honor. 

ergeant Libby received the 

SMedal of Honor posthumously. It read in part: "His 

dauntless courage and gallant 

self-sacrifice reflect the highest 

credit on himself and uphold the 

esteemed traditions of the military service." 

General Maxwell D. Taylor, 

Commanding General of the 

Eighth United States Army, and 

the 34th Regimental Combat to observe the North Koreans. the Corps of Engineers paid tribTeam's withdrawal from Taejon. He was to warn Company C in ute to the heroic deeds of Sergeant 

Engineer troops from Company C the event of an enemy approach. Libby and his engineer comrades 

suffered heavy losses asthey with- Sergeant Libby's instructions on July 4, 1953. General Taylor 

drew from the city but performed were to delay the North Koreans dedicated the Libby Bridge, a 

heroically In one incident, Private any way he could. The patrol modern concrete structure built by 

Charles T. Zimmennan lost his moved forward and came under the 84th Engineer Construction 

jeep to enemy mortar fire. Al- heavy enemy fire before running Battalion across the Imjin River. 

though wounded by a mortar frag- into an enemy road block. All Major William C. Carter, S-3 of the 

ment and 11bullets, Private Zim- members of the patrol except battalion and project manager 

merman killed five enemy soldiers Libby were killed or wounded. during the construction of the 

and destroyed two machine Libby took cover in a nearby bridge, called it a "fitting memoguns. ditch, waiting for the attackers to 

come within close range. He then 

rial to a heroic engineer NCO!' 

The Attack began shooting, killing and 

wounding a number of them. 1 Dr. Fowle is a historian in the 

Office of History, U.S. Army 

Qn the evening of July 20, 

Sergeant Libby was cornmanding a combat patrol tasked 

Several times Sergeant Libby 

crossed the road to give first aid to 

his wounded men, exposing himself to enemy volleys. The North 

Corps of Engineers, at Fort 

Beluoir. He has recently published two books about Army 

engineers in World War II. 

56 Engineer November 1993 
By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, Jr. 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

"The NCO is the Guardian of Standards 

Julius W. Gates, Command Sergeant Major. 

U.S. Army (Retired) 

This rather grand phrase means that the Army 

looks to noncommissioned officers to ensure that 

soldiers are properly motivated and trained to perform 

their missions. 

The U.S. Army's leadership corps includes both officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Responsibilities go with leadership, and a soldier's level of responsibility becomes more prominent as he or she 

moves up in rank or position. Responsibilities are 

sometimes described as "What To's" and "How To's." 

The "What To's" are officer responsibilities and the 

"How To's" are NCO responsibilities. For example, 

when tasked to emplace an obstacle, unit leaders 

have two basic responsibilities: 

What To: The officer describes the obstacle's intent (turn, disrupt, delay, block), general location, and 

possibly the type. 

How To: The NCO does the installation, directs 

the soldiers, and ensures the obstacle is emplaced to 

standard. 

We NCOs must continue to exploit our ideas of 

how to do our job. Displaying our leadership to subordinates in not enough. We must show our superiors 

that we have the institutional knowledge and the 

hands-on experience to do our jobs. The NCO Corps 

has come along way in maintaining our traditions and 

ethical standards, but we must continue to progress. 

A trained and ready Army will always require leaders 

who are professionals in every way--leaders who exemplify traditional Army values. To keep our Army trained 

and ready for any contingency, we must properly use the 

three pillars of leader development: institutional training, 

operational assignments, and self-development. 

institutional Training. The Army's school system 

provides the formal education and training that all personnel need to develop specific job-related skills and 

basic leadership skills. Because schooling is expensive and budgets are shrinking, units must use training dollars wisely and send only their best soldiers to 

institutional schools. Too much money is being lost 

because some leaders fail to follow training guides 

when selecting soldiers for schooling, Unit leaders 

Noventber 1993 

must stop sending unfit soldiers who failed the Army's 

physical fitness test or overweight soldiers who failed 

to maintain acceptable body-fat content levels. Young 

leaders must be prepared both physically and mentally for the schools they attend, and we cannot waste 

resources on those who are not up to standard. Thus 

far in my tour at the Engineer Center, the soldiers 

sent to Fort Leonard Wood to attend basic and advanced NCO courses (BNCOC and ANCOC) do meet 

the standard. Other installations, however, are receiving soldiers who do not. 

Operational Assignments. Operational experiences through duty assignments require that leaders 

use and build on the knowledge and skills learned in 

formal education. This pillar, an essential part of the 

training process, requires more space to describe 

than I have here. It will be the subject of a separate 

article in a future issue of ENGINEER. 

Self-Development. Self-Development is the third 

essential pillar for every soldier's training. It includes 

the Army's self-development tests and correspondence 

courses, civilian education, and developmental reading 

programs. This pillar is needed to ensure that tomorrow's leaders are trained and ready for any contingency. 

Young leaders need and require the best training 

that we can provide. As the Army continues to downsize, we must develop leaders who understand and 

are able to exploit the full potential of present and 

future Army doctrine. To overcome the many challenges we will face in the years ahead, we must develop leaders who exemplify the highest professional 

and ethical standards. Our leaders must possess teaching, coaching, and counselling skills, and be able to 

communicate effectively while stimulating confidence, 

enthusiasm and trust in others. They must provide direction, motivation, and vision to their subordinates. 

Noncommissioned officers are the keepers of the 

knowledge to train young leaders for today and tomorrow. In a downsized Army, NCOs must continue to 

carry out our historical functions as small unit leaders, 

trainers, and guardians of standards. Regardless of 

the physical conditions under which we have worked 

in the past. NCOs have always been role models. As 

such, we bear a special trust: While carrying forward 

the best traditions of the past, we must help shape an 

Army of Excellence for today and tomorrow. That is a 

mighty challenge!