OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

January 24, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE 

 U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

SUBJECT: U. S. Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: Sustained Management Commitment is Key to 

Success (SIGIR-08-008) (Project 8009) 

This is the latest in a series of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reports 

on U.S. government anticorruption efforts in Iraq. SIGIR instituted reviews of these programs in 

recognition of the importance eliminating corruption plays in promoting Iraq’s economic, social, 

and political reconstruction: SIGIR has described the impact that corruption has had on Iraq as 

the “second insurgency.” Previous SIGIR reports concluded that U.S. anticorruption efforts 

lacked a comprehensive plan with metrics that ties programs to an overall strategy as well as 

baselines from which progress could be measured. Moreover, SIGIR found these efforts have 

gone through periods of high activity and periods when they have languished. Our objective for 

this report was to review U.S. Department of State (DoS) progress in implementing our prior 

recommendations to improve the management of U.S. anticorruption initiatives in Iraq. 

Results 

SIGIR found that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq has taken or planned steps to address SIGIR’s 

concerns that if effectively implemented would address all recommendations contained in 

previous SIGIR reports (See Appendix A). Most notably, the Ambassador has identified actions 

to improve the oversight and coordination of the U.S. anticorruption effort and in December 

2007 proposed to the Secretary of State a reorganization of personnel and assets to elevate the 

importance of anticorruption programs. Moreover, the Embassy has recognized the need to 

design and implement a comprehensive, integrated anticorruption strategy to assist the 

Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Iraqi people combat the corruption permeating government 

agencies, private business and other institutions of Iraqi society. SIGIR supports these actions 

but notes that past efforts to revitalize and coordinate U.S. anticorruption efforts have been 

largely ineffective and suffered from a lack of management follow through. The success of these 

new efforts will, therefore, depend in large part on sustained management commitment, 

particularly in terms of day-to-day leadership and senior-management oversight. 

The recent U.S. Embassy plan includes specific actions to revamp the U.S. anticorruption 

strategy, elevate its priority within the Embassy’s areas of responsibility, and better manage and 

oversee activities. To that end, the Ambassador approved a reorganization that calls for a senior 

official, reporting directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission, to coordinate all U.S. anticorruption 

policy and programs. On December 7, 2007, the Ambassador requested the Secretary of State’s 

approval of the plan. The Embassy has also taken other actions such as in resurrecting the 

1
Anticorruption Working Group (ACWG) and beginning an inventory of all U.S. funded 

anticorruption programs. On January 4, 2008 SIGIR provided the Embassy and DoS a summary 

of our findings and a draft recommendation that the Secretary of State direct a timely review of 

the proposed strategy and take whatever actions are necessary to support the reorganization of 

the U.S. Embassy’s anticorruption efforts. On January 9, 2008, the Secretary of State notified the 

Embassy of its support for the reorganization to include the recruiting of a high level official to 

serve as anticorruption coordinator. Accordingly, we make no recommendations in our final 

report. 

Background

The U.S. Embassy and the Iraqi Prime Minister have stated that developing the capacity of the 

GOI to address corruption is critical for good governance. The Ambassador reported that 

pervasive corruption poses a serious threat to Iraq stability and reconstruction efforts. 

Corruption undercuts the construction and maintenance of Iraq’s infrastructure, deprives people 

of goods and services, reduces confidence in public institutions, and potentially aids insurgent 

groups reportedly funded by graft derived from oil smuggling or embezzlement. A recent report 

submitted by Iraq, pursuant to the requirements of the recently enacted International Compact for 

Iraq, identified “high levels of corruption and an immature accountability framework” within the 

government. This report noted that the GoI believes that incidents of corruption could potentially 

be endemic. Prime Minister Malaki has stated that 2008 is the year the GOI will address 

corruption. 

A multitude of agencies in Iraq, including the Department of Justice, U.S. Agency for 

International Development, Department of Treasury, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq, are involved in anticorruption activities. The U.S. 

Embassy began significant efforts in this area in 2005 when, at SIGIR’s urging, the Ambassador 

held an anticorruption summit. The summit included U.S. and Iraqi officials with direct 

anticorruption responsibilities, and resulted in the rejuvenation of the Embassy’s Anticorruption 

Working Group (ACWG). The group’s aim was to develop an anticorruption strategy and to 

synchronize all U.S.-led anticorruption activities with this strategy. Heads of U.S. Embassy 

offices, such as the Political Affairs Section, the U.S. Agency for International Development, as 

well as officials from the Multi-National Force-Iraq, participated in the ACWG. 

In July 2006, SIGIR issued a report1

 that identified problems such as a lack of coordination and 

leadership in anticorruption activities. We recommended that DoS appoint a senior leader to 

direct the program and provide continuity in program administration. The report contained 11 

other recommendations for program improvement. 

In July 2007 another SIGIR report assessed progress in implementing those recommendations 

and found that little progress had been made.2 We noted that the program lacked focus and that 

the Embassy had not completed a recommended inventory of anticorruption activities or a 

recommended assessment of U.S. government anticorruption efforts. Of particular concern, 

 

1 Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program (SIGIR-06-021, July 28, 2006). 2 Status of U.S. Government Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq (SIGIR-07-007, July 24, 2007) 

2
SIGIR found that the Embassy lacked a comprehensive, integrated plan that tied anticorruption 

activities to an overall U.S. Mission-Iraq strategy, and a baseline to measure progress. The 

absence of a strategy made it difficult to assess funding requirements. SIGIR determined that as 

of June 30, 2007, the Embassy had fully implemented only two of our 12 recommendations. In 

response, SIGIR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq re-emphasize and re-address 

the entire list of recommendations made in our July 2006 audit report. As part of re-addressing 

the prior recommendations this second report stated that the Ambassador should: 

1. Include in the corrective action plans an estimated completion date for implementing each 

recommendation. 

2. Complete the inventory of anticorruption programs, activities, and initiatives. 

3. Complete the assessments of the major program initiatives that are supporting the Embassy’s 

anticorruption strategy. 

The U.S. Embassy responded that it remained committed to a vigorous and effective 

anticorruption program, and that the SIGIR recommendations provided a helpful framework for 

developing specific initiatives and the implementing practical plans to address this serious 

problem. As such, the Embassy responded that it would complete the implementation of the 

recommendations no later than September 30, 2007. In October 2007, SIGIR testified that the 

Embassy had been unable to secure enduring and effective leadership for its anticorruption 

program and as a result the effort had languished except for a few points of progress. The 

testimony noted that at that time, the Embassy had neither completed its promised assessment of 

U.S. government anticorruption efforts nor drafted an integrated, strategic plan. SIGIR 

concluded that the Embassy had not addressed the 10 open recommendations.3

Recent Actions May Result in Long Needed Management 

Improvements 

SIGIR’s current review shows that the U.S. Embassy Baghdad has developed and received DoS 

approval of a plan to improve the management of U.S. anticorruption activities. If implemented 

appropriately, the plan would address all SIGIR recommendations. Pending implementation of 

the plan, however, 10 SIGIR recommendations remain open. (See Appendix A) 

The Embassy is aware that its anticorruption program needs attention. In a December 2007 cable 

to the Secretary of State, the Embassy noted that SIGIR reports described the Embassy’s 

programs as uneven, uncoordinated and only modestly funded. The cable also stated that an 

internal assessment had found that the Embassy needed to bolster its leadership and coordination. 

The cable continued that, guided by the SIGIR recommendations and the counsel of the 

Embassy’s senior officers, the Ambassador determined that the Embassy must design and 

implement a comprehensive, integrated strategy, and proposed a reorganization of personnel and 

assets. The Ambassador has taken a number of initial actions to advance the coordination and 

management of U.S. agencies anticorruption programs. As discussed below, the strategy has two 

major components. The first is to elevate the importance of anticorruption activities within the 

 

3 Testimony of Stuart W. Bowen, JR., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Assessing the State of 

Iraqi Corruption”, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007 

3
Embassy’s area of responsibilities. The second is to initiative specific actions in support of the 

reorganization of Embassy priorities. 

Elevating Prominence of Anticorruption Activities 

The revised anticorruption approach would elevate anticorruption activities within the Embassy’s 

areas of responsibilities. The Embassy proposed to accomplish this goal by reorganizing the 

management of the effort, and assigning a high ranking official of “stature and prominence” to 

lead its campaign. SIGIR had previously noted that the lack of a program manager with the 

authority and support to provide the necessary leadership and coordination of the overall 

anticorruption effort posed a major impediment to success. If effectively implemented, that 

action would address SIGIR recommendations that the Embassy provide increased direction and 

oversight of the U.S. anticorruption effort, including the need to develop a plan that links 

individual programs to a strategy, and establish a policy to vet all new anticorruption activities 

through an executive steering group. 

According to a December 2007 Embassy cable to the DoS, the new coordinator would report 

directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission and act as the Ambassador’s personal representative with 

budgetary, planning, staffing and program authority for the anticorruption program. Moreover, 

the coordinator would be the liaison with the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, charged with 

harmonizing all civilian and military efforts. To accomplish its goals the Embassy requested that 

DoS endorse its proposal and either recruit a senior level U.S. government official or assign a 

Foreign Service Officer as coordinator by the end of December. On January 9, 2008 the 

Secretary of State notified the Embassy that the DoS supported the reorganization and that it had 

begun recruiting a senior level officer for the coordinator position. The Secretary stated that DoS 

echoed the Embassy’s recommendation that the coordinator be an individual with significant 

State Department experience as that person would be intimately familiar with the Embassy 

structure and how the DoS functions overseas. The Department also approved the reassignment 

of embassy personnel into the coordinator’s office. 

Actions to Support New Anticorruption Strategy 

The Ambassador notified the Secretary of State that he had directed a number of management 

actions to move the anticorruption effort forward in anticipation that the proposal would be 

approved and a coordinator appointed. Key initiatives include: 

• Reinvigorate the ACWG. SIGIR has previously determined that the ACWG was not 

sustained. In July 2006, SIGIR reported that this group, after being reconstituted seven 

months earlier, was still in the early stages of operation. In December 2007, the Embassy 

noted that the ACWG had been on hiatus again during the previous few months. 

However, to support the new anticorruption strategy, the Ambassador directed the 

ACWG to prepare for an intensified focus on anticorruption in 2008. The ACWG is to 

serve as a forum for coordinating, integrating, and addressing conflicts among all 

Embassy and military anticorruption activities. If effectively implemented, these actions 

would address the SIGIR recommendation that the members of the ACWG develop 

action plans in concert with an overall strategic goal.

4
The ACWG met three times in November and December of 2007. The first December 

meeting included representatives from Embassy sections including the U.S. Agency for 

International Development, Political Affairs, and Rule of Law, as well as from the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq and the Multi-National Forces-Iraq. The 

working group is in the process of determining its structure and specific taskings. 

• Inventory and evaluate all military and civilian U.S. funded programs. The Embassy 

identifies a number of objectives tied to this effort that flow directly from a previous 

SIGIR recommendation. We recommended in 2006 that the Embassy conduct a complete 

review of U.S. programs to assess effectiveness, and reiterated the following year the 

need to inventory and evaluate all U.S. anticorruption programs, activities and initiatives. 

The Embassy now plans to develop a roster of all programs, assess the effectiveness of 

each, and identify best practices. Its aim is to promote programs that work and 

discontinue those that do not. 

Initial actions have been taken to begin the inventory and evaluation process. For 

example, the Chairman of the December 9, 2007 ACWG meeting requested that agency 

officials provide information on each of their anticorruption programs such as the funding 

level and source, the number of U.S. personnel involved, and an evaluation of 

effectiveness. 

• Initiate steps to gain GoI support for the creation of a Good Governance Council. SIGIR 

previously recommended that the Embassy encourage the GoI to take measures to 

institutionalize anticorruption activities such as in establishing its own working groups 

with regional and international partners. The Embassy reported that it was taking actions 

to continue such outreach. The December 2007 reorganization plan addresses the need to 

continue dialogue with the GOI. For example, the new strategy calls for the coordinator 

to work in conjunction with GoI, international and non-governmental organizations and 

the Multi-National Force-Iraq to promote the creation of a Good Governance Council. 

• Address necessary administrative support for reorganization efforts. Previous SIGIR 

reports determined that the Embassy needed to provide the personnel necessary for 

sufficient oversight of U.S. anticorruption efforts. Under the reorganization, the 

Ambassador will transfer staff from other Embassy sections, including the Office of 

Accountability and Transparency, into the new coordinator’s office. When coupled with 

the arrival of a high level coordinator, the workforce restructuring would start to address 

the staffing issues. 

• Outline a 2008 anticorruption initiative. The Embassy lists numerous purposes of this 

year-long effort: leverage the resources and experience of international partners engaged 

in anticorruption efforts; support Iraqi anticorruption institutions and integrate 

anticorruption systems into all levels of the GoI, and; enhance the performance of U.S. 

programs and outreach. Together with inventorying and evaluating individual program 

performance, these initiatives would begin to address the SIGIR recommendation 

regarding the need for an anticorruption strategic plan. 

5
Conclusions 

SIGIR regards recent Embassy decisions to revamp its anticorruption strategy as encouraging, 

and the Embassy’s planned actions are generally consistent with our earlier recommendations. 

SIGIR supports these actions but adds a cautionary note: prior initiatives have been unsuccessful 

due to insufficient management attention. As a result, most of our recommendations have not 

been fully implemented. At this time it is too early to assess current actions. DoS has just 

approved the reorganization and refocus and begun its search for a coordinator. However, it is 

not too early to conclude that as with the prior actions, the proposed approach will yield little or 

no benefit without sustained management commitment to leadership and program oversight. 

Given the critical importance of these efforts to the Iraq reconstruction program, SIGIR will 

monitor Embassy implementation efforts, provide progress reports quarterly, and make 

recommendations as appropriate. 

Management Comments 

We provided the DoS a draft of this report for comment and a Department official stated they 

agreed with the report. 

- - - - - - 

Thank you for the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. David Warren (703-604-0982 / david.warren@sigir.mil; or Mr. Glenn Furbish 

(703-428-1058 / glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix B. 

 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

Appendices 

6
Appendix A—SIGIR Analysis of Actions Planned or 

Taken to Address SIGIR Recommendations 

In July 2006, SIGIR issued a report on anticorruption activities that identified problems such as a 

lack of coordination and leadership. SIGIR made 12 recommendations to improve the 

management of U.S. anticorruption efforts. In July 2007, SIGIR reported that limited progress 

had been made in implementing these recommendations but that the U.S. Embassy was in the 

process of re-establishing and reorganizing its efforts to better oversee U.S. anticorruption 

activities. 

In December 2007, the Embassy completed its proposed strategy and submitted it to the 

Department of State for review: the Secretary approved it on January 9, 2008. SIGIR assessed 

the strategy and actions taken or planned to determine whether they would address our prior 

recommendations. SIGIR’s analysis shows that 12 of 12 have either been closed4

 or are being 

addressed by the new approach. Nonetheless, 10 SIGIR recommendations remain open pending 

the implementation of the strategy and individual actions. The table below presents U.S. 

Embassy actions on SIGIR’s 12 recommendations as of January 2008 and a summary of SIGIR’s 

analysis of them. Overall, planned actions appear to generally support the outcomes SIGIR 

recommendations were designed to achieve. 

SIGIR Recommendations 

SIGIR Analysis of Actions 

Planned or Taken 

SIGIR Analysis of 

Recommendation Status 

Recommendation (1). We recommended that 

the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq provide the 

necessary resources to have sufficient 

direction and oversight of the U.S. Embassy’s 

anticorruption program, including a senior 

leader from DoS and a senior officer from the 

Multi National Forces – Iraq(MNF-I). Both 

positions should be filled with staff that has 

such a background to bring value to the 

position. 

The U.S. Ambassador obtained a senior 

Foreign Service (FS-01) officer who 

arrived on post in September 2006, and 

the MNF-I officer has been regularly 

attending the ACWG. Informal contacts 

between the two organizations are 

frequent. SIGIR’s July 2007 report 

concluded that Embassy reorganization 

efforts also supported this 

recommendation. 

This recommendation was Closed. 

However, the Ambassador 

determined that a higher level 

official was needed to coordinate 

activities. SIGIR will monitor 

progress in achieving sufficient 

direction and oversight of Embassy 

anticorruption efforts. 

Recommendation (2). Continue efforts to 

recruit an Iraqi local national staff member to 

provide support to the full-time anticorruption 

program manager. This person should have 

the necessary skills and level to be 

instrumental in forging joint U.S.-Iraqi 

anticorruption initiatives. 

SIGIR found that as of May 2007, the 

Embassy was still seeking an Iraqi 

national to fill this position. As of January 

2008 the Embassy had not identified 

ongoing actions to hire an Iraqi for the 

program. However, the Embassy 

responded that plans to work more closely 

with the GoI in partnership and a Good 

Governance Council address this 

recommendation. SIGIR will continue to 

monitor Embassy actions in forging joint 

U.S. Iraqi initiatives. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or Underway

 

4

 A recommendation is closed when it has been implemented, when action have been taken that essentially meet the 

recommendation’s intent, or when circumstances have changed and the recommendation is no longer valid. 

7
SIGIR Recommendations 

SIGIR Analysis of Actions 

Planned or Taken 

SIGIR Analysis of 

Recommendation Status 

Recommendation (3). Establish a joint 

executive steering group, chaired by the 

anticorruption program manager, with 

oversight of all U.S. government anticorruption 

programs to ensure that all initiatives are 

working toward a common goal in the most 

efficient and effective manner. 

SIGIR noted in its July 2007 report that 

the Embassy was then re-establishing 

and reorganizing its efforts to better 

oversee all U.S. government 

anticorruption programs to ensure that all 

initiatives were working toward a common 

goal in the most efficient and effective 

manner. Recent reorganization plans 

support the intent of the recommendation 

to establish an executive management 

group with visibility over all U.S. funded 

anticorruption activities. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation (4). Direct the Joint 

Executive Steering Group to provide to the 

Deputy Chief of Mission periodic reports (at 

least quarterly) on progress, barriers, and 

funding needs to support the anticorruption 

Program. 

The current plan has the new coordinator 

reporting directly to the Deputy Chief of 

Mission but available information has not 

yet detailed the type of reports required. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation (5). Establish a policy that 

will require all participating organizations to vet 

new anticorruption initiatives through the new 

joint executive steering group. 

Based on the approved December 2007 

strategy, the DoS will recruit a high level 

coordinator for all civilian and military 

anticorruption efforts. This supports the 

intent of the recommendation. SIGIR will 

monitor the implementation of the 

reorganization to determine if all initiatives 

are vetted through the coordinator. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation (6). Direct the joint 

executive steering group to conduct a 

complete review of each U.S.-funded 

anticorruption program and assess how that 

program helps achieve the U.S. government’s 

strategic goals for anticorruption. 

The ACWG has already begun an 

inventory and initial assessment of U.S. 

funded anticorruption activities. Planned 

actions suggest that they will support the 

development of a strategic plan. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation (7). Direct the members of 

the ACWG to develop action plans for each 

activity’s program in concert with the overall 

strategic goals. 

The Ambassador has stated that the 

Embassy must design and implement a 

comprehensive, integrated anticorruption 

strategy. ACWG actions to inventory and 

evaluate individual programs appear to be 

first steps in developing actions plans. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation (8). Establish a baseline for 

each anticorruption program to document a 

starting point for the program to measure 

progress. 

The structure of the ACWG proposed in 

December 2007 includes a Monitoring 

Sub-Group whose purpose is to establish 

measuring tools for U.S. anticorruption 

efforts and assess program effectiveness. 

Because baselines are a critical 

component of any evaluation, the subgroup’s plan supports the intent of the 

recommendation. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation (9). Establish interim and 

long-term objective(s) for each anticorruption 

program consistent with the overall 

anticorruption program strategy. 

The Ambassador highlighted the 

importance of developing an 

anticorruption strategy and specific 

program objectives. As part of the 

planned reorganization, individual lACWG 

sub-groups are assigned tasks that 

support this goal. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation (10). Engage the Iraqi 

anticorruption counterparts in the new 

government and establish the joint U.S.-Iraq 

On May 16, 2007, the JACC charter was 

signed by the Prime Minister and senior 

Iraqi leaders and since then the JACC has 

This recommendation is Closed. 

8
SIGIR Recommendations 

SIGIR Analysis of Actions 

Planned or Taken 

SIGIR Analysis of 

Recommendation Status 

ACWG. held several meetings. 

Recommendation (11). Encourage the GOI to 

establish its own anticorruption working groups 

with regional and international partners. 

Key components of the December 2007 

reorganization plan address efforts to 

encourage the GoI to take measures such 

as in supporting the development of 

anticorruption systems and procedures 

into their administrative practices at all 

government levels 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation (12). Based on the 

unresolved recommendation 20 from the 

October 2005 DoS Office of Inspector General 

report 5

, develop and implement an action 

plan to: 

A) Identify the training requirements of the 

Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), 

Board of Supreme Audit, Central 

Criminal Court of Iraq, and the 

ministerial Inspector Generals, with 

special emphasis on requirements that 

apply to all four institutions. 

B) Prioritize the identified training 

requirements. 

C) Identify training solutions for those 

requirements that can cut across 

multiple institutions to avoid duplication 

and maximize resources. 

The reorganized ACWG includes a 

Training Sub-Group whose purpose will 

be to deconflict and coordinate 

interagency training assistance and 

mandate clear lanes of authority and 

prevent duplication of efforts. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

 

5 Report of Inspection: Rule of Law Programs, Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq (DoS OIG, ISP-IQO-06-01, October 2005) 

9
Appendix B—Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

SIGIR initiated this review in December 2007 (Project 8009) as part of a series of reviews to 

assess U.S. government anticorruption efforts in Iraq. The objective of this review was to 

determine current U.S. efforts to strengthen the management of anticorruption activities, and the 

extent to which they address SIGIR’s recommendations. We reviewed internal management 

controls from the context of specific plans, policies and procedures that are being implemented 

and planned to improve the anticorruption program. For example, we addressed internal control 

issues such as maintaining the requisite number and level of competent staff to manage the multi 

agency effort, and developing systems to evaluate individual programs.

To determine current U.S. efforts to strengthen management, we analyzed recent Embassy cables 

and other documents detailing new anticorruption measures. We also met with Embassy 

personnel and attended meetings of the Embassy Anticorruption Working Group. 

To assess progress in addressing SIGIR recommendations, we arrayed current planned and 

ongoing anticorruption management changes, and assessed the extent to which they supported 

the objectives of the recommendations. For each recommendation we then concluded whether 

(1) actions were sufficient to completely address and therefore closeout a specific 

recommendation, (2) actions were pending or underway but not to the extent that they had 

resolved the problem the recommendation sought to address, or (3) actions did not address the 

recommendation. 

We conducted this review in December 2007 and January 2008 at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, 

Iraq in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this review. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed these reports: 

• Status of U.S. Government Efforts in Iraq (SIGIR 07-007, July 24, 2007) 

• Report of Inspection: Survey of Anticorruption Programs, Embassy Baghdad, Iraq (DoS 

OIG, ISP-IGO-06-50, August 2006) 

10
Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit work was conducted under the direction of David Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

Staff members who contributed to the report include 

Joan Hlinka 

Shawn Kline 

Lovell Walls 

Roger Williams 

11
SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle 

Director for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

12