CIA Cotd War Records Series

Editor in Chief

J. Kenneth McDonald

CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,

Mary S. McAuliffe, editor ( 1992)

Selected Estimates un the Soviet Union, 1950-19.59,

Scott A. Koch, editor (1993)

The CIA under Harry Truman,

Michael S. Warner, editor (1994)
Kevin C. Ruffner

Editor

History Staff

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D-C.

1995
These documents have been approved for release through

Review Program of the Central Intelligence Agency.

the Historical

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Contents

PaRe

Foreword xi

Preface . . .

x111

Part I: History of CORONA Program 1

1. Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement,

17 (Spring 1973): l-37.

3

Part II: The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

2. Director of Central Intelligence Directive, Committee on

Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), 9 August 1960

3. Col. James E. Mahon, JCS to COMOR, ‘Urgent Requirements for

CORONA and ARGON,” 18 August 1960

4. James Q. Reber, “List of Highest Priority Targets, USSR,”

18 August 1960

41

43

45

49

5. James Q. Reber, Memorandum of Agreement, “Procedures for the

Handling of T-KH Materials,” 22 August 1960

59

6. James Q. Reber, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, 63

“Categories of Billets Planned for T-KH Certification,”

26 August 1960 I

7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Secretary

of State, et al., 26 August 1960

75

8. James Q. Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board Members, 77

“TALENT-KEYHOLE Certification Plans,” 27 August 1960

9. James 0. Reber, “Minutes of COMOR Meeting,” 13 September 1960 79

10. James Q. Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board, 83

“Proposed Expansion of Billets for the Exploitation and

Use of TWENT-KEYHOLE Materials and Information,”

14 September 1960

11. James Q. Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board,

“Amendment to ‘Proposed Expansion of Billets for the

Exploitation and Use of TALENT-KEYHOLE Materials and

Information,“’ 14 October 1960

12. Allen W. Dulles, Memorandum for Brig. Gen.

Andrew J. Goodpaster, “Proposed Additional Billets

for the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security System,” 19 October 1960

87

93

vii
Part III: NPIC Products and Other Reuorts 97

13. Office of Research and Reports, “Visual-TALENT Coverage of the

USSR in Relation to Soviet ICBM Deployment, January 1959-

June 1960,” 11 July 1960

101

14.CIA/PK!, Joint Mission Coverage Index, “Mission 9009, 115

18 August 1960,” September 1960

15. National Intelligence Estimate, 11-8/l -61, “Strength and

Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces,”

21 September 1961

127

16. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Uranium Ore 157

Concentration Plant, Steiu, Rumania,” December 196 1

17. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Regional Nuclear 169

Weapons Storage Site Near Berdichev, USSR,” May 1963

18. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Search for Uranium 175

Mining in the Vicinity of A-Ko-Su, China,” August 1963

19. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Suspect CW Agent 185

Production Plants, Dzerzhinsk, USSR, Changes Since 1962,”

August 1963

20. CWNPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Chronological 191

Development of the Rapustin Yar/Vladimirovka and Tyuratam MissiIe

Test Centers, USSR, 1957-l 943,” November 1963

2 1. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Probable Solid 197

Propellants Testing Facilities and Associated Explosives Plants

in the USSR,” December 1963

22. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Comparison of 215

Possible AMM-Associated Facilities at Moscow and Sary-Shagan,

USSR, August and September 1963,” May 1964

23. Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-64, “The Chances of an 237

Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” 26 August 1964

24. CIA/NPIC, Technical Publication, Photographic Evaluation Report, 247

“Mission 1012-1, 17-20 October 1964RMission 1012-2, 21-23 October

1964,” April 1965

25. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Severodvirisk Naval 253

Base and S hitward 402, Severodvinsk, USSR,” November 1964

26. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Interpretation Report, ‘XI-I-4 Mission 261

1042- 1, 17-22 June 1967,” June 1967

27. ClA/NPIC, Photographic Interpretation Report, ‘XI-I-4 Mission 289

1042- 1,17-22 June 1967, Middle East Edition,” June 1967

28. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Interpretation Report, “KH-4 Mission 307

1042-l) 17-22 June 1967, South China and North Vietnam Edition,”

June 1967

. . . Vlll
Part IV: Nonmilitary Uses for Satellite Imagery

29. Report No. 9, KH-4B System Capability, “Appraisal of Geologic

Value for Mineral Resources Exploration,” March 197 1

315

317 -

Appendix

Executive Order 1295 1, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based 359

National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, 22 February 1995

ix
CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program

Foreword Since the CORONA satellite made its first successful flight in August 1960,

the Intelligence Community’s overhead reconnaissance programs have been

among the nation’s most closely guarded secrets. The end of the Cold War,

however, has at last made it possible to declassify both information and

imagery from the first American satellite systems of the 1960s. To do this,

President William Clinton in February of this year ordered the declassification within 18 months of historical intelligence imagery from the early satellite systems known as the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD. Because

the President’s Executive Order 1295 1 (see appendix) envisions scientific

and environmental uses for this satellite imagery, the declassified photographs will be transferred to the National Archives with a copy sent to the

US Geological Survey. Vice President Albert Gore, who first urged the

Intelligence Community to open up its early imagery for environmental

studies, unveiled the first CORONA sateIlite photographs for the American

press and public at CIA Headquarters on 24 February 1995.

To mark this new initiative, CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and

the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University are cosponsoring a conference, “Piercing the Curtain: CORONA and the Revolution in

Intelligence,” in Washington on 23-24 May 1995. On the occasion of this

conference, the CIA History Staff is publishing this collection of newly

declassified documents and imagery from the CORONA program. This is

the fourth volume in the CIA Cold War Records Series, which began in

1992 when Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates launched CIA’s

Openness Policy and reorganized the Center for the Study of Intelligence to

include both the History Staff and a new Historical Review Group to

declassify historically important CIA records.

The editor of this new volume, Dr. Kevin C. Ruffner, has an A.B. from the

College of William and Mary and an M.A. in history from the University of

Virginia. He joined the CIA History Staff in 199 1, soon after he received his

Ph.D. in American Studies from George Washington University.

The documents and imagery in this volume were reviewed and declassified

with unusual dispatch by a special working group of declassification officers from the National Reconnaissance Office, the Central Imagery Office,

CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, and its National Photographic

Interpretation Center. The group’s prompt work is especially notable since

X i
many documents required consultation with the US Air Force, National

Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy,

Department of State, and CIA’s Collection Requirements and Evaluation

Staff.

This volume’s appearance just three months after President Clinton’s

declassification order is yet another tribute to the skill and speed that the

History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence has come to expect

from the Design Center and Publications Center in the Directorate of

Intelligence, and fromthe Directorate of Administration’s Printing and

Photography Group.

J. Kenneth McDonald

Editor in Chief

xii
CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program

Preface The CORONA reconnaissance satellites revolutionized the collection of

intelligence in the 1960s. This was a time when it was still extraordinarily

difficult to gather information by any other means from “denied areas”

including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and their allies. The need

for intelligence about Soviet strategic weapon systems and bases dramatically increased after 1 May 1960, when the Soviets shot down an American

U-2 aircraft and captured its CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers. Within a few

months, however, on 18 August the United States launched its first successful reconnaissance satellite, which in one mission provided more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than all previous U-2 missions. On

19 August 1960, the recovery of Mission 9009 with a KH- 1 camera marked

the beginning of the CORONA reconnaissance satellite program’s long and

valuable service. The story of this program’s success is one of the most

remarkable in the annals of American science and intelligence.

The US Government did not acknowledge that it used satellite systems and

imagery for intelligence purposes until 1978. Although President Jimmy

Carter then announced that the United States used satellites to verify arms

control treaties, it has only been the past few years that officials have talked

openly about these systems and their intelligence uses.

CORONA, the program name for a series of satellites with increasingly

more accurate cameras, provided coverage of the Soviet Union, China, and

other areas from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. From its start in the late

1950s until its retirement in 1972, CORONA (in its several versions) both

proved valuable in itself and set the stage for the satellite programs that followed it. Fur the first time US policymakers had encompassing coverage of

the Soviet Union and China that was both timely and accurate. Since the

1960s a significant percentage of finished intelligence-intelligence reports

sent to policymakers-has been largely derived from reconnaissance satellites. Satellite imagery is used for a variety of analytical purposes from

assessing military strength to estimating the size of grain production. Far

and away its greatest utility, however, has been to monitor the deployment

of Soviet strategic forces and to verify compliance with arms control

agreements.

.*.

x111
While orbiting the earth, CORONA concentrated principally on photographing the USSR and China. One intelligence community study

summarized CORONA’s efforts over the Soviet Union:

CORONA’s initial major accomplishment was imaging all Soviet medium-range,

intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missile launching complexes.

CORONA also identified the Plesetsk Missile Test Range, north of Moscow.

Repetitive coverage of centers like Plesetsk provided information as to what missiles were being developed, tested, and/or deployed. Also, the unequivocal fact

of observation gave the United States freedom from concern over many areas and

locations which had been suspect in the past.

Severodvinsk, the main Soviet construction site for ballistic-missile-carrying

submarines was first seen by CORONA. Now it was possible to monitor the

launching of each new class of submarines and follow it through deployment to

operational bases. Similarly, one could observe Soviet construction and deployment of the ocean-going surface fleet. Coverage of aircraft factories and airbases

provided an inventory of bomber and fighter forces. Great strides were also made

in compiling an improved Soviet ground order of battle.

It was CORONA imagery which uncovered Soviet antiballistic missile activity.

Construction of the GALOSH sites around Moscow and the GRIFFON site near

Leningrad, together with construction of sites around Tallinn for the Soviet surface-to-air mi.ssiIe known as the SA-5, were first observed in CORONA imagery.

HEN HOUSE, DOG HOUSE, and the Soviet Union’s first phased-array radarsaI1 associated with the Soviet ABM program-were also identified in CORCINA

imagery.

CORONA “take” was also used to locate Soviet SA-1 and SA-2 installations;

later its imagery was used to find SA-3 and SA-5 batteries. The precise Location

of these defenses provided Strategic Air Command planners with the information

needed to determine good entry and egress routes for US strategic bombers.

CORONA imagery was also adapted extensively to serve the needs of the Army

Map Service and its successor, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). Enhanced

by improvements in system attitude control and ephemeris data plus the addition

of a stellar-index camera, CORONA eventually became almost the sole source of

DMKs military mapping data.

Some explanation of the terms used in the CORONA program may be helpful. The imagery acquired from the satellites and cameras that composed

the CORONA program had a specific security system called T?%ENTKEYHOLE. This added the codeword KEYHOLE, for satellite collection,

to the codeword TALENT, which was originally used for imagery collected

by aircraft.

The first four versions of CORONA were designated RX-1 through KH-4

(KH denoted KEYHOLE); KH-4 went through three versions. The camera

in KH-l-public cover name DISCOVERER-had a nominal ground

resolution of 40 feet. (Ground resolution is the ground size equivalent of the

xiv
smallest visibie imagery and its associated space.) By 1963 improvements

to the original CORONA had produced the KH-2 and KH-3, with cameras

that achieved resolutions of 10 feet,

The first ISIS-4 mission was launched in 1962 and brought a major breakthrough in technology by using the MURAL camera to provide stereoscopic

imagery. This meant that two cameras photographed each target from different angles, which allowed imagery analysts to look at KH-4 stereoscopic

photos as three-dimensional. In the KH-4, the workhorse of the CORONA

system, three camera models with different resolutions were the principal

difference between the versions, KH-4, KII-4A, and RI-I-4B. By 1967, the

J-3 camera of KH-4B had entered service with a resolution of 5 feet. This

final version of CORONA continued overflights until 1972.

Two other systems, separate but closely allied with CORONA, also operated during this time with less success. The KH-5, or ARGON, performed

mapping services for the Army in a few missions in the early 1960s with

mediocre results. The same disappointing performance afflicted the LANYARD system, or KH-6, which was both begun and abandoned in 1963.

The following outlines the CORONA versions from 1959 to 1972:

Camera Units

Launched

Time Period

KH-1 10 1959-60

KH-2 c’ (C Prime) 10 1960-61

KH-3 C”’ (C Triple Prime) 6 1961-62

KH-4 M (Mural) 26 1962-63

KH-4A J (J-l) 52 1964-69

KH-4B J-3 17 1967-72

This volume of newly declassified documents and photos is organized in

four parts. Part 1 presents the first history of the CORONA program, an article published in 1973 in a classified special supplement to CIA’s professional quarterly, Studies in Intelligence. Part 2 provides a brief look at how

the interdepartmental Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, formed in

1960 to coordinate satellite collection, implemented the new system. Part 3

includes a number of National Photographic Interpretation Center and other
CIA reports on the analysis of CORONA imagery, while Part 4 concludes

with an example of a nonmilitary use of satellite imagery. In each part, a

brief introduction is followed by the relevant documents in chronological

order.

CORONA was the United States’ response to a growing need in the 1960s

for detailed photographic coverage of countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The introduction of newer-and still classified-satellite systems after

1964 further improved the program’s utility and performance. The sheer

volume of documents and imagery associated with CORONA-its imagery

alone is estimated at over 2 million linear shelf feet-made it both important and difficult to select representative samples for this volume.

In the spring of 1992, Robert Gates, then Director of Central Intelligence

(DC:), formed the Environmental Task Force to determine how the Intelligence Community could use its technology to assist scientists in studying

the environment. Spurred by then Senator Albert Gore, the CIA also formed

a DC1 Classification Review Task Force to examine the declassification of

satellite imagery collected by obsolete, broad-area-search satellite systems.

Both the Environmental Task Force and the DC1 Classification Review

Task Force determined that imagery produced from KH-1 through ISH-6

systems offered unusual information for scientists, scholars, and historians.

The declassification of this imagery, both panels concluded, presented no

threat to national security.

DCI R. James Woolsey approved the recommendations of the two task

forces and on 22 February 1995, President William Clinton signed an Executive order directing the declassification of more than 800,000 early satellite images. These images, collected by the CORONA, ARGON, and

LANYARD systems, provide extensive coverage of the earth’s surface.

This book of documents is but the first installment of information on America’s first satellite system. In the years ahead the American public can look

forward to a wealth of declassified reports and imagery from the CORONA

program.

XVi

Part I: History of the CORONA Program

After the CORONA program drew to a close in 1972, the CIA published a

survey account of the program in a special Spring 1973 supplement to its

classified professional journal, Studies in Intelligence. Kenneth E. Greer’s

article focuses on the program’s early years, its uncertainties and frustrations. CIA manager, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., commented after the second

mission-DISCOVERER I-failed in 1959:

It was a most heartbreaking business. If an airplane goes on a test flight and

something malfunctions, and it gets back, the pilot can tell you about the malfunction, or you can look it over and find out. But in the case of a recce [reconnaissance] satellite, you fire the damn thing off and you’ve got some telemetry

and you never get it back. There is no pilot, of course, and you’ve got no hardware, you never see it again. So you have to infer from telemetry what went

wrong. Then you make a fix, and if it fails again you know you’ve inferred

wrong. In the case of CORONA it went on and on. r

In its first years CORONA encountered considerable difficulties, which did

not immediately diminish even after the first successful mission in August

1960. Indeed, of the first 30 missions from 1960 through 1962, only 12

were considered productive. The description of the recovery of Mission

1005 in South America illustrates some of the problems that the intelligence

community confronted and overcame in developing and employing

CORONA.

The Studies article also highlights CORONA’s considerable achievements.

When The New York Times on 12 August 1960 reported the safe return of

DISCOVERER XIII and its triumphant procession from the Pacific Ocean

to President Eisenhower at the White House, the paper immediately recognized that this startling reentry signaled a new era:

The technological feat marks an important step toward the development of reconnaissance satellites that will be able to spy from space. The same ejection and

recovery techniques eventually will be used for returning photographs taken by

reconnaissance satellites. Indirectly the technique will also contribute to the

eventual return of manned spacecraft.

Within a week, Air Force Capt. Harold E. Mitchell and his crew conducted

the first aerial recovery when DISCOVERER XIV (or Mission 9009), the

first satellite with film, returned to earth on 19 August 1960. Six days later,

‘Quoted in Leonard Mosley, Duller A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster

Dulles and Their Family Network (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1978), p. 432.

1
President Eisenhower and Director of Central Intelligence Allen DuIles

inspected the mission’s photographs. In films “good to very good,” the camera had photographed 1 S million square miles of the Soviet Union and East

European countries. From this imagery 64 Soviet airfields and 26 new surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites were identified. That the first satellite rnission could produce such resuks stunned knowledgeable observers from

imagery analysts to the President.
1. Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” Stu&e,s in Intelligence, Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973): 1-37.

The first photographic

reconnuissance satellite

CORONA

Kenneth E. Greer

When the U-2 began operating in the summer of 1956, it was expected to have a

relatively short operational life in overflying the Soviet Union-perhaps no more

than a year or two. That expectation was based not so much on the likelihood

that the Soviets couid develop the means of shooting it down, as on their ability

to develop a radar surveillance network capable of tracking the U-2 reliably.

With accurate tracking data in hand, the Soviets could file diplomatic protests

with enough supporting evidence to generate political pressures to discontinue

the overflights. As it turned out, the United States had underestimated the

Soviet radars, which promptly acquired and continuously tracked the very first

U-2 flight over Soviet territory. The Soviets fiIed a formal protest within days

of the incident, and a standdown was ordered.

For nearly four years, the U-2 ranged over much of the world, but only

sporadically over the Soviet Union. Soviet radar was so effective that each

flight risked another protest, and another standdown. CIearIy, some means had

to be found to accelerate the initial operational capability for a less vulnerable

successor to the U-2. Fortunately, by the time Francis Gary Powers was shot

down near Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960 (fortunate for the inteIligence community,

that is-not for Powers), an alternative means of carrying out photographic

reconnaissance over the Soviet Union was approaching operational readiness.

On 19 August 1960, just 110 days after the downing of the last U-2 overflight

of the Soviet Union, the first successful air catch was made near Hawaii of a

capsule of exposed film ejected from a photographic reconnaisstince satellite

that had completed seven passes over denied territory and 17 orbits of the earth.

The feat was the culmination of four years of intensive and often frustrating

effort to build, launch, orbit, and recover an intelligence product from a cameracarrying satellite.

At about the time the U-2 first began overflying the Soviet Union in 1956,

the U.S. Air Force was embarking on the development of a strategic reconnaissance weapons system empIoying orbiting satellites in a variety of collection

configurations. The program, which was designated WS-117L, had its origins in

1946 when a requirement was placed on the RAND Corporation for a study of

the technical feasibility of orbiting artificial satellites. The first real breakthrough had come in 1953 when the USAF Scientific Advisory 3oard reported

to the Air Staff that it was feasible to produce relatively small and light-weight

thermonuclear warheads. As a result of that report, the ATLAS ICBM program

was accorded the highest priority in the Air Force.

l

3
Corona

Since the propulsion required to pIace a satellite in orbit is of the same general

order of magnitude as that required to launch an ICBM, the achievement of

an ICBM-level of propulsion made it possible to begin thinking seriously of

launching orbital satellites. Accordingly, General Operational Requirement No* 80

was levied in 1955 with the stated objective of providing continuous surveillance

of pre-selected areas of the world to determine the status of a potential enemy’s

war-making capacity.

The Air Research and Development Command, which had inherited the RAND

study program in 1953, assigned the satellite project to its Ballistic Missile

Division. The development plan for WS-117L was approved in July 1956, and

the program got under way in October 1956 with the awarding of a contract

to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for the development and testing of the

system under the program nameThe planning for WS-11% contemplated a family of separate systems and

subsystems employing satellites for the collection of photograpbk,

and infrared intelligence, The program, which was scheduled to extend beyond

1965, was divided into three phases. Phase I, the TKOR-boosted test series, was

to begin in November 1958. Phase . II, the ATLAS-boosted test series, was

scheduled to begin in June 1959 with the objective of completing the transition

from the testing phase to the operational phase and of proving the capability

of the ATLAS booster to launch heavy loads into space. Phase III, the operationa1 series, was to begin in March 1960 and was to consist of three progressively more sophisticated systems: the Pioneer version (photographic and

w, the Advanced version (photographic and-, and the Survellance version (photographic, and infrared). Xt was expected that O&

erationd control of WS-lI7L would be transferred to the Strategic Air Command with the initiation of Phase III.

It was an ambitious and complex program that was pioneering in technical

fields about which little was known. Not surprisingly, it had become apparent

by the end of 1957 that the program was running behind schedule, It also was

in trouble from the standpoint of security. The U-2 program was carried out

in secret from 1956 until May 1960. Its existence was no secret to the Soviets,

of course, but they chose to let it remain a secret to the general public (and

to most of the official community} rather than publicize it and thereby admit

that they lacked the means of defending their air space against the high-flying

U-2 WS-117L was undertaken as a classified project, but its very size and the

number of people involved made it impossible to conceal the existence of the

program for Iong. The press soon began speculating on the nature of the program, correctly identifying it as involving military reconnaissance satellites, and

referring to it as BIG 3ROTHER and SPY IN THE SKY. The publicity was

of concern, because the development of WS-117L was begun in a period when

the international political climate was hostile to any form of overflight reconnaissance.

‘It was against this background that the President’s Board of Consultants on

Foreign Intelligence Activities submitted its semi-annual report to the President

on 24 October 1957. The Board noted in its report that it was aware of two

4
C0r0/lCl

advanced reconnaissance systems that were under consideration. One was a study

then in progress in the Central InteIIigence Agency concerning the feasibility

of a manned reconnaissance aircraft designed for greatly increased performance

and reduced radar cross-section; the other was WS-117L. However, there appeared little prospect that either of these could produce operational systems

earlier than mid-1959. The Board emphasized the need for an interim photo

reconnaissance system and recommended that an early review be made of new

developments in advanced reconnaissance systems to ensure that they were given

adequate consideration and received proper handling in the light of thenexisting and future intelligence requirements. The Executive Secretary of the

Nationa Security Councit on 28 October notified the Secretary of Defense and

the Director of Central Intelligence that the President had asked for a joint

report from them on the status of the advanced systems. Secretary. Quarks

responded on behalf of himseIf and Mr. Dulles on 5 December with a recommendation that, because of the meme sensitivity of the subject, details on the

new systems be furnished through oral briefings.

As a consequence, there are no official records in CIA’s Project CORONA

files bearing dates between 5 December 1957 and 21 March 1953, but it is

clear that major decisions were made and that important actions were undertaken during the period. In brief, it was decided that the photographic subsystem of WS-Il?L offering the best prospect of early success would be separated from WS-117L, designated Project CORONA, and placed under a joint

CIA-Air Force management t-an approach that had been so successful

in covertly developing and operating the U-2

The nucleus of such a team was then constituted as the Development Projects

Staff under the direction of Richard BisselI, who was Special Assistant to the

DC1 for Planning and Development. &sell was designated as the senior CIA

representative on the new venture, and his Air Force counterpart was Brigadier

General Osmond Ridand, who, as Colonel Ritland, had served as Bissell’s first

deputy in the early days of the Development Projects Staff and later became Vice

Commander of the Air Force Ballistic MissiIe Division.

BisselI recalls that he first learned of the new program and of the role

intended for him in it “in an odd and informal way” from Dr. Edwin Land.

Dr. Land had been deeply invoked in the planning and development of the

U-2 as a member of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Office of Defense

Mobilization. He continued an active interest in overhead reconnaissance and

later headed the Land PaneI, which was formed in May 1958 to advise on the

development of OXCART, the aircraft planned as the successor to the U-2.

Bissell also recalIs that his early instructions were extremely vague: that the

subsystem was to be split off from WS-lliz, that it was to be placed under

separate covert management, and that the pattern established for the development of the W-2 was to be followed. One of the instructions, however, was firm

and precise: none of the funds for the new program were to come from

monies authorized for already approved Air Force programs. This restriction,

although seemingly ciear at first glance, later led to disagreement over its

interpretation. CORONA mangement expected that the boosters already approved

L

5
1. (Continued)

Corona

for the THOR test series of WS-117L would simply be diverted to the CORONA

program; this proved not to be so. As a consequence, CIA had to go back

to the President with an admission that the original project proposa1 had understated the estimated cost and with a request for more money.

Roughly concurrent with the decision to place one of the WS-117L subsystems

under covert management, the Department of Defense realigned its structure

for the management of space activities. The Advanced Research Projects Agency

(ARPA) was established on 7. February 1958 and was granted authority over

all miritary space projects. The splitting off of CORONA from WS-117L

was accomplished by a directive from ARPA on 28 February 1958, assigning

responsibility for the WS-II7L program to the Air Force and ordering that

the proposed WS-117L interim reconnaissance system employing THOR boost

be dropped.

The ARPA directive ostensibly cancelling the THOR-boosted interim reconnaissance satellite was followed by al1 of the notifications that would normally

accompany the cancellation of a military program. The word was passed officially

within the Air Force, and formal contract cancellations were sent out to the

prospective suppliers. There was much furore when the cancellations went out:

contractors were furious over the suddenness of the action; Air Force personnel

were thundentruck at the abandonment of the WS-117L photographic subsystem that seemed to have the best chance of early success. After the cancellation, very limited numbers of individuals in the Air Force and in the participating companies were cleared for Project CORONA and were informed of

the procedures to be followed in the covert reactivation of the cancelled program.

After &sell and IWand had worked out the arrangements for the

 they then began t!&!!

technical problems associated with the design configuration they had inherited

from WS-117L. The subsystem in point amtempfatecl the use of the THOR

IR3M as the first stage booster and, as a second stage, Lockheed’s modification

of a rocket engine that had been developed by Be11 Aircraft for take-off assist

and auxiliary power applications in the B-58 HUSTLER bomber. It was referred

to as the HUSTLER engine during the development phase of WS-117L but

soon came to be known as the AGENA-the name it bears today.

One of the very early CORONA plans called for spin stabilization of the payload, with the camera scanning as the payload rotated. The contractors working

on this subsystem design were Lockheed on the space vehicle, and Fairchild

on the camera. The camera was to have a focal length of six inches, without

image motion compensation. Ground resolution was expected to be poor with

6
1. (Continued)

this short focal Iength, particularly if combined with the readout techniques

envisaged by WS-117L.

Several important design decisions were implemented in this organizational

period of CORONA. Recognizing the need for resolution to meet the intelligence

objectives, it was concluded that physical film recovery offered the most promising approach for a usable photographic return in the interim time period. This

resulted in the addition to the design of a recovery pod or capsule with General

Electric selected as the recovery vehicle contractor. In retrospect, the decision

on film recovery wouId prove to be one of the most important made in U.S.

reconnaissance activities, in that all photo reconnaissance systems developed

up to the current time have relied on physical recovery of film.

Another major decision for the new CORONA Program came in late March

1958, following a three-day conference in San Mateo, California, among representatives of CIA, Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, Lockheed, General

Electric, and Fairchild. The discussion revealed that, while work was going

forward, the design was far from complete. The senior Lockheed representative

reported that they had investigated the possibility of building a satellite vehicle

shaped like a football, a cigar, or a sphere. They bad finally decided, for the

original drawings at least, on a football-shaped pod slightly eIongated at each

end to correct the center of gravity. There was discussion of the need for

immediate contractual arrangements with the various suppliers. Bissell remarked

that he was “faced with the problem at present of being broke” and would need

estimates from all the suppliers as soon as possible in order to obtain the necessary financing to get the program under way. The suppliers agreed to furnish

the required estimates by the following week.

The project quickly began taking formal shape following that meeting. Within

a span of about three weeks, approval of the program and of its financing was

obtained, and the design of the payload configuration evolved into a concept

quite different from the spin-stabilized pod- It was at this point in late March

and early April 1958 that major complications bad arisen in the technical design

of the Fairchild camera. Interest shifted to a competitive design submitted by

the Itek Corporation, a spin-off of Boston University. Itek proposed a longer

focal length camera scanning within an earth-center stabilized pod. The Itek

design was based on the principle of the Boston University Hyac camera. Bissell

recalls that he personaUy decided in favor of the Itek design, but only after

much agonizing evaluation. The decision was a difficult one to make because

it involved moving from a proven method of space vehicle stabilization to one

that was technically more difficult to accomplish. It did, however, standardize

on the 34s stabilization being pursued on the WS-11X ACENA development,

and which has been a part of all subsequent photo reconnaissance systems.

BisseIl’s first project proposal, which was completed on 9 April 1958, requested

approval for concurrent development of both the Fairchild and the Itek systems,

with the Fairchild configuration becoming operational first and the Itek configuration being developed as a follow-on system. Within two days, however,

Bissell had made the final decision ta abandon the Fairchild spin-stabilized

configuration entirely. He rewrote the project proposaI, taking note of the earlier
1. (Conkwed)

Corona

configuration and giving his reasons for favoring the Itek approach (principally

the better resolution attainable, the lower overall cost, and the greater potential

for growth f. The proposal was rewritten a second time, retaining the Itek configuration but raising the cost estimate from to Of the

total estimated cost,-represented ‘a rather arbitrary allowance” for

12 each THOR boosters and Lockheed second stage vehicles, and was to be

financed by ARPA through the Air Force. The remaining- was for

Wrable film cassettes.

by CIA of the pods containing the reconnaissance equipThe final project proposal was forwarded to Brigadier General Andrew 1.

Goodpaster, the President’s Staff Secretary, on 16 April 1958 after having been

reviewed by Mr. Roy Johnson and Admiral John Clark of ARPA; Mr. Richard

Homer, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development;

Brigadier General Osmond Ritland, Vice Commander, Air Force Ballistic Missile Division; and Dr. James Killiau, Special Assistant to the President for Science

and Technology. The proposal was approved, although not in writing. The only

original record of the President’s approval reportedly was in the form of a

handwritten note on the back of an envelope by General C. P. Cabell, the

Deputy Director of Central Jntelbgence.

Although it may have been the original intent, that CORONA would be

administered in a manner essentially the same as that of the U-2 program, it

actually began and evolved quite differently, It was a joint CIA-ARPA-Air Force

effort, much as the U-2 was a joint CIA-Air Force effort, but it lacked the

cent& direction that characterized the W-2 program. The project proposal

described the anticipated administrative arrangements, but it fell short of clarifying the delineation of authorities. It noted that CORONA was being carried out

under the authority of ARPA and CIA with the support and participation of

the Air Force. CIA’s role was further explained in terms of participating in

supervision of the technical development, especially as regards the actual

The work statement prepared for Lockheed, the prime

contractor, on 25 Apd 1958 noted merely that technic4 direction of the program was the ioint responsibility of several agencies of the Government.

The imprecise statements of who was to do what in connection with CORONA

allowed for a range of interpretation, The vague assignments of responsibilities

caused no appreciable difficulties in the early years of CORONA when the joint

concern was primarily one of producing as promised, but they later ( 1963)

became a source of severe friction between CIA and the Air Force over responsibility for conducting the program.

Bissell, the recognized leader of the early CORONA program, gave this

description of how the early program was managed:

The program was started in a marvelously informal manner. Wand and

I worked out the division of labor between the two organizations as we

went along. Decisions were made jointly. There were so few people involved

and their relations were so close that decisions could be and were made

quickly and cleanly. We did not have the problem of having to make

8
1. (Continued)

Corona

compromises or of endless delays awaiting agreement. After we got fully organized and the contracts had been let, we began a system of management

through monthly suppliers’ meetings-as we had done with the U-2 Ritland

and I sat at the end of the table, and I acted as chairman. The group included two or three people from each of the suppliers. We heard reports

of progress and ventilated problems-especially those involving interfaces

among contractors. The program was handled in an extraordinarily coopetative manner between the Air Force and CIA. Almost all of the people

involved on the Government side were more interested in getting the job

done than in claiming credit or gaining control.

The schedule of the program, as it had been presented to the CORONA

group at its meeting in San Mateo in late March KGS, called for a .-count-down”

beginning about the first of july 1958 and extending for a period of 19 weeks.

It was anticipated that the equipment would be assembled, tested, and the first

vehicle launched during that 19-week period, which meant that the fabrication

of the individual components would have had to be completed by 1 July 19%

By the time Bissell submitted his project proposal some three weeks later, it

had become apparent that the earher tentative scheduling was unrealistic. Bissell

noted in his project proposal that it was not yet possible to establish a firm

schedule of delivery dates, but that it appeared probable that the first firing

could be attempted no Iater than June 1959.

It is pertinent to note here that there was no expectation in 19.958 that CORONA

would still be operating over a decade later. The CORONA program got under

way initially as an interim, short-term, high-risk development to meet the intelligence community’s requirements for area search photographic reconnaissance

pending successful development of other, more sophisticated systems planned for

1YS-ll7L The original CORONA proposal anticipated the acquisition of ody

11 vehicles, noting that at a later date it might be desirable to consider whether

the program should be extended-with or without further technological improvement

Raving settled on the desired configuration and having received Presidential

approval of the program and its financing, the CORONA management team

moved forward rapidly with the contractual arrangements. The team of contractors for CORONA differed from the team on the WS-117L subsystem

3s a consequence of selecting &k’s earth-center stabilized approach. Itek was

brought in as one of the hvo major subcontractors to Lockheed (General Electric

being the other). However, to soften the financial blow to Fairchild, Itek was

made responsible for the design and development of the camera subsystem

lvith Fairchild producing the camera under subcontract to Itek. This contractor

team continued throughout the CORONA program, although later in the program,

the relationship was changed to that of associate contractors. The contractor

relationships on the CORONA program were as friendly and cooperative as any

that could have been set up, and this team dedication to the success of the program is one of the primary reasons for the success the program enjoyed. The final

contractors were selected on 25 April 1958 and a work statement was issued

to Lockheed on that date. The contractors began systems design on 28 April

1

9
1. (Cmtinued)

Corona

and completed them and submitted them for first review on 14 May. The designs

Thus, by mid-1958, the program was well down the road-on the contractors’

side-toward meeting the goal of a first launch no later than mid-1959. The

Government side, however, was running into difficulties. The first problem

was money, the second was cover, and the two were inextricably intertwined.

ziiizmr

st estimate for the &vehicle program had assumed that the

R boosters would be absorbed by the Air Force by diverting

them from the cancelled WS-11’7L subsystem. That assumption proved to be

incorrect. An additional- had to he found to pay for the 12 THORs.

Further, it had been decided that an additional four launch vehicles would

be required for testing of hn4 orbit, and recovery procedures and that an

additional three would be required for biomedical launches in support of the

CORONA cover stat-y. ARPA couId not see its way clear to making Defense

Department funds available merely for testing or for cover support when there

were other DOD space programs with pressing needs for money. Consequently,

CORONA management had to go back to the President for approval of a revised

estimate.

By August 1958, it had also become apparent to the project’s managers that

the original, but as yet unannounced, cover story conceived for the future

CORONA launchings (an experimental program within the first phase of WS11X) was becoming increasingly untenable. WS-117L had by then become the

subject of fairly widespread public speculation identifying it as a military

reconnaissance program. It was feared that linking CORONA to WS-117L in any

way would inevitably place the reconnaissance label on CORONA, and-given

the hostility of the international political climate to overflight rmnnaissancethere was the risk that the policy leve1 of government might cancel the program

if it should be so identified. Some other story would have to be contrived

that would dissociate CORONA from WS-Il7L and at the same time account

for multiple launchings of stabilized vehicles in low polar orbits and with payloads

being recovered from orbit.

It was decided, therefore, to separate the WS-117L photo reconnaissance

program into two distinct and ostensibly unrelated series: one identified as

10
1. (Continued)

Corona

DISCOVERER (CORONA -THOR boost) and the other as SENTRY (later

known as SAMOS - ATLAS boost). A press release announcing the initiation

of the DISCOVERER series was issued on 3 December 1958 identifying the

initial launchings as tests of the vehicle itself and later Iaunchings as explorations

of environmental conditions in space. BiomedicaI specimens, including live

animals, were to be carried into space and their recovery from orbit attempted.

The new CORONA cover concept, from which the press release stemmed,

called for a total of five biomedical vehicles, and three of the five were committed to the schedule under launchings three, four, and seven. The first two

were to carry mice and the third a primate. The two uncommitted vehicles

were to be heid in reServe in event of failure of the heavier primate vehicle.

In further support of the cover plan, ARPA was to develop two radiometzic

payload packages designed specifically to study navigation of space vehicles

and to obtain data useful in the development of an early warning system (the

planned 4-b.It might be noted here that only one of the

three pkumed animal-carrying missions was actuaily attempted (as DISCOVERER III), and it was a faihrre. ARPA did develop the radiometric payload

packages, and they were launched as DISCOVERERs XIX and XXI in late 1960

and early 1961.

The photo reconnaissance mission of CORONA necessitated a near-polar orbit,

by launching either to the north or to the south. There are few otherwise suitable

areas in the continental United States where this can be done without danger

that debris from au early in-flight failure could fall into populated areas. Cooke

Air Force Base* near Catifomia’s Point Arguello met the requirement for downrange safety, because the trajectory of a southward launch from there would

be over the Santa Barbara channel and the Pacific Ocean beyond. Cooke was a

natural choice, because it was the site of the first Air Force operational missile

training base and aIso housed the 672nd Strategic Missile Squadron (THOR).

Two additional factors favored this as the launch area: the manufacturing fatilities and skilled personnel required were in the near vicinity, and a southward

launch would permit recovery in the Hawaii area by initiating the ejection/

recovery sequence as the satelhte passed over the Alaskan tracking facility.

Unlike the U-2 flights, Iaunchings of satellites from U.S. soil simply could not

be concealed from the public. Even a booster as small as the THOR (small,

that is, in comparison with present-day space boosters) launches with a thunderous roar that can be heard for miles; the space vehicle transmits telemetry

that can be intercepted; and the vehicle can be detected in orbit by radar skintrack. The fact of a launch could not be concealed, but maintenance of the

cover story for the DISCOVERER series required that the launchings of the

uniquely configured photographic payloads be closed to observation by unwitting personnel. Vandenberg was excellent as a launch site from many standpoints, but it had one feature that posed a severe handicap to screening the

actual Iaunches from unwanted observation: the heavily traveled Southern

Pacific railroad passes through it. The early launches from Vandenberg had to

‘Cooke AFB was renamed Vandenberg AFB in October 1958.

13
1. (Continued)

be timed for early afternoon,* and the Southern Pacific schedule broke this period

into a series of launch windows, some of which were no more than a few

minutes between trains. Throughout its existence, the CORONA program at

Vandenberg was plagued by having to time the launches to occur during one of

the intervals behveen passing trams.

The planned recovery sequence involved a series of maneuvers, each of which

had to be executed to near-perfection or recovery would fail. Immediately after

injection into orbit, the AGENA vehicle was yawed 180 gegrees so that the

recovery vehicle faced to the rear. This maneuver minim&d the control gas

which would be required for re-entry orientation at the end of the mission, and

protected the heat shield from molecular heating, a subject of considerable

concern at that time. (Later in the J-3 deign when these concerns had diminished,

the vehicle would be flown forward until re-entry.) When re-entry was to take

place, the ACENA would then be pitched down through 60 degrees to position

the satellite recovery vehicle (SRV) for retro-firing. Then the SRV would be

separated from the AGENA and be spin-stabilized by firing the spin rockets to

maintain it in the attitude given it by the AGENA. Next the retro-rocket would

be fired, slowing down the SRV into a descent trajectory. Then the spin of the

SRV would be slowed by firing the de-spin rockets. Next would come the

separation of the retro-rocket thrust cone followed by the heat shield and the

parachute cover. The drogue (or deceleration) chute would then deploy, and

finally the main chute would open to lower the capsule gendy into the recovery

area. The primary recovery technique involved flying an airplane across the top

of the descending parachute, catching the chute or its shrouds in a trapeze-like

hook suspended beneath the airplane and then winching the recovery vehicle

aboard. C-119 Aircraft were initially used with C-130 aircraft replacing them

later in the program. The recovery vehicle was designed to float long enough,

if the air catch failed, for a water recovery by helicopter launched from a surface

ship.

While the vehicle was still in the construction stage, tests of the air recovery

technique were conducted by the 6593rd Test Squadron-with disheartening

results. Of 74 drops using personnel-type chutes, only 49 were recovered. Using

one type of operational drop chute, only four were recovered out of I5 dropped,

and an average of I.5 aircraft passes were required for the hook-up. Eleven

drops with another type of operational chute resulted in five recoveries and an

average of two aircraft passes for the snatch. Part of the difficulty lay in weak

chutes and rigging, and in crew inexperience. The most serious problem, however,

was the fast drop rate of the chutes. Parachutes that were available to support

the planned weight of the recovery vehicle had a sink rate of about 33 feet per

second. What was required W;LS a sink rate approaching 20 feet per second SO

that the aircraft would have time to make three or four passes if necessary

for hook-up, Fortunately, by the time space hardware was ready for launching,

The early THOR-ACENA combkation limited film to enough for a 24-hour mission of

17 orbits, seven of which would cross denied territory, Requirements for daylight recovery

and for daylight passage over denied areas with acceptable sun angles dictated the afternoon

launch time.

12
1. (Cm&wed)

Corona

13
Corona

a parachute had been developed with a sink rate slow enough to offer a reasonable

chance of air recovery.

The launch facilities at Vandenberg AFB were complete, and the remote

tracking and control facilities which had been developed for WS-117L were

ready for the first flight test of a THOR-AGENA combination in January 1959.

The count-down was started for a launch on the 2lst; however, the attempt

aborted at launch minus 60 minutes. When power was applied to test the AGENA

hydraulic system, certain events took place that were supposed to occur in flight

but not while the vehicle was still sitting on the launch pad. The explosive bolts

connecting the AGENA to the THOR detonated, and the ullage rockets* fired.

The AGENA settled into the fairing attaching it to the THOR and did not falI

to the ground, but appreciable damage was done.

A program review conference was held in Palo Alto two days after the launch

failure to examine the possible causes of the abort and to assess its impact

on the pIarmed CORONA launch schedule. Fortunately, the problem was quickly

identified and easily corrected, and it was felt that the system was ready for

test launches at the rate of about one per month..

At the review conference, General l3ectric surfaced a new problem having to do

with the stability of the nose cone during re-entry. The cone was designed

for a film load of 40 Pounds, but the first missions would beeable to carry only

20 pounds. GE reported that about three pounds of ballast would have to be

canicd in the forward end of the cone to restore stability. The program officers

decidcvt to add an instrument package as ballast, either for diagnostic purposes

or for support of the hitrmcdical oover story, thus converting what could have

been dead weight into ;1 net plus for the test program.

The test plan contemplated arriving at full operational capability at a relatively

early date through scqucntial testing of the major components of the systembeginning with the THOR-AGENA combination alone, then adding the nose

cone to test the ejection/re-entry/recovery sequence, and finally installing a

camera for a full CORONA systems test just how much confidence the project

planners had in the imminence of success oannot now be discovered; however,

if the confidence factor was very high at the sta& it must soon have begun

to wane. 3eginning in February 1959 and extending through June 1960 an even

dozen launches were attempted, with eight of the vehicles carrying cameras, and

aI1 of them were failures; no film capsules were recovered from orbit. Of the

eight camera-carrying vehicles, four failed to achieve orbit, three experienced

camera or film failures, and the eighth was not recovered because of a malfunction

of the re-entry body spin rockets. These summaries of the initial launch attempts

illusbate the nature and dimensions of the problems for which solutions had

to be found.

l UlIage rockets are small solid propellant rockets attached to the ARENA. These rdkets

are fired just prior to ignition of the AGENA engine after ib separation from the THOR

to insure that the liquid ACENA propellants are pushed against the bottom of the tanks

so that proper Row into the pumps will occur.

14
1. (Continued)

15
1. (Continued)

DISCOVERER I

The on-pad failure of 21 january was not assigned a number in the DISCOVERER series. DISCOVERER I was Iaunched on 28 February 1959 with a

light engineering payload as a test of THOR-ACENA performance. No recovery

was planned. For a time there was uncertainty as to what had happened to it

because no radio signals were received. At the time, it was believed to have

obtained orbit with speculation that the protective nose cone over the antennas

was ejected just before the AGENA fired and that the AGENA then rammed

into the nose cone, damaging the antennas. Today, most people believe the

DISCOVERER I landed somewhere near the South Pole.

DlSCOVERER II

The second vehicle was launched on 13 April 1959. Orbit was officialIy

announced about two hours later, along with a statement that the capsule carried

a lightweight biomedical payload ( as indeed it did ). The Air Force reported on

15 April that plans to recover the capsule near Hawaii had been abandoned

and that the capsuie might descend somewhere in the Arctic. The announcement

slightly understated the known facts. The capsule had ejected on the 17th orbit

as planned, but a timing malfunction (actually a human programming error)

had caused the ejection sequence to be initiated too early. The capsule was down,

probably somewhere in the near-ticinity of the Spitsbergen Islands north of

Norrvay. In fact, there were later reports that the falling capsule had actually

heen seen by Spitsbergen residents. The Air Force announced on the 16th that

the Norwegian government had authorized a search for the capsuIe which would

begin the folIowink day. Planes scoured the area, and helicopters joined the

DISCOVERER 211

Much publicity attended the launching of DISCOVERER III: some of it

planned and some uplanned (and unwanted). This was the first (and only )

DISCOVERER flight to carry animals: four live black mice. Black mice were

chosen in order to ascertain the possible hair-bleaching effects of cosmic rays.

The mice were members of the C-57 strain, a particularly rugged breed. They

had been “trained,” along with 60 other mice, at the Air Force’s Aeromedical

Field Laboratory at Holloman AFB. They were seven to ten weeks old and

16
1. (Continued)

COfOflO

weighed slightly over an ounce apiece. A three-day food supply was provided,

which conskkd of a special formula containing peanuts, oatmea1, gelatin, orange

juice, and water. Each mouse was placed in a small individual cage about twice

its size, and each had a minuscule radio strapped to its back to monitor the

effects of the space trip on heart action, respiration, and muscular activity.

The lift-off on 3 June 1959 was uneventful, but, inst&ad of injecting approximately horizontally into orbit, the AGENA apparently fired downward, driving

the vehicle into the Pacific Ocean and killing the mice. Looking back on the

mission, the attempt to orbit the mice seems to have been jinxed from the very

beginning.

Just before the first try at launch, telemetry indicated a lack of mouse activity.

It was thought at first that the little fellows were merely asleep, so a technician

wras sent up in a cherry-picker to arouse them. He banged on the side of the

vehicle and tried catcalls, but to no avail. When the capsuIe was opened, the

mice were found to be dead. The cages had been sprayed with kryton to cover

rough edges; the mice had found it tastier than their formula; and that was that.

The second try at launch several days later, with a back-up mouse “crew,”

was a near-abort when the capsule life cell humidity sensor suddenly indicated

IO0 percent relative humidity. The panic button was pushed, and troubleshooters

were sent up to check. They found that when the vehicle was in a vertical position

the humidity sensor was directly beneath the cages, and it did not distinguish

between plain water and tine. The wetness dried out after a while, all was

forgiven, and the vehicle was launched-unhappily into the permanent 100

percent moisture environment of the Pacific Ocean.

Also, the timing of the launch was unfortunate. The monkeys, Able and

Baker, had survived a 300-mile flight in a JUPITER nose cone on 29 May in

connection with another, unrelated test program. However, Able died during

minor surgery on 3 June to remove an electrode that had been implanted under

his skin. (This was the date of the DISCOVERER III launch.) The British

Society Against Cruel Sports made a formaI protest to the U.S. Ambassador,

and the press raised quite a stink about the fatal mice flight--comparing it

unfavorably with the Russians’ successful launching of the dog, Laika, in

SPUTNIK II back in November 1957, and demanding that orbit and recovery

procedures be perfected before attempting further launches of mice or monkeys.

DlSCOVERERS N-VIII

DISCOVERER IV on 25 June 1959 was the first to carry a camera and thus

the first true CORONA test, but the payload did not go into orbit. DISCOVERER

V, again with a camera, attained orbit but the temperature inside the spacecraft

ws abnormally low and the camera failed on the fit orbit. The recovery

m

17
I. (Continued)

Corona

capsule was ejected at the proper time, but never showed up; early in 1960 it

was discovered in a high near-polar orbit with an apogee of 1,058 miles. Failure

of the spin rocket had caused the retro-rocket to accelerate rather than de-boost

the package, DISCOVERER VI went into orbit six days later, but the camera

failed on the second revolution, and the retro-rocket failed on the recovery

attempt. *

DISCOVERER VII on 7 November did not go into orbit. DISCOVERER VIII

on 20 November went into an eccentric arbit with an apogee of 913 miles, and

the camera failed again. The recovery vehicle was ejected succasfully, but the

parachute failed to open.

It had become plain by the end of Novem,ber 1959 that something (or, to be

more precise, many things) had to be done to correct the multiple failures that

were plaguing the CORONA system. Eight THOR-AGENA combinations and

five cameras had been expended with nothing to show for the effort except

accumulated knowledge of the system’s weaknesses. The project technicians

knew what was going wrong, but not always why. Through DISCOVERER VIII,

the system had experienced these major failures:

One misfired on the launch pad.

Three faiied to achieve orbit.

Two went into highly eccentic orbits.

One capsule ejected prematurely.

Two cameras operated briefly and then failed.

One camera failed entirely.

One experienced a retro-rocket malfunction.

One had very low spacecraft temperature.

A panel of consultants reviewed the various failures and their probable causes

and concluded that what was needed most was “‘qualification, requalification, and

multiple testing of component parts” before assembling them and sending them

aloft. This called for more money. Accordingly, Bissell submitted a project

amendment to the DDCI on 22 January 1960 asking approval of nearlyadditional to cover the costs of the testing program. He apologized to General

Cabell for submitting a request for funds to pay for work that was already

under way: “Although such a sequence is regrettable, there has been con-

*One of these early launches tested a system for concealinp: the tell-tale payload doors from

inquisitive eyes near the launch pad. The scheme was to wver them with paper, fastened

over two lengths of piano wire with pingpong balls at the front end. The air flow at launch

would use the pingpong balls and wire as “ripcods” to strip away the paper. The idea

was tested on the side of a sports car simulating launch velocity as nearly z possible on

the Bayshore Freeway late one evening. The test proved that the ripcords worked, and that

Freeway patrolmen could overhaul a vehicle going only 90 m.p.h. Unfortunately, the tipcords

malfunctioned on the next actual launch, and there was no consensus for another test round

with the Freeway police.

18
1. (Cuntinued)

Corona

.idcr:lble confusion in this program as to what the amount of the overruns would

I,(* ;md this has made it difficult to obtain approvals in an orderly fashion in

.,‘hm1CC.”

.AS of the fall of 19.59, major problems remained to be solved in achieving

.I,, ;Icceptable orbit, in camera functioning, and in recovering the film capsule.

~hcsc were the more serious of the specific failures that were occupying the

;Irtcntion of the technicians:

The AGENA vehicle was designed for use with both the THOR and the

ATLAS boosters. The ascent technique used by the AGENA vehicle was

essentially the same in both combinations, but there were significant differences in the method of employing the booster. In the CORONA program,

in order to conserve weight, the THOR booster followed a programmed

trajectory using only its autopilot Also, the THOR thrust was not cut off

by command at a predetermined velocity (as in the ATLAS); instead, its

fuel burned to near-exhaustion. This relatively inaccurate boosting profile,

coupled with the low altitude of CORONA orbits, required great precision

in the orbital injection. At a typical injection ahitude of 120 miles, an

angular error of plus or minus 1.1 degrees or a velocity deficit of as little

as 100 feet per second would result in failure to complete the first orbit.

This had happened repeatedly. Lasting relief from this problem lay some

distance in the future: a more powerful ACENA was being developed, and

the weight of instrumentation for measuring in-flight performance on the

early flights would be reduced on later operational missions. The shortterm remedy lay in a drastic weight-reduction program. This was carried

out in part (literally, it is said) by attacking surplus metal with tin snips

and files.

The system was designed to operate without pressurization (again to

conserve weight), and the acetate base film being used was tearing or

breaking in the high vacuum existing in space and causing the camera to

jam. A solution for this problem was found in substituting polyester for

acetate base film. The importance to the reconnaissance programs of this

achievement by Eastman Kodak in film technology cannot be overemphasized. It ranks on a level with the development of the film recovery capsule

itself. The first orbital flight in which the camera was operated with

polyester film was DISCOVERER XI (Mission 9008) in April 1960. Although

recovery was not successful, one of the major space reconnaissance problems

had been solved.

The equipment was built to work best at an even and predetermined temperature. To save weight, only passive thermal control was provided. The

spacecraft’s internal temperature had varied on the flights thus far, and

it was much lower than desired on one flight. An interim solution for this

problem was found in varying the therma painting of the vehicle skin.

The spin and de-spin rockets used to stabilize the recovery vehicle during

re-entry had a tendency to explode rather than merely to fire. Several had

blown up in ground tests. A soIution was found in substituting cold gas

spin and de-spin rockets.
Corona

One of the 111ost i1aTKAable probIems, which was to persist for many

months, ws that of placing the satcIlite recovery vehicle (SRV) into :a

dcsccnt trajectory that would terminate in the recuvery zone. This required

ejecting the SRV from the .4CE3A at precisely the right time, and dcc&rating it by relro-rocket firing to the correct velocity and at a suitnblo

angle. There was very little margin for CT~OT in this phase: each one-second

error in ejection timing could shift the recovery point five miles; a retrovelocity vector error of more than ten degrees would cause the capsule to

miss the recovery zone completely.

One might ask why the CORONA program officers persisted in the face of

such adversity. The answer lay in the overwhelming intelligence needs of the

period. The initial planning of CORONA began at a time when we did not know

how many BEAR and BISON aircraft the Soviets had, whether they were

introducing a new and far more advanced long range bomber than the BISON,

or whether they had Isgc’ly skipped the build-up of a manned bomber force in

favor of missiles. There had been major changes in intelligence estimates of Soviet

nuclear capsbilities and of the scope of the Soviet missile program on the lxasis

of the results of the relatively small number of U-2 missions approved for the

summer of 1957. However, by 1959, the great ‘missile gap” controversy was very

much in the fore. The Soviets had tested ICBM’s at ranges of 5,000 miles, proving

they had a capability of building and operating them. What was not known w&as

where they were deploying them operationally, and in what numbers. In the

preparation of the National Intelligence Estimate on guided missiles in the fall

of 1959, the various intelligence agencies held widely diverse views on Soviet

missile strength, Nineteen Sixty ushered in an election year in which the missile

gap had become a grave political issue, and the President was scheddcd to meet

with Soviet leaders that spring without--l‘t appeared--the benefit of hard

intelligence data. The U-2 had improved our knowledge of the Soviet Union,

but it could not provide .uea coverage and the anstvers to the critical questions,

and it \vas increasingly becoming less an intelligence asset than a political Ibbili ty.

It was judged to be only a matter of time until one was shot dolvn-with the

pl~ogri~n> coming to an end as an almost certain conseqnence.

DISCOVERERS IX-Xl?

A standdown was in effect in CORONA from 20 November 1959 until 4 February 1960 to sllow time for intensive R&D efforts to identify and eliminate the

causes of failure. On 4 February, DISCOVERER IX was launched and failed to

nchict-c orbit.

The first recovery of film from a CORONA vehicle occurred with the launching

of DISCOVERER r; on 19 February 1960, but in a manner such that no one

boasted of it. The THOR booster rocket began to fishtail not long after it left the

launch pad and was destroyed by the range safety officer at 52 seconds after lift20
1. (Continued)

Corona

DISCOVERERs 1% through S carried only a quarter of zt load of film (IO

[wunds) to permit the carrying of additional instrumctttation for testing vehicle

p~riormance. DISCOVERER XI was launched on 15 April 1960 carrying n cmncra

;md 16 pounds of film. A reasonably good orbit was achieved (380 miles at npogec

and 109.5 m&s at perigee), and the camera operated satisfactorily.** All of the

film was exposed and transfcrral into t-he rc~~~ety capsule. Wt~fortunately, the

problem of the esplodinS spin rockets, which had been observed in ground tests,

occurred during the recovery sequence, and the payload was lost.

Another standdown--a major one-was imposed following the failure of

DISCOVERER XI. As of mid-April 1960, there had been 11 launches and one

abort on prod. Seven of the launches achieved orbit, but no capsules had bwn

rccwwcd. DISCOVERER SII was planned as a diagnostic flight-without

camera payload-heavily instruntented to determine precisely why recovery of

cnpsules had failed previously. The vehicle was launched on 29 June 1960, but

the -4GENA failed to go info orbit.

DISCOVERER XIII-Partid Success

The nest flight, on August 1960, was launched as a repcat of the no-orbit

DISCOVERER XII diagnostic flight, without camera and film. The vchick was

launched and successfully inserted into orbit. The recovery packqc was ejected

ou the 1’7th orbit, and retro-firing and descent were uormal-exccpt that the

capsule came down well away from the planned impact point. The nominal inipnct

area was approxima&y 250 miles south of Honolulu where C-119 and C-130

ilircraft circled awaiting the capsule’s descent. The splash-down occurred about

330 miles northwest of Hawaii. The airplanes were backed up by surface ships

deployed in a recovery zone with a north-south axis of some 250 miles and an

cwt-west axis extending about SO miles to either side of the cxpectccl impact

point. Although beyond the range of the airborne recovery aircraft, the DISCOI’ERER XIII capsule descended near enough to the staked-out zone to permit

an attempt at water recovery. A ship reached the scene before the capsule sank

*This was one of the few launch failures for the remarkable DOU&S team which prepared

the THOR boosters at Vandenberg .4ir For~p Base. The early CORONA launches provided

many exciting moments for the Douglas crew, however. Several of the crew were holdo\,ers

from the V-2 “broomlighters,” who on V-2 launch days would a~twlly ignite reluct;mt rocket

engines with kerosene-soaked broolns. At Vandenberg AFB they did not have to resort to this

tactic, but they were required on numerous occasions to return to the launch ~x~cl ns late ns

T minus 15 seconds to unfreeze ~&es with the touch of a sledcehnmrner. Other members

of the blockhouse crew would marvel as the “Dou&~s Daredevils” would race their vehicles

in rel’erse the entire way from the launch pad to the blockhouse, arriving just as ignition would

begin.

“This wns the first mission on which the camera operated successfully throuchout the

mission, prinlnrily because of the change from acetate base to plyestcr 1~s~ film.

21
I. (Continued)

Corona

and fished it out of the ocean. Much of the credit for the SUCCESS was attributed

to the inauguration (on the unsuccessful DISCOVERER XII launch) of the

cold gas spin and de-spin system.

For the first time ever, man had orbited an object in space and recovered it.

This American space *‘first” beat the Russians by just nine days. The Soviets

bad tried to recover SPUTNIK IV the previous May but failed when the recovery

capsule ejected into a higher orbit. They did succeed in de-orbiting and

recovering SPUTNIK V carrying the dogs, B&a and Sttelka, on 20 August 1960.

Arrangements were made for extensive publicity concerning this SUCCESS in

recovering an object from orbit-in large measure to support the cover story

of DISCOVERER/CORONA as being an e.xperimental space series. News photos

were released of the lift-off from Vandenberg, of the capsule floating in the

ocean, ‘and of the recovery ship Haiti Victory. President Eisenhower dispfayed

the capsule and the flag it had carried to the press, and it 1va.s later placed on

exhibit in the Smithsonian Institution for public viewing.

In anticipation of the first recovery being a reconnaissance mission, a plan had

been developed under which the capsule would he switched in transit through

Sunny4c. Since DISCOVERER XIII was a diagnostic flight, the project office

was spared the necessity of executing a clandestine switch of capsules prior

to shipment to Washington, and the President and Smithsonian received the

actual hardware from the first recovery.

We have all watched televisiou coverage of the U.S. man-in-space programs

with the recovery of astronauts and capsules after splashdown in the ocean.

A helicopter flies from the recovery ship to the floating capsule and drops

swimmers to attach a line to the capsule. After the astronauts are removed, the

helicopter hoists the capsule from the water and carries it to the recovery ship.

What most of us don’t realize is that the recovery technique was developed for

and perfected hy the CORONA program as a back-up in event of failure

of the air catch.

DISCOVERER XIV-Frrll Success

Success! ! ? DISCOVERER XIV was launched on 18 August 1960, one week

after the successful water recovery of the DISCOVERER XIII capsule. The

vehicle carried a camera and a Xl-pound load of film, The camera operated

satisfactorily, and the full load of film was exposed and transferred to the recovery

capsule. The ACENA did not initially position itself in orbit so as to permit

the recovery sequence to occur. It was on the verge of tumbling during the first

few orbits, and an excessive quantity of gas had to be used in correcting the

situation. Fortunately, vehicle attitude became stabilized about midway through

the scheduled flight period, thus relieving the earlier fear that recovery would

be impossible. The satellite recovery vehicle was ejected on the 17th pass, and

the fiIm capsule was recovered by air snatch.

Captain Harold E. Mitchell of the 6593rd Test Squadron, piloting a C-119

(flying boxcar) called Pelican 9, successfully hooked the descending capsule on

22
1. (Continued)

C&gnu

23
1. (Continued)

.

his third pass,* UpOn arl-lval at Hi&ham Air Force Base, Hawaii, with his prize,

Captain IMitcheII was decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross, and members of his crew were awarded the Air Medal for their accomplishments.

The film was flown to the

-for development and was then delivered to PIC (now known as

NPIC) for readout and reporting. The resolution was substantially lower than

that obtainable from the U-2, but the photography had intelligence value, and it

covered areas of the USSR which the U-2 had never reached. This one satellite

mission, in fact, yielded photo coverage of a greater area than the total produced

by all of the W-2 missions over the Soviet Union. The only major deficiencies

in the photography were plus and minus density bars running diagonally across

the format. Some were due to minor fight leaks, and others were the result of

electrostatic discharge known as corona. These marks showed that the program

security officer had had great insight when he named the program. There are

hvo types of corona markings, a glow which caused the most difficulty, and a

dendritic discharge which is more spectacular in appearance.

A press release announced the success of the mission but naturally made no

mention of the real success: the delivery of photographic intelligence. The

announcement noted that the satellite bad been pIaced into an orbit with a 77.6

degree of inclination, an apogee of So2 miles. a perigee of 116 miles, and an

orbital period of 94.5 minutes. A retro-rocket had slowed the capsule to x-entry

velocity, and a parachute had ‘been released at 60,000 feet. The capsule, which

lveighed 84 pounds at recovery, was caught at 8,506 feet by a C-119 airplane on

its third pass over the falling parachute.

Progress and Problem

The program officers did not take the success of DISCOVERER XIV to meal\

that their problems with the system were at an end, but many of the earlier

difficulties had been surmounted, The orbitaI injection technique had been

improved to a level at which vehicles were repeatedly put into orbit with injcction angle errors of less than four-tenths of a degree. The timing of the initiation of the recovery sequence had been so refined that ejection of the DISCOVERER ,XI SRV occurred within five seconds of the planned time. P-chute

deceleration and air catch of the capsule had been accomplished repeatedly with

test capsules dropped from high-altitude baIIoons. The last two cameras placed

in orbit had operated well.

There were other critical problems, however, that remained to be solved.

Foremost among them at the time was that of consistently achieving the correct

retro-velocity and angle of re-entry of the recovery vehicle. The DISCOVERER

‘Mitchell had been patrolling the primary recovery zone for DISCOVERER XIII, which

was fished from the water by a recovery ship after Mitchell’s plane missed it. The Air Force,

pride stung, assigned htitchell to the boondocks some 500 miles downrange for DISCOVERER

XIV. The capsule overshot the prime recovery area, where three aircraft were chasing the

wrong radar blip. When Mitchell first tried to report his catch, he was told to keep off

the nir in order not to interfere with the recovery operation,

L

24
1. (Continued)

.,

., ::.. .,’ _ .’ qywta :.’:

..;.,:.. : T... .“. . _.:.

25
I. (Continued)

Corona

XIV capsute was the only one thus far that had descended in the designated

impact zone. This was a problem that was to receive major attention during

the next few week.

Four more cameras were launched within the next four months, with one

success and three failures. DISCOVERER XV was sent aloft on 13 September.

The vehicle was successfully inserted into orbit, and the camera functioned

properly. However, the recovery vehicle re-entered at the wrong pitch attitude,

causing the capsule to oome down outside the recovery zone and demonstrating

that the technicians’ concern over the retro-firing sequence was well founded.

The capsule was located, but it sank before a recovery ship could reach it.

DISCOVERER XVI was launched on 26 October, but the ACENA failed to go

into orbit because of a malfunction of a timing deviceThe first ten camera-equipped vehicles carried what was known as the

C camera: a single, vertical-looking, reciprocating, panoramic camera that exposed

the film by scanning at a right angle to the line of flight. DISCOVERER XVI

carried the first of a new series of cameras known as the C Prime ( C’ ). The C’

differed only slightly from the original C configuration and was essentially little

more than a follow-on procurement of the C camera

The DISCOVERER XVII mission was launched on I2 November and went

the full route through successful air cattixcept for one mishap: the film

broke after I.7 feet of the acetate base leader bad fed through the camera. There

is an inconsistency in the records on this and the succeeding mission. The press

release concerning &is mission announced that the AGENA 3, a more powerful

second-stage engine, was used for the first tiqe; the project files record the first

use of the B vehicle on the following mission. In either event, it was the first of

the two-day missions. The capsule was recovered on the 31st orbit.

DISCOVERER XVIII was launched on 11) December 1960 carrying 39 pounds

of film. Orbit was achieved, and the camera worked well, exposing the entire

film load. The recovery vehicle was ejected on revolution number 48 after three

days in orbit, and the &p&e was retrieved by air snatch. This was the first

successful mission employing the C’ camera and the ACENA B second stage.

There was fogging on the first, second, and last frame of each photo pass due

to mirror light leaks, but image quality was otherwise as good as the best from

DISCOVERER XIV.

CORONA in 1961

Of the next ten launches, extending through 3 August 1961, only four were

CORONA missions. DISCOVERERS XIX and XXI carried radiometric payloads

in support of the CORONA cover story, and they were not intended to ‘be

recovered. DISCOVERER XXI included an experiment that was to be of major

significance in the later development of CORONA and other space programs:

the AGENA engine was successfully restarted in space.

There was another “first” during these 1961 launches. When the film was

removed from one of the capsules, the quality assurance inspector found three

objects that should not have been there: two quarters and a buffalo nickel. Early

26
1. (Continued)

Corona

clipsules had contained a flag, so that there would be one to present to President

Eisenhower after the first successful recovery. This had apparently inspired

program personnel at Vandenberg to make their own payload additions during

flight preparation. The Washington program office sent a sharply worded message

to the West Coast project office charging it with responsibility for ensuring that

the practice of souvenir-launching be stopped. (Years later NASA wouId find

itself in the same position after the Apollo moon flights.)

DISCOVERER XX was the fit of a dozen launches extending over a period

of three years carrying mapping cameras, a program sponsored by the U.S.

Army, which the President had approved for inclusion within the CORONA

project. The purpose of the mapping program, which was known as ARGON,

was to obtain precise geodetic fixes and an extension of existing datum planes

within the Soviet Union. DISCOVERER XX was a bust on a number of counts:

the camera faikd; there were no shutter firings; and the orbital programmer

malfunctioned. This last-named failure led to an important change in control

procedures for CORONA. On this and all prior flights the recovery sequence

was initiated automatically by an ejection command cut into the program tape.

The program timer failed temporarily on orbit 31 of this mission, causing the

entire sequence to be about one-half cycle out of phase. The automatic initiation

of the recovery sequence was eliminated from the program tape on subsequent

missions. Thereafter, the positive issuance of an injection command was required.

Of the four CORONA missions attempted between December 1960 and August

1961, two did not go into orbit as a consequence of AGENA failures, and two

were qualified successes. DISCOVERER XXV was launched on I6 June and

e-xposed its full load of film. The air catch failed, but the back-up water recovery

wvas successful. The camera failed on revolution 22 of DISCOVERER XXVI,

which was launched on 7 July, but about three-quarters of the film was exposed

and was recovered by air catch.

.Going into August 1961, a total of 17 camera-carrying CORONA missions

had been attempted, and usable photography had been recovered from only

four of them. These four successful missions, however, had yielded plottable

coverage of some 13 million square miles, or nearly half of the total area of

interest.

Camera Irnprovetnenfs

The first substantial upgrading of the CORONA camera system came with the

introduction in August 1961 of the C Triple Prime (C’ ’ ‘) camera. The original

C camera was a scanning panoramic camera in which the camera cycling rate

and the velocity-over-height ratio were constant and were selected before launching. Image motion compensation was fixed mechanically to the velocity-overheight ratio. A brief explanation of these terms may be helpful in understanding

the nature of the problems with which the camera designers had to cope.

A means must be provided for matching the number of film exposures

in a given period of time (camera cycling rate) with the varying ratio

between vehicle altitude and velocity on orbit (velocity-over-height > so that

27
1. (Continued)

Corona

the ground area is photographed in a series of swaths with neither gaps

nor cscessive overlapping in the coverage.

If the subject moves just as a snapshot is taken with a hand-held camera,

and if the camera shutter speed is not fast enough to “stop” the motion,

the photographic image will be smeared. To a camera peering down from

an orbiting CORONA space vehicle, the earth’s surface appears to be passing

beneath the camera at a speed of roughly five miles per second. A camera

photographing the earth’s surface from a satellite moving at that speed

would yield smeared photography if some means were not provided for

stopping the relative motion. The technique used in accamplishing this is

known as image motion compensation.

The C Triple Prime was the first camera built totally by the Itek Corporation.

The C’ ’ ’ was also a reciprocating camera with a rotating lens cell, which exposed

the Film during a segment of its rotation, The new camera had a larger aperture

lens, an improved film transport mechanism, and a greater flexibility in command

of camera and vehicle operations-+specially as regards control of the velocityover-height factor. The larger aperture lens permitted use of slower film

emulsions, which, combined with the improved resolving power of the lens

itself, offered the prospect of resolution approximately twice as good as the

C and c’ cameras.

The first C’ ’ ’ camem system with a %-pound film load was launched.on 30

August 1961, The mission was a success, with the full Finn load being transferred

and with ejection and recovery occurring on the 32nd orbit. All frames of the

photography howetler, were out of focus. The cause ‘was identified and was

corrected by redesigning the scan head. Seven more missions were launched

during the last four monthi of 1961, three with the c camera and four with the

c ” ‘. Six of them attained orbit, and the cameras operated satisfactorily on all

six. Film was recovered from four of the missions. The last of the four, which

carried a C”’ camera system, was rated the best mission to date. It also had a

cover assignment to carry ‘out: the injection of a secondary satellite, dubbed

OSCAR (orbital satellite carrying amateur radio), into a separate orbit. OSCAR

was a small radio satellite broadcasting a signal on 145 megacycles for pick-up

by amateurs as an aid in the study of radio propagation phenomena.

Slowly but surely the bugs were being worked out, but it seemed that just

as one was laid to rest another arose to take its place. Perhaps what was actually

happening was that various sets of problems existed simultaneously, but the importance of some of them was masked by others. The elimination of a particular

problem made it possible to recognize the significance of another. The recent

successes had resulted largely from correcting weaknesses in the payload portion

of the system. At the same time, difficulties in the AGENA vehicle began to

surface. Of the last seven missions in 1961, four experienced on-orbit difficulties

with the AGENA power supply or control gas system.

Power system components for general use in satellite systems were designed,

developed, and tested in the CORONA program. Foremost among those cornponents were the static electronic inverters used to convert direct current

28
1. (Continued)

Corona

battery energy into the v,uious alternating current voltages required by the

other subsystems. Static inverters, which were first flown aboard CORONA

vehicles, were considered essential, because they had half the weight and double

the efficiency of their rotary counterparts. Unfortunately, they are rather tempcramental gadgets. The history of inverter deveIapment had been marked

\>y high failure rates in system checkouts on the ground. Despite the lessons

that had been learned and the improvements in circuit design that resulted from

them, the recent on-orbit power failures demonstrated a need for further research

:md development.

‘I’he Lmt DISCOVERER

The ACENA failed on DISCOVERER XXXVII, launched on L3 January L962,

and the payload did not go into orbit It was the last mission to carry the C’ “

camera system, and with it the DISCOVERER series came to an end. After

37 launches or launch attempts, the cover story for DISCOVERER had simply

worn out. With the improved record of success and the near-certainty of an

even better record in the future, it seemed likely that there would be as many

as ;L dozen and a half to two dozen launches per year for perhaps years to come.

The 1961 R&D effort was not confined to improving the performance of the

existing system. A major development program was concurrently under way on

a much better camera subsystem. A contract was awarded on 9 August 1961,

retroactively effective to 20 March, for a new camera configuration to be known

11s MURAL. The rMURAL camera system consisted essentially of two c’ ’ ’ cameras

mounted with one pointing sligh& forward and the other slightly backward.

Two *IO-pound rolls of film were carried in a double-spool film supply cassette. The

two film webs were fed separateiy to the two cameras where they were panoramically exposed during segments of the lens cells’ rotations and then were

fed to R double-spool take-up cassette in the satellite recovery vehicle. The

system was designed for a mission duration of up to four days.

CORONA GWS Stereo

The vertical-looking C, C’, and C’ ” cameras had photographed the target

area by sweeping across it in successive overlapping swaths. The MURAL concept

involved photographing each swath area twice. The forward-looking camera

first photographed the swath at an angle 15 degrees from the vertical. About

a half-dozen frames later, the backward-looking camera photographed the same

swatch at an angle also 15 degrees from the vertical. When the two resulting

photographs of the same area or object were properly aligned in a stereo-micro2 9
1. (Continued)

Corona

scope, the photography would appear to be three-dimensional. Simultaneous

operation of both instruments was required for stereo photography. If either

camera failed, photography could still be obtained from the other, but it could

be viewed in only ho dimensions.

The first MURAL camera system was launched as program flight number

38 on 27 February 1962 On the first 34 flight, an anomaly occurred during

re-entry. The RV heat shield failed to separate and was recovered by the aircraft along with the capsule. This anomaly provided valuable diagnostic data

on the re-entry effects, which served the program well in later years, when program stretchouts caused shelf life of the heat shields to be a major ancem.

The twenty-sixth and last in the MURAL series was launched on 21 December

1963. Twenty of the SRV’s were recovered, 19 of them by air snatch. The one

water recovery was of a capsule that splashed down a thousand miles from the

nominal impact point. An interesting aspect of this recovery was that the capsule

turned upside down in the water, causing loss of the beacon signals. It was

located during the search by an alert observer who spotted the sun shining on

the gold capsule. Of the six vehicles that failed, two malfunctioned in the launch

sequence, one SRV failed to eject properly, and three capsules came down in

the ocean and sank before they couid be recovered. Twenty successes out of

26 tries appeared to be a remarkable record when viewed against the difficulties

experienced only t\vo years earlier.

The three capsules that sank came down in or near the recovery zone, indicating that the problems previously encountered in the reentry sequence had been

solved. They were not supposed to sink so quickly, howe-fer. (One of them

floated for less than three minutes.} To minimize the sbance that a capsule might

be retrieved by persons other than the American recovery crew, the capsules were

designed to float for a period ranging originally from one to three days and then

to sink. The duration of the flotation period was controlled by a capsule sink

valve containing compressed salt, which would dissolve in sea water at a rate

that could be predicted within rather broad limits. When the salt plug had

dissolved, water entered the capsule, and it sank-ingenious but simple.

Other significant improvements in the CORONA program were inaugurated

during the lifetime of the MURAL system. One of them was an aid to photointerpretation. In order to read out the photography, the photointerpreter must

be able to determine for each frame the portion of the earth’s surface that is

imaged, the scale of the photography, and its geometry. In simplest terms, he

must know where the vehicle was and how it was oriented in space at the precise

time the picture was taken. Until 1962, the ground area covered by a particular

frame of photography was identified by combining data provided on the orbital

path of the vehicle with the time of camera firing. The orientation or attitude

of the vehicle on orbit was determined from horizon photographs recorded at

each end of every other frame from a pair of horizon cameras that were included

in the CORONA camera system.

30
1. (Continued)

Beginning with the first of the MURAL flights, an index camera was incorporated into the photographic system, and a stellar camera was added a few missions

later. The short focal length index camera took a small scale photograph of the

area being covered on a much larger scale by successive sweeps of the pan

cameras. The small scale photograph, used in conjunctian with orbital data,

simplified the problem of matching the pan photographs with the terrain. F’hotographs taken of stars by the stehar camera, in combination with those taken

of the horizons by the horizon cameras, provided a more precise means of

determining vehicle attitude on orbit.

The photography from program flight number 47, a MURAL mission launched

on 27 July 1962, was marred by heavy axona and radiation fogging. The corona

problem was a persistent one--disappearing for a time only to reappear Jaterand had become even more severe with the advent of the complicated film transport mechanisms of the MURAL camera. Corona marking was caused by sparking

of static electricity from moving parts of the system, especiaUy from the film

rolIers. The problem was eventually solved by modifications of the parts themielves and by rigid qualification testing of &es

The boosting capacity of the first-stage THOR was substantially increased

in early 1963 by strapping to the THOR a cluster of small solid-propellant rockets,

which were jettisoned after firing. This Thrust Augmented THOR, or TAT as it

came to be known, was first used for the launching of the heavier LANYARD

camera system. LANYARD was developed within the CORONA program as a

film recovery modification of one of the cameras designed for the SALVOS system

and, with its longer focal length, was expected to yield better resolution than

the CORONA cameras, It had a single lens ceI1 capable of stereoscopic coverage

by swinging a mirror through a 30-degree angle. Three flights were attempted,

only one of which was partially swzcessful. The camera had a serious lens focus

problem, which was later traced to thermal factors and corrected. The LANYARD

program was initiated as an interim system pending the completion of a highresolution spotting system then under development. It was cancelLed upon the

success of the spotting system. The TAT booster itself was a significant success,

permitting the later launching of heavier, more versatile CORONA systems.

The Ttm-Bucket System

Program flight number 69, launched on 24 August 1963, introduced the first

two-bucket configuration-the next major upgrading of the CORONA system.

31
I 1 (Continued)

Corona

(The film recovery capsule is commonly referred to as a bucket, aitbough it more

nearly resembles a round-bottomed kettle.) The new modification, which was

knows as the J-l system, retained the MURAL stereoscopic camera concept but

added a second film capsuIe and recovery vehicie. With two SRV’s in the system,

film capacity was increased to 160 pounds (versus the 20-pound capacity of the

first few CORONA missions). The two-bucket system was designed to be deactivated or stored in orbit in a passive (zombie) mode for up to il days.

This permitted the recovery of the first bucket after half of the film supply

was exposed. The second bucket could begin filling immediately thereafter,

or its start could be delayed for a few days. A major redesign of the command

and control mechanisms was required to accommodate the more complicated

mission profiIe of the hvo-bucket system.

AS with each of the major modifications of CORONA, the J-l program had a

few early bugs. On the first mission, the shutter on the master horizon camera

remained open about I,000 times seriousIy fogging the adjacent panoramic

photography, and the AGENA current inverter failed in mid-flight, making it

impossible to recover the second bucket. Also, the J-1 system initiaIIy experienced

a rather severe heat problem, which was solved by reducing the thermal sensitivity

of the camera and by better control of vehicIe skin temperature through shielding

and varying the paint pattern.

Back in 19f30 and 1961, the successful recovery of a CORONA film bucket was

an “event.” A mere two years later, with the advent of the J-1 system, success had

become routine and a failure was’ an “event.” I3y the end of 1966,37 J-1 systems

had been launched; 35 of them were put into orbit; and 64 buckets of film were

recovered. There were M failures at recovery in the three years following 1966: 28

buckets were launched, and 28 buckets were recovered. Also, mission duration

was greatIy expanded during the lifetime of the J-1 system. A mission in June

1964 yielded four full days over target for each of the two buckets. Five full days

of operation with each bucket was attained in January 1965. In April 1966, the

first bucket was recovered after seven days on orbit. A 13-day mission life was

achieved in August 1966, and this was increased to 15 days in June 1967.

The increased mission life and excelIent record of recovery resulted from a

number of successive improvements that were incorporated into the J-I time

period. Among them was a subsystem known as LIFEBOAT, a completely

redundant and self-contained apparatus built into the AGENA that could be

activated for recovering the SRV in event of an AGENA power failure (which

still happened occasionally). Another improvement was the introduction of the

new and more powerful THORAD booster. A third was the addition of a rocket

orbit-adjust system. The CORONA vehicles were necessarily fIown over the

target areas with quite a Iow perigee in order to increase the scale of the

photography, and this led to a relatively rapid decay of the orbit. The orbitadjust system compensated for the decay. It consisted of a cluster of small rockets,

known as drag make-up units, which were fired individually and at selected
Corona

iutervak. Each firing accelerated

approsimately its original orbit.

the vehicle slightly, boosting it back into

A Maverick

The CORONA camera system was to undergo one more major upgrading but

we cannot leave the j-1 program without giving an account of one mission failure

of truly magnificent proportions. Program flight number 78 (CORONA Mission

Number RNI5), a two-bucket J-1 system, was launched on 27 April 1964. Launch

and insertion into orbit were uneventful. The master panoramic camera operated

satisfactorily through the first bucket, but the slave panoramic camera failed

after 350 cycles when the film broke. Then the AGENA power supply failed.

Vandenberg transmitted a normal recovery enable command on southbound

revolution number 47 on 30 April. The vehicle verified receipt of the command,

but nothing happened.. The recovery command was repeated from various c&trol

stations-in both the normal asd back-up LIFEBOAT recovery modes-on 26

subsequent passes extending through 20 May. The space vehicle repeatedly

verified that it had received the commands, but the ejection sequence did not

occur? After 19 May, the vehicle no longer acknowledged receipt, and from 20

May on it was assumed that the space hardware of Mission 109.5 was doomed

to total incineration as tbe orbit decayed.

But AMission 1005, it later developed, had staged its own partial re-entry,

stubborn to the end. At six minutes past midnight on 26 May, cuinciding with

northbound revolution No. 452 of Mission 1005, observers in Maraca&o, Venezuela saw five burning obj& in the sky.

On 7 July, two farm workers found a battered golden object on a farm in

lonely mountain terrain near La Fria in Tachira State, southwestern Venezuela,

a couple OF miles from the Colombian horder. They reported it to their employer,

Facundo AIbarracin, wha had them move it some 100 yards onto his own farm

and then spread the news of his find in hopes of selling it. Albarracin got no

offers from the limited market in Tachira, however-not even from the smugglers

with access to Colombia-so he hacked and pried loose the radio transmitter

and various pieces of the take-up assembly to use as household utensils or toys

for the children.

UItimately word of the find reached San CristobaI, the nearest town of any

size. Among the curious who visited La Fria was a commercial photographer,

Leonardo Davila, who telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Caracas on 1 August

that he had photographed a space object. It was the first bucket from Mission

1005, with one full spool of well-charred film clearly visible.

A team of CORONA officers, ostensibly representing USAF, flew to Caracas

to recover the remains. The capsule was lugged out by peasants to a point where

the Venezuelan Defense Ministry could pick it up for flight to Caracas. There

the CORONA officers bought the crumpled bucket from the Venezuelan govemment, and quietly dismissed the event as an unimportant NASA space experiment

gone awry.

33
I. (Continued)

Corona

The story rated only a dozen lines in the Neti York Times of 5 August, but

the local Vex-ea.&n press had a field day. Diario Catdico, of San Cristobal,

aioog with a lengthy report, published three pictures of the capsule showing the

charred roll of film on the take-up spool. The Daily burml handled the story in

lighter vein with this parody of Longfellow:

I shot an arrow into the air.

It fell to earth I know not where.

Cape Kennedy signalled: “Where is it at you are?”

Responded the rocket: “La Fria, Tachira.”

The CORONA technicians who examined the capsule after its arrival in the

States concluded that the re-entry of the SRV was a result of nmna\ orbit

degeneration, W&I separation from the instrument fairing caused by re-entry

forces. The thrust cone was sheared during separation but was retained by its

harness long enough to act as a brogue chute, &us preventing the capsule from

burning up during re-entry and stabilizing it for a hard, nose-down landing.

The Final Touches

The final major modification of the CORONA system got under way in the

spring of 1965, when about a dozen and a half of the two-bucket J-1 systems

had been flown. The J-1 was performing superbiy, but it had little potential

for within-system growth. The new CORONA improvement program was begun

with a series of meetings among representatives of Lockheed, General Electric,

Itek, and the various CORONA program offices to examine ways of bettering

the performance of the panoramic and stellar]index cameras, and of ‘providing

a more versatile command system. These were the resulting design goals established for a new panmamic camera:

Improved photographic performance by removal of camera system oscillating members and reduction of vibration from other moving components.

Improvement of tbe velocity-over-height match to reduce image smear.

Improved photographic scale by accommodation of proper camera cycling

rates at altitudes down to 80 u.m. (the minimum J-I operating altitude

was 100 am.).

Elimination of camera failures caused by film pulling out of the guide rails

(an occasional problem with the ‘J-1 system).

Improved exposure control through variable slit selection. (The J-l system

had a single exposure throughout the orbit resulting in poor performance

at low sun angles. )

Capability of handling alternate film types and spht film loads. An in-flight

changeable filter and film change detector was added for this purpose.

Capabiiity of handling ultra-thin base film (yielding a 50% increase in

coverage with no increase in weight).

The panoramic camera that was developed to meet those design goals was

known as the constant rotator. The predecessor C ” ’ camera employed a com-

- I

3 4
I. (Continued)
I. (Continued)

Corona

bination of rotating lens cell and reciprocating camera members. In the constant

rotator, the lens cell and the balance of the camera’s optical system is mounted

in a drum, and the entire drum assembly is continuously rotated, thus eliminating the reciprocating elements from the camera system. The film is exposed

during a W-degree angular segment of the drum’s circular sweep. The capability of using ultra-thin base (UTB) film was one of the design goals, but the

camera design was not to be constrained by requirements to accommodate the

thinner film. UTB was successfuUy flown on several flights but ground test results

showed a loss of reliability and attempts to use it in tile contant rotator were

eventully abandoned. In all other respects, however, the constant rotator was

a resounding success. It yielded substantially better ground resolution in the

photography. It also permitted versatility in operation far exceeding that available

in the eariier cameras.

The stellar/index camera in use was a delicate instrument with a short (1.5”)

focal-length and a history of erratic performance. The efforts at upgrading the

performance of the stellar/index camera resulted in an instrument with a 3”

focal length (like ARGON) and a dual-looking stellar element The new camera

had the jaw-breaking designatian of Dual Emproved Stellar Index Camera, commonly referred to by its acronym: DISK.

The new payload system, which was designated the j-3. consisted of a pair

of constant rotator panoramic cameras, a pair of horizon cameras, and a DISK.

The J-3 system naturally retained the stereo capabiiity begun with the MURAL

cameras and the two-bucket recovery concept of the J-l. Apart from the improved picture-taking capabifity of the hardware itself, the most significant advance of the J-3 was the flexibility it allowed in command and contro1 of camera

operations. Any conventional area search photographic reconnaissance system

is film-limited. (When the film runs out, the mission is finished-assuming, of

course, that other mission-limiting components of the system survive that long-)

ConsequentIy, the ultimate goal of all the CORONA improvement efforts was

to pack the maximum of the best possible quality of photography of important

intelligence targets into each roll of exposed film. The built-in flexibility of the

J-3 system geatly increased the variety and degree of controls that could be

applied to camera operations, thus substantially boosting the potential intelligence content of the photography.

The first J-3 system was launched on 25 September 1967, and it proved to be

the one major modification with no bugs in it. In its nearly five years of operation, it yielded even better photographic intelligence and higher reliabihty than

the remarkably successful predecessor J-l system,

An early series of tests demonstrated the unusual flexibility of the J-3. It

could not only accommodate a variety of film loads, including special camouflagedetection color and high-speed, high-resolution black and white; the camera aIso

had two changeable filters and four changeable exposure slits on each camera.

These tests drew such interest throughout the intelligence community that a

CORONA J-3 Ad Hoc Committee was formalIy convened by the Director of the

National Reconnaissance Office on 4 December 1967, and formally constituted

in February 1968. Its purpose was to analyze and evaluate the experiments con36
1. (Continued)

Corona

ducted on these five test flights. Specific findings of the Committee included the

recommendations that further testing of color films and techniques should be

conducted, against specific intelligence requirements and that a special subcommittee of the Committee on imagery Requirements and Exploitation

(COMIREX) should be constituted to evaluate the utility of satellite color photography; and that a well-planned color colhzction program be worked out with

the close cooperation of the system program offices, the Satellite Operations

Center (SOC), the intelligence analysts, and the photo interpreters.

Looking back on CORONA, it is not always easy to keep in mind that it was

merely an assemblage of inanimate objects designed and put together to perform a mechanical task. The program began as a short-term interim system,

suffered through adversity in its formative years, and then survived in glory

throughout a decade. Those who were associated with the program or came

to depend upon its product deveIoped an affection for the beast that bordered

on the personal. They suffered with it in failure and revelled in its successes.

The technological improvements engineered under CORONA advanced the

system in eight years from a single panoramic camera system having a design

goal of 20 to 25 feet ground resolution and an orbital life of one day, to a twin

camera panoramic system producing stereo-photography at the same ground

resolution; then to a dual recovery system with an improvement in ground

resolution to approximately 7 to 10 feet, and doubling the film payload; and

finally, to the J-3 system -with a constant rotator camera, selectable exposure

and filter controls, a planned orbital life of 18 to 20 days, and yielding nadir

resolution of 5-7 ‘feet.

The totality of CORONA’s contributions to U.S. intelligence holdings on denied

areas and to the U.S. space program in general is virtually unmeasurable. Its

progress was marked by a series of notable firsts: the fist to recover objects

from orbit, the fit to deliver intelligence information from a satellite, the first

to produce stereoscopic satellite photography, the first to employ multiple reentry vehicIes, and the first satelIite reconnaissance program to pass the lOOmission mark. By LMarch 1964, CORONA had photographed 23 of the 25 Soviet

ICSM complexes then in existence; three months later it had photographed all

of them.

The vaIue of CORONA to the U.S. intelligence effort is given dimension by

this statement in a 1968 intelligence report: “N& new ICBM complexes have

been established in the USSR during the past year.” So unequivocal a stat&ment

could be made only because of the confidence held by the analysts that if they

were there, CORONA photography would have disclosed them.

CORONA coverage of the Middle East during the June 1967 war was of

great value in estimating the relative military strengths of the opposing sides

after the short combat period. Evidence of the extensive damage inflicted by

the Israeli air attacks was produced by actual count of aircraft destroyed on

the ground in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The claims of the Israelis might have

been discounted as exaggerations but for this timely photographic proof.

37
1. (Continued)

Corona

In 1970, CORONA was called on to provide proof of Israeli-Egyptian claims

with regard to cease-fire compliance or violation. CORONA Mission 1111,

launched on ~3 July 1970, successfully carried out the directions for this coverage,

which brought the following praise from Dr. John ~McLuc~s, Under Secretary

of the Air Force and Director, NRO, who said in a message to the Director

of Special Projects, DD/S&T, on 25 August 1970: _

I extend my sincere thank and a well done to you and your staff for your outstanding response to an urgent InteHigence Community requirement.

The extension of . . . Mission 1111 to 19 days, without benefit of solar panels,

and the change in the satellite orbit to permit photography of the Middle East on

10 August provided information which could not be obtained thraugh any other

means. This photography is being used as a baseline for determining compliance with

the Suez cease-fire provisions.

CORONA’s Decade of Glory is now history. The first, the longest, and the

most successful of the nation’s space recovery programs, CORONA explored

and conquered the technological unknowns of space reconnaissance, lifted the

curtain of secrecy that screened developments within the Soviet Union and Communist China, and opened the way for the even more sophisticated follow-on

satellite reconnaissance systems. The 145th and final CORONA launch took pIace

on 25 Slay 1972 with the final recovery on 31 May 1972. That was the 165th

recovery in the CORONA program, more than the total of all of the other U.S.

programs combined. COROSA provided photographic coverage of approximately

750.000,000 square nautical miles of the earth’s surface. This dramatic achievement was surpassed only by intelligence derived from the photography.

In placing a value on the intelligence obtained by the U.S. through its pho- I

tographic recunnaissance satellite programs between 1964 and 1970, a first

consideration, on the positive side, would be that it had made it possible for the

President in office to react more wisely to crucial international situations whea

amaed with the knowledge provided by these programs. Conversely, it can be

said that without the intelligence which this program furnished, we might have

misguidedly been pressured into a World Wax III,

The intelligence collected by the reconnaissance programs makes a vital contribution to the National Intelligence Estimates upon which the defense of the

U.S. and the strategic plans of the military setices are based. Principal among

those estimates are the ones which deal with the Soviet and Chinese Communist strategic weapons, space, and nuclear energy programs.

The intelligence from overhead reconnaissance c&nts heavily not only in

planning our defense, but also in programming and budgeting for it, it helps

to avoid the kind of floundering that occurred during the time of the projection

of the ‘Missile Gap.” Without the kind of intelligence which the CORONA program provided, the U.S. budget for the defense of our own territory,’ and For

military assistance to our allies, would doubtless have been increased by biIlions.

The total cost for a11 COROX:X activities of both the Air Force and the CIA

over the 16-year period was

The CORONA program was so efficiently managed that even the qualification

models of each series were refurbished and flown. As a result, there was little

38
1. (Continued)

Corona

hardware available at the termination of the program when it was suggested

that a museum display should be set up to illustrate and to preserve this remarkahle program. Using recovered hardware from the last flight, developmental

models from the J-3 program, and photographic records from the memorable

flights, a classified museum &play was set up in Washington, D. C. In his

speech dedicating the Museum, ;Mr. Richard Helms, the Director of Central

Intelligence said:

It was confidence in the ability of intelligence to monitor Soviet compliance with

the commitments that enabled President Nixon to enter into the Slxaategic Arms Limitation Talks and to sign the Arms Limitation Treaty. Much, but by no means all,

of the intelligence necessary to verify SO-&C compliance with SALT will come from

photoreconnaissance satellites. CORONA, the program which pioneered the way in

satellite reconnaissance, deserves the place in history which we are prrservl‘ng through

this smal1 Museum display.

“A Decade of Glory,” as the display is entitled, must for the present remain classified. We hope, however, that as the world grows to accept satelliite reconnaisance,

it can be transferred to the Smithsonian hstitdon. Then the American pubIic can

view this work, and then the men of CORONA. like the Wright Brothers, can be

recognized for the role they played in the shaping of history.

39

Part II: The Committee on Overhead

Reconnaissance

Before 1958, the Director of Central Intelligence’s management or coordination of what is now called the Intelligence Community had been

unsteady, if not haphazard. In 1956 President Eisenhower formed his own

President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

(PBCFIA), which soon worried that the United States was insufficiently

prepared to counter the Soviet missile threat. Out of this concern the Board

suggested that the DCI should better coordinate US intelligence efforts for

early warning, wartime operational planning, and intelligence on new

Soviet weaponry. By the 1960 election year, the “Missile Gap” issue-the

charge that the Soviets were about to take a commanding Lead over the

United States in ballistic missiles-had fostered even greater worries about

Soviet intentions and capabilities.

In 1958, after consolidating two principal interdepartmental intelligence

committees into a single United States Intelligence Board (USIB), President

Eisenhower issued a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive

that gave the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) clear orders to coordinate the foreign intelligence effort of the United States. The DCI was to be

responsible for all forms of intelligence collection, including communications, electronic, missile, and space intelligence. In early 1959, DC1 Allen

Dulles formed the Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee (SIRC) to

manage satellite programs independently of the older Ad I-Ioc Requirements

Committee (ARC), which dealt with collection and exploitation for the U-2

program.

After the Soviets shot down a U-2 over Russia in May 1960, the DC1 in

August established the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR)

to coordinate the development of- intelligence requirements for reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union and other denied areas. COMOR

superseded both ARC and SIRC.

Initially, COMOR’s responsibilities were limited, since U-2s could no

longer fly over the Soviet Union. This dramatically changed with the

success of DISCOVERER XIV, the first CORONA mission to bring back

photographs of the Soviet Union. Most of this section’s documents offer

examples of how COMOR’s first chairman, James Q. Reber, set out to

41
coordinate the analysis of CORONA material and establish procedures for

handling TALENT-KEYHOLE material. Perhaps the section’s most interesting record is Document No. 4, COMOR’s 18 August 1960 “List of Highest Priority Targets, USSR,” which identified primary targets for the U-2

just as CORONA’s KH-1 satellite arrived on the scene.

42
2. Director of Central Intelligence Directive, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR),

9 August 1960

e DCID No. -

(New Series)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. m

COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE (COMOR)

(Effective 9 August 1960)

F?trmant to the provisions of NSCID Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6, and for the

purpose of providing a focal point for information on, and for the

gence requxemen

and development phases of such projects and activities) a Committee on

I ..om?rhea.d B?conn 2tiisanr.e (COMOR) of the U.S. Intelligence Board is

hereby established.

1.’ For the purposes of this directive the term “overhead reconnaissance” includes a.Il reconnaissance for foreign-intelligence purposes by

, whether by photographic,

other means, but does not

include recomce and aerial surveillance in direct support of

actively combatant forces.

2. The Committee shall coorctinate the adaptation of priori@ foreignMxAligence objectives and requirements established by USIB, members

of U3I3, or other committees of USIB, to the capabilities of existing and

potential overhead reconnakisance systems; and shalI examine and make

recommendations, as appropriate, on such related matters as Sissemination and any special security controls required, but shall not undertake

to provide o&zrational guidance.

3. The Committee on Overhead Recormaissance (COMOR) shall be

composed of designated representatives of Intelligence Board depar&

ments and agencies. Representatives of other agencies may be invited

by the chairman lx participate in s&e&d discussions as agreed by the

committee.

4. Thechairman of the Committee shall be designated by the Director

of Central Intelligence in consultation with and with the concurrence

of the Intelligence Board.

* ALlXNW.DTJILES

Director of Central fntelligence

1 As dhtbg&bed fmm operational “early wam$g’ fniormation and other

operationaLsupport lntelllgence.

’ l?or purposes of thfs directive “denied areas” include all h’ritOr~, and territ&al waters claimed by members of the Sine-Soviet Bloc, as well as such other

areas of prloritp intdllgence interest as may be determined by USIB.

43
3. Coi. James E. Mahon, JCS to COMOR, “Urgent Requirements for CORONA and ARGON,”

18 August 1960

18 August 1960

Cal.. James E.- M&on. JCS 1

Urgent Requirements for

CORONA and ARGON

It is under8tood &at

tucce88, i. e.,

and a continuance of the Agena A

tions must also be considered in c

The requirements upon which Discoverer was

interim. Wherever possible, efforts should now

grose coverage of the USSR, on a aeXective.priorlty

tioualy a8 poa8ible. The C’ camera zmd the second

device have been designed for improved per

The Agena B engine has been develop&.to p

allowing for programming reconnai88ance c

a8 well. as a greater dltitudk ca

The g”“ioy requirements

cxitical and it is difficult t

on recovery

:

45
‘Continued)

An additional complicating factor ie

ed that the COMOR recommend to the ‘.

that, if it is technically feasible, at

ONA shot with the C prime camera

to obtain reconnaissance of the whole

of Russia with special refer

25 May 1960, ‘8 riority Targets, u tc!

be followed a8 soon as possib camera with Agent B

engine to fulfiXl geodeey reqrur it is recognited that

the implementation of t$ia recomxne would alter the schedule

estacblished for these programa the COM

of both national strategic targets (fhe

geodesy requirements (ARGON) are o

.

46
3. (Continued)

Q c

47
4. James Q. Reber, “List of Highest Priority Targets, USSR,” 18 August 1960

18 August 1960

LIST OF HXGHEST PFUORITY TARGETS

1. The list of 32 highest priority tarEjeb.for TALENT collection

against the principal ohjecbe, USSR, is attache&’ As in previous lists, the

priority interest centers on: (a). The ICBM, IJZBM, sub-launched ballistic

missiles; (b) The heavy bomber, and (c) Nuclear energy. However, the

principal emphasis is the ICBM and tie question of its deployment. At the

moment, khis objective transcends all others. In the main, it is expressed

in this target list in-terms of the search of sections of rail lines which are

judged to be, among the.&@. of USSR rails, the most likely related in some

way to ICBM deployment and which are short enough in length to be considered

as a terminal objective within operational capabilities. Major targets which

are almost. certainly to be covered if the given rails were searched are listed

under each rail target, These. specific gecgraphic points vary in their importance

some individually capable of sustaining the highest priority label by themselves.

In any given case, the significance of all the individual targets subtended should

assist in weighing the. desirability for recommending missions as circumstances

require.

2. The possibility of the association of long range air bases or

air frame plants,with missile activity has heightened our interest in the bomber

question. It could well be that future coverage of.long range air bases would

cause us to include long range air bases covered three and four years ago

prior to the serial production and deployment of, the ISBM,

3, The limited role which nuclear energy plays in the list may

:be attributed to the past coverage which has been fairly exteneive in terms

of nuclear energy installations as well as the role of collateral in reducing our

.Igrmrance on critical nuclear energy questions. However, there are specific

nuclear energy questiomstill unanswered. It may well be that-the psoage of

tfme may cause us to wish to. reexamine installations previously photographed

.

‘. .Whkh are erikicdl. in.the determination production and stockpile of Soviet

: &tionable materials. I I b .-

..u.‘. r. --------I . . . . .

.$ c ;, .

’ .I

-.

. .I ..; + *

49
4. (Continued)

4. Consideration is also now being given the anti-ballistic missile

missile problem, this b&ng one of the reasons for recoverage of SARA SELAGAN

-and of KAPUSTIN YAR _.

5. In addition to the remarks above regarding rails, it ehould be

noted that ia the attached list there are several area targets, to wit: SARY

SUM (12); KLYIJCHX impact Area (23); the fULTIN/ANADYd Area (25)--

d

-‘.-;\ .;~~6C~g~~~~~~~~~~~c.~:are’ aat-~*~=d.to’.sili~~~‘~~o~~t~~~~~,~er8 _

search is required to diecover whether suspected developments exist.

6. The Soviet surface to air (SAM) threat has been kept very much

in mind in &e preparation of the target list because of the evidence of extensive

deployment in the vicinity of critical industrial and military centers in the

USSR. Complete information on SAM development is recognized as of very

high interest to SAC. The collection against this target list should provide

extensive information oa. this high priority requirement.

7. This fist differa from previous lists of Highest Priority Targets

in that most targets on those liets.were supported by considerable firm evidence

concerning their importance, Many targets on ma list,. kowever, are supported

by relatively little firm evidence, They ant included here because, on a basic

of deductive reasoning, they appear to bs tie most likely of all known targets

to bear upon missile derpioyment and other Wghest-prior&y maticrn at this time.

This means that the recci# by the Intelligence Commdtp of a modest amount

of firm evidence oa a aumher of problcmm could eauae us to add tsrgets not on

the list, or wiZh&aw &rgets now carried,

8. This paper iu for reftrcsce and is not Mended, in its p-resent

form, to indicate an order to priority within itself. Such distinction would be

the subject of specific racommedatiaa by the COMOR when required.

AMES Q. REBER

Chairman

ead Reccmnaiseance

50
4. (Continued)
4. (Continued)

, .

c r

1. Kotlas (6116N-4435E) - Salekhard (6630N-6640E) Rati Li.n%i

‘-.- *

Uet Ukhta (6338N-5353E) l/

Vorkuta {673ON-6403E)

Polyarni Ural (660ZN-65lOE) t -

1.

Khal’mer-ye (6757w6507E) ,

Yeletskiy {b?lON-641OEj

9

I

$i!?&&;o~s~p .(653RJ1.&24J$) -=I’ ; i;.,*, i) .:“,‘rJ”.“.-:.-Lz-. ?a-r->:~r.* ~~~=~.ih~~~,.~.~~~,.;OW...~~~13-’.:r.’.:~~~?. _. ..:;

Anderma (6940N-6145E)

Kara (6915N-6457E)

Muzhi (6523N-66453) *

. ,

Category of interest: ICBM Deployment /

2. Vologda (5913N-3953E) -Perm (580ON-5615E) Rail Line

Kirov {5836N-4942E)

Diui..lov (5812N-4010X)

Category of ixtertet: ICBM Deployment

3. Vologda (5913N-3953E) - Arcbargelsk (6434N-4032E) Rail Line

Konosha (+58N-4009E)

Severodvinsk (6434N-39SQE)

- Plesetskaya (6243N-40 L7E)

waxy of ii&zest= ICBM Deployment, Submarine

Launch

.4. Patrozavodsk (6149N-3420E) - Pechenga (6933N-3112E) Rail Line

Belomorsk {6432N-34473)

Olenya (6809N-3315E)

t.- khmm.nsk (685&N-33053)

-adal@ksha (6709N+-3226E)

say& Guba (6915N-33153)

%l’din (6920&34lOE)

Severomorsk (6905N-3327E)

Polyarnyy (6912N-3328E)

A,. :d .

m

52
4.. (Continued)

,

5. Trans-Siberian Rail Line Ufa (5443N-5558E) - Umsk (5500N-7324E)

Kurgan (5526N-6320E)

Chelyabicsk (5510N-6124E)

Zlatoust (55lON-5940E)

Categories of interest: 1Q;BM Deployment, Long Range

Aircraft Nuclear Energy

7. Chelyabinek (55 LON-6124Ej - Ivdel (7042N-6028E) Rail Line

Kyshtym (5544N-60333)

Sverdlovsk {5650N-6G36E)

Nizhnaya Salda (5805N-60433)

Nizhnaya Tura (5837N-5950E)

Categories of interest: ICBM Deployment, Mis-&lns:-l ?ro&c-

+!&l!iuciegr tier@

8. Komsomolsk (6115N-1390X) - Vl,adivosioit (4308N-1315OE) Rail Line

Khabarovsk (4839N- 135463)

Spaask Dallniy (443iN-13248X)

Khorol (4425N- 132043)

Kxemovo (4402N-13216E)

Categories of interest: IRBM Deployment, ICBM Deployme&, S&marine Launch

-9. Grodekovo (4425N-131233) - Kraskino *(4243N-13048E) Rail Line

. Slavyan’ka (4929N-13045E)

Categories of interest: IRBM Deployme&

’

10. Odessa (4628N-3043E) - Leningrad (5855N-30203) Rail Line

Vinnitsa (4913N-2829E)

Zhitomir (5016N-2840E)

Mogilev (5355N-302lE)m

53
4. (Continued)

Vitebsk (5512N-3013E)

Soltsy (5807N-3019E)

Categories of interest: IRBM Deployment,

Longe Rar,ge Aircraft

Leningrad (5955N-3020E)

Kronsh$ati (5959N-2947E)

Categories of ixterest: IRElM Deployment,

Submarine. Launch

12. Berczovka {SllZN-455iEI

Category of interesti ICBM Deploynext

13. Moscow Complex (5545N-3735E:

Shelkovo

Ramenskoye

Khimki

Ffii

- --

. .

Category of interest: Long Range Aircraft, Missile

Production, Missile Research and Development

14. Dnepropetrovsk {4828N-3500W

Categpqr of interest: Missile Production

15. Tyura Tam Raqehead (45SZN-6318E)

,

,. . Category of interest: Missile Rdrch &:Development

,

16. Gorkiy (5708N-4135EO

.

Category Of interest: Long Range Aircraft
4. (Continued)

Category of interest: Long Range Aircraft

I

17, Mozhayak (5530N-3602Ej

Category of interest: Nuclear Energy

18. Tiksi (7135N-1285Ei

19. Caspian Sea Test Range

Baku (4023N-4955E)

Fort Shevchenko (443UN-50263)

Gurev (4707N.-5115E)

Krasnovodsk (4000N-5300Ej

MakhacWla (4258N-4730E)

Category of i&zerest: Missile Research & Development

20. Priluki (5035N-3224E)

Category of interest: Lorg Range Aircraft

21. Black Sea Coas%ze

Sukhumi (430ON-4101E}

Kerch (4523N-3626E)

Novorossiysk (4444N-3748E)

Odessa (4&28N-3044E)

Sevastapol (443?N-3332E)

Balakalave (443ON-33353)

Ay-Petri (4435N-3412E)

Batumi (4139N-4135E)

YalZa (4430N-3410E)

Feodoeiya (4502N-3523E)

Nikolayev (4658~~320033

. Sudak (4458N-3502E)

mrangit (4502N-35583;)

55
4. (Cuntinued)

Categories oi Werlst: IRBM Dey’loymexzt, Sulxnarine

Zaunc’n, A&i-ICBkf Research and Development

22, Kiuyuchi Impac: Area

I , Categories of $&rest: Miss& Research & Development,

Sukmarine Launch - .

23. Baranovichi (53C7N-2bOZE)

Cgtqpry of interest: Long Range Aircraft

Ugolni Kopi (543CiN- 17753E)

Auad~yr/Leni&a (6445N..11910E) .

Ugol!qy (6225N-17910E)

~$ch*~ Ugol.xqa (6258N-17917E)

Categories of i&eresk Missile Deployment, Nuclear

Energy, Lang Range fircraft

25. Kapustk Yar (4835N-$5&E) - Vladirnirovka (4818N-4SLOE)

Rangehead Zaxle 9, Zone 10

CategoAes of ixteresti i!Aissile Troop Training,

MissUe Research & Development

26. Mukacbavo (482SN -22453)

Uzhgorod (4838N-2217E)

Svalyava (483%-23003)

Lvov (4950N-2400E)

Stryy (4915N-2352E)

Delyatin (4828N-2438E)

,

56
4. (Continued)

Categories of interest: IRBM Deployment, Lang Range

Aircraft

27. KaLingrad/Balfiysk (5443N-2030E) - Riga (5657N-240SE;)

Tallin (5926N-2444E) Ftaii Line

Categories of interest: ICBM Deployment, IRBM

Deployment, Submarine Launch

B&spa; (&ON-3057E)

Mirispol (G958N- 305 7E)

Paltava (49 3 bN - 34Z4E)

Kiev (5037N-3032E)

Uzia/Chepalivka (4950N-3025E)

Categories of interest: IRBM Deployment, Long Range

Aircraft

29. Malaya Sazazhaj~~raina (5T14N-lt804E)

Categoriee of interest: Long Range Aircraft

Nuclear Energy -

30. .Sdumi (42423-4102F) .- Dzhulfa (3854N-45383)

Category of bterest: IRBM Search

3 1 m Ulyanovsk (542ON-4824E) - Saracak (5411Nd5 12E) - Murom (5536N-4202E)

Rail Line

Arzamas (5523N-13053)

Shaiki (551 lN-4408E;

Tashino (5452N-4349E)
4. (Cuntinued)

Catagaries of inter&t: JCBM Deployment, Nuclear

Ez~ergy

.

32. Sary Shagas (46?0N-7355E)

Cztegorizs of interest: fCBM Deployment, Anti-ICBM

Research ad Development, ABM Missile, Nuclear

Energy.

.

-

58
5. James Q. Reber, Memorandum of Agreement, ‘LProcedures for the Handling of T-KH Materials,”

22 August 1960

t-IN1 .V

.

.

22 August 1960

MiiMOXU.NDUh4 OF AGREEMENT

1. The following agreements were reached today by Army,

Nawy, Ah Force, and PIG representatives.

2. Xt ia recommended Wt all oC the $uplicate material6

from T-X.X on this shot be developed on a twenty-four how basis.

This ie recowended not only because of the intelligence urgency at

thie particular time, but also because this material is new and photigr:Lphic interpretation problexzs. and procedures will require attention

in every center where l S&I material will be kndled, It ie recommended

thslt after the reproduction of the materials for joint use in PIc aubsequent materials should be reproduced in the following order of pritirity:

1DP 1 EN

LDP

1 CP

1 DP 1 DN

I DP

1 GN

1 CN

1 DN

1 DP

1DN

59
5. (Gonhw ad)

3. If it is necessary for budget reasons to cut back to eight

hour production as soota as poeaible, we recommend that the cutback

poxt for twenty-four hour proceeeiug be after the first eight listed

duplicate materiala.

4. The firat thpee listed items will be picked up $mxnediMe1y

~;i~~“i:llmn~~~~~~~~~P~~~~~~~~.~~~r:~~~~:~. - ;

handling by the Air Force. The AFIC copy will be delivered to Washington.

The next five copies listed will 3e picked up by Operationa and delivered

to Waehington. The last four items ti be picked up in the third pickup.

PIG wiU,,$e the recipient, will notify addressee agencies upon 8rrivaI of .

the materiat, and wil.3 be responsible for transshipment.

5. The memorandum for handling of TALENT photography

ia prelimiaaty phase8 was reviewed

for applicability to the T-K.%

6. Cnl:r autbolized peraonnd from each participating agency

will be permitted in &he area for OAK preparation. It was agreed that

an ACZC repteaentative would be allowed to view the material in order

to Provide ad-rance plating to ATfC.

7, CorcerGug operations at PLC it was agreed *t&at an OAK

report would be isaued daily. A negative report will be issued if no

QAK report is a-i,&lable. it was further agreed that there would be PO

briefinge, telephone calls, or written memoranda from PXC beatiq

upon the substance of the iuterpretatioa until the OAK for the day ie

produced. Ssquiries into PIG QII previous days’ OAK6 should be avoided.

It was further agreed that in accordance wita the procedure ior handling

of ODES PIG TJpo’uld be respoasible for ;ranamittin.g the OAK report

through the OPerations channel to SAC. PIG wil.3 cut *be tape and handle

transmission directly with Project Communications e {-to

check with __ on slug for transmisaioa to SAC xvi* necessary

coordination with-m. It is agreed at this time that

there will not be transmission of OAK to Theater Commaadzs because of

the sensitivity of the materiat and the fact that secure arrangements have

not yet been established for T-KH material overhear.

8. It is agreed that the Director!PIC i;l consultation with

other tept@seatatires participirting in tie OfiLK will select enlargemeats

for presentation to USIB, Briefing boards made with these material8

60
5. (Continued)

will be disseminated to the Arrtly, Navy, Air Force, and JC& viewgraph form (reproduction of the bxiafikg lmard) in the same k&ion as

was accomplished in the haudling of-photography. The fact

that thrt is greater coverage io the satellite photography bus no effect

upon the number of briefing boards to be prepared. This i8 left to the

judgment of the Director/PIG in keeping w&h the time s&edge of readout

USSB so that the presenwtion may bc made.

9. St was agreed that each agency would examine ite departmental vks with regard to the need for errtabliahixrg @ecu&y artangemerits to meet the needs of overseas commands. To be discuaoed st an

early date.

u Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

61
5. (Cuntinued)

62
6. James Q. Reber, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, “Categories of Billets

Planned for T-KH Certification,” 26 August 1960

some cases the 232x8 of t4e person.

63
6. (Continued)

- .

.

iatez-pretors, carrelate it wifh other spurces, :zmZ, przplre reports and

eetkraates for the senior iiktelligence officer or for his reporting to

Category ISI Phto Interpretation

iprtrative, cormn~nication, and logistics support pcxsonnalhau~g the

T+ILZNT-KEYHGiZ materials in the centers of “&e varitms agencies

considered in &is report.
6. (Continued)

Central. InteUlgence &gencp

.

l

7

-. Senior Officiak 22

DC1 IMr, Allen ‘iii* Dlllles

DDCL Gen. C, F, Cab&i :

~~~~~~~~:.i~~~~l~6~*~~e~l. “y&pgMf. Y&h‘s; ‘?‘~**~&?&*.*-G Y::;=‘..:S’*- - .I

SAIDCI Mr, Joba s. %arrrlan

DDjl Mr. Robert Amory, 3r,

AIDDI Mr. William& TidweU

DD/P Mr. Richard X. Bissell

AfDDPfA Mr. C. Tracy Barnes

ADD/S Mr. H. Gates Lloyd

Comptroller Mr. Edx:ard 3. Saunders

C /BudgetlCompt. Mr. Charles VT. Mason

General Counsel Mr, Lavmeacz R. Iiouston

Legis” Liaison/OGC Mr. John S. Warner

D/Communications Gen. Harold M. McClelland

D/Security Cd, SbefXield Z:dt*~rds

DIPersor=ael Mr. Emmett D. Echols

AD/OCI Mr. Huntington Sheidon

AD/QRR MP, Otto E. &tie

AD/OCR Mr. Pati A. Dorel

AD/OSI Dr s Herbert ScoviUs, ;Tx,

AD/ONX Dr. Sharmaa Kent

D/ PK Mr. Arthur c * Lurldahl

Ix. Substantive Intelligence Ad-jsts and Estimators

.

Ill. Photo fnterpretition

, TOTAL

100

164

286

” -.

_

Mr.

” -,

-1. -

.:::.

65
6. (Continued)

c

Office of the Seiretary of Defense

I, Senior Officials 13 -

Honorable Thomas S. Gates,

wsti,

‘,

Dsfhsst _. c i, - . . - ..,*~~~-~~~-~~.~~~=~~~.‘, : . i?

Honorable James l-3. Douglas, Jr. 9

Deputy Secretary of Defense

.

Honorable Herbert FL York,

Director of Research &d Engineering

Gen. G. G, Erslcine, Retired, Special Assistant

to the Secretary for Special Operations

Lt. Gen, Donald N, Yates, Deputy Director

Research and Engineering

Lt. Gen, William P, Ennis, Director Weapons

System Evaluation Group

Brig, Gen. Austin W, Betts, Director ARPA

(Advance Research Project Agency)

.

Col. Edwin F, Black, Military Assistant to the

Deputy Secretary of Defenee

Brig. Cen, George S. Brown? hliilitary Assistant

to the Secretary of Defense l

Brig. Gen. Edward C, Laneda3e,

Deputy to Geaerai Erskine ’

Capt. Means Johnston, Jr. I Military Assistant

to the Secretary of Defense

- Brig. Gen. William

to the DeputyAT .I A

T, SeaweU, Mtiitary Assist

66
.

3oint Chiefs oi Szaff

Joint C’hieie of Staff

Lt, Gerr. Garle G, Wheeler, Un S. Army,

’ Director. 3oint Chiefs of Staff

Maj. Gen. James F. Whizeaandp

Speciai Assistant to the C’hairman

l&j. Gen, Robert A. Brsitweiser, 5 -2

Rear Admiral Williain S. Post,

Deputy 3-2

Brig, C-en, James C, Sherrill, Executive

to *be Chairman

.,

. .

. .

TOTAL l-s-- 6

67
6. (Guntimed)

Strategic Air llanmand

IX. Substantive Intelligence Analysts and EM.mators 73

TOTAL 200

68
6. (Continued)

United States Army

I. Senior Service and Departmental ’ 12

Secxetaxy of hMy - *

Director of Research and Seveiapment, krtny

Chief of Staff

Secretary of General Staff

. . Comptrolle- of the Army

Director of Army Budget

Deputy Chiei of Staff for UilitaTy Operations

Chief Research and Development

Deputy Chief Research and Development

Deputy Chief of Staff for FeraozaeI

Deputy :=‘nief of Staff for Logistics

11 Substantive Intelligence Analysts and Estimakors 127 0

III, Photo Interpretation 150

69
6. (Continued)

U&F

United States Navy

I. Senior Service and Departmental 10

Secretary of the Navy

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy fcr R&D

The Chief of Naval Operations

The Aide to CNO

The Vice Cfiief .of Naval Qpcrations

TIE Aide to ihe Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Thz Deputy Chief of Naval Upezatiom for ;?ir

Deputy CNO for Devalopment

IL Substantive tiyszs and Estimators 47

HI, Photo Interpreters 43

TOTAL 100

70
6. (Continued)

United States Air Force ,_ _I . . ..-- - ‘. _ ., . _, . ..--. _

I, Senior Service and Departmental

Secretar; of the Air Force 1 : 29

Vice C’nief af Staff 2

Assistant Secretary for R&D 3

. Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations 9

,

Deputy Chief of Staff, Developments

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans

8

4

IL Substantive Intelligence Analysts and Estimators,

Targets, Penetration, Aerial, Space {Technicalj

USAF 20

ATIC 22

ACIC 97

AFIC 38

511, Photo Inire+pretztioa, Cartographic and -Air

Targets f Charts

USAF 51

ATIC 28

ACSC i32

AFIC 62 I

TOTAL 479

a

71
6. (Continued)

National S ecwity *Agency .-

I. Senior Service and Departmental :‘3

Frank 8, Jbwlstt, Special Assistaat to Director NSA

.

II. Sulzstantive Intz~igenre Analysts and Estimators ?

TOTAL 10

72
6. (Conhmed)

Senior Service and Depaztmzniti

Secretary cf St&e

_--- .

-. .-.

73
6. (Continued)

Suminary

Axrny

Navy

USAF

ATIC 50

AFIC 100

ACID 229

AFCIN 75

US-4F 25

NSA

State

TOTAL

289

100

479

10

5

My--

74
7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, et al., 26 August 1960

-- I.,;

.

.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

.

. . . . . August 26, 1960

. ’

. .

. .

&&()~J-JUMJQ~ - .wi r .;

;

.-.

The Secretary of State .’ ’

The Secretary of Defense* .’ * t

The Attorney General** . : ‘.’ .’

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission -.

The Director of Central Intelligence I. .*.

I hereby direct’ that the products of satellite reconnaissance, and information of the fact of such reconnaissance revealed by the product,

‘shall be given strict security handling under the provzsions of a

special security control system approved by me. I hereby approve

the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System for this purpose.

Wrthin your agency, you shall be personally responsibie for the selection of tSose personnel who will have access to the foregoing icfornation

and for determining the scope of that access. Access is to be on a

.‘must know” basis related to major national security needs. A list of

those selected shall be furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence,

who will maintain and review the control roster, -When they are indoctrinatcd, they ‘shall be informed of my specific dire=ttcon to the==

that the provisions of the special Security Control System 3 have

-approved be strictly complied with, including the prckibrtion upon them

of imparting any reformation within thrs system to any person not specifically known to them to be on the list of those attthoriztd to receive

this material. The responsibility for the selection of personnel may

be delegated only to the senior inttIiigezxe chief ar chiefs within the

agencies serving as members of the U; $. Inttlfigence Board.

: The Director of Central InteUigence, in cokstitation with the U. 5.

Intelligence Board, will be responsible to me for determzning all questions involved in the continued protection and control of the fortgoFg

material and information, including the development of a common

understanding as to the meaning of the term ” ‘must krrow’ basis related to major national securify needs, ” and ;d broad cocsensus as to

the numbers of personnel in each agency,comprehended by this term.

*For Department of Defense . signed Dwight D. Eisenhower

includ:ng OSD, JCS, Army, I 4

Navy, Air Farce, and NSA rnf.rNT-

**For Director. FBI . ,

”

*cx’z:Ls A s-ss=M CL’ y

75
8. James Q. Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board Members, “TALENT-KEYHOLE Certification Plans,” 27 August 1960
8, (Continued)
9. James Q. Reber, “Minutes of COMOR Meeting,” 13 September 1960

COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE

0

Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 429

 Building, Central Intelligence Agency

at 1100 p.m., 13 September 1960

. PRESIDING

James Q. Reber

Chairman

MEMBERS PRESENT

CONSULTANTS PRBSENT

Reauirements for T -KH Dunlicate Materials

1. The Committee took note of the experience on Mission 9009 calling

attention to the fact that enlargement is required before exploitation takes place

and &at for t&is reason quality of reproductian of the duplicate materials is

imperative . The Committee recommends that in the future processing of duplicate materials of T-KH photography the greatest emphasis should be placed upon

quality and that insofar as quality reproduction takes a longer time such delays

would have to be sustained by the consumer. It is recommended that operationsmake -all duplicate positive materials from: the original negative.

2. The COMOR requests the following schedule of reproduction be

followed and that insofar as feasible the materials when accomplished be moved

to their destinations in groups as indicated below:

79
9. (Continued)

GROUP I i DN for PIC for joint interpretation

3 DPs for PIC for jojrrrt interpretation

GROUP i.I i DP & 1 DN fox SAC

1 DP for AFIC

GROUP ZIi 5 DPs for PIG for joint interpretation

GROUP IV 1 DP far Navy

1. DP fox ATIC

i DN kr ATIC

ZDPforArrny

GROUP V 1 DN for AFIC

1 DN for ACiC

1 DN for Navy

1 DP for ACIC

1 DN for Army

GROUP K 1 DP for SAC

i DP for ATIC

1 DP for ACIG

L DP for Army

It is reccmmended that a2 of the foregoing duplicate materials be produced t;n a

24-hour basis except Group VI which may be on an S-hour schedule.

Requirements for Future T-KH Collection

?-* m of PIC/ClA presented a briefing showing the highest

priority targets fcr the USSR in an nverlay on the map of Russia along with another

overlay showing the clustering of high and other lower targets and an overlay indicating +ke probable coverage in Mission 9009. Normally the last named chart will

be distributed with the Mission coverage index produced by PIC/CIlI. It was agreed

that (PIG; andm(AFCIN) would consult to get AFCIN

assistance in the reproduction of these overlays for the benefit of the members in

their requirements platicg.

-.
9. (Continued)

4. It was agreed that the principal target for planning. multi-day

orbit should be Polgarnyy Ural. If howeve+ this was confirmed as covered in

the last sicgie orbit series shortly to be delivered, then the principal highest

priority target for planning purposes should be Ust Ilk&a.

. . . xA w

S Q. REBER

Chairman

Committ

81
9. (Continued)

copy I.-

ll12-

13-

14-

15-

16-

,’ 17-

18-

19-

zo21”

22-

23-

82
10. James Q. Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board, “Proposed Expansion of Billets for

the Exploitation and Use of TALENT-KEYHOLE Materials and Information,” 14 September

1960

83
10. (Continued)
10. (Continued)

.

Proposed Expansion of Billets for the

Exploitation add Use of TALENT -

KEYHOLE Materials and Information

1. A Presidential Directive recently issued requires that

satellite photography must be handled within the TALENT SBcurity

.&oot~~LSystsm-sparate comp?rrtmeti knuwzs+~~W4LElNT~KEYHOLE. ---

Xt further requires that tIxe United States Intelligence Board shall develop _

a broad consensus for determining those functions in the United States

Government (and personnel within them) which must have access to satellite

photography for National Security purposes. <

2. The satellite photography from Mission 9009 is in hand

and is currently being expicited and used within Washington Headquar%rs’

intelligence agencies, and The Strategic Air Command, Aero-Space Technical

Intelligence Center, Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, Army AMap

Service, and iVavy Photographic Interpretation Center. The billet structure

wiithin these organizations was planned on an extremely limited basis in

advance of the arrival of satellite photography and pending an evaluation of the

exploitation potential.

3. For six years the U.S. intelli,b-me agencies have bad exkensive

-experience with the Iarger scale photography from overflight held i.n,the

-and TALENT Systems. New equipment bearing upon the art of photographic interpretation has clearly e,Tanded L&e quantity and quality of information derived from that photography. We have seen the extensive uses to which

the material and the information derived therefrom car! be put for strategic

intelligence purposes, emergency war planning, intelligence purposes related

to the responsibility of theater commanders, research and development

requirements of the Department of Defense, and operational purposes of the

military as well as intelligence ogeratioas,

4. The examination of satellite pbatography from Mission 9009

reveals that iii can 8erve essentially the same purposes as tie earlier

TALENT photography. While it has definite limitations for technical intelligence purposes <as compared kth TALENTED it Serves those purpose*

m .

85
10. (Continued)

Attachment to

through comparison with existing TALENT and through the use of coi.lateral

intelligent e. Its vast geographic coverage clearly enhances our ability to

search for guided missile sites of all sorts, and will permit the identification of instalations with whick we have become familiar under the TALENT

Program. In addition to t&o uses for positive information on the USSR, it

will materially assist in refisuing the targets for other collection prcgrams

5. The USlE has reviewed U.S. needs for National Security

purposes in the light of the capabilities of the available satellite photography

and with the purpose and inj;lrbction of the Presidential Directive uppermost

in mindb’ The USIB considers the planned increase of TALENT-KEYHOLE

billeta set forth in the annexes hereto to be necessary and proper in terms

of functional use of TALZNT-KEYHOLE materials and information and the

magnitude of the personne,1 forces to carry these functioas at this time,

Annex A Summary of TALENT-KEYHOLE Xllets for All Agencies

BiUe

Bi3 t

A

3 et

iflet

aillet

Billet

Billet

t

86
11. James Q. Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board, “Amendment to ‘Proposed Expansion

of Billets for the Exploitation and Use of TALENT-KEYHOLE Materials and Information,“’

14 October 1960

14 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board :

“Proposed Expansion

of Billets for the Exploitation and Use

of TALENT -KEYHOLE Materials

. . and Information. I’

REFERENCE:

1. On September 14, 1960 the Committee on Overhead

Reconnaissance submitted to the United States Intelligence Board a

memorandum with zn attachment on Page 3 explaining the needs of the

U.S. Government for *the use of those materials along with Annexes A

through H defining each participating agency’s functional responsibilities

and need for T-m-certified personnel.

2. At that meeting General Erskine stated that he would

not be abZe to approve those billets pertaining to the Department of

Defense until he had secured approa1 of the Secretary of Defense.

Also at that meeting ‘%e Acting Chairman, General C&bell, urged

upon the members &&at further examination of the billet needs be undertaken with severest scrutiny from the point of view of function& need

eliminating wherever possible those now included by virtue of position

but who did not have a “must knuw” requirement for access to the

material u

The Chairman of COMER has received in one copy a

memcL!Lam from 1-bthe JCS/OSD Member of COMER,

which states that the Secretary of Defense has now approved revised

billet schedules of the components of the Depzrtment of Defense. Time

hne not permitted a retyping and distribution of that document. However,

each Department of Defense component has its own paper in f&s regard

and the summary ,of all participating agencies’ billet needs are set forth

87
11. (Continued)

in Annex A io this document. Tbe effect of the re-examination undertaken subsequent to the USlB meeting of September 20th is an overall

reduction of between 20% and 25% from the billet needs eet forth in the

reference. In review&g the att&hed paper it is suggested that special

note be taken of paragraph 5.

.- . . *.e+z~$+~-+Ah&.--i“.

. _.

. ,, ,~,g&&g+&l.-~~:~~:~

5. U&n USIB approval if the a&&n&t it will be sub;

mitted to the White House for comment in accordance with the request

of General Goodpaster.

d; ’ Recomxn&ati&x It is recommended that the United

States Intelligence Board approve the aached paper.

Committ Overhead R ecu-is sance

88
11. (Continued)

89
,

Proposed Expansion of Billets for the

Exploitation and Use of TALENT -

KEYHOLE Materials and Information

A Presidential Directive recently issued reotires ahat certain

It further-requires that the United-States Intelligence 3

a broad conaens~s for determining those functions in the United State

tivernment, (and personnel within them) which must ha

photography ‘for National Security purposes.

2. The satellite photography from Mis

and is currently being exploited and used within Washington Headquar

intelligence agencies , and The Strategic Air Command, Aero-Space

lratelligence Center, Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, Ar

Service,. and Navy P’aotographk Iutzrpre*lation Center.

wit& these organizations was planned on an extremely limited basis

advance of tlrte arrival of satellite photography and pending an evaluat

exploitation potential.

3, For six years the W. S, intelligence agencies have

experience with the large,- scale photography from overflight held in

-and TALENT Systems. New equipment bearing upon the art

graphic interpretation has clearly expanded the quantity and guzl

tion derived from that photography. We have seen the extensive

the materi& and the information derived therefrom can be put fo

inteUigence purposes, emergency war planning, inteI3igence purpose

to the responsibility of theater commarLders, research and developm

requirements of

military as wet1

naterial is its relevance to

4. The examination of sate~ite photo

reveals that:.it can serve essentially the same purposes as the earlier

TALENT photography.

ligence purposes <as compared with TALENT), It serves those purpos

90
11. (Continued)

,

through comparison with eldeting TALEN-T and through the use of coil era1

tion of isrstallatioas with which we have become familiar under Ohe TA

and with the purpose and injunction of the Presidential

in mind, Tkie ‘US13 considers the planned increase of TALENT-KEY

billets set forth in the annexhs hereto to be necessary

of functional use of TALENT-KEYHOLE materials and information

magnitude of the personnel forces to carry these

urnmary of TALENT-KEYHOLE Billets for All Ageacies.

91
12. Allen W. Dulles, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, “Proposed Additional Billets for the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security System,” 19 October 1960

i

-.-.-

19 October 1960
12. (Cuntinued)

P

- .- .I_

--. -

-- - _ - - _

-_ -. -__ _ - _

L - ._ i...@

4. Thm l x8min8tion of ratmlutmpbtogr8phyfrom MillfQp

9009 tsvulr that it can smrve rrrmaBti8uy thr l 8mo pwpures a8 the

urliar TALmT photography. WUlm it ham dmfbita Umitatioam far
12. (Continued)

.

.

-._. -.-.- _ -_ _.-. - ~_.. -- .

95
a I . c . : ._. *. L _i

96

Part III: NPIC Products and Other Reports

Modern day imagery analysis dates back to the development of aerial

reconnaissance during World Wars 1 and IL The CIA’s ability to process and

interpret photographs advanced rapidly in its new Photo-Intelligence Division (PID) with the advent of the secret high-altitude U-2 aircraft in the

1950s. By 1958, with some additional Army and Navy photographic support, CIA expanded PID into the Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC). In

January 1961, DCI Dulles, consolidated all US photographic interpretation

into a single community organization, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). NPIC proved invaluable during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it provided key intelligence for the decisions of President

Kennedy and his advisers.

Because PIG had the unique experience of processing and interpreting U-Z

photographs, it was given a similar role after CORONA began to produce

imagery in 1960. An example of CIA’s pre-CORONA reporting is Document No. 13, “Visual-TALENT Coverage of the USSR in Relation to Soviet

ICBM Deployment January 1959-June 1960,” which the Office of

Research and Reports produced in conjunction with PIC. This report succinctly summarizes how much CIA knew about the USSR from U-2

photography on the eve of CORONA’s first successful mission.

With the advent of CORONA, CIA’s reporting requirements surged to keep

up with the growing amount of satellite imagery. Document No. 14 is the

first Joint Mission Coverage Index of Eastern European targets identified by

Mission 9009 in August 1960. Photographic Intelligence Reports (PIRs)

described specific targets located during CORONA missions that merited

further in-depth analysis. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

designated specific targets of interest for satellite reconnaissance. The FIRS

integrated imagery from CORONA missions with earlier U-2 material and

occasionally also with captured German World War II aerial reconnaissance

photographs. In December 1963, for example, Document No. 16, “Uranium

Ore Concentration Plant, Steiu, Rumania,” drew on imagery from Mission

9009 and other CORONA overflights as well as from 1944 German Luftwaffe photography.

Several PIRs presented here demonstrate how CIA looked all over the

world for varying types of targets and how the PIC, and later NPIC, skillfully brought together analysts, cartographers, artists, and modelmakers to

produce succinct and accurate analysis.

97
A Photographic Evaluation Report (PER) was a “technical publication

expressing the photo quality results of a mission of photography.” NPIC

primarily used PERs to enhance camera resolution for future missions, as

Document No. 24, an April 1945 PER, illustrates. A Photographic Interpretation Report, or “OAK report,” was a “first-phase photographic interpretation report presenting the results of the initial analysis of a new satellite

photographic mission.” Although OAK reports concentrated on highest priority COMOR targets, they could also cover other sites. This volume

includes excerpts of three OAK reports from one KII-4A mission, which

cover the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia in mid- 1967-

a crucial period just after the Arab-Israeli war and while US combat operations were expanding in Vietnam. NPIC produced several other documents

for each CORONA mission, such as Mission Control Plots (MCP) and

Orbit Ephemeris Data. Although limitations of space make it impossible to

include examples of these lengthy technical documents in this volume, they

will be reviewed for declassification along with the rest of the CORONA

materia1 from which this collection has been compiled.

NPIC products, primarily basic working documents, were eventually incorporated into the national strategic analysis that formed the basis for

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). This analysis drew heavily on the

steady output from CORONA throughout the 1960s and into the early

1970s.

This section includes the September 1961 National Intelligence Estimate

(NIE) 11-8/l -61, Document No. 15, which provided key supplemental

information to CIA’s earlier estimates of Soviet ICBM strength. This estimate, based primarily on CORONA imagery, offered US analysts and policymakers conclusive evidence about the strength and capabilities of the

Soviet long-range ballistic missiles. The NIE answered many questions

about the Soviet’s strategic forces and put to rest the “Missile Gap” debate

within the inteligence community. CIA previously released this estimate to

the public with significant omissions for security reasons. Due to the overall downgrading of CORONA material, the Agency is now able to offer historians and other interested readers more information from this important

NE

In addition, CORONA satellites provided increasingly important intelligence about Chinese nuclear developments in the 1960s. In late August

1964, Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-64, Document No. 23,

provided clear evidence that the Chinese would soon obtain nuclear status.

Indeed, the Chinese detonated their first nuclear device in October 1964,

two months after the special estimate.

98
CORONA quickly proved its great value and played a major role in the

intelligence revolution. The records in this part-the PIRs, PERs, OAK

Reports, and NIEs-all derived their wealth of information from satellite

imagery.

99
13. Office of Research and Reports, “Visual-TALENT Coverage of the USSR in Relation to Soviet

ICBM Deployment, January 195%June 1960,” 11 July 1960

VISUAL-TALENT CdVERAGE ,OF THE USSR

IN RELATiON. TO. SOVIET ICBM .DEPLOYMENT _ ;: . .._ :: ; ., a.,_ I .- .

.

. JANUARY 1959 - ~JNE 1960

: orif$nator, ‘_..-. ,

:-: :

101
13. (Continued)

7.

. 1’7 :

:

L

,. . ,I

- I’.._ .

,, r? 1

.,

.

,_ . I:.

I -4; .

‘I

I

-I

: ,

.’ i

-e

‘_.

.“. _

I . :- l . ,, ,í .

c a,
13. (Corztinued)

VISUAL-TALENT COVERAGE OF THE USSR

WI RELATION TO SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT

JANUARY 1959 - JUNE 1960

11 JULY 1960

103
The Offfce of Research and Reports wishes to acknowledge the assist=

awe provided by the CIA Photographic Intelligence Center in publishing

thi8 report,

104
13, (Continued)

This report; provides an estimate of the potiions of the USSR that have

been 44mcocavered by -irtclligen~~ sources

during the period January 1959 to June 1960. The extent of this coverage

is compszed with the total area of the USSR, with the total axea considered

suitable for long-range missile deployment, and with the area of those established priority regions that are believed to be most suitable for missile

deployment. Similar comparisons based on railroad route mileage are also

presented.

105
13. (Continued)

VISUAL-TAIXNT COWE OF !BB USSR IN RRLA!L'IOI? To SOVIET ILCBM DEPLOYMENT

J&WIRY 1959 - JUNE 1960

1. Sunumry

During the period January 1959 through June 1960, about 7.5 percent

of the total land area of the USSR is covered by useable TALEIT photography.

Since about 45 percent of the terrain of the USSR is unsuitable for longrange ballistic missile deployment (especially for deployment of the first

few units), a more meaningful statistic is the coverage of Soviet land area

suitable* for such deployment. About 13.6 percent of the suitable area has

been covered by useable TALENTphotography.

Eight areas* (about 24 percent of the land area of the USSR) have been

designated for priority search for deployed long-range ballistic missiles

by the intelligence community. About 3.6 percent of the total of these areas

is cove-red by useable TALENT photography.

The intelligence community has concluded that the Soviet ICBM system

depends very heavily OR railroad transporLation; therefore, the portion of

the Soviet railroad network covered during this period is probably the most

meaningful. statistic. Useable TALENT coverage of the total rail route mileage

amounts to about 11.5 percent, or about 8.5 percent of such mileage in the

priority areas. Over 35 percent of the rail route mileage in priority area

2 and more than 10 percent of priority arcas 1 and 3 have been covered with

useable TALENT. There .has been no useable TAZNT coverage of the other priority

areas.

3n addition to this highly reliable TALEI@ cover e certain portions

of the USSR have been subject to observation by otherag,-ln-t;elligence

sources. ALthough some 4.5 percent of the total land area of the USSR was

obsenrable% to these sources during the period, less than one percent of

the area is estimated to have been observed**. The estimated observed coverage of suit&le areas by these sources is about 1.5 percent, and such coverage of the priority areas is about 2 percent. Roughly 35 percent of the

rail route mileage in the total land area, suitable areas, and priority areas

of the USSR was traveled during this period, and it is estimated that useable observations were made along about 7 percent of the rail routes in these

areas.

* Definitions and method of calculation are presented below.

106
In conclusion, it is cstimtcd that stow than 65 2erccnt of the suitable area, 35 percent of the priority arcss, and 85 percent of th;: rail route

nile~~:;;e in priority amas have not been obscmcd or covcrca by useablc TmT

during the period. In vim of the largs arcas still ~~~ov~xd o.nd the li;;litcd

nuabzr of ICBMs that are li',rely to bc dcploycd 30 czrby in the Soviet gro~:rm,

it is not surprising that none of these sites haa been positively idcntifiwl.

II. Suitable and Priorit:t Arcas

The total area of the USSR suitable for IC3K deglo:xcnt is csti.rEtCd

to be ~r,~&,OOO ~4. miles. The area, considcrcd u2xmitsbl.c for ICEK d.cplo::-

merit is 45 pcrcmt of the total mea of the USSR (2,6&7,000 SC;. ;xLles) azd

iscludcs arcas of contimods se-mafrost, hi& -iiiOux!xins, xu-shcs, sw7znps,

open bodies of xltcr, tams and cities. 3ccausc of difficulties of const-rwtion ad logistics, it is unlikely that any of the carlicr long-rmgc missiles

trould bc dcploycd in such areas; these areas tight be used only for som

of the very last rxissilcs deployed, if at all. _f

';!ith.iil the USSR, eight areas have beer rccoS;nizcd by th.2 iatelli~encc

.

coiiniltmlty 8s bcinz of priority interest in the saaxh for ion;-ran;;o ninsilc

lsunchi;lS sites.

The intclligcncs cornunity has conclud&l that the Soviet ICI94 systcr

depeads vary heavily on railroad transportation. I? thz lamchin& Pscilitix

a%- fi-ah~-esJ. , the railroad nct?rork is the primary mam of lo&tic support;

0% if -mbile, these facilities am2 rail -305ilc. For this reason, the covcrasc of the Soviet railroad xtxor!;, pri-mrily in the _uriority areas, is zrobGly the aost ;;lcanin$%l of the various iilcasuzcs 2rcszntcci in this gaper.

107
13. (Continued)

-._.--

Table 2

Rail Rmtc XAlcs&;e of the US3R Covered by UsesIDle TAEX3! Fhotosaphy

January lg59-Jme 1960

Arc3

Total USSR

Priority Areas

TCA 02

Area 1

Area 2

Ares 3

L-cas 4-5

Total Rail Route Estiinatcd TAlXN!P Coverqc

(Hrilcs ) HilCS (PClTCilt )

75,900

75,400 8,750 1x.6

46,000

6,200

2,300

3,000

2&500

8,750 11.5

10s
13. (Continued)

IV. Non-TAIJZNT Coverage

A. Observable Area

Large areas of the USSR have been subject to observationduring the period January 1959 to June 1960. The maximum area

been observed if ideal conditions pkevailed -- that is, if

there were absolutely no obstructions or limitations to vision along the

routes traveled -- was calculated by aultiplyjng the total route miles traveled

by the width of the mximuin observation belt. The observable belt for air

travel is estimated to be 10 miles and for rail, water, and highway travel

to be 5 miles. Table 3 presents data on the maximum observable areas for

total USSR land area, suitable area, and priority areas.

Table 3

Maximum Observable Areas in the USSR

Jacuqy 1959-June lg6o

Area

Total Area Maxtium Observable Area

(SQ. Mi.) (Sq..-M')

Total USSR 8,647, ooo 387,500 4.5

suitable for

Deployment 4,764, ooo 368,000 7-7

Priority Areas

Total

Area 1

Area 2

ha 3

Area4

Area 5

Area 6

Area 7

kea 8

2,081,ooo 220,800 10.6

467,800 12,000 2.6

315,600 33,cm 10.5

170,700 13,900 8.2

~95,~O 58,200 29.8

290,700 52,100 17-P

469,800

3;> 2::

8.5

108,000

3: 300

797

62,800 5-3

B. Estimated Observed Area

The total ama actually observed- is estimated to be

fzx less than the msximm observable area based on route miles traveled,

for conditions for observations are frequently far from ideal. Limiting

factors considered in calculating the actual ex-tent of the area observed

arc as follows:

109
13. (Continued)

1. Visibility restrictions, including terrain, vegetation, rain,

snow, fog, time of day (light or darkness), and man-made obstacles of various

types.

2. Limitation of vision to one side of the vehicle (nullified somewhat if the route is frequently traveled; applies least to auto travel).

3. Utation to air observation by altitude, cloud cover, and

seat location.

4. Speed of travel (particularly by train), whkh ld.mLts the t5me

span for recomtion of features, thus reducing the width of the area that

can be effectively observed.

5. Harassment by security personnel, which is particularly likely

at pofnts where sensitive installations might be observed.

In view of the above limitations, the area observed by travelers

was calculated by multiplying the maximum observable szea by an estimated

percentage of effectiveness of observation. The fact that many routes were

traveled a number of times is taken into consideration in determining the

percentage of effectiveness. The percentages used to estimate the portion

of observable ~=a actually observed are as follows:

Type of Travel Effective Observation (Percent)

Air l-5

Rail 20

Water 10

Eigbway 35

The estimated observed coverage for each type or” area under consideration is presented in Table b.

110
23. (Continued)

Table 4

Estimated Observed Area in the USSR

January 3-g5g-&ne 1960

Area square Miles

Total USSR 71,900

Percent of Area

0.8

Suitable for

Ikploynent 68,700 1.4

Priority Areas

Total

Area 1

Area 2

Area 3

Area 4

Axea 5

Area6

ha7

Area8

41,8ow 2.0

2,300 o-5

5,800 1.8

2,600

u, 900 2:;

10,500 3-6

4,500 1.4

1,500 1.4

600 1.0

C. Railroad Route Mileage Waveled

Table 5 presents data on the Soviet rxilroad route mileage traveled

by-observers during the period. The tileage traveled is aLso reduced

for observational difficulties; to arrive at an estimate of useable traveler

observations, the factor of 20 percent was used (see pamgraph IV B above).

* embers have been rounded; total is based on unrounded data.

111
13. (Continued)

Table 5

Railroad Route Mileage of the USSR Traveled bum Observers

Adjusted for EEective Coverage

Ja.mary 1959-J-e 1960

Area

Total Traveled

lG.les lGL??S Percent

Useable

Percent

USSR 75,900 25,700 34 7

Stit3ble for

Dcq1oymnt 75,400 25, loo 33 7

PrLority Areas

Tot al 46,ooo

Are3 1 6,200

Area 2 8,300

Area 3 3, cm

Axeas 4-5 22,000

Area 6 4,000

Axea 7 1,250

idea 8 1,250

s_6,c/40 7

w35-0 ;i 6

2,700 33 7

790 26

a,370 39 2

2,020 50 10

620 g 10

590 9

V. Total Visual-TALENT Coverese

51 order to get an ap$reciattion of total uscable visual a& TAIXXC coverage of the various sl~lea..s of the USSR during the period, a raqe of values

is estimated; the lower end of the range reflects the useable TALEi coverage

and the upper end includes the useable visual coverage Mth EUI aLlowmcc for

possible duplication. These esttiates are presented in Table 6.

112
13. (Continued)

USSR

Priority Axeas

Total

Are.2 1

Arc2 2

Area 3

.!!ezs 4-5

AIRCL 6

Ares 7

Axca 3

4-G

z-3

19-21

2-4

O-5

O-l

O-1

o-1

g-15

10-15

$42

u-15

0-2

o-10

O-10

o-g

113
14. CIA/PIG, Joint Mission Coverage Index, “Mission 9009, 18 August 1960,” September 1960

CE=FPt)

September 1960

18 AUGUST 1960

ARMY

PUBLISHED AND DISSEMINATED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER

This Document Contains Codeword Material

WARNING

Tbir decu8unJ contains eiasd

within the mraning of thh, erp

1 01 pahibitr its trasmir~ien

phi. 0s dl 08 its use in Q

oc k Ik bwrfit of any fonign g

0rfVbYU.L P8V8omd **poeid

inianation. Its sewity must b

IW.

of the United States

794, and 798. l-ho

to on aumvthorird

of tL* Unitd stutor

Itistobrsrm

ENT-KEYHOLE

TALENT regu115
14. (Continued)

MISSlON 9009

18 AUGUST 1960

SEPTEMBER 1960

\

-,-- .-. -- r-- ..“, ..--*

. i.. .,C ,\L : . :
14. (Cuntinued)

PREFACE

This Joint Mission Coverage Index (JMCI) furnishes a listing of

intelligence targets covered by Mission 9009. All priority items of intelligence significance reported in the six installments of the OAK 9009

immediate report have been included in this index. Detailed descriptions

appearing in the OAK Report are not repeated.

Items are arranged by (1) country, (2) WAC area within the country,

(3) subject, and (4) coordinates (grouped by degree square from north to

south within the subject grouping).

For an explanation of rhe codes used in presenting information in

this report see the appendix.

117
14. (Continued,)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Summary . . o . . . . * I . . . . . . . .

Listing of Intelligence Targets for:

country WAC Page

USSR 65

67

93

100

102

122

124

128

130

154

155

158

159

161

163

166

196

204

205

232

Country WAC

USSR 234

235

237

238

240

245

248

281

325

328

339

Bulgaria 332

Czechoslovakia 232

J+wary 232

251

Poland 232

Rumania 251

322

Yugoslavia 251

332

WAC areas with no apparent iztefiigence targets . . , . . . o . o . . .

Subject Index . D . . . . *. . a . . . . . . . . . . . . . a . . , . . . -. e . . .

Appendix . . e 0 . - . . . -. . . . . . I . . . a . . e . . . . . . . . . . . o . . .

1

Page

Page

I

118
119
14. (Continued)

SUMMARY

Mission 9009 was accomplished on 18 August 1960. It consists of

eight north- south passes over the USSR and includes portions of China,

the SateIlites and Yugoslavia (see accompanying coverage map).

Approximately 25 percent of the coverage is cloud free, with lightscattered to heavy ciocds covering the remainder of the photography, The

PI qality of the unobscmed coverage ranges from good to very good.

The ecak of the photography is estimated to range from 1:300,000 to

1:4SO,OOO. Average ground resolution is in the order of 20 to 30 feet on

a side.

Major items of intelligence significance covered by Mission 9009

include the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range CKYMTR), the western portion

of the presumed 1,050 nm impact area of the KYMTR, 20 newly identified

hexadic SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites and six possible SA-2 sites

under construction, the Sarova Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Center, several new airfields, and numerous urban complexes.

120
14. (Continued)

:tTy InstaJlothnl

-USSRPIG Target No

WAC Torg*t Coordhatm Sbi

UR MYS SHMIDTA A/F 1-b 6 5 5-A 6853N 17924w 0 1

2/53-62 X10Y2t59) C

UR CHOKURDAKIi A/F 1-b 6 7 2-A 7039N 14752E 0 1

PROB OPERATIONALI HARD SURFACED

3/? X27Y2 l-4

UR DUDEVO A/F 67 3 4313N 14712E 0 1

3113-14 X45Y1(14) c

UR U/ I f NSTAtlAf I ON 93 8 6438N 05542E 13

8 NM SW OF KADZHEROM ADJACENT TO

KOTLAS-VORKUTA RR ..

Y/25-26 X67Y2 ( 25 I S C

UR U/I CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 100 1 6052N 0602SE 13

ROAD CUNSTR AND OTHER ACTIVITY

LOCATED AT POLUNOCHNOYE

7149~54 X53Y3(Sll S C

UR NEW RR SPUR CONST 102 3-c 6048N 04000E 1 1

NUMEROUS SPURS9 THREE GROUPS OF

BLDGS 15 NM SW KONOSHA

8132-33 X27Y4132) C

UR KARGOPOF 102 24 6130N 03855E 1 2

STORAGE AREA 1 NM N OF KARCOPOL

8/27-28 X27Y4i27) S C

UR NYANDOMA 102 11 6140N 04013E 12

g/28-29 X14Y2{28) S C

UR KONOSHA 102 3-0 6058N 04015E 1 2

NEW RR CONSTRUCTION & STORAGE

AREAS NO A/F NOTED

8132 X17Y2 C

UR U/I INSTALLATION 102 25 6220N 0410% 1 3

NEW ROADS AND OTHER CONSTR

ACTIVITY

8123-26 X3Y31251 S C

UR NYANDOMA MINING AREA 102 11-A 6139N 04015E 1:

4 AREAS* GROUND SCARING, NEW ROAD

AND RR9 LOCATED 3 NM SW NYANDOMA

8/Z+29 Xl5Y4( 28 B S C

m

-.-,_ r, A -_ - - c-. ~. .I_.

1 VI- -r-‘-r\ t ..-..: I

121
14. (Continued)

SUBJECT INDEX

-AIRfIELDS-

-USSRA/F AT INSTRUMENTATION SITE 5

A/F AT INSTRUMENTATION SITE 6

ABAKAN

ABGANEROVO

ACHINSK

ALEKSEYEVSKOYE

ARZAMAS

AT8ASAR

AYAN

BYAUDE

CHIMKENT I

CJ-IIMKENT SE

CHfRCHIK

CHOKURDAKH

CHOP

uiUCHKOVO

CHUMIKAN

DE-KASTRI S

DE-KASTRI SEAPLANE BASE

DOBRYNSKOYE

DUDEVO

DZHAMBUL W

DZHEZKAZGAN

GlZHlA SEAPLANE STATION

GCIRKIY/FEDYAKOVO

GURK I Y/SORMOVO

GORKIY/STRICINO

IKETSUKI

PVANOVO N

KAMYSHIN

KAMYSHIN NE

KAPUSTlN YAR

KHUMMI

KOMSOMOLSK 5

KOMSOMOLSK E

KOMSOMOLSK

KORSAKOV tOTOMARI1

KOSTROMA

KUSTROMSKOYE

KOTELNIKOVSKIY

KYZYLAGACH

LUKHOVITSY

122
14. (Continued)

-CZECHOSLOVAKIAGIL STGE FACIL UiC W OF MICHALOVCE

-RUMAN I APOL STORAGE AREA S OF DRAGASANI

-YUGOSLAVPASMEDEROVO PETROLEUM STORAGE

SMEDEROVO W PETROLEUM STORAGE

-MILITARY INSTALLATIONS-

-USSRADADYM AMMO DEPOT

ARYS (PRO61 CW STORAGE

CHtiRCHlK MILITARY INSTALLATION

CHUCHKOVO AMMO STGE INSTALLATION

DZERZHINSK AMMO DEPOT W

DZHAMBUL MIL AREA

EXPLOSIVES STORAGE SSE OF KOVROV

EXPLOSIVE5 STORAGE S OF SHUYA

EXPLOSIVES STORAGE W OF MUROM

FROLISHCHEVA PUSTYA AMMO STORAGE

GOROKHOYYYSKIY LAGER CW TNG CENTER

KAMYSHIN OFFICERS TANK TRNG SCHOOL

KOMSOMOLSK AMMO STORAGE

MELENKI AMMO STORAGE

MIL PROCESSING9 STORAGE G

HANDCXNG N OF ARZAMAS

MTLETARY AMMO STORAGE DEPOT SE OF

ZHUKOVKA

MOZDOK AMMUNITION DEPCS

NAVOLOKI EXPLOSIVES STORAGE

NEREKHTA AMMO DEPOT9 BURMAKIN

PENZE ARMY E3KS AND TRAINZ[NG AREA

POSS ARMORED TRNG AREA MUKACHEVO

POSSI6LE MEL BKS SSE OF RYAZAN

PROBAGiE EXPLOSIVE YcTGE AREA U/C

WNW OF KASI MC!V

SHUYA EXPLOSIVES STCRAGE

SOVETSKAYA GAVAN AMMO STORAGE

SOVETSKAYA GAVAN 4MMO STORAGE AREA

SOVETSKAYA GAVAN SUPPLY DEPOT9

VANINO 5

STALINGRAD AMMO SfOR AREA

STORAGE AREA ESE OF NIKOLAYEVSKNA-AMtrRE

123
14. (Continued)

APPENDIX

Explanation of Codes Used in the JMCI

Individual items are, in general, arranged according to the following

scheme.

1. Lnstallation Index (First Line)

Country: The country is designated by the two-letter code

used in tied-b.

. I I:.

b. Installation: The name will he given, if known. If not, the

installation will be titled according to an associated geographic name or

according to obvious use, such as storage area, instrumentation station,

etc. The when known, will be given.

C. PLC Target Number: PIC Target numbers are comprised of

two elements : (1) the WAC number for the area in which the installation

lies, and (2) a numerical designation (occasionally followed by capital

letters) for the specific target within that WAC area. For example, 246-6

designates target number 6 in WAC 246.

d. Coordinates: Coordinates are given to the nearest minute

for the approximate center of the installation.

e. Subject: Thirteen categories are used; they are as follows:

1. Airfields

2. Atomic Energy

3. Electronics and Telecommunications

4. Industry

5. Liquid Fuels

6. Military Installations

7. Missiles

8. Naval Installations

9. Ports and Harbors

10. Storage Facilities, General

124
14. (Continued)

11. Transportation

12, Urban Areas

13. Miscellaneous

2. Significant Information

A very brief statement of significant information in connection with

the installation will appear in the second and subsequent lines.

3. Photo Reference (Last Line)

This line is best explained by using an example :

3/729-31 x42Y3(730) HC

3 designates the pass number.

729-31 shows the frame numbers.

x42Y3(730) gives the Universal Reference Grid coordinates of the

installation on frame 730.

HC - This designation indicates cloud conditions as they exist

over the installation. The code used is as follows:

C Clear

SC Scattered Clouds

HC Heavy Clouds

0 Overcast

H Haze (includes smoke, blowing snow and dust)

CS Cloud Shadotv (cloud shadows cast on ground reducing interpretability)

125
15. National Intelligence Estimate, 1 I -8/l -6 1, “Strength and

Ballistic Missile Forces,” 2 1 September 196 1

Deployment of Soviet Long Range

NIE 1 I-WI-61

21 September 1961

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11 -8/l - 61

STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT

OF SOVIET LONG RANGE

BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES

(SUPPLEMENTS NIE 11 - 8 - 61)

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CEnTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this

estimate: The Central fntelligefloe Agency and thd intelligence organizations

of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Farce, The Joint Staff,

the Nationa Security Agency, end the Atomic Energy Commission.

Concurred in by the

UNITED-STATES INTELLIGENCE 3OARD

on 21 September 1961. COncuw&J were the?oirector of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for InteZZigence, Department of the AWY; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for intelligence, DePartment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for fnteltigence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representat& to the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Opera

ations; and the Director of the Nationa Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bveau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his

jurisdiction.

127
15. (Cmtinued)

The title of this estimate when used separately from the text should be classified:-

DISTRIBI’TIOK:

White House

National Security Council

Department of State

Department of Defense

Atomic Energy Commission

Federal Bureau of Investigation

128
(!%PPLEh!ENTS NlE 11 - 8 - 61)

NATIONAL IKTELLlCENCE ESTIMATE

NIE 11-8/l-61

STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF

SOVIET LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES"

THE PROBLEM

To estimate current Soviet operational strength in ICBM’s and other

ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges of 700 n.m. or more, to

identify present areas and methods of deployment, and to estimate the

probable trends in strength and deploymenr over the next few years.

+ NIE 11-8/l-61 revises and updates the estimates on this subject which were made in NIE 11-8-61:

“Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack”, TOP SECRET, 7 June 1961. It supplements the

summary of evidence and analysis on the Soviet ICBM program appended to NIE 1 l-8-61 in Annexes

C and D (TOP SECRET CODEWORD). The new estimate is issued at CODEWORD classification SO

that the reader can fully appreciate the quantity and quality of information on which it is based.

A brief summary of this estimate, at non-CODEWORD classification, will be included in the

forthcoming NIE 11-4-61: “MainTrendain Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961-1966”, now scheduled for completion in December 1961. In that estimate, the treatment of ground launched missiles

will be incorporated into a summary of the entire Soviet long-range atbck capability, including

bombers, air-to-surface missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. For our current estimates on

these latter elements of the long range striking force, see NIE 11-4-61, Annex A: “Soviet Military

Forces and Capabilities”, 24 August 1961, TOP SECRET, paragraphs 16-23.

129
CONCLUSIONS

1. New information, providing a much firmer base for estimates on

Soviet long range ballistic missiles, has caused a sharp downward revision in our estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength but strongly supports our estimate of medium range missile strength.

2. We now estimate that the present Soviet ICBM strength is in the

range of 10 - 25 launchers from which missiles can be fired against the

US, and that this force level will not increase markedly during the months

immediately ahead. L/ We also estimate that the USSR now has about

-

250-300 operational launchers equipped with 700 and 1,100 n.m. ballistic.

missiles. The bulk of these MRBM launchers are in western USSR, within

range of NATO targets in Europe; others are in southern USSR and in the

Soviet Far East. ICBM and MRBM launchers probably have sufficient

missiles to provide a reload capability and to fire additional missiles

after a period of some hours, assuming that rhe launching facilities are

not damaged by accident or attack.

3. The low present and near-term ICBM force level probably results

chiefly from a Soviet decision to deploy only a small force of the cumbersome, first generation ICBMs, and to press the development of a smaller,

second generation system. Under emergency conditions the existing force

could be supplemented somewhat during the first half of 1962, but Soviet

ICBM strength will probably not increase substantially until the new missile is ready for operational use, probably sometime in the latter half of

1962. After this point, we anticipate that the number of operational launchers will begin KO increase significantly. On this basis, we estimate that

the force level in mid- 1963 will approximate 75-125 operational ICBM

launchers. 2,/

&’ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in this sentence. See his

footnote following the Conclusions.

2,’ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, L%AF, does not concur in paragraph 3. See his lootnote foliowing the Conclusions.

130
15. (Continued)

4. In addition to 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles now available, the USSR

will probably have a 2,000 n.m. system ready for operational use late

this year or early next year. The USSR’s combined strength in these

missile categories wiIl probably reach 350-450 operational launchers in

the 1962-1963 period, and then level off.

5. Soviet professions of greatly enhanced striking power thus derive

primarily from a massive capability to attack European and other pesipheral targets, Although Soviet propaganda has assiduously cultivared

an image of great ICBM strength, the bulk of the USSR’s present capability

to attack the US is in bombers and submarine-launched missiles rather

than in a large ICBM force. While the present ICBM force poses a grave

threat to a number of US urban areas, it represents only a limited threat

to US-based nuclear striking forces. 3,’

3/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, VSAF, does not concur in paragraph 3 and the last

sentence of paragraph 5. See his footnote following the Conclusions.

131
Position on ICBM force levels of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF:

I. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that the Soviets had about 50

operational ICBM launchers in mid-1961 and that they will have about IO0 in mid-1962 and about

250 in mid-1963. In his view, the early availability and high performance record of the first generation ICBM indicates the probabi1it.y that, by mid-1961, substantial numbers of these missiles had

been deployed on operational Iaunchers. Four considerations weigh heavily in this judgment:

a. The continuance of firings of the first generation ICBM;

b. The feasibility of adapting the type “C” pad - now identified as being deployed in

the field - for use Gth the first generation system;

d. The USSR’s current aggressive Soreignpolicy indicates a substantial ICI%5 capability.

2. In view of the time that has passed since the first generation system became suitable for

operational deployment, now over’ 18 months, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that about 50 operational launchers in mid-1961 is likely, even though the Soviets may have

elected to await development of second generation missiles before undertaking large-scaIe deptoyment.

3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that the force now depIoyed constitutes a serious threat to US-based nuclear striking forces.

4. As to the future, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that the Soviets

will contin.ue to deploy first generation missiles, as an interim measure until the second generation

missiles become available. He believes that the Soviets would prefer this approach to acceptance

of an inordinate delay in the growth of their ICBM capabilities. Once the second generation system

has become -operational, which could be in early 1962, he believes that deployment will be accelerated, with first generation missiles being withdrawn from operational complexes and replaced by

the new missiles. It is evident from their test program that the Soviets feel obliged to increase the

tempo of their efforts. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that this sense of

urgency, plus the gains realizable from experience will result, in the next year or two, in a launcher

deployment program more accelerated than that indicated in the test.

132
15. (Continued)

DISCUSSION

6. The requirement to revise our estimates on Soviet long range

ballistic missile forces stems from significant recent evidence of three

principal types. First, read-out of electronic data on the 1961 activities

at the Soviet ICBM and space vehicle test range has provided information

on the new types of ballistic vehicles now being developed and on the pace

and progress of the development programs. Second, photographic coverage of large regions of the USSR has provided the first positive identification of long range ballistic missile deployment complexes, has given

excellent guidance as to Soviet deployment methods, and has permitted

detailed search of large areas of the USSR, including many previously

suspected to contain missile complexes. Finally, reliable clandestine

reports have provided useful evidence on the general status and organization of long range missile forces. Therefore, although significant gaps

continue to exist and some of the available information is still open to

alternate interpretations, the present estimate stands on firmer ground

than any previous estimate on thiszritical subject.

TCBM Development

7. The test-firing program from the Tyuratam ICBM and space

launching rangehead has been much more intensive in 1961, and has at

the same time suffered many more failures, than in any other period in

its. four year history. Thirty-nine launching operations were undertaken

between January and 17 September i96r. _4/ Of these, 13 involved either

first generation ICBMs or space vehicles using essentially the same

booster. Al but one of these 13 were generally sudcessful. The other

26 operations involved new vehicles not previously observed in range

activities. Of these, only about half resulted in generally successful

2, A more recent launching operation on 19 September 1961, which resulted in a failure, cannot as

yet be categorized as to type of vehicle.

133
15. (Continued)

TnD Cr@+ET

firings which reached the vicinity of the instrumented impact areas. Of

the last seven operations involving new vehicles, however, six have been

generally successful. (See Figure 1.)

8. One of the new vehicles (called Category B by US intelligence) is

probably a second generation ICBM; the other (Category C) may be a competitive ICBM design or a special vehicle to test lCBM and space components. Both are tandem staged, that is, the upper stage is ignited at

altitude as in the case of Titan, rather than at launch as in the case of

Atlas and the first generation Soviet ICBM. Our’data are sufficient to

show that both of the new vehicles are liquid propelled, but not to establish whether the propellants are storable or non-storable. Some aspects

erformance of the upper stage of the Category B

vehicle are similar to those of the 2,000 n,m. missile, which was tested

intensively at Kapustm Yar for some months preceding the Category B

operations at Tyuratam. The vehicles fired KO a distance of 6,500 ti.m.

into the Pacific on 13 and 17 September 1961 were probably Category B

vehicles. Some relationship seems to exist between the upper stages of

the Category C vehicle and Venus probes. Despite this apparent relarionship with space vehicles, it was a Category C firing which immediately

preceded Khrushchev’s remark to McCloy last JuIy, that a “new ICBM”

had been launched successfulIy.’ No further details are known about the

configuration, propulsion, guidance, range, or payload of the new vehicles.

51

9. The 1961 tests confirm our previous estimate that the Soviets

would develop a new ICl3M system, and we continue to believe that a major requirement for such a system is a missile which can be more readily

handled and deployed than their original ICBM. This belief is supported

by a reliable clandestine source who learned, in .1960 or early 1961, that

the Soviet leadership desired an ICBM using higher-energy fuel which

5J We have taken note of Soviet statements concerning a 100 megaton weapon. We da not believe

that present Soviet capabilities include a missile warhead with 100 liregaton yield or a ballistic vehicle capable of delivering such a warhead to intercontinental ranges. We will examine this matter

in fuller detail in an early estimate.

134
1

would require less bulk. In order 10 be flight tested in early 1961, design

work on a new missile was certainly underway in 1958. Nuclear tests

appropriate to the development of lighter warheads were conducted in 1957

and 1958; the current nuclear testing program may serve further to prove

the warhead design.

10. Although the flight-test failures in the first half of 1961 probably

set back the Soviet schedule for development of second generation missiles, it is clear from the test range activities that the R&D program has

been pursued with great vigor. The recent successes with the Category B

vehicle, and the probable firing of such vehicles to 6,500 n.m. after only

about 8 months of testing to Kamchatka, suggest that the initial difficulties

with this system may now have been largely overcome. Moreover, it is

probable that one or borh the new vehicles have borrowed components or

at least design techniques from proven systems, thereby aiding the R&D

program. We believe that the program will continue to be pursued with

vigor, and that a smaller, second generation ICBM will have been proven

satisfactory for initial operarional’ deployment in the latter half of 1962.

11. Thus we believe that the first generation system will be the only

Soviet ICBM system in operational use for the months immediately ahead

and probably for about the next year. Despite its inordinate bulk and the

other disadvantages inherent in a non-storable liquid fueled system, the

first generation system is capable of delivering a high yield nuclear warhead with good accuracy and reliability against targets anywhere in the

US. (For a summary of its estimated operational characteristics, see

Figure 2.) Test range launchings of first generation missiles (now called

Category A) co n January through July.

135
15. (Continued)

the training of operational crews for launching second salvos, but it cannot be determined whether these firings were from a single pad. Accuracy

could not be determined, but reliability continued high. c/

Utilization of Launching Pads

12. Soviet ICBM capabilities at present depend in part, and in the

near future will depend in considerable measu;re, upon whether or not the

deployment complexes now being discovered through KEYHOLE photography can be used to fire first generation missiles, or whether they cannot become fully operational until a second generation missile becomes

available, The first generation missile is obviously compatible with

massive, fully rail-served launchers similar to those at Tyuratam Areas

A and B. But the launchers at confirmed field complexes, whose construction began only in late 1959 or thereafter, resemble the simplified

pair of pads at Tyuratam Area C, where missiles are transported to the

pad by road and some of the support equipment is mounted on vans. (For

artists’ conceptions of the launchers at Tyuratam and a layout of the

rangehead, see Figures 3-5.)

13. From our examination of the 1961 test firing program, the physical dimensions of various items at Areas A and C, and ‘the requirements

for handling and firing the first generation missile, we conclude that the

simplified Area C was designed for a new and smaller missile now being

test fired. Although it is technically feasible for the Soviets to adapt the

rail-based first generation missile to road served launchers of the type

at Area C, it would be necessary KO redesign much of the check-out,

handling, erecting, and fueling equipment. This redesigned equipment

would differ from both that at Area A and that designed for use with the

136
15. (Continued)

new missile. Such action might have been taken as an interim measure

if a long delay in the advent of the second generation system had been

anticipated well in advance.

ICBM Deployment

14. ‘l‘hrough KEYHOLE photography over [he past three months,

we have positively identified three KBM complexes under construction.

Two are near Yur’ya and Yoshkar-Ola, in a region several hundred miles

northeast of Moscow, and the third is near Verkhnyaya Salda in the Urals.

The paired, road-served pads at these complexes closely resemble those.

at Tyuratam Area C. Near Kostroma, in the same general region but

closer to Moscow, the photography revealed a new clearing suitable

for a pair of pads, and we believe this is possibly a fourth complex

similar to the others. Portions of the installation at Plesetsk, farther

to the northwest, were covered again in mid-1961, but the new photography

was too limited either to confirm or rule out this location as an ICBM

deployment complex. (The locations of presently known and suspected

areas of ICBM deployment activities are shown in Figure 9. )

15. The new evidence confirms that the present Soviet deployment

concept involves large, fixed complexes, with multiple pads and extensive

support facilities. The identified deployment complexes are served by rail

spurs which provide their major logistic support. The complexes are

highly vulnerable to attack. For example, although the Yur’ya complex

is quite large, the entire installation is soft and each pair of pads is

separated from its neighbor by only 3-4 n-m.

 concealment from ground

observation has been achieved by locating the installations in remote,

densely wooded areas. For active defense against aircraft, SA-2 surfaceto-air missile sites are being installed near the complexes.

16. At Yur’ya, the confirmed complex whose construction appears

most advanced, eight launchers in four pairs were observed in various

137
15. (Continued)

stages of construction in mid-1961 (see Figure 6). Considerations of

logistics and control, together with evidence from the MRBM program

and other factors, lead us to believe that eight is the typical number of

launchers for this type of complex.Z/ Each pair of launchers has checkout

and ready buildings which are probably capable of housing a missile for

each pad; however, the extent of the support facilities strongly suggests

that additional missiles are to be held there to provide a reload or standby

capability. The designed salvo capability of the complex is apparently

to be eight missiles. There would be at least 5 minutes delay between

groups of four missiles if the system is radio-inertial (as is the first

generation ICBM) and if one set of guidance facilities is provided for each

pair of launchers. A second salvo might be attempted after some hours,

assuming the launching facilities were not damaged by accident or attack.

Alrhough we have no direct evidence on this matter, we believe it might

be feasible to prepare a second salvo in 8-i2 hours.

17. On the basis of evidence dating back to 1957 and other more

recent information, we have estimated that Plesetsk is an ICBM complex

with rail-served launchers designed to employ the first generation ICBM.

The installation at Plesetsk (see Figure 7) is even larger than the Yur’ya

complex. Although the presence of ICBM launchers has not been confirmed,

there are SAM sites, several very large support areas, and numerous

buildings, including what appears to be housing for some 5,000 to 15,000

persons. The photographic and other evidence is inadequate to establish

the number of launchers which may be at Plesetsk. We believe that the

number may be as few as two, but four or more is also possible. An

ICBM complex involving this much equipment, investment, and personnel

would probably have a reload of at least one missile per pad. Based on

z’ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, betieves that this typical number may be larger

than eight. KIe agrees, however, that if guidance facilities are provided for each pair of launchers,

the sequence of launching would be as described in the text.

138
15. (Continued)

Tyuwacam experience, we estimate the time to prepare a second salvo at

about 16 hours. I/

18. The new evidence gives a better measure of the timing of some

ICBM deployment activities. Based on its size, the extent of its facilities,

and its present state of construction, the Yur’ya complex must have been

started in the autumn of 1959, concurrent with or very shortly after the

start of construction at Tyuratam launch Area C. Yur’ya is probably one

of the earliest complexes of its type. Construction and installation of

equipment will probably be completed some time early in 1962. The

similar complex at Yoshkar-Ola is many months behind Yur’ya; the evidence

is less conclusive with respect to Kostroma and Verkhnyaya Salda, but what

can be seen is apparently in the early stages of construction. From the

evidence, therefore, we have reasonably firm indications that at least

two years were used for the construction of even the simpler ICBM complexes, although this may be reduced to about 18 months as experience

is gained..

Adequacy of Recent Intelligence Coverage

19. Through KEYHOLE operations since mid-1960, our coverage Of

suspected deployment areas in the USSR has been substantially augmented.

This photography has been studied in detail by photo-interpreters with

knowledge of US and Soviet missile programs. The search has been aided

by photography of Soviet missiie test range installations, which are now

known to bear a close resemblance to deployment sites in the field. On

the basis of this activity, combined with other information and analysis,

we now estimate that we have good intelligence coverage of approximately

50 percent of the total railroad route mileage in the USSR. This coverage

is not uniform, however; certain portions of the railroad route mileage

A/ The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believes that

evidence of ICBM deployment at Plesetsk is indeterminate but that, in the aggregate, it points against such deployment.

139
15. (Continued)

in suspected deployment areas, including some in the northwest, have not

yet been well covered by KEYHOLE photography. Moreover, positive

identifications of 1CBM deployment have actually been made in areas

where our photographic and other coverage is only fair. We therefore

believe that we have useful intelligence coverage for more than SO percent

of those portions of the USSR within which ICBM deployment is most

likely. _9/

20. Of the five confirmed or possible ICBM complexes located in

KEYE-lOLE photography, Yur’ya, Plesetsk, and Verkhnyaya Salda were

previously suspected on the basis of other information,q-)

We

previously had not suspected Yoshkar-Ola or Kostroma. The discovery

our ability to detect and recognize ICBM complexes of present types in

KEYHOLE photography of unsuspected areas.

21. The KEYHOLE search has shown that many previously suspected

areas did not contain ICBM complexes as of the summer of 1961. Four

areas not covered by recent, good quality KEYHOLE photography remain

under active consideration as suspected locations of ICBM deployment

activity (see Figure 9). Past experience indicates that some or all of

the areas now under active consideration may prove to be negative,

and conversely, that deployment activity may now be under way in other

unsuspected areas. It is extremely unlikely, however, that undiscovered

LCBM complexes exist in areas on which there is recent KEYHOLE

photography of good quality.

9J Annex D of NIE I I-5-61, \<hich dcnlt with intelligence coverage rel;rting to ICUY1 deplohmcnt.

Lvi1l be revised following completion of a detailed survey of photographic coverage.

140
15. (Continued)

Probable ZCBM Force Levels -LO/

22. We believe that our coverage of both test range activities and

potential deployment areas is adequate CO support the judgment that at

present there are only a few XCBM complexes operational or under

construction. While there are differences within the intelligence community

as to the progress of the Soviet program to date and the precise composition

of the current force, we estimate that the present Soviet ICBM capability

is in the range of lo-25 launchers from which missiles can be fired against

the US. The low side of this range allows for the possibility that the Soviets

could now fire only a token ICBM salvo from a few launchers, located at

the Tyuratam rangehead and an operational complex, perhaps Plesetsk.

The high side, however, takes into account the limitations of our coverage

and allows for the existence of a few other complexes equipped with first

generation missiles, now operational but undetected.

23, The Soviet system is probably designed to have a refire capability

from each launcher. The USSR may therefore be able to fire a second

salvo some hours after the first, assuming that the launching facilities

are not damaged by accident or attack.

24. The reasons for the small current -capability are important to

an estimate of the future Soviet buildup. The first generation system,

designed ar an early stage of Soviet nuclear and missile technology, proved

to be powerful and reliable but was probably LOO cumbersome to be deployed

on a large scale. One or more first generation sites may have been started

probably began in about 1958, andan intensive firing program is now underway concurrent with the construction of simplified deployment complexes.

lo,/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in the estimate of ICL%l

force levels. For his position, see his footnote following the Conclusions.
IS. (Continued)

We therefore believe chat in about 1958 the Soviet leaders decided to deploy

only a small force of first generation ICBMs while pressing toward second

generation systems.

25. The net effect of this Soviet decision, together with whatever

slippage is occurring in the development of second generation systems,

has been co produce a low plateau of ICBM strength. Under emergency

conditions rbe existing force could be supplemented during the first

half of I.962 by putting some second generation ICBMs on launcher at

one or two completed complexes before the weapon system has been

thoroughly tested. However, the Soviets could not have very much confidence in the reliability, accuracy and effectiveness of such a force. In

any event, operational ICBM strength will probably not increase substantially until the new missile has been proved satisfactory for operational

use, probably some time in the latter half of 1962. Alternatively, the

possibility cannot. be excluded that second generation ICBMs could be

proved satisfactory for operational use somewfiar: earlier in 1962, possibly

as soon as the first simplified complex is completed. After this point,

we anticipate that. the number of operational launchers will begin to

increase significantly.

26. We continue to believe, for the many reasons adduced in NIE

ll-8-61, that the Soviet leaders have desired a force of several hundred

operational ICBM launchers, to be acquired as soon as practicable over

the next few years. In addition to the complexes known to be under

construction, it is probably that work is under way on other undiscovered

complexes and that the construction of still others is scheduled to begin

soon. Taking account of rhis probability, together with our present

intelligence coverage and our information on site activation lead-time,

we estimate that the force level in mid-1963 Will ap7prOXimate 75 125

operational ICBM launchers. The high side of this range allows for

eight complexes of eight launchers each under construction at the present:

time, with four more scheduled to begin by rhe end of the year; it would

142
15. (Continued)

require site activation time to decrease to about 18 months by the end

of the year; it builds from a present force level of about 25 operational

launchers. The low side of the mid-1963 range would be achieved if

six complexes were now under construction, two more were begun by

the end of the year, and the present force level were only about 10

launchers.

27. As noted in NIE 1 l-8-61, Soviet force goals for the period to

1966 will be increasingly affected by developments in US and Soviet

military technology, including the multiplication of hardened US missile

sites, the possible advent of more advanced Soviet missiles which can

better be protected, and by developments in both antimissile defenses

and space weapons. The international political situation will also affect

Soviet force goals, and there is a good chance that the Soviet letiders

themselves have not yet come to a definite decision. We have not been

able as yet to review, in the light of the new evidence, these and ocher

considerations pertaining to th-e probable future pace of the Soviet ICBM

program. Therefore we are unable to project a numerical estimate

beyond mid- 1963. Considering the problems involved in site activation,

however, we believe that a rate of I.00 or possibly even 150 launchers

per year beginning in about 1963 would be feasible. To accomplish

such a schedule, the USSR would have to lay on a major program of site

construction within the next year, which we believe would be detected

through continuing KEYHOLE operations and other means of intelligence

collection.

Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

28. Recent KEYHOLE photography confirms the large-scale deployment

of 700 and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles in western USSR. Through this

photography, approximately 50 fixed sites with a total of about 200 pads

suitable for launching these MRBMs have been firmly identified in a wide

143
15. (Continued)

belt stretching from the Baltic to the southern Ukraine. Since photography

establishes that the sites are paired, we are virtually certain that there

are about 10 additional sites hidden by scattered clouds. Taking account

of indica tars pointing co still orher locations not yet: photographed, we

estimate with high confidence that in the western belt alone there are

now about 75 sites with a cotal of about 300 launch pads, completed or

under construction. (For known and estimated site locations in this area,

see Figure 9. )

29. The new information does not establish whether individual sites

are fully operational, nor does it reveal which type of missile each is KO

employ. At the time of photography (obtained during a 3-month period

in the summer of 1961) approximately three-quarters of the identified

sites appeared to be complete or nearly so, some were under construction, and the evidence on others is ambiguous. Construction has probably been completed at some sites since the time of photography; the

installation of support equipment and missiles could probably be accomplished relatively quickly thereafter, perhaps in a period of some

weeks. Three basic site configurations have been observed, all of them

bearing a strong resemblance to launch areas at the Kapustin Yar

rangehead (see Figure 8). Any of the three types could employ either

700 or 1,100 n.m. missiles, whose size and truck-mounted support

equipment are virtually identical. The sites could not employ ICBMs, but

one type might be intended for the 2,000 n.m. IRBM which has been under

development at Kapustin Yar.

30. On the basis of the new evidence and a wealth of ocher material

on development, production, training and deployment, we estimate that in

the western belt alone the U’SSR now has about 200-250 operational launchers equipped with 700 and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles, together with the

necessary supporting equipment and trained personnel. From these

launchers, missiles could be directed against NATO targets from Norway

to Turkey. On less firm but consistent evidence, about 50 additional

144
15. (Continued)

launchers are believed to be operational in other areas: in the TransCaucasus and Turkestan, from which they could attack Middle Eastern

targets from Suez to Pakistan; and in the southern portion of the Soviet

Far East within range of Japan, Korea, and Okinawa. Very recent KEYHOLE photography confirms the presence of some sites in Turkestan and

in the Soviet Far East, north of Vladivostok.

31. On this basis, we estimate that the USSR now has a total of about

250-300 operational launchers equipped. with medium range ballistic mis -

siles, the bulk of them within range of NATO targets in Europe. This is

essentially the same numerical estimate as given in NIE 11-8-61, but it

is now made with greater assurance.

32. Contrary to our previous view that MRBMs were deployed in

mobile units, we now know that even though their support equipment is

truck-mounted, most if not all MRBM units employ fixed sites. Like the

ICBM complexes, these are soft, screened from ground observation by

their placement in wooded areas, and protected against air attack by

surface-to-air missile sites in the vicinity. The systems are probably

.

designed so that all ready missiles at a site can be salvoed within a few

minutes of each other. Two additional missiles are probably available

for each launcher; a second salvo could probably be launched about 4-6

hours after the first. There is some evidence that after one or two salvos

the units are to move from their fixed sires to reserve positions. Their

mobility could thus be used for their immediate protection, or they could

move to new launch points to support field forces in subsequent phases

of a war.

33. The Soviet planners apparently see a larger total requirement

for MRBMs and IRBMs than we had supposed. While the rate of deployment activity in the western belt is probably tapering off after a vigorous

three-year program, some sites of all three basic types are still under

construction. There will therefore be at least some increase in force

levels in the coming months. The magnitude of the buildup thereafter will

depend largely on the degree LO which the 2,000 n.m. system is deployed,

145
15. (Continued)

and whether or not it will supplement or replace medium range missiles.

34. With the advent of the 2,000 n-m. IRBM, probably in late 1961 or

early 1962, the Soviets will acquire new ballistic missile capabilities

against such areas as Spain, North Africa, and Taiwan. To this extent at

least, they probably wish to supplement their present strength. They may

also wish to deploy IRBMs or MRBMs to more northerly areas within

range of targets in Greenland and Alaska. Moreover, evidence from clandestine sources indicates char: the Soviet field forces are exerting pressure

to acquire missiles of these ranges. In general, however, we believe

that the future MRBM/IRBM program will emphasize changes in the mix

among the existing systems, and later the introduction of second generation systems, rather than sheer numerical expansion. Taking these factors into account, we estimate rhat the USSR will achieve 350-450 operational MRBM and IRSM launchers sometime in the 1962-1963 period,

and that the force level will be relatively stable thereafter.

146
15. (Continued)

FIGURES

1. Soviet ICBM Test Range Activities, Tyuratam, USSR - Launching

Operations in 1961.

2. Esrimated Current Performance Characteristics, Soviet Long Range

Ballistic Missiles.

3. Tyuratam Missile Test Center (Status in late 1960-early 1961).

4. Concept of Tyuxatam Launch Area A.

5. Concept of Tyuratam Launch Area C.

6. ICBM Deployment Complex, Yur’ya, USSR (Status in mid-1961).

7. Suspected ICBM Deployment Complex, Plesetsk, USSR (Status in

mid-1961).

8. Typical Fixed MRBM Launch ‘Site.

9. Known and Suspected Areas of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile

Deployment - September 1961.

147
15. (Continued)

148
15. (Continued)

x-4

1100

55-S 1

2000

Second

Generation

55-6 ICBM 1

5000

7000

at least

6500

Range 6-d

Radio/ Radio/ Radio/ Radio? NA

Inertial lncrtiol lntrtiol Inertial

Guidance

Single

ACCUraCy 1 nm 2 nm NA

Single

Stage

NonStor.

Liquid

60,000

Single Partial or

Porollcl

Configuration Tandem

NonStor.

Liquid

Liquid

75,000 NA

NonStor.

Liquid

Propellants Liquid

450,000-

500,000

Prob less

thon 55-6

NA

Gross Tokcoff Weight (Ibs)

Warhcod Weight (Ibs) 3000 3000-

5000

75%

80%

75%

l-3 hrs

15-30 min

5-70 min

6-A hrs

6000- 10000

6000

Ready Missile Rote 65% 85% 70-a5%3

Reliability, on Louncher 90% 95%

Reliability, in Flight 80% 80%

Reaction Tim=‘- Condition 1 l-3 hrs l-3 hrs

Reaction Time - Condition II 15-30 min 15-30 min

Reaction Time - Condition III 5-10 min S-10 min

Refire Capability 6 4-6 hr. 4-6 hrs

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

8-12 hrs

85-90x 4

70-85% 4

1-3 hrs

IS-30 min

5-10 min

about

16 hrs

’ Not yet operational.

* For this missile the range and warhead weight figures are for heavy nosecone (top figure) and

lighter nosecone (bottom figure).

;’ The lower limit of this range approximates the percentage xvhich might be maintained ready in

continuous peacetime operations for an indefinite period. The upper limit might be achieved if

the Soviets prepared their force for an attack at a specific time designated well in advance, i.e.,

maximum readiness.

4 The upper limit would be more likely to be achieved if the Soviets had provided time for peaking

their forces on launcher prior to an attack at a specific time.

’ Condition I: Crews on routine standby, electrical equipment cold, missiles not fueled.

Condition II: Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles not fueled.

Condition III: Crewson alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles fueled and topped. This

condition probably can not be maintained for more than an hour or SO.

6 From same pad, and dependent upon condition of alert.

149
15. (Continued)

FIGURE 3

--u-c RAIL L3NE

SVRCICLD Rcl*D

*----

LAUNCH AREA ‘8’

I, L*UNE*LRI

LAUNCH AREA *A=

I2 L*“NC”CRs

UNCH AREA l cí

2 LAtlHCHER,,

PROBABLE HEW LAUNCH IAEA

UNDER CONSTWCTION. MIDSEPTYURATAM MSSIL E TEST CENT&R (Status in late 1960-early 19611

150
15. (Continued)

PIT: ABOUT 900 X 550 FT

TOP OF CONCRETE PAD TO

BOTTOM OF PIT: 140 FT

FIGURE d

TO ASSEMBLY/CHECKOUT

AREA I.5 N M FROM PAD

COYCEPT OF TYURATAM LAUNCH A REA ‘C”
IS. (Continued)

I

‘,

,..

‘.‘. .’ ‘.

LAUNCH PAD

-.

: .

-* ’

.

I

f

LAUNCH AREA IN MOST AOVANCECI

STAGE 0F CONS~RIJCTION

!

PAD SEPARATION - 1000’

L

PA,, ORIENTATION - APPROX 340” --------------c-3--c---------.

--*_

so00 10000

-“. 5000 0

I 1 1 1 ’ 1 1 I

I

FEET

..:-_ .‘..:‘.. :

lC8M DEPLOYMENT COMPLEX, YUR’yA, USSR (Status in mid-l 96T)

152
15. (Continued)

EAST AREA _

WES7 AREA

WEST AREA

SUSPECTED ~CBM DEPLOYMENT COMPL EX, PL ESETSK, USSR. (Status in mid-19611

FIGURE 7

7
15. (Continued)
15. (Continued)
6. CIALNPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Uranium Ore Concentration Plant, Steiu,

Rumania,” December 196 1

a' -/ia'//'// j///////i/'/ /A/','/ /',. ,*. ,I' .f/ ,' ,' /',.* ;' :' ...

-

December 1961

CENTRAL lNTELLtGENCE AGENCY

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATION PLANT

STEW, RUMA

WARNING

the mcanirrg of the espionage la

in any mannsr preiudisiol to

goYstnmont to rho detriment of

trinotsd and authorized to

?or of Central intelligence.

Published and Disseminuted by

NATIONAL PI-IOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

157
16. (Continued)

PHOTOGRAPHIC 1NTELLlGENCE REPORT

URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATION PLANT

STEW, RUMANIA

-

December 1961

Published and Dissaminatcd by

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHlC INTERPRETATION CENTER

158
16. (Cuntinued)

INTRODUCTION

The Sceiu uranium ore concentration plant appears on fair KEYHOLE

photography of 19 August 1960, 8 July 1961, and 1 September 1961 at

4631N 22-28E, on the east-central edge of the newly constructed town

of Steiu. Steiu is located in a pocketed valley along the Crisul Negru

berween the Bihorului and Codrului mountains in the northwest part of

Rumania, approximately 35 nautical miles (nm) southeast of Oradea and

49 nm west-southwest of Cluj (Figure 1). The Steiu area is served by a

good road and a single-track rail line running-from Oradea and terminating 3 nm south at Vascau. Only road transportation is available from

three mining areas in the vicinity to the plant. Strict security provisions

are said to be in effect in the area.

The concentration process at the plant probably involves crushing of

the ore, followed by ion-exchange of the solutions from the residue, and

finally precipitation of uranium oxide. The uranium oxide is probably

then shipped by rail to the Soviet. Union, via a transshipment point at

Halmeu, Rumania, approximately 87 nm north on the USSR-Rumanian

border. An adjacent thermal power plant furnishes power. Possible

servicing and repair facilities’ for the plant and mining areas are adjacent

to the plant. A possible research institute is located on the southeast

edge of the town. L/ Several storage areas are located throughout the

built-up area. 1-~2/, 3/ west of the plant .may be

associated with it.

Annual production of the Steiu plant cannot be computed by estimating

the volume of material in the possible tailings area and recovery ponds,

due to the scale of the satellite photography. The small-scale photography

can confirm only the general layout of the plant and provide a clue to the

possible functions of the buildings at the plant. Building measurements

given in this report are only approximate and their relative degree of

error must be assumed to be quite large, Heights cannot be determined

at all.

159
3

FltURE 1,

.-. - . . . .<.- . . . . -.. LOCATION OF STEW URANIUM PLANT AND MiNING Ahem IN VlCtNIr 1.

MINING AREAS

16. (Continued)

The uranium ore mining activity associated with the Steiu facility is

8 to 10 nm southeast of the plant in the Apuseni mountains at 4628N

22-36E, 46-28N 22-38E, and 46-23N 22-40E (Figure 1). Ores are rransported to the plant by road.

160
16. (Cuntinued)

_4/ Partial ore concentration -

would probably then have begun in 195.5-56, with full-scale production

(mining and concentration) probably being reached in 1957. These are

open-pit mining operations, with two of them in the early stages of development. One mine was developed between the August 1960 and July 1961

KEYHOLE coverages. The deposits in the Apuseni mountains consist of

siliceous siltstone, coated with flakes of metatorbermite.

5/, 6/ Reserves of ore probably are adequate for a loyear operation.

Recovery at the Steiu plant is probably on the order of 90 percent of

the uranium present in the ore. If the mill was completed in 1957, it can

be assumed that the production process would be comparable to the present US practice of ion exchange for the recovery of uranium oxide.

ORE CONCENTRATION PLANT

The ore concentration plant (Figure 2> occupies an area of approximately 170 acres. It contains four probable main processing buildings, a

possible crusher building, associated buildings, and a possible Dorrtype thickener. Figure 2 represents a concept of the plant layout and

structure based on the KEYHOLE photography and on the layout of other

known plants of the same type. Approximate dimensions of the buildings

are contained in the key to annotations accompanying this illustration.

The main structures visible in the planr: area are a possible orereceiving building (item l), a possible ore classification, crusher, and

grinder building (item 2>, a possible Dorr-type thickener (item 3), and an

ion-exchange building (item 4). &her production facilities are two possible

final treatment buildings (items 5 and 6) and a possible preparation and

packaging building (item 7 >,

161
16. (Continued)

Table 1. Key To .4nnotations, Figure 2

Item No Description

Approximate

Dimensions

(W

Approximate

Roof Cover

(sq ft)

8

1 0

Poss ore-receiving building 140 x 60

Poss ore c&sification, crusher, and

grinder building

L-shaped

Poss Dorr-type thickener

Poss ion-exchange building

Poss final treatment building

Poss final treatment building

Poss preparation and packaging building

Prob storage and shipping building

Prob administration area (3 bldgs)

Thermal power plant, with 2 cooling

towers, each 35 ft diam, and adjoining

StSCk

Poss transformer yard

140 diam

L-shaped

300 x 80

300 x 80

300 x 95

160 x 85

240 x 90( 1)

65 x 60(2)

300 x 85 25,500

Total 216,220

175 x 140

8,400

27,120

36,700

24,000

24,000

28,500

13,600

28,400

Other facilities at the concentration plant include a probable storage

and shipping building (item 8) and a probable administration area (item 9).

A possible tailings area is located adjacent to the western edge of the plant

area. An area of possible recovery ponds, with approximately 18 beds,

is just north of the plant area, No pipelines are discernible on this photography.

With these facilities, the Steiu mill would appear to be a complex plant

for the treatment of probably both uranium ore and concentrates. Both

would be brought from the mining areas by truck to the ore-receiving and

classification buildings (items 1 and 2).

162
16. (Continued)

RAtLROAO

 ROAD

FIGURE 2. URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATION PLANT, STEW, RUMANIA.

Blended ore would be passed through rhe crusher and grinder system

(item 2), with some ores going to the possible thickener (item 3). All

ores would then go to the ion-exchange building (item 4), and thence to the

final treatment buildings (items 5 and 6). The waste material or slurry

would be piped to the possible tailings pile.. The possible recovery pond

area is connected to the plant by a probable pipeline. It contains 18

possible settling or evaporation ponds, covering an area 600 by 500 feet.

Uranium concentrates could be shipped directly from the packaging

building (item 7) or could be stored in the probable storage and shipping

building (item 8) until shipment is made.

163
16. (Continued)

Since no solvent-extraction plant is visible in the vicinity of the concentration plant, it is possible that no further upgrading to green salt or metal

takes place at the Steiu plant.

P reduction Es tima tes

If a plant of this size is treating mostly concentrates and small shipments of ore, its output could represent a considerable production of

uranium concentrate.* There is no way of determining what portion of the

mill feed is crude ore and what is concentrate from primary mills. The

product of the Steiu plant probably is ammonium diuranate containing 75

to 90 percent uranium oxide.

It is very difficult even to attempt an estimate of the possible output

of the Steiu plant because the scale of the satellite photography makes it

impossible to determine rhe height of the possible tailings area and the

volume of the possible recovery ponds.

TRANSPORTATION AND SECURITY

The Steiu uranium concentration plant is served by both road and rail.

A single-track spur off the Oradea-Vascau single-track line serves the

plant area, with spurs serving the thermal power plant, the possible

research institute, and a U-shaped unidentified dead-endspur to the northeast of the built-up area (Figure 3).

A reported five-track holding yard, 1,730 feet long, is on the western

edge of Steiu, with a large adjacent storage area parallel to the tracks.

There are no rail facilities discernible between the uranium ore concentration plant and any of the mine areas. All transportation of the ores to

the plant appears to be by road. Concentrated ores could be shipped to the

Soviet Union for further processing through a rail transshipment point at

Halrneu, Rumania, on the Soviet border.

l It ;S felt that, during its first years, the plant’s input consisted largely of crude ore, but that the

input of concentrates increased steadily, so that the input would now be high in concentrates and

low in crude ore.

164
16. (Continued)

I

I I I --f\

FORCED TO q EIUS 9.1 NM

LABOR

CAMP --

I I

1000 0 I 000 2000

I ’ ’ ’ ’ 1

f 1

FEET

1:~::I-;~:;EA]

FIGURE 3. STEM, RUMANIA, StfOWtNG URANIUM PLANT AND ASSOClATED FACILITIES.

1
16. (Continued)

No fences or walls can be seen surrounding the uranium concentration

plant, but it is reported that the area is divided into three strictly divided

zones of security, with limited access to each zone. People in the various

zones are not permitted into all zones, and are very restricted in their

movement within the area, as well as in their movement to other parts of

Rumania.

SUPPORT FACILITIES

The extensive support facilities seen on the photography could be

central facilities for servicing the tributary mines and plants in the area

as well as the ore concentration plant.

The rail-served thermal power plant immediately west of the uranium

ore concentration plant, contains a boilerhouse and generator hall (item

10, Figure 2), two probable cooling towers, a possible transformer yard

(item ll), and a water tank.

A possible service and repair area, adjacent to the south edge of the

plant, is probably for both the uranium ore concentration plant and the

three mining areas. The area contains 13 buildings of various sizes.

The possible research institute l/ is located on the southeast edge -

of the town area. Nothing is known of the work of the institute,’

The town of Steiu has grown tremendously since the original Rumanian

agricultural village was seen on German photography of 1944. On the

phorography of 1960-61, several large areas of multistory apartment

buildings, single-family dweIling areas, reported military and labor

barracks areas,

Water is supplied from the Crisul Negru, with water storage tanks

located at various points throughout the built-up area. The small-scale

satellite photography reveals no pipelines.

166
16. (Continued)

CONCLUSIONS

Satellite photography of August 1960 and July and September 1961

confirms the existence and operation of a uranium ore concentration

plant, a storage and repair area, and a possible research institute at

Steiu, approximately 35 nm southeast of Oradea and 49 nm west-southwest

of Cluj, in the northwest part of Rumania.

The following conclusions may be drawn from the photography and

from collateral information used:

1. The Steiu uranium ore concentration plant produces an unestimated

amount of uranium oxide in the form of ammonium diuranate from ores m

- -

The plant product is estimated

to have a grade of 75 to 90 percent uranium oxide.

2. The plant probably upgrades concentrates from preliminary

processing plants located at three uranium mines. There are three nearby

areas of uranium mining, located 8-10 miles southeast and connected by

road to the Steiu uranium ore concentration plant.

3. A possible storage and repair area is probably associated with the

plant and the mining areas.

4. A possible research institute, probably connected with the uranium

ore concentration plant and the mining areas, is located on the southeast

edge of Steiu.

167
16. (Continued)

REFERENCES

PHOTOGRAPHY

Mission Date Pass/Camera Frames Classification

GX 9664 7 Ott 44 SK 87, 88 U

9009 19 Aug 60 9 45 TSR

9019 8 Jul 61

2;

114 TSR

9023 1 Sep 61 118 TSR

MAPS AND CHARTS

AM& Series M 506 (GSGS4375), Sheet R-26, 3d ed, Mar 54, scale 1:250,000 (U)

ALEt. Series M 606 (GSCS4417), Sheet 2065, 3d ed, Jan 54, scale l:lOO,OOO (U)

ACID. USAF Operational Navigation Chart 251, 1st ed, Mar 59, scale 1:1,00O,QOO (U)

ACIC. US Air Target Chart, Series 200, Sheets 0251-8A and 13A, 1st ed, Mar and May 59,

scale 1:200,000 (S)

DOCUMENTS

1. CIA. Free Rumanian Press, release #8, 20 Feb 57 (U)

2.

3.

4.

6.

REQUIREMENT
17. CJA/NPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Regional Nuclear Weapons Storage Site Near

Berdichev, USSR,” May 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PliOTOGRAPHlC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

REGIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

STORAGE SITE

NEAR BERDICHEV, USSR

WARNING

This document contains classified infotmuti

meming of the espionage 10~s U. 5. Cod

mission or the revelation of its contents

mcmn~r prcjudiciol to the safety or interer

is to be taken on

to be gained, unless s

curity of the United States within the

and 798. The Luw prohibits its tronszed D~ISO~, EIS well QS its USC in any

c benefit of any foreign government to

especially indoctrinated and authorized

formation. Its security must be maintained

OLE and TALENT regulations. No action

d herein, regardless of the advontogca

Published ond Disseminated by

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

169
3 7. (Continued)

REGIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE SITE

NEAR BERDICHEV, USSR

Good-quality photography providing details

of the regional. nuclear weapons storage site

(IF-j6N 28-16E) located 2,l naurical miles (nm)

west of the BerdichevJMikhaylenki Regional

Military Storage Installation and 12 nm west of

Berdichev, USR, is available from several

KEYHOLE missions, particularly from Mission

9037 of June 1962 (Figures 1 and2). The cruciform buildings at the Ejerdichev site (Figure 3)

are very similar to the cruciform building

observed under construction at the Type III

nuclear weapons storage site ac Dolon Airfield

(Figures 1 and 4). _1/ The layouts of the sites

at Berdichev and Colon are also similar.

DESCRlPTION OF BERDICHEV SITE

This site consists of a double-fenced area

measuring approximately C1,900 by 1,650 feet

and a small singIe-fenced support area adjoin--

ing the eastern side of the double-fenced area

(Figure 2). All of the buildings appear completed

although the cruciform buildings were not yet

earrh mounded.

The double-fenced area contains two cruciform buildings, a drive-through checkout building, and a small unidemified building. The cruciform buildings are located ac the northwest and

southeast ends of the double-fenced area. Each

FIGURE ?. LOCATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON5 STORAGE SITES.

170
7. (Continued)

is ~1 htlavily conscrucied drive-ihrough building

and is encircled Sy a road. Photography of

Sov~:mber l%‘,-+ -rcveakd chat the southeast

cruciform building, \\ilich appeared under consrruclion in June 1962, 1s compieie. 1:~ cruciform buildings, located approximazly 3,250 feet

apar:, are connecred by road. -4 drive-through

checkou: bzildmg (190 by $3 feet) is located

along this road approximately 1, -100 fee: from rhe

southeast cruciform building. .A road wichinme

area paralleis [he inner fence and frames the

area. A small unidcncified building (55 by 30

l-he support a:ua ~on~is[sof~nadminiscraIion building and four support bulldings, -1.!IZ administration building mt’;lsur~s 210 by SO fzet,

three of the support buildings measure S5 by 45

feet, and one support building measures 75 by

4j feet. ILxcep: for EhiS small suppo?arf5a, ;hc

only transporca[ion, communications, and omer

support facilities serving me site are locsred

2.1 nm west ai rkw Ekrdlchcv iies,ional Milirary

S:orage Inscallacion.

COMPARISON WITH DOLON SITE

feet) is locared bec\i’een [he inner and outer

fences on the southwestern side of me area. at krdichev and the Type 111 nuclear weapons

The regional nuclear weapons storage site

32

1900’

2250’

165C’

DRIVE-THROUGH

CHECKOUT

ADMINISTRATION

BUILDING 210’ X 60’

ROIL0 *

4

-FENCE

CLEAREa AREA .___..--

see c SC0 1500

r

FEET IAPPROXI

FIGURE 2. LAYOUT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ;TOR AGE SITE NEAR SERCJICHEV (JUNE 19621.

O N

171
17. (Continued)

FlGURE 3. PLAN AND PERSPECTlVE VlEW OF NORTHW&ST CRUCIFORM BlJlLOlNG AT RfGlONAL NUCLEAR

WEAPONS STORAGE SITE SEAR BERDICHEV, USSR.

FlGURE P. PLAN AND PERSPECTIVE VIEW OF CRUCIFORM BUILDING UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT TYPE 111

NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE SITE AT DOLON AIRFIELD, USSR.

storage site at Dolon Airfield are generally buildings at the two sites is that the drivesimilar. The measurements of the cruciform through section of the northwest cruciform

buildings at Berdichev (measurements for the building at Berdichev is the longer sectionwhile .

northwest building are given in Figure 3j are the drive-through sectionof the cruciform buildclose to tne measurements of the cruciform ing at Dolon is the shorter section.

building at Dolon (given in Figure 4). The The Berdichev and DoIon sites differ in the

measurements at Berdichev, basedon KEYHOLE location of various buildings, particularly the

photography, are less precise than chose at checkout building, and in the layout of security

Dolon, based on TALEXT photography. iMinor

details observed at Dolon are not discernible

fencing. Both sites have adjoining support areas,

but there is variation in the number and dirnenon the small-scale photography of Berdichev. sions of the buiIdings in the areas.

The main difference between the cruciform

172
7. (Continued)

REFEREsCEY

9 +r 60 9 R ‘1170

L 1171

TOP SEC-RETm

3 0 J u n 6 2 03; F\r d 4b TOP ‘ECRET Hl‘fF

XX. ONC-E-1;. 3rd ed. Jun 6 I. scale ;:1,000.000 (CONFIDESTI.kL)

DOCI’VEXTS

- -

REQUIREIIESTS

PROJECT

173
18. CIABWIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, “Search for Uranium Mining in the Vicinity of

A-Ko-Su, China,” August 1963

, , ,* , / / / r s- *. ,/‘, / ,,‘, i I, . .‘,/.X, /.‘////d’J / <*IIs

P

,J,,,d,,d’,,, /

/

/

/

5

/

August 1963 ;. /

/

/

/

/

/

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 5

/

PHOTOGRAPHIC tNTELLIGENCE REPORT

/

5

I

/

/ SEARCH FOR URANIUM MINING i

/

- .,

/

/1 1N l-C-Ii= I I IVlr,lNITV C3F -4 A-KC)-SU_ ,I .m- --I

(1f- ,.llNA

WARNlNG

/

This documanr contains classified informotio

interest of t

rity of the United Stoles within the:

,ond 798. The low prohibits its trons-

‘zed person, os well os it5 use in any

l benefit of any foreign government fd

iolly indoctrinottd and outhorizsd

Its security must be mointoined

to be gained, unie~S

LE and TALENT regulations. No action

d herein, regardless of the advantages

Published and Disseminated by

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER 5

175
18. (Cuntinued)

SEARCH FOR URANIUM MINING

IN THE VICINITY OF A-KO-SU, CHINA

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This report is in response co a request for Sino-Soviet border (Figure 2). X supply base

a search from photography for uranium mining for this activity was not definitely located.

or other activity related to atomic energy within The activity observed near A-ko-su is

a 50-nautical mile (nm) radius of A-ko-su identified as the mining of coal which may

(41- 109 80-16E), Win-chiang Sheng (Sinkiang possibly contain uranium. Lignite deposits are

Province), China (Figure 1). Photography from known to exist in the vicinity of A-ko-su, The

four KEYHOLE missions (December 1960, De- total cumulative production of lignite for the

cember 1961, November 1962, and December period 1959 through 1961 is estimated. from

1962) was examined. The search revealed two photographic evidence at 30,000 to 40,000 metric

areas of mining and prospecting activity locared cons of lignite. If uranium is present, this

approximately 30 co 45 nm northeast of A-ko-su output could yield from 15 to 30 metric tons

in the valleys of the Tien-shan range on the equivalent of uranium oxide !V,O,).

USSR

Ti-hua l

(Urumchj)

Dushanbe.

-..h.

AFGHANISTAN

FIGmE I. AREA OF SEARCH FOR URANIUM MINING.

176
18. (Continued)

Although phorographic evidence of uranium

processing was not observed, the possibility of

uranium extraction cannot be discounted. Some

evidence of extra securiry which is usually

associated with uranium activity was observed

at the mining sites. Observations of some

activity at the mines during periods of snow

cover is evidence of the priority that would be

assigned to uranium extraction.

PHOTOGRAPHIC

The activiry observed in the vicinity of

A-ko-su is located in two areas which are

designated in this report as the Eastern Area

and the Western Area (Figure 2). In rhe

Eastern Area, five mining sites, one prospecting site, a treatment plant, and a possible

explosives magazine were observed, In the

Western Area, three prospecting sites were

observed. For purposes of description, site

numbers have been assigned to identify the

locations of mines and prospects.

Evidence of Mining. The earliest photography (December 1960) of the mining sites

(all in the Eastern Area) showed a cluster of

five mines at Site 5, all apparently in production, and two mines-- one at Site 1 and another

at Site 2--apparently being readied for production. The December 1961 photography revealed all mines in production and the presence

of a higher pile of coa1 refuse, although the pile

covered approximately the same area as it had

in 1960. Track patterns evident acrimesof snow

cover indicated truck traffic on the roads serving

the mines. This also indicated the continuing

operation and development of the mines during

winter.

Accumulation of coal in piles for possible

reprocessing was observed at the treatmenr

plant in the Eastern Area. The stockpiling of

Commercial-grade uraniferous ore deposits

are known to exist on the Soviet side of the

Tien-shan range and the presence of uraniferous coal deposits in the A-ko-su region is

suspected.

OBSERVATIONS

coal at the treatment plant may indicate rhe

possibility that the coal is reprocessed for the

extraction of a by-product. .A by-producr such

as uranium could be produced in such small

quantities that it would elude photographic observation. It could be rransported to a center

wirhouc perceptible traffic indications. Little

or no accumulation of coal or ashes was observed in the towns and villages in the region.

Production Estimate. Based on the observed

accumulation of coal refuse at the treatment

plant, the total cumulative production of coal

in the Eastern Area from 1959 (when digging

probably began) to December 1961 is estimated

at 30,000 to 40,000 metric tons. Coal production for the period December 1960-December

1961 is estimated at 25,000 metric tons. If the

observed mining prospect at Site 2 in the Western

Area is developed into a producing mine, the

area’s annual coal production could increase by

an additional 10,000 metric tons. These estimares do not allow for some local consumption

of coal.

For an estimate of possible uranium yield,

the coal deposits of the A-ko-su area are assumed to resemble other weathered nearsurface deposits of uranium-bearing Jurassic

coals, such as those on the Soviet side of the

border. These deposits may yield from 0.05 to

177
‘.

81’00’

,

\

\

‘-%I

‘,-

, ,ATarlik

\ \ :

POSSIBLE

FltURf 2. AREA.5 OF MINING AND PROSPECTING ACTIVITY NEAR A-K&W, CHINA.

178
0.75 percent U,O, equivalent. This could place

the area’s tota cumulative yield of U,O, equivalent through December 1961 at 15 to 30 metric

tons *Evidence of Security. The areas of mining

activity are locared in remoze valleys. To the

north is an area of high glacier-covered mountains, and to the south, treacherous sands are

found on the alluvial fans at the valIey mouths.

The valleys phvsiographicallv resemble those

emptying on the Fergana Valley of the USSR in

being deep and narrow at their lower ends.

These characteristics permit easy control of

entrance to and egress from a valley and allow

compartmentalization of operations in a valley.

Prison labor could be used ac mine sites in these

valleys with a minimum of control, Prisoners

probably were brought to the mines in 1959 and

1960. Some security precautions were observed

in the Eastern Area. A possible control point

is located on the access road from Jam near

the mouth of the first valley at Abad. Possible

fences were observed at IWO of the mines

[Sires 2 and 5).

Search for a Support Base. A support base

for the observed mining acciviry was not definitely located. Such identifying features as piles

of coal, ashes, or pit props in association with

warehouses were not observed. No laboratorytype building was visible in the Eastern or

Western Areas. Photography of the principal

settlements--A-ko-su, Jam, and Wen-s&-was

examined closely. The activiry at Wen-su,

located in a valley with a steepeasternslope, is

probably local in nature and not related to mining.

A-ko-su is the most likely location for ageneral

support base. Roads from the prospecting and

mining sites converge on A-ko-su, Barnlike

buildings on the eastern outskirts of the town and

on the road to the mining areas may serve a

support function. Traffic in the vicinity ofrhese

buildings, as indicated by patterns in rhe snow,

seemed ro exceed the level expected from local

agricultural activity. However, wincer shelter

for grazing animals may account for the additional activity. Barracks-rvpe buildings on the

large farms (presumably state farms), 21 nm

south-southeast of the mines near dam, may

house adminisixative support for the Eastern

Area, and the farms, located on the northern

edge of the irrigated plains, may supply provisions for the mining settlements.

EASTERN AREA

The Eastern .2rea, located approximately .

39 nm north-northeast of A-ko-su, is the

principal area of mining activity in the region

(Figure 2). A treatment plant and a possible

explosives magazine are centrally locaced with

respect ro the mining and prospecting sites in

the area. Access co the area is by a road from

.Jam 21 nm to the south-southeast, A possible

control point is located 10 nm to the sourhsourheast of the treatment plant on the access

road and near rhe mouth of rhe valley. AI the

times of snow cover the access road appeared

lightly traveled.

Treatment Planr (41-44X 80-42E). This

plant is located at the junction of the access

road from Abad with the road from the norrhwestern (Sites l-3) and northern (Sites 4 and 5)

sites and a road from the norcheasrern site

(Site 6). The plant consists of two small adjoining square buildings identified as mills,

A small pile of waste is located just soath of

each mili, a small rectangular building is

located southeast of each mill, and a possible

storage building is situated east of each mill.

Water is piped to the plant from the river which

flows from the norrhwesr va!ley. However, drymilling and manual removal of waste are apparently prawiced during periods of freeze. The

photography of November and December 1962

179
18. (Cuntinued)

during snow cover indicated char the plant was

probably operating ac a low rate. Tracks in

the snow indicated light traffic on the roads

serving the treatmenr plant. Dust and water

seepage were evident at rhe plant’s coal pile.

Other features observed near the plant include the following: three medium-sizeddormitory-type buildings located just west of the

mills; a small square building identified as a

possible control building located southwest of

the plant on the west side of the access road;

and a motor pool and/or equipment park, including a small rectangular building, located

in a triangular area across the entrance-exit

road.

Possible Explosives Magazine (41-44N 80-

4lE). This facility is located northwest of the

treatment planr off the road to the westernsites

and near the junction with the road tothe norrhwestern sites. Its location on the routebetween

the mines and the treatment plant would allow

trucks to carry return loads of explosives to the

mines. The possible explosives magazine is

secured and road served. Although this facility

appeared on the November 1962 photography to

be inactive, light activity indicating partially

operating mines was observed on the December

1962 photography.

Site 1 (41-43N 80-35E). This site is locared on rhe eastern side of a valley and contains an opencuc mine. A village is located west

of the mine in a valley. The December 1960

photography indicated that the mine was being

readied for production. The site is the western

terminus of a well-traveled road which also

serves Sites 2 and 3. The road was not being

used extensively in 1960. December 1962 photography revealed that the mine had probably been

shut down, although tracks in the snow to the

mine were observed.

Site 2 (41-46N 80-35E). This sitecontains

an open-pit mine, the largest mine in the area.

The terrain of a fenced area eass of the mine

appears broken, apparently caused by slumping

from underground mining. A vilIage is located

south of the mine. The December 1960 photography showed the mine in production. At that

time the road from this site to the rreatment

plant was well traveled. The C&ember 1962

photography revealed a coal pile below the

mine. Tracks in the snow indicating traffic

activity at the mine were observed. The road

from the site to the treatment plant was open,

but the continuation of the road to Site I appeared to be inactive.

Sire 3 (41-45N SO-38E). Site 3 consists

of two small opencuc prospecrs which are Iocared halfway up the west side of a ridge. The

site probably contains only limited reserves of

coal.

Site 4 (41-47N 80-41E). This site contains

a possible opencut mine and a small housing area.

The site is located on a perched upper slope.

It is served by a branch from the well-traveled

road which also serves Site 5. The mine appeared to be inactive on the December 1962

photography, although tracks in the snow to the

mine were discernible.

Site 5 (41-47N SO-42E). This site is the

oldest and best developed mining site in the

area. it ConSiSCS of a large portal mine located on the eastern side of a valley and a

cluster of four small opencut mines located

on the broken western slope of the valley where

faults probabIy limit the availability of reserves.

The portal mine may have large reserves. A

small pile, probably of coal, is observed on the

floor of the narrow valley at the junction of a

loop road serving these mines and the road to

the treatment plant. A possible housing area is

located in the center of the valley. A possible

guard fence, with guard rowers, crosses the

valley below the mines and the possible housing

area. A fence partially encloses the portal mine.
18. (Cuntinued)

Lack of heavy traffic patterns on the road toward

the treatment plant at the time of snow cover

suggests that coal produced was being stockpiled

at the site, The December 1962photographyrevealed that the four opencut mines were inactive.

Tracks in the snow to the mines showed maintenance activity was in progress.

Site 6 (41-49N 80-466). Site 6 contains

three small opencut mines located halfway up the

eastern slope of a ridge. Each mine is served by

a steep, well-defined trail. Scattered settlements are located 3 nm down the valley. The

December 1962 photography indicated that the

mines were inactive, although tracks in the snow

10 the mine were observed.

WESTERN AREA

The Western Area, located approximately 34

nm north of A-ko-su, contains chreeprospeccing

sites (Figure 2). A prospect at one of the sites

(Site 2) is being developed for a mine. The sites

are served by two separate trails. Routes

suitable for vehicle use have been observed.

Site 1 (41-42X 80-15E). Site 1 contains a

prospect located in a mountain meadow, and

numerous trails leading to cliffs indicate other

prospecting activity. Three rows of unidentified

objects, possibly huts or stacks of supplies,

were observed in a valley west of the prospect.

Ten small setclements near the site serve as

centers for farming and prospecting. The

principal traii serving the site leads southward

through the village of Fakalik where it becomes

a secondary road leading to the east side of

A-ko-su.

Site 2 (41-44N 80-20E). Site 2 contains an

opencut prospect which is being cleared fox an

open-pit mine. This prospect is located at the

foot of the western side of a low mountain. Trails

lead up the broken slopes of the mountain to small

prospects. On the November 1962 photography

at the time of snow cover, the prospect appeared

as a small dark area, and tracks connected it with

a village around the mountain. The December

1962 photography revealed a much wider and

darker area at the prospect.

Site 3 (41-44N 80-21E). Site 3 contains

five irreguIarly shaped opencut prospects which

are located halfway up the eastern side of the

mountain. A trail connecrs this site with a small

settlement in the valley.

BACKGROUND

According to a Soviet geologist, V. M. velopments indicated that initial geological work

Sinitsyn, geological reconnaissance of the north- and prospecting were probably in progress by

western part of the Tarim Basin began in 1942- 1958, if not earlier.

43. 31 Geological field work continued intermittently until 1952-53 when localized detailed

studies were carried out. In 1953 Sinitsyn pxepared a geological map of the region as a guide

to prospecting, and during 1955-56 he drafted a

report on the region. 3/

Photography of December 1960 showed char 1956-1957 the accumulation of coal shown by the

roads had been built from A-ko-su northward to 1960 reconnaissance indicates that miners were

the mining areas and that opencut mining and brought to the mines by 1959- 1960. The presence

treatment of coal had been started. These de- of contro1 points and fences in a mountainous
18. (Continued)

region indicates the miners probably are prisoners

The usual prospecting pracrice of Trenching, pitting, and drilling was not seen at the

prospects near A-ko-su. In order to confirm

the size and extent of the deposits exposed at a

likely prospect, the exposure of the outcrop is

widened by digging away the overburden.

GEOLOGY OF THE A-KO-SU REGION

The geology of the Sino-Soviet border region

supports the possibiliry chat uranium is present

in the ores mined near .A-ko-su. The valleys

where mining is observed near A-ko-su are

geologically contemporaneous and lithologically

similar to those emptying on the Fergana Valley

in the USSR where lignite coal of the Jurassic

geological age is mined. Likewise, at KadzhiSay, USSR, northwest of A-ko-su, lignires alsoof

Jurassic age have been described. 41 The

A-ko-su, Fergana VaIley, and the Kadzhi-Say

regions are seen on photography ro have deeply

eroded east /west throughgoing fault zones.

Such fault or crush zones would facilitate the

descent of uraniferous ground water. The

broken or faulted lignite seams would provide

a reducing environment for the precipitation of

the uranium from the percolating ground water.

The coal seams north of A-ko-su are broken by

a series of north/south faults whose crushedrock zones have been enlarged by swiftly flowing

rivers. The broken and faulted character ofthe

A-ko-su mining region limits a knowledge ofthe

reserves and makes prospecting and mining

costly and uncertain. Sinicsyn concluded that

special work would show the location of the coalbearing zones. m He stated that the eastern or

Kuche (Kuchar) coal basin which includes the

X-ko-su region is the counterpart of the western

or Yarkand-Fergana basin which extends from

southern Hsin-chiang Sheng (Sinkiang) into Ihe

USSR. The appearance from photography of the

region north of h-ko-su agrees with Sinitsyn’s

brief generalized geological description.

182
18. (Cuntinued)

REFERENCES

PHGTOGR.4PBY

Mission

9013

Date Pass

9 Dee 60 22

Camera Framer

157.160

Classification

TOP SECRET RUFF

9029

9048

9050

15 Dee 61 38 90 TOP SECRET RUFF

23 Nov 69 70 Fwd 190-193 TOP SECRET RUFF

.A It 194-196

15 Dee 61 D5l Fwd SG-a9 TOP SECRET RUFF

Aft 90-93

MAPS OR CHARTS

AM. Serves ESPG-I, Sheet X-4-1-6. 1st ed, Aug 62. scale 1250.000 (TOP SECRET RUFF)

ACIC. US Air target Chart, Series 800, Sheet 0399-194. Jun 39: scale 1:300.000 (SECRET)

ACIC. WAC 399. Jui 59. scale 1:1,000,000 (COSFIDESTLAL)

US Geol Sum. Geologic Map of Chinn. Place 4.~. 7 Binder 2. Part IV (China and ?;orth Korea), Uranium and

Thcmum Resources of Communist Countries series, Jan 55 (SECRET)

US Geol Surv. !4ap of Coal Basins 21 and 22. Fegana Uraniferous Province. Plate Z-is: Binder 4, Part II

(USSR), Uranium and Thorium Resources of Communlsc Countries series. Aug 5-l (SECRET)

3. Sinitsyn, V. bi. Northwest Part of the Tarim Basin (Severo-Zapadnaya Chast Tarimskovo Basseyna),

Geological Institute, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Wxcow. 1957 (USCLr\SSlFIED)

REQUIREMENT

PROJECT NU?vIBER

183