I 

US Army Engineer School 

573-563-8080 I D$N 676-8080 

COMMANDANT
 

MG R.L. Van Antwerp
 

563-6116 

«ronen.vana ntwerp 1@us.army.m/I> 

INCOMING COMMANDANT
 

MG Randal R. Castro
 

563-6116 

<randal.castro@us.army m l> 

ASSISTANTCOMMANDANT
 

BG William H. McCoy, Jr.
 

563-6192 

<lVllllam.h.mccoy @us.army.mil> 

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
 

CSM Clinlon J. Pearson
 

563-8060 

<clinton.pearson @us.army.mll> 

DEPUTYASSISTANTCOMMANDANT
 

COL John (Pat) Leak e
 

563-8080 

<pat.leake @us.arrny.mll> 

DEPUTYASSISTANTCOMMANDANT-USAR
 

COL Gerald Lago
 

563-8045 

<gerald lago@us army.mil> 

DEPUTYASSISTANTCOMMANDANT-ARNG
 

LTC Denn is V. Smith
 

563-8046 

<dennis.v.smlth@ us.army mll> 

CHIEF of STAFF
 

LTC Paul Grosskruger
 

563-7116 

<pauI.grosskruger@us.army.mil> 

COMMANDER, 151ENGINEER BRIGADE 

COL Paul W, Kelly 

596-0224, DSN 581·0224 

<paul.w.keJly @us army.mrl> 

TRADOC SYSTEMS MANAG ER tor ASSURED MOBILITY 

COL Robert Nicholson 

563-4081 

<robel1.ntChOlson @us.army mt/> 

COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS CENTER 

LTC Thomas T. Quigley 

596-0131 , ext. 38 142 

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COL David A. Kingston 

563-4086 

<david kmgston @us.army.mil> 

DIRECTOR of FUTURES and CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT 

COL Everett McDaniel 

563-4076
 

<everetf.mcdanie/@us army.m il>
 

CHIEF OF DOCTRINE 

LTC Edward Letler 

563-7537 

<edward.lefler@us.army.mi!> 

DIRECTOR of TRAINING and LEADER DEVELOPMENT 

COL Thomas E. O'Donovan 

563-4093 

<thomas.odonovan @us.armymll> 

DIRECTOR of ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION 

Dr. Rebecca N. Johnson 

563-4119 

<rebeccaj ohnson@us.army.mil> 

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General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

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#~~ B. HUDSON 

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0123204 

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ENGI

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

NEER

 Engineer 1

COMMANDANT

Major General

R.L. Van Antwerp

July-September 2004

DEPARTMENTS

02 Clear the Way

By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

03 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major Clinton J. Pearson

36 Enlisted Personnel Notes - “Reclassification of

Soldiers in Selected MOSs”

By Major Ruben Matos

FEATURES

04 Assured Mobility in the Army’s First Stryker Brigade

 By Major Heath C. Roscoe and Captain Kenneth Dean Mitchell

08 Noncommissioned Officer Education System Structure Redesign

 By Command Sergeant Major Clinton J. Pearson

09 Engineer Battalion Headquarters Company Operations

 By Captain Jerry McDaniel

13 Task Force Able Supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom

By Colonel Christopher J. Toomey

18 Engineer Mine Detection Dogs

By Mr. James Pettit and Captain Ronald J. Hughes

21 Operation Tunnel: Confined-Space Operations Within the Tunnels

of Chicago

By Captain David Noble and Captain James Allen

26 Security Operations in Support of the Divisional Rear Area

By Captain Bryan K. Sizemore and Master Sergeant James Duncan

29 The Engineer Command and Staff Course: A New Era

of Leader Development

By Major Craig Jolly

30 Army’s Top Deployers Receive Excellence Awards

By Mr. Henry H. Johnson

32 The Engineer Small-Group Leader

By Major Chris A. Parks

34 The Survey Experience During Operation Iraqi Freedom

By First Lieutenant Vilen Ayvazov and Captain Aaron Wolf

July-September 2004 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 34 PB 5-04-3

37 Engineer Safety - “Hazards of Crystalline Silica”

By Mr. Fred Fanning

38 Past In Review - “Terror on Flight 847”

By Major Ron Eschmann

UNITED STATES ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

Back Cover:

The Soldier’s Creed

Front Cover:

US Army engineer

soldier photos by

Department of Defense

Imagery Service –

Combat Camera

Jennifer Morgan

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

MANAGING EDITOR

Shirley Bridges

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Nancy Baker

Karin Gan

Cheryl Green

Penny Moats

Kathy Webber
2 Engineer July-September 2004

Clear The Way

By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

Commandant, US Army Engineer School

Greetings once again from Fort

Leonard Wood. Our stay here was

extended a few months, and Paula and

I are thankful for the extra time with the Soldiers here at the home of the Engineer Regiment. We will give it our best for as long as the

Army wants us to be here. We talk often about

Soldiers needing to be agile and adaptive, and now

we get a chance to model it. Major General Randy

Castro and his wife Judy are ready to go as soon as

our change-of-command date is approved. Randy

is assigned as Acting Commander of Accessions

Command until the changeover.

Congratulations to all you sappers now authorized to wear the tab and to our Regimental

Command Sergeant Major for this great achievement in recognition. I’ll let him tell you the details,

but I couldn’t be prouder.

For you new commanders who haven’t had a chance to hear

me talk about priorities, here goes: support for the war; initialentry training—the top priority in training (meet the standards,

and fully resource it); training and leader development—all initial

military training; recruiting and retaining the force; transformation; and joint relationships.

If you have any questions about these or other areas within the

Regiment, send your requests and questions here, and we will work

the issues. You will see some new names on the Fort Leonard Wood

team in this issue, and they come ready to contribute to the fight.

My philosophy is that we need to continually work the mission and

resources to find the balance and to get the “walnuts” done first and

well. Where we have resource issues, we will make decisions in light

of the priorities. I would rather “do less with less, but do it much

better” than “do more with less.” Sticking to excellence in basic

fundamentals proves its worth in our training base as well as it does

in our units.

The Army is changing, and many of you are in the midst of this

change. I want to share some of my thoughts with you about this

time in our Regiment. It’s clear that this is the right time to change

our Army and get positioned for the future—the resources, the focus, and the support enabling change are all in place. The sense is

that it will take the next couple of years to get the big pieces in place.

At the same time, we are incorporating as much as we can from the

Future Force template into today’s force.

It’s exciting to see the direction the Army is

going. We are well on our way to increasing the

number of Brigade Combat Teams to 43 in the

Active Component. We are on our way toward

growing the active force by 30,000 Soldiers, a

job that will require all of us to be recruiters

and retainers—a very important job. The Army

is moving in the right direction to make today’s

force more ready for tomorrow’s challenges.

We are growing the Army and paying for it out

of go-to-war dollars. If we have to increase the

end strength even more we will, but that means

we have to recruit it and train it.

Dr. Lenny Wong has written an article on

“agile and adaptive” leaders and what the war

has done to build these characteristics into our

junior leaders. You can find a link to it on the

Engineer School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/eschool>. Our

challenge here at Fort Leonard Wood is to make sure our young leaders

and Soldiers don’t lose sight of what’s key to success. We are looking at

ways to empower them and allow them to retain ownership for their

education and actions.

We are also working to build the “go-to-war and sustain-ourselves-during-war” mentality. In our initial-entry training environment, we need to get rid of administrative time-outs when we are

going to the field and practice what our Soldiers are experiencing

when deployed. We will work improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

into the field scenarios as much as possible. Convoys need to train

like combat patrols because that is what they have become. Every

movement on the battlefield is a combat operation. I ask you to

remember this in your training exercises at home station and our

combat training centers as well. As we incorporate the 40 warrior

tasks and 9 battle drills into our standardized training here, we keep

one statistic in mind: approximately half of the casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom are 21 years old or younger. Many were Soldiers

trained in initial-entry training last year. We need to constantly reinforce what right looks like, incorporating “values” into training.

VOTE! The Army voice is important, so please work hard to get

everyone in a position to vote—either in person or by absentee

ballot.

As I close, I am honored to remember the engineer Soldiers we

have lost. God bless you all.

Specialist Joshua Bunch 91st Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas

Private First Class Samuel Brown 216th Engineer Battalion, Hamilton, Ohio

Private First Class Ryan Martin 216th Engineer Battalion, Hamilton, Ohio

First Lieutenant Charles Wilkins III 216th Engineer Battalion, Hamilton, Ohio
Lead The Way

By Command Sergeant Major Clinton J. Pearson

US Army Engineer School

July-September 2004 Engineer 3

I

t has been a very productive and busy

quarter for our Regiment, our Army, and

our Soldiers serving our nation at war

around the world. Proof of this was seen during

a recent visit to the 2d Infantry Division sappers

in Korea (Engineer Brigade, 44th Engineer Battalion, 2d Engineer Battalion, 82d Combat Support Equipment Company, 50th Engineer Company, US Forces Korea Engineer Command, 33d

and 85th Engineer Detachments [Terrain]).

They’re doing a fantastic job, especially those

preparing to deploy to Iraq.

Additional proof of outstanding work was

evident during the Commandant’s VTC on

5 August when the Engineer School leadership

heard issues from the command teams of most

of our deployed units as well as those that are

preparing to deploy. As a result of this VTC, there are many issues

that we are working, and I’d like to address the most pressing ones:

approval of the sapper leader tab, the Sapper Leader Course, and the

Urban Mobility Breachers Course. Another important issue, the

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) Structure

Redesign (from a four-tier to a three-tier system), is discussed on

page 8. It is my pledge to ensure that we continue to provide firstclass training to a first-class NCO Corps.

The Chief of Staff of the Army approved the creation of the

sapper leader tab on 28 June 2004. The policy should be incorporated into the next revision of Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-22,

Military Awards, and AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army

Uniforms and Insignia, as appropriate, hopefully within the next 90

days. The tab may be awarded retroactively to any person who

successfully completed the Sapper Leader Course after June 1985.

Soldiers who obtain a minimum of 700 points are considered a graduate of the course and are authorized to wear the tab.

For officers and NCOs interested in earning their sapper leader

tab, there are many options available to attend the course. Select

Engineer Officer Basic Course students with follow-on assignments

to light units will have the opportunity to attend the course immediately following graduation. A new initiative will soon allow NCOs in

the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC)/Advanced

Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) to attend the course

immediately upon graduation, with chain-of-command approval.

Soldiers identified to attend must be input into the Army Training

Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) in order to be authorized to remain here at Fort Leonard Wood an additional 25 days

following graduation from BNCOC/ANCOC. This can be done at

the unit level prior to the beginning of school, or it can be done here

at Fort Leonard Wood with the assistance of the NCO Academy

leadership. Those who are deployed in support

of the war can attend in a TDY status when

redeployed, with chain-of-command approval.

As you can see, all options present additional

opportunities for professional development, as

well as allow the Army greater opportunity to

educate, train, and prepare leaders to succeed if

called upon to execute specialized sapper skills.

By the way, let me remind you that during ENFORCE, we announced the first “Best Sapper

Competition,” which will kick off in April 2005.

I challenge you to send the best of the best for

this super competition!

I also challenge you to take advantage of

another initiative positively affecting the Engineer Regiment’s NCOES. Select NCOs are now

being afforded the opportunity to attend the

Urban Mobility Breachers Course, conducted by the US Marine

Corps Engineer School at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. We have

selected two NCOs from the 588th Engineer Battalion, 4th Infantry

Division, and one NCO from the 307th Engineer Battalion, 82d

Airborne Division, to attend Class 01-04 on 4–26 October 2004.

Upon graduation, they will be reassigned to Fort Leonard Wood,

with duty at Camp LeJeune. These NCOs will serve as Interservice

Training Review Organization (ITRO) instructors, augmenting the

training of Army personnel attending the course. All class dates have

been loaded in ATRRS, with the next class scheduled for 31 January–18 February 2005. We have 15 slots per class, as requested by

units. The course will consist of 120 hours of in-depth explosive

theories, urban reconnaissance, employment of urban breaching assets—including explosive, manual, and ballistic breaching techniques

for urban operations—and use of Current Force equipment. To attend this course, you must meet the requirements in DA Pam

611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, and AR

600-9, The Army Weight Control Program; be a combat engineer in

grade E-5 (P) through E-7 and a graduate of combat engineer BNCOC;

have no pending Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) actions

and no limiting profile.

It’s important that everyone accept and adapt to these changes.

Today’s Army is very different from yesterday’s Army. Change is

essential to survival. As the Chief of Staff of the Army insists, “We

have to [change] some of the things that made us the best Army in

the world...but everything else is on the table.” Subsequently, we

must reconsider and challenge our most deep-seated institutional

practices to better serve our Army and our nation. This means retaining practices that make sense and implementing initiatives where

necessary to increase our ability to successfully respond in today’s

Army. Essayons!
4 Engineer July-September 2004

The 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, the Army’s first

Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), deployed from

its home station in November 2003 for Operation Iraqi

Freedom. After training at Camp Udairi, Kuwait, the brigade

moved into Iraq and conducted combat operations in the Salah

al-Din province (Ad Duluiyah, Balad, and Samarra), located in

the Sunni Triangle, and later moved north to the Ninevah

province (Mosul and Tall Afar). Due to the complex nature of

the conflict in Iraq, the brigade is conducting stability

operations and support operations concurrently with combat

operations. The enemy’s ability to affect mobility with the use

of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was anticipated. With

the organic and attached engineer units and the assured

mobility framework, the brigade has been able to effectively

deal with the IED threat to its mobility in the city of Mosul.

Engineers in the SBCT

The engineers in the SBCT are a large part of assuring

its mobility. Engineers organic to the SBCT are the

Brigade Engineer Section and the 18th Engineer

Company, while the 276th Engineer Battalion (Corps)

(Wheeled) and the 744th Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Company are attached for general support.

Brigade Engineer Section

The Brigade Engineer Section consists

of an operations/planning cell and a

brigade terrain team. The cell integrates all

of the engineer battlefield functions

(mobility, survivability [force protection],

countermobility, topographic engineering,

and general engineering). The terrain team

provides standard and nonstandard terrain

products and tactical decision-making aids.

These products, critical to the targeting

process, help commanders at all levels

visualize the terrain and assist them in

making decisions on the employment of

SBCT assets.

18thEngineer Company

The primary focus of the 18th Engineer

Company is tactical mobility. It consists of

a headquarters section, three mobility

platoons, and a mobility support platoon.

Its mission is to detect and prevent

emplacement of IEDs by patrolling the main

routes in the city of Mosul. The engineer

anti-IED patrol is a platoon mission. The

By Major Heath C. Roscoe and Captain Kenneth Dean Mitchell

Assured Mobility in the Army’s First

Stryker Brigade

An ESV with slat armor
July-September 2004 Engineer 5

mobility platoons have a full complement of

necessary engineering equipment, with the

engineer squad vehicle (ESV) at the center.

However, platoon leaders in the company

currently have up-armored, high-mobility

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs)

instead of ESVs. The brigade is working

through the Department of the Army Review

Team process to add ESVs to the mobility

platoon leader position. The engineer antiIED patrol will soon receive new systems to

prevent remote detonation of IEDs, and new

equipment training for these systems is

currently being conducted. Since IEDs seem

to be the weapon of choice for the enemy,

modification of the ESV to add the counterremote-controlled IED is important.

276th Engineer Battalion and 744th EOD

Company

The primary focus of the 276th Engineer Battalion is

supporting the maneuver battalions with mobility, survivability,

and general engineering. The brigade has task-organized

sapper platoons in a direct-support role to all five maneuver

battalions. This provides an engineer reserve to respond to

priority force protection projects. The 276th uses the Meerkat

and Husky to detect and neutralize mines and IED threats in

remote sectors of the area of operations. The company also

provides the 744th EOD Company with mobility and security

while responding to IEDs and caches throughout Mosul. An

IED response force and a cache response force for the brigade

consists of a platoon from the 276th and an EOD team. The

cache response force has the haul capability required for large

finds of captured enemy ammunition or arms.

Assured Mobility in Action

Assured mobility encompasses those actions that give

the force commander the ability to deploy, move, and

.maneuver where and when desired, without

interruption or delay, to achieve the mission. The imperatives

and fundamentals of assured mobility are a relatively new

doctrinal framework. These fundamentals enable friendly

forces to exploit superior situational awareness and situational

understanding, gaining unsurpassed freedom of movement.

This framework describes the processes that enable the

commander to see first, understand first, act first, and finish

decisively.

1

 The six fundamentals of assured mobility are—

 Predict—predict the ability of the enemy to impact

maneuver.

 Detect—use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to identify the emplacement and

location of obstacles. ISR assets can also be used to

identify solutions and alternate courses of action.

 Prevent—act early to prevent obstacles from affecting

maneuver.

 Avoid—choose alternate routes to avoid the obstacle.

 Neutralize—reduce the obstacle if avoidance is not

possible.

 Protect—protect soldiers, equipment, and the mission from

enemy countermobility effects.

Predict

Prediction is a function of brigade-level staff action,

coordination, and analysis. The brigade engineer, along with

the S2, must accurately predict potential enemy impediments

to mobility. They analyze the enemy’s countermobility

capability and effects. The primary method used to impede

mobility in Iraq is the IED. Materials for IEDs are readily

available throughout the country, and anti-Iraqi forces train

resistance elements in the construction and employment of

IEDs. The purpose of IEDs is to kill or wound US and coalition

soldiers and destroy vehicles. A secondary effect is that the

route must be closed while an IED is properly neutralized,

which disrupts civilian and military traffic. In a city of 1.8 million

people, stopping traffic on a main route has major effects.

The brigade staff works to understand the enemy’s

tactics, techniques, and procedures; capability; and evolution in order to understand the effects it can have on

mobility. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) kept

records of IED incidents since its arrival in June 2003, and

the SBCT continued this historical data. The brigade

engineer, along with the S2, analyzed the data and predicted

the most likely emplacement times and locations. Using this

data, the staff was able to coordinate the engineer effort,

ISR collection activity, and maneuver forces to effectively

counter the threat. But the targeted areas, emplacement

times, construction, and trigger mechanisms continue to

change, making it imperative to continually analyze the data

and alter the brigade’s efforts.

A HMMWV with a steel ballistic shield
6 Engineer July-September 2004

 Detect

The SBCT detects explosive hazards before the enemy can

inhibit mobility or cause harm to US and coalition forces. This

is done using the different maneuver and ISR assets embedded

in the brigade: engineer anti-IED patrols, infantry patrols,

observation posts, human intelligence sources, signal

intelligence sources, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

Squadron. SBCT engineers also provided additional training

to maneuver, military police, and host nation forces to increase

effectiveness in identifying and detecting IEDs. There are three

phases during which an IED can be detected:

 During emplacement

 While emplaced but not detonated

 After detonation

All three have some impact on mobility and must be addressed

separately.

Detection During Emplacement. The SBCT aggressively

conducts anti-IED patrols with the infantry battalions and

engineer anti-IED patrols during likely emplacement times

identified by the brigade staff. Some areas along the routes

have been identified as high risk, or named areas of interest,

during the predict process. Because of coalition presence, the

enemy found it difficult to prepare and set up an IED. Ordnance

has been found inside suspicious vehicles stopped by antiIED patrols and at flash tactical control points. In addition,

Iraqis report suspicious activity and devices to the Iraqi police,

who respond with their own civil defense EOD team. These

IEDs are detected early and prevented with an aggressive

presence and human intelligence gathering. Detecting an IED

during this phase has minimal impact on the mobility of the

brigade.

Detection While Emplaced but not Detonated. Anti-IED

patrols sometimes find partially set up IEDs. But anti-Iraqi

forces are starting to produce and emplace “pop-and-drop”

IEDs that significantly reduce emplacement time. The engineer

anti-IED patrols use technology to their advantage. The

thermal capability of the ESV, night vision goggles, and

spotlights with infrared filters allow engineer soldiers to detect

possible emplacement locations. The engineer anti-IED patrol

varies security patrol times, routes, and direction of travel to

support maneuver operations and prevent predictability. The

brigade uses OH-58D helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles

to detect enemy activity in high-risk areas. Upon finding a

potential IED, the Buffalo mine-protected vehicle is used to

investigate with its robotic arm. When the Buffalo is not

available, a Packbot or a MATILDA robot is used to confirm

or deny potential IEDs. Using these devices reduces the risk

to soldiers and false-alarm responses of EOD assets. When

an IED is detected, the roads are closed as maneuver forces

secure the area to ensure that the “triggerman” is not nearby.

The IED response force then neutralizes the threat. Because

the brigade can quickly transfer information through the Force

XXI Battle Command–Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System,

the IED does not impact mobility.

Detection After Detonation. At this phase, the IED

detonates on US or coalition forces. The Stryker vehicles are

remarkably tough and resilient, resulting in very little damage

Strykers roll off the boat in Kuwait
July-September 2004 Engineer 7

to equipment or soldiers. The brigade has made an effort to

protect unarmored vehicles with add-on armor kits. Depending

on the operating tempo (OPTEMPO), the IED response force

can conduct a post-blast analysis. If vehicles are damaged or

personnel are injured, maneuver forces must close the roads

temporarily and secure the site until recovery or medical assets

can respond.

Prevent

To prevent enemy placement of IEDs, infantry and engineer

anti-IED forces patrol continuously, especially in front of critical

soft logistical convoys. Soldier competence and alertness, coupled

with mounted crew-served weapons and hardening of softskinned vehicles, make a more aggressive and less enticing target

for the enemy. Anti-Iraqi forces usually do not detonate an IED

on convoys with overwhelming firepower and an aggressive

stance, but will wait until a softer target comes along. Thus, the

posture of a convoy is a large component of preventing the

detonation of prepared and emplaced IEDs.

The SBCT also prevents IED emplacement through seizure

of caches throughout the city and securing critical ammunition

supply points within the area of operations. Reducing the

amount of ordnance available to bomb makers is a key

component of prevention.

Finally, and most importantly, preventing the enemy from

impeding mobility in the first place requires successful

targeting. The best way to prevent IEDs is to capture or kill

the bomb makers. ISR assets are tasked and focused on

gathering intelligence on these high-payoff targets. An entire

enemy IED cell was captured in early March, which was

followed by a significant decrease in IEDs for a while. The

institutional knowledge to construct the devices and emplace

them was lost. However, those caught are soon replaced by

others, and the brigade must continue to aggressively target

these individuals.

Avoid

A route-status tracker is

used to inform higher and

subordinate elements on the

threat conditions for the routes

in the area of operations. This

tracker, an element of the

common operational picture

(COP), is updated daily and

briefed to the commander. This

tool is used to plan and execute

convoys and combat missions

and avoid areas with IEDs.

When an IED is identified or

detonated, it is immediately

reported to the brigade tactical

operations center. The unit

reporting the IED sends a

contact report that contains

critical IED information and a

request for EOD support. The unit also populates the FBCB2

System with the location of the IED and blocked locations

along the route, allowing military units and convoys to avoid

the hazard. All brigade convoys patrol with an operational

FBCB2 System. With the superior situational awareness and

situational understanding given by the digital systems and

the COP, units see the threat in real time and are able to avoid

the affected area, thereby limiting the IED impact on brigade

mobility.

Neutralize

Because Mosul is a large city and traffic is already severely

congested, it is important to remove the hazard as soon as

possible and get civilian traffic moving again. The SBCT

created the IED response force for this reason. Its task and

purpose is to neutralize IEDs as soon and as safely as possible

to allow unrestricted movement of combat forces. The unit

that finds an IED or the maneuver unit that owns the battlespace

secures the site and keeps civilians and other military traffic

away from the hazard area. Once the IED response force arrives,

it makes a quick assessment, neutralizes the hazard, and

reopens the route. Iraqi police, in conjunction with the local

civil defense EOD team, responds to IEDs reported by Iraqis

and only requests US EOD support if the IED is beyond their

capability. This host nation’s capability greatly reduces the

OPTEMPO of brigade EOD forces.

The 744th and 276th did not come to the brigade equipped

with digital systems, so they had no means to see the brigade

COP and react in real time to incidents. This ability speeds up

response time and allows them to avoid threats en route to a

mission. The brigade reallocated FBCB2 Systems from organic

SBCT vehicles to give them this capability; however, nonequipped forces should be fielded with compatible digital

systems.

The Buffalo mine-protected vehicle
Protect 

Protecting the brigade soldiers from the effects of IEDs has 

been a priorit y of the commander since Day One . The force 

moderni zation cell from the brigade has aggre ssively pursued 

ways to add force protection to brigade soft-skinned vehicles . 

The Army has come up with excellent kits for this purpose. 

But until these kits now to the units, they must look for interim 

fixes by pur chasing stee l and Kevlar® blankets. 

The equipme nt given to soldie rs has improved as well. 

Ballistic eye protection, small arms prot ective insert (SAP I) 

plat es, hatch operator gloves, knee and elbow pads, adva nce 

combat helmets. and medic al battle packs are in the possession 

of each soldier. Items at the squ ad and higher leve ls includ e 

ratchet-type tourniquets, SKEDCO litters, Israeli litters, "jaws 

of life" extraction tools, combat lifesaver bags at the fire team 

level, intrasquad radios, and modu lar integrated conununication 

headsets tha t filter out noise and prevent hearing loss. These 

items have all provided protec tion to soldiers duri ng lED 

inci de nts . The SBCT continues to look fo r addit io nal 

commerc ial, off-the-shelftec hnology to increase vehicle force 

protection and soldier surv ivability. 

Conclusion 

Assure d mobility is a proacti ve process that, instead of 

reactin g to the ene my, allow s us to predict, detect, prevent, 

avoid, neutralize, and prote ct. This processrequiresthe brigade 

staff and all units to conduct detailed planning-incorporating 

th e ass ure d mobility fundament al s-to ens ure th at our 

soldiers remain safe and the mission is accomplished according 

to the commander 's intent. III 

Maj or Roscoe is the brigade eng ineer. 3d Briga de, 2d 

Inf antry Di vision (SBCTj, deployed in support of Operation 

Iraq i Fre edo m. His pa st assignments include Commande r; 

2d Eng ineer Bat talio n, 2d Infa ntry Division, Korea. and 

instructor at the United Sta tes Military Academy. He is a 

gradua te of th e United Sta tes Mili ta ry A ca demy and 

Command and General StaffCollege and holds a master's in 

environ men tal eng in ee ring (rom P en n sy lvania Sta te 

University. 

Ca pta in M it chell is th e Co mmander, 18t h Eng ineer 

Company, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Di vision (SBCT), deployed 

in support ofOperation Traqi Freedom. His past assignments 

inclu de assistant brigade engineer, 3d Brigade, 2d Inf antry 

Division (SBCT), and assignments at the 864th Engineer 

Battalion (Combat) (Hea vy) and the 37th Engin eer Battalion 

(Comba t) (Airbo rne). Captain Mitch ell holds a master's in 

structura l engineering from Stanford Univ ersity. 

Endnote 

JField Manual 3-34, Engine er Operations, 2 January 2004, 

Chapter 3. Section II, paragraph 3-40 , page 3-11 . 

8 Eng ine er 

Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System 

Structure Redesign 

By Command Sergeant Maj or Clinton 1. Pearson 

T Oday's Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES) is a four-tiered, rigid, task-based system 

designed aro und a S el ect-Train-Promote model, 

instead of preparing NCOs for a wid e range of assignments 

and missions that are enco untered on today's battlefield. With 

recent modernization and transformation efforts, the need to 

redesign our NCO ES is obvio us. We must meet the requirement s of leaders in full-spectrum operations, align the criti cal 

developmental transition points in a leader's career with the 

Army ' s assignme nt process, supple ment force stability 

initia tives, and incorporate a system that operates in concert 

with a modul ar force . The NCOES must remain focused on 

core areas- including leading. training , maintaining standards. 

caring for Soldiers. technical competencies, and taetical warrior 

skills-while integrating additional training on conceptual and 

interpersonal skills. 

Modernization efforts are being coordinated with the Center 

for Army Leadership (CAL), using a two-phased approach . 

Phase I consists of nea r-term change s affecting current Basic 

Noncom mis sioned Officer Course (BNCOC)/Adv anced 

Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANC OC) classes. Phase J[ 

co nsists of shifti ng from the current four-tiered system to the 

new three-tiered system. It focuses on leadership development 

and the Warrior Ethos, keeping the responsibility of teachin g 

technical skills with proponent schools/ce nters, and is not an 

integral component of the common core. 

Tier 1, the Warrior Leaders Course (WLC), is for all E-4$ 

with promotion potential. This course trains specia lists to be 

NCOs and focuses on leading , training, main taining standards, 

caring for soldiers, and tactical warrior skills. The WLC prepares Soldiers for assignments in teams, crew s, and squads. 

Potentially, graduating Soldiers will be laterall y transferred to 

corporal upon graduation. Onl y corpo rals are eligible for 

recommendation to sergeant. 

Tier 2, the Intermediate Leaders Course (ILe), is for E-6 s 

with pr om otion pot ential. This co urs e is non-military 

occupational specialty (MOS) specific and trains the staff 

sergeant in skills requisite for all MOSs. It prepares individuals 

to be the primary trainers, operating in a plato on and compa ny 

e nv iro nme nt. Course co m ple tio n is a prerequi si te for 

consideration for promotion selection to sergea nt firs t class. 

Tier 3, the Senior Leaders Course (SLC), is for promotable 

E-7s, E-8s, and sister serv ice E-8 equiva lents. This course 

repl aces the Sergeants Major Cou rse (SMC) in its present 

form and will prepare master sergeants to function within 

battalions, brigade combat teams, and unit ofemployment (UE) 

organizations. Completion of this course is a prerequi site for 

promotion to sergeant major. 

July-September 2004 

III 
July-September 2004 Engineer 9

Engineer Battalion Headquarters

Company Operations

By Captain Jerry McDaniel

Operation Iraqi Freedom has provided many

opportunities for soldiers and units, from all military

specialties, to operate outside of their normal lanes.

Engineers soon learned that they had to adapt to emerging

doctrine, assuming roles and missions not normally envisioned

and learning to function as engineer teams and task forces.

Even headquarters elements, such as Headquarters and

Support Company (HSC), 203d Engineer Battalion (Combat)

(Heavy), had to adapt to the new environment. HSC, 203d—a

Missouri Army National Guard unit based in Joplin, Neosho,

and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—deployed to Iraq in May

2003, serving there until early July 2004. Initially assigned to the

130th Engineer Brigade, the 203d was later attached to the 493d

Engineer Brigade, 1st Armored Division, an Army Reserve unit

from Dallas, Texas, whose area of operation was the greater

Baghdad area.

Missions

T.

he HSC mission was to provide personnel, operations,

supply, food service, communications, medical maintenance, and heavy equipment support to the rest of

the 203d. In addition to being involved in almost every task

assigned to the battalion, HSC was often deployed as a fourth

maneuver element and undertook combat operations normally

assigned to a combat engineer unit rather than a construction

unit.

Support Missions

Within 48 hours of arrival, and during base camp construction, the company was on support missions in the city:

the Baghdad Zoo reopening, trash cleanup, and an ongoing

series of force protection and quality-of-life improvements for

the units located in the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP)

area. These support missions included removing tons of scrap

metal; placing hundreds of yards of HESCO Bastion Concertainer® walls; hauling gravel for unit motor pools; hauling

away Iraqi missiles for destruction; and clearing trees, brush,

and buildings away from the main road leading to the airport.

Equipment operators also cleared trees to improve fields of

fire and dug fighting positions for the armored vehicles guarding

the airport. During these missions, HSC soldiers logged

thousands of miles in Baghdad traffic—largely without assistance

from combat units. They provided most of their own security

during convoys and jobsite security missions as well.

Soldiers from the 203d and Army firefighters work at the bombed United Nations building in Baghdad.
10 Engineer July-September 2004

Construction Missions

As the Army leadership in Baghdad began to develop a

deeper sense of what needed to be accomplished, the mission

load for the engineers increased. In addition to the many small

projects the battalion completed, several major missions were

undertaken. These included construction of the West BIAP

Camp, the Butler Range Complex, Camp Falcon, Camp Muleskinner, and Camp Victory, as well as Camp War Eagle and

Camp Dragoon. HSC soldiers—whether equipment operators,

surveyors, mechanics, or medics—had a hand in all of these

major projects.

West BIAP Camp. This camp was the original home for the

forces at BIAP, and the 203d was a major player in the

establishment of the camp facilities. The battalion engineer

officers were key planners in the development of the base,

and the HSC survey section had the lead in developing the

base camp survey plan and the supporting road network. The

camp was later named Base Neusche, in honor of Specialist

Joshua Neusche, an outstanding young HSC soldier who died

early in the deployment.

Butler Range Complex. Located on a former Iraqi army

installation, this complex was designed to allow 1st Armored

Division to train on its weapons and maintain its combat skills.

The 203d operations staff completed the design and material

requirements. Engineers from across the battalion worked to

construct the temporary living area, wooden barracks, earth

berms, roads, and range facilities. The supply, food service,

and medical sections provided support to the soldiers engaged

in the construction. Later, HSC soldiers improved their own

skills by training at the site. Convoy defense live-fire and

machine gun qualifications were conducted

on the ranges. HSC equipment operators

supported the 16th Engineer Battalion

(Armored) in training exercises by digging

and breaching defenses and fighting

positions and participating in live-fire

exercises.

Camp Falcon. As the mission load began

to increase, HSC was tasked as a de facto

fourth line company, assigned to handle

operations in the southwest area of Baghdad.

Camp Falcon was the home of the 2d Brigade,

82d Airborne Division. After completing the

initial work assessment, the HSC equipment

platoon was assigned the project lead. The

mission, which started with the construction

of two helicopter pads, soon turned into one

of the largest base camp projects in Baghdad.

After constructing the helicopter pads, the

platoon hauled gravel and completed the

motor pools within the camp. As the camp

expanded, the platoon built roads for civilian

vehicle traffic and access around the camp

perimeter. The project included clearing and

placing gravel for a soldier living area and

removing piles of construction debris along a 2-mile stretch of

highway. When Bravo Company was later tasked to assume the

operation, the project had expanded to include substantial vertical

construction as well. Bravo Company engineers continued with

extensive earthwork, constructed four wooden buildings, and

oversaw Iraqi con-tractors on the construction of twelve concrete

and brick barracks and a perimeter wall.

Camp Muleskinner. Designated as one of the primary base

camps in Baghdad, HSC equipment platoon members were the

first to arrive on-site. They bulldozed run-down buildings,

placed protective berms around the camp, cleared fields of fire

and observation for the camp defenses, and surveyed facilities

for the establishment of a training site. After HSC completed

several projects, Charlie Company was selected to lead the

camp expansion. Charlie Company soldiers completed

earthwork and force protection projects, renovated several

buildings, and supervised Iraqi contractors on the construction

of concrete and brick barracks.

Camp Victory. When the primary Baghdad camp moved

from West BIAP, HSC soldiers surveyed an area that was later

known as Camp Victory North. The battalion survey team

directed surveyors from several units in establishing the

baseline survey for the camp. Battalion staff members were

key players in the camp development, laying out locations

for housing units, motor pools, and roads. Parking lots,

housing areas, and roads were soon cleared and

constructed. The HSC concrete and dump truck sections

supported the line companies, pouring concrete for building

slabs and hauling gravel for life support areas and motor

pools.

Equipment from the 203d is used to demolish buildings along

an alternate supply route.
July-September 2004 Engineer 11

Heavy Equipment Missions

Several of the missions assigned were unusual for a

construction unit, especially for a headquarters element.

Shortly after arriving in theater, HSC used armored D9

bulldozers to destroy several buildings in an old Republican

Guard compound along a supply route. Enemy forces hid out

in these buildings to ambush convoys moving along the

highway. Infantry support was not available, and military police

assets were limited. The equipment platoon, supported by

maintenance and medical personnel, moved to the site and

deployed as an infantry force. They cleared and secured the

buildings, then looked for

mines and booby traps in

the area. Once secured,

construction equipment

was brought in to clear

several buildings, along

with abandoned Iraqi

fighting positions. Trees

and brush were also

cleared along the highway.

Another building demolition soon followed.

Enemy forces were firing on

the Baghdad South power

plant, using the buildings

outside the plant for cover.

HSC soldiers coordinated

with the security element,

moved in, and demolished

several of the buildings.

HSC also supported the 82d Airborne Division in raids

against suspected terrorists, who used concrete and brick

buildings and walls for cover and concealment. The D9

bulldozer operators were asked to assist, so they moved out

with the night patrols and demolished some of the buildings

and walls. With the help of the engineers, several suspected

terrorists were caught during these operations.

When terrorists bombed the United Nations facility in

Baghdad, HSC was tasked as the lead element for the recovery

effort and was supported by Bravo Company and additional

soldiers from across the battalion. The engineers loaded their

A 203d soldier helps Iraqi civilians remove debris from a refugee camp.

Engineer equipment was critical in the cleanup of this refugee camp.
12 Engineer July-September 2004

equipment that night and rolled out at first light. Relieving the

first responders on the site, the engineers began a week-long,

24-hour-a-day mission to clear debris and then deployed

rescue teams to search for survivors in the rubble. Coordinating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United

Nations, Turkish civil defense personnel, and Coalition

Provisional Authority representatives, the 203d removed the

remains of the victims, removed and buried the rubble, and

provided building security and media escorts. The battalion

also provided medical, maintenance, supply, and force

protection support to the other forces guarding the site and

to United Nations employees. HSC directed efforts to reestablish water supplies to a neighboring hospital that had

been disrupted after the attack.

The most difficult and dangerous mission was supporting

the 1st Armored Division in the city of Karbala. Shia Muslim

insurgents had killed a US military police officer and taken

over a mosque and a group of buildings in the city. US forces

were sent to the city in October, and the 203d was tasked to

provide D9 bulldozers and additional construction equipment

to support the infantry and help clear debris. HSC received

the mission, and the engineer assault team, supported by

maintenance and medical personnel, traveled through miles

of empty desert and linked up with the assault forces in the

city. They unloaded their equipment and moved against the

enemy-held buildings within minutes of arrival. The enemy,

confronted with overwhelming firepower and armor-plated

bulldozers, gave up without firing a shot.

The battalion also put together an emergency response

team, lead by the HSC executive officer. With additional heavy

equipment, dump trucks, and combat engineers attached from

another battalion, the team arrived in downtown Karbala that

night and linked up with the other HSC soldiers at the attack

site. The operation was completed that first night, but the

team remained to support further operations and assist civil

affairs teams in assessing the damage before returning to

Baghdad.

Even as the company prepared to redeploy, the mission to

support the infantry forces continued. In April, forces loyal to

Muqtada al Sadr staged an uprising. Operators from the

equipment platoon were tasked to support the 1st Cavalry

Division in an operation to capture one of his subordinates.

Once again, the construction engineers participated in night

operations against hostile forces. Over several nights, the

bulldozers were at work with the infantry and tanks, clearing

building rubble from the fighting in the streets of Abu Ghuraib,

in spite of the danger of enemy attack.

Entry Control Point Missions

When not engaged in construction work, the HSC equipment platoon and several technical engineer specialists ran an

entry control point onto the airport. The task was difficult and

potentially dangerous. Iraqi contractors hauled in the gravel,

sand, concrete, and asphalt used in the construction of Camp

Victory, and the vehicles—sometimes more than 600 a day—

and drivers had to be searched for weapons and explosives.

The quality of the construction materials also had to be

checked. This work was often frustrating and challenging.

Most of the Iraqis were from Abu Ghuraib and Fallujah, long

hotbeds of anti-American activity. It took considerable time

and effort for the two sides to learn to work together. The

soldiers earned the respect of the Iraqis because of their

respectful but no-nonsense approach to running the operation.

Many Iraqis were quick to fight each other with fists and lead

pipes, so the HSC soldiers had to break up the fights, often

arresting the antagonists and taking them to the local police

station.

Battalion Support Missions

While the rest of the battalion was out on missions, other

HSC soldiers provided the necessary support base for the

battalion.

Food Service. The food service section ran operations at Base

Neusche and the Butler Range Complex until the contract dining

facilities were established. The section resumed operations later

when the battalion deployed to Camp Duke, outside of An Najaf.

Logistics, Personnel, and Communications. In addition to

the survey work, the battalion staff elements planned the

logistics, personnel, and communications support for the

battalion. At one point, the logistic section operated the largest

construction supply yard in the city, with lumber, wire,

plumbing, and roofing supplies.

Medical. The medical section provided medical support to

three other engineer battalions, the engineer brigade and group,

and personnel passing through the West BIAP Camp.

Maintenance. All company and battalion operations would

have been impossible without the work of the HSC, and battalion

operations would have been impossible without the work of the

company and direct support maintenance sections. Maintenance

teams deployed to the field to support every major mission. The

remaining mechanics performed a wide variety of services from

repairing broken belts to changing engines on construction

equipment. The maintenance sections maintained the pace of

operations, despite a shortage of spare parts. No mission failed

due to a lack of available equipment, and equipment services

were completed on or ahead of schedule.

“When terrorists bombed the United Nations facility in

Baghdad, HSC was tasked as the lead element for the

recovery effort and was supported by Bravo Company and

additional soldiers from across the battalion.”
July-September 2004 Engineer 13

Deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in April

2003, the Fort Lewis-based 555th Engineer Group (the

Triple Nickel) conducted extensive operations with

the 4th Infantry Division’s Task Force Ironhorse and ably

demonstrated the versatility, flexibility, and agility of modern

combat and general engineering forces as it conducted fullspectrum engineer combat operations (to include fighting as

infantry). As the sole brigade-level engineer headquarters with

the Force XXI-structured 4th Infantry Division, the 555th

conducted echelon-above-brigade operations across the

entire division area of responsibility (AOR) and was often

called on to conduct security and infantry operations. This

article briefly summarizes the task force’s operations and

presents some observations.

A Versatile Engineer Force

As a multicomponent, multifunctional unit, the 555th

(known as Task Force Able) benefited from a unique

variety of skills and experience. Of the six battalions

eventually assigned to the group, three were active, two were

Army National Guard (Mississippi and West Virginia), and

one was US Army Reserve (Figure 1). Similarly, the separate

companies also came from all components. This was a key

developmental experience for all leaders and soldiers who had

to understand and appreciate the strengths of each component.

It was also a great success, because all units in Task Force

Able contributed equally to the efforts and sacrificed in the

accomplishment of the mission. The achievements of the task

force demonstrate that Active Component (AC)/Reserve

Component (RC) integration works and is a viable reality for

today’s force.

In a recent letter to the editor of Stars and Stripes, a noncommissioned officer (NCO) from the 223d Engineer Battalion,

Mississippi Army National Guard (part of Task Force Able),

described his impressions of this multicomponent force:

“I don’t know where the writer got the idea that reservists

and guardsmen are whining about doing their jobs. I was

with the 14th Engineer Battalion out of Fort Lewis. Those

guys would work 24 hours if you let them, and our guys are

right there with them to the end. We’re all soldiers out here.

There are no guardsmen and reservists. We are an ‘Army of

One.’”

Task Force Able was multifunctional and included combat

engineers, construction engineers, and bridge builders. This

assortment of units gave the task force the ability to perform

just about every engineer mission imaginable, while working

over the entire division AOR—in excess of 35,000 square

miles—and with every brigade combat team (Figure 2,

page 14). This large and diverse AOR posed some significant

challenges that included long distances, inadequate

infrastructure, and a determined enemy.

Lines of Operation

Within this AOR, Task Force Able

operated along several main lines

 of operation that were based

around the most common mission sets:

 Constructing power projection platforms

and forward operating bases (FOBs).

 Reinforcing force protection.

 Providing assured mobility through route

improvement, bridging, river patrols, and

route clearance.

 Securing and destroying unexploded

ordnance (UXO) and captured enemy

ammunition (CEA).

 Facilitating civil infrastructure by helping

Iraqis rebuild Iraq.

By Colonel Christopher J. Toomey

Figure 1. Task Force Able Organization

555

Task Force Able

Supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom
14 Engineer July-September 2004

These lines of operation, described in general terms below,

were not discrete and often overlapped. Throughout the

deployment, the task force provided direct and general support

to the division-committed brigade combat teams and often

fought as infantry—conducting raids and ambushes and

performing security operations.

Forward Operating Bases

The 555th contributed to building more than 50 FOBs for

division troops. These were essential to provide relatively

secure life-support areas from which units could project

operations. In a harsh environment, with temperatures in

excess of 140oF in the summer, these areas were important for

maintaining the health and safety of the force. The FOBs varied

in size from company outposts to battalion-sized bases. Each

FOB included living areas, power, water, and accommodation

for sewage (ranging from burnout to chemical latrines). Surface

area improvement was essential. In Iraq, the ground is very

unstable; the soil turns to choking dust in the summer and

liquefied mud in the winter. Gravel was the primary material

used for soil stabilization, and Task Force Able spread tons of

gravel over thousands of square meters to provide a stable

surface.

Proper force protection was a key piece of FOB development. The task force constructed bunkers and fighting

positions and emplaced numerous berms and wires to secure

perimeters. The task force and resident units worked diligently

to harden a variety of sites on each FOB—from fighting

positions and access gates to living quarters and morale,

welfare, and recreation tents. The sandbag earned renewed

respect, and the units of Task Force Able used literally

thousands of HESCO Bastion Concertainers®.

Force Protection

Aside from FOBs, Task Force Able’s efforts extended to

protecting all manner of US, coalition, and procoalition Iraqi

installations. The task force constructed multiple welldeveloped traffic control points along major routes and

emplaced protective measures for Iraqi civil infrastructure,

police stations, and civil defense installations to guard against

attack—particularly against the increasing threat of vehicleborne improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Figure 3 shows

some of the force protection measures employed.

Mobility Operations

A major mission for engineers—across history—is giving

freedom of movement to the force by providing assured

mobility. Task Force Able improved and rebuilt thousands of

kilometers of road and trails. Most of the roads in Iraq are not

designed to withstand sustained military traffic and required a

continual program of route upgrade.

Bridging and River Patrols. Task Force Able also put in

and maintained some significant bridging. The task force

emplaced several military bridges over the Tigris River to

provide mobility for military (both the 101st Airborne Division

[Air Assault] near Mosul in the north and the 4th Infantry

Division) and civilian traffic. With most significant bridges

over the Tigris River destroyed during the early part of the

war, it was essential to establish crossing sites. These included

the longest Mabey & Johnson float bridge ever erected. Named

for two soldiers from the 14th Engineer Battalion who were

Figure 2. Area of Responsibility for the 4th Infantry Division
July-September 2004 Engineer 15

lost in the conflict, the Haight-Jordan Bridge was more than

320 meters long.

Tied to bridging was ensuring mobility along the waterways,

principally the Tigris River that effectively bisected the division

AOR. In a great show of flexibility, Task Force Able assumed

water patrol missions using bridge erection boats as riverine

patrol craft. The efforts of the task force ensured that coalition

forces controlled the river and effectively denied it to the

enemy.

Route Clearance. Another major combat operation for Task

Force Able was route clearance. In a noncontiguous and

dispersed battlefield, security and clearance of routes

connecting nodes of combat power is critical. The enemy

quickly seized on coalition routes—extended, exposed, and

difficult to secure—as vulnerable points to launch ambushes

and attacks. The preferred attack was to mine the road or use

an IED to attack convoys. Starting out as simple and relatively

unsophisticated explosives, the IEDs matured into deadly

devices. Often, the enemy followed up IED attacks with small

arms fire or rocket-propelled grenades. The attacks were fast,

and the enemy seldom stayed around to be counterattacked

by US forces.

To thwart these attacks, Task Force Able launched a

concerted campaign of route clearance and presence to inhibit,

find, and destroy IEDs and mines and those emplacing them.

The task force assumed this mission with the intent to thwart

the enemy’s ability to emplace IEDs or mines, while capturing

or killing those who did. The operation, known as Trailblazer,

lasted several months and resulted in the clearing of more

than 23,000 kilometers of road and the destruction of large

quantities of IEDs. Of particular help to the Trailblazer mission

was the use of a new generation of mine clearing and detection

devices and vehicles currently being fielded. The Buffalo—a

wheeled vehicle with a camera-equipped, mine-excavating arm

to allow standoff—was particularly useful. Figure 4, page 16,

shows the Buffalo and the Meerkat mine detection systems.

UXO and Captured Enemy Ammunition

Iraq is littered with both UXO and cached ammunition—

referred to as CEA. Within the 4th Infantry Division area, Task

Force Able was charged with securing and destroying large

caches of CEA. Some of it was located in fixed sites, but much

of it had to be located and destroyed in place. The more of this

unsecured ammunition that was destroyed, the less that would

be available for the enemy to use against the coalition (notably

as the basis for IEDs and explosives). In all, the task force

destroyed several hundred tons of CEA and cleared thousands

of square miles of terrain. Additionally, it managed several

large fixed sites and turned these over to US Army Corps of

Engineers contractor teams for long-term destruction.

Civil Infrastructure

Task Force Able brought a wealth of talent to the civil

infrastructure effort, a major step in creating a secure and stable

Iraq. The task force worked across the division to orchestrate

the building and repair of a myriad of water treatment facilities,

power plants, civilian bridges, and schools. Working closely

with local Iraqis, the task force helped facilitate the creation of

local governments in some areas. The bulk of the Iraqi people

Figure 3. Force Protection Measures Used by Task Force Able
16 Engineer July-September 2004

Figure 4. Buffalo (left) and Meerkat (right) Mine Detection Systems

with whom the units worked were appreciative, and the soldiers

saw very positive behavior in response to their efforts.

An important facet of the Task Force Able civil infrastructure repair was the level of involvement from local Iraqis.

The task force sought to instill self-sufficiency by letting Iraqi

engineers and local firms take the lead whenever possible. In

dealing with a people who were subjected to an oppressive

regime for more than 20 years, the task force wanted to emphasize the Iraqis’ right and responsibility to take care of their

own country. The unit did this by allowing the Iraqis to take

control of their own destiny in terms of prioritizing what needed

to be done and then by instilling a culture of stewardship in

order to care for and maintain what they had.

Observations

T.

hroughout their mission in Iraq, the leaders of Task

Force Able worked to identify lessons learned based

on their experiences. In no way all inclusive, they

represent some take-aways that can be used for preparing

soldiers and units for future operations.

Every Soldier Is a Rifleman. The Army Chief of Staff is

right on target that every soldier must be a rifleman first. All

soldiers are expected and need to have traditional combat

skills. They must be experts with weapons. They must know

first aid. They must know how to communicate with organic

communications systems. The unpredictability of operations

dictates that there are no rear troops in Iraq. This has some

readiness implications. Every unit needs to bear down and

take a hard look at how and what is being trained. Task Force

Able leaders would willingly sacrifice technical engineering

expertise for fighting skill. Balance is key, of course, but

leaders—particularly RC leaders who have scarce training

time—must make some hard decisions on what they train and

how they train.

Predeployment training is not normally enough. First,

common task training, often given short shrift at the end of a

fiscal year, is critical. Second, training must be realistic. Leaders

cannot wish themselves into a benign environment. Make

training hard and challenging. Third, the Army must

institutionally look at the concept of tiered readiness for

equipping and preparing our soldiers. All units are likely to

engage the enemy, and all have sufficient contact time. Thus,

there is a valid argument that all soldiers need a basic level of

common combat equipment, independent of their assigned

unit.

Every Vehicle Is a Fighting Platform. Whether they ride in

a Bradley fighting vehicle, a dump truck, or a bucket loader,

soldiers need to do the best they can to prepare their vehicles

for combat and develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures

(TTP) to make their vehicles effective. The Army is rushing

ahead with Kevlar® blankets, force protection kits, and uparmored, high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles

(HMMWVs), but units—particularly those operating in

thin-skinned vehicles—need to take measures to protect

themselves. Such protective measures as sandbags on the

floor and prefabricated armor are critical and protect soldiers

during engagements.
July-September 2004 Engineer 17

Every Convoy Is a Combat Operation. Nothing is routine

on the noncontiguous battlefields on which our forces operate,

and every leader and soldier must treat each convoy and

movement as a combat patrol and expect contact with the

enemy. All the traditional precombat checks and inspections

must be reinforced and become second nature. These include

briefings and rehearsals that stress contact with the enemy,

evacuation plans for wounded soldiers and damaged vehicles,

and the use of indirect fire. Aggressive, offensively minded

soldiers are less vulnerable to an enemy that looks for a soft

target.

Discipline Is Essential. All units must be disciplined to do

what is expected and to fully inculcate the priorities of work:

security, maintenance, hygiene, food, and rest. These priorities

require constant reinforcement at the lowest level, but

disciplined units will absorb them and become more combat

effective each day. Senior leadership must ensure that basic

standards of discipline are instilled throughout the unit—

particularly within the junior leaders who are responsible for

enforcing the discipline daily.

Efficient Internal Lines of Communication Are Critical.

Units must be able to rapidly transmit information both

horizontally and vertically. Dissemination is critical to get the

word out on changing enemy TTP and to ensure full situational

awareness. This ability to communicate bleeds into two other

observations:

 Exploit Actionable Intelligence. Intelligence comes from

many sources, and units must aggressively move it up

and down the chain. Intelligence cannot wait at one level,

since much of it—normally human intelligence

(HUMINT)—is exceedingly temporal. Every soldier is a

HUMINT collector—locals frequently freely provide

information to soldiers of all ranks and positions. The

information that soldiers gain in their interactions with

locals must be quickly reported and disseminated through

the appropriate chains.

 Rapidly Disseminate Lessons Learned/TTP. As the enemy

changes, lessons learned/TTP must be rapidly shared.

Units must become practiced in pushing and pulling this

form of information. They must do this while continuing

their missions and in contact. In-theater training becomes

extremely important to ensure the sharing of this new

information.

AC/RC Integration Is a Reality. As stated earlier, AC/RC

integration works. Our Army is strengthened by our RC units,

which have incredible strength. However, all leaders need to

be sensitive to the differences in the AC and the RC.

Differences such as personnel manning and how family

readiness groups are organized must be taken into account.

Despite these differences, active AC/RC integration (at least

for the engineers) is a success. The daily operations of Task

Force Able attested to this observation, as AC and RC units

worked side by side with uniformly outstanding results.

Junior Leaders Must Be Empowered. The nature of battle

in Iraq is a series of small-unit fights and actions over wide

distances. Though 21st century communications can give

senior leaders situational awareness, we still need to rely on

the local decisions of the junior officers and NCOs on the

spot. Senior leaders have a responsibility to resource and

provide intent and then give the leaders on the ground the

flexibility to work within that intent. This is sometimes hard in

training and at combat training centers, but it is essential for

success on the battlefield.

Civil-Military Operations Must Be Trained. Civil-military

operations are often treated as residual tasks, but within the

context of a greater conflict, they need to be on every leader’s

training card. The “three-block war” includes phases from

peacekeeping to combat—sometimes occurring simultaneously only blocks away—and it exists in the current

environment.1

 Soldiers need to understand the difference and

the subtleties of each. They have to have internal governors

and training to recognize the differences and to act accordingly.

All soldiers are civil affairs soldiers.

Conclusion

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the diverse mixture of

combat and construction engineers (active duty,

National Guard, and Reserve) comprising Task Force

Able provided the 4th Infantry Division with versatile and

effective echelon-above-brigade engineer support. Along

multiple lines of operation, the task force demonstrated the

potential capabilities and contributions of a combat engineer

group operating as an echelon-above-brigade force. Now back

at their home stations, the units of the task force will use their

experiences in Iraq as a foundation for demanding, realistic

training in preparation for future combat operations.

Colonel Toomey commands the 555th Engineer Group at

Fort Lewis, Washington. He has had numerous command and

staff assignments, to include Commander, 14th Engineer

Battalion at Fort Lewis. He is a graduate of the United States

Military Academy, the British Army Staff College, the Naval

War College, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Endnote

1

Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in

the Three Block War, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999.
18 Engineer July-September 2004

T.here is a significant mine threat in numerous countries

that US forces have the potential to be deployed to

for operations in support of national strategy. As the

current levels of mine contamination are unconfirmed, the threat

to the movement of US troops can be significant. Proven safe

routes can change overnight, requiring the use of engineer

resources to clear and proof these routes and

accesses to critical locations. Somalia, Bosnia,

Kosovo, and Afghanistan are a few of the highprofile places where the US Army has deployed in

high-risk mined areas. This article includes information on how mine detection dogs (MDDs) enhance the US mine clearance capability and why they

are a necessary tool for the force.

From ancient beginnings, the training for military

working dogs (MWDs) has been continuously

refined to produce a highly sophisticated and

versatile extension of a soldier’s own senses. Even

the most complex and sensitive machines are unable

to duplicate the operational effectiveness of a

properly trained working dog. The US Army first used

dogs for mine detection in World War II, when the

228th Engineer Mine Detection Company deployed

about 100 dogs in Algeria and Italy. During the

Vietnam War, the US Army and the US Marine Corps

used dogs for mine detection, tunnel detection, and

tracking.

During the 1970s and 1980s, several US Army

laboratories conducted technical studies to test

dogs’ abilities to perform mine detection under

various conditions. A 1977 study by Nolan and Gravite (Mine

Detecting Canines) concluded that mine/booby trap detecting

canines represent highly adaptable, sensitive, and specific

detection systems. The report also conceded that MDDs are

reasonably durable and readily reproducible. In 2002, the US

Army contracted for MDDs to work in Afghanistan, where the

Training an MDD on a short leash

By Mr. James Pettit and Captain Ronald J. Hughes
July-September 2004 Engineer 19

dogs cleared areas, proofed the work by mine clearing armorprotected (MCAP) D7 bulldozers, and cleared mined soil berms

created by MCAP D7 clearance operations. In 2003, the Army

began to establish its own MDD detachment within the

Engineer Regiment.

Why use dogs for mine detection? MDDs provide a fast

and efficient detection capability that can save lives. They

can reduce the risk involved with mine clearance during combat

or peacekeeping operations. They have excellent mobility and

utility over ground that is not accessible to vehicles and other

mechanical clearance/detection equipment. MDDs provide a

detection capability without touching the device itself, and

MDDs will not initiate magnetically influenced fuzes.

MDDs must not be seen as a fail-safe panacea. However, it

is accepted that they have a high detection rate and that they

offer rapid mine/explosive vapor detection. Additionally,

MDDs provide a faster mine detection capability than current

magnetic-anomaly detection equipment and manual probing

techniques. It must be understood that MDDs are merely an

additional tool to enhance the productivity of mine clearance

operations and to help ensure the safety of the soldiers. MDDs

are not a stand-alone system for conducting mine clearance

operations.

Specific tasks that MDD teams (each consisting of an MDD

and its handler) are capable of performing include assisting

units with locating minefields in area surveys and performing

field and road surveys and casualty evacuation. MDDs can

recognize mines by the distinct odor of the explosives or other

components of the explosive devices, including the metal and

plastic casings surrounding the explosive. MDDs will sit when

they discover a scent that they have been trained to locate.

They are operationally suitable when used to supplement other

preventive measures that are taken to locate and/or avoid mines,

improvised mines/explosive devices, and surprise firing

devices. Traditional engineer mine detection tasks benefit from

the use of MDDs. They reduce the time spent on a search and

will search for mines in open areas, fields, woods, and along

embankments. MDDs are also an excellent tool for routeproofing along roads and railways. An MDD team can be used

in a minefield extraction role to search a path to a given location,

such as a crashed vehicle, or in support of area searches and

route proofing.

MDD teams can be employed in different ways. Engineer

and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assets can be tasked

to dispose of unexploded ordnance (UXO) when contamination

exists on main supply routes. Using MDDs to determine

whether a mine threat exists can significantly reduce the closure

time and any delays that may be imposed. Examples are as

follows:

 Vehicle accidents. When a vehicle has left the roadway

during an accident, there is the potential that it has entered

a mined area. Current tools are slow and may impose delays

in situations involving casualties that require immediate

evacuation. MDDs provide a fast detection capability,

allowing any mines between a known clear area and the

vehicle/casualty to be marked and avoided.

 Route proofing. Current procedures use mechanical means,

such as rollers and detectors, for route proofing. MDDs

provide a significantly faster detection capability, allowing

routes to be proofed more quickly and efficiently and to

a greater degree of accuracy.

 Building and roadblock clearance. MDDs can reduce the

time required for formal proofing and clearance when it is

necessary to obtain access to buildings or get through

roadblocks that were created by the piling of rubble that

may be mined.

 Area identification. Area identification, as a mission, is

singled out for assured mobility. MDDs lend speed to

identifying areas with and without mines and allow a

commander flexibility in mobility.

 Quality assurance/proofing. Quality assurance/proofing

is a role for MDDs that will most likely be done out of

enemy contact and in a relatively secure environment.

In all of these circumstances, the detection/proofing

capability is conducted using MDDs in a low-risk environment.

Because MDD assets are limited in the Army, they should be

protected from direct/indirect fire. Where casualties result from

vehicle accidents or mine strikes, MDD operations can be

conducted under fire or during a high threat in order to aid the

quick removal of casualties.

Training an MDD on a long leash with a surface-laid mine
20 Engineer July-September 2004

To obtain the maximum value from the services of trained

MDD teams, it is essential to have a sound understanding of

their capabilities, limitations, and conditions for employment.

MDDs must be considered as additional, specialized detection

tools and should only be used after a careful analysis of the

situation, the climatic conditions, and the terrain.

MDD detection and warning capabilities stem from the

combination of their training and superior scenting abilities.

MDDs realize their fullest potential when conditions permit

them to use their superior olfactory senses.

The actual continuous working time and the number of

tasks that MDDs can perform will depend on the ability and

character of the individual dogs. MDDs work on a short leash

or a long leash under the direct control of the handler. MDDs

will search for and indicate to their handlers the presence of all

mines on which they have been trained. MDDs are mobile and

easily transported, are capable of working in a variety of

conditions and terrain, and increase the speed and efficiency

of the task.

Commanders are encouraged to request MDD teams before

entering areas where the probability of encountering minefields

or booby traps is high. Once MDD teams are assigned to

support a mission and the handlers are briefed, commanders

should obtain the handlers’ recommendations for the most

effective employment of the MDD teams and best working

positions and route selections, consistent with the factors

that influence the dogs’ detection capabilities. Commanders

are cautioned that MDD support is used to search for casualtyproducing devices and is not a substitute for unit security

and safety planning. Commanders must ensure that unit

personnel are careful to observe all cautions issued by the

handlers.

Commanders should integrate MDD teams fully into the

mission and include them in preparatory inspections and

rehearsals. This will help to ensure that the handlers

understand the breadth and scope of the mission. Commanders

must designate security elements, if required, to overwatch

MDD teams as they perform their mission.

MDDs are normally attached on a

mission basis. Before assignment to any

operation, the dog handler leader (a

specified handler who is in charge of

multiple MDD teams) is carefully briefed

on the planned mission as far in

advance as possible. This allows time

for—

 The dog handler leader to select

teams that have worked with the

supported unit before and/or those

teams that will be most effective

for the particular mission.

 The handlers to prepare themselves and their dogs.

 The dogs to become familiar with the scents of the

individual unit members.

 The unit members to familiarize themselves with the MDD

team method of operation.

 The tactical unit to understand the MDD teams’ capabilities

and limitations, the temperament of the dogs, and any items

of special interest.

Once an MDD team deploys to a theater, the MDD must be

given time to acclimatize. The period of time required will largely

depend on the degree of climatic change. MDDs should not

be used on a live operation until 4 weeks after arrival in theater.

Additionally, transferring a dog suddenly from one climate to

another, such as from an air-conditioned room or vehicle to a

hot environment, is detrimental to its capability. The MDD

handler has the definitive say on whether his MDD is capable

of working in particular climatic conditions.

It takes 6 months to train an MDD before deployment. At

the end of the training period, the handler is fully acquainted

with the dog’s aptitudes, moods, and behaviors under different

conditions. However, in order to maintain a high level of

proficiency, MDD teams should undergo regular refresher

training while in theater. MDDs will maintain their value as

detecting tools only if they receive constant proficiency

training.

Mr. Pettit is the program manager for engineer mine

detection dogs at the United States Army Engineer School at

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He developed the initial

concept and supervised the development and implementation

of the 67th Engineer Detachment (MDD).

Captain Hughes is the first commander of the 67th Engineer

Detachment and was instrumental in proving the concept of

soldier-handled MDDs in Afghanistan. He was the primary

author of Special Text (ST) 20-23-8, Use of Demining Dogs

in Military Operations, and was responsible for training area

development and training planning at Fort Leonard Wood

for the dog detachment. Captain Hughes is a graduate of the

United States Military Academy.

An MDD isolating an odor pattern
July-September 2004 Engineer 21

I

n the spring of 2003, the 863d Engineer Battalion (Combat)

(Heavy) commander decided to start analyzing hot-topic

current events surrounding global military operations,

focusing on urban environments. Taking into account the

actions in Baghdad, urban terrorist actions, and the potential

for future city-oriented engagements, he realized that

construction engineers might be called on to conduct specific

underground missions within the tunnels of major cities, which

is reminiscent of the tunnel rats of the 1960s in Vietnam.

However, there was no established military training on how to

conduct effective underground operations. Being a United

States Army Reserve (USAR) officer in a USAR battalion, he

not only had civilian experience but also was supported by a

battalion staff filled with civil engineers that were required by

civilian and state industry to be trained on confined-space

operations. With this knowledge and the drive to cover all the

possible scenarios that a construction engineer might face,

the com-mander gave the order for the battalion to initiate a

mission training plan to create a platoon of engineers capable

of conducting effective underground operations (with all the

safety and combat considerations involved).

Operational Concept

Operation Tunnel, as it was titled early in the military

decision-making process, was a unique planning

experience, since there was no established military

guidance for such a mission. It was the same as creating military

Operation Tunnel:

Confined-Space Operations

Within the Tunnels of Chicago

By Captain David Noble and Captain James Allen

While underground, soldiers conducted radio operations and tested night vision goggles.
22 Engineer July-September 2004

operations on urbanized terrain training for the first time; a

team would have to analyze enemy tactics, after-action reviews,

and planning considerations in a post-Cold War scenario. The

planning and execution focused on four major areas:

 Confined-space training and duties/responsibilities

 Combat considerations in an underground environment

 Equipment and operations

 A tunnel exercise within the Chicago

tunnel system (Operation Tunnel)

The original plan allowed for 6 months

from start to finish. With the initiative of the

battalion staff and the determination of the

command and battalion Operations and

Training Officer (S3), the mission was

ultimately executed within 5 months.

However, the road to success was paved

with many obstacles. This was expected,

since it was the first time for not only the

battalion but also for the support agencies

to perform this type of mission.

Confined-Space Training

Using an established format from the

civilian sector, which had been proven by

state and local agencies, the battalion had

the basis for a training plan. The training

concept took into consideration many

factors that civilian engineers had faced and

proved to work. The overall objective was

to provide familiarization to soldiers

in case an operation of this type

might be required. Associated

hazards with confined-space

operations, entry-and-rescue

procedures, and personal protective equipment were only some

of the objectives identified. The

battalion commander identified

confined space as an area that is

large enough or so configured that

a soldier can enter and perform

work with limited or restricted means

of entry or exit and is not designed

for continuous military occupancy.

A basic four-soldier team was

developed to identify key areas of

emphasis for underground operations. This team included the

following:

Entry Supervisor. The entry

supervisor was the overall officer

in charge of the operation and

provided command and control for

the team. He recognized the effects of exposure to hazards

that were reasonably expected to be present and performed

the duties and responsibilities identified in Air Force

Occupational Safety and Health (AFOSH) Standard 91-25.1

Entrant. An entrant was anyone who entered the area of

operation (actually went into the tunnel). There could be

multiple entrants during a mission. Each was briefed on his

specific function, focus, and area of responsibility and the

Soldiers and members of the Office of Emergency Management conduct a joint

tunnel inspection.

Remnants of old warning signs and hauling equipment still remain in the
July-September 2004 Engineer 23

toxic effects and symptoms of

exposure. He was trained to detect

atmos-pheric conditions and report

physical and atmospheric hazards

to the attendant.

Attendant. The attendant

maintained an accurate account of

all personnel who entered the

underground area. Functioning

primarily as the entrance guard and

staying outside the tunnel or

confined space, he also communicated with anyone in the

underground area where the

operation was conducted. He had

the authority to order all entrants

out of the area and to keep unauthorized personnel out of the

work area.

Rescue Operator. The rescue

operator provided medical and

rescue support in case of an

accident or injury. He maintained

retrieval and rescue equipment, was

trained in combat lifesaver skills,

and typically waited with the

attendant outside of the tunnel in

case of an emergency.

Certain criteria had to be met

before entering the area of

operation, in this case a tunnel. The entry supervisor

conducted a preentry briefing with all entrants. Precombat

checks and inspections were conducted on all mission-specific

and personal protective equipment. The attendant and the

first entrant had to establish acceptable entry conditions. The

entrant conducted initial air sampling as he entered the tunnel.

The attendant was in position from start to finish. Communication was established between the entry supervisor, the

attendant, and the entrant, with strict orders that if communication was broken, the entrant would return to the

attendant. Once these criteria were met, the entry supervisor

reported all actions to the higher headquarters.

Combat Considerations

Confined-space operations have multiple hazards that must

be considered, some visible (physical) and some nonvisible

(atmospheric). Physical hazards include the following:

 Unguarded machine parts

 Heat

 Exposed electrical circuits

 Slipping and falling

 Engulfments

 Entrapments

 Noise

 Vibration

 Poor lighting

 Wildlife

Atmospheric hazards include the following:

 Oxygen richness/deficiency

 Combustibility

 Flammability

 Explosibility

 Toxic gases

 Dust, vapors, and mist

During planning, all these hazards were briefed in the same

manner as any other risk management procedure. These

potential risks were part of the mission, and risk assessments

were created to capture them with ways identified to counter

and continue the mission should any of them occur.

Equipment and Operations

The entire concept for this operation ultimately involved

specific equipment that would be required to detect potential

environmental hazards and to protect the soldiers during

execution. The following equipment was required to enter the

tunnel:

Soldiers use an air monitor to test the atmospheric conditions at the entrance of

the tunnel system.
24 Engineer July-September 2004

Air Monitor. The US Army has no identified air detection

equipment as part of the modified table of organization and

equipment within a combat heavy engineer battalion. However,

since construction operations and foundation work play a

heavy part in urban repair, such equipment would prove

necessary for mission completion. For Operation Tunnel, one

of the several agreements between the USAR and the city of

Chicago involved the Chicago Office of Research and

Development allowing the battalion to have access to an air

monitor. During execution, the soldiers trained with a GasTech®

GT-402 air monitor. The table below shows the four major

atmospheric conditions that the GasTech GT-402 detects.

Fall Arrest System. This system would be required for a

vertical entry, which was covered during briefings. However,

a horizontal entry was used for this operation, thus eliminating

the need for this equipment.

Ventilation Equipment. Due to the unknown amount of

breathable air, ventilation equipment is recom-mended for

prolonged periods in confined spaces. There are methods to

circulate breath-able air, while at the same time

diluting or flushing out atmospheric hazards.

Lighting System. Special lighting was

required because of the dust particles

underground. Normal flashlights are not

recommended due to their unstable reaction

when turned on. An easy alternative is a chemlight. There are also special flashlights available

in the civilian market, which are used by virtually

every gas and sewage facility in the country.

Communications Equipment. During our

mission, we used Single-Channel Ground-to-Air

Radio Systems (SINCGARS) to maintain

constant contact. Cell phones and other

alternative means of communication are

dangerous, because they can create an electrical

spark that could ignite combustibles or

flammables, causing an explosion.

Body Harness and Lifelines. Based on the

severity of the area of operation, lifelines

connected to the entrants could be used to

maintain physical contact. An easy alternative

would be to use 550 parachute cord.

Working Winch. Mainly used by the rescue operator, this

device would connect to the lifeline and extract entrants

mechanically during a vertical extraction.

Operation Tunnel

On 13 September 2003, at the battalion headquarters in a

Chicago suburb, soldiers from all four companies and a

complement of the battalion staff gathered for the tunnel

exercise. The instruction focused on confined-space

operations, the battalion confined-space standard operating

procedure, operation of the air monitor, and a safety brief.

Those trained included two civilian representatives from the

88th Regional Readiness Command Safety Office, who had

been part of the planning process since Day One. Recognizing

this as a new type of training with no established policies or

procedures, the safety personnel monitored our training and

execution and provided insight when applicable. They

recognized the need for the air monitor, special lighting

equipment, and rescue personnel. After accepting our risk

assessment and level of detail in the training modules, they

gave the final approval for execution.

Safety was not the only consideration during the planning

process for this mission: legal considerations nearly cancelled

the entire operation. Representatives from the city of Chicago,

the USAR Center Legal Assistance, and the 88th Legal

Assistance Office meticulously identified all the legal

implications if an accident were to occur. A military operation

within city limits, focusing on training that was “opportunity

training” at best, posed a high risk for all involved. Ultimately,

it was recognized at the eleventh hour (with the 88th Safety

Office, a guide from the city of Chicago, and a thorough training

plan) that this mission would be a success.

Soldiers travel through part of the tunnel, prepared to conduct

Operation Tunnel.

Element Warning Alarm

LEL/ppm 10% 50%

Oxygen 23.50% 19.50%

Hydrogen sulfide 10 ppm 15 ppm

Carbon monoxide 25 ppm 200 ppm

Legend:

LEL = lower explosive level

ppm = parts per million

GasTech GT-402 Monitoring Capability
Twenty-four soldiers (five solders from four companies and 

fo ur [rom the battalion) convoyed to Chicago City Hall, where 

th ey establish ed the entry supe rv isor. the entrants , the 

attendant, and the rescue operator. At that same time, the 

Chicago Office for Emergency Management was conducting 

similar training and reviewing und erground schematics, which 

is a periodic requirement for tha t organization. So the two 

gro ups . ranging upwards of 50 people, proceeded together to 

tour the tunn els. 

Before entering the tunnel, certain entry procedures had to 

be met. First, the entrant with the air monitor ha d to test air 

concentrations outside the entrance. In this case , the entrance 

involved a secured door, much like a submarine hatch. Once 

ope ned, the entrant had to test the air at the opening and then 

on the oth er side. Fortunatel y, the Ga sTech GT-402 is capable 

of continuous ope rations and bee ps when toxic level s are high. 

For vertical entry, the ent ran t with the air monitor mu st test 

atmospheric conditions in 3-foot increments. The air monitor 

used for Operation Tunnel came with a 30-foot ext ension hose. 

As the hose was lowered, the fact that the hos e (no matter 

what the altitude) wa s still 30 fee t long had to be considered, 

so the same planning factors (based on 10 seconds per foot 

for air to travel throu gh the hose) had to be con sidered. Whether 

a hose is 6 or 16 feel underground,S minutes must be allo wed 

per test (10 seconds x 30 feet = 300 seconds or 5 minutes) . 

Conclusion 

The soldiers from the 863d Engineer Batt alion traveled 

5 miles through th e tunnels, which covered only 

2 percent of the overall tunnel system, then exited and 

completed their mission . Although this was valuable training, 

it was onl y familiarization training. No one was valida ted or 

certified to conduct confined-space operations. However. the 

soldie rs can now appreci ate the inn er workings of such a 

mission and will be better prepared if they are called on to 

conduct this type of operation in the rebuilding of other nations. 

III 

Captain Noble is the Activ e Army/Re serve Component 53 

plan s officer fo r the 863d Eng ine er Battalion. He was a 

platoon leader in the 2d Engineer Battalion, 2d Infantry 

Divi sion , and a company commande r in the l st Engineer 

Battalion with the Jst Infantry Di vision. Captain No ble holds 

a bachelor's in communications. 

Captain Allen was the civil eng ineerfor the 863d Engineer 

Battalion. He is currently deployed overseas in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom with the 980th Engineer Battalion. 

Endnote 

1AFOSH Standard 91-25. Confin ed Spaces. 1February 1998, 

Paragraph 2-13. 

July- Sept emb er 2004 

("'Engin eer Battalion Headquarters, .. continued f rom pa ge 12) 

Humanitarian Projects. The 203d also played a role In 

humanitarian efforts to rebuild the country. The battalion 

directed Task Force Wisdom, a project to rebuild schools in 

Baghdad that in cluded both US engineers and Iraqi 

contractors. They ren ovated 16 Iraqi schools and assessed 12 

more. The project also established a standard operating 

procedure for similar proj ects across Iraq. HSC soldiers 

conducted clean-up efforts at a refugee camp. They also 

provided medical aid, supplies, food , and shoes to needy Iraqis 

around the city. These items were donated by family members 

of the 203d and the Neosho, Missouri, Junior High School. 

Deployment Extension Missions 

The most emotionally difficult mission the 203d soldiers 

faced was the extension past their l-year anniversary. They 

had already packed and shipped home much of their equipment 

and personal items when they received word that they would 

remain in theater. Moving out of the base camp in Baghdad, 

HSC headed into the desert outside of An Najaf. HSC and 

Alpha Company established Camp Duke to support 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) operations against al Sadr's 

forces. HSC took the lead on the base camp force protection 

measures, constructing protective berms and ditches around 

the camp. In addition to construction work, the company 

manned the entry control poin t. provided a quick-reaction force, 

and conducted the reconnaissance and surveillance patrols 

that kept potential enemy forces away from the camp and the 

adj acent ammunition supply point. These missions required 

close coordination with civilian contract security personnel 

and Iraqi police, who shared responsibility for the site. Over a 

2-month period , the battalion built or expanded camps in An 

Najaf, Diwaniyah, and Al Kut. 

Whil e at Camp Duke, HSC also took responsibility for the 

regiment's detainee facility. Aplatoon of combat engineers from 

the Minnesota Army National Guard was attached to the company 

to conduct the mission . Th e facility received high marks from 

inspectors for its security, the care provided to the detainees, and 

the professionalism of the sold iers who operated it. 

Conclusion 

As the high pace of operations continues across the 

globe, more units will be performing missions and 

operating in ways tha t they had not expected. Soldiers 

and commanders will need to anticipate requirements and 

concentrate on basic wa rfighting skills, never assuming that a 

mission is outside their lane. In operations across Iraq, HSC 

soldiers from the 203d Engineer Battalion performed with agility 

and flexibility. They never he sitated to take on new missions 

outside of established doctrine and built a solid record of 

performance and accomplishment. W 

Capta in McDaniel commands Headqu arters and Support 

Company, 203d Engineer Battalion (Missouri Army National Guard). 

Previous assignments include engine er platoon leade r, battalion SI, 

engineer equipment officer; eng ineer brigade staf] officer; and the 

Joint Task Force Alaskan Road staff. 

Engineer 25 
26 Engineer July-September 2004

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 54th

Engineer Battalion (Corps)(Mechanized), based in

Bamberg, Germany, is assigned to the 130th Engineer

Brigade, V Corp’s organic separate engineer brigade. The

company received deployment orders as part of the ongoing

Global War on Terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom on

31 December 2002. After arriving at Camp Virginia, Kuwait, on

13 February 2003, the company began reception, staging,

onward movement, and integration (RSOI) tasks in preparation

for wartime operations with the 3d Infantry Division (3ID)

(Mechanized). HHC crossed the line of departure with the 3ID

on 19 March 2003 as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and

quickly became a valuable member of the division team.

Examined in this article are the nonstandard missions

completed by an engineer HHC supporting security and force

protection efforts throughout the rear area of operations for

the 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT), 3ID. Also discussed are

the planning considerations that must be taken into account

during security support operations and how versatile, agile,

and dedicated soldiers from multiple military occupational

specialties (MOSs) create a combat multiplier on a complex

battlefield.

Operational Orders

Before crossing the line of departure, HHC received

operational orders placing it in direct support of the

1BCT, 3d Forward Support Battalion (3FSB). The

company quickly established liaison with key leaders and

members of the 3FSB tactical operations center (TOC) and

began attending their battle update briefs and commander

updates. While members of the company continued to complete

RSOI tasks at Camp Virginia, the HHC commander and first

sergeant began daily convoy operations to Camp New York to

meet with the leadership of 3FSB and establish a set of tasks

that would ensure HHC full integration with 3FSB and its

scheme of support. The company leadership made the decision

early to offer assistance anywhere soldiers could be of use. Of

vital interest to 3FSB was the issue of force protection

By Captain Bryan K. Sizemore

and Master Sergeant James Duncan
July-September 2004 Engineer 27

throughout the phases of the war. The ability of soft targets

(such as fuelers, logistical trucks, and soft-skin high-mobility,

multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs]) to protect

themselves during the 450-kilometer road march across the

Iraqi desert was a concern. The plan also called for scheduled

halts and Class III retail and bulk refueling point operations

that are extremely vulnerable to enemy direct and indirect fires.

Additionally, a major concern was the issue of force protection

with respect to field hygiene. Commanders at all levels

recognized that the effects of poor hygiene could cripple units.

The 54th Engineer Battalion commander decided to taskorganize the battalion engineer assets wherever they would

make the most impact on the success of the overall mission.

Specifically, he provided HHC with engineer support equipment to meet the needs of 3FSB throughout the phases of the

battle. HHC would have access to equipment and missions

that traditionally would have been given to other engineer

units. Two of the four line companies organic to the battalion

were in direct support roles with adjacent brigade combat teams

of the 3ID and were unavailable to provide support to HHC

missions. Bravo Company, 54th Engineer Battalion remained

organic to the battalion and, based on the 3ID scheme of

maneuver, would remain within range and traveling distance

of HHC during the battle. Bravo Company would have the

ability to provide support with the M9 armored combat

earthmover (ACE) and FLU-419 small-equipment excavator

(SEE), as necessary. The battalion also had direct control of

the assets from the 299th Multirole Bridge Company, whose

hydraulic excavator (HYEX) and D7 dozer were vital to the

mission.

Security Operations

Before deployment, HHC conducted an intensive

weapons training program focused on making each

soldier a “small arms master gunner.” Each soldier

completed Army standard zero and qualification with his

assigned weapon at the local ranges located outside Warner

Barracks in Bamberg. HHC initiated and completed weapons

cross-training of various combat systems, to include an M249

squad automatic weapon, an M9 9-millimeter pistol, an M2 .50-

caliber machine gun, and an MK19 40-millimeter grenade

machine gun. HHC continued to reinforce this training upon

arriving in Kuwait. The company drilled this concept until each

soldier could operate and maintain each of the weapon systems

available to them. This gave the command confidence that

soldiers of every MOS understood and knew how to employ

each of the various weapons systems, which influenced the

structure of the 3FSB convoy during ground movement.

Twenty-one Bravo Company engineers from the support

platoon also provided the 3FSB commander with a more highly

trained combat force that was accustomed to dismounted

operations. During traffic bottlenecks along main supply routes

and during temporary halts, support platoon engineers would

dismount from their vehicles and provide an excellent security

perimeter not only for HHC vehicles but also for the entire

3FSB convoy. When stopping during the march, the engineers’

knowledge of dismounted operations, their confidence in the

marksmanship of their soldiers, and their discipline created a

safe and stable environment.

Force Protection

At certain points during the battle, 3FSB conducted

“tactical pauses” so the forward elements of the

division could shape the battlefield and provide

security for follow-on forces moving toward Baghdad. During

these tactical pauses, engineer assets were employed for a

variety of purposes that increased the overall force protection

and security of 3FSB.

During coordination efforts with the 3FSB commander and

staff, HHC developed a prioritization of engineer tasks to be

completed in support of the battalion. Because of repeated

threats of mortar and artillery fires, completing force protection

berms around the 3FSB TOC and around the northern

perimeter of the tactical assembly area (TAA) center became

mission-essential tasks. Creating crew-served weapon fighting

positions throughout the 3FSB perimeter and field sanitation

trenches became an additional mission-essential task based

on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and

civilian considerations (METT-TC).

Nonstandard HHC Missions

The HHC executive officer was given the responsibility

for command and control of force protection efforts in

support of the 3FSB TOC. The assets available were

an M9 ACE team, a SEE from Bravo Company, a D7 dozer, and

a HYEX from the 299th Multirole Bridge Company. The

executive officer coordinated with each unit after receiving

the verbal tasking authorization from the battalion staff. They

developed a linkup location, and the HHC first sergeant

escorted each piece of equipment and the prime mover from

their TAA south of the location to 3FSB.

From earlier experiences during the war, moving the D7 dozer

and the HYEX on flatbed M916 trailers was a delicate operation.

The dessert terrain made movement difficult and march rates slow,

and there was a high probability of the trailers becoming stuck in

the sand. This risk was mitigated by using the organic heavy

expanded-mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) wreckers as part of

the linkup operation, ensuring the capability to recover assets.

HHC created a security escort convoy to safely move personnel

and equipment from one TAA to another.

At the 3FSB headquarters, the first sergeant released control

of the M9 ACE team to the company executive officer.

Earthmoving operations were based on the previous coordination conducted between the company and the 3FSB

staff. The team created berms around the entire 3FSB TOC

during three separate tactical pauses. The blade work was at a

standoff distance from the TOC. This allowed for continual

operations and improvements to the TOC, as required. They

also ensured that the berms did not interfere with vehicle traffic

and the movement of the 3FSB.
28 Engineer July-September 2004

Using Experience

The first sergeant controlled operations of the D7 dozer

and the HYEX. As a former assault and obstacle platoon

sergeant and an observer-controller at the National

Training Center, his experience became invaluable in directing

engineer efforts on the ground. The D7 dozer team began

creating force protection berms at the most northern point of

the TAA. This involved operating forward of the 3FSB perimeter during limited visibility and with little or no rest. The

first sergeant of the company operations section and the 3FSB

TOC established procedures to mitigate the risk of soldiers

operating forward of the TAA. They established regular

reporting criteria with the battalion and emplaced chemical

lights that could be seen by the nearest fighting and guard

position. The dozers constructed force protection berms along

two of the three sides of the battalion’s northern perimeter.

After completing the mission, they moved to the center sector

of the TAA to create blast protection walls around the 5,000-

gallon fuel tankers. Direct coordination with the commander

of the Class III distribution company was essential to ensure

that blast protection walls were placed properly. This allowed

the tankers to quickly move from their positions if the TAA

became compromised by enemy threat. The dozers created

earthen walls on two sides for nearly fifty fuel tankers and

additional berms to better protect the HEMTT fuelers

belonging to the 3FSB team.

The support platoon leader directed the efforts of the SEE.

The 3FSB wanted crew-served weapon positions dug around

their perimeter. The HHC commander made recommendations

on the location of the fighting positions to the 3FSB

commander, based on a terrain walk of the entire perimeter.

HHC convinced the 3FSB staff to establish the fighting

positions based on a terrain analysis at regular intervals along

the perimeter to maximize the effectiveness of the SEE.

Standard .50-caliber machine gun crew-served fighting

positions were created to enhance force protection and

security of the battalion. The SEE and its operator were

outstanding in making this happen. When possible, the SEE

operator created individual fighting positions along the

perimeter to protect soldiers from mortar and artillery threats.

At the same time, across the entire perimeter of the TAA,

soldiers were also constructing individual fighting positions.

Once the SEE operator constructed the fighting positions

forward of the perimeter, it moved inside the perimeter to create

trench latrines and trash burning pits. This is a critical task

and is very important to every soldier and commander. Failure

to consider this can have a devastating impact on a unit. The

spoil created from the digging could be thrown over the latrines

and pits once the company moved or used to mitigate the

smell of the latrines and the threat of disease. Based on the

total size of the 3FSB perimeter and the number of personnel,

one trench latrine and garbage pit was constructed for every

three companies. One company was given the responsibility

for marking and maintaining the holes to ensure soldier safety.

These temporary latrines and garbage pits greatly mitigated

the risk of disease spreading throughout the TAA.

Guarding the Perimeter

T.

he company focus on making every soldier a small

arms master gunner paid off in the desert of Iraq. The

leadership realized that during battle the company

would not have the luxury of placing an engineer behind the

butterfly of each .50-caliber machine gun because of the need

to man the weapon system 24 hours a day. During each halt,

the company began preparing tripod-mounted M2 .50-caliber

machine gun fighting positions. Mechanics, fuelers,

administrative specialists, cooks, engineers, medics, chemical

officers, and supply clerks took turns operating and

maintaining the machine gun. Dismounting from the vehicle

and emplacing and operating the .50-caliber machine gun

became a battle drill. Soldiers quickly learned that once the

first shot was fired, this system could save lives. The company

leadership also stressed the importance of the AN/TVS-night

vision sight 5 for the weapon. This device was crucial in

detecting enemy presence forward of the position at the TAA,

tracking the status of engineer efforts forward of the fighting

positions, and identifying friendly forces adjacent to the TAA.

Summary

An engineer HHC in support of a divisional brigade

combat team can greatly enhance the readiness and

warfighting capability of an organization. Missionessential tasks, such as commanding and controlling engineer

operations with the battalion staff and sustaining the force

with the support platoon, will continue to constitute the breadand-butter tasks for the unit. However, they are combat

multipliers on other levels. The experiences of the leadership—

from the commander and first sergeant, to the company

executive officer, support platoon leader, and platoon

sergeant—provide the necessary ingredients to complete

multiple tasks with limited assets. Using the concept of every

soldier being a riflemen first, and the willingness to adapt to a

changing and complex battlefield, are essential in providing

first-class support to FSB units during war. Given the proper

tools, an engineer HHC can greatly influence and shape the

battlefield and play a critical role in the success of divisional

rear-area operations.

Captain Sizemore is the Recorder, Secretariat for Department of

the Army Selection Boards, Human Resources Command, Alexandria,

Virginia. He previously commanded the HHC, 54th Engineer Battalion. Captain Sizemore is a graduate of the United States Military

Academy and holds a bachelor’s in environmental engineering and a

master’s in engineering management.

Master Sergeant Duncan is attending the Sergeants Major

Academy in El Paso, Texas. He previously served as the first sergeant

for HHC, 54th Engineer Battalion. Master Sergeant Duncan initially

entered the Army as a 12F combat engineer vehicle operator.
contemporary operating environment. It

was determined that the future course

should produce graduates who have the

ability to act in an uncertain environment

and make quick, logical decisions based

on the information available. This

concept was seen as the basis of

maneuver warfare that is underpinned by

a critical thinking capability.

The ECSC design is based very

closely on the old ECCC. The CAS3 staff

requirements have been met by using the

current instruction in either student-led

discussions and presentations or

different instructional methods. The

major change seen in the ECSC is in the

competencies associated with maneuver

warfare (the basis of how to think

tactically) and critical thinking (how to

think logically, using mind mapping,

battle analysis, and the MDMP). The

ECSC combines these competencies with

a range of repetitive tactical exercises in

differing environments to enforce

adaptability. Essentially, this entails

operating in an uncertain and changing

environment as the norm.

The ECSC staff has taken the tactical

and technical aspects of ECCC and

married them with the critical thinking and

maneuver warfare concepts of the

contemporary operational environment

to produce an intense and challenging

course. The ability of the students to

adapt to unfamiliar situations by thinking

through tactical and technical problems

is far above the capabilities that were

tested and observed previously. The

early assessment is that the graduates

of the course will be able to adapt more

quickly to the environment they find

themselves in and will provide the skill

set that Engineer Regiment commanders

require on today’s battlefields.

July-September 2004 Engineer 29

The first day of the Engineer

Captain’s Career Course (ECCC)

Class 3-04 marked a transition to

a new era of leader development for the

US Army Engineer School. This class

was the pilot program for the Engineer

Command and Staff Course (ECSC), a

revised captains’ education program that

replaces the ECCC. The course redesign

incorporates instruction on digital

systems and tasks taught in the former

Combined Arms and Service Staff School

(CAS3). The ECSC is designed to

develop adaptive commanders and staff

officers for the force who can react to a

multitude of situations, based on critical

thinking skills and exposure to a range

of planning contingencies.

In 2003, the ECCC staff of instructors

and training developers conducted an

analysis, using the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), to determine

if the sequencing and instruction of the

ECCC met the needs of the force. This

work group developed two proposed

course redesigns: a life cycle model

based on the life cycle of taking command, preparing the company and deploying on operations; and a modular

design based on end state competencies

and critical tasks. When compared to the

existing ECCC, both designs validated

that the tactical and technical content of

the existing course was sound and

logical; therefore, improvements in the

new design would focus on the delivery

of the instruction.

The work group adopted the modular,

competency-based design and focused

on incorporating critical thinking skills

and how to embed these skills into the

design. The work group’s research also

looked into what adaptive leaders

require to operate effectively in the

While ECSC 3-04 has only just

completed the tactics portion of the

course, the indications are that the

changes made from ECCC are on the

mark. The spiral development of this

program continues from August to

December 2004 and will continue to be

tested in Classes 4-04 and 1-05. It is clear

from the perspective of the ECSC staff

that while the underlying tactical tools

remain the same, the development of

commanders and staff that are capable

of— and comfortable with— conducting

critical thinking in unfamiliar and timeconstrained environments is a tremendous step forward in engineer leader

development. ECSC will not be fully

validated until these newly trained

leaders deploy on operations in the near

future. The ECSC is much more than the

ECCC plus. It clearly marks a new era in

the way we teach our captains to think,

plan, and execute assured mobility tasks

in support of the force.

Major Jolly is the chief of the

Engineer Command and Staff Course

Division at the US Army Engineer

School. He has served in a wide variety

of engineer command and training

assignments within the Australian Army.

Command appointments include both

the 35th Field Squadron and 23d

Support Squadron, and his instructional appointments include a

posting to the School of Military

Engineering, where he served as the

course manager for both the Regimental

Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. He

is a graduate of the Royal Military

College–Duntroon and the Australian

Command and Staff College. He holds

a master’s in management and defence

studies from the University of Canberra.

The Engineer Command and Staff Course:

 A New Era of Leader Development

By Major Craig Jolly
30 Engineer July-September 2004

These words were spoken by Lieutenant General Claude

V. Christianson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,

G4, keynote speaker at the Army’s 2004 Deployment

Excellence Award (DEA) ceremony on 22 June 2004 in

Washington, D.C.

The Army Chief of Staff established the Deployment

Excellence Award program in 2000 to recognize active, Reserve,

and National Guard units and installations for outstanding

deployment accomplishments. The program is open to any

unit or installation that has deployed or supported a training

or contingency deployment during the competition year

(1 December – 30 November). Units and installations can

participate in the following categories:

 Large unit (battalion and above)

 Small unit (company and below)

 Supporting unit

 Installation

 Operational deployment

Eligible units and installations participating in one of the

first four categories submit self-nomination packets to their

major command (MACOM). The MACOM then forwards its

top unit packet selections to an Army-level evaluation board,

which determines semifinalists within each category. A team

of deployment specialists then visits those selected units and/

or installations, validates their deployment practices, and

determines the best in each category. Each unit’s scores (from

the board and site validation visit) are then combined and

sent to the Department of the Army (DA) G4 for approval and

announcement of the winners.

The operational deployment category (introduced in 2003)

involves units (active, Reserve, and National Guard) that have

to deploy in support of operational missions like the Global

War on Terrorism, peacekeeping rotations, and humanitarian

relief. Requirements are as follows:

 MACOMs nominate specific deploying units based on

their history of deployment excellence, and a team from the

Deployment Process Modernization Office observes and

scores the deployment preparation and submission of

deployment data included.

 Units can contend for either the large-unit or small-unit

award.

 Submission of nomination packets is not required, and the

unit is not required to do anything other than deploy.

Key dates for the 2005 DEA competition are as follows:

 Competition period: 1 December 2003 – 30 November 2004

 DEA operational on-site visits: 1 March 2004–

9 February 2005

 MACOM nominations to DEA board: 31 January 2005

 DEA board convenes: 14 – 25 February 2005

 Semifinalist list forwarded to DA: 8 March 2005

 DA releases message announcing semifinalists:

11 March 2005

 DEA validation teams visit: 15 March – 15 April 2005

 Winners list forwarded to DA: 19 April 2005

 DA releases message announcing winners: 22 April 2005

 Awards presentation ceremony: 1 June 2005

For additional information, visit the Deployment Process

Modernization Office Web site at <http://www.deploy.

eustis.army.mil/DEA/default.htm> to download or to view the

awards evaluation criteria, checklists, and sample nomination

packets.

Mr. Johnson, a transportation system specialist at the

Deployment Process Modernization Office, Fort Eustis,

Virginia, is currently serving as the Deployment Excellence

Award Program Manager.

By Mr. Henry H. Johnson

“Today’s enemy lives on battlefields in the darkest corners of our world, and that requires an ability to rapidly deploy to

remote underdeveloped and harsh locations with very little notice. ... Over the past two years, nine out of ten of our active

divisions have rotated to Iraq or to Afghanistan, and over 50 percent of our Reserve Component soldiers have been activated

in support of current operations. ...Deployment excellence is measured in a variety of ways, including accurate deployment

data and training, equipment preparation, organization, and innovation and excellence in support to deploying units. A

unit’s ability to deploy is a critical measure of readiness and is central to the ability of our Army to accomplish its mission.”
July-September 2004 Engineer 31

2004 Deployment Excellence Award Recipients

Category Winner Runner-Up

Active Large Unit 53d Movement Control Battalion (EAC)

Fort McPherson, Georgia

11th Signal Brigade

Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Active Small Unit

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

7th Transportation Group

Fort Eustis, Virginia

469th Transportation Detachment

24th Transportation Battalion

Fort Eustis, Virginia

Active Support Unit 842d Transportation Battalion

Beaumont, Texas

831st Transportation Battalion

Port of Salalah, Oman

National Guard Large Unit 2d Battalion,116th Infantry Regiment

Lynchburg, Virginia

1st Battalion,162d Infantry Regiment

Forest Grove, Oregon

National Guard Small Unit 82d Rear Operations Center

Lake Oswego, Oregon

Company B

52d Engineer Battalion

Lake Oswego, Oregon

National Guard Support Unit 1067th Transportation Company

Phoenixville, Pennsylvania

Florida State Area Command

St. Augustine, Florida

Army Reserve Large Unit 1192d Transportation Terminal Brigade

New Orleans, Louisiana

1394th Deployment Support Brigade

Camp Pendleton, California

Army Reserve Small Unit

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological

Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1190th Deployment Support Team

1190th Deployment Support Brigade

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Army Reserve Support Unit

2125th Garrison Support Unit

82d Airborne Division

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

307th Quartermaster Battalion

Salt Lake City, Utah

All Army Installation Fort Stewart, Georgia Fort Bliss, Texas

Operational Deployment

Large Unit 

2d Battalion

227th Aviation Regiment

1st Cavalry Division

Fort Hood, Texas

NA

Operational Deployment

Small Unit

Charlie Company

121st Signal Battalion

1st Infantry Division

Kitzingen, Germany

NA

Operational Deployment

Small Unit NA

Bravo Company

65th Engineer Battalion

25th Infantry Division

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
32 Engineer July-September 2004

I

 must admit that becoming a small-group leader (SGL) at

the US Army Engineer School for the Engineer Captain’s

Career Course (ECCC) was not my first assignment choice

after command.1 I wanted to serve as a recruiting battalion

staff officer in my hometown, but that job was filled. So I

accepted the challenge of becoming an SGL. My intent was to

make a difference and give something back to our great Army

that has done so many good things for me and my family.

The Learning Curve

As I progressed in the officer corps, I was given the

impression that becoming an observer-controller at

the National Training Center or an SGL at a

schoolhouse was a tough and challenging job that would

ensure special recognition in the eyes of promotion board

members. But during my first few months in the job, I learned

that there are many important assignments. However, one thing

I can say about the captains who become SGLs is that they are

true professionals who want to make a difference in the lives

of future company commanders.

An SGL spends the majority of his time teaching and

working with students. Approximately 321 instructor contact

hours are spent with the students in each class; this time does

not include physical training, mentoring sessions with senior

officers, formal events, or study sessions. As an SGL is

assimilated into the job, the learning curve is steep. They have

to relearn things they’ve forgotten and/or master the numerous

changes to their craft.

Mentoring

After leaving command, I was still on fire to help mold

and mentor soldiers, and becoming an SGL satisfied

that thirst. Even though students are the same grade,

they are not considered peers due to differences in their military

experience and knowledge level. Mentoring is a mutual

agreement between two parties. The students who want to be

successful in command listen and pay attention to their SGLs.

Program of Instruction

T.he program of instruction for the students has been a

challenge for every SGL. Because of the command

push to get soldiers to divisional units, the US Army

Training and Doctrine Command units have fewer personnel

available to write and update instructional materials. The SGL

By Major Chris A. Parks
Did your unit move recently, or is your Engineer Bulletin

addressed incorrectly? To correct your mailing address, send us the following information:

Old Address:

New Address:

E-mail: <engineer@wood.army.mil>

Telephone: (573) 563-4104, DSN 676-4104

Address: U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, ATTN:

ATZT-DT-DS-B (Engineer), 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite

210, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929

July-September 2004 Engineer 33

must write the instructional material for the changes in doctrinal

principles, sometimes in the midst of a class or during the

limited time between classes. The time between teaching

students is normally spent taking leave or improving course

materials.

Reserve Component

Reserve Component students spend an action-packed

two weeks at the schoolhouse. Knowledge flows full

throttle during their stay, and I found that their course

was a refreshing change. The Reserve Component students

came to the schoolhouse as sponges ready to listen and learn,

absorbing blocks of instruction and tactics, techniques, and

procedures with the intent to return and edify their home units.

I know that I could not do what they do—serve two masters.

They are professionals within their communities and

warfighters for this great nation. I admire them. Their training

requires working for two weeks straight, including weekends,

and 15-hour days. But it’s all worth it when they walk across

the graduation stage, gleaming with the warrior spirit of

confidence.

Students and Graduate Studies

Mentoring good students makes the SGL’s job easy.

Because everyone on the team is the same grade,

the SGL isn’t in the students’ chain of command.

An SGL has no administrative authority over the students.

This means that he relies on the students to act professionally.

If they are late or skip class, they receive a counseling

statement. Sometimes students make it obvious that they came

to the ECCC solely to attain their master’s degree. I told my

students that I appreciated the fact that they wanted to

continue their education, but my primary concern was that

they master the blocks of instruction I was teaching. The

ECCC is a priority, and their degree is second. The graduate

program is a privilege, not a right.

International Students

As an SGL, I worked with soldiers from Romania, Saudi

Arabia, Turkey, Macedonia, Portugal, Tunisia, France,

Venezuela, and Egypt—just to name a few. These

leaders are some of the best-of-the-best from their countries.

They were extremely competent, dedicated, and willing to learn.

I believe that the advantage of forming good relationships

with these students is that we may work together again

sometime, as part of a joint task force.

One of my roles was to ensure that our international

students were always asked to share their experiences and

opinions and were fully integrated into the team. I take my hat

off to these patriarchs. I don’t believe that I could accomplish

their awesome task: listen to instruction in English, convert it

into their native tongue, and then produce answers in English.

The Future

With the many changes coming to Army institutional

learning—from drastic changes in how we fight as

engineers, to distance learning—what will happen

to the SGLs? Will they become a collection of interactive disks

or an icon from the past? For the soldier’s sake, I hope not. The

SGL brings so much to the learning experience. During my two

years as an SGL, every after-action review at the end of the

course had the same comment—keep the SGL concept.

Although becoming an SGL was not my first choice, I

accepted the assignment because I wanted to make a difference.

I can truly say that I have no regrets. The assignment was

challenging and rewarding. When I discussed this with some

of my peers, they concurred with my sentiments and added

that it is a great job to improve tactical skills.

In retrospect, I asked myself, Can an SGL make a difference?

To answer that question, consider this: I was an SGL for 9

teams, with 15 future commanders in each team. Each commander takes command of a company with approximately 100

soldiers. Well, I’m sure that you can do the math. The answer

is simple—yes, they do make a difference.

Major Parks is the Recruiting Officer and Executive Officer

for the Central State University Reserve Officer Training Corps

Battalion, Wilberforce, Ohio. Previous assignments include

instructor/writer for the US Army Engineer School, Fort

Leonard Wood, Missouri. Major Parks holds two master’s,

one in human resource development and one in management.

Endnote

1

The Engineer Captain’s Career Course (ECCC) is now

known as the Engineer Command and Staff Course (ECSC).

(See the article on page 29.)

Moving?
I

n March 2003, the survey platoon of the 320th Engineer

Company received orders to deploy to the Central

Command (CENTCOM) area of operations and support

Operation Iraqi Freedom. As the only V Corps geodetic survey

element, the platoon was called to complete a very unique

mission for an Army that depends on absolute positioning

and the Global Positioning System (GPS) for fighting a hightechnology war. The platoon deployed as a three-squad

element, ready to support field artillery in the combat support

role and the aviation assets in the airfield safety survey role.

The platoon deployed a noncommissioned officer (NCO) with

the company advance party, whose primary mission was to

initiate survey planning and integrate assets early into the

fight. Once the company main body arrived in theater, the

platoon was tasked to immediately send a survey field enhancement module (SFEM) into the V Corps 41st Field Artillery

Brigade (FAB). Once stability operations began, the surveyors

switched missions to complete the geodetic safety surveys of

the major airfields to be used by V Corps or coalition forces.

Geodetic Surveys

T.

he SFEM’s mission was to emplace horizontal and

vertical survey control points (SCPs) in support of

deployable weapon systems. The emplacement of

benchmarks allowed artillery to receive exact positioning before

firing, allowing for greater accuracy of fires, less ordnance

expended, and less collateral damage. The key to the SFEM’s

initial success was the planning and early deployment of the

platoon leader with the company advance party. The company

main body, with the survey platoon, arrived in theater on the

first day of the ground war (28 March 2003). Coordination

with the V Corps artillery staff officers emphasized the

possibility and importance of the SFEM’s abilities. Once the

equipment arrived, the SFEM completed precombat checks,

then convoyed north and linked up with the 41st Field Artillery

Brigade. The first lesson learned was getting the geodetic

surveyors into the theater early enough to allow additional

planning, coordination, and linkup with the supported artillery.

Because the deployment timeline did not allow the company

to arrive any earlier, it was good to have at least one surveyor

on the ground early.

Once the platoon linked with the 41st FAB south of An

Najaf, the SFEM began a baseline for a third-order network (a

third-order point provides an 8-digit grid coordinate). With

the completion of the baseline, the artillery surveyors extended

control with their own systems. One of the most memorable

events was the battle at An Najaf where the artillery fired more

than 20 missiles a day for three days. At this point the platoon

was divided into three separate elements, which supported

two subordinate battalions along with the brigade. The lesson

learned was that the platoon needed to be flexible to support

several units. Unfortunately, the element did not have enough

The Survey Experience

During Operation Iraqi Freedom

By First Lieutenant Vilen Ayvazov and Captain Aaron Wolf

34 Engineer July-September 2004
July-September 2004 Engineer 35

transportation or life support; therefore, the soldiers had to

count on the support of the artillery for more than Class I

supplies.

The most important we lesson learned from the mission

was the necessity for speed. The cannons might be called to

move at any moment (day or night). The SFEM had to be

flexible to break camp and push out with the tactical road

march to the next location and then immediately start tracking

satellites to permit the artillery surveyors to extend control to

allow greater accuracy.

Airfield Safety Surveys

Once the company arrived at Balad Airfield to collocate

with the V Corps rear area, the SFEM initiated a Ron

Brown safety survey of the landing strips at Balad,

Tikrit, and Mosul. On 3 April 1996, an aircraft carrying Secretary

of Commerce Brown crashed near Dubrovnik, Croatia. In

response, then Secretary of Defense William J. Perry issued

two directives relating to flight safety: install GPSs on military

aircraft for flight safety, and require all military aircraft to fly

Department of Defense (DOD) instrument approach

procedures. The Ron Brown Airfield Initiative (RBAI) began

after his death and the issuance of the Secretary of Defense

directives. Critical aeronautical information needed to satisfy

the directives is provided by the airfield initiative.

As the only survey asset in the European Command, the

platoon was very experienced at planning, coordinating, and

executing airfield survey missions. The basic survey was

conducted in five phases: control points, topography,

obstructions, picture points, and drafting. The platoon had

completed three airfields to date (Balad, Tikrit, and Mosul).

Each airstrip provided unique challenges, teaching the platoon

to be innovative.

 Balad Airfield, located at the corps rear north of Baghdad,

was the first airfield and the largest to be surveyed by the

platoon. The surveyors learned to emplace SCPs from tops

of the larger hanger-bunkers, which allowed better

observation and lowered the number of temporary points

that were required from areas that could be observed.

 Tikrit Northwest Airfield, known as Al Sahra, was occupied

by the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. The lesson

learned from this operation was that coordination with other

engineer forces was essential in obtaining unexploded

ordnance (UXO) information. The airfield was littered with

UXO, making planning and mission analysis of the platoon

more critical. The platoon had to capture survey points

without entering the off-limits areas.

 Mosul Airport, located on the southern outskirts of Iraq’s

most northern city, was occupied by the 101st Airborne

Division (Air Assault). To date, this was the smallest,

busiest landing strip. The platoon learned the importance

of constant coordination with the air operations staff.

During the busiest parts of the day, the platoon would

work for 30 minutes, stop for a landing aircraft, and then

resume the survey once more.

An important part of the mission was the transfer of data to

and from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA),

a critical partner and recipient of the data. It was essential for

the platoon to have access to powerful computer systems for

A member of the SFEM sets up an

antenna on a runway at Balad Airfield

to conduct a Ron Brown safety

survey. The survey helped provide a

safer environment during airfield

operations.
transferring information; however, this was sometimes difficult. 

becau se the company did not have its own systems. NGA was 

very fast at processin g the critical data. ensuring that the 

platoon did not have to wait. 

Final Thoughts 

Although the platoon conducted man y airfi eld surveys 

at its home station in Germany. it did not have to 

compete with either the desert environment or busy 

military usage of airfields as it did in Iraq. The plato on learned 

many new techniques while working in the austere desert 

environment. as well as while working around the active airfield 

operations to complete their survey. Fortun at el y, th e 

equipment wa s well co ns truc ted, and it pr otected the 

instruments from water; the sand wa s not a major concern for 

the operation, 

The survey platoon was a unique asset within V Corps. It 

pro vided direct survey control to the artillery unit and a safety 

survey for the airfields. Without the platoon \ expertise. the 

artillery would not have been as acc urate and the aviation 

assets would have been at a greater risk. The platoon learn ed 

several les sons as it integrated as part of a combined arms 

team. The surveyors gained valuable milit ary occupational 

specialty experience from Operation Iraqi Freedom. W 

First Lieutenant Ayva zov is the 565th Engineer Battalion 

maintenance officer He previously served as a platoon leader 

for the 502d Engineer Company (MRB) and as survey platoon 

leader ofthe 320th Engineer Company during the Operation 

Iraqi Freedom ground wal: 

Captain Wolf is the company commander of the 320th 

Engineer Compan y (Topographi c), 130th Engineer Brigade . 

He previously served as the brigade maintenance ojjice!; 130th 

Eng ineer Brigade; the regim ental en gin eer, 1-4 Infantry 

(OPFOR ); a plat oon train er f or the Engineer Officer Basic 

Course, 554th Engineer Battalion; and platoon leade r; J9th 

Engineer Battalion. Captain Wof;l holds a bac he lor's in 

cart ography from the University of Wi.~ consin-Ste ven Point 

and a master 'sin engin eering management from the University 

of Missouri-Rolla. 

Enlisted ersonnel Notes
 

Reclassification of Soldiers in Selected MOSs 

By Maj or Rub en Matos 

Th e Army continues to reshap e and adju st its personnel 

structure to meet changing requirements. One method is to 

precisely target spe cific military occu pational specialties 

(MOSs) within the enlisted soldier population for MOS 

realignment. This helps ensure unit readiness and the ability 

to man the force with the right soldiers, in the right place , at 

the right time. As we transform to a more modular force and 

begin to initiate force stabilizati on. all the while continuing 

with our high personnel temp o, we cannot afford to maintain 

MOS imbalance; otherwise, unit readiness across the Army 

will suffer. To help fix. these potential problems, the US Army 

Human Resources Command (HRC) has begun targeted MOS 

recl assificati on, moving so ldie rs from ove rs tre ngth to 

und erstrength MOS s. 

Effo rts are underway between HRC and the applicable 

branch prop onents to initiate necessary recl ass ification for 

soldiers currently serving in nin e overstrength MOS s-two 

of which are 21 B combat e ng inee r and 21 J general 

construction equipment operator. Selected soldiers serving 

in th e targeted MOS s- who mee t MOS qu alifi cation 

requirements for their newly selected und erstrength MOS ­

will receive a letter from HRC directing their reclassification. 

The numbers needed to reclassify out of and into an MOS will 

vary based on the needs of the Army . 

Soldi ers selected for reclassification by HRC will benefit in 

the long run since moving soldiers into an understrength MOS 

will ex pand their opportunity for promoti on and caree renhancing assignments. The Army will increasin gly rely on 

mand atory reclassificati on of selected soldiers to meet unit 

manning guidance. Soldiers in MOSs that are overstrength 

are encouraged to voluntarily seek recl assificati on as a way 

to stay compe titive fo r promotions and profe ssionally 

rewardin g assignments. The mandatory recl assification effort 

will continue , and the number of MOSs affected is likely to 

expand as additional force structure changes are implemented. 

Th e point of co ntac t is Ms. Connie Marehe , Chief, 

Reclassificati on Management Branch, Enli sted Personnel 

Manag ement Directorate, (703) 325-6845 or DSN 221-6845. 

Major Mat os is chiefofth e Train ing Analysis Management 

Bran ch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, US 

Army Human Resources Command, Alexandria, Virginia. 

36 Enginee r July-September 2004 
July-September 2004 Engineer 37

Silica, a common mineral in the earth’s crust, is a major

component of sand, rock, and mineral ores. Breathing

dust that contains microscopic particles of crystalline silica

is a serious health concern. It can cause scar tissue to form in the

lungs, reducing the lungs’ ability to extract oxygen from the air

they take in and causing a disease known as silicosis.

There are three types of silicosis: chronic, accelerated, and

acute. The most common type—chronic silicosis—is a

uniquely occupational disease resulting from moderate

exposure to crystalline silica over a long period of time (10

years or more). The disease can be progressive and disabling

and can lead to death. According to the Occupational Safety

and Health Administration (OSHA), 1,400 people died of

silicosis from 1990 through 1996.

Exposure to crystalline silica also may increase the risk of

developing tuberculosis and other nonmalignant respiratory

diseases and contribute to renal and autoimmune respiratory

diseases. In addition, the International Agency for Research

on Cancer has designated crystalline silica as a known human

carcinogen.

In spite of the dangers, OSHA reports that more than two

million workers are regularly exposed to crystalline silica dust.

For example, many construction activities—such as highway

repair, masonry and concrete work, and rock drilling—expose

workers to silica. For engineer soldiers, exposure to this hazard

may occur when drilling rock, cutting concrete and other

masonry products, and blasting.

Engineering controls for this hazard, such as exhaust

ventilation and blasting cabinets, are very cumbersome and may

not be feasible. So the next option available to Army engineer

leaders to protect soldiers is to control their exposure by rotating

them as much as possible. Leaders may also consider using a

respirator program, as outlined in Title 29 Code of Federal

Regulation 1910.134 (29 CFR 1910.134) and Army Regulation

11-34, The Army Respiratory Protection Program. Army engineer

leaders also should ensure that soldiers are informed of the

following items as they relate to working with silica:

 Hazards/illnesses that may be caused by exposure

 Proper conditions and precautions for safe use or exposure

 Nature of operations that could result in exposure

 Safe work practices for its handling, use, or release

 Proper housekeeping practices

 Purpose, proper use, and limitations of respirators

 Increased risks from combining smoking and exposure

When leaders cannot reduce exposure to silica by limiting

the concentrations, they must use a program of respiratory

protection to protect every soldier who is exposed. This process

begins with identifying soldiers who will need to use a respirator

and getting them a physical to ensure that they can properly

wear one. Soldiers are then fitted with an appropriate respirator

and trained on its use and maintenance. A safety specialist

assigned to the organization can assist in these steps.

When soldiers have been exposed to dust that contains

silica, their battle dress uniforms or coveralls should be

vacuumed. They should not clean their clothes by blowing or

shaking them. In addition to clothing, exposed surfaces should

be kept free of silica dust. If the dust on these surfaces is

disturbed, it could become airborne and breathable. Dry

sweeping and using compressed air for cleaning floors and

other surfaces should be prohibited. When vacuuming is used,

the exhaust air from the vacuum should be filtered. Gently

washing the surfaces is preferred, when practical. All food,

beverages, tobacco products, nonfood chewing products, and

unapplied cosmetics should not be used in work areas with

silica dust. Soldiers should also be able to wash their hands

with soap and water after exposure.

In addition to the hazards associated with being soldiers,

Army engineers face the many hazards of their civilian

counterparts. This article provides leaders with the basic

knowledge to make informed decisions concerning steps

necessary to prevent or control exposure to one of the

hazards—working with crystalline silica. Although engineer

leaders cannot control all the hazards that soldiers face,

controlling this one could prevent needless illness to the

Regiment now and in the future.

Additional information may be obtained from <http://

www.osha.gov/SLTC/constructionsilica/index.html>.

There are also a number of products that can be downloaded

from <http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/constructionsilica/

recognition.html>.

Mr. Fanning is the Safety Director for the US Army

Maneuver Support Center and Fort Leonard Wood. He may

be contacted at <fred.fanning@us.army.mil>.

References

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Semiannual

Regulatory Agenda, 68:73196-73228, Sequence Number 90 in

part II, 1218-AB70-2103, “Occupational Exposure to Crystalline

Silica,” 22 December 2003.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Instruction

CPL 2-2.7, 30 October 1972.

Title 29 Code of Federal Regulation 1910, Section 134,

“Respiratory Protection,” 23 April 1998.

Army Regulation 11-34, The Army Respiratory Protection

Program, 15 February 1990.

Hazards of Crystalline Silica

By Mr. Fred Fanning
38 Engineer July-September 2004

On 14 June 1985, following a

temporary tour of duty in Egypt, an

Army Reserve civil engineering support

planning officer from the 416th Engineer Command, boarded TWA Flight

847 bound from Athens to Rome. He was

anxious to get back to spend his first

Father’s Day with his wife and newborn

child. On the same flight were two armed

Hezbollah members with other plans.

Soon after takeoff, the soldier wasn’t

sure if he would even be alive the next

day.

At the Army Reserve’s 416th Engineer Command in Chicago, thecall was out: Officers needed for

a predeployment site survey on an upcoming training exercise called “Bright

Star.” Held in Egypt, Bright Star was a

joint tactical exercise involving thousands of multinational troops. Army

Reserve Major Kurt Carlson, a Rockford,

Illinois, roofing and building contractor,

was subsequently selected for the

anticipated week-long trip.

To Carlson, overseas trips were

always an adventure, and he looked

forward to them. “To be successful, you

needed to hit the ground running to

complete a lot of work in a limited period

of time and,” he said prophetically,

“maintain a low profile.”

Following several days of liaison

duties with the Egyptian military and

US Army Central Command officials, the

site survey, and a tour of the Giza pyramids on camelback, Carlson now had time

to call Pan American Airlines to confirm

his return flight. He was looking forward

to experiencing his first Father’s Day. He

called his wife to let her know he would

be in Chicago on Friday, 14 June.

Flights from Cairo to other connecting

hubs had changed, said the Pan American

representative on the crackling hotel

telephone. Carlson thought he might

have better luck at the Cairo airport. It

turned out that it was no better. Fate

seemed to be preventing him from

getting back to Chicago on time. That

was until a beaming ticket agent with a

sense of mission accomplishment told

him that he got him the last seat on TWA

Flight 847 from Athens to Rome. From

Rome, he could make a New York

connection.

As the TWA Boeing 727 aircraft

headed toward Athens from Cairo to take

on additional passengers, the homebound soldier considered himself

fortunate.

Deplaning briefly before the next leg

of the trip to Rome, Carlson noted

alarmingly the lack of security at the

Athens passenger control point—

disinterested security guards and malfunctioning equipment. More disturbing

was the fact that there had been two air

hijackings in the region within the past

week. Carlson recalled that when they

traveled overseas, they always used US

airlines for security purposes. At that

time—1985—they had little training in

dealing with a terrorist hijacking or

kidnapping—only prisoner-of-war

training.

Past In Review

 “...We must, I repeat, we must land at Beirut! We must land at Beirut! No alternative...”

“...They are beating the passengers. They are threatening to kill the passengers. We want fuel now! Immediately!

Five minutes at most, or he is going to kill the passengers...”

 “...He just killed a passenger! He just killed a passenger!...”

– Cockpit communications between TWA Flight 847 pilot and the Beirut control tower

By Major Ron Eschmann

Photo courtesy Mr. Mark Crabill, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
July-September 2004 Engineer 39

Filled mainly with American tourists,

the TWA aircraft—carrying 145 passengers and 8 crewmembers—finally

took flight midmorning on 14 June, about

an hour and a half late. As the aircraft

gained altitude, all appeared normal as

passengers became comfortable in their

surroundings. Some rustled in their

seats, others talked, some started to

read—no different than any other

standard aircraft takeoff.

The false sense of normalcy in

Carlson’s world immediately changed

when the flight engineer turned off the

cabin “Fasten Seatbelt” sign. Almost

instantaneously, two well-dressed men

in white suits with black shirts rushed

the cockpit door, waving weapons. One

of them had a fragmentation grenade in

his hand, and he was frantically pulling

at the pin. They both screamed

repeatedly, “Come to die! Americans

die!”

One of the hijackers viciously kicked

a German-American flight attendant in

the chest, which slammed her against the

aircraft bulkhead and—in an “I-dareyou” motion—held a chrome-plated,

9-millimeter pistol to her ear. The hijackers were later identified as Mohammad Ali Hamadei and Hasan Izz-Al-Din,

both belonging to a Lebanese Hezbollah

faction. Hamadei, who was fluent in

German, brandished the pistol and

shouted at the attendant in her native

language, while simultaneously

pounding on the door of the pilot’s

compartment.

 “They’re on a suicide mission,”

thought Carlson. His first reaction was

to want to try to overpower them. He

unfastened his seatbelt and stood up,

but noticed that no other passenger

contemplated the same action. Carlson

did note the sheer terror on their faces.

Realizing he couldn’t take on two armed

fanatics who could blow the aircraft out

of the sky, the Reserve engineer sat back

down. “There may even be others on the

plane,” he reasoned.

(Note: In fact there was a third

hijacker Ali Atwa, who was arrested by

Greek police at the airport just prior to

boarding. Later released by the Greek

authorities, Atwa is still listed by the

FBI as one of the most wanted terrorists

for his role in the hijacking.)

By this time, Izz-Al-Din, who held the

fragmentation grenade, had forced his

way into the cockpit. Soon after this

forced entry, the pilot announced over

the aircraft address system that their new

destination was Beirut, Lebanon.

Following the pistol-whipping of some

of the flight crew, the hijackers

subsequently went from row to row,

collecting passports from the

passengers.

Carlson’s actions turned to hiding his

military identification card in the airline

seat cushion while at the same time

worrying about his passport and other

official papers in his briefcase located in

another section of the aircraft. Carlson

figured that if they searched him and

found the identification card, he would

have no opportunity at all to jump them

at some future point, because they

would have either separated him from the

rest of the passengers or killed him right

there. He thought he would try to buy

some time in order to help at any

opportunity. As an Army Reserve officer,

he knew he had an obligation to do

whatever might be required of him to

help protect the other passengers and

possibly overpower the hijackers, even

at a risk to himself.

Hamadei waved his pistol and barked

orders in German to the flight attendant,

while Izz-Al-Din jumped up and down

and made threatening gestures. The

flight attendant spoke to the

passengers, “Please, no talking. Put

your heads down and clasp your hands

over your heads...We must do exactly as

we are told.” The aircraft became deathly

quiet. After hours in this contorted facedown position, muscles began to cramp

and ache, but passengers who made a

noise or complained were severely

beaten.

In what became a macabre game of

musical chairs at gunpoint, men were

placed in window seats and women and

children were forced to sit in aisle seats

in order to limit the threat to the hijackers.

Additionally, passengers in the forward

area of the aircraft were moved to the

rear, armrests were removed from the

seats, and four people were crammed in

the three-seat rows.

From his seat, Carlson could hear the

hijackers hysterically yelling, “Marines!” and “New Jersey!” He could hear

other military members trying to explain

that they were US Navy construction

divers, not Marines.

(Note: Why did they use the terms

“Marines” and “New Jersey”? In 1983,

the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit had

been sent to Beirut to support the

Lebanese armed forces. On 23 October,

a truck filled with 2,500 pounds of TNT,

driven by members of the Free Islamic

Revolution Movement, crashed through

a gate at the Beirut International

Airport and came to a stop next to a

four-story building and exploded,

resulting in the deaths of 241 US

Marines. In 1983 and 1984, the

battleship USS New Jersey fired her

massive 16-inch guns at hostile

antiaircraft positions inland of Beirut

with highly effective results.)

Carlson’s luck ran out when the

hijackers finally discovered his official

passport, which he used on military

travel. Maniacally screaming “CIA!

FBI!” the pistol-carrying Hamadei

pointed his chrome-plated weapon in the

major’s face. “Tell him I’m in the Army

Reserve and am only on a one-week tour

of duty,” he told the flight attendant.

Temporarily satisfied that he was not a

CIA or FBI operative, the hijacker moved

on to intimidate and bludgeon other

passengers.

Beirut International Airport officials

wanted no part of this escalating

international incident, so with the

assistance of local militia, they decided

to block the runways with barricades.

Someone at the control tower

subsequently told the pilots that the

airport was closed. As if matters couldn’t

get worse on the ground, a rival militia

had engaged the militia putting up the

runway obstacles in a firefight. The

attacking militia, called the Muslim Amal,

ultimately cleared the runway for the

aircraft with no time to spare.
40 Engineer July-September 2004

As the 727 was taking on fuel, the

hijackers singled out one of the Navy

divers. Grabbing him from his seat, they

pushed him to the forward compartment.

Following refueling, Hamadei and IzzAl-Din demanded to be flown to Algiers.

The aircraft reeked at this point—nearly

five hours from the initial takeover—from

nauseating odors. And for the

passengers, it became difficult to

breathe. The stench became worse after

landing in Algiers as the aircraft sat on

the runway in sweltering Middle East

heat. Sweat poured off of the hostages,

and passengers gasped for air. Other

passengers—children and some of their

mothers—were released by this time.

Carlson felt a tap on his shoulder and

turned around. He again faced the

agitated Hamadei and his chrome-plated

pistol. The Reserve officer was

subsequently forced to the forward

compartment, just inside the aircrew

cabin area. He remembered that this was

the same thing that had happened earlier

to the young Navy diver who now

remained unaccounted for.

Carlson was blindfolded with a vomitsmelling bandana, and his hands were

bound tightly behind his back with a silk

tie—so firmly that it cut into his wrists

and numbed his hands and arms. One of

the hijackers pushed him just inside the

pilot’s compartment and proceeded to

severely beat him with a steel pipe. He

heard the chief pilot talking to the

Algiers control tower, “They’re killing

people and beating them.” At the same

time, both Hamadei and Izz-Al-Din began

kicking him, trying to make him scream

in order to get the aircraft refueled again.

Carlson, though badly injured, could not

feel the kicks because his body was

going numb. He prayed that he could

survive the pain and the injuries he was

receiving.

The hijackers also started making

demands that Shi’ite prisoners in Kuwait

and Israel be freed. The situation got

even worse when they began screaming

over and over, “One American must die!”

In a surreal world of pain and peace,

Carlson heard a strange sound: clickclick, click-click. It took him a moment to

realize that the aircraft pilot was keying

his handheld microphone nearby.

Carlson now realized his part in this brutal

reality radio script: The pilot wanted to

let the airport control tower hear his

screams to let them know the hijackers

were ruthlessly serious. The tower

officials were just part of the audience.

Hamadei and Izz-Al-Din wanted the

world to know that they were willing to

kill a passenger. To buy time, Carlson

forced himself to yell out, and the

continuous beating slowed down.

“Where is the fuel,” demanded the

agitated pilot. “Your fuel is coming,” said

the noncommittal voice in the tower. At

this perceived delay, Hamadei and IzzAl-Din began kicking Carlson in the head

and spine. The ordeal continued for

more than an hour and a half before they

put the pistol to Carlson’s head and

screamed “one American must die!”

before giving a 10-minute deadline.

Carlson thought of his family and his

personal affairs and resigned himself to

the inevitable.

The pilot announced that he could

see the fuel truck and, for the time being,

the officer was spared.

Although Carlson had been beaten

very badly for more than 2 hours, he had

survived. It was a miracle that the fuel

had come just before the hijacker was

going to shoot him—an answer to a lot

of praying. Several discs in his back were

injured, he had broken ribs and fingers

and internal and external bleeding, and

he had lost a lot of blood. There was

head swelling and injuries, blurred vision,

mouth and tooth damage, shoulder

welts, and difficulty using his hands and

arms.

Late that night, the aircraft again

headed to the Beirut Airport. The

controllers there had once again refused

permission to land, but then they gave in

to both the hijackers’ demands and the

pleading of the pilot, who matter of factly

stated that they had only 5 minutes of fuel

left on board. After a very rough landing,

the hijackers made further demands. At this

point, they dragged the Navy diver to the

door of the aircraft, shot him in the head,

and dumped his lifeless body onto the

Beirut airport runway.

The pilot began screaming to the

tower over his radio that a passenger had

just been killed, and one of the hijackers

said that there would be another in 5

minutes. Beirut airport officials soon

complied with their demands.

Major Kurt Carlson and his wife are greeted by President Ronald Reagan at

Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, upon Carlson’s return to the United

States after being held hostage in Beirut, Lebanon.
July-September 2004 Engineer 41

The passengers and aircrew

pondered on what was the next terror

that awaited them. After some additional

heated radio discussions with the tower,

the tail door of the airplane opened and

on rushed a number of shouting and

heavily armed militia members, who ran

to Hamadei and Izz-Al-Din and hugged

them. With the militia weapons pointing

at them, Carlson and four of the Navy

divers were taken off the aircraft to an

awaiting truck, and they sped off to face

another nightmare. Following refueling,

fresh water, and food, the aircraft

departed for Algiers.

The military hostages were taken into

a battle-scarred building located near a

Palestinian refugee camp and forced into

a 12- by 20-foot basement cell with a steel

door and bars on the window. As the

senior officer, Carlson took command of

the small military unit. Still nursing his

injuries, he instructed his fellow

hostages to learn as much as they could

about their environment, the language,

and their Hezbollah-connected militia

guards. They were given a small radio,

which was not only their source of news

but also a source of frustration. They

subsequently found out via BBC

broadcasts that there were small clusters

of 39 of the original 145 passengers and

crew scattered throughout the city. The

hostages could also hear how tenuous,

painstaking, and slow the negotiations

were. Days went by, and they were still

unsure of their ultimate fate.

Although Carlson was badly injured,

the Navy divers who were in the cell with

him helped him survive. Together, they

figured out their location in Beirut in

relation to the airport and the sea. They

learned their guard’s strengths, weaknesses, and routine, and they developed

a plan for escape. They would have likely

made an escape within a few days after

their capture if other hostages had not

been taken and held in Beirut. The

soldiers didn’t want to jeopardize the

lives of the other hostages, since

negotiations were underway for release

of the entire group.

As the military hostages waited in

their cell, they occasionally felt the

impact of mortar explosions or the

ricochet of bullets, which added to the

tension of their captivity. They began to

worry that the shell-pocked building

they were in might fall in if an explosion

was close enough.

On 25 June, after much diplomatic and

political negotiating, Carlson’s group

was driven to a three-story yellow

schoolhouse that was filled with their

fellow passengers. Some of them were

shocked to see that the officer was still

alive. From there, they were moved to a

hotel on the Lebanese coast. Here, they

met with Red Cross officials and the

international news media and learned

that they would be crossing into Syria.

At the Damascus airport was a sight

that will be forever burned into Carlson’s

memories—a US Air Force C-141 aircraft

that would take them to military facilities

in Germany.

After being released from captivity

and flown to Wiesbaden, they were

interviewed by Navy psychiatrists.

Carlson couldn’t talk about the hijacking

and captivity. It was all there in his mind,

but it wouldn’t come out. He needed to

clear his mind of the terror and somehow

find some good from the experience.

Returning home, Carlson chose to

stay in the Army Reserve. As part of his

recovery, he assisted in educating the

military about terrorism. He gave many

talks and even wrote a book, One

American Must Die. In 1987, he returned

to Germany to identify one of the

hijackers who had been captured and

later testified at his trial.

(Note: Mohammad Ali Hamadei was

arrested by German authorities in 1987.

He was convicted by a German court

and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Hasan Izz-Al-Din and Ali Atwa are still

at large, as shown in the Web sites listed

at the right.)

Carlson later served during Operation

Desert Shield and Desert Storm during

1990 and 1991. He concluded his Army

career in 1998, following 3 years of

command of the 961st Engineer Battalion

(Combat) (Heavy).

“Through my 29 years of duty, I was

a true Reservist,” said Carlson. “I never

sought an assignment or position, but

volunteered when asked to serve. It was

an honor and a privilege to be a member

of the Army Reserve in service of our

country.” Reflecting on the current

world situation, he stated, “My support

and prayers will always be there for

Army Reserve soldiers and their

families.”

(Note: In 1995, a guided-missile

destroyer was named for the slain petty

officer, Robert Stethem. From 2000

through 2002, Carlson and the Navy

divers, along with the family of the slain

diver, took the Iranian government to

court for planning, sponsoring, and

training the terrorists who conducted

the hijacking. They won a landmark

case against Iran and state-sponsored

terrorism.)

Major Eschmann is a staff officer

assigned to the Office of the Chief, Army

Reserve, Washington, D.C.

(Editor’s note: In October 2003, a

version of this article was published in

The Officer, the official publication of the

Reserve Officers Association.)

For additional information on the

Flight 847 hijacking:

Books

Kurt Carlson. One American Must Die:

A Hostage’s Personal Account of the

Hijacking of Flight 847. New York:

Congdon and Weed, 1986.

John Testrake and David J. Wimbish.

Triumph Over Terror on Flight 847. Old

Tappan, New Jersey: Fleming H. Revell,

1987.

Video

The Taking of Flight 847: The Uli

Derickson Story (1988) (TV Movie).

Internet

FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists, Hasan

Izz-Al-Din, <http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/

terrorists/terizzaldin.htm>.

FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists, Ali Atwa,

<http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/

teratwa.htm>.