knqine'er 


The Grizzly 


February 1998 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 

5-98-1 Approved for public release, distribution is ur 
EAR - THE - WAY - - - - P 

By Major General Robert 6. Flowers 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

do not use 

The only 

J.S. forces 

iD) APLs. . .. 

A recurring headline in the last few months has 

concerned an international effort to ban antipersonnel 

land mines [APLs]. After wading through the halftruths, emotional diatribe, and disparaging remarks made 

about our President. I want to set the record straight. I will 

address our policy, our nation's role in demining, and our 

current mine doctrine. 

First our policy, which is very clear: I 

or train with nonself-destructing (NS 

exceptions to this policy are for the defense ot Korea and to 

train demining teams. 

Korea is a unique situation. The minefields along the 

demilitarized zone (DMZ) have helped maintain the peace for 

44 years while South Korea has prospered. Poised just 25 

miles from the capital of Seoul (the distance from Dallas to 

Fort Worth) is the vanguard of more than 1 million North 

Korean soldiers.This army, with more artillery than NATO, has 

vowed to reunite Korea by force. This is not a hypothetical 

situation; it is real and it Is now. When occupied by the North 

Koreans in August 1950, thousands of civilians in Seoul 

vanished. Today, more than 11 million people live in Seoul. In 

an interview with the Dallas Morning News, published 

November 23. 1997. our President stated he would not put 

our military or any South Korean in jeopardy. He does not 

want one death occurring "...because of a decision I made 

that seemed compassionate and was popular at the moment 

and 8 or 9 or 10 years later looked like a terrible mistake:' 

The world must also consider the second-order effects of 

removing mines from Korea and how the North Koreans might 

easily misinterpret our actions. A clear indicator for the 

Germans of an impending Russian attack during World War II 

was a buildup of infantry, tanks, artillery, and aircraft and the 

removal of Russian minefields. North Korea rails against 

regularly scheduled military maneuvers in the south. What 

signal will North Korea-a desperate, starving country with an 

unpredictable government-receive as we compensate for 

the lack of mines by increasing all our forces in Korea? How 

will North Korea react if it misinterprets our good intentions for 

signs of an impending attack? We must leave our mines 

where they are protecting a fragile peace: harming no one, 

threatening no one. 

Mr. Cornelio Somaruga, president of the International 

Committee of the Red Cross, stated after the signing of the 

APL Treaty in Ottawa that 'The real victory will come only 

when all mines have been cleared from battlefields and farm 

fields:'This is exactly the problem the world faces. Neither our 

mines in Korea nor our smart mines stored for combat ere the 

problem. It is the indiscriminate use of APLs in countries such 

as Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Angola that the world needs 

to address. The United States leads the world in demining 

spending and in training deminers.This year we almost tripled 

our spending effort to nearly $80 million, and next year we will 

increase that amount to more than $100 million. Many nations 

have also joined us, Including Canada and Norway, by 

pledging millions for demining. 

During the December 2 CNN special program titled "Land 

Mines: Hidden Assassins:' one very committed British 

deminer, who had been blinded and maimed while demining. 

commented, "The land-mine ban has not dealt with the 

problem [human suffering] and will not deal with the problem. 

The real problem ... can only be addressed by clearance." Our 

Countermine Training Support Center at Fort Leonard Wood is 

training Special Forces teams to train deminers worldwide. 

Soon we will train Bosnian deminers in Missouri. Although 

some have chosen to chide our President for not signing the 

Ottawa treaty, I agree with the British deminer: Actions speak 

louder than words. 

We have destroyed 2.3 million APLs and soon will destroy 

another 1 million. In reality, our situational obstacles, which 

use self-destructingiself-neutralizing mines, give the APL ban 

advocates exactly what they profess to want: 

They pose no residual threats to civilians. 

They normally are in storage and are used only during 

intense combat. 

They are not suited for use by guerrilla forces or terrorists. 

Some claim that a mine is a mine and that any risk to 

civilians is unacceptable, but such statements show a basic 

misunderstanding of our mine doctrine. Self-destrucl 

are used to delay and disrupt armored assaults to 

enemy to be engaged by artillery, tanks, attack h~ 

antitank guided missiles, A-lOs, and F-16s. Duriny IIIW lour 

hours the mines are active, th, 

extremely intense environmen 

Bottom line:The United States is clearly tne world leader tor 

demining activities, and our actions will contribute significantly 

to ridding the world of NSD mines. As Jan Egeland, the 

Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, recently stated, "In all the 

countrie iited to observe the effects of the land-mine 

plague. ?r encountered an Am he." We are 

not the [ t we have the solution. 

The YoY event at your Engi~~~~~ ~nter is the 

ENFORCE Confer{ il, and my staff is busy planning 

for it. We have revic ear's comment sheets and have 

made adjustments ro Dorn Improve the conference and meet 

your needs. My next article will be dedicated to ENFORCE 

and the engineer vision. 

s I have vie 

I have nevc 

)roblem, bu .. a L.:" 

?nce in Apr 

?wed last yt . ~ ,~ ~ .,~ . ~~ 

ere won't b 

t. 

.... 

e any civili; 

. . 

erican m 

.^-r P^ 

:ing mines 

allow the 

slicopters, 

. -L. r.... 

3ns in this 

. .. 
February - 1998 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 28 PB 5-98-1 ----- I 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD I 

I 

COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 

Major General Robert B. Flowers 

Shirley Bridges 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

2 The Grizzly: Mobility Support for Force XXI 

By Lieutenant Colonel Donald i? Kotchman, Wesley I. 

Glasgow, and Lieutenant Colonel Harry Greene 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURES EDSTOR 

1 3 5 "Colonel, You're Fired!" 

I By Richard Chaney 

7 Promoting Effective Countermine Operations in BosniaHerzegovina 

By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Toomey and Major 

John Q. Killip 

Jennifer Morgan 11 I The MARTEN: A Quantum Leap for Engineers 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: I By Alan Schlie 

DENNIS J. RE IMER I 7: Command and Control: Seeing the Battlefield 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

JOEL 6. HUDSON 

By Colonel Thomas Bostick and Capfain Matthew 

I Pasvogel 

7-7 Maintaining Engineer Equipment ( By Major Charles Radke 

/ 71 Mission Analysis: Getting It Right 

1 By Major Joey Wyte 

Administrative Assistant to the 1 

Secretary of the Army 

0435~ I I_ ncp,,* _ ~-y,ny=.q~~s 

Front Cover: The Grizzly shown bee 1 lnSideFrontCover: cleartheway reducing a wrre obstacle, will pronde Army I 

engrneers w~th a d~gittzed, sduat!onally aware Personal Viewpoint '3 CfC Motes 

page 2. I 2 1 Letter to the Editor :75 Engineer Update 

Back Cover: A severe storm on 19-22 June I 27 Book Review 77 Lead the Way 

1944 destroyed the floating pier at Omaha 

Beach. See article beginnmg on page 15. I 

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The Grizzly: Mobility Support for Force XXI 

By Lielrler~ant Colorlel Uor~old I? Kotchmorr, Wesley I. Glargow, 

orrd Lieufena~~l Colorlel Horn Grepnr 

"T I1e rapnhilin' to rapidly breach ob.rmcles has 

e~,idc,nced almost no irnprovernent since World 

War 11. Techniqrres in use are conce~~trmll? the 

same a, thone used in the IY40.v." 

Headqrrar-ters, U.S. Depanment of the Ann?, 

Afirr Artion Report.for Operation Desert Sronn, 1991 

Changes are on the horizon. With the fielding of the Grizzly 

in FY 2003, the U.S. Army will have a survivable. mobile, 

complex-ohstaclc-reduction system. These capabilities do not 

exist in any army today and respond to a growing threat. 

"Breaching a comnp1e.x obstaclr covered by errrmy fir(, is 

tlw torrghest attack mission a unit con get." 

General Frederick Franks Jr (Retired) 

Commander; VII Co~ps 

Oprration Dc~sert Storrn 

Preparation for breaching operations traditionally includes 

the following requirements: 

Extensive intelli, vence. 

Sophisticated preparation of reduction assets hrought 

forward from "one terrain feature back." 

The Challenge Extensive rehearsals (days, weeks. or even months). 

A s we look to the 21st centuly and Force XXI 

operations, our Army expects to have a technological 

advantage in information and weapons over any 

potential adversary. To counter our advantages, adversaries 

will attempt to use asymmetric threats. such as obstacles. 

which cost little hut provide them great benefits. 

Obstacles are expected at all levels of conflict, and obstacle 

technology is improving and proliferating. Rapid ditching 

machines; artillery-, rocket-. and air-delivered mines: and 

ground minelayers are available on world markets. They allow 

our adversaries to rapidly emplace complex obstacles, giving 

friendly forces little or no warning of their existence. Mine 

fuzings for hand-emplaced and scanerahle mines are moving 

toward greater sophistication and lethality that overmatch our 

current reduction assets. A low-cost fuze unmade to a World 

Massive combat and support preparation. 

The complex nature of these requirements necessitates 

deliberate breaches for all hut the most simple obstacles, with 

a corresponding loss of tempo. 

Executing a breach is difficult today due to the large 

number of vehicles involved and the synchronization required 

for success. For example, approximately 30 percent of the 

tank assets in the combined arms hattalions of Force XXI 

will be dedicated to carrying rollers and plows to support 

breaches. The smaller, more agile units of Force XXI will use 

information to dominate maneuver. The ability of potential 

adversaries to rapidly emplace increasingly destructive and 

effective minefields and complex obstacles mandates new 

ways to execute breaches to enable dominant maneuver. . L 

War 11-era mine (millions of which are av;lilable around the 

world) transforms a simple, pressure-fuzed mine into a full- Operational Advantage 

width, multisensor mine capahle of killing our $6 million m oday's methods of defeating complex obstacles 

tanks. We can expect an increase in enemy countermobility n require a complex operation involving several types 

operations as a counter to our superiority in information and of specialized equipment, none of which offer the 

weapons technology. versatility, mobility, or survivability of the Grizzly. Using 

2 Engineer February 1998 
"Got to get a mechanical breach to maintain the tempo on the 

battlefield. ..Got to get the soldiers out of harm's way. Grizzly. ..need 

it quickly." 

MG Paul Kern, CG, 4 1 D (M) 

(EXFOR), 2 May 1997 

Today Tomorrow 

Figure 1 

current systems, the task force commander and engineer 

must orchestrate a variety of reduction assets to conduct 

breaches. Since each complex obstacle is unique, each 

breach requires employment of the various assets in a 

different order, effectively preventing the use of battle drills, 

complicating task organization, and mandating the 

requirement for lengthy reconnaissance and rehearsals. 

Consider a complex obstacle consisting of wire, 

minefields, and antitank ditches. After completing the 

preamble to the breach (reconnaissance, planning, assembly 

of equipment, etc.), the breach begins with removing the 

wire, typically accomplished by soldiers using wire cutters, 

bangalore torpedoes, or an M58 mine-clearing line charge 

(MICLIC). Their efforts may be complicated by 

antipersonnel mines and fires. After the soldiers create a lane 

in the wire, they fire a series of MICLICs into the minefield. 

The number of MICLICs needed depends on the linear 

depth of the minefield. When the first MICLIC is fired, the 

breach site is immediately visible to the enemy. After each 

MICLIC is fired, the lane must be proofed, typically with a 

mine roller or plow mounted on an MI tank. Using current 

allocation rules and the decreased size of the Force XXI 

combined arms battalion, 30 percent of the combat vehicles 

are required to push either rollers or plows. The resulting 

lane is cleared only along the width of the MI tank tracks, 

requiring that additional passes or sappers improve the lane 

for follow-on forces. 

The presence of antitank ditches adds complications 

since neither tanks equipped with battalion countermine sets 

nor MICLICs are effective against this obstacle. Either an 

armored combat earthmover (ACE) or an armored vehiclelaunched bridge (AVLB) (Wolverine in the future) must be 

brought to the lane to breach the ditch. Both the ACE and the 

AVLB lack the Grizzly's survivability. If more mines are 

encountered beyond the ditch, additional assets are required to 

continue the breach. The assault force will be very vulnerable 

to counterattack until sufficient lanes are created to push 

additional combat power through the breach. In summary, 

breaching operations currently require a high degree of 

coordination, skill, and training on the part of the soldiers 

attempting to accomplish the mission (Figure 1). 

This situation is complicated by emerging full-width. 

multisensor mine fuzings designed to defeat our current 

reduction assets. The Grizzly will more easily and rapidly 

defeat this threat and provide an integrated breach system. 

The Solution 

he Grizzly promises to greatly improve the effectiveness 

of our maneuver forces. Under development as a variant 

of the proven M1 Abrams main battle tank, the Grizzly 

takes advantage of the Ml's mobility and survivability 

features. With these capabilities, it can maintain the operating 

tempo of the Bradley- and Abrams-equipped Force XXI 

combined arms battalions. The Grizzly's integrated system 

has the capability to reduce all parts of typical obstacles 

(mines, wire. ditches, rubble, and log obstacles), providing 

responsive support to the force. The Grizzly incorporates both 

countermine and counterobstacle capabilities into a single 

survivable system that, in one pass, creates a lane trafficable 

February 1998 Engineer 3 
Reducing Complex Obstacles 

No*: 1) Sale force passage evalualesfhe *$fern3 ablaly lo 0 Good Eff& 

sale@ allowlallow-onlorces andvehrcles lop- by 

guaranleehg the absence 01 rnhesm the lane. klarginall~nd1Hon.I ERed 

2) Evaluadon does no1 considerslrmvab!lily and 

etla;sveness olsyslern or vehhle AFiER a rnlne blail LimiWNo Effa 

Figure 2 

Notional Complex Obstacle Reduction Today b 

Wlmob83ck Friendly Axls of Advansc 

1\dyW~@ with Grinlv in AT & AP mindiild AT <fish 

Breaching Orerations 

-Reconnaissance d obstacle 

can be less delaiied because 

the Grinly deleats dl types ot 

mine luzings. DLy&ms4 doploycd vs. marking lam. 

-Breach lorce batie drlllr will delest mi"es BndTWMP Tmck 

be eankr to execute, raving wirerrith TlacCwIdth and ACE cFr'ar lens 

lime spent on rehersais bangalore mineplovCIWMP) -duos "defer clear. 

- LBSE lime will be spent and and rollers proof ATO. re"duei Engineers 

cutters lam. suppressing the enemy, begin lo 

saving lives, ammunition, and expand 

equipment. Notional Obstacle Reduction Using a Grizzly redua'0n. 

-Fewer smoke rounds will be 

expended to obscure 

reduction riles. 

-Time spent reducing complex 

obslacle~ is greatly reduced-. 8"1i" rcdu~l~on. Grildy Fleduces the Obstacles see drawing. .-"It 

torwto 

-Tanks u~d to push plows F-=. 

and rollers return tothefighl. 

Grizzly Increases Tempo 

Less preparation/rehearsals (saves hours) 

AT =Antilank Reduces exposure time in the breach 

AP = Anipsrronnel 

'Ohh/ opmtbnal requlrement~I1~torrdly;tion of~~mabs~le h 21 mhub or*= 

Figure 3 

by the entire maneuver force. Figure 2 compares the breach 

capability of current equipment with the Grizzly. Only the 

Grizzly is effective across the full spectrum of the threat. 

Contrast the previous situation with the same breach 

conducted by a Grizzly-equipped force. The Grizzly is capable 

of breachmg wire, mines, and ditches; thus, battle drills for the 

breach are possible. Battle drills eliminate the orchestration of 

obstacle reduction and ease the bade command challenge. The 

task force commander can concentrate on suppressing, 

obscuring, and securing the breach site, leaving obstacle 

reduction to the engineer and his Grizzly. A Grizzly crew of two 

can complete a breach that currently requires numerous soldier; 

in less survivable systems. and the Grizzly allows ranks to fight 

rather than breach. Perhaps most impomtly, the additional 

tempo provided by the Grizzly allows the assault force to pass 

combat power sooner than is possible today. 

The presence of a rapidly employed, complex obstacle 

system may he decisive in a battle if it permits adversaries to 

slow the tempo of our forces. Employing the Grizzly with 

maneuver task forces allows them to rapidly react to aerial- or 

artillery-delivered scatterable mines, point obstacles at 

chokepoints. mechanically emplaced mines, or a combination 

of these. The Grizzly enables friendly forces to dominate 

maneuver and strike before the enemy can effectively react. 

Figure 3 illustrates some of the differences the Grizzly can 

make to the maneuver force during a breaching operation. 

4 Engineer Febniay 1998 
Key Features 

Grizzly Design Characteristics 

The Grizzly is a leap ahead in both capabilities provided to the force and In combat vehicle systems. It is a 

full-tracked, heavily protected vehicle that integrates the following MI chassis technologies, modernized 

standard Army components, and Grizzly-unique mission modules: 

MI chassis wlth an NBC overpressure system and advanced track and suspension components. 

Standard Army components include the weapons system, digital command and control communications 

systems, and a wide variety of other standard combat vehicle components, which are integrated in the 

Grizzly system through an aggressive technology-insertion initiative. This technology-insertion program 

will ensure the Grizzly remains Interoperable with the Bradley and Abrams fleet. 

Grizzly-unique components include a mine-clearing blade with automatic depth control, drive-by-wire 

operations, a power-driven arm for obstacle reduction and lift, a remotely controlled weapon statlon, a 

commander's control station for the organic two-person crew, and a sophisticated vision system for operating the Grizzly "closed hatch." 

ey to the Grizzly's success is an automatic depthcontrol system that enables the blade to move at a 

consistent depth regardless of terrain conditions. This 

sy\tem detects changes in terrain contours and automatically 

directs hydraulic controllers to adjust blade height, pitch, and 

roll (angle). Unlike a bulldozer, which provides a final planar 

surface regardless of the ground contour, the Grizzly blade 

maintains a constant plow depth while following an 

undulating surface. The primary system consists of tactile 

sensor units, which "feel" the surface of the ground. A backup 

depth-control system is provided by a series of strain gages 

External cameras 

for crew visibility 

- Increased survivability 

in adverse weather and 

under flre 

that measure shear forces on the blade and adjust the depth to 

maintain a constant force. Manual controls in the crew station 

provide additional redundancy for depth control. Research 

continues on sensing technologies for future product 

improvements. 

The mine blade provides a tremendous improvement over 

the existing mine plow. It is designed to survive mine blasts 

and retract for road travel while not significantly degrading 

the mobility of the M1 chassis. The blade incorporates a 

series of tines (see photo above) that uplift mines onto the dirt 

spoil moving in front of the blade. The mines are then rolled 

to the side and deposited with soil astride the cleared lane as 

the vehicle moves forward. Blade action helps preclude 

U Weapons station 

a 1553 data bus - Sltuaf~onally aware - Provldes bu~lt-~n tests and 

Fehntan] 1998 Engineer 5 

d~agnos~s 

I; "< - Provides ditlgal command and 

control 

Power-driven arm - Provides rnultirole 

capabilities --ip 

-b I Commander's control station 

w , wlth two-man crew BC 

overpressure 

.=--- - i 

chassis - - ..-= -- - Easps support =-- - - Increases ~pee \ 

and range I 

i, 

1 ~~ll-~~dth

blade w~th automatic depth 

-- -- -- control 

- V; ;gin; , ,, 1 r--e'rum of mine threats 

- A.icIs versatil~ty - Keeps pare vrrth 

maneuver force 

- Adds ag~lity 
I - - - -- - - -- - - . - 

Figure 4. The power-driven arm on the Grizzly provides lifting, grappling, and dirt-moving capabilities to breaches.The 

arm and the blade work together to enable the crew to reduce tank ditches and log cribs and move rubble. 

detonation of pressure-fused mines. The Grizzly blade is 

also effective against the full spectrum of the the mine 

threat. Perhaps most importantly, the Grizzly clears the full 

width of the lane, in contrast to the track-width clearance 

available today. 

A power-driven arm (Figure 4) on the Grizzly is adapted 

from commercial construction equipment. It provides 

lifting. grappling, and dirt-moving capabilities to breaches. 

Working together, the arm and the blade enable the crew to 

reduce tank ditches and log cribs and move rubble. 

The Grizzly is designed for under-armor operations, which 

require external cameras to permit day, night, and all-weather 

operations. In addition, the Grizzly will be fully integrated 

into the Force XXI digital information system using the Force 

XXI Battle Command. Brigade and Below (FBCB2) 

software. The Grizzly will be the first drive-by-wire 

(computer-controlled) vehicle in the Army inventory. 

Program Status 

'nited Defense Limited Partnership is under contract 

to mature existing prototype vehicles for government evaluation and testing before the low-rate 

initial production decision, which is scheduled for the spring 

of FY 2000. Testing will include operational tests with 

soldiers, technical testing, and live-fire tests (including 

mine-blast tests). A total buy of 366 vehicles is planned, 

with fielding to heavy division and corps (mechanized) 

engineer battalions scheduled to begin in FY 2004. 

Prospects 

he Force XXI Army promises to possess an 

information advantage over our adversaries. Effective 

mobility support is essential to exploit this advantage. The 

Grizzly provides a revolutionary capability to the force-the 

ability to defeat complex obstacles while maintaining the pace 

and momentum of the attack. The Grizzly is essential for our 

Army to meet the Force XXI objectives to dominate maneuver 

and win the information war. m 

Lieutenant Colonel Kotchman, an ordnance oficer ~~ith 

more than 18 years of service, is product manager for the 

Gri?.ly program at the Detroit Arsenal, Warren, Michigan. He 

is a grad~late of the U.S. Military Academy and holds a master's 

degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. 

Mr: Glasgow is a military equipment analyst and technical 

writer with Camber Corporation, in Warren, Michigan. A 

former U.S. Army ofJicer; he trained as a research, 

development, and acquisition specialist with assignments as 

an operational tester at Fort Sill and materiel developer at the 

U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, 

Warren, Michigan. 

Lieutenant Colonel Greene is Division ChieJ; TRADOC 

Systems Manager; Engineer Combat Systems, U.S. Army 

Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is an 

engineer oficer in the Army Acquisition Corps and a 

registered professional engineer: LTC Greene holds a 

doctorate froin the University of Southern California. 

6 Engineer February 1998 
7 
 BE AWARE 

MINES DC Y'T CARE 


yromo ting Effective Countermine 


Operations in Bosnia-Werzegovina 


Ry Lie~rennnr Colonrl Christopher J. Toomev nwd Mojor- Johil Q. Killip 

'ith an estimated 3 to 6 million mines and pieces of 

unexploded ordnance (UXO) left on the ground. 

the pervasive mine threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

continues to he a major obstacle to achieving lasting stahility 

and furthering reconstruction efforts in the country. Mined 

areas include many roads. hridge sites. and industrial 

complexes, as well as nearly 22 percent of cultivable land. 

There are about 150 mines per square mile. Plans for every 

project to rebuild a hridge, grade a road. or repair a huilding 

must consider costly and time-consuming mine surveys and 

clearance oper:itions. 

Key to Stability 

Within this environment. NATO's Stabilization 

Force (SFOR) has the mission to ensure peace and 

stability. From the start. the SFOR recognized that 

the mine threat had to he reduced to ensure the safety 

of the population and NATO forces and to encourage the 

international community's long-term support for 

reconstruction. 

A fair amount of interest and investment exists in Bosnia 

for removing mines (referred to as rleminit~g).Among the 

organizations with a role in promoting countermine 

operations are the United Nations Mine Action Center 

(UNMAC), the SFOR (which works through the Chief. 

Combined Joint Engineer (CJENGR), Entity Armies (EA). 

governmental agencies, and nongovernmental agencies. 

Rccause the country lacks centralized direction and a national 

demining policy, the actions of these organizations often are 

uncoordinated and nonsupporting. Mines continue to be a major threat to reconstruction in This article focuses on efforts of the SFOR CJENGR to Bosnia-Herzegovina. develop and shape humanitarian demining programs in 
4 

rn KRRLC 

KOPRlVNlCR 

L ZAGRE5 

KUTINA DRRUV0.R r, 

B 

SLAV 

EROD - ~ ~ ~ 

~ - ,--n?s;:rtan~snn ,-.-.~~~ ~ - -711PRh - .. 

.- 

D 

SARAJEV? 

2 ADRIATIC 

Known mine fields - Presttmed mined areas 

? Cleared areas , , 

I Marked areor 

Mine incident MARKING AND CLEARING 

(December 1996) 

Bosnia. The intent of these programs is to systematically 

reduce the mine threat, promote stability, and foster 

economic regeneration. We will outline the development of 

a theater-wide strategy to promote effective demining within 

the framework of peace support operations. 

Terminology 

ar from being a trivial exercise in semantics, the 

myriad of terms used to discuss mine-removal 

operations in Bosnia requires clear understanding. 

O11e of the CJENGR's first jobs was to work with the various 

participants and establish consistent terminology. The 

United States distinguishes between countermine operations 

(military breaching and mine-clearance activities in support 

of a mission) and humanitarian demining (the removal of 

mines as an end in itsell). This distinction is not universally 

accepted within the theater's international community. Some 

key terms used in theater follow: 

- Mine lifting. The removal of specific mines, as shown 

on a minefield record. It is not the systematic inspection of 

each piece of ground: it is the renioval of known mines from 

a record. This technique often leaves unrecorded mines and 

UXO on the ground. 

- Mine clearing. The systematic checking of each portion 

of ground to a particular standard. Most organizations in 

theater use a mix of manual and mechanical techniques, 

including probing, to conduct clearing operations. 

- Humanitanan demirrirzg. A clearing standard that 

removes 99.6 percent of existing mines. In practice, mineclearance techniques are discussed in terms of the "ability to 

produce a humanitarian standard:' Probing at 10 cm2 intervals 

can theoretically produce this result. The standard originated 

with the UNMAC, which has used similar standards in other 

parts of the world. 

The Demining Community 

S everal groups are involved in demining activities 

throughout Bosnia. 

Stabilization Force 

Across the theater, the SFOR (primarily combat engineers) 

removes mines using military techniques. Because mine 

removal is a risky operation, the SFOR developed a rather 

conservative policy that reflects their force-protection 

concerns. Demining by the SFOR takes place only when itSupports freedom of movement or training the SFOR 

(e.g., it is in the interest of the force). 

Is approved by the nation executing the mission. 

Is approved by the SFOR commander. 

Entity Armies 

According to the Dayton Accords, the three EA (:lI.;o 

known as the Former Waning Factions) are responsible fur 

ensuring the timely marking and removal of mines and UXO 

in the country. Until spring 1997, this effort was lackluster for 

several reasons: 
Humanitarian demining requires pai~staking and 

careful probing. 

- Incomplete ir~formation.A 1996 study by United 

Kingdom Royal Engineers operating in Bosnia's 

Multinational Division Southwest indicated there was a less 

than 60-percent correlation between minefield records and 

mines on the ground. Since mines were employed by all 

forces at all levels (from weU-trained, corps-level engineers 

who produced detailed, highly accurate records to embattled 

infantry pl;ltoons with "hack-of-the-envelope" diagrams), a 

wide disparity exists in the accuracy and clarity of reports. 

Many minefields never were recorded or marked. 

- Lack of lraininp. Due to post-hostility demobilization, 

the EA lost much demining expertise and mine-clearing 

equipment. 

-Lack of will. Although never explicitly stated, a lack of 

willpower on the part of the EA to conduct mine-removal 

operations is evident-particularly in certain areas. It is clear 

that some mined areas are still considered viable for use in 

the event hostilities recommence. Thus. targeting specific 

areas for EA demining activities mccts with resistance. 

According to the Dayton Accords. the EA will record, 

mark. and lift minefields. These actions are monitored by the 

SFOR. Monitoring involves verifying that EA forces remove 

thc density (number) of mines shown on minefield records or 

the numher of mines the EA claim are in a minefield. 

United Nation5 Mine Action Center 

The Un~ted Nat~on~ ha.; charged the UNMAC to 

coordinate the efforts of all civilian demining activities in 

Bosnia. Staffed by civilians with a wealth of demining 

experience, the UNMAC does not physically take out mines. 

Instead, the UNMAC performs the following functions: 

- Maintain minefield information. The UNMAC 

maintains the minefield datahase, which lists all known and 

suspected mined locations. 

- Certijj demining companies and teams. A major task is 

to review the training documentation and techniques used by 

demining organizations and certify their competency. The 

UNMAC gives demining organizations a "seal of approval" 

but does not take responsibility for their demining actions. 

- Synchronize demining activifies. The UNMAC attempts 

to synchronize the activities of various demining 

organizations within the countly to ensure that the "right" 

areas are addressed at the right time. 

International and Nongovernmental Organizations 

Numerous agencies and groups, including commercial 

deminers, are involved in mine-removal operations in the 

region. They profit from the extensive demining requirements 

associated with reconstruction. Normally led by experienced 

personnel from outside Bosnia. these organizations employ 

civilians and former soldiers of the EA. The UNMAC 

certifies the techniques used by private companies hired by 

both local governments and other agencies, such as the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID). Some 

agencies. such as USAID, routinely budget the cost of hiring 

deminers in their projects. 

In addition to the commercial demining companies, some 

U.N.-certified volunteer organizations come to Bosnia to 

contribute to the demining effort. 

Obstaclesto Success 

nitially, the mine-removal community did not agree to 

accept a specific standard. The UNMAC focused on 

endorsing clearance to a humanitarian standard (99.6 

percent). The EA originally conducted only mine-lifting 

operations because that was the extent of their capabilities. 

As far as the UNMAC was concerned, the EA did not 

conduct any recognizable humanitarian demining operations. 

Although the EA removed mines from minefield records, the 

UNMAC believed that mined areas must be cleared to a 

humanitarian standard in order to be considered "safe." In 

practice, the UNMAC position nullified the clearance 

activities of the EA and fostered a lack of confidence in mine 

lifting as a viahle method for clearing well-recorded 

minelields. 

Reliahle data concerning the location, composition. and 

extent of minefields in Bosnia are lacking. Even though the 

EA are charged to turn over all minefield and UXO records, 

many of the minefields are either unrecorded or the records 

are not released. Many of the records turned over to the 

SFOR and the UNMAC are inaccurate and incomplete, and 

record management is a continuing prohlem. At the start of 
1997. minefield records were kept at the Multinational Encourage greater participation by international 

Divisional level, the SFOR level, and with the UNMAC. In organizations. 

addition, several independent databases were kept by other 

or!!anizations, such as the World Bank. Developing Entity Army Capahilities . 

Early in 1997, uncoordinated efforts resulted in discrete 

mine-removal activity, but there was no systematic approach 

to clearing areas tied to reconstruction or the priorities of 

other lead organizations. such as the United Nations High 

Commission for Refugees and the Organizations for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

SFOR Campaign to Promote Effective 

Demining 

Ultimate responsibility for formulating and continuing 

an effective humanitarian demining program is not 

an SFOR responsibility. The civilian leadership--

both U.N. and national authorities-are ultimately 

responsible for the success of an effective countermine 

program. However, the climate in late 1996 and early 1997 

was such that SFOR determined it had to take the lead in 

jump starting a country-wide demining program. 

Whcn developing a campaign plan. the CJENGR 

determined that a major goal of the campaign must be to 

promote effective demining activities. To accomplish this 

god. the CJENGR established several initial objectives: 

Develop the EA humanitarian demining capabilities. 

Foster mine-awareness programs. 

Synchronize demining activities, 

Strengthen the position of the UNMAC as the leader in 

demining activities. 

For various reasons, EA demining activity was at a virtual 

halt by December 1996. Not only were the EA not conducting 

viable mine-removal activities, they did not possess valid 

plans to begin mine-removal operations. Therefore, the 

CJENGR took several steps to re-energize the EA: 

Link mine-removal activig to movement and training. 

The commander of SFOR has authority to take actions 

necessary to ensure EA compliance with the military provisions of the Dayton Accords, including the requirement 

to conduct demining. A major step was to firmly link EA 

privileses-notably their ability to train and move their 

forces-to evidence of demining activities. This step provided excellent motivation for the EA to initiate demining 

activities. 

Make thepolicy concrete. The EA and subordinate multinational divisions were unclear as to what constituted 

successful demining activities. The CJENGR clarified 

demining policies and spelled out concrete objectives and 

requirements in the COMSFOR-endorsed Insrrucrions ro 

Parries. A companion document, not given to the EA, is 

Campaign Directive 21, Countermine Opernrion.~,which 

provides additional guidance on administering activities 

to monitor demining. 

Review EA plans. The EA were required to produce 

detailed plans outlining how and where their mincremoval assets would be used. The CJENGR took the ini-

~rrnyesin the surnrnerof 1997 and 

repaired by USAID later that fall. 
tiative to recon~mend adjustments to the plans to ensure supported using the EA to lift and clear high-density 

an adequate pace and priority of demining. In addition, minelields. 

emphasis was placed on demining arear targeted for 

reconstruction. Promoting the UNMAC 

Support bilateral initiatives for equipment and Paining. Several bilateral initiatives emerged, notably one 

initiated hy the U.S. Department of State's Demining 

Commission (USDC). The USDC sponsored counternline training for about 450 EA soldiers that focused on 

clearing mines to a humanitarian standard (vice mine 

lifting). The CJENGR recognized this training as a 

great opportunity and developed strict requirements for 

compliance. 

Prnmote certification through the UNMAC. One prohlem with EA mine-removal operations was the lack of 

recognition they received as credible deniiners. With the 

enhanced training provided by USDC, the CJENGR and 

UNMAC worked to gain recognition for EA mineclearing activities. 

Fostering Mine Awareness 

To foster mine awareness, the CJENGR supported the 

SFOR's information campaign to make the local population 

cogni~ant of the mine threat. The campaign focused on 

developing posters and making radio broadcasts to drcribe 

the mine threat. 

The inforl~ation canipaigri on mine awareness was also 

directed at the international community to encourage support 

for demining and reconstnlction activities. A major initiative 

was to develop brochures outlining current successes and 

shortcomings. These brochures were distributed at a World 

Bank donor\' conference and other meetings. 

The CJENGR established a training team to enhance 

[nine awareness among the SFOR and local organizations. 

The team consists of several highly trained mine experts. 

who are available to conduct brielings and training on mine 

awareness. 

Synchmnizing Efforts 

The CJENGR chaired a series of liieetings throughout the 

spring of 1997 with the UNMAC, the United Nations High 

Comtnission for Refugees, the World Bank, and other 

interested parties. Dialogue at these meetings tied denlining 

activities to reconstruction efforts. proposed refugee-return 

programs. and supported pendine municipal elections in 

various sectors. The goal was to ensure that demining 

occurred in high-payoff areas. 

During these meetings, the role of the EA e\,olved within 

the total mine-clearance scheme. Although the UNMAC 

refused to recognize the EA capability ar viable to achieving 

a hunl;~nitarian standard (even with the USDC-sponsored 

training). thc UNMAC agreed to i~lcorporate EA mine 

rcnio\-al in their overall assessment of mined and cleared 

areas. Additionally. the UNMAC recognired that EA mine 

removal at any level was preferable to no action and 

It is iniportant for the UNMAC to be the recognized leader 

in the long-term mine-removal program in Bosnia for several 

reasons. First, the UNMAC is charged with this role by both 

the United Nations and the London Agreement of January 

1997. The London Agreement specifies the UNMAC as the 

lead agency in orchestrating mine-removal operations 

throughout the country until the Bosnian Commission on 

Demining is established. Second, as a prime agent of the 

United Nations, the UNMAC must have the confidence of the 

international community. Also, because the SFOR's charter is 

limited, that agency should not be the demonstrative leader in 

the long-telm, mine-removal program. 

Promoting the UNMAC took two fomis. First was the 

consolidation of mine datahases. As late as December 1996. 

the SFOR and the UNMAC maintained separate databases of 

information on mined areas. Most of the information in the 

SFOR database came from the EA through subordinate units, 

while the UNMAC received its data through civilian 

agencies. After publicly prciclain~ing the UNMAC as the lead 

agency. the SFOR reformatted its database to ensure 

compatibility with the UNMAC's database and transfened all 

infomiation to it. To ensure a smooth transition, the CJENGR 

established a liaison cell at the UNMAC to assist in data 

collection and transfer. By March 1997. the data transfer was 

complete and the UNMAC. assisted by the SFOR cell, was in 

the lead. 

The second fonii of pronioting the UNMAC was to create 

situations where that organizatio~i could demonstrate its 

leadership, such as at countermine working groups. 

Whenever possible. the CJENGR supported and promoted 

these meetings. While they did not always produce concrete 

results, the meetings served to maintain dialogue within the 

demining comniunity. 

Encouraging Suppnrt fronl International Organizations 

The long-term success of mine-removal operations in 

Bosnia hinges on the commitlnent of the international 

community to resource the effort. Through loans for either 

humanitarian demining or as part of reconstruction projects. 

the eventual clearing of most land mines will happen only if 

the international community establishes an indigenous. 

sustainable propram. 

The CJENGR seeks ways to encourage support. One way 

is through direct contact with organizations wnrkinp in 

Bosnia, such as the World Bank. For cn;lmple, the CJENGR 

asked the World Bank to provide loans to support additional 

dog mine-survey teams to increase the tenipo of clearance 

verification. A practical problem with this sort of funding is 

that it requires loans to the Bosnian government, making it 

necessary to convince Bosnian leaders to accept the loans. 

(This problem is also prevalent in many construction loans. 

hut that's another article.) 
Examples of the numerous mines and UXO that litter the Bosnian countryside. 

Development of a viahle inliirniatil~n campaign that An Uncertain Future 

tarpets the international community is instrumental in 

garnering support. By working with the SFOR's information 

campaien. the CJENGR produced pamphlets and flyers to 

alert the international community 11f niine-rmioval 

successes and to solicit assistance. 

A Success Story 

he SFOR's efforts improved the liverall mine 

situation in Bosnia. An example is EA deminio: at 

the Lipovac and Kalavac bridges along the TuzlaBri.ho Railway. 

i\ m;!inr initiative in the region was to re-establish a 

viable comincrcial rail system. Among the sections of rail 

line targeted for reconstruction was the section between 

Tuzla and Rrcko. which would link with rail systems in 

Croatia and Hungary. Funded by USAID, the construction 

involved local contractors and NATO troops. Two bridges 

along the line at Lipo\,:~c and Kalavac were critical. These 

bridges had been severely damaged during the war and were 

heavily mined. To reduce the cost to USAID, SFOR decided 

to oursue deniinine osine EA slildiers trained bv the USDC. 

umanitarian demining in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not 

nearly as effective as it could be. despite the 

outstanding effnns of the SFOR and other agencies. 

Altho~i$h the CJENGR's efforts were positive. mine-clearance 

operations will he onping for many years and will be 

successful only if the international community continues to 

provide funding. Mine clearance is very expensive, both in 

terms of trai~ng and contracting. Cnsts can he minimized by 

targeting areas that yield the greatest benefit for reconstruction. Nonetheless, it will take countless millions or 

dollars and years of effo~t through a sustained propam to 

make mine clearance a success. 

More importantly, governnient leaders in BohniaHerzegovina must actively support mine clearance. They must 

turn over minefield records, actively pursue mine removal by 

the EA, and prove to the international community that they are 

committed to removing the mines. In short. they must make 

the country safe for its own people. w 

- 

Direct coordination with contractors executing the con- Lirrrfi~iirmf Colr~rii~l firofnq\) U.S. Army Corps of En,qinepm. st~ction established that this plan way acceptable. and the f.~rrllfl~ sm.ed as rhF SFORt,y Ell,cineer Pllms, A 19HI 

area was dernined. qradrrate qffl~e 11.S. Milifafp Academy, he i. cnrrmtly scn,irr,q This example illus1r;rtes the rel;~tivc success of the SFOR ;Il NATO, I*rrld C(,nrrNI CJENGR initiatives. With increased training and multiagency coordination, the EA conilucte(l humanitarian Mujor Killip. Royl~l Efl,qOrrer Unifed Kin~dofn AI-~n!: 

clearance in direct support civil rcc~,nstrLlctinll. me sen'cd rrs f/!e SFOR's Enginc~r I~rfellig~rzce Oflicer: He is a 

initiative could not have occurred sc\~cral months earlier. 19x6 ~radrrare offl?~ Royr~l Milifor? Acndern?. Sandl~lrr-sf. 
30 Years Held in Reserve: 


Nothing's Easy, but the Team Can Do It! 

This article could be a historical 

review. hut I want it to be a 

glimpse toward the future. My 

ex]?eriences of the past 30 years are 

u.;ed to examine how we might consider moving into the 21st century. In 

particular, I will focus on the need 

for team-building communication that 

informs. seeks continuous feedback to 

improve team accomplishments. and 

Trains the force. 

Inform 

We were tnoving through the 

pinr-forested mountains of 

rrorrlreastern New Mr.;ico in 

ear-/? Arr~rrst 1967. 1 was heginnirlg my 

er~lizred senjicr with a milifan rr~ritthis was nr)]jirrt dr-ill. Unfomls ond 

rqrri/~~nrnt u,o111d nor he issrred to mr 

rr~rril I star-red hasit. training at For! 

Bliss. Te.ras. in Se/)rrmber I remernher 

fcclin~ like tlze ud(1 mmorl our, hecnrrse I 

M'(I.C !lor in un(form. No one had 

i~lforrnrdme that we were jioirl,y to the 

fieM, so I Mac dressed in crrsr~ol clothes 

rmri wore sli/~-on loafers. We were in 

the mountui~rs to conrplere a coml1n.r.rorienreering corrrsr set up by the rmir's 

r~orlco~nrniszi(~rred [~ficers.MI' teatnmnrr and I. u1o11,q brirlr rhe ofher- reorns. 

.srrcrr.v.:fi~llycom1~let~,df11e coitr,se. 

Overall rile day kid gonr MY'//, even 

rhough I had slipped and slid oivr the 

mlrgh terrtrirl, bur rhe day was nor oiSer 

Riding down the Rorh~ Mountains in rlre 

hrrck of an rrncov~red 2 If,-ton truck, ~ve 

mde most of the w~ry bark ro the annoy 

rmnprotecfed in a midsummer dololvnpour 

ofcold rain. 771e other so1dier.s hadponchos, hut tl~r nm privare did nor. No orle 

offered ro assisr me. My impression boas 

that teamwork was resewed for militan 

operarions, nor,forper.sonalprohlem.sor 

new recnrits. 

Now, 30 years later. I can recall this 

incident with a little humor. But let's 

look into the future. How many of 

today's service members consider 

themselves to be uninformed members 

uf a military team or only pan-time 

team members? How many service 

members find themselves without the 

information and communications they 

need to remain true "team members" in 

times of personal crisis? I am speaking 

of job-related as well as personal crises. Some units find it easier to replace 

an individual than to determine a team 

solution that will move a team member 

and the team beyond a crisis. 

We don't know what crises may face 

those who will serve our country in the 

years ahead. but one we can foresee is 

that of unnecessary stress. Most people 

agree that some stress is beneficial, 

because it can build character. Unnecessary stress, however, such as that 

resulting from a failure to communicate 

effectively, hams the very team cohesiveness we seek to huild. Informing. 

seeking continuous feedback, and training go a long way toward reducing the 

magnitude of a crisis. 

Let's return to the introductory 

vignette, where I am dressed inappropriately in a field setting and in a summer rainstorm, and look for lessons that 

will apply to future teams. My circumstances could have been alleviated easily if the weekend's planned events had 

been passed to me. With proper information. responsibility of how to dress 

would have been mine. The team could 

not be faulted had I been infor~lird. So 

one major way to relieve undue stres.; is 

simply to ensure that everyone on the 

team gets the word. 

Seek Feedback 

n these high-tech days of phones. 

faxes, e-mail. Internet. intranets. 

video teleconferencing. etc.. [here 

are many ways to get the word out. 

What is equally crucial, though. is 

obtaining fecdback to check the clarity 

RY Licrrrrnant Culor~el Kirhnnf Rrid 
of the message sent. The future of military operati<ms looks bright with regard 

to our ability to broadcast messages. I 

feel our leadership needs to focus on 

ensuring that every message (be it information or formal training) has an interactive piece. In my case, a short phone 

call from an assigned enlisted sponsor 

would have alerted me of the weekend 

events in the mountains and provided an 

oppomnity for me to query my sponsor. 

Infomiation is power, and power builds 

teams. Tuna-way (interactive) communication is key. 

Interactive infonnatioli helps alleviate inordinate stress. The military is not 

a "democratic" or~anization, nor can it 

be, but in most circumstances feedback 

from team members is extremely useful 

and should be sought. The phrase "I 

just can't get anyone to listen" is never 

the norm in a vibrant military organizetion, today or in the future. 

As we move into the 21st century 

and commend ourselves on the successes of the past 100 years, we should 

remember that interactive communication has been a critical piece in achieving military successes. Our failure to 

achieve overall victory in Vietnani is 

attrihutahle, in part. to weak interactive 

communication, which hindered operations at the highest strategic levels and 

extended throughout the services and 

commands to field-level combat teams. 

Although this century is apparently 

ending in relative peace, soldiers still 

face the possibility of a cold, wet ride 

down a mountain. How does your team 

prepare for potential eventualities and . ~ 

stressful military operations that may 

suddenly appear'? 

Train 

ne way military units keep team 

members infornied is through 

training that occurs at all le\~eIs. 

Future training may be provided on an 

as-needed. per-request basis to an individual, a team. or a unit. Training 

courses will he available for students 

on-site when necessary, but a large portion will be conducted in distancelearning fomiats via the Internet, intranets. satellite links, virtual reality, and 

CDs, as these media become available. 

Distance learning and computergenerated training are not training 

modes of the future-they are used in 

industry. academia, and the military 

today. Simulations, including virtual 

reality and enhanced virtual reality. 

soon will be more widely available to 

military trainers and will provide 

authentic training experiences for students. Pros and cons can be made for 

how simulations impact interpersonal 

communications. The capability for 

c<~mmunication transmission is growing exponentially, but management of 

communication traffic will remain a 

challenge for individuals and organizations for the foreseeable future. 

Reali<tically, some equipment training must advance beyond the use of 

simulators and simulations. and some 

training will continue to be performed 

on-site. Hands-on training for specific 

equipment ultimately will require that 

soldiers be on-site with the equipment. 

Much of the stress and expense associated with relocating, even temporarily, 

for training soldiers can be eliminated 

if most of it is accomplished close to 

home. This will be possible when both 

Active and Reserve Component soldiers can access real-time training at 

their convenience or participate in 

training activities on their personal 

time by using the Internet and other 

distance-learning modes. 

Another way to reduce undue stress 

is to ensure that effective training is 

prepared, produced. and provided hy 

professionals who understand the 

medium used to present the material 

and who select the proper method of 

delivering it. The Arniy and the Engineer School are working hard at developing the staff to better use new 

training technologies a? they become 

available at reasonahle cost. 

A Final Look at Feedback 

C ommunication is key. A common complaint I hear when 

attending active duty training as a 

Reserve officer. is the expressed and 

implied grievance that workers can't get 

those above them to listen to their ideas 

and observations. "Worker bees" often 

feel left out of the Feedback and 

impriivement loop. Some of this cannot 

be helped. but I have ohserved that 

communication between supervisors 

and workers often needs improvement. 

It is easy to slide into the trap of telling 

si~pervisors only what they want to 

hear, and some supervisors imply they 

only want to hear "good news. Obviously, any management technique that 

fails to communicate fully produces 

great stress for all concerned. Such 

techniques hinder mission accomplishment and do not help the organiration 

grow and prosper. 

There are many ways to disseminate 

training. and we should use them to 

engage in effective dialogue regarding 

matters affecting training. For example. 

each revision to Amiy training affects 

many individuals and organizations. We 

must use all of the communication tools 

at our disposal to make training more 

effective and to sharpen our comniunication skills. 

Information is power. To prevent 

future "cold rides down the mountainside." we must provide information to 

everyone who needs it. Two-way, interactive commu~iication will help reduce 

unnecessary stress on all members of 

our team. Because we fight like we 

train, we must employ up-to-date training and training methods. w 

Lieutola~it Colml Reid, on izird<fense 

arrillery officer; i.7 nssigned at the US. 

AI~? Engineer School as executii,e officer: 

U.S. Am?Reserve (USAR). He al.~~ .senses 

a.s USAR Commandec 5.755fh lndi~~idital 

Mohili7rrtion Augmentntion Defnchment, 

For? Ler~nnnl Wood. Since 1990, he has 

held the USAR posts of in~trctor/writer. 

and senior in.sfrctor/wn'ter at the Engineer School. LTC Reid enlisted itz the 

National Gzrard in .lul.y 1967. 
"Colonel, You're Fired. I" 


By Richard Chnnry 

M nps 11m~alu~a?s beern paramount dzrrir~~ militan. operarions. Wise p1annin.q ir~clrrdes 

u rnecI~oni.~rnfor timely mapproductio~l 

otid dis.seminrrtinn, hut ever] the bestplorrrrcd op,po.atio~ls ma?, meet with 

dixa.ster: AN example of this occurred 

The words in the title of this anicle were directed at Lieutenant 

Cc~lonel Daniel Kennedy during 

the Rattle of the Bulge in World War 11. 

As chief of the Army Topographic Section of the 652d Engineer Topographic 

Battalion under Lieutenant General 

drrrir~!: Wor-Id War 11 when unex~~ertrd George S. Patton's Third Army. Kenprol~lems caused map shortages rlrnt nedy was doing his best to improvise 

tl~reatenrd the succe.7.s of the Eun~peizn and make up for map shortages and 

irn~rr.sion. Altlrough today's military has 

commitled to the digital map pin^ envirorzntenf. the technology creates nru: 

hazords as u:ell as solatiuns. We must 

carefully consider- both lo,qi,vtic and 

~rodrrctionfactor.~. 

rapidly changing battle plans. 

Kennedy's reprimand came from 

Major General John S. Wood. commander 

of the 4th Armored Division, XII Corps. 

Third Army. At abut the same time. Patton ordered General Wood to spearhead 

the attack into Alsace-Lorraine. Wood and 

his troops were exhausted fmm earlier battles and Wood replied. "Dammit George. 

we're not robots. We need a rest:' Many 

oficers and historians believe that Patron 

"fired W d at this point'. At about the 

same time. Wood sent a letter to the XII 

Corpscommander concerning "the rotten 

map ~imation."~ He "fired" Kennedy soon 

after. 

Although General Wood reprimanded Kennedy more than 50 years 

ago. Kennedy still vividly recalls the 

sting. The words were a bitter reminder 

of the frustrating events that plagued 

battlefield engineer units during that 

3-

LTG Patton and MG Van Fleet examine a map layout of the Danube River area. 

Fehnrmry 1YYR Erfpinrer 15 
historic but trying period. Today. Logistical Problems. Subsequent to strong tidal streams pulled about 20 of 

~~~~~d~'~ may serve as a direct enemy action, most of thc the first-wave landing craft completely 

"heads-up" for future engagements. research indicates that logistics (specif- off course. Although they met little 

ically, distribution) was one of the hig- i enemy resistance and there was little 

World War 11 , - gest problems and bottlenecks to the surf to contend with. the troops soon 

mapping equation. Once inside the har- realized that none of the local features 

M uch of the planning for the bors. no one knew which ships to matched their maps. Later Brigadier 

European in\.asion of World unload first. Although well-defined pri- General Theodore Roosevelt Jr discovWar U began in 1943. The Gen- orities were established. depending on ered the prohlem. Having studied the 

era1 Stirff estimated that the four U.S. the cargo type, strict adherence to these terrain maps earlier, he realized that the 

Amlies involved would need approxi- priorities tneant time-consuming inves- troops had "slipped" about 2.000 yards 

mately 7 million maps each month. Since tigations of each load, followed by south of the designated point.h 

this was more than the base and field unloading only specific. partial car- weather. ~~~~~,-.h~~~

topographic units and local civilian facili- 1 goes. Meanwhile. other vessels and 1y and 22 J~~~ 194;1 ties could provide, additional British and cargoes sat idle. creating additional hea\y losses to supplies equipment, 

American facilities l(xated in England congestion. The staff finally agreed to According to the assault 

were tasked for support. This wise plan- discharge each ship as quickly as possi- force 0. fewins and an unde. 

ning was overshadowed hy the disruptive hle regardless of cargo and then sort the termined nllmher of larger craft were events that followed. supplies once they were ashore. This , lost on omaha ~~~~h alone, me ~ri~i~h 

During World War 11. and panicu method greatly reduced harhor conges- that they lost 250 fernins 

larly in the European Theater. most bat- tion. hut it created confusion at several craft, and ahout 800 craft 

tles were characterized by rapid , depots. During the unloading of Project we, on ",s, and p,ritish 

advancement over new and difficult ter- ' Overlord. one frustrated staff officer beaches. On 22 one eyewitness on 

rain. "Go whcre you can, as fast as you jokingly summed up the entire harhor Beach counted 335 L~~s 

can" was Patton's buzz phrase during logistics problem: "The general princi- craft, mechanical), I I L~~s 

his campaigns in France, and General ple is that the number of divisions (landing craft. wnks), (landing Wood echoed this philosophy in his , required to capture the number of ports . craft, inhntry), ferries, 

actions. However, when troops began I required to maintain those divisions is 1 more than 20 other craft up,' their raoid advances, they were plagued always greater than the number of diviby tnap shortages 

Map Shortages 

. . 

sions those ports can maintain." 

Distribution Demands. Although 

combat actions and congested . barb.;., set 

T wo major factors led to map short- the stage for many map shortages. addiages during the Battle of the tional problems compounded the situa- 

~~1~~. me first was directly tion. Topographic battalions were wellrel;ited to enemy action, which impacted equipped and well-organized, but they 

the situation early in the invasion: the sec- were not adequately prepared to handle 

ond was logistical problems. whch com- unexpected changes in demands. Acpounded most of the later shortages. cording to some expens, '"The tnnsportaChanges in distribution demands and tion [of map stocks] between depots and 

weather conditions also took a heavy toll from depi~ts to troops was to cause more 

on early supply and logistics efforts. trouble than any other aspect of map disEnemy Action. According to LTC tribution on the ~ontinent."~ 

Kennedy, rnclst of the advance maps In some insrances, maps were of no 

were aboard transport ships that sunk in value because troop locations did not 

Cherbourg harhor durine the first days match the map coverag. However. this 

of the invasion. Many ships were sunk was not necessarily due to improper 

ils they crossed the English Channel, delivery of the maps. During the invawhilc others were destroyed as they sion of Utah Beach. the combination of 

approached or entered French harbors. , naval artillery bombardment and Amy 

The Few strategically located harhors ' Air Force bombs created so much d~lst 

(most notably. Cherhourg) were either ' and smoke that terrain features could not 

heavily mined or too damaged to allow- he seen. Radar could not distinguish 

adequate discharge of ship cargoes.' between the different beaches, and 

Changes in Tactics 

he demand for accurate maps 

on short notice has always 

been a high priority th;tt 

requires constant reorganization and 

logical thinking to contend with 

changing cir-cumstances. In France. 

map shortages due to enemy action, 

logistics, distribution. and weather 

were exacerbated by changing tactics, particularly those of Palton's 

rapidly advancing forces. Patton's 

attack plans changed so often that 

there was insufficient time to make 

new maps to support the latest strategy. Kennedy remembers an all-toofamiliar scene: "Each morning at 

0900, Patton held a general's meeting and determined where each unit 

was going. Then he would leave to 

check the front lines. By IY00. he 

would have another meeting. and all 

the earlier decisions would change. 

We had to pitch the first maps and 

1 start on the new cines. This went on 
throughout most of the campaign."" 

Because Patton demanded such 

quick map-support response, the Army 

Survey Center was cannibalized into a 

topographic section to better meet his 

needs. A photogrammetric camera and 

printing press capabilities were added 

to make it self-contained and capable 

of providing quick response. LTC Kennedy recalls many instances where the 

topographic section received carte 

blanche status to commandeer whatever supplies and facilities it needed. 

The demand for maps exceeded all 

expectations, and a paper shortage 

became a major engineer supply problem. Local supplies of French paper 

stock were inadequate. so U.S. Anny 

engineers printed about 10 million 

maps on the reverse side of captured 

Gemian maps? In areas such as the 

upper Rhone valley. small-scale maps 

were particularly scarce, and French 

units relied on Michelin road maps supplemented by information from local 

residents." 

Today's Army 

oday's Army is committed to 

pursue digital technology and to 

provide cartograpluc products as 

they are needed. According to current 

map doctrine and AR 115-1 1, Army 

%pogral~hy, the U.S. Anny Corps of 

Engineers remains the proponent for 

topography. Engineer topographic battalions are responsible for the production of special maps and terrain-related 

products and services. They also retain 

the ability to produce limited quantities 

of standard maps in the field. 

Present and future technology allows 

us to use huge, global databases in many 

useful ways, but mana&$ng that infom~ation requires comparable levels of administration. System admi~strators must 

monitor and provide quick access to a 

wide spectrum of data through a more 

controlled intranet versus Intemet environment. Simultaneously. organizations 

such as the National imigery and Mapping Agency need access to deposit traditional or specialized cartographic products. Data mnagers rnust control both 

input and access to digital data from 

all sources, civilian and military. Additionally, many scenarios may require 

specific physical locations and levels of 

control, although physical location is less 

critical than it was during World War TI. 

The transfer medium poses another 

dichotomy. Many technological advances have geometrically increased the 

data storage capacity on either magnetic- or laser-imprinted materials. But 

these advances come with a price in survivability. One frequently asked question is: "Which would you rather have, a 

CD-ROM with a bullet hole or a paper 

map with a bullet hole?" Although a 

high-tech, "shoot-and-scoot" Amy may 

reduce the possibility of receiving bullet 

holes, CDs are also more susceptible to 

damage from dust and moisture. 

Learning From the Past 

B istory reminds us that we should 

not place too much faith in tecbnology. "Look what happened 

with the fratricide during Desert Stom:' 

LTC Kennedy explains. "Technology is 

fine in controlled situations, but combat 

is usually unpredictable and far from 

controlled ... [In combat situations] you 

have to be able to do anything. You have 

to adapt to situation requirements. There 

are basic things every engineer should 

know, but they need a broad range of 

knowledge to better prepare them for a 

wide set of circumstances. Then they 

must use conlmon sense and make do 

with what they have." 

After we survived the problems during the Battle of the Bulge, historians 

placed a "mark on the wall." It was a 

strong reminder that we need to possess 

and be able to disseminate critical terrain information on demand. When a 

general requests maps from an engineer, the engineer must produce them. 

To accomplish this, he must have 

appropriate equipment and supplies 

and be able to disseminate the finished 

products. 

Could a similar mapping problem 

occur today? In this age of advanced 

digital imaging, can we still lose maps 

on a sinking ship? Many experts 

believe a similar scenario is possible. 

The logistics of transfer medium, data 

management, training, and support are 

elements that we must scrutinize from 

every angle. If we fail to leam from the 

past, we may find ourselves in a situation similar to LTC Kennedy's. We cannot afford to be lulled into technological 

complacency or to produce critical information only to let it "sink in Cherbourg 

Harbor." If that happens, the next outcry 

we hear may be more tragic than 

"Colonel, you're fired!" Y 

Mr Chaney is a physical .scientist ar 

the U.S Army Engineer School und a terrain analyst warrant oficer with the 

Missouri Narional Guard. He previously 

worked as a cartographer for the 

U.S.Geologica1 Survq, National Mnppin8 Division. Rollo, Missouri. and was 

editor ofrhe dii~i.~ion's puhlicnrion Topographically Speaking. Mr Chnney holds 

a master's r(egree in geography fronr 

Oregon Stare Urliver,dty 

Endnotes: 

Nat Frenkel and Larry Smith. PuttonS 

Rest: Arr Injion?mI Histon, of the 4rl1 

Armored Divi.riin, Hawthorn Books, Inc, 

New York. 1989. 

John Wood, Commander. 4th Armored 

Division. Letter to Commander, XI1 Corps. 

referencing the "rotten map situation." 

S<imael E. Morison. The Invasion of 

Fmncr nnri Genrwri,y, 1944.1945. Hisron, of 

United States Nnvnl Ol~eratiow in World War 

11, Vil. 11. Atlantic Monthly Press. Little 

Brown and Company. Boston. 1957. p. 3011. ' Roland G. Rupenthd. Lo,qisricnl Suppopon 

ofthe Ammiex, Vol. D. 1958, p. 46. ' Alfred M. Beck, el al. United Stares 

Arm? in War-id Wur 11. The Tu~.lrr~icul Services. 711~ CO~JIZ qf Engineers: The WarAgainst Ger-mrrrry. Center of Military History. Washington. D.C.. 1985. p. 297. ' Rupenthal, p.100. ' Gordon A. Harrison, Crors-Cl~urinei 

Arrnck. 1997. pp. 423. 426. 

Interview with Daniel Kennedy. Rolla. 

Missourj. 3 Octoher 1996. ' Rupenlhal, p. 216. 

'O Beck. p. 454. 

(C~~nt~nned on page 20) 

Ffhnlary I998 Engineer 17 
- @v Alrrn Schlic 

Let me introduce you to a skid 

steer called the MARTEN. We 

have the Griz7ly and Wolverine. 

which are system names, and we have 

the ACE and the DEUCE, which are 

acronyms. So I present to you the 

MARTEN-manpower augmentation, 

robotics-capahle tractor for engineers. 

The marten (the animal) is a small, 

aggressive. agile. and quick carnivore of 

the weasel family. Its sharp claws are 

excellent for burrowing. climbing. attacking, and defending. The MARTEN 

(the skid steer) is a small, agile tool platform with the capability to significantly 

reduce man-hour requirements for 

obstacle emplacement and reduction, 

protective suuctures construction, and 

line-of-communications improvements. 

Performance 

n recently completed evaluations 

at Fort Knox, Kentucky, the 

MARTEN enabled combat engineer squads from the 19th Engineer 

Battalion to construct double-apron time allowed in the ARTEP standard 

fence and triple-standard concertina (done by hand) and faster than excavdtwire fence 40 percent faster than the ing with a small emplacement excavaArmy Training and Evaluation Pro- tor (SEE). The MARTEN and a squad 

gram (ARTEP) standard (see table). of contbat engineers completed log crib 

The MARTEN excavated fighting posi- and log post obstacles so quickly that 

tions and trenches in one-fourth the the ARTEP standard can be changed 

Task Completion Times 

(Man-Hours)

I Task ARTEP Standard MARTEN 

Construct log crib 

Construct log post 

I Construct triple-standard concertina fence I 8 1 5.2 1 I Construct double-apron fence 1 24 1 16.3 1


I Construct two-soldier position I 6 1 1 I I Construct machine-gun position 7

I Construct fighting trench I 12 1 10.5 I 

Clear landing zone 24 16.2 

Construct road crater 16 8.8 

Install culvert 16 9.5 

18 Engineer Fehnmn 1998 
-- 

,~ -
mental cleanup, fighting forest fires. 

~

- . humanitarian relief, border security, 

base-camp construction. and unit bed 

down, as well as other battlefield uses. 

I Robotics Capable 

he MARTEN is capable of being 

fitted with robotics controls 

operable through the standardized teleoperating system (STS) currently in use. Wiring for the STS 

remains in place without hindering 

soldier-in-the-seat operation. The robotics capability allows continued use 

of all attachments and significantly 

increases the combat engineer squad's 

countermine operational capabilities. 

Skid steers already carry the miniflail 

and have been credited with saving 

lives in Bosnia. ~ 

A soldier uses the MARTEN with its dirt bucket attachment to finish an antitank 

ditch. Evaluation 

from a platoon- to a squad-level task. Think of the MARTEN as a first- , he next step is a "right-size" In a wooded area, the MARTEN generation exoskeleton for combat evaluation being conducted at 

helped a squad clear a landing zone in engineers. During the evaluation. 12Bs Fort Polk to determine which ' one-half the time allowed in the ARTEP. operated the skid steer and its attach- skid steer best in various 

The MARTEN reduced by one-third the ments after only one week of training scenario, The current limiting factor is 

time needed to construct protective earth and stick time. It enables a single sol- , a properly sized trailer for 

walls and substantially reduced the time dier to pick up, move, and accurately both the load and towing capacity of the 

required to excavate a trench for culvert position objects weighing more than prime mover, emplacement and create boreholes for three-fourths of a ton, which is equiva- As a system. the skid steer does not 

road-cratering charges. i lent lo two bridge panels and a require further testing or evaluation. Its 

The news isn't all good though. no , transom. And operating in most terrain ve,,tility and lltility have been proven MARTENS would take 100 times as is not a problem with the MARTEN. It , in commercial construction, utility, and 

long as two bulldozers to construct a I was evaluated in loose sand. deep mud. landscaping industries. Our sister ser300-meter tank ditch and twice as long standing water. close woods, and vices already use skid steers 

as the dozers to reduce the same ditch. uneven terrain. their or~anizations. The Engineer The MARTEN represents the first The MARTEN is capable of increas- ~ ~ will h ~ ~ l 1 continue to review 

conscious effort to augment the man- ing a combat engineer squad's produc- applications. such as attachments to 

power of the combat engineer squad tivity by 25 percent. which means that assist in bridge consmlction and 

across the wide spectrum of field engi- eight soldiers can do the work of ten. McPherson.style blades, neering tasks. With its 12 attachments, As the squad wears down physically, Thirty.five platoon training and 

the MARTEN can bulldoze, bucket the MARTEN allows productivity to evaluation outlines (TRrEOs, listed in 

load, fork lift, compact, level, auger remain high. In some cases. with pol- ARTEP 5-145.1 involve field 

holes, backhoe, mix cement, sweep, fill ished battle drills, the MARTEN engineering. obstacle construction or 

sand bags, break concrete, drive pick- enables a squad to complete platoon reduction, or construction of protective 

ets. carry logs, pull posts, pound nails, tasks, which enhances productivity and structures,Nine of these were 

saw wood and metal. and flail mines. In effectiveness. during the skid steer concept evaluation 

other words, the MARTEN performs The MARTEN is world- at Fort Knox. Except for two of the 

the repetitious and physically demand- wide, in every deployment scenario TBiEOs-tank ditch construction and 

ing activities associated with the com- imaginable. It is the perfect piece of reducing-the MARTEN performed bat engineering effort to shape the equipment for engineers involved in better than the current methods. 

battlefield. natural disaster recovery and environ- 
Thls MARTEN is being used to drive U-shaped pickets for a double 

apron fence. 

Considering the results of the concept conduct assault and countermine operevaluation, we anticipate that an addi- ations without putting the soldier at 

tional 20 tasks can be completed faster , risk, and help the shrinking combat 

and more efficiently by wing the skid engineer squad coniplete manpowersteer instead of the current methods. intensive tasks. The MARTEN completes the suite of equipment required 

Shaping the Battlefield to make engineers true architects of 

the battlefield. w 

ngineer organizations have 

heavy-duty, bladed equipment 

capable of mo\'ing substantial 

amounts of material to create tank 

ditches, berms. and fighting positi~in\. 

Engineers also have access to mine-dispe~ising systems capable of creating 

large minefields in shon periods of time. 

But squads are ill-equippcd to handle 

the physically demanding and repetitive 

activities that constin~te the major portion of the conihat engineer's contribution to shaping the battlefield. 

The MARTEN represents that 

missing system. It can work in 

restricted terrain while presenting the 

smallest practical target to quickly 

accomplish soldier-sired excavations, 

MI: Schlie is o Force Der~elol~merir 

Annlyst with the Directorore of Cnnzhot 

De~vlopnients, U.S. Army En~ineer 

Scliool. A retired rornmand srlgeont 

nzajur: he hnr served irl variolrs calincities in Errrope. Korea, nnrl CONUS 

througl~o~rt Iis roreer 

(Cnntinued.fr~~ni /,age 17) 

I(-' 

l'.~~ F 

References: 

Anderson. Duncan. I: The

Sro? nf 1/71, Lo?~,yesi Dux Sriiitlimi~rk 

Rooks. New York. 1993. 

Amiy Regul;~tion 115-1 1. Arni? 

Tr~~)o,qrfl/~l?y, 30 No\'eniber 1993. 

Rlumenson. Martin. Uriited Stur~r 

Arnl? in World War 11. T11e Errropeon 

Tlieoter of O/ier<~rions. Breokotrt and 

Piirruit, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Amiy. 

1961. 

A Brief Hi.sto~? qf 01ierntion.s in 

EIIITJIJP. 652d Engineer. (Top) Battalion (Dct.). Third Anny. 

Cole. I-I.M. United Srrrrcs Ann? in 

World War 11. Ei~roprrin Tl~errter 

O/~erutions. 7/11, Lorraine Crrm/~aign, 

Office of the Chief of Military History. Department ol'the Army. 1950. 

Essame, H. Patton. A Sirldy ill 

C~~ninto~id. Charles Scrihner's Sons, 

New York, 1974. 

Forty. Georse. Pnttorl 's Tliird Am? 

ot ~WIINI; Arnis and Armour Press. London. 1976. 

Rupenthal. Roland G. Lo,qi.rtirrrl 

SLI/)IIOI' of rhe Arnlir.~. Vnlnmes I und 

11. US. Arni? irr ll/orld Wrir Il. Eiiroper111 TIICOIPI- OIJL'~UIIOI~S. Office of 

the Chief of Military Hirtory. Department of the Anny. 1953. 

Utrrh Beach ro Cherl,our,q ((6 .111n<,- 

27 .hmr 1934). A~nrricon Forr.cs in 

Actiori Ser-fes. Historical Division. 

Department of the Arni!, Center of 

Military History. U.S. Amiy. 

ington. 1947. 

Whiting. Charles. P(rtton, Hallantine Books. Inc., New York. 1970. 

Wright, Marsli;~l S.. ed. 652d Enginecr Topographic Battalion. We h11- 

lowed Prirtor~. A Battalion Eon 

Wash- 

- .. 
Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon: 


~~~~~~~i~~ the ~~~k of E ~ R~~~~* ~~~~t~
 ~ 

I a,ll wliting in regard to an article by Michael W, Sayer in the 

issue of Engineer I currently serve as the Brirish 

Exchange Royal Engineers, with the Engineer 3rd 

Division (3rd Mv dutv nost is of . . , . ,. deputy engineer coordinator, until recently known as the assistant 

division engineer, a post I have filled for the past two years. 

Mr. Sayer's article caught my attention. because what he 

proposes for the cstablishment of an engineer reconnaissance 

platoon within heavy engineer battalions mirrors almost identically 

the existing engineer reconnaissance troop (platoon) of a British 

Army close support engineer regiment (battalion). LC.. one that 

supports a manoeuvre brigade. I understand that plagiarism is just 

imothrr ...~ form ..... of .. flattcrv! ~ ~ ~ 

,~ 

one area that Sayer.s proposal do not address, 

howevel: is the provision of similar cngineer expertise and 

capabilityto the heavy division.s primary of division~level 

reconnaissance-the division cavalry squadron. With all ~ ~ 

engineer battalions of the engineer brigade neatly aligned to 

matiocuvre hrigades, providing engineer suppon to the division 

cavalry squadron is not a new problem or one that is easily solved. 

The need for a pernianent engineer reconnaissance capahility. 

however. could easily he included with the case put forwilrd hy Mr. 

Sayer. 

During the 3rd ID'S rcccnt deployment to Egypt for Exercise 

Bright Star 97198. uje had the opportu~ty to work with the 

divisional reconnaissance battalion of the 3rd (UK) Division. the 

Household Cavalry Regimcnt. A Rritish divisional reconnaissancc 

hattalion docs not have the combat power of a U.S. division cavalry 

~quadron. hut its reconnaissance mission is very similar. Toenahle it 

to f~tllill this mission, it is assigned an engineer reconnaissancc 

platoon with sufficient squads lo upport the reconnaissance 

companies. As Mr Sayer points out. engincer teamclsquads will hc 

\,cry thinly sprcad across the bauletield. But with engineer 

capability avuilahle with both the division forward deployed 

reconnaissancc (division cavalry) and with bcout platoons within 

manoeuvre brigades. the oppomtnity exists to bctter direct and 

employ scarcc asrcts. 

By way ufa simple example: The division is advancing with two 

hrigades up with the division cavalry leading in a reconnaissance 

role. lntelligcnce preparation of the battlefield (1PB)itcrrain 3n;llysis 

has identified a river linc tli;it crosses the division sector Thc 

division cavalry is taskcd 10 identify brigade avenues of advance 

forward. The information that is rcnt hack. with enginecr 

cunlirmation, is that the river will require AVLB bridging in thc 

castcni scctor between grids X-Y. whilc pontoon hridging will he 

needed in the western sector hctween grids A-B. hopefully 

confirming the PB. This information allows engineer commander. II ~ ~ ~ and staff LO prepare appropriate units. Perhaps more importantly. the 

information acts as a cue for limited brigade engineer 

reconnaissance teams, in conjunction with task force scouts. to 

target likely crossing sites. Other examples where engineer 

reconnaissance would be a bonus when integrated with the division 

cavalry are not hard to imagine. 

Where this fourth ensineer reconnais5ance platoon should be 

established 1 am probably not best qualified to say. Perhaps it could 

be a permanent pan of the division cavalry squadron'.; modified 

table of organization and equipment, with the very real difficulties 

of developins and monitoring appropriate training. Another option 

is to establish the platoon as part of the headquarters and 

lieadquarters detachment, enginccr brigade-although this prohahly 

is not a long-tern, starter in view of current proposals to remove the 

engineer brigade headqumers from heavy ditPisions. 

In wmmary. I think that the debatc staned hy Mr. Sayer's article 

shoi~ld he hroadened to include an engineer reconnaissance 

ca~abilit~for Ihe division ca"alry 

Major Allan P Dennis 

Royal Engineers 

Author%reply: 

Thank youfor ro~t~ribrrrir~x to rnv discus.~ion. Altlr~~!i:h A~nrrica

and Grvnr Brirrii,? ~ru,m qrrorr IVill Rogers. "ln,o <.oioirrit.s 

sepowrcd by u aomrnori lrr,r,qrm,~e." great ideor nrire front bor11 .ri,les 

of rlre "por~d" So I'll plrod nor ,qt,iln. ro plagiarism hut hope rite 

rlehare helps our E~t~i~reer R~i~tzellr. 

Wlrcn writin* ,nj nrriclc. 1 pa,poscl? lirnired discirssion ro tl~c 

henw br-iqodes, ber~nise I ltave nor iern the rrcorinnissnnce 

w'eak,~u.rs inhcro>r x,irlri,, rlcr i~en~,? bri,qrr<iv.r replicafed in rhc

di~,i.vkmrm.nlq .sqaa~tron.s. Alrlrou~h dedirnr~d support unirr do nor 

marincl? rrin wirh rhe squadron, the dit,ision er,~ir~eerprouirles onu 

e~t~ineer ro~ttparzv(I /lope one of the hcst) to rltc cqriodron for 

engineer supporr, A miiirn,y occ~t/~orionol,sppci~~lr? lMOS)19D 

Srour NCO is rerltrired 10 perf0r.m moxr of rhe nrnrr r<,co~ttzairrance 

rasks as tlzusc p<~rforn?erl br nn MOS I2B Scour NCO, Tlrcr<fore, ir 

n*o~ld be difirirb ro sirppon tlze mrrnpower reqliir<,mentx for a 

reco,inaissance elemt~r with o diririon ca~jnlq supporl ,rris.rinn. in 

n perfect worlrl. n:ilh .n!firienf nzonpower and money mnilrrblr. I 

hove sornr dqfinire idcar os ro whar would provide grrnr strp/lorr. 

U~tfirf~inafel?, gil.en carrenr manpower- constroinfs, norw (11. fhore 

id<,cr.r nrefrarible. 

Micl~oel S<ij<,r 

Milinm. rr,inlvsr 
Command and Control: 

Seeing the Battlefield 

BJ Colonrl Tt1ornn.r Bosfick or~d Cuptuin Matthew Posvo,~el 

M any maneuver commanders help commanders "see" important elethroughout history have made ments of the battlefield, including 

key decisions regarding corn- friendly and cnemy capabilities, terrnitme~~t of important resources with rain, and key decision points. 

very little information or time. During This article describes simple techthe Battle of Gettyshurg. for instance, niques used in offensive and defensive 

lack of information from J.E.B. Stuart's operations that facilitate the decisioncavalry had a significant impact on making process and allow commanders 

Robert E. Lee's decisions. Unknown to to hettcr "see the battlefield." The 1st 

Lee. Stuart was involved in an indepen- Bngade Combat Team (BCT) and ihe 

dent operation. which denied Lee the 1st Engineer Battalion of the 1st Infan- 

"eyes" necessary to gather information , try Division from Fort Riley. Kansas, 

about the Union Amy. This lack of successfully validated these techniques 

timely information contributed to the at the National Training Center (NTC). 

Army of Northern Virginia's defeat in a 

battle that hecame the turning point of Offensive Operations the Civil War. 

At times the "fog" of war makes dis- ' D uring offensive operations. 

seminating information difficult. In friendly forces often face formimany instances, however, standard dable enemy obstacles. Comoperating procedures for communicat- nlanders must understand the assets 

ing information leads units down a path ' needed to reduce or bypass these obstaof potential problems. Staffs can sim- cles. Equally important, commanders 

plify the complex battlefield decision- must know the decision points where 

making process to help commanders they can reallocate mobility assets 

mass combat power. By preparing an within the combined arms team.To 

effective matrix or sketch, can achieve this understanding, planners 

must identify the minimum critical 

resources at the hreach site (MCRABS). 

Based on the engineer estimate, 

planners allocate critical reduction 

assets. These include engineer platoons. 

mohility reserve, armored conlhat 

eanhmovers (ACES), mine-clearing 

line charges (MICLICs). and tank 

plows to either hypass an obstacle or 

reduce, mark, and proof a lane. Reduction assets are task organized to subordinate units using appropriate planning 

factors (see Figure I, page 13). Those 

Factors include: 

A 50- percent loss of reduction 

assets while reducing. marking. 

and proofing a lane. 

H A 60- to 90-meter enemy minefield 

depth, which friendly f(irces can 

reduce, at some risk. by using two 

MICLICs. 

An engineer platoon to mark a 

hypass around scatterable minefields or two tank plows to reduce 

them if necessary. 
Main Eftat Support Eftat Reserve Engineer Reserve 1Rl6 -InW.Qla lm(-) Current 

i Phase Assets rqllrejto mmplde ~achphaseand follow-on phase \ 

2 MlCLlCs 0 MlCLlCs I Volcano 3 MlCLlCs LO: 

4 Plows 2 Plows 2 ACES Total startin 

2 ACE* 3 ACES 1 Platoon assets 

2 Platoons 1 Platmn (on hand) 

2 MlCLlCs 0 MlCLlCs 1 Volcano 2 MlCLlCs 

2 Plows 2 ACES LDto PL 2 ACE3 :F:g 1 Platoon 1 San Antonic 2 Platmns(mark bypass) 1 Plalmn p~
-

2 MICLICs(reduce) 0 MlCLlCs 1Vdcano 2 MlCLlCs I 

2 Plows (reduce) 2 Plows 2 ACES Is1 BeH 

2 ACE~(prmt) 2 ACE3 1 Platoons (security zone 

1 Platoon (mark lank) 1 Platoon 

0 MlCLlCs 0 MlCLlCs 1 Volcano 2 MICLICs(redu~) 

0 Plows 2 PlWyreduas) S - 2 ACEs(proot) ', 2nd Belt 0 ACES 2 ACEs(prmt) /r.l 1 Plat- (mak 1 7 ( matn battle

0 Plaloons 1 Platoon (mark) 1anes)'no $\A am) redundancy (risk) 

Figure 1.Minimum Critical Resources at Breach Site. 

In this example. Task Force (TF) I- provide the commander flexibility one of the battalion task force elements. 

16 has two MICLICs, four plows. two when recponding to changing situations The engineer platoon leader of the 

ACES, and two engineer on the baulefield. As the intelligence mohility reserve then begins working 

before it begins breaching operations in and the battle develop. the brigade for the task force. Therefore it is importhe first belt. ~h~ task force commander may decide to commit the tan1 that the mobility reserve. or at least 

marks one scanerable minefield be mobility reserve to the task ibrcc key representatives from this element. 

tween the line of departure (LD) and breaching the obstacle. participate in the brigade and battalion 

Phase Line (PL) San Antonio and cre- Composition of the mobility reserve rehearsals. After the mobility reserve 

ares two lanes in the first belt or secu- will vary depending on the amount of reverts to task force control. the engirity zone Mobility assets from the intelligence gathered and the size of the ' neer battalion S3 provides additional 

engineer reserve create two lanes in the obstacle that planners anticipate. Plan- "eyes" for the hrigade at the point of 

second obstacle belt. If the M-CRABS ners may decide to form the reserve hrcnch.

are not availahle. the maneuver com- from engineers habitually attached to. I Despite the absence of intelligence 

proceeds to the point of breach or under the operational control ~ information. engineers must plan in 

with great risk. (OPCON) of. the task force providing , derail for commitment of the mohility 

Engineer Mobility Reserve. To support Using a platoon as the mobil- reserve. Even if planning is based on an 

successt-ully reduce enemy obstacles. ity resenre provides the command and enemy situation templ;~te. detailed 

the commander requires detailed infor- control liecessary when the reserve engineer planning will facilitate a decinlation on their size, orientation. and assignment changes from brigade to sion process that is based on wellc(jmposition. there a tank ditch in maneuver hattalion. The mobility thought-out trigger points for executfront of or behind the minefield? What reserve !krill require reduction assets ing important decisions. The timing of 

is the minefield depth, length, and such as MICLICs and ACES. decisions to move breachins assets is 

entation? Are there antitank andlor There is no doctrinal method to key to the outcome of the battle. Mitntipersonnel ~nines,? If so, how are the comnand and control the mobility CRABS provide the analysis that supmines dispersed in depth and across the , reserve. Since this element is a brigade ports construction of a simple decision 

front? ~ ~ to these ~ questions ~ are c asset. ~ the engincer s battalion operations support template (DST) (see Figures 2

vitally i~nportant when planning officer (S3j, who understands the entire , and 3, page 24). 

breaching operations, but unfortunately brigade pl:ln. is 3 good choice to ini- Decision Support Template. A 

they often are not available until just tially conim:tnd and control it. At some DST helps commanders identify trigger 

before or during the attack, if at all. If point in the battle. the brigade com- points for key decisions concerning 

key information is not available, it may mander may change the task organiza- when to move the mobility reserve forhelp to form a nlobility reserve that can lion and assign the mobility reserve to ward or when to move tank plows from 

Febnrary 1998 Engrneer 23 
1st BCT Deliberate Anack 

Engineer DST as of 140600 February 

Figure 2 

Engineer Decision Points 

Decisions and Critical Events I 1. hnd -d r-n I-m. 2. Replaae dis-ntswlh mounted learn iftesrn 

is cape&. 

3. uemver &*a and evscuate -wan-. 

I. r~r-re mum ntain 2 ~lc~lC1.2plaus. ZACE* 

rsintor(e"mu?). 

2. Reinformwah mobiri rsserveand 2MlCLlCr 

h 1 1- 1 I. n ~lth. mi rasewe ir opcw to F r-rs BriQ*ecmnenderdsoider 2. U mth. Mly merueis OFCON IoTF 1s. 

i ? ;' lobreach Mhor)Mh 3Tmilta&taasbeftlemritanhsu~rm 

I A%,.a, I tors mu* ,,a," 2 U CLlCsa2 p(- 

'"'la' m"Vue 2 Mob i) #Me OPCOh lo TF 1-34 ' x'o%,P.T"~ I-" w,lh2HICLIC,a maudr~usomeralm, 

Figure 3 

an uncommitted unit to une needing mobility reserve to either TF 1-16 to 

n~obility assets. Figure 3 shows the tim I breach in Brown Pass or to TF 1-34 to 

ing of key decisions to shift engineer breach in Debnam Pass. At decision 

assets based on M-CRABS. For exnm- point 4, the brigade commander must 

ple. if there are maintenance or combat decide whether to continue with the 

losses at decision point 2 that reduce , attack or pause to refucl vehicles and 

TF I-16's reduction assets hclow those reload the MICLTC. 

shown in Figure I, the brigade coni- The Battle of Brown Pass. At the 

mander may decide to commit the NTC, the opposing force (OPFOR) 

mobility reserve. including an engineer defeated the 1st BCT during its deliberplatoon with two MlCLlCs and two ate attack through Brown and Dehnam 

ACES. If there is no chanfe in task Passes. All friendly scouts were dead. 

organization of the mobility reserve. so the brigade had no "eyes" fonvanl. 

the hrigade commander will zrrrive at The lead task force could not destroy 

another decision point after PL El Paso. the enemy on the far side of the obstaThen he must decide to commit the cle. The OPFOR. which was overlooking the ohstacle, destroyed all engineers 

during breaching operations. 

In a repeat battle, thc 1st BCT was 

successful. This time, an engineer scout 

team walked more than LO kilometers 

into position at Bmwn Pass and provided the brigade's only "eyes" as it 

began to attack. The brigade commander decided to attack through 

Brown Pass hecause Debnarn Pass was 

heavily fortified (there were no "eyes" 

in that pass). At decision point 3. the 

brigade commander changed the task 

organization by making the mobility 

reserve OPCON to TF I - 16. The engineer scout team called for indirect anil24 Engineer Fehrunrv 1998 
lery fire. which destroyed most Key players involved in a 

of the enemy poqitions on the far brigade-directed obstacle group 

side of the obstacles. When the 

lead ensineer commander's vehicle was destroyed, he took his 

backpack rndio and moved to 

high ground near the breach site. 

The TF 1- 16 commander spotted 

the enemy's combined arms 

reserve, but due to intense fighting. he was not in position to call 

for air support. The engineer 

commander. who oversaw the 

breaching operations, helped 

identify the exact location of the 

enemy reserve. Then friendly air 

support destroyed it. Assault 

forces pushed through the breach 

and ultimately destroyed every 

OPFOR vehicle. The brigade 

won the difficult battle of a deliberate breach on the reverse slope 

of Brown Pass. 

Using sirmlar techniques durbattlefield." 

ing a later battle at the NTC. the mobility 

reserve successf~~lly completed breaching operations with one task force and 

then moved to a location I0 kilometers 

north. The reserve linked up with 

another task force and began breaching 

operations without delaying the attack. 

Without well-planned decisions on moving and commanding and controlling the 

critical assets. shifting these resources 

would have ken extremely difficult. MCRABS and DST cards. handwritten or 

cnmputer-generated. can facilitate decision.; by helping commanders "see the 

co~~ll-lhi~tc IL~ IIIC r;~\h 11111~ p1:111, l'\i~~ 

ally the task f~rce does not rlc\clop it\ 

plan before nizhtfall, and attempting to 

site obstacles and direct-fire systems in 

the dark is ineffective. Having to wait 

for the task force to develop a plan 

often results in countern~obilitylsurvivability assets remaining idle for several 

hours. Various solutions to this problem 

would allow engineers to initiate work 

effort in areas that will ultimately support the task force plans. Options 

include digging survivability positions 

for anillery, monar, and command and 

control systems. These missions are 

valuable for the defense, but the highest 

Defensive Operations priority mission is to develop the EA 

with obstacles and survivability posi- . . 

uring defensive operations. the tions for direct-fire systems. 

focus of effon is on engineers- A brigade-directed obstacle group 

from digsing survivnhility posi- and battle position (BP) facilitate rapid 

tlonc to huilding ohstacles for engage- ernplacemenl of obstacles or survivabilnlent itreas (EAs). Two key lesson? ity positions, but they must support the 

often learned ;It the NTC are the impor- brigade's scheme of maneuver. The task 

lance of starting the engineer efron force's ultimate plan should include the 

early and the need to erficiently and brigade-directed obstacle group and BP. 

accurately track the battle. When the task force is rcady to execute 

Regin the Engineer Effort Early. , its plan, engineers should have very litThis is a tu,o-ctlged sword. A hasty tle work remaining on their briyadestan may result in work that does not 1 directed task. 

and BP must meet on the ground 

to resolve difference5 before 

work begins. Key individuals 

may include the task forcelcompany team commander, the fire 

support officer. the S2, the mgineer. and others. The brigade 

commander will help clarify their 

understanding of the mission by 

explaining his intent at the site 

of the brigade-directed obstacle 

group and BP This meeting. 

which should occur immediately 

after the operations order briefing, is perhaps the last time the 

group can assemble before nightfall. 

Track the Battle. The second 

area of importance during the 

defense is tracking the progress 

of defensive preparations. Many 

unity track defensive preparalioi~s using detailed charts that require 

an engineer to explain them. 

The 1st Arnmored Division Engineer 

Rrigade in Germany experimented with 

various methods to graphically track 

and pnrtr;ly progress in defensive preparations. While in the division tactical 

;~ssault center one night. the division 

commander callell the operations 

officer (Ci3i for an update on defense 

preparations. The G3 walked over to 

the engineer hattle-tracking hoard. 

removed a countem~ohility/sur\.ivahility chart (similar to Figure 4. page 26). 

and began to update the divisi~)n cnmmander It was clear that milneuver elements could eaily communicate information using this chart. Engineers in 

the I st Engineer Battalion S3 and assistant brigade engineer sections helped 

refine this system of reporting prior to 

and during two NTC rotations. 

The countermobilitylsurvi\.abiIity 

tracking chart is simple but includes 

enough details to give the commander ;I 

complete picture of defensive preparations. Using this chart. the brigade staff 

can efliciently track defensive preparations and start and completion times, and 

the commander can better understand 
216 Fix 

~ ~ Positions '., 

I 

._ s:22060 

Lasi~lg Team 1 \ 

L* ---7. 

when and whch engineer assets to shift 

to support his intent. For example, in 

Figure 4 (as of 0400 hours on 23 Febm- ' 

aly, in obstacle belt A6) only two of the 

six planned obstacles were completed. 

In BP 1-34. u,hich covered that obstacle. 

all of the 37 planned fighting positions 

were completed, while 16 of 20 planned 

I positions in BP 1-16 were completed. 

Stan and finish times on the tracking 

chan help Tactical Operations Center 

(TOC) personnel track the battle. Battle 

tracking helps colnmanders understand 

planned versus actual engineer work 

effort and the approximate time when 

they will receive engineer assets. 

TOC personnel mu$t know the commander's key decision points. When he 

is asleep. planners or suhordinate commanders must know which trigger 

points require that somconc awnkcn 

him for a decision. In this particular 

defense (Figure 4). the brigade commander decided to move additional 

engineer platoons to Belt A6 and additional digging assets from BP 1-34 to 

BP 1-15. The logic for these decisions 

was based on info~mation depicted on 

the countermohilitylsttrvi\~ability chart. 

The brigade. task force. and engineer commanders carry similar counterrnobilitylsurvivabity cards. Their 

TOCs track the defensive preparations 

in the same manner. By using these 

Figure 4 

cards, staffs can update the commander 

and higher command posts quickly, 

efficiently, and accurately. A repon 

from the TF 1-34 commander may he 

simply "Status of defensive preparation 

follows: Two of six obstacles were 

con~pleted in Belt A6. and 37 of 37 

positions were completed in BP 1-34:' 

The countermobilitylsurvivability 

chan works well for developing a con>- 

nion understanding of the overall 

defensive plan and progress, hut engineers must maintain more detailed 

battle-tracking information. such as the 

start and enti points of specific minefields. During this particular battle, the 

brigade built an unprecedented number 

of obstacles (more than 3.000 mines. 

two tank ditches. and more than 75 

vehicle survivability positions). The 

battle ended at 2000 hours on 23 Febmaw. The final disposition re-flected the 

commander's intent. Staffs at all levels 

can help commanders "see the hattlefield" and make informed decisions. 

Good battle tracking through clear, efficient, and understandable processes provides the commander with the "eyes" 

and information necessary to make key 

decisions with confidence and success. 

Y 

Colonel Bortick is Com~no~~rlrr; Isr 

Armored Divisioti. Division E~rgi~lerr: 

Gerrnanv. He previou,sly cornmandcd 

the 1st Enfiineer Batralinn, .sen,ed as 11 

planner with USAREUK DCSENG. \tsa.c 

a White HOIITP Fellow, and sen.ed CIS 

exec~rtil,e officer to the Chief of E11,qineer,s. COL Bosrick is u grad~rare ofrhe 

US. Milifai:~~ Acndern? ar~d the U.S. 

Army War Colli,,~e and 1mld.s rnasfer's 

degrees iri mer~irr~~~i~rrl orrd civil engineering fronr Smnford Urtil~er:riw. .. 

success of the brigade's defensive prep- in P~l,sl.o,~cl tr~lirlilr,~ alrrl 

aration: no enemy penetration of doctririr sruffr$fi%ficer: Umcc of fire Dep friendly positions and every enemy uh Chief of Sfuff for Er~gir~cerir~,q, U.S. whicle destroyed. Arnry Eirrope (USAREUK). He kvusl~rcConclusion vir,ri.sly the Assisfarit Bri,yarl Erigirl~~~: 

/.st En~inrer Barrolior~, Isf BI-ignrle. /.sf 

acilitating command and control iqfnrrrr? Division. For-f Ri1r.v. Konzu.~. 

through better hattle tracking in He i.r a grrrrlrrote of fhe U.S. Miliraq 

both offensive and defensive Acnd<,~n? and the Engineer Ofllc~rc 

operations is a comhined arms team Advonc~d Co!ir.rr arid kol~ls a arra.srer'.~ 

efton. Each member of the team must de,~~.e~ ill CIIR~II~~I-~I~,~ manuqe~nenr 

ullderstand and work to achieve the from fh~ Ll~li~~er.siry OfMi.r~o~r~-i-RoIIa. 

26 Engineer Fehr~m~ 1998 
Book Review 


St0rmtr00p Tactics: lnn~~ati~n in the German 

Arm% 1974-1918, by Bruce 1. Gudmundsson, 

Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 198% 

210 pages. 

~h~ G~~~~~ blitzkrieg campaigns of 

early World War I1 were in part the product of their 

experiences in world war I of a prussoG~~~~~ military culture stretching back through 

Moltke the Elder (1800-1881) to the great military 

reformers of the Napoleonic era (Scharnhorst, ~ ~and clausewitz). ~ hi^ i tradition~ enCollraged small unit leader initiative, flexibility, risk 

taking, and relative military open-mindedness. 

with the onset of stalemate on the western front 

late in 1914, the Germans began to experiment with 

various means of breaking the deadlock of trench 

warfare. These experiments included unrestricted 

submarine warfare, strategic bombing, massed artillery fire, and new tactical techniques based on 

several siege warfare innovations. The innovations 

were the domain of the German pioneers (combat 

engineers). After much experimentation, the most 

effective innovations were combined to create the 

"storm-trooper tactics." 

The author traces the origin and development of 

German storm-trooper tactics (sometimes incorrectly referred to as infiltration or Hutier tactics) 

from 1914 until the end of the war. The many 

technical innovations introduced by the pioneers 

included the first use of modern grenades, trench 

mortars, man-packed flamethrowers, chemical 

warfare, and, belatedly, the first German tanks. 

These innovations, combined with the tactical 

flexibility inherent in the pioneer corps, resulted in 

the development of highly effective combined arms 

teams at company and battalion levels.The reasons 

for the somewhat surprising contributions of the 

pioneers are described by the author: 

The reasons that the German pioneers, rather 

than line infantr)! were able to innovate so quickly 

are many In 1914, the pioneers were already used 

to working, with very little supervision, in squad 

sized teams. Pioneers were trained for fortress 

warfare before the outbreak of hostilities. This gave 

them a head start in thinking about the problem of 

crossing 'ho man's land," which, after all, is an 

easier proposition than crossing the glacis of the 

masonry fortress, as wellas Providiflg them with the 

tools, particularly hand grenades, of trench warfare. 

Pioneers were, moreover, free of romantic notions of 

battle. War to them was a dangerous job, like the 

digging of a mine or the bufldiflg of a bridge over a 

fast-moving ~ river ~ Martial virtue ~ consisted ~ of finding ,

the most efficient way of doing the job, not in the 

beau geste of a bayonet charge. Finally, pioneers, 

whose training in prewar infantry tactical forms was 

not as thorough as that of the infantr% had fewer 

badhabits to break. 

The first and most famous of the storm-trooper 

units, Sturm Battalion Rohr, was named after its 

commander. It was formed in 1915 from the 

replacement companies of two pioneer battalions of 

the 8th Corps and a flamethrower detachment from 

the 3rd Guard's Pioneer Battalion. Many more 

storm-trooper units were formed later, primarily from 

pioneer and Jager (light infantry) units. Storm 

troopers spearheaded attacks at Verdun, Cambrai, 

Riga (in Russia), the 12th Battle of the lsonzo, and 

the German "Peace Offensives" of 1918. German 

storm troopers were able to restore operational 

maneuver to the deadlocked western front by using 

flexible, dismounted infantry tactics at the same time 

that the allies were turning to the tank. Because the 

German army was unable to logistically support the 

storm troopers after they had broken through allied 

lines in 1918, they were unable to exploit their 

tactical successes. 

Combat engineers should find this book to be 

fascinating reading. It is recommended to all combat 

arms leaders. 

Major w;/1jam 

Engineer, 29th 

National Guard. 

C, schneck, 

Infantry ~;vis;on, ~ ~ Virginia Army ~ ~;~;~j

; ~ t ~
Maintaining Engineer C 

4\' Major Charles Radke 

n his "State of the Engineer Branch officer in an engineer battalion deployed monthly inventories conducted by parts 

1997" (The Army Engineer, June to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The follow1997, page 20). MG Clair F. Gill, ' ing information includes some of the 

thcn commandant of the U.S. Army items I helieve are necessary for a sucEngineer School. asked that we help cessful mainrenance program. The 

move the branch forward into the next Army Maintenance Management Syscentury. He presented seven challenges tern describes other requirements in DA 

to remember as we go about our daily Pamphlet 738-750. F~mctionnl User.c 

specialists. Insist that the PLL clerk 

record parts used and then douhlecheck the availability of each part 

monthly. Parts that receive fairly regular demands must he stocked in the 

PLL. When authorized, keep on hand at 

least two of each ifem in the PLL to 

activities. Challenge number four was Manual for The Army Maintenance avoidazerobalance. 

"Maintain your equipment to standard Managernen! Systenr (TAMMS). Addi- You mu" quick-serviceand train your soldiers to use it to its tional requirements in local SOPS and s"~~l~, items (under %25) Ihat 

full effectiveness." MG Gill explained regulations help ensure s~~ccessful Can be retained and do not count against 

why this is important and tried to maintenance operations. The impera- PLL ceilings. Know what you have On 

influence maneuver commanders to ' tives in this article were extracted from h"ds and make it 

voice their concerns about engineer 1 several of these docun~ents. ble to users. If small parts from a set, 

equipment. ! kit, or outfit are at zero balance, order 

' Manage repair Parts bad lists (0 replacements immediately. O-rings, 1 lnaximize on-hand Parts. Prescribed bolts, connectors, and hardware are just 

Maintenance Imperatives load lists (PUS) are automated in the as important to have on hand as new 

Unit-Level Logistics System (ULLS). staners, 

T hat challenge reminded me of ' Stockape is based on demands (as participate in authorized stockage I 

my experiences as executive , required by Army regulations) and On list (ASL) review hoards and insist that 

Instead of running this ACE to 

maintenance without its track, a 

plan was executed to move it as 

shown here and not cause additional damage. 
Maintenance in the mud should be anticipated.Truck-mounted shop equipment and a 

trailer-mounted hydraulic fabrication set help accomplish the maintenance mission. 

the ASL of the direct support unit 1 requirements for parts. Then, we man- 1 SARSS-O must exchange information 

(DSU) supports your repair parts stock- aged the required parts by exception. If daily to ensure that valid requisitions 

age and is tailored to support engineer parts requests were passed to the get into the system. If the ULLS status 

equipment. Amy regulations allow wholesale supply system, experienced is incorrect, something is wrong with 

ASLs to stock repair pans for low- personnel reviewed the problem to the human side of the system and must 

density equipment (like engineer equip- ensure that the correct part was be corrected. 

ment) on the basis of "three demands to ordered. Usually the battalion's mainte- Follow pas from the source of supadd and one to retain." Regulations nance technician, sergeant, or officer ply through delivery to the equipment. require that "nine to add and three to performed the task, but sometimes it Requests are quickly established in the 

retain" criteria be used fbr more corn- was a technician from the Logistics wholesale supply system. and the status 

mon parts. Help the DSU identify the Assistance Office, the DSU. or a con is returned just as quickly. DSU opera- low-density equipment repair pans you tracted maintenance advisor. tions personnel can determine the status 

need. Most assemblies (such as Once a repair pan is ordered, a of all requests and speed a shipment or 

en@nes3 tracks. road and trans- record of the request is in the repair solve problems. They also maintain conmissions' are stocked and carried at the pans system. Imponant items to verify tact with the entire supply infrastructure, 

DSU. It look 25 lo 30 for parts lo are stock numbers, nomenclature, which was developed to fix problems as 

be shipped fr')nl lo 'OSnia If quantity ordered, unit of issue. iquisi- they are identified. With modern tools the DSU did not have a major assembly tion advice (one of the most commonly such as "Total Asset Visibility" and "Inon hand, we had at least a month of non- disregarded codes), urgency-of-need Transit Visibility," we can determine mission-capable (NMC) time. designator, and required delivery date. when a part arrives at the local pans Don't excess repair pans. If the delively date block is left blank, warehouse. If necessary, means are whether serviceable Or unserviceab'e, regardless of priority, there is no NMC available to quickly get the part from the because they take up valuable space request in the system, 1 warehouse to the equipment. and require a separate management Periodically check the status of the 8 

system. Turn in unserviceable pans and 

request at the unit and take the neces- Train operators, maintenance and get them into the rebuild program. Alw 

say action. Now that the entire Army supply personnel, and supervisors on 

turn in unauthorized serviceable parts. operates on ULLS and the Standard maintenance and operation of engi- You may need lhem someday' hut let Army Retail Supply System-Objective I neer equipment. Training operators the system hold them until then. (SARSS-0). a maintenance supervisor saves time and saves equipment from 

can quickly determine if parts have operator-induced failures. Training is 

Manage each Part that makes a been ordered and if requests have been often performed at the unit level, but 

piece of equipment NMC-from dk~- passed to the next higher level of sup- formal training elsewhere is available. 

nosis through insmiiation. Order the ' ply. The request is printed on the Main- Begin operator training with a wellright part the first time. In Bosnia we tenance Inspection Worksheet 5988-E I structured drivers' training program. 

let organizational maintenance person- and includes a list of parts on order for 1 Once soldiers know the correct methnel identify deficiencies and establish the equipment. Both the ULLS and ods of maintenance and operation. 

Fehnrun 1998 Engineer 29 
"Once soldiers know the correct methods of maintenance 

9 9 

and operation, they usually follow proper procedures. 

they usually follow proper procedures. 

Maintenance personnel in a division receive training from the Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team 

and other sources. Logistics Assistance 

Office personnel, the local representatives from the Army Materiel Command. are positioned forward to 

provide training assistance. 

Perqonnel who supply repair pans 

also require training. Regardless of 

their military occupational specialty. 

well-trained parts specialists and assistants are cornerstcines of mainreliance 

management. 

Current engineer doctrine places the 

company first sergeant in the role of 

maintenance support supervisor. To perform this function. NCOs must be 

trained on the entire maintenance process as they move through the echelons 

of leadership. Training to go beyond the 

company and battalion to solve maintenance issues must be instilled early. 

Then. when small units are away from 

the parent unit. the NCO super!' 'Isor can 

continue a maintenance pro, oram. 

Fabricate repair parts locally to 

save time and money. In Bosnia. the 

engineer battalion was the conduit for 

the fabrication of repair pans for the 

brigade combat team. A hydraulic shop 

and two machine shops were under 

contract. In addition. our fully stocked 

shop van, welding outfit. and hosefabrication outfit made many items 

quickly, saving transportation costs. 

Nearby aviation maintenance units usually are an excellent source for hydraulic hose fabrication. 

Perform periodic services on time 

and to standard. Technical manuals. 

lubrication orders, and regulations provide the standards. Don't forget to 

check out-of-sight items (such as weapons: night-vision devices; and nuclear. 

biological, and cheniical equipment) 

when scheduling and completing services. Task organize maintenance and 

engineer units to complete a block of 

services. When one leader is given the 

responsibility, time, and tools to complete a service mission, the results are 

very close to optimal. The overarching 

goal of periodic service is to have 

equipment leave the service process in 

like-new condition. Make every effon 

to identify problems and institute corrective actions. Ensuring that parts are 

on hand for scheduled services requires 

a well-planned. systematic ordering 

process. If the wheel seal needed during scheduled services is not on hand. 

chances are it will never be installed. 

Complete, document, and correct 

problems identi$ed during periodic 

checks. Some maintenance checks are 

listed in technical manuals for the 

equipment, and others come from 

Army safety regulations. Each set of 

guidance specifies that checks he performed before, during. and after operations. Too often. maintenance checks 

consist of a quick walk around the 

equipment arid starting the engine. It's 

better to put an entire weapon system 

together and run it through normal 

operation. Put the weapon on the vehicle. tun1 on the communication devices, and move the system to complete 

all required checks. If an operator identifies a problem during the checks, 

maintenance personnel must correct it 

without delay. 

Exercire equipment to help identqy 

problems and keep it fully mission 

capable (FMC). Equipment stored for 

any lenzth of time begins to deteriorate. 

Seals lose resiliency, rubber rots. electrical connections corrode, and rust 

invades spaces that should be clean. 

Our equipment in Bosnia hit record 

highs in terms of miles and hours but 

continued to stay FMC. One reason 

was that by operating complete systems 

often enough to prevent deterioration, 

we helped prevent early component 

failure. 

PIan well and consistently enforce 

standards to ensirre safe maintenance 

operafions. Planning ensures that standard procedures are in place to reinforce 

the safety program. Include detailed procedures for inflating split-ring wheels, 

backing vehicles. handling hazardous 

material. and operating the shop. After 

policies are established, enforce thmi. 

Also enforce common safety rules. 

Safety is a force multiplier, and maintenance operations are one of the higgest 

benefactors from this practice. 

Maintenance Success 

W ith successful maintenance 

practices established, our battalion followed the directive to 

deploy to Bosnia only equipment that 

could shoot. move, and communicate. 

and that could self-load onto the rail cars. 

After the equipment mived in Hungary. 

we mad marched to Croatia and drove 

every vehicle across the Sava River to a 

remote base camp. Our battalion accomplished this trip without leaving anything 

in Germany and without borrowing 

replacements from other units. In Bosnia, 

we enjoyed higher-than-average readiness rates even though we logged additional miles and hours. 

Maintenance imperatives are longtern events. Getting started on them as 

soon as possible will lead to earlier success. Perhaps the imperatives described 

above will help satisfy MG Gill's chdlenge to "Maintain your equipnient to 

standard and train your soldiers to use it 

to its full effectiveness." Y 

Mnjor Radkr is assigned lo rhe Concepf.s Division, Direcmiale qf Cr~rnbar 

D~~~eI)~~~iieilfs. U.S. Army Err~ineer 

Scl~ool. Pre~iorrs arijinmeiifs iriclr~le 

rxeclrtive (~fi(.rc 9111 Err~irieer Bun(rli~ti. 

Isr Irgfanm Division, Bosrria nrld Hene- 

,q>~iru~: andciiicf ~$aufo~nafiorr~i~r /ogi.sticrll rysrers, 3rd hlfor11. Divisiorr Slr{~pon 

Comniuiid. MAJ Ra~tke i.s a grudrmte of 

file A~mor Officer Ad~,ur~ced Co~rr.se, Sysrerm Alrromrrtion Courre, orrd rhe Crnilrnand and G~,nrral Sfaff CoI/r,ye. 

30 Engineer Fehnror) 1998 
Mission Analysis: 

Getting It Right 

Fehruap 1998 Engineer 31 

R? Major Joe? V&re 

W irh !/re hrrttlr rhythm in place, engineer planners on engineer-specific survivability tasks. it doesn't fully identhe hriqarle staff initiates tasks rather than mobility/survivability tify those that maneuver units must 

l11anni11g for an iipcoming tasks. Understanding the difference he- accomplish. Experience at the JRTC 

~/c,liher~rte rrtlack. The brigade S3 tries tween the two will ensure that critical shows that when critical nlobilitylsurto keep lu the established tirneline. He tasks are identified and integrated into vivahilily tasks are not specifiedrips anne.res from the division opera- the overall plan. either from a higher headquarters operations order andpasses them to his staff; The question isn't how to get "your" lions order or as a result of mission analin.rrructing them to "condrict your mis- dog in the fight as much as it is how to get ysis at the hrigade or battalion levelsio~r arialysis and provide your inpirt ro "the" dog in the fight. lrlstead of viewing those tasks are not incorporated into the 

the battle captain." With nnnex in hand, the MDMP as a funclion of a particular 

the brigade engineer retur~~s to hir BOS. enpincer planners (as well as other 

work station, gives the annex a crirsor? BOS representatives) see the "dog" as a 

look, conducts his rni.s.siori nno1~si.s. specific unit. Hence, task force engineers 

COA. This subsequently leads to critical 

tasks not being included as an event during the "action, reaction, counteraction" 

drill of wargaming. The end state is a 

and passes his i~zput to the ha~tle cap- at the JRTC often provide the same desynchronized plan that often leads to 

rain. The time sper7r was less that7 15 generic input. \vhich is directed entirely disastrous results for the unit and the 

minutes. at cnginccr units. The result is a one- "dog" never making it to the fight. 

sided approach to identifying tasks. Table 2, page 32, highlights the mulAt the Joint Readiness Training Cen- ' Tahle I shows common phases of an tiple mohility/survivability tasks that 

ter (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, task operation and helps illustrate the input can be associated with any operation. 

force engineers at brigade and batlal- routinely provided by engineer plan- regardless of the mission. and the type 

ion levels often experience difliculties ners. Because the MDMP is sequential. or level of maneuver unit rcsponsihle 

with providing mohility1surviv;ibility the lack of detailed input directly influ- for executing them. This method of 

illput to the military decision-making ences other steps of the decision-making analysis stresses the function of the 

process (MDMP). Due to the MDMP's process, including the staff's ability to mohilitylsurvivability BOS and is not 

11)eical sequence. engineer planners fully synchrl~nire courses of action limited to a specific type of unit. Anamust get it right fr~~m thebeginning. (COAS). An insufticient mission analy- lyzing the mission from this perspective 

This means they must correctly identify sis normally leads to an incomplete creates several ways to get the "dog" in 

and integrate the specified and implied COA. Therefore the engineer planner the fight. The input does not address 

mohilitylsurvivability tasks during their must analyze the mission from a mohil- only engineer tasks but identifies tasks 

initial mission analysis. ity/survivability perspective. Although the brigade and battalions must execute 

Tahle 1 addresses CI-itical mobility1 as a comhined arms team. 

Engineer Planning 

Table 1. Generic mission analysis input directed at engineer units 

E ngineers who participate in the 

MDMP usually rely on [asks Phase l Phase ll Phase Ill Phase lV 

specified in the higher headquar. (Reconnoiter and (Conduct Air (Attack) (Consolidate and 

ters operations order as the primary Set Movement) Reorganize) 

Conditions 

source of input for their mission analysis p~ 

and seldom focus on the mobility1 1 Conduct 11 Conduct n Conduct 0 Provide 

suwivability battlefield operating sys- precombat air assault. assault countermobility 

tem (60s). Our maneuver counterparts. checks and breach. support. 

who facilitate the MDMP, often say, inspections. 

"How are you going to get your dog in 1 Rehearse 

battle drills. the fight?" This phrase tends to focus 
Table 2. Mobilitylsurvivability tasks associated with any mission. 

I Phase I I Phase ll I Phase Ill I Phase lV 

(Reconnoiter and Set (Conduct Air (Attack) (Consolidate and 

Conditions) Movement) Reorganize) 1 

I n ldentifv uossible main / 7 Conduct air assault. i O Confirm or deny the 1 Employ hasty urotec- I 

o identify enemy battle 

positions and supporting 

tactical obstacles. 

and aliernative routes 

(MSR and ASR). 

0 Recon MSRIASR. 

3 Recon axis of advance. 

3 Locate and identify 

enemy obstacles along 

MSR. 

n Identify and locate 

possible bypasses. 

n Recon landing zone 

(LZ) and pick-up zone. 

breach. I reduce: dbstacles. 

o Conduct route 

clearance. 

secure primary LZ, 

n Clear alternate LZ. 

o Employ scanerable 

mines to isolate and 

fix counterattack. 

Engineer and maneuver staff planners must realize that a mobilitylsurvivability task does not necessarily 

equate to an engineer-specific task. The 

brigade has at its disposal a variety of 

assets-such as scouts, long-range surveillance detachments (LRSD), and 

aviation and maneuver companies-to 

help accomplish the mohility/suwivability tasks. For example, scouts and 

LRSD are tasked to confirm or deny 

enemy ohstacles, while aviation assets 

conduct aerial recons to determine the 

suitability of main supply routes 

(MSRs) and planned axes of advance. 

By applying the methodology in 

T~hle 2, engineer planners focus on the 

function of the BOS and ensure critical 

mohilitylsu~ivahility tasks are identified, addressed, and synchronized in 

the tactical plan. This forces the hrigade and battalion stafts to consider 

using a wide variety of assets without 

relying solely on engineer units. The 

end result equates to a more detailed 

maneuver plan and highlights the 

necessity for proper implementation of 

limited engineer assets. 

presence of obstacles MSR and 

axis of advance. 

fl Conduct in-stride 

breach and bypass 

obstacles. 

7 Conduct assault 

analysis. is the engineer annex. A 

developing trend at the JRTC revolves 

around how input to the engineer 

annex is addressed. Engincer staff 

planners continue to use the annex as 

the primary means to task engineer 

units (versus maneuver units) with 

specific engineer tasks. The engineer 

annex is where maneuver units should 

go to seek additional information 

and tasks related to the mobility1 

survivability BOS that are not covered 

in the base operations order. However. 

the engineer annex is consistently 

viewed as a source of information useful only to engineer units. To compound the problem, engineer leaders 

view the engineer annex as their version of an engineer operations order. 

Hence. they use this as an excuse for 

not issuing detailed operations orders 

at company and platoon levels. This 

shortcut fails to use the annex as the 

primary tool for addressing specified 

mobilitylsurvivability tasks for maneuver units. as identified during mission analysis. 

tive'obstacles.' 

0 Prepare hasty fighting positions. 

n Establish tactical 

command posts. 

fl Upgrade minefieldmarkino svstems on 

viewing our piece strictly from an 

engineer perspective, critical mohilityl 

survivability tasks will continue to he 

overlooked and will be absent during 

the MDMP. As task force engineers and 

staff planners, we must learn to distinguish between the need for engineer 

advice and the need for advice pertaining to the function of the mobility1 

survivability BOS. 

To ensure our success as ~nemhers of 

a combined arms staff. engineers must 

gain a better working knowledge of the 

MDMP and understand the importance 

of comprehensive mission analysis. 

This includes broadening our vision 

and providing input based on the fitnction of the mobilitylsuwivability BOS 

If we overcomc the temptation to see 

the fight just from an engineer viewpoint. then the "dog" stands a better 

chance of not only getting to the fight 

hut also of winning. Y 

Major Wyte is the Chief: Or~ineer 

Plarzr und Operations Sectio17. nnd 

senzed as the Engineer Conil~anp 

Senior Oh.sen~er/Controller at tlze Joint - 

Kev tn SI~PPPPP ' Readir7er.s Training Center: HP h[r.s 

Engineer Annex 

- , - - - - - - - ., completed torrrx with the Royal Arrstrir0 uccess of the MDMP-and the /inn Engineer-,s, 10th Mountain Di~.i.sior~ 

A product of the MDMP, and (3 unit+pends on a complete (Liyht), and the 9th Er7,yineer Bott[rli,n 

closely associated with mission Inlsslon analysis. If we persist in (Corps, Mechnniz~d). 
very innovative ways, and the speed at which data can 

be transferred is impressive. But, the data remains 

"information" until someone analyzes it. Staffs perform 

analyses and then make recommendations to 

commanders based on the analyses. 

Engineer brigade and battalion commanders must 

maximize the use of technology without stifling staff 

interaction or analysis. It should not require a captain 

with a degree in computer science to operate computer 

programs and software. If a young specialist cannot 

understand a computer program or the software, the 

staff will lose valuable time. Commanders and staffs 

should ask, "How does this software save us time?" or 

"What is the value added by using this system?" The 

most important question is, "How will this process help 

the commander?" Technology will continue to provide 

wonderful benefits to commanders and staffs by 

producing more timely and accurate information that 

enables both groups to do their missions. 

Note:To obtain a complete copy of the 1997 mobility1 

Su~ivability perceptions, call LTC Bush at (913) 684- 

9904 or DSN 552-9904. The e-mail address is: 

bushal @leav-emhl .army.mil. 

Lieutenant Colonel Bush is the Mobility/Survivability 

BOS Chief for Team A, Battle Command Training 

Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously 

served as executive officer, 588th Engineer Battalion, 

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. 

Battle CommandTraining Program 

By Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Bush 

Every year the Battle Command Training Program 

(BCTP) publishes perceptions for each battlefield 

operating system (BOS). Engineer and chemical 

perceptions are combined into mobility and survivability 

BOS. The 1997 mobilitylsurvivability perceptions are 

basically the same as those identified in 1996. Engineer 

commanders and staffs should keep in mind that 

mobilitylsurvivability perceptions focus on key items 

that contribute significantly to mission accomplishment 

for corps and divisions. This does not mean that units Joint ReadinessTraining Center 

are not working hard to solve these problems, because 

the perceptions address very difficult tasks that present 

challenges to every newly assembled staff. During the 

past 18 months, I have seen tactical and technical 

expertise at all levels. The soldiers, noncommissioned 

officers, and officers are using their expertise in 

conjunction with emerging technology. 

Technological improvements provide great benefits 

for tracking, collecting, and reporting information. Most 

units are using computers, headsets, and telephones in 

By Captain John DeJarnette 

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 

provides light engineer companies and their supported 

maneuver brigade combat teams excellent opportunities to train in realistic major regional 

contingency and lesser regional contingency operations. Observers note that many units rotating 

through the JRTC have experienced difficulty in the 

following areas: 

Fehrlin~ 1998 Engineer 33 
Observation. Rotational brigades do not conduct 

mobility and survivability training as part of reception 

staging, onward movement, and integration 

operations. The result is confusion and needless mine 

casualties at platoon and squad levels. 

Discussion 

Vehicle drivers are unfamiliar with standard minefield lane-marking systems. Therefore, they often 

drive vehicles on uncleared lanes, resulting in 

injured personnel and damaged equipment. 

Soldiers and vehicle crews do not understand the 

correct actions to take when they strike a mine. As 

a result, additional losses occur during vehicle 

recovery operations and casualty evacuations. 

Minefield locations are not reported and disseminated to other units in a timely fashion. 

Battalion and brigade staff are unfamiliar with the 

mine-strike battle drills described in the unit standing operating procedure (SOP). 

Recommendations 

Engineers construct a standard vehicle lanemarking system at entrances and exits to unit 

motor pools and staging areas. Leaders ensure 

that drivers understand how lanes are marked. 

Unit leaders conduct a mine-strike "action drill" 

rehearsal for both crews and unit staff. Stress individual and collective tasks as well as timely reporting in the action drill. 

Battalion and brigade staffs include mine contact 

and obstacle intelligence dissemination procedures in unit communication exercises. 

Observation. Engineer company SOPS are not 

consistent across engineer units within the same 

division, and they frequently conflict with the supported 

maneuver brigade's SOP 

Discussion 

Many engineer companies develop SOPSthat are 

independent of existing battalion or division standards.This practice complicatesthe task organization across companies that support the divisional 

main effort. 

The format of engineer SOP reports is not consistent with the format used by the supported maneuver brigade, resulting in difficulty using the 

personnel replacement and logistics systems. While 

differences often are minor, they are confusing. 

Recommendations 

Engineer battalions develop and enforce the use of 

one SOP for all subordinate units that are assigned or 

attached. The SOP should be endorsed by the division 

and targeted for use by the engineer platoon in support 

of infantry battalions and artillery batteries. The SOP 

should include--

- Appropriate reports and clear time lines for 

submitting them. 

- Tactics, techniques, and procedures and battle drills 

for standard tasks. - Mission-specific precombat checklists for squad 

and platoon leaders. 

- Standard planning factors and clear standards for 

mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations. 

- Pro forma operations orders, warning orders, and 

execution checklists for use by task force engineer 

planners. 

A standard SOP that includes the above items will 

reduce friction at engineer squad, platoon, and company 

levels. 

Captain Dejarneite is an engineer observer/controller 

at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, 

Louisiana. He previously served with the 37th Engineer 

Baitalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and as 

commander, B Company, 11th Engineer Battalion, Fort 

Stewart, Georgia. 

34 Engineer Frhniar)' I998 

Sergeants Major Homepage 

A sergeants major homepage on the Fort 

Leonard Wood web site provides topics of 

interest to sergeants major throughout the 

Engineer Regiment. To date it includes information on safety, training, promotions, doctrine, 

equipment, quality-of-life issues, and the ENFORCE Conference. While the homepage is up 

and running, your advice and suggestions for 

improvements are welcome. To access the 

homepage, access the Fort Leonard Wood 

homepage (http://www.wood.army.mil), click on 

"Leadership:' and then click on the ECCSM 

homepage hot button under CSM Dils' photo. 

-
- -- 

ENGINEER UPDATE 

Commerc8al numbers are (573) 563-xxxn and Defense System 

Newark (OSN) numbers are 676-mu unless othewlse noted. 

Field Manual (FM) Update. The following FMs will be available on the Engineer 

School's Publications homepage about 1 March (http:llw.wood.armymillPUBS/ 

pubs.htm). Paper copies will be distributed throughout the spring. 

- FM 5.170, Engineer Reconnaissance, sets forth the principles of conducting 

engineer recon activities in support of a maneuver brigade or task force. It provides 

guidance on conducting enemy obstacle recons as well as technical recons such as 

bridge. ford, and tunnel recons.The manual supersedes FMs 5-36 and 5-30. 

- FM 20-32. Mine/Counterrnine Operations, provides tactical, technical, and 

procedural guidance for conducting mine and countermine operations. It is presented in 

three parts: mine operations, countermine operations, and special mining operations. 

The manual incorporates recent guidance on the use of training on antipersonnel land 

mines. 

- FM 5-428. Concrete and Masonry is primarily a training guide and reference text 

for engineer personnel using concrete and masonry materials in field construction. 

- FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions, is the technical compilation of the 

explosives and explosive techniques used by U.S. military forces. It provides soldiers 

with the ability to conduct demolition operations using the conventional detonating cord 

initiation systems as well as recently approved modernized demolition initiators. The 

manual serves as a guide to familiarize leaders with the demolition effects simulators 

program. It superseded TC 5-250. 

POC is Lucius Warrick, -7767. 

Staffing of Draft Publication. The draft version of FM 90-13-1. Combined Arms 

Breaching Operations, is posted on the Engineer School's Publications homepage 

(address above). Comments are due by 1 April. POC is CPT Joe Birchmeier, -7762. 

Digital Topographic Support System-Light (DTSS-L). Approval to proceed with 

production of the DTSS-L, which will provide commanders with tactical decision aids, 

was received on 9 January. Production will begin in FY 99, with fielding scheduled for 

FY 00. POC is Don Monton. -7970. 

Feedback Page. A feedback page on DCD's homepage includes items of interest 

about which DCD requests readers' comments. The address is: http:// 

www.wood.army.millDCDMeedback.htm. Let us know what you think about the 

information posted. POC is Larry Allen, -4080. 

Joht Countermine Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (JCM ACTD) 11. 

The MSBL and Night Vision and Electronic Sensor Directorate, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, are 

working to execute the Army's part of JCM ACTD II. Soldiers of the XVlll Airborne Corps 

used novel countermine equipment to detect, report, and reduce surface and buried 

minefields during Joint Task Force Exercise 98-1 in January. The Close-in. Man-portable 

Mine Detector (CIMMD) uses a combination of a metal detector, ground-penetrating 

radar, and forward-looking infrared thermal imaging to locate buried metallic and 

nonmetallic mines. The Airborne Standoff Mine Detection System is used to detect 

surface and buried antitank mines. The Digital Reconnaissance System uses laser 

ranger-finder binoculars, the Global Positioning System, and SINCGARS to send digital 

mine and obstacle reports over the communications net. Another demonstration is 

planned for March 1998 at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. 

Additionally. Marines from Camp LeJeune. North Carolina, will demonstrate the 

equipment during a Joint training exercise in Newfoundland later this summer. POC is 

CPT Paul Aufschlager, -4082. 

Department of Training 

and Doctrine 

Development (DOTD) 

Directorate of Combat 

Developments (DCD) 

Maneuver Support Battle 

Lab (MSBL) 
hler~s and Notes 

Biological Defense Experiment. The program manager, Integrated Biodetection 

Advanced Technology Demonstration, and the Chemical School are working with the 

MSBL to demonstrate a new concept in biological detection. The Distributive Biological 

Detection System is intended to provide warning of a biological attack. Two kinds of 

experiments are planned. First, the atmosphere at several installations will be sampled to 

determine what is normally there. Later, trials using nontoxic materials that simulate a 

biological attack will be conducted at Dugway Proving Ground. Utah. The experiments will 

test a prototype system of three technology applications. Sensor units are based on laserparticle counters, the Global Positioning System, and a telemetry system. In addition, a 

state-of-the-art miniature laboratory is being developed to identify biological material. 

POC is Mike Cress. -4083. 

Global Positioning System (GPS) Tutorial. A GPS tutorial is available on CD-ROM 

from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The national stock number is: 7644-01- 

445-4559. POC is Ed Forman. Defense Mapping School, (703) 805-3215 or DSN 

655-3252. 

v isitors to Fort Leonard Wood will notice a 

difference in the skyline as they enter the post, 

due to the major construction program underway 

to support the relocation of the U.S. Army Chemical and 

Military Police Schools and related functions from Fort 

McClellan, Alabama. Initial planning and design for the 

facilities under construction began in 1995 afterthe Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission's recommendation to close Fort McClellan became public law. 

Construction projects totaling more than $230 

million will be completed at Fort Leonard Wood to 

support BRAC 95. In May 1997. a contract worth more 

than $160 million was awarded to Hensel Phelps 

Construction Company, headquartered at Greeley, 

Colorado. This contract includes a 300,000-square-foot 

General lnstruction Facility that will provide classrooms, 

support facilities, and administrative areas to support 

officer and advanced noncommissioned officer training: 

an 888-person unaccompanied enlisted personnel 

housing complex; and a Chemical Defense Training 

Facility, which will provide an applied instruction area 

for training to identify and decontaminate toxic chemical 

agents. Included in the Hensel Phelps contract is the 

Applied lnstruction Facility. This project will provide 

approximately 163,000 square feet of facilities to 

support Military Police one-station unit training and 

advanced law enforcement training; a Decontamination 

Apparatus Training Facility; and an extension to the 

existing Engineer Museum to store historical artifacts 

from the Military Police and Chemical Museums. At the 

end of January 1998, the Hensel Phelps contract was 

approximately 30 percent complete with overall 

completion scheduled for summer 1999. 

Additional contracts were awarded in FY98 and 

work is underway for other facilities to support the 

BRAC 95 program. This work includes range 

modifications and a training site for military operations 

in built-up areas (MOBA). The MOBA site will provide a 

16-building facility for training soldiers in tactics and 

techniques for urban operations under simulated 

combat conditions. Range work involves modifications 

to 13 static and mobile smoke ranges, pistol and 

shotgun ranges, and vehicle operations training areas. 

Relocation activities are expected to begin during 

the last quarter of FY98, and all BRAC missions should 

be relocated to Fort Leonard Wood and fully 

operational by September 1999. POC is CPT (P) 

Mike Dunn. 596-0081. 
@ Lead the Way 

*QS&,# 

By Command Sergeant Major Robert M. Dils 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

Achieving Balanc~ 

T housands of Noncommissioned Officer Developmental Programs have been conducted and 

volumes of information have been written about 

the Army Senior NCO Centralized Promotion System 

and how soldiers can make it to the top. The 

centralized promotion system or a particular centralized promotion board are favorite topics of discussion 

any time two or more senior NCOs get together. Many 

NCOs falsely believe that doing a good job every day 

and waiting until they have enough time in grade are 

the keys to success in our promotion system. Nothing 

could be further from the truth. Another misconception 

many senior NCOs have is that high proficiency in 

physical training is the key to success. Some think that 

a college degree will ensure that next stripe. Others 

wrongly think that a token amount of time in a key 

leadership position will put them over the top. The 

following information explains how senior NCOs can 

successfully compete in the Senior NCO Centralized 

Promotion System. 

In our down-sized, right-sized, right-functioned Army, 

achieving career balance will become a key factor in 

career progression. Balance will be important in every 

facet of an NCO's career: leadership, versatility of 

assignments, performance, potential, and military and 

civilian education. To be "best qualified" for promotion, 

an NCO cannot have specialized achievements in one 

or two key areas and minimum experience in the 

others. He or she needs significant achievements in all 

areas. Achieving a high degree of balance will ensure 

NCOs their best opportunity to make it to the top. The 

following examples describe NCOs who have attained a 

high degree of balance: 

An Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course 

(ANCOC) graduate, Sergeant First Class Smith has 

successfully completed two years of college and is 

a member of the Audie Murphy Club. She is in the 

primary zone for the first time and has been a 

platoon sergeant for 2 112 years after serving two 

years as a drill sergeant. SFC Smith has received 

two or three "Excellent" ratings, a "1" in the potential 

block, and a "1" in the performance block on her last 

five Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reports. 

An ANCOC graduate, Sergeant First Class Jones 

has completed one year of college and was the 

Division NCO of the Quarter as a staff sergeant. His 

academic efficiency report reflects that he exceeded course standards in ANCOC. SFC Jones is 

in the primary zone and has served as a recruiter 

for three years and as a squaa leaderlsection sergeant for three years. He currently serves as a platform instructor. 

Neither of these soldiers has a blemish on his record; 

both have current photos in their personnel files. Both 

soldiers reviewed their records before the promotion 

board met. While it is impossible to totally describe 

every component of a well-balanced career, these two 

examples reflect excellence in every area considered by 

the board, and they show excellent balance in all career 

areas. 

As engineer proponent, the Engineer School is 

responsible for providing NCO Centralized Promotion 

Boards with job, unit, and functional information on the 

various engineer military occupational specialties. We 

also advise the boards on the importance of the areas 

they will consider when determining which NCOs are 

best qualified. On future boards, career balance 

increasingly important. Good luck. 

ENFORCE XXI-98 

P lanning for ENFORCE XXI-98 is moving along at 

a rapid pace. This year's conference promises to 

be the best ever, and we need your suggestions 

on how to make it a more valuable training tool. The 

Council of Sergeants Major will meet on Tuesday, 21 

April, and all engineer command sergeants major are 

welcome to attend. I look forward to seeing you in April. 

- - ~ 

SGT Rogelio Martinez (12B20), A Company, 588th Engineer Battalion, 4th ID Engineer Brigade, is the 1st-Quarter FY98 NCO 

of the Quarler for Ill Corps and Fort Hood. I 

Febrrra!? 1998 fa U.S.GOVERNMENTPRlNT1NG OFFICE 1998-655120 18M01 
PIN: 0- -