Abstract

The World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled in June 2005 that Japan’s

phytosanitary protocol related to fire blight for imports of U.S. apples was not

justified and was in breach of Japan’s WTO commitments. In August 2005,

Japan issued a new phytosanitary protocol that complies with the WTO ruling.

With the elimination of the restrictive fire-blight protocol, U.S. producers have

a new opportunity to export apples to a high-quality export market, at a significantly lower cost than before. This analysis estimates that over the long run,

Japanese apple imports will increase by an average of $144 million per year

but that substantial variation from the average import estimate would be likely

because of fluctuating market conditions from season to season.

Keywords: Apples, Japan, fire blight, phytosanitary barriers, World Trade

Organization, trade disputes, ERS, USDA

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the many growers, shippers, industry representatives, and

scientists who contributed to our understanding of the impact of the fire-blight

protocol. We also acknowledge the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Japan for

providing information on Japanese prices and transaction costs. We appreciate

comments from our colleagues: Joy Harwood, Agnes Perez, Donna Roberts,

and John Dyck of the Economic Research Service, USDA; John Love, World

Agricultural Outlook Board, USDA; Carol Goodloe, Office of the Chief Economist, USDA; Larry Deaton, Heather Velthuis, and Doreen Chen-Moulec,

Horticultural and Tropical Products Division, Foreign Agricultural Service,

USDA; and Thomas Wahl and Thomas Schotzko, Washington State University.

The authors likewise thank Priscilla Smith and Juanita Tibbs for excellent

editorial and production assistance.

United States

Department

of Agriculture

www.ers.usda.gov

Electronic Outlook Report from the Economic Research Service

FTS-318-01

October 2005

Resolution of the U.S.-Japan

Apple Dispute

New Opportunities for Trade

Linda Calvin and Barry Krissoff
The United States has a long history of trying to gain access to the Japanese

apple market. Most recently, after U.S. complaints to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the WTO found that Japan’s phytosanitary protocol with

respect to fire blight for imports of U.S. apples was not justified and was in

breach of Japan’s WTO commitments. The WTO found that Japan’s import

restrictions on U.S. apples were without sufficient scientific evidence and

not based on a risk assessment. In August 2005, Japan brought its phytosanitary protocol for apples from the United States into compliance with the

WTO ruling.

Although Japan is recognized as a demanding market for apples, reducing

the costs of complying with phytosanitary protocols should open up more

export opportunities for U.S. apple growers. This report provides an estimate of the potential increase in Japanese apple imports. We begin with the

history of U.S. efforts to gain access to the Japanese apple market. The next

section describes the U.S. apple market and exports, particularly to Asia, as

well as the Japanese apple market. A discussion follows of the previous

Japanese phytosanitary protocol and the new one. This puts the Japanese

protocol in perspective and explains why U.S. producers have not yet been

successful in their efforts to develop a market for their apples in Japan.

Then the report turns to estimating the increase in trade made possible by

the elimination of the restrictive fire-blight requirement. The first part of the

analysis involves measuring the cost of the old fire-blight requirement,

which we assume is equal to the decrease in U.S. export costs under the

new Japanese protocol. The second part of the analysis takes the decrease in

costs and estimates the volume of increased apple trade. The report ends

with brief conclusions.

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Introduction
Japan officially opened its apple market in 1971, but its list of quarantine

pests kept U.S. apples out of the market (Kajikawa, 1998). At bilateral talks in

1982 between the United States and Japan, the United States first asked officially for market access for U.S. apples. Japan rejected this request, citing the

potential for introducing codling moth to their country. Japanese attention

later shifted to fire blight. In 1993, with the U.S. apple industry having failed

to gain access to the Japanese market, the U.S. Trade Representative threatened Section 301 general trade sanctions over Japan’s failure to resolve the

apple issue. Section 301 is the principal U.S. statute for addressing foreign

government practices that are “unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory

and [which] burden or distort” U.S. exports.

In 1994, Japan opened its market to U.S. Red and Golden Delicious apples

from Washington and Oregon under a restrictive phytosanitary protocol

directed at preventing the import of codling moth and fire blight (discussed

in the following section). In 1995, U.S. growers shipped 8,935 metric tons

of apples to Japan, with a Japanese import value of $14.8 million (table 1).

This first year of the Japan protocol represented the high point of U.S.

exports to Japan. Over the next 2 years, U.S. exports fell to 404 metric tons

(1996) and 105 metric tons (1997). In 1998, no U.S. growers registered for

the Japan export program. Limited demand for Red and Golden Delicious

apples in Japan, a high tariff, and the costly and risky phytosanitary requirements combined to make U.S. apple exports to Japan less profitable than

originally anticipated. A problem with pesticide residues in the first year of

U.S. exports also had a negative impact on Japanese consumer demand

(Foreign Agricultural Service, 1996). While this experience is often cited as

evidence that U.S. apples can not meet demanding Japanese consumer

expectations, the history of U.S. exports of cherries to Japan shows that U.S.

firms can compete profitably with the right product at the right price (see

box, “U.S. Cherry Exports to Japan”).

In the 1970s, when the United States began research to develop a phytosanitary

protocol for the export of Red and Golden Delicious apples, Red Delicious was

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History of U.S.-Japan Apple Disputes

Table 1

Japanese apple imports

Year Australia France Nepal New Zealand South Korea United States1 Total

Metric tons

1994 235 7 242

1995 190 171 8,935 9,295

1996 1 254 51 404 710

1997 12 1 9 22 105 150

1998 112 108 221

1999 110 39 159 308

2000 247 251 96 594

2001 650 1,411 278 2,339

2002 120 1 120

2003 108 108

2004 16 2 18

1From 1994 to 1998, Japan limited U.S. apple imports to Red and Golden Delicious varieties. In 1999, Japan opened its market to five 

additional varieties of U.S. apples: Braeburn, Fuji, Gala, Granny Smith, and Jonagold.

Source: World Trade Atlas.
the most common type of apple grown in the United States and Japan

(Kajikawa, 1998). Over the next two decades, sweeter varieties became more

popular in both countries, particularly in Japan. Before the United States

received Japanese clearance for exports of Red and Golden Delicious apples,

U.S. growers realized that other apple varieties were likely to have stronger

demand in Japan. But Japan required the efficacy of the codling moth treatment to be tested individually on each variety, a lengthy and expensive

process. U.S. negotiators did not add additional varieties to the discussions

out of concern that they might jeopardize their progress on Red and Golden

Delicious apples and because of their belief that approval for these two varieties would ease the approval process for other varieties. New Zealand,

which began negotiations with Japan at a later date when the shift in

Japanese consumer preferences was more obvious, asked for permission to

export varieties more likely to do well in the Japanese market. In 1993, 1

year before the United States gained access, Japan gave New Zealand

permission to export Fuji, Gala, Royal Gala, Red Delicious, Braeburn, and

Granny Smith apples to Japan.

The United States had long argued against testing for the efficacy of a quarantine treatment for insects on each variety of apple, claiming that a treatment to

kill an insect on one variety of apple is equally effective on another variety. In

1997, the United States brought the varietal testing issue to the WTO. In 1998,

the WTO concluded that Japan’s varietal testing of apples was not consistent

with the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement because varietal testing

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U.S. Cherry Exports to Japan

The success of U.S. cherry exports to Japan provides lessons that are relevant

for apple exports. Japan imported 13,941 metric tons of fresh cherries in

2004, with 99 percent coming from California, Oregon, and Washington

State. Japan has a relatively small cherry crop with a short marketing season.

Imports accounted for an estimated 42 percent of the Japanese fresh cherry

supply. The often-stated Japanese preference for domestic fruit does not

prevent Japanese consumers from enjoying high-quality U.S. cherries.

In 2004, sales of California cherries began in late April and ended June 10

before the peak Japanese shipments that began in mid-June. Washington and

Oregon cherries overlap with the Japanese season. By extending the cherry

season and increasing supply during the traditional season, imports may

increase consumer demand for cherries in general, benefiting both U.S. and

Japanese producers. Cherry production area in Japan is increasing.

Most Japanese cherries are the Satonishiki variety, which is similar to the

U.S. Rainier variety. Japanese traders have high regard for U.S. Rainier cherries which are largely used as gifts in Japan (Foreign Agricultural Service,

2004). Clearly U.S. cherry quality can meet the exacting Japanese consumer

standards for flavor, size, and quality. Japan does not produce dark sweet

cherries, yet U.S. exports of this type of cherry do very well in the Japanese

market. Japanese consumers are obviously open to new varieties and tastes.

Cherries also face phytosanitary restrictions in the Japanese market. While

U.S. cherries must be fumigated with methyl bromide, like U.S. apples, the

fumigation has had less impact on cherry quality than on apple quality.
was not supported by scientific evidence, was more trade restrictive than

required, and was nontransparent (APHIS, 1999). Japan appealed the decision, and, in 1999, the WTO again sided with the United States. Japan

announced that it would eliminate the import bans on five additional U.S.

varieties—Braeburn, Fuji, Gala, Granny Smith, and Jonagold—beginning

with the 1999/2000 season.

Two U.S. shippers registered for the phytosanitary protocol in the

1999/2000 season. In February 2000, the U.S. began selling Fuji apples in

Japan. Two U.S. shippers registered for the program in 2000/01, the last

season with exports to Japan. In 2001/02, one U.S. shipper registered for the

protocol but did not export any apples. Clearly, U.S. firms felt that the

expected costs of participating in the Japanese phytosanitary protocol

exceeded the expected benefits even with access for apple varieties thought

to be more competitive in Japan. Apple exporters in other countries have

faced similar challenges in exporting to Japan (see box, “Other Countries

that Export to Japan”).

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Other Countries that Export to Japan

Japan opened its markets to imported apples in 1971. However, no country

has exported large volumes on a regular basis. Before 1993, only North Korea

and South Korea exported apples to Japan. In 1996 and 1997, Nepal shipped

small quantities of apples to Japan. These countries do not have fire blight or

codling moth so do not need to follow the same type of phytosanitary protocols as the United States. South Korea has the longest history of exports to

Japan but exports have been very small in most years.

Countries with fire blight had to develop phytosanitary protocols with Japan.

In 1993, New Zealand received permission to export Fuji, Gala, Royal Gala,

Red Delicious, Braeburn, and Granny Smith apples to Japan. New Zealand

growers exported for 5 years, but like their U.S. counterparts, found that the

expected benefits of the Japanese export program were outweighed by the

expected costs. In September 1997, France received permission to export

Golden Delicious apples to Japan but only shipped during that year. In

December 1998, Australia received permission to export Tasmanian Fuji

apples to Japan. Australia claims to not have fire blight and does not therefore

have to comply with the type of protocol the United States faces for this

disease. But growers do have to fumigate for codling moth, as do U.S.

growers. Exports to Japan are limited to the island of Tasmania, the only fruitfly-free area in Australia. While Tasmania has exported apples every year

since it gained entry to the market, the level of trade is very low in part

because it is a small industry. Trade has declined rapidly from its 2001 high.

Growers have had problems meeting Japanese size and color preferences for

their relatively high-priced apples (Foreign Agricultural Service, 1999). Also,

methyl bromide fumigation has caused problems with fruit deterioration.

Australia’s efforts to change the protocol to allow fumigation in Japan have not

been successful. This change would reduce the problem of shortened shelf life.

While Chinese apples are a rapidly growing presence in Asian markets, Japan

prohibits the import of fresh Chinese apples due to codling moth and oriental

fruit fly. Currently, China has not requested that Japan lift the import ban nor

has there been any discussion to establish a protocol.
The United States also took aim at the Japanese requirements for fire blight.

The United States argued that the fire-blight requirements were not based on

science—specifically, that mature, symptomless fruit do not carry the

disease. In 1997, the United States asked Japan to modify its phytosanitary

protocol (Yue, Beghin, and Jensen, 2005). The United States and Japan

conducted joint research that confirmed the U.S. position on the transmission of fire blight. In October 2001, Japan refused to change its protocol

with respect to fire blight.

In 2002, the United States requested and was granted a panel by the WTO

Dispute Settlement Body to hear the case, and, in July 2003, the panel

agreed with the U.S. position (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,

2003). Japan appealed the decision and lost again in December 2003. In

June 2004, Japan submitted a revised protocol that the United States deemed

inadequate to bring the protocol into compliance. In July 2004, the United

States asked the WTO to review the revised protocol.1 In June 2005, the

WTO panel found that Japan’s revised protocol was still inconsistent with

its WTO obligations. In August 2005, Japan issued a new phytosanitary

protocol for apple imports from the United States that complies with the

WTO ruling (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2005). The United

States and Japan jointly notified the WTO that Japan had ended the practices that were inconsistent with its WTO obligations.

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1The United States also sought

authorization to impose trade sanctions

against Japan in the amount equal to

damages based on the annual value of

forgone apple sales (Office of the U.S.

Trade Representative, 2004). 
The United States is the second-largest apple producer in the world, after

China, with 4.2 million metric tons in 2003, and is usually the largest apple

exporter in the Western Hemisphere. The well-being of the U.S. apple industry

depends on strong export markets. In the 2003/04 season, exports accounted

for 18 percent of domestic fresh-market production. U.S. producers have a long

history of exporting to a large number of countries and catering to diverse

consumer preferences. In 2003, the United States exported 528,487 metric tons

of fresh apples. Mexico and Canada were the largest markets for U.S. fresh

apples, accounting for 43 percent of total export volume (table 2). Asian countries are also top markets for U.S. apple exports, despite considerable recent

competition from China. Taiwan, Indonesia, and Hong Kong accounted for 24

percent of total U.S. fresh apple exports. Other Asian markets in the top 20

U.S. destinations for U.S. apple exports—Malaysia, India, Thailand, Singapore, China, and the Philippines—accounted for another 11 percent of the

export volume. The U.S. share of imports in these Asian countries ranged from

4 percent in the Philippines (a country that has drastically reduced its imports

of U.S. apples in favor of cheaper Chinese apples) to 47 percent in Indonesia.

The prospect of gaining access to the high-income Japanese market has enticed

U.S. growers for years.

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Apple Markets in the United States 

and Asia

Table 2

U.S. apple exports to top 20 markets in 2003

U.S. share of 

Country U.S. exports country’s imports

Metric tons Percent

World 528,487

Mexico 121,248 69

Canada 107,613 76

Taiwan 50,978 45

Indonesia 1 40,783 47

Hong Kong 36,055 34

Malaysia 24,429 10

United Kingdom 24,077 4

United Arab Emirates 19,094 NA

India1 10,748 41

Thailand 9,157 12

Singapore 8,138 9

Saudi Arabia 6,924 NA

Greece 1 5,367 5

Colombia1 5,154 6

China 4,676 46

Philippines1 4,547 4

Costa Rica 3,621 NA

El Salvador 3,293 NA

Guatemala 3,233 NA

Kuwait 3,227 NA

NA= not available.

1U.S. share of imports based on 2002 data.

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and World Trade Atlas.
Hundreds of varieties of apples exist and different groups of consumers often

favor particular varieties, as well as certain sizes. In the United States, the

Red Delicious apple remains the most common variety, although its share of

production and consumption has declined. The U.S. Apple Association estimates Red Delicious production at 29 percent of the U.S. crop in 2003,

compared with 43 percent in 1994. Golden Delicious is the second most

popular apple, maintaining approximately a 13- to 14-percent share of production over the last decade. In contrast, Fuji, Gala, and other new varieties (Braeburn, Jonagold, and Pink Lady) have increased in production, with Fuji and

Gala each growing from less than 2 percent of total U.S. production in the

early 1990s to nearly 10 percent in 2003. This change in varieties represents a

response to changing U.S. consumer preferences for sweeter apples and high

prices for these apples in the fresh export market.

Japan is a significant producer and consumer of apples, famous for its highquality and very expensive fruit. In 2003, Japan ranked 13th in world apple

production with 891,700 metric tons. The Japanese apple industry has thousands of small, high-cost producers. However, the country’s apple industry has

been declining slowly over the last decade as area planted and production have

decreased. In 2003, production was down approximately 15 percent from 1990

and acreage had declined 20 percent. The number of growers is also down, as

Japan’s population of apple producers is aging and the lifestyle has failed to

attract a younger generation (World Apple Review, 2004).

The Fuji is the most popular apple variety grown in Japan, accounting for

approximately 55 percent of the nation’s production. Producer prices for Fuji

apples are higher than for other varieties. Production practices differentiate Fuji

apples; there are bagged Fuji and sun Fuji. Bagged Fuji apples are individually

covered with bags until just before harvest. This technique protects the fruit

from blemishes and yields an almost iridescent coloring. These pampered

apples are often used as gifts; they are sold individually wrapped or boxed in

department stores at very high prices. Production of bagged Fuji apples is

declining because of the high labor costs. Sun Fuji apples are grown without

the protective bag, similar to U.S. Fuji apples, and sell at lower prices than

bagged Fuji apples. 

With phytosanitary restrictions on most imports, Japan has high domestic

prices and relatively low per capita apple consumption. Japanese consumers

often eat apples as a dessert with one apple divided among several diners. They

do not tend to eat them as snacks as do U.S. consumers. Japanese apple

consumption has the potential to grow. 

Figure 1 shows per capita consumption for six major Northern Hemisphere

production groups and Taiwan (World Apple Review, 2004; Korea Rural

Economic Institute, 2002). The high-income North American and European

countries have a tradition of apple production and consumption. From 1991

to 2003, per capita apple consumption averaged 8.1 kilograms (kg) in the

United States and 11.8 kg in Canada. Per capita consumption in the 11

European Union countries averaged 17.9 kg, but ranged from an average of

9.3 kg in the United Kingdom to 24.0 kg in Austria.2 In China, the world’s

largest apple producer, apple consumption averaged 12.6 kg per capita.3

Northern China may have a higher consumption level than southern China,

which is more tropical. In Taiwan, a tropical and subtropical country with

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2The 11 countries are Austria,

Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,

Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,

Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

3Consumption data in figure 1 are

based on disappearance data, not

actual consumption data from consumer surveys. With disappearance

data, fresh consumption equals production plus imports minus exports

and processing. This is the maximum

possible consumption. Losses at many

levels reduce actual consumption.

Losses can occur in the field, packinghouse, retail outlets, and the kitchens

of consumers. If losses are more substantial in China, the per capita consumption numbers for that country

may be inflated.
obvious cultural similarities to southern China, per capita consumption averaged 6.2 kg. Taiwan has a small domestic apple industry and imports over 90

percent of all apples consumed (Foreign Agricultural Service, 2003). Japan

has relatively low per capita consumption, averaging 5.9 kg per

person—just 73 percent of U.S. consumption levels. In South Korea, which

also restricts imports, per capita consumption averaged 8.7 kg—slightly

above U.S. consumption levels and 47 percent more than Japanese levels.

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Figure 1

Average per capita apple consumption, 1991-20031

Kilograms

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

U.S. Canada EU-11 Japan Taiwan

South 

Korea China

8.1

11.8

17.9

5.9 6.2

8.7

12.6

1

For South Korea, average consumption for 1991-2001.

Sources: World Apple Report and Korea Rural Economic Institute.
In 2004, the United States exported apples to 85 countries. Many export

markets accept U.S. apples produced under standard industry operating

practices with the addition of a phytosanitary certificate asserting that the

packed apples have been inspected and are free of diseases or pests of

concern. Other countries require additional production or postharvest practices beyond the standard U.S. industry operating practices. Exporting to

these countries can be much more expensive. In some cases, for example, a

government may require fumigation to kill a pest. In other countries, a

government may require a systems approach to protect its domestic industry.

A systems approach uses a combination of risk-mitigating measures that

individually and cumulatively reduce the risk of the target diseases or pests

to an acceptable level. This approach is typically employed in cases where a

country or region cannot qualify as a disease-free or pest-free zone, or the

postharvest treatment damages the commodity or leaves unacceptable chemical residues. Japan’s previous protocol required a systems approach for fire

blight. In extreme cases, a country may refuse to accept U.S. apples under

any conditions.

The previous Japanese protocol for U.S. apples that was challenged by the

United States in the WTO had two main parts—preharvest activities, which

dealt with fire blight, and postharvest cold treatment and methyl bromide

fumigation, which dealt mostly with codling moth—that are not part of U.S.

standard industry operating practices. The new 2005 protocol eliminates the

fire-blight requirements, but the codling-moth requirements remain in force.

Japan also is concerned about lesser apple worm and apple maggot but we

do not address those pests here.

As part of the old Japanese fire-blight protocol, growers from Washington

and Oregon, the only growers then allowed to export to Japan, had to

register their core acreage for the program in early spring. Representatives

of USDA had to inspect each tree in the orchard three times for signs of fire

blight—at blossom time, when the fruit was 3 centimeters in size, and just

prior to harvest in the presence of a Japanese inspector. In the event of hail,

the orchard had to be re-inspected because conditions might increase the

risk of fire blight.4

Additionally, each orchard block had to have a 500-meter buffer zone on all

sides, which involved a substantial area, to ensure that no fire blight was

near the apples in the core area. Pear trees or other natural fire-blight hosts

in the buffer zone also had to be individually inspected on the same

schedule. Although not required by the Japanese protocol, Washington and

Oregon growers decided to ban pear trees in the buffer zone to minimize the

risk of fire blight. Apple orchards typically surrounded the core acreage so

the buffer zones usually required inspection. Any evidence of fire blight

found in the orchard or the buffer zone eliminated the orchard from the

export program for that year. If there was no evidence of fire blight at the

final orchard inspection before harvest, apples from the core acres were

eligible to continue in the export program. Apples from the buffer acres

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4While no other country requires

this type of orchard inspection program for fire blight, several countries,

such as Australia and South Africa,

reject U.S. apples outright because of

the presence of fire blight in the

United States. In the wake of the WTO

ruling, these restrictions may change.

Japan’s Phytosanitary Protocol for Apples
were not allowed into Japan. In 1994/95, the first season of the export

protocol, only about half of the core acres still qualified for export by

harvest time; over time, as growers became more familiar with the protocol,

this share increased (table 3).

At harvest, growers had to decide whether to proceed with the postharvest

protocol. If apples were free of fire blight but a high percent of the apples

were not consistent with Japanese consumer demands, the grower might have

decided to quit the program before incurring more costs. Japanese consumers

are used to large and very good-looking apples. Market conditions posed

another risk to producers. All the decisions regarding participation had to be

made before relative market conditions in the United States and Japan were

known. Growers could comply with every phytosanitary requirement only to

discover that market conditions precluded trade. Japan is a major apple

producer and would not necessarily be expected to import large volumes

every year if its domestic supplies were ample. At harvest time, there might

have been enough information for a grower to decide there were no Japanese

market opportunities and redirect the apples to other markets.

The new protocol eliminates orchard registration, buffer zones, and orchard

inspection. The old protocol included inspection of packed apples to ensure

that there was no evidence of fire blight and this provision remains in force.

The new protocol also requires tests for maturity on any shriveled fruit. In

addition, the new protocol allows imports of California apples (Office of the

U.S. Trade Representative, 2005).

The postharvest treatment, which remains in effect, is mostly directed at

killing codling moth and its larva. Apples are held in cold storage rooms

dedicated to the Japan export program. U.S. and Japanese inspectors check

the monitoring equipment, and then seal the apples in the storage room for

55 days of cold treatment to kill codling moth. Once apples are removed

from cold storage, they are fumigated with methyl bromide, which kills the

codling moth larva. Japan is the only country that requires methyl bromide

fumigation of U.S. apples. It also requires apples to be fumigated in field

bins instead of in packed cartons. This requirement raises costs because all

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Table 3

Washington/Oregon apple export program for Japan

Core Buffer Core acres Shipments 

Season acres acres1 qualified at harvest to Japan

- - - - - - - - - - Acres - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Metric tons

1994/95 2,386 4,843 1,212 8,872

1995/96 2,188 2,510 1,390 1,050

1996/97 739 656 739 231

1997/982 00 0 0

1998/99 0 0 0 0

1999/00 450 511 361 362

2000/01 321 408 321 505

2001/02 250 142 250 0

2002/03 0 0 0 0

2003/04 0 0 0 0

2004/05 0 0 0 0

1Acres in buffer zones in the early years of the program are estimates.

2No growers participated in the program for the 1997/98-1998/99 and 2002/03-2004/05 seasons.

Source: James Archer, Northwest Fruit Exporters.
apples from an orchard must be fumigated whether or not they meet the

quality and size standards for the Japanese market.5

Methyl bromide fumigation may damage fruit or reduce its shelf life, but the

impact is not observable immediately. Once the phytosanitary protocol activities are completed, the apples are graded and packed, and both U.S. and

Japanese inspectors sign off on the phytosanitary export permit. At this stage,

growers may still decide not to export if relative market prices are unfavorable. If fruit is exported and then methyl bromide damage is discovered after

it arrives in Japan, buyers may discount the price or reject the load.

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5Depending on the technology

used, some packers can presort apples

before they go into cold storage. Then

the grower can reduce costs by fumigating just those bins that contain fruit

most likely to meet Japanese consumer

preferences.
To determine the expected increase in Japanese imports with the new

phytosanitary protocol, we look to the past and estimate the level of trade

that would have occurred in the absence of Japan’s fire-blight requirements.

The first step in this analysis is to estimate the cost of the fire-blight

protocol in the past and use this figure to represent the decrease in the cost

of imported apples in the Japanese market with the new protocol. In the next

step, we estimate the increase in Japanese apple imports in response to the

decrease in imported apple costs.

For this analysis, we use a price wedge methodology to measure the cost of the

fire-blight protocol (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998). This method recognizes that

phytosanitary technical barriers can alter relative prices between world and

national markets, thus creating a price wedge between potential traders. A technical barrier is any import standard or regulation that reflects a country’s

concern and valuation for safety, health, food quality, and the environment.

When the price wedge is removed, market forces rather than government

regulatory policy determine trade flows. This methodology is often used in

empirical analyses of technical barriers and is most appropriate for analyzing

homogeneous products. We argue here that the average Japanese Fuji apple is

equivalent to the highest quality Washington Fuji apple. Yue, Beghin, and

Jensen (2005) develop the more general case where products are imperfect

substitutes, but they have no empirical estimate of the degree of substitutability between U.S. and Japanese apples.

Figure 2 illustrates the price wedge, or tariff equivalent, methodology. For ease

of exposition, we first assume Japan allows no imports. In this case, the

Japanese domestic price per pound of apples is PJ1. Now, consider the reverse

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Price per pound

Supply

Demand

Quantity (mt)

PJ2

PJ3

Q S Q S1 Q D1 Q D

PJ5

PJ1=PJ4

tTB

PW

k

t

tTBcm

tTBfb

Figure 2

Japanese apple market

Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.

Measuring the Cost of the Fire-Blight

Requirements
case—where Japan does not impose any import restrictions—no technical

barriers or tariffs. The law of one price would suggest that, for like products,

internal Japanese prices would equal worldwide prices adjusted for transaction

and transportation costs. Since the United States is the leading Western Hemisphere producer and an important exporter, we assume that U.S. prices can

serve as a reasonable proxy for world prices.6 Furthermore, we assume that

Washington apple prices represent world prices, as most U.S. apple exports

originate from that State. Then the world price in Japan equals:

PJ2 = PW + k,

where PJ2 is the price per pound of a Washington apple delivered to Japan. PW

is the price per pound of a Washington apple in the United States, produced

with standard industry operating practices that would allow the apple to be

exported to most countries with just a routine and relatively inexpensive

phytosanitary certificate. Let k represent transaction and transportation costs to

Japan per pound of apples. In this situation, Japan would import the difference

between consumer demand and producer supply evaluated at PJ2, or QD less

QS, the free market solution. 

Japan currently imposes an ad valorem tariff and this protection raises

Japanese prices by an additional 17 percent over the world price.7 Let:

PJ3 = PW + k + t,

where PJ3 is the cost of delivering a pound of Washington apples to Japan with

a tariff, and t is the additional per-pound cost of an apple associated with the

tariff. Japanese producers would sell their product at PJ3 and Japanese

consumers would pay this price for both domestic and imported apples.

Japanese producers would supply less to the market than under the no trade

scenario and consumers would purchase more. While it is possible that the

tariff may create a price wedge sufficient to eliminate excess demand, we have

illustrated the case where the tariff reduces but does not eliminate trade.

A phytosanitary technical barrier can also act as a barrier to trade, similar to a

tariff. It increases the price wedge between world and Japanese markets and

can be measured as a tariff equivalent of the technical barrier (tTB). This adds

to the cost of delivering a Washington apple to Japan. No U.S. grower would

participate in the export program and ship to Japan unless the price they

received for their commodity covered the additional cost of complying with the

phytosanitary protocol. Let PJ4 equal the price of a pound of Washington

apples in the Japanese market with a tariff and after compliance with the fireblight and codling-moth protocols. In figure 2, the tTB and tariff just eliminate

trade so that in this case PJ4 = PJ1:

PJ4= PJ1 = PW + k + t + tTB ➯ t

TB = PJ4 - PW - k - t. 

Figure 2 is a good representation of the current Japanese market where

phytosanitary barriers are a serious barrier to trade. Japanese apple imports

relative to the size of the domestic market have been very small in the last

several years. In the 1994/95 season, when U.S. apple exports to Japan were at

their peak, U.S. apples accounted for just 1 percent of Japanese fresh apple

consumption. The Japanese tariff and phytosanitary protocols relating to fire

blight and codling moth have made trade unprofitable. With the elimination of

the restrictive fire-blight protocol, tTB will decrease so trade may increase.8

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8It is possible that the phytosanitary

barrier would more than eliminate

trade and the price wedge would not

be distinguishable from that which

would just eliminate trade. So, the

price wedge model could just be the

observable portion of the true value of

the technical barrier. In this case it

would be possible to partially relax the

technical barrier and still have no trade.

6The United States is usually the

largest Western Hemisphere exporter

but in 2003/04, which was a low

export year for the United States,

Chilean exports led Western

Hemisphere exports.

7Since Japan has an ad valorem,

not a fixed value, tariff, t in the model

will vary depending on the price of the

apples. Japan imposes tariffs on the

cost, insurance, and freight (cif) value

of the apples.
Because the recent WTO decision only addresses the fire-blight protocol, we

estimate trade with the codling-moth protocol still in place. Now the tTB needs

to distinguish between the barriers caused by the fire-blight (tTBfb) and codlingmoth (tTBcm) protocols. Let:

t

TB = tTBfb + tTBcm.

Then let PJ5 equal the price U.S. growers must receive to cover the costs of

participating in the codling-moth protocol and exporting to Japan:

PJ5 = PW + k + t + tTBcm ➯ t

TBfb = PJ4 - PJ5.

With the removal of the fire-blight protocol, the price of exporting U.S.

apples to Japan falls by tTBfb, and the volume of trade increases to the quantity QD1 - QS1.

The most difficult challenge in estimating tTBfb is determining which apples

(and consequently which price relationships) to compare. Our objective is to

compare products that are homogeneous—same variety, grade, and size—at

the same point in the marketing chain so that price differentials will not

reflect quality differences. In this analysis, there are two groups of apples:

Fuji and “all other apples.” We have information on Fuji apples for both the

United States and Japan so we can separate out Fuji as a relatively homogeneous product. The category of “all other apples” in the United Sates and

Japan is less homogeneous. Other than Fuji, the main types of apples

produced and consumed in Japan are Tsugaro, Jonagold, and Ohrin.

To create the Fuji category, we use Tokyo wholesale market prices for

Japanese Fuji apples, PJ4. We compare Japanese wholesale market prices

with our estimate of what it would cost to deliver a Washington Fuji apple

to the Japanese wholesale market in Tokyo under the codling-moth protocol,

PJ5. However, the two countries do not share common grading or sizing

standards so we must make assumptions about what are comparable Fuji

apples. While the top quality Japanese bagged Fuji apples are extraordinarily beautiful, large, and expensive, wholesale market prices reflect the

average Fuji apple—a range of all qualities of bagged Fuji and lower cost

sun Fuji apples. A current estimate puts the sun Fuji share of total Fuji

production at 70 percent (U.S. Embassy in Japan, 2004). Also, in the mid1990s, in anticipation of apple imports, Japanese producers began to market

lower grades of apples at lower prices (Foreign Agricultural Service, 1996).

For an equivalent U.S. apple, we use very large (size 72) Washington State

Extra Fancy Fuji apples—the highest quality. We assume these apples would

compare very favorably with the average Japanese Fuji apples.9

For the category of all other apples, we use average Japanese wholesale

apple price data and average U.S. free-on-board (fob) shipping price data.

We adjust both price series to exclude the share attributable to Fuji prices

based on the shares of Fuji apples in each market, approximately 55 percent

in Japan and 10 percent in the United States.

To estimate the costs of delivering a Washington Fuji or another type of

apple to the Japanese wholesale market without the fire-blight protocol, we

start with the Washington fob apple price and add the direct cost of the

codling-moth protocol, transaction and transportation costs, and the tariff.10

Japanese prices are converted to U.S. dollars for purposes of comparison. 

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10The transaction and transportation

costs in delivering a Washington State

apple to the Japanese wholesale market, costs in both the United States and

Japan, include the following: the

postharvest costs of the codling moth

protocol (tTBcm); shipping costs from

the Washington growing area to the

port of Seattle; freight and insurance

costs to ship apples from Seattle to

Japan; the Japanese tariff (based on

the landed value including the cost of

insurance and freight (cif)); the 5 percent Japanese consumption tax; customs clearance and terminal service

charges; warehouse charges and transportation costs from the port to the

warehouse; and importer margins

(Archer, 2004; Agricultural Marketing

Service, 2004; U.S. Embassy in Japan,

2004, and Washington Growers

Clearing House Association, 2004). In

our previous analysis (Calvin and

Krissoff, 1998), information on transportation and transactions costs was

limited just to costs incurred in delivering apples to the Japanese port.

9Apples vary with respect to other

characteristics such as brix. Other

quality issues cannot be addressed in

this model since there are no comparable data on prices as a function of

other characteristics.
We calculate the price wedge for the last six U.S. apple seasons (August-July),

1998/99 to 2003/04, for Fuji and all other apples (table 4). For each season, we

first calculate the monthly price wedge and then average them to determine the

annual price wedge.11 The values of the price wedge vary substantially between

months and years and are a function of the exchange rate, market prices in the two

countries, and marketing costs; the value for Fuji apples ranges from 43 cents per

pound to 1 cent, with an average of 19 cents. The variation does not reflect

changes in phytosanitary requirements. Within a season, the price wedge usually

begins high, declines during the middle of the season, and then increases toward

the end of the season. Across years, the price wedge is large in the 1998/99,

2000/01, and, to a lesser degree, 1999/2000 seasons and small in the 2001/02-

2003/04 seasons.

The main source of variation in the price wedge between the two countries is

weather conditions, which affect both yields and prices (figure 3). For example,

the large price wedge in 1998/99 is due to high production and low prices in the

United States, and low production and high prices in Japan. In the 2000/01

season, total U.S. production was down a bit from the previous year (although

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Figure 3

U.S. and Japanese apple production 

United States-million metric tons

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0.70

0.75

0.80

0.85

0.90

0.95

Japan-million metric tons

United States

Japan

Table 4

Price wedge and tariff equivalent of the technical barrier for fire blight

Fuji apples Other apples

Price Tariff Price Tariff

Season wedge equivalent wedge equivalent

Dollars/lb. Percent Dollars/lb. Percent

1998/99 0.40 87 0.68 503

1999/00 0.22 40 0.44 236

2000/01 0.43 113 0.55 334

2001/02 0.04 9 0.11 57

2002/03 0.01 2 0.19 83

2003/04 0.06 10 0.33 119

Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.

11Since apple markets are very thin

in the summer months, we exclude

July and August from our annual price

wedge calculations. Also, in calculating the annual price wedge, we use

zeros in the months with a negative

price wedge, implying that U.S. apples

are not competitive in those months.
Washington State production was up 20 percent) but Japanese production fell,

down 14 percent from the previous year, again yielding a large price wedge. In

contrast, in the 2001/02-2003/04 seasons, Japan produced large crops, lowering

prices substantially. U.S. apple production was at very low levels in the 2001/02-

2003/04 seasons with high domestic prices, which reduced the U.S. price advantage in exporting to Japan.

Without the fire-blight protocol, Japanese imports would have been potentially

quite large in the first three of the six seasons. That does not imply, however, that

the fire-blight protocol did not have an adverse impact on U.S. growers in the

latter period. Rather, it demonstrates the importance of using several years of data

on observed prices to approximate the expected price wedge. For a fruit with

considerable year-to-year production fluctuations, relying on one year’s ex post

observed prices is not adequate to paint a complete picture of a grower’s ex ante

decision to participate, which is based on expected prices. Expected prices are a

function of experience over time.

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The second step in this analysis is to estimate the expected volume and

value of imports that will occur now that Japan’s fire-blight requirements

have been eliminated, but with the codling-moth protocol remaining in

place. To estimate trade flows, we use a spatial partial-equilibrium model of

the Japanese apple market as illustrated in figure 2 and the estimates for the

reduction in costs with the new phytosanitary protocol. We look at the trade

that would have occurred in the 1998/99-2003/04 seasons if the fire-blight

protocol had not been in place. This model estimates total Japanese imports,

not imports from any particular country. Since the WTO decision on fire

blight is with respect to the United States, we assume all gains to trade

would accrue to the United States.

To attain results, we make assumptions regarding the responsiveness of

demand and supply to changes in price, that is, how much Japanese demand

and supply would change as price falls from PJ4 to PJ5 with the removal of

the fire-blight protocol. Kajikawa (1999) estimated Japanese apple demand

elasticities for 1977-1995 and found -0.57 for all apples, -0.67 for Fuji

apples, and -0.37 for Red Delicious apples. That is, for every 1-percent

decrease in Fuji prices, consumers in Japan would respond by increasing the

quantity demanded by 0.67 percent. In our analysis we use demand elasticities of -0.67 for Fuji apples and-0.37 for all other apples. We use the lower

price elasticity of demand for all other apples to reflect the change in

Japanese demand for a price change in U.S. Red Delicious apples since this

is the most common apple produced in the United States. 

We found no empirical estimates of apple supply elasticities available for the

Japanese market. For Fuji apples, we use a longrun supply elasticity of 1; for a

1-percent decrease in Fuji apple prices, Japanese producers would respond with

a 1-percent decline in output. Previous analyses also have assumed a longrun

elasticity of 1 (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998; Yue, Beghin, and Jensen, 2005).

Now that the restrictive fire-blight protocol has been lifted, it will take some

time for growers to adjust resources in response to the new economic conditions. Japanese farmers confronted with lower prices may decide to reduce

production or at least curtail any planned increases. A supply elasticity of 1 for

Fuji apples is a reasonable estimate to reflect these longrun trends.12 For other

apples we assume a much smaller longrun supply response of 0.2. Japanese

growers of other apples (mainly Tsugaru, Jonagold, and Ohrin) are not likely to

substantially alter their production patterns in reaction to a price change of U.S.

all other apples (mainly Red and Golden Delicious).

Table 5 presents the impact of removing the tTBfb. These estimates for future

trade changes are based on simulations for average Japanese imports that

would have prevailed in the last six seasons if there had been no tTBfb. The

estimated changes in trade are substantial. Average annual Japanese apple

imports of Fuji and all other apples would have been 190,876 metric tons (the

quantity QD1 - QS1 in figure 2), with a value of $143.6 million. Actual annual

Japanese apple imports averaged only 581 metric tons for calendar years 1999-

2004 (table 1). For Fuji apples, the increase in imports would have been

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Measuring the Potential Longrun

Trade Increase

12Recently, Devadoss and Wahl

(2004) estimated an apple supply elasticity for India of 0.696. 
109,138 metric tons or $110.5 million. The overall change in apple trade

volume represents about 5 percent of average U.S. production and 21 percent

of average Japanese production (see table 6 for average U.S. and Japanese

apple and Fuji apple production levels). Comparing our findings with the top

three U.S.-apple importing countries, Mexico and Canada imported at least

100,000 metric tons of all types of apples in the 1999-2003 period but both had

less than 100,000 in 2004. Taiwan imported over 100,000 metric tons of all

types of apples from the United States in 2000, although the volume of trade

has since declined. 

With lower import prices, Japanese consumers would increase their consumption of apples by 10.8 percent, raising their per capita consumption to 6.4 kg,

still below the 2003 per capita consumption in the United States of 6.8 kg

(World Apple Review, 2004). In terms of Japanese producers, the increased

competition from the United States would suggest that there would be less

production, a decline of 10.6 percent (table 7). While this represents a substantial decrease in Japanese production, it is only slightly more than the average

year-to-year variation in production in the last six seasons (1998/99-2003/04)

which is approximately 8 percent.

There is one further point to make about U.S. bilateral trade with Japan. Our

analysis assumes that all benefits from the relaxation of the Japanese phytosanitary barrier would accrue to U.S. growers. Only the United States is involved in

the WTO case against Japan. Thus, all else being equal, only U.S. exports to

Japan would be affected by the WTO decision. Countries that currently have

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Table 5

Estimated change in Japanese apple imports with the elimination of the fire-blight protocol

Change in trade

Season Fuji All other Fuji All other Total

Million dollars Metric tons Million dollars Metric tons

1998/99 228.0 42.9 226,000 143,487 270.8 369,487

1999/00 152.1 41.1 126,286 100,943 193.2 227,229

2000/01 193.3 36.9 230,790 102,107 230.2 332,897

2001/02 35.1 14.0 31,724 31,691 49.1 63,415

2002/03 8.9 23.3 7,067 46,122 32.2 53,189

2003/04 45.6 40.4 32,958 66,077 86.0 99,036

6-year average1 110.5 33.1 109,138 81,738 143.6 190,876 1Average season is based on 1998/99-2003/04 marketing years.

Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.

Table 6

Average U.S. and Japanese apple production, 1998/99-2003/04

Country Total apple production1 Fuji production1

1,000 metric tons

United States2 4,203 388

Japan3 892 490 1Considering total production for the fresh and processed markets.

2Total production data are from the National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA and Fuji 

production data are from the U.S. Apple Association.

3Data on Japanese production are from various issues of the GAIN attache reports from the

Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA.

Sources: National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA; the U.S. Apple Association; and 

various issues of GAIN attache reports, Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA.
approved phytosanitary protocols to deal with fire blight—France and New

Zealand—would have to enter into independent negotiations with Japan

regarding changes to their phytosanitary protocols. In the mean time, there

would be no change in their competitiveness in the Japanese market. Furthermore, while France is the world’s largest apple exporter, it is unlikely to be

much of a market force in Asia. France’s share of imports for nine Asian

markets in 2003 ranged from 6 percent in Malaysia to 0 percent in Taiwan,

China, and the Philippines (table 8). U.S. shares in the same set of countries

ranged from 47 percent in Indonesia to 4 percent in the Philippines. Total

French apple exports to these countries were just 6 percent of U.S. exports.

The United States will always have an advantage over France in terms of transportation distance to Asia. New Zealand’s competitiveness would improve if

the fire-blight protocol were dropped and it might provide increased competition for U.S. growers during the summer months. In 2003, New Zealand’s

exports to the nine Asian markets were 31 percent of U.S. exports.

Other U.S. competitors are unlikely to gain. Australia does not have fire blight,

so its phytosanitary barriers to trade would not change. Similarly, South Korea,

North Korea, and Nepal, would not gain any advantage.13 In fact, South Korea,

with a protected domestic market and falling prices in Japan, would not find

the Japanese market as profitable as in past years. China is still not allowed

into the Japanese market because of various phytosanitary issues.

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Table 8

Apple imports in select Asian countries, 20031

Taiwan Indonesia Hong Kong Malaysia India Thailand Singapore China Philippines

Metric tons

Total imports 108,745 83,769 102,378 76,596 20,093 84,229 50,616 41,636 50,023

Share of imports from: Percent

United States 45 47 34 10 41 12 9 46 4

Canada 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

France 0 4 1 6 2 2 4 0 0

South Korea 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Japan 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

China 0 41 36 46 16 76 56 0 90

New Zealand 13 4 12 11 12 4 16 22 0

Australia 3 1 1 7 23 0 4 0 1

Other Southern Hemisphere

countries2 21 1 15 19 3 5 10 32 0

Others 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 5 1Statistics for Indonesia, India, and the Philippines are based on 2003 data.

2Chile, South Africa, and Argentina.

Source: World Trade Atlas.

Table 7

Estimated changes in Japanese consumption and production

Changes in market 

volume due to: Fuji Other apples Fuji Other apples Total

Metric tons Percent1 Metric tons Percent1

Gain in consumption 43,681 52,904 4.9 5.9 96,585 10.8

Loss in production 65,456 28,834 7.3 3.2 94,290 10.6

1Percent change from average total apple production (1998/99 to 2003/04).

Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.

13In the Yue, Beghin, and Jensen

analysis of the impact of removing the

fire-blight protocol, their estimate of

the total change in Japanese apple

imports equaled $202 million (higher

than our estimate of $144 million) and

they allocated $48 million as the U.S.

share. They based the U.S. share on its

24-percent share (in terms of value) of

Japanese apple imports in 2000. In

2000, only Australia, South Korea, and

the United States exported to Japan

(table 1). Since Australia and South

Korea do not have fire blight, any

change in the fire-blight protocol

would not affect them. If U.S. growers

could export to Japan without the fireblight protocol, the U.S. share should

be much higher than it was in 2000.
With Japan’s elimination of its restrictive phytosanitary protocol for fire

blight in August 2005, U.S. apple growers will see increased export opportunities. This report provides an estimate of the expected long-term trade

gains. The analysis uses a price wedge methodology that is a standard

procedure for analyzing the cost of nontariff barriers for homogeneous

goods. The results depend crucially on the assumption that average Japanese

Fuji apples and the highest quality Washington State Fuji apples are comparable in the eyes of Japanese consumers. The elimination of the restrictive

fire-blight protocol suggests that, in the long run, Japan will import an

average of 190,876 metric tons of Fuji and other apples valued at $143.6

million annually. There may be substantial variation, however, from the

average import level because of fluctuating market conditions from season

to season. This market growth will occur over a decade. The estimate

assumes a period of adjustment that will allow U.S. and Japanese growers

an opportunity to respond to new market conditions. It also will take some

time for Japanese consumers to learn more about U.S. apples and reassess

their consumption choices.

The new level of trade may have a significant impact on the U.S. apple

industry, increasing demand for apples by nearly 5 percent. By assuming a

longrun period of adjustment, the United States could respond by changing

production plans to favor Fuji apples, probably with limited longrun upward

price pressure. As for Japanese producers, the adjustment implies approximately an 11-percent decrease in production. Japanese consumers, though,

would benefit from lower prices and greater availability of the most

preferred Fuji and other apple varieties.

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Conclusions
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), U.S. Department of Agriculture.

“Ocean Rate Bulletin-Apples.” various issues. Accessed June 15, 2004:

http://www.ams.usda.gov/tmd/Ocean/index.asp. 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department of

Agriculture. “Japan Varietal Testing Case” in Technical Trade Report,

May 1999. Accessed June 10, 2004:

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/is/tst/Publications/TTreports/1999May.pdf.

Archer, James. Northwest Fruit Exporters Association, personal communication, 2004.

Calvin, Linda, and Barry Krissoff. “Technical Barriers to Trade: A Case

Study of Phytosanitary Barriers and U.S.-Japanese Apple Trade.” Journal

of Agricultural and Resource Economics 23(1998): 351-66.

Devadoss, Stephen and Thomas Wahl. “Welfare Impacts of Indian Apple

Trade Policies.” Applied Economics 36(2004): 1289-1294.

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), U.S. Department of Agriculture.

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Time to Japan.” GAIN Report #JA9077, June 24, 1999. Accessed June 2,

2004: http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/199906/25454940.pdf. 

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), U.S. Department of Agriculture.

“Japan: Fresh Deciduous Fruit-The 2004 Japanese Sweet Cherry MarketProduction and Trade.” GAIN Report #JA4065, August 24, 2004.

Accessed April 25, 2005: http://www.fas.usda.gov/gain

files/200408/146107356.pdf.

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), U.S. Department of Agriculture.

“Japan: Fresh Deciduous Fruit-Review of U.S. Apple Export Season in

Japan.” AGR Number JA6018, May 17, 1996. Accessed April 4, 2004:

http://www.fas.usda.gov/scriptsw/attacherep/display_gedes_report.asp?Re

p_ID=10009417.

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), U.S. Department of Agriculture.

“Taiwan Fresh Deciduous Fruit Annual 2003.” GAIN Report TW3032,

September 10, 2003. Accessed April 13, 2004:

http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200309/145986037.pdf.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Accessed April

13, 2004: http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/collections?version=ext&hasbulk=0&subset=agriculture. 

Kajikawa, Chikako. “Apple Economy and Quantitative Analysis.” Nourin

Toukei Kyoukai, (April) Tokyo, Japan, 1999. 

Kajikawa, Chikako. “Quality Level and Price in Japanese Apple Market.”

Agribusiness 14 (1998): 227-234. 

Korea Rural Economic Institute. Food Balance Sheet, 2001. South Korea,

December 2002.

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References
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “U.S. Wins WTO Appeal on

Japan’s Restrictions on U.S. Apples.” Press release, December 1, 2003. 

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “U.S. Dissatisfied with Japan over

Apple Dispute.” Press release, July 19, 2004. 

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “United States Succeeds in

Removing Japan’s Barriers to U.S. Apples.” Press release, August 31,

2005.

U.S. Apple Association. Production and Utilization Analysis, various issues.

U.S. Embassy in Japan, personal communication, 2004.

Washington Growers Clearing House Association. Weekly Bulletin, various

issues, 1997-2004. Accessed June 3, 2004:

http://www.waclearinghouse.org/.

World Apple Review. Belrose, Inc., Pullman WA, 2002, 2003, and 2004.

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Technical Barriers to Trade With Imperfect Substitution and Trade

Costs.” Working Paper 05-WP 383, February 2005.

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