5

MANAGING CONSTRUCTION 

IN GERMANY, 1956–1966

Between 1950 and 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany financed 

the military construction program that supported the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the expansion of U.S. 

forces in West Germany. Once the Western Powers recognized 

the Federal Republic diplomatically in May 1955, the occupation officially ended and the West German government had no further obligation to pay the costs of the U.S. troops on its soil. To manage construction in Germany, the United States created a new entity, the U.S. Army 

Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG). Operating in a new fiscal 

environment, USACAG managed the continuation of the construction 

programs begun in the early 1950s. It also oversaw the design and construction requirements necessitated by the introduction of tactical and 

strategic missiles into Europe in the late 1950s. Then, when the Soviet 

Union threatened the independence of Berlin, USACAG managed urgent 

construction to defend the city.

The German Environment

For the first time since 1945 the U.S. military had to work with a fully 

sovereign German state that insisted on controlling construction within 

its territory. Direct contracts awarded by the Army during the early 1950s 

had overtaxed the German economic and social systems, provoking the 

extremes of excessive profit and bankruptcy among local construction companies. Similar economic and social consequences had troubled the French 

construction sector during the buildup of the line of communications.1 Since 

1953—even before the formal end of the occupation of Germany—the West 

German government had insisted that its own Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung

(German Federal Construction Administration) participate in an increasing 

share of the construction financed with Deutschmarks. During 1953 about 

30 percent of the total value of United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), 

construction contracts went to the Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung, which 
122

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

then awarded the contracts to construction firms. During the 1954–1955 

program year, the amount approached 40 percent.2 Once sovereignty 

became a reality in 1955, all U.S. military construction became subject to 

German law and the Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung became the conduit for 

both design and construction work for the U.S. military. In 1956 the Federal 

Republic’s Ministry of Finance created the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe

(Technical Construction Working Group) to coordinate American and other 

allied military construction programs at the German federal, state, and 

local levels.

As USAREUR’s agent, USACAG dealt directly with the Ministry of 

Defense or the Ministry of Construction in Bonn to develop an agreement 

for each new construction program. The agreements were international 

and intergovernmental in character in that they were between agencies of 

sovereign powers; but each one was specific to a particular construction 

program, such as Nike missile installations or housing for troops or military families. The construction agreements were subordinate to broader 

diplomatic accords, such as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement or the 

Dollarbaukontrakt (Dollar Construction Contract). USACAG’s role always 

depended upon a higher authority, such as USAREUR, and at the completion of any formal discussions it submitted copies of accords for review by 

the secretary of the Army and the Department of State. The need to negotiate an implementing agreement on each new program delayed the construction; at times each installation site had to be negotiated individually. 

The negotiations were, however, an unavoidable consequence of doing 

business in a host nation. William E. Camblor, the USACAG director, 

proved particularly adept at managing these negotiations and remained 

involved in them with Germany and other NATO host countries for over 

four decades.3

Any implementing agreement between USACAG and the Federal 

Republic’s ministries of defense and construction in Bonn was only the 

beginning. Each agreement next passed through the Federal Ministry 

of Finance’s Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe, which maintained its offices in 

Frankfurt. The federal ministries then issued orders to state construction 

offices (Oberfinanzdirektionen), which in turn passed the orders for execution to a local office (called Landesbauamt, Staatsbauamt, or Finanzbauamt, 

depending on which state it was in). USACAG’s contracts for U.S. military 

construction were with West German government agencies at the federal 

level, not with the firms executing the work.4 By contrast, states and localities—rather than federal agencies—had jurisdiction over all contracts that 

engaged architect-engineer firms or builders. The entire system gained 

the label indirect contracting.

The Dollarbaukontrakt, negotiated in 1956 and modified in 1961, coupled with the Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces 

Agreement signed with West Germany in 1959, governed the indirect 

contracting system and formed the basis for all U.S. dollar–funded design 

and construction executed in the Federal Republic.5 During USACAG’s 

early years the Germans still allowed many of the dollar-funded projects 
123

Managing Construction in Germany, 1956–1966

to be contracted directly. The new West German government progressively expanded the indirect contracting system so that by the early 1960s 

indirect contracting had become the standard operating procedure for 

construction in Germany. It remained for decades the aspect of engineer 

activities in Europe least understood by the people not directly involved 

with it.6

USACAG Organization

In organizing for the transition of U.S. forces from occupying power 

to ally, the U.S. commander in chief for Europe delegated execution of 

dollar-funded construction in Germany to USAREUR’s commander in 

chief. Well before Deutschmark financing ended, planners had contemplated creating a new construction organization.7

 They were motivated by severe budgetary pressure as well as by the change in West 

Germany’s international status and responsibilities. Although its obligation to support U.S. military construction was ending, the Federal 

Republic nonetheless agreed to provide Deutschmark funding for construction obligations contracted before May 1955 so long as projects were 

completed by the end of 1957. During fiscal year 1956, despite this commitment, German support for the U.S. military dropped by nearly $500 

million. Because the bulk of these Deutschmark funds had gone into 

wages and utilities, the U.S. military had to trim staff and consolidate 

services. Lacking the funds for pay, the Army released 24,000 German 

employees in fiscal year 1956.8

To manage contract construction for the U.S. Army, on 1 July 1956, 

USAREUR activated its Construction Agency. Within a short time the 

organization, subordinate to USAREUR’s Engineer Division but with 

headquarters in Frankfurt, settled on the name U.S. Army Construction 

Agency, Germany.9 USAREUR removed responsibility for contract construction from the area and post commanders and placed it under this single agency. (See Chart 5.) Centralized administration for contract construction remained characteristic of U.S. forces in Europe from 1956 onward.

The new organization enabled USAREUR to reduce personnel. Of 

the 1,037 persons in construction employed in the area commands, by 

1 January 1957, these commands retained only 76. USACAG operated 

initially with about 210 employees, producing a net saving of more than 

750 places. USAREUR expected a central construction agency to manage 

the dollar-funded contracts more consistently than the area commands. 

Furthermore, USAREUR saw an advantage in being able to transfer many 

of the command and operating responsibilities of its Engineer Division to 

USACAG, thereby allowing the USAREUR engineer to concentrate on his 

staff responsibilities as adviser to the commander in chief.10

USAREUR appointed an American civilian, Camblor, to direct 

USACAG. Before World War II, Camblor had worked in the New York 

District of the Corps of Engineers. Mobilized as a reserve officer early 

in the war, he had landed at Normandy shortly after D-Day and moved 
124

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

through France and Belgium 

with the Communication Zone’s 

Advance Section engineers. 

In 1947 Camblor resigned his 

commission and took a position in the Office of the Theater 

Chief Engineer. By 1950 he had 

become deputy chief of the 

Construction Branch. He served 

under two European Command 

engineers, Brig. Gen. David H. 

Tulley and Brig. Gen. Frank M. 

Albrecht, during the years that 

U.S. forces expanded rapidly. As 

West Germany approached full 

sovereignty, Camblor’s proficiency in German, knowledge of 

Army engineer operations, and 

ability as a negotiator gave him 

a significant supporting role in 

the talks between the United 

States and the Federal Republic. 

He served as a resource person 

on engineering issues in discussions leading to the agreements governing U.S. military construction in 

Germany—the Auftragsbauten Grundsätze 1955 and the Dollarbaukontrakt

in 1956.11

Although barely forty years old in 1956, Camblor had served as the 

highest ranking civilian in the USAREUR Engineer’s Office for several 

years. Tulley, who esteemed Camblor’s talent and service, had moved 

to the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington; but he remained 

in close contact with affairs in Europe. Tulley and his successor as 

USAREUR engineer, Albrecht, gave Camblor strong support for the position of director of USACAG, as did Camblor’s immediate military superior 

in Heidelberg, Brig. Gen. Charles McNutt.12

Camblor’s appointment as director of USACAG made the organization noteworthy in four ways. First, he was the only civilian ever to command an Army engineer agency of such scope. Second, because he was 

not subject to the military cycle of rotating assignments, Camblor brought 

continuity during his seven-year service that gave him increased influence 

in dealing with his counterparts in the local German agencies responsible 

for supporting U.S. military construction. Third, Camblor had an aptitude 

for European languages. He conducted formal negotiations in English 

aided by an interpreter and a legal adviser, but he established rapport with 

officials in Europe by conversing freely with them in either German or 

French. Fourth, as a Cuban-American, Camblor commanded USACAG at 

a time when it was unusual for persons from ethnic or racial minorities to 

William Camblor, shown here in the 1970s, 

was the first director of USACAG.
Chief of Staff

Commander in Chief

Office of the

Comptroller

Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–3 Operations

Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–4 Logistics

Secretary of the

General Staff

Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–2 Intelligence

Adjutant

General

Division

Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–1 Personnel

Provost

Marshal

Division

Chemical

Division

Ordnance

Division

Chaplain

Division

Engineer

Division

U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG)

Medical

Division

Armed Forces

Information and

Education Division

Finance and

Accounting

Division

Civil

Affairs

Division

Signal

Division

Quartermaster

Division

Transportation

Division

Headquarters

Commandant

Historical

Division

Special

Activities

Division

Public

Information

Division

Inspector

General

Division

Labor

Services

Division

Judge

Advocate

Division

Special Staff

Administrative Staffs

and Services Technical Staffs and Services

General Staff

Political Adviser

Chart 5: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 30 June 1956
126

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

hold executive positions in American institutions. It had been less than a 

decade since President Truman ordered the military to integrate. Although 

the military responded with greater speed than many other segments of 

American society, it would still be many years before another member of a 

minority group achieved a comparable position of leadership in the Corps 

of Engineers.

Camblor set up headquarters for USACAG in Frankfurt in the summer of 1956. He quickly selected fourteen people and took them to Paris 

to the headquarters of the Joint Construction Agency, where they spent a 

week learning the regulations, rules, and procedures. He then returned to 

Frankfurt and began recruiting personnel, drawing particularly on those 

who had served in the USAREUR engineer’s office in Heidelberg or with 

engineer offices in the area commands. USACAG’s staffing level fluctuated between 210 and 250, including both the Central Office staff and the 

staffs of district offices.13

Camblor brought John Tambornino from Heidelberg to USACAG as 

chief of engineering. Tambornino already had over twenty years in government engineer positions, beginning in 1934 when he joined the Corps 

of Engineers in the United States. From 1940 to 1942 he had worked in 

Panama on the design of the third set of locks for the canal. He had come 

to Germany in 1951 to serve in the post engineer’s office in Heidelberg 

and then in the USAREUR engineer’s office. Tambornino served as chief 

of engineering in USACAG and successor commands until he retired in 

late 1974.14

Camblor recruited H. Jace Greene from the Southern Area Command 

in Stuttgart.15 Active as an engineer in military communities in Germany 

since 1946, Greene had turned Bundesbahn locomotives into a temporary heating plant for military family housing in Kornwestheim. Greene 

moved from chief of construction for Southern Area Command to chief of 

construction for USACAG.

Transfers came from other Army engineer offices throughout Europe. 

In 1957 Saul Fraint, who had worked in Austria, Italy, and France, left the 

Joint Construction Agency and joined USACAG as Greene’s deputy in the 

Construction Division. Fraint became head of the Technical Engineering 

Branch in 1958 and served in varying capacities before his retirement in 

1974.16

Camblor also recruited engineers just arriving in Europe. Paul Friesch, 

for instance, had seen Germany at the end of World War II but harbored 

a desire to see it again in better times. After completing his professional 

education in the United States, he worked in the Detroit District of the 

Corps of Engineers, spending a good deal of time on designs of facilities 

in support of new missile systems. He applied for a position in Germany 

and was accepted; but when he arrived in September 1956, the job had 

been eliminated. He followed a suggestion and called Camblor, who 

immediately offered him a position with USACAG. Friesch spent most of 

the rest of his career in Europe, working with USACAG and its successor 

and then with NATO in Brussels, from which he retired in 1990.17
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Managing Construction in Germany, 1956–1966

Like Friesch, Louis Brettschneider had been looking for a way to 

work in Europe. After graduating from college in 1944, Brettschneider 

had joined the U.S. Merchant Marines. A job with the Joint Construction 

Agency in Paris disappeared, but he too found his way to Frankfurt; he 

joined USACAG in December 1956. A technical engineer of considerable 

ability, Brettschneider continued with USACAG’s successor organizations 

into the 1990s.18

For every Department of the Army civilian (DAC), USACAG’s staff 

included two Germans (local nationals) in professional and clerical support capacities. The Germans’ reasons for seeking jobs with the U.S. 

military varied. Some, like Hasso Damm, developed a sense of loyalty 

and a strong commitment to the organization. A young student already 

trained in classical Greek and Latin, Damm hoped to earn money to 

continue his studies in law when he took a job as an estimator with 

USACAG in mid-September 1956. In addition to his academic interests, 

Damm was also a qualified stonemason, which gave him a range of 

practical experience that served him well as USACAG’s first estimator.19 Because USACAG had no legal branch, Camblor asked Damm to 

research legal issues associated with applying the Dollarbaukontrakt

under which U.S. military construction operated. In addition to his estimating work, Damm conducted the legal research, although he never 

returned to his formal studies. He stayed with USACAG and came to 

head the Estimating Section that developed.20

Another young German who obtained employment with USACAG followed a different path. Georgi Reitzel received an engineering degree in 

1949. Because of the limited opportunities for professional employment in 

Germany, he spent several months working as a construction laborer and 

carpenter. Hired as a draftsman for the Army at Tompkins Barracks in 

Schwetzingen, Reitzel made a deal to teach one of his superiors German 

in exchange for English lessons. In 1956 he was working at Headquarters 

Area Command in Heidelberg, and he became one of the first appointees 

to USACAG’s Engineering Division. In March 1962 Reitzel left USACAG 

to form his own contracting firm. Over the next thirty-five years he won 

a variety of contracts from USACAG and its successors, from NATO, and 

from West German government construction agencies. Reitzel considered 

his experience at USACAG fundamental to his later success in business.21

Germans employed by the U.S. military came under different work 

rules than those applied to DACs. These work rules changed as West 

Germany emerged from the occupation. Between 1948 and 1952 post commanders were responsible for the salaries and social insurance surcharge 

for all personnel paid in Deutschmarks. Beginning on 1 July 1952, the 

United States paid each employee’s wages to the German Länder (states). 

The Länder then disbursed the funds.22 In 1954 the United States accepted 

an agreement that affirmed the right of German workers to belong to 

unions. The agreement exempted U.S. forces from German civil laws that 

mandated “works councils” in industry. USAREUR, however, authorized 

works councils for its organizations employing Germans, limiting their 
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

scope to the consultative role of making suggestions and presenting grievances and complaints on working conditions.23

USAREUR negotiated the terms of the local nationals’ employment 

with the Federal Republic for all its subordinate organizations, including 

USACAG. In 1955 allied forces in Germany agreed to establish uniform 

pay schedules and policies and a 48-hour, six-day workweek as standard 

for all German employees. In August 1957 USAREUR introduced a 45-

hour, five-day workweek.24

Because so many German nationals joined USACAG at the start, their 

influence in the small organization was significant. Many stayed with the 

Army engineers for their entire careers, despite improved employment 

opportunities in Germany. The German employees felt they were valued 

as an integral part of the organization. Many American professionals 

viewed their German coworkers as the key to continuity in the organization and as a vital element in USACAG’s operation.

USACAG had offices in an old, two-story, wooden, prefabricated 

building behind the officers’ club at the rear of the I. G. Farben building 

in Frankfurt.25 Camblor set up the organization on the model of a stateside 

Corps of Engineers district, where the office of director was comparable to 

that of a district engineer. Camblor and his deputy, at the outset a lieutenant colonel and later a full colonel, were the only authorized contracting 

officers. Camblor operated with a small special staff, an advisory and 

administrative staff to support the organization as a whole, and a technical staff to supervise design and construction.26 (Chart 6)

USACAG’s assigned task was to execute the Army’s (and later the 

Air Force’s) construction programs within the entire Federal Republic of 

Germany. This marked a contrast with the area commands, which had 

handled Deutschmark construction on a regional basis. For fiscal year 

1957 USACAG executed 35 percent of the construction projects budgeted 

by USAREUR. Repair and utilities agencies handled 60 percent of the 

projects, and troops and combat engineer units handled the remaining 5 

percent. By 1960 USACAG, at the direction of the commander in chief of 

USAREUR, had taken on responsibility for construction in other areas of 

Europe beyond Germany.27

USACAG Projects

The projects under Deutschmark funding included community support facilities and family housing.28 In fiscal year 1957, USACAG’s first 

year of operation, Congress cut the appropriated funds for Military 

Construction, Army, from a projected total of $11.5 million to around $2.2 

million and reduced the number of projects from twenty-eight to nine. 

Total construction placement, including projects using Deutschmark 

funds, amounted to around $5 million for the year.29

In December 1957, reacting to the military implications of the Soviet 

launch of Sputnik, the NATO Council decided that “stocks of nuclear warheads would be established in Europe and ... nuclear delivery weapons, 
Legal Branch

Office of the Director

Budget Branch

Property and

Supply Branch

Reports and Analysis Branch

Comptroller Division

Management

Services Branch

Engineering Division

Fiscal

Accounting

Branch

Construction Division

Planning and

Estimating Branch

Mechanical

Section

Technical

Engineering Branch

Civil

Section

Electrical

Section

Technical

Branch

Army and

Air Force

Section

Operations

Branch

Modifications

and Additions

Branch

Structural

Section

Advisory

Weapons

Section

Contract

Administration

Branch

Purchasing and

Contractng

Branch

Hahn

Kaiserslautern

Bitburg

Pirmasens

Frankfurt

Katterbach

Heidelberg

Nuremberg

Munich

Würzburg

Bad Kreuznach

Western

Projects

Section

Change Orders

and

Termination Section

Eastern

Projects

Section

Special Staff

Advisory and Administrative Staff

Resident OFFICES

Technical Staff

Office Services Branch

Estimating

Section

Legal Branch created in 1960. Command Technical Supervision

Chart 6: Organization of U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG), ca. 1961, Depicting the New Legal Branch

 and Eleven Resident Offices
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

including intermediate-range ballistic missiles, would be placed at the 

disposal of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe].”30 To implement this decision, the United States increased its defense spending. Work 

on missile sites and installations became a main part of USACAG’s construction program. Construction placement more than doubled for fiscal 

year 1958, to $11.6 million, as the organization assumed responsibility for 

construction to support the new weaponry. In fiscal year 1959, the first 

year of the Nike air defense missile program, construction placement rose 

to $13.6 million. By fiscal year 1961 it had reached about $19 million as the 

Hawk and the Mace missiles were also introduced into Europe.31

By September 1961 USACAG’s backlog of authorized but unbuilt construction totaled $95 million, of which only $16 million was supported 

with appropriated dollars. The balance ($79 million) was funded by the 

Germans, principally under the Alternate Construction Program, or by 

NATO. The U.S. military budget initially funded construction for the 

Nike, Hawk, and Mace missiles. Subsequently, a substantial portion of the 

construction for the missile programs qualified for financing under the 

NATO Common Infrastructure Program and funding for the Nike installations shifted to the NATO budgets.32

NATO’s Common Infrastructure Program paid for construction of 

fixed structures and elements of any military installation necessary 

to support forces committed for the common defense of Europe. The 

expense was justified as a collective investment for all the nations of the 

alliance. USACAG worked through the Common Infrastructure Program 

on projects where U.S. forces would use the facilities.33 The infrastructure 

program paid for design and construction; the host nation (on whose territory the installation would be located) acquired the land and provided 

local utilities. The United States, whose forces assigned to NATO would 

occupy the facilities, took responsibility for maintenance and for financing any construction features that exceeded NATO criteria.34

The construction program for the Nike missiles was the first large 

NATO program in Europe. The Nike missile, about a foot in diameter and twenty feet long and armed with an explosive warhead, was 

designed as an all-weather antiaircraft ground-to-air missile with a 

range of about twenty-five miles. The Nike installation site had four 

components: the launching area, an electronic command and control 

center, a radar installation for tracking incoming aircraft, and housing 

for the troops manning the facility. These components were located 

within a total area of about thirty acres, but the control area could be as 

far as five miles away from the launching area. One of USACAG’s critical responsibilities was site selection, because the control and launching 

areas required unobstructed line of sight between them.35 By the end of 

the Nike program, USACAG had built some two dozen sites using definitive drawings developed by the Advanced Weapons Section headed by 

Paul Friesch. These drawings provided the basis for all of the Nike sites 

eventually built by NATO in Norway, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Greece, 

and Turkey.36
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Managing Construction in Germany, 1956–1966

While construction of the Nike installations was still in progress, 

the United States began the Hawk missile program—also for NATO—

and USACAG had construction responsibility in Germany. The Hawks 

were ground-to-air missiles designed to bring down low-flying aircraft. 

Eventually about 100 installations were built.37 Hawk facilities required 

only about half the space of Nike sites because the structures were concentrated in one location. USACAG also supervised contracts with architect-engineer firms designing Mace missile sites for the Air Force. Airbreathing subsonic Mace missiles were designed for underground shelters 

capable of surviving an atomic attack and thus allowing a retaliatory 

strike. Despite the design, the first sites built in Germany were at ground 

level. Construction for all these weapons systems required attention to the 

special requirements of sensitive electronic equipment.38

In 1958 USACAG also began work on storage sites for atomic and 

chemical weapons. Other storage sites, built with a humidity control system, warehoused equipment pre-positioned for use by troops who would 

be flown from the United States to Europe in case of emergency.39 These 

new storage sites addressed a major tactical-logistical concern by providing dispersed depot facilities to replace storage heretofore concentrated 

west of the Rhine during the buildup immediately after the Korean War. 

The new depot complexes consisted of two major components: a large 

earth-covered warehouse with a storage area of about 20,000 square feet 

and a series of about fifteen 2,000-square-foot storage igloos that were 

highly blast-resistant and distributed over protective terrain. The original 

construction plan called for nine such depots.40

The warehouses created particular problems in community relations. 

To keep the potentially hazardous materials away from population centers, the warehouses were located in what amounted to public parks—

forest areas that Germans valued greatly. Of twenty-one sites considered 

for the warehouse facilities, eight were finally selected as appropriate. 

Selection did not mean final acquisition, however. The German state governments owned all the sites in question; they showed great reluctance to 

turn them over to the U.S. military because it meant a diminution of their 

forest areas. By October 1961 only two warehouses had been completed, a 

third was close to completion, and three additional facilities were scheduled for completion by March 1962. Two of the sites still had not been 

acquired because the community opposed the installations. The Army 

finally sought expropriation of the land in question, and the governments 

eventually acquiesced. Once a site became available, USACAG needed 

eight months to complete the construction.

In November 1960 the German government granted USACAG permission to survey sites for six groups of storage igloos. By grouping 

up to fifteen igloos in each site, USACAG achieved its goal of locating 

seventy-four igloos on only five sites. In June 1961 the German government gave permission to proceed with construction at the five sites with 

the condition that each site be secure from accident or intrusion. The Army 

agreed, and USACAG designed fencing and fire protection for each area. 
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

The security features added about $27,000 to the cost of each site. Costs 

averaged another $350,000 each for the warehouses and about $870,000 for 

each igloo area.41

While USACAG supervised this work in Germany, the United States 

Construction Agency, France (USACAF), managed construction of similar 

storage facilities near Metz, France. An engineer captain, James C. Donovan, 

aided by a team of French and American technical specialists, supervised 

construction.42 At each site, the French contractor excavated into the side 

of a hill, set out forms, and poured concrete over reinforcing steel rods. As 

a young engineer, Donovan was impressed by the quantity of reinforcing 

rod that went into the structure. “That re-bar was so close and there was so 

much steel in those walls and in that roof” that it could withstand a significant blast. In addition, the doors had a sensing device that would feel the 

shockwave of a nearby explosion; trigger a release mechanism; and automatically close the mammoth steel doors, which were “12 or 16 inches deep 

and extending clear across the entire opening.”43

USACAG received orders to include these sensitive storage sites in a 

major electronic radio network called troposcatter, a vast communications 

system that ran 8,300 miles from northern Norway to eastern Turkey. Its 

eighty-two sites were completed by 1963.44

A substantial share of USACAG’s work came from the Alternate 

Construction Program, sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany. 

In 1949 local communities had offered to construct alternate facilities 

for U.S. troops in exchange for the return to its German owners of property previously requisitioned.45 During the final years of the Deutschmark 

construction, the Alternate Housing Program provided 3,228 units of 

family housing for U.S. military personnel. Once the occupation ended 

in May 1955, continued American use of requisitioned property became 

even more irritating to the Germans. The two countries resolved the issue 

with an accord negotiated in 1957 and 1958, whereby the Federal Republic 

agreed either to buy a requisitioned facility and make it available for use 

by the U.S. forces or to construct an alternate facility.46 In August 1960 

USAREUR’s commander in chief, General Clyde D. Eddleman, and West 

Germany’s defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, signed an agreement that 

extended the Alternate Construction Program to facilities not acquired by 

requisition but wanted by the Federal Republic. German government 

agencies and contractors accomplished all work under the Alternate 

Construction Program, with the U.S. military user setting specifications 

for the new facilities.47

The 1960 agreements covered five projects. The Germans constructed 

about 1,000 family housing units at various locations in West Germany 

in exchange for the release of about the same number of units. They 

also rehabilitated and built new facilities at the Illesheim Caserne (completed in 1969) and rehabilitated the former quartermaster installation in 

Giessen for use by the European Exchange Service (later Army and Air 

Force Exchange Service). The 4th Armored Division vacated facilities in 

Ulm for the Germans and received renovated facilities formerly used by 
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Managing Construction in Germany, 1956–1966

the European Exchange Service in Katterbach. The Germans provided 

alternate facilities in the Nuremberg–Munich area for administrative and 

support units in return for American release of the Palace of Justice in 

Nuremberg and the main customs office and other facilities in Munich.48

The Berlin Crisis of 1961

USACAG, like other American military organizations in Europe, owed 

its very existence to the Cold War. This rationale was never more dramatically evident than in the intensity of USACAG’s involvement in Operation 

Bamboo Tree in Berlin, a program designed to prepare West Berlin for an 

airlift if the Soviet Union imposed a second blockade.49

West Germany’s growing participation in NATO made the leaders of the 

Soviet Union exceedingly uneasy. Their unease only intensified when, after 

the Soviets launched Sputnik, West Germany agreed to station tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. Each time Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 

provoked a crisis over Berlin, he warned West European nations that they 

were risking nuclear annihilation in the event of a war between the United 

States and the Soviet Union. Far from disrupting NATO, as Khrushchev had 

hoped, the series of threats to Berlin prompted Britain, Italy, and Greece to 

authorize the installation of American medium-range missiles in their 

countries in the summer of 1959.

Two years later, in June 1961, Khrushchev met in Vienna with the 

new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy. At that meeting and in subsequent 

exchanges, Khrushchev demanded a German peace treaty, the end of 

allied occupation of Germany, recognition of East Germany as a state, 

and establishment of West Berlin as a “Free City,” undefended by Western 

military units. In the absence of a satisfactory settlement, Khrushchev 

threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic 

Republic on 1 January 1962 and turn over full control of Berlin to the East 

Germans. Kennedy responded by requesting that Congress appropriate 

an additional $3 billion for defense spending and by doubling draft quotas to increase the size of the Army.

As tension over Berlin mounted during the summer of 1961, thousands of East Germans fled from Communist rule simply by passing into 

the western sector of the city and asking for assistance to fly from there to 

the West. A total of 22,000 refugees fled in the first twelve days of August 

1961.

At 2:00 a.m. on 13 August 1961, under cover of darkness, the East 

German regime imposed its solution to this drain. Soldiers strung barbed 

wire barriers along the entire line separating the western sectors from 

East Berlin. Over the next several days, troops erected a formidable wall 

of concrete and barbed wire guarded by watchtowers, dogs, and soldiers 

who had orders to shoot anyone trying to escape. With all eyes on the 

Berlin Wall, the West and the East seemed poised on the brink of war.

President Kennedy’s overt reaction was limited to rhetoric and military mobilization, and he took no steps to remove the wall. Secretly, 
134

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

however, he ordered Operation Bamboo Tree. In September 1961, as part 

of this covert operation, the Air Force instructed USACAG to improve the 

landing and navigational facilities available at West Berlin’s three zonal 

airports—Tegel, Gatow, and Tempelhof—and at several specific airfields 

in West Germany. The orders, attributed to Secretary of Defense Robert 

McNamara, stated that nothing was to stand in the way of the “timely 

completion” of this mission. USACAG’s staff interpreted the charge quite 

broadly.

Camblor immediately set up an office in West Berlin and surveyed the 

needs of the airports. USACAG’s Engineering Division became the coordinating point for Operation Bamboo Tree. Ignoring the normal process of 

paperwork and requisition, USACAG engaged architect-engineer firms in 

West Germany and construction firms in West Berlin. Design engineers 

in Frankfurt worked through many nights that autumn preparing drawings and specifications. USACAG engineers literally pulled the designs 

off the designers’ drawing boards, flew to West Berlin, and handed the 

project specifications to the construction companies mobilized for the job. 

Bidding was done on the spot. For the most important building, the base 

for a tower that would house two large generators, Saul Fraint traveled to 

Berlin with the design drawings. “I gave them these three sheets—that’s 

all there were—and said, ‘We need bids on this building. It’s for a very 

important project’—and they knew what it was for—‘day after tomorrow.’” He remained in Berlin to receive the bids, compared them, and 

awarded the contract to Philipp Holzmann, A.G., to start work the next 

day.50

USACAG managed construction at all three allied airfields with 

good cooperation but little material help from the French and the British. 

Air Force construction troops and American firms were also involved. 

Contractors worked around the clock. Support from the West Berliners—

who had a clear appreciation of what was at stake—was outstanding. 

As Khrushchev’s 31 December deadline approached, Fraint and Louis 

Brettschneider sought a meeting with the director of Siemens and his 

managers to appeal for their support and supervision of a very delicate 

installation of electrical cable. Fraint and Brettschneider explained that 

completing the job on time would demand work straight through the 

Christmas holiday. After listening to their appeal, the director of Siemens 

replied, “I understand the need, and I will be there on Christmas Day.” 

He then turned to his managers and asked, “Who will join me?”51

The same spirit of cooperation that prevailed in the Siemens’ boardroom extended to the construction site. About two weeks after construction began on the building to house the generators, Fraint learned that 

the equipment ordered by the Air Force would not be available on schedule because of a labor dispute in the United States. The Air Force located 

substitute generators, but they were too long to fit into the building as 

designed. Rather than take time to redesign, Fraint and Brettschneider 

flew to Berlin and went to the construction site, where the contractor 

was about to lay the foundation for the back wall of the building. They 
135

Managing Construction in Germany, 1956–1966

paced off an additional five meters and asked the construction crew to 

change the specifications on the spot. According to Fraint, the foreman 

said, “Yes, Sir!” To everyone’s relief, when the generators arrived they fit 

into the redesigned building. By 1 January 1962, the essential work was 

done. The crisis had also eased. Operation Bamboo Tree remained in the 

memory of those involved as a period of intense activity and a source of 

great satisfaction.52

From USACAG to Engineer Element

In August 1962, after a record year in construction placement, William 

Camblor took a year’s leave to study at the Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. One of five civilian 

employees of the Department of the Army admitted into the program, he 

felt it would enhance his credentials. Already a GS–15, he had been recommended for promotion in 1959 but had not received the higher grade. 

The year at the Industrial College seemed to be an opportunity to advance 

his career.

About the time Camblor left for Washington, USAREUR reexamined 

its organization of engineer resources. (See Chart 7.) With work declining 

in France, the maintenance of separate construction organizations for 

France and Germany seemed a costly duplication. At the same time, some 

of the colonels who served under Camblor in USACAG bridled at being 

subordinate to a civilian. They made their feelings clear to the USAREUR 

engineer in Heidelberg and found a sympathetic ear when Brig. Gen. 

Howard A. Morris took over that office in January 1963. Morris, who had 

served as post engineer in Frankfurt in 1946–1947, felt strongly that an 

engineer officer should direct military construction.53

USACAG had been one of several distinctive agencies the Department 

of Defense organized in the 1950s to manage military construction. In 

addition to the Joint Construction Agency and its successor, the United 

States Army Construction Agency, France, the Army activated in 1956 

the United States Army Construction Agency, Korea (USACAK), and the 

United States Army Construction Agency, Japan (USACAJ). In the Pacific 

the experiment had been short-lived. In a scant year, control of the contract construction resources for the military passed from theater commanders to the chief of engineers in Washington. USACAK and USACAJ 

were inactivated in June 1957 and their functions taken over by the newly 

formed Pacific Ocean Division of the Corps of Engineers.54

The construction agency in France also disappeared. In October 1961, 

with the volume of construction declining, a smaller entity, the United 

States Army Field Engineer Office, France, replaced USACAF. Of the special organizations created in the 1950s to manage U.S. military construction, only USACAG in Frankfurt survived. As the workload in France 

declined, USACAG’s workload increased through the late 1950s, reaching 

its peak in 1962 at $40 million, more than five times its dollar volume in 

1957.55
Communications

Zone

Headquarters

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR)

U.S. Army Signal

Brigade Europe

513th Intelligence

Corps Group

Special Troops

USAREUR

U.S. Army

School Europe

Southern European

Task Force

9th Hospital

Center

U.S. Army

Berlin

7th Engineer

Brigade

Northern Area

Command

U.S. Army Military

District, Europe

10th Special Forces

Group (Airborne)

1st Special Forces

Southern Area

Command

American Forces

Network, Europe

U.S. Military Liaison

Mission to CINC, Group of

Soviet Forces, Germany

U.S. Armed Forces

Institution, Europe

U.S. Army Construction

Agency, Germany

Stars and Stripes

Darmstadt

U.S. Army Dependents

Education Group

Karlsruhe

U.S. Army European

Exchange System

Nuremberg

U.S. Army Special

Services Depot

Aschaffenburg

Special Ammunition Support

Command, Europe

Units

Major Commands

Subordinate Commands

Seventh Army

Chart 7: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1963, Just before the Dissolution of USACAG
137

Managing Construction in Germany, 1956–1966

USACAG outlasted the other construction agencies, but as an organizational anomaly. It had always been unusual because a civilian served 

as director. Several factors conjoined to bring on its demise: Camblor’s 

leave of absence during most of 1962 and 1963, USAREUR’s study of engineer resources, a Department of Defense study urging consolidation of 

construction activities, the declining volume of work in France, and the 

elimination of all other construction agencies. Camblor’s deputy, Col. 

Paavo Carlson, became acting director of USACAG; by June 1963 Carlson 

was signing documents as director.56 USAREUR appointed another military officer, Col. Ed Streck, to succeed Carlson. Camblor completed the 

program at the Industrial College and continued his studies for several 

months in Washington, earning a master’s degree in business administration. By the time he was ready to return to Germany, USAREUR had 

decided to reorganize its engineer activities.57

Camblor returned to Europe in September 1963 to serve in the 

USAREUR engineer’s office in Heidelberg, not to his former position in 

Frankfurt. Camblor accepted a new position as Morris’ special assistant 

because he judged that serving at a higher headquarters might enhance 

Infrastructure Alternate

Construction

Military

Construction,

Army

Military

Construction,

Air Force

Nonappropriated 

Funds

Operations &

Maintenance, Army

PEMA

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Calendar Year

0

10

20

30

40

Figure 2: Annual Construction Placement of the U.S. Army Construction 

Agency, Germany, and the Engineer Element, 1957–1966
138

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

his opportunity for promotion; but many of his civilian colleagues 

viewed Morris’ offer as a device to remove him to install a military officer as USACAG commander.58 In February 1964 USAREUR consolidated 

USACAG with the U.S. Army Field Engineer Office, France, to form a new 

entity, the Engineer Element.59 (Figure 2)

The Engineer Element inherited USACAG’s offices in Frankfurt and its 

staff. A subordinate command of the USAREUR engineer, it supervised 

dollar-funded military construction in Germany, France, and the Benelux 

countries; monitored NATO construction and construction programs 

financed from other sources; and provided professional and technical 

engineering services to other USAREUR elements. For USAREUR, the 

Engineer Element managed Operations and Maintenance, Army, designengineering projects costing between $25,000 and $200,000. USAREUR 

assigned projects costing under $25,000 or involving no design to its 

post engineers. In October 1965 USAREUR transferred management of 

real estate to the Engineer Element. Since the end of World War II, major 

subordinate commanders at the area level had handled real estate operations. Late in 1964 USAREUR had centralized these responsibilities under 

the Army Area Command, with headquarters in Munich; a year later 

the function and a staff of about eighty people passed to the Engineer 

Element.60

The change from a civilian director of USACAG to an Army colonel 

commanding the Engineer Element made little difference in the dayto-day work on such activities as Nike and Mace missile installations, 

troposcatter, NATO infrastructure, Alternate Construction, and other programs and projects. Many long-term employees hardly remembered the 

Engineer Element as a distinct organization. When interviewed twentyfive years later, only one person other than Camblor could recall by name 

the colonels who commanded it from 1964 to 1966.

During an eight-year existence, USACAG achieved a distinguished 

history. It had overseen the installation of missile sites and construction 

of storage facilities to support atomic weaponry as NATO expanded its 

military capabilities in the 1950s. It had responded to the challenge of 

the Berlin Wall by preparing Berlin to receive supplies by air if the Soviet 

Union tried to impose a second blockade. It had the unique distinction 

among military construction agencies of being commanded by a civilian. 

USACAG ceded place in 1964, but its successor, the Engineer Element, 

gave way in 1966 to the Engineer Command, a unique organization that 

brought together all engineer resources in the European Theater for the 

first time.