SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4625-19

ANGELINA GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EASTERN INTERNATIONAL

COLLEGE, BASHIR MOHSEN,

and DR. MUSTAFA MUSTAFA,

Defendants-Respondents,

and 

ANDREW SCOTT ZINER,

Defendant.

___________________________

Argued May 2, 2022 – Decided August 12, 2022

Before Judges Messano, Enright and Marczyk.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-2287-18.

S. Yelena Perchuk argued the cause for appellant.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Peter W. Homer (Homer Bonner Jacobs, PA) of the 

Florida bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for 

respondents (McCarter & English, LLP and Peter W. 

Homer, attorneys; Daniel P. D'Alessandro and Peter W. 

Homer, of counsel and on the brief; Rayda Aleman 

(Homer Bonner Jacobs, PA) of the Florida bar, 

admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In 2007, plaintiff Angelina Gonzalez enrolled in Eastern International 

College (EIC), a for-profit technical school formerly known as Micro Tech 

Training Center, and in 2011, she successfully completed EIC's Diagnostic 

Medical Ultrasound Technology (DMUT) program and received her diploma. 

At all relevant times, defendant Dr. Bashir Mohsen was the CEO of EIC, and 

defendant Dr. Mustafa Mustafa was the school's Vice President for Academic 

Affairs.

The DMUT program was designed to prepare students for entry-level 

positions as sonographers in healthcare offices, clinics, and facilities. Upon 

successful completion of the didactic portion (classroom instruction) of the 

program, students participated in an externship. Plaintiff participated and 

completed the externship portion of the course between February and May 2011.

In New Jersey, there is no licensure requirement for sonographers. 

Instead, the American Registry of Diagnostic Medical Sonographers (ARDMS) 
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offers a voluntary credential to sonographers who meet certain criteria. ARDMS 

certification requires applicants to pass two separate exams: 1) the Sonography 

Principles and Instrumentation (SPI) exam; and 2) a Specialty exam, which 

focuses on particular areas of sonography, e.g., abdominal, vascular, or

OB/GYN. EIC students were eligible to sit for the SPI portion of the ARDMS 

as soon as they successfully completed Physics I and Physics II at the school, 

i.e., before doing their externship and receiving their diplomas.

Only after graduating from EIC's DMUT program and obtaining one year 

of work experience in sonography would students be eligible to take the 

Specialty portion of the ARDMS exam. However, like all but four other states, 

New Jersey does not require ARDMS certification to practice as a sonographer. 

Nonetheless, while the ARDMS certification demonstrates competence in

sonography and may be used to enhance marketability of its recipients, 

plaintiff's contention was that employment in New Jersey without the 

certification was essentially impossible, and EIC was not sufficiently accredited 

to allow her to receive the certification without one year of practical 

employment experience. See Suarez v. E. Int'l Coll., 428 N.J. Super. 10, 18, 

36–37 (App. Div. 2012) (reversing the grant of summary judgment on a claim 
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brought under the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -224, based 

on similar assertions made by the plaintiff in that case).1

Despite her continued contact with EIC's placement advisor after 

graduation, plaintiff's initial attempts to secure interviews for an entry level 

position in sonography were fruitless until May 2013. With the help of her 

cousin, Carlos Fernandez, she secured an interview at Meadowlands Hospital

but was not hired. Plaintiff claimed during that interview she learned for the 

first time it was unlikely she would ever secure a position as a sonographer

because she lacked ARDMS certification.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants on June 12, 2018, alleging 

in general terms, breach of contract, deceptive business practices and fraud, and 

violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -224. The court 

denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and compel binding 

arbitration and granted plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint. 

Plaintiff's amended complaint filed January 20, 2019, specifically alleged 

1 Plaintiff's continued reliance on our decision in Suarez for support is 

misplaced. Suarez did not deal with the issue presented here, i.e., whether 

plaintiff complied with the applicable statute of limitations. Moreover, all we 

decided in Suarez was that on the record presented in that case, summary 

judgment on the plaintiff's CFA claim was improvidently granted. We did not 

decide the merits of the plaintiff's allegations.
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violations of the CFA, common law fraud, breach of contract and deceptive trade 

practices. She alleged defendants made certain representations that EIC's 

program would prepare her and make her eligible to work as an entry level 

sonographer, and further, defendants never told her an ARDMS certification was 

a requirement. Plaintiff claimed when she applied to sit for the ARDMS 

certification after her 2013 job interview, she was told EIC's DMUT program 

was not "certified," and she was ineligible. Defendants answered and discovery 

ensued.

In January 2020, defendants moved for summary judgment, denying the 

substance of plaintiff's complaint and also asserting the complaint was untimely 

under the six-year statute of limitations applicable to fraud and CFA claims. See

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 Plaintiff filed opposition and asserted, among other things, 

that her complaint did not accrue until May 2013, when she realized the lack of 

ARMDS certification was fatal to her job search. Focusing on whether 

plaintiff's first-filed 2018 complaint was timely, the judge ordered a plenary 

hearing "to find out if [plaintiff] was acting as a reasonable person" by not filing 

her complaint until June 2018. 

2

 The same statute of limitations applies to breach of contract claims. 
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The court conducted the hearing in a virtual format during the height of 

the COVID-19 pandemic, from June 26 to June 30, 2020. Plaintiff testified that 

she graduated in May 2011 from EIC, and she disputed defendants' claims that 

the school posted bulletins and posters advising students of the ARDMS 

certification, or that anyone at the school told students the certification was 

necessary to secure employment. Plaintiff described the efforts she made upon 

graduation to secure an entry level job as a sonographer:

I was handing out my resume at doctors' offices, at 

clinics. I was walking to . . . small home clinics in my 

town and no one called me back or anything.

. . . .

I was handing out my resume to everyone. I was 

speaking to family doctors . . . , and I was looking for 

every way to get a job. I was speaking to the doctors 

of the pharmacy that I was working at and giving them 

my resume.

Plaintiff began volunteering as a sonographer on a per diem basis and contacted 

representatives at EIC "three to five times" seeking their assistance. Plaintiff 

asserted that after the May 2013 interview, she enrolled in Hudson County 

Community College (HCCC).

On cross-examination, defendants produced government records 

indicating plaintiff enrolled at HCCC in January 2012, and was a "half-time" 
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student there as of February 2012. Plaintiff continued to assert that she did not 

attend the school until 2013.

Fernandez also testified at the plenary hearing, as did plaintiff's expert, 

Dr. Marc Glickstein. Beverly Nemati,3 EIC's retired director of career services, 

testified for defendants, as did Ilene Brodsaiy, EIC's financial director. The 

judge ordered additional briefing at the conclusion of the hearing.

In an oral decision placed on the record July 17, 2020, the judge concluded 

the statute of limitations period did not commence until, at the earliest, May 

2011, when plaintiff graduated from EIC. In this regard, he did not consider 

much of defendants' evidence in support of summary judgment that asserted 

while plaintiff attended EIC: she and other DMUT students were routinely 

reminded about the eligibility requirements for ARDMS certification; and

plaintiff was specifically told EIC would assist in job placement but did not 

promise or guarantee employment after graduation. As the nonmoving party, 

the judge said plaintiff was entitled to have all evidence viewed "in the light 

most favorable" to her. 

The judge then considered possible tolling of the statute of limitations by 

application of the discovery rule. He first determined plaintiff failed to prove 

3 At other points in the record, the witness's surname is transcribed as Memaci.
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any "specific material misrepresentations from an EIC representative after . . . 

her graduation that would allow th[e] [c]ourt to toll the statute of limitations." 

Regarding Dr. Glickstein's testimony, the judge "put[] aside the issue of whether 

[his] testimony constitute[d] a net opinion," and concluded "it still failed to 

establish any objective credible material evidence to aid . . . [p]laintiff in 

evading summary judgment." The judge cited Dr. Glickstein's testimony that it 

was "common sense . . . an uncertified sonographer could not obtain 

employment and . . . an applicant would determine pretty quickly . . . almost 

immediately . . . that ARDMS certification was required to obtain entry-level 

employment." The judge noted Dr. Glickstein testified "it would be difficult for 

an applicant . . . to know why [their] application was deficient without some sort 

of feedback," but the judge determined "[a]ssuming . . . plaintiff submitted as 

many applications as she testified to, . . . why did she not follow-up with at least 

one of them?"

The judge concluded that in the absence of any evidence EIC misled 

plaintiff after her 2011 graduation, he was "left with a two-year period in which 

we are asked to toll the statute of limitations without a reason." He determined 

plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and granted EIC's

summary judgment. 
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Before us, plaintiff contends the judge erred in dismissing her complaint 

based on the statute of limitations and in discounting Glickstein's opinion as a 

"net opinion."4 We disagree and affirm. 

"Determining whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations 

is a question of law that we review de novo." Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. 

Camden City Bd. of Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2018) (citing 

Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016)). The issue 

presented in this case turned on proper application of the discovery rule. "The 

application of the discovery rule is for the court, not a jury, to decide." Catena, 

447 N.J. Super. at 52 (citing Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274–75 (1973)). 

"Under the rule, a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff 'discovers, or by an 

4

In her reply brief, plaintiff raises additional arguments, some never made in 

the Law Division, including that the judge, a "privileged white male[,] . . . 

compared himself to an underprivileged Hispanic woman," "made a ruling" 

based on defense counsel's father being a judge in the same vicinage, and "was 

distracted" during the virtual hearings. It is axiomatic that we do not consider 

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief and deem them to have been 

waived. See, e.g., Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 38

(App. Div. 2015) (citing L.J. Zucca, Inc. v. Allen Bros. Wholesale Distribs., 

Inc., 434 N.J. Super. 60, 87 (App. Div. 2014)). Most assuredly, we will not 

consider these arguments.

Moreover, plaintiff makes no argument regarding dismissal of her breach 

of contract cause of action. An issue not briefed is deemed waived on appeal. 

Pullen v. Galloway, 461 N.J. Super. 587, 595 n.1 (App. Div. 2019). 
10 A-4625-19

exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered[,] that 

[s]he may have a basis for an actionable claim.'" Id. at 52–53 (emphasis added) 

(quoting Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272). "The party seeking the rule's benefit bears the 

burden to establish it applies." Id. at 53 (citing Lopez, 62 N.J. at 276).

The judge seemingly mistook these guidelines to some extent. At points,

he eschewed the opportunity to make specific credibility determinations 

regarding plaintiff's testimony. However, "[t]o determine whether the discovery 

rule applies, a plenary hearing is necessary 'since credibility is usually at issue.'" 

Maldonado v. Leeds, 374 N.J. Super. 523, 531 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting J.L. 

v. J.F., 317 N.J. Super. 418, 429 (App. Div. 1999)); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 275. 

Nevertheless, the judge made some factual findings based on the evidence 

adduced at the plenary hearing, and, as to those, we defer under our standard of 

review. See, e.g., Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super. 325, 336 

(App. Div. 2021) ("[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence so as to offend the interests of justice[.]" (alteration in 

original) (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013))). 
11 A-4625-19

As already noted, the statute of limitations for each of plaintiff's claims is 

six years.5 That means plaintiff was required to file her complaint within six

years of when it accrued, i.e., when she knew "or by an exercise of reasonable 

diligence and intelligence should have discovered that [s]he may have a basis 

for an actionable claim." Catena, 447 N.J. Super. at 52–53 (quoting Lopez, 62 

N.J. at 272). In fraud and CFA claims, "[t]he date of discovery . . . is when the 

fraud was or reasonably should have been discovered." Id. at 55. 

Plaintiff claimed her causes of action did not accrue until her May 2013 

interview, when she first learned the lack of an ARDMS certification would 

thwart her ability to obtain employment. Her June 2018 filing was, therefore, 

within the statute of limitations. 

However, plaintiff testified that she submitted numerous applications 

immediately after receiving her diploma and left her resume at the offices of 

many medical providers, without any success. No one ever called her back for 

an interview. Although he did not fix a specific accrual date, the judge 

5 Plaintiff's amended complaint pled a cause of action for "deceptive trade 

practices," which is within the rubric of the CFA. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 (defining 

an unlawful practice as the "act, use or employment . . . of . . . deception . . . in 

connection with" the advertisement or sale of merchandise). The CFA defines 

"merchandise" to include "services or anything offered . . . to the public for 

sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c).
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concluded a person exercising reasonable diligence would have realized the 

purported importance of the ARDMS certification within three to six months 

after graduation, but "certainly within six months of sending out . . . resumes." 

Whether you use May 2011, when plaintiff completed both parts of EIC's DMUT 

course, or July 2011, when plaintiff testified she received her diploma, and 

applying the judge's calculus, plaintiff's causes of action would have accrued in 

either November 2011 or January 2012.6In either case, plaintiff's June 2018 

filing was time barred.

Contrary to plaintiff's suggestion that the judge erred in rejecting Dr. 

Glickstein's opinion as a net opinion, the judge relied upon Dr. Glickstein's 

testimony to support his conclusion that a reasonable person would have realized 

the importance of the ARDMS certification very quickly after all the initial 

rejections. The judge noted plaintiff made no inquiries from those to whom she 

applied why she was rejected. In short, the judge's conclusion that through the 

exercise of reasonable diligence, plaintiff would have discovered what she 

alleged was defendants' fraudulent conduct is supported by the record evidence. 

Plaintiff's complaint was therefore untimely.

6

Interestingly, Brodsaiy's review of the financial records indicated plaintiff 

matriculated at HCCC in January 2012.
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To the extent we have not addressed them, plaintiff's remaining arguments 

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.