Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 

Economic Security, Infrastructure 

Protection, and Cybersecurity, Committee 

on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00p.m. EDT 

Wednesday, July 13, 2005 AVIATION SECURITY

Better Planning Needed to 

Optimize Deployment of 

Checked Baggage Screening 

Systems 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice 

GAO-05-896T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-896T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or 

berrickc@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-896T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Economic 

Security, Infrastructure Protection, and 

Cybersecurity, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

July 2005

AVIATION SECURITY

Better Planning Needed to Optimize 

Deployment of Checked Baggage 

Screening Systems 

TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the 

nation’s more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen all 

checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by 

Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA 

placed stand-alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines—mainly in 

airport lobbies—that were not integrated in-line with airport baggage 

conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency’s ability to initially 

install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs and the time 

required for airport modifications. These interim lobby solutions resulted in 

operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number of screeners, 

as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor 

systems. 

TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line baggage 

screening systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce 

screening costs, and enhance security. Eighty-six of the 130 airports we 

surveyed either have, are planning to have, or are considering installing full 

or partial in-line systems. However, resources have not been made available 

to fund these capital-intensive systems on a large-scale basis. Also, the 

overall costs of installing in-line baggage screening systems at each airport 

are unknown, the availability of future federal funding is uncertain, and 

perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, 

airport operators, and air carriers in funding these systems. 

TSA has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to determine at 

which airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies 

and security by installing in-line systems or, where in-line systems may not 

be economically justified, by making greater use of stand-alone EDS systems 

rather than relying on the labor-intensive and less efficient ETD screening 

process. However, at nine airports where TSA has agreed to help fund the 

installation of in-line baggage screening systems, TSA conducted a 

retrospective cost-benefit analysis which showed that these in-line systems 

could save the federal government about $1 billion over 7 years. TSA further 

estimated that it could recover its initial investment in the in-line systems at 

these airports in a little over 1 year. 

EDS and ETD Machines Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage 

Mandated to screen all checked 

baggage using explosive detection 

systems at airports by December 

31, 2003, the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) 

deployed two types of screening 

equipment: explosives detection 

systems (EDS), which use 

computer-aided tomography X-rays 

to recognize the characteristics of 

explosives, and explosives trace 

detection (ETD) systems, which 

use chemical analysis to detect 

traces of explosive material vapors 

or residues. This testimony 

discusses (1) TSA’s deployment of 

EDS and ETD systems and the 

impact of initially deploying these 

systems, (2) TSA and airport 

actions to install EDS machines inline with baggage conveyor 

systems, and the federal resources 

made available for this purpose, 

and (3) actions taken by TSA to 

optimally deploy checked baggage 

screening systems. 

What GAO Recommends

In a prior report, GAO 

recommended that TSA 

systematically evaluate baggage 

screening needs at airports, 

including identifying the costs and 

benefits of installing in-line EDS 

systems or stand-alone EDS 

machines in lieu of ETD machines, 

and prioritizing those airports 

where TSA would benefit by such 

actions. DHS generally concurred 

with the recommendations and 

described its corrective actions to 

address the issues identified. 
Page 1 GAO-05-896T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on leveraging 

technology to improve aviation security, and to discuss our work on the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) deployment of checked 

baggage screening systems. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001, which highlighted the vulnerability of U.S. aircraft to acts of 

terrorism, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), mandating, among other things, 

that all checked baggage at U.S. airports be screened using explosive 

detection systems by December 31, 2002.1

 To meet this requirement, the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of 

equipment to screen checked baggage for explosives: (1) explosives 

detection systems (EDS) that use specialized x-rays to detect 

characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage as it moves 

along a conveyor belt; and (2) explosive trace detection (ETD) systems, 

whereby an individual (i.e., a baggage screener) swabs baggage and then 

inserts the swab into the ETD machine, which in turn can detect chemical 

residues that may indicate the presence of explosives within a bag. 

As we reported in February 2004, largely because of shortages of 

equipment and insufficient time to modify airports to accommodate EDS 

machines, TSA was unable, at certain airports, to meet the 2002 

congressionally established deadline to screen all checked baggage for 

explosives using EDS and ETD machines.2

 Recognizing the obstacles 

encountered by TSA, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002,3

 which, in effect, extended the 

deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives until December 

31, 2003, for airports at which TSA was unable to meet the earlier deadline 

established by ATSA. We also reported that TSA fell short of fully 

satisfying the extended 2003 mandate and continued to face challenges in 

deploying and leveraging screening equipment and technologies. 

My testimony today discusses (1) TSA’s initial deployment of EDS and 

ETD systems and the impact of that deployment; (2) actions taken by 

 1

Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

2

GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and 

Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004). 

3

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
Page 2 GAO-05-896T 

airports and TSA to install automated in-line EDS baggage screening 

systems,4

 and the key federal resources that have been made available to 

fund these systems; and (3) TSA’s actions to plan for the optimal 

deployment of EDS and ETD equipment, including in-line checked 

baggage screening systems, in order to ensure the efficiency, cost 

effectiveness, and security of its checked baggage screening operations. 

My comments are based primarily on our March 15, 2005, report on our 

assessment of TSA’s checked baggage screening program.5 As part of that 

assessment, we reviewed available documentation on TSA’s checked 

baggage screening program and interviewed officials from TSA, air 

carriers, airports, EDS and ETD equipment manufacturers, and airport 

industry associations to obtain information regarding TSA’s efforts to 

improve checked baggage screening operations using EDS and ETD 

machines. We also visited 22 airports to observe baggage screening 

procedures and discuss these procedures with TSA, airport, and airline 

officials. In addition, we surveyed all 155 federal security directors,6

 who 

oversee federal security operations at one or more airports in the United 

States where screening is required, to obtain their perspectives on the 

implementation of checked baggage screening operations at 263 airports 

under their supervision, and to obtain information on these airports’ plans 

regarding the incorporation of EDS machines within the airports’ baggage 

conveyor systems for screening checked baggage for explosives.7

From its creation in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA 

procured and placed about 1,200 EDS machines and about 6,000 ETD 

 4

In-line EDS checked baggage screening systems typically involve checked baggage 

undergoing automated screening with EDS machines while on a conveyor belt that sorts

and transports baggage to the proper location for its ultimate loading onto an aircraft. 

5

GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of 

Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365 (Washington D.C.: March 15, 2005). 

6

A TSA federal security director oversees federal security operations at one or more U.S. 

commercial airports and has operational responsibility for the screening of passengers and 

checked baggage. 

7

Although we could not independently verify the reliability of all of the information we 

obtained, we compared it with other supporting documents, when available, to determine 

data consistency and reasonableness. On the basis of these efforts, we believe the

information we obtained is sufficiently reliable for this testimony. A detailed discussion of 

our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I of our March 2005 report (GAO-05-

365). 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-05-896T 

machines at over 400 airports and modified airports for the installation of 

this equipment. Although TSA made significant progress in fielding EDS 

and ETD equipment to the nation’s airports, TSA placed this equipment in 

a stand-alone mode—usually in airport lobbies—to conduct the primary 

screening of checked baggage for explosives, rather than integrating EDS 

machines in-line with airports’ baggage conveyor systems. TSA officials 

stated that they used EDS machines in stand-alone mode and ETD 

machines as an interim solution in order to meet the congressional 

deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives. Officials stated 

that they employed these interim solutions because of the significant costs 

required to install in-line systems and the need to reconfigure many 

airports’ baggage conveyor systems to accommodate the equipment. These 

interim screening solutions led to operational inefficiencies, including 

requiring a greater number of screeners and screening fewer bags for 

explosives each hour, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with 

baggage conveyor systems. Performing primary screening using ETD 

machines, as is the case for more than 300 airports, is more labor intensive 

and less efficient than screening using the EDS process. TSA’s placement 

of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in airport lobbies also resulted in 

passenger crowding, which presented unsafe conditions and may have 

added security risks for passengers and airport workers. Certain 

information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosive detection 

technologies and their effectiveness in TSA’s checked baggage screening 

operations are classified or are considered by TSA to be sensitive security 

information. Accordingly, the results of our review of this information 

have been removed from this testimony.8

TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line EDS baggage 

screening systems—to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce 

screening costs, and enhance security—but resources have not been made 

available to fund these systems on a large-scale basis. Most airports that 

have installed or are planning to install these capital-intensive in-line 

systems have relied on or plan to rely on some form of federal funding to 

help install the systems. Although TSA and airports operators are taking 

 8

We issued two additional reports detailing the results of our review, which discuss results 

deemed to be classified or sensitive security information. The report that contains 

classified and sensitive security information is GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic 

Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, 

GAO-05-135C (Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005). The report containing sensitive security 

information but not the classified information is GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic 

Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, 

GAO-05-302SU (Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005). 
Page 4 GAO-05-896T 

actions to install in-line EDS baggage screening systems, identifying the 

resources to fund the systems on a large-scale basis continues to be a 

challenge. The issuance of letter of intent (LOI) agreements—TSA’s 

primary method for funding in-line systems—has been limited to nine 

airports. An LOI, though not a binding commitment of federal funding, 

represents an intent by TSA to provide funds in future years if they are 

appropriated by Congress. This in turn enables an airport to proceed with 

a project, such as installing in-line baggage screening systems, because the 

airport and investors are aware that allowable costs will likely be 

reimbursed. However, TSA has not determined the total cost of installing 

in-line EDS baggage screening systems at airports determined to need 

these systems, the availability of funding for in-line systems is uncertain, 

and perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal 

government and airport operators in funding these systems. 

At the time of our March 2005 report,9

 TSA had not yet completed a 

systematic analyses needed to plan for optimally deploying EDS and ETD 

equipment—including installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems or 

replacing ETD machines with stand-alone EDS machines—at the nation’s 

more than 400 airports to enhance security and reduce TSA staffing 

requirements and long-term costs. Specifically, TSA had not completed a 

prospective analysis to determine at which airports it could achieve longterm savings and improved security benefits by installing in-line baggage 

screening systems rather than continuing to rely on labor-intensive standalone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives. 

TSA’s retrospective cost-benefit analysis conducted on the nine airports 

with signed LOI agreements to install in-line screening systems found that 

significant savings and other benefits, including reduced screener staffing 

requirements and increased baggage throughput, may be achieved through 

the installation of in-line systems. Also, for airports where in-line systems 

may not be economically justified because of the high cost of installing 

these systems, TSA has not conducted an analysis to determine whether it 

could achieve savings and other benefits by making greater use of standalone EDS systems rather than relying on the use of less efficient and 

more labor-intensive ETD machines at these airports. 

With the passage of ATSA in November 2001, TSA assumed from the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the majority of the responsibility 

 9

GAO-05-365.

Background 
Page 5 GAO-05-896T 

for securing the commercial aviation system. Under ATSA, TSA is 

responsible for ensuring that all baggage is properly screened for 

explosives at airports in the United States where screening is required, and 

for the procurement, installation, and maintenance of explosive detection 

systems used to screen checked baggage for explosives. ATSA required 

that TSA screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection 

systems by December 31, 2002. As it became apparent that certain airports 

would not meet the December 2002 deadline to screen 100 percent of 

checked baggage for explosives, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in 

effect extended the deadline to December 31, 2003, for noncompliant 

airports.10 Prior to the passage of ATSA in November 2001, only limited 

screening of checked baggage for explosives occurred. When this 

screening took place, air carriers had operational responsibility for 

conducting the screening, while FAA maintained oversight responsibility. 

With the passage of ATSA, TSA assumed operational responsibility from 

air carriers for screening checked baggage for explosives. Airport 

operators and air carriers continued to be responsible for processing and 

transporting passenger checked baggage from the check-in counter to the 

airplane. 

Explosive detection systems include EDS and ETD machines. EDS 

machines, which cost approximately $1 million each, use computer-aided 

tomography X-rays adapted from the medical field to automatically 

recognize the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. By taking the 

equivalent of hundreds of X-ray pictures of a bag from different angles, the 

EDS machine examines the objects inside of the baggage to identify 

characteristic signatures of threat explosives. TSA certified, procured, and 

deployed EDS machines manufactured by two companies, and has 

recently certified a smaller, less costly EDS machine, which is currently 

being operationally tested. ETD machines, which cost approximately 

$40,000 each, work by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. 

Because human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, 

which are then chemically analyzed in the ETD machines to identify any 

traces of explosive materials, the use of ETD is more labor-intensive and 

subject to more human error than the automated process of using EDS 

machines. ETD is used both for primary, or the initial, screening of 

 10ATSA also authorized the use of alternative means to screen checked baggage, such as 

positive passenger bag match (i.e., air carriers determining whether the passenger is on the 

same aircraft as the checked baggage), canine searches, and searches of bags by hand for 

time periods when airports were not able to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using 

explosive detection equipment. 
Page 6 GAO-05-896T 

checked baggage, as well as secondary screening, which resolves alarms 

from EDS machines that indicate the possible presence of explosives 

inside a bag. TSA has certified, procured, and deployed ETD machines 

from three manufacturers. 

As we reported in February 2004, to initially deploy EDS and ETD 

equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, TSA 

implemented interim airport lobby solutions and in-line EDS baggage 

screening systems.11 The interim lobby solutions involved placing standalone EDS and ETD machines in the nation’s airports, most often in 

airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas where baggage is sorted for 

loading onto aircraft. For EDS in a stand-alone mode (not integrated with 

airport’s or air carrier’s baggage conveyor system) and ETD, TSA 

screeners are responsible for obtaining the passengers’ checked baggage 

from either the passenger or the air carrier, lifting the bags onto and off of 

EDS machines or ETD tables, using TSA protocols to appropriately screen 

the bags, and returning the cleared bags to the air carriers to be loaded 

onto departing aircraft. In addition to installing stand-alone EDS and ETD 

machines in airport lobbies and baggage makeup areas, TSA collaborated 

with some airport operators and air carriers to install integrated in-line 

EDS baggage screening systems within their baggage conveyor systems. 

 11GAO-04-440T.
Page 7 GAO-05-896T 

Since its inception in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA used 

its funds to procure and install about 1,200 EDS machines and about 6,000 

ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400 

airports and to modify airport facilities to accommodate this equipment. 

For the most part, TSA deployed EDS machines at larger airports and ETD 

machines at smaller airports, resulting in primary screening being 

conducted solely with ETD machines at over 300 airports. Table 1 

summarizes the location of EDS and ETD equipment at the nation’s 

airports by airport category,12 based on a June 2004 TSA inventory listing. 

The number of machines shown in table 1 includes EDS and ETD 

machines procured by both TSA and FAA prior to and during the 

establishment of TSA. 

Table 1: EDS and ETD Machines Deployed at U.S. Airports as of June 2004 

Number 

Airport category Airports EDS machines ETD machines

X 21 679 2,833

I 61 467 2,401

II 50 71 695

III 124 9 744

IV 190 2 473

Total 446 1,228 7,146

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Although TSA made significant progress in fielding this equipment, TSA 

used most of its fiscal years 2002 through 2004 funds for its checked 

baggage screening program to design, develop, and deploy interim lobby 

screening solutions rather than install more permanent in-line EDS 

baggage screening systems. During our site visits to 22 category X, I, and II 

airports, we observed that in most cases, TSA used stand-alone EDS 

machines and ETD machines as the primary method for screening checked 

baggage.13 Generally, this equipment was located in airport lobbies and in 

baggage makeup areas. In addition, in our survey of 155 federal security 

directors, we asked the directors to estimate, for the 263 airports included 

 12TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States into one of five categories—X, I, 

II, III, and IV. Generally, category X airports have the largest number of passenger 

boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest number. 

13The 22 airports included 12 category X, 9 category I, and 1 category II airports. 

TSA Equipped More 

than 400 Airports to 

Screen Checked 

Baggage for 

Explosives, but the 

Initial Deployment 

Led to Operational 

Inefficiencies, and 

Additional Security 

Risks 
Page 8 GAO-05-896T 

in the survey, the approximate percentage of checked baggage that was 

screened on or around February 29, 2004, using EDS, ETD, or other 

approved alternatives for screening baggage such as positive passenger 

bag match or canine searches. As shown in table 2, the directors reported 

that for 130 large to medium-sized airports in our survey (21, 60, and 49 

category X, I, and II airports, respectively), most of the checked baggage 

was screened using stand-alone EDS or ETD machines. The average 

percentage of checked baggage reported as screened using EDS machines 

at airports with partial or full in-line EDS capability ranged from 4 percent 

for category II airports to 11 percent for category X airports. In addition, 

the directors reported that ETD machines were used to screen checked 

baggage 93 to 99 percent of the time at category III and IV airports, 

respectively. 
Page 9 GAO-05-896T 

Table 2: Average Percentage of Checked Baggage Reported as Screened Using EDS, ETD, or Other Approved Method at 263 

Airports on or around February 29, 2004 

Airport category X I II III IV Total

Number of airports 21 60 49 73 60 263

Percentage of checked baggage screened using: 

EDS (at airports with no in-line EDS capability) 59 59 27 6 0 25

EDS (at airports with partial or airportwide in-line EDS capability) 11 8 4 0 0 3

Totala EDS 70 67 32 6 0 28

ETD 18 33 66 93 99 69

Totala EDS and ETD 88 99 98 99 99 98

Other approved method 12 1 2 2 1 2

Totala 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Analysis of GAO federal security director survey data. 

a

Percentages in totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 

Stand-alone EDS and ETD machines are both labor- and time-intensive to 

operate since each bag must be physically carried to an EDS or ETD 

machine for screening and then moved back to the baggage conveyor 

system prior to being loaded onto an aircraft. With an in-line EDS system, 

checked baggage is screened within an airport’s baggage conveyor system, 

eliminating the need for a baggage screener or other personnel to 

physically transport the baggage from the check-in point to the EDS 

machine for screening and then to the airport baggage conveyor system. 

Further, according to TSA officials, ETD machines and stand-alone EDS 

machines are less efficient in the number of checked bags that can be 

screened per hour per machine than are EDS machines that are integrated 

in-line with the airport baggage conveyor systems. As shown in table 3, as 

of October 2003, TSA estimated that the number of checked bags screened 

per hour could more than double when EDS machines were placed in-line 

versus being used in a stand-alone mode.14

 14According to a senior TSA official in the Office of Security Technology, these throughput 

numbers could change as TSA gains greater operational experience. However, this data did 

not change between October 2003 and May 2005. 
Page 10 GAO-05-896T 

Table 3: Bags Per Hour Screened by Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines and 

ETD Machines 

Bags per hour 

Type of equipment Stand-alone In-line

EDS machines 

CTX 2500—stand-alone only 120 NA

CTX 5500 180 250

CTX 9000—in-line only NA 425

L3 6000 180 425

ETD machines—stand-alone only 36 NA

Source: TSA. 

NA: Not applicable. 

In January 2004, TSA, in support of its planning, budgeting, and acquisition 

of security screening equipment, reported to the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) that the efficiency benefits of in-line rather than standalone EDS are significant, particularly with regard to bags per hour 

screened and the number of TSA screeners required to operate the 

equipment. According to TSA officials, at that time, a typical lobby-based 

screening unit consisting of a stand-alone EDS machine with three ETD 

machines had a baggage throughput of 376 bags per hour with a staffing 

requirement of 19 screeners. In contrast, TSA estimated that 

approximately 425 bags per hour could be screened by in-line EDS 

machines with a staffing requirement of 4.25 screeners. 

In order to achieve the higher throughput rates and reduce the number of 

screener staff needed to operate in-line baggage screening systems, TSA 

(1) uses a screening procedure known as “on-screen alarm resolution” and 

(2) networks multiple in-line EDS machines together, referred to as 

“multiplexing,” so that the computer-generated images of bags from these 

machines are sent to a central location where TSA screeners can monitor 

the images of suspect bags centrally from several machines using the onscreen alarm resolution procedure. When an EDS machine alarms, 

indicating the possibility that explosive material may be contained in the 

bag, the on-screen alarm resolution procedure allows screeners to 

examine computer-generated images of the inside of a bag to determine if 

suspect items identified by the EDS machines are in fact suspicious. If a 

screener, by viewing these images, is able to determine that the suspect 

item or items identified by the EDS machine are in fact harmless, the 

screener is allowed to clear the bag, and it is sent to the airline baggage 

makeup area for loading onto the aircraft. If the screener is not able to 
Page 11 GAO-05-896T 

make the determination that the bag does not contain suspicious objects, 

the bag is sent to a secondary screening room where the bag is further 

examined by a screener. In secondary screening, the screener opens the 

bag and examines the suspect item or items, and usually swabs the items 

to collect a sample for analysis using an ETD machine. TSA also uses this 

on-screen alarm resolution procedure with stand-alone EDS machines.15

A TSA official estimated that the on-screen alarm resolution procedure 

with in-line EDS baggage screening systems will enable TSA to reduce by 

40 to 60 percent the number of bags requiring the more labor-intensive 

secondary screening using ETD machines. In estimating the potential 

savings in staffing requirements, TSA officials stated that they expect to 

achieve a 20 to 25 percent savings because of reductions in the number of 

staff needed to screen bags using ETD to resolve alarms from in-line EDS 

machines. 

TSA also reported that because procedures for using stand-alone EDS and 

ETD machines require screeners to lift heavy baggage onto and off of the 

machines, the interim lobby screening solutions used by TSA led to 

significant numbers of on-the-job injuries.16 In addition, in responding to 

our survey about 263 airports, numerous federal security directors 

reported that on-the-job injuries related to lifting heavy baggage onto or 

off the EDS and ETD machines were a significant concern at the airports 

for which they were responsible. Specifically, these federal security 

directors reported that on-the-job injuries caused by lifting heavy bags 

onto and off of EDS machines were a significant concern at 65 airports, 

and were a significant concern with the use of ETD machines at 110 

airports. To reduce on-the-job injuries, TSA has provided training to 

screeners on proper lifting procedures. However, according to TSA 

officials, in-line EDS screening systems would significantly reduce the 

need for screeners to handle baggage, thus further reducing the number of 

on-the-job injuries being experienced by TSA baggage screeners. 

In addition, during our site visits to 22 large and medium-sized airports, 

several TSA, airport, and airline officials expressed concern regarding the 

security risks caused by overcrowding due to ETD and stand-alone EDS 

 15TSA began implementing the on-screen alarm resolution procedure in May 2004 after pilot 

testing the procedure. 

16TSA was unable to provide GAO with data on the on-the-job injuries sustained during 

baggage screening operations. 
Page 12 GAO-05-896T 

machines being located in airport lobbies. The location of the equipment 

resulted in less space available to accommodate passenger movement and 

caused congestion due to passengers having to wait in lines in public areas 

to have their checked baggage screened. TSA headquarters officials also 

reported that large groups of people congregating in crowded airport 

lobbies increases security risks by creating a potential target for terrorists. 

The TSA officials noted that crowded airport lobbies have been the scenes 

of terrorist attacks in the past. For example, in December 1985, four 

terrorists walked to the El Al ticket counter at Rome’s Leonardo DaVinci 

Airport and opened fire with assault rifles and grenades, killing 13 and 

wounding 75. On that same day, three terrorists killed three people and 

wounded 30 others at Vienna International Airport. 

Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install in-line EDS baggage 

screening systems because of the expected benefits of these systems. Our 

survey of federal security directors and interviews with airport officials 

revealed that 86 of 130 category X, I, and II airports (66 percent) included 

in our survey either have, are planning to have, or are considering 

installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems throughout or at a 

portion of their airports. As of July 2004, 12 airports had operational in-line 

systems airportwide or at a particular terminal or terminals, and an 

additional 45 airports were actively planning or constructing in-line 

systems. Our survey of federal security directors further revealed that an 

additional 33 of the 130 category X, I, and II airports we surveyed were 

considering developing in-line systems. 

While in-line EDS baggage screening systems have a number of potential 

benefits, the total cost to install these systems is unknown, and limited 

federal resources have been made available to fund these systems on a 

large-scale basis. In-line baggage screening systems are capital-intensive 

because they often require significant airport modifications, including 

terminal reconfigurations, new conveyor belt systems, and electrical 

upgrades. TSA has not determined the total cost of installing in-line EDS 

baggage screening systems at airports that it had determined need these 

systems to maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to screen 

all checked baggage for explosives using explosive detection systems, or 

to achieve more efficient and streamlined checked baggage screening 

operations. However, TSA and airport industry association officials have 

estimated that the total cost of installing in-line systems is—a rough orderof-magnitude estimate—from $3 billion to more than $5 billion. TSA 

officials stated that they have not conducted a detailed analysis of the 

costs required to install in-line EDS systems at airports because most of 

Airports and the 

Federal Government 

Are Taking Actions to 

Install In-line Baggage 

Screening Systems, 

but Resources Have 

Not Been Made 

Available to Fund 

These Systems on a 

Large-Scale Basis 
Page 13 GAO-05-896T 

their efforts have been focused on deploying and maintaining a sufficient 

number of EDS and ETD machines to screen all checked baggage for 

explosives. TSA officials further stated that the estimated costs to install 

in-line baggage screening systems would vary greatly from airport to 

airport depending on the size of the airport and the extent of airport 

modifications that would be required to install the system. While we did 

not independently verify the estimates, officials from the Airports Council 

International-North America and American Association of Airport 

Executives estimated that project costs for in-line systems could range 

from about $2 million for a category III airport to $250 million for a 

category X airport.17

TSA and airport operators are relying on LOI agreements as their principal 

method for funding the modification of airport facilities to incorporate inline baggage screening systems.18 As of January 2005, TSA had issued eight 

LOIs to reimburse nine airports for the installation of in-line EDS baggage 

screening systems for a total cost of $957.1 million to the federal 

government over 4 years. In addition, TSA officials stated that as of July 

2004, they had identified 27 additional airports that they believe would 

benefit from receiving LOIs for in-line systems because such systems are 

needed to screen an increasing number of bags due to current or projected 

growth in passenger traffic. TSA officials stated that without such systems, 

these airports would not remain in compliance with the congressional 

mandate to screen all checked baggage using EDS and ETD.19 However, 

 17Joint Statement of David Z. Plavin, President, Airports Council International-North 

America (ACI-NA) and Todd Hauptli, Sr. Executive Vice President, American Association 

of Airport Executives (AAAE) before the House Aviation Subcommittee Hearing on 

Passenger and Baggage Screening Problems; February 12, 2004. GAO did not independently 

verify cost figures provided in this testimony. 

18The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 

386, approved the use of LOIs as a vehicle to leverage federal government and industry 

funding to support facility modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage screening 

systems. When an LOI is established to provide multiyear funding for a project, the airport 

operator is responsible for providing—up front—the total funding needed to complete the 

project, even though the LOI is not a binding commitment of federal funds. Work proceeds 

with the understanding that TSA will, if sufficient funding is appropriated, reimburse the 

airport operator for a percentage of the facility modification costs, with the airport funding 

the remainder of the costs. LOIs issued by TSA for in-line baggage screening systems 

provide for reimbursement payments over a multiple year period, contingent upon the 

appropriation of sufficient funding to cover such projects. 

19TSA officials stated that the number of airports that could benefit most from in-line 

checked baggage screening systems varies depending on changing airport circumstances, 

such as adding new terminals or an increased or decreased number of flights. 
Page 14 GAO-05-896T 

because TSA would not identify these 27 airports, we were unable to 

determine whether these airports are among the 45 airports we identified 

as in the process of planning or constructing in-line systems. 

TSA officials stated that they also use other transaction agreements as an 

administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments, 

airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification projects.20 Under 

these agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator also 

provides a portion of the funding required for the modification. As of 

September 30, 2004, TSA had negotiated arrangements with eight airports 

to fund small permanent in-line projects or portions of large permanent inline projects using other transaction agreements.21 These other transaction 

agreements range from about $640,000 to help fund the conceptual design 

of an in-line system for one terminal at the Dallas Fort-Worth airport to 

$37.5 million to help fund the design and construction of in-line systems 

and modification of the baggage handling systems for two terminals at the 

Chicago O’Hare International Airport. TSA officials stated that they would 

continue to use other transaction agreements to help fund smaller in-line 

projects.22

Airport operators also used the FAA’s Airport Improvement Program—

grants to maintain safe and efficient airports—in fiscal years 2002 and 

2003 to help fund facility modifications needed to accommodate installing 

in-line systems. Twenty-eight of 53 airports that reported either having 

constructed or planning to construct in-line systems relied on the Airport 

Improvement Program as their sole source of federal funding. 

 20Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by TSA to directly fund 

airport operators for smaller airport modification projects without undertaking a long-term 

commitment. These transactions take many forms; are generally not required to comply 

with federal laws and regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative 

agreements; and enable the federal government and others entering into these agreements 

to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually agreeable. 

21The eight airports included four category X airports: Dallas Fort-Worth International, 

Chicago O’Hare International, Detroit Metro Wayne County, and San Francisco 

International; three category I airports: Piedmont Triad International (North Carolina), 

Pittsburgh International, and Sacramento International; and one category II airport 

Harrisburg International (Pennsylvania). These eight airports were among the 45 airports 

that we identified as being in the process of planning or constructing in-line systems. 

22TSA also used four other transaction agreements to fund work related to interim 

solutions, three of these agreements were for partial in-line systems that eventually were to 

be replaced by permanent in-line systems. 
Page 15 GAO-05-896T 

Airport officials at over half of the 45 airports that we identified are in the 

process of planning or constructing in-line systems stated that they will 

require federal funding in order to complete the planning and construction 

of these in-line systems. TSA officials also reported that additional airports 

will require in-line systems to maintain compliance with the congressional 

mandate to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives. Despite 

this reported need, TSA officials stated that they do not have sufficient 

resources in their budget to fund additional LOIs beyond the eight LOIs 

that have already been issued. The Vision 100—Century of Aviation 

Reauthorization Act (Vision 100)23 provided for the creation of the Aviation 

Security Capital Fund to help pay for, among other things, placing EDS 

machines in line with airport baggage handling systems.24 However, 

according to OMB officials, the President’s fiscal year 2005 budget request, 

which included the Aviation Security Capital Fund’s mandatory 

appropriation of $250 million, only supported continued funding for the 

eight LOIs that have already been issued and did not provide resources to 

support new LOIs for funding the installation of in-line systems at 

additional airports. Further, while the fiscal year 2005 Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act provided $45 million for 

installing explosive detection systems in addition to the $250 million from 

the Aviation Security Capital Fund, Congress directed, in the 

accompanying conference report, that the $45 million be used to assist in 

the continued funding of the existing eight LOIs. Further, the President’s 

fiscal year 2006 budget request for TSA provides approximately 

$240.5 million for the continued funding of the eight existing LOIs and 

does not allocate any funding for new LOI agreements for in-line system 

integration activities. The fiscal year 2006 Department of Homeland 

Security appropriations bill passed by the House on May 17, 2005, and the 

appropriations bill pending before the Senate include, among other things 

$75 million and $14 million for installation of checked baggage explosive 

detection systems, respectively. The committee reports accompanying the 

House and Senate appropriations bills state that the amounts included for 

installation are in addition to the $250 million mandatory appropriation of 

 23Vision100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 177 Stat. 2490 

(2003). 

24Vision 100 authorizes a $250 million mandatory appropriation for the Aviation Security 

Capital Fund for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2007. Of that mandatory amount, the act 

designates $125 million as priority funding to fulfill intentions to obligate under LOIs. In 

fiscal year 2004, Congress provided $250 million for the physical modification of airports to 

install checked baggage explosive detection systems but did so separate from the Aviation 

Security Capital Fund because a provision of that act precluded the use of funds to 

establish the Fund in fiscal year 2004. 
Page 16 GAO-05-896T 

the Aviation Security Capital Fund but do not earmark these funds 

specifically for the installation of in-line EDS systems. 

In addition, perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the 

federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these 

capital-intensive in-line EDS systems. Airport operators and TSA have 

shared in the total costs—25 percent and 75 percent respectively under 

LOI agreements, which have been TSA’s primary method for funding inline EDS systems. A 75 percent federal cost-share will apply to any project 

under an LOI for fiscal year 2005.25 Further, the President’s fiscal year 2006 

budget request for TSA requests to maintain the 75 percent federal 

government cost share for projects funded by LOIs at large and medium 

airports. For fiscal year 2006 appropriations for DHS, both the Senate, in 

its pending appropriations bill, and the House, in its committee report, 

also propose to maintain the 75 percent federal cost share for LOIs. 

However, in testimony before Congress, an aviation industry official 

expressed a different perspective regarding the cost sharing between the 

federal government and the aviation industry for installing in-line checked 

baggage screening systems. Testifying in July 2004, the official said that 

airports contend that the cost of installing in-line systems should be met 

entirely by the federal government, given its direct responsibility for 

screening checked baggage, as established by law, in light of the national 

security imperative for doing so, and because of the economic efficiencies 

of this strategy. Although the official stated that airports have agreed to 

provide a local match of 10 percent of the cost of installing in-line systems 

at medium and large airports, as stipulated by Vision 100, he expressed 

opposition to the administration’s proposal, which was subsequently 

 25The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution authorized TSA to issue 

LOIs for terminal modifications related to the installation of in-line baggage screening 

systems and mandated that each LOI provide for a 75 percent federal cost-share of the 

project’s cost, with the remaining 25 percent to be paid by the airport operator at airports 

with at least 0.25 percent of the total number of passenger boardings each year at all 

airports (and 90 percent for projects at all other airports). Subsequently, Vision 100 

instituted a 90 percent federal cost-share of the project’s cost, with the remaining 

10 percent to be paid by the airport operator at medium and large hub airports (and 

95 percent for projects at any other airport) though TSA continued to operate at the 

75 percent cost-share. The fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-334, 

118 Stat.1298, signed into law in October 2004, reestablished the federal cost-share at 

75 percent for any medium or large hub airport during fiscal year 2005. 
Page 17 GAO-05-896T 

adopted by Congress for fiscal year 2005, to reestablish the airport’s costshare at 25 percent.26

In July 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 

United States (the 9/11 Commission) also addressed the issue of the 

federal government/airport cost-share for installing EDS in-line baggage 

screening systems.27 Specifically, the commission recommended that TSA 

expedite the installation of in-line systems and that the aviation industry 

should pay its fair share of the costs associated with installing these 

systems, since the industry will derive many benefits from the systems. 

Although the 9/11 Commission recommended that the aviation industry 

should pay its fair share of the costs of installing in-line systems, the 

commission did not report what it believed the fair share to be.28

 26TSA officials stated that the increased cost-share to 90 percent as stipulated in Vision 100 

would further constrain their ability to fund future LOIs, as well as impact their ability to 

assist airports to achieve and maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to 

screen all checked baggage for explosives. 

27The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: July 2004). 

28The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 

Stat. 3638, enacted in December 2004, requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 

conduct a cost-sharing study that must include, among other things, a proposed formula for 

cost sharing among the federal, state, and local governments and the private sector for 

projects to install in-line baggage screening equipment that reflects the benefits that each 

such entity will derive from the projects, including national security benefits and labor and 

other cost savings. 
Page 18 GAO-05-896T 

At the time of our March 2005 report,29 TSA has not completed a 

systematic, prospective analysis of individual airports or groups of airports 

to determine at which airports installing in-line EDS systems would be 

cost-effective in terms of reducing long-term screening costs for the 

government and would improve security. Such an analysis would enable 

TSA to determine at which airports it would be most beneficial to invest 

limited federal resources for in-line systems rather than continue to rely 

on the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for 

explosives, and it would be consistent with best practices for preparing 

benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects called for by 

OMB Circular A-94.30 TSA officials stated that they had not conducted the 

analyses related to the installation of in-line systems at individual airports 

or groups of airports because they have used available staff and funding to 

ensure all airports have a sufficient number of EDS or ETD machines to 

meet the congressional mandate to screen all checked baggage with 

explosive detection systems. During the course of our review, in 

September 2004, TSA contracted for services to develop methodologies 

and criteria for assessing the effectiveness and suitability of airport 

screening solutions requiring significant capital investment, such as those 

projects associated with the LOI program. In July 2005, TSA officials 

stated that TSA and DHS are reviewing a draft report from the study. 

According to these officials, the study will provide TSA with a strategic 

plan for its checked baggage screening program, including the best 

screening solution for airports processing most of the airlines’ baggage 

volume, and the capital costs and staffing requirements for each solution. 

Although TSA had not conducted a systematic analysis of cost savings and 

other benefits that could be derived from the installation of in-line baggage 

screening systems, TSA’s limited, retrospective cost-benefit analysis of inline projects at the nine airports with signed LOI agreements found that 

significant savings and other benefits may be achieved through the 

 29GAO-05-365.

30OMB Circular A-94 Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 

Programs, January 22, 2002. Agencies use this guidance to support government decisions 

to initiate, review, or expand programs that would result in measurable costs or benefits 

extending for 3 or more years into the future. 

TSA Has Not 

Systematically 

Planned for the 

Optimal Deployment 

of Checked Baggage 

Screening Equipment 

to Ensure the 

Efficient and CostEffective Screening 

for Explosives while 

Enhancing Security 

Benefits 
Page 19 GAO-05-896T 

installation of these systems.31 This analysis was conducted in May 2004—

after the eight LOI agreements for the nine airports were signed in July 

and September 2003 and February 2004—to estimate potential future cost 

savings and other benefits that could be achieved from installing in-line 

systems instead of using stand-alone EDS systems. TSA estimated that inline baggage screening systems at these airports would save the federal 

government about $1 billion32 compared with stand-alone EDS systems and 

that TSA would recover its initial investment in a little over 1 year. 33 TSA’s 

analysis also provided data to estimate the cost savings for each airport 

over the 7-year period. According to TSA’s data, federal cost savings varied 

from about $50 million to over $250 million at eight of the nine airports, 

while at one airport, there was an estimated $90 million loss.34

According to TSA’s analysis of the nine LOI airports, in-line cost savings 

critically depend on how much an airport’s facilities have to be modified 

to accommodate the in-line configuration. Savings also depend on TSA’s 

costs to buy, install, and network the EDS machines; subsequent 

maintenance cost; and the number of screeners needed to operate the 

machines in-line instead of using stand-alone EDS systems. In its analysis, 

TSA also found that a key factor driving many of these costs is 

throughput—how many bags an in-line EDS system can screen per hour 

 31We reviewed the TSA cost model showing savings expected to be achieved with in-line 

rather than stand-alone EDS equipment at nine airports. We assessed the model’s logic to 

ensure its completeness and correctness of calculations. Also, as discussed in appendix IV 

of our March 2005 report (GAO-05-365), we conducted a Monte Carlo simulation to: 

(1) illustrate sensitivity of potential cost savings of replacing stand-alone with in-line EDS 

systems to alternative values of key cost drivers and (2) to explore the variability in the key 

factors used by TSA in their model. Based on our review of TSA’s cost model, we believe 

that it is sufficiently reliable for the analyses we conducted and the information included in 

this testimony. 

32This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years if received up front. 

33For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94 stipulates 

using a 7 percent real discount rate to compute the present value of cost savings. TSA used 

a 4 percent real discount rate. Following Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost 

savings are $1.14 billion. In addition, in TSA’s analysis, the federal government does not pay 

for $319 million, or 25 percent, of project costs. Accounting for these costs to reflect total 

costs, as recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall savings to $820 million. 

34The relatively large costs for upfront in-line EDS at one airport are not offset by the 

modest amount of estimated operation and maintenance cost savings; therefore, the in-line 

EDS system may be more costly than EDS stand-alone. By contrast, at another airport the 

upfront costs of in-line EDS are lower than for stand-alone EDS, and there is a substantial 

amount of estimated operation and maintenance cost savings. Therefore, the in-line EDS 

system this latter airport may be less costly than stand-alone EDS. 
Page 20 GAO-05-896T 

compared with the rate for a stand-alone system. TSA used this factor to 

determine how many stand-alone EDS machines could be replaced by a 

single in-line EDS machine while achieving the same throughput. 

According to TSA’s analysis, in-line EDS would reduce by 78 percent the 

number of TSA baggage screeners and supervisors required to screen 

checked baggage at these nine airports, from 6,645 to 1,477 screeners and 

supervisors. However, the actual number of TSA screeners and supervisor 

positions that could be eliminated would be dependent on the individual 

design and operating conditions at each airport. 

TSA also reported that aside from increased efficiency and lower overall 

costs, there were a number of qualitative benefits that in-line systems 

would provide over stand-alone systems, including: 

• fewer on-the-job injuries, since there is less lifting of baggage when EDS 

machines are integrated into the airport’s baggage conveyor system; 

• less lobby disruption because the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines 

would be removed from airport lobbies; and 

• unbroken chain of custody of baggage because in-line systems are more 

secure, since the baggage handling is performed away from passengers. 

TSA’s retrospective analysis of these nine airports indicates the potential 

for cost savings through the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening 

systems at other airports, and it provides insights about key factors likely 

to influence potential cost savings from using in-line systems at other 

airports. This analysis also indicates the merit of conducting prospective 

analyses of other airports to provide information for future federal 

government funding decisions as required by the OMB guidance on costbenefit analyses.35 This guidance describes best practices for preparing 

benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects, one of which 

involves analyzing uncertainty. Given the diversity of airport designs and 

operations, TSA’s analysis could be modified to account for uncertainties 

in the values of some of the key factors, such as how much it will cost to 

modify an airport to install an in-line system. Analyzing uncertainty in this 

manner is consistent with OMB guidance. 

 35OMB Circular A-94. 
Page 21 GAO-05-896T 

TSA also has not systematically analyzed which airports could benefit 

from the implementation of additional stand-alone EDS systems in lieu of 

labor-intensive ETD systems at more than 300 airports that rely on ETD 

machines, and where in-line EDS systems may not be appropriate or costeffective. More specifically, TSA has not prepared a plan that prioritizes 

which airports should receive EDS machines (including machines that 

become surplus because of the installation of in-line systems) to balance 

short-term installation costs with future operational savings. Furthermore, 

TSA has not yet determined the potential long-term operating cost savings 

and the short-term costs of installing the systems, which are important 

factors to consider in conducting analyses to determine whether airports 

would benefit from the installation of EDS machines. TSA officials said 

that they had not yet had the opportunity to develop such analyses or 

plans, and they did not believe that such an exercise would necessarily be 

an efficient use of their resources, given the fluidity of baggage screening 

at various airports. 

There is potential for TSA to benefit from the introduction of smaller 

stand-alone EDS machines—in terms of labor savings and added 

efficiencies—at some of the more than 300 airports where TSA relies on 

the use of ETD machines to screen checked baggage. Stand-alone EDS 

machines are able to screen a greater number of bags in an hour than the 

ETD used for primary screening while lessening reliance on screeners 

during the screening process. For example, TSA’s analysis showed that an 

ETD machine can screen 36 bags per hour, while the stand-alone EDS 

machines can screen 120 to 180 bags per hour. As a result, it would take 

three to five ETD machines to screen the same number of bags that one 

stand-alone EDS machine could process. In addition, greater use of the 

stand-alone EDS machines could reduce staffing requirements. For 

example, one stand-alone EDS machine would potentially require 6 to 14 

fewer screeners than would be required to screen the same number of 

bags at a screening station with three to five ETD machines. This 

calculation is based on TSA estimates that 4.1 screeners are required to 

support each primary screening ETD machine, while one stand-alone EDS 

machine requires 6.75 screeners—including staff needed to operate ETD 

machines required to provide secondary screening. 

Without a plan for installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems, and 

for using additional stand-alone EDS systems in place of ETD machines at 

the nation’s airports, it is unclear how TSA will make use of new 

technologies for screening checked baggage for explosives, such as the 

smaller and faster EDS machines that may become available through 

TSA’s research and development programs. For example, TSA is working 
Page 22 GAO-05-896T 

with private sector firms to enhance existing EDS systems and develop 

new screening technologies through its research and development (R&D) 

efforts. As part of these efforts, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent almost 

$2.4 million to develop a new computer-aided tomography explosives 

detection system that is smaller and lighter than systems currently 

deployed in airport lobbies. The new system is intended to replace systems 

currently in use, including larger and heavier EDS machines and ETD 

equipment. The smaller size of the system creates opportunities for TSA to 

transfer screening operations to other locations such as airport check-in 

counters. TSA certified this equipment in December 2004 and is 

operationally testing the machine at three airports to evaluate its 

operational efficiency. 

TSA’s checked baggage screening R&D efforts are part of a broader DHS 

program focused on researching and developing technologies to detect, 

prevent, and mitigate terrorist threats. In September 2004, we reported 

that TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing transportation 

security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best 

practices.36 However, we found that their efforts were incomplete in 

several areas. For example, as of our September 2004 report, although 

both TSA and DHS had established processes to select and prioritize R&D 

projects that include risk management principles, they had not yet 

completed vulnerability and criticality assessments, which we have 

identified as key elements of a risk management approach, for all modes 

of transportation.37 In the absence of completed risk assessments, TSA 

and DHS officials reported basing funding decisions on other factors—

such as available threat intelligence, expert judgment, and information 

about past terrorist incidents. However, TSA officials stated that they do 

not use formal threat assessments to make R&D decisions. During our 

review, we also found limited evidence of coordination between TSA and 

DHS, or between these agencies and other federal agencies, such as the 

Department of Transportation, and industry stakeholders. Without such 

coordination, DHS raises the risk that its R&D resources will not be 

effectively leveraged and that duplication may occur. We also found that 

although many of TSA's R&D projects were in later phases of 

 36GAO, Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing 

Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management, GAO-04-890 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 30, 2004). 

37 GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, GAO-02-150T

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001). 
Page 23 GAO-05-896T 

development, the agency had not estimated deployment dates, without 

which managers do not have information needed to plan, budget, and 

track the progress of projects. We also found that TSA and DHS did not 

have adequate databases to monitor and manage the spending of the 

hundreds of millions of dollars that Congress had appropriated for R&D. 

In moving forward, it will be important for DHS to resolve the these 

challenges to help ensure that limited R&D recourses are focused on the 

areas of greatest need. 

TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at 

the nation’s airports—mainly as part of interim lobby screening 

solutions—to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for 

explosives, as mandated by Congress. With the objective of initially 

fielding this equipment largely accomplished, TSA needs to shift its focus 

from equipping airports with interim screening solutions to systematically 

planning for the more optimal deployment of checked baggage screening 

systems. Part of such planning should include analyzing which airports 

should receive federal support for in-line EDS baggage screening systems 

based on cost savings that could be achieved from more effective and 

efficient baggage screening operations and on other factors, including 

enhanced security. Also, for airports, where in-line systems may not be 

economically justified because of high investment costs, a cost 

effectiveness analysis could be used to determine the benefits of 

additional stand-alone EDS machines to screen checked baggage in place 

of the more labor-intensive ETD machines that are currently being used at 

the more than 300 airports. In addition, TSA should consider the costs and 

benefits of the new technologies being developed through its research and 

development efforts, which could provide smaller EDS machines that have 

the potential to reduce the costs associated with installing in-line EDS 

baggage screening systems or to replace ETD machines currently used as 

the primary method for screening. 

An analysis of airport baggage screening needs would also help enable 

TSA to determine whether expected reduced staffing costs, higher baggage 

throughput, and increased security would justify the significant up-front 

investment required to install in-line baggage screening. TSA’s 

retrospective analysis of nine airports installing in-line baggage screening 

systems with LOI funds, while limited, demonstrated that cost savings 

could be achieved through reduced staffing requirements for screeners 

and increased baggage throughput. In fact, the analysis showed that using 

in-line systems instead of stand-alone systems at these nine airports would 

save the federal government about $1 billion over 7 years and that TSA’s 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 24 GAO-05-896T 

initial investment would be recovered in a little over 1 year. However, this 

analysis also showed that a cost savings may not be achieved for all 

airports. In considering airports for in-line baggage screening systems or 

the continued use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines, a systematic 

analysis of the costs and benefits of these systems would help TSA justify 

the appropriate screening for a particular airport, and such planning would 

help support funding requests by demonstrating enhanced security, 

improved operational efficiencies, and cost savings to both TSA and the 

affected airport. 

To assist TSA in planning for the optimal deployment of checked baggage 

screening systems, we recommended in our March 2005 report that TSA 

systematically evaluate baggage screening needs at airports, including the 

costs and benefits of installing in-line baggage screening systems at 

airports that do not yet have in-line systems installed. DHS agreed with our 

recommendation, stating that TSA has initiated an analysis of deploying inline EDS machines and is in the process of formulating criteria to identify 

those airports that would benefit from an in-line EDS system. DHS also 

stated that TSA has begun conducting an analysis of the airports that rely 

heavily on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage screening 

technology to identify those airports that would benefit from augmenting 

ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404. 

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included 

Charles Bausell, Amy Bernstein, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett, 

David Hooper, Noel Lance, Thomas Lombardi, and Alper Tunca. 

Contact Information 

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