Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

ROBERT LEWIS GILLESPIE, 

a/k/a ROBERT LEWIS GILLISPIE OPINION BY 

 SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 

v. Record No. 060034 November 3, 2006 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 This appeal requires us to construe the language of Code 

§ 19.2-295.1 concerning bifurcated trials in criminal cases. 

It presents the question whether the Commonwealth may, at the 

sentencing stage of a bifurcated trial, present evidence of 

the sentences imposed upon the defendant as a part of his 

record of prior convictions. 

Facts and Proceedings

 In a jury trial, Robert Lewis Gillispie1 was found guilty 

of statutory burglary. The jury fixed his punishment at five 

years imprisonment. After considering a pre-sentence report, 

the trial court imposed that sentence, to be followed by three 

years of post-release probation supervision. 

 1

 The defendant was indicted as "Robert Lewis Gillespie 

AKA Robert Lewis Gillispi." He was sentenced by the trial 

court as "Robert Lewis Gillespie a/k/a Robert Lewis Gillispie" 

and that style was used in all subsequent proceedings in the 

Court of Appeals and in this Court. The defendant, in his 

petitions for appeal in both courts, as well as in his briefs 

on appeal, has stated that the correct spelling of his name is 

"Gillispie." 
 At the sentencing stage of the trial, the Commonwealth 

offered an authenticated copy of a “Conviction and Sentencing 

Order” entered in the same court, dated December 8, 1998, 

showing that Gillispie had been convicted of grand larceny and 

sentenced to five years imprisonment, with three years and 

four months suspended upon the condition that Gillispie be of 

good behavior and submit to drug treatment. The order also 

showed that Gillispie had been charged with robbery but found 

not guilty of that offense. 

 Defense counsel objected to the exhibit as offered and 

moved the trial court to redact any reference to the robbery 

charge. The Commonwealth agreed and the trial court redacted 

that portion of the order. The defense also moved the court 

to redact the sentencing information relating to the grand 

larceny charge, as well as any reference to drug treatment, on 

the ground that both were “prejudicial to this case and could 

inflame the jury.” The Commonwealth opposed the motion and 

the court denied it. The 1998 order was admitted in evidence 

without change except for the redaction of the reference to 

the robbery charge. 

 After this evidence was received, the jury retired to 

consider sentencing. During its deliberations, the jury sent 

written questions to the trial court, inquiring whether the 

judge could reduce the sentence the jury fixed, whether the 

2
defendant had been on probation when the crime occurred, and 

in what facility the defendant would be confined if 

imprisoned. The jury explained, in the last question, “We 

don’t want this defendant to spend time in penitentiary 

w/murderers & rapists.” The court answered these questions 

properly, by replying that the jurors should fix a sentence 

they considered appropriate and not concern themselves with 

future events, that they should not consider the defendant’s 

probation status, and that the Department of Corrections, not 

the court or the jury, determines where prisoners are housed. 

 After the jury reported that it had reached a verdict and 

returned to the courtroom, a juror asked the judge whether 

suspension and parole were different, and if the judge made 

the decision whether to suspend a sentence. The court 

answered both these questions in the affirmative, and asked 

all jurors whether, in the light of those answers, they were 

satisfied with the verdict they had reached or whether they 

wished to retire to the jury room for further deliberations. 

The jurors unanimously stated that they were satisfied and 

presented their verdict. 

 Gillispie appealed his conviction and sentence to the 

Court of Appeals, which affirmed by a per curiam opinion. We 

awarded him an appeal, limited to his assignment of error 

3
relating to the trial court’s refusal to redact sentencing 

information from his record of prior convictions. 

Analysis

 Code § 19.2-295.1 provides, in pertinent part: 

In cases of trial by jury, upon a finding that the 

defendant is guilty of a felony or a Class 1 

misdemeanor . . . a separate proceeding limited to 

the ascertainment of punishment shall be held as 

soon as practicable before the same jury. At such 

proceeding, the Commonwealth shall present the 

defendant’s prior criminal convictions by certified, 

attested or exemplified copies of the record of 

conviction. . . . After the Commonwealth has 

introduced such evidence of prior convictions, or if 

no such evidence is introduced, the defendant may 

introduce relevant, admissible evidence related to 

punishment. Nothing in this section shall prevent 

the Commonwealth or the defendant from introducing 

relevant, admissible evidence in rebuttal. 

 In denying Gillispie’s appeal on this issue, the Court of 

Appeals followed its prior decisions in Gilliam v. 

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 465 S.E.2d 592 (1996), and 

Mosby v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 284, 482 S.E.2d 72 (1997), 

wherein it held that “Code § 19.2-295.1 allows the 

Commonwealth to present evidence of the defendant’s prior 

criminal convictions, which includes the conviction orders 

that show length of prior sentences.” Mosby, 24 Va. App. at 

291, 482 S.E.2d at 75. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 

purpose of the statute was to enable the jury to determine an 

appropriate sentence and that previous efforts to punish and 

4
rehabilitate the defendant were indispensable to that purpose. 

Gilliam, 21 Va. App. at 524, 465 S.E.2d at 595. 

 Our duty is to interpret the intent of the General 

Assembly in adopting the language it chose. If the language 

is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial 

construction; the language will be applied as written. Tiller 

v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 420, 69 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1952). 

Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more 

than one way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, is 

difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks 

clearness and definiteness. Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 

321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). 

 The Court of Appeals, in Gilliam, found the language of 

the statute in question here to be ambiguous because it was 

susceptible of more than one interpretation, and therefore 

appropriate for judicial construction. 21 Va. App. at 522, 

465 S.E.2d at 594. We agree that an ambiguity exists, as 

illustrated by the positions of the parties here: The 

defendant contends that “record of conviction” means a 

document showing only the fact of conviction; the Commonwealth 

contends that the term refers to the final order entered by 

the trial court, typically showing both conviction and 

sentence. Nevertheless, we reach a different conclusion from 

5
that reached by the Court of Appeals as to the intent of the 

General Assembly in enacting Code § 19.2-295.1. 

 The General Assembly adopted Code § 19.2-295.1 in its 

original form in 1994. At that time, bifurcated trials in 

capital murder cases were provided for by Code §§ 19.2-264.2, 

et seq., which had been in effect in varying forms since 1977. 

The General Assembly clearly had those laws in contemplation 

in 1994, when considering the extension of bifurcated trials 

to non-capital felonies for the first time in our history. 

Code § 19.2-264.2 provided then, as it does now, that the 

jury, at the penalty phase of a capital murder case, shall not 

impose the death penalty unless it finds either the “future 

dangerousness” predicate or the “vileness” predicate to exist 

“after consideration of the past criminal record of 

convictions of the defendant.” Code § 19.2-264.4(C) provided 

then, as it does now, that in the penalty phase of a capital 

murder trial, evidence may be admissible, subject to the rules 

of evidence, that includes the “prior history” of the 

defendant.2

 2

 In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 593-94, 304 

S.E.2d 644, 660 (1983), we held that these two provisions, 

read together, were not unconstitutionally vague, despite 

their differing language. 

6
 In ascertaining legislative intent, we presume that the 

General Assembly, when enacting new laws, is fully aware of 

the state of existing law relating to the same general subject 

matter. United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs National Bank, 233 Va. 

476, 480, 357 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1987); Cape Henry v. Natl. 

Gypsum, 229 Va. 596, 600, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985). The 

General Assembly is not only presumed to have been aware of 

the capital murder statutes in effect in 1994, but is also 

presumed to have been aware of our decisions construing them. 

Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 19, 613 S.E.2d 432, 434 

(2005) (citing Waterman v. Halverson, 261 Va. 203, 207, 540 

S.E.2d 867, 869 (2001)). 

In Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 858, 284 S.E.2d 

844, 853 (1981), we were presented with the precise question 

presented by this appeal, but in the context of a capital 

murder case. There, we held that the sentences imposed as a 

result of the defendant’s prior convictions might properly be 

admitted at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, 

observing: “The sentence reflects the gravity of the offense 

and the offender’s propensity for violence.” Id.

 In the light of our interpretation of the capital murder 

statutes in Bassett, the General Assembly, if it had desired 

the same result in non-capital felony trials, could simply 

have mirrored the capital murder laws when enacting Code 

7
§ 19.2-295.1. Instead, it employed more restrictive language 

than it had used in the capital murder laws, limiting the 

Commonwealth to the introduction of “the defendant’s prior 

criminal convictions” by presenting copies of the “record of 

conviction.” (Emphasis added.) Section 19.2-295.1 was enacted 

without any provisions permitting the introduction of evidence 

of prior sentences as a part of the defendant’s “history and 

background” in the Commonwealth’s case in chief at the penalty 

phase. By contrast, the Commonwealth may do just that in 

capital murder cases, relying on our interpretation in 

Bassett. The General Assembly had an opportunity to make 

bifurcated trials in non-capital cases similar to those in 

capital cases, but chose a different course. 

We consider the General Assembly’s departure from the 

language it had used in enacting the capital murder laws to be 

a significant demonstration of a legislative intent to 

accomplish a different result with respect to non-capital 

cases. We therefore construe the words “prior criminal 

convictions” and “record of conviction,” as employed in Code 

§ 19.2-295.1 to mean exactly what they say, and no more. 

Thus, in the Commonwealth’s case in chief at the penalty 

phase of the trial of a non-capital felony or a Class 1 

misdemeanor, the Commonwealth is required to introduce 

evidence, as prescribed by the statute, of records showing 

8
only the fact of conviction of a criminal offense, including 

the name of the crime, the date of the conviction and the 

court in which the conviction occurred. If the record 

contains information concerning proceedings subsequent to 

conviction, such as sentence, suspension, probation or other 

rehabilitative efforts, such information should be redacted 

before the record is received in evidence. 

In the present appeal, the Commonwealth relies on our 

language in Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 257 Va. 34, 43, 510 

S.E.2d 232, 236 (1999): 

We perceive no sound reason why the factors that may 

be considered by a jury in capital murder cases 

should not likewise be available for consideration 

by a jury in noncapital cases under § 19.2-295.1. 

The goal of having an informed jury assess 

appropriate punishment should be no less essential 

merely because a noncapital offense is involved. 

The Commonwealth’s reliance on Shifflett is misplaced. That 

case dealt with the obverse aspect of Code § 19.2-295.1, the 

question of what evidence the defendant may introduce at the 

penalty phase of a bifurcated non-capital felony trial. In 

§ 19.2-295.1, the General Assembly imposed no such limitations 

on the defendant’s evidence as it had placed upon the 

Commonwealth. While limiting the Commonwealth to “prior 

criminal convictions,” the statute expressly provides that the 

defendant “may introduce relevant, admissible evidence related 

to punishment.” It was that language that we construed in 

9
Shifflett,3 when we held that the trial court’s decision as to 

relevancy would only be set aside for a clear abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 44, 510 S.E.2d at 237. For that reason, 

nothing we decide here is inconsistent with our holding in 

Shifflett. 

 It is conceivable that a defendant may, for his own 

purposes, wish to offer sentencing information at the penalty 

phase, and in our view of the statute, he would be free to do 

so. Further, as we observed in Shifflett, the statute is a 

two-way street. The Commonwealth as well as the defendant may 

introduce “relevant, admissible evidence in rebuttal.” Id. at 

43-44, 510 S.E.2d at 236. Thus, the Commonwealth may 

introduce evidence of sentencing and prior efforts to 

rehabilitate if the court, in its discretion, deems it 

relevant and admissible to rebut evidence the defendant has 

introduced at the penalty phase. 

Conclusion

 Because the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 

sentencing information was properly admitted in the 

 

3

 As originally enacted in 1994, the defendant could only 

introduce such evidence if the Commonwealth had first 

introduced evidence of prior convictions. The following year, 

however, the General Assembly amended the statute to provide 

that the defendant might introduce his “evidence related to 

punishment” whether the Commonwealth had introduced a record 

of prior convictions or not. 1995 Acts, ch. 567. 

10
Commonwealth’s case in chief at the penalty phase of the 

trial, we will reverse the judgment appealed from and remand 

the case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the 

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion, limited to the issue of sentencing, pursuant to the 

provisions of Code § 19.2-295.1. 

Reversed and remanded. 

JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE AGEE joins, dissenting. 

 I respectfully dissent because I cannot reconcile the 

majority’s conclusion with either the letter or the spirit of 

Virginia’s bifurcated scheme for the trial of non-capital 

felonies and Class 1 misdemeanors. 

 The premise underlying the majority’s holding is that in 

Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 284 S.E.2d 844 (1981), 

“we were presented with the precise question presented by this 

appeal.” I disagree. In that case, the defendant objected to 

the admission of information concerning his prior sentences on 

the basis that the evidence lacked probative value and was 

unduly prejudicial. Brief of Appellant at 61, Bassett v. 

Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 284 S.E.2d 844 (1981) (Record No. 

810301). Neither the litigants nor the Court discussed the 

meaning of the phrases “record of convictions” in Code § 19.2-

264.2 or “prior history” in Code § 19.2-264.4(C). Instead, we 

11
were concerned only with subsection B of Code § 19.2-264.4, 

which states, “[E]vidence may be presented as to any matter 

which the court deems relevant to sentence.” The Court 

rejected the defendant’s argument, concluding that evidence of 

the sentences previously imposed on the defendant was relevant

to “the gravity of the offense and [the defendant’s] 

propensity for violence” under Code § 19.2-264.4(B) and, 

therefore, admissible. Bassett, 222 Va. at 858, 284 S.E.2d at 

853. 

 That the Court in Bassett did not purport to ascribe 

definitions to the terms “record of convictions” and “prior 

history” undercuts the majority’s reasoning. It is axiomatic 

that we cannot presume that the General Assembly, in enacting 

Code § 19.2-295.1, relied on our interpretation of statutory 

language in Bassett when we never undertook any such 

interpretation in the first place. Consequently, I turn to 

other canons of statutory interpretation to ascertain the 

General Assembly’s intent in Code § 19.2-295.1. 

In my view, a proper analysis begins with an examination 

of the words the General Assembly used, rather than those it 

did not. See Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 

547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003). The plain language of Code 

§ 19.2-295.1 requires the Commonwealth to present “the 

defendant’s prior criminal convictions by certified, attested 

12
or exemplified copies of the record of conviction.” Our 

decisions recognize the term “conviction” often embraces more 

than a jury’s verdict finding a defendant guilty. Rather, in 

contexts such as this one, it entails a “[j]udgment . . . 

entered on [the] verdict.” Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 

518, 520, 450 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1994) (emphasis added). In 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 589, 113 S.E. 707 (1922), this 

Court held: 

“[W]hen the context of the statute refers to the 

successive steps in a criminal case, or any 

particular stage of such a prosecution, as 

distinguished from others, th[e] words[, 

conviction or convicted,] apply simply and solely 

to the verdict of guilty; but where the reference 

is to the ascertainment of guilt in another 

proceeding, in its bearings upon the status or 

rights of the individual in a subsequent case, 

there a broader meaning attaches to the 

expressions, and a ‘conviction’ is not 

established, or a person deemed to have been 

‘convicted’ unless it is shown that a judgment 

has been pronounced upon the verdict.” 

Id. at 598, 113 S.E. at 710 (quoting People v. Fabian, 85 N.E. 

672, 675 (N.Y. 1908)); see also White v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 

611, 615−16 (1884). 

 In the context of a bifurcated trial under Code § 19.2-

295.1, the phrase “prior criminal convictions” refers to the 

“ascertainment of guilt in another proceeding” that will bear 

upon “the status or rights” of a defendant in a subsequent 

criminal adjudication. Smith, 134 Va. at 598, 113 S.E. at 

13
710. In my view, it does not refer to the mere verdict of 

guilt or “fact of conviction.” Thus, a defendant’s prior 

criminal convictions necessarily means the judgments 

pronounced upon verdicts of guilt. Id.

In this case, the Commonwealth carried out its statutory 

duty by introducing a certified copy of the order of judgment

pronounced upon a trial court’s verdict finding Gillispie 

guilty of grand larceny. Neither the majority nor the parties 

argue that there is anything anomalous about the inclusion of 

sentencing information in a trial court’s judgment of 

conviction. The majority concludes, however, that the 

Commonwealth can introduce “only the fact of conviction of a 

criminal offense, including the name of the crime, the date of 

the conviction and the court in which the conviction 

occurred.” To comply with the majority’s holding, redaction 

of a significant portion of information set forth in judgments 

of conviction, which are the most common and reliable 

documentation of a defendant’s “record of conviction,” will be 

required as a matter of course. I do not believe the General 

Assembly intended such an absurd result. See, e.g., Cook v. 

Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116, 594 S.E.2d 597, 87 (2004). 

14
 Nor is the majority’s conclusion in accord with the 

General Assembly’s purposes in enacting a bifurcated trial 

procedure for non-capital, felony cases. 

 When we know the object of a statute and are 

called upon to construe a phrase or a sentence 

which, standing alone, may be susceptible of 

different interpretations, we know of no safer rule 

than to take the statute by its four corners and 

critically examine it as a whole to ascertain the 

legislative intent, as manifested by its different 

provisions. If, upon such an examination, an 

interpretation can be made, consistent with the 

language used, which will carry into effect the 

object sought to be accomplished by the statute, 

that interpretation should be adopted, in preference 

to one which would be equally consistent with the 

language used, standing alone, but which would 

defeat, or tend to defeat, the manifest intent of 

the legislature. 

Harris v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 620, 625, 128 S.E. 578, 579 

(1925). 

Criminal punishment is the means by which an orderly 

state pursues the recognized ends of prevention, restraint, 

rehabilitation, deterrence, education, retribution, and 

restoration. 1.5 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law

§ 1.5 (2d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2007); see also Byrd v. 

Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 371, 375, 517 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1999) 

(“the purposes underlying the punishment of criminal conduct 

include deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 

retribution”). With these goals in mind, a jury has the duty 

to fix “a specific term of confinement that it considers to be 

15
an appropriate punishment under all the circumstances revealed 

by the evidence in the case.” Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 

Va. 104, 113, 532 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2000). We have held, “A 

jury should not be required to perform this critical and 

difficult responsibility without the benefit of all 

significant and appropriate information.” Id. That the 

effectiveness of previous attempts to rehabilitate, deter, or 

educate a particular defendant is “significant and appropriate 

information” for a jury to consider is beyond serious 

question. See Bassett, 222 Va. at 858, 284 S.E.2d at 853. 

Thus, in my view, the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting 

Code § 19.2-295.1 was to advance “truth in sentencing.” 

Fishback, 260 Va. at 113, 532 S.E.2d at 632. 

 The majority opinion, however, is not in accord with that 

purpose. If the majority believes the General Assembly had 

another purpose in mind when it enacted Code § 19.2-295.1, its 

opinion does not disclose it. 

The better view is that the General Assembly did not 

intend to limit the evidence admissible in the Commonwealth’s 

case in chief in the penalty phase of a non-capital, felony 

trial to the mere fact of a defendant’s prior convictions. I 

cannot ascribe a meaning to the provisions of Code § 19.2-

295.1 that would impede a jury’s ability to “fashion[] a 

sentence suitable both to [the] defendant and the offense.” 

16
Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 524, 465 S.E.2d 592, 

595 (1996). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and 

would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and find 

that the sentencing information at issue was properly admitted 

in the Commonwealth’s case in chief during the penalty phase 

of Gillispie’s trial. 

17