STATUS

OF

ALLEGATION PROGRAM

CALENDAR YEAR 2002

ANNUAL REPORT
CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OVERVIEW OF THE ALLEGATION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Protecting the Identity of Allegers .........................................3

Timeliness Goals ......................................................3

Quality Goal ..........................................................4

Alleger Feedback on Performance ........................................4

Discrimination Task Group ..............................................4

Resources Expended on Allegations .......................................5

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

General Trends .......................................................7

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Indian Point 2 & 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Davis-Besse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

D. C. Cook 1 & 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

San Onofre 2 & 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Salem/Hope Creek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

North Anna 1 & 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Oyster Creek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Palisades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Allegation Trends at Materials Licensees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Allegation Trends at Vendors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

APPENDIX 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

APPENDIX 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In SECY-94-089, "Response to the Report of the Review Team for Reassessment of the NRC's

Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation," the staff committed to have the Agency

Allegations Advisor (AAA) prepare an annual report for the Executive Director for Operations

(EDO) that assesses the conduct of the allegation program in each NRC office and region that

routinely handles allegations. This annual report fulfills that commitment. In this report, the

staff discusses allegation trends for reactor and materials licensees and vendors, and reviews

the resources expended on following up on technical allegations. Because the Office of

Investigations prepares an annual report covering the follow-up of allegations involving

wrongdoing, this report does not specifically address activities concerning allegations of

wrongdoing.

Overall, the allegation program has maintained the improvements realized in all areas in the

last two years. The findings from the Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 audits and NRC’s performance

measures for the allegation program indicate the improvements made in reviewing,

documenting, tracking, and completing evaluations of allegations continue. The quality of

communications with allegers has also been maintained. Based on the FY 2002 audit of the

allegation program, the program continues to achieve an outstanding effectiveness rating of

100%, similar to the ratings achieved in the last two years. Additionally, no inappropriate

disclosures of the identity of allegers occurred in FY 2002, continuing the performance of the

last two years. The timeliness goals for communications with allegers were met in all but a few

cases. 

As the figure to the right indicates, from 1998 through 2002 the number of allegations received

by the NRC remained fairly stable. After receiving increasing numbers of allegations in 1996

and 1997, the trend reversed significantly

in 1998, due to a) the emphasis the

Commission and the staff have placed,

and continue to place, on licensees

establishing and maintaining work

environments that encourage employees

to raise issues and b) the industry’s effort

to create and maintain such an

environment. Through this period, the

staff has increased the information

available to licensees when appropriate

by placing allegation statistics on the

NRC’s web page, referring more

allegations to licensees for evaluation and

reply, and discussing trends that emerge with licensees. For their part, licensees have used the

statistics on allegations and trend information provided by the staff as an opportunity to

understand why licensee employees are raising issues externally rather than using internal

reporting processes. In general, licensees have been responsive in addressing employee

concerns using internal processes and, as a consequence, more employees are using internal

mechanisms and fewer issues are coming to the NRC.
2

However, for some licensees the NRC continues to receive allegations in numbers that warrant

additional analysis. In preparing this report, a 5-year history of allegations was reviewed for

reactor and material licensees and vendors to identify adverse trends. Given the Commission’s

continuing emphasis on establishing and maintaining a safety conscious work environment, the

analysis focused on allegations that originated from onsite sources, either from licensee or

contractor employees, former employees, or anonymous sources. The staff identified eight

reactor sites for a more in-depth review: Indian Point 2 & 3, Davis-Besse, D.C. Cook 1 & 2, San

Onofre 2 & 3, Salem/Hope Creek, North Anna 1 & 2, Oyster Creek, and Palisades. Each of

these sites is discussed in the report. 

Only one materials licensee was the subject of allegations at a level that warranted additional

analysis, the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant. On the basis of allegation statistics for 2002,

the review did not identify any other materials licensees warranting additional review. 

Additionally, no vendors or contractors were the subject of allegations in sufficient number to

warrant additional review.

Over the last five years, the trend in

resources expended on the follow-up of

technical allegations has generally followed

the trend in allegations received. The

hours expended on allegation follow-up

decreased from approximately 64,000 in

FY 1998 to approximately 32,500 in FY

2002. Declines can also be attributed to

the continued effort to schedule allegation

followup activities during planned

inspections and refer more allegations to

licensees for evaluation and response. 

The extent to which this can be done is

limited by the NRC’s goals for timely closure of allegations and alleger identity protection, as

well as the willingness of licensees to conduct objective and complete reviews and provide

candid results back to the NRC.

In summary, the staff continues to emphasize addressing each allegation fully in a timely

manner and improvements seen in the implementation of the allegation program in the last two

years continue. 
3

OVERVIEW OF THE ALLEGATION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

The Commission established the allegation program to provide a way for individuals working in

NRC-regulated activities and members of the public to provide safety and regulatory concerns

directly to the NRC. The program includes a database that allows the staff to track concerns

submitted to the NRC to ensure that the concerns are evaluated and resolved in a timely

manner, consistent with the associated safety or risk significance, and that the results of NRC’s

evaluation are communicated to the individual who submitted the concerns, when appropriate.

The performance of the allegation program is measured against goals for protecting the identity

of allegers and conducting an appropriate review of all concerns in a timely manner. The goal

for protecting the identity of allegers is no inappropriate release of an alleger’s identity. 

Timeliness goals have been established for various stages of the process, including the

convening of an initial allegation review board (ARB) to evaluate the concerns, acknowledgment

correspondence to the alleger, and completion of the evaluation and closure with the alleger. 

The quality of the staff’s review and its correspondence with the alleger are assessed during

the annual audits. 

Protecting the Identity of Allegers

One element of the allegation program that is essential to its credibility is protecting the identity

of allegers to the extent possible. The goal is to have no substantiated complaints of the

inappropriate release of an alleger’s identity as determined by either the Office of Inspector

General (OIG) or the staff. In 2002, neither the OIG nor the staff substantiated an inappropriate

release of the identity of any allegers. 

Timeliness Goals

The initial ARB is conducted for the purpose of reviewing the allegation and assigning

appropriate staff actions for followup. The program requires an initial ARB to be held within 30

days of receiving an allegation. Two of the 751 ARBs held in 2002 did not meet this goal. In

the worst case, the metric was missed by 101 days. The allegation was sent by letter to a

regional inspector who happened to be on a rotational assignment. Mistaken for a routine

document change letter because of the envelope it arrived in, it was overlooked for prompt

response, until the alleger approached the resident inspectors and asked them if they had any

knowledge of the information submitted. The agency has since apologized to the alleger, and

as a result of a lessons learned review, made changes to the handling of all incoming mail,

especially for people who may be out of the office for extended periods of time. The second

late ARB was missed by 5 days.

Initial correspondence with the alleger acknowledges receipt of the allegation and documents

the specific concerns as understood by the NRC staff to ensure agreement prior to the staff

taking further action. The goals for issuing letters acknowledging receipt of allegations are 90

percent within 30 days and 100 percent within 45 days. The 45-day goal provides an

opportunity to contact the alleger by telephone to solicit additional information prior to sending a

letter acknowledging receipt to ensure complete understanding of the alleger’s concerns. 

These goals were met in every case except for the one allegation discussed above.
4

In March 2002, five months into the fiscal year, the NRC implemented new timeliness goals for

closing technical, non-wrongdoing, allegations. The new goals are to close 70 percent of the

allegations in 150 days or less; 90 percent of the allegations in 180 days or less; and 100

percent of the allegations in 360 days or less. As shown in the following table, of the 467

allegations closed in FY 2002, one remained open longer than 360 days. This allegation,

however, was closed prior to the new metric being implemented. 

Time to Close

Metric (Days) Total NMSS NRR RI RII RIII RIV

467 10 28 98 93 145 93

70%  150 83%-389 80%-8 89%-25 90%-89 78%-73 82%-120 79%-74

151  90%  180 96%-60 90%-1 96%-2 100%-9 100%-20 95%-18 90%-10

181  100%  360 99.8%-17 100%-1 100%-1 100%-7 98.9%-8

0% > 360 1 1

Quality Goal

The staff instituted a quality or effectiveness goal for the allegation program in FY 1999. The

goal is that staff follow-up of allegations appropriately captures and responds to each issue

raised in 90 percent of the allegations reviewed during the annual audit. During the FY 2002

audits, the staff found that all of the 60 allegations reviewed achieved this goal, resulting in a

quality or effectiveness rating of 100 percent for FY 2002. This is an improvement over last

year’s rating of 98.6 percent. This goal was also met in FY 1999 and FY 2000.

Alleger Feedback on Performance

On October 10, 2002, the Commission approved a recommendation by the staff to discontinue

the practice of surveying allegers. The surveys had been used to solicit feedback from allegers

on the performance of the allegation program. The response rate, however, had been

historically low, and as the program matured, significant changes resulting from the feedback

declined until little value was achieved. Closure correspondence continues to solicit feedback

from allegers should they have questions about the response or believe their concerns were not

adequately addressed.

Discrimination Task Group

Commissioned in April 2000, the Discrimination Task Group (DTG) was chartered to evaluate

the agency’s handling of employee protection issues and propose recommendations for

improvement. The group’s final report in April 2002 addressed 5 basic policy questions ranging

from, whether the NRC should be involved at all in whistleblowers concerns, to proposals for

Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) rulemaking, and ultimately proposed a number of

improvements. A senior management review team (SMRT) was established to review the final
1 Hours for materials allegations includes time spent by the regions and NMSS on allegations concerning

agreement state licensees. Time spent on issues concerning agreement state licensees is not tracked separately.

5

recommendations of the DTG and provide any additional perspectives that could enhance the

DTG options. Prepared by the SMRT, SECY 02-0166, in September 2002 proposed to the

Commission rulemaking which would require licensees to establish and maintain a SCWE. In

that rulemaking would take two to three years, the SMRT team recommended adoption of most

of the DTG’s recommendations in the interim. In late March 2003, the Commission responded

to the DTG and SMRT recommendations. The staff is in the process of implementing the

Commission’s guidance, which approved, in part, many of the recommendations of the DTG as

revised by the SMRT, and disapproved SCWE rulemaking. 

Resources Expended on Allegations

As part of this report, the resources expended on handling allegations were reviewed. Figure 3

shows the hours expended by the technical staff in handling allegations concerning reactor and

materials licensees1

. The graph shows a gradual decrease in the hours expended on

allegations from FY 1998 through FY 2002. As noted below, the changes are most heavily

influenced by the decline in the number of reactor-related allegations received and the

associated decline in the hours expended.

The number of hours expended per allegation can be greatly impacted by the number of issues

in an allegation. To account for this, Figure 4 displays the hours expended on a concern basis. 

While the trend curve is similar, the number of hours expended per concern is a more accurate

measure and is a more appropriate indicator of efficiency.
6

Figure 5 breaks down the hours expended on allegations into the total hours expended by NRR

and each region to ascertain each office’s performance. 

Figure 6 displays the labor rates for each office for FY 1998 through FY 2002.

Historically, NRR’s labor rate has been higher than the regions because the issues addressed

in NRR are the generic, more complex, technical issues involving the design bases and/or

licensing bases for nuclear power plants that sometimes involve a class of plants. Additionally,

it is more difficult to refer these types of issues to licensees or their contractors for review. The

regions refer a higher percentage of allegations to licensees which helps reduce their labor

rate. 
7

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS

The NRC monitors both technical and discrimination allegations to discern trends or sudden

increases that might justify the NRC questioning the licensee as to the root causes of such

changes or trends. In preparing this report, a 5-year history of allegations was reviewed for

reactor and material licensees and vendors.

With the continuing emphasis on establishing and maintaining a safety-conscious work

environment, the staff focused on those allegations that have the potential to provide insights

into the environment. To achieve this goal, the staff selected only those allegations submitted

by licensee or contractor employees or by former employees or by anonymous sources. The

staff is currently performing the analysis twice a year; in the first quarter of the calendar year to

support the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) end-of-cycle assessments and this annual report

and in the third quarter to support the ROP mid-cycle assessments. In addition, an analysis for

a particular site or licensee may be performed whenever allegations or inspection findings

indicate it is warranted. The discussions in the sections on trends concerning reactor and

materials licensees and vendors or contractors are based on allegations from onsite sources

and are calendar year trends, rather than fiscal year trends. Calendar year trends are used to

be consistent with the ROP cycle.

The staff also reviews trends in allegations to identify national trends for reactor and materials

allegations, shifts in users of the allegation program, and impact on the workload in the regions,

NRR and NMSS. These trends are discussed in the next section on general trends.

General Trends

National trends are of interest because they are used in developing budget assumptions, labor

rates, and preparing operating plans. As the following graphs indicate, there can be significant

changes in the number of allegations received due to internal and external influences. Figure 7

below shows the 5-year national trend. For CY 2002, it is evident from Figure 7 that allegations

received by the NRC have remained fairly stable of the last five years. 

As stated above, the staff also looks for trends in the workload by organization, disciplines or

departments from which allegations originate,

and the sources of allegations. The allegation

tracking software that was deployed in October

1996 provides for tracking the source category

for each allegation and the discipline for each 

concern. With five years of data available, the

staff is analyzing and reporting statistics at the

allegation level and at the concern level. The

concern level analyses produce a better picture

of the allegation workload and allow the staff to

track whether individual concerns are

substantiated. 
8

Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 show the shift of allegation workload in the regions at the concern or

issue level. With the NRC’s budget prepared two years in advance, budgeted resources may

not reflect the actual workload in the organization when shifts in workload occur as happens

with allegations.

While the number of issues or concerns received remained steady agency-wide from 2001 to

2002, Figures 8 - 11 show that impact is not evenly distributed across the regions. While most

regions experienced small increases, the number of issues received by Region II declined,

particularly in the reactor area. This decline can partly be attributed to resolved union issues at

one reactor site. Increases in materials concerns in RII are a result of post September 11, 2001

fuel facility security issues. The drop in materials-related issues in Region I can be largely

attributed to a drop in the number of issues received concerning decommissioned reactors.
9

To provide further insights into the areas in which the NRC is spending resources on reactorrelated allegation followup, the following graphs depict the ten areas that represent

approximately 80 percent of the issues received nationwide and the distribution of those issues

in NRR and the four regions.

HP - Health Physics or Radiation Protection, QA/QC - Quality Assurance/Quality Control, FFD - Fitness For Duty
10

Because the activities performed by materials licensees are not as homogeneous as those

performed by reactor licensees, a comparison at the “Discipline” level doesn’t produce

meaningful results. To provide further insights into the areas in which the NRC is spending

resources on materials-related allegations, the following graphs depict the nine licensee

categories that represent approximately 80 percent of the issues received nationwide and the

distribution of those issues in NMSS and the four regions.

Decom - Decommissioning Reactor or Materials Site, R&D - Research & Development Company
11

Figures 24 and 25 provide a breakdown of allegations received by categories of sources for the

last three years for reactor and materials allegations. For reactor-related allegations, there has

been a steady decline in allegations received from anonymous sources. Anecdotal information

might suggest this is a result of improved safety conscious work environment initiatives.

In comparing the sources for materials vs. reactor-related allegations, private citizens are a

more prevalent source for materials-related allegations and contractor employees are less

prevalent. This is logical because materials licensees’ activities are more visible to the public

and involve fewer contractors.
12

Two of the categories deserve some explanation. The source category “NRC” is used for when

the NRC staff suspects a violation of requirements is deliberate or due to careless disregard

and the Office of Investigations opens an investigation. The category “Licensee” is used for the

same kinds of issues that are reported by a licensee to the NRC. An allegation number is used

to track the followup on the technical and wrongdoing aspects of the issue. 

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites

As noted previously, the trending of allegations received concerning individual reactor sites is

one method the NRC staff uses to monitor the work environment at reactor sites. Statistics on

allegations received concerning all operating reactor sites are given in the table in Appendix 1. 

The table covers the period January 1998 through December 2002 and includes statistics on

onsite allegations received.

In determining which reactor sites should receive a more in-depth review, the staff applied the

following criteria:

1) The number of allegations received exceeds 2 times the median value for the industry, but

does not exceed three times the median, and there is a 50 percent increase in the number of

allegations received over the previous year, or;

2) The number of allegations received exceeds 3 times the median value.

For CY 2002, the median number of allegations per reactor site was four. The eight reactor

sites that met one of these criteria are Indian Point 2 & 3 (28), Davis-Besse (27), D.C. Cook 1 &

2 (14), San Onofre 2 & 3 (12), Salem/Hope Creek (11), North Anna 1 & 2 (10), Oyster Creek

(9), and Palisades (9). The first three sites exceeded 3 times the industry median of four

allegations. The remaining five sites exceeded 2 times the median and experienced more than

a 50 percent increase in the number of allegations concerning the site. A more detailed

discussion of each of these sites follows.

Indian Point 2 & 3

As illustrated by Figure 26, allegations at the Indian Point site have notably increased. 

Approximately 75% of the allegations received at Indian Point 2 & 3 were in the security area. 

While most plants across the country have

received a general increase in security-related

allegations since the September 11, 2001

terrorism attacks, Indian Point’s increase has

been pronounced. 

Entergy, the current owner and operator of both

Indian Point units, purchased the Indian Point 2

facility from Consolidated Edison Company, and

the Indian Point 3 facility from New York Power

Authority in the fall of 2001. At the time of the

purchase, security at Indian Point 2 was

provided by Wackenhut, a contract guard force. Security at Indian Point 3 was provided by a
13

utility guard force. The guard forces at each unit remained under separate bargaining units

until the guard forces were consolidated in March 2003.

In 2002, a consultant completed an independent assessment for Entergy of guard force issues

raised internally at Unit 2. After a number of security concerns were raised to the NRC and the

media late in 2002, Entergy also completed an internal assessment in 2003 of guard force

concerns at both units. Entergy evaluated the security concerns and initiated actions to

address them. 

Since the terrorist attacks, the NRC has issued several Orders and threat advisories to Entergy

and all other nuclear utilities to enhance security capabilities and improve guard force

readiness. These orders required enhancements to the security programs at all nuclear power

reactors. The enhancements required by those orders addressed many of the issues that have

been raised regarding the security program at Indian Point.

The NRC conducted inspections of Entergy’s implementation of the requirements in the orders,

monitored Entergy’s actions, and confirmed that the enhancements were being effectively

implemented and security has been strengthened. Additional actions by the licensee have

been taken recently in response to some substantiated allegations in this area. The NRC plans

to continue inspections of the security program and maintain a heightened level of oversight at

Indian Point.

With regard to allegations of discrimination, of the eight raised in 2002, a prima-facie showing

of potential discrimination was not articulated for five of them and these allegations have been

closed. Three, however, were open as of January 1, 2003 and under investigation. Of the four

allegations of discrimination raised in 2001, one remained open at the time of this report. The

NRC did not substantiate any allegation of discrimination at either Indian Point facility in 2001 or

2002. The NRC staff will continue to monitor the open allegations of discrimination, as well as

the general allegation trend at the Indian Point site.

Davis-Besse

As indicated in Figure 27, there has been a significant rise in the number of allegations since

the March 2002 discovery of the degraded reactor vessel head and subsequent shutdown. The

licensee’s analyses of this event identified

weaknesses in its safety culture. The licensee

also identified a lack of employee confidence in

their Employee Concerns Program. The licensee

has initiated corrective action in both these areas. 

The NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter

documenting the licensee’s commitment to not

return the plant to service without NRC

authorization. The agency’s continuing oversight

of Davis-Besse performance is being

accomplished by an Oversight Panel under NRC

Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, “Oversight of Operating Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown

Condition with Performance Problems.” That oversight includes consideration of allegation
14

trends and the licensee’s initiatives to address weaknesses in the safety culture and safety

conscious work environment (SCWE). 

Similar to other sites reviewed, a review of the disciplines that were the subject of the

allegations received in 2002 showed an increasing trend in Security. Not surprisingly,

considering the attention paid on the reactor vessel head issue, increasing trends were also

indicated in Engineering and Health Physics. Lastly, the allegation data supported the

licensee’s concern with their SCWE.

There were fourteen allegations of discrimination in 2002 concerning activities at the DavisBesse site. As of January 1, 2003, ten of the fourteen were closed because a prima-facie

showing of potential discrimination was not articulated and four remained open and were being

investigated by the agency. Since mid-2001, the NRC has issued one Severity Level IV Notice

of Violation (NOV) for an act of discrimination that occurred in 2001. 

The staff will continue to monitor the general trend of allegations, trends in the licensee’s

internal reporting programs, and the outcome of investigations into the allegations of

discrimination.

D. C. Cook 1 & 2

Figure 28 displays a trend that is consistent with trends exhibited by other plants that have been

through extended shutdowns. The increase in allegations from 1998 to 2000 was indicative of

the effects of an increased workforce and

subsequent workforce reductions. 

No discipline trends are evident in the allegation

data for 2002. However, the NRC continues to

receive a high number of allegations of

discrimination compared to other reactor sites;

six in 1999, six in 2000, five in 2001, and seven

in 2002. Since mid-2000, the NRC has issued

two NOVs for discriminatory acts by contractors

that occurred in 1998 and 1999. In both cases

the staff did not issue a civil penalty because of

the broad and/or prompt corrective actions taken by the licensee. Of the seven allegations of

discrimination received in 2002, one remained open as of January 1, 2003 pending completion

of an NRC investigation and the remaining allegations either did not make a prima-facie

showing for potential discrimination and were closed or were investigated and insufficient

evidence was found to substantiate the allegation. 

At the time of this report, the NRC had three allegations of discrimination under investigation. 

The staff will continue to monitor the outcome of the open discrimination allegations and the

general allegation trend.
15

San Onofre 2 & 3

Although the number of allegations received from onsite sources at the San Onofre site have

notably increased from 2001 to 2002, over the

5-year period analyzed (1998 through 2002)

the trend is relatively flat. The number of

allegations of discrimination remained fairly

steady (one to three) over this same period. 

Of the two allegations of discrimination

received by the NRC in 2002, one remained

open at the time of this report pending

completion of the NRC’s investigation, while

the other was investigated and closed after

insufficient evidence was found to

substantiate the allegation.

A review of the subject disciplines of the allegations received in 2002 revealed no trend, other

than in the area of security. As with other sites around the country, security issues continue to

be raised in response to heightened concerns at the plants after the terrorism attacks of

September 11, 2001. 

The licensee continues to take actions to assess and improve their work environment, including

surveys of the safety culture and safety conscious work environment. The NRC will continue to

monitor the licensee’s initiatives to assess their impact on the general allegation trends as well

as monitor resolution of the one open allegation of discrimination.

Salem/Hope Creek

As indicated in Figure 30, there has been a significant rise in the number of allegations at the

Salem/Hope Creek site in 2002. Similar to

other sites across the country, and particularly

in the northeast, there is an uptrend in securityrelated allegations. Nearly 25% of allegations

received at the NRC concerning the

Salem/Hope Creek site were security-related. 

No other trends were noted in the NRC data. 

Discussions with the licensee indicate that

security concerns were also the focus of their

internal program’s increased activity. 

Additional training is being conducted to

address the concerns in this area.

The NRC issued one Notice of Violation in the last five years for a discriminatory act that

occurred in 1998. Three allegations of discrimination were received by the NRC in 2002 and,

as of January 1, 2003, all were still being investigated by the agency. The licensee conducted

quarterly surveys of their safety conscious work environment in 2002 and got generally positive

responses from the workforce. In the fourth quarter the ratings worsened somewhat, in

response, the licensee believes, to increased safety performance expectations. 
16

The NRC will continue to monitor the resolution of the open allegations of discrimination, their

impact on the safety conscious work environment and the general trend of allegations.

North Anna 1 & 2

The majority of the allegations received by the agency in 2002 from North Anna involve

concerns associated with their reactor vessel head replacement. An increase in concerns

associated with such a significant event is not

unexpected and the licensee has also seen an

increase in concerns going to their internal

employee concerns program. The licensee also

suspects that the purchase of Millstone in mid2001 and subsequent integration of processes

and cultures in 2002 may also have contributed

to increased concerns in 2002. 

There has only been one allegation of

discrimination raised in the five-year period

reviewed, and it was received in 2002. This

allegation was not raised by the person who

was the subject of the alleged discrimination

and therefore was not investigated further by the NRC and was closed.

The NRC will continue to monitor general allegation trends at the North Anna site.

Oyster Creek

After declining for several years, the volume of allegations concerning the Oyster Creek site

has increased each of the last two years. A review of the individual issues found no pattern or

trend in the disciplines involved. However, with

regard to allegations of discrimination, there has

been a notable increase from one each of the

last four years to four in 2002. The licensee

underwent significant staff reductions in 2002

and concerns regarding the selection process

may have contributed to the higher number of

allegations of discrimination last year. 

There has not been a substantiated allegation of

discrimination in the last five years at Oyster

Creek. However, in March 2002, the NRC found

that an Exelon corporate manager deliberately discriminated against an employee of their

Byron Station. The NRC exercised enforcement discretion with regard to issuing an NOV and

civil penalty, however, on October 3, 2002 the agency issued a Confirmatory Order that

impacted all of the licensee’s operating facilities, including Oyster Creek. That order required,

among other things, training for all levels of management on the provisions of employee

protection regulations. Two allegations of discrimination concerning Oyster Creek specifically

were filed with the NRC in 2002. As of January 1, 2003, both remained open and under

investigation. 
17

The NRC will continue to monitor the open allegations of discrimination, their impact on the

safety conscious work environment, and the general allegation trend.

Palisades

In the last five years, the NRC has received few allegations concerning Palisades. In 2002, the

number of allegations increased substantially. The majority of the allegations received

involved security-related issues. The concerns

primarily involved security guard force working

hours and related Fitness-for-Duty concerns. 

These concerns were precipitated by increased

demands on the plant security workforce coupled

with recent security management changes. The

NRC has engaged the licensee regarding this

increasing trend in security concerns. In late 2002,

the number of allegations regarding plant security

subsided. Increased licensee management

involvement in resolving security-related concerns

appears to have been effective in the short term. 

The NRC will continue to monitor the open security allegations and the general allegations

trend. 

With regard to allegations of discrimination, only two allegations were received during the five

years reviewed and those were received in 2002. At the time of this report, the NRC continued

to review one of those allegations, while the other did not make a prima-facie showing of

potential discrimination and was closed. The NRC will monitor the outcome of the open

investigation on the licensee’s safety conscious work environment.

Allegation Trends at Materials Licensees

Because of the small number of allegations received concerning individual materials licensees

and because of the potential for a licensee or contractor to identify an alleger, tables of

statistics on allegations concerning these two categories have not been included in this report. 

With the exception of the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant, none of the contractors or licensees

received a sufficient number of allegations in FY 2002 to discern an adverse trend or pattern.

On December 20, 1999, the staff issued a Severity Level II Notice of Violation and an $88,000

civil penalty to the licensee for a substantiated allegation of discrimination at the Paducah

facility. Although, the licensee denied that it had discriminated against the alleger, the licensee

initiated extensive actions to address the issue. The U. S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC)

hired a consulting firm to perform a site-wide survey of the work environment at both its

Paducah and Portsmouth facilities. At a subsequent public meeting, USEC presented a

summary of the results of the survey and committed to address issues identified as needing

improvement. During the meeting, USEC requested additional time to develop specific

corrective actions and the staff granted USEC’s request. 

The actions USEC took included (1) improvements to the Employee Concerns Program, (2)

training for supervisors and managers in how to how to deal with employees who raise issues in

a constructive manner, (3) training for employees in how to raise issues and their rights and
18

responsibilities, and (4) training for senior management in detecting and preventing retaliation. 

To assess the effectiveness of these actions, in May 2000, USEC conducted another

assessment of the work environment using the same independent consultant. Employee

responses to the May 2000 assessment provided very good ratings for nuclear safety culture

and safety conscious work environment. Both ratings had improved 5 percent from the

previous rating.

As displayed in Figure 34, since 2000 there continues to be a decline in the number of

allegations at Paducah. The number of allegations in calender 2002 was less than half the

number received in 2000. The number of

allegations of discrimination has declined to 5 in

2002 dropping from 14 in 2000. Two of the five

remained open and under investigation at the time

of this report, while the others did not make a primafacie showing for potential discrimination and were

closed.

While it appears the actions taken by the certificatee

are having a positive effect, the NRC staff continues

to receive allegations that some Paducah

employees are reluctant to use the certificatee's internal process to raise safety concerns. In

August 2002 the NRC staff held a public meeting with the certificatee to discuss its efforts to

maintain a safety conscious work environment. The certificatee's analysis, presented at the

meeting, confirmed an overall improvement in the safety conscious work environment at

Paducah with a need for a continued management focus in at least one area. Based on the

current downward trend in the number of allegations at Paducah and the certificatee's efforts to

improve the safety conscious work environment, the NRC plans no additional actions other then

continuing to monitor the open allegations of discrimination and the general allegation trend.

Allegation Trends at Vendors

Because none of the vendors or contractors received a sufficient number of allegations to

discern a trend or pattern, or provide insights into the work environment, more in-depth reviews

were not performed. Statistics by contractor or vendor are not given in this report because

publishing the number of allegations received has the potential of identifying the alleger.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the implementation of the allegation program has maintained the improvements made

in recent years. The findings from the audits and NRC’s performance measures for the

allegation program indicate improvements continue in receiving, documenting, tracking, and

completing evaluations of allegations. The quality of communications with allegers has also

improved. Although there has been a general improvement in the handling of allegations, the

timeliness goals have not been met in all cases. In the most egregious of issues, corrective

actions have been taken to address the cause of the untimely actions.

As noted in the previous discussions of specific licensees, the analysis of allegations has

provided insights into the work environment at several facilities. The staff continues to take a

deliberately measured approach in addressing work environment issues with licensees. To
19

date, licensees have been responsive to this approach and have taken action to address the

staff’s concerns. As this report indicates, the staff continues to monitor work environment

issues at several facilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The staff has no recommendations for program changes at this time.
20

APPENDIX 1

ALLEGATIONS STATISTICS – OPERATING REACTORS
21

ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED FROM ONSITE SOURCES

Site 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

ARKANSAS 1 & 2 22533

BEAVER VALLEY 1 & 2 24371

BRAIDWOOD 1 & 2 4 13 14 5 5

BROWNS FERRY 2 & 3 6 4 4 2 2

BRUNSWICK 1 & 2 91111

BYRON 1 & 2 16 22 14 20 12

CALLAWAY 3 5 9 6 7

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 & 2 1 6 3 2 3

CATAWBA 1 & 2 1 3 0 7 0

CLINTON 12 9 10 1 3

COLUMBIA PLANT 6 4 0 13 5

COMANCHE PEAK 1 & 2 45552

COOK 1 & 2 11 19 22 12 14

COOPER 4 2 1 8 6

CRYSTAL RIVER 3 3 4 2 2

DAVIS-BESSE 1 3 0 2 27

DIABLO CANYON 1 & 2 17 4 6 6 3

DRESDEN 2 & 3 7 3 12 32 11

DUANE ARNOLD 1 4 2 3 2

FARLEY 1 & 2 5 3 8 3 1

FERMI 2 1 4 3 4

FITZPATRICK 3 1 6 1 1

FORT CALHOUN 5 1 1 2 2

GINNA 0 2 1 0 1

GRAND GULF 4 2 3 5 6

HARRIS 1 & 2 6 3 1 1 6

HATCH 1 & 2 8 6 12 2 3

INDIAN POINT 2 & 3 15 13 20 18 28

KEWAUNEE 0 1 0 4 3

LASALLE 1 & 2 7 11 4 2 1

LIMERICK 1 & 2 2 1 2 2 7

MCGUIRE 1 & 2 1 0 1 0 0
22

MILLSTONE 2 & 3 23 22 8 2 7

MONTICELLO 0 3 1 0 0

NINE MILE POINT 1 & 2 16 7 11 4 5

NORTH ANNA 1 & 2 0 0 4 1 10

OCONEE 1, 2, & 3 5 4 2 5 1

OYSTER CREEK 7 6 3 5 9

PALISADES 1 0 0 4 9

PALO VERDE 1, 2, & 3 4 4 3 3 1

PEACH BOTTOM 2 & 3 1 1 4 2 1

PERRY 3 4 7 7 5

PILGRIM 3 5 2 3 2

POINT BEACH 1 & 2 5 6 5 7 7

PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 & 2 1 3 0 0 5

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 9 5 6 1 3

RIVER BEND 1 9 2 1 1

ROBINSON 0 1 0 1 0

SALEM/HOPE CREEK 9 1 1 3 11

SAN ONOFRE 2 & 3 7 15 15 7 12

SEABROOK 42336

SEQUOYAH 1 & 2 4 4 7 2 5

SOUTH TEXAS 1 & 2 10 13 10 4 6

ST LUCIE 1 & 2 27 36 9 25 11

SUMMER 0 1 3 3 2

SURRY 1 & 2 10424

SUSQUEHANNA 1 & 2 8 8 13 15 9

THREE MILE ISLAND 0 0 1 5 5

TURKEY POINT 3 & 4 12 11 12 11 2

VERMONT YANKEE 90204

VOGTLE 1 & 2 2 3 0 1 3

WATERFORD 4 4 2 2 7

WATTS BAR 6 6 4 4 8

WOLF CREEK 86641
23

APPENDIX 2

DESCRIPTION OF THE ALLEGATION PROCESS
24

DESCRIPTION OF THE ALLEGATION PROCESS

All of the regions and offices generally follow the same basic process in receiving, processing,

and evaluating allegations. The Allegation Coordinator is the focal point for receiving,

processing, and closing allegations and communicating with allegers. All incoming written

allegations are forwarded to the Allegation Coordinator and calls to the toll-free safety hotline

are directed automatically to the regional Allegation Coordinators according to the geographical

location of the caller, i.e., an alleger's call is directed to the region that covers the alleger’s

location.

The Allegation Coordinator reviews the incoming allegations to determine whether the issues

involve reactor, material, or vendor issues and the immediacy of safety issues. An Allegation

Review Board (ARB) is scheduled on the basis of this review. The Allegation Coordinator

prepares the material for the ARBs, guides the ARB members on implementing the allegation

process, and keeps the minutes for the ARB meetings. ARBs normally meet once a week and

allegations are usually discussed within 2 weeks of receipt. Following the ARB meeting, the

Allegation Coordinator notes the directions to the staff in the allegation tracking system. The

responsible division director or a designee chairs the ARB. Other ARB participants include

technical staff and managers and, in cases involving wrongdoing, the regional counsel and a

representative from the Office of Investigations (OI) field office. Letters acknowledging receipt

of the allegation are usually sent to allegers after the ARB meets. 

The assignment of allegations for evaluation and closure varies slightly between the regions

and offices. Generally, the technical staff evaluates technical allegations and sends a copy of

an inspection report or a memorandum to the Allegation Coordinator with the result of the

evaluation. The Allegation Coordinator reviews the information and, if all of the issues have

been sufficiently addressed, prepares a closure letter to the alleger based on the information

provided. If the issues have not been addressed, the allegation and the evaluation are usually

discussed at a subsequent ARB meeting to determine what additional actions are necessary to

complete the evaluation and close the allegation.

For wrongdoing issues for which OI completes an investigation and determines whether the

allegation was substantiated, the report of investigation serves as a basis for responding to the

alleger. The responsible technical division will review the OI report and will either provide input

to or prepare a draft closure letter to the alleger. If OI does not complete the investigation to

the point at which OI can determine if wrongdoing occurred, the Allegation Coordinator

prepares a closure letter informing the alleger that because of limited resources and the relative

safety significance of the issue, the investigation was terminated without reaching a conclusion

about whether wrongdoing occurred.