TN: DT-01-03

To: NRC Management Directives Custodians

Subject: Transmittal of Directive 8.3, “NRC Incident Investigation

Program”

Purpose: Directive and Handbook 8.3 are being revised in their entirety

to more broadly address the risk-significant criteria regarding

the activation criteria for Incident Investigation Teams and

Augmented Inspection Teams. The revision also includes a

reference regarding Special Inspections. In addition, because

of the AEOD/IRO reorganization, MD 8.3 is being revised, in

part, to clearly designate the Director of Incident Response

Operations (IRO) as the individual responsible for administering

the Incident Investigation Program to meet the objectives set

forth in IRO's mission. Finally, MD 8.3 is being revised to

require that the resolution of staff actions be documented by

the assigned NRC lead office and tracked by the EDO's Work

Item Tracking System (WITS).

Office and 

Division of Origin: Office of Incident Response Operations

Contact: Peter J. Prescott, (301) 415-7591

Date Approved: March 31, 1997 (Revised: March 27, 2001)

Volume: 8 Licensee Oversight Programs

Directive: 8.3 NRC Incident Investigation Program

Availability: Rules and Directives Branch

Office of Administration

Michael T. Lesar, (301) 415-7163

Christy Moore, (301) 415-7086

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DIRECTIVE TRANSMITTAL

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
NRC Incident

Investigation Program

Directive

8.3
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Directive 8.3

Approved: March 31, 1997 iii

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Contents

Policy ................................................. 1

Objectives ............................................. 1

Organizational Responsibilities and

Delegations of Authority ............................ 2

Commission ............................................. 2

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) ........................ 2

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) .................... 2

Office Directors and Regional Administrators .................... 3

Applicability ........................................... 3

Handbook .............................................. 3

References ............................................ 3
Approved: March 31, 1997 1

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Volume: 8 Licensee Oversight Programs IRO

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Directive 8.3

Policy

(8.3-01)

It is the policy of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to

ensure that significant operational events involving reactor and

materials facilities licensed by the NRC are investigated in a timely,

objective, systematic, and technically sound manner; that the

factual information pertaining to each event is documented; and that

the cause or causes of each event are ascertained. The events

may involve responses by an incident investigation team (IIT) or

less formal responses by an augmented inspection team (AIT) or

a special inspection team (SIT), depending upon the level of

response required.

Objectives

(8.3-02)

• To promote public health and safety, instill public confidence,

and provide for the common defense and security by reducing

the frequency of incidents and preventing accidents. (021)

• To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NRC regulatory

programs and licensee operations by the prompt dissemination

of the facts, conditions, circumstances, and causes of

significant operational events and the identification of

appropriate followup actions. (022)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Directive 8.3

2 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Objectives

(8.3-02) (continued)

• To improve regulatory oversight of licensee activities by

uncovering facts that may indicate a need to reevaluate whether

a particular aspect of the regulatory process before the event

contributed directly to the cause or course of the event. (023)

• To ensure that IIT, AIT, and SIT findings are properly

dispositioned. (024)

Organizational Responsibilities and

Delegations of Authority

(8.3-03)

Commission

(031)

Approves the followup actions assigned as a result of IIT

investigations.

Executive Director for Operations (EDO)

(032)

Approves an IIT investigation of a significant operational event and

ensures that resultant followup actions are taken, as defined in

Parts I and II of Handbook 8.3.

Director, Incident Response 

Operations (IRO)

(033)

Administers the incident investigation program with the assistance

of other NRC offices. In addition, establishes and maintains an NRC

investigatory capability and identifies and coordinates training

requirements for IIT candidates, as defined in Part I of Handbook 8.3.
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Directive 8.3

Approved: March 31, 1997 3

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Organizational Responsibilities and

Delegations of Authority

(8.3-03) (continued)

Office Directors and 

Regional Administrators

(034)

Participate in the incident investigation program as defined in this

directive and handbook.

Applicability

(8.3-04)

The policy and guidance of this directive and handbook apply to all

NRC employees. 

Handbook

(8.3-05)

The handbook discusses the major components of the NRC's

response to significant operational events (i.e., Incident

Investigation, Augmented Inspection, and Special Inspection).

References

(8.3-06)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Inspection Manual Chapter 1301, “Response to Radioactive

Material Incidents That Do Not Require Activation of the NRC

Incident Response Plan.”

— 1302, “Action Levels for Radiation Exposures and

Contamination Associated With Materials Events Involving

Members of the Public.” 
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Directive 8.3

4 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

References

(8.3-06) (continued)

Inspection Procedure 71153, “Event Followup.”

— 93800, “Augmented Inspection Team.”

— 93812, “Special Inspection.”

IRO Administrative Procedure 12, “Incident Investigation Team

Administrative Requirements.”

Management Directive 8.2, “NRC Incident Response Program.”

— 8.5, “Operational Safety Data Review.”

— 8.10, “NRC Medical Event Assessment Program.”

NUREG-1303, “Incident Investigation Manual.”
NRC Incident

Investigation Program

Handbook

8.3
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Parts I - III

Approved: March 31, 1997 iii

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Contents

Part I

Major Components and Responsibilities of the Program ...... 1

Coverage (A) ............................................ 1

Incident Investigation Team (IIT) (1) ......................... 1

Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) (2) ....................... 1

Special Inspection (SI) (3) ................................ 2

Licensee and Licensed Operations (4) ....................... 2

Significant Operational Event (5) ........................... 2

Responsibilities (B) ........................................ 9

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) (1) ................... 9

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) (2) ............... 9

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) (3) .......... 10

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards (NMSS) (4) ............................... 11

Office of the Chief Information Officer (5) ..................... 12

Director, Office of Administration (6) ......................... 12

Director, Office of Human Resources (7) ..................... 13

Regional Administrators (8) ............................... 13

Director, Office of Public Affairs (9) ......................... 14

Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (10) ............ 14

Office of the General Counsel (11) .......................... 15

Director, Office of Congressional Affairs (12) .................. 15

Office of the Inspector General (13) ......................... 15

Office of Investigations (OI) (14) ........................... 15

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (15) ...................... 16

Part II

Incident Investigation Team ............................... 17

Objectives of an Incident Investigation Team (A) ................... 17

Scope of an Incident Investigation (B) .......................... 17

Schedule (C) ............................................ 18

Team Composition and Qualifications (D) ........................ 19

Duties (E) .............................................. 20
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Parts I - III

iv Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Contents (continued)

Part II (continued)

Conduct of an Investigation (F) ............................... 23

Followup (G) ............................................ 24

Part III

Augmented Inspection Team .............................. 26

Objectives of an Augmented Inspection Team (A) .................. 26

Scope of an Augmented Inspection (B) ......................... 26

Schedule (C) ............................................ 27

Team Composition and Qualifications (D) ........................ 27

Duties (E) .............................................. 28

Conduct of an Augmented Inspection (F) ........................ 32

Followup (G) ............................................ 33
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

Approved: March 31, 1997 1

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Part I

Major Components and Responsibilities of

the Program

Coverage (A)

“Incident investigation” is a formal process conducted for the

purpose of accident prevention. The process includes gathering and

analyzing information; determining findings and conclusions,

including the cause(s) of a significant operational event; and

disseminating the investigation results for NRC, industry, and public

review. The components of the process follow.

Incident Investigation Team (IIT) (1)

This group consists of technical experts who, to the extent

practicable, do not have, and have not had, previous significant

involvement with licensing and inspection activities at the affected

facility and who perform the single NRC investigation of a significant

operational event as described in Part II of this handbook. An NRC

senior manager leads the IIT. Each IIT reports directly to the

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and is independent of

regional and headquarters office management.

Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) (2)

This group consists of technical experts from the region in which the

incident took place, augmented by personnel from headquarters or

other regions or by contractors. The group performs an inspection

of a significant operating event as described in Part III of this

handbook. AIT members may have had prior involvement with

licensing and inspection activities at the affected facility. The AIT

reports directly to the appropriate regional administrator.
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

2 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Coverage (A) (continued)

Special Inspection (SI) (3)

This inspection is similar to an AIT inspection except that the group

generally is smaller (the number of members is based on

management's judgment) and is generally not augmented by

personnel from headquarters or other regions or by contractors.

The special inspection team (SIT) reports directly to the

appropriate regional administrator. Inspection Procedure 93812,

“Special Inspection,” provides implementing procedures for SIs. 

Licensee and Licensed Operations (4)

The licensee is an individual or organization that is authorized by the

Commission to conduct activities under a license issued by the

NRC. (a)

Licensed operations are those activities or facility operations that

are permitted under an NRC license. (b)

Significant Operational Event (5)

A significant operational event is any radiological, safeguards, or

other safety-related operational event at an NRC-licensed facility

that poses an actual or a potential hazard to public health and

safety, property, or the environment. A significant operational event

also may be referred to as “an incident.” (a)

The decision regarding an “investigatory response” for a significant

operational event is defined by its risk significance, complexity, and

generic safety implications. Significant operational power reactor

events are evaluated on the basis of both deterministic criteria and

risk significance such as conditional core damage probability

(CCDP) in order to define the level of investigatory response. Other

significant operational events (e.g., material, non-power reactor,

and safeguards events) are currently evaluated on the basis of

deterministic criteria in order to define the level of investigatory

response. (b)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

Approved: March 31, 1997 3

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Coverage (A) (continued)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

Significant events may involve responses by an IIT or less formal

responses by an AIT or an SIT, depending upon the level of

response deemed appropriate. The level of investigatory response

for significant power reactor events is based on both the

deterministic criteria and the risk criteria included in this section. (c)

Upon notification of a significant operational power reactor event,

the regional administrator and staff should perform the initial review

to assess the safety significance of the event in order to assess the

level of response required. (The Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research [RES] will provide risk analysis support [coordinated by

the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)] to the regions for

power reactor events that warrant at least consideration of an AIT.

Risk analysis support for events for which only consideration of the

need for an SI may be warranted will be provided if requested by

the regional administrator.) (d)

If the initial review indicates that the event warrants at least

consideration of an AIT response, the regional administrator shall

consult with the Director of Incident Response Operations (IRO)

and the Director of NRR (power reactor events) or the Director of

the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS)

(materials events) to decide if an AIT or an IIT response is

appropriate on the basis of their collective judgment. (e)

Upon notification of a significant operational event at a non-power

reactor, the Director of NRR and staff should perform the initial

review to assess the safety significance of the event to determine

the level of response required. (f)

If the results of the initial review conclude that the event warrants

at least consideration of an AIT response, the Director of NRR
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

4 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Coverage (A) (continued)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

shall consult with the Director of IRO and the appropriate regional

administrator to decide if an AIT or an IIT is the proper

response. (g)

If an IIT is agreed upon, the initiating office makes that

recommendation to the EDO. Differences among offices concerning

whether an AIT or an IIT is the proper response are submitted to

the EDO for resolution. (h)

• Significant operational power reactor events meeting the

following deterministic criteria should be evaluated for risk to aid

in determining the level of response, if any. These events may

include significant unplanned degraded conditions identified by

the licensee or NRC. Plant configurations due solely to planned

maintenance need not be considered. (i)

– Involved operations that exceeded, or were not included in,

the design bases of the facility (a)

– Involved a major deficiency in design, construction, or

operation having potential generic safety implications (b)

– Led to a significant loss of integrity of the fuel, the primary

coolant pressure boundary, or the primary containment

boundary of a nuclear reactor (c)

– Led to the loss of a safety function or multiple failures in

systems used to mitigate an actual event (d)

– Involved possible adverse generic implications (e)

– Involved significant unexpected system interactions (f)

– Involved repetitive failures or events involving safety-related

equipment or deficiencies in operations (g)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

Approved: March 31, 1997 5

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Coverage (A) (continued)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

– Involved questions or concerns pertaining to licensee

operational performance (h)

• Significant operational power reactor events meeting the above

deterministic criteria should be evaluated for risk as follows:

CCDP best reflects loss of defense in depth due to the event,

regardless of whether the cause is deficient licensee

performance or otherwise. CCDP accounts for actual plant

configuration, including equipment unavailable because of

maintenance and testing. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

“Significance Determination Process,” addresses CCDP

determination. Although CCDP represents a fundamentally

different concept for events than for degraded conditions that

do not initiate an event, the same guidelines may be applied to

each in assisting management in its risk-informed

decisionmaking. (ii)

• The lack of complete event information at the time of the NRC

response decision focuses attention on the uncertainty of

influential assumptions and their effect on the risk significance.

Inspection Procedure 71153, “Event Followup,” discusses

inspector inputs to risk analyses that are needed to understand

the risk significance. In determining risk significance of an

operational event, NRC should assess the potential influence on

risk of the following: (iii)

– Dominant core damage sequence(s) (a)

– Level of confidence in failure/unavailability values assumed

for the sequence(s) (b)

– Influence on the CCDP estimate of contributing factors

where the confidence level is low (c)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

6 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Coverage (A) (continued)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

• The following table lists appropriate power reactor operational

event response options as a function of CCDP. The overlap of

options relative to CCDP levels provides the opportunity to

select different inspection or investigation options on the basis

of such factors as uncertainty of the risk estimate coupled with

the deterministic insights. Risk insights should also be used in

considering the number of inspectors, their expertise, and the

areas of focus. In addition to risk, NRC should assess whether

degraded conditions could increase the likelihood of a large

early release resulting from containment failure. (iv)

• In addition to the above guidance for power reactor events, the

following guidance should be considered for any significant

reactor or materials event: (v)

– An IIT should be considered for significant operational

events with one or more of the following characteristics: (a)

• Led to a significant radiological release (levels of

radiation or concentrations of radioactive material in

excess of 10 times any applicable limit in the license or

10 times the concentrations specified in 10 CFR Part 20,

Appendix B, Table 2, when averaged over a year) of

byproduct, source, or special nuclear material to

unrestricted areas (1)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

Approved: March 31, 1997 7

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Coverage (A) (continued)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

• Led to a significant occupational exposure or significant

exposure to a member of the public. In both cases,

“significant” is defined as five times the applicable

regulatory limit (except for shallow-dose equivalent to

the skin or extremities from discrete radioactive

particles) (2)

• Led to a site area emergency (3)

• Exceeded a safety limit of the licensee's technical

specifications (4)

• Involved the medical use of byproduct, source, or special

nuclear material and may have resulted in deterministic

effects to a significant number of patients or individuals

over a long period (months or years) (5)

• Involved the medical, academic, or commercial use of

byproduct, source, or special nuclear material and

resulted in the potential exposure of a significant number

of individuals above occupational or public dose limits (6)

• Involved the deliberate misuse of byproduct, source, or

special nuclear material from its intended or authorized

use, which resulted in the exposure of a significant

number of individuals (7) 

• Involved byproduct, source, or special nuclear material,

which may have resulted in a fatality (8)

• Involved circumstances sufficiently complex, unique, or

not well enough understood, or involved safeguards

concerns, or involved characteristics the investigation of
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

8 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Coverage (A) (continued)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

which would best serve the needs and interests of the

Commission (9)

– An AIT inspects events of lesser health and safety or

safeguards significance. The characteristics of these events

may include one or more of the following: (b)

• Led to a radiological release of byproduct, source, or

special nuclear material to unrestricted areas that

resulted in occupational exposure or exposure to a

member of the public in excess of the applicable

regulatory limit (except for shallow-dose equivalent to

the skin or extremities from discrete radioactive

particles) (1) 

• Involved the deliberate misuse of byproduct, source, or

special nuclear material from its intended or authorized

use and had the potential to cause an exposure of

greater than 5 rem to an individual or 500 mrem to an

embryo or fetus (2) 

• Involved a significant infraction or repeated instances of

safeguards infractions that demonstrate the

ineffectiveness of facility security provisions (3)

• Involved repeated instances of inadequate nuclear

material control and accounting provisions to protect

against theft or diversions of nuclear material (4)

• Involved the failure of the dam for mill tailings with

substantial release of tailings material and solution off

site (5)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

Approved: March 31, 1997 9

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Coverage (A) (continued)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

• Involved the failure of radioactive material packaging that

resulted in external radiation levels exceeding 10 rads/hr

or contamination of the packaging exceeding 1000 times

the applicable limits specified in 10 CFR 71.87 (6)

Responsibilities (B)

The responsibilities and functions of the various NRC offices for

establishing and implementing IITs and AITs are described below.

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) (1)

Determines whether a potentially significant operational event is to

be investigated by an IIT. (a)

Selects the IIT leader and members, provides policy and technical

direction, and ensures the independence of the IIT. (b)

Concurs with the decision, made by the appropriate regional

administrator and office director following an event that involves an

IIT response, that facility operations may resume. (c)

Resolves conflicts between a regional office and/or one or more

program offices regarding such matters as the need to initiate an

AIT or an IIT, the office assigned the responsibility for AIT

implementation, and office representation on an AIT. (d)

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) (2)

Administers the incident investigation program to meet the

objectives set forth in this directive, with the assistance of other

NRC offices. (a) 
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

10 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Responsibilities (B) (continued)

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) (2) (continued)

Ensures that procedures governing IITs are developed,

coordinated, approved, distributed, and maintained. (b) 

Provides administrative support staff to IITs (and as requested for

AITs) as necessary to achieve objectives defined in Part II of this

handbook, with assistance from other NRC offices. (c)

For events warranting consideration of an AIT or an IIT response,

consults with the appropriate regional administrator and the

Director of NRR (reactor events) or the Director of NMSS

(materials events) to decide if an AIT or an IIT is the proper

response. Identifies the potential safety or safeguards issues and

provides recommendations to the EDO on events warranting

consideration of an IIT and on the composition of the IIT. (d)

Establishes and maintains rosters of potential team leaders and

team members who are certified through formal training in incident

investigation. (e)

Identifies needed training and coordinates training requirements for

IIT candidates through the Technical Training Center. (f)

Assesses the effectiveness of the incident investigation program

activities and recommends action, as appropriate, to improve the

program. (g)

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (3)

Ensures that procedures governing SITs and AITs for reactor

events are defined, developed, coordinated, approved, distributed,

and maintained. (a)

Identifies and provides staff to be members and leaders of IITs and

AITs. (b)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

Approved: March 31, 1997 11

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Responsibilities (B) (continued)

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (3) (continued)

Provides assistance in implementing the incident investigation

program. (c)

Recommends to and coordinates with the appropriate regional

administrator and the Director of IRO on events that warrant

consideration of an AIT or an IIT as defined in this part. (d) 

For reactor events warranting consideration of an AIT or an IIT,

consults with the appropriate regional administrator and the

Director of IRO to decide if an AIT or an IIT is the proper

response. Identifies the potential reactor safety or reactor

safeguards issues and provides recommendations to the EDO on

events warranting consideration of an IIT and on the composition

of the IIT. (e)

Provides and coordinates risk analysis support (from both NRR and

RES) to the regions for reactor events that warrant at least an AIT.

Risk analysis for reactor events where only an SIT may be

warranted must be provided if requested by the regional

administrator. (f)

Discusses with the appropriate regional administrator the

acceptability of the decision by the affected licensee to resume

facility operations following an event that involves an IIT response

and obtains the EDO's concurrence. (g)

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (4)

Ensures that procedures governing AITs for nonreactor events are

defined, developed, coordinated, approved, distributed, and

maintained. (a) 

Identifies and provides staff as members and leaders of IITs and

AITs. (b)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

12 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Responsibilities (B) (continued)

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (4)

(continued)

Provides assistance in implementing the NRC incident investigation

program. (c)

Recommends to and coordinates with the appropriate regional

administrator and the Director of IRO on events that warrant

consideration of an AIT or an IIT as defined in this part. (d)

For materials events warranting consideration of an AIT or an IIT,

consults with the appropriate regional administrator and the

Director of IRO to decide if an AIT or an IIT is appropriate.

Identifies the potential nuclear material safety, health, or

safeguards issues and provides recommendations to the EDO on

events warranting consideration of an IIT, including the composition

of the IIT. (e)

Discusses with the appropriate regional administrator the

acceptability of the decision by the affected licensee to resume

facility operations following an event that involves an IIT response

where the facility has been shut down and obtains the EDO's

concurrence. (f)

Office of the Chief Information Officer (5) 

Provides staff to assist IITs in writing, editing, printing, and

distribution of reports through the Division of Information

Management.

Director, Office of Administration (6) 

Provides advice and assistance on the protection of classified or

sensitive unclassified information related to the incident.
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

Approved: March 31, 1997 13

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Responsibilities (B) (continued)

Director, Office of Human Resources (7)

Assists the Technical Training Center with IIT training on an

as-needed basis.

Regional Administrators (8)

In coordination with the Directors of IRO and NRR or NMSS, as

appropriate, determine those operational events warranting

consideration of investigation by an AIT or an IIT. As soon as it

becomes clear that at least an AIT is warranted (preferably before

an AIT is actually established) and when information identified in

connection with an established AIT indicates significantly increased

event significance, consult with the Directors of IRO and NRR or

NMSS, as appropriate, to consider whether an upgrade of an IIT

response is appropriate. Identify the potential health and safety

issues and provide recommendations to the EDO on events

warranting consideration of an IIT. (a)

For operational reactor events or events that do not warrant

consideration of an AIT, determine if an SIT is the appropriate NRC

response. (b)

Select the SIT and the AIT leader and members and direct,

coordinate, and approve the performance of SITs and AITs. (c)

Provide assistance in implementing the NRC incident investigation

program. (d)

Identify and provide staff as members and leaders of IITs, AITs,

and SITs. (e)

Make appropriate State notifications of NRC responses to

operational events. (f)
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3 Part I

14 Approved: March 31, 1997

(Revised: March 27, 2001)

Responsibilities (B) (continued)

Regional Administrators (8) (continued)

For all IITs and some AITs, issue a confirmatory action letter, as

appropriate, to the affected licensee confirming the licensee's

agreement that within the constraints of ensuring health and safety,

relevant failed equipment and areas are quarantined and subject to

agreed-upon controls for troubleshooting; that information and data

related to the event are protected; that the facility is maintained in

a safe condition, and that if the facility, or any part, had been shut

down as a result of the event, it shall not resume operation until

concurrence is received from the NRC. (g)

Consult with the Director of NRR (or, as appropriate, the Director

of NMSS) to ensure a collegial decision is reached that it is

acceptable for the affected licensee to resume facility operations

following an event that involves an IIT response where the facility

has been shut down and obtains the EDO's concurrence. (h)

Director, Office of Public Affairs (9)

Follows established NRC public affairs policies for keeping the

press and the public informed of information related to NRC

investigatory responses to operational events (see Parts II and III

of this handbook). (a)

Supports IITs. (b)

Issues press releases announcing the formation of all AITs and IITs

and of SITs on a case-by-case basis, as deemed appropriate;

arranges for press briefings. Informs the public of all AIT exit

meetings, IIT status briefings, and meetings on the final

investigation results. (c)

Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (10)

Identifies and provides staff as members and leaders of IITs and

AITs. (a)
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Responsibilities (B) (continued)

Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (10)

(continued)

Provides assistance in implementing the NRC incident investigation

program. (b)

Provides risk analysis support (coordinated by NRR) to the regions

for power reactor events that warrant consideration of at least an

AIT. Risk analysis support for power reactor events where only an

SIT may be warranted will be provided if requested by the

appropriate regional administrator. (c)

Assists in identifying the potential nuclear material safety, health, or

safeguards issues. (d)

Office of the General Counsel (11)

Provides legal assistance in implementing the NRC incident

investigation program. (a)

Identifies and provides legal staff to support IITs. (b)

Director, Office of Congressional Affairs (12)

Makes congressional notifications and arranges congressional

briefings, as appropriate, to ensure Congress is informed of NRC

responses to operational events.

Office of the Inspector General (13)

Participates as an observer during IITs in coordination with the

Director of IRO.

Office of Investigations (OI) (14)

Provides assistance in implementing the incident investigation

program. (a)
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Responsibilities (B) (continued)

Office of Investigations (OI) (14) (continued)

Identifies and provides staff as members of IITs and AITs. (b)

For AITs, promptly coordinates with the appropriate region and

headquarters offices information obtained in connection with any

parallel OI investigation that indicated significant increases in the

health or safety significance of the event. (c)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (15)

Provides professional stenographers to transcribe formal interviews

conducted by the IIT.
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Part II

Incident Investigation Team

The investigatory initiative involving a response by an incident

investigation team (IIT) is described in this part.

Objectives of an Incident

Investigation Team (A)

The objectives of an IIT are to—

• Conduct a timely, thorough, systematic, formal, and

independent investigation of certain safety-significant events

occurring at facilities licensed by the NRC. (1)

• Collect, analyze, and document factual information and evidence

sufficient to determine the probable cause(s), conditions, and

circumstances pertaining to the event. (2)

Scope of an Incident Investigation (B)

An IIT investigation should emphasize factfinding and determination

of probable cause for a significant operational event (as defined in

Part I of this handbook). The scope of the investigation must be

sufficient to ensure that the event is clearly understood, the relevant

facts and circumstances are identified and collected, and the

probable cause(s) and contributing cause(s) are identified and

substantiated by the evidence associated with the event. The

investigation must consider whether licensee and NRC activities

preceding and during the event were timely and adequate. (1)

The scope of an IIT investigation must include conditions preceding

the event, event chronology, systems response, human factors

considerations, equipment performance, precursors to

the event, emergency response, safety significance, radiological
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Scope of an Incident Investigation (B) (continued)

considerations, and findings and conclusions. The scope of the IIT

investigation will be established by a charter attached to the

initiating memorandum from the Executive Director for Operations

(EDO). (2)

The scope of the investigation shall exclude— (3)

• Specific assessment of violations of NRC rules and

requirements (a)

• Review of the design and licensing bases for the facility, except

as necessary to assess the cause for the event under

investigation (b)

• Assessment of reasonable assurance of offsite emergency

response capabilities of State and local agencies (c)

• Determination for resumption of licensed operation (d)

The NRC will consider information collected as part of the IIT

process when a decision is made by the affected licensee to

resume facility operations before issuance of the IIT report. Such

instances require close coordination between the IIT leader, the

regional administrator, and the appropriate program office

director. (4)

Schedule (C)

The IIT must be activated as soon as practicable after the health

and safety significance of the operational event is determined and

will begin its investigation as soon as practicable after the facility

has been placed in a safe, secure, and stable condition. If there is

an NRC incident response, the IIT investigation will begin after the

incident response is deactivated. (1)
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Schedule (C) (continued)

The IIT must issue interim reports at appropriate intervals outlining

the status, plans, and relevant new information related to its

investigation. (2)

The IIT must prepare and transmit its final report to the

Commission and the EDO in 45 days from activation of the team,

unless relief is granted by the EDO. The EDO will normally

schedule a meeting approximately 1 week after receipt of the final

report for the IIT to brief the Commission on its investigation. (3)

Information contained in the report is not to be released until a copy

of the final report is placed in the Agencywide Documents Access

and Management System (ADAMS), which normally occurs during

the day of the Commission briefing, if one is conducted. If deemed

necessary, the EDO may forward a copy of the final report to the

affected licensee before the Commission briefing and

simultaneously forward a copy of the final report to ADAMS.

Following the Commission briefing, the EDO will transmit a copy of

the final report to the licensee and the NRC staff for review and

comment before the EDO defines the followup actions and assigns

them to NRC offices. (4)

Team Composition and Qualifications (D)

The IIT will be composed of technical experts selected on the basis

of expertise relevant to the event under investigation and their

freedom from significant involvement in the licensing and inspection

of the facility involved or other activities associated with issues that

had a direct effect on the course or consequences of the event.

The number of members and areas of technical expertise required

for each IIT will be determined on the basis of the type of facility

and characteristics of the event. (1)

Note: The special procedures for clearing non-Government

individuals, which are outlined in NUREG-1303, “Incident

Investigation Manual,” apply whenever they are used to support an

IIT. (2)
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Team Composition and Qualifications (D) (continued)

The team leader and expert members should, to the extent

practicable, be selected from rosters of candidates who have been

certified through formal training in incident investigation. An NRC

senior manager from the Senior Executive Service shall be the

team leader. (3)

Duties (E)

The IIT carries out the single NRC factfinding investigation of the

event and is authorized to pursue and is responsible for pursuing all

aspects of an event that are within its scope as defined above.

NRC response personnel on site shall provide support as needed

to ensure the efficient and effective transition to investigation of the

event in a manner that does not interfere with facility safety. (1)

The following duties are in addition to the duties defined elsewhere

in this directive and handbook. (2)

Executive Director for Operations (a)

• Approves the formation of an IIT, selects the team leader and

members, provides policy and technical direction to the IIT, and

ensures the independence of the IIT. (i)

• Concurs in the decision made by the appropriate regional

administrator and office director following an event that involves

an IIT response that the affected licensee may resume

regulated activities or facility operations. (ii)

• Determines that the investigation was effectively conducted and

was consistent with the goals of the incident investigation

program. (iii)

• Assigns followup actions associated with the IIT report. (iv)
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Duties (E) (continued)

• Monitors the closure of IIT findings (i.e., staff actions) of the

assigned NRC office (via the EDO's work item tracking system

[WITS]) and evaluates the staff's actions to confirm that

pertinent aspects of each IIT finding are addressed in the

implemented resolution. (v)

• Resolves conflicts between a regional office and/or one or more

program offices regarding such matters as the need to initiate

an AIT and the office assigned the responsibility for an AIT

versus an IIT. (vi)

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) (b)

• Provides administrative support staff to the IIT to help the team

to meet its objectives and schedule. (i)

• Provides advice and consultation to the IIT leader on procedural

matters and suggestions regarding completeness of the IIT

report. (ii)

• Coordinates with the Division of Information Management in the

Office of the Chief Information Officer to provide support

necessary to publish an IIT report as a NUREG document. (iii)

Regional Administrators (c)

• Provide assistance in briefing and supplying background

information to the IIT when it arrives on site. (i)

• Provide onsite support for the IIT during its investigation. (ii)

• Identify and provide staff to monitor licensee troubleshooting

activities to assess equipment performance. (iii)

• Consult with the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) (or, as appropriate, the Director of the Office
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Duties (E) (continued)

of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards [NMSS]) to ensure

that a collegial decision is reached that the affected licensee

may resume facility operations following an event that involves

an IIT response. (iv)

The IIT Leader (d)

• Directs and manages the IIT in its investigation and ensures that

the objectives and schedules are met for the investigation as

defined in this handbook. (i)

• Identifies, adds, and removes equipment and areas from the

quarantined list to ensure facility safety. In addition, ensures

that the licensee is able to perform appropriate maintenance

and testing of equipment and determine causes for equipment

anomalies. (ii)

• Works with the Office of Public Affairs in providing the news

media with information on IIT activities. (iii)

• Serves as principal spokesperson for the IIT activities in

interacting with the licensee, NRC offices, the Advisory

Committee on Reactor Safeguards, the Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Waste, news media, and other organizations on

matters involving the investigation. (iv)

• Prepares frequent status reports documenting IIT activities,

plans, significant findings, and health and safety concerns that

may require timely remedial actions or issuance of information

notices, bulletins, or orders. (v)

• Receives direction from and supervision by the EDO. (vi)

• Identifies and requests that the EDO provide additional IIT

resources (e.g., additional members, consultants, contractor

assistance) as needed. (vii)
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Duties (E) (continued)

• Identifies and recommends to the EDO further studies and

investigations, such as those involving staff performance in

regulatory activities before the event, when significant concerns

could not be thoroughly evaluated because of time or resource

limitations. (viii)

• Ensures, in cooperation with the IIT members and the technical

writer/editor, preparation of the final report within the due date

established by the EDO. (ix)

• Briefs the Director of NRR (or, as appropriate, the Director of

NMSS) and the regional administrator on the facts surrounding

the event in support of decisionmaking concerning resumption

of facility operations by the affected licensee. (x)

• Promptly documents and conveys significant ancillary findings

or information outside the scope of the IIT charter to regional

management for followup action. (xi)

• Ensures that a lessons-learned evaluation is conducted and

documented on the IIT efforts and results. (xii)

Conduct of an Investigation (F)

The investigation process is based on the principles of incident

investigation provided in IIT training programs and described in

NUREG-1303, “Incident Investigation Manual.” (1)

The composition of the IIT must be structured and the procedures

developed to maintain independence and objectivity. Personnel

possessing a high degree of independence, ingenuity, and

resourcefulness should be selected to ensure that the investigation

is conducted in a timely, professional, thorough, and coordinated

manner. (2)
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Conduct of an Investigation (F) (continued)

Implementing procedures to guide and control the establishment

and investigatory activities of an IIT are included in NUREG-1303

and IRO Administrative Procedure 12, “Incident Investigation Team

Administrative Requirements.” These procedures provide guidance

for— (3)

• Activating an IIT, including responsibilities, coordination,

communication, team composition, and guidance (a)

• Outlining an IIT investigation of an operational event, including

responsibilities, work plan, communication, interfaces, scope,

and schedule (b)

• Interviewing personnel (c)

• Collecting and maintaining records, documents, data, and other

information (d)

• Treating quarantined equipment and areas (e)

• Preparing, reviewing for classified or sensitive unclassified

information, and distributing the IIT report and related

documents (f)

• Defining administrative support requirements for an IIT (g)

For an IIT involving a medical event, additional guidance is provided

in Management Directive 8.10, “NRC Medical Event Assessment

Program.” (4)

Followup (G)

Following NRC staff and licensee review and comment on the IIT

report, the EDO shall identify generic and facility-specific staff

actions resulting from the investigation that are safety significant

and warrant additional attention or action. Following Commission
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Followup (G) (continued)

approval, the EDO shall assign NRC office responsibility for each

action. Office directors shall provide a written status report on the

disposition of each assigned action as directed by the EDO. (1)

The memorandum assigning followup actions (i.e., staff actions)

should address all IIT findings, including those that are judged to

require no followup action, in order to document the consideration

of all findings. The resolution of each staff action will be

documented by the assigned NRC lead office in a single safety

evaluation report, and each staff action will be individually tracked

by the EDO's WITS. (2)
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Part III

Augmented Inspection Team

The investigatory initiative involving a response by an augmented

inspection team (AIT) is described in this part.

Objectives of an Augmented

Inspection Team (A)

The objectives of an AIT are to—

• Conduct a timely, thorough, and systematic inspection related

to significant operational events at facilities licensed by the

NRC. (1)

• Assess the health and safety significance of the event and

communicate to regional and headquarters management the

facts and safety concerns related to the event so that

appropriate followup actions can be taken (e.g., study a generic

concern, issue an information notice or bulletin). (2)

• Collect, analyze, and document factual information and evidence

sufficient to determine the cause(s), conditions, and

circumstances pertaining to the event. (3)

Scope of an Augmented Inspection (B)

The AIT response should emphasize factfinding and determination

of probable cause(s), as well as the conditions and circumstances

relevant to issues directly related to the event. (1)

The AIT response should be sufficiently broad and detailed to

ensure that the event and related issues are well defined, the

relevant facts and circumstances are identified and collected, and

the findings and conclusions are identified and substantiated by

the information and evidence associated with the event. The
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Scope of an Augmented Inspection (B) (continued)

inspection should consider the adequacy of the licensee's actions

during the event. (2)

The regional administrator directing the AIT inspection shall define

and revise the scope of the inspection, as appropriate. (3)

It is not the responsibility of an AIT to— (4)

• Examine the regulatory process (to determine whether that

process contributed directly to the cause or course of the event)

(a)

• Determine whether NRC rules or requirements were violated, or

recommend enforcement actions (b)

• Address licensee actions related to plant restart (c)

• Address the applicability of generic safety concerns to other

facilities (d)

Schedule (C)

The AIT must be activated as soon as practicable after the health

and safety significance of the event is determined and should begin

its inspection as soon as practicable after the facility has been

placed in a safe, secure, and stable condition.

Team Composition and Qualifications (D)

The AIT will be composed of technical experts from the responsible

regional office, augmented by personnel from headquarters

or other regions or by outside contractors with special

technical qualifications to complement the technical expertise

of the regional response. The size of the AIT and the

areas of expertise will be determined by the regional administrator
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Team Composition and Qualifications (D) (continued)

and coordinated with other NRC offices on the basis of the event

and its implications. (1)

Note: The special procedures for clearing non-Government

individuals, which are outlined in NUREG-1303, “Incident

Investigation Manual,” apply whenever they are used to support an

AIT. (2)

The AIT leader will normally be selected from the responsible

regional office unless the lead is transferred to another NRC office

by mutual consent. (3)

Duties (E)

The AIT is responsible for pursuing all pertinent aspects of an

operational event. The following duties of NRC offices are in

addition to those defined elsewhere in this directive and handbook.

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) (a)

• Resolves conflicts between a regional office and/or one or more

program offices regarding such matters as the need to initiate

an AIT, the office assigned the responsibility for AIT

implementation, and office representation on an AIT.

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) (b) 

• For reactor events, monitors and evaluates the AIT process and

products and ensures that AIT procedures are properly

maintained. (i)

• Defines, develops, coordinates, approves, and maintains the

necessary procedures for reactor events to guide and control

AIT activities at a reactor facility. Reviews the draft AIT

charter. (ii)
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Duties (E) (continued)

• For reactor events, reviews the AIT report for generic safety

implications and initiates followup action, as appropriate. (iii)

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

(NMSS) (c)

• For materials events, monitors and evaluates the AIT process

and products and ensures that AIT procedures are properly

maintained. (i)

• Defines, develops, coordinates, approves, and maintains the

necessary procedures that guide and control AIT activities at

non-reactor facilities and reviews the draft AIT charter. (ii)

• For materials events, reviews the AIT report for generic safety

implications and initiates followup action, as appropriate. (iii)

Regional Administrators (d)

• Select the AIT leader and members in coordination with the

appropriate headquarters office. (i)

• Staff, direct, supervise, coordinate, and approve the

performance of AITs. (ii) 

• Prepare, in coordination with NRR or NMSS, a written charter

for the AIT. The charter shall include the basis for the formation

of the AIT. (iii)

• Ensure that the AIT response is initiated, defined, and

conducted in a manner that achieves the objectives of the

AIT. (iv) 

• Evaluate if and when the AIT inspection should be upgraded to

an incident investigation team (IIT) investigation and,

in consultation with the Directors of NRR and/or NMSS and
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Duties (E) (continued)

Incident Response Operations, recommend to the EDO that an

IIT response is warranted. (v)

• Provide administrative support and resources to assist the AIT

in meeting its objectives and schedule. (vi)

• Issue a periodic Daily Staff Note and Preliminary Notification, if

warranted, to the EDO and coordinate development of a press

release with the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) when an AIT

response is implemented; provide updates, as appropriate. (vii)

• Identify and request additional expertise for AIT response from

other NRC offices. (viii)

• Identify followup actions needed based on the AIT findings and

forward to the appropriate headquarters office for action. (ix)

• Coordinate with OPA and appropriate headquarters offices to

ensure that the AIT exit meeting is open to the public for

observation, as appropriate. (x)

AIT Leader (e)

• Manages the AIT in its inspection and ensures that the

objectives and schedules are met for the inspection as defined

in this handbook. (i)

• With the approval of the appropriate regional administrator,

adds and removes equipment and areas from a quarantined list

(if applicable) to ensure facility safety. In addition, ensures that

the licensee is able to perform appropriate maintenance and

testing of equipment and determine causes for equipment

anomalies. (ii)
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Duties (E) (continued)

• Serves as principal spokesperson for the AIT activities in

interacting with the licensee, NRC offices, the Advisory

Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), news media, and

other organizations on matters involving the inspection. (iii)

• Prepares interim status reports documenting AIT activities,

plans, and new information. Communicates to NRC offices any

significant findings or health or safety concerns that may require

timely remedial actions or issuance of information notices,

bulletins, or orders. Identifies where new information indicates

a significant increase or decrease in event significance, which

should be considered in any recommendation to upgrade the

AIT response to an IIT investigation or downgrade the AIT

response to an SI. (iv)

• Receives direction and supervision from the appropriate

regional administrator. (v)

• Coordinates with OPA in providing the news media with

information on AIT activities. (vi)

• Identifies and requests that the regional administrator provide

additional AIT resources (e.g., additional members, consultants,

contractor assistance), as needed. (vii)

• Ensures the issuance of the AIT final report within 30 calendar

days of inspection completion (the day of the exit meeting). The

AIT report distribution list shall include the EDO, the ACRS, the

Commissioners, the appropriate headquarters project manager,

the Division of Information Management of the Office of the

Chief Information Officer, and for power reactor events, the

branch responsible for event assessments. A copy of the report

should be placed in the Agencywide Documents Access and

Management System immediately after it is provided to the

affected licensee. (viii)
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Duties (E) (continued)

• Ensures that a lessons-learned evaluation is conducted and

documented on the AIT effort and results. (ix)

Conduct of an Augmented 

Inspection (F)

The AIT process is based on the in-house principles of incident

investigation provided in NRC's incident investigation training

courses and the general principles described in NUREG-1303 and

IRO Administrative Procedure 12, “Incident Investigation Team

Administrative Requirements.” (1)

The composition of the AIT must be structured and the procedures

developed to maintain objectivity. Personnel selected shall possess

a high degree of technical capability and should be able to ensure

that the inspection is conducted in a timely, professional, thorough,

and coordinated manner. (2)

The procedures that guide and control the establishment and

investigatory activities of an AIT are included in Inspection

Procedure 93800, “Augmented Inspection Team,” and as

necessary, NUREG-1303. These documents provide guidance

for— (3)

• Activating an AIT, including responsibilities, coordination,

communication, team composition, and guidance (a)

• Outlining the work plan for conducting an AIT investigation of an

operational event, including responsibilities, communication,

interfaces, scope, and schedule (b)

• Interviewing personnel (c)

• Collecting and maintaining records, documents, data, and other

information (d)
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Conduct of an Augmented 

Inspection (F) (continued)

• Controlling quarantined equipment and areas (e)

• Providing administrative support, as necessary, for an AIT (f)

• Upgrading an AIT response to an IIT investigation or

downgrading it to an SI (g)

• Interfacing with other parallel investigations such as those by

the Office of Investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

or State authorities (h)

For an AIT investigation involving a medical event, additional

guidance is provided in Management Directive 8.10, “NRC Medical

Event Assessment Program.” (4)

Followup (G)

Identification, review, and approval of licensee corrective actions,

licensee actions before resumption of facility operations, and NRC

enforcement actions must be accomplished through the normal

organizational structure and procedures. (1)

The appropriate regional administrator will initiate followup actions

needed on the basis of AIT findings. Generally, followup actions will

be handled through normal office procedures. For example, the

regional office might initiate a task interface agreement with NRR

to examine a particular issue and track it. Specific guidance on

resolution and closeout of followup actions will be provided in the

NRC Inspection Manual and inspection procedures. (2)