OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

 July 25, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, 

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMANDIRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND THE 

ENVIRONMENT 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Guide the Future of the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management System (SIGIR-08-021) 

This report is provided for your information and use. It discusses the results of our audit of the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS). This audit was conducted as SIGIR Project 

8027. 

We considered written comments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division 

when preparing this report. We also considered informal comments from the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development. The comments are addressed in the report, where 

applicable. A copy of the Gulf Region Division’s written comments is included in the 

Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Glenn Furbish (703-428-1058) (glenn.furbish@sigir.mil). 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
Comprehensive Plan Needed to Guide the Future of the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

SIGIR-08-021 July 25, 2008

Introduction 

In November 2003, the Congress passed Public Law 108-106, the Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, which 

created the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). In addition to providing 

funding for Iraq reconstruction, the law contained a requirement to submit reports to the 

Congress on how the funding was being used, and provided $50 million “to be used to fulfill the 

reporting and monitoring requirements of this Act and for the preparation and maintenance of 

public records required by this Act.” 

In 2004, a management information system was developed to meet the IRRF reporting 

requirements. Now known as the Iraq Reconstruction Management System1 (IRMS), the system 

was intended to meet three objectives: 

• Provide a single, unified management information system with a common data 

dictionary that would provide a common operating picture of the Iraq 

reconstruction effort. 

• Support the production of reports required by Public Law108-106. 

• Serve as a joint U.S.-Iraq system that could be transferred to the Government of 

Iraq (GOI) to provide management information on U.S.-funded reconstruction 

projects. 

Six agencies involved in Iraq reconstruction currently share responsibility for IRMS: 

• Iraq Transition Assistance Office (U.S. Mission–Iraq) 

• Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan 

• Multi-National Corps–Iraq 

• Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq 

• U.S. Agency for International Development 

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division 

 

1

 National Security Presidential Directive 36 created the Project and Contracting Office to provide acquisition and 

project management support for activities in Iraq, which developed a management information system initially 

known as the Project and Contracting Office Solution. 

1
The management of IRMS has largely been accomplished by a working group–the IRMS InterAgency Working Group (IIWG),2

 which comprises representatives from six agencies. In late 

2005, the agencies3 signed a Memorandum of Understanding to define the type of information to 

be entered in IRMS and to set forth the mutually agreed upon procedures for providing 

information. The Memorandum identified the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region 

Division (GRD) as the agency responsible for maintaining and administering IRMS. 

Although IRMS was initially developed to track and report on projects funded by the IRRF, as of 

May 30, 2008, the Congress had appropriated an additional $21.3 billion for Iraq reconstruction, 

including: 

• $15.4 billion for the Iraq Security Forces Fund 

• $3.2 billion for the Economic Support Fund 

• $2.7 billion for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

Data on projects funded by these appropriations was incorporated in IRMS to maintain the 

common operating picture for the U.S. government reconstruction and economic development 

activities in Iraq, as agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanding. The system currently

supports multiple funding sources across multiple fiscal years. GRD reports that the system is 

tracking more than 50,000 records—ranging from a payment of a few hundred dollars for a 

single item to a multimillion dollar contract action for all or just a portion of a project.

On May 1, 2008, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) announced a 

review of IRMS to assess the overall data system management, policies, procedures, uses, and 

benefits. However, in the course of conducting the audit work, SIGIR learned GRD is preparing 

a draft plan for the future of IRMS. SIGIR is issuing this report to alert management of certain 

issues that it believes need to be addressed when assessing the future of IRMS. 

Because of the ongoing efforts of the IIWG and GRD, SIGIR plans no further work at this time. 

 

2

 In May 2008, the Inter-Agency Information Technology Working Group was restructured into the IIWG and 

subsequently a new draft charter was written. The draft charter is being reviewed by the stakeholders and is 

expected to be finalized before the end of August 2008. 

3

 In late 2005, there were only five agencies participating in the Inter-Agency Information Technology Working 

Group. 

2
Issues for Consideration During Planning 

IRMS is the only source of aggregate data on the activities and accomplishments of the multiple 

agencies supporting the U.S. government’s reconstruction efforts in Iraq. According to senior 

officials in U.S. Mission–Iraq and Multi-National Corps–Iraq, IRMS data is essential to 

reporting and analyzing the U.S. government’s accomplishments; without IRMS the effort and 

resources required to acquire the same data would be significantly greater. However, IRMS is 

four years old and its hardware and software systems are becoming obsolete and in need of 

immediate management action to sustain reporting capabilities. According to GRD officials, 

IRMS has had few major system upgrades and many of its critical system components are no 

longer under warranty. In some cases, the manufacturer no longer supports the system. As its 

software becomes obsolete, IRMS becomes more complex and less efficient due to needed 

programming. Without appropriate action, the Congress and the Departments of State and 

Defense risk losing the only integrated information on Iraq reconstruction projects. 

To their credit, the IIWG and GRD have acknowledged the problems and are currently assessing 

the system and its future. As part of this effort, GRD has prepared a draft plan, the USACE-GRD 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System Refresh or Migration Charter, which examines options 

for the future of IRMS. In mid-April 2008, the draft plan was presented to senior GRD 

leadership for consideration. This assessment and the resulting plan offer an opportunity to 

enhance the usefulness and quality of information generated by the system. To help support the 

planning effort, SIGIR provides discussions of a number of issues, including organizational 

accountability, data quality, funding, and system information transfer to the GOI. 

Organizational Accountability 

Currently, no executive-level leadership has the mandate to coordinate with the implementing 

agencies and, as required, the authority to compel these agencies to take key actions such as 

entering project data in IRMS. When IRMS was developed, the U.S. Mission–Iraq, through the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office,4

took a leadership position by directing the 

organizations obligating IRRF to provide data to IRMS. Since then, GRD has continued to 

provide operations and maintenance support to the system as agreed to in the Memorandum of 

Understanding. According to GRD and members of the IIWG, any major changes to the IRMS 

are coordinated through the IIWG, but GRD incorporates day-to-day operations, maintenance, 

and system enhancements as necessary. The IIWG assumed the de facto oversight and overall 

management role for the system, with mixed success, but no agency has accepted or been 

assigned responsibility as the executive agent for the system. As the system continues to develop 

and organizations and missions evolve, establishing an executive agent for IRMS or its 

replacement will become even more critical. 

 

4

 National Security Presidential Directive 36 created the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office to administer U.S. 

assistance to Iraq. On May 8, 2007, the President created the Iraq Transition Assistance Office as the successor 

organization to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. 

3
Executive level leadership that supports the development and use of a joint management 

information system would provide these benefits: 

• long-term leadership and strategic guidance on IRMS requirements 

• a budget for necessary resources and funding to support system requirements 

• resolution of issues for the IIWG,5 as necessary 

• coordination with the other implementing agencies at the executive level when 

necessary 

Data Quality 

IRMS data suffers from a lack of consistency, accuracy, and completeness—even though GRD 

makes a good effort to ensure data accuracy. SIGIR has previously reported that the system does 

not include complete project data from all agencies involved in reconstruction activities because 

the executing agencies were not regularly entering their data into IRMS.6 For example, as of 

early January 2008, approximately $35.3 billion of funds in the IRRF, Iraq Security Forces Fund, 

Economic Support Fund, and Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds were 

obligated; however, IRMS contained data on only $25.08 billion in projects, or 71% of the 

obligations as of January 2008. 

The data quality problems occur because the evolution and growth of IRMS has required 

numerous changes, patches, and business rule modifications, each of which added complexity 

and decreased the efficiency of the system. GRD officials acknowledged that IRMS is known to 

contain inconsistent and incomplete data in several areas. GRD officials told SIGIR that the 

complexity of the system was one cause of the problems, as were the business rules that must be 

established to allow interfaces necessary to obtain data from supporting systems. As IRMS grew 

more complex and system enhancements were added, some trade-offs in data consistency and 

completeness had to be made to allow for the required interfaces. 

Despite the challenges of the current system, requests for additional enhancements continue to 

emerge. IRMS has demonstrated the need for a joint management information system to collect 

aggregate data that can provide a common operating picture across supporting agencies in any 

similar joint civil-military operation. 

 

5 The IIWG comprises representatives from the six principal organizations of the U.S. government charged with the 

reconstruction and development of Iraq, including the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, GRD, Joint Contracting 

Command–Iraq/Afghanistan, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and 

the U.S. Agency for International Development. The chairperson of the IIWG is from the Iraq Transition Assistance 

Office. The IIWG charter is under revision, but the current draft states that the IIWG is required to ensure that 

information regarding all U.S. government-funded and -managed projects in Iraq are consolidated into the IRMS 

and that the data are accurate, complete, and updated on a regular basis. Additionally, the IIWG provides oversight 

for the need and use of reports within the IRMS, with the goal of ensuring that information reporting is consistent 

and accurate. The IIWG also supports GRD by providing direction and oversight for the export of data from IRMS 

to the GOI. 6 Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations (SIGIR-08-013, April 28, 2008). 

4
Funding Responsibility 

Future responsibility for funding the operations and maintenance of IRMS has not been 

determined. Since 2005, GRD has funded the operations and maintenance costs as agreed to in 

the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the IRMS users. GRD officials provided 

documentation showing that operating and maintaining IRMS costs approximately $4 million 

annually, excluding software or hardware upgrades. According to GRD officials, over the next 

few years, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is expected to change the organizational structure 

of GRD significantly. If this transition occurs, the fiscal and technical support needed for IRMS 

or its replacement might not be available. 

Transferring Information to the Government of Iraq 

Although not required by law, an initial objective of IRMS was to serve as a vehicle for 

transferring information on U.S. reconstruction projects to the GOI. As envisioned, warranty 

information, operating manuals, blueprints, cost data, and other key project information needed 

by the GOI to operate and maintain the projects and to leverage their value for international loans 

would be provided through IRMS. In September 2005, the Department of State and GRD agreed 

to develop a transition strategy that would identify system specifications, an assessment of 

required capability, and an estimate of sustainment costs. However, the strategy was never 

developed. Instead, a monthly file is used to transfer IRMS data to the GOI using the United 

Nations-sponsored Donor Assistance Database system. The planning process offers the 

opportunity to consult with the GOI regarding project information and to assess whether IRMS 

has any potential as a tool for meeting data transfer requirements. 

Conclusions 

The IRMS system is becoming obsolete, its data is incomplete, and it provides only a limited 

common operating picture of Iraq reconstruction activities. Nevertheless, the system provides 

the only aggregate data on U.S. government-funded reconstruction efforts. To their credit, GRD 

and the IIWG have started to develop a plan to address these issues. SIGIR believes it is in the 

best interest of all implementing agencies to begin detailed discussions and planning on these 

issues as soon as possible. Developing a comprehensive approach to this planning process 

provides an opportunity to maximize the benefits from future system resource investments. 

Resolving system issues–such as program management accountability, funding sources, data 

quality, (including completeness and accuracy), and a transfer strategy to the GOI–will require 

an interagency approach supported by senior management. 

Recommendations 

To provide the necessary senior leadership to support the development and use of a management 

information system that meets the needs of its stakeholders, SIGIR recommends that the U. S. 

Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, jointly direct the 

establishment of an interagency planning process to address the future operation and use of 

IRMS. In doing so, SIGIR recommends that the plan address the following: 

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1. An accountability structure for managing IRMS, with assigned leadership for developing a 

coordinated management plan for the future and authority to resolve differences between the 

reconstruction implementing agencies–to ensure the consistency, accuracy, and completeness 

of IRMS data and to ensure the system’s ability to meet the current and future Iraq 

reconstruction data requirements of its users, including the Congress. Key steps needed 

include: 

a. Appointing an executive agent to take the lead in developing a coordinated 

management plan that addresses the future of IRMS. 

b. Directing the executive agent, in preparing the plan, to conduct a systems analysis to 

identify deficiencies in the integrity, accuracy, and completeness of IRMS data; and 

identify steps to ensure the deficiencies are not carried forward into a new or 

revamped system. 

c. Assessing the current and future reconstruction information requirements for system 

stakeholders, including the Congress, as well as the need for a common operating 

picture. 

d. Determining whether to upgrade the current system to a new baseline, develop a 

replacement system that will meet the defined requirements, or develop an alternative 

method for providing complete, accurate, and consistent data. 

2. Identify funding requirements and sources for developing and implementing the future 

system and for the continued support of IRMS or its replacement. 

3. Decide whether to use IRMS as the vehicle for transferring reconstruction data to the GOI, 

and, if so, develop a formal agreement with the GOI on the expected format of the data and 

the required transfer process. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 

In prior reviews, SIGIR noted that IRMS was not providing complete information on the Iraq 

Reconstruction Program. In this report, SIGIR recommends the development of an interagency 

process to plan the future use and operation of IRMS. Because the Congress established the 

requirement for reconstruction information, the Congress may wish to consider requesting that 

the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense provide it with a copy of the plan. 

6
Management Comments and Audit Response 

GRD provided written comments on a draft of this report but did not express an overall view on 

the issues we identified. According to GRD it has initiated a study of IRMS that will consider 

factors such as the system’s age, compatibility of hardware platforms, software and network 

infrastructure. The study will also provide GRD with recommendations for the future needs of 

stakeholders. GRD also said that the IIWG will continue discussing the future of IRMS at its 

meetings and that future discussions will focus on appointing an executive agent to take the lead 

in developing a coordinated management plan that addresses the future of IRMS, and identifying 

funding requirements and sources for developing and implementing the future system and for the 

continued support or replacement of IRMS. GRD’s comments are printed in their entirely in 

appendix D of this report. 

MNSTC-I, JCC-I/A, and USAID provided informal comments that we considered in finalizing 

the report. 

The U.S. Embassy and MNF-I did not respond and SIGIR continues to believe that there is a 

need for joint action by the Ambassador and Commanding General, MNF-I, to fully address our 

recommendations. SIGIR plans to continue monitoring reconstruction reporting. 

7
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

We performed this audit under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended. The original purpose of the audit was to assess overall data system 

management, policies, procedures, uses, and benefits of IRMS. However, in the course of 

conducting the audit work, SIGIR learned that IIWG and GRD are preparing a draft plan for the 

future of IRMS. Consequently, SIGIR truncated its audit effort to provide this abbreviated report 

to alert management of certain issues that SIGIR believes need to be addressed when assessing 

the future of IRMS. 

In conducting this audit, we reviewed prior SIGIR audit reports, relevant policies and procedures 

and held discussions with officials from the Department of State, GRD, and Multi-National 

Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) related to the future of IRMS. We also reviewed: the USACE-GRD Iraq 

Reconstruction Management System Refresh or Migration Charter (Draft); the IIWG draft 

charter; and other relevant documentation. The work was done in Baghdad at the U.S. Embassy 

Annex, GRD headquarters, and MNC–I at Camp Victory. 

We conducted this audit between May and June 2008, in accordance with generally accepted 

government-auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit. 

Prior Coverage 

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued the following related 

audit reports, accessible on its website at http://www.sigir.mil: 

• Issues Related to the Use of the $50 Million Appropriation to Support the 

Management and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-05-

026, January 2006) 

• Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of 

the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (SIGIR-06-001, April 2006) 

• Review of Data Entry and General Controls in the Collecting and Reporting of the 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-003, April 28, 2006) 

• Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations (SIGIR-08-013, 

April 28, 2008) 

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Appendix B—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

GOI Government of Iraq 

GRD U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division 

IIWG IRMS Interagency Working Group 

IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

9
Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

W. Dan Haigler 

Walt R. Keays 

Milton L. Naumann 

10
Management Comments 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - GRD 

11
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SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the 

American people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for 

Congressional Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-604-0368 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine Belisle 

Assistant Inspector General for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

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