* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has det ermined t hat this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-20966

(Summary Calendar)

DORIS JACKSON; Lewis Jackson,

Plaint iffs-Appellants,

versus

TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, SYSTEM; PRAIRIE VIEW A&M

UNIVERSITY; HAROLD NMI BONNER, Individually and as Vice

President for Finance and Administrat io n o f Prairie View A&M

University; WILLIE TEMPTON, Individually and as Assistant Vice

President of Physical Plant & Depar t ment of Public Safety;

LORENZO TR AMBLE, Individually and as former employee with

Prairie View A&M University; ALBE RT GEE, Individually and as

Director of Personnel Services of Prairie View A&M University,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(95-CV-1072)

May 19, 1997

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Doris Jackson (“Jackson”) and husband Lewis Jackson appeal the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. Jackson sued defendants claiming, i nter alia

, violations of Title VII of the Civil2

Rights Act of 1964 based on a hostile work environment. The claims stem from false rumors that

were circulated about Jackson and a supervisor having an adulterous affair, which caused dissension

between Jackson and her co-workers. Jackson, and her co-workers, all secretaries, were later

transferred to different departments but without any loss in pay or benefits. Jackson claims that the

rumors and her transfer were the result of a hostile work envir o nment based on her sex. She also

claims that the hostile environment resulted in the intentional infliction of mental distress.

The district court tentatively dismissed Jackson’s claims, but res e rved final determination

until Jackson submitted additional evidence and it heard arguments in support of Jackson’s position.

After considering the additional evidence and oral arguments the court rendered a final decision and

entered an order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. After carefully reviewing the

briefs and the record, we affirm for the same reasons set forth in the district court’s Memorandum

and Order. See Jackson v. Texas A& M, et al. , No. H-95-1072 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1 1996).

Specifically, the district court determined that Jackson did not establish a prima facie case of

discrimination because she has proffered no evidence of discrimination on the basis of her sex. See

LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc.

, 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996). Jackson has not alleged any facts

sufficient to establish that the false rumors were circulated in an effort to discriminate against her on

the basis of sex. Nor has she proven that the rum ors or i nsul

ts were so perverse as to al ter a

condition of her employment. Finally, defendants had an articulated nondiscriminatory reason for

transferring Jackson that was neither rebutted by Jackson, nor did she raise a genuine issue of material

fact. Thus, Jackson has also failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action by

defendants on the basis of her sex. DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n , 51 F.3d 591,

593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 116 S.Ct. 473 (1995).3

Accordingly, we are satisfied that the district cour t adequately considered Jackson’s

arguments and rendered a proper decision, thus, we AFFIRM.