UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, et al., Case No.: 1:20-cv-23287(DPG)(AMO)

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________/ 

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint 

 

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Plaintiffs respectfully submit this memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to 

dismiss (DE 227) under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) (“Motion”) filed jointly by Defendants, Corporación 

Habanos, S.A. (“Habanos”), Imperial Brands plc (“Imperial”), WPP PLC (“WPP”), Young & 

Rubicam LLC (“Y&R”), and BCW LLC, a/k/a Burson Cohn & Wolfe LLC (“BCW”) 

(collectively, “WPP Defendants”). 

Preliminary Statement 

 Plaintiffs are the owners of a 90% interest in Ramón Rodriguez e Hijos Sociedad en 

Comandita (“RRHSC”). RRHSC was the owner of the Partagas cigarette factory building and a 

modern mixed-use building adjacent and connected to said factory at the corner of Calle 23 y 16 

(23rd Street and 16th) in Havana, Cuba (collectively the “Property”). In 1961, the Castro 

government confiscated ownership of RRHSC and the Property. Plaintiffs are the owners of a 

“Claim” under the Helms-Burton Act (“HBA” or “Libertad Act”) due to the Cuban government’s 

confiscation and trafficking in the Property. 

The HBA took effect in 1996: 

It is the purpose of statute to deter third party foreign investors from 

trafficking in the confiscated property (defined as ‘purchas[ing] 

an equity interest in, manag[ing], or enter[ing] into joint ventures

using property and assets some of which were confiscated from 

United States nationals.’) 

Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting 

22 U.S.C. § 6081(5)); see Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 

2000) (“Congress sought to discourage business arrangements” like the joint venture arrangement 

at issue in that case that sought to challenge a U.S. trademark in the Havana Club mark). 

Despite the clear warning, Imperial was neither deterred nor discouraged. Instead, in 2008, 

Imperial entered into a joint venture with Cuba and its tobacco monopoly company, “Tabacuba.” 

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Defendant Habanos is a joint venture company controlled by Cuba with financial interests owned 

50% by Cuba and 50% by Imperial. See Amended Complaint (Am. Compl.) ¶7, (ECF 82). 

According to Imperial, its joint venture arrangements with Cuba and Tabacuba (the “Cuban Joint 

Ventures”) collectively “manufacture, market, distribute and sell cigars manufactured in Cuba.”1

Plaintiffs allege that, in furtherance thereof, Imperial and its joint venture partnership, Habanos, 

together with the WPP Defendants as their agents, have “trafficked” in the Property without 

compensation to Plaintiffs in violation of the HBA. Among other things, the unauthorized use of 

the Property by Imperial and Habanos extended to Tabacuba’s management of the day-to-day 

business of all Cuban tobacco products from offices it maintained in the RRHSC Property at all 

times from 2007 or 2008 until at least October 29, 2020. See SAC, ¶ 11. This included use of a 

portion of the Property by Tabacuba, for its executive offices, and the use of the loading dock and 

space for warehousing and shipping Habanos’ products. See id., ¶ 80. Plaintiffs further allege that 

Imperial and Habanos retained WPP, through WPP’s U.S. based subsidiaries Y&R and BCW, to 

market products produced, shipped, or stored at or from the confiscated RRHSC Property. The 

marketing arrangement included use of official “portals” on U.S. based social media companies. 

See id., ¶ 82. Plaintiffs seek redress against the Defendants for violations of the HBA, as each of 

the Defendants have either participated in, or profited from, trafficking of the Property. 

All Defendants collectively move to dismiss contending broadly that Plaintiffs do not have 

Article III standing and have otherwise supposedly failed to state a claim. Defendants repeatedly 

assert that the Property was confiscated by “the Cuban Government” and try to separate themselves 

1 See Am. Compl. ¶6, citing Imperial Prospectus for “€15,000,000,000 Debt Issuance 

Programme,” at 27. The Amended Complaint included a link to the Prospectus that was available 

on the Imperial Website. As that link has now apparently been removed or disabled, Plaintiffs are 

separately filing a copy of the Prospectus. 

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from its conduct. Among other things, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege “trafficking” 

because the conduct at issue is that of Cuban companies, who Defendants contend, “are 

categorically incapable of committing trafficking.” See Motion at 6. They also insist that Plaintiffs 

have failed to allege that Defendants knowingly trafficked in confiscated property. Significantly, 

Defendants’ arguments completely ignore that, under the HBA, the Habanos joint venture 

controlled by Cuba is an “agency or instrumentality” of Cuba.2 As a result, Defendant Habanos, 

Imperial’s partner and the WPP Defendants’ principal, therefore is the Cuban Government from 

which Defendants try so hard to separate. 3 As demonstrated below, Defendants’ arguments 

misconstrue both the complaint’s allegations as well as the HBA and other governing legal 

doctrines. 

I. Plaintiffs’ Have Standing to Pursue Their Claims Under the HBA 

Defendants’ primary argument is that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue their 

claims. Defendants acknowledge as they must that that this court has twice held that HBA plaintiffs 

do have Article III standing. See De Fernandez v. Crowley Holdings, Inc., --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2022 

WL 860373, at *3– 4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2022); N. Am. Sugar Indus. Inc. v. Xinjiang Goldwind 

Sci. & Tech. Co. Ltd., No. 20-cv-22471, 2021 WL 3741647, at *3–5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2021). As 

2 Under the HBA, “The term ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ has the meaning 

given that term in section 1603(b) of Title 28. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603 

(a) (“A “foreign state” . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 

instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)”); id., § 1603 (b) (“An ‘agency or 

instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity-- (1) which is a separate legal person, 

corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, 

or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political 

subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor created 

under the laws of any third country.”) (emphasis added). 

3 See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(5) (A) (“The term ‘Cuban Government’ includes the government of 

any political subdivision of Cuba, and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of 

Cuba.”) (emphasis added). 

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has the only appellate court to consider the issue. See Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., 7 F. 4th 331 

(5th Cir. 2021). Other judges in this district have similarly concluded that HBA plaintiffs have 

standing to sue. See Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., 484 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1188-95 

(S.D. Fla. 2020); Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 3d 

1215, 1226-31 (S.D. Fla. 2020); Iglesias v. Ricard, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164117, at *25-29 (S.D. 

Fla. Aug. 17, 2020).4 

 This Court’s reasoning in de Fernandez applies equally to Plaintiffs’ claims in the instant 

case and succinctly describes why Defendants’ standing arguments fail. De Fernandez explained: 

To establish Article III standing, ‘[t]he plaintiff must have (1) 

suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 

favorable judicial decision.’ ‘[T]he plaintiff needs to show that the 

defendant harmed him, and that a court decision can either eliminate 

the harm or compensate for it.’ Muranksy, [v. Godiva Chocolatier, 

Inc.] 979 F.3d [917,] at 924 [(11th Cir. 2020) (en banc)]. 

A. Injury-In-Fact 

. . . To demonstrate an injury in fact, “a plaintiff must show that he 

or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 

‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” “At the pleading stage of a case, 

‘general factual allegations of injury’ can suffice.” 

1. Legally Protected Interest 

“No legally cognizable injury arises unless an interest is protected 

by statute or otherwise.” Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA 

Co., 484 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1191 (S.D. Fla. 2020) “That interest must 

consist of obtaining compensation for, or preventing, the violation 

4 Decisions from districts courts in New York, Delaware, and D.C. agree that HBA plaintiffs 

have standing. See Sucesores de Don Carlos Nunez y Dona Pura Galvez, Inc. v. Societe Generale, 

S.A., 20-CV-851, 2021 WL 6065758, at *7 - *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2021); Moreira v. Societe 

Generale, S.A., --- F.Supp. 3d---, 2021 WL 5524484, at *3 - *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2021) Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Corporacion CIMEX S.A., 19-CV-01277, 2021 WL 1558340, at *20-21 (D.D.C. 

Apr. 20, 2021); Glen v. Trip Advisor LLC, CV 19-1809, 2021 WL 1200577, at *7 (D. Del. Mar. 

30, 2021). 

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of a legally protected right.” Here, Plaintiffs allege a current 

property interest in the Confiscated Property based on their prior 

ownership and the Concession. That interest is protected by the Act 

“which conveys a right to prevent third-party use of the same.” 

2. Concrete 

Though Plaintiffs have alleged an invasion of a legally protected 

interest, they must still allege that they have suffered a concrete and 

particularized injury. . .. 

“The Supreme Court has explained that ‘[c]entral to assessing 

concreteness is whether the asserted harm has a “close relationship” 

to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit 

in American courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or 

various intangible harms.’ ” Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 

331, 334 (5th Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiffs allege that they were 

harmed when Defendants used the Confiscated Property “without 

consent from or paying adequate compensation to Plaintiffs.” This 

harm “bears a close relationship to unjust enrichment, which has 

indisputable common-law roots.” Glen, 7 F.4th at 334. Indeed, 

Congress passed the Act, in part, because it found the remedies for 

“unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property 

... by private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the 

property” to be ineffective. 22 U.S.C. § 6081(8). . . . 

B. Traceability 

. . . Plaintiffs must also show that their injuries are “fairly traceable” 

to Defendants’ use of the Confiscated Property. “To show 

traceability, a plaintiff must allege that his injury is ‘connect[ed] 

with the conduct about which he complains.’ ” Glen, 7 F. 4th at 335 

(quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018)). The SAC 

alleges that Defendants profited from their use of the Confiscated 

Property without compensating Plaintiffs. Accordingly, like in the 

Glen and the Havana Docks cases, “there exists a causal link 

between a claimant's injury from the Cuban Government’s 

expropriation of their property and a subsequent trafficker's unjust 

enrichment from its use of that confiscated property.” Havana 

Docks, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 1230. . .. 

de Fernandez, slip op., at *3–4 (footnotes and some citations omitted). 

 At least ten separate federal court orders have held that HBA plaintiffs have standing to 

sue. Defendants nevertheless insist that neither this court, nor presumably any of the other courts 

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holding similarly, has addressed standing arguments pertaining to HBA plaintiffs’ supposed 

“inability to demonstrate they have suffered concrete harm from” HBA defendants’ alleged use of 

real property in which the HBA plaintiffs necessarily have no legal ownership interest under Cuban 

law. See Mot. at 6. The question of standing to sue in federal court is no trivial matter. Rather, 

standing “‘is a threshold question that must be explored at the outset of any case.’ ‘It is . . . an 

indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case. . . . ’” de Fernandez, slip op., at *3. Defendants’ argument 

is not just wrong, it assumes that this and every court that has considered HBA standing has failed 

in this fundamental inquiry. Moreover, every HBA plaintiff necessarily had their property 

confiscated by Cuba, and defendants in each of the cases cited above and in note 4 made standing 

arguments similar if not identical to those Defendants make here. 

Also wrong, as well as misleading, is Defendants’ further assertion that this court has not 

addressed “the impermissibility of requiring Defendants to remedy harm that the Cuban 

Government caused by confiscating the RRHSC Property decades before Defendants’ alleged 

trafficking began.” See Mot at 6. Defendants well-know that the HBA does not require defendants 

to remedy harm caused by the Cuban Government’s confiscation of property. To the contrary, 

Defendants must the remedy the harm caused by their own trafficking in the confiscated RRHSC 

Property. As this court made clear: “Congress passed the Act, in part, because it found the 

remedies for ‘unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property . . . by private 

entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the property’ to be ineffective.” de Fernandez, 

slip op., at *4 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Sucesores, 2021 WL 6065758, at *7 

(“Congress identified an injury produced by later exploitation of confiscated property, which it 

expressly distinguished from the harm of the initial confiscation: ‘unjust enrichment from the 

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use of wrongfully confiscated property by governments and private entities at the expense of the 

rightful owners of the property’ . . ..”) (emphasis added) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6081(2), (8)). 

A. The HBA Remedies “Concrete” Harm 

 Given the apparently unanimous conclusion of available decisions that HBA plaintiffs have 

standing to sue, Defendants are necessarily forced to try to create a standing argument without 

relying on any opinion involving standing under the HBA. Defendants fare no better under cases 

that have decided the question of standing by non-HBA plaintiffs. 

The Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 

917 (11th Cir. 2020), focused on the standing “injury” requirement, explaining that: 

Congress may “elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries 

concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law” 

. . . Congress . . . [C]an also recognize and provide legal remedies 

for concrete injuries that already exist, but for which there is no 

cause of action. 

Muransky, 979 F.3d at 925 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Contrary to Defendants’ 

suggestion, courts do not focus on the legal elements of common law claims, but instead on 

whether the harm or injury that Congress sought to remedy is a real injury: “To establish standing, 

an injury in fact must be concrete. “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually 

exist,” as opposed to being hypothetical or speculative.” Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1167 

(11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see Muransky, 979 F.3d at 929 (“a ‘bare procedural violation, 

divorced from any concrete harm’ is not enough to establish an Article III injury.”) (emphasis 

added).5 

5 The statute at issue in Muransky (“FACTA”) prohibits publication of more than six 

digits of a credit card account number on a receipt. Although the defendant violated FACTA by 

exceeding the allowed number of digits, Muransky did not allege that anyone other than he had 

ever seen the offending receipt. See Muransky, 979 F. 3d at 930. 

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There is no dispute that Cuba’s uncompensated taking of property cut-off legal title. 

Defendants’ citation to Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(“Club Med”), adds nothing to their standing argument. There is simply no question that: “Congress 

may ‘elevate’ harms that ‘exist’ in the real world before Congress recognized them to actionable 

legal status.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (emphasis added). That is 

of course what Congress, and the President, did when enacting the HBA. Congress also made 

express findings that explain its reasons for the creation of the statutory right at issue here: 

(1) Individuals enjoy a fundamental right to own and enjoy property 

which is enshrined in the United States Constitution. 

 . . . 

(8) The international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks 

fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property

and for unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated 

property by governments . . .. 

. . . 

(10) The United States Government has an obligation to its citizens 

to provide protection . . . including the provision of private remedies. 

See 22 U.S.C § 6081. Congress’s findings demonstrate that it was intent on creating a statutory 

remedy for the harm suffered by victims of Cuba’s uncompensated takings. Again, “Congress

passed the Act, in part, because it found the remedies for ‘unjust enrichment from the use of

wrongfully confiscated property . . . by private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of 

the property’ to be ineffective.” de Fernandez, slip op., at *4 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

The limitation imposed on Congress by the standing doctrine is that Congress “may not

simply enact an injury into existence, using its lawmaking power to transform something that is not

remotely harmful into something that is.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205 (emphasis added). This 

explains why the Muranski plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. Although Congress validly 

enacted FACTA to provide a remedy for persons injured by a violation of the statute, “no one's 

identity is stolen at the moment a receipt is printed with too many digits.” “The question, always, 

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is whether an injury in fact accompanies a statutory violation.” Muransky, 979 F.3d at 930. 

Similarly, the Transunion plaintiffs injured by publication of false or misleading information had 

a claim under the statute at issue there. That was so even “when the OFAC alerts on the 

disseminated credit reports were only misleading and not literally false.” See TransUnion, 141 S. 

Ct. at 2209. This because: “In looking to whether a plaintiff’s asserted harm has a ‘close relationship’ 

to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts, we do not 

require an exact duplicate.. . . [T]he harm from a misleading statement of this kind bears a sufficiently 

close relationship to the harm from a false and defamatory statement.” Id. It was only plaintiffs 

whose information had not been published at all that that had no claim. Id.

 Muransky teaches that: 

[B]y looking to history, we can discern a concrete injury where the 

“intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has 

traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in 

English or American courts.” The fit between a new statute and a 

pedigreed common-law cause of action need not be perfect, but we 

are called to consider at a minimum whether the harms match up 

between the two.” 

Muransky, 979 F.3d at 926 (emphasis added, citations omitted). This standard is readily met here. 

At common law, a taking of property without compensation is the essence of theft. See Danopulos 

v. Am. Trading II, LLC, 69 N.E.3d 157 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). The true owner has then a claim for 

conversion: “Conversion is a common-law tort relating to the wrongful exercise of dominion over 

property in exclusion of the owner's right, or the withholding of property from the owner's 

possession under a claim inconsistent with the owner's rights.” Id. at 159. And, significantly: 

“Under the common law, a thief does not acquire good title to stolen property and, therefore, ‘one 

who purchases or acquires property from a thief,’ even in good faith, does not have a right to the 

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possession of the goods against ‘the rightful owner.’”6Id. The common law also prevented the 

government from taking land without compensation. See Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 124–25, 81 

A.2d 533 (1951).7

 The harm that Congress sought to remedy, the uncompensated taking of property, is 

obviously not some theoretical or “procedural” harm. It is true that there is no claim for 

“conversion” of real property at common law. By its nature, of course, real property is not mobile. 

Cuba, however, is a foreign country whose totalitarian regime and uncompensated taking of 

property caused many U.S. Citizens to flee Cuba. The harm that the HBA seeks to remedy is a 

concrete harm analogous to harm recognized at common law. It has a direct analogue to common 

law remedies available to the owner of property taken either by theft or by government taking: 

“[O]ne who purchases or acquires property from a thief,’ even in good faith, does not have a right 

to the possession of the goods against ‘the rightful owner.’” Danopulos, 69 N.E.3d at 159. 

The HBA does not attempt to take title back from the [not-so] innocent joint-venture 

partners or agents of the Cuban Government. But it does create a right intended at least in part to 

place victims of Cuba’s takings in a position analogous to that of the true owner of stolen property 

– or that of an heir or successor to the true owner. Instead of requiring the “innocent” purchaser of 

property (or of a joint venture in property) stolen or taken without compensation by Cuba to return 

the property, Cuba’s partner or vendee is required to compensate the true owner. Again: “The fit 

6 See also In re Newpower, 233 F.3d 922, 928–29 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting the “long 

established at common law [rule] that a thief has no title in the property that he steals”); Richardson 

v. Seattle-First Nat. Bank, 38 Wash. 2d 314, 315–16, 229 P.2d 341, 342 (1951) (“At common law, 

except in the market overt, a thief could convey no title to his vendee.”) (emphasis added). 

7 See Appeal of Lord, 81 A.2d at 534–35 (noting that: “As the King's power decreased and 

the power of his nobles increased, slowly the right, first of the nobles and then of every land owner 

to freely and absolutely own, possess and enjoy the land which he owned in freehold, became 

recognized by all as a sacred, absolute, inviolable right.”) (emphasis added). 

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between a new statute and a pedigreed common-law cause of action need not be perfect.” 

Muransky, 979 F.3d at 926. Here, “Congress did indeed ‘elevate to the status of legally cognizable’ 

a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts: 

the harm of unjust enrichment. ‘The equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment rests, generally, on 

the principle that a party should not be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another.’ . . . 

Congress itself recognized the relationship between unjust enrichment and claims under the 

[HBA], finding that ‘[t]he international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks fully 

effective remedies ... for unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property by 

governments and private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the property.’” Moreira 

v. Societe Generale, ---F.Supp. 3d---, 2021 WL 5524484, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2021) (citations 

omitted). Nor, contrary to Defendant’s insistence, is there any doubt that “the harms match-up 

between the two.” Cuba’s joint venture partners and agents are in the exact position of someone 

who acquires property from a thief, even if innocently. 

B. Defendants Caused the Injury That Plaintiffs Seek to Remedy 

Defendants finally try to salvage their standing argument by pointing to the “causation 

element.” According to Defendants, causation is missing because “the injury that is sought to be 

remedied was caused, not by” Defendants, but rather by “‘the independent action of some third 

party not before the court,’” i.e., presumably, by Cuba. Again, that is plainly wrong as well as 

misleading. Defendants must the remedy the harm caused by their own trafficking in the 

confiscated RRHSC Property. As this court made clear: “Congress passed the Act, in part, because 

it found the remedies for ‘unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property . . 

. by private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the property’ to be ineffective.” de 

Fernandez, slip op., at *4 (emphasis added) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6081(8)). See also Sucesores, 2021 

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WL 6065758, at *7 (“Congress identified an injury produced by later exploitation of confiscated 

property, which it expressly distinguished from the harm of the initial confiscation: ‘unjust 

enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property by governments and private entities 

at the expense of the rightful owners of the property’ . . ..”) (emphasis added) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 

6081(2), (8)). Nor can Defendants negate causation by pointing to the presumptive damages 

allowed under the HBA. Defendants have not, and on their facial challenge to standing under the 

HBA, cannot establish that the damages allowed under the HBA are unrelated to their unjust 

enrichment through use of the confiscated RRHSC Property. Defendants’ standing arguments 

cannot support dismissal. 

II. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint States a Claim Under the HBA 

Defendants also move to dismiss with a series of arguments under 12(b)(6). None of their 

arguments can support dismissal. 

Standard on Rule 12(b)(6) Motion 

When considering a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), a court “must 

accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint, and 

plaintiffs should receive the benefit of all favorable inferences that 

can be drawn from the facts alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 

S.Ct. 1937; Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th 

Cir. 2012). A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion generally is 

limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits 

but also may consider documents referred to in the complaint that 

are central to the claim and whose authenticity is undisputed. See

Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 

2009). “Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate 

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (cleaned 

up). 

In re Mednax Services, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 21-MD-02994-RAR, 2022 WL 

1468057, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 10, 2022). 

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Nor can Defendants base their 12(b)(6) arguments on facts outside of the SAC by pointing 

to matters asserted in affidavits filed by Habanos in support of jurisdictional arguments: 

A district court should decide a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) only “ ‘[i]f the facts 

necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of plaintiff's cause of action.’ 

“Turcios, 275 F. App'x at 880 (quoting Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th 

Cir.2003)). However, when the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction are necessarily 

intertwined with the merits of the cause of action, “ ‘the proper course of action for the 

district court is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct 

attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case.’ ” Id. 

Waziry v. HR Club Mgmt., LLC, 13-60333-CIV, 2013 WL 3834392, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 

2013) (emphasis added). 

A. Defendants’ Improper Invocation of their Affirmative Defense of Limitations Does 

Not Support Dismissal 

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed due to a statute of 

limitations. The argument misconstrues the law, the complaint, and the rules governing motions 

to dismiss. Defendants first say that a claim under the HBA “may not be brought more than 2 years 

after the trafficking giving rise to the action has ceased to occur.” 22 U.S.C. § 6084. While the 

body of the statute is accurately quoted, Defendants fail to acknowledge that it is expressly titled 

“Limitation of actions.” Nor does Defendants’ limitations argument provide a basis for dismissal. 

Defendants state that that they call “the sole factual allegation on that topic” is supposedly that 

“Habanos, S.A. was using the RRHSC Property in February 2010.” They then insist that “Plaintiffs 

cannot “circumvent” Section 6084 by asserting upon ‘information and belief’ that Habanos, S.A. 

has continually used the RRHSC Property since 2010.” See Motion at 12. 

Defendants’ argument attempts to manufacture a requirement that Plaintiffs plead that the 

Property was in continuous use. But there is no basis for any such requirement. Defendants do not 

explain why Plaintiffs would be required to plead anything more than that the Property was used, 

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and otherwise “trafficked” as defined in the HBA. Nor can they. First, the law is clear that, with 

respect to statute of limitations: 

‘A statute of limitations bar is an affirmative defense, and 

plaintiffs are not required to negate an affirmative defense in their 

complaint.’ Id. (quotation marks, ellipsis, and alterations omitted). 

As a result, ‘[a] dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of 

limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face 

of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.’ 

Roberts v. Carnival Corporation, 824 Fed.Appx. 825 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting 

La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiffs did not plead 

that Defendants use of the Property ceased in 2010 nor at any other time before October 2020, 

when Plaintiffs believe that Imperial sold its interest in Habanos. Defendants’ accusation that 

Plaintiffs are attempting to “circumvent Section 6084” is wrong and baseless. This is nothing more 

than an attempt to require Plaintiffs to negate Defendants affirmative defense. Again, Defendants 

provide no basis for such a requirement. Without more, this argument fails. 

 Defendants’ argument is not improved by their assertion that Plaintiffs cannot plead on 

‘information and belief.’ Because Defendants have provided no basis for requiring any pleading 

at all regarding their affirmative defense, Plaintiffs’ supposed failure to properly plead matters on 

information and belief cannot serve to create a non-existent requirement to plead at all. Indeed, 

Defendants’ citation to Moreira, 2021 WL 5524484, confirms that Plaintiffs have no obligation to 

plead timeliness and that failure to do so precludes dismissal. See Moreira at *6. Significantly, the 

Moreira court concluded that dismissal there was appropriate precisely because the plaintiffs there 

“explicitly allege that Defendants’ trafficking conduct ended more than a decade ago.” Id. The 

Moreira plaintiffs alleged: “SocGen processed at least 2,500 transactions . . . between 2004 and 

2010”; “[F]rom at least 2000 to 2010, Paribas offered U.S.-dollar financing to Cuban entities.” See 

Moreira, id., quoting plaintiffs’ complaint. ¶¶ 37 & 43 (emphasis added). In sharp contrast, there 

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are no allegations in Plaintiffs’ SAC that Defendants ever stopped trafficking in the RRHSC 

Property. To the contrary, Plaintiffs expressly plead that all Defendants trafficked in the RRHSC 

Property from at least 2010 through October 2020. See SAC, ¶ 178; see also id., ¶ 21.9 Defendants 

further assertion that Plaintiffs somehow plead that their use of the Property stopped in 2010 or at 

any other time is baseless. Nor is it supported by their citation to paragraph 20 of the SAC, which 

merely refers to a 2010 “publicity piece” that expressly refers to the RRHSC Property. 

Finally, Defendants’ suggestion that photographs attached to complaint somehow support 

a limitations defense on their face is nothing more than an improper attempt to reverse the black 

letter rule that inferences from a complaint must be viewed favorably to Plaintiffs on Defendants’ 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. That a photograph was taken on a particular date may not necessarily 

support that use of the Property continued after that date. It certainly cannot support the opposite 

proposition – that use stopped on any particular date after the photograph was taken. Defendants’ 

reference to an Internet blog on which a picture may have appeared also does not support dismissal. 

To be clear Plaintiffs do not concede authenticity of the blog and do not agree consideration of any 

blog on this Motion. Defendants’ limitations arguments also cannot support dismissal. 

B. Defendants are Not Excused from the HBA by Habanos’ Trafficking 

Defendants next argument for dismissal attempts to turn the HBA on its head. There is no 

dispute that one of the main goals, if not the principal goal, of Congress when passing the HBA. 

8 Alleging that: “At all times from January 2008 until at least October 29, 2020, Imperial, 

both through Habanos and the other Cuban Joint Ventures, as well as through the Cuban tobacco 

monopoly company, Tabacuba, Imperial’s joint-venture partner in Habanos, had the use of, and 

continued to use, the RRHSC Property.” 

9 Alleging that: the WPP Defendants and their affiliates “are part of a complex network that 

share resources and operate as a single entity” and “continuously trafficked in the RRHSC Property 

by marketing and publicizing the Cuban tobacco products made, stored, shipped or managed from 

the RRHSC Property since at least 2010 through October 2020.” 

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It is the purpose of statute to deter third party foreign investors from 

trafficking in the confiscated property (defined as ‘purchas[ing] 

an equity interest in, manag[ing], or enter[ing] into joint ventures

using property and assets some of which were confiscated from 

United States nationals.’) 

Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting 

22 U.S.C. § 6081(5)); see also 22 U.S.C. § 6081(5) (“The Cuban Government is offering foreign 

investors the opportunity to purchase an equity interest in, manage, or enter into joint ventures 

using property and assets some of which were confiscated from United States nationals.”); id. at 

(11) (“To deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property, United States nationals who were 

the victims of these confiscations should be endowed with a judicial remedy in the courts of the 

United States that would deny traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's 

wrongful seizures.”). 

 Defendants nevertheless argue that, because Habanos – the very type of the joint venture 

arrangement that the HBA intends to deter – was involved in the trafficking alleged by Plaintiffs, 

Defendants’ trafficking somehow ceases to be trafficking. In support, Defendants cite to a portion 

of the HBA definitions, but ignore the ones that are directly on point. Defendants’ argument again 

ignores the statute and governing law. The Eleventh Circuit in In Re Shek, 947 F.3d 770 (2020), 

recently discussed guidelines for statutory interpretation: 

Statutory provisions are not written in isolation and do not operate 

in isolation, so we cannot read them in isolation. The plain meaning 

of a statutory provision derives not only from the “particular 

statutory language at issue,” but also “the language and design of 

the statute as a whole.” As one prominent treatise on statutory 

interpretation puts it, “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of 

meaning,” and “[t]he entirety of the document thus provides the 

context for each of its parts.” We must interpret statutes 

“harmoniously,” reconciling separate sections so that they are 

compatible and not contradictory. 

 

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Most importantly for present purposes, we must attempt to give 

effect to every word or provision in [in the statute]. . . . “Because 

legal drafters should not include words that have no effect, courts 

avoid a reading that renders some words altogether redundant.” 

This surplusage canon obliges us, whenever possible, to disfavor an 

interpretation when that interpretation would render a “clause, 

sentence, or word ... superfluous, void, or insignificant.” 

Shek, 947 F.3d at 776 – 77 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 

The Eleventh Circuit’s admonition applies with full force here. Defendants point to a single 

sub-paragraph in support of this argument. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iv). Ignoring the obvious 

purpose of the statute and legislative findings, as well as paragraphs in the same statute that are 

directly on point, Defendants argue that Habanos, and its joint venture partner and agents, cannot 

“traffic” under the HBA because, under sub-paragraph (13)(B)(iv): “trafficking does not include 

‘transactions and uses of property by a person who is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba, 

and who is not an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.’” See

Motion at 15. The language quoted appears obviously designed to prevent claims against 

individual Cuban residents, other than government officials, living in residential property in Cuba 

that may have been confiscated by the government, unless the property was the subject of a 

certified claim.10 

Sub-paragraph (13)(B)(iv) certainly does not mean that Congress wiped out the entire 

purpose of the HBA in a single definition. To the contrary, as demonstrated above, Defendants 

ignore two sections of the HBA definitions that make clear that the HBA, in fact, is not self10 See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12)(B) (“For purposes of subchapter III of this chapter, the

term “property” does not include real property used for residential purposes unless, as of March 

12, 1996-- (i) the claim to the property is held by a United States national and the claim has been 

certified under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949; or (ii) the property is 

occupied by an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.”) 

(emphasis added). 

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annihilating. Defendants’ arguments completely ignore that, under the HBA, the Habanos joint 

venture controlled by Cuba is an “agency or instrumentality” of Cuba.11 As a result, Defendant 

Habanos, Imperial’s partner and the WPP Defendants’ principal, therefore is the Cuban 

Government.12 There is no provision in the HBA that excuses Defendants from their trafficking. 

This argument too cannot support dismissal. 

C. Plaintiffs Properly Plead That Defendants Knowingly Trafficked in the RRHSC 

Property 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs do not properly plead that they “knowingly” trafficked 

in the confiscated Property. This argument also ignores the complaint and the HBA. Plaintiffs 

agree that Defendants must “knowingly” traffic in the confiscated Property. See 22 U.S.C. § 

6023(13)(A).13 Nor do Plaintiffs merely plead that Imperial should generally have known that the 

tobacco industry as a whole was nationalized. Even though Imperial knows well that it was. To 

the contrary, again, one Defendant here is Habanos, an instrumentality of the Cuban Government 

11 Under the HBA, “The term ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ has the meaning 

given that term in section 1603(b) of Title 28. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603 

(a) (“A “foreign state” . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 

instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)”); id., § 1603 (b) (“An ‘agency or 

instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity-- (1) which is a separate legal person, 

corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, 

or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political 

subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor created 

under the laws of any third country.”) (emphasis added). 

12 See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(5) (A) (“The term ‘Cuban Government’ includes the government of 

any political subdivision of Cuba, and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of 

Cuba.”) (emphasis added). 

13 Defendants’ citation to Glen v American Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665 and Glen v. Trip 

Advisor LLC, 529 F. Supp. 3d 316, at *331–33 (D. Del. 2021) as support for the argument that 

general allegations of knowledge are insufficient, also fails. This may be true in American Airlines, 

where the defendant American Airlines had a passive website selling hotel rooms. It may even be 

true in Trip Advisor, where the defendants were three groups of passive hotel websites and two 

credit card companies. But in the context of Plaintiffs’ allegations, this argument cannot win the 

day. 

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that is statutorily deemed to be the Cuban Government itself, and a joint venture partner venture 

of Imperial. No further allegation of knowledge that the Cuban Government confiscated the 

RRHSC Property could possibly be necessary. And once more, Imperial cannot escape the 

knowledge of its joint venture partner, which should be deemed to be that of Imperial itself. The 

same holds true for Habanos’ agents, the WPP Defendants. 

 At a minimum, there is no basis for assuming that Imperial, which was well-aware of the 

HBA before purchasing its joint venture interests was unable to obtain information from its partner. 

The WPP Defendants too were well-aware of the HBA and had easy access to relevant records 

from their principal. In that regard, the HBA makes clear that the “knowingly” requirement “means 

with knowledge or having reason to know.” See 22 U.S.C. § 6023 (13) (emphasis added). On 

their 12(b)(6) motion, Defendants are certainly not entitled to an inference that, despite express 

knowledge that their dealings in Cuba would be subject to the HBA, they failed to make inquiry 

of their owner, Cuba (Habanos), or of Habanos, their partner (Imperial) or principal (WPP). 

Certainly, Defendants had had “reason to know” that the information was readily available to them. 

Defendants’ failure to so inquire, does not and cannot excuse their knowledge. 

Finally, Plaintiffs expressly allege that, prior to commencing this action, Plaintiff provided 

a pre-suit demand “to Imperial, WPP, Y&R and BCW (and to Habanos in care of Imperial) stating 

. . . Plaintiffs’ intention to commence this action and demanding that each Defendant immediately 

cease unlawfully trafficking in the RRHSC Property.” Despite demand, however, “each Defendant 

continued to traffic in the confiscated RRHSC Property.” See SAC, ¶¶ 98 – 99. Similar allegations 

have been deemed sufficient to plead scienter “at the very least for the post-notice period.” See

de Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine, Ltd., 20-CV-25176, 2021 WL 3173213, at *8; Glen v. Trip 

Advisor LLC, 529 F. Supp. 3d 316, 332 (D. Del. 2021) (same). 

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If more was somehow necessary, as Defendants acknowledge, Plaintiffs also plead that 

information about the confiscated Property was available to Defendants in corporate and property 

records. Defendants’ complaint that the nature of such records is not described also does not help 

their cause. First, the corporate records are not only described, but the relevant excerpt is also 

attached as exhibit 5 to the SAC. The text of that exhibit is part of the publicly available Cuban 

“Official Gazetta.” Plaintiffs allege and are certainly entitled to an inference that it was publicly 

available to Defendants. In relevant part, it provides that: 

First: The Nationalization, by means of forced expropriation, is 

decreed, and consequently the Cuban State, in complete 

authority, is awarded all the interest in assets and business 

entities located in the national territory and the rights and 

actions arising from the exploitation of the same, whatever the 

interest, title or mode of their ownership, of the following natural 

persons or judicial entities: 

. . . . 

96. Ramón Rodriguez e Hijos, S. en C. 

Official Cuban Gazetta (emphasis added). See translation at exhibit 5A. While Plaintiffs were 

unable to obtain property records, there is certainly no basis for assuming that they would be 

significantly different that property records generally available in most countries. 

 Defendants also cite to Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia, de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 

F. 3d 1277, 1286–88 (11th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that “Cuban corporations—including 

specifically joint ventures—must be treated as separate and apart from the Cuban Government.” 

Significantly, however, Alejandre, decided in 1999 did not arise under the HBA. To the contrary, 

the HBA expressly decrees that Cuban joint ventures, at least those controlled by Cuba as alleged 

here, must be treated as the Cuban Government under the HBA. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(5) (A) (“The 

term ‘Cuban Government’ includes the government of any political subdivision of Cuba, and any 

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agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.”) (emphasis added). See also 22 U.S.C. § 

6023(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603.

 Defendants finally contend that Plaintiffs have not alleged that “Defendants knew that a 

United States national held a claim to the RRHSC Property.” See Motion at 19. This argument 

fails because there is no such requirement in the HBA. Nor could there be, as such a requirement 

would also effectively eliminate HBA claims. As there is no way that anyone could actually 

“know” who currently holds a claim, only perhaps who may have once held a certified claim. 

Instead, the statute actually states: 

 (13) Traffics 

(A) As used in subchapter III, and except as provided in 

subparagraph (B), a person “traffics” in confiscated property 

if that person knowingly and intentionally— 

 

(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or 

otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, 

leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, 

uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated 

property, 

(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise 

benefiting from confiscated property, or

(ii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking 

(as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or 

otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) 

or (ii)) through another person, 

without the authorization of any United States national who holds a 

claim to the property. 

See 22 USC § 6023 (13) (emphasis added). The structure of the statute makes clear that, in order 

to be deemed to have “trafficked” in confiscated property, a person must “knowingly” engage in 

the conduct described in subsections (13)(A)(i), (13)(A)(ii), or (13)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 

There is no requirement in the statute that the trafficker knowingly acts “without the authorization 

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of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.” To the contrary, that phrase was 

expressly kept outside of actual requirement of the statute which appear in numbered paragraphs 

((13)(A)(i), (13)(A)(ii), or (13)(A)(iii)). And, of course, as demonstrated above, Defendants were 

undeterred after Plaintiffs expressly put Defendants on notice of Plaintiffs’ ownership of the 

RRHSC Property and their intent to file this lawsuit. This argument also cannot support dismissal. 

D. Plaintiffs Properly Plead Ownership of the HBA Claim

1. The HBA Does Not Require That Confiscated Property Have Been Held by a 

U.S. National at the Time it Was Confiscated 

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs do not plead that the RRHSC limited partnership “was 

a United States national. . . . Nor does the SAC allege that a United States national owned the 

limited partnership when it, too, was confiscated.” See Motion at 21 - 22. While both are true, 

neither is required by the HBA. To the contrary, the HBA requires only that a United States 

national have “acquire[d] ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996.” 14 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082 

(4)(B); see also 22 U.S.C. § 6023 (15) (defining U.S. Nationals as “any” U.S. citizen, without 

temporal requirement) (emphasis added); 22 U.S.C § 6081 (3)(iii) (acknowledging protection for 

“Cubans who claimed asylum in the United States as refugees because of persecution and later 

became naturalized citizens of the United States.” (emphasis added). 

Defendants also argue that the HBA must be deemed require that RRHSC was a U.S. 

National because: “Any taking by Cuba of property belonging to its own nationals implicates the 

domestic takings rule.” Mot at 22. They also cite to Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 141 

S. Ct. 703, 709–11 (2021), which held that Germany was “immune from claims arising from 

expropriations the Nazi regime committed against German nationals.” Defendants’ “domestic 

14 Each Plaintiff is a U.S. Citizen who acquired an interest in the Claim before 1996. See SAC 

¶¶ 27 – 33. 

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takings” arguments add nothing. First, the HBA does not purport to provide any claim against 

Cuba for its confiscation of domestic property. There is also no relevant “immunity” at issue. The 

Sucesores court expressly rejected a similar argument concluding: “Defendants’ contention that 

international law affirmatively legitimates domestic takings . . . has no basis in law.” The 

explained: “Because the domestic takings rule is rooted in the jurisdictional principle of sovereign 

immunity. . . the rule does not determine the substantive rights of those subject to a domestic 

taking.” Rather, “[U]nder international law, the law of sovereign immunity from adjudication does 

not establish causes of action or create or destroy legal obligations[.]” Sucesores, 2021 WL 

6065758, at *6 (citations omitted). 

2. Plaintiffs Properly Plead That They Own the HBA Cliam 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs do not own the claim at issue, because the Property 

was confiscated from RRHSC, not from Ramon Rodriguez Gutierrez (“RRG”). Defendants 

contend that, because RRG was a shareholder and not direct owner, he cannot assert the claim. 

This contention has been rejected by courts in this district. See Motion at 23 n. 17. Further, it 

ignores the action confiscation at issue. As set out in exhibit 5A, the Cuban Government 

confiscated “extend[ed] the nationalization . . . to as many assets, business entities, rights and 

stocks as are linked or related to those nationalized, whatsoever the form and title of the bond 

of affinity to the nationalized entities.” (Emphasis added). In other words, the Cuban Government 

ignored and destroyed the corporate form and took all possible rights of RRG, leaving RRHSC 

only a shell. The court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporacion CIMEX S.A., 534 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27, 

discussing international expropriation explained that this type of total taking of all value does 

create a claim in the shareholders themselves. This reasoning applies here with equal force. 

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Defendants finally add that Plaintiff Forns cannot assert a claim because he inherited his 

claim after 1996. Plaintiffs acknowledge that reported HBA decisions have agreed. Plaintiffs 

submit, however, that Forns’ Claim is valid under published (and, therefore, binding) Eleventh 

Circuit case law. See U.S. v. NEC Corp., 11 F.3d 136, 137 (11th Cir. 1993) (“In the absence of an 

expression of contrary intent, the survival of a federal cause of action is a question of federal 

common law.” (citing James v. Home Constr. Co. of Mobile, 621 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir.1980)). 

Like the FCA claim at issue there, neither the HBA nor its legislative history reveals the drafters’ 

intent with respect to survivability. Like the claim at issue in James, the HBA claim is a remedial 

action. Therefore, survivability of the claim is governed by federal common law which expressly 

allows the transfer. Defendants also argue that the Claims held by Francisco Rodriguez, Raul 

Rodriguez and Cristina Conroy should be dismissed. But they acquired a portion of their claims 

before 1996. See SAC, ¶ 33. As a result, they have a claim no matter what. There is no basis for a 

partial dismissal of their claims. 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons and based on the cited authorities, the Court should deny the 

Motion to Dismiss. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

Rodriguez Tramont & Nuñez P.A. Berenthal & Associates, P.C. 

By: /s/ Paulino A. Núñez Jr. By: /s/ James L. Berenthal 

Paulino A. Núñez Jr. James L. Berenthal 

Florida Bar No. 814806 Florida Bar No.126035 

Primary email: pan@rtgn-law.com email: jlb@berenthalaw.com 

255 Alhambra Circle 255 Alhambra Circle 

Suite 1150 Suite 1150 

Coral Gables, FL 33134 Coral Gables, FL 33134 

Telephone: (305) 350-2300 Telephone: (212) 302-9494 

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Certificate of Service 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 20, 2022, a copy of the foregoing was filed with the 

Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send a notification of the filing to all counsel 

and parties of record. 

 

/s/ Paulino A. Núñez Jr. 

Paulino A. Núñez Jr. 

. 

 

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