[Cite as State v. Holsinger, 2020-Ohio-5353.]

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CHAMPAIGN COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

NATHAN ALLEN HOLSINGER 

 Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-25 

Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-114 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 20th day of November, 2020. 

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KEVIN TALEBI, Atty. Reg. No. 0069198, Champaign County Prosecutor’s Office, 

Appellate Division, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

K. GEORGE KORDALIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0089697, 130 West Second Street, Suite 1818, 

Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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FROELICH, J. 
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{¶ 1} Nathan Allen Holsinger pled guilty in the Champaign County Court of 

Common Pleas to having weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony, and 

domestic violence, a first-degree misdemeanor. In exchange for the plea, the State 

agreed to dismiss four additional charges and to recommend a presentence investigation 

(PSI). Holsinger agreed to pay any court costs and court-appointed legal fees that the 

court imposed. The trial court sentenced Holsinger to 36 months in prison for having a 

weapon while under disability and six months in jail for domestic violence, to be served 

concurrently, fines totaling $250, and court costs. 

{¶ 2} For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

I. Factual and Procedural History 

{¶ 3} According to the complaint filed in the municipal court, at approximately 5:30 

p.m. on May 4, 2019, the victim, “Nichole,” called 911 and reported that her boyfriend, 

Holsinger, chased her through their home with a loaded firearm. Nichole told the 

dispatcher that she had locked herself in the bathroom and did not know Holsinger’s 

location. 

{¶ 4} Two deputies responded to the call. Deputy Dixon, who arrived first, located 

Holsinger on the front porch of the home and detained him. Deputy Kriesel arrived soon 

thereafter, placed Holsinger in handcuffs, and frisked him for weapons. No weapons 

were found on Holsinger’s person. Deputy Dixon told Nichole that it was safe to leave 

the bathroom. 

{¶ 5} Nichole informed the deputies that, during the prior 48 hours, Holsinger had 

been acting paranoid and believed that his brother was sneaking into the home. 
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Holsinger then began walking around outside with a rifle. Nichole stated that the 

situation began to escalate, and Holsinger took a revolver from a lock box in a closet and 

pointed it at her head. Nichole grabbed her phone and ran to the bathroom. Holsinger 

grabbed Nichole’s hair and shirt, causing her shirt to tear. Deputy Kriesel observed a 

tear on the back of Nichole’s shirt, bruises around both of her wrists, and small cuts to 

her hands and fingers. Officers located both firearms inside the home. 

{¶ 6} Holsinger initially was charged by complaint in the Champaign County 

Municipal Court with having weapons while under disability and aggravated menacing. 

After a preliminary hearing, the municipal court found probable cause to believe that 

Holsinger committed those offenses. On May 6, Deputy Kriesel filed additional 

complaints for misdemeanor assault and domestic violence; the municipal court sent 

those charges to the grand jury. 

{¶ 7} On June 3, the grand jury indicted Holsinger on four counts of having 

weapons while under disability and two counts of misdemeanor domestic violence. Two 

of the weapons counts addressed the rifle (Counts 2 and 4), and two addressed the 

revolver (Counts 1 and 3); Counts 1 and 2 cited a prior burglary conviction in Franklin 

County, and Counts 3 and 4 cited a prior conviction for aggravated trafficking in drugs in 

Madison County. 

{¶ 8} The magistrate set a $7,000 bond, with conditions. At his arraignment with 

counsel, Holsinger pled not guilty. On June 13, the court modified Holsinger’s bond to a 

personal recognizance bond with house arrest and electronic monitoring. The house 

arrest included exceptions for traveling directly to and from the courthouse or Holsinger’s 

attorney’s office. At Holsinger’s request, the trial court later modified his bond so that he 
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could reside with his mother and step-father; the court denied Holsinger’s request to be 

able to work outside around their residence. 

{¶ 9} On July 15, 2019, the date of the scheduled final pretrial conference, the trial 

court held a hearing on allegations that Holsinger had violated his bond on July 11 and 

July 14 by traveling to places not authorized under his bond conditions. Holsinger 

admitted to the conduct, but offered explanations for why he violated his bond. The court 

found Holsinger guilty of the bond violations and told him that the bond violations would 

be used as a sentencing factor in the event he were convicted of an offense in the case. 

{¶ 10} Following the bond violation hearing, the State informed the court that the 

parties had reached a plea agreement. The trial court then conducted a plea hearing, 

pursuant to Crim.R. 11, during which Holsinger pled guilty to one count of having weapons 

while under disability (Count 1) and one count of domestic violence (Count Five). The 

court ordered a PSI and gave Holsinger instructions about completing the PSI 

questionnaire. The court revoked Holsinger’s bond and scheduled sentencing for 

August 16, 2019. 

{¶ 11} At sentencing, the trial court heard from the prosecutor, Nichole, defense 

counsel, and Holsinger. The prosecutor recommended a prison sentence of 30 months 

in prison and indicated that it would favorably consider judicial release to West Central 

after Holsinger served one year in prison. The prosecutor stated that the State did not 

think Holsinger presently was amenable to community control, noting Holsinger’s criminal 

history. It also had “some very serious concerns” about Holsinger’s actions, including 

that he reportedly was on heroin and methamphetamine at the time of the offenses. The 

prosecutor noted that Holsinger claimed not to remember what he did, and the State was 
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concerned about his lack of memory and whether that was genuine. 

{¶ 12} Nichole wrote a letter to the court and she told the court at sentencing that 

she bore “some responsibility for this situation.” She indicated that she knew Holsinger’s 

history, yet failed to remove the weapons from the house before he moved in. 

{¶ 13} Defense counsel asked the court to consider community control sanctions 

with a stipulation that Holsinger complete a program at West Central. Defense counsel 

acknowledged that the facts of the case were “severe” and that Holsinger was high on 

heroin and methamphetamine when the incident occurred. Counsel emphasized 

Holsinger’s “difficult upbringing” and his need for treatment after this relapse. 

{¶ 14} Holsinger apologized to the court and Nichole. He stated that he “might 

need maybe a prison sentence. But two and a half years I really don’t agree with.” 

Holsinger said that community control would probably help him, but he was ready to 

accept whatever punishment the court imposed. 

{¶ 15} Prior to imposing sentence, the court asked Holsinger about his PSI 

questionnaire, which was not completed before the PSI interview. Holsinger reportedly 

had told the PSI interviewer that he had not received it. Holsinger told the trial court that 

he left the courthouse after his plea without the PSI questionnaire. The court indicated 

that it found the assertion that he never received one to be not credible. The court noted 

that Holsinger could not get community control without a PSI. The court further noted 

that Holsinger had violated the terms of his bond while this case was pending. The court 

also addressed Nichole’s assertion that she was responsible for Holsinger’s predicament. 

The court stated that Holsinger’s acts of pointing a revolver at her head and of grabbing 

her hair and shirt were not due to the presence of guns in the house. 
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{¶ 16} After discussing the seriousness and recidivism factors, the trial court 

imposed concurrent, maximum 36-month and six-month sentences for having weapons 

under disability and domestic violence, respectively. The trial court told Holsinger that, 

upon his release from prison, he was subject to post-release control for a discretionary 

period up to three years; the court informed Holsinger of the consequences if he violated 

post-release control. Upon considering the seriousness and recidivism factors, the court 

did not recommend intensive program prison or a risk reduction sentence. The court 

found that Holsinger was employable and in good health for purposes of his present and 

future ability to pay financial sanctions. It imposed concurrent $250 fines for both 

offenses and ordered Holsinger to pay court costs. The court determined that Holsinger 

was entitled to 74 days of jail time credit, plus additional credit pending transport to prison. 

{¶ 17} Holsinger appeals from his convictions. 

I. Anders Appeal Standard 

{¶ 18} Holsinger’s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). We informed Holsinger 

that his attorney had filed an Anders brief on his behalf and granted him 60 days from 

that date to file a pro se brief. To date, no pro se brief has been filed. 

{¶ 19} Pursuant to Anders, we must determine, “after a full examination of all 

the proceedings,” whether the appeal is “wholly frivolous.” Id. at 744; Penson v. Ohio, 

488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). An issue is not frivolous merely 

because the prosecution can be expected to present a strong argument in reply. 

State v. Pullen, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19232, 2002-Ohio-6788, ¶ 4. Rather, a 

frivolous appeal is one that presents issues lacking arguable merit, which means that, 
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“on the facts and law involved, no responsible contention can be made that it offers a 

basis for reversal.” State v. Marbury, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19226, 2003-Ohio3242, ¶ 8, citing Pullen at ¶ 4. If we find that any issue — whether presented by 

appellate counsel, presented by the appellant, or found through an independent 

analysis — is not wholly frivolous, we must appoint different appellate counsel to 

represent the appellant. Id. at ¶ 7. 

III. Anders Review 

A. Holsinger’s Guilty Plea 

{¶ 20} “An appellate court must determine whether the record affirmatively 

demonstrates that a defendant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary[.]” State v. 

Russell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25132, 2012-Ohio-6051, ¶ 7, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 

395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). If a defendant’s plea is not 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it “has been obtained in violation of due process and 

is void.” Id. 

{¶ 21} “In order for a plea to be given knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must 

follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 

24520, 24705, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13. The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged trial courts 

to comply literally with Crim.R. 11. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 

893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 29. However, in reviewing the plea colloquy, the focus should be on 

whether “the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the 

defendant understood the consequences of his plea.” State v. Dangler, Ohio Slip 

Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2765, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 22} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires a trial court to address the defendant personally 
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and (a) determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding 

of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty, and, if applicable, that the 

defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions; 

(b) inform the defendant of and determine that the defendant understands the effect of 

the plea of guilty and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with 

judgment and sentencing; and (c) inform the defendant and determine that he or she 

understands that, by entering the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury trial, 

to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses, and to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at 

which he or she cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. State v. Brown, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21896, 2007-Ohio-6675, ¶ 3. 

{¶ 23} In general, a defendant is not entitled to have his or her plea vacated unless 

the defendant demonstrates he or she was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to 

comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C). Dangler at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 

Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). The test for prejudice is “whether the plea 

would have otherwise been made.” Id. 

{¶ 24} This general rule is subject to two exceptions. Id. at ¶ 16. First, the trial 

court must comply strictly with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), as it pertains to the waiver of federal 

constitutional rights. Id at ¶ 14; Clark at ¶ 31. “When a trial court fails to explain the 

constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we presume 

that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is 

required.” Dangler at ¶ 14. 

{¶ 25} Second, “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 
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11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v. 

Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22. See also State v. 

Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 11 (a defendant must 

show prejudice if the trial court partially complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in regard to a 

nonconstitutional right, but no showing of prejudice is required if the trial court completely 

failed to comply). 

{¶ 26} We have reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing and find that the trial 

court fully complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11. The trial court initially 

questioned Holsinger about whether he was under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs 

and about the medications he was taking. The court inquired about whether he had 

discussed the case with his attorney, whether he received enough information to make a 

decision on whether to enter a plea, and whether he had confidence in his attorney. 

{¶ 27} The court reviewed the two offenses to which Holsinger was entering a plea 

and the maximum sentences for those offenses. The court told Holsinger that the felony 

and misdemeanor sentences would run concurrently. The court informed Holsinger that 

he could be required to pay court costs and attorney fees. The court reviewed what 

community control entails and the potential consequences for violating community 

control. The trial court discussed judicial release and post-release control. The court 

told Holsinger that it was not involved in the plea negotiations and that it would determine 

Holsinger’s sentence. Holsinger expressed that he understood what the court had told 

him. 

{¶ 28} The trial court told Holsinger that a guilty plea was a complete admission of 

guilt, and it reviewed the constitutional rights that Holsinger was waiving by entering a 
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plea. Holsinger denied that his plea was the result of promises (other than the plea 

agreement) or threats. Holsinger stated that he did not have any defense to the charges, 

and he admitted to committing Counts One and Five of the indictment. Holsinger told 

the court that he was entering his plea voluntarily and “of [his] own free choice,” and he 

signed the plea forms. 

{¶ 29} Upon review of the plea hearing transcript, we find no non-frivolous issues 

relating to Holsinger’s plea. 

{¶ 30} In addition, we find nothing in the record to suggest that anything that 

occurred prior to the plea hearing precluded Holsinger from entering a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary plea. A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. E.g., 

State v. Faulkner, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2013-CA-43, 2015-Ohio-2059, ¶ 9; State v. 

Wheeler, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24112, 2011-Ohio-3423, ¶ 3; Crim.R. 11(B)(1). 

Consequently, a guilty plea generally waives all appealable errors that may have occurred 

in the trial court, unless such errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily entering his or her guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 

127, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus; Wheeler at ¶ 3. We find no 

non-frivolous issues related to the events prior to Holsinger’s guilty plea. 

B. Holsinger’s Sentence 

{¶ 31} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of 

review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), rather than an abuse of discretion standard. See 

State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or it 

may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, only if it “clearly and convincingly” 
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finds either (1) that the record does not support certain specified findings or (2) that the 

sentence imposed is contrary to law. State v. Huffman, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2016-CA-16, 

2017-Ohio-4097, ¶ 6. 

{¶ 32} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the 

authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its 

reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-

Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). However, in exercising its discretion, a trial 

court must consider the statutory policies that apply to every felony offense, including 

those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Leopard, 194 Ohio App.3d 

500, 2011-Ohio-3864, 957 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38. 

{¶ 33} In imposing sentence, the trial court made the following findings: 

Regarding pre-sentence findings, the Court finds that Defendant

violated bond and had previously served prison terms. The Defendant’s 

Ohio Risk Assessment Score is 20, which is considered moderate. Court 

finds that Counts One and Five are not allied offenses of similar import and 

do not merge. In imposing sentence, the Court considered and applied the 

purposes and principles of sentencing as set forth in 2929.11 Divisions A, 

B, and C. The Court also considered the seriousness of the conduct, 

likelihood of recidivism, and lack of service in the Armed Forces. 

 Because the victim is here, and because the victim has given the 

Court insight into her thoughts, the Court is going to read the seriousness 

and recidivism factors on the record now so that the victim understands the 
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basis for the Court’s decision. 

 * * * 

 With regard to more serious factors, the Court finds the Defendant 

used the firearm to facilitate domestic violence. The Defendant used the 

firearm by possessing it and pointing it at the victim’s head in a threatening 

manner. The Defendant used more than one firearm during the weapons 

under disability offense. The Defendant’s relationship with the victim 

facilitated the offense. The victim suffered physical injuries as a result of 

the domestic violence. And the Defendant committed the offenses within 

a little over four months after his release from his last term of imprisonment. 

With regard to less serious factors, the Court acknowledges that the 

victim facilitated the offense because the firearms in the residence, shared 

with the victim and Defendant, were owned by the victim. Court concludes 

that factors establishing Defendant’s conduct is more serious outweigh 

factors establishing conduct is less serious. 

With regard to likely to commit future crimes and recidivism, the 

Court finds that the Defendant has a history of criminal convictions. And 

he’s not responded favorably to sanctions previously imposed for criminal 

convictions. Court finds that the victim and the Defendant desire to 

continue their relationship. Making the domestic violence offense 

committed under circumstances likely to reoccur. The Court finds that 

Defendant has four prior community control violation revocations of 

sentence. And the Court finds that the Defendant committed multiple bond 
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violations within two weeks of being placed on personal recognizance bond 

in the case at bar. 

With regard to less likely to commit future crimes, the Court finds that 

prior to committing the offense the Defendant had not been adjudicated a 

delinquent child. The Court finds Defendant has remorse. The Court 

questions whether the remorse is genuine. Court concludes that factors 

establishing recidivism is more likely outweigh factors establishing 

recidivism is less likely. Court considered military service record and finds 

he has no military service record. 

{¶ 34} The PSI reflects that Holsinger was 40 years when the offenses occurred 

and at sentencing. He had no juvenile record. His first adult offense, misdemeanor 

assault, occurred when he was 21 years old. In 2010, Holsinger was convicted of 

burglary, a second-degree felony, for which he received community control. In 2011, his 

community control was revoked, and Holsinger served four years in prison. Holsinger 

committed several misdemeanor theft offenses in 2013 and 2014. In 2018, he was 

convicted of misdemeanor drug possession. In two of those cases, Holsinger’s 

community control was revoked and the municipal court imposed jail terms. In June 

2018, Holsinger was sentenced to seven months in prison for breaking and entering. 

{¶ 35} Holsinger reported that he was using methamphetamine and heroin at the 

time of the offense. He told the PSI investigator that he had overdosed 15 to 20 times 

and was transported to the hospital most of those times. 

{¶ 36} Holsinger obtained a GED and was not in special education classes while 

in school. Holsinger described his health as good and denied having any health 
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concerns during the PSI interview. Holsinger previously held employment. From 

December 2017 to February 2018, he worked at Subway; and from March 2019 to May 

2019, he worked as a laborer. In the months immediately prior to the instant offenses, 

Holsinger worked 40 hours per week, making approximately $2,000 per month. He 

reported monthly expenses totaling $1,580. 

{¶ 37} Upon review of the record, including the PSI, we find no arguably 

meritorious claim that the trial court’s sentence was clearly and convincingly unsupported 

by the record. Holsinger’s prison term for having weapons while under disability and his 

jail term for domestic violence were within the statutory ranges. Holsinger’s criminal 

history and the conduct underlying the offenses supported the trial court’s imposition of 

maximum sentences. The court reasonably concluded that Holsinger had the ability to 

pay a $250 fine and that amount was not contrary to law. The trial court supported its 

decisions to disapprove Holsinger’s participation in intensive program prison and a risk 

reduction sentence. 

{¶ 38} The trial court determined that Holsinger was entitled to 74 days of jail time 

credit. In its judgment entry, the trial court indicated that this calculation represented 41 

days from May 4, 2019 (date of arrest) to June 13, 2019 (date of personal recognizance 

bond), and 33 days from July 15, 2019 (date of plea hearing) to August 16, 2019 (date of 

sentencing). The court indicated that Holsinger would receive additional credit while 

awaiting transport to prison. The record supports this calculation of jail time credit. 

{¶ 39} We have examined the entire record and conducted our independent review 

in accordance with Penson, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300. We conclude 

that no non-frivolous issues exist for appeal in this case. 
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IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 40} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

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TUCKER, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Kevin Talebi 

K. George Kordalis 

Nathan Allen Holsinger 

Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio