OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

July 28, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 

 OFFICE 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING 

 COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, 

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

 

SUBJECT: Review of the Advanced First Responder Network 

(SIGIR-06-020) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed the audit in 

accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

requires that we provide for the independent and objective conduct of audits, as well as 

leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations 

and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

We considered comments from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, 

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division on the draft of this report when 

preparing the final report. Their comments are addressed in the report where applicable, and 

copies of their comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott at (703) 343-7926, or by email at 

joseph.mcdermott@iraq.centcom.mil; or Mr. Clifton Spruill at (703) 343-9275 or by email at 

clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil. For the distribution of the report, see Appendix C. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

 Inspector General 

cc: Distribution 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SIGIR-06-020 July 28, 2006 

Review of the Advanced First Responder Network

Executive Summary 

Introduction. Recognizing the problematic security environment that existed in Iraq in 

April of 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) initiated a project to deploy a 

communications network to enable interoperable communications for Iraqi Ministry of 

Interior security and safety forces throughout Iraq to improve public safety. This project, 

commonly referred to as the Advanced First Responder Network, or simply “AFRN”, 

intended to address the limited communication capabilities of Iraq’s emergency first 

responders: the police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel. 

In total, the AFRN design-build project, first responder radio procurement, and 

subsequent sustainment efforts will cost $218.5 million by the end of Fiscal Year 2006. 

The funding for this project came from three sources: $181.8 million from the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF),1

 $20 million from the Iraq Security Support Fund 

(ISSF), and $16.7 million from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). The AFRN system 

was transferred to full Iraqi government ownership and control on June 26, 2006. 

Objectives. This report addresses whether responsible personnel efficiently and 

effectively managed the Advanced First Responder Network project that was created to 

provide Iraqi police, fire, and emergency medical units with a core national public safety 

communication, command, and control system. More specifically, this report addresses 

the extent to which: 

• AFRN provides effective emergency communications for the citizens of Iraq, the 

police, fire, emergency medical departments, and related command and control 

organizations 

• radios purchased for distribution to the Iraqi police, fire, and emergency medical 

organizations were properly accounted for, controlled, supported, and transferred 

to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior 

• U.S. government plans and funding were in place to sustain the Advanced First 

Responder Network pending the Iraqi government’s assumption of those 

responsibilities; and whether U.S. officials provided the responsible Iraqi Ministry 

with sufficient information on operations and maintenance support requirements 

• AFRN task orders were properly definitized; and related equipment purchases and 

contractor services were within the scope of the contract 

 

1

 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds included $52.3 million from the fiscal year 2003 appropriation and 

$129.5 million from the fiscal year 2004 appropriation. These appropriations are commonly referred to as 

IRRF-1 and IRRF-2, respectively. 

i
Results. The initial assumptions to build the AFRN system upon the existing Iraqi 

electrical and fiber optic infrastructure exacerbated the extent to which U.S. 

implementing agencies could efficiently and effectively manage the AFRN project. The 

conditions limiting the AFRN’s effectiveness are fundamental and significant on both the 

governorate and national levels of the AFRN system, which spans Iraq from Basrah in 

the south to Mosul in the north. To a large measure, the AFRN limitations are the result 

of assumptions by U.S. government officials that the existing fiber optic and electrical 

infrastructure could readily support the communications requirements of the AFRN 

project. 

Effectiveness has been impacted by no connectivity between the three zones of the 

AFRN system; inability to receive emergency calls from citizens at the majority of first 

responder dispatch centers; no network performance monitoring for two of the zones; and 

insufficient backup generators to power the various system elements when commercial 

power is unavailable. Further, even if the fiber optic and electric infrastructure 

conditions can be effectively resolved, it would operate inefficiently because of 

insufficient numbers of trained personnel to fully staff and operate all nine of the first 

responder dispatch centers. 

As a result, the AFRN project has not yet produced: 

• an effective nationwide first responder communication, command, and control 

system 

• an efficient means to dispatch and direct first responders at the governorate level 

• the ability to escalate incidents to the national level 

Although the AFRN project has increased communication capability amongst first 

responder organizations, Iraqi citizens cannot use their cellular or regular telephones to 

call into the AFRN system to request police, fire department, or emergency medical 

assistance from seven of the nine governorate dispatch centers. 

There were insufficient property controls to effectively manage over 30,000 radios 

valued at over $24 million to provide reasonable assurance that all assets were accounted 

for, controlled, and properly transferred to the Iraqi government. For example, property 

records show a significant shortage of one type of radio and an even greater overage of 

another type. 

U.S. agencies did not anticipate the operations and maintenance funding requirements to 

sustain the AFRN until the Iraqi government was prepared to assume this role. However, 

once identified, corrective action was taken to address the funding shortfall. Contract 

management officials stated these sustainment funds came from various funding sources 

(DFI and ISSF). We were also told that this includes funding for future training of 

additional personnel to staff AFRN dispatch centers. Although there was insufficient 

funding allocated, the task orders issued from the design/build contract as well as the 

Integration contract contained provisions to develop the Iraqi government’s ability to 

maintain the AFRN system. In addition, the U.S. agencies provided the Iraqi government 

with information that an estimated $16.7 million would need to be budgeted for to 

address annual operations and maintenance costs for the AFRN. 

During our review, we were able to determine that the AFRN task orders were properly 

definitized and related equipment purchases and contractor provided services were 

within the scope of the contract requirements and terms.

ii
Material Management Control Weaknesses. Our review disclosed a material 

management control weakness regarding U.S. government property accountability for the 

30,000 radios purchased during the AFRN project. 

Management Actions. U.S. government officials initiated two actions during the course 

of this review. First, officials within the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

(JCC-I/A), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division and Project and 

Contracting Office (GRD-PCO), and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) included a requirement in the new DFI sustainment contract for the new 

contractor to assess and provide a “state of the network” report on the AFRN system. 

In addition, we notified responsible officials in MNSTC-I’s Civilian Police Assistance 

Training Team (CPATT) that the documentation they provided did not accurately 

account for the transfer of first responder radios to the Ministry of the Interior. As a 

result, the officials began action to identify any missing documents evidencing transfers 

of radios to the Ministry of Interior. CPATT personnel requested and received copies of 

transfer/receipt documents from the Ministry and, subsequently, provided copies of these 

records to us. However, the additional documentation did not resolve the accountability 

issues described in this report.

Recommendations. 

We recommend the following management corrective action regarding fiber optic 

network connectivity and capacity required to achieve inter-zone operation of the 

Advanced First Responder Network. 

1. We recommend that the Commanding General, Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq ensure that the contractor conducting the AFRN 

assessment is required to coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi 

Ministry of Communications Iraq Telephone and Postal Company in diagnosing 

and resolving the specific technical reason or reasons why connectivity between 

the three AFRN zones does not exist. 

 

We also recommend the following management corrective actions regarding the 

accountability of radios purchased for the Advanced First Responder Network. 

2. We recommend that the Commanding General, Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq, direct the appropriate command organization to: 

a. Request the Iraqi Ministry of Interior provide current inventory information, 

by model type, for the first responder radios in their possession. 

b. Direct CPATT personnel conduct a physical inventory, by model type, of any 

radios not yet transferred to the Ministry of Interior. 

c. Reconcile the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and CPATT inventories to the record 

of all radios purchased and document the results. 

d. Initiate actions in accordance with applicable U.S. government property 

management policies, to properly account for and control all radios.

iii
Management Comments and Audit Response. We received written comments on a 

draft of this report from MNSTC-I and the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. We 

received technical comments from JCC-I/A and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf 

Region Division. 

MNSTC-I officials did not concur with the first recommendation (for jurisdictional 

reasons), but did concur with the second. We agree the IRMO Communications Sector 

was responsible for the AFRN project, as evidenced by the original CPA tasking order; 

however, our recommendation was appropriately addressed to MNSTC-I for the 

following two reasons. First, the AFRN system transferred to control of the Iraq Ministry 

of Interior on June 26, 2006 and secondly; MNSTC-I assumed responsibility for coalition 

force liaison to the Ministry of Interior in October, 2005. Although officials did not 

specifically concur with the first recommendation, we believe the substance of their 

comments fully satisfy the recommendation’s intent. Corrective actions are either in 

progress or planned. MNSTC-I also provided technical comments for this report. We 

reviewed those comments and incorporated changes into the final report where 

appropriate. 

 

The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office suggested we add a recommendation to “get 

all nine AFRN Governorate Dispatch Centers operating and in service with fully trained 

staff to realize the full potential of the system”. While we recognize the importance of 

the Governorate Dispatch Centers to the AFRN system, we did not include this 

recommendation because the DFI Sustainment contract includes training, as discussed in 

this report. 

JCC-I/A and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division also provided 

technical comments for this report. We reviewed these comments and incorporated 

changes into the final report where appropriate. 

All comments received were fully responsive. 

iv
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objectives 9 

Findings 

 Effectiveness of the AFRN 10 

 First Responder Radios 14 

 Sustainment of the AFRN 16 

Contract Definitization and Propriety of Equipment Purchases 

 and Contractor Services 18 

Conclusion and Recommendations 19

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 22 

B. Acronyms 24 

C. Report Distribution 25 

D. Audit Team Members 27 

 Management Comments 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 28 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 33 
Introduction 

Background 

In March of 2004, the Department of the Army awarded contract W914NS-04-D-0005 to 

restore Iraq’s communication infrastructure. Under that contract, the Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA) Program Management Office and its successor 

organizations would issue task orders for specific projects within the communications 

sector. The only task orders issued under this contract were for the Advanced First 

Responder Network (AFRN).2

 In total, the AFRN project and subsequent sustainment 

efforts has amounted to $218.5.1 million. The AFRN contract ended on May 2, 2006. 

The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) budget for the AFRN project included 

$30.6 million for first responder radios and $151.2 million for the design-build task 

orders. Subsequent contracts to sustain the system and address conditions limiting full 

operating capability received $20 million from the Iraq Security Support Fund and 

remaining monies from the $16.7 million DFI allocation. The latter of which will 

provide sustainment for the remainder of calendar year 2006. The AFRN system was 

transferred to full Iraqi government ownership and control on June 26, 2006. Table 1 

summarizes the source of funds and their use. 

Table 1: AFRN Funding Sources and Application (Dollars in Millions) 

Contract 

Purpose 

IRRF3 Iraq Security 

Support 

Fund 

DFI Total 

By 

Contract 

First Responder Radios $ 30.6 0 0 $ 30.6

AFRN Design Build Contract 

 Design/Build $ 147.4 0 0 $ 147.4

 Operations and Maintenance $3.8 0 0 $ 3.8

 Contract Total: $ 151.2 0 0 $ 151.2

AFRN Integration Contract 

 Construction 0 $ 18.9 0 $ 18.9

 Operations and Maintenance4 0 $ 1.1 $ 2.9 $ 4.0

 Contract Total: 0 $ 20.0 $ 2.9 $ 22.9

DFI Bridging Contract; 

Operations and Maintenance 0 0 $ 2.3 $ 2.3

DFI Sustainment Contract 

 Operations/Maintenance and 

Training 

0 0 $ 11.5 $ 11.5

 Contract Total: 0 0 $11.5 $ 16.7

Total By Fund Source $ 181.8 $ 20.0 $ 16.7 $ 218.5

Source: SIGIR Analysis of AFRN Project Costs as of July 23, 2006. 

 

2

 There were six task orders issued under this contract. Task Order 1 ($2.5 million) pertained to the 

contractor’s mobilization and Task Order 3 ($16.2 million) provided contractor life support. Task Orders 2 

($2.5 million), 4 ($1.4 million), 5 ($53.3 million), and 6 ($75.3 million) pertained to the design and 

construction of the AFRN system, to include sustainment contained in Task Order 5. 

3

 This column includes total funds from the fiscal years 2003 and 2004 IRRF appropriations. These 

appropriations are commonly referred to as IRRF-1 and IRRF-2, respectively. 4

 The $2.9 million of DFI funding was pending and not yet committed on this date. 

1
Recognizing the problematic security environment in Iraq, a CPA Communications 

Sector5 tasking6, issued April 1, 2004, through the CPA Program Management Office, 

directed initiation of the “National Security Emergency Communications Network: First 

Responder Network” (commonly referred to as the Advanced First Responder Network 

or “AFRN”). AFRN is a communications network designed to enable interoperable 

communications for Iraqi Ministry of Interior security and safety forces throughout Iraq 

to improve public safety. The Communications Sector tasking stated Iraqi first 

responders such as police, border patrol officers, firefighters, emergency medical 

personnel, and civil defense agencies, had only limited voice communications capabilities 

to conduct their respective missions. 

The Communications Sector tasking also stated the project objective, intended scope of 

work, assumptions regarding the Iraq construction environment, the project start date of 

May 1, 2004, and a desired completion date of November 15, 2005. One of the 

Communications Sector tasking elements was to “...maximize the use of existing 

common infrastructure (especially long haul fiber, microwave links, towers, etc.) but not 

to the point where integration adds undue risk, cost, limits flexibility or data handling 

capabilities, impacts performance or causes safety concerns.” Tasking assumptions 

included the statement that, “Iraq is a harsh environment for electrical equipment due to 

temperature extremes, frequent power outages, heavy rains and flooding, severe dust, 

high winds and sand storms. Looting, sabotage, and vandalism also remain prevalent 

throughout Iraq. ” 

On May 6, 2004, CPA and Combined Joint Task Force 7, which was the top Coalition

military command in Iraq until May 2004; in cooperation with the Iraqi Ministries of 

Communications and Interior, published a Concept of Operations for the AFRN. The 

concept of operations stated the need for a nationwide first responder communication, 

command, and control system; and defined final operational capability as a digital 

communications system delivering national knowledge to individual first responders 

anywhere, anytime within seconds. The intended scheme of construction was to first 

establish functional, reliable networks in Baghdad and quickly establish comparable 

networks in the target cities connected to Baghdad. 

Department of Defense Program Responsibilities. The CPA was created in May 2003 

to oversee and operate the interim governing authority in Iraq. In addition to providing a 

temporary government for Iraq, CPA also had the duty to oversee the reconstruction and 

rehabilitation of Iraq’s infrastructure. CPA prioritized its efforts into five general areas, 

which included security and the provision of essential services, such as energy, to the 

Iraqi people. Reconstruction and rehabilitation activities to address these priorities were 

divided into ten categories, or CPA offices, pursuant to Public Law 108-106 to support 

the Iraqi provisional ministries. These ministries were advised by CPA personnel. The 

CPA Senior Advisors to the Ministry of Communications and Ministry of Interior 

provided guidance to the ministries for developing the AFRN Concept of Operations; and 

determining user (i.e. Ministry of Interior) requirements, use of the communications 

infrastructure in Iraq, and funding for AFRN. The CPA was dissolved on June 28, 2004, 

and replaced by the United States Ambassador to Iraq, as the Chief of Mission-Iraq, with 

 

5

 Public Law 108-106, November 6, 2003, specified Iraq reconstruction funding by reconstruction sectors. 

6

 CPA Program Management Office Task Order Transportaton/Communications-001, First Responder 

Network, April 1, 2004. Not to be confused with task orders issued under a contract, during this period of 

time, the CPA Program Management Office issued task orders to implementing agencies. A task order is 

an administrative management tool. To avoid confusion, we refer to the administrative task orders in this 

report as “taskings”. 

2
the CPA advisory responsibilities being subsumed into the Department of State’s Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). 

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is a subordinate 

command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, which is the top coalition military command 

in Iraq. MNSTC-I provides support in training police and other security forces. 

MNSTC-I’s mission is to organize, equip, and mentor Iraqi security forces in order to 

support Iraq’s ultimate goal of a unified, stable, and democratic Iraq, which provides a 

representative government for the Iraqi people. On October 1, 2005, the responsibility 

for Ministry of Interior liaison transferred from IRMO to MNSTC-I. The MNSTC-I 

mission to provide training support to the Ministry of Interior is performed by its Civilian 

Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT). The MNSTC-I Directorate of 

Communications, Ministry of Interior Support Division provided management control 

and accountability of the first responder radios purchased for the AFRN project from the 

point in time they were removed from a U.S. Government controlled warehouse until 

such time as the radios were transferred to the Iraqi Government. 

The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) was established in 2004 to 

consolidate contracting activities and reports through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Army (Policy and Procurement) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. As part of this mission, JCC-I/A issued and 

managed all contracts and task orders associated with the AFRN project, and also had 

responsibility for records administration for all records of U.S. property obtained through 

JCC-I/A contracts. With regards to the AFRN project, the Commanding General, JCCI/A was designated as Program Executive Officer, in June of 2005, to increase overview 

and focus management of the basic AFRN contract as well as the contract providing the 

AFRN first responder radios. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD) and the Project and 

Contracting Office (PCO) merged on December 4, 2005 to create an organization known 

as GRD-PCO. PCO was a temporary organization created under the Department of 

Defense on May 11, 2004, by National Security Presidential Directive 36, United States 

Government Operations in Iraq, which replaced the CPA Program Management Office. 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense established PCO within the Department of the Army 

and directed PCO to provide support for all activities associated with financial, program, 

and project management for both construction and non-construction IRRF activities. 

Both PCO and the Program Management Office provided AFRN project management 

support for the implementation of the AFRN project. 

Department of State Program Responsibilities. The U.S. established the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) on May 11, 2004, pursuant to National 

Security Presidential Directive 36. IRMO, a temporary office within the Department of 

State and the U.S. Mission to Iraq, was established to facilitate the transition to a 

democratically elected, sovereign government of Iraq. IRMO executes its mission by 

assisting the U.S. Ambassador in setting reconstruction policy and provides expertise and 

operational assistance to Iraqi ministries in the reconstruction process. IRMO is 

organized into sectors to support the current Iraqi ministries much in the same manner as 

the CPA had been. IRMO responsibilities relative to IRRF include strategic planning, 

prioritizing requirements, monitoring spending, and coordinating with the applicable 

military commander. The CPA Project Management Office task order initiating the 

AFRN project assigned responsibility to the Senior Consultant, Communications Sector, 

to liaise with the Ministry of Communications. However, the intended user and ultimate 

the “owner” of AFRN was the Ministry of Interior. Until October 1, 2005, IRMO was 

responsible for liaison with both the Iraqi Ministry of Communications and the Ministry 

3
of Interior. After October 1, 2005, the IRMO Senior Consultant to the Ministry of 

Communications also functioned in an advisory role for implementation of the AFRN. 

Design of the Advanced First Responder Network. First responder networks 

essentially have three main elements: The public telephone system; a communication, 

command, and control system; and radios in the hands of first responders and their parent 

organizations such as police stations and fire departments. In that respect, AFRN is a 

typical first responder system. The AFRN project was to design and construct the 

second element and procure equipment for the third element. 

 

Public Telephone System

The starting point in a first responder network is the public telephone system, including 

cellular phone systems, which provides the public with a means to request emergency 

services or report emergency information. In Iraq, the public telephone system is owned, 

operated, and maintained by the Iraq Telephone and Postal Company (ITPC), which is an 

agency of the Iraqi Ministry of Communications. The existing communications 

infrastructure of the ITPC includes the public telephone system and a fiber optic network 

that runs from Basrah in southern Iraq, through Baghdad, and terminates at Kirkuk in the 

north. The AFRN system design specified using the existing fiber optic network where 

available and would need a transmission capacity of 88 “E1s”7

 from the fiber network

throughout the three AFRN “zones”. The southern zone runs from Basrah in the south to 

Hillah, just to the southwest of Baghdad; a distance of approximately 300 miles. The 

northern zone runs from Mosul in the north to Baqubah, just to the northeast of Baghdad, 

a distance of approximately 225 miles. The central zone runs about 25 miles and is 

comprised of the area in and immediately surrounding Baghdad. 

Communication, Command, and Control System 

The second element in a first responder network is the infrastructure system that receives 

emergency requests from the public and ultimately dispatches first responder resources. 

The AFRN contract task orders 5 and 6 were to provide that system but, for reasons 

explained below, resulted in a smaller first responder system than originally intended. 

The AFRN system includes: 

• the national coordination center

• network communications center 

• 9 governorate dispatch centers

• 3 mobile switching offices

• 66 base transceiver stations (equipment shelters and towers used to receive and 

transmit radio calls between the first responder and the dispatch center) 

• 104 high frequency radios for an emergency back up system

Although all of the existing AFRN components are important, the governorate dispatch 

centers, mobile switching offices, and the network communication center are critical to 

the functioning of all other components. Of the preceding three, the governorate 

dispatch centers are the heart of the AFRN system. 

 

7

 An “E1” is a communications circuit which provides 30 megabits of transmission capacity and delivers 28 

voice channels (with an additional two channels for transmission control). 

4
Governorate Dispatch Centers 

 

The governorate dispatch center (GDC) is the point where an Iraqi citizen’s request for 

emergency services or report of emergency information reaches the Ministry of Interior’s 

first responder resources. As the primary first responder dispatch organization, the GDCs 

contain the support personnel who receive calls from the public and dispatchers who 

determine the proper first responder resources to dispatch. The AFRN network includes 

communication equipment and software that accepts the incoming emergency call from 

the ITPC public telephone system. Once the AFRN system accepts the emergency call 

from the public phone system, a “call taker” in the GDC receives the call. After the call 

is received, the dispatcher determines the first responder assistance needed (police, fire, 

or medical) and then views a terminal that uses computer assisted dispatch software to 

display the location of available first responder resources. Radios used by the police, 

firefighters, or medical personnel transmit global positioning system data to the AFRN 

network. In addition, radios can belong to one or more “talk groups”.8 For example, all 

radios used by a city’s police department would likely be in one talk group while all of 

the fire department radios would constitute another talk group. Dispatchers typically 

monitor talk groups to stay abreast of unfolding events. 

Mobile Switching Office 

The mobile switching office9 receives and routes all communications from and to first 

responders and the applicable governorate dispatch center and provides the link to the 

public telephone system, to include communication protocols compatible with that used 

in the public telephone system. As built, the AFRN network has three mobile switching 

offices (one in each of the three AFRN zones) that use the ITPC fiber network to 

establish connectivity between the mobile switching offices in the other zones. This is 

especially important because the central zone (Baghdad) contains the national-level 

command and control functions and, more importantly from a system operation and 

maintenance standpoint, the AFRN system network communication center. 

AFRN Communications Center 

The AFRN Communications Center provides the vital function of monitoring and 

managing the entire communications network such as the mobile switching offices, base 

stations, transmission links, as well as all systems responsible for supporting the network 

such as servers. This includes network surveillance and alarm monitoring, disaster 

recovery, performance management and monitoring, and security management. 

Essentially, the communications center overseas all major components of the AFRN 

system. Due to its system-wide or “national-level” function, the communications center 

is co-located in Baghdad (the central zone) with the AFRN National Coordination 

Center, both of which are within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior building. 

First Responder Radios 

The third element of a first responder network consists of communication devices such as 

handheld or vehicle mounted radios used by police, fire, and emergency medical 

 

8

 Groups of radios can be programmed to appear as a private radio network even though they share a 

common radio system. A radio may belong to more than one talk group. Dispatchers can scan several talk 

groups if needed. 

9

 The term mobile switching office comes from terminology used in cellular phone communications and 

refers to a central switch that controls the entire operation of a cellular system. The AFRN system is a 

cellular Terrestrial Trunked Radio network commonly used in Europe. 

5
personnel; or desktop radios for the police stations, fire departments, and emergency 

medical units. The radios purchased for the AFRN project, funded with $30.6 million 

from the IRRF Security and Law Enforcement Sector under a separate contract,

10

ultimately provided over 30,000 radios at an actual cost of $24 million. MNSTC-I’s 

Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) Communications Directorate was 

responsible for the management of the AFRN radios and developed written guidance and 

procedures to account for, control, and transfer the first responder radios. 

Radio Models and Quantities 

The purchased a total of 30,297 radios, including 140 spares, consisting of 4 models: 

• 25,149 handheld (for issue to first responder personnel) 

• 4,140 mobile (for first responder vehicles)

• 609 Gateway mobile (vehicle mounted unit to improve localized reception of 

handhelds) 

• 399 desktop consoles (for police stations, firehouses, and medical units) 

The mobile radios included the “Gateway” models that are used to increase the effective 

local area transmission/reception range of the handheld radios. For example, if 

emergency personnel were responding to a situation in a large building, a Gateway model 

mounted in one of the vehicles would improve the effective range of the radios used 

inside the building. 

AFRN Construction, De-scoping, Integration, and Deployment.

Construction of the AFRN system primarily involved rehabilitating or remodeling 

existing buildings for the various command and control facilities such as the nationallevel facilities in Baghdad, the nine governorate dispatch centers, three mobile switching 

offices (normally collocated with a dispatch center). For the 66 base transceiver stations, 

leases and site access were required whenever a communication tower already existed in 

the required radio coverage area but was not owned by the Ministry of Interior. Sites 

without an existing tower required the erection of a new one and, again, if not a site 

owned by the Ministry of Interior, site access was required. However, to appreciate the 

otherwise straightforward task of remodeling existing facilities and erecting base 

transceiver station towers, it is important to recognize that the AFRN construction “site” 

stretched across Iraq, from Basrah in the south to Mosul in the north, and required site 

access to locations in nine different governorates and facilities often owned or operated 

by entities other than the ultimate user, the Ministry of Interior. Further, AFRN required 

the coordination and support of at least four different Iraqi government ministries.11 The 

construction and deployment commenced with Task Order 5, in the Baghdad region; and 

continued with Task Order 6 for the remaining five regions.12 Table 2 provides a 

chronology of significant events during the course of the two task orders. 

 

10 The Project and Contracting Office awarded contract W914NS-05-D-9008 on November 23, 2004, to 

obtain handheld, mobile, and desktop radios. 

11 These included the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Communication for the fiber optic network, the 

Ministry of Electricity for the commercial power supply, and the Ministry of Oil for the refueling of backup 

generators for AFRN. 

12 The remaining five regions were Basrah, Hillah, Mosul, Ramadi, and Tikrit. 

6
Table 2: AFRN Task Orders 5 and 6 Chronology

Date Project Event 

August 10, 2004 The U.S. Project and Contracting Office issues notice to proceed for 

AFRN Task Order 5, Region 5 (Hillah) deployment of the AFRN 

system. 

August 24, 2004 Delivery of AFRN design (completed under Task Order 2). User 

requirements specify AFRN deployment per region beginning with 

Region 5 (Hillah). 

September 14, 2004 JCC-I/A and PCO receive a requested rough order of magnitude cost 

estimate for entire AFRN system (less first responder radios). 

October 7, 2004 MNF-I issues memorandum to PCO stating a need to change the 

priority of AFRN installation to support January 2005 Iraq National 

Referendum resulting in a scope change to pending Task Order 5. 

October 12, 2004 Contractor delivers definitized task order response reflecting change in 

Task Order 5 deployment priority. 

November 30, 2004 JCC-I issues Task Order 6 notice to proceed. 

December 26, 2004 Contractor provides Task Order 6 proposal for expansion to the 

remaining five regions. 

February 2005 In response to JCC-I/A request, contractor provides revised Task Order 

6 reflecting de-scoping the Governorate Dispatch Center (GDC) and 

nine base transmission stations from Basrah region. 

June 2005 Stop work order issued for Ramadi sites due to security concerns. 

Ramadi de-scoped. 

June 2005 JCC-I/A requests contractor to provide a “Top Down” estimate on 

completing and sustaining the AFRN project. 

August 2005 Basrah GDC and seven base transceiver stations added back to scope 

August 2005 JCC-I/A seeks funding for “Integration” of the AFRN system 

August 22, 2005 JCC-I/A issues awards ISSF-funded contract W914NS-05-C-0066, the 

AFRN “Integration” contract. 

June 2006 JCC-I/A awards the DFI-funded sustainment contract for AFRN. 

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract files

AFRN Scope Reductions. In September of 2004, PCO requested the AFRN prime 

contractor provide a rough order of magnitude cost estimate for the designed AFRN 

system. The subsequent $242 million estimate for the intended deployment of the 

system, which did not include the required radios for emergency personnel, vehicles, and 

stations ($30.6 million); exceeded the IRRF allotment by $91 million. Additional 

programming and/or contracting actions to reduce the scope of the AFRN system resulted 

in significant changes in the capability of the system as originally designed and as it 

exists today. Table 3 provides an overview of the net effect de-scoping. 

7
Table 3: AFRN Net Effect of De-Scoping 

Feature AFRN Original 

Design 

Actual 

Construction 

Subsequent To 

 De-Scoping 

Net Effect 

Mobile Switching 

Offices 

6 3 (3)

Switch Redundancy 1 in Hillah to 

backup Baghdad

None (1)

Governorate 

Dispatch 

Centers 

19

(2 for Baghdad) 

9 

(1 for Baghdad) 

(10)

Regional Dispatch 

Centers13

6 0 (6)

Incident 

Coordination 

Centers 

6 1 (5)

National Control 

Center 

1 1 0

Communications 

Center 

1 1 0

Base Transceiver 

Stations 

172 66 (106)

Population Served 18,589,700 13,049,600 (5,540,100)

 Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract files, as of June 3, 2006. 

AFRN Integration Contract. In June of 2005, the JCC-I/A, in conjunction with PCO, 

began efforts to determine the remaining costs associated with completing and sustaining 

the AFRN project pending eventual turnover to the Iraqi government. Although the 

resulting estimate was not located during this audit, a June 20, 2005 “Funding 

Recommendation Paper” prepared by the Multi-National Force-Iraq stated an assessment 

of the AFRN project had established that the extension of the network was at risk. The 

paper included an estimate that $22 million was needed to continue progress and fund 

such things as needed training and support. In August 2005, JCC-I/A issued a second 

contract14 funded with $20 million from the Iraq Security Support Fund provided by 

MNSTC-I. This contract included both costs to complete the system, such as additional 

costs for back-up generators; as well as operations and maintenance costs , such as 

physical repairs, software updates , and refueling of generators to ensure electrical power. 

The contract ended on May 2, 2006. 

 

13 The Regional Coordination Centers were removed from the design early on as redundant to the Incident 

Coordination Centers, which were subsequently reduced in number as well. 

14 Contract number W914NS-05-C-0066, August 22, 2005. 

8
Besides operations and maintenance15 provisions, the contract statement of work 

included the following: 

• Install backup generators for 22 base transceiver stations sites. 

• Develop and install software to convert the first responder radios’ global 

positioning system data into the AFRN computer-assisted dispatch software 

program. 

• Plan and execute AFRN database development, populate the database for all 15 

AFRN cities, verify compatibility with the computer assisted dispatch software 

and conduct operational capability testing. 

• Provide requirements for AFRN intercity connectivity and capacity, assess 

existing infrastructure [ITPC fiber optic network], and identify any shortfalls. 

• Operations and maintenance of the AFRN system to include daily reporting of 

system performance management, to include AFRN reliability and availability. 

• Train and certify 889 Ministry of Interior personnel, to include 765 governorate 

dispatch personnel. 

Objectives 

This report addresses whether responsible personnel efficiently and effectively managed 

the Advanced First Responder Network project that was created to provide Iraqi police, 

fire, and emergency medical units with a core national public safety communication, 

command, and control system. More specifically, this report addresses the extent to 

which: 

 • AFRN provides effective emergency communications for the citizens of Iraq, the 

police, fire, emergency medical departments and related command and control 

organizations 

• radios purchased for distribution to the Iraqi police, fire, and emergency medical 

organizations were properly accounted for, controlled, supported, and transferred 

to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior 

• U.S. government plans and funding were in place to sustain the Advanced First 

Responder Network pending the Iraqi government’s assumption of those 

responsibilities; and whether U.S. officials provided the responsible Iraqi Ministry 

with sufficient information on operations and maintenance support requirements 

• AFRN task orders were properly definitized; and related equipment purchases and 

contractor services were within the scope of the contract 

For a discussion of the scope, methodology and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix B. For a 

list of the report’s distribution, see Appendix C. For a list of the audit team members, see 

Appendix D. 

 

15 For the purposes of this report and as it relates to sustainment, “operations and maintenance” refers to 

activities related to the performance of routine, preventive, predictive, scheduled, and unscheduled actions 

aimed at preventing equipment failure or decline with the goal of increasing efficiency, reliability, and 

safety.

9
Effectiveness of the AFRN 

As of June 15, 2006, the AFRN project had not resulted in an effective nationwide first 

responder communication, command, and control system for the Iraqi citizens or the Iraqi 

police, fire, and emergency medical services. Specifically, 

• Communication connectivity did not exist between the three “zones” of the 

AFRN the system.

• Only two of nine governorate dispatch centers could receive emergency phone 

calls from the public.

• None of the nine GDCs can identify the locations of the various first responders. 

• The AFRN Communications Center could only monitor system performance and 

health for the Baghdad zone.

• Reduced and unstable commercial electrical supply is causing higher than 

anticipated usage and failure of backup generators and associated automatic 

transfer switches.

Communication Connectivity. The three AFRN zones cannot communicate with each 

other. Specifically, the May 5, 2006, AFRN status report stated a system requirement of 

84 E1s16 with only 33 available. Although it has been well documented that sufficient 

connectivity and capacity does not exist to support communications between the three 

AFRN zones, determining why that has not happened is not clear. We did not identify 

any action being taken to address the causes. Further, in our discussions with 

representatives from GRD-PCO, IRMO, and CPATT present differing opinions on causes 

ranging from ITPC has not provided sufficient E1s; ITPC has provided sufficient E1s but 

they either fail or do not operate properly; to the AFRN construction may not have 

established proper connections between the AFRN equipment and the ITPC nodes. 

Further, physical damage to the ITPC fiber network resulting from either adjacent 

construction activity or deliberate interdiction periodically prevented connectivity 

regardless of network E1 capacity. Because connectivity could not be established, a full 

operational capability test (specified as a task order deliverable) of either the AFRN 

system installed under Task Order 6 or the entire AFRN system as a whole was not 

conducted at the time of this audit. 

Despite the nationwide connectivity problems, the additional 30,000 radios purchased 

under the AFRN project have increased the communication capabilities, within each 

AFRN zone, for the Iraqi police, firefighters, and emergency medical responders and 

their applicable police, fire, and medical departments. Although subject to interrupted 

service associated with electrical supply, the first responder radios do allow a wider range 

of communication within the AFRN zones and shared access between the police, fire, and 

medical first responders and agencies. 

 

16 An “E1” provides 30 megabits of transmission capacity, delivers 28 voice channels (with an additional 

two channels for transmission control), and requires both system software and hardware on both the ITPC 

and AFRN sides of the “connection”. The total requirement was 88 E1s on January 1, 2006 and was 

revised downward to 84 in the contractor’s May 7, 2006 E1 requirement report. 

10
Governorate Dispatch Centers (GDCs). When completed, the AFRN was to have nine 

fully operational and staffed GDCs. With the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, none of 

the dispatch centers are operational. To illustrate: 

• At least seven of the GDCs cannot receive emergency phone calls, including 

those from cellular phones, from the public. 

• None of the nine GDC dispatcher consoles provide the intended computer assisted 

dispatch function. 

• With the possible exception of Baghdad, a sufficient number of trained personnel 

are no longer available to fully staff the remaining eight GDCs. 

• Seven of the GDCs could not monitor radio network talk groups. 

Table 4, below, provides a summary of the limitations reflected in the last AFRN status 

report provided to the GRD-PCO project manager (May 5, 2006). Discussions with 

GRD-PCO and CPATT representatives in June 2006 indicated the information in the 

May 2006 report is a fair representation of the AFRN operational status. 

Table 4: AFRN configuration discrepancies by type 

(X denotes discrepancy by location and category). 

GDC 

Location 

Cannot 

Receive 

Emergency 

Phone 

Calls

Required 

Computer 

Assisted 

Dispatch 

Upgrade 

Network

Talk 

Groups 

Not 

Loaded

GDC 

Staffing

Shortage

Total 

Discrepancies 

for Each 

GDC 

Baghdad X 1

Kirkuk X X 2

Tikrit X X X X 4

Basrah X X X X 4

Samawa X X X X 4

Diwaniyah X X X X 4

Hillah X X X X 4

Al Kut X X X X 4

Mosul X X X X 4

Total 7 9 7 8 31

 Source: SIGIR analysis of PCO AFRN Status Report, May 5, 2006

Emergency Phone Calls Seven of the nine GDCs cannot receive emergency calls from the Iraqi public. It appears 

the AFRN network was not designed for the communication protocol used by the ITPC 

public phone system. The exception to this is the Baghdad GDC. Based on statements 

obtained from CPATT and GRD-PCO personnel, the problem did not occur in the 

Baghdad GDC because the ITPC either was already using a compatible protocol system 

or was otherwise able to provide a compatible protocol. For calls made in the other eight 

GDC locations, the alternative is that the ITPC public phone system automatically routes 

emergency calls either to individual police, fire, or medical locations or to one of the 

11
Provincial Joint Command Centers17 where the information is then relayed to applicable 

first responder organizations. Although these alternative procedures will provide first 

responder help, the ability to do so quickly, efficiently, and effectively is diminished. 

Computer-Assisted Dispatch None of the nine GDCs can use computer-aided dispatch features. For example, one 

feature displays up-to-the-minute locations of the various first responders on the 

dispatcher’s terminal screen. An upgraded version of the software required to provide 

computer-assisted dispatch had not been successfully loaded at any of the nine GDCs as 

of May 5, 2006. Further eight GDCs required an additional software upgrade to be able 

to display the computer-aided dispatch information in Arabic. As a result, without the 

computer-aided dispatch software, the one GDC that can receive emergency calls directly 

from the public (the Baghdad GDC) cannot readily identify the current location of first 

responders that may be near by to render assistance. 

Radio Network Talk Groups Dispatchers in seven of the nine GDCs cannot monitor radio calls from the various first 

responder talk groups in the GDC service area. Network talk groups are assigned by 

software that identifies which individual radios that belong to a specific talk group or 

groups. For example, the police officers within a defined jurisdiction and their assigned 

police station or city would constitute a talk group. Similarly, medical personnel and 

their associated medical facilities would be another talk group. Without the talk group 

identifiers loaded on individual radios, dispatchers cannot monitor radio talk groups, and 

hence manage the resources (i.e., Police officers) to resolve an incident. 

GDC Staffing Without a sufficient number of trained staffs, the GDCs, even if otherwise fully 

operational, will remain partially inoperable. The AFRN Integration contract included a 

requirement for training 710 GDC call takers and dispatchers; an average of 78 personnel 

per each of the nine GDCs. However, both CPATT and GRD-PCO personnel stated that 

although approximately 450 Iraqi nationals had received the training, the delays 

encountered in standing up the GDCs likely resulted in some people seeking employment 

elsewhere. CPATT personnel who have visited the GDCs estimated that as of June 1, 

2006, there were approximately 9 employees in the Tikrit GDC, 7 in Mosul, and 30 in 

Bagdad. Estimates were not available for the remaining GDCs but were believed to be 

not staffed or, if so, understaffed because the GDCs were not operational. Without 

personnel to take emergency calls and dispatchers to locate, direct, and monitor first 

responder resources, functionally, a dispatch center does not exist. 

AFRN System Performance Monitoring. The Communications Center, located in the 

central (Baghdad) system zone, cannot monitor the AFRN system performance in either 

of the two other AFRN system zones. As a result, system performance indicators, or 

system alarms, that could alert managers to potential system degradation do not exist for 

the majority of the AFRN system. GRD-PCO management personnel stated that the 

contractor had either planned or taken steps to install monitoring capability at one GDC 

in both the northern and southern zones. However, we believe either the equipment 

installation was not completed or trained personnel capable of monitoring the system at 

the two additional GDCs were not available because none of the required AFRN 

 

17 The Provincial Joint Command Centers have representatives from both the Ministry of Defense and 

Ministry of Interior to coordinate provincial resources and provide more complete assessments to the 

National Joint Coordination Center (NJCC). The NJCC is not part of the AFRN system or project.

12
performance reports we reviewed provided a comparable level of system performance 

detail as contained in the central zone reports. 

Electrical Supply. There are an insufficient number of backup generators to ensure 

uninterrupted electrical power to the AFRN facilities. In spite of the documented 

problems with maintaining constant, and stable, electrical supply in Iraq; the AFRN 

design and subsequent construction task orders 5 and 6 assumed the availability of 

commercial power. For these sites, the task orders included the installation of backup 

generators. However, in addition to sporadic electrical supply, the Iraq electrical grid is 

unstable and voltage spikes frequently occur. The combined effects of the reduced 

availability and “on again-off again” nature of commercial power and voltage spikes have 

caused: (1) premature failure of the automatic transfer switches that serve to detect 

interruption of power and switch to a backup generator and (2) accelerated wear on the 

backup generators, which were not intended to provide power over long periods of time. 

 The AFRN “Integration” contract included a requirement to install an additional 22 

generators in the AFRN system. At contract end in May 2006, only 12 of the additional 

generators were installed. As a result there is an increased risk of loss of both power 

sources, effectively shutting down portions of the network. 

Management Actions 

During the course of this audit, management officials within JCC-I/A, GRD-PCO, and 

MNSTC-I included a requirement in the new DFI contract for the new contractor to 

assess and provide a “state of the network” report on the AFRN system. 

13
First Responder Radios 

Accountability and Transfer of First Responder Radios

To their credit, the Office of the Chief of Staff, CPATT, issued written policy and 

procedures for receipt and issuance of AFRN radios. The guidance contained specific 

procedures and documents for transferring the assets from CPATT to the AFRN 

contractor for programming, from the contractor back to CPATT, and then from CPATT 

to representatives of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. 

However, CPATT personnel did not properly account for, control, and transfer all first 

responder radios. Specifically, the number of radios transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of 

the Interior and on-hand with CPATT18 exceeded the total number documented as 

purchased. On the last recorded date of a signed receipt from a representative of the 

Ministry of Interior (January 22, 2005), the total of all radios transferred by CPATT 

representatives to the Iraqi government was 28,417 radios. On March 27, 2006, the 

AFRN contractor transferred 4,444 residual first responder radios of various models to 

CPATT representatives. Our reconciliation of available documents for the total radios 

purchased to the total quantities transferred to the ministry or on-hand disclosed CPATT 

did not maintain proper accountability over the radios. As noted in Table 5, the total 

number of handheld radios transferred or on-hand (28,481) exceeded the quantity 

purchased (25,149) by over 3,300 radios. 

 

 Table 5: Reconciliation of First Responder Radios

Model 

Type Purchased Received

CPATT 

Transfers 

To 

Ministry 

of Interior 

Residual 

Radios 

Received 

from 

Contractor

Total 

On-Hand 

or 

Transferred 

Difference 

(Purchased 

less On-Hand/

Transferred) 

Handheld 25,149 25,149 24,831 3,650 28,481 +3,332

Mobile 4,140 4,140 3,282 161 3,443 -697

Gateway 609 609 0 609 609 0

Desktop 399 399 304 24 328 -71

Total 30,297 30,297 28,417 4,444 32,861 N/A

 Source: CPATT and Contractor Transfer and Inventory Records, as of March 27, 2006. 

This condition brings into question the accuracy of the quantities19 listed on all transfer 

and inventory documents. Although there is no way to make a specific determination, it 

is possible that discrepancies occurred when radios were returned from the Ministry of 

 

18 The contractor responsible for programming the radios transferred all remaining radios to CPATT 

officials on March 27, 2006. Our reconciliation included a review of available documents for all transfers 

to the Ministry of Interior prior to that date and all on-hand radios received on that date. 

19 In addition to the 30,297 radios purchased under the contract there were many thousands of associated 

accessories purchased as well; for example carrying cases, antennas, spare batteries and re-chargers. Our 

reconciliation was limited to the radios which had the highest dollar value per item and were most subject 

to pilferage. 

14
Interior to CPATT and then on to the various contractors20 for either warranty work, 

upgrades, or retrofitting; and subsequently back the Ministry of Interior. Under these 

circumstances, it is possible that radios previously transferred to the Ministry of Interior 

were once again documented as transfers and receipted again by ministry officials. The 

CPATT procedures did not include guidance on the accountability, control, and transfer 

of radios returned from the Ministry of Interior to be worked on. However, we must note 

that there was insufficient documentation, either in the form of signed receipts 

transferring radios to the Iraqi government or remaining balances received21 from the 

contractor, to account for 697 mobile and 71 desktop radios. For those two models 

(valued at over $700,000), either the Ministry of Interior transfer receipts or the actual 

radios are missing. Further, we could not determine why CPATT did not issue any of the 

609 Gateway model radios (valued at over $900,000) to the Ministry of Interior for use in 

the AFRN system. Regarding the 3,332 handheld radios that exceeded the actual 

quantity purchased and received, we can only speculate that this occurred as a result of 

radios issued to the Ministry of Interior and subsequently returned and later reissued 

again.

Management Actions

Upon detection of the radio accountability issues we notified responsible CPATT 

officials. The officials began action to identify any missing documents evidencing 

transfer of radios to the Ministry of Interior. CPATT personnel requested copies of 

transfer and receiving documents from the ministry and, to that end, did receive and 

provide to us the copies they received. However, this additional documentation did not 

provide any new information on radio transfers or resolve the accountability issues 

described in this report. 

 

20 There were two contractors: (1) the vendor responsible for warranty work and (2) the AFRN contractor 

who performed programming and retrofitting required to add each radio to the AFRN system. 21 DD Form 1149, Requisition and Invoice/Shipping Document, March 27, 2006, transferring residual 

assets from the AFRN contractor to CPATT.

15
Sustainment of the AFRN 

U.S. funding for sustainment of the AFRN, to include typical operations and maintenance 

activities, is inadequate to maintain the system over time. Although U.S. government 

officials developed plans to sustain the AFRN system and U.S. officials provided the 

responsible Iraqi Ministry with sufficient information on operations and maintenance 

support requirements , the $180.1 million IRRF budget for AFRN , combined with the 

ultimate cost to field the system , was insufficient to provide sustainment pending the 

Iraqi government’s assumption of those responsibilities. Specifically, only one of the 

AFRN task orders contained statement of work elements for operations an maintenance 

of the system. The AFRN “Integration” contract, funded from the Iraq Security Support 

Fund as discussed earlier, was a follow-on contract that contained operations and 

maintenance provisions for the AFRN through the end of January 2006. Consequently, 

U.S. officials sought sustainment support to fund an operations and maintenance contract 

from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. However, the time required for writing, soliciting, 

and awarding the resulting contract eventually necessitated extending the AFRN 

Integration contract, and eventually the use of a separate “bridging” contract to cover the 

period between the “Integration” contract and the eventual Iraq contract, awarded with 

DFI funds. Although there was insufficient funding, the task orders issued from the 

design/build contract as well as the Integration contract contained provisions to develop 

the Iraqi government’s ability to maintain the AFRN system.

 

Task Orders 5 and 6 – Operations and Maintenance Provisions. In contrast to AFRN 

Task Order 5, which included operations and maintenance of the AFRN Baghdad Region, 

the work scope for Task Order 6 specifically did not include any such provision, even 

though the size22 of the Task Order 6 infrastructure deployment was nearly twice that 

(approximately 173%) of the AFRN infrastructure deployed under Task Order 5. 

Although Task Order 6 included the provisioning of required tools for end-user personnel 

to perform maintenance it did not include the actual performance of operations and 

maintenance activities such as making repairs or refueling generators. In effect, U.S. 

agencies were installing additional infrastructure during Task Order 6 with no provisions 

to provide associated operations and maintenance for the AFRN system. However, the 

task orders did include training the system users (the Iraqi government) for both 

operations and maintenance personnel, to include equipment manuals. 

Iraqi Ministry of Interior Sustainment Support. U.S. officials recognized the shortfall 

in sustainment funding. On August 1, 2005, the Commanding General, JCC-I/A sent a 

memorandum to the Iraqi government’s Minister of the Interior requesting assurance that 

the Iraqi government would provide adequate funds for operations and maintenance of 

the AFRN system during 2006. The memorandum provided an estimated sustainment 

cost of $15.3 million23 for the period of February through December of 2006. The 

Minister’s response was that the Ministry’s budget for calendar year 2006 could not 

support operations and maintenance funding following completion of the AFRN 

Integration contract on January 31, 2006. As a result, on August 6, 2005, MNSTC-I and 

JCC-I/A decided to request financial support from the Ministry of Interior by obtaining 

approval to use $15.3 million of uncommitted DFI money to supplement the ministry’s 

 

22 This is a SIGIR computed estimate based on the number of “facilities” in each task order. This included 

switching offices, command/control/system monitoring facilities, and base transmission tower sites; a total 

of 30 facilities for Task Order 5 and 52 facilities for Task Order 6.

23 Our extrapolation of the figure results in an annualized estimate of $16.7 million.

16
calendar year 2006 budget for AFRN sustainment. On December 24, 2005, the Iraqi 

Minster of Finance signed a memorandum providing $20 million of uncommitted DFI 

funds “solely for the purpose of operation and maintaining the Advanced First Responder 

Network.” The memo also extended to December 31, 2006, the authority for JCC-I/A to 

monitor, make payments, and otherwise administer DFI funded contracts. The approval 

to use DFI money would allow sustainment through December 31, 2006, for example the 

cost of refueling generators, various lease expenses, and maintenance of the system 

components. 

Extension of the AFRN “Integration” Contract. The Integration contract was also 

extended to address the shortfall in sustainment funding and included additional tasks to 

build the Iraqi government’s abilities to take over system operations. For example, the 

contract included an on-the-job training program to transfer technical operations and 

maintenance knowledge that would enable Iraqi engineers and technicians to conduct 

operations and maintenance activities. In addition, all documentation created for the 

operations and maintenance program was provided in English and Arabic, and in both 

hard and soft (electronic) copies. On January 15, 2006, pending solicitation and award of 

the DFI funded contract for the Iraqi government, JCC-I/A extended the performance 

period on the Integration contract line item for generator refueling and operations 

maintenance at an additional cost of $2.9 million. The cost to extend the contract caused 

the total contract costs to exceed the $20 million obtained from the Iraq Security Support 

Fund. The additional $2.9 million needed was funded from the $16.7 million allotment 

received from the DFI and was intended to ensure continued sustainment support. 

DFI Bridging Contract. Due to the time required to solicit and award the DFI funded 

AFRN sustainment contract it was necessary to find a temporary vehicle to continue 

operations and maintenance support when the AFRN “Integration” contract expired on 

May 2, 2006. As a result, JCC-I/A awarded a short duration “bridging” contract24 to 

span the period until award of the DFI contract. The bridging contract period ended on 

June 10, 2006, and used an additional $2.3 million of the $16.7 million allocation from 

the Development Fund for Iraq. This allowed the U.S. and Iraqi governments to continue 

AFRN sustainment support. 

DFI Sustainment Contract. JCC-I/A awarded DFI sustainment contract25 began on 

June 11, 2006. The contract will provide operations and maintenance support through 

December 31, 2006, at which time the Iraqi government’s budget will begin for calendar 

year 2007. The contract also includes training of Iraqi personnel. The net amount of the 

original DFI allotment of $16.7 million, after deducting the sustainment support received 

from that allotment on the “Integration” and bridging contracts funded the DFI 

Sustainment Contract at $11.5 million. 

 

24 Contract number DFIFAC-06-C-0001, May 3, 2006.

25 Contract number DFIFAC-06-C-0003, June 11, 2006.

17
Contract Definitization and Propriety of 

Equipment Purchases and Contractor Services 

Contracting officials properly managed the undefinitized contract actions issued under 

both the IRRF funded design-build contract and the subsequent ISSF-funded 

“Integration” contract. These were the only contracts related to the AFRN project that 

we reviewed which were subject to definitization. Specifically, and in accordance with 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation criteria, each task order for the design-build 

contract or contract line item for the “Integration” contract established a not to exceed 

value at the time of notification to proceed; each undefinitized contract action was 

definitized within the 180 day time limit; and none of these exceeded the 50% obligation 

limit prior to definitization. As a result, U.S. officials took appropriate actions to 

definitize both contracts containing undefinitized contracting actions. 

For the definitized contracts, our review did not identify any equipment or contractor 

services that indicated expenses not reasonably expected for the design and installation of 

a communications system. Specifically, our review of the definitized cost proposal 

schedules of the most significant costs for equipment (predominantly communicationselectronics equipment items) and services (security, design and installation) did not 

reveal planned equipment or services that would not be consistent with the design, 

procurement, and installation of a communications system. For example, the most 

significant single item equipment cost estimate contained in the pricing schedules was for 

the three switches for the mobile switching offices (estimated at approximately $3 million 

per item). Contractor services included system engineering, installation, and the life 

support and security platform of Task Order 3; with the latter estimated at $16 million 

over the life of the design-build contract. 

18
Conclusion and Recommendations 

Conclusion

The initial assumptions to build the AFRN system upon the existing Iraqi electrical and 

fiber optic infrastructure exacerbated the extent to which U.S. implementing agencies 

could efficiently and effectively manage the AFRN project. The combined effects of the 

concept of operations; scope assumptions regarding existing infrastructure; project 

budget; and the political and security environment in which the system would be built 

and operated resulted in a project fraught with risk. As a result, the Advanced First 

Responder Network project has not provided the Iraqi citizens or the Iraqi government 

with a fully functioning and effective first responder communication, command, and 

control capability. 

The conditions limiting the effectiveness are fundamental and significant on both the 

governorate and national levels of the AFRN system. To a large measure, the AFRN 

limitations are the result of assumptions that the existing fiber optic and electrical 

infrastructure could readily support the AFRN project. Assuming the infrastructure 

conditions can be effectively resolved, sufficient trained personnel are not available to 

man the first responder dispatch centers. Although the AFRN project has increased 

communication capability amongst first responders, at the governorate level, Iraqi 

citizens cannot use their telephones to access the AFRN system to request police, fire 

department, or emergency medical from seven of the nine governorate dispatch centers. 

• None of the dispatch centers can use the AFRN systems computer-assisted 

dispatch features while dispatchers at seven of the centers cannot monitor radio 

communications of the first responders. Assuming the preceding problems did 

not exist, sufficient trained personnel to fully staff all of the dispatch centers are 

likely not available. 

• At the national level, there is no AFRN connectivity between the three zones of 

the system. Consequently, the escalation of incidents to and visibility of first 

responder resources by the national coordination center is not possible for eight of 

the nine governorates. Located in and isolated to Baghdad as well are the systems 

monitoring functions of the AFRN communication center. As a result, 

monitoring the performance and health of the AFRN system is limited to the 

Baghdad zone.

Accountability was not maintained for the 30,000 radios, valued at over $24 million, 

purchased for the Iraqi police, fire, and emergency medical organizations. Our 

reconciliation of the thousands of radios purchased to the total number of radios 

transferred to the Iraqi government or from the contractor to the Civilian Police 

Assistance and Training Team pending transfer to the Iraqi government disclosed 

accountability had been lost. The reconciliation indicated 9% more radios transferred to 

the Ministry of Interior than the number purchased. On one hand, our reconciliation 

indicated two different radio models with a combined shortage (i.e. number purchased 

greater than number transferred or on hand) totaling 768 radios; while the records for a 

third model reflected 3,332 more radios than were ever purchased. The reconciliation 

variances bring the accuracy of all inventory and transfer records into question. 

Sufficient U.S. funds were not available to sustain the AFRN system until the Iraqi 

Ministry of Interior could budget for and obtain the necessary funds to sustain the AFRN 

19
system. When U.S. officials determined sufficient funding was not available they took 

effective actions to seek and obtain the needed funding from other sources. 

Material Management Control Weaknesses. Our review disclosed a material 

management control weakness regarding U.S. Government property accountability for 

the 30,000 radios purchased during the AFRN project. 

 

Recommendations 

We recommend the following management corrective action regarding fiber optic 

network connectivity and capacity required to achieve inter-zone operation of the 

Advanced First Responder Network. 

1. We recommend that the Commanding General, Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq ensure that the contractor conducting the AFRN 

assessment is required to coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi 

Ministry of Communications Iraq Telephone and Postal Company in diagnosing 

and resolving the specific technical reason or reasons why connectivity between 

the three AFRN zones does not exist. 

We also recommend the following management corrective actions regarding the 

accountability of radios purchased for the Advanced First Responder Network.

2. We recommend that the Commanding General, Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq, direct the appropriate command organization to: 

a. Request the Iraqi Ministry of Interior provide current inventory information, 

by model type, for the first responder radios in their possession. 

b. Direct CPATT personnel conduct a physical inventory, by model type, of any 

radios not yet transferred to the Ministry of Interior. 

c. Reconcile the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and CPATT inventories to the record 

of all radios purchased and document the results. 

d. Initiate actions in accordance with applicable U.S. government property 

management policies, to properly account for and control all radios.

Management Comments and Audit Response

We received written comments on a draft of this report from MNSTC-I and the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office. We received technical comments from JCC-I/A and 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division.

MNSTC-I did not concur with the first recommendation (for jurisdictional reasons), but 

did concur with the second. We agree the IRMO Communications Sector was 

responsible for the AFRN project, as evidenced by the original CPA tasking order; 

however, our recommendation was appropriately addressed to MNSTC-I for the 

following two reasons. First, the AFRN system transferred to control of the Iraq Ministry 

of Interior on June 26, 2006 and secondly; MNSTC-I assumed responsibility for coalition 

force liaison to the Ministry of Interior in October, 2005. Although management did not 

specifically concur with the first recommendation, we believe the substance of their 

comments fully satisfy the recommendation’s intent. Specifically, their comments state 

20
the contractor has in fact assessed the connectivity situation, is working with the Iraq 

Telephone and Postal Company to address the connectivity issues, and that a formal 

meeting is planned between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Communication to 

discuss system requirements and the way ahead. In addition to concurring with 

recommendation two, MNSTC-I stated corrective actions are either in progress or 

planned. MNSTC-I also provided technical comments for this report. We reviewed 

those comments and incorporated changes into the final report where appropriate. 

The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office suggested we add a recommendation to “get 

all nine AFRN Governorate Dispatch Centers operating and in service with fully trained 

staff to realize the full potential of the system”. While we recognize the importance of 

the Governorate Dispatch Centers to the AFRN system, and discuss this on pages 12-13, 

we did not include this recommendation in our report because the DFI Sustainment 

contract depicted in Table 1, page 1 and discussed on page 18 notes the subject contract 

includes training. 

The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Gulf Region Division also provided technical comments for this report. We reviewed 

those comments and incorporated changes into the final report where appropriate. 

All comments received were fully responsive. 

21
Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

This audit was initiated on February 23, 2006 (Project No. 6008) to determine whether 

responsible personnel efficiently and effectively managed the Advanced First Responder 

Network (AFRN) project which was created to provide Iraqi police, fire, and emergency 

medical units with a core national public safety communication, command, and control 

system. More specifically, this report addresses the extent to which: 

 

• AFRN provides effective emergency communications for the citizens of Iraqi, the 

police, fire, emergency medical departments, and related command and control 

organizations 

• radios purchased for distribution to the Iraqi police, fire, and emergency medical 

organizations were properly accounted for, controlled, supported, and transferred 

to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior 

• U.S. government plans and funding were in place to sustain the Advanced First 

Responder Network pending the Iraqi government’s assumption of those 

responsibilities; and whether U.S. officials provided the responsible Iraqi Ministry 

with sufficient information on operations and maintenance support requirements 

• AFRN task orders were properly definitized; and related equipment purchases and 

contractor services were within the scope of the contract 

In the performance of the audit, we interviewed key management officials in Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region 

Division and Project and Contracting Office , Iraq Reconstruction Management Office , 

and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq . 

To determine whether the AFRN system provided effective emergency communications 

to the Iraqi citizens, first responders, and associated command and control elements we 

identified first responder network requirements contained in the CPA Program 

Management Office, Communications and Transportation Sector Task Order TC-001 , 

the final AFRN Concept of Operations , and the user requirements contained in the 

applicable contract task orders . In addition, we reviewed applicable contract and project 

administration records for AFRN task orders 2, 4, 5, and 6 ; and the follow-on contract 

for indications of scope or user requirement changes , associated cost estimates, and cost 

to complete information . 

To determine if the AFRN system was effective we reviewed the most recent AFRN 

status report, charts depicting system performance, and discussed the operational status of 

the system with U.S. government officials knowledgeable with the project and current 

status. In addition, we visited the Ministry of Interior where we observed AFRN 

Communications Center, the central zone mobile switching office, and discussed the 

AFRN system with officials of the ministry.

To determine if the radios purchased for the AFRN system were properly accounted for, 

controlled, supported, and transferred to the Ministry of the Interior we reviewed the 

pertinent contract and related purchase orders; U.S. government receiving documents; 

documents used to transfer and evidence receipt of radios transferred to Iraqi government 

representatives; and receiving documents used to transfer residual AFRN radios and 

accessories to CPATT. We computed and reconciled the totals of radios orders, received, 

transferred to the Iraqi government representatives, and the residual assets transferred to 

22
CPATT. We also reviewed the CPATT policy and procedures to maintain control and 

accountability of the AFRN radios to the point of transfer to the Government of Iraq. 

To determine if government officials effectively and efficiently managed the AFRN 

contract to include the definitization of the task orders we reviewed each of the six task 

orders issued under the design-build contract and compared the date of task order issue to 

the date each respective task order was definitized. To determine if AFRN task orders 

were properly definitized, we reviewed and compared the applicable independent 

government estimates, notices to proceed, not to exceed funding documents, and related 

definitization documents to criteria contained in SUBPART 217.74 of the Defense 

Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, May 12, 2006. 

To determine whether plans and funding were in place to sustain the first responder 

radios and AFRN, we identified and reviewed pertinent contracts for sustainment efforts 

(operations and maintenance) in the statements of work. We identified and reviewed 

U.S. documents used to develop sustainment cost estimates in order to determine whether 

U.S. officials had developed and provided to representatives of the Iraqi government 

sufficient information detailing the estimated funding needed to operate and sustain the 

AFRN system. 

To determine whether equipment purchases and contractor services were within the scope 

of the contract, we reviewed the definitized contractor and subcontractor estimated cost 

exhibits for both equipment and services and compared high dollar equipment items and 

services to the applicable task order or contract line item work scopes. 

We conducted this audit from February 2006 to July 2006, in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. During the course of this audit we used computerprocessed contract payment data for radios purchased under contract number W914NS05-D-9008 obtained from Corps of Engineers Financial Management System. Although 

we did not assess the general or application controls of the system, we determined the 

accuracy of the data through comparison to applicable invoices and purchase order 

pricing documents. Our tests disclosed the data were sufficiently reliable to support audit 

conclusions and recommendations.

Prior Coverage. We did not identify any prior audit or inspection reports addressing the 

effectiveness of AFRN, definitization of AFRN task orders, control and transfer of first 

responder radios, or U.S. government plans and funding to sustain AFRN. 

23
Appendix B. Acronyms 

AFRN Advanced First Responder Network 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

CPATT Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 

DFI Development Fund for Iraq 

GDC Governorate Dispatch Office 

GRD-PCO U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division - Project and 

Contracting Office 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

IRRF-1 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Fiscal Year 2003 

Appropriation 

IRRF-2 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Fiscal Year 2004 

Appropriation 

ISSF Iraq Security Support Fund 

ITPC Iraq Telephone and Postal Company 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

24
Appendix C. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

25
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

 

 

26
Appendix D. Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. 

McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to the report 

include: 

Samuel Gonite 

Walt Keays 

Larry T. Monson 

Jason Venner 

27
Management Comments 

Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq 

28
29
30
31
32
Management Comments 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

33