The success of the FBI's internal investigati. s is due, in
large part, to the support and participation of FBI employees.
Experience has shown that thorough, effective internal
investigations require the expertise of agents who are intimately
familiar with the FBI's structure and procedures. Furthermore, an
internal policing function is necessary for me to manage the agency
successfully, to establish investigative and ethical priorities,
and to demonstrate to the agency, the Congress, and the American
people that improper conduct by FBI employees will be dealt with
effectively.

In partnership with the Department of Justice Office of
Professional Responsibility and the Office of the Inspector
General, the FBI has been and remains committed to an effective
internal integrity program. Based upon my twenty years of
experience inside and out of the FBI, I have reached two
conclusions: first, the FBI is the best investigative agency in
the world; and second, the FBI has enjoyed extraordinary success in
policing itself with independent oversight. I do not intend to
diminish that record.

The Subcommittee should also consider the experience and
uniformity of major police departments around the United States.
They have learned from hard experience that police integrity is
absolutely dependent on police being responsible and accountable to
investigate themselves with independent oversight -- exactly like

the FBI. I have prepared a chart which notes some of the major

18



about the interplay between deadly force policy .nd rules of
engagement. The standard deadly force policy will be the sole
standard, although on-scene commanders will be permitted to further
restrict the use of deadly force as necessary. In addition, if it
is necessary to communicate to agents an especially heightened
risk, that will be done through separate, threat advisories.

Shooting Incident Review Policy

In the aftermath of Ruby Ridge, there were problems relating
to the shooting incident review conducted by the FBI in 1992. That
review inaccurately and incompletely. analyzed the accidental
shooting death of Vicki Weaver. The person in charge of that
review had participated in FBI Headquarters oversight of the Ruby
Ridge response and was then asked to assess the validity of the
shootings that occurred there.

Shooting investigations must be full and fair. They must be
conducted by persons who do not have even the appearance of a
conflict-of~interest.

Thus, on April 3, 1995, I announced revisions to the FBI's
shooting review policy in order to ensure the complete and accurate
investigation of shooting incidents. Among other things, I:

* raised the executive level of review of shooting incidents;

* placed investigative responsibility in the FBI's Inspection
Division;

*, established new protocols governing the conduct of post-

shooting inquiries; and,

12



RULES OF ENGAGEMENT --- Discontinued. Only the new, revised standard deadl
force policy, which permits the use of deadly force only in the face of imminent deat
or sertous physical injury to the Agent or another person, will be used in future crisis
situations. :

CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP --- The FBI's crisis response structure has
been created as a single entity under the leadership of an FBI executive experienced in
crisis management. Negotiators and tactical personnel are on equal footing and the ~
negotiators will always deploy with the Hostage Rescue Team. Leadership and
accountability have been tixed to specific individuals, including the FBI Director.

HOSTAGE RESCUE TEAM DEPLOYMENT --- The Hostage Rescue Team will not be
deployed without an independent assessment by the FBI of the threat and need. The FBI
Director must be personally satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate.

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATORS --- FBI hostage negotiators have been given a status equal
to tactical personnel and negotiators will always deploy with the Hostage Rescue Team.
The number of FBI hostage negotiators has been increased.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT TRAINING --- The Director, Deputy Director, The Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General and 42 FBI Special Agents in Charge of FBI field
offices have received specialized crisis management training. Only specially trained
Special Agents in Charge will be placed in field command ot a crisis.

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW --- Responsibility for investigating all shooting
incidents involving FBI Agents has been removed from the FBI's Criminal Investigative
Division and placed with the FBI's Inspection Division. The results of the investigation
will be reviewed by a newly reconstituted group that includes Department of Justice
representation.

SWAT TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT --- Responsibility for training and equipping
FBI SWAT Teams has been placed under the Critical Incident Response Group and their
training and equipment has been enhanced, so that all FBI SWAT Teams are compatible
with and can supplement the Hostage Rescue Team.

FBI LABORATORY --- Specialized teams have been created that are experts in the
identification, recovery and preservation of evidence.

OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT --- Through universities and other
sources, a network of outside experts on crisis management and other disciplines has
been established to aid the FBI in understanding and responding to unique crisis and
hostage situations.


On April 5, 1995, after reviewing the Departmenc of Justice's
performance at. Ruby Ridge, the Deputy Attorney General determined
that the threat posed by Randy Weaver was exaggerated. ~She also
determined that repetition of those exaggerations to the FBI led to
a higher threat assessment than otherwise might have been made.

It is important to understand, however, that, in August, 1992,
the FBI acted upon information that had been provided by other law
enforcement agencies. Based upon that information, the FBI
believed that it was facing a very grave threat in Idaho ~- a
threat that required a prompt response. Now, with all of the
benefits of hindsight, the FBI's response clearly was an
overreaction. In future situations, I will make a more independent
assessment of such threats before the FBI acts.

Rules of Engagement and
The Death of Vicki Weaver

The Death of Vicki Weaver

As I have stated many times before, Vicki Weaver's death was
tragic but accidental. I fully appreciate the fact that three
children have been left without their mother as a result of what
eccurred at Ruby Ridge. On behalf of the FBI, I wish to express my
regret and sorrow for Mrs. Weaver's death. Moreover, the FBI fully
supports the settlement with the Weaver family that the Department
of Justice negotiated. For the FBI, the settlement does not bring
any sense of closure to the stark tragedy of Vicki Weaver's death.
Rather, her death will always be a haunting reminder to the FBI to
take every possible step to avoid tragedy, even in the most

dangerous situations.



police forces that investigate themselves. I requ c that it be
made part of the record.
Conclusion .

Serious mistakes occurred with regard to the Ruby Ridge
incident. Some of those mistakes should have been avoided and were
not. For those, the FBI offers not excuses, but rather the facts
and significant reforms.

Intentional misconduct is a different matter altogether. As
I stated before, I assure the Subcommittee and the American people
that I will swiftly and decisively deal with anyone who the facts
show committed misconduct.

With the arsenals at the disposal of criminals in our Nation
today, everyone must understand that law enforcement officers have
a very dangerous job to do. Since becoming Director of the FBI in
September, 1993, I have attended the funerals of three FBI Special
Agents and numerous state and local law enforcement officers who
were murdered in the line of duty by criminals with guns. Again,
last Friday, I attended the funeral for a young Washington
Metropolitan Police Department officer killed without provocation
in the line of duty. I have witnessed first-hand the devastation
these weapons inflict upon the agents and officers, their families,
and loved ones. Every week, I speak with Chiefs of Police and
Sheriffs from around the country who suffer casualties in their
ranks at the hands of criminals with guns.

We take our responsibility seriously when we ask the men and

women of law enforcement to put themselves in harm's way -- people

19



RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DISCONTINUED.

CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP CREATED.

HOSTAGE RESCUE TEAM DEPLOYMENT PROCESS CHANGED. ~

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATORS STATUS AND NUMBER ENHANCED.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROVIDED FOR DO} AND FBI.

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW REDESIGNED, INCLUDES DOJ ATTORNEY.

SWAT TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT ENHANCED.

FBI LABORATORY SPECIALIZED EVIDENCE RECOVERY TEAMS CREATED.

OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT NETWORK ESTABLISHED.

INTERAGENCY CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCESS ESTABLISHED.

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW PROCESS ELEVATED AND STANDARDIZED.

NEW UNIFORM DOJ / TREASURY DEADLY FORCE POLICY



The Treasury Department also participated in th. negotiations
leading to the deadly force policy. Through the efforts of
Treasury Undersecretary Noble and his staff, there is now a uniform
deadly force policy that governs the actions of Treasury Department
and Justice Department law enforcement officers. That’ policy
permits deadly force to be used “when the officer has a reasonable
belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of
death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another
person."

The FBI Investigating Itself

Several times, during these hearings, the issue of whether the
FBI should investigate itself has arisen. In assessing this issue,
the Subcommittee should consider the FBI's history in this regard.
Unlike most police forces, the FBI has not one, but two,
independent watchdogs that provide oversight of the FBI's employees
and activities.

In coordination with the Department of Justice Office of
Professional Responsibility since 1976, the FBI has had a long and
distinguished record of successfully investigating alleged
misconduct by FBI employees. This record of success includes
matters of great significance to the FBI and the American péopile.
For example:

* In 1976, the FBI successfully investigated allegations of
“sweetheart” contracts with the U.S. Recording Company, which led
to the indictment of an FBI Special Agent and disciplinary action

against numerous others. One FBI employee who was fired as a

16



managerial oversight. Accordingly, I imposed or proposed
discipline ranging from an oral reprimand or written censure to
written censure with suspension from duty. At that time, I
believed the discipline imposed or proposed was commensurate with
the factual basis for the imposition of that discipline.

The discipline imposed was, as I said, based upon facts that
had been determined at that time. Discipline was not imposed on
the basis of showing favor to one person or another, or on the
basis of speculation, or in order for me to render a "popular"
decision. Indeed, discipline was imposed on the basis of the
record before me and precedent, which is a fundamental component of
the FBI's Administrative Summary process. The reliance upon
precedent is a basic matter of due process and fairness. That
reliance ensures that people who commit similar offenses are
punished in a similar manner. In imposing and proposing discipline
this past January, that is what I was trying to accomplish.

In January, I imposed and proposed discipline on the basis of
what I believed was a complete report. Ongoing investigations,
which I obviously cannot discuss, may prove that report was not as
complete as I had believed.

If this, in fact, occurred, then it is much like being a judge
-- if the judge does not have all of the facts, or does not have
facts that have an impact upon credibility or honesty, the judge's
findings will not withstand later scrutiny. That judge will make

an incorrect and, thus, invalid decision that he must readdress.



not saying that I would have taken it. I am not saying that others
should do what he did. I am certainly not saying that in a future
similar set of circumstances FBI Agents or law enforcement officers
should take such a shot. The FBI will strive and train to avoid
such tragic results, whenever humanly possible.

Indeed, the constitutionality of Special Agent Horiuchi's
second shot is a very close and very difficult question. It is not
a matter that can be addressed in “black and white" terms. It
cannot be answered categorically or with a high degree of
certainty.

On careful balance, however, I believe that Special Agent
Horiuchi's second shot was constitutional. Under all of the
circumstances that Special Agent Horiuchi faced on August 22, 1992,
and based on all of the evidence, I do not believe that it was
unlawful in that time and place for him to take the second shot.

Special Agent Horiuchi testified he took the first shot when
he observed a man later determined to be Randy Weaver, who was next
to the birthing shed, raise his rifle. At that time, Special Agent
Horiuchi perceived that Weaver "was trying to get a shot off" at a
law enforcement helicopter that was flying overhead. Special Agent
Horiuchi said he took the first shot for only one reason: he
believed he was protecting fellow law enforcement officers who were
in the helicopter.

Special Agent Horiuchi said he took the first shot only when
he observed Randy Weaver raise his rifle in the direction of the

helicopter. Although FBI Agents in sniper positions had observed



I also want to express my heartfelt condolences .o Mrs. Degan.
This Country asked her husband to make the ultimate sacrifice.
What happened at Ruby Ridge and its aftermath fails to honor the
price paid by this dedicated public servant. We, as a Nation,
should never forget those left behind when an officer dies in the
line of duty.

At Ruby Ridge, the Hostage Rescue Team ("HRT") was operating
in accordance with rules of engagement that were reasonably subject
to interpretation that would permit a violation of FBI policy and
the Constitution. Those rules said that, under certain
circumstances, certain persons "can and should" be the subject of
deadly force. Those rules of engagement were contrary to law and
FBI policy. Moreover, some FBI SWAT personnel on-scene interpreted
the rules as a “shoot-on-sight" policy -- which they knew was
inconsistent with the FBI's deadly force policy. Such confusion is
entirely unacceptable.

According to Special Agent Lon Horiuchi, the HRT sniper who
accidentally shot Mrs. Weaver, he fired two shots on August 22,
1992, both pursuant to the FBI's deadly force policy. He has
testified that he did not shoot pursuant to the rules of engagement
that I just mentioned.

The shot that killed Mrs. Weaver was the second that Special
Agent Horiuchi fired. He testified that it was not intended for
Mrs. Wéaver and was not fired at her.

In discussing Special Agent Horiuchi's second shot, I am not

saying that I approve of it. I am not trying to justify it. I am



result of this investigation was then-Deputy Dire -or Nicholas
Callahan. A report of this investigation was publicly released.

* The FBI successfully investigated allegations of bribery of
Special Agent Joseph Stabile who, on September 15, 1978, became the
first Special Agent indicted in the FBI's history.

* The FBI successfully investigated and assisted in the
prosecution of two agents for illegal transportation of stolen
property. ~

* The FBI successfully investigated and assisted in the
prosecution of the first FBI Special Agent charged with murder, who
was later convicted for the killing of a confidential informant.

* The FBI investigated my predecessor for misuse of his
position, which resulted in his dismissal. A report of this
investigation was publicly released.

The Attorney General issued an order on November 8, 1994,
which makes clear that, in addition to the Department of Justice
Office of Professional Responsibility, the Office of the Inspector
General also performs oversight of the FBI. That oversight is
occurring in connection with the FBI's performance in the Ames
internal security investigation. Indeed, the Office of the
Inspector General may request authority from the Deputy Attorney
General to take responsibility for investigating a particular
allegation under investigation by the FBI's Office of Professional
Responsibility. Further, the FBI can recuse itself from a
particular investigation, if appropriate, and has done so recently

in a high-profile case.

17



the Office of Professional Responsibility and the Civil Rights
Division -- independently determined that there was no basis upon
which to conclude that she had been shot intentionally or
unlawfully. Both determined by their analysis that the second shot
was not unconstitutional.

Special Agent Horiuchi's second shot, was not criminal. Nor do
I believe that a court -- applying qualified immunity principles --
would find any civil liability. Further, based on all of the
evidence, I do not believe it was unconstitutional.

Punishment Administered to FBI Employees

In January-of this year, I disciplined or proposed discipline
for twelve FBI employees for their conduct related to the incident
at Ruby Ridge and the subsequent prosecution of Randy Weaver and
Kevin Harris. My disciplinary action followed an FBI
administrative review of the conduct of those employees. My action
also followed reviews by the Department of Justice Office of
Professional Responsibility and the Civil Rights Division, which
independently determined that criminal prosecution was not
warranted.~ All of these actions, including my own, relied upon a
fask Force investigation that was directly supervised by the
Department of Justice and a report that was written by Department
of Justice attorneys -- not FBI Special Agents.

I too determined that the twelve FBI employees did not commit
any crimes or intentional misconduct. Nevertheless, I concluded
that those employees had demonstrated inadequate performance,

improper judgment, neglect of duty, and failure to exert proper



GRISIS MANAG

co

DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
Criminal Investigative Division

FIELD
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE

CRISIS

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE

CRITICAL INCIDENT

RESPONSE GROUP

MANAGERS

ASSISTANT
SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Child Abduction &

Serial Killer

Crisis Management U
(Negotiators)

Aviation & Special
Operations Unit

Undercover Safegua
Unit

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE

as acre i

Investigative Support
Unit

ASSISTANT
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE
TACTICAL SUPPORT

Hostage Rescue Team

Special Detail

Unit
Attorney General Detail

rd



FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTI GATION

YREEDOM OP INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACTS
RPLEASE

SUBJECT: Kuby Lidew Linc idex Zz

FILE:



I consulted with numerous people inside and oucside the FBI,
including judges, a former Attorney General, prosecutors,
investigators in other agencies, and leaders of federal, state, and
local law enforcement associations. It was their consensus that
Larry Potts was an excellent and progressive leader, highly
qualified to be Deputy Director. Like them, I placed great trust
and confidence in Mr. Potts.

Looking back, I recognize that I was not sufficiently
sensitive to the appearance created by my decision to discipline
and then promote Mr. Potts. Thus, I made a mistake in promoting
Mr. Potts. I take full responsibility for that decision and I
alone should be held accountable for it.

The Ongoing Inquiries

As the Subcommittee is aware, two criminal investigations
relating to Ruby Ridge and its aftermath are currently pending.
One is in Boundary County, Idaho, where prosecutor Randall Day is
investigating the deaths of Vicki Weaver, Sammy Weaver, and Deputy
Marshal Degan. The other is a federal investigation here in
Washington, D.c. It focuses upon actions allegedly taken by FBI
employees during and after the Ruby Ridge crisis.

I do not wish to prejudice either investigation. I also do
not wish to prejudge anyone who may be a subject of those
investigations. I must stress, however, that the coverup
allegations are quite serious and go to the very heart of what FBI

Special Agents do -- seek the truth. There is nothing more

10



I intend to be fair about this matter, but any final action
must be based upon a full and accurate reporting of the facts.

The Promotion of Larry Potts

Larry Potts was one of the twelve FBI employees included in my
disciplinary decisions this past January. He received a letter of
censure for failure to provide proper oversight with regard to the
rules of engagement employed at Ruby Ridge. It should be noted
that the Administrative Summary report recommended that neither Mr.
Potts nor Mr. Coulson be disciplined. I disagreed with that
conclusion based upon the facts as I found them.

At the time I disciplined Larry Potts, he was the Acting
Deputy Director. Shortly thereafter, I sought to promote him to be
Deputy Director of the FBI.

In pressing for Mr. Potts's appointment as Deputy Director, I
was not trying to minimize or downplay the significance of the
punishment that I had imposed upon him. I did not appoint him
Deputy Director simply because he ‘is a friend.

In determining whether to appoint Larry Potts to be the Deputy
Director, I considered his many years of public service to the
Nation and to law enforcement. I considered the esteem in which
subordinates, superiors, counterparts, and colleagues hold him. I
considered his vast accomplishments in the FBI, including our work
together during the VANPAC investigation for which President Bush
personally awarded Mr. Potts an Exceptional Leadership Award in the

Rose Garden.



three armed people run from the cabin and head tce«ward the rock
outcroppings, they did not shoot as those three persons moved from
the cabin -- because their actions were not judged to pose a threat
to the safety of the agents on the scene.

The bullet that struck Mrs. Weaver was fired seconds after the
first shot. It was intended for a man who Special Agent Horiuchi
mistakenly believed was the one he had just shot in the vicinity of
the birthing shed. Special Agent Horiuchi fired at his intended
target while he was running toward the cabin and before he reached
the cabin door.

Tragically, Mrs. Weaver was struck by that shot while she
stood behind the open front door of the cabin.

Special Agent Horiuchi said he could not see Mrs. Weaver when
he took the second shot and that he had no reason to believe that
she was standing there. The shot that killed Mrs. Weaver was not
even fired at or into the cabin; it travelled on a path parallel to
the cabin.

Special Agent Horiuchi made one thing abundantly clear during
his testimony at the trial of Randy Weaver and Kevin Harris: he
aid not see Vicki Weaver or anyone else behind the cabin door when
he fired the second shot. Special Agent Horiuchi has testified
that he was aiming at a moving target -- Kevin Harris -- at that
time.

It is important to remember that two different components of
the Department of Justice have reviewed the circumstances leading

to Vicki Weaver's unfortunate death. Both of those components --


like Deputy United States Marshal Bill Degan. As 1 «4 enforcement
leaders and managers, we owe them our complete support and must
strive to give them the best guidance possible. -

We rely upon the men and women of law enforcement to do their
best job under very difficult circumstances. In return for
protecting us, we vest them with a measure of discretion and ask
them to use their best judgment. Sometimes, as human nature tells
us, that judgment may be imperfect and mistakes will happen. ~

As long as we ask them to be in the arena, to be ready in the
middle of the night to take cover behind a tree or a mailbox, to
put their lives and the well-being of their families in the line of
fire, we must show some empathy and compassion for their human
fallibility. This is particularly true as we judge with the caln,
well-lighted knowledge of hindsight, far from what the Supreme
Court calls "split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are

tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving."

IGraham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).

20



out to a federal courtroom in Boise, Idaho. Tou.y, there are
allegations that a coverup occurred -- allegations that, if proven,
shake the very foundation of integrity upon which the FBI is built.
Although I was not FBI Director when the Ruby Ridge crisis
occurred, I am sincerely disappointed with the FBI's performance
during the crisis and especially in its aftermath. These hearings
have only served to confirm that belief. The FBI has, however,
learned from its mistakes there. I have changed almost every
aspect of the FBI's crisis response structure and modified or
promulgated new policies and procedures to address the flaws and
shortcomings apparent from the FBI's response. I am committed to
ensuring that the tragedies of Ruby Ridge never happen again.

Circumstances Surrounding the
Deployment of FBI Resources to Idaho

As you are aware, the FBI responded to Ruby Ridge subsequent
to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms investigation of
Randy Weaver. The FBI response came after the United States
Marshals Service had conducted an 18-month investigation and
surveillance of Weaver. The FBI responded to Ruby Ridge on August
21, 1992, after the tragic murder of Deputy United States Marshal
William Degan.

It is important to keep these facts in mind. Deputy Marshal
Degan's murder, as well as additional information provided by other
law enforcement agencies -- which other witnesses have described --
formed the basis upon which the FBI responded to Idaho in August,

1992.



* included, for the first time, Department of Justice attorney
representation on the Shooting Incident Review Group.

Critical Incident Response Group -

The third and most significant major change I made is the
creation of the Critical Incident Response Group ("CIRG"), which I
established in 1994. I have provided to the Subcommittee a handout
describing CIRG and its responsibilities. I request that it be
made part of the record.

Without question, Ruby Ridge demonstrated that the FBI's
crisis management structure was inadequate and terribly flawed.
The new CIRG ensures the FBI's experienced senior leadership's
responsibility and directly establishes accountability on specific
individuals, including myself, for crisis management. CIRG fully
integrates crisis negotiators and the HRT and joins them at the
same level under a unified command. The structure which I have
established ensures an equal tension between our tactical and non~
tactical components, with a Special Agent in Charge and myself
overseeing the process. As a part of that integration, I have
ordered that, whenever HRT deploys on a mission, CIRG negotiators
will deploy with then.

The members of the HRT are not commandos. They are Special
Agents of the FBI. Their goal has always been to save lives. Like
any FBI Special Agent, the members of the HRT carry badges and
handcuffs. Their objective is identical to that of law enforcement

officers around the country -~ to arrest safely those responsible

13



investigative agencies of the Department of Ju. vice. These
resolutions were created at the request of Attorney General Reno
and she has approved then. -

Resolution 12 established policy to govern agencies' use of
the FBI's crisis management resources in the field, as well as
components of CIRG. I believe that Resolution 12 clearly
establishes lines of authority during crises and will avert

confusion when a crisis occurs. Additionally, Resolution 12

requires other Department of Justice investigative agencies to

consult and coordinate with the FBI when the degree of threat in

one of their cases requires and allows for preplanning.

Resolution 13 established a general policy concerning the
conduct of post-shooting incident reviews. I previously described
changes to FBI policy governing this matter. Resolution 13 ensures
that Department of Justice.agencies will conduct thorough and
objective shooting incident reviews, which subsequently are
reviewed further in order to ensure fairness and accuracy.

Many months ago, the Attorney General tasked the Office of
Investigative Agency Policies to draft a uniform deadly force
policy for her consideration. After months of research, discussion
and analysis between the agencies comprising the Office of
Investigative Agency Policies and various components of the
Department of Justice -- especially the Office of Legal Counsel --
Resolution 14, which established a uniform deadly force policy, was

issued and the Attorney General has approved it.

15



Introduction

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. I am pleased to testify before you concerning the
role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the events at Ruby
Ridge and the substantial reforms I have made as a result of the
serious deficiencies in the FBI's performance during the crisis.

I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee
today. Only through a public discussion of these issues can we
assure the public's confidence in law enforcement.

Ruby Ridge has become synonymous with tragedy, given the
deaths there of a decorated Deputy United States Marshal, a young
boy, and the boy's mother. It has also become synonymous with the
exaggerated application of federal law enforcement. Both
conclusions seem justified.

At Ruby Ridge, the FBI did not perform at the level which the
American people expect or deserve from the FBI. Indeed, for the
FBI, Ruby Ridge was a series of terribly flawed law enforcement
operations with tragic consequences.

We know today that law enforcement overreacted at Ruby Ridge.
FBI officials promulgated rules of engagement that were reasonably
subject to interpretation that would permit a violation of FBI
policy and the Constitution -- rules that could have caused even
worse consequences than actually occurred. Rules of engagement
that I will never allow the FBI to use again.

There was a trail of serious operational mistakes that went

from the mountains of Northern Idaho to FBI Headquarters and back



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U.S. Department of *stice

Federal Bureau of Inve-“‘gation

Office of the Disector Washington, D.C. 20535 ~

OPENING STATEMENT

OF

LOUIS J. FREEH
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OCTOBER 19, 1995

Fevnos


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grievous and shocking than an allegation that an FBI Agent has
committed perjury or obstruction of justice.

The Subcommittee and the American people should have no doubt
that I will swiftly and decisively address any misconduct which was
committed by any FBI employees. In that regard, my actions will be
consistent with the “bright line ethical and legal standard" that
I established for FBI employees on January 3, 1994.

Any such actions, however, cannot occur until the
investigation is complete and all of the facts are known.

FBI Crisis Management Reforms
Subsequent to the Events at Ruby Ridge

The FBI has learned the lessons of Ruby Ridge. As the
Subcommittee has already heard, we have changed policies and
procedures to prevent similar, tragic mistakes in the future. I
have prepared a handout describing these reforms. I request that
it be made part of the record. I would like to review four of the
reforms with you.

Rules of Engagement

First, I have ended forever the use of rules of engagement by
the FBI. “rhe FBI will govern its use of deadly force by the
Department of Justice deadly force policy, which permits the use of
deadly force only in the face of imminent death or serious physical
injury to the officer or another person. In a moment, I will
describe this policy in greater detail.

Never again will rules of engagement be open to an
interpretation which expands the deadly force policy. In future
crises, there will be no confusion -- as there was at Ruby Ridge --

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for crimes and assist in their prosecution. The members of HRT,
however, perform these tasks in crisis situations.

The HRT is a unique and necessary law enforcement response
capability. Nevertheless, the simple fact that HRT exists does not
mean that it must be used, especially if we do not have to use it.

The HRT should not be used reflexively. I approach the use of
HRT conservatively and seek independent FBI assessments before its
use. Indeed, I cannot envision utilizing the HRT unless I am
personally satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate to use
it.

Through the integrated response that CIRG provides, I am
confident that the FBI will better perform its duties to resolve

future crisis situations without loss of life.

Crisis Management Training

Finally, I have increased the crisis management training
provided to FBI executives who will serve as on-scene commanders in
crisis situations. Attorney General Reno, the Deputy Attorney
General, and I have received this training. It has also been
provided to other senior Department of Justice officials and a
cadre of FBI field commanders. I believe that this training effort
will help ensure the peaceful resolution of future crises. °

Department of Justice
Crisis Management Reforms

Some crisis management reforms have been’ established
throughout the Department of Justice. In my capacity as Director
of Investigative Agency Policies, I have issued Resolutions 12, 13
and 14, which resulted from consensus recommendations of the

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