OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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Status of U.S. Government Anticorruption Efforts 

in Iraq 

SIGIR-07-007 July 24, 2007

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Status of U.S.Government Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq 

This report discusses the results of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

(SIGIR) assessment of U.S. government anticorruption efforts in Iraq and follows up on 

our earlier review to determine the U.S. Embassy’s progress in implementing our prior 

recommendations. For the details on our objectives, scope, and methodology, see 

Appendix A. 

SIGIR recognizes that developing the capacity of the Government of Iraq (GOI) to 

address corruption is a top Embassy priority for Iraq. To support this effort, Embassy 

staff and other U.S. government organizations and activities have established many 

programs in a number of areas, including economic restructuring, strengthening the Iraqi 

accountability organizations, rule of law, open and accountable government, free media, 

and civil society. 

According to the Embassy’s August 2006 Consolidated Anti-Corruption Strategy, 

corruption has a number of significant implications for Iraq: 

• Corruption contributes to capital flight and makes Iraq less attractive as a regional 

competitor for foreign direct investment. 

• Economic growth is reduced by the misallocation of resources to nonproductive 

activity. 

• Government institutions are undermined by the widespread association of 

political elites with corrupt activities. 

• The market economy is adversely affected by the widespread availability of 

black-market energy products and food rations delivered through corrupt and 

illegal delivery systems. 

• Corruption funds illegal activities. 
Summary 

 

Addressing the issue of corruption remains a top Embassy priority for Iraq. Our analysis 

generally shows two levels of effort—one aimed at economic, financial, and public 

integrity reforms and one aimed at technical and law enforcement reforms. 

Nevertheless, since our July 2006 audit report, several challenges impeded the progress in 

implementing a coherent anticorruption program: 

• The absence of a program manager with the authority and support to provide the 

necessary leadership and coordination of the overall anticorruption effort is a 

major challenge to success. 

• Although several organizations are conducting many individual programs in Iraq, 

there is no comprehensive, integrated plan with metrics that ties these programs to 

an overall U.S. Mission-Iraq strategy or that provides a baseline to measure 

progress. All of these programs are attempting to address the complex 

development and institutional issues surrounding corruption, but we believe that 

greater synergy among these programs could be achieved by having a plan that 

links programs to specific objectives of the overall strategy. Although the 

Embassy planned to create an inventory of programs and activities and then assess 

each against goals and objectives, neither has been accomplished as of 

June 1, 2007. 

• The absence of an overall strategy makes it difficult to assess the adequacy of 

funding to meet the desired end state. 

On balance, there has been some progress by individual initiatives. For example, in 

January 2007, the Embassy established the Office of Accountability and Transparency 

(OAT), which works to strengthen the Iraqi anticorruption institutions—the Board of 

Supreme Audit (BSA), the Office of the Inspector General (IG) at each ministry, and the 

Commission on Public Integrity (CPI). This new office has already accomplished a 

number of noteworthy achievements, including: 

• providing a full-time advisor for the Iraqi IGs 

• providing a full-time advisor for the Board of Supreme Audit 

• assisting in the development of a charter for the Joint Anticorruption Council. (On 

May 16, 2007, the Joint Anticorruption Council charter was signed, and Iraqi 

charter members have already held meetings.) 

Another initiative to address corruption is the development of a financial management 

tool, the Iraqi Financial Management Information System (FMIS). This system is 

intended to help the GOI provide financial transparency and accountability in its fiscal 

operations. Besides reducing corruption, this comprehensive, fiscal automated 

2
recordkeeping process should provide for open and reliable accounting and financial 

reporting and help restore the Iraqi citizens’ confidence in their government. However, 

because of security and safety issues, the contractor has suspended work on this project. 

Follow-up on Prior Report Recommendations

In July 2006, we issued a report on the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s anticorruption program,1

which identified problems, including a lack of coordination and leadership in 

anticorruption activities. We recommended that the Department of State (DoS) appoint a 

senior leader to direct the program to provide continuity in program administration and 

made 11 other recommendations for program improvement. As of June 30, 2007, limited 

progress has been made implementing these recommendations. For the status of actions 

taken, ongoing, and planned for each of the prior SIGIR recommendations, see 

Appendix B. 

Background

During 2005, the SIGIR and U.S. Embassy staff discussed approaches to addressing the 

corruption in Iraq. On November 12, 2005, at SIGIR’s urging, the U.S. Ambassador to 

Iraq held an anticorruption summit. Participants at this summit included U.S. and Iraqi 

officials with direct responsibilities in anticorruption efforts in Iraq. 

The summit rejuvenated the Embassy’s previously inactive Anticorruption Working 

Group, chaired by the Embassy’s economic affairs counselor. The Working Group’s aim 

was to develop an anticorruption strategy and to synchronize all U.S.-led anticorruption 

activities with this strategy. These U.S. organizations participate in the Working Group:2

• Economic Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

• Political Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

• Political-Military Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

• Public Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

• Foreign Commercial Service, U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

• Rule of Law Organization, Office of Accountability and Transparency, U.S. 

Embassy-Iraq 

• Iraq Transition Assistance Office (formerly the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office) 

• Department of Justice Attaché Office, U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

 

1 Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program (SIGIR-06-021, July 28, 2006). 2

 SIGIR attends the working group meetings as an observer. 

3
• Department of Treasury Attaché Office, U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

• U.S. Agency for International Development Mission-Iraq 

• DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

• Multi-National Force-Iraq, Office of the Inspector General 

• Multi-National Force-Iraq, Office of Strategic Effects 

• Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Findings 

Corruption is pervasive in the Iraqi government and appears to be getting worse, based on 

Transparency International’s annual country survey rankings.3

 Corruption contributes to 

capital flight, making Iraq less attractive as a regional competitor; undermines 

government institutions; and creates budget shortfalls. 

The Embassy is well aware of these problems and is carrying out a wide range of 

anticorruption activities to build the confidence of Iraqi citizens in their government and 

to address the economic problems that result from corruption. The program, however, 

lacks focus. Unlike many countries where DoS works on corruption, in Iraq it has 

numerous partners—Department of Justice, U.S. Agency for International Development, 

Department of Treasury, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq. Coordinating the activities of myriad partners is complex and 

requires a clear strategic plan to guide the efforts of each partner; however, no document 

clearly identifies all planned and ongoing activities, the roles and responsibilities of all 

participating organizations, and the resources needed for implementation. 

The Embassy also has had problems identifying program management leadership for this 

effort and has not provided this position with the necessary authority to manage and 

coordinate an effective program. After our July 2006 audit report, the Embassy quickly 

appointed a Senior Foreign Service Officer to guide the program, but unfortunately the 

individual departed soon after. Finding a qualified person to serve in Iraq was difficult; 

the replacement arrived in early June 2007. However, the program has languished in the 

interim, and the Embassy has not completed the promised overall assessment of U.S. 

government anticorruption efforts. 

 

3

 Corruption Perception Index reports for 2006 and 2005. Transparency International measures perceptions 

of corruption by country and produces an annual corruption perception survey report. 

4
Recommendations 

Based on our assessment of U.S. government anticorruption efforts, we recommend that 

the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq take these actions: 

1. Re-emphasize and re-address the recommendations made in SIGIR’s July 2006 audit 

report. As part of re-addressing the prior recommendations: 

a. Include in the corrective actions plans an estimated completion date for 

implementing each recommendation. 

b. Complete the inventory of anticorruption programs, activities, and initiatives. 

c. Complete the assessments of the major program initiatives that are supporting 

the Embassy’s Anticorruption Strategy. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

We requested and received consolidated comments from the U.S. Embassy-Iraq on a 

draft of this report. The Embassy stated that it supported and was committed to pursuing 

the recommendations of this report, and provided additional information on actions 

underway on our previous recommendations. We also received and considered technical 

comments, where appropriate, in the preparation of the final report. We consider the 

comments and actions taken to be responsive to our report. 

During our regular semi-annual follow up cycle we will validate the actions the Embassy 

has reported it has taken on previous recommendations in its response to our draft of this 

report. For a copy of the U.S. Embassy’s consolidated response, see Appendix E. 

 - - - - - - 

Thank you for the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Mr. Glenn Furbish (703-428-1058 / glenn.furbish@sigir.mil); or 

Mr. Walt Keays (703-343-7926 / walt.keays@iraq.centcom.mil). For report distribution, 

see Appendix C. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix D. 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Appendices 

cc: See Distribution 

5
Appendix A—Objective, Scope, and Methodology

SIGIR initiated this review on January 23, 2007 (Project 7009). The overall objective was 

to assess U.S. government anticorruption efforts in Iraq. To meet this objective, we 

addressed these specific questions: 

1. Has the U.S. government developed a strategic anticorruption program with 

identified goals? 

2. Do the anticorruption activities conducted by all U.S. government agencies in Iraq 

support the U.S. anticorruption strategy? 

3. Have organizational roles and responsibilities been clearly identified and 

resources provided to meet strategic program goals? 

4. Have U.S. government agencies established programs to strengthen Iraq’s 

anticorruption institutions? 

5. Have the appropriate U.S. government agencies developed action plans or 

implemented the recommendations made in previous reports? 

To determine if the U.S. government developed a strategic anticorruption program with 

identified goals, we attended the weekly Anticorruption Working Group (ACWG) 

meetings, reviewed previous meeting minutes, and interviewed the ACWG chairman. We 

also reviewed the Embassy Consolidated Anti-Corruption Strategy (August 30, 2006). 

To determine if the anticorruption activities conducted by all U.S. government agencies 

in Iraq support the U.S. anticorruption strategy, we reviewed the Embassy Consolidated 

Anti-Corruption Strategy (August 30, 2006) and discussed it with the responsible U.S. 

Embassy component, the Economic Affairs Section. In addition, we reviewed the 2006 

and 2007 benchmarks from the strategy and discussed them with the Economic Affairs 

Section. We also interviewed Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

officials and discussed anticorruption efforts in the petroleum sector. 

To determine if the organizational roles and responsibilities have been clearly identified 

and resources provided to meet strategic program goals, we met with representatives 

from the Economic Affairs Section, Department of Justice Attaché Office, DoS Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, OAT, and U.S. Agency for 

International Development. We reviewed the Embassy Consolidated Anti-Corruption 

Strategy and funding documents from the various entities. 

To determine if the U.S. government agencies established programs to strengthen the 

Iraqi Inspectors General, we met with the representatives from the OAT, Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq, and the ACWG to discuss the progress, review 

documentation, and review the funding provided for strengthening the Iraqi Inspectors 

General. 

6
To determine if U.S. government officials had taken action on recommendations made in 

Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program (SIGIR-06-021, 

July 28, 2006), we interviewed the Embassy’s Economic Affairs Counselor to obtain 

information and documentation on actions taken to address the prior recommendations. 

We also met with the OAT Director to discuss the progress that office has made to 

address the prior recommendations. We obtained the Director’s 30-day report 

(February 25, 2007) to document actions and plans for addressing the prior 

recommendations. 

In accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, we conducted this 

review from January 2007 through June 2007, primarily in Baghdad, Iraq—visiting 

offices in the International Zone and Base Camp Victory—and also in Washington, D.C. 

Use of Computer-processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform 

this survey. 

Prior Coverage. We reviewed these reports: 

• Report of Inspection: Survey of Anticorruption Programs, Embassy Baghdad, 

Iraq (DoS OIG, ISP-IGO-06-50, August 2006) 

• Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program (SIGIR 06-021, 

July 28, 2006) 

• Report of Inspection: Rule of Law Programs, Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq

(DoS OIG, ISP-IQO-06-01, October 2005) 

• Report on the 6th Meeting of the International Group for Anti-Corruption 

Coordination, Brussels, 30 September–1 October 2004, (UN Office of Drugs and 

Crime) 

• Foreign Assistance: U.S. Anti-Corruption Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa Will 

Require Time and Commitment (GAO-04-506, April 2004) 

• Audit of the Status of USAID’s Anti-Corruption Efforts in Assisted Countries 

(USAID 9-000-98-0002-P, September 1, 1998) 

7
Appendix B—Summary of Prior SIGIR 

Recommendations and Actions Taken 

This appendix presents the 12 recommendations made in our prior report, Joint Survey of 

the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program (SIGIR-06-021, July 28, 2006), as well 

as the reported actions taken, planned, or under way in response to each recommendation. 

Acronyms: 

ACWG Anticorruption Working Group 

BSA Board of Supreme Audit 

CCCI Central Criminal Court of Iraq 

CPI Commission on Public Integrity 

FS-01 Foreign Service Officer 

GOI Government of Iraq 

IGs Inspectors General 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

JACC Joint Anticorruption Council 

JESG Joint Executive Steering Group 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

OAT Office of Accountability and Transparency 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

Status 

At the time of our review, 10 of 12 prior SIGIR recommendations remain open. We 

determined that 2 recommendations have been implemented as intended, and are 

therefore Closed; 2 recommendations are considered as Open, Actions Under Way; and 8 

recommendations are Open, Actions Planned. 

Recommendation (1). We recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq provide the 

necessary resources to have sufficient direction and oversight of the U.S. Embassy’s 

anticorruption program, including a senior leader from DoS and a senior officer from 

MNF-I. Both positions should be filled with staff that have such a background to bring 

value to the position. 

8
Action taken. The Foreign Service (FS-01) officer arrived on September 25, 2006. 

MNF-I participates regularly at the Embassy’s ACWG, and informal contacts between 

the two organizations are frequent. Moreover, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy, 

IRMO has established OAT as a deputy directorate with senior consultant positions for 

the CPI, BSA, and the ministerial IGs. 

This new organization will support U.S. Embassy’s efforts to strengthen GOI 

anticorruption programs and institutions in coordination with the Embassy’s Economic 

Affairs Section. Key OAT staff members were in place as of January 2007, and 

recruitment continues for additional needed staff. 

In December 2006, the FS-01 unexpectedly departed after only eight weeks of work. The 

replacement officer arrived in June 2007. 

STATUS (1): This recommendation is Closed.

Recommendation (2). Continue efforts to recruit an Iraqi local national staff member to 

provide support to the full-time anticorruption program manager. This person should 

have the necessary skills and level to be instrumental in forging joint U.S.-Iraqi 

anticorruption initiatives. 

Action taken. U.S. Embassy and IRMO (now ITAO) continue the process of identifying 

and seeking to recruit local Iraqi national staff member candidates to provide support to 

the full-time anticorruption program manager. 

Locating competent staff in an environment where they are subject to intimidation and 

assassination is difficult. However, with the assistance of Iraqi-American citizens 

currently working under the U.S. Mission, more potential candidates are being identified. 

As of May 21, 2007, U.S. Embassy-Iraq is still seeking a locally employed staff member 

to fill this position. Baghdad is an extremely difficult place in which to recruit qualified 

staff. One person who was interviewed and wanted to accept the position could not be 

hired because a security clearance was denied the day before. The Embassy’s Human 

Resources Department was processing another candidate, depending on the security 

clearance and acceptance of the offer. 

STATUS (2): This recommendation has not been satisfied and currently 

 remains Open, Actions Under Way.

Recommendation (3). Establish a joint executive steering group (JESG), chaired by the 

anticorruption program manager, with oversight of all U.S. government anticorruption 

programs to ensure that all initiatives are working toward a common goal in the most 

efficient and effective manner. 

9
Action taken. U.S. Embassy is currently re-establishing and reorganizing its efforts to 

better oversee all U.S. government anticorruption programs to ensure that all initiatives 

are working toward a common goal in the most efficient and effective manner. 

For example, IRMO has established OAT to identify, facilitate, and coordinate 

anticorruption capacity-development initiatives with the primary Iraqi anticorruption 

agencies—the CPI, BSA, and ministerial IGs. 

As a result of the current U.S. Embassy strategy, ACWG successes, and ongoing support 

from IRMO (now ITAO) and other U.S. government agencies, the Embassy’s Economic 

Affairs Section will establish a JESG, chaired by the anticorruption program manager. 

This group will have oversight of all U.S. government anticorruption programs to ensure 

that all initiatives are working toward a common goal in the most efficient and effective 

manner. 

U.S. Embassy focused on getting the JACC established to work more closely with its 

GOI interlocutors. The status of the roles and responsibilities of all the Embassy’s 

anticorruption efforts were under review, pending the outcome of the reorganization and 

realignment of the IRMO. OAT has submitted a plan that addresses forming a joint 

executive steering group. 

STATUS (3): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Planned. 

Recommendation (4). Direct the JESG to provide to the Deputy Chief of Mission 

periodic reports (at least quarterly) on progress, barriers, and funding needs to support the 

anticorruption Program. 

Action taken. There are plans that state that on completion of the formal organization 

and ratification of the JESG Charter, rules governing the organization will be established. 

These are some of the organization’s administrative and reporting duties: 

• Under the direction of the JESG Chairperson, periodic reports on anticorruption 

efforts, progress, barriers, and funding needs to support the U.S. Embassy 

anticorruption program will be provided to the Deputy Chief of Mission. 

• Such reports shall be completed on a quarterly basis at a minimum and shall 

follow the calendar quarter reporting period (March, June, September, and 

December). U.S. Embassy recognizes the value that such timely and scheduled 

reporting provides to the senior leadership. 

STATUS (4): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Planned. 

10
Recommendation (5). Establish a policy that will require all participating organizations 

to vet new anticorruption initiatives through the new JESG. 

Action taken. This recommendation is closely related to recommendation 4 and will be 

value-added to the policy guidelines for the JESG. The status of the roles and 

responsibilities of all the Embassy’s anticorruption efforts was under review, pending the 

outcome of the reorganization and realignment of IRMO. 

STATUS (5): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Planned. 

Recommendation (6). Direct the JESG to conduct a complete review of each U.S.-

funded anticorruption program and assess how that program helps achieve the U.S. 

government’s strategic goals for anticorruption. 

Action taken. There are plans that on completion of the formal organization and 

ratification of the JESG Charter, rules governing the organization shall be established. As 

part of the organization’s administrative reporting and directive duties, the following 

directive will be established and completed: 

• Under the direction of the JESG Chairperson, a directive will be given to a 

subcommittee of the JESG to conduct a complete written review of each of the 

current U.S.-funded anticorruption programs to assess how that program helps 

achieve the U.S. government’s strategic goals for anticorruption in Iraq. 

• A written assessment report will be completed and presented to the group’s 

chairperson within 90 days after the first organized meeting of the JESG. 

STATUS (6): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Planned. 

Recommendation (7). Direct the members of the ACWG to develop action plans for 

each activity’s program in concert with the overall strategic goals. 

Action taken. The U.S. Embassy, under the supervision and guidance of the Economic 

Affairs Section, has re-established the ACWG, which comprises U.S. Embassy, MNF-I, 

and other U.S. agency representatives. The ACWG meets once a week, bringing together 

approximately 20 U.S. government and other agency representatives to discuss, facilitate, 

and coordinate U.S. government anticorruption initiatives in Iraq. 

In January 2007, the ACWG has seen clear indications of the drive to develop new action 

plans for each of the anticorruption program activities. For example, OAT has been 

working closely with U.S. Embassy and Iraqi representatives for CPI, the Iraqi IGs, BSA, 

and the High Judicial Court. The action plan is to facilitate the formal organizing of the 

JACC. The intended purpose of the JACC is to create Iraqi anticorruption institutions in 

11
which the respective Iraqi representatives can come together to collectively share ideas 

and promote the development of GOI anticorruption policy and legislation initiatives. 

Moreover, as the ACWG moves forward and the JESG is established, more definitive 

directives to the ACWG members will be presented to develop greater detailed action 

plans for each activity’s program, in concert with the overall anticorruption strategic 

goals of U.S. Embassy. The directive to develop greater detailed action plans for each 

activity’s program will follow closely after the recommended assessment of each 

program as noted in the response to recommendation 6. 

STATUS (7): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Planned. 

Recommendation (8). Establish a baseline for each anticorruption program to document 

a starting point for the program to measure progress. 

Action taken. In coordination with and on completion of recommendation 6, to 

complete an assessment of all anticorruption programs that fall under the U.S. Embassy 

responsibility, and in coordination and completion of developing an action plan according 

to recommendation 7, the Chairperson of the JESG will direct a designated subcommittee 

to establish a baseline for each anticorruption program. Documenting the starting point 

for the program will help measure progress over time. 

STATUS (8): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Planned. 

Recommendation (9). Establish interim and long-term objective(s) for each 

anticorruption program consistent with the overall anticorruption program strategy. 

Action taken. After the completion of recommendations 6, 7, and 8; the action plan calls 

the Chairperson of the JESG to direct a designated subcommittee to establish interim and 

long-term objective(s) for each anticorruption program, consistent with the overall 

anticorruption program strategy. 

STATUS (9): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Planned. 

Recommendation (10). Engage the Iraqi anticorruption counterparts in the new 

government and establish the joint U.S.-Iraq ACWG. 

Action taken. The U.S. Ambassador and the Prime Minister have committed to 

establishing the JACC. The intended purpose of the JACC is to create an association of 

Iraqi anticorruption institutions in which Iraqi representatives can come together to 

collectively share ideas and promote the development of anticorruption policy and 

legislation initiatives within the GOI. 

12
To date, U.S. Embassy representatives have been working closely with top leaders from 

the CPI, BSA, ministerial IGs, and the High Judicial Court. On May 16, 2007, the JACC 

charter was signed by the Prime Minister and senior Iraqi leaders. U.S. participation will 

be at the request of the Iraqi government. The JACC has held several meetings since the 

charter signing. 

STATUS (10): This recommendation is Closed. 

Recommendation (11). Encourage the GOI to establish its own anticorruption working 

groups with regional and international partners. 

Action taken. In a recent meeting with leading Iraq anticorruption representatives 

regarding the JACC initiative, the BSA President recommended that Iraqi representatives 

take the lead in anticorruption efforts and programs in Iraq. 

Acknowledging and appreciating the past, current, and continued support of U.S. 

Embassy assistance on anticorruption efforts, the BSA President said that for 

sustainability in such efforts, the Iraqi institutions must be engaged and take leading roles 

in the efforts against corruption. The GOI has constituted a group comprising 

representatives of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Parliament's Committee on Integrity, 

the courts, and the three anticorruption institutions. One of their first self-mandated tasks 

is to address investigative standards. 

A second example of U.S. Embassy encouragement is clearly identified in the most 

recent round of meetings with all Iraqi stakeholder organizations involved in 

anticorruption efforts. A result of U.S. Embassy encouragement has been intensified 

participation and involvement of the Iraq representatives from the CPI, BSA, ministerial 

IGs, and the High Judicial Court to complete the conceptualization of the JACC and 

formally establish the organization as a leading supporter of anticorruption programs and 

activities to more fully establish its own anticorruption working groups with regional and 

international partners. 

U.S. Embassy recognizes the value that such encouragement for the GOI provides in 

establishing its own anticorruption working groups with regional and international 

partners. U.S. Embassy has encouraged the GOI to establish such groups during frequent 

meetings with on anticorruption issues. 

STATUS (11): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Under Way.

13
Recommendation (12). Based on the unresolved recommendation 20 from the October 

2005 DoS OIG report,4

 develop and implement an action plan to: 

a. Identify the training requirements of the CPI, BSA, CCCI, and the ministerial IGs, 

with special emphasis on requirements that apply to all four institutions. 

b. Prioritize the identified training requirements. 

c. Identify training solutions for those requirements that can cut across multiple 

institutions to avoid duplication and maximize resources. 

Action taken. As of December 2006, the GOI has allocated $10 million to establish such 

an institute and has determined that the JACC will facilitate and direct the institution’s 

development. 

In addition, the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(INL) has obligated FY 2006 funds to support the training of GOI anticorruption 

investigators, which will be conducted in a CPI training facility until a new facility is 

available. 

Moreover, OAT is expected to receive approximately $8 million in the FY 2007 budget, 

which will be used in part to seek and support Iraqi efforts to design and establish a 

training facility for anticorruption personnel from all three of the Iraqi anticorruption 

institutions. A portion of the FY 2007 budget will also be dedicated to support the new 

institute and develop and implement its training curriculum, both domestically and 

internationally. 

The U.S. Embassy recognizes the value of seeking and supporting Iraqi efforts to design 

and establish a training facility for BSA, IGs, and CPI. No further information is 

available from the GOI regarding the $10 million pledged to the training program. 

STATUS (12): This recommendation remains Open, Actions Planned.

 

4 Report of Inspection: Rule of Law Programs, Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq (DoS OIG, ISP-IQO-06-01, 

October 2005)

14
15

Appendix C—Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for 

International Development 

 Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction 

 Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer, 

 Bureau of Resource Management 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq* 

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

Coordinator, Office of Provincial Affairs 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Regional Inspector General-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International 

Security Affairs 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

*Recipient of the draft audit report 
16

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic 

Affairs, and International Environmental Protection 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and 

Human Rights 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, 

Federal Services, and International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia 
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Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit work was conducted under the direction of 

Joseph T. McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

Staff members who contributed to the report include: 

Benjamin H. Comfort 

Walt R. Keays 

Glenn D. Furbish 

Frank W. Gulla 

Ronald L. Rembold 
Appendix E—Consolidated U.S. Embassy 

Management Comments 

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SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Denise Burgess 

Assistant Inspector General for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil