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*********************************************** 
KRIS J. LIPPI ET AL. v. UNITED SERVICES

AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION

(AC 43470)

Alvord, Alexander and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendant insurance

company, alleging that the defendant breached a homeowners insurance

policy that insured their residential property. The policy excluded coverage for ‘‘collapse,’’ except as specifically provided for in the policy,

which defined ‘‘collapse’’ as, inter alia, a ‘‘sudden falling or caving in’’

of a building. The plaintiffs discovered cracks in the walls of their

basement, and filed a claim for coverage with the defendant. A contractor

inspected the cracks and stated that they appeared similar to the cracks

associated with the deterioration of concrete caused by the presence

of a chemical compound, pyrrhotite, in the mixture used to make the

concrete walls. The defendant denied coverage on the basis of a provision of the policy excluding coverage for, inter alia, cracking of walls,

floors, roofs or ceilings. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant

breached the policy by denying coverage for the cracks in the basement

walls under the collapse provision of the policy. The defendant filed a

motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs demonstrated

no evidence of collapse under the policy. The trial court granted the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs

could not demonstrate that the damage to their property constituted a

sudden ‘‘caving in,’’ and, therefore, concluded that the defendant had

not breached its contract with the plaintiffs. From the judgment rendered

thereon, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held:

1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erred

in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to

whether they were entitled to coverage under their homeowners insurance policy because their property did not suffer a collapse as defined in

the policy, which was based on their claim that the trial court improperly

interpreted the phrase ‘‘caving in’’: the phrase ‘‘caving in’’ was not ambiguous, the only damage alleged by the plaintiffs was the appearance of

cracks in their basement walls, and, although the plaintiffs argued that

the term ‘‘caving in’’ can mean that the basement walls have yielded to the

internal force of the oxidation of pyrrhotite, this was just an alternative

description of the cracks, thus, the mere cracks in the walls of the

plaintiffs’ basement, in the absence of any evidence of displacement,

shifting or bowing of the walls, could not be understood to be included

under the policy’s definition of ‘‘collapse’’ as a ‘‘caving in’’; moreover,

the meaning of the word ‘‘sudden’’ as used in the context of the collapse

provision could not be construed to encompass the gradual nature of

the cracking that had occurred to the walls of the plaintiffs’ basement.

2. The trial court applied the correct standard in granting the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment: although the plaintiffs claimed that the

court improperly shifted the burden to them and that the defendant

offered no evidence demonstrating that their home had not caved in,

the court found that the defendant provided evidence that the house

had not fallen or caved in, was safe to live in, and that the damage

occurred over a long period of time, and the plaintiffs failed to recite

specific facts that contradicted those provided by the defendant’s evidence because they did not allege or provide any evidence that the

damage to the walls constituted more than mere cracking.

Argued September 22—officially released December 28, 2021

Procedural History

Action seeking to recover damages for, inter alia,

breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where

the court, Farley, J., granted the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,

from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Jeffrey R. Lindequist, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Theodore C. Schultz, pro hac vice, with whom were

Alice M. Forbes, pro hac vice, and William J. Forbes,

for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ALEXANDER, J. The plaintiffs, Kris J. Lippi and Gina

M. Lippi, appeal from the trial court’s rendering of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, United Services Automobile Association, on the plaintiffs’ two

count complaint that alleged breach of an insurance

policy and extracontractual claims. On appeal, the

plaintiffs claim that the court erred by improperly granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiffs purchased residential property at 46 Ellsworth Circle in

South Windsor in 2010. The house on this property was

built in 1998. The plaintiffs have maintained a homeowners insurance policy on the property with the defendant from the time they purchased the property.

The policy provides coverage for direct, physical loss

to the covered property, unless excluded in ‘‘SECTION

I—LOSSES WE DO NOT COVER.’’ The exclusions

include ‘‘[s]ettling, cracking, shrinking, bulging or

expansion of pavements, patios, foundations, walls,

floors, roofs or ceilings . . . .’’ These exclusions apply

to the ‘‘ADDITIONAL COVERAGES’’ provision of the

policy by endorsement. The policy does not insure for

damages consisting or caused, directly or indirectly, by

‘‘collapse,’’ other than as provided under the ‘‘ADDITIONAL COVERAGES’’ provision. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) The ‘‘ADDITIONAL COVERAGES’’ provision provides in relevant part: ‘‘8. ‘Collapse’ For an

entire building or any part of a building covered by this

insurance we insure for direct physical loss to covered

property involving ‘collapse’ of a building or any part

of a building only when the ‘collapse’ is caused by one

or more of the following: a. ‘Named peril(s)’ apply to

covered buildings and personal property for loss

insured by this additional coverage. b. Decay that is

hidden from view, meaning damage that is unknown

prior to collapse or that does not result from a failure

to reasonably maintain the property . . . f. Use of

defective material or methods in construction, remodeling or renovation . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted.) The policy defines ‘‘collapse’’ as ‘‘a. A sudden falling or caving

in; or b. A sudden breaking apart or deformation such

that the building or part of a building is in imminent

peril of falling or caving in and is not fit for its intended

use.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thus, the policy excludes coverage for ‘‘collapse,’’ except as provided by the ‘‘ADDITIONAL COVERAGES’’ provision

and subject to the exclusions described under ‘‘LOSSES

WE DO NOT COVER,’’ with ‘‘collapse’’ defined under

the policy’s ‘‘DEFINITIONS’’ section, as amended by

endorsement. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In 2016, the plaintiffs discovered cracks in the walls
of their basement. A contractor inspected the cracks

and stated that they appeared similar to the cracks

associated with the deterioration of concrete caused

by the presence of a chemical compound, pyrrhotite,

in the mixture used to make the concrete walls. The

plaintiffs learned that their basement walls likely were

constructed with concrete that contained pyrrhotite

and was manufactured by the J.J. Mottes Concrete Company. The plaintiffs filed a claim for coverage with the

defendant, which the defendant denied on the basis

of the ‘‘LOSSES WE DO NOT COVER’’ provision that

excludes coverage for ‘‘[s]ettling, cracking, shrinking,

bulging or expansion of pavements, patios, foundations,

walls, floors, roofs or ceilings . . . .’’

The plaintiffs commenced this action in July, 2016,

claiming that the defendant breached the homeowners

insurance policy that it had issued to them by denying

coverage for cracks in the walls of their basement under

the collapse provision of the policy. Thereafter, the

plaintiffs had the property inspected by two engineers,

James L. Silva and David Grandpre`. Silva stated that

the cracking ‘‘appears to be consistent with the conditions that are usually observed after the incipient stage

of a concrete sulfate attack . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted.) He further explained that ‘‘the immediate replacement of the foundation is not warranted’’ but that ‘‘the

rate of damage can accelerate and a foundation replacement could likely be required within the next two to

five years.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Grandpre` stated that

the property was not unsafe to live in and he could not

say when, or if, the walls would ever need to be

replaced. He did not observe any shifting, bowing or

other displacement of the walls or other structural elements. The plaintiffs have continued to reside at the

property and stated that they feel safe living there.

In April, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment maintaining that ‘‘the [plaintiffs] have

no evidence of collapse under the policy . . . . The

[plaintiffs’] own expert admits the [plaintiffs’] foundation does not need replacement now, and may never

need replacing in the future . . . . Furthermore, the

[plaintiffs’] policy does not cover losses that happen

over time, such as pyrrhotite degradation in concrete.’’

The plaintiffs countered in their opposition to the defendant’s motion that ‘‘the record suggests that [the plaintiffs] have suffered a collapse of the basement walls of

their home, as defined by the terms of one or more of

the policies issued by the defendant, which collapse

was caused by an enumerated peril. To the extent that

the record does not clearly demonstrate such a covered

collapse, or the timing thereof, this lack of clarity arises

from factual issues that preclude summary judgment.’’

After oral argument, and in a written decision, the court

granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

In its decision, the court discussed the definition of
‘‘collapse’’ as it applied to the ‘‘collapse’’ coverage contained within the policy issued by the defendant to the

plaintiffs. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court

noted that the policy defines ‘‘[c]ollapse’’ as ‘‘a. A sudden falling or caving in; or b. A sudden breaking apart

or deformation such that the building or part of a building is in imminent peril of falling or caving in and is

not fit for its intended use.’’ The court also noted the

policy’s exclusion for ‘‘[s]ettling, cracking, shrinking,

bulging or expansion of pavements, patios, foundations,

walls, floors, roofs, or ceilings.’’ (Emphasis added.) The

court concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish

that the damage to their property constituted a ‘‘sudden

. . . caving in’’ and, therefore, the defendant had not

breached its contract with the plaintiffs. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The court determined that ‘‘[t]he facts of this case

do not raise a jury question as to whether the plaintiffs’

basement walls have experienced a caving in. There is

no evidence of any displacement, shifting or bowing of

[the] walls. There is only evidence of cracking resulting

from the internal pressure caused by the chemical reaction the plaintiffs maintain is occurring. . . . Moreover, the evidence in this case places the damage to

the plaintiff’s basement walls squarely within the scope

of the cracking exclusion recited above.

‘‘Further, in order for the plaintiffs to establish coverage, any caving in must have occurred suddenly, i.e.,

abruptly. A gradual loss of strength, even where it does

include a gradual succumbing to external forces, is not

sudden. While there is evidence that the basement walls

have experienced a gradual loss of strength, the record

evidence only supports a conclusion that it has been a

gradual process. Damage that occurs gradually over

time does not satisfy the requirement that any caving

in must be sudden.’’ The court then concluded that the

plaintiffs’ extracontractual claims were not viable.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court

erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the

trial court erred by (1) concluding that the plaintiffs’

property did not suffer a collapse as defined in the

policy issued by the defendant because there existed

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the damage to the property constituted a ‘‘sudden . . . caving

in,’’ and (2) failing to apply the correct standard in

granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.1

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) We disagree

and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We first set forth the applicable standard of review.

‘‘The standard of review of a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment is well established. Practice

Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any

other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding

a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. . . . Our review of the trial court’s

decision to grant . . . summary judgment is plenary.

. . . On appeal, we must determine whether the legal

conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and

logically correct and whether they find support in the

facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial

court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Warzecha

v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 206 Conn. App. 188, 190–91,

259 A.3d 1251 (2021).

‘‘[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents

a question of law for the [trial] court which this court

reviews de novo.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity

Co., 333 Conn. 343, 364, 216 A.3d 629 (2019). ‘‘An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general

rules that govern the construction of any written contract . . . . In accordance with those principles, [t]he

determinative question is the intent of the parties, that

is, what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to

receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy. . . . If the terms

of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be

deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary

meaning. . . . Under those circumstances, the policy

is to be given effect according to its terms. . . . When

interpreting [an insurance policy], we must look at the

contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions

together and, if possible, give operative effect to every

provision in order to reach a reasonable overall

result. . . .

‘‘In determining whether the terms of an insurance

policy are clear and unambiguous, [a] court will not

torture words to import ambiguity [when] the ordinary

meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly,

any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the

language used in the contract rather than from one

party’s subjective perception of the terms. . . . As with

contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy

is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more

than one reading. . . . Under those circumstances, any

ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy must be

construed in favor of the insured because the insurance

company drafted the policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Jemiola v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 335

Conn. 117, 128–29, 229 A.3d 84 (2019).

In Jemiola, the plaintiff commenced an action against

the defendant insurance company, claiming that cracks

in the basement walls of the plaintiff’s home were covered under the collapse provision of her homeowners

insurance policy. Id., 119. The trial court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and, on

appeal, our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s

judgment. Id., 119–20. The definition of collapse in that

policy was ‘‘an abrupt falling down or caving in of a

building or any part of a building with the result that

the building or part of the building cannot be occupied

for its current intended purpose.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 121. The court concluded that there

was no plausible interpretation of the policy’s definition

of ‘‘collapse’’ that ‘‘reasonably encompasses a home,

such as the plaintiff’s, that is still standing and capable

of being safely lived in for many years—if not decades—

to come.’’ Id., 135. Additionally, the court concluded

that the plaintiff’s reliance in Jemiola on cases with

materially different facts was misplaced, because

‘‘[c]ontext is . . . central to the way in which policy

language is applied; the same language may be found

both ambiguous and unambiguous as applied to different facts. . . . Language in an insurance contract,

therefore, must be construed in the circumstances of

[a particular] case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous [or unambiguous] in the abstract. . . . [O]ne

court’s determination that [a] term . . . was unambiguous, in the specific context of the case that was before

it, is not dispositive of whether the term is clear in the

context of a wholly different matter.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 134.

I

The plaintiffs first argue that the court erred when

it concluded that there was no genuine issue of material

fact as to whether they were entitled to coverage under

the insurance policy issued by the defendant. They contend that the trial court’s interpretation of the phrase

‘‘sudden falling or caving in’’ was in error because it

‘‘failed to construe the ambiguities in favor of the plaintiffs . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) They

argue that the term ‘‘cave in’’ can reasonably be defined

as to ‘‘yield’’ or to ‘‘submit to pressure’’ and that the

basement walls of the property have yielded to the

chemical reaction in the concrete. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) However, we will not construe words

in a contract to import ambiguity when an ambiguity

is not present. See Jemiola v. Hartford Casualty Ins.

Co., supra, 335 Conn. 129. In this context, we do not

conclude that the phrase ‘‘caving in’’ is ambiguous.

In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cite multiple cases that can be distinguished from the circumstances of the present case. In Sirois v. USAA Casualty

Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 3d 235, 241–42 (D. Conn. 2018),

the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in interpreting the same policy language as

that which is at issue in the present case, denied the

defendant insurance company’s motion for summary

judgment after finding that the phrase ‘‘caving in’’ was

ambiguous. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The
court stated that the plaintiffs’ proposed meaning,

‘‘yield’’ or to ‘‘submit to pressure,’’ was a reasonable

interpretation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

242. In that case, however, the plaintiffs alleged in their

complaint that the basement walls of their home had

‘‘a series of horizontal and vertical cracks’’ and that they

had begun to show signs of ‘‘bowing, bulging, jacking,

shifting, and other instances of differential inward and

upward motion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Sirois v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., United States District

Court, Docket No. 3:16-CV-1172 (MPS) (D. Conn. August

29, 2017) (prior decision denying defendant’s motion

to dismiss).

In Gnann v. United Services Automobile Assn., Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV16-6010517-S (July 11, 2019) (68 Conn. L. Rptr. 882, 890),

the court, also interpreting the same policy language

as that which is at issue in the present case, denied the

defendant insurance company’s motion for summary

judgment, finding that there was a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the damage to the plaintiff’s

basement walls constituted a ‘‘ ‘caving in.’ ’’ The plaintiffs in that case alleged that there were large cracks

in their basement walls, loose pieces of concrete that

could be removed from the walls, and the deterioration

had ‘‘resulted in the bulging, bowing and shifting of the

walls’’ and further, that these conditions ‘‘are evidence

that the concrete basement walls have failed and have

begun to move inward . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 883. On the basis of these facts,

the court found the phrase ‘‘ ‘caving in’ ’’ to be ambiguous and concluded that there was a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the damage constituted

‘‘ ‘caving in . . . .’ ’’ Id., 890.

Turning to the present case and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs as

the nonmoving parties, the facts of this case can be

distinguished from both Sirois and Gnann because the

only damage alleged by the plaintiffs is the appearance

of cracks in their basement walls. Although the plaintiffs contend that the term ‘‘caving in’’ can mean that

the ‘‘basement walls have yielded to the internal force

of the expansive oxidation of pyrrhotite,’’ this is just

an alternative description of the cracks in the walls of

their basement. (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) On the basis of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the mere cracks in the

walls of the plaintiffs’ basement, in the absence of any

evidence of displacement, shifting or bowing of the

walls, cannot be understood to be included under the

policy’s definition of ‘‘collapse’’ as a ‘‘caving in . . . .’’

See Jemiola v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 335

Conn. 134.

Next, the plaintiffs contend that the term ‘‘sudden’’

must be construed to mean ‘‘unexpected’’ or, in the
alternative, that the word ‘‘sudden’’ is ambiguous and

should be construed in favor of the insured.2

(Internal

quotation marks omitted.) We disagree. In Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259

Conn. 527, 540, 791 A.2d 489 (2002) (Buell), our

Supreme Court interpreted the word ‘‘sudden’’ in an

insurance policy to mean ‘‘temporally abrupt . . . .’’

The policy at issue in that case excluded pollution

related claims from coverage but contained an exception to the pollution exclusion reinstating coverage

when the release of pollutants was ‘‘ ‘sudden and accidental.’ ’’ Id., 534. The plaintiff argued that although the

pollution occurred over a period of years, the exception

to the pollution exclusion should apply because the

term ‘‘ ‘sudden’ ’’ meant ‘‘unexpected . . . .’’ Id., 536.

The court stated that the word ‘‘sudden’’ generally

described the unexpected nature of an event but is also

used to describe a situation that is abrupt or quickly

occurring. Id., 540. It explained that the word ‘‘sudden’’

may ‘‘connote either state—or even a combination of

both an unexpected and a temporally abrupt quality—

in a given context, [but] what matters for our purposes

is what the word was intended to mean in the context

of the ‘sudden and accidental’ exception to the pollution

exclusion.’’ Id. Within the context of that policy, and

due to ‘‘the juxtaposition of the word ‘sudden’ with

the word ‘accidental,’ ’’ the court concluded that the

definition of ‘‘sudden’’ included the phrase ‘‘temporally

abrupt . . . .’’ Id.

We conclude that the meaning of the word ‘‘sudden’’

as used in the context of the collapse provision of the

policy in the present case includes the ‘‘temporally

abrupt’’ quality of the word. Although the language in

the present case does not use the phrase ‘‘sudden and

accidental,’’ we conclude that our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buell and Jemiola is instructive. In both cases,

the court emphasized the importance of interpreting

words in the context of the policy at issue and the facts

of the case. See Jemiola v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.,

supra, 335 Conn. 134; Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater

New York Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 259 Conn. 540. Furthermore, although the plaintiffs cite to dictionary definitions of ‘‘sudden’’ in support of their argument that

‘‘sudden’’ is an ambiguous term, ‘‘[t]he existence of

more than one dictionary definition is not the sine qua

non of ambiguity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins.

Co., supra, 546. It is untenable to construe the word

‘‘sudden’’ ‘‘as an event whose only requirement is that

it be unexpected to the observer.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 544. ‘‘A provision in an insurance

policy is ambiguous only when it is reasonably susceptible of more than one reading’’; (emphasis in original)

Jemiola v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 135; and,

here, the word sudden cannot be susceptible to the

meaning the plaintiffs ask us to ascribe to it. Here, as
the trial court noted, the cracks in the walls of the

plaintiffs’ basement have occurred gradually over time,

and, as we noted earlier in this opinion, the cracks do

not constitute a ‘‘ ‘caving in . . . .’ ’’ In the context of

this case, therefore, the word ‘‘sudden’’ cannot be construed to encompass the gradual nature of the cracking

that has occurred in the walls of the plaintiffs’ basement.

Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that there was

no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

cracks in the walls of the plaintiffs’ basement constituted a ‘‘ ‘sudden . . . caving in . . . .’ ’’

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court failed to

apply the correct standard in granting the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. Specifically, they contend that the court improperly shifted the burden to

them, and that the defendant ‘‘offered no evidence that

affirmatively demonstrated that the [plaintiffs’] home

had not caved in.’’ We conclude that the trial court

applied the correct standard in granting the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment.

The general principles governing a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment are well established. ‘‘In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant

who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of

any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement

that the moving party for summary judgment has the

burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue

as to all the material facts, which, under applicable

principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment

as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a

strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must

make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is,

and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of

any genuine issue of material fact. . . . As the burden

of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the opponent. . . . When

documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine

issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence

of such an issue. . . . Once the moving party has met

its burden, however, the opposing party must present

evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn.

304, 319–20, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). ‘‘To oppose a motion for

summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must

recite specific facts . . . which contradict those stated

in the movant’s affidavits and documents. . . . The

opposing party to a motion for summary judgment must

substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is

a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brusby v. Metropolitan
District, 160 Conn. App. 638, 646, 127 A.3d 257 (2015).

In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the ‘‘pattern cracking’’ damage to their basement walls constituted a ‘‘ ‘collapse’ ’’ and was covered under the collapse

provision of the policy. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that there was no genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the damage to the

plaintiffs’ basement walls constituted a ‘‘collapse’’ as

defined in the policy. First, the defendant argued that

the ‘‘slow degradation of concrete that took years to

develop’’ could not constitute a ‘‘ ‘sudden’ ’’ collapse,

as that term is used in the policy’s definition of collapse.

In support of its argument, the defendant provided evidence in the form of statements from the plaintiffs’

engineers, Silva and Grandpre`, as well as its own engineer, Joseph Malo, all of whom inspected the property

and stated that the chemical reaction occurring within

the basement walls was slow and took place over a

long period of time.

The defendant also argued that the plaintiffs could

not show that the damage constituted a ‘‘ ‘collapse’ ’’

because the house had not collapsed, fallen down or

caved in, and it was safe to live in. The defendant

pointed again to Silva’s and Grandpre`’s statements that

replacement of the plaintiffs’ foundation was not warranted at that time and that the plaintiffs’ house may

never fall down. In addition, the defendant referred

to Grandpre`’s statements that the plaintiffs’ basement

walls were plumb, the cracks were generally smaller

than he had seen in other residences, the home was

safe to live in, and the foundation was able to support

the load of the house above and was able to keep out

soil and water.

In their objection to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiffs offered an interpretation of the policy language at

issue suggesting that the mere cracks in the basement

walls constituted a ‘‘collapse’’ as defined in the homeowners policy. The plaintiffs argued that the damage

constituted a ‘‘caving in’’ because that phrase is defined

as to ‘‘ ‘yield’ ’’ or to ‘‘ ‘submit to pressure’ ’’ and pointed

to Grandpre`’s statement that the basement walls had

yielded to the internal force of the chemical reaction

in the concrete. The plaintiffs further argued that the

word ‘‘ ‘sudden’ ’’ was ambiguous and should be construed in their favor to mean ‘‘ ‘unexpected,’ ’’ and that

‘‘it is only reasonable to conclude that the chemical

reaction at work in [the plaintiffs’] walls was completely

unexpected.’’

The trial court construed the language at issue in the

policy and concluded that, based on the facts of the

case, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the damage to the plaintiffs’ home constituted

a ‘‘ ‘collapse’ ’’ such that it would be covered under the

collapse provision of the policy. The court concluded

that the defendant met its burden of establishing that
there was no genuine issue of material fact by providing

evidence that the house had not fallen or caved in, was

safe to live in, and that the damage occurred over a

period of time. The plaintiffs argued in their opposition

that the cracking, in and of itself, constituted a ‘‘caving

in’’ because that phrase should be interpreted to mean

to ‘‘ ‘yield’ ’’ or to ‘‘ ‘submit to pressure’ ’’ and that the

term ‘‘ ‘sudden’ ’’ means ‘‘ ‘unexpected’ ’’ and that the

cracking occurred unexpectedly. The court, however,

found that there was ‘‘no evidence of any displacement,

shifting or bowing of walls. . . . There is no evidence

that any loss of strength associated with the cracking

has undermined the structural integrity of the building

or part of it such that a part of the building has actually

given way to external forces.’’ Therefore, the plaintiffs

failed to recite specific facts that contradicted those

provided by the defendant’s evidence because they did

not allege or provide any evidence that the damage to

the walls of their basement constituted more than mere

cracking. See, e.g., Brusby v. Metropolitan District,

supra, 160 Conn. App. 646. The court concluded that,

even when construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the mere cracking in the basement

walls of the plaintiffs’ home could not support a finding

that the plaintiffs’ home suffered a ‘‘collapse’’ as defined

in the policy.

Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiffs failed to

show that a genuine issue of material fact existed as

to whether the damage to their property constituted a

‘‘collapse’’ as covered under the insurance policy provided by the defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did

not err in rendering summary judgment in favor of the

defendant.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiffs also claim that the court erred in rendering summary

judgment in favor of the defendants on their extracontractual claims.

Because we conclude that the trial court properly granted the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment as to the breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs’ extracontractual claims also fail. See, e.g., Zulick v. Patrons Mutual

Ins. Co., 287 Conn. 367, 378, 949 A.2d 1084 (2008) (trial court’s rendering

of summary judgment in favor of defendant on breach of contract claim

was proper, therefore, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to

whether application of policy constituted violation of extracontractual

claims).

2 The plaintiffs also argue that the defendant’s interpretation of ‘‘sudden’’

as meaning ‘‘temporally abrupt’’ would render coverage illusory. Specifically,

they contend that requiring the insured to wait for a catastrophic event to

occur, such as a complete falling to the ground of their home, ‘‘defies the

reasonable expectations of the insured and serves only to render the collapse

coverage illusory.’’ We disagree that the coverage provided by the defendant

is illusory. The policy’s definition of ‘‘collapse’’ provides coverage before a

complete falling to the ground of a home, such as when ‘‘a building is in

imminent peril of falling or caving in and is not fit for its intended use.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coverage is not rendered illusory merely

because the policy’s definition of collapse does not encompass the damage

to the plaintiffs’ basement walls.