NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0577n.06

No. 16-3147

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BRYAN BAILEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, ROGERS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Bryan Bailey challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness 

of his 96-month sentence. We affirm.

Bailey pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(i) and 846. 

Bailey’s presentence report set forth a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months of imprisonment 

based on a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of I. The district court 

sentenced Bailey to 96 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. 

In this timely appeal, Bailey argues that his 96-month sentence is (1) procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court failed to address a mitigating argument and started from 

an artificially high recommended sentence and (2) substantively unreasonable in light of his 

post-offense rehabilitation. We review Bailey’s sentence for procedural and substantive 
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United States v. Bailey

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reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Battaglia, 

624 F.3d 348, 350 (6th Cir. 2010).

Bailey first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to address his 

mitigating argument about the physical abuse that he suffered as a child. The district court “must 

consider all non-frivolous arguments in support of a lower sentence.” United States v. Gunter, 

620 F.3d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 2010). The district court is not, however, required to “give the 

reasons for rejecting any and all arguments by the parties for alternative sentences.” United 

States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see United States v. Odeh, 

815 F.3d 968, 983 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[A] sentencing court need not, in a ‘point-by-point’ fashion, 

respond to each mitigation argument offered by a defendant.”). On appeal, we must determine 

whether, based on the entire sentencing record, “we are satisfied that the district court fulfilled 

[its] obligation” to “conduct a meaningful sentencing hearing and truly consider the defendant’s 

arguments.” Gunter, 620 F.3d at 646. 

The district court satisfied that obligation. Bailey’s presentence report and sentencing 

memorandum both referred to the abuse inflicted by his mother’s boyfriend. At sentencing, the 

district court acknowledged receipt of the sentencing memorandum and heard defense counsel’s 

arguments, which mentioned the abuse but focused on Bailey’s post-offense rehabilitation. 

Bailey’s aunt testified that he came to live with her because of the abuse. The district court 

asked clarifying questions during the aunt’s testimony, showing that the judge was listening and 

was aware of Bailey’s circumstances. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387; cf. United States v. Wallace, 

597 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir. 2010) (remanding where “the entire sentencing transcript fails to 

make clear whether the district court even considered the argument”).
No. 16-3147

United States v. Bailey

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Bailey next argues that that the district court procedurally erred in starting from an 

artificially high recommended sentence. The probation officer recommended a 108-month 

sentence, the high end of the guidelines range, in part to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities 

among similarly situated defendants—specifically, a defendant in a related case who received a 

210-month sentence. The probation officer also based her recommendation on Bailey’s 

“knowledge and scope of the illegal activity and his considerable involvement in transporting 

money and narcotics” and the need “to effectively punish the defendant and hopefully deter him 

from re-engaging in illegal behavior.”

At sentencing, the district court indicated its agreement with defense counsel’s argument 

that Bailey and the other defendant were not similarly situated due to differences in both offense 

level and criminal history category and later stated that Bailey was “nowhere near where” the 

other defendant was positioned in the conspiracy. The district court went on to explain why it 

was not imposing the recommended sentence, noting Bailey’s post-offense rehabilitation and his 

support from family and friends, and why it was not granting a downward variance, noting his 

“deep and significant” involvement in the conspiracy. The district court did not err. 

Bailey further asserts that the district court procedurally erred by disregarding his postoffense rehabilitation and limiting its consideration of his history and characteristics to the time 

of the offense. Contrary to Bailey’s argument, the district court expressly considered his postoffense conduct, recognizing “the strides that Mr. Bailey has made in the last couple of years.” 

The district court’s reference to “turn[ing] the clock back three years” indicated that the court 

was shifting its analysis to the nature and circumstances of Bailey’s offense. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1).
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United States v. Bailey

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Bailey also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, asserting that 

96 months is longer than necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) in light of his post-offense rehabilitation. Bailey’s “argument ultimately boils down to 

an assertion that the district court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently,” which 

is beyond the scope of our review. United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). 

Bailey has not overcome the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence is substantively 

reasonable. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Bailey’s sentence.