UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 20-cv-23270-DAMIAN

VICTOR MANUEL CORONEL RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

ROSALIA’S INC., KOSMAS A. KALAS,

and MANUEL PAUCAR,

 

Defendants. 

______________________________________/ 

 

 

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

AND COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND REQUEST FOR A FEE MUTLIPLIER 

AND PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEY 

FEES AND COSTS [ECF NOS. 126, 143] 

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff, Victor Manuel Coronel Ramirez’s,

(“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Ramirez”), Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Against 

Defendants and Request for a Fee Multiplier [ECF No. 126], filed December 1, 2022, and 

Verified Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees and Costs [ECF No. 143], filed January 6, 

2022. This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to the parties’ Consent to Proceed Before 

a United States Magistrate Judge, in which the parties jointly and voluntarily elected to have 

the undersigned conduct all further proceedings in this case. [ECF No. 80]. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). 

The undersigned has reviewed the Motions and their supporting documents, 

Defendants’ Responses [ECF Nos. 141, 146], Plaintiff’s Replies [ECF Nos. 142, 147], the 

pertinent portions of the record, and the relevant legal authorities and is otherwise fully 

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advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 7, 2020, Mr. Ramirez filed the Complaint against Defendants in state court 

[ECF No. 1-2], and Defendants removed the case to this Court on August 6, 2020 [ECF No. 

1]. In the Complaint, Mr. Ramirez alleges he was employed as a cook for Defendants from

July 2005 to January 2020 and that between May 2017 and January 2020, Defendants 

willfully and intentionally refused to pay him overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. [ECF No.1-2 at ¶¶ 16, 22-23]. 

In October 2022, the parties proceeded to a jury trial, and on October 28, 2022, the 

jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. [ECF No. 115]. The Court entered Final Judgment 

in favor of Plaintiff on November 1, 2022. [ECF No. 118].

On December 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

pursuant to Title 29, United States Code, Section 216(b), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(d)(3). [ECF No. 126]. In the Motion, Plaintiff seeks to recover $187,193.75 in attorney’s

fees, with a fee multiplier of 2 in light of the exceptional result counsel achieved for Plaintiff, 

and $14,954.35 in costs 1

. Id. 

In their Response, Defendants argue that the Motion should be denied in part because 

numerous time entries are either duplicative, redundant, excessive, clerical in nature, contain 

1Separately, Plaintiff filed an Application for Bill of Costs [ECF No. 124] and Motion to Tax 

Costs [ECF No. 126], which sought the same costs as the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Those

costs were addressed by separate order. [ECF No. 148]. As such, the arguments regarding the 

$14,954.35 sought in costs are moot and will not be addressed by the Court. 

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insufficient descriptions, or are based on unrecoverable time. [ECF No. 141]. Defendants also 

argue that the Motion should be denied to the extent it seeks hourly rates higher than are

reasonable. Id. Lastly, Defendants argue that the request for a fee multiplier should be denied 

because Plaintiff did not achieve an exceptional result. Id.

In Reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants waived their right to contest the requested 

hourly rates because they did not timely submit their objections as required by Local Rule 

7.3(a). [ECF No. 142]. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ objections to the hours expended by 

counsel should be denied for the same reason. Lastly, Plaintiff reasserts that a fee multiplier 

is warranted. 

On January 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees 

and Costs. [ECF No. 143]. In that Motion, Plaintiff seeks to recover supplemental fees and 

costs spent litigating the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and attempting to collect on the Final 

Judgment. Id. In their Response, Defendants argue that the Motion should be denied in part 

to the extent it seeks non-recoverable attorney fees and costs and requests hourly rates higher 

than are reasonable. [ECF No. 146]. Additionally, Defendants reassert that Plaintiff’s request 

for a fee multiplier should be denied. Id.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Section 206 of the FLSA establishes the federally mandated minimum hourly wage, 

and Section 207 prescribes overtime compensation of “one and one-half times the regular 

rate” for each hour worked in excess of forty hours during a given workweek. 29 U.S.C. §§ 

206, 207. An employer who violates the FLSA is liable to its employee for any unpaid 

minimum and/or overtime wages and, in enumerated circumstances, for an equal amount in 

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liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). When a plaintiff prevails in a FLSA action, the 

district court “shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a 

reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” Rodriguez v. 

Molina Healthcare Inc., 806 F. App'x 797, 802 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S.C. § 216(b)).

In determining reasonable attorney’s fees, the Court looks to the lodestar method as 

developed by federal case law. Under the lodestar method, as applied by courts in the 

Eleventh Circuit, attorney’s fees are calculated by multiplying the reasonable hours expended 

times a reasonable hourly rate. See Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 

1299 (11th Cir. 1988).

Courts review the hourly rate and attorney time for reasonableness based on the twelve 

so-called “Johnson factors,” including: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the 

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the 

customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the 

client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the 

experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) 

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in 

similar cases. See Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)). The 

Court may also rely on its own knowledge and experience in determining the reasonableness 

of fees. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The court, either trial or appellate, is 

itself an expert on the question [of reasonable hourly rates and hours expended] and may 

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consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may 

form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” 

(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940))).

A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community 

for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984). The applicant bears the burden of producing 

satisfactory evidence that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and 

reputation, as well as the burden of showing that an enhancement of the basic fee award is 

necessary. N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Evergreen, Ala., 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987). 

In assessing the number of hours reasonably expended, the Court should exclude 

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours from the amount claimed. Norman, 836 

F.2d at 1301. As the Court must be reasonably precise in excluding hours thought to be 

unreasonable or unnecessary, so should be the objections and proof from fee opponents. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees for the work of J.H. Zidell, Esq., Natalie Starochak, Esq., 

and Samuel Gold, Esq., as well as fees for the work of Lisa Novick, a paralegal. Plaintiff also 

seeks supplemental costs associated with the issuance of writs of garnishment onto 

Defendants.

A. Reasonable Hourly Rates

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff argues, in the Reply, that Defendants waived their 

right to contest the requested hourly rates by failing to submit an affidavit opposing the hourly 

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rates within fourteen days of receiving the Motion for Attorney’s Fees, as required by Local 

Rule 7.3(a)(8). [ECF No. 142 at 1-2]. 

Local Rule 7.3(a) governs motions for attorney’s fees and states in relevant part: 

Within fourteen (14) days after service of the motion [for attorney’s fees], the 

respondent shall describe with reasonable particularity each time entry or 

nontaxable expense to which it objects, both as to issues of entitlement and as to 

amount, and shall provide supporting legal authority. If a party objects to an 

hourly rate, its counsel must submit an affidavit giving its firm’s hourly rates for 

the matter and include any contingency, partial contingency, or other 

arrangements that could change the effective hourly rate. 

Local Rule 7.3(a) (alteration added). 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not submit an affidavit in opposition within 

fourteen days after service of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. See ECF No. 142 at 1-2. A 

review of the docket reflects that the parties filed an agreed motion to extend the deadline for 

Defendants to respond to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [ECF No. 139] and that the Court 

granted the agreed motion and extended the deadline for Defendants to respond to December 

22, 2022. [ECF No. 140]. The docket further reflects that Defendants filed their Response on 

December 22, 2022, within the extended deadline, and that Defendants included with their 

Response an affidavit by attorney Adi Admit regarding defense counsel’s hourly rates charged 

in this case See ECF Nos. 141, 141-6. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that

Defendants did not waive their right to object to the requested hourly rates.

2

2 Even if Defendants had waived their right to object to the requested hourly rates, such a 

waiver would not discharge the Court of its duty to determine the reasonableness of the 

requested rates.

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Next, Plaintiff avers that his counsel learned, during the course of this litigation, that 

Defendants’ insurer agreed to cover the costs of Defendants’ attorney’s fees. [ECF No. 142 at 

2]. Plaintiff thus argues that Defendants failed to disclose whether their attorneys’ rates 

charged in this case are discounted in light of this alleged agreement. Id. Plaintiff offers no 

support for the argument that Defendants’ attorneys’ hourly rates were reduced. On the other 

hand, in defense counsel’s affidavit submitted in support of Defendants’ opposition, attorney 

Adi Amit declared, under oath, that there is no arrangement that may change the effective 

hourly rate of Defendants’ counsel in this matter. [ECF No. 141-6 at ¶ 9]. Defense counsel’s 

sworn statement is unrebutted. Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendants’ counsel’s

hourly rates in determining the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates. 

The Court now considers whether Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable. A 

reasonable hourly rate is defined as the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and 

reputation.” ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 439 (11th Cir. 1999). With regard to hourly rates, 

this Court “is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and 

experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment 

either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (quoting 

Campbell, 112 F.2d at 144).

Here, Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $425 for Mr. Zidell, $350 for Mr. Gold, $300 

for Ms. Staroschak, and $150 for Ms. Novick. [ECF No. 126 at 11]. In support, Plaintiff 

provides legal authority from the Southern District of Florida where courts found similar rates 

reasonable. Id. at 8-10. 

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Defendants argue that Plaintiff unjustifiably relies on decisions in which the 

defendants did not object to the reasonableness of the requested rates. [ECF No. 141 at 5-6]. 

Defendants assert that based on the information provided by Plaintiff, the Court should 

reduce the hourly rates for Mr. Zidell from $425 to $375, for Mr. Gold from $350 to $250, for 

Ms. Staroschak from $300 to $200, and for Ms. Novick, the paralegal, from $150 to $125. 

[ECF No. 141 at 5-8]. In support, Defendants rely on the affidavit of lead defense counsel, 

Adi Amit, in which Mr. Amit states that his hourly rate for this matter was $300, that the 

hourly rate for his associates was $200, and the hourly rate for his paralegal was $125. [ECF 

No. 141-6 at ¶ 8]. 

Although most of the decisions relied on by Plaintiff to support the reasonableness of 

his counsel’s hourly rates were based on unopposed fee applications, the applicants in those 

decisions nevertheless bore the burden of establishing that the requested hourly rates were

reasonable. The lack of opposition to requested rates does not invalidate the courts’ findings 

that the rates in those cases were reasonable. 

Mr. Zidell’s requested hourly rate is $425. A review of the relevant authority in this 

District reflects that attorneys of similar experience are typically awarded between $300 to 

$400 per hour in similar cases. However, courts in this District have found hourly rates of up 

to $450 reasonable for similar services by legal professionals of reasonably comparable skills, 

experience, and reputation as Mr. Zidell. See Gonzalez v. Radiation Shield Techs., No. 20-23262-

CIV-GOODMAN, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58291, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2021) (finding 

hourly rate of $425, which was later increased to $450, reasonable) (Goodman, J.); Toledo v. 

Vioss Vision, Inc., No. 18-20309-CIV, 2019 WL 5689246, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2019)

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(Goodman, J.) (finding hourly rate of $425 reasonable), report and recommendation adopted, 

No. 18-20309-CIV, 2019 WL 13144562 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2019); Mila v. Big Steve's Deli, LLC, 

No. 20-60367-CIV, 2020 WL 9460230, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2020) (Snow, J.) (same), report 

and recommendation adopted, No. 0:20-CV-60367, 2020 WL 9460219 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2020). 

Based on this Court’s own knowledge and experience, and taking the Johnson factors into 

consideration, including consideration of the quality of the representation, counsel’s years of 

experience, and all other pertinent factors, this Court finds that Mr. Zidell’s hourly rate of

$425 is reasonable and appropriate given the circumstances of this case.

Plaintiff provides less support for the requested rates for Mr. Gold and Ms. Staroschak. 

Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Gold “was licensed in Florida in 2002 and had several years of 

employment law experience” and that Ms. Staroschak “is licensed to practice law in the State 

of Florida since 2015 and has been handling FLSA cases of this nature for approximately 

three years at the time she left this Firm.” [ECF No. 126 at 7]. In support of these requested 

rates, Plaintiff relies on the decision in Acosta v. Pajeoly Corp., in which the court found that a 

reduced rate of $325 “is more appropriate for a senior associate working on an FLSA case” 

and reduced Ms. Staroschak’s hourly rate for from $285 to $250. No. 18-23399-CIV, 2020 

WL 764127, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2020) (Torres, J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

18-CV-23399-CIV, 2020 WL 764035 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2020). This Court finds that a 

reduction in Mr. Gold’s hourly rate from $350 to $300 and a reduction in Ms. Staroschak’s 

hourly rate from $300 to $275 is appropriate under the circumstances presented in this case.

With regards to the requested hourly rate for Ms. Novick, a paralegal, a review of 

relevant authority in this District indicates a reasonable hourly rate range of $100 to $150 for 

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paralegals of comparable experience. Mila, 2020 WL 9460230, at *2 (finding hourly rate of 

$150 reasonable); Garica, 23399-CIV, 2020 WL 764127 (finding hourly rate of $100 

appropriate). Although the requested hourly rate is on the higher side for paralegals in South 

Florida, the Court observed Ms. Novick’s participation in the trial, and Ms. Novick was 

actively involved and, undoubtably, an instrumental part of Plaintiff’s trial team. Therefore, 

the Court finds that an hourly rate of $150 is appropriate under the circumstances presented

in this case. 

B. Reasonable Hours Expended

The Court next considers whether the number of hours spent on the matter by 

Plaintiff’s counsel is reasonable. Counsel must use “billing judgment” when requesting 

attorney’s fees and must exclude “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours 

from any fee petition, irrespective of their skill, reputation, or experience. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. The party requesting attorney’s fees must 

submit evidence sufficient to allow the court to determine that the requested fees are 

reasonable. “When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, 

the court may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an 

across-the-board cut.” Bivins v. Wrap it Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008).

In the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Plaintiff requests fees for a total of 542.85 hours 

worked by counsel and a paralegal. The breakdown of the requested fees is as follows: 

• 340.15 hours by J.H. Zidell; 

• 62.9 hours by Sam Gold; 

• 5.8 hours by Natalie Staroschak; and

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• 134 hours by paralegal Lisa Novick.

[ECF No. 126 at 11]. In the Supplemental Motion and Reply thereto, Plaintiff requests fees 

for an additional 35.1 hours worked, broken down as follows:

• 30.4 hours by J.H. Zidell; and

• 4.7 hours by Lisa Novick. 

[ECF No. 143-1]. Taken together, Plaintiff requests fees for a total of 577.95 hours worked, 

broken down as follows:

• 370.55 hours by J.H. Zidell; 

• 62.9 hours by Sam Gold; 

• 5.8 hours by Natalie Staroschak; and

• 138.7 hours by Lisa Novick.

Defendants argue that the number of hours should be reduced to account for time 

entries that are clerical in nature, duplicative, redundant, excessive, contain insufficient 

descriptions, or are based on unrecoverable time. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff should 

not be compensated for fees spent litigating fees in light of the valid arguments raised in the 

Response. [ECF No. 146 at 7]. 

1. Hours Expended on Clerical Work and Paralegal Work

Defendants argue that they should not be forced to reimburse Plaintiff for time spent

performing work that is not traditionally done by an attorney and that does not require a 

lawyer’s skill or training nor for time spent by Ms. Novick attending trial. [ECF No. 146 at 8-

10]. Plaintiff argues that time spent filing, attending trial, uploading/saving documents, and 

preparing trial binders is compensable because no other employee was available to perform 

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those tasks due to the size of Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm. [ECF No. 142 at 4]. Plaintiff also argues 

that tasks such as calendaring and inputting filing deadlines should be compensated because 

of their utmost importance in this District. Id. 

Fees for paralegal work are recoverable “to the extent that the paralegal performs work 

traditionally done by an attorney.” Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir. 1988). “Tasks 

of a clerical nature are not compensable as attorney's fees." Martin v. Italian Cabinetry, Inc., 

No. 18-CV-24958, 2019 WL 3429919, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2019) (O’Sullivan, J.) (quoting

Gates v. Barnhart, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2002)), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. 18-CV-24958-UU, 2019 WL 3425942 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2019). Examples of 

clerical work include scheduling, filing, and preparing trial binders. Ramos v. Arba Constr. Inc., 

No. 20-25192-CIV, 2021 WL 4482659, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2021) (McAliley, J.), report 

and recommendation adopted, No. 20-25192-CV, 2021 WL 4480169 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2021); 

Kahn v. Cleveland Clinic Fla. Hosp., No. 16-61994-CIV, 2020 WL 10502419, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 

Apr. 20, 2020) (O’Sullivan, J.). 

The Court finds Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that time spent

on clerical work, such as filing, uploading/saving documents, and preparing trial binders is

compensable. However, the Court does find that Ms. Novick’s time spent in trial is 

compensable based on her level of involvement in assisting with trial, which, as discussed 

above, the Court observed first-hand. Accordingly, the Court has conducted an hour-by-hour 

analysis of Plaintiff’s counsel’s bills and has removed those hours based on performance of 

only clerical work. 

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2. Hours Expended Litigating Fees

With regards to the supplemental fees requested in Plaintiff’s Motion for Supplemental 

Attorney Fees [ECF No. 143], Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be reimbursed for 

16.9 hours spent reviewing Defendants’ Response to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and 

drafting his Reply in light of the valid arguments raised by Defendants in their Response. 

[ECF No. 146 at 7]. Defendants similarly argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees for the 5.1 

hours spent researching and drafting the Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees. Id. And 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be reimbursed for fees incurred collecting on the 

Final Judgment because Plaintiff failed to indicate what efforts were made to collect on the 

Final Judgment and whether the work was necessary. Id. 

Plaintiff argues that the authority in the Eleventh Circuit establishes entitlement to an 

award of “fees on fees.” [ECF No. 147 at 2]. Plaintiff also attaches emails sent to defense 

counsel requesting that Defendants voluntarily pay the Final Judgment to demonstrate that 

fees incurred in attempting to collect on the Final Judgment were necessary. [ECF No. 147-

1]. 

The Court agrees that under the precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, Plaintiff is entitled 

to recover fees incurred litigating the amount of attorney’s fees. See Norelus v. Denny's, Inc., 

628 F.3d 1270, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010). Whether Defendants’ arguments in opposition to the 

requested fees are valid or substantially justified does not affect Plaintiff’s entitlement to the 

fees. See Jean, 863 F.2d at 780. As the court pointed out in Jean, not allowing fees-on-fees 

would undermine the congressional policies behind awarding attorney's fees. See id. However, 

the Court agrees with Defendants that several time entries are excessive and, therefore, will 

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reduce the hours recoverable accordingly. Moreover, under the FLSA, Plaintiff is entitled to 

recover his reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in collecting the Final Judgment. DiFrancesco 

v. Home Furniture Liquidators, Inc., No. 06-21709-CIV, 2009 WL 36550, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 

6, 2009) (O’Sullivan, J.). Here, Plaintiff has established that reasonable efforts were made to 

collect on the Final Judgment, including applying for and obtaining three writs of 

garnishment [ECF No. 134-136]. Plaintiff may recover fees for these efforts. 

Based on the foregoing and a review of the record activity regarding Plaintiff’s fee 

applications, the Court finds that Plaintiff may recover fees incurred litigating the amount of 

attorney’s fees and attempting to collect on the Final Judgment, albeit in the reduced amounts 

indicated. 

3. Defendants’ Other Objections

Defendants argue that the amount of hours recoverable should also be reduced to 

account for time entries that are duplicative, redundant, excessive, contain insufficient 

descriptions, or are based on unrecoverable time. In support, Defendants provide a 

spreadsheet identifying the contested time entries and the bases for each objection. [ECF No. 

141-7]. In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ chart of objections lacks specificity and 

supporting legal authority, as required by Local Rule 7.3(a). [ECF No.142 at 6]. Plaintiff also 

insists that his counsel’s billing entries are not vague nor otherwise insufficient. Id. 

Local Rule 7.3(a) states, in relevant part, “[T]he respondent shall describe with 

reasonable particularity each time entry or nontaxable expense to which it objects, both as to 

issues of entitlement and as to amount, and shall provide supporting legal 

authority.”(emphasis added). Other than the objections regarding clerical work discussed 

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above, Defendants did not provide legal authority supporting its objections to specific time 

entries. Regardless, the Court has carefully reviewed the billing records to determine whether 

the amounts sought are reasonable. Based upon an hour-by-hour review of the records, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested hours warrant reduction based on time entries for clerical 

work; that are duplicative, redundant, or excessive; contain insufficient descriptions; or are 

based on unrecoverable time. After these reductions, the Court finds the following amounts 

reasonable: 

• 307.3 hours by J.H. Zidell; 

• 56.8 hours by Sam Gold; 

• 4.1 hours by Natalie Staroschak; and

• 111.6 hours by Lisa Novick. 

C. Loadstar Amount

After taking into consideration the above findings, including reductions to hourly rates 

and the reasonable number of hours billed, and applying the lodestar method pursuant to 

Norman and Johnson, the Court finds that a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees in this case 

is $165,510 (307.3 x $425+ 56.8 x $300 + 4.1 x 275 + 111.6 x $150). 

D. Fee Multiplier

The Court next considers whether the lodestar amount should be adjusted up or down 

based on the results obtained. Plaintiff requests the Court assess an attorney fee multiplier of 

2 to the reasonable amount of fees because of the exceptional result Plaintiff’s counsel 

achieved for their client. [ECF No. 126 at 4]. 

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Normally, when a plaintiff has obtained an excellent result, his attorney should recover 

all hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. There may be some 

cases of “exceptional success” where an enhanced award may be justified. Id. However, even 

a complete victory for a plaintiff does not require an enhanced award because “winning on 

all claims” is not “so unusual that it must be deemed ‘exceptional.’” Jones v. Cent. Soya Co., 

748 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1984). 

Here, although Plaintiff prevailed on his claims, the Court finds that the result was not 

“exceptional” and therefore an enhancement is not warranted. Accordingly, the Court denies 

Plaintiff’s request for a fee multiplier.

E. Supplemental Costs Requested

The following costs are taxable against a losing party:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for 

use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials 

where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and 

salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 

1828 of this title.

28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Although a prevailing party is entitled to taxable costs, the Court may still exercise 

discretion in awarding the costs that Section 1920 enumerates. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. 

Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987). The Court is limited to taxing the costs specifically 

authorized by statute. E.E.O.C. v. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing 

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Crawford Fitting Co., 482 U.S. at 445). Moreover, the Court must independently review the 

costs sought to determine whether they are recoverable under Section 1920. See Monelus v. 

Tocodrian, Inc, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (Dimitrouleas, J.) (“Although [the] [p]laintiff has 

failed to object to the costs set forth in [the] [d]efendant's [m]otion, the Court nonetheless 

reviews each category of the items sought in the [d]efendant's [m]otion, and whether [the] 

[d]efendant can properly receive monies for these categories of costs under the statute.”). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover $440 in costs related to efforts to collect on the Final 

Judgment. [ECF No. 143]. However, as Defendants correctly point out, such costs are not 

taxable under Section 1920. In reply, Plaintiff argues that even though costs related to the 

collection of a final judgment do not fit into the enumerated categories in Section 1920, such 

costs are compensable under the FLSA. [ECF No. 147 at 3]. Plaintiff provides legal authority 

to support his position that fees incurred in relation to collecting a final judgment are 

recoverable under the FLSA. The authority citied by Plaintiff does not, however, support an 

award of costs incurred in collecting on a final judgment. On the other hand, it is clear that 

these costs are not taxable under Section 1920. 

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for $440 in supplemental costs. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

and Costs Against Defendants and Request for a Fee Multiplier [ECF No. 126] and Plaintiff’s 

Verified Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees and Costs [ECF No. 143] are GRANTED 

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is further

Case 1:20-cv-23270-MD Document 151 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/09/2023 Page 17 of 18
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ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $165,510 in 

attorney’s fees to be paid by Defendants, jointly and severally.

The Court will issue a judgment as to fees and costs by separate order. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 9th day of June, 2023. 

MELISSA DAMIAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:20-cv-23270-MD Document 151 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/09/2023 Page 18 of 18