IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

FINN LAW GROUP, P.A., FINN LAW GROUP, P.C.,

MICHAEL D. FINN AND PATRICK A. KENNEDY,

Petitioners, 

v. Case No. 5D16-1591

ORANGE LAKE COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,

WILSON RESORT FINANCE, LLC AND 

GLOBALACCESS EXCHANGE, LLC,

Respondents.

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Opinion filed December 16, 2016

Petition for Certiorari Review

of Order from the Circuit Court 

for Orange County,

Lisa T. Munyon, Judge.

J. Andrew Meyer, of LeavenLaw, St. 

Petersburg, for Petitioners. 

John H. Pelzer, Richard W. Epstein and 

Sherine Marder, of Greenspoon Marder, 

P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Respondents.

PALMER, J.

Finn Law Group, P.A., Finn Law Group, P.C., Michael D. Finn, and Patrick A. 

Kennedy (“Petitioners”) have filed a petition seeking a writ of certiorari. Specifically, they

seek certiorari relief from an order entered by the trial court requiring them to respond to 
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discovery requests submitted in a lawsuit filed against them by Orange Lake Country 

Club, Inc., Wilson Resort Finance, LLC, and GlobalAccess Exchange, LLC 

(“Respondents”). Determining that, in ordering certain portions of such discovery, the trial 

court departed from the essential requirements of law resulting in material injury which 

cannot be remedied on direct appeal, we grant the petition, in part.

“An appellate court may grant a petition for certiorari only where the petitioner 

demonstrates (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law (2) resulting in 

material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be remedied on post-judgment 

appeal.” Cohen v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 121 So. 3d 1121, 1124 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citing

Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004)).

Here, Respondents sued Petitioners alleging that Petitioners tortiously interfered 

with the contractual arrangements between Respondents and certain of Petitioners’ legal 

clients. Respondents also alleged that Petitioners violated the Florida Deceptive and 

Unfair Trade Practices Act and otherwise caused harm requiring injunctive relief. 

Essentially, Respondents' theory of the case was that Petitioners wrongly advised or 

encouraged their legal clients to breach their contracts with Respondents. 

Respondents moved to compel Petitioners to produce ten different categories of 

documents pursuant to an earlier-served request to produce. Petitioners opposed that 

motion, arguing that each category was overbroad, harassing, not reasonably calculated 

to lead to admissible evidence, and protected by the work-product and the attorney-client 

privileges. The trial court ordered Petitioners to respond to Respondents’ requests for 

certain categories of documents and directed that any documents withheld due to a claim 

of privilege be noted on a privilege log. This certiorari petition followed.
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Petitioners challenge the trial court’s order, asserting that each of the categories

of documents are (1) overbroad, vague, or incapable of leading to admissible evidence, 

and (2) categorically barred by work-product or attorney-client privilege, or both. We 

agree, in part.

Discovery of certain kinds of information “may reasonably 

cause material injury of an irreparable nature.” Martin–

Johnson[,Inc. v. Savage], 509 So. 2d at [1097],1100 [(Fla. 

1987)]. This includes “cat out of the bag” material that could 

be used to injure another person or party outside the context 

of the litigation, and material protected by privilege, trade 

secrets, work product, or involving a confidential informant 

may cause such injury if disclosed. Id.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1995) (citing Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. 

Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1987) (emphasis added)). Thus, the "entry of an order 

compelling the disclosure of communications protected by a legal privilege is a departure 

from the essential requirements of the law." Cruz-Govin v. Torres, 29 So. 3d 393, 395 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2010). 

We realize that the order under review does not expressly require the production 

of any privileged communications since the order permits Petitioners to file a privilege log 

as to any such documents. However, certain categories of documents clearly request

documents that are privileged, either under the attorney-client or work-product privilege. 

Thus, the trial court's ruling requiring the production of a privilege log as to those 

categories constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law resulting in 

material injury to Petitioners which cannot be remedied on direct appeal. See Shell Oil 

Co. v. Par Four P'ship, 638 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that, when 

communications appear on their face to be privileged, the party seeking disclosure bears 

the burden of proving that they are not); see also Coffey-Garcia v. S. Miami Hosp., Inc., 
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194 So. 3d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (explaining that in cases where communication 

appears to be protected by attorney-client privilege on its face, party seeking disclosure 

of the communication bears the burden of proving that it is not privileged).

Here, categories Five, Seven, Eight, and Ten seek documents which would 

typically be privileged under the attorney-client privilege and, accordingly, we grant the 

petition as to those categories without prejudice to Respondents filing more narrow 

requests aimed at non-privileged documents. Similarly, categories Three and Four seek 

documents which would typically be privileged under the work-product privilege and, 

accordingly, we grant the petition as to those categories without prejudice to Respondents

filing more narrow requests aimed at non-privileged documents. See Nat'l Car Rental 

Sys., Inc. v. Kosakowski, 659 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (explaining that order 

compelling production of privileged work-product materials from litigant's file is type of 

discovery order properly reviewable by certiorari). However, categories Six and Nine do 

not seek documents which would typically be privileged and, accordingly, we deny the 

petition as to those categories.

PETITION GRANTED in part; and DENIED in part; Cause REMANDED.

BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.