Cover: Under fire, noncommissioned officers of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, urge

fellow Marines to cross the damaged Diyala

Bridge on the southeast outskirts of

Baghdad. (©1be Boston HeraldiKuni Takahashi)
U.S. MARINES IN IRAQ, 2003

BASRAH, BAGHDAD

AND BEYOND

US. Marines in the

Global War on Terrorism

by

Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2007
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

U S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

PCN 106 0000 0200

11
Foreword

The leader of the Chinese communist revolution, Mao Zedong, was once asked

by a journalist what he thought was the lasting impact of the French Revolution. He

allegedly responded that he did not know the answer to this question as it was "too

early to tell." In this same vein, field historian Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds' book

on the beginning of hostilities in Iraq is one of the first historical works commissioned by the History Division to focus on the role of the u.s. Marine Corps in the

long war against global terrorism.

This particular book is about Marines during the first stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom COIF). It spans the period from 11 September 2001 to March and April 2003,

when the Coalition removed Saddam Hussein from power, and concludes in November 2003 when the Marines left Kuwait to return to their home bases in the

United States. While many then believed that the "kinetic" phase of the fighting in

Iraq was largely over, as we now know, it was only a prelude to a longer but just as

deadly phase of operations where Marines would be redeployed to Iraq in 2004 to

combat insurgents Cboth foreign and domestic) who had filtered back into the country. However, this phase of the fighting would be very different from the one the

Marines and u.s. Army had fought in the spring of 2003 in the march up to take

Baghdad.

The primary focus of the book is I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)-the runup to the war in 2002 and early 2003, especially the development of "the plan," with

its many changes, the exhaustive rehearsals, and other preparations, and then the

conduct of decisive combat operations and the immediate postwar period, mostly

under the control of the U.S. Central Command's Coalition Forces Land Component

Command. The book also touches upon other Marine activities in the Military Coordination and Liaison Command in northern Iraq and with the British in the south.

Nonetheless, the primary focus remains on I Marine Expeditionary Force and the interactions of its constituent elements. Other forthcoming History Division publications

will soon offer detailed narratives on Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom COEF)

in Afghanistan and II MEF operations inside Iraq.

This book is not intended to be the final story on U.S. Marine Corps involvement

in Iraq. To paraphrase Chairman Mao, it is too early for that. But it is not too early

for a first cut at the role of the Marine Corps in the early phrases of the war in Iraq.

These are the first salvoes, intended to bracket the target and start the process of adjusting fire. My view is that it is important to get rounds down range early on, at a

time when memories are still relatively fresh and a reasonable number of official

sources have become available. My hope is that this book will prove to be a useful

overview and introduction to the subject, especially for its Marine students who want

to understand the prologue to the continuing war; that it will stimulate further research and healthy debate; and that its readers will perhaps come forward with their

own comments and perspectives to be possibly incorporated in follow-on histories.

The author, Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, is an infantry officer who has served

as a field historian and writer with the Division since 1992. He is the author of two

other histories, Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama, 1988-1990, and A Skillful Show ofStrength: u.s. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996. In January 2000 he

became officer-in-charge of the Field History Branch and directed the mobilization

and deployment to Iraq of all of the Division's field historians and one combat artist.

Colonel Reynolds deployed to the theater to serve with the Military History Group

at Coalition Forces Land Component Command. From that base he supervised Maiii
rine history operations during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom and

helped to record combined and joint history. Following his deployment, he remained

on active duty to write this text and is now a civilian on the faculty at the Naval War

College in Newport, Rhode Island. He holds a doctorate in history from Oxford University.

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History

iv
Preface

As pointed out in the foreword, this is not a finished official history, but an operational history from one field historian's point of view. It is not intended to be a

desktop guide for future operators, but rather a framework for understanding Marine

participation in the Iraq War by describing how Marines coped with the set of challenges they faced in 2002 and 2003. Some of the implied lessons may turn out to be

universal, such as the ways Marine staff officers worked in the joint arena. But some

of the issues that were pressing in Iraq in March and April 2003 may turn out to be

irrelevant in other times and places, except in the sense that past is prologue, that

we need to understand where we have been if we want to understand where we are.

This was not a bad time to write this kind of history. I had access to an array of

sources that flowed into the then History and Museums Division between the summer of 2003 and the spring of 2004. The efficiencies of the computer age played an

important role. It has probably never been easier to track down sources and conduct

follow-on interviews or ask participants to expand on the record. Above all, I tried

to rely on primary sources--oral history interviews, command chronologies, personal journals, and various contemporary documents. Some of the material is based

on personal observation from my time in Kuwait and Iraq in the spring of 2003. I

found one or two published accounts particularly useful, especially those that clearly

laid out how the author knew what he was reporting. A personal favorite is In the

Company ofSoldiers by Rick Atkinson, a journalist who is also a respected military

historian. I have written extensive endnotes in the hope that future students of the

war will be able to continue where I leave off. Occasionally, I have purposely omitted a name or a source because of the sensitivity of what someone told me. But that

is rare. While I am not as free with my opinions as a journalist or an academic might

be-I was, after all, writing on government time as a member of a diSCiplined Service-I have tried to report both the good and the not so good.

This monograph would not have been possible without the assistance of a lot of

people. I want to begin by acknowledging my brother Marines, and one sister Marine, in the Field History Branch, who, in 2003, did an amaZing job of collecting the

raw material of history before it was lost. They served in various billets, both Marine

and joint, from the Horn of Africa to northern Iraq, enduring austere and sometimes

dangerous conditions to get the job done. Their examples often inspired me. Lieutenant Colonel David T. Watters, my successor as officer-in-charge, was the first to

volunteer for mobilization in the fall of 2002, when the war clouds were still forming; Major Melissa Kuo, who served with 1st Force Service Support Group; Chief

Warrant Officer William E. Hutson, who drew a difficult assignment in the early days

of the war, wrote to me to thank me for giving him the opportunity to serve instead

of complaining about his luck; Colonel Reed R. Bonadonna, a talented journal writer,

was with Task Force Tarawa during the heavy fighting at An Nasiriyah; Lieutenant

Colonel Michael D. Visconage and Major Carroll N. Harris were at neighboring commands during the war, and we formed a kind of historical wolf pack when we flew

into Iraq in late April to conduct a series of interviews in Ad Diwaniyah. It was a

week I will not soon forget. Major Theodore R. McKeldin III, Lieutenant Colonel

Tommy Ryan, USA, and I visited with the British division a few days later, collecting

data in and around Basrah. Our British colleagues were wonderful hosts, and I cannot say enough good things about their hospitality and their openness. My hosts at

Coalition Forces Land Component Command in the Military History Group under

Colonel Neil Rogers, USA, were equally generous with their resources, especially

v
Major Shane Story, USA, who stayed in touch after the war while he was writing the

command's official history.

After returning to Washington, D.C., I read every one of our historians' personal

journals, as well as many of the documents and oral histories they collected, great

sources for putting some flesh on the dry bones of official records. For the same reason, I looked at a lot of great combat art created by Staff Sergeant Michael D. Fay

who is not only one hell of a field Marine, but also the only other member of the

branch who was over 50 when the war broke out. It was good to have at least one

other Marine in the group who could remember what it was like to be in the Corps

in 1975. All of the field historians' materials ultimately found their way into the unit's

finding aid, ably compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey to provide a

guide to the vast amounts of data that we collected. Colonel Jeffrey Acosta, who

served at Marine Corps Forces Central Command headquarters in Bahrain during the

war, added many useful documents he collected, as well as a short history of the

command in the operation. Colonel Jon T. Hoffman, Major Christopher]. Warnke,

and Captain Christopher M. Kennedy did the same after their trips to Iraq in the late

spring and summer of 2003.

I also want to express my appreciation to all of the Marines who received our

field historians in March and April 2003. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and the 1st

Force Service Support Group went out of their way to make us feel welcome. So too

did virtually all of the Marines who sat for interviews, before and after the war. They

interrupted busy schedules to meet, in some cases for many hours. One commander

even sat for a video teleconference interview a few hours before his Marine expeditionary unit mounted out for the Middle East. Another commander met with me for

half a day in Quantico, Virginia, during his pack out to return to I Marine Expeditionary Force and ultimately to Iraq. Talk about dedication to the historical record!

The staff of the History and Museums Division was uniformly helpful, from the director, Colonel]ohn W. Ripley, and the deputy director, Colonel Hoffman, to the Marine on the quarterdeck. I want to express my thanks to all and to single out a few

people for special thanks. The chief historian of the Marine Corps, Charles D. Melson, was there for us whenever we needed him. During the writing stage, he shared

the remarkable trove of data that he collected, and he was good enough to read the

manuscript in draft. The Field History Branch partnered with the Oral History and

Archives Sections to conduct and access some 1,300 interviews. Dr. Gary D. Solis,

friend and colleague, was instrumental in the process, as were Dr. Fred Allison and

Frederick]. Graboske and his staff, Christine Laba and Robert Piehel. Danny]. Crawford, head of the Reference Branch, remains one of the linchpins of the Division. Annette Amerman, also of Reference, did great work correcting and editing the troop

list. I would be remiss if I omitted Charles Grow, the curator of the art collection, always imaginative, helpful, and cheerful; graphic designer William S. Hill, who produced wonderful maps; librarian Evelyn A. Englander, always willing to chase down

one more source for a writer; Charles R. Smith, Major Valerie A. Jackson, Greg

Macheak, and Wanda]. Renfrow, who edited and illustrated the book; and Mrs. Carol

Beaupre, the director's executive assistant, ever responsive to calls for help of many

kinds.

Mr. Jay Hines, the Central Command historian, was good enough to read and comment on the text, as was my neighbor at the Navy War College, Colonel William].

Hartig, late of the I Marine Expeditionary Force staff. The manuscript finally got into

decent shape thanks to the world-class word-processing skills of Ms. Tina Offerjost

of Stafford, Virginia, not to mention the editing skills of Ms. Jill Hughes.

Last but far from least is my wife, Becky, fondly known as "the Boss" to the

branch, who not only agreed to let me interrupt my civilian career one more time and

go to war for a few months but was also as loving and supportive as any man could

vi
want while I was away. I promised her that this would be my last big adventure. I

will try to keep that promise. But I will always cherish the camaraderie of the field

historians, an unusual band of brothers, and keep a uniform on hand, just in case.

Nicholas E. Reynolds

Colonel, u.s. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

vii

Table of Contents

Foreword .iii

Preface v

Table of Contents ix

Chapter 1 Prelude to War l

Chapter 2 Inside Our Own Loop: Joint Planning for War in Iraq 15

Chapter 3 Preparing I MEF for War: The Most Important Fight is the First Fight .41

Chapter 4 The Opening Gambit: "Tally-Ho!" .57

Chapter 5 The Bridges of An Nasiriyah 65

Chapter 6 Toward the Enemy Center of Gravity: Ad Diwaniyah,

AI Kut, and the Pause 79

Chapter 7 Baghdad: Going Down Fast, Going Down FinaL 89

Chapter 8 No Smell of Saltwater: North to Tikrit, South to Ad Diwaniyah 107

Chapter 9 The Other War in the North: Marines in Kurdistan and Mosul. 113

Chapter 10 A Marriage of Convenience: Cooperation Between I MEF

and the British Division 121

Chapter 11 Postlude to Combat: Marines and Occupation of Iraq, 2003 131

Notes 145

AppendixA Data Collection and Lessons Learned Process 161

Appendix B Command List 165

Appendix C Unit List 169

Appendix D Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 177

Appendix E Chronology of Events 181

Appendix F Presidential Unit Citation 185

Index 187

ix

Chapter 1

Prelude to War

Before 11 September 2001, the Marines at U.S.

Central Command (CentCom) were housed in a tan

building that looked something like a double-wide

trailer on cinder blocks. It stood almost literally in the

shadow of the imposing, and very permanent-looking, CentCom headquarters" at the north end of

MacDill Air Force Base near the shores of Tampa Bay

in Florida. Up until then it was forgivable for visitors

to think that the Marine Forces, Central Command,

known as MarCent Tampa, was an afterthought, one

of CentCom's many appendixes. That was not quite

the case, although the situation was as complicated as

an infernal machine designed by Rube Goldberg.

MarCent Tampa was a liaison element run by a

chief of staff, Colonel John A Tempone, who was

stationed at MacDill and charged with representing

the Marine Corps before CentCom. Colonel Tempone

did not command any fighting forces, and there was

no commanding general on the books, although

there was an informal arrangement whereby the senior Marine on the CentCom staff could step into that

role. When there was a formal requirement for Marine forces, or for a Marine general officer, the Commanding General, Marine Forces Pacific (MarForPac),

who had two corps-sized Marine expeditionary forces

at his disposal, would engage; curiously, MarCent

Tampa was an outpost of that command, whose

headquarters was thousands of miles away in Hawaii

at Camp H.M. Smith on the island of Oahu. One of

the few things MacDill and Smith had in common

was palm trees. With forces spread from California to

Korea and Okinawa, MarForPac was, by name and

location, part of Pacific Command, well placed for

engagement in Indonesia, Korea, or the Philippines,

while CentCom was responsible for the Middle East,

on the other side of the world. It was the joint command that had fought the Gulf War of 1990-1991

against Iraq and maintained steady pressure on Iraq

throughout the 1990s and into 2001, mostly by orchestrating an international Coalition of forces to enforce the no-fly zones in the northern and southern

thirds of the country, which were known as Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch.l

CentCom was now very much in the limelight

again. The day after the attacks on New York and

Washington on 11 September, Secretary of Defense

Donald H. Rumsfeld directed CentCom to prepare

"credible military options" to neutralize the terrorist

threat to the United States. This spanned contingency

plans against a variety of potential targets, including

Iraq and Afghanistan. President George W. Bush's administration initially believed these two countries had

played a role in supporting or sponsoring the attacks.

However, it soon became clear that it was

Afghanistan, not Iraq that harbored the terrorist organization that had planned the attacks By 21 September the CentCom commander, General Tommy R.

Franks, USA, had briefed the President on a plan to

take the war to that organization, the Moslem fundamentalist Al Qaeda, and to the equally fundamentalist Taliban government of Afghanistan. It would not

be an exaggeration to say that Al Qaeda, run by the

Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, had purchased a

share of the government, and that he could more or

less do as he pleased in the remote, mountainous

country wedged in between Pakistan and the other

"stans," the small successor states to the Soviet Union

north of Afghanistan. 2

General Franks' plan to destroy the Taliban and to

eradicate Al Qaeda relied heavily on indigenous opposition forces within Afghanistan, especially those

known as the Northern Alliance, with heavy support

from U.S. airpower, special operations forces, and

other government agencies. A broad range of Coalition partners, especially North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, offered various kinds of

support. The operation ultimately known as Enduring

Freedom would consist of several simultaneous lines

of operation ranging from reconnaissance and information operations to unconventional warfare and

deep air attacks on enemy lines of communication.

American forces would not be heavily committed on

the ground. It was, like Goldilocks' porridge, neither

too much nor too little, but "just right," an imaginative mix of traditional and "transformational" approaches. No one on the United States side wanted

to follow the Russian example, set during years of

bloody and ultimately futile fighting, mostly by conventional forces against guerrilla bands that ended in

Russian defeat in 1989. Nor did they want to follow

earlier American examples of simply firing a few missiles at an elusive enemy.3
2 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

DVIC DN-SD-03-11500

On 11 September 2001, five members ofAl Qaeda hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 shortly after it took off

from Dulles International Airport outside Washington, D.C. Afterfollowing a circuitous route which took them

away and then back toward Washington, they flew the aircraft into the side ofthe Pentagon. The impact destroyedfour ofthefive "rings" in a section ofthe bUilding, killing 64 on board theplane and 125 on the ground.

Exactly what the Marine Corps could or would

contribute to a fight in a land-locked country was not

clear at first, but the MarForPac staff in Hawaii began

to focus far more on CentCom than it normally did,

eventually splitting itself more or less in two, with

one group for the Pacific and another for the Middle

East. The first challenge was to gain and maintain

"situational awareness," jargon in this war for knowing what was going on, and then to develop and

weigh potential courses of action. For example, could

any of the battalion-sized special operations capable

Marine expeditionary units, which were loaded on

ships, spread throughout the world, and combat

ready, be brought to bear? Two suggestions came

from then-Lieutenant General Michael W. Hagee,

who was serving as the commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). He passed the word up

the chain-of-command to CentCom that the Marine

Corps could contribute special operations capable

expeditionary units to a fight in Afghanistan and that

it could stand up a task force for a mission known as

"consequence management. "4.

"A draft of "The Informal History of MarCent" states: "as operations developed, ComUSMarCent was tasked by the Secretary of

Defense, and the chairman [of the] Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander, Central Command to-(1) establish ... C/JTF-CM [and] (2)

support Coalition ... [forces] with two Marine MEUs under the

command of a Marine General Officer ... [while] deploying MarCent headquarters to Bahrain" (USMarCent, "The Informal History

of MarCent," copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico,

VA)

This was certainly in line with the thinking of the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James L.

Jones, Jr., who wanted it known that the Marine

Corps was willing and able to commit a Marine expeditionary brigade to the new contingency. General

Jones was a proponent of the view that a brigade

(which could be made up of two expeditionary units)

was the kind of organization that worked well in joint

and Coalition operations; a brigade of any kind was

a relatively familiar concept to a planner from another Service. 5"

The first suggestion set in motion a chain of events

that led to the creation, under MarCent's operational

control, of the Combined Joint Task Force Consequence Management (C/JTF-CM), which came to be

based at Camp Doha, Kuwait. Commanded and

staffed largely by Marines from I Marine Expeditionary Force augmented by Reserve Marines from I

MEF Augmentation Command Element (I MACE),

C/JTF-CM's unusual mission was to assist local governments in coping with the effects of a nuclear, bi-

"Gen James L. Jones contrasted the utility of a Marine expeditionary brigade with that of a Marine expeditionary force-forward,

which he saw as less useful in the joint/combined arena. The

brigade has a checkered history. It was coming back into favor in

the early part of the 21st century. Gen Anthony C. Zinni also

noted the continuing struggle between the "MEFers," who believe

that the Marine Corps should focus its energies at the force level,

and the "MEBers," who believe the same of the brigade. (Gen Anthony C. Zinni intvw, 7Jan04 [MCHC, Quantico, VAl, hereafter Zinni

intvw)
ological, or chemical (NBC) attack by, for example,

Al Qaeda or Iraq. Its table of organization was

equally unusual, eventually coming to include contingents from a number of allied nations, especially

NnC units from Germany, Slovakia, and the Czech

Republic. Although it was never called to manage the

consequences of an NBC attack during the 18 months

of its formal existence, from October 2001 to May

2003, it could have made an enormous difference

had Kuwait or another Arab ally been attacked and

was a notable experiment.6

Thousands of miles away from Kuwait,

Afghanistan, or Hawaii, the small MarCent office

building in Tampa began to hum with operational intensity-the increasingly more organized and purposeful chaos that characterizes a successful wartime

staff. The deputy commander of MarForPac, Brigadier

General John G. Castellaw, came to spend time on

scene, helping with the interface between that command and CentCom. Other augmentees of various

sorts, including recently retired officers and the categories of reservists known as individual mobilization

augmentees and individual ready reservists, flowed

in."

Only half in jest, some began to refer to MacDill as

"Tampastan." The workday there was now as long as

the workday for Americans in or near Afghanistan,

but it was more complicated in some ways, and there

were still the peacetime responsibilities of home and

family after hours. It was not dangerous like combat,

but it was very stressful, and a few CentCom officers

suffered heart attacks or other forms of burnout. For

Marines there was the additional twist of a complicated "battle rhythm" that spanned numerous time

zones. They often had to repeat the same evolution

many times over. For example, if an event happened

in the Middle East during the day, which was nighttime in Tampa, MarCent officers faced it when they

came to work in the morning, which was still night-

·Some picked up the rhythm more quickly than others. This was

true of the retired officers, some with CentCom experience, and

the individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs), who were trained

for specific wartime jobs, but tended to be less true of the individual ready reservists, who came from a large pool of less active

reservists. Although MarForPac had an IMA detachment, quickly

mobilized to augment its staff to take on the increased responsibilities of two fronts, the small liaison element at MarCent did not.

The Marine Corps' Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team

suggested that the lesson learned here was, if you do not have

your own IMAs you have shaped to your needs, the Marine Corps'

personnel system is unlikely to give you what you want in times

of crisis, and you should not be surprised when that happens.

(U.S. Marine Corps, Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team Summary Report [Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 2003], p. 73,

hereafter MCCDC, OEF Summary Report)

Prelude to War 3

Photo courtesy of U.S. Central Command

An artilleryman by training, Gen Tommy R. Franks,

USA, commanded the u.s. Third Army before being

selectedfor promotion to general and assignment as

Commander in Chief, United States Central Command. Franks succeeded Marine Gen Anthony C.

Zinni to this position on 6July 2000.

time in Hawaii. They would then have to recap the

facts, and their discussions, for MarForPac a few

hours later, near the end of their workday but at the

beginning of MarForPac's. On many issues, they also

had to engage I MEF, which was a constituent part of

MarForPac. Built around 1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Force Service Support

Group, it was the Marine air-ground task force that

was most likely to send Marines to fight in the Middle East. Being located at Camp Pendleton near San

Diego, California, it was in yet another time zone.

There was another small staff at work on contingency plans for Marine operations against the enemy

in Afghanistan, the MarCent coordination element,

commanded by the redoubtable Colonel John B.

Kiser and based at the Naval Support Activity,

Bahrain, a compact facility where the Commander,

U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (NavCent) flew

his flag. To bolster the handful of officers at the coordination element, the Marine Corps created the

designation "Commanding General, MarCent-Forward" for an officer who was already in theater for

the multinational CentCom exercise in Egypt known

as "Bright Star," and who was able to assume some

of the responsibilities of a Service component commander." That officer was Brigadier General James

""BGen Uames N.J Mattis, originally deSignated ComMarCent (Forward)... assumed significant responsibilities as the Marine Service

component commander forward in the A[rea of] O[perations] for

ensuring the proper employment, administration, and sustainment

of Marine Corps Operating Forces in theater." (MCCDC, OEFSummary Report, p. 63)
DVIC DM-SD-07-o6012

4 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

N. Mattis, the commanding general of the 1st Marine

Expeditionary Brigade, the smaller Marine air-ground

task force embedded in I MEF, who was tasked

briefly with commanding C/]TF-CM but soon shifted

his focus to Bahrain and Afghanistan.7

A historian could follow the course of who was in

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom by

answering the question, where is General Mattis?

Born in Richmond, Washington, and educated at Central Washington State College, Mattis was commissioned on 1 January 1972. In 2001 he was a trim

51-years-old. Especially when wearing his reading

glasses, he looked like a military intellectual, which

would not have been far from the mark. But he was

also a field Marine par excellence. Even in a Corps of

energetic men and women with a bias for action, to

say nothing of their Single-minded devotion to their

profession, he stood almost in a class by himself.

General Mattis' official biography was characteristically brief; it did not contain any personal data, only

a list of the military schools he had attended and the

A native ofWashington state, MajGen James N. Mattis commanded the 1stMarine Expeditionary Brigade

and Task Force 58 dUring Operation EndUring Freedom in Afghanistan before assuming command of

the 1stMarine Division. As commander ofTask Force

58, he became the first Marine to command a naval

task force in combat.

commands he had held, along with the obligatory official photograph, without the glasses. He had been

a lifelong student of war, known for his voracious

but discriminating appetite for the printed word. He

believed "we face NOTHING [emphasis in original]

new under the sun." It followed that to understand a

problem; the approach he recommended was to

study its history. For example, during Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, when he had commanded an

infantry battalion, he had read Bruce Catton's Grant

Takes Command, studying the need for commanders

to get along, as well as books by Erwin Rommel and

Bernard Law Montgomery, presumably to learn about

desert warfare.s On one occasion, General Mattis described himself as a student of "Sun Zinni," a tonguein-cheek reference to another "one of them field

Marines that reads," the iconoclastic General Anthony

C. Zinni, who had retired in 2000 after serving as the

commander-in-chief at CentCom and had always

stressed the need to understand the cultural dimension of war. General Mattis could relate well to enlisted Marines and to senior Pentagon officials,

equally comfortable in the roles of salty platoon commander and, less salty, policy maker. Some have described General Mattis as more demanding than most

commanders and slow to warm to officers who were

not on his team, but also as willing to "go to hell and

back" for his Marines.9 He liked to say that the secret

of success was "brilliance in the basics." There can be

no question that that is what he demanded of his

Marines, but there was nothing basic about his ability to think outside the box.

Within days of his arrival in Bahrain on 27 October, General Mattis was shaping plans for amphibious

raids into Afghanistan, in effect following up on General Hagee and General]ones' readiness to use a Marine expeditionary unit or, better yet, a Marine

expeditionary brigade in that country. Mattis reported

to Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, USN, the commander of NavCent, which included the Marines then

afloat in theater. Admiral Moore was charged with responsibilities ranging from deployment and sustainment to warfighting, which meant he was able to

send forces into combat. Moore has been described

as an unusually aggressive officer, interested in finding ways to take the fight to the enemy; he and General Mattis had no trouble understanding each other.

A fellow innovator, Admiral Moore took the unusual

step of designating Mattis as the sale commander for

the ad hoc Task Force 58, which made him "the first

Marine to command a naval task force in wartime."IO

General Mattis was now serving both as ComMarCent-Forward and as commander of a task force
Prelude to War 5

DVIC DM-SD-OG-03033

A Marine from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) carries a full combat load,

including an FNMI 7.62mm M240 machine gun, while moving into a security position after seizing Forward

Operating Base Rhino in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

preparing for combat. In accordance with his request,

it would be designated Task Force "Chaos" after the

effect he wanted to have on the enemy, and he himself would use the call sign "Chaos" for the next two

years.1

Under the control of NavCent were the two amphibious ready groups (ARGs) in theater. Each carried a Marine expeditionary unit, special operations

capable, built around a battalion landing team of infantry, a helicopter squadron, and a combat service

support element. The two units were the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

(15th MEU(SOC)), in the ARG built around the USS

Pelelieu (LHA 5), and the 26th MEU(SOC), in the ARG

built around the USS Bataan (LHD 5). Together they

formed Task Force 58. Admiral Moore made it clear

he did not want Task Force 58 to have a large staff,

like some Marine expeditionary brigades that had literally hundreds of Marines and sailors on their

books. This was fine with Mattis, who liked to work

with a very small staff of trusted individuals. The upshot was that the staff stayed small, never exceeding

40 officers and men. It focused on broad-brush planning, while the Marine expeditionary units relied on

their own staffs for the detailed planning and conduct of operations. A sensible corollary was the decision not to "composite" the two expeditionary

units, that is, to meld them into one force under one

staff, but to keep them intact and to create a supported/supporting relationship between them

whereby one expeditionary unit would take the lead

for a time, and then the other. In the words of the

Task Force 58's command chronology: "While one

MEU executed a mission, the second MEU. . . [clould

conduct detailed planning for the follow-on mission."12

By 3 November, General Mauls had briefed Admiral Moore on his concept of operations. The admiral provided additional guidance, telling the

Marines he wanted them to defeat Taliban and Al

Qaeda forces. Moore thought the Marines would

make a difference, that a "squad of Marines running

through Kandahar would turn the tide."3 But soon

the mission changed from conducting raids to seiz-

*The combat assessment team surmised that this "staff lite"

arrangement worked because it included the two traditional Marine expeditionary unit staffs; "staff lite" by itself might not have

been as successful. (MCCDC, OEFSunnnary Report, p. 64)
6 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

ing a forward operating base in order to attack lines allies had driven the Taliban's ragtag forces from

of communication and generally support Coalition most of the country's larger cities, including the capoperations.14 ital, Kabul, and Task Force 58 was ready to launch.

By the middle of November, the Coalition's Afghan On 25 November, traveling some 400 nautical miles