OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

July 27, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

SUBJECT: Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction 

 Efforts (SIGIR-08-020) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. The report summarizes the key 

recurring management issues identified in many of the 121 audit reports issued during the 

existence of the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General (CPA-IG) and its successor 

agency, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). More specifically, it 

summarizes key issues from these reports, and actions that might be considered to help avert 

similar situations in any future contingencies. The audits were performed in accordance with the 

statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended which mandates the conduct of 

audits relating to the treatment, handling, and expenditure of funds by the CPA or its successor 

entities in Iraq reconstruction, and of the programs, operations, and contracts carried out in using 

Iraq reconstruction funds. This review was conducted as project 8004. 

For more information on this report, please contact Mr. Glenn Furbish, Deputy Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits, at (703) 428-1058 or via email at glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: See Distribution 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 1 

Implementing Reconstruction Programs in an Unstable Security 

Environment 4 

Impact of Not Having an Integrated Management Structure 

To Provide Clear Lines of Authority on Program Coordination 

and Successful Delivery of Projects 8 

Importance of Anticipating Staffing Needs and Reducing 

Staff Turnover 12 

Working Closely with Host Governments Is Essential to the 

Long- Term Success of U.S. Investments in Reconstruction Projects 15 

Conclusions 17 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 20 

B. Audit Reports Issued Since Inception through July 2008 22 

C. Acronyms 28 

D. Audit Team Members 29 

Management Comments 

U.S. Embassy-Iraq 30 
Key Recurring Management Issues Identified In 

Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts 

SIGIR-08-020 July 27, 2008

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

May 2003 marked the end of U.S. combat operations to defeat Saddam Hussein’s military forces 

and the beginning of U.S. efforts to provide reconstruction assistance to Iraq. The Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA) was created as the interim managing body for governance and 

reconstruction activities. The U.S. Congress initially appropriated about $3.45 billion for 

initiatives to reconstruct Iraq; of this amount, $2.475 billion was provided by Public Law 108-11 

to establish the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). In November 2003, the Congress 

passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction 

of Iraq and Afghanistan (Public Law 108-106). The act provided additional funding for 

reconstruction activities and also created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Inspector 

General, which became the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). 

Since the initial congressional appropriation, other appropriated funds have financed a broad 

array of reconstruction activities—from building hospitals to improving the capacity of the Iraqi 

ministries to govern, manage their finances, and maintain and sustain U.S. reconstruction 

projects. As of July 2008, the U.S. Congress had appropriated approximately $50 billion for all 

relief and reconstruction activities. 

As of July 2008, SIGIR and its predecessor have issued 122 audit reports. SIGIR has reported 

on the management and implementation of almost every aspect of reconstruction, including 

building projects, anticorruption programs, and the development of a financial management 

information system to support ministry decision-making. A number of these reports have 

identified important lessons learned to apply to future reconstruction efforts and 

recommendations to improve ongoing activities. To date, SIGIR has also issued three special 

reports presenting lessons learned in human capital management, contracting and procurement, 

and program management. 

After five years of reconstruction and during a critical year in which many completed 

reconstruction projects will be transferred to the Government of Iraq (GOI), SIGIR evaluated its 

overall body of audit work to identify additional steps to consider that would be useful to the 

Executive Branch and the Congress for managing reconstruction activities. Therefore, this report 

looks across the totality of SIGIR audit reports and identifies the broad, key, recurring 

management issues that—if better understood—may help guide improvements in the ongoing 

Iraq reconstruction efforts. Further, without adequate advance preparation to address them, these 

issues could continue to be problems if the U.S. government becomes involved in similar 

reconstruction efforts in the future. 

i
Results 

SIGIR identified four broad recurring issues that were the key contributing causes to the 

deficiencies noted in the body of SIGIR’s audit work: 

• The need to better understand the problems associated with implementing reconstruction 

programs in an unstable security environment. 

• The impact of not having an integrated management structure to provide clear lines of 

authority on program coordination and successful delivery of projects. 

• The importance of anticipating staffing needs and reducing staff turnover. 

• Recognition of how essential working closely with host governments is to the long-term 

success of U.S. investments in reconstruction projects. 

Understanding these issues is critical to avoid repeating them in the future, under similar 

contingencies. Their prevalence in Iraq contributed significantly to reduced program 

effectiveness and increased the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. The following further 

illustrates issues identified in SIGIR’s work. 

Security 

The U.S. government did not fully anticipate or plan for working in the unstable security 

environment that faced U.S. managers when reconstruction began in Iraq. Security issues have 

continuously permeated and hampered reconstruction efforts across much of Iraq. From the 

beginning of reconstruction in 2003, U.S. agencies have incurred high costs for security—

spending billions of dollars for protection—which has diverted funds from reconstruction 

projects. 

The unstable security environment had other consequences as well, including the sabotage of 

basic oil and electric infrastructure while the United States was investing to improve the capacity 

of these industries. SIGIR reported that because of poor security $560 million was wasted 

resulting from costly repairs to these facilities. In addition, SIGIR reported at one point that 

contractors spent an average of almost 12.5% of their reconstruction contract dollars for security. 

In one case, SIGIR found that 53% of the expenditures to create a financial management 

information system for GOI were reportedly used for security. SIGIR reports have also 

identified other consequences of poor security. For example, SIGIR found many instances in 

which the threat of violence prevented U.S. officials from performing quality assurance functions 

and hampered the work of some Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It was not always clear why 

the government chose to continue a project that was being significantly disrupted by security 

problems. Nor was it clear who was responsible for the decision to continue, and what 

information was available to support the decision. SIGIR believes that a more deliberate and 

documented process for supporting the government’s decisions is needed. 

Organizational Structure and Processes 

Throughout Iraq reconstruction, poor interagency coordination and frequently changing, 

fragmented organizational structures contributed to delays, increased costs, terminated projects, 

and completed projects that did not meet program goals. The Department of State, Department 

ii
of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development used their own management 

structures and decision-making processes. Some of these problems were made worse because 

the U.S. government changed its organizational structures and shifted program responsibility to 

other organizations. For example, SIGIR reported in April 2006 that CPA had spent more than 

$104.1 million on programs to secure Iraqi oil and electrical infrastructure but the U.S. had 

difficulty accomplishing this goal for two reasons. First, three organizations were responsible 

for program implementation, but none was clearly in charge. Second, changes to the program 

structure during implementation resulted in changed priorities and program terminations. In 

another example, multiple agencies are currently implementing programs in ministerial capacity 

development, economic development, anticorruption, and asset transfer. In each area, agencies 

implement their own programs—often with little prioritization of projects or cross-agency 

planning. Without a carefully integrated set of programs to support the transfer of these assets, 

the risk that the U.S. investment will be wasted is very high, as SIGIR has reported many times. 

Staffing Concerns 

Problems in U.S. program and project management were exacerbated by two factors: 

• not having the right number of people with the right skills to manage the contracting and 

program management workload 

• the rapid turnover of personnel, which resulted in the loss of institutional knowledge 

The U.S. government did not come prepared to manage this large construction workload, which 

led to weak oversight of project management and inadequate quality assurance of projects. In a 

$1.8 billion contract, for example, USAID did not have enough personnel to oversee construction 

progress, so they contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to do the job. 

Even USACE did not have the skilled people to conduct inspections of the quality of contractor 

construction against contract specifications. At the mid-point of contract execution, both 

organizations were staffed at only about half of their planned numbers. This lack of quality 

assurance raises the risk that funds will be wasted performing costly rework. 

Working with Host Governments 

Finally, SIGIR work shows that U.S. agencies often made many decisions about investments 

without ascertaining Iraqi needs or obtaining the views and buy-in of Iraqi officials. For 

example, early in the reconstruction program, the CPA decided that the Iraqi ministries needed a 

financial management information system, but U.S. planners did not identify Iraqi ministry user 

requirements. The program stopped when the contractor’s project leader was kidnapped. The 

program was suspended at that time—largely because of a lack of support from GOI officials. In 

January 2008, USAID officials and the GOI reached agreement to resume implementation of the 

system. In another example, managers of the CERP program are concluding that projects are 

more successful when Iraqi ministries have been involved throughout the lifecycle of the project. 

Of the projects reviewed in SIGIR audits, there is a clear correlation between the inability of the 

U.S. to transfer control of projects, and the lack of Iraqi input in project selection or execution. 

When a host nation participates and buys in to reconstruction projects from their inception, 

projects are more likely to be successfully transferred and maintained. Collectively, these 

problems have placed the attainment of many U.S. reconstruction goals at risk. 

iii
Steps For The Government To Consider 

SIGIR reports have highlighted many lessons learned from specific projects and programs that 

should be considered in planning reconstruction efforts to help reduce the extent of fraud, waste, 

and abuse while emphasizing program success. Actions to address the broader recurring 

management issues identified in this report would also be important to consider. Depending on 

the facts and circumstances of a contingency operation, a number of steps may be needed in key 

areas to avoid a repetition of the problems identified in this report, including: 

Security 

• Develop plans to secure basic infrastructure—such as oil, gas, and water—until the 

capabilities of the host government can be developed. 

• Develop guidance on project risk for managers to assess the merits of funding a project 

faced with security threats. 

• Evaluate the practicality of proceeding quickly with large-scale construction projects 

when the risk of sabotage may divert funds from construction to security and threaten the 

effectiveness of the investment. 

• Prepare a comprehensive and independent government estimate for high-risk construction 

projects that accurately identifies the costs associated with the project—particularly those 

costs associated with the security risk. This information should be a mandatory part of 

the contract file. 

• Proceed with the project only when senior management specifically determines that 

strategic objectives outweigh the risks of project failure if government oversight and 

surveillance activities are impeded to any significant degree by security concerns. 

Organizational Structures and Processes 

• Clearly define the management roles, responsibilities, authority and accountability for 

program decision-making and ensure management continuity. 

• Develop an integrated organizational structure for contingency reconstruction efforts that 

clearly recognizes the complicated interrelationships between program elements and the 

success of U.S. program goals. When multiple agencies are participating, the Secretary 

of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of USAID, and other agencies as applicable 

should delineate which lead agency will be in charge of each program element and which 

agency will be in charge of the overall management and execution of programs. 

• Frame an organizational structure that can withstand an extended duration, if needed, to 

minimize the resulting disruptions and loss of management continuity. An assessment 

may be appropriate to understand the reasons for the many organizational changes 

associated with reconstruction efforts and identify actions that may be taken to reduce 

them in a future contingency operation. 

• Ensure management controls over the expenditure of U.S. funds by requiring integrated 

financial management information systems to support managerial decision-making and to 

provide the Congress with better information about how U.S. funds are being spent. 

iv
v

• Require that all agencies spending reconstruction monies from any source provide 

agreed-on contracting information into a single management information system. 

Staffing Concerns 

• Develop criteria for determining staffing needs so that agencies start with the right people 

and the right skills. 

• Take steps that contain high staff turnover to the extent practical and implement 

processes to ensure appropriate transfer of program knowledge when turnovers do occur 

to better ensure program continuity. This is another area where a more detailed 

assessment of personnel turnovers in advance of a contingency may be needed to more 

effectively deal with this issue. 

Working with Host Governments 

• At the outset of reconstruction efforts, implement procedures that enable close 

coordination with the host government to help ensure that reconstruction projects are 

consistent with needs and to maximize buy-in resulting in acceptance and maintenance of 

donor-funded projects. 

• Obtain initial project buy-in from and systematically work with host-government officials 

through construction and preparations for transfer to the host government. 

SIGIR presents these steps as actions that may be needed or considered—not as specific 

recommendations. Currently, SIGIR is completing a more comprehensive report on the history 

and evolution of planning for and management of Iraq reconstruction, which will be issued later 

this year. The report will provide a number of specific recommendations related to planning for 

and implementing reconstruction activities in a contingency environment. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

The U.S. Ambassador, Iraq, in commenting on a draft of this report, expressed agreement with 

the issues identified in the report and steps to be considered for the future to avoid repetition of 

the problems identified. The Ambassador noted, as did the SIGIR report, the impact of an 

unstable security environment on reconstruction project management. At the same time he 

expressed concern about the absence of information in the report concerning limitations in the 

capacity of Iraqi governmental institutions to deal with all aspects of project planning and 

execution and security; and a lack of coverage of steps the U.S. government has taken to improve 

interagency coordination and deal with the transfer of completed reconstruction projects to the 

GOI. Although this report does not address GOI capacity issues in-depth, it does address 

challenges related to asset transfer issues, some of which SIGIR recognizes as being capacityrelated, as well as the need for improved coordination among all affected parties. SIGIR has 

reported separately on capacity building and asset transfer issues and plans additional reporting 

in the future on steps being taken in these areas. The Ambassador’s comments are included in 

their entirety at the end of this report. 
Introduction 

May 2003 marked the end of U.S. combat operations that were designed to defeat Saddam 

Hussein’s military. It also marked the beginning of U.S. efforts to manage the reconstruction of 

Iraq. The U.S. Congress initially appropriated about $3.34 billion for initiatives to reconstruct 

Iraq. Of this amount, $2.475 billion was provided under Public Law 108-11 to establish the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA) was created to provide temporary governance of Iraq and to oversee reconstruction 

efforts, including the expenditure of U.S.-appropriated and Iraqi funds. 

To support the evolving U.S. mission in Iraq, the U.S. Congress appropriated an additional $18.4 

billion in IRRF funds in November 2003 in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 

Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan (Public Law 108-106). This 

legislation also created the CPA Inspector General. Upon dissolving the CPA and the 

establishment of the U.S. Mission to Iraq, the CPA Inspector General duties were reauthorized 

through the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 108-375)1

 to continue as 

the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). Much of SIGIR’s work to date 

has focused on construction projects funded through IRRF, based on its legislative authority. 

Recent legislation has broadened SIGIR’s oversight responsibilities and it now includes the Iraq 

Security Forces Fund (ISFF), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) (as it relates to Iraq), the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund, and other funds across multiple 

years of appropriations that support reconstruction activities in Iraq. It should be noted that 

reconstruction includes construction projects such as building hospitals, but it also includes other 

activities such as anticorruption, governance, economic development, and asset transfer 

activities. To date, SIGIR has issued 122 reports covering projects and programs involving Iraq 

reconstruction. 

Since the early days of the CPA, the United States has engaged in a long-term effort to stabilize 

and reconstruct basic infrastructures throughout Iraq. Very early in this effort, the United States 

determined that the infrastructure of basic services such as electricity, water, and sanitation was 

badly aging and poorly maintained. Compounding this situation was and still is an Iraqi 

government that has a limited capacity to manage its budgets and translate those budgets into the 

delivery of essential services and government functions such as electricity, water, sanitation, 

police and military forces. 

As of July 2008, the U.S. Congress had appropriated approximately $50 billion for all relief and 

reconstruction activities. Of this amount, $46.455 billion went to four accounts, as shown in 

Table 1. 

 

1

 Title III, Section 3001 of Public Law 108-375 authorizes the creation of the CPA Inspector General. 

1
Table 1—Appropriated Funds 

Fund Name Fund Acronym 

Appropriation 

(Billions)

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund IRRF $20.86

Iraq Security Force Fund ISFF $17.94

Economic Support Fund ESF $ 3.74

Commander’s Emergency Response Program CERP $ 3.49

Other Funding $ 4.43

Total $50.46

Source: SIGIR Quarterly Report, July 2008, 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction fund was established in November 2003, under Public Law 

108-106 to fund Iraq reconstruction requirements that had been identified by the Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA) during the summer and fall of 2003. The CPA identified thousands 

of projects within various infrastructure sectors in Iraq, such as electricity, water, oil, health care, 

transportation, and education. IRRF funding covers both construction projects and nonconstruction requirements. Non-construction requirements include equipment, supplies, training, 

and materials to support the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure. 

Iraq Security Forces Fund 

The Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) was originally established in May 2005 under Public Law 

109-13 to allow the Commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) to fund the development of Iraqi security forces.2 This fund is spent on training, 

equipping, and sustaining these forces. It also supports infrastructure projects for Iraqi troops.

Economic Support Fund 

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act. This act 

recognizes that under special economic, political, or security conditions, the President may 

furnish assistance to countries and organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may 

determine, to promote economic or political stability. ESF funds for Iraq are justified based on a 

need to stabilize strategic Iraqi cities through rehabilitation of community infrastructure, job 

training and vocational education, youth programs, and micro-loans. Among other things, the 

ESF fund provides resources to support the war on terror, help countries provide basic education 

and health services to their population, aid countries in their transition to democracy, and finance 

economic stabilization programs. 

 

2 The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act For Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief for 2005 originally funded 

ISFF. Subsequent acts have continued to increase funding for training of Iraqi security forces.

2
Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

In June 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority authorized the operation of the CERP3 which 

was designed to give commanders in the field the ability to respond to urgent humanitarian relief 

and reconstruction needs in their areas of responsibility. These commanders could execute a 

variety of non-construction and construction activities that would immediately assist the local 

population. Projects funded through the program were intended for small-scale, urgent 

humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects for the immediate requirements of relatively lowcost procurements. Projects eligible for funding under CERP included civic cleanup, education, 

electricity, health care, and food. 

Objectives 

After five years of reconstruction and during a critical year for the transfer of many completed 

reconstruction projects, SIGIR decided to evaluate its overall body of audit work seeking to 

identify additional lessons learned believing it would be useful to the Executive Branch and the 

Congress. Therefore, SIGIR looked across the totality of its audit reports and identifies the 

broad key recurring management issues that, without adequate advance preparation to address 

them, could be problematic should the U.S. government become involved in similar 

reconstruction efforts in the future. This effort is derived from SIGIR audit work completed 

through July 2008. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For a listing of all prior 

SIGIR reports see Appendix B. For a list of acronyms used in this report see Appendix C. For a 

list of audit team members, see Appendix D. 

 

3 Congress passed the first appropriation for CERP as part of Public Law 108-106, the “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 

Defense and for the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004.” Section 1110 of Pl. 108-106 made $180 million available for CERP in Iraq.

3
Implementing Reconstruction Programs in an 

Unstable Security Environment 

The United States assumed that reconstruction would take place in a relatively stable 

environment with little threat from insurgents and other groups. This assumption proved wrong. 

The costs and consequences of this situation were not clearly understood, nor is there a clear 

understanding today about the precise impact on costs and project attainment associated with 

doing business in an unsecure environment. However, SIGIR believes it is significant based on 

individual project examples. SIGIR audit reports provide some indications of the impact of poor 

security on reconstruction performance from the beginning of reconstruction activities to current 

initiatives. The lack of security, for example, resulted in a higher risk of sabotage to critical Iraqi 

infrastructures such as oil and electrical systems, significantly increased reconstruction costs, and 

created impediments to effective construction and project management. SIGIR reports for 

example, identified the following specific major consequences of the poor security: 

• Over $104.1 million was spent in an unsuccessful attempt to train Iraqi security forces to 

protect critical infrastructures.4

• The United States had to adjust its priorities and reallocate over $1.78 billion in IRRF 

reconstruction funds to provide for security and law enforcement programs.5

• About $560 million was wasted because construction efforts were sabotaged and had to 

be rebuilt and were delayed.6

• Government officials were precluded from performing their quality control functions.7

• Provincial Reconstruction Teams were often unable to have face-to-face contacts with 

local officials, a critical objective of the program.8

 

4 Review of Task Force Shield Programs, SIGIR-06-009, April 28, 2006. 5 Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Activities, SIGIR-05-029. 6 Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Activities, SIGIR-05-029. 7 Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects, SIGIR-06-011, April 29, 2006. 

8 Status of The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 2006. 

4
The Unstable Security Environment Led to Concerns That Critical 

Infrastructure Was Vulnerable to Sabotage 

With an unstable security environment in Iraq, the CPA recognized that part of the cost of 

reconstruction would include protecting Iraq’s oil production capabilities and their electrical grid 

from sabotage. A CPA Infrastructure Security Working Group concluded that Iraq could not 

prosper without the uninterrupted export of oil and the reliable delivery of electricity. In April 

2006, SIGIR reported that this conclusion led to an effort to train security forces to protect these 

assets; that effort started in September 2003 unfortunately proved difficult. Protecting these 

assets was also important because the United States had planned to spend over $7 billion to 

improve the capacities of both the oil and electric sectors. The CPA established the coalition 

Joint Task Force-Shield with the mission of training and equipping over 20,000 guards; 14,400 

for the Oil Ministry and 6,000 for the Ministry of Electricity. Attempting to protect this 

infrastructure was no small feat, since there were approximately 340 key installations, 7,000 

kilometers of oil pipelines, and 14,000 kilometers of electricity transmission lines. SIGIR 

determined that the United States had spent about $104 million as of September 2004 to improve 

Iraq’s capability to protect its oil and electric infrastructure. However, when SIGIR reviewed the 

issue in the January to April 2006 timeframe, after training about 11,400 guards, there was little 

information to determine if the guards that were trained were doing their job of protecting this 

vital infrastructure. The program was subsequently discontinued. 

The Unstable Security Environment Increased Costs and Degraded 

Efforts to Supervise and Ensure Quality Control Over Construction 

Projects 

The Iraq insurgency greatly affected the U.S. reconstruction efforts, as has been well 

documented in numerous SIGIR reports. SIGIR reported in January 2006 that from a strategic 

standpoint, increased spending for security needs and strategy changes brought about by the 

changing environment in Iraq were major contributors to a significant shift in the U.S. 

reconstruction strategy. Altogether, SIGIR reported in 2006 that approximately $1.78 billion had 

been moved from infrastructure construction and renovation projects, principally from the water 

and electricity sectors, into security and law enforcement projects to address security issues.9

As a result of the insurgency, hundreds of planned projects intended to benefit the Iraqi people 

were not provided. Our reports have similarly identified the large-scale effects security issues 

have had on reconstruction activities at the individual personnel level. Since 2003, 1,181 death 

claims for civilian contractors have been filed with the Department of Labor, and thousands 

more contractors have been injured.10 In addition, according to a May 2005 State Department 

(DoS) report, of $9 billion allocated for construction activities, approximately $2 billion, or 22% 

of the total, had been forecast as attributable to costs associated with security. Of this $2 billion, 

direct security costs were estimated at $1.46 billion and an additional $560 million was attributed 

 

9 Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities, SIGIR-05-029, January 26, 2006. 10 Casualty figure as of April 2008. 

5
to the rework of damaged facilities, replacement of damaged materials, and construction delays. 

Put another way, $560 million was wasted because of poor security.11

SIGIR reported on security costs associated with IRRF funded reconstruction projects. We 

obtained data on security costs incurred from nine major contractors being paid with IRRF funds. 

As of August or September 2006 (each contractor provided its most current data as of one of 

these months), these contractors reported that security costs as a percentage of the total contract 

price ran between 7.6% and 16.7%. The average percentage of security costs to total costs was 

12.5% for all contractors. Contract expenditures total about $4.6 billion of which about $510.8 

million was paid for security.12 

In one of the most dramatic examples of very large security costs as a percentage of total costs 

was the USAID contract to develop a financial management information system for Iraqi 

ministries. As of May 2007, the contractor cost estimate was $22.1 million related to the Iraqi 

Financial Management Information System. Under the contract terms, the prime contractor was 

not required to report a cost breakdown for its billed costs. SIGIR asked USAID for a cost 

breakdown, but it gave us the contractor’s estimate instead. According to the contractor’s 

estimate, over $11.6 million, or 53% of the total costs were for security. Finally, SIGIR reported 

that in the worst case scenario, the contract project manager who was leading the team to 

develop the Iraqi Financial Management Information System and his security team were 

kidnapped. The entire project was halted for some time as a result.13

Despite this adverse security environment, the government adopted a high-risk strategy and 

pushed forward with its relief and reconstruction activities and, as discussed above, experienced 

some level of project failure and waste. While government officials were clearly aware of the 

risk, SIGIR’s audit work found little guidance on how project managers were to factor security 

risk into their project planning. Consequently, it was often difficult to understand why the risks 

associated with some of the projects were accepted. For example, in a report on projects in the 

security and justice sector, SIGIR identified security as a significant issue associated with a 

project to build a prison facility in Kahn Bani Sa’ad.14 The prison was originally scheduled to be 

built in two years, but after two years and one month the contract was terminated. According to 

the contractor, security issues significantly complicated the project. The project was continued 

with another contractor, but after an additional year of effort the project was abandoned. A total 

of $40 million was disbursed on this project. What is not clear from the contract file, however, is 

an understanding of why the government chose to continue this project, who was responsible for 

the decision to continue, and what information was available to support the decision. At this 

point, the prison is not complete and $40 million has been wasted unless the U.S. can convince 

the Iraqi government to take possession of a partially completed facility. Given that $40 million 

was disbursed on this project, SIGIR believes that a more deliberate and documented process for 

supporting the government’s decisions was needed.15

 

11 Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities, SIGIR-05-029, January 26, 2006. 12 Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractor’s Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund contracting Activities, SIGIR-06-042, 

January 30, 2007. 

13 Efforts to Implement A Financial Management Information System in Iraq, SIGIR-08-007, January 25, 2008. 14 Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc., SIGIR 08-019, July 2008. 15 Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract With Parsons Delaware, Inc., SIGIR-08-019, July 2008. 

6
Further, this security environment made site visits for inspections of progress and quality 

difficult. It has also created problems in defining project requirements and in some cases 

prevented project site selection. For example, SIGIR found that the Corps of Engineers was 

limited in its ability to conduct regular and frequent site visits because of security concerns and 

limited availability of personnel security detail assets. Further, many of the construction projects 

were in restricted areas where U.S. government personnel were either not allowed or had limited 

access.16 

Security has been a significant problem in implementing the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

(PRT) program. This program was and is important because it provides grassroots support in the 

development of local provincial governments’ abilities to govern, increase security and rule of 

law, and promote political and economic development, among other objectives. SIGIR found 

that because of security concerns, face-to-face meetings between provincial government officials 

and PRT personnel were often limited and, in some cases did not occur at all.17 The security 

challenges were limiting the teaching, coaching, and mentoring that form the core of the PRT 

capacity-development mission. PRT members are at particular risk when traveling to and from 

their engagements with their Iraqi counterparts, as are provincial government officials and local 

Iraqi staff working with the PRT. All are equally at risk if they are identified as cooperating with 

the U.S. government. Although no one was responsible for recording and reporting security 

incidents, security officials with the U.S. Embassy expressed concern for the overall physical 

safety of unarmed civilians and cautioned that the security situation could deteriorate as coalition 

forces withdraw and turn over areas to the Iraqi government. 

 

16 Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects, SIGIR-06-011, April 29, 2006. 17 Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 2006.

7
Impact of Not Having an Integrated Management 

Structure To Provide Clear Lines of Authority on 

Program Coordination and Successful Delivery of 

Projects 

The U.S. government was not efficiently organized to accomplish and manage its reconstruction 

programs in Iraq. From the beginning of reconstruction activities to the present, fragmented 

organizational structures and management information systems have resulted in poor interagency 

coordination, management oversight, and program implementation. These problems contributed 

to the failure of projects and/or the failure to meet program goals and therefore, in a number of 

cases, have led to wasteful expenditures. Since 2004, SIGIR reports have highlighted many of 

these problems and recommended corrective actions. 

At least five major U. S. contracting and program management organizations have managed 

reconstruction programs within Iraq. The Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development each brought their own management, contracting structures, 

management information systems, and decision-making processes to the reconstruction effort. 

Within the Department of Defense, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and the 

Army Corps of Engineers/Gulf Region have independent contracting authority. In addition, the 

Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

also have program management responsibilities. SIGIR found that there has been a lack of 

coordination and overlap of leadership between and among these organizations. These problems 

were sometimes exacerbated as the U.S. government periodically changed its organizational 

structures and shifted program responsibility to other organizations. The lack of an integrated 

management information system left managers and the Congress with fragmented data on how 

funds were being spent. At the direction of the Congress, a limited system that tracked IRRF 

expenditures, the Iraq Reconstruction Management System, was developed. It has since been 

expanded to also track the expenditure of funds from ISFF, ESF, and CERP. 

Early Attempts at Securing Iraqi Infrastructure Were Impeded in 

Large Part Because of Fragmented U.S. Agency Organizational 

Responsibilities 

At the beginning of reconstruction activities, the CPA spent over $104.1 million on priority 

programs to secure Iraqi oil and electrical infrastructure but had difficulty accomplishing its goal. 

The program was impeded primarily because three organizations were responsible for program 

implementation but none was clearly in charge, and changes made to the program structure 

during implementation resulted in changed priorities and program terminations.18 The original 

contract and management responsibility belonged to the CPA, whose senior oil advisor had 

contractual responsibility. The Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), which reported to the 

Central Command, was responsible for security in general and was expected to integrate oil 

 

18 Review of Task Force Shield Programs, SIGIR-06-009, April 28, 2006. 

8
security forces into the overall force. Finally, Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil, a Corps of Engineers 

organization, was tasked with responsibility to refurbish the Iraqi oil infrastructure and provide 

operational supervision of security forces. Changes to organizational responsibilities 

complicated fragmented organizational issues. 

The CPA was disbanded in June 2004 and its responsibilities were transferred to the U.S. 

Mission Iraq. A new but temporary organization called the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office (IRMO) was created and continued to function within the Mission. The office’s function 

was to facilitate the transition to a democratically elected Iraq, and this included playing a key 

role in deciding not to continue the security forces project. Also, CJTF-7 was replaced by the 

Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), thus leaving only one of the original organizations with 

responsibility for this effort intact. Responsibility for this program was again moved from MNFI to the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) in April 2005, at which time the program was 

effectively disbanded.19 

Current Asset Transfer and Anticorruption Programs are at High 

Risk of Waste Because they Lack Program Management 

Accountability, Centralized Leadership, and Authority 

Multiple agencies implement ministerial capacity development, anticorruption, economic 

development, and asset transfer programs. These programs should be closely interconnected and 

coordinated. However, if U.S. capacity development, anticorruption, and asset transfer programs 

fail, reconstruction projects worth billions are at a high risk of being wasted. In each area, SIGIR 

found that agencies implement their own programs, and there is little prioritization of projects or 

overall planning among the agencies. Individual ministerial capacity development programs, for 

example, are managed by the State Department through the U.S. Mission, USAID, the U.S. 

Army Corps or the Multinational National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). 

Most of these programs have been directed by individual agencies rather than being integrated 

into an overarching U.S. government capacity-building plan or program that defines roles and 

responsibilities, goals, objectives, and milestones. One critical function of capacity-development 

is preparing the Iraqis to accept and maintain transferred U.S. reconstruction assets, a function 

which has faced major challenges.20

SIGIR noted in July 2006 that U. S. anticorruption programs were being implemented by the 

Department of Justice, USAID, the Department of the Treasury, MNF-I, and MNSTC-I. SIGIR 

reports have noted repeatedly that anticorruption activities lack coordination and leadership.21

SIGIR has noted that the programs lack focus and no inventory of anticorruption activities has 

been done.22 More specifically, SIGIR found that the Embassy lacked a comprehensive, 

integrated plan that tied anticorruption activities to an overall U.S. Mission-Iraq strategy and a 

baseline to measure progress. Nevertheless, SIGIR found in its January 2008 report that the U.S. 

 

19 Ibid. 20 Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR-06-017. Also see Transferring Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq, SIGIR-07-004. 21 Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program, SIGIR-06-021, July 28, 2006. 22 Status of U.S. anticorruption Efforts in Iraq, SIGIR-07-007, July 24, 2007. 

9
Mission had developed an anticorruption plan that, if implemented appropriately, would address 

all SIGIR recommendations.23 

The management of the asset transfer process is fragmented among four organizations. Through 

IRMO, MNSTC-I, Corps of Engineers, and USAID, the State Department was responsible for 

transferring to the Iraqi government assets that were built by their respective organizations.24 In 

May 2007, a Presidential Executive Order established another new but temporary U.S. mission 

organization called the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) as a successor organization to 

IRMO.25 According to the Executive Order, ITAO was responsible for the coordination, 

oversight, and reporting concerning remaining IRRF monies. This gave the office oversight of 

about $6 billion in assets that were ready for transfer. However, monies from three other 

appropriated funds have produced $2.2 billion in assets that are also ready for transfer to the 

Iraqis. SIGIR reported that ITAO has taken some steps to improve the asset transfer process by 

developing and getting agreement to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with each agency 

as to the general process for asset transfers. Under this agreement, each agency will provide the 

Iraqi government with applicable designs, drawings, operation and maintenance manuals, and 

warranty information. However, SIGIR found that agencies are still stovepiped and implement 

individual policies and procedures that may not comply with even the general guidance in the 

agreement. A significant problem has been what is called the unilateral transfer of assets. This 

happens when the Iraqis will not accept or acknowledge the asset. For example, SIGIR found 

that MNSTC-I unilaterally transferred 388 projects valued at $1 billion as of December 2007 to 

the GOI. Some capacity development programs have targeted appropriate Iraqi officials to be 

trained in sustaining the assets but again the activities are fragmented among multiple agencies 

without overarching strategy or leadership. This is a critical omission to the continued 

sustainment of reconstruction assets by the GOI. 

An Integrated U.S. Agency Management Information System to 

Support Reconstruction Programs Is Lacking 

In the early years of the reconstruction program, the United States lacked an integrated 

management information system for reporting contracting, financial, and construction 

management data for reconstruction projects and programs managed by multiple U.S. 

government agencies. This type of system could have facilitated program and project 

management coordination and decision-making.26 Multiple automated reports were required 

from each participating agency, but no overall system was created. USAID, the Army Corps of 

Engineers, the State Department, the MNC-I, and MNSTC-I had their own systems. Congress 

however, directed that such a system be developed. 

The November 2003 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and the 

Reconstruction of Iraq (Public Law 108-106) provided funding for IRRF. The act also 

established congressional reporting and monitoring requirements for expenditures from IRRF. 

 

23 U.S. Anticorruption Efforts In Iraq: Sustained Management Commitment is Key To Success, SIGIR-08-008, January 24, 2008. 24 Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress Made But Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste, 

SIGIR-08-017, April 28, 2008. 

25 “Establishment of Temporary Organization to Facilitate United States Government Assistance for Transition in Iraq,” Executive Order 13431, 

May 9, 2007.

26 Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program, the Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management system, SIGIR-06-001. 

10
Attempts to develop an integrated reporting system, called the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

System (IRMS) to meet the legislative requirements began about January 2004, and after 20 

months of development, there was still no fully functioning system. By June 2007, IRMS had 

achieved limited functionality. As SIGIR pointed out, rapidly developing a management 

information system to support an $18.6 billion program is difficult under controlled conditions. 

Efforts to develop this system in Iraq where not even the most basic off-the-shelf solutions were 

available and skilled IT mangers were reluctant to go was a challenging system development 

effort. 

While the IRMS system was originally designed to meet the legislative requirement to report on 

the expenditure of IRRF funds, it has been expanded to include tracking ongoing reconstruction 

efforts of the ISF, ESF, and CERP with management data being entered and used by seven 

agencies. Each of these agencies uses its specific data to track and report on the funds and 

projects it is responsible for managing. Although IRMS is the only system that attempts to 

capture comprehensive data, not all agencies enter their data and so IRMS does not provide a 

complete or consistent picture of reconstruction activities in Iraq.27

 

27Comprehensive Plan Needed to Guide the Future of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System, SIGIR-08-021, July 2008. 

11
Importance of Anticipating Staffing Needs and 

Reducing Staff Turnover 

U.S. agencies that participated in reconstruction activities in Iraq did not anticipate the large and 

long-term staffing needs required to effectively manage such a large and prolonged 

reconstruction effort. Program and project management offices were significantly understaffed 

even after major reconstruction projects were well under way, and existing staff often lacked the 

right skills to manage the contracting and program management workload. Exacerbating this 

problem, as highlighted in a number of SIGIR reports, was a high turnover of staff that left 

already understaffed offices regularly trying to bring new employees up to speed on the progress 

and problems with projects. SIGIR reports have identified these problems and the associated 

consequences of these personnel practices. Staffing shortages and a high turnover of staff can be 

disruptive and may result in waste and inefficiency. These problems contributed to poor contract 

administration and resulted in many contract management problems. 

Early in the reconstruction process, USAID, with technical support from USACE, was to provide 

government review and oversight of an estimated $1.8 billion contract with Bechtel National, 

Inc., for construction of multiple facilities in Iraq. The original contract was awarded on January 

5, 2004, and on March 31, 2007 the contract ended. The final total estimated cost of the 

construction projects was $1.33 billion. Under this contract, 24 job orders were issued for work 

in the following sectors: 14 in water and sanitation, eight in power, one in telecommunications, 

and one to build the Basrah Children’s Hospital. 

USAID was responsible and accountable for the overall implementation of all its reconstruction 

activities and for providing technical and management oversight of the work to be performed by 

Bechtel. To help accomplish these responsibilities, USAID signed a Participating Agency 

Service Agreement for USACE to provide construction oversight of Bechtel. Under the 

agreement, USACE was to provide technical assistance to USAID and be responsible for 

monitoring the quality control, quality assurance, schedule, performance, environmental issues, 

de-mining of unexploded ordnance, and safety programs of Bechtel. SIGIR reviewed the 

resourcing of both USAID and USACE personnel at about the midpoint of the contract 

execution. According to an April 5, 2006, roster, as noted in a July 24, 2007, SIGIR report, just 

under half (18 of 37) of the required USACE positions were filled. At the same time, USAID 

had filled only 170 of 251 authorized positions.28

Further, in a SIGIR review of the construction of health care facilities in Iraq, USACE’s Gulf 

Region Division (GRD) reported that in the southern region of operations, it was responsible for 

managing 400 projects but employed fewer than 40 military and civilian field engineers and 

construction inspectors.29 According to GRD, 5% to 8% of these individuals were on rest and 

recuperation leave at any one time. As an indicator of the severe shortage of these inspectors, 

 

28 Review of Bechtel’s Spending Under its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction Contract, SIGIR-07-009, July 24, 2007. 

29 Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Iraq Reconstruction Contract W914NS-04-0006, SIGIR-08-010, January 28, 2008.

12
GRD informed SIGIR that it was trying to hire and train 115 Iraqi engineers to compensate for 

GRD personnel shortages.30

As a microcosm of the general problems with shortages of contract and program management 

staff, SIGIR points to staff shortages complicating problems at the Basrah Children’s Hospital 

project..31 At the time of our audit, SIGIR could not identify a program manager or program 

management team that managed the project. Instead, we were told that Bechtel, the overall 

construction contractor, managed the contract for USAID. Having an independent government 

management team should have been a critical USAID internal control over the program. 

High Turnover of Contract And Program Management Personnel 

Have Degraded Contract Management in Iraq 

The shortages in contracting and program management personnel in Iraq have been exacerbated 

by a high turnover of government personnel in these areas, which resulted in a lack of staff 

continuity and contributed to a perception that government officials were inexperienced.32 By 

example, SIGIR reported on January 28, 2008, that on one contract involving Parsons Delaware, 

Inc., the contractor estimated that it was overseen by 17 different contracting officers between 

March 2004 and April 2006, the two years of the contract. 33 While the effect of this turnover on 

the project is difficult to quantify, in a draft memorandum addressing the contractor’s 

performance, GRD stated that the significant turnover of personnel in support of the contract 

contributed significantly to a perception of inexperience and unresponsiveness. 

In another major contract with the Perini Corporation to build electrical transmission and 

distribution facilities in southern Iraq, a high turnover of government contracting officials also 

impacted contract management throughout the contract. For example, SIGIR found that between 

March 2004, when the contract was issued, to September 2006, 14 contracting officers were 

assigned. This averages out to a new contracting officer every 65 days. The causes of high 

reconstruction program turnover included the uncertain length of rotations, high work volume, 

intense operational tempo, limited incentives, high-risk environment, and shortfalls in qualified 

personnel. A former Program Contracting Office electricity sector official stated that the 

turnover of contracting officers and contracting officer representatives negatively impacted the 

Perini contract because it undercut the effectiveness and efficiency of the contract administration 

function. 

These shortages of personnel and high turnover contributed to many contracting problems. 

Contractors had poorly defined statements of work, and the government failed to take timely 

action to remedy problems and in many cases was unaware of contractor progress and 

expenditures. For example, SIGIR found that in a DoS contract to build facilities for a police 

training program, poor contract administration by the State Department’s Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the DoS Office of Acquisition Management 

resulted in millions of dollars being put at risk of waste. The DoS paid about $43.8 million for 

 

30 Ibid 31 Review of the U.S. Agency For International Development’s Managements of the Basrah Children’s Hospital Project, SIGIR-06-026. 32 Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects, SIGIR-06-011, April 29, 2006. 33 Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Iraq Reconstruction Contract W914NS-04-0006, SIGIR-08-010, January 28, 2008. 

13
manufacturing and temporary storage of a residential camp that was not being used. This 

amount included $4.2 million for unauthorized work.34 In another contract review SIGIR 

determined that high contracting officer turnover and high contracting officer workload due to 

personnel shortages resulted in a lack of resolution of serious construction deficiencies. 

Construction deficiencies were not identified in writing but SIGIR found that major plumbing 

and structural problems were not corrected.35

 

34 Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-0030, Task Order 0338, For the Iraqi Police Training Program 

Support, SIGIR-06-029, January, 30, 2007. 35 Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc., SIGIR-08-019, July 2008. 

14
Working Closely with Host Governments Is Essential 

to the Long-Term Success of U.S. Investments in 

Reconstruction Projects 

U.S. agencies often made decisions about investments in Iraq reconstruction projects without 

obtaining the views and buy-in of Iraqi officials. This pattern began with decisions that the CPA 

made in 2003 to develop a financial management information system and continue today with 

the completion of many reconstruction projects that the U.S. government cannot transfer to the 

Iraqi government. The failure to attain host government agreement on projects, and U.S. efforts 

to foster a functioning democracy, can lead to the waste of U.S. investments. 

Early in the reconstruction process, the CPA recognized the need for the Iraqi government to 

have a financial management information system. SIGIR reported however, that according to 

USAID officials, the CPA made a policy decision to not identify Iraqi ministry user 

requirements. This decision was made despite the fact that studies by both the International 

Monetary Fund and the World Bank stated that a sound information technology project design is 

predicated on the identification of user requirements.36 SIGIR concluded that the Iraqi Financial 

Management Information System (IFMIS) development appeared to have been driven by U.S. 

reconstruction policy decisions, CPA guidance, and BearingPoint work plans. SIGIR found, 

however, that the project was suspended for reasons related principally to the lack of GOI 

commitment, and that user commitment should be a prerequisite for any system development.37 

In November 2007, USAID began initiatives to ensure GOI support for the system in the future. 

In mid-January 2008, five years after the initial decision to develop the system, the Iraqi Minister 

of Finance and Acting Mission Director of USAID signed a MOU to restart the system. This 

agreement, however, by no means guarantees the extent to which the GOI will fully implement 

the system. 

Similarly, the U.S. government also faces difficulty in transferring completed projects to the 

GOI, at times because the Iraqis had not agreed to, or were unaware of, their existence. For 

example, Iraqi Ministry of Defense officials informed SIGIR in March 2008 that many U.S. 

funded projects were at risk of deterioration because the GOI did not even know of their 

construction. The absence of GOI support for these projects is demonstrated by the experiences 

of officials from USAID, the GRD and MNSTC-I; they stated that U.S. reconstruction agency 

officials may search for any Iraqi official willing to sign for and accept projects at myriad levels, 

including ministries, provinces, and local communities. MNSTC-I resorted to “unilaterally” 

transferring assets to ministries via a letter stating that the sustainment of these facilities was now 

the ministries’ responsibility.38

Projects funded under the CERP have also been implemented without first seeking Iraqi support. 

Overall program guidance for implementing CERP projects is published in an MNC-I document 

 

36 Efforts to Implement A Financial Management Information System in Iraq, SIGIR-08-007, January 25, 2008. 37 Interim Report on Efforts and Further Actions Needed to Implement a Financial Management System in Iraq SIGIR-08-001, October 24, 

2007. 

38 Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress Made But Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste, 

SIGIR-08-017, April 28, 2008. 

15
called Money as a Weapon System. It is a policies and procedures manual that directs program 

execution and establishes the goals for CERP funding.39 This manual was updated in June 2007 

to recognize that coordination with local officials is critical to ensure that the project meets a 

perceived need by the population, is appropriate to the culture, and will be maintained in the 

future. It also states that Coalition forces have built numerous projects that did not meet the 

projects’ intended purpose due to lack of coordination with the local officials. Further, in 

response to a SIGIR questionnaire, officials observed that the transition of CERP projects to the 

GOI has been successful when local GOI ministries have been involved throughout the life cycle 

of the project. 

Host government support and buy-in is also essential to create conditions for a functioning 

democracy. SIGIR’s anticorruption reports have noted that a long term and sustained 

commitment is needed by both the United States and GOI to achieve any measurable 

improvement in the pervasive corruption the country faces. In its latest report, SIGIR 

recommends that the U.S. efforts be based on assurances that the GOI supports the U.S. 

approach, and that there are measurable indicators of progress. Absent such assurances, the U.S. 

programs are vulnerable to waste.40

 

39 Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq Funds Many Large-Scale Projects, SIGIR-08-006, January 25, 2008. 40 Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: U.S. and Iraq Take Actions but Much More Remains to Be Done ,SIGIR 08-023, July 2008.

16
Conclusions 

The United States was not prepared for the major reconstruction effort that was needed in Iraq. 

Although the U.S. military was attempting to control the violence, it was not prepared to protect 

critical Iraqi infrastructures and U.S. reconstruction sites. SIGIR’s reports lead to a series of 

lessons learned that if addressed could result in significantly improved management and 

oversight of reconstruction programs. Their implementation could also contribute to reducing 

reconstruction costs, improving quality controls over contracting and contractor performance, 

and help increase the likelihood that reconstruction projects can be successfully transferred to the 

host government. Addressing these issues is critical because individually, and often collectively, 

they significantly reduced program effectiveness, increased reconstruction costs, and increased 

the likelihood of fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Steps For The Government To Consider 

SIGIR reports have highlighted many lessons learned from specific projects and programs that 

should be considered in planning reconstruction efforts to help reduce the extent of fraud, waste, 

and abuse while emphasizing program success. Actions to address the broader recurring 

management issues identified in this report would also be important to consider. Depending on 

the facts and circumstances of a contingency operation, a number of steps may be needed in key 

areas to avoid a repetition of the problems identified in this report, including: 

Security 

• Develop plans to secure basic infrastructure—such as oil, gas, and water—until the 

capabilities of the host government can be developed. 

• Develop guidance on project risk for managers to assess the merits of funding a project 

faced with security threats. 

• Evaluate the practicality of proceeding quickly with large-scale construction projects 

when the risk of sabotage may divert funds from construction to security and threaten the 

effectiveness of the investment. 

• Prepare a comprehensive and independent government estimate for high-risk construction 

projects that accurately identifies the costs associated with the project—particularly those 

costs associated with the security risk. This information should be a mandatory part of the 

contract file. 

• Proceed with the project only when senior management specifically determines that 

strategic objectives outweigh the risks of project failure if government oversight and 

surveillance activities are impeded to any significant degree by security concerns. 

Organizational Structures and Processes 

• Clearly define the management roles, responsibilities, authority and accountability for 

program decision-making and ensure management continuity. 

17
• Develop an integrated organizational structure for contingency reconstruction efforts that 

clearly recognizes the complicated interrelationships between program elements and the 

success of U.S. program goals. When multiple agencies are participating, the Secretary 

of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of USAID, and other agencies as applicable 

should delineate which lead agency will be in charge of each program element and which 

agency will be in charge of the overall management and execution of programs. 

• Frame an organizational structure that can withstand an extended duration, if needed, to 

minimize the resulting disruptions and loss of management continuity. An assessment 

may be appropriate to understand the reasons for the many organizational changes 

associated with reconstruction efforts and identify actions that may be taken to reduce 

them in a future contingency operation. 

• Ensure management controls over the expenditure of U.S. funds by requiring integrated 

financial management information systems to support managerial decision-making and to 

provide the Congress with better information about how U.S. funds are being spent. 

• Require that all agencies spending reconstruction monies from any source provide 

agreed-on contracting information into a single management information system. 

Staffing Concerns 

• Develop criteria for determining staffing needs so that agencies start with the right people 

and the right skills. 

• Take steps that contain high staff turnover to the extent practical and implement 

processes to ensure appropriate transfer of program knowledge when turnovers do occur 

to better ensure program continuity. This is another area where a more detailed 

assessment of personnel turnovers in advance of a contingency may be needed to more 

effectively deal with this issue. 

Working with Host Governments 

• At the outset of reconstruction efforts, implement procedures that enable close 

coordination with the host government to help ensure that reconstruction projects are 

consistent with needs and to maximize buy-in resulting in acceptance and maintenance of 

donor-funded projects. 

• Obtain initial project buy-in from and systematically work with host-government officials 

through construction and preparations for transfer to the host government. 

SIGIR presents these steps as actions that may be needed or considered—not as specific 

recommendations. Currently, SIGIR is completing a more comprehensive report on the history 

and evolution of planning for and management of Iraq reconstruction, which will be issued later 

this year. The report will provide a number of specific recommendations related to planning for 

and implementing reconstruction activities in a contingency environment. 

18
Management Comments and Audit Response 

The U.S. Ambassador, Iraq, in commenting on a draft of this report, expressed agreement with 

the issues identified in the report and steps to be considered for the future to avoid repetition of 

the problems identified. The Ambassador noted, as did the SIGIR report, the impact of an 

unstable security environment on reconstruction project management. At the same time he 

expressed concern about the absence of information in the report concerning limitations in the 

capacity of Iraqi governmental institutions to deal with all aspects of project planning and 

execution and security; and a lack of coverage of steps the U.S. government has taken to improve 

interagency coordination and deal with the transfer of completed reconstruction projects to the 

GOI. Although this report does not address GOI capacity issues in-depth, it does address 

challenges related to asset transfer issues, some of which SIGIR recognizes as being capacityrelated, as well as the need for improved coordination among all affected parties. SIGIR has 

reported separately on capacity building and asset transfer issues and plans additional reporting 

in the future on steps being taken in these areas. The Ambassador’s comments are included in 

their entirety at the end of this report. 

19
Appendix A — Scope and Methodology 

In March 2008, SIGIR initiated this audit (Project No. 8004) to identify systemic issues based on 

its 121 reports issued from June 2004 through July 31, 2008. It was not SIGIR’s objective to reaudit the subject matter of the original audit reports. 

We conducted our work in the Washington, D.C., office of SIGIR, with assistance from our 

Baghdad audit staff. We did not sample any item for this project, relying instead on our previous 

audit workpapers and reports. Using all the reports listed on SIGIR’s web site, we conducted 

limited interviews with field auditors and audit management in Washington, D.C. and Baghdad. 

During the course of our fieldwork, we did not develop any problems with the evidentiary 

material requiring explanation, nor did we encounter any scope impairments or data limitations. 

Finally, there were no significant omissions from the audit work, no major areas not reviewed, 

and no limitations on the audit because of time or resource constraints. 

Before our review and evaluation of the 121 published audit reports, we identified common 

themes that emerged from multiple reports. We also reviewed the audit reports and augmented 

“current thinking” with the addition and review of current, relevant GAO, USAID, State 

Department Inspector General, and DoD Inspector General audit reports. In addition, we asked 

SIGIR field auditors and audit management to comment on any pertinent issues affecting prior 

audits, if any. Using these themes we next developed a set of questions against which we 

analyzed SIGIR reports. The purpose of the analysis was to identify examples relating to the 

questions that provided lessons learned for future reconstruction activities in a contingency 

environment. 

The questions we used to analyze the reports included the following: 

• What are the logical consequences of the high cost of security? 

• What fostered poor interagency coordination and contributed to projects’ failure? 

• What can the United States do to mitigate the lack of quality project management control 

that places it at risk of wasting funds to perform costly rework? 

• Did the United States come prepared to effectively and efficiently manage $47 billion in 

Iraq reconstruction programs? 

• What needs to happen before the United States can craft an integrated set of programs to 

support the transfer of reconstruction assets, avoiding the potential waste of U.S. 

investments? 

• Going forward, what can be done to secure the “buy-in” of GOI officials and ministries? 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions as 

they relate to our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions they relate to our audit objectives. 

20
This audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended. 

Internal Controls 

Because we are auditing and commenting on prior audit reports, we did not independently assess 

or re-assess the overall systems of management controls. Instead, we relied on the assessments 

of systems of internal control performed and discussed in the original audits. The original audits 

more fully explain the significant internal controls assessed, the scope of the assessment work, 

and any significant deficiencies found during the review. Further, the issued reports identify 

management control weaknesses and make recommendations or highlight lessons learned that 

would improve the management control problems. In addition to being developed in the findings 

and recommendations section of the original audit reports, we fully developed all reportable 

conditions identified during the course of our current review. 

Reliability of Data from Computer-Based Systems 

To perform this audit, we did not rely on data from computer-based systems. Our audit focused 

on published SIGIR audit reports and discussions with responsible officials. We used audit 

reports whose data originated in CEFMS, RMS, IRMS, the USAID Iraq database, the Joint 

Contingency Contracting System, and the DoS accounting system. To achieve the original audit 

assignment’s objective, we examined computer-processed data contained in the above databases. 

Our review of system controls in many cases casted doubt on the data’s completeness and 

accuracy. 

Compliance with Laws and Regulations 

Because this audit is a compilation of other reported audit activity, this audit does not include an 

evaluation of agencies or programs’ compliance with laws and regulations. Those compliance 

issues would be addressed in the individual published audit reports. All significant findings of 

noncompliance that were individually or collectively material were reported in the Findings and 

Recommendations section of the original audit reports. 

21
Appendix B — Audit Reports Issued Since Inception 

through July 2008 by SIGIR and its Predecessor, the 

CPA IG 

Report 

No. Report Title 

Report 

Date 

04-001 Coalition Provisional Authority Coordination Of Donated Funds 6/25/04 

04-002 Management Of Personnel Assigned To The Coalition Provisional Authority 

In Baghdad, Iraq 6/25/04 

04-003 Federal Deployment Center Forward Operations At The Kuwait Hilton 6/25/04 

04-004 Task Orders Awarded By The Air Force Center For Environmental Excellence 

In Support Of The Coalition Provisional Authority 7/28/04 

04-005 Award Of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts 7/23/04 

04-006 Corporate Governance For Contractors Performing Iraq Reconstruction 

Efforts 7/21/04 

04-007 Oil For Food Cash Controls For The Office Of Project Coordination In Erbil, 

Iraq 7/26/04 

04-008 Coalition Provisional Authority Control Over Seized And Vested Assets 7/30/04 

04-009 Coalition Provisional Authority Comptroller Cash Management Controls Over 

The Development Fund For Iraq 7/28/04 

04-011 Audit Of The Accountability And Control Of Materiel Assets Of The Coalition 

Provisional Authority In Baghdad 7/26/04 

04-013 Coalition Provisional Authority’s Contracting Processes Leading Up To And 

Including Contract Award 7/27/04 

05-001 Coalition Provisional Authority Control Of Appropriated Funds 10/22/04 

05-002 Accountability And Control Of Materiel Assets Of The Coalition Provisional 

Authority In Kuwait 10/25/04 

05-003 Task Order 0044 Of The Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program III Contract 11/23/04 

05-004 Oversight Of Funds Provided To Iraqi Ministries Through The National 

Budget Process 1/30/05 

05-005 Compliance With Contract No. W911S0-04-C-0003 Awarded To Aegis 

Defence Services Limited 4/20/05 

05-006 Control Of Cash Provided To South-Central Iraq 4/30/05 

05-007 Administration of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contract Files 4/30/05 

05-008 Administration Of Contracts Funded By The Development Fund For Iraq 4/30/05 

05-009 Reconciliation Of Reporting Differences Of The Source Of Funds Used On 

Contracts After June 28, 2004 7/8/05 

05-010 Interim Briefing To The Project And Contracting Office - Iraq And The Joint 

Contracting Command – Iraq On The Audit Of The Award Fee Process 7/26/05 

05-011 Cost-To-Complete Estimates And Financial Reporting For The Management 

Of The Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund 7/26/05 

22
Report 

No. Report Title 

Report 

Date 

05-012 Policies And Procedures Used For Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund 

Project Management - Construction Quality Assurance 7/22/05 

05-013 Controls Over Equipment Acquired By Security Contractors 9/9/05 

05-014 Management Of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program For Fiscal 

Year 2004 10/13/05 

05-015 Management Of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants In South-Central 

Iraq 10/25/05 

05-016 Management Of The Contracts And Grants Used To Construct And Operate 

The Babylon Police Academy 10/26/05 

05-017 Award Fee Process For Contractors Involved In Iraq Reconstruction 10/25/05 

05-018 Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: Acquisition of 

Armored Vehicles Purchased Through Contract W914NS-05-M-1189 10/21/05 

05-019 Attestation Engagement Concerning The Award Of Non-Competitive Contract 

Daca63-03-D-0005 To Kellogg, Brown, And Root Services, Inc. 9/30/05 

05-020 Management Of The Contracts, Grant, And Micro-Purchases Used To 

Rehabilitate The Karbala Library 10/26/05 

05-021 Management Of Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Programs: Cost-ToComplete Estimate Reporting 10/24/05 

05-022 Managing Sustainment For Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Programs 10/24/05 

05-023 Management Of Rapid Regional Response Program Contracts In SouthCentral Iraq 1/23/06 

05-024 Management Of The Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project 1/23/06 

05-025 Management Of The Commander’s Emergency Response Program For 

Fiscal Year 2005 1/23/06 

05-026 Fact Sheet On the Use of the $50 Million Appropriation to Support the 

Management and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1/27/06 

05-027 Methodologies For Reporting Cost-To-Complete Estimates 1/27/06 

05-028 GRD-PCO Management Of The Transfer Of IRRF-Funded Assets To The 

Iraqi Government 1/24/06 

05-029 Challenges Faced In Carrying Out Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund 

Activities 1/26/06 

06-001 Management Of Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution 

Of The Iraq Reconstruction Management System 4/24/06 

06-002 Prompt Payment Act: Analysis Of Expenditures Made From The Iraq Relief 

And Reconstruction Fund 2/3/06 

06-003 Review Of Data Entry And General Controls In The Collecting And Reporting 

Of The Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund 4/28/06 

06-004 Changes In Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Program Activities - 

October Through December 2005 4/28/06 

06-005 Follow-Up On Recommendations Made In SIGIR Audit Reports Related To 

Management And Control Of The Development Fund For Iraq 4/28/06 

23
Report 

No. Report Title 

Report 

Date 

06-006 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management Of The 

Transfer Of Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Projects To The Iraqi 

Government 

4/29/06 

06-007 U.S. Agency For International Development Management Of The Transfer Of 

Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Projects To The Iraqi Government 4/29/06 

06-008 Development Fund For Iraq Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support 

Group-Central 4/28/06 

06-009 Review Of Task Force Shield Programs 4/28/06 

06-010 Review Of The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Reconciliation Of The Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund 4/28/06 

06-011 Management Of The Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects 4/29/06 

06-012 Development Fund For Iraq Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support 

Group-Central/Falluja 4/28/06 

06-013 Briefing To The International Advisory And Monitoring Board For Iraq: 

Management Controls Over The Development Fund For Iraq 4/28/06 

06-014 Review Of Efforts To Increase Iraq’s Capability To Protect Its Energy 

Infrastructure (Classified) 7/27/06 

06-015 Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund Review Of Contracts And Financial 

Documents 4/28/06 

06-016 

Interim Audit Report On The Review Of The Equipment Purchased For 

Primary Healthcare Centers Associated With Parsons Global Services, 

Contract Number W914NS-04-D-0006 

4/4/06 

06-017 Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi 

Government 7/28/06 

06-018 

Survey Of The Status Of Funding For Iraq Programs Allocated To The 

Department Of State’s Bureau Of International Narcotics And Law 

Enforcement Affairs As Of December 31, 2005 

July 2006 

06-019 Review Of The Use Of Definitization Requirements For Contracts Supporting 

Reconstruction In Iraq 7/28/06 

06-020 Review Of The Advanced First Responder Network 7/28/06 

06-021 Joint Survey Of The U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program 7/28/06 

06-023 Changes in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program Activities - 

January through March 2006 7/28/06 

06-024 Joint Cash Count: Iraq National Weapons Card Program 7/26/06 

06-025 

Review Of The Medical Equipment Purchased For The Primary Healthcare 

Centers Associated With Parsons Global Services, Inc., Contract Number 

W914ns-04-D-0006 

7/28/06 

06-026 Review Of The U.S. Agency For International Development’s Management Of 

The Basrah Children’s Hospital Project 7/31/06 

06-028 Review Of Administrative Task Orders For Iraq Reconstruction Contracts 10/23/06 

06-029 Review Of Dyncorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C0030, Task Order 0338, For The Iraqi Police Training Program Support 1/30/07 

24
Report 

No. Report Title 

Report 

Date 

06-030 Status Of Medical Equipment And Other Non-Construction Items Purchased 

For Primary Healthcare Centers 1/30/07 

06-031 Management Of The Iraqi Interim Government Fund 10/27/06 

06-032 Iraqi Security Forces: Review Of Plans To Implement Logistics Capabilities 10/28/06 

06-033 Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided By The U.S. Department Of 

Defense Using The Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund 10/28/06 

06-034 Status Of The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program In Iraq 10/29/06 

06-035 Interim Audit Report On Inappropriate Use Of Proprietary Data Markings By 

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Contractor 10/26/06 

06-036* Follow-Up On SIGIR Recommendations Concerning The Development Fund 

For Iraq (DFI) 1/29/07 

06-037 Interim Audit Report On Improper Obligations Using The Iraq Relief And 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2) 9/22/06 

06-038 Unclassified Summary Of SIGIR’s Review Of Efforts To Increase Iraq’s 

Capability To Protect Its Energy Infrastructure 9/27/06 

06-039 Review Of USAID/Bechtel National, Inc., Property Management Controls For 

Contract SPU-C-00-04-00001-00 1/29/07 

06-040 Improper Obligations Using The Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 

2) 1/30/07 

06-042 Fact Sheet On Major U.S. Contractor’s Security Costs Related To IRRF 

Contracting Activities (Restricted Distribution) 1/30/07 

06-043 Review Of Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Unmatched Disbursements 1/30/07 

06-044 Fact Sheet On Major U.S. Contractors’ Security Costs Related To Iraq Relief 

And Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities 1/30/07 

06-045 Status Of Ministerial Capacity Development In Iraq 1/30/07 

07-002 Status Of The Advanced First Responder Network 4/25/07 

07-003* Cost-To-Complete Reporting For Iraq Reconstruction Projects 7/26/07 

07-004 Transferring Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects To The 

Government Of Iraq 7/25/07 

07-005 Fact Sheet On Sources And Uses Of U.S. Funding Provided In Fiscal Year 

2006 For Iraq Relief And Reconstruction 7/27/07 

07-006 Management Of The Commander’s Emergency Response Program In Iraq 

For Fiscal Year 2006 4/26/07 

07-007 Status Of U.S. Government Anticorruption Efforts In Iraq 7/24/07 

07-008 Fact Sheet On The Roles And Responsibilities Of U.S. Government 

Organizations Conducting IRRF-Funded Reconstruction Activities 7/26/07 

07-009* Review Of Bechtel’s Spending Under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction 

Contract 7/24/07 

07-010* Agency Management Of The Closeout Process For Iraq Relief And 

Reconstruction Fund Contracts 10/24/07 

07-011 Controls Over Unliquidated Obligations In The Iraq Relief And Reconstruction 

Fund 10/23/07 

25
Report 

No. Report Title 

Report 

Date 

07-012 Review Of Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Unmatched Disbursements 

At The Department Of State 4/26/07 

07-013 Sustainment Of The Advanced First Responder Network (Restricted) 4/27/07 

07-014 Status Of The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion In Iraq 7/25/07 

07-015 Review Of The Effectiveness Of The Provincial Reconstruction Team 

Program In Iraq 10/18/07 

07-016 Interim Review of DynCorp spending Under its Contract for the Iraqi Police 

Training Program 10/23/07 

08-001 Interim Report On Efforts And Further Actions Needed To Implement A 

Financial Management Information System In Iraq 10/24/07 

08-002 Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Task Orders 130 And 151: Program 

Management, Reimbursement, And Transition 10/30/07 

08-003* Review Of The Use Of Contractors In Managing Iraq Relief And 

Reconstruction Projects 10/29/07 

08-004* Outcome, Cost, And Oversight Of Reconstruction of Taji Military Base And 

Baghdad Recruiting Center 1/15/08 

08-005 Differences In Services And Fees For Management And Administration Of 

Iraq Reconstruction Contracts 1/29/08 

08-006 Commander’s Emergency Response Program In Iraq Funds Many LargeScale Projects 1/25/08 

08-007* Efforts To Implement A Financial-Management Information System In Iraq 1/25/08 

08-008 U.S. Anticorruption Efforts In Iraq: Sustained Management Commitment Is A 

Key To Success 1/24/08 

08-009* Appropriate Award-Fee Conversion Scales Can Enhance Incentive For 

Contractor Performance 1/24/08 

08-010* Outcome, Cost, And Oversight Of Iraq Reconstruction Contract W914NS-04-

D-0006 1/28/08 

08-011* Outcome, Cost, And Oversight Of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract 

With Perini Corporation 4/29/08

08-012 Attestation To Development Fund For Iraq Cash In The Possession Of The 

Joint Area Support Group-Central 3/13/08 

08-013 Interim Report On Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations 4/28/08 

08-014 Progress On Recommended Improvements To Contract Administration For 

The Iraqi Police Training Program 4/22/08 

08-015 Interim Analysis Of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided By The 

Department Of Defense Report, Measuring Stability And Security In Iraq 4/25/08 

08-016 U.S. Anticorruption Efforts In Iraq: Progress Made In Implementing Revised 

Management Plan 4/24/08 

08-017* Transferring Reconstruction Projects To The Government Of Iraq: Some 

Progress Made But Further Improvements Needed To Avoid Waste 4/28/08 

08-018* Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with 

FluorAMEC, LLC 7/15/08 

26
Report 

No. Report Title 

Report 

Date 

08-019 Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with 

Parsons Delaware, inc. 

7/28/08 

08-020 Key Recurring Management Issues identified in Audits of Iraq reconstruction 

efforts 

7/25/08 

08-021 Comprehensive Plan Needed to Guide the Future of the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management System 

7/26/08 

08-022 Government of Iraq Increasingly Funding Iraq Security Force Infrastructure 

Development, but Substantial U.S. Support Remains 

7/26/08 

08-023 Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: U.S. and Iraq Take Actions but Much Remains 

to be Done July 2008 

08-024 Information on a Special Department of Defense Program to Foster 

Economic Recovery in Iraq July 2008 

* SIGIR reports with specific "lessons learned" sections in them. (Not all of them would have been used in the 3 SIGIR lessons learned reports.) 

27
Appendix C — Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

CEFMS Corps of Engineers Financial Management System 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

EG Economic Governance 

ESF Economic Support Fund 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

GOI Government of Iraq 

GRD Gulf Region Division 

IFMIS Iraqi Financial Management Information System 

IMF International Monetary Fund 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund 

ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps – Iraq 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq 

RMS Resident Management System 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

28
Appendix D — Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to this report include: 

James Shafer 

Glenn Furbish 

Samson Wright 

29
Management Comments 

U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

30
31
32

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil) 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

Phone: 703-602-4063 

Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle 

Director for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil