6

ENGINEER COMMAND

1966–1974

The Engineer Command owed its origin to the determination 

of the commander in chief of the United States Army, Europe 

(USAREUR), General Andrew P. O’Meara. When O’Meara 

assumed command in March 1965, he brought a wealth of experience in postwar Germany to his new assignment. From 1948 to 1951 

he had served as chief of logistics planning at the European Command’s 

headquarters in Heidelberg; and in 1957, as commander of the 4th 

Armored Division, he had moved the unit from Fort Hood, Texas, to 

Germany, where he remained for a two-year tour of duty. O’Meara had 

developed strong opinions about what the Army engineers ought to be 

doing for USAREUR.

Soon after arriving in Heidelberg in 1965, O’Meara inquired about a 

project he had launched while commanding the 4th Armored Division: 

moving the rear elements of the division into the Nuremberg area. 

O’Meara learned that his plan had been approved in 1960, but the relocation had become stalled in negotiations for the Alternate Construction 

Program. Incensed by the lack of progress, O’Meara asked the USAREUR 

engineer, Brig. Gen. Howard A. Morris, for an explanation. Morris said 

that the district commanders were responsible for the delays; the district commanders put the blame elsewhere. O’Meara’s review of other 

engineer activities fueled his anger. Garrisons targeted for renovation 

during his tour in the logistics division fifteen years earlier had not been 

finished. USAREUR’s construction battalions had poor discipline and 

inadequate supervision. And O’Meara did not think that the labor service 

units of skilled German and Baltic craftsmen were being used appropriately. O’Meara dubbed the situation “a stinking engineering mess” and 

demanded accountability.1

While O’Meara questioned the deployment of engineer resources 

within USAREUR, his control of these assets was being challenged in 

Washington. Early in 1965 the Department of the Army asked the Office 

of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) to study the organization of military 
140

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

construction in Europe, the only 

Army command where contract 

construction was not managed 

by the OCE. The OCE study 

concluded that contract construction currently assigned to 

USAREUR ought to be assumed 

by the Corps of Engineers and 

managed by the Mediterranean 

Division through a district office 

in Frankfurt. When these recommendations were announced in 

May 1965, O’Meara immediately 

dissented.2

O’Meara insisted that control of all engineer resources 

remain directly under his authority as USAREUR commander. The 

Department of the Army asked 

the Army Audit Agency (AAA) 

to review the OCE study and to 

present independent recommendations. The audit, completed in 

October 1965, concurred with the OCE analysis. Among the staff of the 

Engineer Element, rumors began to circulate of “a power struggle for us 

between USAREUR and the chief’s office.”3

Despite the consensus between the OCE and the AAA, O’Meara resisted. He wanted to consolidate all engineer personnel and resources directly 

under the USAREUR commander. Months before O’Meara assumed 

command, USAREUR had consolidated its logistical support facilities in 

Germany, creating a single logistical command to provide area support to 

all Army forces in Germany except those in Berlin and Bremerhaven. The 

new Army Area Command, headed by a West Point classmate of O’Meara’s, 

Maj. Gen. Tom R. Stoughton, managed all stocks and logistical activities 

as well as installation support throughout Germany. Stoughton strongly 

opposed O’Meara’s proposal to create a competing engineer command, 

as did most of O’Meara’s general staff, including the USAREUR engineer, 

General Morris. O’Meara realized that he needed to go outside his own 

staff to get another assessment of his idea. A personal friend and engineer 

officer, Earl Peacock, recommended Col. Robert P. “Rip” Young, commander of the 7th Engineer Brigade. In July 1966 O’Meara wrote Young—whom 

he had never met—instructing him to study the feasibility of organizing all 

the engineer elements in Europe into an engineer command.4

Colonel Young had arrived in Frankfurt in September 1964 for his first 

tour in Europe. A 1942 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Young had 

served with an airborne engineer battalion in World War II, commanded 

an engineer battalion in Korea, and served as district engineer in the 

General Young in 1970
141

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

Seattle District of the Corps of Engineers. Assigned as V Corps engineer 

in 1964, Young was moved within weeks to deputy chief of staff of V 

Corps. In July 1966 Young had begun an assignment as commander of the 

7th Engineer Brigade. O’Meara’s letter arrived almost immediately.5

Concerned about the task given to him directly by O’Meara, Young 

discussed the situation with Brig. Gen. Craig Cannon, Morris’ successor as USAREUR engineer. He quickly learned that O’Meara’s idea was 

unpopular with the staff in Heidelberg and opposed by the area commanders. Nevertheless, Young began with the assumption that a feasible 

plan could be devised.

At the first briefing to discuss the feasibility of reorganization, the 

USAREUR staff was hostile, but O’Meara told Young to formulate an 

implementation plan. General Stoughton objected that the engineers could 

not supervise services such as snow clearing, packing and crating furniture, or other tasks that his Army Area Command provided to support 

U.S. military installations throughout Germany. General O’Meara agreed 

to leave the engineer positions assigned for facilities maintenance with 

the Army Area Command. When Young presented the implementation 

plan, O’Meara announced that the new command would be implemented 

as outlined and that Colonel Young would head it.6

In a brief ceremony on 1 November 1966, USAREUR activated the 

Engineer Command (ENGCOM). In the first phase of the implementation, 

ENGCOM merged the Engineer Element (contract construction and real 

estate) and the 7th Engineer Brigade (engineer troops and 6970th Labor 

Service/Civilian Labor Group [LS/CLG]). Young set up offices in the 

building in Frankfurt that had been used by the Engineer Element and 

its predecessor, the United States Army Construction Agency, Germany 

(USACAG). He moved headquarters of the 7th Engineer Brigade from 

Karlsruhe to Frankfurt. The second phase of ENGCOM’s consolidation 

entailed the transfer of the repairs and utilities mission from the Army 

Area Command to ENGCOM.

Beginning in May 1967, for the first and only time, the Army’s major 

engineer resources—contract construction, troop construction, and facilities 

engineering—operated under one headquarters as a subordinate command 

of USAREUR rather than as an element of the general staff office in charge of 

logistics (G–4). The reorganization preserved a unique aspect of the authority 

of the commander in chief, USAREUR; only in Europe did the theater commander control engineer resources directly. (See Chart 8.) In all other major 

Army commands, the OCE in Washington managed contract construction 

for the Army and Air Force. O’Meara had achieved what he wanted.7

Structure and Organization

In the face of overt opposition in the Heidelberg headquarters, 

Young’s task of pulling the various components together into one 

organization was not easy: “It was,” he recalled, “a tug of war all the 

way.”8 The contract construction mission that ENGCOM took over from 
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

USACAG and the Engineer Element encompassed the execution of 

dollar-funded construction for U.S. military forces in Europe; the supervision and inspection of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

construction undertaken for U.S. forces and of alternate construction 

provided by the Federal Republic; and the management of related real 

estate functions.

ENGCOM also inherited from the 7th Engineer Brigade three missions associated with engineer troops: execution of construction for the 

Army and the Air Force using troop labor, maintenance of combat readiness among the engineer troops, and readiness to execute contingency and 

war plans. Throughout USAREUR (excluding Bremerhaven and Berlin), 

ENGCOM’s mission to support installations—facilities engineering—

covered the complex and essential tasks of maintenance, repairs, and provision of utilities. All elements of ENGCOM shared responsibility for furnishing professional and technical engineering services to the commander 

in chief, USAREUR.9

Young organized ENGCOM headquarters in Frankfurt with an 

Executive Command Section and seven directorates: Engineering, 

VII

Corps

Headquarters,

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and Seventh Army

Special Forces

Detachment

(Airborne), Europe

15th Military

Police Brigade

Special Ammunition

Support Command,

USAREUR and

Seventh Army

U.S. Army

Berlin

U.S. Theater

Army Support

Command

Europe

U.S. Army

Engineer

Command,

Europe

U.S. Army

Southern

European

Task Force

U.S. Army

Medical

Command,

Europe

32d Army

Air Defense

Command

European

Exchange

System

U.S. Military Liaison

Mission to the CINC,

Group of Soviet

Forces, Germany

USAREUR

and Seventh

Army Troops

U.S. Army

School

Europe

Seventh

Army Training

Center

U.S. Army Reserve

Affairs, Europe

American Forces

Network, Europe

Armed Forces

Recreation Center

U.S. Dependents

Schools, European

Area

USAREUR

Class VI Agency

Assigned Activities

Major Commands

Assigned Units

V

Corps

Chart 8: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and 7th Army, 1969
143

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

Construction, Operations, Facilities, Personnel, Logistics, and 

Comptroller. (Chart 9) The Operations Directorate coordinated military 

activities other than construction, and the Facilities Directorate managed 

the repair and utilities mission. The Logistics Directorate supported 

both troop units and the repair and utilities needs of the engineers serving military facilities (district engineers) and supervised the operations 

of the real estate offices.10 ENGCOM maintained five offices in West 

Germany to supervise the acquisition, disposal, and management of real 

estate for USAREUR.11

Resident engineers, operating out of ten (early 1967) and then nine 

(summer 1968) localities, executed the contract construction function. 

Eleven district engineers carried out the repair and utilities mission (see 

Map 11), supervising thirty-nine community engineers (also called post 

engineers, although posts had been replaced by military communities in 

USAREUR) and forty-five subcommunity engineers.12

Executive

Officer

Commanding General

Logistics

Directorate

Comptroller

Directorate

Personnel

Directorate

Chief of

Staff Deputy Chief

of Staff

Public

Information

Office

General

Council

Headquarters

Commandant

Special

Assistant

Engineering

Directorate

Troop

Operations

Directorate

Facilities

Engineer

Directorate

Headquarters

Company

Engineer

Groups

Engineer

Districts

Construction

Directorate

Resident

Engineers

Real Estate

Offices

Operational

Control

Local

Nationals

Office

Chart 9: Organization of U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe, 1970 
144

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

Military, Civilian, and German Personnel

During 1967 and 1968 some 700 to 800 people worked at ENGCOM 

headquarters, in district and resident engineer offices, and in real estate 

functions. With nearly 7,000 soldiers and 14,000 civilians working on-site 

Map 11

E A S T G E R M A N Y

LUXEMBOURG B E L G I U M

C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

A U S T R I A S W I T Z E R L A N D

F R A N C E

N E T

H E R L A

N

D S

Erfurt

Dresden

Berlin

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

H E S S E N

V O G E L S B E R G

F R A N C O N I A

N O R T H B AV A R I A

N O R T H

B AV A R I A

 7 t h A R M Y

T R A I N I N G C O M M A N D

TAUN U S

R H I N E L A N D - P F A L Z

N O RT H

B A D E N

S O U T H B AV A R I A

PA L AT I N AT E

W Ü RT T E M B E R G

Kaiserslautern

Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Giessen

Hanau

Bad Kreuznach Würzburg

Stuttgart

Grafenwöhr

Nuremberg

Augsburg

Rhine R

Elbe R

District Boundary (approximate)

District Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

ENGINEER COMMAND

WEST GERMANY

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

Late 1960s
145

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

at the installations, the Engineer Command had an overall force of about 

21,000.13

Personnel for the command consisted of military officers, Department 

of the Army civilians (DACs), and German nationals. In general, Army 

engineer officers headed major divisions in headquarters and in the 

field offices. Young named Col. A. Darby Williams, Jr., commander of 

the Engineer Element since the autumn of 1964, as chief of contract construction and deputy commander.14 A second colonel served as deputy 

commander and chief of troop operations with responsibility for the 24th 

Engineer Group (Construction) and the 6970th LS/CLG. In August 1967 

a third colonel assumed office as deputy commander and chief of facilities engineering. ENGCOM consistently had problems finding qualified 

officers to serve as engineers at the community level. The job called for 

officers with the experience commensurate with the rank of an engineer 

major; but competing demands, especially the war in Southeast Asia, left 

only lieutenants available for most assignments.15

Civilians who had served with USACAG and the Engineer Element 

provided both leadership and continuity in ENGCOM headquarters. John 

Tambornino became chief of engineering, and H. Jace Greene remained 

as chief of construction. William E. Camblor, former director of USACAG, 

returned to Frankfurt to serve as special assistant to the commander. 

Leonard L. Phillips, legal counsel in USACAG since 1960, became general 

counsel. Saul Fraint served as chief of technical engineering, and John 

Haugen continued as chief of planning. Adolph Faust, who had come 

to USACAG after working for the Army engineers in Austria and with 

USAREUR’s Northern Area Office, was named chief of civil engineering; 

he later worked as chief of structural engineering. Louis Brettschneider 

remained as chief of mechanical engineering (a section under USACAG 

but now a branch) and, when Fraint retired in June 1973, succeeded him 

as chief of technical engineering.16 When offices in France closed in 1966 

and 1967, Jacques Bouchereau, a naturalized American citizen from Haiti 

who had worked with the Joint Construction Agency and its successors in 

France, joined ENGCOM’s Engineering Division, as did John Shadday, a 

former Army engineer officer.17

Other experienced civilians came into the organization when 

ENGCOM assumed responsibility for facilities engineering. Randolph S. 

Washington, a budget analyst, transferred from the Army Area Command 

in 1967; he later served as deputy and supervisor of the Budget Office. 

Edward Zawisza, who had worked for the Joint Construction Agency, for 

the facilities engineer in Stuttgart, and with the Army Area Command, 

joined ENGCOM as deputy chief of facilities engineering. Robert 

Rodehaver first became chief of operation and maintenance programming 

in the new Facilities Directorate and then in 1972 was promoted to chief of 

buildings and grounds.18

Despite the continuity in leadership that these men provided, 

American civilians made up less than 3 percent of ENGCOM’s workforce 

and the command remained short of qualified engineers in mid-level 
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

positions.19 Germans and third-country nationals held more than 90 percent of the civilian positions as estimators, typists, translators, engineers, 

legal aides, and contract administrators. During the late 1960s and early 

1970s, ENGCOM had difficulty attracting Germans with professional 

qualifications: Unemployment was low in the Federal Republic, and the 

salaries offered by the Army were about one-third less than comparable 

jobs in the West German economy. Although retaining qualified Germans 

was even harder than recruiting them, some, including Hasso Damm, 

who had joined USACAG in 1956, continued under ENGCOM.20

Engineer Troops

The Engineer Command included the 24th and 39th Engineer Groups 

(Construction) and the 6970th LS/CLG.21 Engineer troops in the 24th 

and 39th were assigned to heavy construction, including earthmoving, 

rehabilitation, and road building. The command also used troops for 

crash programs such as constructing forty school classrooms, work that 

involved preparing foundations, laying concrete, setting up Quonset huts, 

and installing wiring.22

ENGCOM gained a unique resource in the 6970th LS/CLG. Each of its 

six companies maintained a roster of about 150 men. Three companies—

civilian labor groups—were composed of Germans; the other three—

labor service—included displaced persons from East European nations, 

The 6970th Labor Service/Civilian Labor Group built this school in 

Heidelberg in 1967.
147

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

especially the Baltic states that had been absorbed into the Soviet Union. 

A headquarters company of about 200 men managed this organization 

under the 7th Engineer Brigade. Members of the labor service units wore 

uniforms and were commanded by officers from their own ranks who 

were experienced in planning and executing construction projects.23

The U.S. Army of occupation created labor service units in early 1947 

to augment its engineer units, and over the next twenty years the Army 

developed contractual relations with the groups. The labor service personnel in the 6970th LS/CLG served an average of ten years and maintained 

a high level of proficiency in crafts crucial to construction—carpentry, 

masonry, electrical wiring, heating, plumbing, and welding.

The standard workweek for the labor service personnel was fortythree hours on construction plus additional hours in training and improving skills. In 1950 the labor service men adopted the elephant as their 

emblem to symbolize strength and endurance; their nickname became 

Dickhäuter, “thick-skinned.”24 For their tremendous morale, pride, dedication, and discipline, as well as consummate skill, they won the praise of 

the Americans who worked with them.25

The ENGCOM structure permitted the labor service and civilian 

labor groups to be employed quickly and effectively to support contract 

construction, as they had previously supported troop construction. 

Furthermore, troop units and the labor service units could be assigned 

to a project together, with troops doing the initial site preparation and 

roughing in a structure and the labor service troops finishing the project.26

Facilities Engineers

Before the creation of the Engineer Command, district engineers, 

working under the eleven commanders of military districts in West 

Germany, provided support for the military installations used by the U.S. 

Army and Air Force. The district commanders in turn had reported to the 

Army Area Command in Munich, whose deputy chief of staff for installations had supervised all activities connected with facilities engineering. 

After 1966–1967, district engineers reported to the director of facilities 

at ENGCOM headquarters and came under the immediate authority of 

the ENGCOM commander, who endorsed their efficiency reports.27 The 

engineers liked the centralization of resources in the Engineer Command 

because it allowed them to establish uniform criteria for ranking projects 

across USAREUR. Moreover, the weight of ENGCOM’s authority made 

the resources needed to accomplish an approved task more readily available to the district engineer.

The Engineer Command set rationalization and standardization as its 

goals. At its recommendation, USAREUR approved a plan for establishing 

priorities among competing demands for work on repair and utilities projects. Facilities and activities were divided into four categories—operational, tactical, recreational, and administrative—and assigned priority to the 
148

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

first two categories. It then set six levels of urgency within each category, 

which helped district engineers prepare annual work plans with some 

uniform benchmarks. ENGCOM also set standards for materials used in 

repair and replacement, whether the work was done by contract, in-house 

personnel, or engineer troops.28

ENGCOM’s efforts to centralize decision making and to standardize criteria were similar to the attempt launched in the late 1940s by 

EUCOM’s chief engineer, Brig. Gen. Don G. Shingler, to centralize planning for maintenance and repair throughout the his command. Like 

Shingler, ENGCOM organized mobile technical teams that included electrical, mechanical, and civil engineers. Teams in both periods traveled to 

districts to offer assistance at the local level.29

The structure of the Engineer Command allowed its leaders to manage the limited resources available to USAREUR during the 1960s and 

early 1970s. The command combined engineer troops, contract authority, 

and facilities engineers, thus bringing to military communities in Europe 

a range of assets that facilitated effective organization, comprehensive 

planning, and standardization. The combination made possible more 

effective delivery of engineer services with fewer people and at lower cost 

than in the past.30

The Changing Environment in Europe

As Colonel Young worked to establish the Engineer Command, 

USAREUR wrestled with two major developments that conditioned its 

operations. The first was dramatic and relatively short-lived: France’s decision to leave NATO. The second was the growing American involvement 

in Southeast Asia and pressures from within the United States to reduce 

the financial drain of a large troop commitment in Europe. This development proved to be more consequential and had longer-lasting effects.

Freloc Mission

In March 1966 French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew all 

French military forces from NATO and stipulated that any foreign forces 

remaining on French soil on 1 April 1967 would come under French 

military authority and command. Faced with subordination to French 

military authority, the United States and other NATO members decided to 

relocate their military units from France. The U.S. removal bore the name 

Operation Freloc, for Fast RELOCation.

A major element in the relocation was how to allocate management of 

USAREUR’s stocks and logistical activities, all of which were being concentrated in West Germany. The Communication Zone (COMZ) in France 

had handled all logistical and area support for U.S. forces; USAREUR concluded that it should absorb the Army Area Command, which handled 

similar functions in Germany from its headquarters in Munich. On 1 July 

1967, COMZ headquarters moved from Orleans, France, to Worms, West 
149

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

Germany, and took over the responsibilities of the Army Area Command. 

Exactly one year later, with no change of mission, COMZ was redesignated the Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM).31

The redeployment of American personnel and resources from France 

in Freloc involved moving about 30,000 troops and 40,000 civilians 

from nearly 200 military installations. Both the Army and the Air Force 

required new or expanded facilities to accommodate the units and the 

equipment that would be transferred, principally to Belgium and West 

Germany.32 In preparation for constructing new facilities, ENGCOM 

dispatched staff members to France. The deputy chief of construction, 

Jacques Bouchereau, traveled with cost estimator Hasso Damm to see the 

buildings that would be vacated and to estimate the size and probable 

cost of replacement facilities.33

One especially tedious project that fell to ENGCOM involved taking inventory, segregating, packaging, and storing pieces of prefabricated buildings that had been dismantled and removed from locations in 

France. Command leaders protested that the costs involved would exceed 

the value of the materials salvaged, but the order remained in effect. The 

first assessment undertaken addressed 302 prefabricated ammunition 

storage huts shipped to Karlsruhe. As ENGCOM personnel predicted, 

the cost of the work was twice the value of the materials saved. Similar 

work indicated that parts from several types of buildings had been mixed 

together when they were disassembled and shipped.34

Army engineers built depots like this one in Hanau to store equipment arriving in 

Germany as U.S. troops moved out of France.
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

Initially, USAREUR assigned ENGCOM sixteen construction projects 

funded at $18.6 million under the program for Military Construction, 

Army. This included $5 million to provide 873,000 square feet of storage 

and other support facilities in Germany. To accommodate the supplies 

and ammunition stored along the line of communications in France, the 

command expanded depot facilities, including controlled-humidity storage warehouses in Germersheim, Nahbollenbach, and Pirmasens. Design 

and construction also proceeded on new command facilities in Stuttgart 

to accommodate the headquarters staff of the United States European 

Command (USEUCOM) and in Worms for COMZ.

The relocation of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, 

Europe (SHAPE), to Brussels generated a number of construction projects, 

including a house for the supreme allied commander, General Lyman L. 

Lemnitzer; a headquarters building; and a school complex for the children 

of U.S. military and civilian employees. The Belgians, eager to accommodate the incoming military staffs and families, worked to make it possible 

to open the school for the 1967–1968 academic year.

ENGCOM assigned Bouchereau, deputy chief of construction and 

responsible for estimating, as project engineer for the school in Belgium 

because of his experience in both engineering and construction and his 

fluency in French. To speed decisions, the Department of Defense sent 

the assistant secretary for construction, Evan Harrington, to Frankfurt, 

where Fraint and his staff rushed to draft design specifications and preliminary floor plans. Harrington approved the basic design on the spot, 

and Bouchereau delivered the plans to the Belgian government, which 

contracted with an architect-engineer firm to adapt the design to the site. 

With the help of a Belgian realtor, Bouchereau located an appropriate 

site—an apple orchard outside the small community of Sterrebeek, five 

miles from the center of Brussels—and then negotiated for and bought the 

property on behalf of the U.S. government.

Clearing began on the site before the Belgian government realized 

that Bouchereau had acquired title to the land in fee simple; that is, the 

property owner had surrendered absolute possession of the fourteen 

acres. Individuals do not exercise sovereignty over their property, but a 

country does; thus sovereignty over this property passed with the title 

to the United States. It was an oversight the Belgians would not repeat. 

In the government-to-government agreements negotiated in 1968, the 

Belgian government insisted on a clause specifying that all land used by 

the United States for its military forces remain the property of Belgium. 

As late as 1992 the acreage on which the American school sat in Sterrebeek 

remained the only piece of land in Europe that belonged in full title as 

sovereign territory to the United States.

Bouchereau headed the ENGCOM resident office set up in Brussels 

to oversee projects in Belgium, including the school complex and a dental clinic to be built at the same site. The school complex had to be made 

completely self-sufficient, with a heating plant, transformer station, water 

chlorinating station, and sewage plant. The school complex consisted of 
151

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

a two-story elementary school; a high school building; a gymnasium; a 

sports field; and a one-story structure combining administrative offices, 

cafeteria, library, kitchen, and shops. The final design for the school was 

completed in two months. A Dutch company, Strabed, began construction 

in July 1967 and used 55,000 square feet of prefabricated reinforced concrete panels to hold construction costs to $1.6 million. The school opened 

in October.35

New construction for the relocation also involved creating a headquarters facility for the U.S. European Command, which since 1954 had 

been located in France with SHAPE. When SHAPE moved to Belgium, 

USEUCOM moved to Stuttgart and the Seventh Army headquarters 

moved to Heidelberg to share space with USAREUR. ENGCOM also managed the construction of the command center for USEUCOM at Patch 

Barracks in Stuttgart.

The command and control center—informally referred to as C2 (Csquared)—was a three-story building with wings to the east and to the 

west constructed with a welded steel frame and reinforced concrete. For 

reasons of physical and electronic security, the main building, 54,370 

square feet of floor space, had only one window. The electronic equipment 

needed for intelligence work and to exercise command and control was 

housed on the first floor and shielded to prevent hostile monitoring of 

electromagnetic signals. The main building also featured a two-story situation room with a command balcony and an eight-screen projection wall 

furnished with the most sophisticated audiovisual equipment available. 

The west wing contained the computers that processed intelligence information. The east wing contained the support systems. Pneumatic tubes 

connected all the stations within the building and other sites in the headquarters complex. To accommodate heavy demand for electronic support, 

the facility was equipped with two backup diesel generators.36

Design for the C2 project began in November 1966; ground was broken on 10 May 1967; and by 13 October ENGCOM and USEUCOM celebrated the “roofing-in” of the building with a Richtfest, the old German 

construction ceremony. The C2 Richtfest honored the construction crews, 

which included men from seven nations, and the engineers, all of whom 

had worked sixty-hour weeks to enclose the structure before winter. The 

workers installed the heating plant ahead of schedule, so work continued 

uninterrupted throughout the winter. John Shadday oversaw the project 

for ENGCOM. USEUCOM’s liaison officer for the project was an infantry 

colonel who insisted that the military users make prompt decisions and 

drove them by threatening to make the decisions for them if they delayed. 

The center became operational in July 1968, eliciting commendations for 

ENGCOM for rapid completion of the project.37

On 31 March 1967, eight hours before de Gaulle’s deadline, U.S. forces 

completed the evacuation of personnel and materiel from France. With 

the approval of the French, a small residual force remained behind to 

complete the liquidation of U.S. assets and to support U.S. dependents 

authorized to remain until the end of the school year or until completion 
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

of facilities in Belgium. By the end of 1967 the U.S. Army had closed all 

installations in France except facilities associated with the oil pipeline. 

Under agreements negotiated in April 1967, the pipeline remained available for both American and French use. Civilian contractors operated the 

facility, and the French government provided security. The United States 

retained the right to inspect the pipeline, accompanied by French officials, 

four times a year.38

The work that resulted from the movement of U.S. forces was not 

over once the troops were relocated. Nor was all of it as satisfying as 

the American school in Belgium or the command and control center for 

USEUCOM in Stuttgart. Still, Colonel Young was proud of his command’s 

efforts. “We really did a great job.... Because we had put everybody, all 

the engineers, under one commander ... we could move fast and effectively in using resources.”39

Rethinking the Commitment to Europe

While ENGCOM struggled to integrate the various engineer 

resources into an effective command and responded to the challenges 

of Freloc, political pressures in the United States mounted that would 

influence Army engineer activities for many years. Since the beginning 

of the 1960s the United States carried a balance-of-payments deficit 

with the Federal Republic of Germany, prompting a growing American 

political sentiment that the Germans ought to bear a greater share of 

the financial burden for their own defense. Senator Mike Mansfield 

(D-Montana) advanced this argument in August 1966 when he first 

introduced his Sense of the Senate Resolution calling for a reduction 

in U.S. forces in Germany. For the next several years the call to remove 

U.S. troops from Germany sounded annually in the Senate, intensified 

by the increasing burden of the conflict in Vietnam. These pressures 

led the Department of Defense to withdraw about 35,000 U.S. troops 

and 28,000 dependents from Germany between late 1967 and the end 

of 1968. The West German government, although nervous about the 

troop withdrawals, acquiesced.40

Concerned that the withdrawals not send a message of weakness or 

lack of resolve to either the Europeans or the Soviets, the Department 

of Defense devised a strategy called dual basing. Under this arrangement troops stationed in the United States would be airlifted each year 

for training in West Germany with NATO army groups. The Reforger

(REturn of FORces to GERmany) exercises were designed both to enhance 

the military capabilities of the U.S. and allied forces and to reassure the 

NATO participants of the firm U.S. commitment to the alliance.41

While the withdrawals took place and U.S. defense planners initiated Reforger, the West German government accepted an arrangement to 

help offset the costs of the U.S. military presence in Germany by buying 

$500 million in medium-term treasury certificates. The arrangements to 

fund modernization of facilities used by the U.S. military represented one 
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Engineer Command, 1966–1974

additional effort in a long line of offset agreements. Undertaken by the 

West German government, these arrangements became a recurring part 

of USAREUR’s operations and provided substantial Deutschmark (DM) 

funds for military construction during the 1970s. (See below in this chapter, 

as well as Chapter 11.)

Workload and Funding

ENGCOM applied the combined resources of troop construction, 

contract construction, and facilities engineering to manage work under 

the NATO Common Infrastructure Program, a full array of military construction for the Army on projects ranging from airfields to schools to 

washracks, and work under the Alternate Construction Program.

In summer 1968 ENGCOM had more than 400 active projects with an 

estimated value of $198 million under contract in various stages of design 

and construction. Forty contracts were for Air Force projects and seven 

for NATO infrastructure projects; twenty contracts represented facilities 

under the Alternate Construction Program with funds provided by the 

Federal Republic of Germany.42 Army construction occupied the largest 

percentage of ENGCOM’s efforts, a total of ninety-two projects with an 

estimated value of over $20 million.43 (See Table 3.)

Troop construction under ENGCOM accounted for 196 projects that 

had a value of only $5.7 million. This did not include the operation and 

maintenance work performed by troops in support of the district and 

community (post) engineers. Although the dollar value of this work was 

low, the involvement of troops in construction gave the command flexibility in carrying out its mission.44

Dozens of ENGCOM construction projects qualified for funding under 

the NATO Common Infrastructure Program. These projects included 

some of the facilities built in Belgium to accommodate the move of NATO 

headquarters from France; many of the Hawk missile sites built in the 

1960s and 1970s; aircraft shelters; and facilities for U.S. forces assigned to 

NATO in Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.45

During the 1950s the United States had willingly advanced the money 

for the construction of military facilities rather than waiting for NATO 

budgetary approval. In the 1960s the practice of prefinancing declined, 

because of U.S. concern about gold outflow and the financial demands of 

the Vietnam War. The U.S. government wanted NATO to finance infrastructure projects from the start, but the NATO funding process involved 

long and very complicated negotiations to get the unanimous approval of 

the NATO member states required for each project.

In 1969 ENGCOM established a branch in the Office of the Comptroller 

to recover funds from NATO for projects that had been prefinanced with 

U.S. dollars. Headed by an American civilian, the NATO Recoupment 

Branch initially included three German civilians, although this number grew as the volume of work increased. The work of this group was 

enormously complicated by a fire in November 1968 when papers were 
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charred, damaged by water, or lost entirely. The recoupment staff had to 

develop regulations, policies, and procedures to govern its work. They 

also had to pay painstaking attention to detail and complete numerous 

NATO forms. It took years before the staff’s efforts led to the recovery of 

significant amounts of money.46

ENGCOM also discharged the task of developing and negotiating 

all the alternate construction agreements for USAREUR. Once Germany 

and the United States signed an agreement, ENGCOM provided the 

German construction agency, the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical 

Construction Working Group), with a scope of work on which to base 

design and construction. Lower-echelon offices such as the Landesabteilung

(State Construction Division) or the Finanzbauamt (Office of Finance for 

Construction) eventually produced preliminary designs for review by 

ENGCOM’s Engineering Directorate, a construction contract, and a finished project. The process involved two parallel operations: a contract 

between ENGCOM and the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe and then contracts 

between the Finanzbauamt and an architect-engineer firm (for design) and 

a contractor (for construction). The process demanded significant staff 

time.47

All of ENGCOM’s programs involved real estate. To monitor this 

dimension of the projects, the command maintained a Real Estate Division 

with regional offices covering Germany, France, Italy (excluding Naples 

and Sicily), and the Benelux countries. After the relocation of U.S. forces 

from France, responsibilities there consisted only of leases with private 

French contractors to manage and operate the petroleum pipeline that the 

United States had built across France.48

Securing real estate became an ever more difficult task. West 

Germany’s booming economy, the presence of armed forces from several 

nations, and a growing environmental sensitivity all created pressures on 

Table 3

Military Construction for the Army

June 1968

Project Type Number

Operational facilities 10

Commercial facilities 31

Maintenance 1

Storage 15

Airfields (Army) 9

Administrative and community 26

Total 92

Source: “Briefing for LTG Cassidy,” 17 June 1968.
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Engineer Command, 1966–1974

land use. During the early 1970s continued talk in the U.S. Senate about 

reducing forces in Europe, as well as meetings of the major powers to 

discuss detente in international politics, also made it difficult for many 

Germans to understand why the Americans needed more land.49 By 1973 

the Real Estate Division was hampered by having German employees in 

positions where a familiarity with U.S. policies, procedures, and concepts 

constituted major criteria for the work. ENGCOM lacked the funds to discharge its real estate mission. Indeed, it faced a budget gap for fiscal year 

1974 of $115,000 just to cover the salaries of existing staff.50

Projects

The pressures created by Operation Freloc strained the Engineer 

Command’s capabilities; but the elements drawn into the new command worked effectively together, and Young won the confidence of the 

employees. General O’Meara, who left USAREUR in March 1967, pressed 

to have Young promoted to brigadier general, intending that he remain as 

ENGCOM commander.51 Young’s name appeared on the promotion list, 

but he did not remain in Europe. The chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Frederick 

J. Clarke, selected him to organize the new Huntsville Division of the 

Corps of Engineers, which was to design and construct the Sentinel/

Safeguard ballistic missile systems. Young was promoted to brigadier 

general in September 1967 and left Europe the next month.52

Young’s successor as commander, Kenneth W. Kennedy, 

was also on the August 1967 

promotion list, but he arrived 

in Germany on October 17 as 

a colonel. Kennedy had served 

two tours in repairs and utilities positions; ENGCOM was 

his first assignment in Central 

Europe. Kennedy’s promotion to 

brigadier general came in March 

1968.53

The Boiler Conversion Program

Upon assuming command, 

Colonel Kennedy immediately 

received directions to give high 

priority to a specific problem. 

On his first day in Germany, he 

received a message from General 

James H. Polk, O’Meara’s successor as commander in chief 

of USAREUR, instructing him 

General Kennedy (right) with Chief of 

Engineers Lt. Gen. William F. Cassidy in 

June 1968
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

to make a special effort to improve troop facilities. Ten days later the 

USAREUR engineer, Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley, wrote Kennedy about the 

heating systems in the barracks. An attachment to Kelley’s letter bore 

the typed message, “It can be expected that the commander in chief will 

verify completion status during field trips throughout the command.” 

To that Kelley added the handwritten note, “Strong CINC [commander in 

chief] interest!”54 The need to modernize heating equipment in American 

facilities in Europe was the first of several major maintenance problems that 

Kennedy faced.

Most of the buildings used by U.S. troops since the occupation 

had been built for the German Army before World War II; many of 

them dated back to the turn of the century. Heating equipment in the 

facilities dated from the 1930s. By the 1960s the cast-iron boiler design 

typical of these systems was antiquated, and repairs were difficult and 

expensive. Although the boilers were designed to burn Ruhr coal, by 

the early 1960s they were all fired with anthracite coal imported from 

the United States, which had different mineral properties. Political pressures from the American coal lobby and economic pressures over the 

outflow of gold reserves from the U.S. Treasury combined to persuade 

President John F. Kennedy to order the U.S. Army to use American 

coal in Europe. Kennedy’s presidential order added about $1 million a 

year to USAREUR’s maintenance budget and, because the anthracite 

coal—owing to its properties—burned poorly in the German boilers, 

further decreased the efficiency of the existing heating systems. Because 

USAREUR consistently received inadequate money for routine maintenance, the equipment continued to deteriorate. In 1964 the Engineer 

Element had proposed converting to oil-burning furnaces throughout 

Germany. The Department of the Army rejected the proposal but suggested that USAREUR submit requests to convert individual heating 

plants.55

In addition to the boilers, the military in Europe also used hundreds 

of single-room coal-fired space heaters to warm troop billets, latrines, 

mess halls, and work areas. In September 1964 USAREUR authorized a 

“repair by replacement” plan to systematically eliminate all space heaters over a five-year period. In March 1967 General O’Meara declared that 

he wanted the job completed before the next winter. In addition to being 

inefficient, the space heaters were a major cause of fires in European 

buildings.56

Kenneth Kennedy inherited a replacement plan for space heaters but 

had no comparable plan for replacing the central heating boilers. In fact, 

ENGCOM did not even have an accurate count of how many boilers the 

military operated. Kennedy therefore ordered an inventory of almost 800 

U.S. installations and learned that the military operated some 10,000 lowpressure boilers of various capacities. The equipment included forty-four 

different German makes and models, 90 percent of them outmoded.57

With this new information, ENGCOM launched a plan early in 1968 to 

modernize all heating equipment used in USAREUR installations. The 
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Engineer Command, 1966–1974

command centralized approval 

of boiler replacement and used 

salvage stock on hand, including 

oil-fired boilers recovered from 

France during Freloc to replace 

worn-out coal-burning boilers in 

Germany.58

Coal-fired boilers had the 

additional disadvantage of being 

labor-intensive in a scarce labor 

market. Because coal-fired boilers needed to be stoked, they 

required 60 percent more hours 

of labor than oil-fired boilers. 

The ENGCOM roster listed 

5,000 boiler-firemen, jobs filled 

primarily by Germans. The 

older German firemen who had 

worked since the 1940s were 

retiring by the late 1960s, and 

few younger men wanted the 

backbreaking job. Budgetary 

pressures persuaded Kennedy 

to mandate that the number 

of Germans on his payroll be reduced by 20 percent. To achieve the 

reduction and still keep the boilers heated, Kennedy persuaded Polk in 

September 1968 to allow the use of troops to fuel the boiler fires.59

ENGCOM personnel were not surprised when inexperienced troops 

damaged the antiquated boilers. Once damaged, a coal-burning boiler 

automatically became eligible for replacement with an oil-burning boiler. 

Replacing the old German boilers with steel boilers manufactured in the 

United States increased efficiency and economy in heating, eliminated the 

need for firemen, helped the American balance of payments, modernized 

heating facilities, and reduced long-term expenditures for maintenance.60

The 6970th LS/CLG played a key role in the entire program to convert heating plants. Kennedy organized U.S. soldiers into teams to work 

with the labor service units. By April 1970 ENGCOM had thirteen boiler 

conversion teams in the field, nine made up of enlisted men on loan 

from USAREUR troop units.61 The teams made good progress, but cuts in 

ENGCOM’s maintenance budget and a congressionally mandated moratorium on conversion to oil-burning boilers imposed on 12 October 1972 

made completion of the program impossible.62 The program had converted less than half of the 8,755 boilers still in use when it was suspended.63

In 1972 Kennedy’s successor had to procure a small stock of U.S.-manufactured coal-fired boilers to replace those that inevitably broke down. In 

late 1973, in the face of the oil crisis brought on by the Arab-Israeli War, 

USAREUR’s staff considered converting back to coal.64

Coal-fired boilers, like this one at Warner 

Barracks in Bamberg, were prevalent in the 

1960s and 1970s.
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Stem to Stern Renovations

The high priority that General Polk placed on boiler conversion only 

highlighted the antiquated state of the facilities out of which the U.S. military operated in Germany. The newest buildings, constructed specifically 

to accommodate the augmentation of U.S. forces in the early 1950s, had 

been designed as temporary structures. Built to austerity standards, with 

a life expectancy from five to fifteen years, they were at the end of their 

functional usefulness. The balance of the facilities, taken over from the 

German military, dated from before 1939 and was even more run down.

For years USAREUR had lacked the money and the personnel for 

routine building maintenance. The repair and utilities budget equaled the 

programmed requirements in only one year between 1956 and 1964; the 

engineers could not even maintain the minimum standards prescribed by 

Army regulations.65 As resources increasingly flowed to Vietnam, facilities in Europe deteriorated further. While the Pacific Theater spent $523 

per square foot for repair and utilities and posts in the continental United 

States averaged $384 per square foot, USAREUR had only $193 per square 

foot for Germany.66

By the late 1960s troop barracks in Europe were in shockingly deplorable condition. Electrical systems and heating equipment failed regularly. 

The high mineral content of the water clogged the plumbing systems, frequently leading to broken pipes. Mildew was rampant in the dank shower 

rooms. Latrines drained through piping embedded in masonry walls. 

When a leak developed in a latrine pipe, the entire barracks smelled of 

urine. One officer recalled wryly, “you never had to tell the new recruits 

where the latrines were.... [Conditions were] worse than a prison.”67

In March 1966, to address the worst casernes, General O’Meara had 

earmarked about $5 million of year-end funds for use by the Engineer 

Element. Because the Army engineers received the funds late in the fiscal 

year, they had no chance to plan the repairs or to target the most critical 

situations. As a result, only eleven casernes received piecemeal attention.68

General Kennedy resolved to attack the problem more systematically, and he developed a plan to renovate troop barracks and mess halls 

sequentially. When he discussed the plan with one of the colonels in the 

USAREUR engineer’s office in Heidelberg, the officer agreed that the 

command needed to repair barracks and casernes “from stem to stern,” 

a characterization that became the label for the program.69 To launch the 

Stem to Stern program, ENGCOM asked the district engineers to assemble data on their facilities and prepare plans to renovate latrines, showers, 

and mess halls. To keep costs down, he instructed them to use their own 

in-house design capabilities. Kennedy then committed year-end funds 

from fiscal 1967 to carry out these plans.70

The construction engineers from ENGCOM headquarters conducted a 

complete survey of Sullivan Barracks in Mannheim, and Kennedy ordered 

labor service troops to gut the building—replumb, rewire, and rebuild it 

floor by floor.71 ENGCOM’s Engineering Directorate identified Lucas and 
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Engineer Command, 1966–1974

Associates in Rome as an architect-engineer firm with experience doing 

work on repair and utilities for the military. In January 1968 ENGCOM 

contracted with this firm to survey six other casernes—three from the 

Seventh Army’s V Corps area and three from VII Corps—and prepare 

designs for their complete renovation. With year-end funds from fiscal 

year 1968, ENGCOM began renovating four casernes. ENGCOM signed a 

second contract with Lucas to survey another nine casernes.72

By December 1968 the Stem to Stern program was far enough along 

that, ironically, Kennedy began to get criticism about its slowness. The 

commanding general of V Corps complained about the slow pace of work 

in his area, but Kennedy replied that projects in V Corps were “the first to 

be let for construction.” He explained that to take advantage of year-end 

funds, surveys of conditions, design, and the award of $6 million in contracts had to be completed in only four months. The Army’s program to 

limit the outflow of U.S. gold also required contractors to order such items 

as floor tiles from the United States, further delaying the work. Despite 

these problems, Kennedy cited progress on the mess halls at Rivers 

Barracks in Giessen and at McPheeters Barracks in Bad Hersfeld and on 

four barracks buildings at Downs Barracks in Fulda.73 Kennedy hoped 

that commanders would understand that a systematic program such as 

Stem to Stern meant that at some point all facilities would be renovated. 

Of course, the U.S. military operated nearly 800 installations throughout 

Germany. At the rate of three—or even ten—a year, it could be a long 

wait.

As work under the Stem to Stern program continued, the ENGCOM 

staff codified their experiences. Kennedy asked the design engineers to 

prepare standard plans and specifications room by room so that the plans 

could be given to district and community (post) engineers for adaptation 

at any facility. ENGCOM headquarters also prepared lists of materials for 

faster and more accurate procurement. These standardizations had only 

limited value, because buildings varied from caserne to caserne and even 

within a single caserne.74

With the war in Southeast Asia continuing, money remained a problem for ENGCOM. By early 1969 the backlog of essential maintenance 

and repair reached $150 million, and Kennedy expected a reduction in 

the ENGCOM budget for fiscal year 1970. The staff continued to dwindle, 

making it difficult even to maintain the utility systems in place.75

Given the process for financing Stem to Stern work, ENGCOM could 

not make the best use of the money it received. Most of the money came 

at the end of the year from segments of USAREUR that wanted to commit 

unspent money before it reverted to the U.S. Treasury. ENGCOM always 

had a backlog of unfinanced projects, but it received the supplementary 

money very near the end of the fiscal year (30 June). This timing meant 

that the summer construction season was already well under way, activity 

was intense, and prices for contracts were correspondingly high. Year-end 

dollars thus produced fewer improvements than the command could have 

gained if it could have placed contracts during the winter.76
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

By the end of fiscal year 1969, the program had undertaken work at 

seventy-seven barracks buildings and nineteen mess halls, less than 10 

percent of the facilities that needed attention. Nine months later, by the 

spring of 1970, Stem to Stern had spent $32 million for projects at about 

twenty casernes. Kennedy estimated that, at the current rate of repair, correcting two decades of neglect would take at least another fifteen years. 

He calculated that the program would require an additional $240 million 

for standard renovation and an additional $333 million to improve supporting utility systems. Kennedy readily acknowledged that Congress 

was unlikely to approve the money, certainly not “until the permanency 

of U.S. forces in Germany is settled once and for all.”77 It is startling in retrospect to realize that, after twenty-five years of the U.S. military presence 

in Germany, permanency remained an issue.

The Stem to Stern program and the deplorable conditions in the barracks began to attract attention in Washington. On a command visit in the 

spring of 1971, the Army chief of staff, General William C. Westmoreland, 

inspected renovated barracks. After the tour Westmoreland turned to 

Kennedy and asked, “Why don’t you do this faster?”78 At one point the 

general saw huge quantities of black smoke belching from the heating 

plant at Ferris Barracks in Erlangen. The scene convinced him of the need 

for remedial action, and he directed that ENGCOM convert the heating plant from coal to oil in spite of existing congressional restrictions. 

Within weeks of Westmoreland’s visit, ENGCOM received orders from 

USAREUR’s deputy commander in chief, Lt. Gen. Arthur S. Collins, Jr.: 

“As a first priority ... undertake a massive project for the rehabilitation of 

troop facilities to include messhalls [sic], sanitary facilities, and heating.”79

Between June 1968 and April 1972 USAREUR put more than $50 million 

into ENGCOM’s Stem to Stern program.80

TAB VEE Program

A third priority program for ENGCOM grew out of experiences in 

Vietnam and in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 that highlighted the vulnerability of aircraft parked on the ground. If the Soviet Union launched 

an attack, even conventional weapons could destroy a good portion of 

American air power in Europe. The Air Force therefore initiated a new 

building program that ENGCOM managed. Called TAB VEE (Theater Air 

Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise), the program aimed to improve 

runways and provide shelter for aircraft at air bases in Germany, Holland, 

and Turkey.81 The designers assigned one fighter aircraft to each hangar, 

which consisted of simply constructed concrete walls on three sides and 

a slightly arched concrete roof. The hangars did not have doors, but they 

were located in a nonuniform pattern to minimize flak and blast damage. 

Earthen berms were placed against the walls in some instances, and roofs 

were painted in camouflage colors.82

TAB VEE construction began as a crash program in June 1968. The 

first projects involved improvements to the pavement in Ramstein, 
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Engineer Command, 1966–1974

Bitburg, and Hahn. Seven months after the start, the first aircraft shelters began to go up at Ramstein Air Base. By late 1968 the Air Force had 

won strong support in Washington for TAB VEE, and the estimate for 

future construction placement under the program jumped from $10 million to $50 million for fiscal year 1969. At that volume it constituted more 

than 60 percent of ENGCOM’s scheduled construction placement for the 

year. TAB VEE remained a high-volume project for all of 1968 and 1969. 

It contributed to a record-breaking workload in design for February 1969, 

embracing 153 projects and an estimated construction cost of $129 million.83 By January 1971 the TAB VEE program had accounted for $64.6 million in construction contracts for work at air bases in Ramstein, Sembach, 

Bitburg, Spangdahlem, Hahn, Erding, and Zweibrücken in Germany; 

Soesterberg in Holland; Aviano in Italy; and Incirlik in Turkey. By April 

1972 ENGCOM had constructed 324 TAB VEE aircraft shelters.84

In high-priority programs such as TAB VEE it is commonplace to award 

contracts before final drawings and specifications are available. Although 

accustomed to that practice, the engineers still found the Air Force’s initial specifications for TAB VEE distressingly imprecise. Furthermore, 

the requirements changed frequently as the program progressed, delaying completion dates and escalating costs.85 ENGCOM’s Construction 

Directorate had to respond to the Air Force’s objections to these delays at 

the same time that it tried to maintain surveillance over construction projects and manage the indirect contracting. When the Air Force complained 

about the charges that ENGCOM levied to manage the program, General 

Kennedy flew to Washington to explain the complexities of indirect contracting and to defend ENGCOM’s management of the program.86

ENGCOM Headquarters

An unexpected event interrupted ENGCOM’s activities. In midNovember 1968 the two-story wood-frame building that housed command headquarters burned to the ground.87 Built immediately after the 

war on the grounds of the I. G. Farben complex in Frankfurt, Annex B 

was designed with a central spine and six wings off the back of the spine. 

Although up to four people shared an office, every room had a window 

and trees surrounded the building. Some staff considered it a pleasant 

working environment; many regarded the building as a firetrap.

In November 1967 there had been a fire on the first floor beneath 

Kennedy’s office. Flames burned through the floor between stories, and 

the desk used by Kennedy’s sergeant major fell through to the floor below. 

After the fire was extinguished, gas cans were found in the area. Kennedy 

and others suspected arson, but there was no proof.88

A year later contractors were performing routine maintenance in the 

building. About 8:00 p.m. on 13 November, Kennedy received the news at 

his residence in Bad Vilbel of a fire. When he arrived at ENGCOM headquarters, one end of the building was blazing; fire fighters from Frankfurt 

had an inadequate supply of water and were losing the battle to extin-
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

guish the flames. As the fire burned, Kennedy and other staff members 

ran ahead of the flames, throwing files and office equipment out the windows. Local newspapers called it the biggest fire in Frankfurt since World 

War II. By 4:00 a.m. the building was gone; workers who arrived in the 

morning saw only the shell.

A skeleton staff crowded into a few rooms in V Corps headquarters 

and hurriedly arranged to lease an abandoned four-story factory building 

near the Messe (market building) in Frankfurt as temporary headquarters. 

Labor service troops cleaned the leased building and installed new boilers 

so operations could continue.

Kennedy wanted a new building for the command. USAREUR’s commander, General Polk, was skeptical that the Department of the Army 

would approve funds. To make his case, Kennedy flew to Washington 

and met with the chief of engineers and officials at the Pentagon. They 

approved a new building that was somewhat smaller than Kennedy had 

wanted. Jacques Bouchereau coordinated design and construction of the 

building, a three-story rectangular design featuring large open spaces and 

few private offices. German contractors were encouraged to “do something good for Engineer Command” in calculating costs.89 The completed 

building of pre-cast concrete cost about $12 per square foot, a reasonable 

rate at the time.

Groundbreaking for the new headquarters was held on Thursday, 

3 July 1969. Building 31 was completed, except for outside paving and 

landscaping, on 15 January 1970. The day after an opening ceremony the 

staff moved in. For the first time the Army engineers in Europe had a new 

building that they did not share with any other organization.

Ammunition Storage Projects

One of the programs that continued under ENGCOM involved safe 

storage for ammunition. Attention to ammunition storage intensified as 

economic and demographic pressures moved the German population 

closer to U.S. military facilities.90 By early 1968 seven storage projects 

approved as a part of the NATO budget for 1963 had reached varying 

stages of completion. One site remained behind the rest because of problems between the Federal Republic and the state of Hesse concerning the 

real estate rights for an access road.91 Work on ammunition storage sites 

frequently involved removing and disposing of old ammunition, an operation that the German government insisted on controlling and for which 

its officials could find only one willing contractor.92

Incidents of terrorism in West Germany in the early 1970s prompted 

both NATO and the United States to consider the vulnerability of their 

ammunition storage facilities and to launch a program to improve security. The 59th Ordnance Brigade, commanded by Maj. Daniel Waldo, Jr., 

surveyed the storage sites in Europe north of the Alps and recommended 

installation of new security towers and fences. In late 1972 ENGCOM’s 

commander anticipated needing $1 million in fiscal year 1973 to address 
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Engineer Command, 1966–1974

the critical requirements identified by the Ordnance Brigade’s surveys. 

When planning began for the fiscal year 1974 budget, the command projected a construction program of nearly $13 million. Construction would 

extend into fiscal year 1977 and equip fifty-one sites with anti-intrusion 

devices, special fencing, guard towers, and lighting. The program, which 

continued to grow after 1974, was subsequently labeled the Long Range 

Security Program.93

Challenges in the 1970s

General Kennedy completed his tour as commander of the Engineer 

Command in June 1971 and retired. His successor, Brig. Gen. Carroll 

N. LeTellier, a graduate of the Citadel, had served in Germany between 

1956 and 1959 and again in 1966 and 1967 when he commanded the 10th 

Engineer Battalion in Kitzingen.94 ENGCOM’s first commander, Colonel 

Young (later Major General), recruited LeTellier to replace the retiring 

Col. A. Darby Williams as deputy commander and chief of contract construction of ENGCOM. LeTellier arrived in Frankfurt in October 1967, just 

as Young was leaving. LeTellier served first as chief of the Construction 

Directorate of ENGCOM and then from May to August 1968 as director of troop operations. In August 1968 LeTellier volunteered for a tour 

in Vietnam. In June 1971 he was promoted to brigadier general; the next 

month he assumed command of ENGCOM.95

When LeTellier returned to ENGCOM as commander, he found an 

organization that had more than 570 design and construction projects 

General LeTellier and His Staff in the Early 1970s
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

with an in-place construction value of $434 million. The Vietnam War, 

budget restrictions, and difficulties in recruiting, however, had reduced 

the workforce to about 19,000 (a drop of about 2,000).96

The command continued to face strong outside criticism. Community 

commanders still resented having to go outside their own staff for 

approval of construction on their installations. LeTellier believed strongly 

in ENGCOM’s centralized authority and in its consolidation of engineer 

resources. To counter the criticism and promote a more positive self-image 

within ENGCOM, LeTellier used the command’s fifth anniversary as the 

occasion to set up an ad hoc committee to review the past and project a 

five-year plan. He observed that ENGCOM had “developed habits and 

procedures through managing one crisis after another, sudden releases 

and sudden withdrawals of funds, [and] continuous reorganization studies involving roles and missions.”97 LeTellier hoped that the long-range 

plan would help the command move beyond crisis management.

During 1965–1972 ENGCOM’s overall workload and the numbers of 

staff increased. (Table 4) By early 1972 ENGCOM had more than thirty 

NATO infrastructure projects under design, including missile installations, radio relay stations for the Nike and Hawk systems, special ammunition storage sites, controlled-humidity storage warehouses, and tactical 

and training sites. Ten other infrastructure projects with a value of about 

$2 million were already under construction.98

Between 1967 and 1970 the Alternate Construction Program, funded 

by the Federal Republic, had grown from $3.4 million to $11.8 million annually. In 1972 seven alternate construction projects were under 

design, including housing units in Mainz, Fürth, and Katterbach (near 

Table 4

Engineer Command Construction Placement and Staffing 

1965–1972

Placement and 

Personnel 1965* 1966* 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

Placement

($ million) 26.0 30.0 19.9 20.0 48.2 75.7 69.7 100.0

Staff (actual) 77 82 87 92 93 104 127 141

Temporary duty 0 0 0 0 27 25 20 0

Temporary and

over-strength 0 0 0 0 0 32 40 47

Source: EUD Graphics file

*Work conducted by the Engineer Element.
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Engineer Command, 1966–1974

Nuremberg); an access road near Giessen; and an airfield in Bonames 

near Frankfurt. Another thirty active construction projects had a value of 

about $31 million.

Modernizing U.S. Facilities

By early 1972 ENGCOM managed nearly thirty separate construction programs.99 One of the newest and largest was renovation of U.S. 

military facilities paid for by the Federal Republic of Germany. 100 From 

1945 until the activation of the Engineer Command more than twenty 

years later, improving facilities used by U.S. forces had low priority 

because of scarce resources and the predilection of local commanders 

for high-visibility projects. LeTellier termed the inclination of commanders for projects that showed visible results during their tours 

the “eighteen-month syndrome.” Plumbing, wiring, heating plants, 

and sewage lines—invisible maintenance projects that failed to garner 

much notice and thus little credit for anyone—received little attention. 

The Stem to Stern program tried to address these mundane needs, 

but it took care of one caserne at a time, with never enough money to 

improve more than a small fraction of the casernes in any one year. 

LeTellier called it a “never catch up” program.101

On 10 December 1971, the United States signed an accord with the 

Federal Republic whereby the West German government agreed as part 

of the burden sharing to contribute DM 600 million for the renovation of 

U.S. military facilities in West Germany (almost $170 million at the official exchange rate). The agreement for Modernization of U.S. Facilities 

(MOUSF) formed part of the recurrent West German effort to respond 

to pressures from the United States to offset the costs of the American 

military presence. Of the DM 600 million made available by the West 

German government, DM 576 million, or 96 percent, was designated for 

USAREUR. As a result, ENGCOM had two similar programs to administer simultaneously—Stem to Stern, which used dollars from USAREUR’s 

budget for Operations and Maintenance, Army, and MOUSF, which was 

funded with Deutschmarks.102

The Army engineers had far more freedom in using MOUSF money 

than in using appropriated dollars.103 The congressional mandate that halted the conversion of boiler/heaters from coal to oil under Stem to Stern, 

for instance, did not apply to MOUSF work. Starting in 1972 the Federal 

Republic began renovating boilers and heating plants in accordance with 

specifications and technical instructions supplied by ENGCOM.104 The distinction between dollar-funded and Deutschmark-funded work remained 

important into the 1990s. Improvements funded by dollars have residual 

value. As the U.S. military turned facilities over to the Germans, the U.S. 

government could claim compensation for dollar-funded improvements 

but not for improvements made under the MOUSF program.105

Payments for work contracted in Deutschmarks were complicated 

by the changes in the international system of exchange rates for cur-
166

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

rencies. In early August 1971 the United States abandoned gold payment on foreign-held dollars; and the value of the dollar on international money markets suddenly dropped, meaning that the dollar 

bought considerably less in German money or services. By 16 August 

ENGCOM’s comptroller, Lt. Col. John L. Buxton, had calculated that 

the command needed an additional $1.5 million to cover the increase 

in outstanding obligations and commitments associated with the 

decline in the dollar’s value.106 A second difficulty arose from the 

Army regulation that ENGCOM had to convert any money that it held 

into dollars. Because of this requirement, the command lost money 

twice when settlement of the obligation would be in Deutschmarks—

once on the exchange from marks to dollars and again on the exchange 

from dollars back to marks to pay the bill. Buxton’s deputy, Randolph 

S. Washington, proposed creating a limited deposit account for marks 

in a local bank; ENGCOM could use that account to pay German contractors doing work under any program that involved only marks. 

LeTellier supported the idea, and ENGCOM opened an account despite 

resistance in Washington.107

The tempo of modernization of facilities increased and came to represent the dominant program during most of General LeTellier’s command. 

By April 1972 ENGCOM had managed the partial renovation of 226 barracks and 26 mess halls under Stem to Stern and had placed contracts for 

another 160 barracks and 31 mess halls. In the first two years of MOUSF, 

the command completed designs on 283 barracks and 91 mess halls and 

awarded contracts for the renovation of 77 barracks. Designs were ready 

on another set of contracts for work on 251 more barracks and 74 mess 

halls under a later phase of MOUSF.108

ENGCOM quickly initiated the renovations supported by MOUSF 

funds using available designs prepared under the Stem to Stern program. 

Construction on the first MOUSF project began in January 1972, just twentytwo working days after the agreement was signed. Saul Fraint, chief of 

technical engineering, established procedures for the program, coordinated 

design development, and worked with installation personnel on construction schedules. Two architect-engineer firms (Louis Berger with offices in 

Frankfurt and McGahey, Marshall, and McMillan with offices in Italy) were 

the principal designers.109

The MOUSF program, which concentrated on barracks and dining 

facilities, did more extensive renovations than Stem to Stern, including suspending acoustical ceilings in dining facilities; completing new 

shower and latrine facilities; and installing partitions in buildings, 

facilities for washers and dryers at a ratio of one per thirty soldiers, 

and mail boxes. Utility systems were totally replaced. The dining halls 

received all new equipment, funded with dollars and purchased in the 

United States to help counter the unfavorable balance of payments. To 

minimize disruption for the troops who continued to live and work 

at the casernes during the renovations, supervisors and contractors 

had to maintain a continuous supply of utilities and shift the men and 
167

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

their equipment from one facility to another as the renovations progressed.110

As the work under MOUSF increased, Stem to Stern tapered off; 

in 1974 the program ended officially. As the money made available in 

December 1971 was progressively committed, design for future MOUSF 

projects also began to slow. In late April 1974 a second MOUSF agreement 

between the United States and the Federal Republic made DM 600 million 

available for additional renovations ($203 million at the official exchange 

rate); USAREUR received DM 503 million, about 84 percent.111

Upgrading Remote Sites

Attention shifted in the 1970s to U.S. military sites located in remote 

areas. These installations included communications sites (listening posts), 

monitoring stations along strategic borders, and missile-launching sites. 

Generally, the locations were secret as well as remote. Both staff and materials usually had to be flown in by helicopter, and regulations prohibited 

the ENGCOM staff from taking photos of the construction. The sites were 

small and their facilities sparse: a building for living quarters, sometimes 

a separate dining facility; warehouses or preparation buildings; and concrete slabs at the missile launching sites. In some locations a perimeter 

fence was not necessary. Initially, many sites did not have commercial 

power.112

Located as they were, these installations were not part of a community and did not have a network of support. ENGCOM tried to furnish 

them with modular prefabricated structures that could be transported by 

helicopter and assembled in a variety of configurations, depending on site 

conditions and need. Starting in 1968, ENGCOM began erecting low-cost 

prefabricated structures from Yugoslavia. On eight sites for the armored 

cavalry stationed around Fulda, ENGCOM erected twenty-five buildings. 

The work was deemed minor construction, and each project had a limit 

of $25,000. To stay within budget, ENGCOM eliminated floor tiles, paint, 

and other items considered optional. This sort of expedient compromise 

produced facilities sufficient to complete the mission but severe enough to 

prompt complaints from the users once the sense of urgency had passed.

In the first half of 1973, MOUSF money became available to improve 

thirty-five remote sites. ENGCOM solicited bids through the Bautechnische 

Arbeitsgruppe for prefabricated buildings at several sites; other sites called 

for construction to be done by labor service units and engineer troops. 

The improvements included barracks, dining facilities, administrative 

buildings, recreational facilities, portable toilets where there were no 

residents, and construction of external sewage and water supply systems. 

MOUSF made $16 million available to ENGCOM to acquire relocatable, 

prefabricated, air-transportable units and to install them and the utilities 

to support them. By the end of 1973 work had begun at several sites, but 

almost 90 percent of the 302 remote sites remained to be upgraded under 

later programs.113
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Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

The Phaseout

Consolidation of engineer resources under ENGCOM continued to 

meet resistance into the 1970s. The negative attitude emanated from the 

staff at USAREUR headquarters, commanders of military communities, TASCOM, and Washington. In August 1968 a member of a systems 

analysis team from the Office of the Secretary of Defense remarked on 

the “general difficulties that were being experienced in accepting the 

Engineer Command.”114 Continuing skepticism and outright hostility—often cloaked in “data” and presented in lengthy studies—could be 

traced to three facts. First, community commanders in USAREUR resented ENGCOM’s authority over engineer resources that had been available 

to them previously for work on their installations. They complained that 

they could not execute their mission effectively when important members of their staff answered to another command. Second, because the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers did not manage contract construction in 

Europe—as it did for military commands elsewhere around the globe—

ENGCOM had no advocate in Washington. Third, the distinctions 

between the services provided by ENGCOM and by TASCOM were not 

clearly delineated.

Both ENGCOM and TASCOM offered support for base operations. 

ENGCOM concentrated on the engineering functions associated with repair 

and maintenance, and TASCOM assigned facilities and retained the logistical 

and procurement functions of the earlier Communications Zone in France.115

Initially, each command operated through eleven districts in West Germany. 

In late 1968 TASCOM reduced the number of its support districts by half 

to six. (Map 12) In 1970, under pressure to conform, ENGCOM grudgingly 

reduced the number of its engineer districts, using the same boundaries as 

TASCOM. (See Map 13.) The reorganization focused on simplifying the military communities’ access to support; it also placed the headquarters of the 

support and engineer districts in the same city and, with two exceptions, in 

the same barracks or caserne. The simplification did not work. Local commanders complained that they never knew whom to call when they had a 

problem. The confusion was compounded because ENGCOM also maintained resident engineer offices to handle contract construction.116

None of ENGCOM’s positive achievements—Freloc, barracks renovation, boiler conversion, TAB VEE, remote site upgrades—changed the 

negative attitude toward the organization. In addition, a larger issue 

remained: Did USAREUR need two separate commands providing support services?

In 1971 USAREUR’s deputy chief of staff, operations, published a 

study, “Project Fender: An Examination of the Missions, Organization, and 

Functions of the U.S. Army Engineer Command,” concluding that TASCOM 

could effectively incorporate ENGCOM’s functions. The study reluctantly 

recommended retaining ENGCOM because of work in progress on Stem to 

Stern and the ongoing negotiations with the Federal Republic concerning 

what some months later became the MOUSF program.
169

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

During 1972, discussions on the future of ENGCOM intensified. The 

recommendations of Fender II, issued 22 March 1972, proposed reducing ENGCOM’s role to that of an agency assigned to TASCOM while 

retaining the coordination of the three major engineer functions—facilities engineering, troop construction, and contract construction—under 

Map 12

E A S T G E R M A N Y

LUXEMBOURG B E L G I U M

C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

A U S T R I A S W I T Z E R L A N D

F R A N C E

N E T

H E R L A

N

D S

Erfurt

Dresden

Berlin

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

H E S S E N

N O R T H B AV A R I A

N O R T H

B AV A R I A

R H I N E L A N D - P F A L Z

S O U T H B AV A R I A

B A D E N - W Ü RT T E M B E R G

 7 t h A R M Y

T R A I N I N G C O M M A N D

Kaiserslautern

Frankfurt

Stuttgart

Grafenwöhr

Nuremberg

Augsburg

Rhine R

Elbe R

WEST GERMANY

THEATER ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1970

District Boundary (approximate)

District Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers
170

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

one headquarters. USAREUR deferred any decision on subordinating 

ENGCOM to TASCOM, but it did direct the USAREUR engineer and 

ENGCOM to eliminate redundant positions and reduce their staffs by 

twenty-seven and fifty-three positions, respectively.117 In April, coinciding 

with the circulation of the Fender II recommendations, Maj. Gen. Francis 

Map 13

E A S T G E R M A N Y

LUXEMBOURG B E L G I U M

C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

A U S T R I A S W I T Z E R L A N D

F R A N C E

N E T

H E R L A

N

D S

Erfurt

Dresden

Berlin

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

H E S S E N

N O R T H B AV A R I A

R H I N E L A N D - P F A L Z

S O U T H B AV A R I A

B A D E N - W Ü RT T E M B E R G

 7 t h A R M Y

T R A I N I N G C O M M A N D

Kaiserslautern

Frankfurt

Stuttgart

Grafenwöhr

Nuremberg

Augsburg

Rhine R

Elbe R

WEST GERMANY

ENGINEER COMMAND

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

1970

District Boundary (approximate)

District Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers
171

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

P. “Frank” Koisch arrived in Heidelberg as USAREUR engineer. Koisch 

quickly concluded that USAREUR did not have the kind of organization 

that could accomplish its tremendous construction workload. He decided 

that Europe needed the equivalent of an engineer district.118 In November 

USAREUR ordered a study of the structure of the military communities in 

the Federal Republic. The far-reaching Project Red Wheel study coincided 

with Department of Defense demands that the Army reduce the size of 

“management headquarters.” The conjunction of pressures prepared the 

way for a major reorganization of the U.S. Army in Europe.119

General LeTellier vigorously defended the ENGCOM integration of 

contract construction, troop construction, and facilities engineering in 

a vertical structure of command. Like his predecessors, Generals Young 

and Kennedy, LeTellier thought it the most efficient and effective way to 

provide engineer services to the U.S. forces in Europe. In August 1973 

LeTellier was reassigned to the United States to head the South Atlantic 

Division. As he prepared to leave Europe, he composed a ten-page report 

for the commander in chief of USAREUR, General Michael S. Davison. In 

addition to addressing a number of general topics related to the engineer 

mission, LeTellier expressed concern about the future of the Engineer 

Command. He observed that ENGCOM had been “a step-child during the 

allocation of resources and the ‘whipping boy’ when supported organizations evaluate the style of life to which they believe they are entitled.”120

Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan succeeded LeTellier at the Engineer 

Command. Donovan had served as area engineer in Metz, France, and as 

chief of the Design Branch in the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France, 

from 1959 to 1962. He came to 

Germany as a new general officer after three years as district 

engineer in Sacramento.121

By t h e t i m e D o n ova n 

arrived in Europe, ENGCOM 

was under siege from several 

directions. The insistence in 

the Senate to reduce the presence of U.S. forces in Europe 

and a general retrenchment as 

the Vietnam War wound down 

created pressure for change in 

USAREUR. Secretary of Defense 

James Schlesinger’s mandate to 

increase the ratio of combat forces to support forces—the “toothto-tail” ratio—was a manifestation of the changing atmosphere. 

The increase in the volume of 

ENGCOM’s work, shortages in 

the officer ranks, difficulties in General Donovan
172

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991

recruiting German employees, and budget constraints added to administrative problems. As 1974 approached, the command faced the prospect 

of running $14 million short of covering its salaries, utility bills, heat, 

and other fixed costs.122

In September 1973 two operating principles crystallized in the 

Department of the Army: Community commanders should control 

their own resources and personnel committed to all support activities, 

and USAREUR should cut its headquarters and management personnel sharply. In response, the USAREUR staff prepared a report titled the 

“Consolidation of Headquarters and Area Support Elements” (Project 

Chase), which outlined a major reorganization in Europe. Project Chase

recommended the abolition of both TASCOM and ENGCOM. To give 

community commanders in Europe greater control over resources, 

the plan transferred ENGCOM’s responsibilities for facilities engineering to the regional commands: V Corps in Frankfurt, VII Corps in 

Stuttgart, and 1st Support Brigade in Kaiserslautern. To reduce headquarters, ENGCOM’s contract construction functions passed to the OCE 

in Washington. TASCOM’s responsibilities were distributed among the 

military communities, the USAREUR engineer, and the new 1st Support 

Brigade (later 21st Support Command).123

On 7 February 1974, the USAREUR commander in chief, General 

Davison, approved the basic proposals outlined by Project Chase for reorganization of engineer resources in Europe. With ENGCOM’s three major 

responsibilities removed, the core of the organization disappeared. The 

Office of the Engineer in USAREUR could assume authority over troop 

construction, real estate, and the U.S. Army Topographic Center.124 The 

pressures that General O’Meara had successfully overcome in 1965 and 

1966 won out in 1974.

As soon as General Davison made his decision to redistribute 

engineering resources in Europe, USAREUR in Heidelberg, OCE in 

Washington, and ENGCOM headquarters in Frankfurt initiated planning 

to implement the new arrangement. Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. William 

C. Gribble, Jr., created a new division and named General Donovan to 

command it, with Donovan’s chief of staff, Col. Edwin S. Townsley, to 

serve as deputy division engineer. Townsley took charge of establishing policies and coordinating procedures for the transition, appointing 

the deputy comptroller, Randolph S. Washington, as action officer. The 

chief of engineers assigned members of his Washington staff to work 

with Townsley on administrative and managerial tasks such as drawing up support agreements with USAREUR and drafting organizational 

plans and procedures so that the new division would conform to Corps of 

Engineers structure and practice.125

To reassign the 25,000 people from the support commands being inactivated, the receiving organizations had to write provisional descriptions 

for the transfer positions, develop tables of distribution and allowances, 

and prepare formal job descriptions to be processed through the Civilian 

Personnel Office. The process was tedious and laborious.126
173

Engineer Command, 1966–1974

The positions associated under ENGCOM with contract construction 

passed to the new Engineer Division. Administrative support positions 

attached to ENGCOM headquarters were transferred to the three regional 

USAREUR commanders to provide manpower for base support functions.127 These transfers left the new division without the positions necessary to support contract construction, its principal mission. Although the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers authorized a manpower level of 438 for 

the division, USAREUR transferred only 310 spaces from ENGCOM and 

the division received only 280 people who had experience or training in 

contract construction.128

OCE’s deputy chief of engineering, Frederick B. McNeely, headed a 

team of nine people who worked in Frankfurt during April and May 1974 

to set up the administrative structure for the new Corps of Engineers. 

They reviewed staff functions and procedures and wrote job descriptions. Despite their efforts, many employees waiting for new assignments 

worked the summer of 1974 without knowing to which position, at which 

grade, or in what branch they would be assigned.129

Special attention was given to the Germans who had worked in 

the Engineer Command. They were indirect-hire employees paid in 

Deutschmarks by the Federal Republic. USAREUR reimbursed the 

Federal Republic for their salaries and benefits and paid an administrative 

surcharge.130 Over the years USAREUR had signed a series of tariff agreements with the Federal Republic which affirmed that U.S. forces employing local employees would comply with German labor laws on issues 

of pay, annual leave, sick leave, maternity rights, hours, holidays, and 

termination procedures.131 USAREUR and the OCE agreed that the OCE 

would not negotiate an independent agreement with the Federal Republic. 

Germans hired to work in the new division would continue to be included 

with the USAREUR budget and work under USAREUR agreements. Thus, 

the Germans working at the Engineer Division were not employees of the 

Corps of Engineers.

On 1 July 1974, the OCE activated the United States Army Engineer 

Division, Europe, and a new chapter in the organization of engineer 

functions for Europe began. The Engineer Command had undertaken 

major new projects, including Freloc construction, facilities rehabilitation 

under Stem to Stern and MOUSF, and TAB VEE. It had also continued 

projects begun under predecessor organizations—converting heating 

plants; building missile and weapons sites; providing hardstand parking for tanks and other military equipment; securing ammunition storage facilities; and building schools, chapels, and recreational facilities. 

Construction placement in 1974 totaled $152 million, a 50 percent increase 

over 1972. Although the Engineer Command ceased to exist, the construction mission continued.