Counter-Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Operations

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.8 

26 January 2007

This document complements related guidance in Joint Publication 3-40, 

Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-1.8 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 26 JANUARY 2007 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

 AFDD 2-1.8, Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Operations, has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It 

replaces the previous Air Force approach to counter-nuclear, biological, and chemical 

operations with a full-spectrum methodology for C-CBRN operations. The primary 

revisions include an expanded discussion of the set of weapons of mass destruction 

(pages 3-6) and provide Air Force-specific guidance for countering a CBRN attack. The 

concept of Air Force pillars of C-CBRN operations and their relationship to joint mission 

areas is introduced (pages 2-3 and page 8), with separate chapters devoted to each 

(Chapters Two through Six). Finally, the term consequence management is introduced 

(as the fifth pillar) with a detailed discussion of this stage of operations (Chapter Six). 

Supersedes: AFDD 2-1.8, (16 August 2000) 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DDS 

Certified by: HQ AFDC/DD (Col Jon Wolfe) 

Pages: 83 

Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading 

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication 

Approved by: Allen G. Peck, Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center 
FOREWORD 

 The threat or use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons by 

hostile regimes and terrorists represents one of the most difficult challenges facing our 

nation and our Air Force. This challenge is further complicated by the advance of 

technologies used to develop and deliver these weapons, making it possible for our 

enemies to attack us at a time and place of their choosing, with little or no warning. 

Success in defending our nation, our military forces, and partners and allies depends on 

how effectively we apply air, space, and cyberspace power to counter this threat. 

 Many of our adversaries are actively seeking or already possess weapons of 

mass destruction and have stated their willingness to employ them. The key to 

successful protection against this threat is our people and their dedication to this vital 

mission. This doctrine document describes the Air Force’s role in countering the threat 

or use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons at the operational level 

of war. Our Air Force has tremendous capability available to address this challenge. 

We now use five pillars to describe how to counter these weapons: proliferation 

prevention, counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence 

management. This doctrine document provides guidance for understanding, planning, 

and executing counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations to 

enable US forces to survive and operate effectively in this deadly environment. 

 

 

ALLEN G. PECK 

Major General, USAF 

Commander, Headquarters 

Air Force Doctrine Center
iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................vi

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS..............................................................viii

CHAPTER ONE—CBRN Operational Environment ........................................................ 1

Overview...................................................................................................................... 1

CBRN Weapon Characteristics ................................................................................... 3

Chemical .................................................................................................................. 3

Biological..................................................................................................................4

Radiological.............................................................................................................. 5

Nuclear..................................................................................................................... 6

Delivery Methods ..................................................................................................... 6

Operational Risk .......................................................................................................... 6

C-CBRN Construct ...................................................................................................... 7

Relationship to National Security Guidance and Joint Doctrine ............................... 7

Strategic Enablers ....................................................................................................... 7

Intelligence............................................................................................................... 8

International Partnerships ........................................................................................ 8

Strategic Communications ....................................................................................... 8

Air Force Pillars of C-CBRN Operations..................................................................... 8

Proliferation Prevention............................................................................................ 9

Counterforce ............................................................................................................ 9

Active Defense....................................................................................................... 10

Passive Defense .................................................................................................... 10

Consequence Management ................................................................................... 10

Command Relationships............................................................................................ 11

CHAPTER TWO—Proliferation Prevention Operations................................................. 13

General Framework................................................................................................... 13

Detect and Monitor................................................................................................. 14

Denial and Interdiction Operations......................................................................... 15

Information Operations........................................................................................... 15

Security and Intelligence Cooperation.................................................................... 16

Treaties and Agreements....................................................................................... 17

Planning Considerations............................................................................................ 17

CHAPTER THREE—Counterforce Operations ............................................................. 18

General Framework................................................................................................... 18

Counterforce Objectives ............................................................................................ 18

Counterforce Targets................................................................................................. 21

Linkage to Air Force Operations ................................................................................ 22

Strategic Attack Operations ................................................................................... 22

Counterair Operations............................................................................................ 22

Counterland Operations ......................................................................................... 23

Countersea Operations .......................................................................................... 23
iv 

Information Operations........................................................................................... 23

Counterforce Resources and Forces......................................................................... 24

Planning Considerations............................................................................................ 25

Operational Risk..................................................................................................... 25

ISR Requirements.................................................................................................. 26

Targeting and Weaponeering Considerations........................................................ 26

Legal Considerations ............................................................................................. 26

CHAPTER FOUR— Active Defense Operations........................................................... 27

General Framework................................................................................................... 27

Active Defense Objectives ..................................................................................... 27

Planning Considerations............................................................................................ 28

Layered Active Defense Approach......................................................................... 28

Time Sensitivity...................................................................................................... 30

Engagement Location of Target Set....................................................................... 30

Rules of Engagement............................................................................................. 30

Command Relationships ........................................................................................ 30

CHAPTER FIVE—Passive Defense Operations ........................................................... 32

General Framework................................................................................................... 32

Passive Defense Activities......................................................................................... 32

Sense..................................................................................................................... 33

Shape..................................................................................................................... 34

Shield ..................................................................................................................... 35

Sustain ................................................................................................................... 37

Planning Considerations............................................................................................ 39

Joint, Coalition, and Host Nation Operations ......................................................... 39

Manpower .............................................................................................................. 39

CHAPTER SIX—Consequence Management Operations ............................................ 40

General Framework................................................................................................... 40

Consequence Management Activities........................................................................ 41

Casualty Management ........................................................................................... 41

Remediation........................................................................................................... 42

Restoration of Essential Services........................................................................... 42

Planning Considerations............................................................................................ 43

CHAPTER SEVEN—Support Operations ..................................................................... 46

Logistics and Sustaining Operations.......................................................................... 46

Air Mobility................................................................................................................. 46

AF Airlift in a CBRN Contaminated Environment ................................................... 46

Aeromedical Evacuation ........................................................................................ 47

Commercial Aviation .............................................................................................. 48

Contractor Supported Aviation ............................................................................... 48

Health Services ......................................................................................................... 48

Services Support ....................................................................................................... 49

Chaplain Services...................................................................................................... 50

Force Protection ........................................................................................................ 50

Emergency Management........................................................................................... 51
v 

Infrastructure ............................................................................................................. 51

Legal Support ............................................................................................................ 51

Total Force ................................................................................................................ 52

Public Affairs.............................................................................................................. 52

Personnel Support for Contingency Operations ........................................................ 52

Family Assistance Control Center.......................................................................... 52

AF Repatriation Guide for Airmen and Family Readiness Flight ............................ 53

Command and Control Systems................................................................................ 53

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance......................................................... 53

CHAPTER EIGHT—C–CBRN Education, Training and Exercise.................................. 54

General Framework................................................................................................... 54

Education................................................................................................................... 54

Training...................................................................................................................... 55

Exercises and Wargames.......................................................................................... 56

Suggested Readings..................................................................................................... 58

Glossary........................................................................................................................ 64
vi 

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 Air Force commanders and personnel must be able to prevent an attack of 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and be able to counter the 

resulting effects if such weapons are used. Air Force procedures and training must be 

developed with joint operations in mind. Airmen must understand how to organize Air 

Force forces and how to present them to the joint force commander to ensure safety 

and survivability for all personnel while ensuring mission accomplishment. This Air 

Force doctrine document details principles for conducting counter-chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear operations. 

APPLICATION 

 This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, 

including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. 

Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

military operations. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation 

when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

 This document expands the doctrine for combating chemical, biological, 

radiological and nuclear weapons. The doctrine reflects guidance outlined in the 2006 

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and addresses a 

broad range of capabilities to combat these weapons, including the ability to 

preemptively strike a suspected enemy target to prevent or preempt a chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear attack. Finally, the doctrine details the consequence 

management stage of operations and discusses critical command relationships, support 

operations, and education and training. 

 The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 

technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of 

mass destruction, and evidence indicates they are doing so with determination. 

The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed...History will judge 

harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we 

have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action. 

—President George W. Bush 

September 17, 2002 
vii 

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology 

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force 

prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air 

Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and 

space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component 

commander while the term “JFACC” refers to the joint component-level 

operational commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will 

normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are 

different, and should be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control/ 

administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through a 

Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air and 

space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a 

combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the 

air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in 

joint or combined operations is correctly known as a Joint AOC (JAOC) or 

Combined AOC (CAOC). 
viii 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDD expands on or supports these 

statements.

 The Air Force interlinked operational pillars of Counter-Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (C-CBRN) operations are proliferation prevention, 

counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. 

(Page 2) 

 Proliferation prevention operations are designed to restrict the spread of CBRN 

weapons and prevent adversary acquisition of CBRN materials and technology by 

supporting political, economic, military, and diplomatic efforts to discourage the 

pursuit and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and deny proliferation by 

enabling interdiction of dangerous materials before they reach enemy hands. (Page 

9) 

 Counterforce refers to offensive operations to strike adversary CBRN weapons and 

associated production, transportation, and storage facilities prior to use. (Page 9) 

 Active defense operations attempt to intercept CBRN weapons en route to their 

targets. (Page 10) 

 Passive defense measures are designed to protect US and host nation installations 

and facilities, interests, points of embarkation and debarkation, critical infrastructure, 

equipment, and personnel from CBRN effects. Passive defense measures will 

enable sustained air and ground combat/combat support operations in a CBRN 

environment. (Page 10) 

 Consequence management activities serve to reduce the effects of a CBRN attack 

or event, and assist in the restoration of essential operations and services at home 

and abroad in a permissive environment. (Page 10) 
1 

CHAPTER ONE 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

OVERVIEW 

 The proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 

weapons and the methods to deliver them presents a serious security threat to US 

forces, allies, and interests around the world. Even limited numbers of CBRN weapons 

could inflict heavy casualties on military forces and civilian populations, degrade the 

effectiveness of US combat and combat support units, and counter US conventional 

military superiority. The use of CBRN weapons by an adversary could reduce the 

effectiveness of friendly forces and create serious political and psychological 

repercussions disproportionate to the physical impact on military operations. 

 The CBRN threat is characterized by the increasing availability of highly 

destructive technologies, a variety of weapons and means of delivery, and a wide range 

of adversaries. Potential adversaries who desire or possess CBRN weapons include 

both state and non-state actors. Non-state actors can include terrorist groups, 

transnational criminal organizations, or individuals operating independently. These 

adversaries may have the capability to threaten US and friendly forces both within and 

outside the homeland. Commanders must prepare to counter the threat or use of 

CBRN weapons. 

 Commanders should assess and plan for the effects of CBRN weapons across 

the full range of military operations. This requires an assessment of an adversary’s 

capability and intent to employ CBRN weapons. It also requires commanders to 

consider and analyze the potential effects of CBRN weapons on US and friendly forces. 

The Air Force must prepare to counter the CBRN threat through planning, education, 

training, and close coordination with the other Services, US civilian government 

 

 On September the 11th, 2001, America saw the destruction 

and grief terrorists could inflict with commercial airlines turned 

into weapons of mass murder. Those attacks revealed the 

depth of our enemies' determination, but not the extent of 

their ambitions. We know that the terrorists seek an even 

deadlier technology. And if they acquire chemical, biological 

or nuclear weapons, we have no doubt they will use them to 

cause even greater harm. 

 —President George W. Bush 

White House Rose Garden 

July 21, 2004 

 
2 

 Non-State Operational Capabilities 

 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 serve as examples of 

the global reach some non-state organizations 

possess. The ability of al Qaeda to plan, rehearse, 

pre-position personnel and equipment, and ultimately 

execute a string of coordinated attacks against the 

US demonstrated an effective operational capability. 

Similar operational capabilities could be applied to 

the use of WMD against the US and other 

international targets. The covert operational 

capabilities of al Qaeda and other terror 

organizations pose significant challenges for our 

detection and monitoring capabilities. State support 

– direct or indirect – provides these non-state actors 

an additional capability that is difficult to detect and 

monitor. In addition, al Qaeda leveraged bin Laden’s 

personal fortune to plan and train to execute the 9/11 

attacks. Additional funding support came from 

surrogates around the globe, often through numerous 

filters to hide the origin of the support. The 

combination of these capabilities positions al Qaeda 

to potentially acquire and/or develop and ultimately 

use WMD. 

 —Various Sources 

organizations, allies, and coalition partners. A trained, equipped, and exercised force 

may deter an adversary from employing CBRN weapons. 

 

 Counter-CBRN (C-CBRN) operations are activities taken to detect, deter, disrupt, 

deny, or destroy an adversary’s CBRN capabilities and to minimize the effects of an 

enemy CBRN attack. The Air Force interlinked operational pillars of C-CBRN 

operations are proliferation prevention, counterforce, active defense, passive 

defense, and consequence management. These operational-level pillars support the 

overarching guidance, in the form of military mission areas, provided in the National 

Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD), and the 

operational pillars identified in Joint Publication (JP) 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the National Strategy to Combat WMD. 

Figure 1.1 (page 3) provides a visual depiction of the relationship between the various 

mission areas and operational pillars. 
3 

 

 Figure 1.1. Air Force C-CBRN Operational Pillars in Relation to Joint and 

National Guidance 

CBRN WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS 

 Commanders should be familiar with the characteristics of each CBRN element 

as not all CBRN attacks will have the same impact on operations. Different 

materials/agents have varying degrees of lethality, persistence, destructive capability, 

and psychological impact. Combinations of CBRN agents may present additional 

challenges for detection, protection, and treatment of casualties. Different delivery 

methods create varying concentrations, areas of contamination, and/or physical 

destruction. Additionally, weather conditions, terrain, and effectiveness of precautions 

taken all influence the resulting effects/severity of injuries on personnel and operations. 

The impacts from use of CBRN weapons can vary significantly across the spectrum of 

conflict, potentially leading to increased levels of protective posture that may be 

detrimental to mission operations tempo. Therefore, commanders may choose to 

reduce the level of protective posture, considering operational requirements and the 

nature of the threat, to accomplish the mission despite the hazards present. 

Chemical 

 Chemical agents are defined as “chemical substance[s] intended for use in 

military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate a person through its 

physiological effects.” (Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1997). 

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, defines a chemical agent as “any toxic chemical intended for use in military 

operations.” It is important to note that some chemical substances, while not 

Proliferation 

Prevention Passive 

Counterforce Defense 

Active 

Defense Consequence 

Management 

Restore essential 

services at 

home & abroad 

Deny enemy access to 

CBRN . . . 

Destroy it before it is 

used . . . 

Intercept it during delivery 

. . . 

Minimize its effects and 

operate . . . 

Security Coop & Partner Activities 

Interdiction

Active Defense Passive Defense 

Offensive Operations 

Elimination 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

National Military Strategy to Combat WMD Mission Areas 

Consequence 

Management 

Nonproliferation Counterproliferation Consequence Management 

JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating WMD and 

 National Strategy to Combat WMD Pillars 
4 

specifically designed for use as weapons in military operations, can be used quite 

effectively as attack agents. Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs), Toxic Industrial 

Materials (TIMs), and other potentially hazardous materials fall into this category. 

 Chemical weapons are 

categorized according to their 

physiological effects: choking, blister, 

blood, and nerve agents. Large 

quantities may be needed to achieve 

mass casualties, but even limited use 

can have devastating psychological 

effects sufficient for the adversary to 

achieve their objectives. While 

chemical weapons can be made in 

facilities designed specifically for that 

purpose, they can also be 

manufactured using dual use 

industries. Dual use technology and 

the small quantity required for a 

strategic effect make chemical 

weapons creation and capabilities 

extremely difficult to detect and 

assess. 

Biological 

 Biological agents are capable 

of spreading disease to a target 

human population, livestock animals, 

or crops. Potentially pathogenic 

(disease-causing) microorganisms 

enter the body through the lungs, 

digestive tract, mucous membranes, and skin abrasions. Once established, the 

microorganisms can multiply, eventually overcoming the body’s natural disease-fighting 

capabilities. Because an incubation period is normally required before effects become 

apparent, adversaries may release biological agents covertly prior to or early in a 

conflict, escape undetected, and avoid retaliation by plausibly denying having used 

prohibited weapons. Toxins, some of which can be synthetically produced, are 

poisonous byproducts of microorganisms, plants, and animals. They work by interfering 

with cell and tissue functions such as breathing or control of muscle functions. 

Biological weapons may be produced using small-scale, in-home techniques, or largescale pharmaceutical or fermentation facilities. Thus, as with chemical weapons, 

biological weapon production and proliferation can be challenging to detect and even 

small amounts have potentially widespread effects. 

 

Nerve Agent Attack – Tokyo Subway 

Shoko Asahara, founder of Japanese 

religious cult Aum Shinrikyo, orchestrated a 

politically-motivated chemical nerve agent 

attack on three Tokyo subway lines in 

March, 1995, killing 12 people and 

injuring...[1,000]... others. The post-attack 

investigation revealed the religious group 

had produced and used both sarin and VX 

nerve agents. Further investigation showed 

the cult was also responsible for two past 

biological attacks using botulinum toxin and 

anthrax and five chemical attacks using 

cyanide and sarin. All components 

necessary to produce these chemical and 

biological agents were legitimately obtained 

on the open market. Unfortunately, only 

small quantities of readily available 

materials are required to produce many 

deadly chemical and biological weapons for 

use by terrorists. 

—The Biological and Chemical Warfare 

Threat, Revised Edition 1999, Central 

Intelligence Agency 
5 

Radiological 

 Radiological materials that can create a hazard with the potential to injure and kill 

personnel can come from any radioactive source. While nuclear detonations produce 

large amounts of radioactivity and a significant hazard, radiological attacks do not 

create a nuclear blast. Radiological weapons could contain virtually any type of 

radioactive material and disperse only the amount of material originally contained within 

the device. Sources of radiological material include medical and industrial equipment 

and waste and may originate in countries having insufficient control of these materials. 

 A radiological dispersal device, which combines a radioactive substance with a 

dispersal mechanism, has the potential to contaminate a wide area and may be 

deployed clandestinely or overtly. One example of a radiological dispersal device, 

known commonly as a “dirty bomb,” combines a radioactive substance with a 

conventional explosive in order to spread radiation over a given area. The extent of 

contamination is determined primarily by the amount and type of radioactive substance 

and explosive used. In such a weapon, the majority of casualties will be from direct 

results of the blast effects. Depending on the variables of type, amount, and size of the 

dispersal device and radiological material, radiation-based injuries (primarily long-term 

health effects such as cancer, and to a lesser degree, radiation sickness) could result. 

Dirty bombs are not the only means of weaponization, however. Other means may 

include aerosolization and contamination of water and food supplies. Non-dispersal 

weapons, commonly referred to as point sources or point emitters, can also create 

radiological effects. Any radiological weapon’s effectiveness depends on the amount, 

type, and form of radioactive material used and its delivery mechanism. Physiological 

effects of radiation are calculated based on duration of exposure, distance from the 

 

Shortly after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, letters containing anthrax 

spores were delivered to several media outlets 

in New York City and two senators in 

Washington, DC. Two of the letters contained 

highly refined, “weaponized” anthrax designed 

to cause the life-threatening inhalation form of 

anthrax. Several people, including postal 

workers at the facilities where the letters were 

processed and office workers at the letters’ 

destinations, were infected. By the end of the 

crisis, twenty-two people developed anthrax infections, eleven of which were the 

inhalation variety. Five people died of inhalation anthrax. The perpetrator has never 

been caught. 

—Various Sources 
6 

radioactive source, and the level of man-made and/or natural shielding. Although direct 

effects may be militarily minimal, the political and psychological effects could disrupt 

combat forces, negatively impact the US civil population psyche, and stress 

international partnerships. 

 Radiological threats differ from chemical and biological threats in several key 

aspects. Personnel may be harmed even if not in direct physical contact with a 

radiological source. Radiation cannot be “neutralized” or “sterilized” and many materials 

have half-lives measured in years. Radiation sickness is not contagious, but crosscontamination is a distinct possibility if proper tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) 

are not exercised. Respiratory protection will protect against the inhalation of airborne 

radiological contaminants. Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) or personal protective 

equipment (PPE) can provide the wearer with some protection against the contact and 

penetration effects of alpha and beta radiation, but do not provide significant gamma 

and neutron radiation protection. 

 

Nuclear 

 The technologies involved with the development, production, and physical effects 

of nuclear weapons are well-known. The greatest difficulty in creating a weapon is 

acquiring enough fissile material—highly enriched uranium or plutonium, neither of 

which occurs in concentrated amounts in nature—to produce a device capable of a 

fission chain reaction. 

 Along with the devastating damage to personnel, equipment, and structures from 

blast, heat, and radiation effects, nuclear weapons can cause massive destruction and 

disruption to electronic infrastructure. When employed to optimize the electromagnetic 

pulse, a nuclear device will likely cause catastrophic effects to unshielded critical and 

vulnerable systems. 

Delivery Methods 

 Delivery methods for CBRN weapons vary widely. Manned aircraft, ballistic 

missiles, and artillery have been used for decades. Newer delivery platforms, including 

cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft (UA), pose complex challenges to allied forces. 

Clandestine means of delivery also vary greatly and may include personnel, aerosol 

sprayers, land vehicles, watercraft, manned aircraft, or UAs. 

 Viable chemical agent delivery systems include artillery shells, rockets, 

improvised vehicle bombs, missiles, and other small-scale improvised dispersal 

methods. Aerosol forms can also be sprayed from aircraft, land vehicles, and ships. 

Biological pathogens can be spread in aerosol form and can also be used covertly to 

contaminate food and water supplies. Radiological materials may be spread by 

dispersal devices or from point sources, surface vehicles, or, potentially, by personnel 

(tactical nuclear devices). 

OPERATIONAL RISK

 Operational risk assessments consolidate and clarify issues so leaders are able 
7 

to make informed decisions. CBRN attacks can come from multiple sources utilizing a 

broad range of tactics, from clandestine operations to large-scale attacks. These 

attacks may be intended to cause psychological distress to hinder operations, deny the 

use of fixed sites such as airbases and staging areas, or inflict massive casualties and 

force withdrawal. Identifying the risk of CBRN attack requires a concerted intelligence 

effort. Operational risk assessments, based upon an understanding of potential 

adversary tactics, weapons capabilities, and delivery platforms, are essential for 

effective C-CBRN operations. The risk assessment is vital to determining mission 

requirements and priorities in the early stages of operations, and should be revisited 

throughout operations since the nature of the threat may change (refer to AFDD 2-4.1, 

Force Protection, for a more detailed discussion of risk assessment). 

C-CBRN CONSTRUCT 

Relationship to National Security Guidance and Joint Doctrine 

 The requirement to counter CBRN threats is prominent in US national security 

guidance. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction builds on 

the National Security Strategy and articulates a proactive and comprehensive strategy 

built upon three pillars of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence 

management. The National Military Strategy to Combat WMD supports this national 

framework by applying the three pillars across eight military mission areas, with the goal 

being to dissuade, deter, defend against, and defeat those who seek to harm the US, its 

allies, and partners through WMD use, and mitigate the effects if attacked. The mission 

areas are: offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction operations, active 

defense, passive defense, WMD consequence management, security cooperation and 

partnership activities, and threat reduction cooperation. These mission areas are 

translated into joint military doctrine by JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction, which uses an integrated approach with a focus on 

nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management activities. Air 

Force operational contributions to joint capabilities can be grouped into five supporting 

pillars labeled proliferation prevention, counterforce, active defense, passive defense, 

and consequence management (see Figure 1.1, page 3). Although different terms are 

used, one can see the common elements that yield a comprehensive approach for 

defeating WMD. 

 The Air Force pillar approach to CBRN can best be described as a number of 

mission areas or filters designed to reduce CBRN threats from “many” to “few.” The 

areas or filters are overlapping across the spectrum of operations. Underpinning these 

pillars are strategic enablers to enhance Air Force contributions to countering CBRN 

threats. 

STRATEGIC ENABLERS 

 Enablers are crosscutting capabilities which integrate the five C-CBRN pillars and 

facilitate execution of Air Force operations. The three enablers are intelligence, 

international partnerships, and strategic communications. 
8 

Intelligence 

 Intelligence directly supports strategy, planning, and decision-making; enhances 

operational capabilities; and facilitates risk management assessments. Our current 

WMD intelligence can be strengthened by improving our early warning for WMD 

attacks; transforming processes to improve intelligence support; and fusing intelligence 

with operations to improve collection, assessment and dissemination of intelligence. 

 Actionable intelligence facilitates activities within each of the five Air Force pillars. 

For instance, intelligence enables the Air Force to prevent, defeat, or reverse the 

proliferation and/or use of WMD. Information collected by the intelligence community 

allows for the operational or tactical detection of a CBRN threat and selection of 

appropriate defeat options. Also, early detection based on intelligence enables an 

accurate characterization of the CBRN threat and informed prediction of impending 

attack. This early detection provides opportunities for counterforce, to include 

preemption, and active defense measures to neutralize the threat. Actionable 

intelligence also allows appropriate passive defense and consequence management 

measures to be put in place should these efforts fail. 

International Partnerships 

 Building international partnerships bilaterally and multilaterally enhances Air 

Force capabilities to combat CBRN. Security cooperation efforts should not only focus 

on missile defense cooperation or the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (see 

information box, page 16), but should equally stress counterforce, active defense, 

passive defense and consequence management cooperation. Assistance from the 

international community offers a force multiplier in the Air Force efforts to combat CBRN 

effectively and, if this fails, sustain operations. It is also critical that partner nations have 

the ability to detect and eliminate threats, and if that fails, to survive an attack and 

restore essential operations and services. 

Strategic Communications 

 Strategic communications shape perceptions at the global, regional, and national 

levels. Words and actions of Airmen reassure allies and partners and underscore to 

potential adversaries, the costs and risk associated with CBRN acquisition and use. 

The Air Force plays a significant supporting role in the larger US Government effort to 

communicate policy and demonstrate US resolve. 

AIR FORCE PILLARS OF C-CBRN OPERATIONS 

A balanced and integrated approach is necessary to counter the CBRN threat. 

The activities associated with the Air Force pillars are mutually supporting and 

reinforcing. Each pillar may deter a potential adversary by denying them access to 

CBRN weapons and components or any perceived significant advantage through the 

threat or use of such weapons.
9 

Proliferation Prevention 

Proliferation prevention operations are designed to restrict the spread of 

CBRN weapons and prevent adversary acquisition of CBRN materials and 

technology by supporting political, economic, military, and diplomatic efforts to 

discourage the pursuit and acquisition of WMD and deny proliferation by enabling 

interdiction of dangerous materials before they reach enemy hands. Military 

activities include support for implementation of treaties, agreements, sanctions, and 

export control procedures. In addition, security cooperation and military-to-military 

activities foster common threat awareness, coalition building, and interoperability. An 

example would be USAF support to US participation in the PSI. Successful proliferation 

prevention operations greatly reduce the level of effort and resources that must be 

dedicated to the other Air Force C-CBRN pillars. 

Counterforce 

Counterforce refers to offensive operations to strike adversary CBRN 

weapons and associated production, transportation, and storage facilities prior to 

use. Counterforce encompasses the detection, deterrence, denial, degradation, and/or 

destruction of an adversary’s WMD assets, means of delivery, and facilities. Associated 

capabilities include the ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess attacks 

against WMD targets, as well as the ability to defeat or neutralize the CBRN material, 

weapons, and equipment before they can be brought to bear on the battlefield, while 

limiting collateral effects. These operations are intended to deter or defeat a CBRN 

threat or subsequent use of WMD and reduce the level of threats to be dealt with by 

active or passive defenses. One unique aspect of this pillar is that it may be executed 

by a preemptive military strike as part of an overall operation or in response to an 

 US European Command (USEUCOM) plays a major role in the Proliferation 

Security Initiative (PSI). Most PSI partners are in the AOR, which has been the 

location of numerous exercises, workshops, and expert meetings. Interdiction 

is also an important focus of the command’s involvement in Project Caspian 

Guard, designed to enhance the capabilities of friendly states in the Caspian 

Basin in the areas of counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and 

counternarcotics. Additionally, USEUCOM has an active foreign consequence 

management program to assist allied governments through capability 

assessments and improved awareness. The command partners with the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency in this effort, which has focused on Italy, 

Poland, and Spain this year. The command’s support to the 2004 Olympics in 

Greece emphasized consequence management preparations. Finally, 

USEUCOM has been active in discussions with new North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) countries on WMD and terrorism issues. A number of 

states possess CBRN defense or consequence management capabilities that 

will add to the NATO capability in these areas. 

—Combating WMD: Challenges for the Next 10 

 Years, February 2005, National Defense University 
10 

enemy attack. As we have seen in previous conflicts, preemption requires close 

coordination with friends and allies, as well as the American people, in order to be 

accepted and effective. From a tactical perspective, pre-attack intelligence and precise 

target location are crucial. 

 

Active Defense 

Active defense operations attempt to intercept CBRN weapons en route to 

their targets. A layered defense approach provides opportunities to intercept CBRN 

threats at any point between employment and their targets. Interception may occur in 

space, air, or on the surface. Examples of active defense include missile defense, air 

defense, special operations, and security operations. Successful proliferation 

prevention, counterforce and active defense operations can reduce the threat, lessen 

the number of attacks, thwart an attack, and reduce the burden on passive defense and 

consequence management measures. 

Passive Defense 

 WMD passive defense includes measures to minimize or negate the vulnerability 

to, and minimize effects of WMD use against, US and partner/allied forces, as well as 

US military interests, installations, and critical infrastructure. If an adversary succeeds 

in launching a CBRN attack and active defense measures fail to eliminate the delivery 

vehicle and/or weapons, passive defense will be essential. Passive defense 

measures are designed to protect US and host nation installations and facilities, 

interests, points of embarkation and debarkation, critical infrastructure, 

equipment, and personnel from CBRN effects. Passive defense measures will 

enable sustained air and ground combat/combat support operations in a CBRN 

environment. Activities associated with passive defense include preparation and 

planning for operations in a CBRN environment and are organized as sense, shape, 

shield, and sustain measures. Success depends on the effective integration of 

equipment, trainer personnel, and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures. In 

uncertain or hostile environments, passive defense measures include those 

consequence management measures designed to save lives and to restore and sustain 

wartime mission operations. Additionally, passive defense contributes to the success of 

the other CBRN pillars. 

Consequence Management 

Consequence management (CM) activities serve to reduce the effects of a 

CBRN attack or event, and assist in the restoration of essential operations and 

services at home and abroad in a permissive environment. CM includes actions 

taken to respond to and mitigate the effects of a WMD attack or event against our 

homeland, deployed forces and US interests abroad, and to assist the US, host nation, 

and allies on an installation and provide military assistance to civilian authorities off an 

installation to restore essential operations and services. JP 1-02, Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines CM as “actions taken to 

maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from 
11 

disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents.” The 

primary activities that comprise CM, which are generally regarded as post-hostility 

activities, are casualty management, remediation of the affected area, and restoration of 

essential services. Figure 1.2 depicts the overlapping relationship between passive 

defense and CM. 

Figure 1.2. Passive Defense and Consequence Management Continuum 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 

 Command relationships for C-CBRN operations will vary depending upon the 

nature of the threat and the set of capabilities needed to counter the threat, but should 

be integrated into normal command relationships. C-CBRN operations may be singleService, joint, or multinational in scope; may involve civil authorities from the US and 

host nations; and can take place as part of an ongoing military operation or under the 

command of a distinct joint task force. 

 Due to the indiscriminate nature of WMD, their effects may not be confined to a 

specific target or military installation. Commanders should be cognizant of the shared 

responsibilities across military jurisdictions, civil authorities, and host nations. The Air 

 

 The activities and planning in the passive defense and consequence 

management pillars are conducted simultaneously across the spectrum of pre-, 

trans-, and post-attack. In the pre-attack phase, activities are focused primarily 

in the passive defense pillar. Commanders must consider the logistics of prepositioning equipment, materials, and supplies necessary to respond to the 

direct effects and consequences of a CBRN event. While in the post-attack 

phase, activities are focused primarily in the consequence management pillar, 

initially on saving lives and, where feasible, on mission restoration and 

sustainment. Various activities in the sense, shape, shield, and sustain areas 

of passive defense should be conducted to reduce further vulnerability and 

minimize effects of WMD and subsequent attacks on mission capabilities. 

Following the cessation of hostilities and when host military and civil law 

enforcement agencies have control, consequence management activities are 

focused on the restoration of essential operations and services. 

Pre-Attack Trans-Attack Post-Attack

Level

Of

Effort

Passive Defense

Consequence Management

Pre-Attack Trans-Attack Post-Attack

Level

Of

Effort

Passive Defense

Consequence Management
12 

Force may be asked to provide support in the form of air mobility, command and control, 

medical care, force protection, and consequence management. 

Joint Command and Control (C2) Process 

 Normally command and control is through a joint force commander (JFC) or, for 

a combined operation (i.e., with coalition forces), a combined force commander. The 

JFC C2 support system gives the JFC the means to command forces conducting CCBRN operations. The C2 process includes the direction to survive and operate in a 

CBRN environment, and establish the necessary requirements for starting consequence 

management activities. 

Air Force Forces 

 The JFC normally appoints the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) as 

the joint force air component commander (JFACC) to direct air and space operations. 

Air Force commanders should develop a thorough understanding of joint and allied 

capabilities. Commanders should establish working relationships that foster information 

sharing and resolve equipment interoperability issues. 

Coalition Operations 

 It is vital that C-CBRN activities be coordinated in advance with host nations, 

coalition partners, and international organizations. Combatant command Air Force 

components may coordinate with the staff of the geographic combatant commander and 

the Department of State, and develop support agreements with the host nation to 

facilitate logistics across jurisdictions. 

Interagency Operations on US Territory 

 The COMAFFOR will coordinate Air Force forces efforts with federal, state, and 

local agencies on US territory. Coordination with state agencies may include 

interactions with Army and Air National Guard units in Title 32 status operating in their 

state. 
13 

CHAPTER TWO 

PROLIFERATION PREVENTION OPERATIONS 

GENERAL FRAMEWORK 

 The Air Force approach to proliferation prevention includes those actions (e.g., 

diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, export 

controls, and interdiction) taken to prevent or limit the spread of WMD. By dissuading or 

impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, materials, or expertise, the 

Air Force can reduce the potential for adversary acquisition and use of WMD. 

 Air Force proliferation prevention capabilities include detecting, deterring, and 

denying an adversary’s acquisition of CBRN weapons and components; air, space, and 

cyberspace power provide robust capabilities to do this. These capabilities help ensure 

prohibited technologies and materials do not get into the hands of potential adversaries 

or states potentially hostile to the US. Air Force proliferation prevention activities 

include intelligence, operational, and technical support for the implementation of 

treaties, agreements, sanctions, and export control procedures, as well as national, 

international, and host-nation programs. For example, the Air Force is involved in 

implementation and compliance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; facilitating 

national technical means of monitoring international compliance with the Treaty on the 

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and tracking and interdicting the transport of 

illicit technologies and expertise as an operation of the PSI. In addition, these activities 

are in direct support of the NMS-CWMD mission areas of Security Cooperation and 

Partner Activities, Threat Reduction Cooperation, and Interdiction. 

 Along with security cooperation and interdiction operations, the Air Force must be 

prepared to provide support for Threat Reduction Cooperation missions. These 

missions involve activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation 

authorities to enhance physical security; emplace detection equipment; and reduce, 

dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a state’s existing CBRN programs, 

 The United States, our friends and allies, and the broader international 

community must undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists from 

acquiring WMD and missiles. We must enhance traditional measures – 

diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, 

and export controls – that seek to dissuade or impede proliferant states and 

terrorist networks, as well as to slow and make more costly their access to 

sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. 

 —National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, December 2002 
14 

stockpiles, and capabilities. A successful proliferation prevention effort can reduce the 

need for counterforce and active defense operations. 

Detect and Monitor 

 Detect and monitor operations include activities that locate, characterize, and 

track adversary efforts to acquire WMD. Identification, surveillance, and tracking of 

adversary activity enable commanders to maintain comprehensive intelligence on 

adversaries’ capabilities and possibly gain information on their intentions. Examples of 

Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to detect 

adversary activity include individuals (every airman a sensor), satellites, and various 

manned and unmanned aircraft and/or systems. 

Nuclear Power and the Nuclear Weapons Threat 

 Virtually any combination of plutonium [Pu] isotopes (different forms of an element) can 

be used to make a nuclear weapon, but not all combinations are equally convenient or 

efficient. The most common isotope, Pu-239, is best suited for making nuclear weapons, 

and is produced in various quantities in virtually all operating nuclear reactors. A critical 

factor in the production of relatively pure (93%) “weapons-grade” Pu-239 is the length of 

time the reactor fuel remains in the reactor and exposed to neutron irradiation. As the 

irradiation time increases, the reactor becomes less effective in producing pure Pu-239, 

but more efficient in producing electrical power. Longer irradiation time leads to the 

buildup of higher Pu isotopes, such as Pu-240 and 241, resulting in isotope combinations 

with less concentration of Pu-239. While these “fuel-grade” or “reactor-grade” 

combinations can be used to produce weapons, the process is much more difficult (and 

challenging for less technologically-advanced countries) due to spontaneous fission, heat 

production, or gamma ray emission. 

 

 Another factor in producing weapons-grade Pu-239 is the type of reactor in use. Many 

types exist today, such as light water, heavy-water, graphite-moderated, and fast-breeder 

reactors. While all produce Pu-239, light-water reactors are inefficient at producing 

weapons-grade Pu-239, but extremely efficient in electrical-power production. Conversely, 

graphite-moderated reactors have been found most suitable for Pu-239 production, as fuel 

elements can be changed with the reactor on-line, reducing the fuel irradiation time, but 

this also reduces power production efficiency. 

 Nation-states intent on developing nuclear weapons obviously prefer reactors efficient 

in producing weapons-grade Pu-239. Such is the case with North Korea. Long desiring a 

nuclear capability to offset the perceived US military threat, North Korea began a nuclear 

program, with Soviet assistance, in the mid-1960s. The program resulted in a 5 megawatt 

(MW) reactor at Yongbyon and the start of construction of 50 MW and 200 MW graphitemoderated reactors. In the 1994 US/North Korea “Agreed Framework,” North Korea 

agreed to dismantle these facilities and freeze its nuclear program in exchange for two 

light-water reactors and normalization of relations. Since that time, North Korea has 

repeatedly violated this agreement, which ultimately collapsed in 2003. At that time, North 

Korea admitted possession of nuclear weapons. 

— Various sources
15 

 Monitoring CBRN programs is often complicated by the dual-use nature of 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials. Pharmaceutical and 

petrochemical factories can mask chemical and biological warfare production programs.

Radiological materials are commonly used in support of the medical community, and all

nuclear reactors, whether designed specifically for peaceful electric-power production or 

for production of weapons-grade material, produce plutonium of various grades that can 

be used to make nuclear weapons. Distinguishing between peaceful civilian industrial 

use and hostile use requires robust intelligence and surveillance capabilities. 

Denial and Interdiction Operations 

 Denial and interdiction operations aid compliance with international agreements 

and prevent prohibited acquisition of CBRN assets. These operations track, intercept, 

search, divert, seize, or stop trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, related materials, 

technologies, and expertise from adversaries. An example of these operations includes 

the redirection of international shipments of unauthorized CBRN, related material, or 

information sources. Operations to deny and interdict proliferation-related shipments 

assist the disruption and dismantlement of proliferation networks. Associated activities 

may include interception, identification, securing, disposing of, or rendering safe 

materials suspected to be WMD-related. 

Information Operations (IO)

 A direct result of the Information Age is the ability to place a greater emphasis on 

influencing political and military leaders, certain individuals or organizations, and 

national populations to resolve conflicts without resorting to conventional military force. 

IO can assist CBRN deterrence and counterproliferation policy and objectives through 

the application of the tenets of influence operations. The objectives of influence 

operations are to affect adversary behaviors, protect friendly operations, communicate 

national intent, and project accurate information. These objectives are achieved via 

physical actions and activities (exercises, training missions, etc.), counterpropaganda, 

counterintelligence, and public affairs operations. These types of operations 

demonstrate and communicate resolve, heighten public awareness, promote national 

and coalition policies, aims, and objectives, as well as countering adversary propaganda 

and disinformation in the news. Influence operations are most useful in CBRN 

deterrence when applied before the onset of hostilities and ultimately may deter 

potential adversaries by helping “drive a crisis back to peace” before the use of force 

becomes necessary. If deterrence fails, the subsequent actions taken to resolve the 

situation must be synchronized and coordinated with a new information operations 

campaign in order to capitalize on successes (armed recovery of CBRN material, armed 

defense, physical destruction of threat, etc.). Military planners must pay special 

attention to the integration of intelligence and IO in proliferation prevention, since 

deterrence options may involve a coordinated approach to the collection, 

declassification, and release of information on adversary CBRN capabilities. 
16 

Proliferation Security Initiative 

 In May 2003, President George W. Bush initiated a voluntary partnership of countries 

working together to develop broad measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD. The 

partnership became known as the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. Today, the PSI is 

composed of core member states–Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 

Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, 

and the United States-and carries the signatures of more than 60 states. The PSI creates a 

global partnership in the prevention of WMD, and is an international mechanism to interdict 

shipping vessels, cargo trucks, and aircraft suspected of transporting WMD. 

 On 4 October 2003, German and Italian security forces operating under the auspices of 

the PSI intercepted a marine vessel in the Mediterranean Sea on its way from Malaysia to 

Libya. The ship was carrying components for a “turn-key” uranium enrichment centrifuge 

factory that appeared to have been produced using the expertise of Pakistani nuclear 

specialists. The ship contained the production equipment of nuclear weapons technology 

that carried the distinct trademark of the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, who was later 

revealed to have been selling nuclear secrets to rogue states around the world. Following 

the successful interdiction operation in October 2003, Libya’s leader, Colonel Moammar 

Ghadafi, in December 2003, agreed to permanently dismantle Libya’s WMD programs and 

allow weapons inspectors into the country to start the dismantling process. “Colonel 

Ghadafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer once his commitment is 

fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example. Abandoning the pursuit of illegal 

weapons can lead to better relations with the United States and other free nations” - 

President Bush, National Defense University, 2004. 

—Various Sources 

Security and Intelligence Cooperation 

 Security assistance operations implement programs and initiatives that respond 

to regional threats and provide conventional military assistance to secure regional 

stability and national sovereignty. Assistance to allies and friends improves 

interoperability and strengthens C-CBRN capabilities. 

 Military-to-military engagement consists of coordinated activities that reinforce 

US positions in the international community, improve interoperability, facilitate 

information sharing, provide training opportunities between US and international forces, 

and prepare for future coalition operations. Cooperative military-to-military 

engagements enhance bilateral/multilateral efforts and improve diplomatic relations. 

 Military-to-military intelligence cooperation plays a vital role in preventing the 

proliferation of CBRN weapons. The PSI allows the interdiction of transporters of WMD 

through enhanced intelligence sharing and cooperation between US and international 

partners. 

 Air Force capabilities may be called upon by order of the Secretary of Defense to 

render security and intelligence assistance or to support US agencies, like the 
17 

Department of Justice, to prevent proliferation of CBRN threats that may be directed at 

the homeland. For more information on homeland security operations, refer to AFDD 2-

10, Homeland Operations. 

Treaties and Agreements 

 The US is a party to numerous international treaties and agreements that prohibit 

or restrict proliferation of CBRN weapons and related technology. Treaties such as the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons 

Convention provide international standards to address the activities of potential 

proliferators. International agreements such as the PSI provide a forum for states to 

engage in multilateral exercises and information sharing. Agreements like the PSI 

facilitate enforcement of arms control treaties and provide for diplomatic and military 

tools to respond to treaty violations. 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

 Status of forces agreements, diplomatic notes, and/or other international 

agreements determine the legal status of US armed forces in host countries and should 

be in place before conducting operations. These agreements preserve command 

authority, guarantee fair treatment of individual Service members, and conserve scarce 

resources. At times, US forces must conduct operations in countries where these 

agreements are not in place. In those instances, US forces should consult with the 

servicing staff judge advocate to determine the existence of applicable international 

agreements, the possibility of obtaining an agreement if one does not exist, or the exact 

status of the deploying forces in the absence of an agreement. 

 While operating in foreign territory or with foreign nationals, commanders must 

plan to safeguard sensitive equipment and dual-use technology that may be diverted to 

adversaries seeking CBRN capabilities. 

 Due to the clandestine nature of typical proliferation networks, the intelligence 

necessary to support effective interdiction efforts may provide very little time for 

planning and conducting proliferation prevention operations. Commanders should 

maintain the ability to plan and act quickly in support of proliferation prevention taskings. 
18 

CHAPTER THREE 

COUNTERFORCE OPERATIONS 

GENERAL FRAMEWORK 

 Counterforce operations provide combatant commanders with the ability to 

defeat the full suite of CBRN capabilities before they can be used against United States 

interests, while minimizing collateral effects. While Air Force counterforce operations 

are conducted under the auspices of strategic attack, counterair, counterland, 

countersea, and information operations, the inherently catastrophic potential of WMD 

warrants an independent examination of the objectives, potential targets, resources and 

forces, and planning considerations. 

 

 Counterforce operations aim to detect, deter, deny, degrade, or destroy 

adversary CBRN capabilities, including research and development, production, and 

storage facilities, fielded forces, and related C2. Numerous kinetic and non-kinetic 

capabilities are available to create counterforce effects against adversary CBRN 

capabilities. Given the threat posed by WMD, counterforce operations present unique 

planning considerations in the areas of operational risk, ISR needs, targeting and 

weaponeering challenges, and legal issues. 

COUNTERFORCE OBJECTIVES 

 The United States Air Force may conduct counterforce operations to achieve a 

variety of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. These objectives fall under the 

general headings of: detect, deter, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary CBRN 

capabilities. Accomplishment of these objectives leads to a “rollback” of the adversary’s 

CBRN capabilities or their ability to employ them against the forces or territories of the 

United States or those of its allies and friends. 

 

 The security environment confronting the United States today is radically 

different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of the United States 

Government remains what it always has been: to protect the American people 

and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty 

obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of 

national power, before the threats can do grave damage.... There are few 

greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such 

hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 

preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. 

 — National Security Strategy, 

March 2006 
19 

Detect 

 While not truly an objective of counterforce operations in and of itself, the ability 

to detect the location of adversary WMD and related facilities is the fundamental enabler 

for effective counterforce operations.

 

 

Deter 

 A credible counterforce capability may have a deterrent effect on adversaries 

contemplating the deployment or use of WMD. If adversaries doubt their abilities to 

secure and protect their WMD assets, they may be less likely to rely on them or even 

develop them in the first place. 

 Predator UAS E-8C JSTARS Aircraft 

Degradation of Iraqi WMD Capability – Operation Desert Storm 

 Baghdad’s offensive weapons and research 

and productions sites—the known nuclear, 

biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons research, 

production, and storage centers—underwent 

repeated attacks to ensure that their products did 

not endanger the coalition; manned aircraft and 

TLAMs hammered thirty-one different NBC sites 

that first night and day. The F-117As proved 

particularly devastating, for unlike the TLAM, they 

could destroy hardened targets. Laboratory, research, and production 

facilities staggered under stealth-dropped smart bombs; video subsequently 

showed blasts sending destructive ripples through buildings like some parody 

of waves crashing on a beach. 

—Storm over Iraq: Air Power and 

 the Gulf War Richard P. Hallion 
20 

 

Deny 

 Target hardness and/or collateral damage considerations may make direct attack 

against WMD or related facilities impossible or undesirable, but an effects-based 

approach to targeting may result in alternatives that prevent the adversary from gaining 

access to or employing WMD. 

Degrade 

 In situations where an adversary’s CBRN capabilities are robust and widely 

dispersed, assuring destruction of the enemy’s WMD and infrastructure may fall beyond 

current counterforce capabilities. It is still possible, however, to achieve results that 

significantly limit the adversary’s ability to respond, and thus limit the potential damage 

to friendly forces or territory. Additionally, in a situation where an adversary’s CBRN 

capabilities are still maturing, counterforce operations may significantly lengthen the 

period of time necessary to field operational CBRN capabilities. 

Destroy 

 The fundamental objective of counterforce operations is to destroy or render 

impotent adversary CBRN capabilities before they are employed against friendly forces 

or territory. If military action is necessary, destruction of CBRN capabilities on the 

adversary’s home territory represents the best opportunity to limit friendly casualties and 

avoid contamination and damage to friendly territory. 

AL QAEDA ATTACKS - 1998 

 On August 7, 1998, two trucks loaded with high-yield explosives were detonated 

at US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 

people, including 12 Americans, and wounding more than 4,000. 

 The US government quickly concluded the embassy attacks were an al Qaeda 

operation, and 12 days later the US launched Operation INFINITE REACH, a strike 

against al Qaeda operations. The targets included a suspected al Qaeda terrorist 

training facility in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical weapons factory in 

Khartoum, Sudan. 

 Operation INFINITE REACH demonstrates the complexity of detecting, 

deterring, denying, degrading, and destroying individual adversaries and their WMD 

assets and the importance of direct intelligence for engagement. 

 —Various Sources
21 

COUNTERFORCE TARGETS 

 Counterforce targets are those that enable the adversary to develop, produce, 

store, or employ WMD. Identifying and striking these targets in the early stages of 

development and acquisition reduces an adversary’s potential attack capability, 

provides commanders with more options to defeat the threat, and potentially reduces 

collateral effects. Guidance and objectives received from national leadership and the 

JFC, combined with intelligence assessments of adversary CBRN threats, capabilities, 

and locations, help operational planners select CBRN targets, determine target priority, 

and sequencing. Counterforce targets may be planned before the initiation of hostilities 

and updated as warranted by new intelligence. The difficulty of conducting successful 

counterforce operations against CBRN capabilities increases the further the adversary 

has progressed down the path from development to WMD employment. 

Research and Development Facilities 

 Operations against research and development (R&D) facilities rely heavily on 

accurate intelligence to detect and characterize CBRN activities, which may be 

concealed within medical and industrial complexes otherwise used for legitimate 

purposes. A preemptive strike could have a temporary effect or completely disable 

future CBRN development. 

Weapon Production Facilities 

 Operations against production facilities provide another option for degrading or 

destroying an adversary’s CBRN capability. While the effect of the operation may be 

temporary, strikes against production facilities represent a relatively low-risk option for 

reducing the CBRN threat, especially if the adversary has not yet achieved an 

operational CBRN capability. 

Weapon Storage Facilities 

 As with R&D and weapon production facilities, operations against CBRN storage 

facilities present effective options for the denial, degradation, and destruction of an 

adversary’s ability to employ CBRN. If detected, fixed storage facilities are particularly 

vulnerable to counterforce operations. However, adversary passive defense measures, 

such as hardening or deeply burying the facility, may complicate destruction of the 

weapons inside. Adversary use of mobile storage facilities can further complicate 

destruction of CBRN weapons. Effects-based solutions, rather than weapon 

destruction, may still deny the adversary access to the facility. 

Fielded Weapon Systems and Supporting Infrastructure 

 Attacks (kinetic or non-kinetic) against this target category seek to deter, deny, 

degrade, or destroy an adversary’s ability to promptly employ WMD, either prior to an 

adversary attack or to limit damage from potential follow-on attacks. This target 

category is one of the highest priorities and potentially the greatest threat to the national 

security of the United States and its allies and friends. Once deployed into the field, 
22 

weapon systems such as mobile surface-to-surface missile system transporter erector 

launchers present a significant challenge to current ISR capabilities and have 

demonstrated a capability for rapid reaction and launch with little or no warning. 

CBRN-Related C2 Facilities 

 Command and control capabilities are a critical node in an adversary’s CBRN 

capability. Counterforce operations, both kinetic and non-kinetic, against C2 facilities 

necessary for directing the employment of WMD may impede the adversary’s ability to 

employ these weapons for a period of time. If conducted concurrently with operations 

against the adversary’s fielded forces and storage locations, attacks against C2 

capabilities may further reduce the adversary’s ability to employ WMD. 

LINKAGE TO AIR FORCE OPERATIONS 

 Within the construct of Air Force doctrine, counterforce operations are not 

addressed as a separate entity. A variety of Air Force operations, including strategic 

attack, counterair, counterland, countersea, and information operations, may be 

conducted to achieve counterforce effects. The linkage between these categories of 

operations and counterforce are:

Strategic Attack Operations 

 Strategic attack operations are offensive actions specifically selected to achieve 

national or military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s 

ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without 

necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition (please see 

AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack). Strategic attack operations can bypass fielded forces 

and act directly upon the adversary’s strategic centers of gravity (COGs) to affect its 

sources of strength, freedom of action, or will to fight. Based on this construct, 

operations against the full spectrum of CBRN targets could be considered strategic 

attack operations. In both Operation DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM, suspected Iraqi CBRN delivery vehicles, storage areas, production 

facilities, and associated C2 capabilities were designated as COGs and became the 

focus of extensive counterforce operations throughout both campaigns. 

Counterair Operations 

 Offensive counterair (OCA) operations, including the surface attack mission, 

consist of offensive operations aimed at destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy air 

and missile threats and their supporting infrastructure (see AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair 

Operations). Consistent with the objectives of counterforce operations, the main goal of 

the OCA surface attack mission is to prevent the employment of adversary air and 

missile capabilities. The allocation of strike aircraft to “SCUD hunting” during Operation 

DESERT STORM is a prime example of OCA operations intended to achieve a 

counterforce effect. 
23 

Counterland Operations 

 Counterland operations are air and space operations against enemy land force 

capabilities to create effects that achieve JFC objectives by dominating the surface 

environment using air and space power (please see AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland 

Operations). The most relevant portion of counterland to counterforce operations 

against CBRN targets is air interdiction that aims to destroy, neutralize, or delay the 

enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly

forces. For example, air strikes against a convoy transporting WMD to indirect fire units 

near the front or strikes against CBRN equipped indirect fire units would constitute 

counterforce operations. 

Countersea Operations 

 Countersea operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of 

maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption, delay, diversion, or other 

neutralization of threats in the maritime environment (please see AFDD 2-1.4, 

Countersea Operations). While normally under the purview of the Maritime Component, 

the JFACC may act in support of maritime operations with air, space, or information 

capabilities to perform countersea operations. Countersea operations against CBRNarmed surface ships or submarines, including those still in port, contribute to achieving 

counterforce objectives. Prior to targeting CBRN-armed vessels in port, commanders 

and planners must carefully consider the potential collateral effects of such an attack. 

Information Operations 

 IO are the integrated employment of the capabilities of influence operations, 

electronic warfare operations, and network warfare operations, in concert with specified 

integrated control enablers, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human 

and automated decision-making while protecting our own (AFDD 2-5, Information 

Operations). The joint force can leverage each of these three capabilities to achieve 

counterforce effects. While each IO capability is separate and distinct, when linked, 

they can achieve operationally important IO effects in the CBRN arena. 

 Influence operations employ the capabilities of psychological operations, military 

deception, operations security, counterintelligence operations, counterpropaganda 

operations, and public affairs operations to affect the perceptions and behaviors of 

adversary leaders, groups, or entire populations against the development or use of 

CBRN weapons. Influence operations can potentially deter an adversary from 

employing WMD. 

 Electronic warfare operations use electromagnetic and directed energy to deny, 

disrupt, degrade, and/or destroy adversary CBRN capabilities. These operations can 

utilize infrared, electro-optical, laser, radio frequency, targeting devices, and directed 

energy threat systems. 

 Network warfare operations use the tools of cyberspace and the global 

information grid to change, add, delete or deny operational data to an adversary’s 
24 

information systems to dissuade him from employing CBRN weapons, or for the 

purpose of denying, disrupting, degrading, and/or destroying his CBRN capabilities. 

Electronic or network warfare may interfere with adversary C2 capabilities and deny it 

the ability to employ WMD. Network warfare may also be employed to disrupt WMD 

development or production efforts. 

 

COUNTERFORCE RESOURCES AND FORCES 

 The effectiveness of counterforce operations against adversary CBRN 

capabilities depends on the capabilities and availability of certain resources and 

systems. The choice of which resources or systems to employ is driven by the threats, 

environmental conditions, and available intelligence. The inherent characteristics of air 

and space forces make them particularly well suited to conducting counterforce 

operations against adversary CBRN capabilities. Additional joint capabilities that may 

be leveraged to successfully achieve counterforce objectives are: 

Aircraft 

 Many modern strike aircraft (such as the B-2A Spirit), possess, in varying 

degrees, the ability to penetrate defenses, all-weather precision, payload, extended 

range, and loiter capability necessary to accomplish effective counterforce operations. 

Missiles 

 A variety of missiles, including both ballistic and cruise missiles, possess 

significant standoff range, precision, and quick-reaction capabilities coupled with the 

ability to strike CBRN targets without placing military personnel in harms way. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 

 The capabilities of UASs for reconnaissance and strike continue to evolve. UASs 

retain the attributes of traditional aircraft, but share with missiles the advantage of not 

exposing friendly military personnel to direct hostile fire. 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

 SOF may conduct direct attacks against CBRN capabilities or provide terminal 

guidance for attacks by other capabilities. Throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 

SOF were deployed in western Iraq to prevent the use of SCUD missiles against Israel 

or other nations in the region. 

Information Operations 

 IO may be employed to achieve counterforce objectives or support operations by 

other capabilities through non-kinetic effects to interfere with adversary CBRN 

production or C2. Influence operations could convince an adversary not to use WMD or 

agree to give up its CBRN capabilities without the need for traditional military action. 
25 

Communications System Support and ISR 

 These systems are critical to the success of counterforce operations because 

they provide the information necessary to detect and target adversary CBRN 

capabilities and assess the outcome of kinetic or non-kinetic operations. 

Surface Forces 

 When employed as part of a larger military campaign, surface forces enable the 

securing and/or destruction of captured adversary WMD or capabilities. Occupation of 

adversary facilities prevents the theft or diversion of WMD or technology. 

Agent Defeat Weapons 

 These are a special class of weapons designed to defeat CBRN capabilities and 

limit collateral damage and hazardous material dispersal to the greatest extent possible 

by incinerating or entombing potential contamination. 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

 The USAF may conduct strategic attack, counterair, counterland, countersea, or 

information operations against adversary CBRN capabilities, either within or separate 

from extensive military operations, to achieve counterforce effects. While not distinct 

from a doctrinal perspective, the inherent potential for mass destruction and/or mass 

effect of WMD, and the timing and circumstances of the counterforce operation present 

the military planner with unique requirements. Operational risk, ISR timeliness and 

accuracy, targeting, and international law are all areas for special consideration when 

planning C-CBRN operations. 

Operational Risk 

 Counterforce operations face varying degrees of operational risk that fall into two 

major categories. The first is the direct risk faced by military members participating in 

the operation. The use of stealth aircraft, standoff weapons, UASs, or non-kinetic 

capabilities such as network warfare may greatly reduce this facet of operational risk. 

 The second category of operational risk involves the risks associated with the 

threat of the target itself. Fielded CBRN forces present a much more urgent and direct 

threat, given their readiness to strike at friendly forces or territory, than do their 

associated production facilities, which represent a longer-term threat. One must also 

consider the operational risks that result from a partially successful or unsuccessful 

counterforce operation. For example, if the target were a number of launch-ready 

CBRN armed missiles, a partially successful attack may precipitate, with remaining 

missiles, the very attack the counterforce operation aimed to counter. Conversely, a 

partially successful operation against production facilities may still degrade the 

adversary’s CBRN capabilities for some time and present much less risk of immediate 

retaliation. 
26 

ISR Requirements 

 Accurate and timely ISR information is a critical enabler for successful 

counterforce operations against CBRN capabilities. Adversary CBRN capabilities must 

be detected before they can be countered. The proliferation of mobile missiles and 

underground facilities greatly complicates the challenge faced by those who collect and 

analyze ISR information. Potential adversaries have learned the lessons of the United 

States-led precision air campaigns in the Balkans and Southwest Asia, and now employ 

more sophisticated efforts to camouflage, conceal, disperse, and harden CBRN facilities 

against attack. 

Targeting and Weaponeering Considerations 

 The proliferation of hardened or deeply buried facilities dedicated to the 

production, storage, or C2 of adversary WMD and infrastructure challenges current 

capabilities to deal with this threat. Facilities may be hardened or buried deeply enough 

to protect their contents from direct attack by all existing munitions, including nuclear 

weapons. While destruction of the facility contents may be impractical (or impossible), 

an effects-based approach to targeting may still deny the adversary access to CBRN 

capabilities for a period of time. 

 Even adversary CBRN targets that are vulnerable to existing U.S. counterforce 

capabilities present weaponeering challenges. For example, the use of a nuclear 

weapon to strike an adversary’s hardened and deeply buried CBRN storage facility may 

effectively eliminate the threat, but create significant collateral damage, ionizing 

radiation, and nuclear fallout. Conventional weapons may pose a similar risk when 

employed against adversary chemical and biological weapons. The conventional 

explosion may disperse rather than destroy the agents resulting in residual hazard for 

local civilian populations or advancing friendly forces. Specialized agent defeat 

weapons that neutralize the CBRN weapon (i.e., via simple puncture or extremely high 

temperature) without dispersing the agent, as with a high explosive, may help to 

mitigate these risks. 

Legal Considerations 

 The preemptive nature of counterforce operations, particularly when not 

connected to a broader military campaign, is subject to conflicting interpretations of 

international law. Given this controversial nature, orders to conduct counterforce 

operations will likely originate at the highest levels of the United States Government. 

Resulting rules of engagement may be highly restrictive given the inherently high 

operational risk and potential for collateral damage. 
27 

CHAPTER FOUR 

ACTIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS 

GENERAL FRAMEWORK 

 While counterforce operational capabilities are proactive in nature, active 

defense operational capabilities contain reactive characteristics. Active defense 

operations attempt to intercept CBRN weapons enroute to their targets. Successful 

active defense operations can complement counterforce activities by forcing an 

adversary to alter attack strategies and expose CBRN assets. If counterforce 

operational capabilities are unsuccessful or unavailable, successful active defense 

operations can reduce the threat, lessen the number of attacks, thwart an attack, allow 

more effective passive defense and consequence management responses, and 

enhance US/Coalition operational capability following a CBRN attack. 

 Effective active defense measures take into account active defense capability 

sets (detect, divert, and destroy) with various planning considerations for each of the 

layered-defense domains (i.e., space, air, and surface). This layered defense approach 

incorporates networked space, air, and surface systems, and employs both kinetic and 

non-kinetic means of defeat. Measures include, but are not limited to, missile defense 

(ballistic and cruise), offensive/defensive counterair (OCA/DCA), special operations, 

and force protection operations to defend against conventionally and unconventionally 

delivered WMD. 

 

Active Defense Objectives 

 Active defense capability sets include actions to detect, divert, or destroy an 

adversary’s WMD while enroute to US interests while minimizing collateral damage. 

Detect includes space, air, and surface sensors to locate, characterize, track, 

and monitor an enroute CBRN threat. Divert capabilities cause the CBRN threat to 

redirect, modify, or miss the intended target set. Destroy capabilities prevent the 

function of or neutralize/eliminate the CBRN threat.

 It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is 

technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system 

capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 

ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) 

with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the 

annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense. 

— National Missile Defense Act of 1999 

(Public Law 106-38) 
28 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

 Active defense forces must work together to counter enemy attacks in order to 

protect friendly forces. These defenses should detect, track, and provide time-sensitive 

data to neutralize attacking enemy CBRN systems. While counterforce is proactive in 

nature, active defense is reactive, dependent upon an adversary’s engagement. As a 

result, timely and accurate data is vital to the success of the active defense detect, 

divert, and destroy countermeasures. The layered defense approach of active defense 

allows a greater opportunity to successfully intercept incoming WMD. In addition to the 

layered defense approach, successful implementation of CBRN active defense requires 

careful attention to the planning considerations of time sensitivity, engagement location 

of target set, and rules of engagement. 

Layered Active Defense Approach 

 Active defense capabilities are deployed in a layered defense (i.e., space, air, 

and ground (surface)) that maximize intercept opportunities against a wide range of 

threats. Active defense interception occurs within space, air, and/or ground (surface) 

domains, where US capability resides. These capabilities are further subdivided into 

“sensor” (detect) and “shooter” (divert or destroy) categories (See figure 4.1, page 29). 

Theater Missile Warning - Operation DESERT STORM 

 Theater missile warning evolved as a tactical concept during Operations DESERT 

SHIELD and DESERT STORM. For the first time in history, U.S. personnel 

participated in a major land campaign where they faced missile threats, potentially 

armed with chemical or biological warheads, from highly mobile and hard-to-find 

weapons systems. This meant existing U.S. Strategic Missile Warning units were 

forced to perform a mission for which they were not originally designed -- the detection 

and warning of shorter-burning, short-range missiles launched less than 1,000 

kilometers from deployed forces. During the operation, Defense Support Program 

satellites detected 87 SCUD missile launches. A warning sent to the theater generally 

allowed time for US and allied forces to seek shelter from incoming SCUDs. The data 

was also used for attack operations (SCUD hunting) and Patriot missile operations 

(SCUD in-flight destruction). Based on the lessons learned from DESERT STORM, 

new space units were created to improve warning operations to the theater, using 

space-based missile warning and infrared detection. 

 —Various sources
29 

 

Figure 4.1. CBRN Active Defense Framework 

 The space domain of the active defense layered approach encompasses all 

space-based capabilities. These assets provide critical detection ability, including 

theater and ballistic missile launches. Other space-based assets assist the warfighter 

by supporting active defense capabilities (e.g., communication, weather, and precision 

navigation/timing). Space assets also provide data to national decision makers. 

 The air domain of the active defense layered approach includes all airborne 

capabilities across all three doctrinal capability sets. These assets include a range of 

capabilities from airborne radar providing detection to OCA/DCA platforms supporting 

diversion and destruction of CBRN delivery systems. DCA operations consist of active 

and passive air defense operations. Potential CBRN threats may consist of CBRN 

payloads on a multitude of delivery vehicles ranging from general aviation aircraft and 

unmanned aerial vehicles to commercial and military airframes to cruise and shortrange ballistic missiles. 

 The ground (surface) portion of the active defense layered approach provides 

capabilities to both sense and neutralize a CBRN threat on any ground or water 

battlespace. This surface area includes any geographic region regardless of the 

installation boundary (i.e., “inside or outside the wire”), as well as littoral access to any 

Air Force operating location or US areas of interest. The required capabilities include 

ground-based radars, security forces, and special operations forces. 

Layered Active Defense Doctrinal Capability Sets

Detect Divert Destroy

 SPACE

 Sensors (space-based)

Ballistic threats X

Air threats X

Ground threats X

 AIR

 Sensors (airborne)

Air threats X

Ground threats X

 Shooters (airborne)

Air threats X X

Ground threats X X

 GROUND

 Sensors (ground)

Air threats X

Ground threats X

 Shooters (conventional/SOF)

Air threats XX X

Ground threats XX X

Layered Active Defense Doctrinal Capability Sets

Detect Divert Destroy

 SPACE

 Sensors (space-based)

Ballistic threats X

Air threats X

Ground threats X

 AIR

 Sensors (airborne)

Air threats X

Ground threats X

 Shooters (airborne)

Air threats X X

Ground threats X X

 GROUND

 Sensors (ground)

Air threats X

Ground threats X

 Shooters (conventional/SOF)

Air threats XX X

Ground threats XX X
30 

 The Patriot missile system is a longrange, all-altitude, all-weather air 

defense system to counter tactical 

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and 

advanced aircraft. The mach 3+ Patriots 

were deployed by US forces during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, stationed in 

Kuwait, and successfully destroyed a 

number of hostile surface-to-surface 

missiles using the new PAC-3 and 

guidance enhanced missiles. 

― Various sources 

US Army Patriot Missile 

Air Defense System 

 An integrated approach to active defense is essential to effective C-CBRN 

operations, and active defense must continue to be a highly coordinated joint mission 

for conducting missile defense and force protection. Active defense operations 

leverage Air Force capabilities for OCA, DCA, air interdiction, and force protection. 

Time Sensitivity 

 Time sensitivity is a critical component in CBRN active defense between target 

detection and engagement. Timely and accurate data collection, analysis, and 

presentation to senior decision makers are vital to effective active defense operations. 

Therefore, throughput must be robust enough to support short reaction times. In 

addition, commanders must be prepared for decision-making within a compressed 

timeline, as well as coping with adversaries who attempt to use deceptive measures to 

disrupt active defense systems. As discussed below, rules of engagement (ROE) may 

assist in shortening these decision timelines. 

Engagement Location of Target Set 

 Active defenses should engage 

enroute targets as far from the US and allied 

forces as operationally possible, taking into 

account ROE and evidence preservation 

considerations. Commanders should 

establish procedures to identify appropriate 

active defense measures to defeat CBRN 

attacks in advance of attack. 

Rules of Engagement 

 Although active defense against an 

adversary’s CBRN capability is similar to 

conventional capability, commanders must 

take into account the effects of agent/material 

dispersal near friendly forces or populated 

areas. In addition, active defense measures 

against both conventional and CBRN threats 

require a highly complex, joint methodology to 

provide warning and reporting to in-theater 

users within a time-sensitive environment. 

Specific ROE take into consideration 

established command relationships. 

Command Relationships 

 In theaters outside the continental US (OCONUS), the JFC normally assigns 

overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander designated the Area Air 

Defense Commander (AADC). Normally, the JFACC is designated the AADC. The 

AADC is responsible for integrating the entire air defense effort and is the component 
31 

commander with the capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations 

with other air operations. The JFACC, dual-hatted as the AADC, has the responsibility 

to integrate the counterair effort, offensive and defensive, from all components into one 

cohesive effort. The JFACC also has the capability to coordinate space and surface 

forces (e.g., battlefield coordination detachments, liaison officers, and security forces) to 

cover the entire layered defense approach. 

 Within North America, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 

provides air sovereignty, air warning, and air defense. Each NORAD region has a 

commander, triple-hatted as JFACC, Airspace Control Authority, and AADC. US 

Strategic Command supports NORAD by providing the necessary missile warning and 

space surveillance. 
32 

CHAPTER FIVE 

PASSIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS 

GENERAL FRAMEWORK 

 Despite the best efforts of CBRN proliferation prevention, counterforce, and 

active defense measures, some enemy weapons may reach their targets. CBRN 

passive defense measures improve the abilities of personnel to survive and sustain 

operations in a contaminated environment. Commanders will assess the threat in 

relation to the mission and determine appropriate passive defense measures. Passive 

defense measures maximize the ability to survive and operate in a contaminated 

environment through proper planning, training, risk assessment, and vulnerability and 

hazard mitigation. The extensive nature of CBRN contamination makes tactical-level 

passive defense requirements the responsibility of every Airman. 

 In the event of a CBRN attack, the operations tempo of an installation may 

decrease due to degradation in the ability to perform the mission. A well-planned 

strategy will facilitate a more rapid return of operations tempo, especially if assisted by 

advanced warning. Passive defense measures do this by reducing vulnerability and 

minimizing the effects of WMD employed against US and host nation installations and 

facilities, interests, points of embarkation and debarkation, and critical infrastructure. 

Passive defense will assist ground, air, and space forces to continue operations despite 

the presence of CBRN agents. 

PASSIVE DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

 Passive defense activities are conducted to enable a commander to neutralize, 

contain, and/or manage the effects of CBRN attacks on an Air Force installation or area 

 We saw figures running wildly in 

confusion over the fields. Greenish-gray 

clouds swept down upon them, turning 

yellow as they traveled over the country 

blasting everything they touched and 

shriveling up the vegetation. No human 

courage could face such a peril. Then 

there staggered into our midst French 

soldiers, blinded, coughing, chests 

heaving, faces an ugly purple color, lips 

speechless with agony, and behind them the gas-soaked trenches, we learned 

that they had left hundreds of dead and dying comrades. It was the most fiendish 

and wicked thing I have ever seen. 

―Description of German chlorine gas attack at Ypres, 22 April 1915 

 O. S. Watkins
33 

of interest. To achieve these objectives, commanders should implement passive 

defense measures appropriate to the threat, location of installation, and availability of 

resources. These measures may include the following: 1) facility hardening, 2) 

evacuation, 3) individual and collective protection, 4) detection and identification, 5) 

warning systems, 6) contamination avoidance, 7) contamination control, 8) 

decontamination, 9) health risk assessments, 10) medical surveillance, and 11) medical 

countermeasures. A “one size fits all passive defense” is not possible. Individual 

CBRN effects may be significantly different and often require unique strategies and 

procedures. For example, counter-biological vaccines and restriction of movement 

strategies designed to contain disease outbreaks are unlikely to be useful against 

chemical, radiological, or nuclear effects. Likewise, the protection provided by existing 

mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) equipment is not uniform across the CBRN 

spectrum. In general, CBRN detection systems, computer-based warning systems and 

reporting tools, and various levels of decontamination capabilities reduce the effects of 

an attack. These passive defense activities and measures should be applied in a 

layered and tailored approach to facilitate a comprehensive response. All 

activities/measures fall under one or more components of the passive defense 

framework, which consists of sensing, shaping, shielding, and sustainment. While 

these activities normally occur at the installation level, the COMAFFOR should be 

aware of and ensure the emplacement and employment of theater-wide passive 

defense capabilities. The passive defense pillar is comprised of four tenets: Sense, 

Shape, Shield, and Sustain. 

Sense 

 Passive defense activities provide a commander with up-to-date information on 

CBRN threats by detecting, identifying, and qualifying/quantifying hazards. Obtaining 

this information requires accurate intelligence assessments in a number of areas, to 

include sampling, detection, and identification. 

 

 CBRN detection, sampling, and identification are multifaceted and multifunctional 

operations and include CBRN point and stand-off detection systems; medical, food, and 

water surveillance; and pre- and post-attack reconnaissance for explosive ordnance 

detection by unit and installation post-attack reconnaissance teams. Samples collected 

for real-time identification, typically detected and collected by civil engineering, 

bioenvironmental engineering, and/or medical forces, provide evidence of a CBRN 

attack and may trigger passive defense or consequence management responses. Point 

detection systems continue to improve and incorporate rapid identification capabilities. 

 Epidemiological surveillance conducted by public health and medical personnel 

also contributes to detecting biological weapons exposure, low-level chemical agent 

exposure (below current instrument detection levels), or radiation exposure. Airmen 

serve as a key component of the sensing architecture. All Airmen must recognize their 

role as a CBRN “sensor.” They should be trained to sense indications of impending or 

actual CBRN attacks, report those indications, and take the immediate and prudent 

actions necessary to protect themselves and mission resources. 
34 

Shape 

Shaping is the characterization of CBRN hazards to accurately describe the 

current and future operational picture to the commander. Passive defense activities that 

allow a commander to shape the operational environment include CBRN effects 

predictions, meteorological condition assessments, gaining situational awareness and 

predicting future events, establishing protected beddown locations to mitigate CBRN 

effects, and identifying health risks to ensure a fit and healthy fighting force. 

 Prediction, in combination with detection, identification, and quantification, 

provides commanders with a clear delineation of clean and contaminated areas. 

Intelligence, civil engineering, and weather experts provide predictions on the nature of 

the threat. For meteorological condition assessments; weather experts supply 

information on terrain, weather conditions and other meteorological data, while CE 

readiness CBRN experts provide accurate predictions about the type of agent, release 

point, and the plume (footprint of the contaminated area). 

 

 Predictive modeling under differing meteorological conditions helps a commander 

prepare responses to a range of possible scenarios. Meteorological conditions such as 

temperature, cloud cover, rainfall, and wind speed may impact the effectiveness of 

CBRN attacks and persistence of contamination. Analyzing the potential meteorological 

effects on unit operations is key to an effective response. Additionally, adverse weather 

such as storms may severely affect a unit’s passive defense actions and impact an 

adversary’s ability to employ CBRN weapons effectively. The Air Force must be able to 

produce real-time data on current weather conditions pre-, trans-, and post-CBRN 

attack to determine what conditions might affect plume patterns and persistence of a 

CBRN agent. Accurate and timely meteorological assessments also contribute to 

effective sampling, detection, and identification of CBRN agents. 

 Gaining and maintaining situational awareness of the CBRN threat is critical in 

predicting the potential future degradation of operations and allows the commander to 

optimize offensive and defensive operations. Integrating information gained in the 

“sense” passive defense component is critical in shaping the commander’s view of the 

operational battle space. 

 Location planning is necessary for the beddown of forces and mission 

parameters. Site development concerns are also critical to optimizing the ability to 

support passive defense operations. The physical features of a region should be 

factored into passive defense planning, as different geographical features will affect the 

potential for sensing CBRN agents and alter the spread of the CBRN contamination. 

 Despite the threat of or existence of CBRN threats, commanders should 

accurately identify the health risks associated with each potential CBRN agent. 

Accurate assessment via the installation medical intelligence/public health emergency 

officer, bioenvironmental engineer, and CE readiness personnel allow the commander 

to consider each agent in its proper context, establish a risk priority, and make informed 

risk management decisions. 
35 

Shield 

 Shielding includes protecting forces from harmful effects and hazards of CBRN 

threats. Shielding may be accomplished through activities including the administration 

of vaccines and prophylaxis (to prevent, mitigate, and minimize CBRN exposure 

effects), or contamination avoidance to prevent or reduce exposures. Passive defense 

activities which allow a commander to shield warfighting forces include disease and 

casualty prevention, contamination avoidance, contamination control, and protective 

countermeasures. 

 Disease and casualty prevention include steps taken to prevent casualties before 

attack and minimize casualties after a CBRN attack. Good health and hygiene, 

vaccines, and prophylaxis increase the survivability of the forces. The commander 

should optimize the appropriate level and type of protection based upon current 

intelligence, the specific hazard of the CBRN agent, the quantity of the agent dispersed, 

weather conditions, and the location of the attack or potential attack. 

Contamination avoidance includes actions taken to minimize the impact of CBRN 

attacks by eliminating exposure to contamination. Successful contamination avoidance 

results from a combination of dispersal, prediction, sampling and identification, marking, 

rerouting equipment and materials, and protective countermeasures, such as sheltering 

people and providing hardening for facilities and critical equipment. Before an attack 

occurs, it is important to disperse mission critical assets to enhance the probability that 

some facilities and equipment will escape contamination. Dispersal includes 

transporting mission-essential personnel and equipment from high-risk to low-risk areas 

for survival, recovery, and reconstitution. Permanent and expedient hardening 

measures are used to strengthen buildings and utility systems or provide barriers to 

resist the destructive effects of weapons on aircraft and equipment. Successful 

hardening measures will protect people and weapons systems from explosive weapon 

effects. Permanent hardening may be incorporated into structures during initial 

Pyridostigmine – Nerve Agent Pretreatment 

 In the late 1980s, the United States, following the example of Great Britain, 

stocked the compound pyridostigmine for its combat units as a wartime contingency 

pretreatment adjunct for nerve agent exposure. Several other allies, including most 

members of the NATO, did so as well. At the recommended dose, pyridostigmine is 

free of performance-limiting side effects. Unfortunately, pyridostigmine by itself is 

ineffective as a pretreatment against subsequent nerve agent exposure and thus it is 

not a true pretreatment compound. Pyridostigmine pretreatment does provide greatly 

improved protection against soman [nerve agent] exposure, however, when combined 

with postexposure antidote therapy. For this reason, pyridostigmine is classified as a 

pretreatment adjunct. 

 

—Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological 

 Warfare, Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army, 1997
36 

construction or added later as a modification or retrofit. Expedient hardening, such as 

the rapid erection of sandbag walls or building soil berms, is the primary hardening 

method for expeditionary forces. 

 While operating in a CBRN environment, contamination control prevents 

secondary transfer of disease, chemical, biological or radiological material, and/or reaerosolization of an agent. Contamination control includes avoiding, reducing, 

removing, or rendering harmless the hazards from CBRN contamination. As part of the 

contamination control process, decontamination operations are intended to help sustain 

operations by preventing or minimizing performance degradation, casualties, or loss of 

materiel. 

 If CBRN contamination is found on equipment, facilities, or terrain, the area must 

be marked to identify areas for possible decontamination. Personnel must be alerted to 

avoid the area to reduce the spread of contaminants and avoid unnecessary 

contamination. If contamination is too great, or the contamination received negatively 

impacts the mission, relocation or rerouting of equipment and material may be 

necessary to survive and recover from an attack. For air and space forces, although 

unlikely, this may require relocating operations to a different base and transporting noncontaminated assets to an alternative location. Diverting aircraft to an uncontaminated 

airfield prevents the spread of contaminants to valuable airlift assets and cargo. 

 When contamination is unavoidable, protective countermeasures allow Air Force 

forces to survive and operate in a CBRN environment. It is important to plan for and 

develop these protective countermeasures prior to CBRN attack. The commander 

should optimize the appropriate level of protection based upon the specific threat (type, 

quantity, hazard, and means of delivery), anticipated warning time, duration of 

exposure, and the actual or projected attack location. Protective countermeasures 

include restriction of movement (to limit exposure of forces to hazardous agents via 

limiting interactions between personnel, restricting large gatherings, closing facilities, 

quarantining, and isolating), shelters (or collective protection), immunizations and 

chemoprophylaxis, masks, personal protective equipment (PPE), and individual 

protective equipment (IPE). If forces have advance warning of an attack, personnel 

protective measures and MOPP gear can increase survivability of the forces during 

operations. However, the occurrence of a biological attack may not be determined until 

personnel become symptomatic, in which case personnel protective measures may be 

of little use. 
37 

Sustain 

 It may be imperative to sustain combat operations in a contaminated 

environment. Some passive defense activities which enable a commander to sustain 

operations may duplicate activities in the consequence management pillar, since both 

passive defense and consequence management are conducted simultaneously across 

the spectrum of pre-, trans-, and post-attack. Regardless of where a planner decides to 

define an activity, operations will continue by conducting specific passive defense and 

consequence management activities to facilitate the return to operational capability as 

soon as possible. These activities include post-attack reconnaissance to identify 

hazardous areas, notifying personnel, and decontaminating and managing casualties, 

as needed. 

Decontamination and health risk assessments are important first steps toward a 

return to pre-attack operational capability. If assets could not be covered or protected 

from the CBRN attack, priority must be given to those personnel and equipment most 

needed for combat effectiveness. There is ongoing research in the area of fast and 

effective decontamination solutions and techniques. The commander, and appropriate 

subject matter experts, should be aware of the latest cutting-edge technologies, 

approved for use by DoD, to rapidly decontaminate critical assets and personnel. 

 Post-attack health risk assessment, typically accomplished by bioenvironmental 

engineering forces, provides critical guidance to commanders. Accurate assessment of 

health risk via the installation aerospace medicine team should allow the commander to 

make informed risk management decisions. 

Split-MOPP Concept 

 This tactic divides the airbase into multiple sectors or control zones and assigns 

threat-based protective actions and MOPP for each area that’s independent from one 

another. It provides commanders with the flexibility to respond to threats in specific 

areas and continue operations within areas unaffected by the incident or at lower risk 

from the threat. Your unit control center controls your movement between one sector 

and another. Ensure you understand what alarm condition and MOPP level applies 

before entering a sector or zone. 

―AFMAN 10-2602, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and 

 Conventional (NBCC) Defense Operations and 

 Standards, 29 May 2003 
38 

 [Before the Gulf War] [w]e maintained 

an interest by scaring people. We did 

training, but in many cases it was rote. 

Everybody went through the motions. You 

knew you had to put on your protective 

mask and overgarment in X amount of 

time. The Gulf War changed all that. It 

put a real focus on chemical-biological 

operations. Suddenly, the specter was 

real, due to the fact that we were up 

against someone who could truly use it 

against us. 

 Since Desert Storm, the military has 

made marked progress on two fronts – 

awareness and technology. Units now 

train more frequently with chemical and 

biological defense equipment that, in the 

past, was locked away and issued only 

occasionally. Today, service members do 

their jobs while wearing protective 

equipment. 

This is now just another facet of being a 

Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine that you 

have to assimilate into the rest of your 

military skills. We realized that’s how 

we’re going to fight, so we started training 

that way. 

—US Army Col John V. Wade, 

former medical chemical-biological 

warfare adviser to Gen Norman 

Schwartzkopf, Desert Storm 

Commander, In Linda D. Kozaryn’s 

“Knowledge Key to Combating 

Chemical, Biological Warfare,” 

American Forces Information 

Service, 1999 

 Long-term health risks due to exposure to low levels of residual contamination 

must also be considered. Even after thorough decontamination, formerly contaminated 

assets may pose a long-term health risk to personnel. Commanders must ensure all 

appropriate assets are marked as 

formerly contaminated, contamination 

and decontamination is annotated in 

vehicle/equipment life-cycle historical 

documents, and personnel medical 

records are documented with agent type, 

detector reading, MOPP level, and 

exposure times. 

 Immediate medical actions are 

important to personnel survivability and 

operability in the post-CBRN attack 

phase. Casualty management involves 

triaging, treating, stabilizing, and 

transporting the victims of CBRN attacks, 

which appear in the consequence 

management chapter of this doctrine. 

However, the full spectrum of C-CBRN 

operations will include medical activities 

that may be applied throughout both 

passive defense and consequence 

management operations, such as self aid 

and buddy care (see Air Force 

Instruction (AFI) 36-2238, Self-Aid and 

Buddy Care Training and AFH 36-2218, 

Volume 2, Self Aid and Buddy Care 

Student Handbook). 

 Commanders, through medical 

and services personnel, must also be 

prepared to care for contaminated 

casualties and human remains. In 

addition to challenges within the theater 

of operations, medical evacuation and 

return of deceased personnel could be 

problematic due to potential prohibitions 

on overflight and landing imposed by 

other nations. 

 Operating effectively in a contaminated environment may be critical to mission 

success. Proper planning in the sense, shape, and shield areas prior to CBRN attack 

will ensure that the sustain aspect of passive defense is successfully accomplished. 
39 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

 Commander implementation of the passive defense framework requires careful 

attention to the following planning considerations, each of which falls under one or more 

framework components. 

Joint, Coalition, and Host Nation Operations Planning 

 The Air Force should plan to support C-CBRN operations as part of a joint and 

coalition force and with host nation forces who may provide additional valuable 

resources, but may also add new vulnerabilities. Commanders must fully understand 

joint and allied capabilities, requirements, and potential limitations regarding C-CBRN 

operations to make the most effective use of existing defense assets to protect essential 

mission activities. To the extent that joint or allied forces provide mission critical 

functions, commanders must either plan and train for provision of passive defense 

measures that sustain these functions or provision of these functions independent of 

joint or allied forces. To facilitate this support, joint equipment and procedural concepts 

should be established and documented in appropriate publications, such as JP 3-41, 

CBRN, and High-Yield Explosive Consequence Management and JP 3-40, Joint 

Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

Manpower 

 Contractor or host nation personnel are often utilized to provide valuable 

functions and services on military installations, including support of passive defense 

operations. Commanders must be prepared to protect all non-military personnel in the 

event of a CBRN attack or incident and must account for this protection in passive 

defense plans and training activities. To the extent that contractors or host nation 

personnel provide mission-critical functions, commanders must either plan and train for 

provision of passive defense measures that sustain these functions or provision of these 

functions independent of these non-military personnel. The contractor or host nation 

roles should be defined within memorandums of understanding, memorandums of 

agreement, and/or statements of work. 
40 

On 3 December, 1984, poison gas leaked 

from a Union Carbide factory in Bhopal, India, 

killing thousands. Most research organizations 

put the toll at about 8,000...in the first week. 

The plant once manufactured pesticides, using 

chemicals similar to those used in chemical 

warfare agent production. There were no 

detection or warning systems, no response 

plans, and no protective equipment. By the time 

the residents realized there was a problem and 

relayed it to the Union Carbide factory, there 

wasn’t much that could be done, other than 

collecting and burying the dead. 

 ― Various Sources

CHAPTER SIX 

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS 

GENERAL FRAMEWORK 

 A CBRN event can occur via wartime attack, terrorist attack, or accident, and the 

COMAFFOR will likely deal with managing the consequences of the event. 

Consequence management (CM) is principally applied after a CBRN event occurs. CM 

is defined as: 

Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and 

mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including 

natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02 and JP 

3-41) 

In addition, the Air Force C-CBRN Council approved the following definition: 

Consequence management activities serve to reduce the effects of a 

CBRN attack or event and assist in the restoration of essential operations 

and services at home and abroad in a permissive environment 

 CBRN attacks or incidents may generate a wide variety of effects that greatly 

complicate planning and preparations for CM activities. Nuclear events create a 

significant degree of physical damage. Chemical, biological, and radiological incidents 

may result in short or long-term residual contamination hazards, but may create little or 

no physical damage. All CBRN events will likely challenge existing capabilities to 

manage casualties and continue or restore operations. Regardless of the specific 

CBRN event involved, there are effectively three phases to dealing with the 
41 

Post-attack victim transport 

consequences of an event: casualty management, remediation of the affected area, and 

restoration of essential services. 

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 

 The purpose of CM operations is to quickly get the CBRN incident under control 

in order to minimize the long-term impact on an Air Force installation’s ability to conduct 

operations. The primary activities that comprise CM are specific to the three phases 

listed above. Within CONUS, many local state and federal agencies will be involved. 

Agreements and plans must be established and exercised fully to ensure integrated and 

efficient operation during real-world incidents. 

Casualty Management 

 Casualty management involves self-aid and buddy care, patient identification, 

stabilization, medical treatment, rehabilitation, and transportation of victims of CBRN 

attacks, if necessary, to a higher level of care. Although medical activities occur 

throughout the full spectrum of C-CBRN operations, the majority of casualty 

management activities, including medical response, occur during CM. 

 In addition to physiological ailments, 

victims of CBRN attacks may suffer from 

psychological disorders including acute 

stress, panic, and post-traumatic stress 

syndrome, the effects of which may not be 

apparent for weeks, months, or even years 

after an attack. Symptoms of psychological 

disorders range from anxiety due to fear of 

exposure to long-term stress that 

deteriorates physical and mental health. 

 It is likely that these psychological 

effects are an adversary objective for CBRN 

attacks against military and civilian targets 

alike. The actual physical damage suffered 

in a CBRN attack can vary significantly. In many cases, however, the adversary, 

particularly if a terrorist, may aim to achieve a psychological impact that exceeds the 

physical damage caused. 

 Chaplains and chaplain assistants, serving as religious support teams, perform a 

significant role in casualty management. These individuals bolster our forces and 

dependents by providing direct spiritual care and the free exercise of religion. 

Chaplains and assistants also advise commanders concerning morale, ethical, and 

moral issues. The trauma of CBRN events will likely intensify the need for spiritual 

counseling and religious support. Military chaplains are uniquely trained, of all clergy, to 

operate in hostile, dangerous, and other military environments. Chaplains and chaplain 
42 

assistants must be included in planning and training for ministry operations in CBRN 

CM. 

Remediation 

 As part of CBRN CM operations, commanders will undertake long-term 

remediation to return Air Force equipment and facilities to pre-attack levels, if possible. 

On-scene remediation activities are designed to remove unexploded ordnance and 

reduce, remove, or neutralize contamination within affected areas and enable return to 

normal operations. The goal is to enable personnel to operate within these areas 

without protective equipment; however, some residual hazards may remain. Personnel 

must be observant for hazards such as unexploded ordnance. They may be required to 

wear protective equipment when near contaminated surfaces and equipment to avoid 

exposure to toxic chemical agents. In the event CM activities are in response to an 

accident, ensure appropriate care and actions are taken to allow investigations to be 

conducted properly. 

 Remediation activities begin with post-attack reconnaissance and reporting, 

detection, and sampling in order to determine the extent of any CBRN hazard and the 

effects to human health and the environment. Commanders also may conduct marking 

and modeling to determine if there is a downwind hazard as a result of an attack. 

Commanders will need to mark, report, and track all equipment and facilities affected by 

a CBRN attack and document the procedures taken to contain contamination. 

 As part of CBRN CM operations, commanders may need to decontaminate 

personnel, equipment, aircraft, terrain, and facilities. Decontamination requirements 

and methods will vary for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. For 

example, following a chemical attack, decontamination activities and procedures will be 

based on whether the attack took place inside a facility or outdoors. Depending upon 

the extent and type of contamination, commanders may need to seek assistance from 

other organizations such as other military facilities, specialized units, local agencies, or 

civilian contractors. Examples of specialized units for CM operations include the US 

Army Chemical Corps, the US Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response 

Force, the National Guard Bureau Civil Support Teams and CBRN Enhanced Response 

Force Package, and the 20th Support Command CBRNE. 

 Another part of long-term remediation is the management and disposal of 

hazardous waste. Commanders will need to mark, track, and report on the process for 

disposing of hazardous waste, which will vary for chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear materials. 

Restoration of Essential Services 

 As part of CM operations, the Air Force is responsible for the restoration of 

essential services on its installations. These services include security; health services; 

housing; potable water; electrical power for lighting, heating, air conditioning, 

telecommunication, and other utilities; and a sustainable food supply. 
43 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

 In dealing with a CBRN event, including TICs and TIMs, there are two primary 

situations facing the COMAFFOR: the effects of the event on an installation and the 

effects of the event on the military forces/civilian population off the installation. Offinstallation forces and civilians can be those in the homeland or in a foreign nation. 

 When responding to an off-installation event in the nation’s homeland, the 

installation commander should attempt contact with higher headquarters for guidance 

on assistance to the civilian population. However, if time or circumstances do not 

permit contact, the installation commander may conduct an immediate response to save 

lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great property damage. For further 

information refer to AFDD 2-10, Homeland Operations. 

 When responding to an off-installation event in a foreign country the same 

guidance applies for an immediate response. However, for foreign CM the installation 

commander must be sensitive to the political environment within the civilian community 

and the laws and policies governing a response. With the exception of the immediate 

response authority, the Department of State (DOS) is the lead federal agent (LFA) for 

foreign CM. As the LFA, DOS will coordinate US government CM activities in response 

to a request by a host nation. 

 If a CBRN event occurs on an installation where Air Force forces are present, 

one of the COMAFFOR’s top priorities will be ensuring the safety and survival of 

personnel on the installation. The COMAFFOR may need to divert forces from other 

installations in the area of operations or request additional forces to deal with the effects 

of the event. These forces may range from medical assistance to health risk 

assessment to medical evacuation to decontamination and clean-up. 

 If the COMAFFOR is engaged in military operations in the Area of Operations, 

then another priority will be sustainment of operations. Factors to consider are: 

 Can the operations at the affected installation be sustained? Can they be sustained 

with augmentation? 

 Do the mission/forces of the installation need to be diverted to another installation? 

 How soon can the affected installation return to mission capable status? 

 How much effort must be diverted to do initial recovery of personnel and clean-up? 
44 

 How much effort must be expended to regenerate the installation to pre-event 

capability? 

 The nature of the event should also be considered. The United States considers 

a terrorist attack (with or without CBRN) a crime and it must be investigated by 

appropriate authorities (normally the Department of Justice). The first priority of the 

DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

 A recent example of domestic CM is the response to the anthrax letters 

mailed through the US Postal Service in September 2001. Although there had 

been extensive biological warfare CM planning prior to the event, the complexity 

of the delivery system, combined with the regional dispersion and jurisdictional 

issues led to numerous challenges. A mere five postal letters containing tiny 

amounts of anthrax cost the US Government hundreds of millions of dollars to 

clean. It took over two years for the Brentwood Post Office to return to operation. 

The perpetrators have never been caught, nor is there a working model of who is 

responsible for this costly incident. The cleanup involved chlorine dioxide, which 

unnecessarily destroyed everything in the buildings where it was used. These are 

critical lessons-learned from what could have been an overwhelming public 

disaster. There were in excess of 7000 people potentially exposed. A 

comprehensive medical surveillance program combined with a solid public 

information campaign limited the number of casualties to five deaths and thirteen 

hospitalizations. Because of the integrated response plan of fire and law 

enforcement personnel, some key evidence was recovered to support the 

ongoing investigation of the anthrax attacks. Some highlights of the 2001 

Anthrax CM response are: 

- Rapid assessment and identification of the agent 

- Potential hazard areas identified 

- Preventive health measures started immediately 

- Active public affairs plan to inform, quell rumors, and allay fears 

- Deliberate and thorough decontamination procedures using the latest 

technology 

- Focal point for reporting laboratory analysis results 

- No one organization could do it all. A combination of local, state, federal, and 

military was required 

 Military support included sampling, packaging, planning guidance, security, 

agent analysis, and a reach-back capability to scientists for technical advice. 

 Conclusion: Prior planning at the time of the anthrax letter attack was clearly 

inadequate to cope with consequences which were extensive to manage and 

expensive to mitigate. 

—Various Sources 

 
45 

COMAFFOR should be the immediate response to save lives, but the criminal 

investigation will also begin immediately and the two may be conducted in parallel. 

 

 The COMAFFOR should advise senior leadership on the short-term and longterm future of the installation and impact on mission accomplishment. The installation 

may be damaged to such an extent that it is cost prohibitive to restore to pre-attack 

capability. In this case the COMAFFOR may advise that other installations take over the 

damaged installation’s pre-attack responsibilities. 
46 

CHAPTER SEVEN 

SUPPORT OPERATIONS 

 C-CBRN activities require a broad range of support operations, including 

logistics, air mobility, health services, legal support, force protection, and many others. 

Support operations provide air and space forces the combat support capabilities to 

achieve desired results. 

LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS 

 Logistical considerations, such as the flow of war materiel, are essential 

supporting elements of Air Force C-CBRN operations. Adversary CBRN operations 

present challenges to logistics support by introducing the threat of contamination to 

aircraft, mission critical assets, personnel, war materiel, and logistics. The COMAFFOR

should ensure critical consumables reach the area of operations in a timely manner and 

provide needed weapons, supplies, and facilities in such a way as to reduce the 

“footprint” of deployed forces. 

AIR MOBILITY 

 Air mobility forces play a crucial role in supporting Air Force C-CBRN efforts. In 

spite of an adversary’s use of WMD, air mobility must continue to provide the Air Force 

with the global responsiveness necessary to achieve its objectives. 

AF Airlift in a CBRN Contaminated Environment 

 To allow sustained and effective use of airlift resources, theater planners may 

have to identify alternate aerial ports of embarkation and/or debarkation to protect and 

continue the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) airflow and other 

resupply efforts. 

 While air mobility forces are trained and equipped to operate in a CBRNcontaminated environment, the limitations imposed on air mobility assets in those 

environments may significantly degrade the rate of force deployment. For instance, 

 

 

 Logistics controls all campaigns 

and limits many. 

 

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower 

 Supreme Allied Commander, WWII 
47 

AE patient loading 

policies and procedures for large-frame aircraft decontamination have not been 

successfully established. Until large-frame aircraft decontamination is technically 

feasible, contaminated aircraft should be segregated from the airlift flow. If operations 

into a contaminated airfield are deemed mission-critical and are specifically authorized, 

the JFC should establish a geographically-separated transload site that can be used to 

transfer personnel and cargo between clean and contaminated aircraft. This transload 

process will likely delay TPFDD deliveries and may only be feasible for emergency or 

isolated cases. Research concerning policies and procedures should be conducted to 

develop the capability to operate contaminated and previously contaminated mobility 

assets without restriction. 

 Retrograde cargo from contaminated areas may be severely restricted. Until 

internationally recognized standards and legal requirements for acceptable 

decontamination levels are established, nations may deny transit and overflight rights to 

contaminated aircraft or cargo. 

Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) 

 The Air Force’s AE capability to move 

contaminated patients should only be used in 

extreme circumstances. Potential aircraft 

contamination, threats to aircrew safety, and 

limited availability of protective resources 

significantly restrict the ability to move large 

number of patients, contaminated or otherwise. In 

fact, treatment-in-place using contagious casualty 

management (CCM) capabilities is preferred. This 

is normally accomplished via deployed 

expeditionary medical support (EMEDS) CCM 

specialty set or can be done expeditiously using 

existing theater assets redeployed by the COMAFFOR to assist with the management 

of contagious casualties. 

 Air Mobility Command (AMC) can move a limited number of biologicallycontaminated patients to CONUS via litter-based isolation units after the patient has 

been stabilized. This will facilitate “hands-on” disease analysis by Department of 

Defense (DOD) and other US infectious disease experts to determine optimum 

management of biological casualties. Patients exposed to non-contagious biological 

agents can also be decontaminated and transported on aircraft. Basic infection control 

guidelines should apply when biological warfare casualties are evacuated. Chemically 

or radiologically contaminated casualties must be decontaminated before entering the 

AE system unless the theater and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) 

commanders direct otherwise. When directed, the AMC commander is the formal policy 

waiver authority for movement of contaminated casualties. Once the theater combatant 

commander and USTRANSCOM identify the requirements for AE of contaminated 

patients, AMC will authorize their transportation. 
48 

 Evacuating potentially contaminated patients, as well as non-contaminated 

patients, requires the approval of the destination country, overflight privileges, and 

approval of any country where the aircraft will land for servicing. Close coordination 

between the supporting and supported commanders and the Departments of Defense 

and State will be required for such movements. 

Commercial Aviation 

 Commercial aviation plays an important role in the deployment, sustainment, and 

redeployment of Air Force forces. Upon full activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

(CRAF), the civilian sector provides almost all of AMC’s passenger-lift capability and a 

significant portion of its cargo airlift. 

Civilian aircraft under DOD contracts and the CRAF may be deployed on a 

voluntary basis, but will not conduct operations on an air base that is under attack, 

potentially under attack, and/or contaminated at the time of flight arrival. Although 

commercial aircrews are issued ground crew chemical defense equipment for personal 

protection and trained to use it, they are neither trained nor equipped for flight 

operations in a contaminated environment. Upon warning of impending CBRN attack, 

every effort will be made to divert arriving commercial aircraft and launch those currently 

on the ground. Contaminated CRAF assets and civil aircraft under DOD contract will 

not be used, even if decontaminated to negligible levels. Currently no decontamination 

standards exist for international flights. En route transload of cargo and passengers 

from civilian carriers to military aircraft or other transportation modes (sealift, rail, trucks, 

etc.) may be required, involving decontamination procedures. Generally, civil aircraft 

will not be used to transport equipment with residual CBRN contamination due to safety 

and legal concerns. 

Contractor Supported Aviation 

 Civilian contractor personnel provide essential maintenance support for USAF 

operational support airlift (OSA) aircraft (C-21, C-37, etc.). If contractor-supported OSA 

aircraft are deployed to medium and high threat areas, the USAF installation 

commander will provide contractor personnel with IPE and “just in time” training on IPE 

wear and CBRN passive defense TTPs. Commanders at the deployed location will 

integrate the civilian contractor personnel into the base defense plan and ensure that 

they are properly trained, equipped, and exercised. 

HEALTH SERVICES 

The Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) provides critical support in C-CBRN 

operations. In addition to post-attack casualty treatment (passive defense and 

consequence management operations) via fixed medical treatment facilities (MTF) or 

EMEDS facilities, the AFMS provides essential expertise for conducting medical 

intelligence, conducting medical surveillance, detecting and identifying CBRN threats, 

performing health risk assessments, to include food and water quality/vulnerability 

assessments, and decontamination. 
49 

These unique capabilities are provided by home station defense teams located at 

each of our main operating bases, as well as by various deployable teams (unit type 

code assets), such as the medical nuclear, biological, and chemical defense team. This 

team provides human health protection, support to medical facility operations, and 

prevention of acute and chronic health hazards resulting from a CBRN threat 

environment. The biological augmentation team performs rapid, specific pathogen/ 

infectious disease identification and risk analysis. The radioanalytical assessment team 

measures, analyzes and interprets environmental and occupational samples for 

radioactivity and provides expert guidance on the type and degree of radiological 

hazard. Finally, the Expeditionary Medical Decontamination Team removes, neutralizes 

or lowers the level of contamination from casualties prior to admission to MTFs. 

The COMAFFOR must be aware of all AFMS capabilities and ensure the AF 

Forces Surgeon has the appropriate theater medical assets to support C-CBRN 

operations. 

SERVICES SUPPORT 

 Continued operations during C-CBRN threats demand specific planning 

considerations for service support activities. Services personnel providing meals to 

forces should take all necessary steps to safeguard and protect food and bottled water 

assets during the pre-attack period. Commanders may choose to forego hot meal 

preparation during periods of intense conflict in CBRN threat areas and allow Services 

personnel to protect kitchen facilities from possible contamination. All efforts should be 

made to disperse and protect food assets from contamination, particularly meals readyto-eat. 

 Services personnel should consider the hazards of a CBRN environment when 

developing shelters, reassignment of living quarters, and evacuation plans, and 

procuring food service support in the local area. These plans must include measures to 

protect personnel, equipment, materials and food from contamination. 

 In the deployed environment during extreme situations, it may be necessary to 

temporarily inter contaminated human remains. Prior to interment, mortuary personnel 

should be prepared to conduct standard processing procedures for contaminated 

remains. Temporary burial and decontamination of remains should follow guidelines 

stated in JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations. Geographic combatant 

commanders are responsible for ensuring the development of policies for the overall 

supervision of mortuary affairs matters. Upon return to CONUS of contaminated 

remains, protecting the health of service members and the public must take precedence 

over rapid repatriation. 

 The US Army, as executive agent for mortuary affairs, manages development of 

and obtains approval from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for joint mortuary 

affairs doctrine, procedures, and training materials for use by all Services. 
50 

Active Defense 

Operations 

CHAPLAIN SERVICES 

 Chaplains and chaplain assistants serving as religious support teams, as 

discussed in Chapter Six, provide a significant support service to Air Force forces and 

dependents by providing for free exercise of religion and advising commanders 

concerning morale and ethical issues. CBRN events will intensify the need for chaplain 

support. Chaplain and chaplain assistant support requirements are included in military 

planning and training for ministry operations in CBRN events. 

FORCE PROTECTION (FP) 

 FP is an inherent command responsibility and is critical for C-CBRN operations. 

FP requires a collaborative, integrated, cross-functional effort. Civil engineers (including 

explosive ordnance disposal teams, fire protection, and civil engineer readiness), 

Security Forces (SF), medical services (including bioenvironmental engineering and 

public health), communications, intelligence, and counterintelligence communities all 

play key roles in force protection. 

 SF, with its integrated base defense, is a key component of both active and 

passive C-CBRN defenses. In active defense operations, it provides a system of 

measures, like off-base patrolling, to defend against an adversary’s use of CBRN 

weapons. In passive defense operations, a collaborative force protection program will 

identify vulnerabilities and mitigate the effects of CBRN weapons. To achieve adequate 

FP for C-CBRN, commanders at AF installations worldwide should develop effective 

security and emergency management programs. These programs must be designed to 

protect Service members, civilian employees, 

dependents, facilities, and equipment; minimize the loss 

or degradation of resources; and continue, sustain, and 

restore combat and combat support operational 

capability in an “all hazards” physical threat 

environment. These programs may require planned and 

integrated application of antiterrorism operations, 

physical security, operations security, and personal 

protective services. Commanders should ensure a 

fundamental emphasis on awareness of FP and 

emergency management challenges. Air Force 

personnel must be trained in basic skills necessary to 

survive and operate in a CBRN environment. 

Commanders at all levels need to be aware of all the forces that are affected by 

their FP decisions. Installation commanders have FP responsibility for forces whether 

or not they fall directly under the installation commander’s chain of command or are 

confined to the boundaries of the installation. Tenants or transients are examples of 

forces that would normally fall under the FP responsibility of an installation 

commander. For additional information on force protection, see AFDD 2-4.1, Force 

Protection. 
51 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

 The Emergency Management Program includes activities to coordinate and 

organize efforts to manage, prepare for, respond to and recover from the direct and 

indirect consequences of CBRN and conventional weapon attacks, major accidents and 

natural disasters. Civil Engineer Readiness is the primary function supporting these 

actions through CBRN hazard analysis and assessments, establishment and operation 

of the CBRN point and standoff threat detection grid, active CBRN response, and 

development of CBRN contamination avoidance measures. The ancillary missions of 

the program are to support homeland security operations and to provide support to civil 

and host-nation authorities in accordance with DOD directives and through the 

appropriate combatant command. 

 The Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) is the organizational 

structure used by Air Force units worldwide to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

attacks and emergencies. AFIMS was designed for compliance with the National 

Incident Management System and National Response Plan to maintain the unique 

military requirements for command, control and support mission requirements. 

 For additional information on the Air Force Emergency Management Program, 

see AFPD 10-25, Emergency Management; and AFI 10-2501, Emergency Management 

Planning and Operations (as of the publication date of this AFDD, AFPD 10-25 and AFI 

10-2501 were in revision. HQ USAF/IL message [DTG 2215312 Dec 05] directed 

program name change from “Full Spectrum Threat Response” to “Emergency 

Management,” effective immediately, and stated these documents are being revised).

INFRASTRUCTURE 

 

 Infrastructure includes the physical elements, structures, and systems subject to 

a CBRN related event or required to support remedial operations in the aftermath of a 

CBRN related event. To alleviate the impact of CBRN attacks, the AF must orient 

critical infrastructure protection planning toward protecting and sustaining missionessential activities. CBRN contamination can be mitigated through maximum sheltering 

of infrastructure plus contamination avoidance. Air Force commanders must plan to 

mitigate the loss of key infrastructure. 

LEGAL SUPPORT 

 International law largely prohibits the use of biological and chemical weapons, 

with the exception of some uses of riot control agents other than as a method of 

warfare, and bans the use of poisonous weapons. While no controlling international law 

prohibits the use of radiological or nuclear weapons, there are a number of 

governments worldwide that support non-proliferation to prohibit certain parties from 

possessing and trafficking in these weapons. Therefore, the use of such weapons 

would likely elicit a strong international response. Additionally, adversaries who employ 

CBRN against the US may deny their involvement. 
52 

Commanders need to understand and consider the potential legal ramifications 

of any decision to attack or destroy an adversary’s CBRN capabilities. During 

operations, commanders should have access to a judge advocate and seek legal advice 

to avoid actions that may lead to excessive collateral damage in relation to the direct 

military advantage sought. 

TOTAL FORCE 

 The Air Reserve Component (ARC), comprised of the Air National Guard and Air 

Force Reserve, are integral partners with the regular Air Force. Together with regular 

forces, the ARC plays a key role in protecting the homeland by providing states with 

access to specialized capabilities. The ARC’s capabilities for C-CBRN operations 

include aerial spray (utilizing the Modular Aerial Spray System to lay down neutralizing 

C-CBRN materials), aerial refueling, cargo transport, emergency management, civil 

engineer, force protection, hazardous materials handling, device neutralization, 

detection and identification, casualty extraction, decontamination, legal counsel, and 

medical care. 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

 Air Force public affairs operations support the C-CBRN mission by releasing 

information through public communication channels. This information serves to execute 

prevention and deterrence strategies, reinforce the effects of counterforce operations on 

adversary decision-making, mitigate unintended information effects of counterforce 

operations, and maintain public confidence in local, state, federal and military authorities 

during CM operations. Successful communication on C-CBRN activities requires a 

highly coordinated, multi-agency public affairs effort that is fully integrated into 

operational planning. 

PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (PERSCO) 

 The primary mission of PERSCO is force accountability and casualty reporting. 

PERSCO teams must be able to operate in a contaminated environment. Accurate 

force accounting will inform commanders about the availability of resources. PERSCO 

teams are normally an integral component of the location’s reception processing center. 

Base subject matter experts at the employment location work with PERSCO teams to 

ensure that arriving personnel are briefed on emergency management actions, 

protective measures, threat conditions (including the CBRN threat), and the local area 

health condition. 

Family Assistance Control Center (FACC) 

 Upon implementation of the base Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, 

the Installation Commander will activate a FACC to serve as the focal point for family 

assistance services. The FACC, prescribed by DoDI 1342.22, Family Centers, and AFI 

34-1101, Assistance to Survivors of Persons Killed in Air Force Aviation Mishaps and 

Other Incidents, serves as a staging area where families can obtain disaster relief, 
53 

contingency information, and services. The center’s primary mission is to handle the 

practical and emotional needs of families of potential DoD casualties and DoD 

personnel affected by the disaster. The Airmen and Family Readiness Flight (AFRF) 

will be the focal point of dissemination of timely information for affected families 

excluding casualty notification. The AFRF must address FACC activation, sustainment 

and deactivation processes in the AFRF Family Readiness OPLAN. 

AF Repatriation Guide for Airmen and Family Readiness Flight 

 The AF AFRF plays a critical role when DOD personnel are repatriated to safe 

haven locations. During the past several years we have seen an increasing number of 

authorized and/or ordered departures of DOD personnel from hot spots around the 

world. Since 9/11 we have seen even more authorized and/or ordered departures of 

families from OCONUS locations. Family Readiness NCOs/Program Managers, AFRF 

staff, and Reserve Family Readiness Directors have played a key role in assisting these 

families. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) SYSTEMS 

 Effective and interoperable C2 systems are vital to planning and conducting 

successful C-CBRN operations. Air Force C2 requirements for C-CBRN operations 

may vary depending upon the type of operation, the nature of the threat, and the set of 

capabilities needed to counter the threat. 

 Centralized C2 is fundamental to air and space power. C2 systems are 

integrated in daily operations and warfighting operations and enable air and space 

forces to rapidly access and disseminate information and decisions. Due to their 

importance and the need for them to remain operational in adverse environments, C2 

assets are likely targets. An adversary’s ability to disrupt our decision loop can 

seriously limit a commander’s C-CBRN options. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) 

 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are key elements of C-CBRN 

operations. ISR seeks to detect, identify, and track the development and deployment 

of adversary WMD. The unique signature of WMD devices and materials may require 

use of specialized detectors to complement traditional ISR platforms, such as the Global 

Hawk UAS and satellites. Vigilant surveillance may reveal production of large-scale 

biological or chemical weapons programs. Properly coordinated release of this 

information may support prevention or counterforce mitigation efforts by IO personnel. 

 ISR is a critical component of counterforce attack operations and plays a vital 

role in detecting, tracking, and warning of air and missile attacks for active defense 

operations. ISR enables passive defense operations by providing information on CBRN 

material warning and reporting, and supports a commander’s ability to protect Air Force 

and allied forces. As with C2 assets, ISR assets must remain operational in adverse 

environments and are likely to be targeted by our adversaries. 
54 

CHAPTER EIGHT 

COUNTER–CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 

NUCLEAR EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXERCISE 

GENERAL FRAMEWORK 

 Due to the growing asymmetric threat confronting the Air Force, all Airmen must 

be fully prepared not only to survive in a CBRN environment, but to conduct operations 

as well. The Air Force C-CBRN Education, Training, and Exercise Program is a lifecycle approach that gives individuals the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to 

operate in a CBRN environment. Vital education and training is delivered to every 

airman in a coherent fashion and subsequently reinforced directly through realistic 

exercises and wargames. This approach is crucial to the development of Air Force 

personnel in terms of what all Airmen need to know and be able to perform. The AF 

must institutionalize the C-CBRN mindset to enable Airmen to operate in a CBRN 

environment. Regardless of the area of responsibility (AOR), Airmen must possess the 

necessary knowledge and skills and abilities to maintain sortie generation and cargo 

throughput rates, as well as support operations in a CBRN environment. Success in the 

Homeland and on the battlefield requires personnel that are both competent and 

proficient. 

 The deliberate education, training, and exercise life-cycle is an integrated end-toend (accession to separation/retirement) process that ensures each Airman receives 

the appropriate level of C-CBRN education and training, and perfects that knowledge 

and skill through robust exercises at each career stage. 

EDUCATION 

 AF personnel must possess the appropriate knowledge to perform C-CBRN 

operations across the spectrum of military operations. Each Airman must possess an 

appropriate level of education, commensurate with rank and AF specialty, in CBRN 

In February 2006, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen T. 

Michael Moseley, approved the award of the civil 

engineer readiness occupational badge to graduates of 

the Civil Engineer Readiness Apprentice Course. The 

badge identifies course graduates as emergency 

management professionals and CBRN defense 

specialists. For the first time, civil engineer CBRN 

experts have a distinctive occupational badge that 

represents a unique Air Force capability and an 

invaluable resource for Air Force commanders.

―AF Link, Nov 6 06 (AFPN) #123032127 
55 

principles, threat environment, agent characteristics, and appropriate mitigation 

strategies in order to ensure an operational capability in a CBRN attack. Much of this 

education takes place in the various rank-specific Developmental Education courses, as 

well as courses required of selected specialties. 

 Success in C-CBRN operations requires the active participation of all members 

of the Air Force and thus, all Airmen must understand the nature of operating in a 

CBRN environment. Air Force personnel with responsibilities for C-CBRN functions 

should also be cognizant of C-CBRN capabilities of local agencies, other Services, 

allied, and coalition partners. 

TRAINING 

 C-CBRN training programs are designed to provide Airmen with the basic skills 

necessary to function in a CBRN environment. Training programs should incorporate 

each C-CBRN pillar. Training programs are divided into three categories: accession 

training, operational training, and continuation/recurring training. 

Accession Training 

 Accession training prepares members for service by providing indoctrination to 

the military culture, organization, and mission. The growing CBRN threat requires that 

accession training include the basic C-CBRN combat skills needed to survive and 

operate in a CBRN environment. Consistent with the education, training, and exercise 

life-cycle process, accession training provides foundational C-CBRN skills that Airmen 

will build upon throughout their careers.

Operational Training 

 Operational C-CBRN training builds upon the basic skills developed in accession 

training and provides the necessary technical skills to ensure mission accomplishment 

in a CBRN environment. Formal training provides individuals with the knowledge and 

skills to perform their duty assignments effectively. While accession training provides 

the initial training, operational training offer the advanced level of training to continue 

operations within a CBRN environment. 

 

Continuation/Recurring Training 

 Continuation or recurring training maintains and refines skills necessary for a unit 

to conduct their mission in a CBRN-threatened or contaminated environment. This 

training should provide the means to keep Air Force personnel current on changes in 

C-CBRN policies and procedures. Additionally, it will prepare them for increased 

responsibility, to include training others, leading forces, and planning C-CBRN 

operations. 

 Continuation training normally occurs at the installation level, including ancillary 

training. For example, individuals, teams, and leaders/supervisors enhance their 
56 

knowledge, skills, and abilities through the CBRNE Defense Training Course, 

specialized team training, and CBRNE Defense Senior Leaders Course. These courses 

provide training on how to perform detection, identification, prediction, marking, 

decontamination, and health risk assessments of CBRN agents. Training for the base 

populace may also include IPE and PPE training, protective countermeasure training, 

and collective protection procedural training. See AFI 10-2501, Emergency 

Management Planning and Operations, for a complete list of emergency management 

training courses and target audiences. 

 Commanders must ensure their units are trained and able to perform in CBRN 

threat environments throughout the spectrum of conflict. Continuation training enables 

a commander to assess organizational capabilities and to maintain the unit’s ability to 

survive and operate in CBRN threat environments. 

EXERCISES AND WARGAMES 

 To ensure effectiveness, C-CBRN education and training must be validated 

through exercises and wargames using time-tested principles and experience. 

Providing an exercise environment for Airmen to hone C-CBRN knowledge and skills is 

critical. Exercises and wargames serve as effective methods of developing both 

individual experience and organizational capabilities under controlled conditions. In 

addition to providing instruction, they may also aid in evaluating performance and the 

effectiveness of training and education programs. 

Exercises should include a realistic CBRN element and require participants to 

demonstrate their skills in personal protection, performing wartime functions and 

working together as an integrated unit in a simulated CBRN contaminated area. 

C-CBRN exercises and wargames should emphasize all aspects of CM and operations 

in a CBRN environment, to include: command and control; emergency management; 

intelligence, surveillance, and post-attack reconnaissance; planning; logistics; medical 

response; force protection; and individual and collective protection. When possible, Air 

Force units should also conduct joint, allied, and coalition C-CBRN exercises to develop 

and improve interoperability. 

 Wargames emphasize critical thinking and are most useful for indoctrinating 

C-CBRN education. C-CBRN principles, decision tools, and TTPs must be integrated 

into all significant wargames to offer additional opportunities to develop and evaluate 

C-CBRN competencies of individuals and organizations. Commanders should 

continually assess the impact of training and wargames on their units’ abilities to 

conduct wartime missions. 
57 

Kunsan Focused Effort – April 2005 

 The 8th Fighter Wing (Wolf Pack), Kunsan Air Base (AB), Republic of South Korea, 

“tested its ability to sustain mission operations in a biological warfare environment 

and... [evaluated how effectively it could recover from an unconventional biological 

attack]...during the first-ever Kunsan Focused Effort [KFE] exercise, which ran from 

April 26 to 28.” According to chief of the Air Force Counterproliferation Division at the 

Pentagon, Kunsan AB was used “as a test bed for policy, procedures and guidance to 

help the greater Air Force if faced with a...[biological]...incident.” “Biological agents 

pose unique challenges to operations at places like Kunsan due to the varied means 

enemy forces can deliver deadly or incapacitating amounts of bacteria, viruses and 

toxins.” 

 The Wolf Pack has been called the “petri dish” for this project and was chosen due 

to “...the operational nature of the base, the immediate threat, and the...closed and 

isolated nature of Kunsan.” “The KFE team...made four visits to Kunsan working 

different stages of the project...[and]...ended their data gathering phase 

with...[the]...field training exercise. The team looked at numerous areas, particularly 

the impact of reducing the work force due to biological casualties. According to the 

team chief, “...the problem with bio is it takes people out of the work force and 

causes... [the wing]...to have to continue to operate with less.” For the exercise, 20% 

of Kunsan manning was eliminated. 

 The Wolf Pack rose to the challenge, took the KFE very seriously, and, according to 

the team chief, they performed very well. The results of the KFE at Kunsan will be the 

CONOPS [Concept of Operations] – operational guidance on how to deal with a 

biological attack and what a wing needs to do to survive and operate in this scenario. 

Hopefully, the contribution by the 8th Fighter Wing will help others survive in case of a 

biological attack. 

—WOLF PACK WARRIOR Newspaper, May 6, 2005

and AFN Korea.net, September 29, 2005

 The threat of a CBRN attack on Air Force operations demands implementing and 

employing effective C-CBRN education, training, and exercise. Airmen must possess 

an appropriate level of C-CBRN education, training, and exercise at each stage of their 

careers. C-CBRN education, training, and exercise must include realistic survive-tooperate exercises, basic instruction, in-depth scenarios, and cross-functional 

involvement to be effective. 
58 

SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications (Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the Air 

Force Doctrine Center web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil; All Air Land Sea 

Application (ALSA) documents [AFTTP(I)s] are available on their website 

https://wwwmil.alsa.mil/index.html) 

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine 

AFDD 2, Operations and Organization 

AFDD 2-4, Combat Support 

AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection 

AFDD 2-10, Homeland Operations 

AFH 36-2218, Volume 2, Self Aid and Buddy Care Student Handbook

AFI 10-2501, Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning and Operations

(currently under revision and name will change to reflect program name change from 

“FSTR” to “Emergency Management,” per HQ USAF/IL message, DTG 22153Z Dec 05) 

AFI 10-2603, Emergency Health Powers on Air Force Installations

AFI 10-2604, Disease Containment Planning Guidance

AFI 34-242, Mortuary Affairs Program 

AFI 34-1101, Assistance to Survivors of Persons Killed in Air Force Aviation Mishaps 

and Other Incidents 

AFI 36-2238, Self-Aid and Buddy Care Training 

AFMAN 10-100, Airman's Manual

AFMAN 10-2602, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Conventional (NBCC) Defense 

Operations and Standards 

AFPD 10-25, Full Spectrum Threat Response (currently under revision and name will 

change to reflect program name change from “FSTR” to “Emergency Management,” per 

HQ USAF/IL message, DTG 22153Z Dec 05) 

AFPD 10-26, Counter-Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operational Preparedness 
59 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.33, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, 

Ports, and Airfields

AFTTP (I) 3-2.35, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special 

Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.37, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence 

Management 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.42, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.44, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.46, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.52, Biological Surveillance

AFTTP (I) 3-2.54, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Vulnerability Analysis

AFTTP (I) 3-2.55, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.56, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Contamination 

Avoidance 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.60, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Decontamination 

USAF Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CCBRNE) Master Plan 

USAF Strategic Planning Directive for Fiscal Years 2006-2023 

Joint Publications 

JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats 

JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater 

JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 

Environments 

JP 3-26, Homeland Security 

JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive 

Consequence Management 
60 

JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting. 

JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations 

DOD Publications 

DODI 1342.22, Family Centers 

DODI 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines 

CJCS CONPLAN 0400-00, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (S) 

(Draft) 

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. 

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. 

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 

National Publications 

The National Response Plan. US Department of Homeland Security. 

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

Other Publications 

Alibek, Ken and Handelman, Stephen, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest 

Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told by the Man Who Ran It (Random 

House). 1999. 

Barnett, Jeffrey R., Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010 (Air 

University Press). 1996. 
61 

Carus, W. Seth, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 

20th Century (Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense 

University). March 1999 Revised Edition. 

Central Intelligence Agency, The Biological and Chemical Warfare Threat (CIA), 

Revised Edition. 1999. 

Chandler, Robert W. with Backschies, John R., The New Face of War: Weapons of 

Mass Destruction and the Revitalization of America’s Transoceanic Military Strategy 

(AMCODA Press). 1998. 

Chandler, Robert W. with Trees, Ronald J., Tomorrow’s War, Today’s Decisions: Iraqi 

WMD and the Implications of WMD-Armed Adversaries for Future US Military 

Strategy (AMCODA Press). 1996. 

Compton, James A. F., Military Chemical and Biological Agents, Chemical and 

Toxicologic Properties (The Telford Press). 1987. 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Reports on Activities and Programs 

for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism (CPRC). 1994-Present. [These are 

classified from 1999 to present.] 

Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, AMedP-6(B), NATO Handbook 

on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations. February 1999. 

Dickinson, Lansing E., The Military Role in Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, No. 1 (USAF 

Counterproliferation Center). 1999. 

DOD Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Defense, Annual Reports to Congress (US 

Department of Defense) 1993- Present. [Order from DTIC-E, 8725 John J. Kingman 

Road, Suite 0944, Ft Belvoir, VA 22060-6218.] 

Douglas, Joseph, and Livingstone, Neil, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of 

Chemical / Biological Warfare: The New Shape of Terrorism and Conflict (Lexington 

Book). 1987. 

Eitzen, E., Cieslak G., Pavlin, J., Christopher, G., and Culpepper, R., Handbook: 

Medical Management of Biologic Casualties. 3d ed. (US Army Medical Research 

Institute of Infectious Diseases). 1998. “Environmental Air Sampling to Detect 

Biologic Warfare Agents.” Military Medicine (Aug 99), 541-542. 

Franz, David R., DVM, PhD., Defense Against Toxin Weapons (US Army Medical 

Research Institute of Infectious Diseases). 1997. 
62 

Fuller, John G., The Day We Bombed Utah: America’s Most Lethal Secret (National 

Books). 1984. 

Gleisser, Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, (Oxford University Press). 1986. 

Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard E. (Gen), The General’s War: The Inside Story 

of the Conflict in the Gulf (Little, Brown, and Company). 1995. 

Harris, Sheldon H., Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the 

American Cover-up (Routledge). 1994. 

Hayes, Peter L., Jodoin, Vincent J., and Van Tassel, Alan R., Countering the 

Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (McGraw-Hill). 1998. 

Hepburn, Byron C., Chemical-Biological Attack: Achilles Heel of the Air Expeditionary 

Force? Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, No. 4 (USAF 

Counterproliferation Center). 1999. 

Hickman, Donald C., A Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat: USAF Water Systems 

at Risk. Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, No. 3 (USAF 

Counterproliferation Center). 1999. 

Hockett, Michael C., Air Interdiction of Scud Missiles: A Need for Alarm (Air War 

College). April 1995. 

Jones, Rodney W., McDonough, Mark G., with Dalton, Toby F. and Koblenz, Gregory 

D., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace). 1998. 

Kaplan, David E. and Marshall, Andrew, The Cult from the End of the World (Crown 

Publishers). 1996. 

Keaney, Thomas A. and Cohen, Eliot A., Gulf War Survey Summary Report 

(Government Printing Office). 1993. 

Kipphut, Mark E., Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: Lessons from History 

(Air War College). April 1996. 

Navias, Martin, Saddam’s Scud War and Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Centre for 

Defense Studies). 1991 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and 

Response (Office of the Secretary of Defense).November 1997. 

Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, United States of America, 

Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. 1997. 
63 

Roberts, Brad, editor, Biologic Weapons: Weapons of the Future? (The Center for 

Strategic and International Studies). 1993. 

Roberts, Brad, editor, Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons (The Chemical 

and Biological Arms Control Institute). 1997. 

Schneider, Barry R. and Davis, Col (ret) Jim, editors, Avoiding the Abyss: Progress, 

Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat. USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, July 2005. 

Schneider, Barry R. and Davis, Col (ret) Jim, editors, The War Next Time: Countering 

Rogue States and Terrorists Armed with Chemical and Biological Weapons. USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, November 2003. 

Schneider, Barry R. and Dowdy, William L., editors, Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: 

Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats (Frank Cass Ltd.). 1998. 

Schneider, Barry R. and Grinter, Lawrence E., editors, Battlefield of the Future: 21st 

Century Warfare Issues (Air University Press). 1998, Revised Edition. 

Schneider, Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation: US Military Responses to 

NBC Proliferation Threats (Praeger). 1999. 

Schneider, Barry R., editor, Middle East Security Issues in the Shadow of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Proliferation (USAF Counterproliferation Center). 2000. 

Sidell, Frederick R., Takafuji, Ernest T., and Franz, David R., editors, Medical Aspects 

of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Office of Surgeon General, Borden Institute). 

1997. 

 

Sloan, Steven, Beating International Terrorism (Air University Press). 1986. United 

States Strategic Bombing Survey. V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign (Military 

Analysis Division). January 1947. 

Spector, Leonard S., and Mark McDonough, editors, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. 

(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 1995. 

The Washington Institute, Policy Papers Number Twenty-One: The Sword of the Arabs: 

Iraq’s Strategic Weapons (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy). 1990 

Weaver, Greg and Glass J. David, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Undermine US Strategy for Projecting Military Power (AMCODA Press). 1998. 

Wirtz, James J., Counterforce and Theater Missile Defense: ASW Approach to TMD 

Counterforce (Army War College Strategic Studies Institute). 27 Mar 1995. 
64 

GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AADC area air defense commander 

AB air base 

AE aeromedical evacuation

AFDD Air Force doctrine document

AFI Air Force instruction

AFIMS Air Force Incident Management System 

AFMS Air Force Medical Service 

AFRF Airmen and Family Readiness Flight 

ALSA Air Land Sea Application Center 

AMC Air Mobility Command

AOC air and space operations center

AOR area of responsibility

ARC Air Reserve Component 

C2 command and control

CAOC combined air and space operations center 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosives

C-CBRN counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

C-CBRNE counter-chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 

high-yield explosives 

CCM contagious casualty management 

CE civil engineer 

CFACC combined force air and space component commander 

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CM consequence management 

COCOM combatant command

COG center of gravity 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 

CONUS continental United States

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet

DCA defensive counterair

DOD Department of Defense

DOS Department of State 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities

EMEDS expeditionary medical support 
65 

FACC Family Assistance Control Center 

FP force protection 

IO information operations

IPE individual protective equipment

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JAOC joint air and space operations center 

JFACC joint force air and space component commander

JFC joint force commander

JP joint publication

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

JTF joint task force

JTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

KFE Kunsan Focused Effort 

LFA lead federal agency

MOPP mission-oriented protective posture

MTF medical treatment facility 

MW megawatt 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NMS-CWMD National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

OCA offensive counterair

OCONUS outside the continental United States

OPR office of primary responsibility

OSA operational support airlift

PERSCO Personnel Support for Contingency Operations 

PPE personal protective equipment 

PSI proliferation security initiative

Pu plutonium 

ROE rules of engagement

SF security forces 

SOF special operations forces

TIC toxic industrial chemicals 
66 

TIM toxic industrial materials

TMD theater missile defense 

TPFDD time-phased force deployment data 

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

UA unmanned aircraft 

UAS unmanned aircraft systems

USEUCOM United States European Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Definitions 

active defense. The employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks 

to deny a contested area or position to the enemy. (JP 1-02). [Active defense 

operations attempt to intercept CBRN weapons en route to their targets.] (AFDD 

2-1.8) {Words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

Air Force Emergency Management Program. The single, integrated Air Force 

program to coordinate and organize efforts to manage, prepare for, respond to 

and recover from the direct and indirect consequences of CBRN and 

conventional weapon attacks, major accidents and natural disasters. The 

primary missions of the emergency management program are to save lives, 

minimize the loss or degradation of resources and continue, sustain, and restore 

combat and combat support operational capability in an “all hazards” physical 

threat environment at Air Force installations worldwide. The ancillary missions of 

the program are to support homeland security operations and to provide support 

to civil and host-nation authorities in accordance with DoD directives and through 

the appropriate combatant command. The program is managed by the Office of 

The Civil Engineer, AF/A7C. (AFDD 2-1.8)

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the 

enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against 

friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of 

each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 

1-02)

Airman. Any US Air Force member (officer or enlisted, active, reserve, or guard, 

along with Department of the Air Force civilians) who supports and defends the 

US Constitution and serves our country. Air Force Airmen are those people who 

formally belong to the US Air Force and employ or support some aspect of the 

US Air Force’s air and space power capabilities. The term Airman is often used in 

a very narrow sense to mean pilot. An Airman is any person who understands 

and appreciates the full range of air and space power capabilities and can 

employ or support some aspect of air and space power capabilities. (AFDD 1-1)
67 

airlift. Operations to transport and deliver forces and materiel through the air in 

support of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. (AFDD 1)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant 

command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and 

conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood 

to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. 

This includes air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; 

facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information 

environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)

biological agent. A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or 

animals or causes the deterioration of materiel. (JP 1-02). 

chemical agent. Any toxic chemical intended for use in military operations. (JP 

1-02) [A chemical substance which is intended for use in military operations to 

kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate personnel through its physiological effects. 

The term excludes riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame.] (AFDD 2-

1.8) {Words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common 

action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command 

authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 

164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands 

unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 

Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the 

authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command 

over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to 

accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command 

(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through 

subordinate joint force commanders and the Service and/or functional 

component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides 

full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant 

commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational 

control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called 

COCOM. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
68 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed 

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 

procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also 

called C2. (JP 1-02)

consequence management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential 

services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and 

catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. 

(JP 1-02) [CM activities serve to reduce the effects of a CBRN attack or event 

and assist in the restoration of essential operations and services at home and 

abroad in a permissive environment.] (AFDD 2-1.8) {Words in brackets apply only 

to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

contamination. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or 

of biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. 

(JP 1-02)

contamination control. Procedures to avoid, remove, or render harmless 

(temporarily or permanently) nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination for 

the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of military 

operations. (JP 1-02)

counterair. A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain 

and maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are 

designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after 

launch. (JP 1-02) [Counterair integrates and exploits the mutually beneficial 

effects of offensive and defensive operations by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, 

surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, antiaircraft guns, artillery, and electronic 

warfare to destroy or neutralize enemy aircraft and missile forces both before and 

after launch.] (AFDD 2-1.1) {Words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and 

are offered for clarity.}

counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear. Activities taken to 

detect, deter, disrupt, deny, or destroy an adversary’s CBRN capabilities and to 

minimize the effects of an enemy CBRN attack. Note: The interlinked 

components of C-CBRN operations are proliferation prevention, counterforce, 

active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. Also called CCBRN. (AFDD 2-1.8)

counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (C-CBRN) 

environment. A condition of warfare in which an adversary possesses or uses 

nuclear, radiological, biological and/or chemical weapons, by-products, 

infrastructure, and associated delivery methods. (AFDD 2-1.8)
69 

counterforce. The employment of strategic air and missile forces in an effort to 

destroy, or render impotent, selected military capabilities of an enemy force 

under any of the circumstances by which hostilities may be initiated. (JP 1-02) 

[Counterforce operations aim to detect, deter, deny, degrade, or destroy 

adversary CBRN capabilities including research and development, production, 

and storage facilities, fielded forces, and related C2.] (AFDD 2-1.8) {Words in 

brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

counterland. Air and space operations against enemy land force capabilities to 

create effects that achieve joint force commander objectives. (AFDD 1) 

counterproliferation. Those actions (e.g., detect and monitor, prepare to 

conduct counterproliferation operations, offensive operations, weapons of mass 

destruction, active defense, and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat 

and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military 

forces, friends, and allies. Also called CP. See also nonproliferation. (JP 1-02)

countersea. Operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of 

maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption, delay, diversion, or other 

neutralization of threats in the maritime environment. The main objective of 

countersea operations is to secure and dominate the maritime environment and 

prevent the opponents from doing the same. (AFDD 2-1.4)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, 

facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting 

potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the 

coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the 

effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the 

enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02) 

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, 

composed of forces of two or more military departments which may be 

established across the range of military operations to perform particular 

operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of 

time. (JP 1-02)

half-life. The time required for the activity of a given radioactive species to 

decrease to half of its initial value due to radioactive decay. The half-life is a 

characteristic property of each radioactive species and is independent of its 

amount or condition. The effective half-life of a given isotope is the time in which 

the quantity in the body will decrease to half as a result of both radioactive decay 

and biological elimination. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations 
70 

and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through 

its territory. (JP 1-02)

hostile environment. Operational environment in which hostile forces have 

control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the 

operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

individual protective equipment. In nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, 

the personal clothing and equipment required to protect an individual from 

biological and chemical hazards and some nuclear effects. Also called IPE. (JP 

1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface 

military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (JP 1-

02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, 

assigned or attached, of two or more military departments, operating under a 

single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and 

coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may 

be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority 

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing 

commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02) [The joint air and space component 

commander (JFACC) uses the joint air and space operations center to command 

and control the integrated air and space effort to meet the joint force 

commander’s objectives. This title emphasizes the Air Force position that air 

power and space power together create effects that cannot be achieved through 

air or space power alone.] [AFDD 2] {Words in brackets apply only to the Air 

Force and are offered for clarity.}

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise 

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint 

force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the 

Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an 

existing Joint Force Commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operation. Operations directed by the Department 

of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby 

noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are 
71 

endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the 

United States. Also called NEO. (JP 1-02) 

nonproliferation. Those actions (e.g., diplomacy, arms control, multilateral 

agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls) taken to prevent 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding 

access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. Also 

called NP. See also counterproliferation. (JP 1-02)

nuclear weapon. A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or 

thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon 

completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of 

producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. 

Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). 

Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and 

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational 

control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and 

joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. 

Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint 

force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and 

forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control 

considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does 

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of 

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called 

OPCON. (JP 1-02)

passive defense. Measures taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize 

the effects of damage caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the 

initiative. (JP 1-02)

permissive environment. Operational environment in which host country 

military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and 

capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02) 

personal protective equipment. Personal protective equipment is equipment 

designed to protect individuals exposed to hazards from injury or illness in nonmilitary unique occupational environments where OSHA or applicable AFOSH 

standards apply, including emergency response to CBRNE incidents in the 

United States. Also called PPE. (AFDD 2-1.8) [HQ USAF/IL message, DTG 
72 

22153Z Dec 05― to be incorporated into AFI 10-2501]

proliferation prevention. To deny efforts by those seeking to acquire or expand 

their chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear capabilities by: providing 

inspection, monitoring, verification, and enforcement support for nonproliferation 

treaties and arms control regimes; supporting export control activities; assisting 

in the identification of those attempting to acquire or expand these capabilities; 

and, if so directed by the proper authorities, planning and conducting denial 

operations. (AFDD 2-1.8)

radiological dispersal device. Any device, other than a nuclear explosive 

device, that disseminates radiation to cause damage or radiation injury. (AFDD 

2-1.8)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains 

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that 

helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or 

supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is 

limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within 

the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. 

Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be 

delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant 

command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the 

command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing 

commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary 

of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and 

directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within 

the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

theater missile. A missile, which may be a ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or 

an air-to-surface missile (not including short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire 

missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-guided missiles), whose 

target is within a given theater of operation. (JP 1-02)

toxic industrial chemicals. Any chemicals manufactured, used, transported, or 

stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: pesticides, 

petrochemicals, fertilizers, corrosives, poisons, etc. TICs produce toxic impacts 

to personnel, materials, and infrastructure. Also called TIC.

toxic industrial materials. All toxic materials manufactured, stored, transported, 

or used in industrial or commercial processes. It includes toxic industrial 

chemicals, toxic industrial radiologicals, and toxic industrial biologicals. TIMs 

produce toxic impacts to personnel, materials, and infrastructure. Also called

TIM.
73 

uncertain environment. Operational environment in which host government 

forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to 

conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the 

intended operational area. (JP 1-02)

unmanned aircraft. An aircraft or balloon that does not carry a human operator 

and is capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming. A UA 

can be expendable or recoverable, can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload, is not 

operated for sport or hobby, and does not transport passengers or crew. Also 

called UA. (Modified from the OSD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030)

unmanned aircraft systems. Unmanned Aircraft System: That system, whose 

components include the necessary equipment, network, and 

personnel to control an unmanned aircraft Also called UAS. (Modified from the 

OSD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of 

destruction and or being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of 

people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield explosives or nuclear, 

biological, chemical and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of 

transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and 

divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02) [The Military Strategy 

to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD), 13 February 2006, 

deletes “high-yield explosives” from this definition and changes the verbiage 

“transporting or propelling the weapon” to “delivery of weapons.”]