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37–010 PDF 2007

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 26, 2007

Serial No. 110–86

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOSEPH GIBSON, Minority Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 26, 2007

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................... 1

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......................... 2

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 3

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 62

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Betty Sutton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ....... 73

Post-Hearing Questions posed by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., and the 

Honorable Luis V. Guiterrez to the Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation .................................................................. 74

Letter from Richard C. Powers, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional 

Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated 

November 13, 2007 .............................................................................................. 84

Letter from Richard C. Powers, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional 

Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated 

December 19, 2007 ............................................................................................... 85

(1)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:35 p.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John Conyers, 

Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Watt, Lofgren, 

Jackson Lee, Delahunt, Cohen, Sutton, Davis, Wasserman Schultz, 

Ellison, Smith, Sensenbrenner, Coble, Gallegly, Chabot, Lungren, 

Forbes, Feeney, Franks, and Gohmert. 

Staff present: Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director and Chief Counsel; 

Joseph Gibson, Minority Chief Counsel; Robert Reed, Majority 

Counsel; and Brandon Johns, Majority Staff Assistant. 

Mr. CONYERS. Good afternoon. The Committee will come to order. 

Today’s hearing is on the Federal Bureau of Investigation. And 

our sole witness today is Robert Mueller, III, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whom we welcome to the Committee 

hearing. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the linchpin of the Nation’s law enforcement efforts. We have granted the Bureau significant powers: the ability to initiate investigations, to conduct surveillance on our citizens, and to combat crime and, more recently, 

terrorism. 

And with those powers go responsibility and accountability to respect citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties, to testify fully and 

forthrightly to Congress. 

There are thousands of men and women in the FBI who put their 

lives on the line for us every day, while doing their utmost to ensure the rights of the people are fully respected. 

It is a difficult balancing act, and the FBI’s history is replete 

with instances where the Bureau has crossed the line, and sometimes that abuse has risen to the very top. 

We saw it going back in history with the notorious 

COINTELPRO investigation into political activities in the 1950’s 

and 1960’s. We saw it when the FBI saw fit to wiretap and harass 

Martin Luther King, Jr., and the files of groups such as the 

NAACP. 

It is no understatement to say that the shadow of J. Edgar Hoover still haunts the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

The stakes are even higher today than they were then, because 

after the tragedy of September 11, Congress passed new laws 

transferring even greater powers to the Federal Bureau of InvesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:04 Jul 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\072607\37010.000 HJUD1 PsN: 37010
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tigation under the PATRIOT Act. At the same time, the Department relaxed regulations that had been in place for decades to 

check the FBI’s powers. We also granted the Bureau significant 

funding increases. 

Now, the FBI has had notable successes, and under Mr. 

Mueller’s leadership has been able to begin the process of modernizing and retooling itself. 

This week, they seized more than $500 million worth of counterfeited goods in China. 

The Bureau has also had some unfortunate failures, that include 

the so-called National Security Letter program. And several 

months ago, we learned that FBI agents had routinely used national security letters without proper authorization and outside of 

statutory and regulatory requirements. 

We learned of the FBI misuse of so-called exigent letters in nonemergency situations. In other words, the FBI claimed that there 

was an emergency simply to bypass the national security letter requirements. 

Five months later, I have yet to learn of a single FBI agent or 

employee being disciplined. Five months later, we have no concrete 

guarantees that this won’t happen again. Five months later, we 

still have no reform of the whistleblower process. 

We all appreciate the need for increased powers to combat terrorism. We in Congress have the job of making sure that these 

powers are not abused. If they are, we have the further job of reining in those powers as appropriate, by oversight and, if necessary, 

by statute. 

And so it is in that spirit that we are conducting this hearing. 

And I hope that we will be able to work cooperatively with this Director and head of the FBI to ensure that we are striking that difficult and proper balance between security and liberty. 

I am pleased now to recognize Lamar Smith, the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, from Texas, for his opening comments. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Like you, Mr. Chairman, I welcome today’s witness, Director 

Mueller. And I want to thank him for his dedication and commitment to the mission of the FBI, which plays such an integral role 

in protecting the lives of the American people. 

Certainly Director Mueller deserves credit for his efforts to successfully prevent another terrorist attack since 9/11. The FBI recently has thwarted two intended terrorist attacks: one at Fort Dix 

Army Base and one at JFK International Airport. 

As the recent National Intelligence Estimate has indicated, 

though, our Nation is still at risk. We must continue to wage the 

war against terrorism at home and abroad. 

On another subject, last March the Committee reviewed the Inspector General’s audit of the FBI’s use of national security letters. 

In that audit, the I.G. raised concerns regarding the FBI’s use of 

such letters. The problem was with enforcement of the law, not the 

law itself. 

The FBI has conducted an internal audit of NSL files, prepared 

and dispersed specific guidelines for the use of NSL authority to its 

3

56 field offices, and established an Office of Compliance to ensure 

that its practices adhere to Federal laws and regulations. 

A few days ago, the Justice Department and the FBI announced 

new measures to enhance national security oversight and compliance. 

DOJ created a dedicated Oversight Section within the National 

Security Division. The FBI created a new Office of Integrity and 

Compliance. 

These new oversight programs will help ensure that national security investigations are conducted in a manner consistent with the 

Nation’s laws, regulations, and policies, including those designed to 

protect the privacy interests and civil liberties of U.S. citizens. 

It is worthwhile to remember that no evidence suggests that anyone at the FBI intended to violate the law or internal policy governing use of NSLs. 

FBI agents acted in good faith and sought to comply with the 

law, even as they worked under severe time constraints and with 

an urgent desire to stop terrorist activities. 

As the Inspector General reported, NSLs are a critical tool in 

fighting terrorism and keeping our country safe. To do their job, 

the FBI must collect important information about suspected terrorists and spies. 

The FBI has combated terrorism while continuing to fight 

against other more traditional forms of crime, such as gang violence, white-collar fraud schemes, cyber-crime, child pornography, 

drug trafficking, and intellectual property crime, too. 

Director Mueller, thank you for all the good work that the FBI 

has done for all good Americans. I appreciate your being here. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Robert Mueller III, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has held his post since September 4, 2001. He has a long and 

distinguished career in public service. Between Princeton and University of Virginia Law School, he served as an officer in the Marines and was heavily decorated. 

He has been an Assistant United States Attorney in San Francisco, in Boston, and in Washington, DC. He served as Assistant 

Attorney General for the Criminal Division in the early 1990’s. And 

he returned to San Francisco in 1998 as United States Attorney. 

In between that, he has managed two stints in private practice 

as a partner at two prominent Boston firms. He was called back 

from San Francisco to Washington in early 2001 to be Acting Deputy Attorney General, where he served until assuming his current 

post. 

We have his statement, which will be included in the record, and 

we welcome him to proceed with his commentary. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, 

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, Chairman Conyers, Representative 

Smith and other Members of the Committee. Thank you for having 

me here today. 

When I was sworn in nearly 6 years ago, we were keenly aware 

not only of the successes of the Bureau, but also of the need to adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:04 Jul 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\072607\37010.000 HJUD1 PsN: 37010
4

dress a number of management and administrative challenges facing the Bureau. 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, coupled with emerging 

terrorist and criminal threats brought on by globalization and advances in technology, required far more changes than we ever anticipated prior to September 11. 

Today, the FBI is a stronger organization, committed to protecting the American people from both terrorism and traditional 

crime, while upholding the Constitution and protecting civil liberties. 

Today, I want to give you a brief sense of the FBI’s current priorities, the changes we have made to meet our mission, and some of 

the challenges we are facing. 

After September 11, the FBI’s priorities shifted dramatically. 

Today, our top three priorities—counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity—relate to the national security. And to 

that end, we have made a number of changes in the Bureau, both 

in structure and in the way we do business. 

The FBI’s top priority is, and will continue to be, the prevention 

of another terrorist attack. 

Since September 11, we have made significant progress and had 

notable successes in the war against terror. We have doubled the 

number of intelligence analysts on board and tripled the number 

of linguists. We have set up field intelligence groups in each of our 

56 field offices, tripled the number of joint terrorism task forces 

from 33 to over 100, in which we combine the resources and expertise of the FBI, the intelligence community, and State and local law 

enforcement officers. 

And today, intelligence is woven through every FBI program and 

every operation. And as has been pointed out, we have successfully 

broken-up terrorist plots across the country; whether it be Lackawanna, New York; Portland, Oregon; Torrance, California; Chicago; 

and recently the potential attacks on Fort Dix and the JFK plot. 

Our second priority is counterintelligence, protecting our Nation’s 

most sensitive secrets from those who would do us harm and who 

would strike at our economic well-being. We reach out to businesses and universities, we join forces with other intelligence community members, and we work closely with the military and others 

to safeguard our secrets. 

Our third priority in the post-9/11 world is the ever-evolving 

cybercrime threat. Our foreign adversaries and competitors can remotely observe, target, acquire and exploit our information to their 

advantage. Terrorists now recruit, train and plan attacks on the 

Internet. 

Sexual predators prowl chat rooms for young victims. Spies sell 

intellectual property and state secrets to the highest bidder. Hackers who used to shut down servers around the world for bragging 

rights may now be linked to criminal and terrorist organizations. 

Many traditional crimes, from money laundering and fraud, to 

identity theft and organized crime, have migrated online. 

The FBI’s Cyber Division, created 5 years ago, uses highly 

trained investigators to address these threats. And we effectively 

partner with government and industry through our sponsorship of 

5

InfraGard, a public and private alliance of over 20,000 individual 

members. 

And while Americans are justifiably concerned about terrorism, 

it is crime in their communities that often directly touches their 

lives. With limited resources, the FBI must target those criminal 

threats against which we have the most substantial and lasting impact. And I want to emphasize five areas. 

First, public corruption. In the past 2 years alone, we have convicted over 1,500 Federal, State, and local officials and recovered 

hundreds of millions in fines and restitution. 

Civil rights: In recent years, we have expanded our civil rights 

program beyond police brutality and hate crimes to include the 

Civil Rights Cold Case Initiative and human trafficking issues. 

Transnational organized crime continues to evolve with advances 

in globalization and technology. And we will continue our international commitments to this threat. 

White-collar crime, including corporate, securities, commodities, 

investment, mortgage, and health care fraud, continue to adversely 

affect our Nation’s economy and contributes to a number of victims. 

And we will continue our efforts to maintain public confidence in 

our country’s economic institutions. 

Another area I might mention is our hurricane fraud initiative, 

addressing contract and procurement fraud in the Gulf Coast region in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Violent crime, especially violent gangs: Gangs are a nationwide 

plague no longer limited to our largest cities. The FBI works to 

combat this pervasive threat through our Safe Streets task forces, 

which have grown nearly three-fold since 2001. 

And we are combating violent crime through other partnerships 

and task forces. Some of our Safe Streets and Safe Trails task 

forces are dedicated to other violent crime, from kidnappings to extortions to major interstate theft to assaults and murder in Indian 

country. 

Finally, let me conclude by bringing you up to date on two issues 

about which I know you have particular concern, one of which has 

already been mentioned, and that is national security letters. 

In response to the Department of Justice inspector general’s report concerning our use of national security letters, the Bureau is 

in the process of implementing numerous reforms on which, I believe, your staff members have been continuously briefed. 

These reforms will ensure that we comply fully with both the letter and the spirit of the authorities entrusted to us. 

We are identifying and rectifying errors in our use of NSLs. We 

have changed the approval process to include review of all NSL requests by FBI attorneys. We have and are retraining agents and 

supervisors on how and when to use NSLs. 

Within the FBI itself, we have established the Office of Integrity 

and Compliance, reporting directly to the FBI’s deputy director. 

While many major corporations have compliance divisions, few, if 

any, government agencies have a department-wide program to internally monitor compliance. And given the complex nature and important nature of our mission, as well as the number of rules and 

guidelines and laws to which we are subject, such a program is an 

imperative, and we have put it in place. 

6

And finally, to respond, Mr. Chairman, to one of your issues in 

terms of accountability, we are conducting an investigation with 

the Inspector General in the lead into the use of the exigent letters. 

And my expectation is, as a result of that investigation, we will 

take whatever steps are necessary to hold persons accountable. 

That investigation is pushing forward rapidly, but it is still ongoing. 

Second, in recent years, we have made major improvements to 

the FBI’s outdated information technology systems. We have installed thousands of state-of-the-art computers and secure and 

global networks. 

We are also in the process of implementing Sentinel, to help the 

FBI manage information and provide enhanced information sharing, search and analytical capabilities. In June, we successfully implemented the first phase of Sentinel, and are currently working on 

the development and deployment of the next set of capabilities. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that the FBI was created nearly 100 years ago to address crime crossing State boundaries. The threats we now face are global, and technology is moving 

more quickly than any of us could have foreseen just 10 years ago. 

We must continue to protect the security of our Nation, while upholding the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 

When I speak to special agents upon their graduation from the 

FBI Academy, I remind each one that it is not enough to prevent 

foreign countries from stealing our secrets. We must prevent that 

from happening while still upholding the rule of law. It is not 

enough just to stop the terrorist. We must stop him while maintaining his civil liberties. It is not enough to catch the criminal. We 

must catch him while respecting his civil rights. 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Smith, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify this afternoon and 

look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER


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Mr. CONYERS. Thank you for your testimony, which will accompany your written statement. 

I wanted to begin with the anthrax investigation, which we can’t 

get any information about, but yet the Senate apparently got a 

briefing on it. And we have Richard Hertling, Acting Assistant Attorney General, who wrote Congressman Rush Holt, saying that, 

‘‘We can’t give you any information or a briefing in the House.’’

Is there any way we can overcome this difference of views? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would be happy to discuss with the Department 

of Justice the possibility of providing some form of briefing with regard to what is happening in the anthrax investigation. 

It is an ongoing investigation, and, quite obviously, we have some 

concerns that the confidentiality be maintained. 

But in the meantime, I will discuss with the Department, a 

mechanism whereby we can give you a briefing as to what we are 

doing, the number of agents on the case, and some of the aspects 

of the case that would not compromise the ongoing investigation. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Now, the national security letters. The Inspector General’s report 

said that, of the 143,074 requests between 2003 and 2005 involving 

information on U.S. citizens, most of them were presumably innocent. 

And there are those in the Congress that begin to question the 

continued giving of the FBI this broad NSL authority in light of the 

findings not only from the Inspector General’s report but from the 

FBI’s own internal audit that the Bureau has systemic difficulties 

in limiting national security letters to appropriate uses. 

Your comments, please. 

Mr. MUELLER. First of all, let me say I absolutely understand the 

concern from the I.G.’s report. 

A couple of preliminary points to make, and that is that the Inspector General did not find any intentional activity or actions by 

FBI agents to circumvent and obtain records to which they were 

not entitled. And in almost every case, the FBI was entitled to the 

records that were obtained. 

One of the concerns I think is raised is the fact that there are 

so many and that they are U.S. citizens. And I would give perhaps 

a hypothetical that would explain the necessity for the use of that 

tool. 

We will, upon occasion, have investigations such as we had overseas these last few weeks where, in the United Kingdom, there 

were a couple of cars left outside a nightclub with the expectation 

they would explode. There was a terrorist attack in Scotland. And 

a year ago, if you will recall, there were a group of individuals in 

the United Kingdom who were arrested intending to bring on-board 

liquid explosives on a number of planes and blow them up. 

Either in international investigations or domestic investigations, 

we will find, in the course of those investigations, telephone numbers that they have utilized and been passed to us by British authorities, e-mail addresses, and other identifiers of communication. 

If we have individuals in the United States who are in contact 

with individuals who are part of a terrorist cell overseas, it is incumbent upon us to determine whether or not they are contacting 

people in the United States who may be terrorists, may be part of 

20

that group, or to determine that they are not persons part of that 

group. In order to get those records, we use national security letters. 

The standard needs to be relevance to our investigation. It is important that we track down every possible lead to individuals in 

the United States who might be undertaking terrorist attacks. It 

is not something that we did; we did not have the tools prior to 

September 11. 

It is fair to say that to the extent that we have been in some 

ways successful in preventing terrorist attacks since September 11, 

it is attributable to the tools that have been given to us under the 

PATRIOT Act. 

Let me finish by saying that what we did not have in place, 

which we should have had in place, is a compliance program, to assure that the procedures we had were being followed across the 

field, and that our databases were accurate and up to date. We did 

not have that. We have put that into place. 

And my hope and expectation is that, with all of the changes we 

have made, we will never again face the problem that we have 

faced in the last few months on items such as national security letters. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I have more questions, of course, but my 

time has expired. I will yield to Lamar Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, when the American people think of the FBI, I 

think they think of your two worthy missions: one, to reduce violent crime and, two, to deter terrorist attacks. And I would like to 

ask you about the latter. 

To what extent is al-Qaida trying to get agents into the United 

States? Are you seeing an increase in activity or a decrease in activity? 

And also, to what extent is the FBI able to break up cells or 

deter those types of activities? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, as the recently released national—or the national intelligence report, the NIE, indicates that, for the next 3 

years, we face a threat of terrorist attack. 

In part, it is attributable to the understanding of persons affiliated or associated with al-Qaida, that it is important to try to find 

individuals who can circumvent our border security and come into 

the United States, in much the way the 19 hijackers did prior to 

September 11. 

They have, since September 11, not for one instant given up the 

hope and the efforts to try to infiltrate persons into the United 

States to undertake attacks. 

Mr. SMITH. You are saying we need to strengthen our immigration laws and our border security then? 

Mr. MUELLER. We have, and we need to continue to do so. 

We also need to understand that it is not just stopping individuals at the borders, but that, once individuals were in, we have to 

identify those individuals who may have come in with the intent 

of undertaking an attack or, as important, individuals within the 

country who have been radicalized by the Internet or otherwise—

perhaps American citizens or perhaps recent immigrants—but 

21

come together, self-radicalized, with the expectation of being able 

to undertake a terrorist attack. 

So it is not just border security, but it also is our ability to develop sources to have tripwires out to identify individuals who may 

already be in the United States, or others who are coming into the 

United States who may be part of an effort to undertake a terrorist 

attack. 

Mr. SMITH. Director Mueller, how many individuals in the 

United States have you suspected of either intending to commit a 

terrorist act or had the potential to commit a terrorist attack, that 

you have deterred, stopped, arrested or otherwise prevented from 

doing so? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, certainly——

Mr. SMITH. Is it——

Mr. MUELLER. I hate to get into numbers, particularly in an open 

forum. 

I can tell you that, since September 11, we have had thousands 

of investigations into persons in some way associated with terrorists, various Sunni, or even Shia terrorist groups. 

And there also are levels of participation, there is funding, there 

is recruiting, there is radicalization—all pieces of the terrorist puzzle—in addition to those who provide support or those who are 

going to undertake a terrorist attack. 

And we have to address that, across the board, and have. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you a question about internal policy at 

the FBI that affects, I think, most of your personnel. 

What has been the success or lack of success involved with the 

5 years up-or-out policy, I think, that was implemented a couple of 

years ago? 

Mr. MUELLER. In 2004, we determined that we needed to change 

the way we develop leadership to encourage and push forward, give 

incentives to the best in the Bureau to rise to the top. 

We decided that in 2004 and indicated we would—I would start 

the process 2 years later, in 2006, giving individuals an opportunity to adjust their career moves. 

The purpose of this was to use the supervisor’s position as a first 

step in career-building, and to encourage persons to become Assistant Special Agents in Charge. It has had that effect. We have 

many more people seeking to move up the career ladder within the 

FBI. 

Mr. SMITH. So it has been a success. 

Let me squeeze in one more last question on a different subject. 

What have been the main obstacles to the States’ providing accurate information to you all for the instant background check? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, either an obvious example, such as what 

happened with West Virginia, in terms of medical and the psychiatric records. That is an obvious example. 

The other area is where, because of the lack of technology in particular States, it is difficult for the information to be given to us 

or to be adequately queried. I would have to get back to you on 

more of the specifics on that. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. If you can get back to me——

Mr. MUELLER. I would be happy to do that. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. That would be great. 

22

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The Chairman of the Constitution Committee, Jerry Nadler of 

New York? 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, the I.G. reports that the number of requests for 

NSLs from 2002 to 2005 was over 143,000. Over half of those concerned U.S. persons. He also reports that the number of terror-related convictions the Inspector General was able to confirm, stemming from the 143,000 persons’ information that was collected 

through NSLs, was one. 

Doesn’t that sound a little unbalanced? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to go back and look at that. Quite 

clearly, national security letters have figured in any number of terrorist investigations, disruptions and prosecutions. 

Mr. NADLER. Substantially more than one? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Because the I.G. reports that there was one conviction that stemmed from those 143,000 people. 

Mr. MUELLER. I have to go back and look at that statement. I 

didn’t focus on that. But I can assure you that there are national 

security letters that focus in any number of investigations. 

Any time you have an investigation such as this Operation 

Overt, where individuals are trying to get on planes in the U.K., 

we will have efforts to immediately determine whether or not we 

have a threat here; if you have a JFK plot, the recent plot against 

Fort Dix, I can assure that——

Mr. NADLER. All right. Let me go further. 

The I.G. also discovered that the subscriber information for approximately 11,000 phone accounts was obtained with only nine 

NSLs. Nine NSLs produced 11,000 phone accounts. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to get back to you on that. 

Mr. NADLER. All right, because—well, that is what is in the I.G.’s 

report. And my question is, that ratio sort of implies a fishing expedition, or at least not very focused investigations. 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not going to disagree with you in terms of 

the perception. I would have to get back to you as to the circumstances under which, number one, what the I.G. was referring 

to and the circumstances that he is referring to. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. 

In the June 1, 2007, draft guidelines on the issuance of NSLs, 

on page three, there is a discussion of e-mail and what is content 

and therefore cannot be obtained by an NSL, but that discussion 

is redacted. 

So my question is, do you consider the body or the text of an email to be content? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Both? 

Mr. MUELLER. If you are talking about the body of an e-mail, 

that is content. 

Mr. NADLER. And therefore cannot be obtained? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, the content. 

Mr. NADLER. And therefore cannot be obtained by an NSL? 

Mr. MUELLER. That is correct. 

23

Mr. NADLER. And the subject line of the e-mail? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to make certain and get back to you. 

I believe that is content as well. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. 

Now, on page 109 of the Inspector General’s report, it is reported 

that agents are accessing ‘‘NSL information about parties two or 

three steps removed from their subjects without determining if 

these contacts are real serious connections.’’

Doesn’t this violate even the relevance standard for issuing 

NSLs? 

Mr. MUELLER. Again, I would have to go—it may. I do not believe 

it necessarily does, but is determined by the circumstances of a 

particular investigation. 

Mr. NADLER. And if it doesn’t, would that not imply that the relevance standard is a little too low? 

Mr. MUELLER. Again, I think you would have to look at the circumstances. I don’t think you can base a conclusion on that statement alone. You would have to look at the circumstances, because 

there may well be indications that this person is part of a community——

Mr. NADLER. Let me switch topics. 

In the revisions to section 505 that were made by the PATRIOT 

Act, the new standard was that, in order to get an NSL, you simply 

had to assert that it is relevant to an ongoing investigation——

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. With respect to terrorism. 

The old standard was that, in order to get an NSL, you had to 

assert specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that 

the information or records sought by the letter pertain to a foreign 

power, an agent of a foreign power, or terrorist. 

Now, why shouldn’t we go back to that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Because it would absolutely hobble us in terms of 

our ability to do it. Because you need information to make the finding that the person is an agent of a foreign power. The only way 

to get the information to make that finding is to obtain records in 

which there is a limited privacy right, such as subscriber records, 

until you make that finding. And to put that finding at the front, 

it would preclude us from doing exactly what I said we need to do. 

When we get telephone numbers from a U.K. plot, we do not 

know whether the persons contacted in the United States are terrorists or not. If we had that standard, we would not be able to follow up on that information we got from our counterparts overseas. 

Mr. NADLER. I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The former Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Jim Sensenbrenner from Wisconsin. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Director Mueller, let me say I appreciate your meeting 

with me yesterday relative to the audit of the Milwaukee FBI office 

on privacy violations. 

And while I understand that the audit is not finalized and it 

would be premature to talk about the substance of that, I would 

like to ask you to send me a copy of the finalized audit once it is 

available. Can you do that? 

24

Mr. MUELLER. I will look and see if we can, yes. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. 

Now, relative to national security letters, am I correct in understanding that the Justice Department and the FBI had national security letter authority long before the PATRIOT Act, specifically 

since 1986? 

Mr. MUELLER. Correct. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. And the national security letters were not 

new at the time the PATRIOT Act was signed by the President in 

October 2001? 

Mr. MUELLER. Also true. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Am I also correct in understanding that 

national security letters, under the revised standard, cannot be 

used for a garden-variety criminal investigation that does not involve terrorism or espionage? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. So my question is, what kind of safeguards 

were there in the FBI to prevent NSLs from being used for the 

non-terrorism and non-espionage investigations? 

Mr. MUELLER. The safeguards we had were, in essence, the agent 

had to do a write-up of the basis for the NSL that would support 

the national security letter itself. And then it would have to approved by the Special Agent in Charge. 

What we have put into place since we realized that this was not 

always happening appropriately, is we have required, now, that before a Special Agent in Charge signs-off on a national security letter, that special agent—the lawyer in the office—go through the 

national security letter to ensure that it is appropriately being 

issued, and that there is the appropriate underlying investigation 

supporting the issuance of that national security letter. 

We also put into place—and it is being piloted as we speak; the 

pilot started this week—a new database, software program, and we 

have started piloting it in the Washington, DC, field office, which 

requires certain information to be filled into particular blanks before that national security letter will be issued, which will assure 

that we have the appropriate approvals but will also assure that 

we have the appropriate count to forward to Congress, as well. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Have you had any experience to make sure 

that these new guidelines are working and preventing national security letters from being issued when they are not supposed to be 

issued? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, in the wake of the I.G.’s report, we took approximately 200 agents and others and did an audit of all of our 

offices to see where we were. In the wake of that, if there was an 

office that had a particular problem, we have addressed it. 

We are continuously in the process of training and putting out 

the guidance. I think somebody had a copy of the draft guidance. 

We had run our draft guidance past privacy and civil rights organizations to get input on that policy. We have issued that policy. 

And I know the Inspector General is looking at the ability of our 

initiatives to address the problem and will be reporting to Congress 

in December. But my expectation is that he will find that we have 

taken the steps necessary to assure that this does not happen. 

25

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. As the author of the PATRIOT Act and the 

author of the PATRIOT Act reauthorization, which did put some 

restrictions on NSLs about a year and a quarter ago, now let me 

say that I am very concerned that the controversy on NSLs is 

bringing down certain support for the PATRIOT Act, even though 

the bells and whistles and traps to prevent NSL abuse had nothing 

to do with the PATRIOT Act, because the NSLs were authorized, 

I believe, in the law that was authored by the PATRIOT Act’s principal critic in the Senate, Senator Leahy. 

I guess people have a much lesser attention span or institutional 

memory on the other side of the Capitol than over here. But I can 

say that in 2006, this Committee did a lot to fix up some of the 

gaps that Senator Leahy had in the NSL law of 1986. 

And my time is up. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me just say that I testified before both bodies, 

sir, and I understand what you are saying. [Laughter.] 

But will not comment. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CONYERS. Careful. 

Mr. MUELLER. That is what I—I have a very good relationship 

with the other body. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, 

Bobby Scott of Virginia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mueller, you mentioned linguistics as a skill set that is needed at the FBI. Does the diversity in employment within the FBI reflect the need to get persons with the cultural knowledge, sensitivity and linguistics? Do you have enough people of different backgrounds? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Could we get the diversity breakdown at the FBI, if 

you could provide that, of your employees? 

Mr. MUELLER. Absolutely. 

Mr. SCOTT. We have heard previously that there was virtually 

nothing that you can get with a no-warrant NSL that you couldn’t 

get by going through FISA. Was that right? 

Mr. MUELLER. That is wrong. We are limited to what we can get 

under NSLs. There are broader categories of records we certainly 

can get going through the FISA Court under 215. 

Mr. SCOTT. You can get more out of FISA than you can get with 

an NSL? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Then remind me why we need—and then you can get 

an emergency after-the-fact warrant under FISA. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. So why do we need to do this without a warrant? 

Mr. MUELLER. Because we need to react quickly to terrorist 

threats. We need the capability of immediately—when we get information on individuals who may want to communicate with others, 

we need to get that information. We need to get the information, 

say, on a number, 10, 15, 20 numbers. 

If we make an arrest someplace, and we find an address book, 

and the numbers are in that address book, of a terrorist, we have 

to know with whom that terrorist is communicating, and we need 

to get that information quickly. And we cannot take the time, in 

26

my mind, to go through that which is necessary to have the court 

review the paperwork in order to get that information. 

Mr. SCOTT. Isn’t there an after-the-fact procedure where you can 

go get the information and then later get around to the paperwork? 

Mr. MUELLER. That is true. But the paperwork for the court proceeding to get a FISA, where you are seeking the right to intercept 

the conversations of an individual, is generally a quarter-of-an-inch 

thick. It requires the certification by me, the certification by the attorney general, an affidavit by an agent. 

And to require that in order to get the information on a subscriber would be an inordinate burden and would hobble us, as I 

have said before, in our ability to swiftly react to the threat of a 

terrorist. 

Mr. SCOTT. Wait a minute. I thought you said you could already 

swiftly react, go get the information, and then do the paperwork 

when you get around to it? 

Mr. MUELLER. Right. And the paperwork would inundate us. 

I have given you some examples of what we do in terms of needing the subscriber information, the e-mail information and the like. 

And we do it countlessly, day-in and day-out. 

Mr. SCOTT. The advantage of a warrant is that you—it is an ex 

parte proceeding. Only one side is represented, so you can’t possibly lose the case. But the fact that you just have to explain to 

somebody what you are doing, kind of, has a little check and balance to it that you don’t have when you just go on your own and 

get what you want. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, there are, in my mind, several checks and 

balances—internal checks and balances in the—— [Laughter.] 

Mr. SCOTT. I am sorry, but some of us look at checks and balances as one branch of government looking at another branch of 

government. An employee of the executive branch checking with a 

subordinate does not constitute, in my mind, a check and balance. 

Mr. MUELLER. I was going to go on to say also the Department 

of Justice. The Inspector General’s Office, under the original PATRIOT Act and the revisions to the PATRIOT Act, is looking at our 

processes and procedures. And ultimately, as well, the checks and 

balances from Congress, the other branch of government. 

In my mind, where the intrusion into privacy is somewhat limited when it comes to toll records and the like, the necessity for 

going through the FISA process is much reduced. In the same way 

in the criminal sphere, where a grand jury subpoena is issued on 

a relevant standard—there is a more dramatic incursion into the 

privacy rights in terms of the Title III and the like, you go to a 

court. 

Mr. SCOTT. In the past, the Department has seen the requirement of proving force and fraud as a major obstacle to their efforts 

to investigate and prosecute cases of domestic human trafficking. 

To address the problem, as you know, we recently increased the 

penalties from 10 to 20 years under the Mann Act, so that the Department could pursue domestic trafficking cases, and also changed 

the standard to remove the provision that you had to prove force, 

fraud, and coercion. 

Since increasing the relevant penalties, what has the FBI done 

to bring about more investigations in this case? And how has the 

27

FBI used the more relaxed standard for prosecution purposes? And 

what services are available for the victims? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to get back to you on the specifics 

tied into that statutory change, if you will allow me. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me just ask one other quick question. And 

that is, you know that running an Internet gambling operation is 

illegal in the United States. Is there any way that you can effectively prohibit Internet gambling by people in the United States on 

the Internet? And if not, would it make better sense to legalize and 

tax it and regulate it? 

Mr. MUELLER. I have not really looked or thought long and hard 

about it, but I would probably be adverse to legalizing it, for a variety of reasons. 

They are difficult to prosecute because they can go offshore so 

quickly. And with the ubiquitous nature of the Internet, it is often 

difficult, with anonymizers and the like, to track down individuals 

who are running offshore gambling organizations in the United 

States, although we endeavor to do so. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman 

from California, Elton Gallegly. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to thank the gentleman from North Carolina for 

letting me speak out of order. And I will try to be brief, because 

I have another commitment. 

Director Mueller, as of April of this year, there is a backlog of 

636,000-plus illegal alien absconders. And that number has doubled since the last report 5 years ago. 

Clearly, many of these folks have an objective to do great harm 

to our Nation. Many others are here strictly for economic reasons. 

Clearly, I understand that, under your leadership as a Director, 

you have had probably more challenges of significant magnitude 

than any Director in history. And I know that one of the most difficult jobs in any administrator’s life is establishing priorities. 

But could you tell me if and what the FBI is doing to identify 

and apprehend illegal alien absconders? 

Mr. MUELLER. It generally does not fall within our bailiwick. We 

certainly help the Department of Homeland Security and its various agencies where we can. And I know that Homeland Security 

and Mike Chertoff have programs to address that particular issue. 

But our support is secondary support, where we can give it. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Appreciate that. 

An issue that we have heard a lot about lately, FISA, the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act. And we know the Administration has 

recently asked Congress to modernize this act. Could you give us 

a very brief summary of why you feel that that is so important? 

Mr. MUELLER. Generally speaking, as I referred to in my opening 

remarks, the digitization, the ability of persons to communicate in 

a variety of ways through digital networks, whether it be Skype or 

voice-over IP, otherwise, the ability of persons to utilize communication capabilities across international lines has grown immensely over the years, and the statutory framework has not kept 

up with it. 

28

It goes without saying that, as was shown on September 11, we 

face threats from overseas that we never thought we would face 

prior to that happening, because of the oceans on both sides of us. 

But with internationalization, we have to be astute and flexible 

in understanding that those who wish to do us harm from overseas 

can quickly cross borders with the click of a mouse or come into 

the country. 

One of the things we absolutely need to do is, to the extent possible, understand that we have to use all of our resources on persons who are not U.S. citizens, in foreign countries, to obtain information with regard to their communications traffic. With a United 

States citizen in the United States, there should be a different 

mechanism, we all agree. 

But the FISA modernization statute that we have sought from 

Congress will upgrade those capabilities and allow us to do, in 

some sense, that which we were able to do before technology, when 

we were using the old technology, but have been barred from using 

given the provisions of the FISA statute. 

But we have to recognize that the division between information 

from outside the country—the division of that information from 

outside the country to the information inside the country has to be 

broken down. There has to be integration. There has to be use of 

full capabilities, particularly when it comes to non-U.S. persons. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you. 

Mr. Director——

Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman—are you finished? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I just want to make a 15-second summary. 

It is clear, I think, to most of us that in order to get to the core 

of organizations like al-Qaida, who have absolute modernized technological telecommunications ability, is to penetrate through the 

network. And without this modernization, I think we all know that 

it is going to be very difficult to penetrate that outside network to 

get to the core. 

I thank you very much. 

I thank the gentleman for letting me speak out of turn. 

Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman yield to me——

Mr. GALLEGLY. Certainly. 

Mr. CONYERS [continuing]. The balance of his time? Thanks, 

Elton. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CONYERS. Since we are not likely to have a second round, I 

just wanted to get in some of the two issues in Dearborn, Michigan, 

in which we have the largest concentration of Muslims and Arabs 

of anywhere in the country. 

And we have had two charities in Dearborn that have had their 

accounts suspended, and they are under investigation. And individual bank accounts of people of Arab descent have been summarily discontinued by their banks. And I need to have the FBI assist us in understanding where all of this is going, since these two 

charities enjoyed a pretty good reputation in the general public. 

Mr. MUELLER. Mr. Chairman, I think I am sure you understand 

that whatever actions were taken, at least by the law enforcement 

authorities, were taken with the approval, certainly, of the U.S. attorney and, in most cases, I would believe, the courts. 

29

With regard to independent actions of banks, that is something 

I am not aware of and would be happy to look into. 

But whatever actions have been taken on these charities, I think 

you will find, have been taken as a result of appropriate legal process. 

Mr. CONYERS. Did you know, in 2004 and it was reported in the 

papers—Homeland Security ICE, the Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement section, and the FBI, were knocking on doors in the 

October before the November elections, that apparently gave many 

of those citizens in that area the impression that they were being 

intimidated about the voting process? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, sir. It is the first I have ever heard of that. 

I have not heard a complaint about that. And I can assure you that 

at no time have we in the Bureau in any way sought to intimidate 

an individual from exercising their constitutional right to vote. 

And if you wish to pass on the specifics to me, I will certainly 

look into that. 

Mr. CONYERS. I will get the information to you. 

Mr. MUELLER. It does not sound like something that we would 

engage in, at all. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from North 

Carolina, Mel Watt. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Director, one of the concerns that I am hearing expressed to 

me by a number of people, is that traditional law enforcement is 

being compromised by our overemphasis on—not overemphasis, I 

guess you can’t overemphasize—but we are paying so much attention to terrorism and that prospect, that your traditional law enforcement—and the 2005 FBI Uniform Crime Report suggests that 

most, if not all, the major traditional criteria are up, crime-wise. 

And despite that, that the FBI crime investigations, violent crime 

investigations, are down by 60 percent. 

Respond briefly to that, if you can. I don’t want to respond to it 

too long, because I have a whole other question that I need to ask 

you to respond to. 

Mr. MUELLER. We have had to reprioritize after September 11, 

moving agents from criminal cases over to counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence. We are not doing as many drug cases. We are 

not doing as many smaller white-collar criminal cases as we have 

done before. We are not doing as many bank robberies as we have 

done before. We have had to focus. 

What we have done——

Mr. WATT. So the concern that people are expressing is correct, 

then, that you have shifted——

Mr. MUELLER. Well, yes, but we have also grown our safe street 

task forces to address crime. And my own view is that we are most 

effective when we leverage our relationships with State and local 

law enforcement. 

And so, we are doing—we have far more task forces than we 

have had in the past. And we are focusing on violent crime. But 

we could always use more resources to address that. 

30

Mr. WATT. The statistics don’t seem to bear out that this task 

force process is working as effectively as the other process, but 

that—I just wanted to make sure that we got that on the record. 

I wanted to ask you about the testimony of Mr. Comey and ask 

you if you can verify or give us your description of what occurred 

at the hospital, or leading up to the hospital visit, that has become 

so famous. 

Mr. Comey says that he phoned you, and you agreed to meet him 

at the hospital, and that you ordered the FBI agents on Mr. 

Ashcroft’s security detail not to evict the Acting Attorney General 

from the hospital room. 

Can you just give us—I won’t program what he said. I would 

rather hear what you have to say about that whole sequence of 

events. 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t dispute what Mr. Comey said in terms of 

receiving a call requesting my going to the hospital, and alerting 

persons that Mr. Comey wanted to be present during any conversations that were had with the Attorney General. 

Mr. WATT. And he further says that the President met with you, 

and after that meeting emerged to inform Mr. Comey that the 

President had authorized the changes in the program that had 

been sought by the Justice Department. 

Do you confirm that that is correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t dispute what Mr. Comey says. 

Mr. WATT. Okay. What do you make of that whole episode? 

Mr. MUELLER. Unfortunately, Congressman, I don’t think it appropriate to speculate. I can answer questions as to what happened 

to the extent that I am able to, but beyond that—I would be happy 

to answer any further questions——

Mr. WATT. Well, can you confirm that you and some of your 

agents were prepared to resign because of—leading up to this controversy? 

Mr. MUELLER. Again, I am uncomfortable getting into conversations I had with individuals, because I do believe that individuals 

are entitled to my unfettered thoughts. 

Mr. WATT. Can you confirm that you had some serious reservations about the warrantless wiretapping program that kind of led 

up to this? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. WATT. Okay. 

I thank the Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Now, Howard Coble of North Carolina, the former Chairman of 

the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, now the Ranking Member, is recognized. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mueller, good to have you with us. Thank you for your years 

of public service. 

I am going to ask you a provincial question, tobacco being prominent in my State. Have there been recent arrests regarding the 

trafficking of counterfeit cigarettes by terrorist groups? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to check on recent—there was one 

notable case from several years ago, with Hezbollah, in which I 

know cigarettes were being shipped from North Carolina to, if I am 

31

not mistaken, it was Detroit, and there was substantial prosecution. 

I would have to check to determine whether any additional prosecutions since then. 

Mr. COBLE. I would like you to do that, if you could, Mr. Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. Happy to get that. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Mueller, we are all aware of several recent highprofile public corruption arrests and prosecutions of Federal officials. How significant a problem, in your opinion, is public corruption in State and local governments? And does the FBI pursue 

these cases as well? 

Mr. MUELLER. It is hard to compare at times. I actually think 

that the incidence of public corruption is probably less so now than 

it was, say, 10 or 15 years ago. 

I do believe, however, that it is and should be one of the main, 

if not the principal, priority, and it is currently the principal priority of the FBI, to identify and ferret out public corruption, wherever it occurs. We have had, as I indicated, in the last 2 years, over 

1,500 convictions of Federal, State, and local officials who have 

abused the trust. And to the extent that that happens, it undercuts 

the core of democracy. 

And so, for us, it is a substantial priority, and I can say that 

there is enough work to keep us busy for a long time. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Mueller, recent reports have highlighted the 

growing problem of Chinese espionage efforts. Describe the nature 

of that threat, if you can, and the FBI’s role in this area. 

Mr. MUELLER. I can probably say more in a classified setting. I 

can say that it is a substantial concern. China is stealing our secrets in an effort to leap ahead in terms of its military technology, 

but also the economic capability of China. It is a substantial threat 

that we are addressing in the sense of building our program to address this threat. 

And beyond that, I would feel uncomfortable saying more in this 

open setting. 

Mr. COBLE. I can appreciate that. Perhaps we could get subsequent information on that. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Director, let me ask you this. The recent rise in 

violent crime does not appear to be uniform across the country. Cities, for example, like Los Angeles and New York, actually experienced a reduced crime rate. To what do you attribute this disparity? 

Mr. MUELLER. There are probably a number of factors. A number 

of people are trying to wrestle with what contributes to the uptick 

in crime in particular cities and not others. 

I do believe that the police departments in both New York and 

Los Angeles have been on the cutting edge of devising new ways 

to address violent crime. But there are also a number of factors 

probably outside the control of police departments to address it. 

In response to one of Mr. Scott’s question with regard to the use 

of task forces, in Los Angeles we have, over the last 6 months, 

come together on a task force with the Los Angeles Police Department, San Francisco Sheriff’s Office, and a number of other Federal 

agencies to address gang violence. And there has been a substanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:04 Jul 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\072607\37010.000 HJUD1 PsN: 37010
32

tial reduction in gang violence in Los Angeles as a result of the 

joint efforts in that task force. 

So it is not just us, but it is the other Federal agencies, coming 

together to target. And when we do so, we are effective. 

Mr. COBLE. Let me try one more question before the red light illuminates. 

Recent terrorist plots were thwarted at Fort Dix Army base and 

JFK International Airport. What role did the FBI play in those 

matters? 

Mr. MUELLER. We, along with the joint terrorism task forces in 

each of those communities, were responsible for the investigation 

and the arrests that were made as a result of that investigation. 

It was the combined efforts of the Bureau, with the State and local 

law enforcement and other Federal partners on joint terrorism task 

forces, who are responsible for both of those successes. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I beat the red light. 

Mr. CONYERS. That has never happened before. 

Mr. COBLE. I think it has. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CONYERS. Maybe. 

The Chair is pleased to recognize the Chair of the Immigration 

Subcommittee of Judiciary, the gentlelady from California, Zoe 

Lofgren. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Director, it is good to see you. 

I have strong concerns about many of the issues that have already been raised. But I think, as they are being handled well by 

my colleagues, I would like to ask about something that has not yet 

been attended to. And that is the role of the FBI in checking the 

names of immigration beneficiaries for any concern that they might 

pose. 

I have a strong concern about the delays that have been encountered for a portion of this. I understand that 85 percent of the 

names are cleared electronically right away, and that of the remaining 15 percent, 95 percent of those are usually cleared within 

1 week’s time. 

The problem is the 5 percent remaining. And I have situations, 

cases in my office, and I hear from other members all the time, 

where people have been waiting for as long as 5 years for an answer. 

And I am aware of situations, now, where companies who have 

a valued employee, are going to court, getting mandamus orders to 

the FBI, just to produce an answer. And I have been told—and I 

guess this is a question, not a statement, that the FBI is now 

10,000 behind on the mandamus-ordered name checks. 

Can you tell me what you are doing to get this speeded up? What 

needs to be done? Is it additional resources? Is it computer technology? What do we need to do to fix this, Director? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me give you just a wee bit of background in 

terms of where we are. 

Back in 2002, the Citizenship and Immigration Service, they 

gave us 2.7 million names to run through, to check not just on that 

33

name, but any references to an individual in any of our files, which 

put us way behind the curve in doing that. 

We have a problem. I share your concern on the problem. We 

have been working with DHS, we have been working with OPM. 

For instance, OPM gave us 30 contractors to address their backlog. 

It is a combination of personnel, but it will take a period of time 

to get additional contractors on. It is a question of money in order 

to pay them to do this. And lastly, it is a function as well of computerizing the documents and putting them in digital form so the 

searches can be done——

Ms. LOFGREN. But these are paper files, sir? 

Mr. MUELLER. They are. 

Ms. LOFGREN. My goodness. 

Mr. MUELLER. And they are paper files around the country. And 

the problem is that we have files going back—I don’t want to say 

we have got them back to when we started in 1908, but we have 

some files that probably are of that vintage. And quite clearly——

Ms. LOFGREN. Presumably, those files would not be relevant 

today. 

Mr. MUELLER. They would not. And what we have tried to do is 

triage in terms of seeing if there are ways to expedite it by cutting 

out categories of files that we need to look at. We are also talking 

with DHS in terms of changing the requirements, in terms of looking at all references. 

So we are looking at it from a variety of perspectives, understanding that there are a number of people out there that are very 

frustrated that they cannot get their citizenship, and that Congress 

in particular is frustrated at this backlog. So we are doing what we 

can. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I am concerned on two levels. One, that perfectly honest, honorable people—and way less than 1 percent ever 

have anything negative come out. But if you are waiting for 5 

years, the 1 percent is out there in America and unknown to us. 

So that is a concern from security, and it is also a concern from 

the process not working well. 

Let me ask you about your computer system. Because it strikes 

me that, not only is this a problem for the orderly administration 

of the immigration and citizenship laws but, just in terms of law 

enforcement, if you have got paper files, your virtual case——

Mr. MUELLER. Virtual case files? 

Ms. LOFGREN [continuing]. File—that was $170 million, was that 

right? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the virtual case file—yes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. And did we get anything of value out of it? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, we did, but not as much as we should have 

out of that. And several years ago, we decided to go another route. 

And the Sentinel program that we put into place, for four stages, 

we successfully completed, as I indicated, the outset, first phase of 

Sentinel, this last June. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, when that is done, will the searches by 

digitized prospectively? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. And as we go through the process, now, we 

are digitizing—every time we do a search, we digitize the information. 

34

Ms. LOFGREN. Okay. 

Mr. MUELLER. But there are still miles of records out there, 

miles of records out there that have not been digitized. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I know my time is up, but I would suggest that, 

you know, it is always hard to have a records-keeping function 

compete with personnel in the field and the like. 

Yet I would think that that ought to be one of the highest budget 

priorities, for you to have to digitize all those records. And it will 

give power to your agents in ways that will far exceed the funding 

necessary to do that, in 6 months’ time. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we have a new facility that we are building 

out in Winchester. We have had the funding for it. It is going into 

place. It will be one of the most modern records-handling facilities 

in the country. And we started doing this almost 3 years ago, 

maybe even 4 years ago, understanding that we have to bring ourselves into the modern era and that we have to digitize just about 

everything. 

The problem is we have miles upon miles and miles of files. And 

it is a question of resources and bringing on board the best technology. 

In the next year, my expectation is, we will leap ahead with our 

new facility out in Virginia. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The distinguished gentleman from Cincinnati, Ohio, Steve 

Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being today, Mr. Mueller. 

Several Members of this Committee have an interest in ensuring 

that the contracting opportunities available in the Federal prison 

industries, which is set forth in section 4124 in title XVIII, are protected. 

And, as I am sure you know, the FBI is the Federal prison industry’s largest customer, comprising 35 percent of the Federal prison 

industry’s annual revenue. 

In fact, in response to our urging, the Attorney General issued 

a memorandum last October to all the Department’s components, 

including the FBI, of course, directing them to comply with their 

legal obligations under the Federal Acquisition Regulations—and, 

again, including the FBI. 

Unfortunately, this directive hasn’t settled the issue. Because 

over the last few months, we have received ongoing accounts of FBI 

officials circumventing this directive and their legal obligations to 

contract work out to the Federal prison industries. 

In a briefing provided on March 27 of this year by FBI Deputy 

Assistant Director Joe Ford, Congressman Bobby Scott, who was 

here—he is right here now—Congressman Scott and I were assured 

that while three contracts that should have been outsourced to the 

Federal prison industries were not, steps had been taken to prevent this situation from reoccurring. Yet we continue to hear accounts of non-compliance, in fact defiance, as recently as last week. 

Is there something that you can assure us that you will do to 

look into this matter, and make sure that the FBI is meeting its 

35

legal obligations, so that contracts that are supposed to go to Federal prison industries will? Because as we know, the people that 

are behind bars, most of them are going to come out someday, and 

it makes sense to give them job skills and something to do. It is 

safer for the guards and those sorts of things. 

So could you respond, please? 

Mr. MUELLER. Surely. 

I don’t purport in any way to be an expert in the area of contract 

formulation. But I have been aware of this issue. And I believe that 

we are following the law. 

Again, I would have to go back and study it more, but my expectation is that you would also find there is a responsibility for competition under the statutory requirements. 

And it is not the conflict, but how you coordinate the responsibility to let competitive contracts, along with the desire to provide 

to the Bureau of Prisons the business that creates the issue. 

But I can tell you and assure you that we are trying we are trying to comply with the statutes to the letter of the statute. And I 

would be happy to get back to you and review that more personally, and see if there is some issue there that I am missing. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I would appreciate that, if you could get 

back to me and also Congressman Scott, as well. I think they essentially agreed that the three contracts should have been, weren’t 

let out, they would do better, and apparently there is still a problem. So if you would look into that, we would greatly appreciate it. 

The other matter I would like to mention, in 2000, the FBI extended DNA testing to locate missing persons and identify unidentified human remains and established the National Missing Persons DNA Database to store this information. 

How effective has this database been in locating and identifying 

missing persons and unidentified human remains? And how does 

the FBI’s database interact with the Center for Human Identification, located at the University of North Texas? 

Last month, the Administration announced the creation of yet 

another new database, called NamUs, which creates a central reporting system for unidentified remains. How will the FBI’s database interface with this new database, and what additional resources are needed? Or can the resources that are in place be 

streamlined to truly assist families who are searching for loved 

ones? 

My interest in this came from a woman, Debra Culberson—her 

daughter, Carrie, was murdered, and they have never found the remains, unfortunately. 

And this is a fairly common occurrence. And to give some closure 

to the families, it is certainly helpful. And there are thousands of 

cases where these unidentified remains are literally in a coroner’s 

office or somewhere, maybe in another State. 

And so if you could respond, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. MUELLER. The database we established for missing persons 

was, I think, an outgrowth of the development of the mitochondrial 

DNA capabilities. And in terms of its success, I periodically hear 

anecdotal stores of successes they have had. But I would have to 

get back to you on the statistics. 

36

I am not certain about our intersection with the group at the 

University of North Texas, and I would have to get back to you on 

that. Quite clearly, the developments we have had in DNA over the 

last number of years have transformed in some sense the criminal 

justice system—giving us positive identifications of individuals, 

whether it be persons who were subsequently successfully prosecuted, but also missing persons. 

As the use of DNA grows, we are short of resources, we are backlogged. And whether it be for the missing persons database or to 

more effectively and efficiently process requests for DNA examinations, it is something where we are going to need substantial resources in the future. My belief is the Federal system we have that 

integrates the State systems is working overall very well. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

I would be pleased to recognize the indefatigable gentlelady from 

Houston, Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Welcome to Mr. Mueller. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for creating a very important—or expanding on the very important role 

of this Committee, and that is oversight. 

And we welcome you, Mr. Mueller. I know that we have visited 

before and you have missed some times. We hope you are well. 

Thank you for that. 

I have three questions. My time is very, very short. And I think 

in the spirit of oversight, we have some very, very important questions to focus on that address a line of questioning that we have 

addressed over the past couple of weeks. 

It is March 10 when General Ashcroft was in the hospital and 

you got a call from Jim Comey, concerned about a meeting that Mr. 

Gonzales was going to have with the chief of staff of the White 

House. 

And it seems as if you would dispatch your FBI detail so that 

Mr. Comey would not be evicted from the room with General 

Ashcroft. And I might say that all of us were wishing him well at 

that time—certainly expressed our concern. 

But he was going there, General Gonzales, to talk about the TSP, 

warrantless wiretapping. And it is a concern, so that we can get 

the record straight about what happened. And Mr. Comey was—as 

he arrived, he expressed a number of concerns about what this 

meeting was going to be about. 

So my question to you, first of all, did you ever speak with either 

Mr. Gonzales or Mr. Card while they were at the hospital? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And if you did not do that, did any of your 

agents speak to those individuals? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t believe so. I arrived at the hospital after 

Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Card had left. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The discussion—and I don’t know if you did 

arrive—did you have an opportunity to talk to General Ashcroft or 

did he discuss what was discussed in the meeting with Attorney 

General Gonzales and the chief of staff? 

37

Mr. MUELLER. I did have a brief discussion with Attorney General Ashcroft. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Pardon? I am sorry? 

Mr. MUELLER. I did have a brief discussion with Attorney General Ashcroft after I arrived. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And did he indicate the details of the conversation? 

Mr. MUELLER. I prefer not to get into conversations that I had 

with the Attorney General. At the time I—again, he was entitled 

to expect that our conversations——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I respect that. Could I just say, did you 

have an understanding that the discussion was on TSP? 

Mr. MUELLER. I had an understanding the discussion was on an 

NSA program, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I guess we use TSP; we use warrantless wiretapping. So would I be comfortable in saying that those were the 

items that were part of the discussion? 

Mr. MUELLER. The discussion was on a national—an NSA program that has been much discussed, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I appreciate that. 

And do you then later remember what might have occurred? We 

know that there was a meeting back at the White House that 

night. Again, all of us were interested. It was raising debate in the 

United States Congress. Do you remember what happened at the 

meeting at the White House that night? 

Mr. MUELLER. I was not present at the White House that night. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And would you have any recollection, or asked 

for recollection through staff, whether TSP was discussed? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I was not present at the meeting that Mr. 

Comey testified to having later that night at the White House. I 

do believe it related to a national security program—or a national 

NSA program, I should say. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And let me just be clear, because I am saying 

this to you. Is it your understanding that General Gonzales was at 

the hospital and visited then-former General Ashcroft along with 

the chief of staff, Andy Card? Is it your understanding that they 

did have a meeting? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And so as we listen to General Gonzales’s testimony, I believe under oath, regarding that, his statement, if I 

might just indicate that, in a question posed to him—and if it was 

about the TSP you are dissembling to this Committee—now, was 

it about TSP or not, the discussion on the 10th? 

I think this says the 8th; I think the transcript is incorrect. This 

was a question posed by Senator Schumer. 

The answer was, the disagreement on the 10th was ‘‘about other 

intelligence activities.’’ The question, specifically, was, was it about 

TSP or not? And the answer was ‘‘about other intelligence activities.’’

It appears, from our discussion here today, that the discussion 

was certainly more focused than what General Gonzales has offered to the United States—in your recollection? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am sorry. Is that a question, ma’am? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes, it is. 

38

Mr. MUELLER. I really can’t comment on what Judge Gonzales 

was thinking or saying. I can tell you what I understood at the 

time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think we appreciate your recollection. And 

I will just follow up—just to finish, Mr. Chairman, if I may—to say 

that, General, I had a series of questions about hate crimes and 

about that watch list. 

I would only say to you, on the watch list, there are many people 

hurting, as my colleague said, while others may be going free. 

I would like to get a report back on the watch list, because I will 

speak for the Texas Medical Center. And researchers and scientists 

are on that list—and it is very destructive—among others. 

My last point is, Mr. Chairman, is that we like your priorities 

on terrorism, but, if I may just show this, we have no action on 

hate crimes and racial violence. That is where you are in the investigation of those. 

And so I would appreciate a quick answer or a letter back on 

why we are so low. And I would welcome the letter, if the Chairman does not indulge me at this point. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, if I may comment on that last point, the addressing of hate crimes, the addressing of civil rights abuse is our 

number-two priority. But I would look at that figure in terms of 

what it represents in actual investigations we have undertaken. 

Because, for a substantial period of time, we would open cases 

to report that which has happened in a particular community, as 

opposed to a thorough investigation. 

And I will absolutely get back to you. But I do not believe that 

those statistics reflect what we have done in terms of hate crimes 

of civil rights abuses. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to pursue in the Committee——

Mr. CONYERS. The gentlelady’s time——

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. The conflicting testimony of General Gonzales. 

Mr. CONYERS [continuing]. Has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. I would like to recommend that there will be questions coming to the Director from Members, that he will be able to 

respond to. 

I am pleased now to recognize Dan Lungren, the distinguished 

gentleman from California. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mueller, let me try and go back to the FISA warrants, versus 

the NSLs, just so we make sure that the record is correct. Because 

you said you can get more in FISA warrants than you can get in 

NSL, leading to the suggestion that you don’t need NSLs because 

you have FISA warrants. 

But as I understand your testimony, you use the NSLs in some 

ways in preparation to be able to get a FISA warrant, because the 

NSLs gives you non-content material. And you may not have the 

basis to go after the more extensive information, absent that which 

you would get through the NSL. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Correct. 

39

Mr. LUNGREN. So the NSL is an essential investigative enabling 

tool that you use at the very beginning, particularly in time-sensitive situations, such as evidence of an impending terrorist plot. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Exactly. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Now, the NSLs are extremely important. You 

have said that. 

And one of the concerns I have had, and some other Members of 

this Committee who have supported you on the NSLs and supported the continuation of the NSLs, is the failures in the Bureau 

to do it properly, that which was revealed in the Inspector General’s report. 

And when we were probing on this, it became evident that at 

some of the Bureau offices, there wasn’t the proper understanding 

of what was required. And so, the question we asked was, why 

didn’t that information go from the General Counsel down to your 

lawyers at the office level. 

And we were told that the lawyers at the office level, branch 

level, actually work for the SAC, not for the General Counsel. So 

the question becomes, does that make good sense, to continue that 

sort of focused direction? 

Would it not make more sense to have those lawyers have a direct responsibility to the General Counsel’s office? 

Mr. MUELLER. That is an issue that we are still looking at. But 

in the meantime, what we have done is to put each lawyer, in each 

of our field offices, in the NSL process by procedure. And we have 

also indicated that they have an independent responsibility, beyond 

the office and beyond the SAC, to the Office of General Counsel in 

carrying out the responsibilities with regard to the—well, the responsibilities on NSLs and their responsibilities in their particular 

office. 

Now, whether we go and change the line from a dotted line to 

a solid black line is something we are still looking at. There are 

downsides to doing that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I know there would be downsides to it, but let me 

just ask you this: Who has greater effect on their potential advancement in the FBI, the General Counsel or the SAC in the office 

in which they now work? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to say the SAC. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And doesn’t that create somewhat of a conflict 

from independent judgment for the counsel to the SAC, where the 

SAC is saying, ‘‘I want these NSLs,’’ and you have told us that the 

system didn’t work. Would not that be perhaps one of the reasons 

why it didn’t work? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think that it was perhaps one of the reasons 

that it did not work, but I would not say that that was the main 

reason that it did not work. The General Counsel in a particular 

office, or the legal counsel in a particular office, was not put into 

that process in a way that gave them the independence and the capability to do it. 

And so, I have not totally ruled out changing it. It is something 

we are looking at. But in the meantime, we have taken steps to 

make certain that we address that particular issue. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I appreciate that. 

40

Now, let me say that I happen to think that you have been one 

that has worked very, very hard and very effectively to change 

somewhat of the culture of the FBI, with the new obligations that 

are imposed on it. 

At the same time, we have to deal with certain continuing difficulties with the FBI. And the order of the court that came down 

in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts today, with a $101 million damage against the FBI for the 

misconduct in the handling of confidential informants, where, if 

you read the summary, it is astounding. I never thought I would 

see that about the FBI. 

I never thought I would see four people framed, three of them 

sentenced to death, one to life imprisonment. The three did not receive the death sentence because it was later changed to life, a conspiracy to keep them in jail for three decades, findings by the court 

that are absolutely astounding. 

Now, this happened back in 1968, in the 1960 timeframe. But it 

is almost the beginning of my understanding of the difficulty with 

handling confidential informants, and the continued problems that 

ensued with the Department, as exposed by the report of the Inspector General just a year ago. 

Can you tell us now whether we are going to continue to need 

to pursue legislation—which I would grant you that Mr. Delahunt 

and I have sponsored for some time, which is pretty tough legislation with criminal sanctions in it. Or is there some movement in 

the Bureau to come up with absolute standards, a certification that 

they are being followed, with some teeth in it so that there are disciplinary actions taken against those, whether they are supervisors, SACs, whether they are agents, for violating the policy? 

Which, if you look at the Inspector General’s report, it suggested 

that, I believe, 87 percent of the cases, the CIs were being followed 

in accordance with the promulgations that you had put out. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me make a distinction between two aspects of 

what you discuss. The first, and what your statue addresses, is the 

failure to inform State and local law enforcement of unauthorized, 

illegal activity by informants handled by the FBI, and your statute 

does address the FBI and no other agency. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Actually, it is confined to violent, felony offenses. 

Mr. MUELLER. And the second aspect of it is the disclosure of exculpatory information that the FBI might have as to an individual 

who is being prosecuted at the State and local level. 

In the wake of what happened in Boston in the late 1990’s, substantial attention was given to redoing the guidelines with regard 

to handling informants. 

It is mandated today that if we know—and by we, the FBI—

know of violent activity, or actually any illegal activity, of an informant that comes within the bailiwick of State and local prosecutors, we are to tell the United States Attorney, and the U.S. attorney is then mandated with us to provide that information to State 

and local authorities. 

Likewise, with the discovery of exculpatory information in our 

files related to a prosecution of State and local law enforcement, we 

are mandated to inform the U.S. attorney, and then, with the U.S. 

attorney, to provide that information. 

41

There is an oversight panel that has both FBI and Department 

of Justice personnel on it. In every office now, we have a human 

source coordinator. We have a quarterly review of all of our sources 

by supervisors to determine if there has been any unauthorized 

criminal activity or exculpatory information. And that is followed 

up by inspections. 

And I would suggest—I would be happy to give you a further 

briefing on what this—what we have put in place to address what 

I agree is a very difficult problem. I do not believe that this statute 

is the answer. I think it is too broad and it will have a chilling effect on our ability to develop sources and to address terrorist attacks, to address public corruption, to address—as you well know, 

being a prosecutor, and Mr. Delahunt being a prosecutor, in order 

to effectively undertake these investigations, you have to utilize 

sources. 

We have to do a better job in assuring that we do not have another debacle such as we had in Boston, and we have put into place 

the mechanisms to do so. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank you for that response. 

And I would say that on my behalf and Mr. Delahunt, and I 

know Mr. Scott has talked with me about this as well, we probably 

need to get a briefing at the very least, a closed-door briefing, on 

this with you at an early date. 

I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes the other prosecutor, Bill 

Delahunt from Massachusetts. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

And I will pursue the same line of questioning that my friend 

from California initiated. 

But before I do, you indicated, Director Mueller, that you are 

going to get back to us. I think I have heard that several times, 

and I would suggest that is very positive. 

You also indicated you have testified before both bodies. And yet 

I have no recollection that you have testified before the House Judiciary Committee until this moment. But you can check with your 

staff and advise me if I am incorrect. 

Mr. MUELLER. That was the first time I have testified before this 

House Committee. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. This is the Committee of jurisdiction. We had a 

number of concerns about the FBI not just dealing with NSLs or 

confidential informants. I dare say it would have been very beneficial for the Members of this panel to hear your concerns in a public venue regarding the terrorist surveillance program. Because this 

is too important simply to have a briefing behind closed doors. I 

would suggest that it is important to educate and inform the American public in full measure as to what we are doing. 

The legislation that Mr. Lungren and I have been discussing 

should not be viewed as an effort to punish or embarrass the FBI. 

To the contrary, I view it as an effort to help the FBI restore its 

credibility with the American people. I don’t know if you have had 

an opportunity to read the decision by Judge Gertner today. 

Mr. MUELLER. I have not. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is embarrassing. It is scathing. Let me just 

read one excerpt: ‘‘The issue is not about failure to produce exculVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:04 Jul 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\072607\37010.000 HJUD1 PsN: 37010
42

patory evidence, but procuring convictions by misrepresentation, 

not letting perjured testimony proceed uncorrected but facilitating 

it.’’

With all due respect to internal reviews, audits, Inspectors General, in a democracy my understanding of checks and balances is 

as the founders foresaw it, and that is having an independent 

branch of government review what the executive is doing. 

It is not just the responsibility of the judicial branch to protect 

individual freedoms and civil liberties, but it is our responsibility, 

as well. 

However, having said all that, I am glad to hear that we are now 

going to have a Bureau of Compliance, where these kind of issues 

will be monitored. I dare say it is late in coming, with all due respect. 

And while my friend, the former attorney general of California, 

mentions that this happened in the 1960’s, you and I know that 

this has been a problem of decades, including the 1990’s. We saw 

this decision now. 

There is a former FBI agent that is currently indicted for murder, awaiting trial in the state of Florida. Another former FBI 

agent that appeared at the bench that you are sitting at, Paul H. 

Rico or H. Paul Rico, was indicted for murder before he died. 

This is the kind of behavior that really undermines the confidence of the people in the integrity of the FBI. 

And talking about guidelines—we have had guidelines. We have 

had guidelines for the past four decades, commencing with the 

former Attorney General Levi. It is a question of whether they are 

going to be complied with. 

I have reached the conclusion that we need legislation in an effort to, once and for all, put an end to these embarrassing moments, not just for the Bureau, not just for the Department of Justice, but for the government that the American people support 

when they go to the polls every 2 years. 

Any comment? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I do. You and I both come from a background 

where this was a substantial issue. It is an episode that redounds 

to the detriment of the Bureau, without a question of a doubt. But 

I would suggest to you that is isolated. It is isolated in the past. 

And we have put into place guidelines and procedures——

Mr. DELAHUNT. With all due respect, Mr. Director, you know, 

there was a cistrict attorney in Brooklyn that received information 

that was very comparable. I don’t know even what has happened 

to that particular case. But there were former FBI agents that 

were indicted in that matter, as well. And the similarities are 

striking. 

Mr. MUELLER. I cannot disagree with you on these instances. But 

day in and day out, over the years, FBI agents have undertaken 

investigations and done them lawfully. They have done them successfully. 

And I would absolutely agree with you, afterward, we have to ensure that these incidents do not repeat themselves. Because it does 

undercut the credibility and the work of the 99 percent of the Bureau that are out there, day-in and day-out, doing their job. 

43

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. And I hope to see you here—I hope, 

in the future, you adjust your schedule so that we can see you on 

a more frequent basis and have more ample opportunities to exchange views, to work in a cooperative fashion, and not wait for 6 

years to see you again. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, we can correct that by inviting him more. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me just say, Congressman, I would be happy 

to come up and sit down informally with you and go through whatever issues you have, periodically. And I am also, quite obviously, 

looking forward to being here again. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is good to hear that, Mr. Mueller. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair is pleased now to recognize the Ranking 

Member of one of our Subcommittees, Randy Forbes of Virginia. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Director, thank you for being here. And I am going to ask 

you to shift gears a little bit and talk about criminal gang activity 

in the country, if you could. 

And just to lay the groundwork for that, on April 20, 2005, the 

FBI Assistant Director, Chris Swecker, testified before the House 

International Relations Subcommittee on Western Affairs, regarding the FBI’s efforts to combat criminal gangs. 

And during his testimony, he stated that there is some evidence 

of an increased level of sophistication and some indications of a hierarchy of leadership. 

And cliques throughout the country often follow the lead of the 

Los Angeles-based cliques. And there are reports of Los Angelesbased members traveling throughout the United States for the purpose of recruiting new members, establishing new cliques, and taking over existing Latino gangs and instilling discipline through violence and intimidation. 

And yesterday the Washington Times reported on a recent Army 

intelligence assessment that identifies MS-13 as an organization 

that can function as networks with extensive transnational linkages. 

Furthermore, their internal functions include recruiting, logistics, attacks, intelligence, and activities including murders, drugs, 

extortions and others. 

And my questions for you are these: Do you agree with this upgraded assessment? How many members of MS-13 do you think we 

might have in the United States or internationally? How sophisticated are their operations? What kind of threat are they posing to 

us at this particular point in time? 

Mr. MUELLER. First of all, I agree with the assessment. There 

are many thousands of persons associated with MS-13 in the 

United States, in Guatemala, in Mexico, in quite obviously El Salvador and several other countries. And the threat is not just limited to Los Angeles, but is throughout the United States. 

One of the benefits of developing an intelligence capability within 

the Bureau is to better identify those areas within the United 

States that currently have a presence of MS-13, identify those 

areas in the United States that did not have a presence of MS-13, 

and make certain they do not have a presence of MS-13. 

44

We have a task force, MS-13 task force, with a number of participants from various agencies that address this across not only the 

different State borders within the United States but 

transnationally. Approximately a year ago, there were some 600 

MS-13 individuals who were arrested not only in the United States, 

but in El Salvador and Guatemala, Mexico, I think it may have 

been Dominican Republic, Honduras in a coordinated takedown. 

With a gang such as this that crosses borders, it is a function of 

globalization, a different type of globalization which requires us to 

work cooperatively and build allegiances and alliances with our 

counterparts overseas, if we are to effectively address what I would 

call a scourge of gang activity. 

As I mentioned—I would finish by saying that we have been 

somewhat successful recently in a joint task force operating out of 

Los Angeles to address violent crime with MS-13 and the 18 street 

gangs there. 

Mr. FORBES. And if I could follow up on that—and I know you 

did have that success. You mentioned it earlier. How important are 

the joint task force capabilities to be able to pull down the gang 

networks that you are seeing, especially the national connectivity 

that we are beginning to see with MS-13? 

Mr. MUELLER. My belief is task forces are tremendously important. And that it is tremendously important that State and local 

law enforcement authorities be funded to support task forces. 

The funding constraints on State and local law enforcement have 

been somewhat substantial over the last years. We ask them to 

participate in joint terrorism task forces, to join with us in addressing the threat of terrorism. They ask us to participate with them 

to address what is most on their mind, which often is violent crime 

and, quite often, violent crime at the hands of gangs. 

And the funding for both us, as well as State and local law enforcement, to address this must be provided, if we are to make a 

dent in violent crime activity, violent gang activity in the United 

States. 

Mr. FORBES. And the last question—you may, if you don’t have 

this statistic with you, just get back to us with it. Do you have any 

idea about the percentage of members of, let us say MS-13, because 

that is in the news lately, might be here illegally? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not. I would have to get back to you. But it 

is fairly—well, I would really have to get back to you on that. I 

don’t want to——

Mr. FORBES. We have had testimony that it could be between 60 

percent and 80 percent. But if you could just see what your statistics and get back. 

Mr. MUELLER. Will do. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Director. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Forbes. 

The Chair is pleased to recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, 

Mr. Steve Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know we have gone over, two or three times, this fact that General Ashcroft was in the hospital. But I am curious. Mr. Comey 

45

said that he called you, and you called your agents and said that 

Mr. Comey was not to be removed from the room. 

Why did you feel that there might be an attempt to remove him 

from the room? 

Mr. MUELLER. It was based on my conversation with Mr. Comey, 

in which he indicated he had a concern that he would not be participating in discussions in which he felt he should be participating 

as the Acting Attorney General. 

Mr. COHEN. And were there FBI agents at the room protecting 

General Ashcroft? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. He had a detail of FBI agents throughout his 

tenure. 

Mr. COHEN. All right. And so, he was concerned that Mr. Card 

and Mr. Gonzales, or Judge Gonzales, were not going to include 

him in the conversation. Is that correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. All I can tell you is what I learned from him. 

Mr. COHEN. So he believed that. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. Why did you rush there? 

Mr. MUELLER. He requested that I be there to determine what 

went on. You would have to ask Mr. Comey why he had me there. 

I did go at his request. He was the Attorney General at the time. 

Mr. COHEN. So you went there, and when you were there, he said 

at one point that you had a brief and memorable conversation—a 

brief, memorable exchange with the Attorney General. How memorable was that? 

Mr. MUELLER. I had a conversation with him. I couldn’t recite to 

you word for word what that conversation was. I do remember him 

being there. 

Mr. COHEN. Just a memorable conversation——

Mr. MUELLER. It was a conversation, yes. 

Mr. COHEN. What was the gist of it, sir? 

Mr. MUELLER. I guess it covered very generally what had happened the moments before. 

Mr. COHEN. And what had happened the moments before? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, again, I resist getting into the conversations, 

the specifics of conversations I had, because I do think the Attorney 

General then, the Attorney General now, and others are entitled to 

keep those conversations between themselves. 

Mr. COHEN. They may be entitled to, but are you entitled to? 

And he is no longer the Attorney General, so at this point, he is 

not the Attorney General. I am asking you to tell us what the conversation was. I don’t think there is a privilege. 

Mr. MUELLER. Excuse me just 1 second. 

Mr. COHEN. Sidebar. 

Mr. MUELLER. The discussion was that there had been a prior 

discussion about an NSA program and that the Attorney General 

deferred to Mr. Comey as the person to make whatever decision 

was to be made. 

Mr. COHEN. He had confidence in Mr. Comey, I take it. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. Okay. At some point or another, I think you told 

maybe Mr. Watt that you felt that there were problems with some 

of the operations there, the wiretaps. 

46

Mr. MUELLER. At a point in time, in conversations with Mr. 

Comey, I had understood that the Department of Justice had some 

concerns about the legality of an NSA program. That affected the 

FBI in the sense that we received pieces of information from the 

NSA. 

My purpose was to determine that whatever we did as the Bureau in handling that was done according to the directive and the 

appropriate directive of the Department of Justice. 

So my concern was to assure that whatever activity we undertook as a result of the information we received was done appropriately and legally. At some point in time, he expressed concern 

about the legality of it. 

Mr. COHEN. And because of that concern, at some point did you 

express to Mr. Watt, I believe that was correct, earlier, that you 

considered resignation? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t believe I expressed that. I did not dispute 

what Mr. Comey had said. But, again, in this area, I would say 

that I should not get into the conversations I had with individuals. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, this wouldn’t be a conversation. I go back to 

Mr. Comey’s testimony to the Senate—was about resignations. And 

Mr. Schumer asked, ‘‘Was one of those people that might have resigned the Director?’’ And he said, ‘‘I believe so. You would have 

to ask him, but I believe so.’’

So I am not asking you about a conversation with Mr. Comey, 

I am asking you, was he correct? Or better yet, just were you that 

person? 

Mr. MUELLER. I was that person to whom he refers, yes. 

Mr. COHEN. And were you considering resigning? You don’t have 

to relay the conversation, this is just your own mind——

Mr. MUELLER. Understand why I cannot say that I do not dispute what Mr. Comey says, because Mr. Comey says ask Mr. 

Mueller. I will tell you that I don’t believe that it is appropriate 

of me to get into conversations that I have had with principals on 

that issue. 

Mr. COHEN. And I don’t want a conversation. I want what is in 

your psyche. Did you consider it yourself? That is not a conversation, that is a state of mind. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, to the extent that I followed through on the 

state of mind, then it is a conversation. Again, I would resist getting into that conversation. 

Mr. COHEN. My time is almost up. If I could have 30 more seconds, Mr. Chairman? And I would just like to ask this. 

You made a comment about some task forces doing a great job 

in reducing crime in New York and Los Angeles. I am from Memphis. We have a serious crime problem there. Is there any plan to 

have any task forces there, street task forces, or additional personnel to help us with our crime problem? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am quite confident we have at least one, if not 

more, safe streets task forces in Tennessee, in particularly in Memphis. And I will get back to you on that. 

Mr. COHEN. No matter how many it is, I want one more. [Laughter.] 

47

And I want to compliment you on your Tennessee—whatever it 

was called—that got some public officials. That was good work that 

you all did. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. But if we go along with your request, 

I have a number of seats up here that would probably be making 

the same request. Always happy to accommodate with more resources. 

Mr. COHEN. Memphis is a great city that needs help. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Franks is now recognized for the usual 

amount of time. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Director Mueller, for being here. I know that a 

lot of people have good ideas about how things should be done, but 

the guy that has to turn these good ideas into reality has always 

got the biggest challenge. And I appreciate you so much for kind 

of standing there between the malevolent and the innocent, as you 

do. And I know it is a tremendous responsibility. 

Director Mueller, I have said many times I think that the 

jihadist ideology that we face is the most dangerous ideology that 

we have dealt with in the Nation’s is history. And I know that half 

the problem is knowing where the dangers are coming from. 

If we knew where every terrorist exactly was today, we could 

probably solve this problem in a month. But knowing where they 

are is critical, and I understand that that is one of your biggest 

challenges. 

That said, I have also believed that the President has the constitutional authority to—you know, we have given him the job to 

hunt down, ferret out, and kill terrorists. And as Commander in 

Chief under the Constitution, he has that authority as well. 

It occurs to me, if he has the authority to hunt down, ferret out, 

and kill terrorists, that he also has the authority to listen to them 

on the telephone before he proceeds. 

And I know there has been an incredible amount of discussion 

going around the terrorist surveillance program. But given the fact 

that it is now under FISA, can you tell us, is it working? Is it something that is an effective tool, notwithstanding the fact that probably every terrorist in the galaxy knows about the conversations 

that we have now? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I think that probably my answer would have 

to come in some form of classified setting. 

But generally I can say that the leads we have received from an 

NSA program have been helpful in the war on terror, yes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, the Administration has recently submitted 

proposals to reform FISA. And do you think that those reforms are 

necessary and that they will help you do your job? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. And it would help not just the FBI, but operating together with NSA, the CIA, the DIA, all of whom, all of us 

share the same responsibility to protect the homeland. And what 

is proposed in the revision of the FISA statute would help all of us. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, without touching on anything that could be of 

a disadvantage to the country, what do you consider your greatest 

concern, the greatest gap, that you have in terms of being able to 

48

assess and predict or prevent the terrorist challenge that we face 

in the homeland itself? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think we have made substantial strides since 

September 11 in terms of breaking down the walls between the 

various entities in the intelligence community. 

We do a far better job, not only within the United States, but 

ourselves as an intelligence community—and I consider us an intelligence community—working together with our counterparts overseas. 

The gaps come, I believe, in—and it is gaps that, I believe, that 

my counterparts at the CIA or ODNI would also focus upon. And 

that is the threats of terrorists having the opportunity to train, to 

plan, to coordinate in a sanctuary around the world, whether it be 

in Waziristan or the Horn of Africa or elsewhere. And we cannot 

let that happen. 

Secondly, it is important to understand that al-Qaida is intent on 

attacking in the United States and finding ways to infiltrate individuals in the United States, often through countries that do not 

have the same stringent controls that we have at the borders. 

And those are the biggest concerns, I think, to the intelligence 

community as a whole, in terms of the threat that we face from alQaida from outside. 

Internally, I think we have done a very good job in building up 

our Joint Terrorism Task Forces and enlisting the cooperation and 

input and assistance and expertise of State and local law enforcement. 

We have to remain vigilant. We have to remain on guard. And 

as we get further away from September 11, my greatest concern is 

that we become complacent and that we do not pick up on that 

which would alert us to the possibility of a group in the United 

States who are going to undertake an attack. 

And lastly, I would say, as I have iterated before, that advances 

in communications, the advances in technology, are putting us behind the curve in our ability to identify and to intercept communications on those that would do us harm. 

And so the statutory changes are necessary, but also the funding 

to keep us on the cutting edge of technology so that we can intercept individuals’ communications who wish to do us harm requires 

both—not just both, but the Administration, Congress, as well as 

the various telecommunication carriers working together to try to 

fill that gap. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. The light is red. 

Mr. CONYERS. You are more than welcome. 

The Chair is pleased to welcome a recent addition to the Committee, Ms. Betty Sutton of Ohio. 

Ms. SUTTON. I thank the Chairman. 

Director Mueller, thank you for being here to shed some light on 

the Bureau’s operations. There are so many topics, and I share my 

colleagues’ wishes that you return often so we can delve into a lot 

of them deeper. 

At this moment, I would just like to talk to you a little bit about 

something we haven’t discussed: the whistleblower protections. 

We have had some problems in the Bureau and actually they reflect upon some of the facets, the consequences that Mr. Delahunt, 

49

the distinguished gentleman, points out, and it emphasizes the importance that we have proper whistleblower protection, not just because governmental employees need to have that safeguard, but it 

is also a matter of ensuing that our national security and the integrity of the agency is intact. 

I know that you have given personal assurances in the past that 

you were going to take action to ensure that whistleblowers would 

be protected, but we know that there has been a culture within the 

FBI through some years where that just hasn’t been the case. 

So I would like to, just for a moment, go through a couple of 

those instances, and then you can share with me how things have 

changed so that their plight would have changed and outcomes 

would be different. 

In 2001, Coleen Rowley claims that she was blocked at every 

turn from pursuing her concerns about 9/11 co-conspirator 

Moussaoui. In a statement you issued in response to that case, you 

stated that there is no room for the types of problems and attitudes 

that could inhibit our efforts. 

In 2002—you are familiar with John Roberts’ case. He blew the 

whistle on several senior FBI officials, all of whom were subsequently promoted, and some of whom received bonuses. 

And of course, the Inspector General subsequently issued a report endorsing John Roberts’ findings of wrongdoing within the 

agency and concluded that the FBI suffered, and still suffers from 

a strong perception that a double standard exists within the FBI 

with regard to the treatment of senior officials versus lower-level 

employees. And of course, he was humiliated because of coming forward with evidence of wrongdoing. 

And we are all familiar with Sibel Edmonds, a former translator 

with the FBI, who did work for the counterterrorism program, who 

was fired after reporting serious problems in the Bureau’s translation services department. And of course, when she sought recourse, she was completely blocked, after the Bureau invoked the 

State secrets privilege. 

So my question to you is, what have you done, specifically, to 

make sure that moving forward—not redress in those cases, but 

moving forward—that these things shall not happen and the 

chilling effect that this culture produces and the consequences beyond that are no longer being felt? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, initially, I had an outside panel come in and 

look at how we were handling OPR, how we were handling our response to incidents of misconduct, including those that would be set 

out by whistleblowers. And we have changed our procedures. 

Every year, at least every year, I sent out statements about, ‘‘I 

will not put up with retaliation for persons who bring to our attention that which should be brought to our attention.’’

Whenever that occurs, it is immediately referred to the Inspector 

General so the Inspector General can do an independent investigation. And I have followed the recommendations of the Inspector 

General as to what steps should be taken when retaliation has 

been found, all the way up to the SES level. 

So I believe, both through statements as well as actions, the message has gone out that we will not put up with retaliation for those 

50

who bring to our attention those matters that should be brought 

to our attention. 

Ms. SUTTON. Well, could you be more specific in the changes that 

have been implemented? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can get back to you on specifically, but I think 

the biggest change is the ability and putting in place the mechanisms to ensure an independent investigation of allegations of retaliation for whistle-blower activities, and our willingness to follow 

up immediately with the results of the independent investigation 

which has been done by the Inspector General. 

Ms. SUTTON. Okay, Director. But let us say that that fails and 

we have a situation like Sibel Edmonds. How does she deal with 

the invocation of the State secrets privilege? How does she have 

any recourse? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I can’t get into the rationale behind asserting the State secrets privilege in that particular case. It is a matter 

that was sealed by the court. 

But in that case as well, the case was investigated independently, and actions that were necessary to be taken as a result of 

that investigation, as to individuals in the FBI, have been taken. 

Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, if I just may—but with respect to 

somebody facing the same situation, they would face the same outcome. Is that correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. It depends on the circumstances of the case. 

Ms. SUTTON. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Before I recognize Judge Gohmert, could you yield 

just for one very brief comment from Bill Delahunt? Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Is that going to be part of my time, or are we just 

yielding——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I hope so, Mr. Gohmert. [Laughter.] 

I appreciate your yielding. 

Just a quick question, Director. I would direct your attention to 

the FBI presence, early on, at the base in Guantanamo. There were 

a number of reports indicating that the Bureau expressed its concerns about interrogation methods. 

Can you just tell us when those concerns were expressed to the 

appropriate agencies? 

Mr. MUELLER. It would depend on particular concerns. In the 

wake of what occurred in Iraq, we undertook a review of those concerns. And in the months subsequent to that, Abu Ghraib, we had 

sent to the military what information we had with regard to specific concerns and specific incidents, as opposed to generalized concerns as to the type of interrogation techniques that were being 

used, and those techniques had changed over a period of time. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Judge Gohmert? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, for the record, I 

guess I am the other other prosecutor from 30 years ago. 

But anyway—and I do want to applaud the tone of this hearing. 

Director Mueller, I don’t know if you have seen some of the hearings from other administrative officials, but sometimes voices have 

been raised, yelling has occurred, accusations flying. 

51

And I can’t help but wonder if maybe people had heard about 

that story of the guy calling the FBI office, wanting—demanded to 

talk to somebody in authority, getting them, telling them his name, 

just blowing hard about how—all the things evil and wrong with 

the FBI and then finishing by saying, ‘‘and I demand to know, do 

you have a file on me?’’

And they responded, ‘‘Well, we sure do now.’’ [Laughter.] 

So I don’t know if that is why the tone is down like it is. [Laughter.] 

But in any event, seriously, I do believe this probably is the most 

difficult time in our Nation’s history, since the War of 1812, to protect our homeland. And you have been serving during that time. 

And I know you care every bit as deeply about the safety and future of our country as I do. I know that. And I know people here 

all have that concern. It doesn’t mean we can’t have disagreements 

on how we go about securing that safety. 

Many of us fought and pushed to make sure that the Justice Department had the tools they needed in the PATRIOT Act. I wanted 

sunsets on things to be sure we had accountability in future Administrations, and we got some, to some extent. 

But I would like to go back to something that, apparently, you 

had wanted to address early on, and brought up, and that is—back, 

right after the NSL disclosure and the abuses by the Inspector 

General’s report, there was a press conference in which I understood you to say, I should have made sure that the people in the 

field working on these NSLs had the experience and training they 

needed not to abuse the process. 

And frankly, I agree with that. And I do believe that the 5-year 

up-or-out policy has been one of the things that has been an impediment to having that experience in training, where we have numerous experienced, well-trained people. 

And I applaud your efforts. I love when people have innovative 

ideas about how to proceed with management, but giving incentives to rise to the top, as you had indicated, giving individuals a 

chance to move to the top or seeking to move up the career ladder, 

I applaud that, except this isn’t the Army. And I know you know 

that. 

But it takes time to develop those relationships, to allow a joint 

task force to work between the law enforcement. 

I have seen it, for the last 30 years, very personally. It takes 

time to develop respect and trust and credibility and a good working relationship, not only with task forces, with confidential informants. And actually, it helps to have years of experience. 

When I first got out of law school and became a prosecutor, I 

would not have agreed to this, but I see, in hindsight, I needed that 

D.A. looking over my shoulder because I was aggressive; I was 

competitive. And it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 

justice is the end result. 

And I am curious. Do you know how many experienced FBI 

agents have chosen not to move up after 5 years, but to move out 

or down? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know that. I would have to get you the 

specific figures. 

52

And let me tell you, if I might respond, that it was one of the 

more difficult decisions I had to make, because you had to balance 

the scales. I think the program is beneficial to the institution as 

a whole, in terms——

Mr. GOHMERT. And that goes without saying. I know you 

wouldn’t have put it in place if you didn’t. 

Mr. MUELLER. And I absolutely acknowledge we have lost, 

through retirement, some very, very experienced agents——

Mr. GOHMERT. Who wouldn’t have retired otherwise? 

Mr. MUELLER. Who would not have retired otherwise. And we 

have had—I understood this was going to be a consequence. We 

also have had agents step down who are very good supervisors, and 

my hope and expectation is those that are taking their place are 

very experienced as well, and build up that experience during the 

time. 

And we have seen the results of increased movement through the 

upper ranks, and I have had a number of ASACs, Assistant Special 

Agents in Charge, come up to me and say, ‘‘I wouldn’t have moved 

absent this policy. I hated it. I thought it would never go into effect 

but now I am ASAC and I actually have benefited from it.’’

Let me say one other thing, if I could, in regard to these individuals who have been supervisors, who have been and are the backbone of the Bureau. I am supportive of pension retention, additional funds to provide pension retention. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay, well, the pension retention idea goes beyond my scope. I am concerned about the NSLs and those kind of 

things, and we can get into that later. But my time is so short. 

Mr. Delahunt had mentioned earlier that, you know, it is not just 

the judiciary that protects us. With my background, I thought that 

would. I thought judiciary protection was adequate. 

And then you start to seeing the abuses J. Edgar Hoover had, 

and you start realizing there is some information that is gleaned 

never intended to be introduced in court. And when you see that, 

you realize judicial protection is not enough. We do need all the 

checks and balances, including oversight from the Congress. 

And so I appreciate your willingness to work with us in the future, but I also hope it will be done and that you will look into efforts and even intimidation when oversight has been attempted by 

people, like when Mike Rogers wanted to talk with somebody—

former FBI agent from Michigan wanted to talk with somebody 

from the FBI. 

He asked to talk to a supervisor, came back to his office for the 

appointment, and found that his old office had been run out, and 

they said, well, they were having to do a sweep, they said, before 

you could talk. 

And he knew that there was nothing confidential that would be 

discussed, and to try to come into his own office was not allowed. 

He said it looked like, from the reflection when he tried to open his 

own office, that his contents of his office were being videotaped, but 

he couldn’t be certain. And he knew, as a former FBI agent, he 

hadn’t seen that before. 

But anyway—and then also, after—and I am sure the Chairman——

53

Mr. MUELLER. Congressman, can I respond to that, sir? Just to 

say that I will look into that incident, but we don’t do that type 

of thing. I will look into what you are alluding to, but we do not. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I appreciate your saying that, but I really don’t 

think Mike Rogers lied to me, and so I would not say he lied about 

that. 

But then also, right after—some people felt like the raid on William Jefferson’s office and people that were concerned about that 

were defending William Jefferson. They weren’t. 

There was a concern here in this body that there was an intimidation moving forward and that, by raiding his office, it wasn’t 

about William Jefferson because, as I understand, those documents 

may have already been secured by other means but, nonetheless, 

that it—and this may not have been your sense at all, but from 

this side, it appeared that there was a lot of intimidation going on. 

And then when Dennis Hastert proposed objections or posed objections, then it was leaked by someone in Justice that he was 

under investigation, and that is why he was concerned. And then 

he demanded to know, ‘‘Am I really a target?’’ And the official answer was, ‘‘No, you are not,’’ and then the next day it was in the 

national press that two people had acknowledged, yes, they said 

that as the official answer, but it really wasn’t. 

And then—I never heard this. Somebody told me—one of the 

other Members of Congress, so I don’t know, and I wanted to ask 

you directly—that that same week with all this back and forth 

going on and the concerns about the power struggles between the 

branches, that you had made a statement that you may need to 

add 400 people to investigate corruption in Washington, which, if 

it were said, would actually sound like more intimidation. 

And I don’t know. I never heard it, couldn’t find that it was written. Did you ever say anything like that? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, sir, I did not. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. MUELLER. And I will tell you that the search of Congress 

was done out of a great deal of effort, a great deal of reflection at 

the Department of Justice, and in the White House. It certainly 

was no way to intimidate. 

It was done in the belief that, as part of an ongoing investigation, records were necessary to that investigation and I can assure 

you that the last thing on anybody’s mind was intending to intimidate Congress. It was just to do our job as we saw in pursuing that 

investigation. 

Mr. GOHMERT. No, I am just saying that was an appearance, and 

do you know whether or not——

Mr. CONYERS. The gentleman’s time is almost over. 

Mr. GOHMERT. This will be my final question. 

Do you know whether or not copies of those documents had already been secured and were secured, perhaps, by the Ethics Committee here? 

Mr. MUELLER. We did not believe that to be the case. 

Mr. GOHMERT. You do not believe, but you do not——

Mr. MUELLER. Do not believe that to be the case. 

Mr. GOHMERT [continuing]. Know for sure? 

54

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to go look, but I do not believe that 

to be the case at all. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right, thank you. 

And I do appreciate the Chairman’s flexibility. 

And, Mr. Mueller, I do thank you for coming up here and visiting 

with you. I think this helps us to have a better relationship. Thank 

you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes yet another prosecutor, the 

gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Artur Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Chairman Conyers. 

Mr. Mueller, I didn’t know that my friend from Texas was going 

to be the first witness to beat you up today. That is news to those 

of us on this side. 

Let me, in the time that I have, go back to something that we 

have obviously talked about a lot today, and it is the circumstances 

around the March 10 visit from the Attorney General to thenWhite House counsel Gonzales’ office to Mr. Ashcroft, then the Attorney General. 

And I will preface it by saying that I know you feel that we have 

plowed over this ground a lot today. We are doing it for an obvious 

reason. There have been serious questions raised about whether 

the current Attorney General was candid and truthful in his testimony at the United States Senate. And I know that you, if you had 

an opinion of that, would not venture it to us. 

But it is important and we have some obligation to try to elucidate facts around as much as we can. So in that spirit, let me try 

to fill in some of gaps that some of my colleagues may have left 

today. 

What did you understand John Ashcroft’s condition to be on 

March 10, 2004? 

Mr. MUELLER. He had gone through a difficult operation and was 

being closely monitored in the hospital. 

Mr. DAVIS. Had you been in touch with him in the interim between March 10 and his operation? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. The operation preceding March 10? 

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, that is right. That is right. 

Mr. MUELLER. No, I had not. I had not. 

Mr. DAVIS. Did you understand him to be in a condition to receive visitors on these serious matters? 

Mr. MUELLER. I did not, no. 

Mr. DAVIS. Had you felt anything was pressing enough for you 

to get in touch with him during that timeframe? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. DAVIS. Were you surprised when you received the phone call 

from Mr. Comey indicating that there was going to be this visit to 

Mr. Ashcroft by Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Card? 

Mr. MUELLER. It was out of the ordinary. 

Mr. DAVIS. And was one of the reasons it was out of the ordinary 

because you didn’t understand Mr. Ashcroft to be in a condition to 

receive visitors on serious matters? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. It was a request from Mr. Comey that was out 

of the ordinary. 

Mr. DAVIS. What was out of the ordinary? 

55

Mr. MUELLER. To be requested to come to the hospital at that 

particular time, early in the evening. 

Mr. DAVIS. And I think you have testified, or there has been testimony from Mr. Comey, that he asked you to have a conversation 

with FBI agents and to instruct them not to remove him from the 

room. Is that essentially accurate testimony on Mr. Comey’s part? 

Mr. MUELLER. I have no dispute with Mr. Comey as in that regard. My own recollection is somewhat uninformed. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, that certainly strikes me as unusual. You are 

the FBI Director. A senior official calls you and says, ‘‘Make sure 

that I am not evicted from the room,’’ and I am sure that must 

have struck you as being an unusual request, didn’t it? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Did you take notes and memorialize your conversation with Mr. Comey, at that point? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, at that point, I did not. 

Mr. DAVIS. At some point, did you memorialize your conversations regarding this visit with Mr. Comey? 

Mr. MUELLER. I may have, yes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Do you still have those notes? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIS. And are they available to the Committee if the Committee was to ask for them? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to get back to you on that. 

Mr. DAVIS. Can you think of a reason or a privilege that would 

prevent the Committee from receiving these notes? 

Mr. MUELLER. Deliberative, but I would have to get back to you 

on that. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, but as we sit here, can you think of any privilege that would preclude the Committee? 

Mr. MUELLER. Deliberative. Deliberative. 

Mr. DAVIS. Okay. That is your answer. 

Let me move forward. I think you have indicated that you did 

not encounter Mr. Gonzales or Mr. Card at the hospital. Is that 

right? 

Mr. MUELLER. Correct. 

Mr. DAVIS. But you did speak with Mr. Ashcroft after the conversation that he had with Mr. Card and Mr. Gonzales. Is that 

right? 

Mr. MUELLER. I did. 

Mr. DAVIS. Did you make any notes regarding your conversation 

with Mr. Ashcroft? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIS. And do you still have those notes in your possession? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Can you think of any reason why those notes should 

not be disclosed to the Committee? 

Mr. MUELLER. The same response that I gave before in response 

to your earlier question, deliberative. 

Mr. DAVIS. Now—this is an important question—tell me why you 

decided to make notes of your conversation with Mr. Ashcroft? 

Mr. MUELLER. It was out of the ordinary. 

Mr. DAVIS. What was out of the ordinary, Mr. Mueller? 

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Mr. MUELLER. Being asked to go to the hospital and be present 

at that time. 

Mr. DAVIS. Did you share those notes with anyone in the Administration? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. DAVIS. Who have you shared them with prior to today? 

Mr. MUELLER. My counsel. 

Mr. DAVIS. Counsel——

Mr. MUELLER. Office of General Counsel. 

Mr. DAVIS. Okay. Is that the only individual, Office of General 

Counsel? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. Well, there may have been persons in my immediate staff, but——

Mr. DAVIS. Have you made any other notes or memorandum regarding the March 10 visit that you have characterized as unusual? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. DAVIS. Do you know if any notes or memorandum were made 

regarding the visit itself? I understand you didn’t make them as 

you weren’t there, but regarding the visit by Mr. Card and Mr. 

Gonzales to Mr. Ashcroft, do you know if there was any notetaker 

present. 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know. 

Mr. DAVIS. I am sorry. Did you finish your answer? I am sorry. 

Mr. MUELLER. I was going to anticipate your next question is I 

have not seen any such notes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Okay, and——

Mr. CONYERS. I hate to tell the gentleman this, but with two 

other Members and the vote on, we are now really——

Mr. DAVIS. If you would just indulge me 10 seconds, Mr. Chairman, I would ask the Committee to take note of Mr. Mueller’s very 

candid statement to us that he does have notes regarding this very 

important conversation, and I would ask the Senate to certainly be 

aware of it. 

And I would certainly ask this Committee and our colleagues in 

the Senate to make a formal inquiry to obtain those thanks 

Thank you for being candid, Mr. Mueller. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Debbie 

Wasserman Schultz. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, I am going to change the subject and ask some 

questions related to the Internet and the ICAC task forces. 

As you know, the Internet has facilitated an explosion of child 

exploitation. And Department of Justice officials testified before the 

Energy and Commerce Committee in the last Congress that there 

are hundreds of thousands of individuals trafficking in child pornography in the United States. 

Everyone that I have talked to—from Mark Lunsford in Florida 

who is Jessica Lunsford’s father, Marc Klaas, Polly Klaas’s father 

in California and a number of other parents who have formed the 

Surviving Parents Coalition, to the National Coalition to Protect 

Children—everyone tells me that this problem is only getting worse 

and not better. 

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And let me be clear. These are images and video of children 

being sexually abused, including depictions of rape and sexual penetration. These are crime scene photos. 

A 2005 study by the Department of Justice determined that 83 

percent of child pornography possessors have images as young as 

6, while another 19 percent of possessors had images of infants and 

toddlers. 

Flint Waters, who is the director of the Wyoming Internet 

Crimes Against Children task force, ICAC, and who is widely recognized as the Nation’s top investigator, recently examined one of 

15 networks where peer-to-peer file sharing exchanges occur. 

By extrapolating local cases nationwide, he estimates conservatively that there are 485,000 known individuals—485,000 known 

individuals—engaging in trafficking child pornography in the 

United States. That is half a million people right here in the U.S. 

trading these criminal imagines online and spreading them around 

the world. 

The Wyoming ICAC learned that there have been more than 1.2 

million unique Internet protocol addresses that have engaged in 

child pornography tracking since 2004—1.2 million I.P. addresses 

that we know for a fact are trading in criminal child pornography. 

Do you know, Director Mueller, what percentage of these cases 

are presently being investigated by the FBI or other branches of 

Federal law enforcement? I will, in the interest of time, answer it 

for you, because I know. It is 2 percent—2 percent. 

Now, that figure alone is appalling, but when you consider one 

more statistic that is all the more chilling, we know that 30 percent 

of the offenders identified by the ICAC databases are typically associated with local victims. These are children who are being violated from within their daily circle of trust. 

That would mean that there are 145,000 offenders exploiting 

children in their local areas who could be arrested by local law enforcement right now, if law enforcement established different priorities, or asked for the funds that they needed to eradicate this 

problem. 

Director Mueller, do you know how many FBI agents are dedicated to white-collar crime? I will answer that one for you, too: 

2,342 agents—2,342 agents. 

And do you know how many agents are dedicated to child exploitation? Two hundred and forty-two—242—for child exploitation; 

2,342 for white-collar crime. 

In the interest of time, I will speed my testimony. But I am sponsoring legislation which will also be sponsored by Senator Biden, 

that will authorize $1 billion that would build the largest law enforcement effort dedicated to the protection of children. 

I am really not sure—and what I would like you to respond to—

is why the FBI has not made child exploitation a bigger priority, 

and why have you not asked for more help from this Congress? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can tell you that child exploitation is a substantial priority. Our Innocent Images undertaking has grown over the 

years, even though we have had other priorities such as 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence. 

To the extend that I can obtain additional resources—and we 

have put in, over the years, for additional resources to the extent 

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that I can obtain additional resources to address child pornography 

and support the ICACs, I, of course, would be willing to do so. 

I do believe the ICACs around the country are—the mechanism 

that leverages our capability in working with State and local law 

enforcement to address this problem. You can give us a tremendous 

number of resources, but they would be inadequate to address this 

problem alone. 

And, again, I share your concern. I share your desire to utilize 

everything we have at the Federal level to address this problem. 

Again, it is a question of trying to maintain those resources we 

have and augment them when there are other competing priorities. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. But I just want to share with you that 

I have a deep concern about the FBI and the Department of Justice’s priorities when you have 2,342 white-collar criminal investigators, and only 242 investigators for child exploitation. 

And I would hope that the FBI and that you would commit to 

working with me and Senator Biden and the other Members that 

are deeply concerned about reordering the priorities of the Department of Justice and the FBI, to make sure we can go after the people who are really harming the most vulnerable population—and 

that is our children. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would be happy to work with you. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes our last Member to ask questions, the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Keith Ellison. 

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Director, thanks for being here today. 

In the past several weeks, I have been in a lot of events for members of the Muslim and Arab community. And there have been several of them where I have seen people from the FBI who were 

there who spoke, who interacted with the community. I thought 

that was a good thing. I want to commend you and encourage you 

to continue to do that. 

Could you talk about other things that the FBI is doing right 

now to try to build better relationships within those communities 

at this time? 

Mr. MUELLER. As you have pointed out, we have substantial outreach in every one of our 56 field offices. And Special Agents in 

Charge since September 11 have been directed to attend mosques, 

attend dinners, attend congregations of Muslim-Americans, ArabAmericans, Sikh-Americans in order to share basically what we do 

and our concern not only about the contributions of that community to protect the United States against another attack, but addressing hate crimes which also are a substantial concern in the 

wake of September 11. 

And we take any allegations of a hate crime against a Muslim 

as extremely serious in undercutting the democracy in which we 

live. 

I meet periodically with the national leaders of the Muslim communities. We have established a mechanism whereby when we do 

make an arrest, and it does happen to be Muslims, that we have 

a dialogue immediately so that there is an understanding of what 

supports that arrest, and allowing leaders of the Muslim community to explain to the flock what we are doing. 

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Part of our outreach is also through citizens’ academies in which 

we will have Muslim leaders participate in citizens’ academies 

which are several, continuous weeks of, I would say, training by 

the FBI as to what we do and how we do it, the constraints under 

which we do it. 

And I will say almost to a one that the persons who go through 

the citizens’ academies come out with a much better understanding 

about what we do, how we do it, and our concerns about the civil 

rights of all populations in the United States. Those are just a few 

of the areas in which we operate. 

I will tell you that the participation in the Muslim community, 

in terms of trying to prevent another terrorist attack, from September 11, has been terrific. 

Mr. ELLISON. Do you agree, then, that the American-Muslim 

community stands four-square with the American people in working to prevent any kind of further extremist violence? 

Mr. MUELLER. Absolutely. And the worst thing for the Muslim 

community would be another attack such as September 11. And I 

think members and leaders of the Muslim community recognize 

that. 

Mr. ELLISON. Do you think they are doing their good part? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do, but there is always more to be done in all 

communities. The need to be vigilant to self-radicalization, is important. And when you see persons or individuals, in whatever 

community, whom you think present a concern, it is important that 

one take action. 

I am always reminded of the—on the airline flying from Paris to 

Florida, the shoe-bomber. And it was an alert flight attendant who 

fixed on the fact that there was something unusual when he was 

lighting a match, and saved the lives of hundreds of people. 

Now, that did not happen to be a Muslim flight attendant but, 

nonetheless, we have had that same type of——

Mr. ELLISON. Forgive me for my interruption. It is just the time 

that makes me have to do that. 

There were recently some arrests in Detroit—Detroit area, Dearborn—that may well have been justified. I don’t have any view on 

that. But what the residual impact was was that some charities 

were notified by the banks that they were working with that their 

relationship was going to be terminated. 

Are you at all concerned about how third parties out in the communities, such as banks and others, might react when it has gotten 

into the public arena that there has been some law enforcement activity in a certain community? 

Do you understand what I am getting at? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I am concerned. But, on the other hand, we 

have our job to do. When we have the evidence and we have the 

imperative to move ahead, we have to. There will be residual effects. I am not saying there will not be. And that is of some concern——

Mr. ELLISON. Can the FBI do anything to help mitigate those residual effects? I mean, is that something that you regard as something that is important in terms of continuing to pursue your program to build better, stronger relationships? 

60

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. And the mitigation goes to what I was saying 

before in terms of developing relationships and understanding of 

how the FBI operates—when we do searches, it is at the behest of 

a judge who has approved a search warrant—so there is greater 

understanding of the parameters in which we operate, as well as 

our mission and how we undertake it. 

Mr. ELLISON. Do you ever send communications to banks or any 

groups like that to say that, ‘‘Look, we haven’t found anything; 

these people are—you might not want to take adverse action 

against them because our investigation has not turned up anything 

against them’’? 

Mr. MUELLER. Generally, we cannot and do not do that, given 

the confidentiality of our investigations. But to the extent that we 

can mitigate such adverse consequences within the constraints of 

what we can do investigatively, we would try to do it. Much of it 

is building up the relationships and the rapport. 

Mr. ELLISON. Is there anything you could do to remove that cloud 

of suspicion that would inevitably hang over a group where there 

may have been some investigative action that has found not be 

fruitful? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, ultimately, if we take an action, generally 

there is an indictment or some other action. It may be a forfeiture 

action like in which the courts address it. And the facts that triggered the enforcement action come through and become transparent in the judicial process. 

Mr. ELLISON. Yes, but sometimes there is no further action. 

There might be just a couple of guys in black suits and ties that 

knock on the door. That causes a certain amount of fear and suspicion. Or maybe there are some search warrants served, but then 

there is no further action after that. The community continues to 

wonder what is up with those guys? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, there is—and, again, it is usually up to the 

U.S. attorney. There is the capability of indicating to a defense attorney that the client is no longer either a target or subject of an 

investigation, and that goes generally to—that kind of letter goes 

to a defense attorney. 

Mr. CONYERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

It has been a long day, Director Mueller, but it has been a very 

fruitful day. 

We will keep the record open for 5 legislative days for questions 

to go to you and for Members to add additional material. 

And we think that this first hearing with the head of the FBI 

is one that will get us together more frequently in the future. We 

thank you for your patience and cooperation with the Committee. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CONYERS. And, with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BETTY SUTTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO, AND MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this hearing. And thank 

you, Director Mueller, for being here today. 

This opportunity to examine the operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

is a welcome one. As the nation’s premiere domestic law enforcement, counter-espionage and counter-terrorism agency, the FBI stands at the forefront of some of the 

most critical issues facing the country. 

The job that the agency does, and the way it carries out that job, are questions 

of vital importance to all Americans. 

Director Mueller, as you mention in your prepared testimony, the September 11th 

terrorist attacks brought about fundamental changes in our country, both in our individual attitudes and in refocusing the priorities of the federal government. 

The questions before us today are how has that change been managed, and how 

do we ensure that we strike the right balance between the demands of this new 

world of security challenges and our long-standing commitment to maintaining the 

protections guaranteed to all Americans in our Constitution. 

It is clear to me from the Department of Justice Inspector General’s report in 

March of this year that the correct balance was not struck in the FBI’s use of National Security Letters (NSL)—and I would like to thank you, Director Mueller, for 

the acknowledgement of that in your prepared testimony. 

Many officials who come to testify before our Congressional committees lack the 

candor and the willingness to admit things under their jurisdiction need a second 

look and a better system of accountability. 

I hope your agency implements improvements in the NSL program so that it 

meets the standards of accountability and integrity that the American people deserve from their government. The first system of NSLs was fatally flawed. 

I know that several of my colleagues will want to discuss the NSL issue with you 

today. There are two other things under the jurisdiction of the FBI that are also 

cause for grave concern, which I would like to call to the committee’s attention 

today. 

First, I understand that the demands on your agency are greater than they were 

before, but I would ask that you take a hard look at how you are formulating your 

agency’s priorities—especially in the priority given to assistance for state and local 

law enforcement. 

The Administration, in my opinion, has treated the distribution of resources in the 

area of domestic law enforcement as a zero-sum game. 

While the emphasis given to counterterrorism is good, important and vital, this 

does not mean that the FBI’s traditional responsibilities have gone away. 

I don’t pretend to know the solution to this problem of balancing priorities, but 

it is clear that many of our neighborhoods have become less safe in recent years. 

Murders are up 3.4% nationwide—the largest increase since 1998. The lack of 

funding, and decrease in FBI violent crime investigations, is having a palpable effect 

on our communities. 

There are never enough resources to achieve everything we would like, but when 

state and local law enforcement agencies have been stretched so thin that many 

Americans no longer feel safe walking in their own neighborhoods, it’s time to reconsider our priorities. 

Second, your submitted testimony mentions that you have tripled the number of 

linguists and acknowledges that the need for experts who can help our government 

in fighting terrorism is especially critical. 

Given that, I remain deeply concerned about your agency’s efforts to protect those 

seeking to ensure the integrity of your agency’s operations. 

I was a strong supporter of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 

2007, which passed in the House earlier this year. 

I supported it because cases like Sibel Edmonds’s make it clear that the Whistleblower Protection Act is falling short of its purpose. I am not only concerned that 

government employees are not being protected, I am concerned that their dismissals 

came at the expense of our national security. 

I know you have spoken out strongly on this subject, and that you made personal 

assurances that you would not tolerate retaliation against whistleblowers within 

your agency. But I would encourage you to be vigilant in examining the culture 

within the FBI to ensure these abuses will not be tolerated. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Director Mueller, for being here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

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POST-HEARING QUESTIONS POSED BY THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., AND THE

HONORABLE LUIS V. GUITERREZ TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


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LETTER FROM RICHARD C. POWERS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 

DATED NOVEMBER 13, 2007

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LETTER FROM RICHARD C. POWERS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 

DATED DECEMBER 19, 2007

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