J-S14012-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3072 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 24, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 23, 2019

James Elijah Dickson appeals, pro se, from his judgment of sentence, 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after he was 

found guilty of three counts of first-degree murder,1two counts of attempted 

murder,2two counts of aggravated assault on a police officer,3two counts of 

aggravated assault,4four counts of simple assault,5two counts of recklessly 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 901.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(6).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a).

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.
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endangering another person (REAP),6 and one count each of possessing a 

firearm (prohibited)

7 and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC).8

 Dickson 

was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions.9 

After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court aptly summarized the facts underlying the instant case 

as follows:

During the evening of April 16, 2016, [Dickson] was hanging out 

at the home of his cousin, Alphonso Liverpool. Also at the home 

were Ziyon Laboy, Levi Almonte, Joel Almonte, Edwin Laboy, and 

Christine Chromiak. At some point, the group decided to walk 

over to [Dickson’s] home at 637 East Westmoreland Street in 

Philadelphia. Along the way, they ran into Kenny Stowe. 

[Dickson] told Liverpool that he did not want Stowe to come over, 

and threatened that if Stowe did, he would kill Stowe and 

Liverpool. However, Stowe remained persistent about going to 

[Dickson’s] home with the group, so [Dickson] eventually relented 

and allowed Stowe to come over. 

Once at the home, the group ate, drank alcohol, and smoked 

marijuana and PCP. Stowe began to argue with [Dickson], so 

[Dickson] ejected Stowe from his home; however, [Dickson]

allowed Stowe to return approximately twenty minutes later. 

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6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.

8 18 Pa.C.S § 907.

9 The court also sentenced Dickson to concurrent terms of 20-40 years in 

prison for attempted murder of one victim, 10-20 years’ imprisonment for 

attempted murder of another victim, two terms of 4-8 years in prison for the 

aggravated assault of two police officers, 5-10 years in prison for the 

possession of a firearm by a prohibited person charge, and 11⁄2-3 years’ 

imprisonment for the PIC charge. Due to merger, Dickson was not sentenced 

on the aggravated assault, simple assault, or REAP convictions.
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Once Stowe returned, he again argued with [Dickson], prompting 

[Dickson] to eject Stowe from his home a second time; however, 

like before, [Dickson] allowed Stowe to eventually reenter the 

home. 

At some point, a transgender individual came over, and [Dickson]

went upstairs with the individual. After the individual left, Stowe 

told [Dickson] to “stop messing with boys,” and called [Dickson]

a faggot. [Dickson] then told Liverpool to get Stowe out of his 

home, or he would kill them both. At the time, [Dickson] had a 

shotgun in his hand and proceeded to point it in Liverpool’s 

direction and pull the trigger; however, it was not loaded. 

[Dickson] then asked Liverpool and Joel Almonte to come upstairs 

with him, and there, Almonte admitted to unloading the shotgun 

earlier that evening because he felt unsafe in the home with the 

loaded gun. Almonte then went back downstairs, but Liverpool 

remained upstairs with [Dickson]. While the pair was upstairs, 

[Dickson] told Liverpool that the people downstairs were trying to 

kill him. Liverpool tried to convince [Dickson] otherwise, and 

eventually told him that he would go downstairs to see what was 

going on. Once downstairs, Liverpool warned Stowe that they had 

to leave immediately, but Stowe refused to leave, so Liverpool left 

alone. 

After Liverpool left, [Dickson] walked down the stairs with the 

shotgun, and shot Stowe, who was standing in the living room, in 

the head. Ziyon Laboy ran to the door; however, before he 

escaped, [Dickson] shot him twice in the arm. [Dickson] next shot 

Edwin Laboy, who was also in the living room at the time, in the 

head. After seeing [Dickson] shoot Edwin Laboy, Levi Almonte 

made his escape through the front door. Joel Almonte and 

Christine Chromiak ran into the kitchen and hid in two different 

corners. [Dickson] followed the pair into the kitchen with the 

shotgun in his hands, and eventually pointed the gun at Almonte. 

Almonte thereafter smacked the gun and ran away from the

scene. After Almonte escaped, [Dickson] shot Chromiak three 

times. 

After the shootings concluded, [Dickson] called 911. While he

remained on the line with the authorities, he barricaded himself in 

his home when police arrived. Police therefore secured the 

perimeter and called in the SWAT team. While members of the 

SWAT team were on the roof of [Dickson’s] home, [Dickson] shot 

through the roof at them. Eventually, [Dickson] exited his home 

without incident and was taken into custody. Once [Dickson] had 
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left the home, officers entered the premises and found the bodies 

of Stowe, Edwin Laboy, and Chromiak. In addition, police 

recovered numerous spent shotgun casings and a camouflage -

printed shotgun at the scene, as well as unspent shotgun casings 

on [Dickson's] person. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/19, at 4-6 (citations to notes of testimony omitted). 

After a three-day bench trial, Dickson was convicted of the above-stated 

offenses and, on May 24, 2017, the court sentenced him to the abovementioned penalties. Dickson filed timely post-trial motions on May 25, 2017; 

the court denied the motions on September 11, 2017. Dickson filed a timely 

notice of appeal and pro se Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal.10 Dickson presents the following issues for our 

consideration:

(1) The prosecutor did not present the forensic testing results 

and the physical evidence at [Dickson’s] trial.

(2) The crime scene unit[] staged a false crime scene.

(3) The medical examiner[] reported false autops[y] reports.

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10 On September 19, 2017, Dickson filed a direct appeal from his judgment of 

sentence. On October 6, 2017, the trial court asked this Court to remand the 

matter for a Grazier hearing to determine whether Dickson sought to proceed 

pro se on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). 

Our Court complied with the request and remanded the case; the trial court 

held a hearing on December 22, 2017, where Dickson stated that he wanted 

to remain counseled. The Defender Association, however, subsequently 

sought and was granted leave to withdraw. As a result, the court appointed 

new counsel, Earl G. Kauffman, Esquire, to represent Dickson on appeal. 

Attorney Kauffman, however, filed a statement of his intent to file an 

Anders/McClendon brief and Dickson subsequently requested to proceed pro 

se. Accordingly, this Court remanded the matter for a second Grazier

hearing, which the trial court held on June 22, 2018. The trial court 

determined that Dickson’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary. 
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(4) Did the prosecution witness “Joel Almonte[’s]” testimony 

establish[] that [Dickson’s] thought[]s were without an 

intentional killing [] and [made without] . . . malice or a 

specific intent to kill?

(5) Was [the] trial judge fact finding [and] clearly erroneous[] 

when [he] found [Dickson] guilty[] of first-degree murder?

Appellant’s Brief, at 3-4.

We first note that Dickson has waived issues four and five by failing to 

include them in his July 17, 2018 pro se Rule 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not 

included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions 

of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); see also Commonwealth v. 

Hansley, 24 A.3d 410 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Dickson waived certain issues on 

appeal when not raised in Rule 1925(b) statement).

In his first issue, Dickson claims that the prosecution withheld physical 

evidence that was submitted to criminologists for forensic DNA testing. 

Specifically, he says that a swab for DNA from the shotgun used to shoot the 

victims, a swab of blood from the step outside of the home where the victims 

were found, and used and unused shotgun shells were not presented at trial. 

He asserts that this evidence was material and, thus, constitutes a Brady11

violation. 

To establish a Brady violation, a Dickson must demonstrate:

(1) the prosecution concealed evidence; (2) the evidence was 

either exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to him; 

and (3) he was prejudiced. To establish prejudice, [a Dickson]

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11 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Impeachment evidence, which goes to the 

credibility of a primary witness against the accused, is critical 

evidence and it is material to the case whether that evidence is 

merely a promise or an understanding between the prosecution 

and the witness.

Commonwealth v. Packer, 146 A.3d 1281, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citations omitted).

In his brief, Dickson lists three questions at the end of his argument 

section on the Brady issue. Those questions concern whether he was 

deprived of the testing results, whether this material evidence had probative 

value and whether the prosecutor intentionally withheld potentially 

exculpatory physical evidence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17. Dickson states,

“If [you] answer, Yes, to any question above[, then the] Appellant is entitled 

to relief.” Id. at 18. Dickson has clearly failed to not only allege the elements 

necessary for a successful Brady claim, but offers nothing to support an 

argument that the prosecution actually concealed the evidence, that the 

evidence was actually exculpatory or favorable to him, or that he was actually 

prejudiced. Packer, supra. Thus, his claim fails.

In his final two issues, Dickson contends that the crime scene unit 

staged a false crime scene and that the medical examiner crafted false 

autopsy reports. Dickson’s entire argument on these issues consists of the 

following statement: “[T]he crime scene unit, and the medical examiner were 

with [sic] intent to impair, and mislead with documents knowing it [sic] to be 

false.” Appellant’s Brief, at 24. Dickson appends several copies of crime scene 
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photos and medical examiner reports of two of the victims in an apparent 

attempt to note inconsistencies between the photos and the findings. 

At trial, Dickson testified that he “believe[s]” he shot two of the victims 

two times each. N.T. Trial, 5/24/17, at 8. When the assistant district attorney 

noted that the medical examiner testified that one of those victims was shot

four times, and asked Dickson whether he thought the medical examiner was 

wrong, he replied, “I would say no, sir.” Id. at 9. Doctor Lindsay Simon, 

Philadelphia Associate Medical Examiner and an expert witness in the field of 

forensic pathology, performed the post-mortem autopsies on two of the three 

victims. The trial court notes that, in its fact-finding role, it chose to credit 

Dr. Simon’s testimony that detailed the victim’s various injuries over that of 

Dickson, including Dr. Simon’s testimony that the female victim was shot three 

times. See N.T. Trial, 5/22/17, at 10-49 (testimony on direct examination).

The court also heard the testimony of a firearms examiner who testified 

regarding the maximum capacity of a shotgun; Dickson specifically stated that 

he did not dispute the examiner’s testimony. N.T Trial, 5/24/17, at 12.

Whether Dickson shot the female victim two or three times does not 

translate into a “doctored crime scene” or “false reports.” The bottom line is 

that Dickson admitted he shot the victims multiple times, and that no one else 

in the residence fired the shotgun. The court did not believe Dickson’s selfserving testimony that consisted of a claim of self-defense. See 

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 39 (Pa. 2011) (“The finder of fact 

. . . exclusively weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses, and 
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may choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”). Thus, we find no 

merit to Dickson’s final two issues.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.12 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/23/19

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12 We, herein, deny Dickson’s motion for remand.