NUREG/CR-4747

EGG-2473

Vol. 2

An Aging Failure Survey of

Light Water-Reactor Safety Systems and Components

Prepared by B.M. Meale, D.G. Satterwhite

EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Prepared for

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NOTICE

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NUREG/CR-4747

EGG-2473

Vol. 2

RG, RM

An Aging Failure Survey of

Light Water Reactor Safety Systems and Components

Manuscript Completed: June 1988

Date Published: July 1988

Prepared by

B.M. Meale, D.G. Satterwhite

EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, ID 83415

Prepared for

Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

NRC FIN A6389
ABSTRACT

This report describes the methods, analyses, results, and conclusions of two different aging studies. The first study consists of a survey of light water reactor component

failures associated with 15 selected safety and support systems. Analysts used computerized sorting techniques to classify component failures into generic failure categories. The second study consists of careful examination of component failure records to

identify and categorize the reported cause of component failures. The systems evaluated in the failure-cause analysis were the auxiliary feedwater, Class IE electrical

power distribution, high-pressure injection, and service water. Tables and figures are

presented, indicating the systems and the components within those systems most

affected by aging. Also provided are engineering insights drawn from the data. This

report is the second of two volumes and presents all of the Volume I data from FY-86

combined with the data gathered in FY-87.

FIN No. A6389-Component Residual Lifetime Evaluation and Feasibility Relicensing

ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the methods, analyses,

results, and conclusions of an aging survey of light

water reactor safety system component failures and

a detailed aging-related failure-cause study of

selected component failure reports. Both the aging

survey and the failure-cause study were performed

over a two-year period for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as a part of the Nuclear

Plant Aging Research Program. This report is the

second volume of a two-volume set addressing the

impact of component aging on selected nuclear

power plant safety and support systems. Volume 2

combines data from Volume la and subsequent

data into one final data analysis and presentation.

A third document will address the risk importance

of time-dependent aging-related failures using the

failure-cause data reported in Volumes I and 2.

The purpose of the analyses presented here is to

identify which safety and support systems and their

associated components have been affected by aging

and, for selected systems, to identify aging-related

failures at the reportable cause or mechanism level.

The following definition of aging is used in the

analyses presented in this report:

Aging is the degradation of a component resulting in the loss of function or reduced performance caused by some time-dependent agent or

mechanism. The agent or mechanism can be

cyclic (e.g., caused by repeated demand) or continuously acting (e.g., caused by the operational

environment). The change in the component failure probability resulting from the degradation

will be monotonically increasing with the time of

exposure to the agent or mechanism unless the

component is refurbished, repaired, or replaced.

The nuclear power plant operational data

selected for the aging-related failure analyses were

from the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System

(NPRDS), a data base of the Institute of Nuclear

Power Operations. The NPRDS is considered the

best currently accessible data base on which to perform the present work scope of the aging-related

data collection and analysis. However, the data

source does have significant limitations (detailed in

Section 3.2) that should be considered when intera. B. M. Meale and!D. G. Satterwhite,AnAgingFailureSurvey of Light Water Reactor Safety Systems and Components,

Vol.],, NUREG/CR-4747, EGG-2473, July 1987.

preting or applying the results. The plant-specific

NPRDS data are proprietary. Therefore, the data

presented in this report have been made generic to

enable wider distribution of the results and to

ensure that those results cannot be traced to specific plants or component manufacturers.

The analyses documented in this report examine

the NPRDS data using two different procedures.

The aging survey analysis used computerized sorting techniques to classify failure reports for

15 complete systems; some of these systems are

used in both pressurized water and boiling water

reactors. The purpose of this survey was to identify

which systems and which associated components

were being most affected by aging. It is a rather

gross analysis but does provide relative magnitudes

of aging effects In systems and components. The

results of the aging survey will help define future indepth engineering studies of selected systems and

components.

The second analytical procedure consisted of a

failure-cause determination to identify the aging

mechanisms (to the level of resolution available in

the failure reports) that caused component failures

in four safety and support systems. To determine a

true root cause of failure in every case is beyond the

scope of this study. Such a root cause determination would require a detailed in-depth engineering

evaluation of the component and the plant maintenance practices. For this report, guidelines developed by the Root Causes of Component Failures

Programa were used to evaluate the NPRDS failure

reports and identify the failure mechanisms. An

aging classification procedure was developed to aid

the analyst in distinguishing aging-related from

nonaging-related (random) failures. The results of

the failure-cause study will be Incorporated in

system-level aging' evaluations using probabilistic

risk assessment (PRA) techniques.

Aging Survey Analysis

In the aging survey, NPRDS data were obtained for

15 different light water reactor safety and support systems. The NPRDS information was used to create a

computerized data base which was analyzed to Identify

a. D. 0. Satterwhite. L. C. Cadwallader, W. E. Vesely, and

B. M. Meale, Root Causes f Component Failures Pirogram:

Methods and Applications, NLUREC/CR.4616. EGG-2455,

December 1956.

iii
time-dependent failure contributions of systemspecific components. The failures were grouped into

five generic failure categories based upon the NPRDS

classification of the failure. Mechanisms of failure

were not determined during this analysis since mechanism determinations cannot be made using computerized sorting techniques. However, several analyses were

performed using the failure-category data. Selected

groupings of the data were examined to identify systems and components that are susceptible to aging failures. Also, an uncertainty analysis was performed to

provide an indication of the confidence to be placed in

the data analysis results.

Analyzing the five generic failure categories

determined that, for these systems, many nuclear

power plant component failures are due to

aging (32%). The other category is the largest failure category, containing 49%o of the failures. This

category consists of failures for which the utility

personnel could not identify the cause or the cause

could not be assigned to another NPRDS category.

The size of this category is indicative of the difficulties encountered in identifying the cause of failure

for certain components and the practice of replacing a component or piece part without establishing

the reason for failure. Therefore, a reasonable but

unknown fraction of the failures in the other category is also probably due to aging mechanisms. It is

recognized that the aging category could also contain an unknown number of misclassified failures.

However, comparison to the reported failure-cause

study (discussed below), where the number of

unclassified failures (15%) is significantly smaller

and the aging fractions are generally higher, indicates that this misclassification is probably minimal. The additional generic failure categories of

design and installation, testing and maintenance,

and human-related contained 10%, 7.50%,

and 1.5%o of the failures, respectively.

Results of the aging survey established that, on

one hand, normally operating fluid systems tend to

exhibit slightly higher proportions of aging-related

failures than normally standby systems; on the

other hand, however, system dependencies for component aging were generally not statistically identifiable. There were several exceptions to this

finding. Pumps in the component cooling water

system, valves in the containment isolation system,

supports in the high-pressure injection system, and

switches in Class 1E electrical power distribution

and reactor protection systems were all identified as

having statistically distinguishable aging impacts

when compared to similar components in other

systems.

An evaluation of the data to determine system

effects indicated that only a small fraction of the failures caused loass of systemfunction. Additionally, no

dominant system effect category was evident.

Analyses of the collected data indicate that

valves, valve operators, and pumps have the highest

potential for aging impacts on system operation

based on their corresponding failure population

and aging fractions. In the component-level analysis, which determines the aging impacts on the performance of the component, 50%o to 60% of the

reported valve failures were aging-related failures.

At the component level, the valves in the containment isolation system were the components most

affected by aging mechanisms. However, care

should be taken in drawing a conclusion concerning

actual failure of the containment isolation system

valves. Because of very/stringent surveillance

requirements, those valves may not have actually

failed but instead may have failed an operational

specification when tested (which is reportable). In

the system-level analysis, which indicates the component's aging importance within the system, the

average aging fraction (in percent) for valves

is 12.5%. The systems where the impact of valve

aging (at the system level) is relatively important are

containment isolation (28%) and main

feedwater (21 %), followed by auxiliary feedwater,

component cooling water, and service water to a

lesser extent. At the component level, aging fractions for valve operators are also relatively constant

between systems (approximately 25%). However,

aging in valve operators does not produce a significant failure contribution at the system level

(only 4%). Pumps are the second most agingimpacted component. Pumps in the component

cooling water system have the highest aging fraction (in percent) at both the component level (75%)

and the system level (14%). At the component

level, the average failure fraction (in percent) for

pumps is 45%; and, at the system level, the average

failure fraction (in percent) for pumps is 4%o. Furthermore, the data for components, such as

motors, heat exchangers, pipes, and circuit breakers, indicate that these components are statistically

independent across systems and do not produce a

significant failure contribution at the system level

(less than 5%).

Another analysis ranked the system-specific component aging fractions at the system level. This analysis indicates that valves in the containment isolation

system exhibit the highest aging-related

fraction (0.28) of all the system-specific components

analyzed. Aging-related failures of valves in main

iv
feedwater, auxiliary feedwater, component cooling

water, and service water systems also rank with the

top five system-specific components. Pumps in the

component cooling water system exhibit the highest

aging-related fraction, at the system level, for pumps

and rank sixth on the list of important system-specific

components.

A study was also made of the time dependency of

aging-related failures for system-specific components. The time-dependent analysis indicated

potential time dependencies in aging-related failures. Most of the data indicate the potential for

increasing aging fractions with time. However,

some of the data indicate only the potential for a

constant trend in the aging fractions with time. The

data utilized in this study are impacted by variables

such as plant maintenance practices, the age of the

plant, and reporting practices. This information,

which is needed to assess the impact of these variables on aging, is not available from the NPRDS

source data.

Reported Failure-Cause Analysis

The failure-cause analysis of component failures

used a cause categorization scheme to classify the

reported cause-of-failure information for agingrelated and nonaging-related failures for selected

light water reactor systems. The analysis identified

the component failure modes and associated failure

mechanisms. The systems chosen for this analysis

were auxiliary feedwater, Class IE electrical power

distribution, high-pressure injection (which

included some associated chemical and volume

control components), and service water. The cause

identification information provides insights into

the effects of aging failures versus nonaging failures on system performance.

The analysis evaluated 2012 NPRDS component

failure records. Results of the analysis indicate that

the auxiliary feedwater system has a lower-bound

aging-related fraction (expressed in percent)

of 57% and-an upper bound of 79% for agingrelated failures; the chemical and volume control

system exhibited 61% to 84% aging-related failures; the high-pressure injection system

exhibited 54%e to 82%o aging-related failures; and

the service water system exhibited 67% to 85%17

aging-related failures. The subsystems of the Class

IE electrical power distribution system exhibited

the following lower- and upper-bound aging fractions (expressed in percent): dc power

subsystem 28% to 57%1o, emergency onsite power

subsystem 58% to 77%, and instrumentation and

uninterruptible power supply subsystem 51%

to 98%. The results also indicate that two components in the auxiliary feedwater system, one component in the Class IE electrical power distribution

system, one component in the high-pressure injection system, and two components in the service

water system dominated the failure contributions.

Pneumatic-operated valves and check valves

contributed the largest number of failures within

the auxiliary feedwater system. These components

exhibited relatively high aging-related failure fractions. The aging-related failure fraction (in percent)

for pneumatic-operated valves had a lower bound

of 63% and an upper bound of 79°0%. The fraction

(in percent) for check valves had a range of 87%

to 92%. The dominant failure mode for

pneumatic-operated valves wasfails to close, which

accounts for 49% of the pneumatic-operated valve

failures. The dominant failure mode for check

valves was internal leakage, which accounts

for 73% of the check valve failures. The dominant

aging failure cause for both these components was

wear. The wear mechanism accounted for 39% of

the pneumatic-operated valve failures, with the

valve operator being the subcomponent most

affected. For auxiliary feedwater check valves, the

wear mechanism accounted for 60°7. of the check

valve failures, with the valve seat being the piece

part most affected.

In the high-pressure injection system, motoroperated valves dominated the system failures with

wear and binding/out of adjustment being the dominant mechanisms. Wear mechanism accounted

for 28.5% of the motor-operated valve failures,

and binding/out of adjustment accounted for 20%0o.

Limit switches and torque switches were the subcomponents most affected by these two mechanisms. The dominant failure mode for

high-pressure injection motor-operated valves was

fails to close, which accounted for 29% of the failures. Binding/out of adjustment was the dominant

failure cause for the failure mode fails to close,

accounting for 30% of the fails to close failures.

The valve operator sustained the largest number of

binding/out of adjustment closure failures, with the

piece parts affected being the torque and limit

switches.

For the chemical and volume control portion of

the high-pressure injection system, the component

with the highest potential for causing system failure

is also the motor-operated valve. There were

46 reported failures associated with the chemical

and volume control system. The dominant failure

v
-

mode for these valves isfails to close (48°1 of total

motor-operated valve failures), which is the same as

for the high-pressure injection system. These closure failures, however, were dominated by wear.

The wear mechanism accounted for 45%o of the

closure failures. The dominant piece part affected

by the wear mechanism was the valve seat.

Motor-operated valves and motor-driven pumps

contributed the largest number of failures within

the service water system. Aging-related failure fractions (in percent) for motor-operated valves were a

lower bound of 39%o and an upper bound of 84%.

Fractions (in percent) for motor-driven pumps

are 77% and 84%, respectively. The dominant failure mode for motor-operated valves was fails to

close, which accounts for 39% of the motoroperated valve failures. The dominant failure mode

for motor-driven pumps was fails to run, which

accounts for 53%o of the motor-driven pump failures. The dominant aging failure cause for these

two components was wear. The wear mechanism

accounts for 13% of the motor-operated valve failures, with the valve stem connection to the valve

operator being the piece part most affected. For

service water motor-driven pumps, the wear mechanism accounts for 45%o of the failures, with the

pump seals and packing being the subcomponents

most affected.

Within the Class I E electrical power distribution

system, the diesel generators in the emergency

onsite power subsystem dominated the failures with

a lower-bound aging-related percentage of 58%

and an upper bound of 76%. The dominant aging

cause for the emergency onsite power subsystem

was wear. The failure records indicate that the failures due to wear are distributed over four diesel

generator subsystems: diesel cooling water, diesel

fuel oil, diesel lube oil, and diesel starting air. The

components most affected are valves and pumps.

Inverters in the instrumentation and uninterruptible power supply subsystem also account for a relatively large failure count. These failures are

dominated by electrical failures. The major contributors to these electrical failures are blown fuses,

defective fuses, and defective solid-state components. However, there were few aging-related failures identified for this component.

Analysis of the system-specific failure causes

regardless of component or failure mode indicate

that, for the fluid systems, wear was the dominant

failure cause. Wear accounted for 30%o of the failures in the auxiliary feedwater system, 38% in the

chemical and volume control system, 21%o in the

high-pressure injection system, and 32%o in the

service water system. In the Class IE electrical

power distribution subsystems,faulty module dominated the failures in the dc power supply subsystem and the instrumentation and uninterruptible

power supply subsystem. Wear dominated the failures in the emergency onsite power supply subsystem. The factors which, in turn, caused the wear,

corrosion, or other behavior are not addressed in

the NPRDS failure records and, thus, are also not

addressed in this study. However, these factors are

being studied in other tasks of the NRC Nuclear

Plant Aging Research Program.

vi
FOREWORD

This report is the second volume of a two-volume set addressing the impact of

component aging on selected nuclear power plant safety and support systems. A

future document using the failure-cause results presented in Volumes I and 2 will

address the risk importance of time-dependent, aging-related failures. The work was

performed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as part of the Nuclear Plant

Aging Research Program. Data selected for these analyses were from the Nuclear

Plant Reliability Data System, a data base of the Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations.

vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to express their sincere appreciation to the following persons for

their assistance in the aging-related studies: J. P. Vora (NRC), for his program guidance; W. Norris (NRC), for expediting the acquisition and transmittal of the Nuclear

Plant Reliability Data System data; C. L. Hertzler, for performing the uncertainty

study and assisting in interpreting the results of the uncertainty study; E. D. Bounds,

for her expertise in word processing; and J. L. Edson, for his assistance in developing

the electrical failure-cause codes.

viii
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.......................... ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................iii

FOREWORD.......................... vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................. viii

ACRONYMS........................................................................ xiii

1. INTRODUCTION ............................... I...............................

2. DEFINITIONS . ................................................................. 4

3. METHODOLOGY . .............................................................. 6

3.1 Aging Definition and Classification ........................................... 6

3.2 Failure Event Data Source ............. ....................................... 6

3.3 Aging Survey Analysis .................. .; 8

3.4 Reported Failure-Cause Analysis ........... ................................... 11

4. RESULTS ...... ............................................................. 14

4.1 Aging Survey Analysis . ...................................................... 14

4.1.1 Aging Survey Results for Failure Categories and System Effect

Categories.......................................................... 14

4.1.2 Aging Survey Results for Specific Components .18

4.1.2.1 Aging Survey Results for Valves .23

4.1.2.2 Aging Survey Results for Valve Operators .25

4.1.2.3 Aging Survey Results for Pumps .25

4.1.2.4 Aging Survey Results for Motors .28

4.1.2.5 Aging Survey Results for Heat Exchangers .28

4.1.2.6 Aging Survey Results for Pipes .28

4.1.2.7 Aging Survey Results for Circuit Breakers .28

4.1.3 Aging Survey Results at the System Level .33

4.1.4 Aging Survey Results of Time-Dependent Study .33

4.2 Reported Failure-Cause Analysis ....................... ....................... 33

4.2.1 Reported Failure-Cause Results for Auxiliary Feedwater System. 45

4.2.2 Reported Failure-Cause Results for High-Pressure Injection System. 45

4.2.3 Reported Failure-Cause Results for Service Water System .48

4.2.4 Reported Failure-Cause Results for Class IE Electrical Power

Distribution System .51

4.2.5 Reported Failure-Cause Results at the System Level .5

ix
S. SUMMARY .................................................................... 60

5.1 Aging Survey Analysis ....................................................... 60

5.2 Reported Failure-Cause Analysis .............................................. 61

6. REFERENCES .................................................................. 63

APPENDIX A-ACRONYMS AND CODES FOR THE AGING FAILURE SURVEY ......... A-l

APPENDIX B-REPORTED FAILURE-CAUSE IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION ........ B-i

APPENDIX C-COMPONENT BOUNDARIES FOR THE REPORTED

FAILURE-CAUSE ANALYSIS ............. ........................................ C-I

APPENDIX D-FAIWRE MODE CODES AND DEFINITIONS .......... .. .............. D-l

APPENDIX E-AGING FAILURE SURVEY INFORMATION ...... ...................... E-l

APPENDIX F-REPORTED FAIWRE-CAUSE DATA SUMMARIES .................... .. F-i

FIGURES

1. Relationship of the NPRDS cause categories and the aging survey failure categories ..... ... 11

2. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems due to design error ..... ........... 16

3. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems due to aging ...... ................ 16

4. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems due to testing and maintenance ...... 17

S. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems due to human-related actions 17

6. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which are unknown or

categorized as other .............................................................. 18

7. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which resulted in a complete loss

of system function ................................................................ 19

8. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which resulted in degraded

system operation ................................................................ 19

9. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which resulted in loss of

redundancy ...................................................................... 20

10. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which resulted in loss of

subsystem/channel . ............................................................... 20

11. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems in which the system function

was unaffected .2.................................................................. 21

12. Fractions of valve failures within specified systems due to aging ......................... 24

x
13. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in valves ..... ..... 24

14. Fractions of valve operator failures within specified systems due to aging ..... ............ 26

15. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in valve

operators....................................................................... 26

16. Fractions of pump failures within specified systems due to aging ........................ 27

17. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in pumps ..... .... 27

18. Fractions of motor failures within specified systems due to aging ........................ 29

19. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in motors ..... .... 29

20. Fractions of heat exchanger failures within specified systems due to aging ..... ........... 30

21. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in heat

exchangers ..................................................................... 30

22. Fractions of pipe failures within specified systems due to aging ......................... 31

23. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in pipes ..... ..... 31

24. Fractions of circuit breaker failures within specified systems due to aging ..... ............ 32

25. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in circuit

breakers........................................................................ 32

26. Time-dependent aging fractions for valves ........................................... 38

27. Time-dependent aging fractions for pumps .......................................... 38

28. Component aging fractions for the auxiliary feedwater system .......................... 46

29. Failure-cause and aging fractions for auxiliary feedwater pneumatic-operated valves

for selected failure modes . ......................................................... 46

30. Failure-cause and aging fractions for auxiliary feedwater check valves for selected

failure modes ................................................................... 47

31. Component aging fractions for the high-pressure injection system ...... ................. 47

32. Failure-cause and aging fractions for high-pressure injection system motor-operated

valves for selected failure modes ............. ...................................... 48

33. Component aging fractions for the service water system ............................... 49

34. Failure-cause and aging fractions for service water motor-driven pumps for selected

failure modes ................................................................... 49

35. Failure-cause and aging fractions for service water check valves for selected failure

modes ........................................................................ 50

xi
36. Component aging fractions for the Class I E electrical power distribution system ..... ..... 52

37. Failure-cause and aging fractions for Class IE diesel generators for selected failure

modes ................................................... 52

38. System fractions for dominant system-specific components ............................ 55

39. System fractions for dominant system-specific failure causes in auxiliary feedwater,

high-pressure injection, and service water systems ............ ........................ 55

40. System fractions for dominant system-specific failure causes in Class IE electrical

power distribution subsystems .............. ....................................... 56

TABLES

1. NPRDS system codes used in aging survey . .......................................... 9

2. Example of the root cause categorization scheme (full depth) ........................... 13

3. Example of detailed aging survey tables ............................................. 15

4. Uncertainty study: no statistical system dependency related to aging ...... ............... 22

5. Uncertainty study: statistical system dependency related to aging ....................... 23

6. Ranking of system-specific components by system-level aging fractions ..... ............. 34

7. System-specific component time-dependent aging fractions ............................ 35

8. Component failures and aging fractions as determined by the reported causes of failure

study ...................................................................... 39

9. Reported failure-cause identification summary ....................................... 42

10. System fractions for system-specific components ..................................... 53

I1. System-specific failure-cause fractions .............................................. 57

Xii
ACRONYMS

AFW auxiliary feedwater system

B&W Babcock & Wilcox Company

CCW component cooling water system

CTF containment fan system

CTIS containment isolation system

GE General Electric Company

HPIS high-pressure injection system

INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

LER Licensee Event Report

LPIS low-pressure injection system

LWR light water reactor

MFW main feedwater system

NPAR Nuclear Plant Aging Research

NPRDS Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSSS nuclear steam system supplier

PRA probabilistic risk assessment

RBC reactor building cooling system

RCIC reactor core isolation cooling system

RHR residual heat removal system

RPS reactor protection trip system

RXC reactor coolant system

SBL standby liquid control system

SWS - service water system

UPS instrument and uninterruptible power supply subsystem

WEC Westinghouse Electric Corporation

IE Class IE electrical power distribution system

xiii
AN AGING FAILURE SURVEY

OF LIGHT WATER REACTOR SAFETY

SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Problems caused by time- or cyclic-dependent

degradation (aging) mechanisms, such as wear, corrosion, and fatigue, have occurred at some U.S.

nuclear power plants. These problems have raised

questions about the age-dependent degradation of

safety equipment at operating plants. Many of

these aging issues have been, and are being,

addressed by the nuclear industry through research,

improved designs, standards development, and,

especially, improved operational and maintenance

practices. Nevertheless, aging and degradation of

plant safety systems and components will continue,

and currently unrecognized degradation effects are

likely as the U.S. light water reactor (LWR) population ages. Collection and evaluation of operating

experience data are necessary to study the effects of

aging and degradation on the safety of operating

nuclear power plants during their normal design

life and any extended life.

Therefore, an important part of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) research

effort is the Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR)

Programl which is being conducted at several

national laboratories, including the Idaho Nationail

Engineering Laboratory (INEL). This program

uses component failure data from Licensee Event

Reports (LERs) and the Nuclear Plant Reliability

Data System (NPRDS); the latter is maintained by

the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

Specific program objectives include: (a) identifying

which LWR safety or support systems and components have been significantly affected by aging,

(b) identifying specific aging failure causes for a

few selected systems and components, (c) calculating aging contributions to system and component

unavailabilities, and (d) developing quantitative

relationships between aging failure data and risk.

One of the NPAR Program tasks at the INEL is to

evaluate the extent to which aging has affected the

performance of LWR safety and support systems.

This report is the second volume of a two-volume

set addressing the impact of component aging on

selected nuclear power plant safety and support

systems.a A future document using the failurecause results presented in Volumes I and 2 will

address the risk importance of time-dependent,

aging-related failures. The specific objectives of the

analyses reported herein center around the first and

second program objectives.

The two studies documented in this report

address these two objectives using two different

procedures to analyze NPRDS data. The first

study, an aging survey, used computerized sorting

techniques to classify NPRDS failures into five

generic failure categories, and the second study, a

failure-cause analysis, utilized a detailed categorization scheme to classify selected NPRDS failures

by the reported mechanism causing the failure. The

intent of the studies is to provide a comparative

measure of aging effects in systems and components. This measure of aging effects could be incorporated into a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)

analysis to address the component importances due

to aging and help set priorities of components for

in-depth engineering studies. The results are represented in terms of failure fractions that relate agingrelated failures to nonaging-related failures. The

fractions used in these two analyses are defined as:

* Failure-categoryfractions: For the failurecategory fractions, the number of failures

for all components in a system classified in

one particular failure category is compared to the total failure count reported for

that particular system. The five failure categories are aging, design and installation,

testing and maintenance, human-related,

and other.

* Component aging fractions: The component aging fractions are calculated at the

component level and the system level. For

a. Bibliographic information on the first volume is as follows:

B. M. Meale and D. G. Satterwhite, An Aging Failure Survey

of Light Water Reactor Sqfety Systems and Components,

Vol. 1, NUREG/CR-4747, EGG-2473, July 1987.

I
the component aging fractions, at the

component level, the number of agingrelated failures for a specific component in

a particular system is compared to the total

failure count for that specific component

in that particular system. This comparison

is useful in determining the aging impacts

on the performance of the component. For

the component aging fractions, at the system level, the number of aging-related failures for a specific component in a

particular system is compared to the total

failure count for all components in that

particular system. This comparison gives a

representation of the component's aging

importance within the system. (This

should not be confused with an importance that would be obtained from a PRA

calculation.)

* 7ime-dependent aging fractions. For the

time-dependent aging fractions, the number of aging-related failures for a specific

component in a particular system within a

selected age interval is compared to the

total number of failures for that specific

component in that particular system for

the selected age interval.

* Failure-ause fractions: The failure-cause

fractions are calculated at the component

level and the system level. For the failurecause fractions, at the component level,

the number of aging-related failures corresponding to a specific failure cause for a

component-specific failure mode in a system is compared to the total number of

failures for that component-specific failure mode in the system of interest. For the

failure-cause fractions, at the system level,

the number of aging-related failures for a

specific failure cause in a system is compared to the total failure count for that

particular system.

The aging survey used computerized sorting

techniques to sort NPRDS failure reports for 15

LWR safety, support, and power conversion systems, for both pressurized water and boiling water

reactors. The purpose of this survey was to identify

which systems and associated components were

being most affected by aging phenomena as identified in the NPRDS data base. It is a rather gross

analysis but provides relative magnitudes of aging

effects between systems and components.

In the aging survey, NPRDS failure data were

compiled for pressurized water reactor and boiling

water reactor systems and their major subsystems.

The vendors represented in this survey were

Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC), Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W), and General

Electric Company (GE). It is recognized that several of these systems are designed by the architect/

engineering firm and are not vendor-specific.

However, the NPRDS is structured to supply system information by reactor vendor only. The systems surveyed are as follows:

1. Class lE electrical power distribution

(lE)-WEC, B&W, GE

2. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW)-WEC, B&W

3. Component cooling water (CCW)-WEC,

B&W, GE

4. Containment fan (CTF)-WEC

5. Containment isolation (CTIS)-WEC,

B&W

6. High-pressure injection (HPIS)-WEC,

GE, B&W

7. Low-pressure injection (LPIS)-GE

8. Main feedwater (MFW)-B&W, GE

9. Reactor building cooling (RBC)-B&W

10. Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)-

GE

11. Reactor protection trip (RPS)-WEC,

GE, B&W

12. Reactor coolant (RXC)-GE, B&W

13. Residual heat removal (RHR)-WEC,

GE, B&W

14. Service water (SWS)-WEC, BMW, GE

15. Standby liquid control (SBL)-GE.

2
The information contained in the survey data is

specific to the nuclear steam system supplier, system, and component. The NPRDS component failure records were utilized to create a data base. This

data base was used to classify the NPRDS cause

categories and assign them to one of five failure

categories (see Section 2). There was no examination of the NPRDS failure records during this

study. The in-service age of the component and the

system effect associated with the individual failures

also were evaluated.

The failure-cause analysis consisted of examining selected NPRDS records to determine a failure

cause for component failures associated with the

auxiliary feedwater, Class IE electrical power distribution, high-pressure injection (which included

some associated chemical and volume control components), and service water systems. The purpose

of the failure-cause determination was to identify

the aging mechanisms that caused the component

failures. The depth of this analysis was limited to

the level of resolution available in the NPRDS failure records. To determine a true root cause of failure in every case is beyond the scope of this study.

Such a determination would require a detailed indepth engineering evaluation to be performed on

the components and the plant maintenance practices. Guidelines developed by the Root Causes of

Component Failures Program2 were used to evaluate the NPRDS failure reports and identify the failure mechanisms. An aging classification procedure

was developed to aid the analyst in distinguishing

aging-related from nonaging-related (random) failures.

These systems were selected for the aging failurecause analysis for the following reasons:

1. PRAs indicate that support systems (those

supplying power or cooling to the frontline preventive or mitigative systems) tend

to dominate risk in many plants.

2. Corresponding systems exist in all nuclear

plants.

3. Significant amounts of data have been

gathered on failures in these systems.

The failure-cause information is useful in the

evaluation of the influence of aging on plant risk

using PRA techniques. In this application, the

absolute magnitude of the aging effects is not

essential. Relative impacts are useful for the modification of the PRA failure rate data.

Other work related to the system studies

described in this report has involved investigating

aging of components within the systems. Major

components included in those studies are motoroperated valves, 3 electric motors,4 containment

purge valves, 5 and diesel generators. 6 While those

studies provide very specific information related to

the components, they do not address the systems in

which the components reside. An additional aging

study7 provides insight into aging-related failures

and system effects of failures in reactor protection

systems. The information for this study was

obtained from both the available failure event data

(NPRDS, Nuclear Power Experience, Inc., and

LERs) and utility records. Of the two, the utility

records yielded significantly more detailed information relating to aging failures.

Section 2 of this report discusses the definitions

of the terms used in the two studies. Section 3

defines aging and describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the results of the aging survey and

failure-cause identification analysis. The survey

and failure-cause results are summarized in

Section 5.

3
2. DEFINITIONS

Definitions of the terms used in the studies are

presented in this section. The definition of aging as

used in this report is presented in the next section.

1. Age-The intent of the aging survey was to

produce a time-dependent failure data base

for various component failures. Therefore,

for this analysis, the age of the component

in years at the time of the failure was calculated from the in-service date recorded in

the NPRDS component engineering

record. The data were then placed into the

following four age divisions: 0 to 4.9 yr, S

to 9.9 yr, 10 to 14.9 yr, and 15 to 20 yr.

However, this age calculation may not

reflect the actual age of the component

because the in-service date provided by

NPRDS is defined as the actual date the

system or component went into service.

Therefore, in some cases, the in-service date

as reported in the component engineering

record is not the date the component went

into service but the date the system became

operational or the criticality or low-power

operations date. Ideally, the age of the component should be calculated from the date

when the component itself was placed into

service (including preoperational testing).

This would more accurately reflect the

actual impact of aging on component failures since the wear on the component during testing would be reflected in the age

calculation. Also, the NPRDS in-service

date is updated only when a component is

replaced; therefore, the time-dependent

data would reflect replacement but not

repair. Furthermore, no attempt was made

to identify how many times the same component failed.

2. Cause Categories-The cause categories

refer to the nine failure categories used by

NPRDS to classify a failure, e.g., design/

engineering, incorrect procedure, wearout.

Additional information concerning this

categorization is contained in Appendix A,

Table A-i.

3. Cause Codes-The cause codes refer to the

codes used by NPRDS to identify the cause

of, or factors contributing to, the failure,

e.g., normal/abnormal wear, dirt, mechanical damage/binding, loose parts.

4. Components-In the aging survey, the component designations developed by the

NPRDS are used. The NPRDS utilizes

generic names which sometimes refer to

more than one specific component. The

failure-category data are presented using

these designations. Appendix A (Table A-2)

includes definitions of the NPRDS component acronyms. In the failure-cause analysis, more specific component designations

are used with specific component boundaries as developed for the Root Causes of

Component Failures Program. 2

5. Component Aging Fractions-The component aging fractions are calculated at the

component level and the system level. For

the component aging fractions, at the component level, the number of aging-related

failures for a specific component in a particular system is compared to the total failure count for that specific component in

that particular system. This comparison is

useful in determining the aging impacts on

the performance of the component. For the

component aging fractions, at the system

level, the number of aging-related failures

for a specific component in a particular system is compared to the total failure count

for all components in that particular system. This comparison gives a representation of the component's aging importance

within the system. (This should not be confused with an importance that would be

obtained from a PRA calculation.)

6. Engineering Parameters-Engineering

parameters indicate a variety of engineering

information regarding the component. This

information includes type, application, ratings, construction materials, and engineering values (such as temperature, revolutions

per minute, and horsepower) with their corresponding units.

7. Failur-Failure is defied as a reduced

functional efficiency or effectiveness of a

4
component or the loss of ability of the component to perform its intended function.

8. Failure Categories-The failure categories

are broad generic categories used to classify

the specific failure information. These categories are defined as follows:

a. Aging-These are failures that are the

consequence of expected, timedependent wear or degradation.

b. Design and Installation-These include

failures attributable to (a) inadequate

design of the responsible component or

system, (b) inadequate assembly or initial quality of the responsible component or system, and (c) improper

installation of equipment.

c. Human-Related-These include failures attributable to incorrect procedures that were followed correctly and

failures caused or aggravated by personnel errors, including failure to follow procedures correctly.

d. Other/Unknown-These include failures attributable to failure or misoperation of another component or system

and failures for which the cause cannot

be assigned to any of the other failure

categories.

e. Testing and Maintenance-These are

failures resulting from improper maintenance, lack of maintenance, or personnel error that occur during

maintenance or testing activities performed on the responsible component

or system.

9. Failure-CategoryFractions-For the failurecategory fractions, the number of failures

for all components in a system classified in

one particular failure category (see above) is

compared to the total failure count reported

for that particular system.

10. Failure-Cause Fractions-The failure-cause

fractions are calculated at the component

level and the system level. For the failurecause fractions, at the component level, the

number of aging-related failures corresponding to a specific failure cause for a

component-specific failure mode in a system is compared to the total number of failures for that component-specific failure

mode in the system of interest. For the

failure-cause fractions, at the system level,

the number of aging-related failures for a

specific failure cause in a system is compared to the total failure count for that particular system.

11. Failure Mode-The failure mode of a component is used in PRA analyses to refer to

an action that a component fails to perform. For example, a valve that will not

open when required is categorized in the

fails to open failure mode.

12. Reported Failure Cause-This is an underlying or initiating event or condition that

produces the failure of a component. This

cause is identifiable only to the level of

detail present in the event report.

13. System-Systems are defined in the aging

survey in the same manner as in the

NPRDS. There is some concern that the

utility definitions of systems differ somewhat from those used in the NPRDS. However, this is not considered significant, due

to the relative nature of the data obtained in

these analyses. Systems are defined in the

failure-cause analysis in the manner developed for use in the Root Causes of Component Failures Program.2

14. System Effect-The system effect code

identifies the effect on the system caused by

the component failure. The codes were

taken directly from the NPRDS failure

records. The NPRDS has five system effect

categories. Appendix A (Table A-3) contains a list of the system effect codes and

their corresponding descriptions.

15. Time-Dependent Aging Fractions-For the

time-dependent aging fractions, the number of aging-related failures for a specific

component in a particular system within a

selected age interval is compared to the total

number of failures for that specific component in that particular system in the selected

age interval.

5
3. METHODOLOGY

This section describes the methodology used in

the aging survey and the failure-cause analyses.

Aging is defined and its identification through a

classification procedure is discussed. The acceptability of the NPRDS for these types of analyses is

also discussed.

3.1 Aging Definition and

Classification

The definition of aging as used in the analyses

presented in this report is:

Aging is the degradation of a component resulting in the loss of function or reduced performance caused by a time-dependent agent or

mechanism. The agent or mechanism can be

cyclic, e.g., caused by repeated demand, or continuously acting, e.g., caused by the operational

environment. The change in the component failure probability resulting from the degradation

will be monotonically increasing with the time of

exposure to the agent or mechanism unless the

component is refurbished, repaired, or replaced.

Different types of aging agents or mechanisms affect

a component's performance during its operational life.

Environmental effects, such as normal wear of component parts, erosion, corrosion, and cyclic fatigue, tend

to affect the component in a continuous fashion with

rather low aging rates. Other types of aging stem from

activities affecting the component through a random

event. An example of the latter type is a random maintenance error which causes the component to experience significantly accelerated aging through a

mechanism, such as binding, resulting in wear. Random maintenance errors will usually not be identified

in a failure report. There are other cases where a mechanism identified as causing a failure could be considered aging or random, depending upon the

circuostances under which the failure occurred. It is

difficult to distinguish aging-related failures from random failures solely on the basis of a failure description

or reported failure causes. Therefore, the practical

application of this definition leads to a certain amount

of uncertainty. Engineering evaluations of the materials, stressors, and environment of the failed components and knowledge of the component maintenance

histories are sometimes necessary to accurately identify

aging-related failures. N

The analyses of component failures presented in

this report attempt to identify aging-related failures

through two different techniques. The aging survey

analysis uses computer sorting techniques to classify the aging-related failures. This analysis relies

on the failure-category codes assigned by the utility

personnel when reporting the failure. The failurecause analysis attempts a more detailed and accurate determination of aging classification by

meticulous examination of the failure report

descriptions. The aging-related failures were identified on the basis of a classification procedure developed for the analysis. These techniques are

described in Section 3.4.

3.2 Failure Event Data Source

Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were considered

as a data source but were rejected due to the nature

of the data collection system. The LER system acts

as a reporting agent to the NRC and is concerned

with the failure effects on systems and safety functions. As such, LERs do not generally go into detail

about specific component failure mechanisms,

causes, or required repair actions. Additionally, the

current LER guidelines do not require the reporting

of certain single failures of safety-related equipment. Since most aging-related failures are single

failures, this current reporting requirement further

reduces the use of the LER system for identifying

aging-related failures.

Plant-specific data are the most desirable

because of the availability of maintenance histories

associated with the failed components. An additional feature of plant-specific data is the ability to

identify plant-specific environmental and human

contributors to aging-related failures. These are

essentially averaged out when analyses are performed using the generic data bases, such as the

NPRDS and LERS. However, individual plants

have relatively small failure populations, and

access to the plant data records is very limited.

Gaining access to plant-specific records and the

resultant collection and analysis process was

beyond the scope of the current analysis.

The component-failure data selected for analysis

were obtained from the NPRDS. NPRDS is a

component-failure data system owned by the Institute

of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Data are submitted on a voluntary basis by the INPO member utilities. The data for each failure are sent to INPO for

6
processing and input into the computerized data base.

INPO distributes these data to other member organizations and to the NRC upon request. The plantspecific NPRDS data are proprietary. Therefore, the

data presented in this report have been made generic so

events cannot be traced to specific plants or component

manufacturers.

The NPRDS data source has several strengths

and limitations that reflect on the quality of the

data and its applicability to certain uses and interpretations. Some strengths are:

1. The NPRDS is a large, computerized

nuclear power plant component-failure

data base containing multiple entries for

all the safety-significant systems and components. Many utilities contribute to the

data base.

2. Many of the equipment failures reported

to NPRDS are not reported in LERs since

LERs have no requirement to report certain single equipment failures.

3. Component engineering data are supplied

with the failure records. These data supply

items such as capacities or ratings, and

equipment types. An in-service date of the

component is also provided in the engineering data.

4. The component failure records provide a

categorization of the failure by the utility

personnel and a failure description. Event

dates, discovery methods, plant conditions, and corrective actions are also provided.

5. For reported failures, the data base contains sufficient information to allow a reasonable determination of the relative

number of failures attributable to various

mechanisms. Only 15% of the 2012

NPRDS records examined for the failurecause analysis were unclassifiable into one

of the cause or effect codes developed for

use in the Root Causes of the Component

Failures Program. 2

Some limitations are:

1. Not all utilities report to the NPRDS, but

the number and quality of reporting has

been increasing.

2. Incipient failures are not reportable under

NPRDS reporting requirements.

3. Complete maintenance histories of failed

components are not available and the

effects of test and maintenance activities

on aging-related failures are, masked.

Therefore, time-line histories needed for

aging evaluations are not available through

NPRDS.

4. Accurate component service age calculations are difficult to obtain from NPRDS

data. The age calculations obtainable from

NPRDS reflect the years between the inservice date and the component failure

date. The in-service date provided by

NPRDS is defined as the actual date the

system or component went into service.

Therefore, in some cases, the in-service

date as reported in the component engineering record is not the date the component went into service but the date the

system became operational or the criticality or low power operations date. Ideally

the age of component should be calculated

from the date when the component was

placed into service (including preoperational testing). This would more accurately

reflect the actual impact of aging on component failures since the wear on the component during testing would be reflected in

the age calculation. Also, in-service dates

reflect replacement but not overhaul or

major repairs.

5. Approximately 50% of the NPRDS data is

placed in the unknown or other devices

failure categories by the reporting utility.

This reflects the practice of replacing a

component or piece part without establishing the reason for failure. This problem

In classification of failures can be significantly offset if manual examinations of

the failure records are performed as in a

failure-cause analysis.

6. In many cases, the NPRDS cause description codes do not reflect the mechanism

causing the failure but are related to the

effect of the failure. This makes aging

mechanism identification difficult and

makes a true root cause of failure

7
determination impossible unless additional information is included in the failure narrative.

7. Many of the narratives provided in the

NPRDS failure record do not provide suf- ficient information to verify the cause category or cause description codes chosen to classify the failure. For example, in many of the NPRDS records that have coded the

cause category as testing and maintenance, the narrative or the cause description code will indicate an aging-related mechanism

such as wear. The narrative may state or

imply that the failure was discovered during testing and maintenance but does not

state that the wearout was due to testing and maintenance.

8. The narratives contain ambiguous words

such as bad, defective, and worn out and

use these words interchangeably. This adds

confusion as to whether a failure is aging- related or whether the piece part was incorrectly manufactured.

In view of the above strengths and weaknesses, the NPRDS data can supply only relative informa- tion regarding which light water reactor (LWR) safety systems and components have been signifi- cantly affected by aging and the underlying cause of that aging. Accurate determinations require analysis of plant records, which is beyond the

scope of this study. However, for use in aging eval- uations that rely on probabilistic risk assessment

(PRA) techniques, only relative information is needed to modify the existing PRA information.

3.3 Aging Survey Analysis

The NPRDS data were utilized to create a data base, which contains information about compo- nent failures; this information identifies the nuclear steam system supplier (NSSS), utility (not reported herein), system, component, in-service date, and the components' engineering parameters. The components' engineering parameters allowed collecting failure data that are specific to a particu- lar component type, size, or capacity. Furthermore, the data base contains the failure event date, system effect produced by the failure, cause category, cause codes, and a failure description narrative.

The NPRDS data are reported by specific utili- ties and categorized by NSSS-specific system desig- nations. Table I is a list of these NSSS-specific system designations for the 15 systems analyzed in the aging survey.

The failure reports in the NPRDS are classified into nine categories, referred to as cause categories. These categories refer to general causes, such as engineering/design, installation error, and wearout. A reported failure is then further characterized by the addition of a cause code identifying the cause of, or contributing factors to, the failure. These codes refer to mechanical, electrical, or human- related causes of failure.

A relationship between the nine NPRDS cause categories and the five generic failure categories used in this analysis (as defined in Section 2) was developed so that generic issues could be examined. The correlation between the nine NPRDS cause categories and the rive generic aging survey failure categories selected with NRC concurrence is illus- trated in Figure 1. Appendix A (Table A-I) con- tains a list of the NPRDS cause category and NPRDS cause code grouped into these five failure categories. In practice, examination of the cause code is not necessary to group the failures into the five categories. Minimal error is introduced by using only the NPRDS cause category. The result- ing aging-survey data base contains the number of failures, also called counts, specific to NSSS, sys- tem, and component grouped into the five failure categories. Associated with each failure count are the system effect of the failure and the component

age at the time of failure.

For each system, failure fractions were calculated for the five broad failure categories and the five

system effect categories. These fractions represent an aggregation of all components within a system. Failure fractions within a particular system were calculated by dividing the total counts for a failure

category by the total failure counts for that system. System effect fractions were calculated in a similar

manner. Component failure-category fractions

were calculated at the component level and the sys- tem level. For the component-level fractions, the total failure counts per failure category for a partic- ular component are divided by the total failure

counts for that component within the appropriate system. This comparison is useful in determining the impact of a particular failure category on the performance of the component. In the system-level component failure-category fractions, the numerator remained the same but the denominator for the fractions was the total failure count for that system.

8
Table 1. NPRDS system codes used In aging survey

Nuclear Steam System Supplier NPRDS System Code Description

WEC GE B&W

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution

EBF EBA EBE PLANT AC POWER

EBK EBJ EBG INSTRUMENT AC POWER

ECC ECB ECD DC POWER

EEB EEA EEC EMERGENCY POWER

EEBDAA EEADAA EECDAA DIESEL STARTING AIR

EEBDCA EEADCA EECDCA DIESEL COOLING WATER

EEBFOA EEAFOA EECFOA DIESEL FUEL OIL

EEBLOA EEALOA EECLOA DIESEL LUBE OIL

Auxiliary Feedwater

HHC HHB AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY FEEDWATER

Component Cooling Water

WBD WBB COMPONENT COOLING WATER

WBA REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER

Containment Fan

SBG CONTAINMENT FAN

Containment Isolation

SDB SDA CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

High-Pressure Injection

PCB LETDOWN PURIFICATION AND MAKEUP

SFK SFC SFD HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION

SFB HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY

SFKUHI HIGH PRESSURE UPPER HEAD SUBSYSTEM

Low-Pressure Injection

SFA LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY

Main Feedwater

CHA HHA FEEDWATER

Reactor Building Cooling

SBB REACTOR BUILDING COOLING

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

CEA REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING

9
Table 1. (continued)

Nuclear Steam System Supplier NPRDS System Code Description

WEC GE B&W

Reactor Protection Trip

IBG

IBK

IBA IBB

IBC

IBAIAA

REACTOR PROTECTION

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION

NEUTRON LEVEL SUBSYSTEM

REACTOR COOLANT

Reactor Coolant

CBA CBD

Residual Heat Removal

CFF CFA CFC RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL/LOW PRESSURE

INJECTION

SERVICE WATER

Service Water

WAD WAA WAB

Standby Liquid Control

PCA STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL

This comparison gives a representation of the failure category importance within the system. (This

should not be confused with an importance that

would be obtained from a PRA calculation.)

Using the component failure-category fractions

for aging (component-level fractions in which the

denominator is the total failure count per component within a specific system), an uncertainty study

was performed using Chi-square testing and

adjusted residual analyses.8 The Chi-square test of

independency examines all systems together. A

standard statistical hypothesis test was performed

for each component. The hypothesis chosen for the

test was that no differences in aging fractions

existed for similar components placed in different

systems. This hypothesis of independence underlies

the formulation of the Chi-square test statistic. The

hypothesis is either rejected or not rejected by comparing the test statistic to a quantile of its distribution. The tests were performed at a family

significance level of 0.05. The significance level is

defined as the probability that test-indicated differences in aging effects exist; when in fact there are no

differences for the specific component between systems. A family significance level of 0.05 means that

if no components have significant differences

between systems, one can expect 5 % of the family

components to show significance (the family consisted of 31 different components). These 31 different components are based on the NPRDS

component designations; therefore, some designations contain several types of components. For

example, the NPRDS designation GENERA

includes generators, inverters, and alternators, and

the designation VALVE includes all types of

valves.

The Chi-square testing of systems with an

expected failure count of less than five was

excluded from the analysis. The remaining component data were compared to the Chi-square contingency table quantiles to determine differences in

aging effects for the component between systems.

When no statistically significant difference

occurred, the component failure counts for the

component from all involved systems were combined to calculate an overall aging fraction

10
Aging Survey Categories

Design & Installation

Aging -

NPRDS Categories

- Engineering/Design

'Manufacturing Defect

Installation Error

We arout

Testing & Maintenance Z Maintenance/Testing

Human-Related so 1-~ Incorrect Procedure

I Operating Error

Other Other Devices

I Unknown

M01100974

Figure 1. Relationship of the NPRDS cause categories and the aging survey failure categories.

irrespective of system. A 95%e confidence interval

was calculated for the composite fraction.

When the Chi-square testing indicated statistically significant aging-effect differences for some

components in different systems, an adjusted residual analysis was performed. Adjusted residuals

refer to the components' statistical residuals being

adjusted by their variance. The variance takes into

account the system-specific component aging fraction, total failures observed in that particular system, component-specific aging fraction for all

systems, and the Chi-square test statistic data contribution. The adjusted residual analysis identifies

system-specific components for which aging

impacts are statistically distinguishable when compared to other systems. For the remaining systems,

it is assumed that no statistically significant differences exist. Each group could then be characterized

by estimating a composite aging fraction based

upon a larger data population base. In addition to

aging fractions, 95% confidence intervals were calculated for each group. These confidence intervals

for the proportion of failures due to aging were calculated according to the method described in

Reference 9.

The aging survey analysis also included a timedependent study of aging failures versus nonaging

failures to evaluate their relationship with respect to

component age. The aging failures in the four age

divisions were tallied for each system-specific component. The time-dependent aging fractions for the

four age divisions were calculated for the components within the specific systems by dividing their

total aging failures per age division by their total

failures per age division.

3.4 Reported Failure-Cause

Analysis

The methods used in the reported failure-cause

identification study are similar to those used in previous work performed at INEL for the Root Causes

of Component Failures Program.2 This section

expands on the different aspects of the methodology utilized in this failure-cause identification

effort.

Failure cause is defined as the underlying discernible cause of failure contained in the failure report

for a component. The NPRDS data base codes provide some information about the underlying causes

11
of the component failures. However, failure-cause

identification and aging classification require a

manual examination of failure records including

compiling and organizing specific information

concerning the component and its failure.

The detail and depth of the information in the

NPRDS records vary for different components,

systems, and plants. To accommodate these differences, the categorization scheme (or list) consists of

three levels, in accordance with the failure-cause

categorization scheme as developed by the Root

Causes of Component Failures Program.2 A portion of the root cause categorization scheme to

show the general structure is presented in Table 2.

This table shows the full-depth level of detail for

the first general category. The entire categorization

scheme is presented in Appendix B (Table B-2),

along with the cause coding form used to compile

the data. A description of the cause coding form

and the correlation between NPRDS records and

the data fields on the form are also provided in

Appendix B.

The unclassifiable cause codes were used when

the NPRDS records did not provide sufficient

information to accurately determine the cause of

the component failure. Subjective interpretations

of the NPRDS narrative were not made. The

unclassifiable cause category is resolved into

second- and third-level codes. However, the thirdlevel resolution of the codes indicates the effect of

the failure rather than the actual cause.

Using the definition in Section 3.1, the aging

classification scheme was developed to allow a procedural approach to be taken in the identification

of aging failures. The procedure for classifying failures is presented in Appendix B. Each failure-cause

code is assigned one of three aging classifications:

aging, nonaging, or conditional aging. Agingrelated failure-cause codes are codes that always

relate to time-dependent effects. Examples of these

time-dependent codes are erosion, corrosion, and

wear. Nonaging-related failure-cause codes are

used for random events that cause immediate failure of the component. Examples of these types of

failure causes are fire/smoke, impact loads, and

electromagnetic interference. Conditional aging

failures are classified as aging-related if information in the failure report indicates some agingrelated effect code (from the categorization

scheme), or some keyword indicates that a timedependent process is present. A failure categorized

with a conditional aging code is classified nonaging

if the failure description indicates that a random

event caused an immediate failure. In some

instances, a failure description contains enough

information to allow categorization with a conditional code but gives no indication as to whether

the failure was random or aging-related. In this

case, the failure is assigned an unknown aging

classification.

This failure-cause identification study was oriented towards analyzing component failures in specific systems. The system configurations used in

the failure-cause analysis were developed for use in

the Root Causes of Component Failures Program.2

These configurations differ somewhat from the system configurations used within the NPRDS. In the

current analysis, these differences led to some failure records that were reported within the NPRDS

high-pressure injection system configuration being

analyzed as component failures in the chemical and

volume control system.

The component boundaries utilized in the

failure-cause analysis are listed in Appendix C,

along with examples of subcomponents and piece

parts of each component. These component

boundaries are also different than the ones used

within the NPRDS. For example, NPRDS separates failures of valves and valve operators, whereas

the failure-cause study considers these as one component. The boundary for diesel generators also

differs considerably from the boundary used within

the NPRDS.

The failure modes, and definitions thereof, used

in the failure-cause identification are presented in

Appendix D. The failure modes are, in general,

directly related to the failure modes used in PRA

analysis. Whenever the PRA failure mode definitions did not encompass the type of failures reportable under the NPRDS guidelines, certain failure

modes were chosen and defined to represent the

failure descriptions actually encountered in the

NPRDS data. For example, the no failure failure

mode used for diesel generators was developed to

indicate when the diesel generator remained operable, but a failure was reported for a subcomponent

of the diesel generator. This failure could have

resulted in the inoperability of a single train of a

multiple-train redundant diesel generator

subsystem.

One type of failure-cause fraction, as used in this

analysis, was derived for use in a probabilistic risk

analysis and is therefore specific to component and

failure mode (component-level calculation).

Manipulation of the reported failure-cause data

base allowed the calculation of cause fractions and

aging fractions for the various components for

each system. The populations for these fractions

12
Table 2. Example of the root cause categorization scheme (full depth)

D Design/manufacturing/construction/quality assurance inadequacy

DC Construction error or inadequacy

DCI Initial construction activity

DCR Retrofit construction activity

DE Design error or inadequacy

DEI Initial design activity

DER Retrofit design activity

DM Manufacturing error or inadequacy

DQ Quality assurance error or inadequacy

DQD

DQE

DQI

DQM

DQR

Initial design quality assurance activity

Retrofit design quality assurance activity

Initial construction quality assurance activity

Manufacturer quality assurance activity

Retrofit construction quality assurance activity

DR Plant definition requirements inadequacy

DRI Initial definition activity

DRR Retrofit definition activity

are the component failures which occurred due to a

specific failure mode. During this process, the

number of failures, or counts, was obtained for

each component-specific failure mode, individual

failure cause, and failure-cause-specific aging classification. The failure-cause fraction for each

failure-mode-specific component (excluding components with less than five total failures) was calculated. The number of failure-mode-specific

component failures attributed to a particular cause

divided by the total number of component failures

in that failure mode (excluding the unclassified

causes) yields the failure-cause fraction. The aging

failure-cause fractions were calculated in the same

manner. Failure-cause and aging failure-cause fractions were calculated for each system-specific component (excluding components with less than five

total failures).

Failure-cause fractions, at the system level, were

calculated for each system-specific failure cause.

For these calculations, the failure count per failure

cause was divided by the total failure count for the

particular system. This type of calculation allows

the analyst to identify and rank dominant mechanisms in the specific systems.

The aging-related failure-cause fraction data presented in this study reflect upper and lower bounds

derived from the operational data source. These

bounds are developed to account for the uncertainty encountered in accurate identification of

aging-related causes on the basis of the component

failure descriptions. The categorization scheme

defines when a failure should be classified as

related to aging or nonaging. When insufficient

information is contained in the failure description,

the aging classification is unknown. These failures

are then used to establish the upper and lower

bounds for the aging-related failure-cause fractions. The upper bounds are calculated using the

failures classified as unknown as aging-related failures, while the lower bounds are calculated using

them as nonaging-related failures.

13
4. RESULTS

This section describes the results of the aging survey and the failure-cause analysis. Since the two

studies used the wide spectrum on NPRDS data,

the results represent an average, and plant-specific

effects of maintenance or environment tend to be

masked. Data gathered in FY-87 have been combined with the data gathered in FY-86, which were

presented in Volume 1. Therefore, portions of the

data presented in this section are repetitive. Engineering insights based on the complete data are presented in this volume.

4.1 Aging Survey Analysis

The data resulting from the aging survey analysis

of the NPRDS failure data are presented in Appendix E. The information is organized by specific system (auxiliary feedwater, component cooling water,

etc.). For each system, the following is provided:

(a) definitions of the data fields and other information presented in the tables, (b) summary tables for

system-level failure-category fractions and system

effect fractions, (c) two tables (for each system)

that present component failure-category fractions,

and (d) detailed aging survey tables. (These

detailed tables tabulate an extensive amount of

data and are included as microfiche on the inside

back cover.)

For each system, the first component failurecategory fraction table in Appendix E lists fractions

(at the component level) which are calculated using

the total system-specific component failure count

(failures for the particular component) as the

denominator. The second component failurecategory fraction table in Appendix E lists fractions (at the system level) calculated using the total

system failure count (failures for all components in

the system) as the denominator. The significance of

these differing types of data presentation will be

discussed below. The data summaries and results

are an aggregate of the information contained in

the detailed aging survey tables.

Table 3 is an illustration of the format of the

detailed aging survey tables. The tables contain the

distribution of failures in the five aging survey categories for each five-year age increment for the

system-specific component designation. Some

component designations are detailed only to the

major NPRDS components designation, as shown

by the information for SUPORT data in the table.

For other components, the component engineering

data were utilized to provide a more detailed breakdown of designations, as shown in the table for the

NPRDS major category VALVE. The detailed

breakdown using the component engineering data

depended on the possible safety importance of the

component and the amount of data available in the

NPRDS. In 14 of the 15 systems, valve types were

differentiated because they are an important component in PRA analysis (reactor protection trip system does not contain valves). However,

instrumentation components were only differentiated in the reactor protection trip system because,

in that system, the amount of data for instrumentation components is extensive.

4.1.1 Aging Survey Results for Failure Categories and System Effect Categories. The failurecategory fractions in percent (by system) for the

five generic failure categories for all 15 systems are

shown in Figures 2 through 6, with each figure corresponding to an individual category. Analysis of

data for the failure categories indicates that the

dominant failure categories are aging (32%) (Figure 3) and other (49%) (Figure 6). Human-related

failures (Figure 5) contribute only about 1.5% to

the total of failures reported. Failures in the testing

and maintenance (Figure 4) and design and installation (Figure 2) categories are responsible for

approximately 7.5%7 and 10%, respectively.

The other category consists of failures for which

utility personnel could not identify the cause of

failure or the cause could not be assigned to

another NPRDS category. The size of the other category is indicative of the difficulties encountered in

determining the cause of failure for certain components and the practice of replacing a component or

piece part without establishing the reason for failure. Therefore, it is likely that some of the failures

recorded in the other category were caused by unidentified aging mechanisms. However, it is also

possible that the aging category could contain

other types of failures. Examination of the

reported failure-cause study (discussed in the next

section), where the number of unclassified failures

(15%) is significantly smaller, indicates generally

higher component aging fractions and thus tends to

support the conclusion that the other category contains a significant number of aging-induced failures.

Examination of aging failure-category data

(Figure 3) indicates that, in general, normally

14
Table 3. Example of detailed aging survey tables

Age of Comtonent and Fall ure Categorya

Sys Sys 0-4_9 Years

Failure rt? Eff,

NSSA SysteM CoDonent TotsalI MA. -QL - -A Q

C CFA SUPORT

5-9.9 Years 10-14.9 Years 15-20 Years

D J T JL -Q D A 1 H Q D ^A..,.L 0

Support/

Snubbers

101 A I I .1 II1

3 C I _ _ _ _ _ _ _

5 0 ( 1

RIO r A 0 I1 

a

C CFA VALVE

Check Valve 29 A

11 B

6 C

4 0

8 E

Manual Valve 25 A

5 B

4 C

3 D

13 E

Mechanical 20 A

Valve 2 B

2 C

8 D

8 E

I 1 1 1313 3! i 1 1 1 4

!! !- 1~ 3i 1 7 1 l

! 21 1! 2 1 ! 12! 1 4! 1 i !

Motoroperated

Valve

155 A ! I I 6 12 1 1 ! I

25 B

2 5 C _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I_ _ _

60 - 3 Of-11

a. Failure categories are: D-design and installation; A-aging; T-testing and maintenance; H-human related; and O-other.

b. System effect categories are: A-loss of system function; B-degraded system operation; C-loss of redundancy; D-loss of subsystem/channel; and E-systenm function unaffected.
C

0

4-0

C,

co

L.

U60

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Fz;n

P M R M 0 a R

x cc -i xa .c U o -' U)

U) U) ~ 3 System F

EMNormally operating system Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

EZStandby system

Figure 2. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems due to design error.

60

55 -

50 _

45 -

40 -

35-

C

- 330 

0 25-

co

LL20-

15-

10

5

U U) s 2

[2nNormnally operating system

W 3: U U J Lo cc U U. (A (A 6 a x co 5j s a K a

System

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

E3Standby system

Figure 3. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems due to aging.

UGM118572

16
60

55

50

45

40

NCO

c 35

.o 30

° 25

LL 20

15

10

5

0 P P P N R  pi RI [A pi fa O El fn

o tos:IL W E U.

U 0 E UJ 3

C x 0: U

System

C4 ) I 40 cc

1g2Normally operating system

C Standby system

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

MGMH7677

Figure 4. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems due to testing and maintenance.

C

0

+-O

60

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 -9 rM M qK EAri _, __ M i-j 177 P- z-, - - _

L 40 U) 0 w 3

cc .. x UU

_

U. 3 L W U co 0 34

U 6 U c X ' 4 #a

System

ENormally operating system Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

EStandby system

Figure S. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems due to human-related actions.

GH?57?-4

17
C

0

4Z-,

co

LL

60

5 5

50

4 5

40 o lL

30

25 -

20~~~~~~~~~~11

15

10

5

Cj o U. UI

E]Normally operating system

EZStandby system

a: )s U Ca :t 0 j :t U) Ca x KL X KL U. m - Ad e cc LI LI W L ( U ~* X cc ._ IL U.U) U

System

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

MG H87.6

Figure 6. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which are unknown or categorized as

other.

operating systems exhibit slightly higher aging fractions than standby systems. The average aging fraction (in percent) for normally operating systems is

36.8%, while the average aging fraction (in percent)

for standby systems is 27.7%. The normally operating systems with the highest aging fractions are

component cooling water, service water, and containment isolation. The component cooling water

system in nuclear power plants is operating at all

times. This constant operation results in a higher

incidence of aging failures. River, lake, or ocean

water are the normal sources for service water.

These influent waters contain particulates and

debris that accelerate some aging mechanisms such

as erosion and corrosion and increase the chance of

failures due to foreign material intrusion. Containment isolation components must meet strict criteria

defined in the technical specifications or are considered failed.

The relationship of failures to the reported system effects is presented in Figures 7 through 11.

Examination of these figures indicates that,

although the fractions in the systemfunction unqffected (Figure 11) category are slightly higher than

the other four system effect categories, there was

no clearly dominant system effect category. However, very few failures caused a total loss of system

function (see Figure 7) in any of the systems.

4.1.2 Aging Survey Results for Specific Components. Component-specific aging fractions can

be expressed in several illustrative ways. One way

would be to express the component aging fraction

in terms of only the failures experienced by that

component within its respective system. This

component-level aging fraction representation is

useful to determine the aging impacts on the performance of the component. Another way of representing the component aging fraction is to express

it in terms of all of the various component failures

in a system (this representation is referred to as

being performed at the system level). In this representation, the aging failures experienced by a particular component are related to the total number

of failures of all of the components in a particular

system, thereby giving a representation of the component's aging importance within the system.

However, this should not be confused with an

importance that would be obtained from a probabilistic risk calculation.

To measure the uncertainty of the aging fraction

data, a statistical uncertainty study was performed

18
50

45

40

35

aR 30

.o 25

TCU 20

11 15

10 -

5

U U) U) W

c E - cc I J

EnNormally operating System

3: 0 U. e: 3: 31 CO U) U) u U) 0 U -jgoJ U. x JU < u L

2 cc U cc <. LI cc F W

System

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

EoStandby System M6H787-5

Figure 7. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which resulted in a complete loss of

system function.

50

45

C

0

ar

0

co

L40

35

30

25

20

15 77

;1_1 71,

;I-I

;1_1

5

10

5

0

F ,t x cc 30 U 3

System

E7Normally operating system

CZjStandby system

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

ItGH7S7.7

Figure 8. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which resulted in degraded system

operation.

19
50

45

40

4-

*-

-o

lL

35

30

25

20

15

10 If7m5

0 uJ IL rU 3O A, W -j to -~~~~~~~ m E, L 3: . x co u U W -l < 0 cc W mcos - I- U- ~ Systemo

3 3 rU U L x U 2 m

(A U

K i3

EMNormally operating system

CEStandby system

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

CMG787- .S

Figure 9. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which resulted in a loss of redundancy.

50

45

40

0-

C

0

Cu

35 -"

30-

25 -~

20

15 -o

10

5

0 --

EMNormally operating system

T W U L U. U W (A ,l 3 C )

4 U-j U C. x

System

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

=Standby system

Figure 10. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems which resulted in loss of

subsystem/channel.

MCH077-9

20
0S

C

0

IL).

LL

50

45-

40 -

35 -

; X J Q

30-

25 - ;00

20-

15-

10

5

0 s

F? Normally operating system

to U 3U . . To

5: x U a. I.- to 0 -J U

System

U)

3

4) C.

0:

W U

- co

a:

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

EZStandby system

Figure 11. Fractions of the total failures within specified systems in which the system function was

unaffected.

MGO76?.tO

on the system-specific component aging fractions

to identify statistically which components exhibit a

system-dependent aging impact (the denominator

is the total number of failures for the particular

component within its respective system). The

results of this study are presented in Tables 4 and S.

The components were divided into two groups.

Components for which the systems exhibited no

statistical dependency related to aging effect are

listed in Table 4. Components for which system

dependency of aging effects could be statistically

determined are listed in Table 5. Only four components demonstrated any statistically significant differences between aging fractions across systems.

These components were pumps, supports,

switches, and valves. These results are somewhat

different from those presented in Volume 1. The

difference is primarily due to the performance of a

more rigorous statistical analysis using adjusted

residual techniques.

Aging fraction representations for selected components are presented throughout the following

discussion. The first figure of each two-figure set

displays the component aging fractions at the component level (i.e., the number of aging-related failures divided by the total number of failures of that

particular component in a specified syst-m) along

with their associated estimated confidence intervals. The numbers shown with each data point are

the number of failures associated with that component in that system. The second figure displays the

component aging fractions, at the system level,

which reflect the importance of aging for that component within the particular system. The systemlevel fractions are calculated by taking the number

of aging-related failures for a specific component

and dividing it by the total number of failures of all

components in that system. These figures represent

only a subset of the data presented in Appendix E.

The component data shown in the figures are for

the NPRDS component designations which roll up

data for similar component types. For example,

data for all types of valves, such as check valves,

motor-operated valves, and pneumatic-operated

valves, are combined for the data illustrated for

valves. Appendix E must be consulted to obtain

information about the specific components

included in the component designation. The components illustrated were chosen for several reasons:

(a) they tend to have high aging fractions in some

systems, (b) they are represented in a majority of

the systems, and (c) they are used in probabilistic

21
Table 4. Uncertainty study: no statistical system dependency related to aging

Component

Accumulatora

Air dryb

Annunciatora

Battery and battery charging unitsa

Blower-compressorc

Circuit breakerC

Electrical conductora

Enginea

Filterc

Generator/alternator/inverterC

Heat exchangersC

Heatera

Aging

Fraction

0.17

0.50

0.50

0.32

0.60

0.26

0.09

0.25

0.56

0.24

0.52

0.14

95%o

Confidence

Interval

(0.05, 0.37)

(0.07, 0.93)

(0.12,0.88)

(0.26, 0.38)

(0.54, 0.66)

(0.23,0.30)

(0.03, 0.20)

(0.22, 0.29)

(0.46, 0.65)

(0.20, 0.29)

(0.45, 0.58)

(0.07, 0.25)

Instrumentation: computation modulec 0.28 (0.25, 0.30)

Instrumentation: controllerC 0.23 (0.19, 0.28)

Instrumentation: indicator/recorderc 0.25 (0.21, 0.28)

Instrumentation: electric power supplya 0.27 (0.22, 0.32)

Instrumentation: isolation devicea 0.45 (0.29, 0.62)

Mechanical function unitc 0.31 (0.27, 0.41)

MotorC 0.36 (0.30, 0.43)

Penetrationa 0.80 (0.28,0.99)

Pipea 0.26 (0.19, 0.35)

RelayC 0.25 (0.21, 0.29)

Transformera 0.16 (0.05, 0.34)

Thrbinea 0.16 (0.11, 0.23)

Valve operatorC 0.25 (0.24, 0.27)

Vesselb 0.42 (0.15, 0.72)

a. The deletion of systems with expected cell count less than 5.0 led to deletion of all systems. Therefore, all data were used to

estimate aging fraction and confidence interval.

b. One system/component combination (and no difference test).

c. Systems with expected cell count of less than 5.0 were deleted. The remaining system/component data were used to calculate the

aging fraction and confidence interval.

22
Table 5. Uncertainty study: statistical system dependency related to aging

Component

Aging

Fraction

95%

Confidence

Interval Systems

Instrumentation-switcha

Pumpa

Supportsa

0.19

0.10

0.75

0.45

0.37

0.20

(0.16, 0.23)

(0.09,0.13)

(0.70, 0.81)

(0.42, 0.49)

(0.27, 0.48)

(0.16, 0.24)

IE, RPS

HPIS, LPIS, RCIC, RHR,

RXC, SWS

CCW

IE, AFW, HPIS, LPIS,

MFW, RHR, RXC, SBL, SWS

HPIS

LPIS, MFW, RCIC, RHR, RXC

Valvea 0.58

0.49

(0.53, 0.63)

(0.47, 0.51)

CTIS

IE, AFW, CCW, CTF,

HPIS, LPIS, MFW, RCIC,

RHR, RXC, SBL, SWS

a. Systems with expected cell count of less than 5.0 were deleted. The remaining system/component data were used to calculate the

aging fraction and confidence interval.

risk assessments (PRAs). For use in PRAs, data

for some NPRDS component designations are usually combined for components such as motoroperated valves (valves and valve operators) and

motor-driven pumps (pumps and motors).

4.1.2.1 Aging Survey Results for Valves.

Aging fraction data for valves are presented in Figures 12 and 13. Data in Figure 12 indicate that component aging fractions, at the component level, for

valves are relatively significant and consistent

between systems at 50% to 60%. The exceptions

are standby liquid control and containment fan systems, where valve aging failures were less evident.

Examination of Figure 12 reveals that the associated confidence intervals for the valve fractions are

reasonably small (20%) due to the large valve failure populations. The confidence intervals imply

that aging in valves is independent of the system in

which the valves reside. However, the uncertainty

study ascertained that aging in valves residing in the

containment isolation system is system-dependent.

The uncertainty study also ascertained that valves

in the containment isolation system have a higher

aging fraction (0.58) than valves in the other systems (0.49 composite) containing valves. Even

though the analyses of the aging fractions of

valves, at the component level, indicate that there is

little system-to-system variability, data in Figure 13

indicate that, at the system level, systems can be

identified where aging of valves has a greater

impact on system performance. The data presented

in Figure 13 indicate that the systems where the

impact of valve aging is relatively important are

containment isolation (28%) and main feedwater

(21 %) systems, followed by auxiliary feedwater

(17%), component cooling water (16%), and service water (16%) systems to a lesser extent. Also

data in Figure 13 show that, at the system level, the

average aging fraction (in percent) for valves is

12.5%. This is the highest average aging fraction,

at the system level, for any of the NPRDS component designations. Therefore, valves are considered

to have the most significant contribution to the

aging-related failures in the systems in which they

reside as compared to other components.

Even though the analysis indicates that valves in

the containment isolation system are impacted by

aging-related failures, care should be taken in drawing a conclusion concerning actual failure of these

valves. The technical specifications concerning the

performance of these valves and their associated

valve operators are rigorous. Technical specifications govern the maximum acceptable leak rate and

maximum acceptable response time. When any of

the performance requirements in the technical

23
100

90

80

- 70

- 60 C W

.2 50

0

co 40 VU106 jf~~~~~~~~~~~T4*,12 j }2651 13v {77~ 3a4{ 2f~ {lgg ~484 110' 4} 1 lo 88 jss. 30 i

20

10

0 U U I 3) L 3 ZP c U to to .m U.

cc U U to 2 4 c ccx -j to U

System

* Total valve failures per system fdsnominatorj

Data for this component not available for RPS.

PAJGH1167-1

Figure 12. Fractions of valve failures within specified systems due to aging.

30

25

C

0

4-,

LL

20

15

10

5

0LNIINJ

co 31 31 3: P- U. ILL U

u 2 4 U

CENormally operating system

E Standby system

u) U C U) -i U Ca U W U. 3: <, o K co co 3; X i

System

Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system. Data for this component not available for RPS.

UCH1IS7-3

Figure 13. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in valves.

24
specifications are not met, the valve is considered

failed. These rigorous performance requirements

and the importance of valves in the containment

isolation system may account for the failure population associated with these valves. Also, it should

be noted that the NPRDS system boundary for the

containment isolation system differs from the definition normally used by utilities (they consider it

primarily an instrument and actuation system).

The NPRDS containment isolation system configuration consists of valves and valve operators, as

well as the instrumentation, annunciators, and circuit breakers associated with these valves. Valves

accounted for 49% (see Appendix E) of the

reported failures for the containment isolation system. The majority of the reported valve failures (see

Appendix E) were for pneumatic-operated valves

(62.50%) and motor-operated valves (12.5%o).

4.1.2.2 Aging Survey Results for Valve

Operators. Aging fraction data for valve operators

are presented in Figures 14 and 15. Data in

Figure 14 indicate that aging, at the component

level, in valve operators is also relatively constant

between systems at approximately 25%. The confidence intervals associated with valve operators are

slightly larger than those associated with valves due

to the failure population being slightly smaller. The

three systems with very large confidence intervals

and very small failure populations are the reactor

building cooling, Class IE electrical power distribution, and standby liquid control systems. The

remaining 11 systems exhibited confidence intervals similar to each other and overlap adequately to

be considered basically the same. Thus, data in Figure 14 indicate that aging associated with valve

operators is independent of the system in which the

valve operators reside. The results of the uncertainty analysis support this observation since valve

operators showed no statistical system dependency

related to aging. The uncertainty study's composite

aging fraction for valve operators is 0.25 with an

associated confidence interval of 0.24 to 0.27. Data

illustrated in Figure 15 indicate that aging in valve

operators does not produce a significant failure

contribution at the system level. Based on all failures in a system, the average aging fraction (in percent) for valve operators across all 14 systems in

which they reside is only 4%. Further examination

of Figure 15 shows that valve operators in the containment isolation system have the highest aging

fraction at the system level. Valve operators

accounted for 38%o (see Appendix E) of the total

reported failures for the containment isolation system, and 12% of the total reported failures were

due to aging in valve operators. The majority of

reported valve operator failures in the containment

isolation system (see Appendix E) were for valve

operators associated with pneumatic-operated

valves (74.5%) and motor-operated valves (21 %).

These valve operators in the containment isolation

system must be able to close the valves within a

maximum acceptable response time. Not meeting

these response times constitutes a failure and is

reportable under NPRDS guidelines.

4.1.2.3Aging Survey Results for Pumps. The

aging fraction data for pumps are presented in Figures 16 and 17. These figures identify pumps in the

component cooling water system as having the

highest aging fraction at both the component level

(75%, see Figure 16) and the system level (14%, see

Figure 17). This is a reasonable observation since

the component cooling water system is operating in

a nuclear power plant at all times. The constant

pump operation results in increased aging effects.

This is a unique factor since most systems within a

nuclear power plant are not operating during all

phases of reactor operations. Some systems are not

required during refueling outages, and some are

placed in a standby mode during power operations.

The uncertainty study further indicates that the

component cooling water pumps have statistically

distinguishable aging impacts when compared to

other systems. The uncertainty study results state

that component cooling water pumps have a higher

aging fraction (0.75) than pumps in the other

11 systems containing pumps (0.45 composite).

These aging fractions indicate that pump agingrelated failures have a significant impact on their

respective system's operation. Data in Figure 16

also show that the confidence intervals associated

with the pump aging fractions, at the component

level, vary considerably and are larger than the ones

associated with valves and valve operators. The

total failure count for pumps is also smaller than

the total for valves and valve operators. Additionally, data in Figure 17 show that, at the system level,

aging of pumps within the service water (1 1 No) and

standby liquid control (7%) systems is slightly more

important than aging in pumps within the other

nine systems containing pumps. These nine systems

all exhibit less than 5% aging-related fraction at the

system level. Pumps in both the service water and

standby liquid control systems are adversely

affected by the fluid they pump. Service water is

usually river or ocean water which contains particulates and debris that can plug, erode, and corrode

25
100

90

80

_~ 70

S-O

a,

- 80

.° 50

U--- (U 40

30

20

10

0 U W i V U ) E U 0 U. -J 0 - 3 2 x 3 - - M U. I.- 3 x U. U a. 0. I- E U us 4 U cc x -j 0 U

System

Total valve operator failures per system (denominatorL Data for this component not available for RPS.

Figure 14. Fractions of valve operator failures within specified systems due to aging.

30

25 -

20

0

U- ,P 15

10

5

0lwotlR~S a

UAHG8S77

0 o to 3~ 3 U (Al U (a 3: U U. UI .j 0 U). x U U. 0 X I E IL X co0 

0 U) U0 1 x -' 4 0 U)

System

E Normally operating system Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

Data for this component not available for RPS.

GDStandby system

AGH7I

Figure 15. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in valve operators.

I7- 14

26
100

90 -

80 T

*183*

- 70 30 T

412* 48%

O2 50 1 4g6

C.,~~ pupTiue e yse dnmntr Toa 

c~40 03aT

30

20 ~

10

0 U. ...iU co ICLa £ 0 I- co x U.~~~~ x U. 8 o ~~~~~~ c- ICzt

System

Total pump failures per system (denominator). Deit for this component not available for CTIS. RBC. and RPS.

Figure 16. Fractions of pump failures within specified systems due to aging.

10'

so

-

U

0

u

IIICH7-5

30

25

2. C

0

4-'

C) 15

LL

10

5

0

;C co XU x 3 .u u c

System

EMNormally operating system Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

Data for this component not available for CTIS. RBC. and APS.

[Z Standby system

Figure 17. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in pumps.

27

CH7S7-22
pump internals. Standby liquid control is a boric

acid injection system. The boric acid environment

can be very damaging to pump seals.

4.1.2.4 Aging Survey Results for Motors.

The aging fraction data for motors are presented in

Figures 18 and 19. NPRDS reporting guidelines

for motors state that all motors used as a prime

mover or driver of a reportable component, such as

a pump, blower, or generator, are separately reportable. Motors that are a part of such components as

valve operators, circuit breakers, and battery

chargers are considered a piece part of the respective component and reported as that component. I

0

Data in Figure 18 show that, at the component

level, motors in the Class IE electrical power distribution system exhibit the highest aging fraction.

The data in Figure 18 also show that the confidence

intervals associated with the aging fractions calculated for motors are relatively large due to the small

failure populations. Data in Figure 19 show that, at

the system level, aging-related failures of motors

are relatively insignificant contributors to total failures, with the average aging-related failure fraction

(in percent) being approximately 1.5 No. Of the various systems, motors in the reactor building cooling

system exhibit the highest aging fraction. The

motors in the reactor building cooling system drive

the blowers in that system. These blowers are operating continuously to cool the reactor building.

Motor failures in the reactor building cooling system account for 17% of the total reported system

failures, with 6%o being related to aging.

4.1.2.5 Aging Survey Results for Heat

Exchangers. The aging fraction data for heat

exchangers are presented in Figures 20 and 21.

Data in Figure 20 show that, at the component

level, heat exchangers have a relatively high aging

fraction (ranging from 30% to 68%o). Of these systems, the main feedwater heat exchangers have the

highest aging fraction. These heat exchangers are

used as feedwater heaters and are located downstream of the turbine exhaust. It is suspected that

the steam environment contributes to the degradation process. However, the uncertainty study results

and examination of the confidence intervals in Figure 20 indicate aging of heat exchangers does not

show a system dependence. Data in Figure 21 indicate that, at the system level, heat exchangers are

not significant contributors to system failure, with

the average aging fraction being 2%. The component cooling water system has the highest aging

fraction. Aging-related failures of component cooling water heat exchangers accounted for 5% of the

total reported failures in that system. These heat

exchangers use service water to remove heat from

the component cooling water. In many cases, the

impurities in the service water erode the tubes. As

stated above, the component cooling water system

is in constant use; therefore, these heat exchangers

have service water flowing through their tubes continuously, which contributes to the aging of the

heat exchangers.

4. 1.2.6 Aging Survey Results for Pipes. The

aging fraction data for pipes are presented in Figures 22 and 23. The failure populations for pipes

were very small. The reactor cooling system had the

largest population of pipe failures with 35 failures,

followed by low-pressure injection system (20) and

high-pressure injection system (19). The confidence intervals associated with pipes are very large

due to the small failure population for each system.

Thus, aging in pipes is statistically independent of

the system in which they reside. The composite

component aging fraction resulting from the statistical analysis for pipes is 0.26 with an associated

confidence interval of 0.19 to 0.35. Data in

Figure 23 show that the pipe failures in the reactor

cooling system are only 1 %o of the total component

failures in that system and that pipe failures in the

other systems exhibit an even smaller fraction of

the total component failures in their respective systems. Thus, aging-related pipe failures are not significant contributors to the failure populations

within those systems.

4.1.2.7 Aging Survey Results for Circuit

Breakers. The aging fraction data for circuit

breakers are presented in Figures 24 and 25. Circuit

breakers appear in all 15 systems studied. Their

population ranges from two in the standby liquid

control system to 243 in the Class IE electrical

power distribution system; therefore, their confidence intervals (Figure 24) vary considerably. Data

in Figure 24 show that the main feedwater system

has the highest aging-related fraction for circuit

breakers, but the failure population is only nine.

The Class IE electrical power distribution system,

which has the largest population, has a relatively

low aging-related fraction (0.24) associated with it.

Data in Figure 25 show that, at the system level,

aging in circuit breakers does not significantly

impact system operation. The average agingrelated fraction (in percent) at the system level is

2%.

28
100

90

80

701

I31

2o 50 3 T : j j~~~~1* 29'

c~40 -1 1

64 * ~

30 ~~~~~~~I26'

2021

101

0

Wu L ) LAo )U U- CC LI'

U 5 I F 02 x U. U- 0.

C U Jt G

System

Total motor failures per system (denominator). Data for this component not available for RPS and SBL.

UGHS57 S

Figure 18. Fractions of motor failures within specified systems due to aging.

30

25

OR 20

0

LL

10

0

e} rn v 3 0 a. x U a 3 D.

U) U (C r. ~

System

FMNormally operating system Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system. Data for this component not available for RPS and SBL.

EZ Standby system UMG787.20

Figure 19. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in motors.

29
100

90

80

_ 70

__ 60

C

. 50

o 40

LL 3

30

20

.10

0

210

T 439 sa K i j j ~~~~27 144

-

3: U W 3 U. W (4 U I-~~~~~

E G tC U UJ a. 1

System 9 Total heat exchanger failures per system (denominator). Data for this component not available for AFW. CTIS. LPIS, RCIC.

RPS. SBL. and SWS.

UGH787-2

Figure 20. Fractions of heat exchanger failures within specified systems due to aging.

30

25

C

0

U20

15 _-

10 _

5

f%

M M

-0-N-fa M El - - : U U. U x U.t4 3 : i Lo¢ W U U IL

System

M Noimally operating system Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system. Data lor this component not available for AFW. CTIS. LPIS. RCIC.

=Slandby system RPS. SBL. and SWS.

Mea"77. 1

Figure 21. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in heat exchangers.

30
100

90

80

. 70

- 60

.2 60

C.)

to 40

U- 30

20

10

0 U.I- w U x 

U U *1 G U. U.u U U) 0 C C 2 *< z

System

* Total pipe failures per system (denominator) Data for this component not available for RBC, RPS. and SOL

MG"NSS.4

Figure 22. Fractions of pipe failures within specified systems due to aging.

30

25

uR 20

C

0

{L

5

10

6

0 , '-' - I

U ILU. to ): 2 V )i> W U ) to

x : U 3. U) U. U. 9L I K

IC U th U U W < Z Cr -J

System

EnNormally operating system Note: Denominator equals total component failures per system.

Data for this component not available for RBC. RPS. and SL.

C Slandby system AGHMM?.21

Figure 23. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in pipes.

31
100

90

80

_-. 70

*- 60

0 C 6

.° 50

C-,

co 40

LL

30

20

10

0

19- l2.1 47.148* 49I

58' 4 8' 74* t99* I 22- I 8

U

3 v 3 t) U. to) ) u( U) de Lw

,, x U 3 P _ a. x -

cc Q W U U -i M x

System

^ Total circuil breaker failures per system (denominator).

U o 3: U. Uc cc uU : t s -j

U)

MGh557-1

Figure 24. Fractions of circuit breaker failures within specified systems due to aging.

30

25

, 20

C

0

*..-. 15

LL

10 F

5

a  q 2 El O eq M 1-10 M P-1 Pr" - -

U.

U

U) U X D f j

LU 33 to e t £0 U 3 3 0 to

U 3 I X S U U. U. x U U)

U (4 x I 4U

System

vslem Note: Denominsto1 equals total component failures per system.

MGH?87-13

R"Normally operating s5

I 2Slandby system

Figure 25. Fractions of total component failures for specified systems due to aging in circuit breakers.

32
4.1.3 Aging Survey Results at the System

Level. Based on the analyses, the components

which exhibit statistical system dependency and

significant aging fractions are valves and pumps. A

ranking of the system-specific component aging

fractions, at the system level, is presented in

Table 6. Table 6 is a list of only the system-specific

components whose aging-related fraction (in percent) at the system level is greater than 5%. These

fractions are calculated by dividing the number of

aging-related failures for a specific component by

the total number of failures for all components in

its respective system. Valves in the containment isolation system exhibit the highest aging-related fraction (0.28) of all the system-specific components

analyzed. Valve aging-related failures in main feedwater, auxiliary feedwater, component cooling

water, and service water also rank in the top five

system-specific components. Pumps in the component cooling water system exhibit the highest agingrelated fraction for pumps, at the system level, and

rank sixth on the list of important system-specific

components.

4.1.4 Aging Survey Results of Time-Dependent

Study. A study was made of the time dependency

of aging-related failures for system-specific components. The time-dependent aging fractions for

system-specific components having at least 50 failure counts are listed in Table 7. Since valves and

pumps had the highest failure populations, data for

these two components were chosen to illustrate the

time-dependent fractions. Confidence intervals

were calculated for the valve and pump data to

illustrate any potential trending of the data. Data in

Figure 26 illustrate the time-dependent fractions

for valves in six different systems along with their

associated confidence intervals. Similar pump data

are shown in Figure 27. The systems chosen for the

illustration were the six systems with the largest

component populations for that component. The

fractions were calculated using the component failure population within each of the time intervals

(number in parentheses in the figures) as the normalizing basis.

The data exhibit discernible time dependencies in

aging-related failures as indicated in Figure 26 by

the data for valves in the high-pressure injection,

residual heat removal, and main feedwater systems.

Examination of the time-dependent fractions along

with their postulated confidence intervals indicates

that most of the illustrated data have the potential

for increasing aging-related failure fractions with

time. However, in some cases, such as the data for

pumps in the Class I E electrical power distribution

system (Figure 27) and the data for valves in the

component cooling water system (Figure 26), the

time-dependent aging fractions and confidence

intervals indicate the potential for constant aging

fractions with time.

It was expected that the pattern would show an

increase in aging failures with an increase in the age

of the component up to the useful lifetime of the

component. However, some of the components

studied may have useful lifetimes only in the range

of 5 to 10 yr. This is especially true of the component piece parts or internals that age more rapidly

than the component structural parts. Furthermore,

very few components have experienced an exposure

time into the 15-to-20-yr range. This causes the

existing time-dependent aging fractions to be very

uncertain due to sparse data. This is illustrated in

Figures 26 and 27 by the large confidence intervals

calculated for the fractions in the 15-to-20-yr division. Additionally, the data utilized in this study are

affected by variables such as plant maintenance

practices, the age of the plant, and NPRDS reporting practices. Plant maintenance often results in

the complete rejuvenation of a component; however, occasionally, plant maintenance results in

accelerated component degradation. The impact of

these variables cannot be assessed from the data

contained in the NPRDS data base. To address the

effectiveness of maintenance on controlling aging,

plant-specific maintenance practices and component maintenance histories would have to be studied. As discussed earlier, this type of analysis was

beyond the scope of the current study.

The data exhibit potential time-dependent trends

when the postulated confidence intervals are considered, with most components having an increasing (to some degree) failure rate with time.

However, some components may statistically or

actually have constant failure rates, which would

indicate that aging effects are not important to

these components over their lifetimes. Statistical

analysis could be used to calculate the failure rate

increases but was beyond the scope of this study.

4.2 Reported Failure-Cause

Analysis

In the reported failure-cause analysis, 2012

component failure records were carefully evaluated. Thble 8 is a summary of all the component

failures for the systems studied in this analysis. The

data are ordered by lower-bound aging fraction.

33
Table 6. Ranking of system-specific components by system-level aging fractions

System

Containment isolation

Main feedwater

Auxiliary feedwater

Component cooling water

Service water

Component cooling water

Reactor core isolation cooling

Residual heat removal

Containment isolation

High-pressure injection

Service water

Standby liquid control

Reactor building cooling

Low-pressure injection

Reactor protection trip

Service water

Standby liquid control

Reactor building cooling

Low-pressure injection

Class I E electrical power

distribution

Reactor cooling

Class IE electrical power

distribution

Containment fan

Component

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Pump

Valve

Valve

Valve operator

Valve

Pump

Valve

Valve

Valve

Instrumentation:

computation module

Valve operator

Pump

Motor

Support

Blower

Valve

Engine

Circuit breaker

Aging

Fraction

0.283

0.212

0.168

0.159

0.158

0.140

0.127

0.121

0.120

0.114

0.111

0.092

0.092

0.082

0.073

0.071

0.069

0.062

0.062

0.059

0.057

0.056

0.053

34
Table 7. System-specific component time-dependent aging fractionsa

Total Fraction Fraction Fraction Fraction

System Component Failures (0 to 4.9 y) (5 to 9.9 y) (10 to 14.9 y) (15 to 20 y)

IE Battery 243 0.317 0.379 0.271 0.111

IE Blower 217 0.552 0.635 0.735 0.167

IE Circuit breaker 249 0.222 0.177 0.231 0.231

HPIS Circuit breaker 74 0.107 0.324 0.333 0.333

LPIS Circuit breaker 58 0.083 0.462 0.333 0.167

RHR Circuit breaker 100 0.235 0.179 0.318 0.500

IE Engine 512 0.155 0.197 0.504 0.000

SWS Filter 101 0.676 0.518 0.375 0.000

I E Generator/alternator/inverter 403 0.211 0.223 0.250 0.667

CCW Heat exchanger 88 0.625 0.312 0.727 0.304

RXC Heat exchanger 53 0.333 0.316 0.840 0.000

I E Instrumentation: switch 93 0.241 0.250 0.214 0.000

HPIS Instrumentation: switch 358 0.026 0.085 0.250 0.000

LPIS Instrumentation: switch 63 0.100 0.125 0.357 0.000

RCIC Instrumentation: switch 177 0.067 0.058 0.333 0.000

RHR Instrumentation: switch 207 0.078 0.183 0.150 0.000

RPS Instrumentation: switch 514 0.172 0.182 0.237 0.200

RXC Instrumentation: switch 83 0.043 0.194 0.115 0.667

RPS Instrumentation: controller 209 0.229 0.182 0.246 1.000

HPIS Instrumentation: recorder 55 0.143 0.357 0.667 0.000

RHR Instrumentation: recorder 79 0.167 0.147 0.286 0.000

RPS Instrumentation: recorder 219 0.150 0.208 0.404 0.387

RXC Instrumentation: recorder 103 0.200 0.289 0.293 0.000

RPS Instrumentation: computation module 932 0.251 0.278 0.329 0.526
Table 7. (continued)

Total Fraction Fraction Fraction Fraction

System Component Failures (O to 4.9 y) (5 to 9.9 y) (1O to 14.9 y) (15 to 20y)

RPS Instrumentation: electric 270 0.204 0.266 0.270 0.667

power supply

AFW Instrumentation: transmitter 78 0.020 0.261 0.200 0.000

CCW Instrumentation: transmitter 61 0.150 0.231 0.000 1.000

HPIS Instrumentation: transmitter 262 0.104 0.107 0.182 0.000

MFW Instrumentation: transmitter 82 0.147 0.222 0.083 0.000

RHR Instrumentation: transmitter 184 0.130 0.060 0.161 0.500

RPS Instrumentation: transmitter 942 0.206 0.113 0.328 0.222

RXC Instrumentation: transmitter 123 0.024 0.159 0.037 0.000

IE Mechanical function unit 55 0.118 0.421 0.222 0.000

SWS Motor 66 0.300 0.286 0.611 0.000

IE Pump 69 0.619 0.630 0.524 0.000

AFW Pump 111 0.132 0.120 0.531 0.000

CCW Pump 185 0.585 0.717 0.910 0.714

HPIS Pump 103 0.242 0.290 0.487 0.000

RHR Pump 87 0.500 0.385 0.545 1.000

RXC Pump 94 0.295 0.378 0.167 1.000

SWS Pump 252 0.488 0.602 0.581 1.000

IE Relay 89 0.182 0.188 0.391 1.000

RPS Relay 381 0.168 0.252 0.363 0.000

HPIS Support 84 0.217 0.550 0.190 0.000

LPIS Support 54 0.333 0.280 0.143 1.000

MFW Support 55 0.054 0.294 0.000 0.000

RHR Support 204 0.074 0.169 0.079 0.000

RXC Support 88 0.254 0.409 0.286 0.000

AFW Turbine 60 0.115 0.115 0.167 0.500
Table 7. (continued)

System Component

Total

Failures

IE

AFW

CCW

CTF

CTIS

HPIS

LPIS

MFW

RCIC

RHR

RXC

SBL

SWS

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

Valve

193

276

303

66

535

591

103

335

200

524

128

69

369

Fraction

(O to 4.9 y)

0.511

0.550

0.448

0.107

0.397

0.253

0.276

0.417

0.368

0.430

0.382

0.118

0.504

Fraction

(5 to 9.9 y)

0.603

0.473

0.656

0.250

0.634

0.446

0.364

0.537

0.495

0.472

0.478

0.200

0.604

Fraction

(10 to 14.9 y)

0.595

0.543

0.507

0.143

0.730

0.576

0.538

0.603

0.615

0.649

0.704

0.700

0.519

Fraction

(15 to 20 y)

0.500

0.000

1.000

0.667

0.667

0.667

1.000

0.667

0.000

0.800

0.000

0.000

1.000

Ua AFW

CCW

CTF

CTIS

HPIS

LPIS

MFW

RCIC

RHR

RXC

SWS

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

Valve operator

105

186

52

354

316

75

115

144

447

92

311

0.237

0.175

0.094

0.317

0.158

0.040

0.217

0.261

0.164

0.189

0.333

0.310

0.321

0.200

0.323

0.227

0.440

0.368

0.182

0.239

0.231

0.288

0.176

0.190

0.200

0.302

0.287

0.167

0.407

0.281

0.273

0.385

0.222

0.000

0.667

0.000

0.200

0.000

0.000

0.250

0.000

0.200

0.333

0.000

a. Fractions calculated by dividing total aging-related failures within a time component division by the total component failures within that timc division.
100

80

60

40

at 20

C

o 0

C3

° 100

U.

80

60

40

20

0

CCW (Normally operating) _ '3

(3)

- i(1 °

221 03f1

_ i 11'05) f(731

HPSitsndby)_'

I2'

(3:

RHR (Standby)

SWS (Normally operatingl

f 67 ) 1 1514)42'

f(133) (81

I ~I -

I.

I

I I I

5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20

Year

* Total number of aging-related valve failures.

I ) Tolal number of valve failures within age division.

P699-WHT.21I-2A

Figure 26. Time-dependent aging fractions for valves.

1E (St'andby)' RHR IStandby)

100 t- ,2' (21

80

60

40

.C

0

U1 13' 117' - 121) I127) 11' 1121)

AFW (Standby)

201 o 0

HPIS (Standby)

100 _ SWS (Normally operating)

80 I_ T60

40

20

0

173

1121

i 7'199'I

( (39)

40' 183) (86)

f 82)

- 151) IP( 2?) 1 _

5 10 15 20

I (33) 1 .-* 0

5 10 15 20

Year

I I I,

5 10 15 20

* Total number of aging-related pump failures.

(I ) Total number of pump failures within age division.

PkST-WHT-26S.IA

Figure 27. Time-dependent aging fractions for pumps.

38
Table 8. Component failures and aging fractions as determined by the reported causes of

failure studya

Lower- Upper- Lower-d Upper-d

Bound Bound Bound Bound

Totalc Aging Aging Aging Aging

System/Componentsb Failures Total Total Fraction Fraction

Auxiliary Feedwater

Relief valve 7 7 7 1.000 1.000

Check valve 90 78 83 0.867 0.922

Hand control valve 16 12 15 0.750 0.938

Snubber 7 5 5 0.714 0.714

Pneumatic-operated valve 100 63 79 0.630 0.790

Circuit breaker 8 5 7 0.625 0.875

Flow transmitter 27 14 22 0.519 0.815

Motor-operated valve 43 22 36 0.512 0.837

Flow control recorder 10 5 9 0.500 0.900

Motor-driven pump 63 30 42 0.476 0.667

Turbine-driven pump 58 27 38 0.466 0.655

Level controller 18 8 17 0.444 0.944

Pressure switch 21 9 18 0.429 0.857

Pressure controller 7 3 5 0.429 0.714

Flow controller 19 8 13 0.421 0.684

Relay 12 5 9 0.417 0.750

Level control indicator 20 7 14 0.350 0.700

Pressure transmitter 17 5 12 0.294 0.706

Support 5 0 4 0.000 0.800

Total 548 313 435

System aging fractions 0.571 0.794

Chemical and Volume Control

Motor-driven pump 29 23 25 0.793 0.862

Motor-operated valve 46 34 43 0.739 0.935

Level controller 7 4 4 0.571 0.571

Heat tracing heater 9 5 7 0.556 0.778

Circuit breaker 5 1 4 0.200 0.800

Level transmitter 19 3 14 0.158 0.737

Total 115 70 97

System aging fractions 0.609 0.843

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution

DC Power Supply Subsystem

Inverter 63 18 38 0.286 0.603

Circuit breaker 5 1 1 0.200 0.200

Total 68 19 39

Subsystem aging fractions 0.279 0.574

39
Table 8. (continued)

Totalc

System/Componentsb Failures

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution (continued)

Emergency Onsite Power Supply Subsystem

Diesel generator 113

Circuit breaker S

Total 118

Subsystem aging fractions

Uninterruptible Power Supply Subsystem

Battery charging unit 35

Battery 10

Total 45

Subsystem aging fractions

High-Pressure Injection

Relief valve 18

Snubber 10

Check valve 18

Pneumatic-operated valve 10

Hand control valve 12

Circuit breaker II

Pressure transmitter 6

Heat tracing heater 21

Motor-driven pump 17

Motor-operated valve 70

Flow transmitter 17

Load sequence controller 10

Level transmitter 21

Total 241

System aging fractions

Service Water

Flow switch 16

Check valve 31

Strainer 21

Motor-driven pump 167

Pneumatic-operated valve 47

LowerBound

Aging

Total

66

2

68

18

23

17

9

Is

8

7

6

3

10

8

32

7

4

4

130

UpperBound

Aging

TIbtal

86

S

91

34

10

44

17

10

Is

9

9

6

14

12

53

17 .

6

20

198

Lower.d

Bound

Aging

Fraction

0.584

0.400

0.576

0.514

0.500

0.511

0.944

0.900

0.833

0.800

0.583

0.545

0.500

0.476

0.471

0.457

0.412

0.400

0.190

0.539

Upper-d

Bound

Aging

Fraction

0.761

1.000

0.771

0.971

1.000

0.978

0.944

1.000

0.833

1.000

0.750

0.818

1.000

0.667

0.706

0.757

1.000

0.600

0.952

0.822

1.000

0.903

0.857

0.838

0.957

16

27

17

129

36

16

28

is

140

45

1.000

0.871

0.810

0.772

0.766

40
Table 8. (continued)

System/Comp~onentsb

Totalc

Failures

LowerBound

Aging

Total

UpperBound

Aging

Total

Lower-d

Bound

Aging

Fraction

Upper-d

Bound

Aging

Fraction

Service Water (continued)

Pressure indicator 6 4

Hand control valve 17 11

Flow indicator 5 3

Circuit breaker 17 9

Motor-operated valve 111 43

Total 438 295

System aging fractions

a. Data have been listed by lower-bound aging fractions.

b. Data used exclude components with < 5 total failure counts.

c. Data used exclude failure records in which failure cause was unclassifiable.

d. Fraction denominator is system/component combination failure total.

6

12

4

12

93

0.667

0.647

0.600

0.529

0.387

1.000

0.706

0.800

0.706

0.838

374

0.674 0.854

The complete data analysis set is presented in

Appendix F. The data presented in Table 8 consist

of the total failures, lower-bound total aging failures, upper-bound total aging failures, lowerbound aging fraction, and upper-bound aging

fraction for system-specific component combinations. The upper-bound data include, as agingrelated failures, the records with an aging

classification of unknown; whereas, the lowerbound data exclude those records. The data presented represent the aggregation of the specific

component and failure mode data presented in

Appendix F. The study determined (Table 8) that

the auxiliary feedwater system has a lower-bound

fraction (expressed in percent) of 57% and an

upper bound of 79% for aging-related failures; the

chemical and volume control system exhibited 61 %

to 84% aging-related failures; the high-pressure

injection system exhibited 54%e to 82%; and the

service water system exhibited 67% to 85%, respectively. The subsystems of the Class IE electrical

power distribution system exhibited the following

lower- and upper-bound aging fractions (expressed

in percent), respectively: direct current power subsystem, 28% to 57%; emergency onsite power subsystem, 58% to 77%; and instrumentation and

uninterruptible power supply subsystem, 51 % to

980%.

The following sections discuss the detailed

results of the reported failure-cause analysis for the

auxiliary feedwater, high-pressure injection, service

water, and Class IE electrical power distribution

systems. Only the significant failure modes and

failure causes are covered. A failure mode is considered significant if 20% or greater of the failures for

a system-specific component are due to that particular failure mode. Significant failure causes are

defined as failure causes that have greater than five

failure counts and that account for greater than

10% of the failures within a particular analytical

boundary. Additional data may be presented in the

referenced figures and tables. These additional data

are provided for comparative analysis only. The referenced figures illustrate both the upper- and lowerbound aging fractions for the particular analytical

boundary. A crosshatch indicates when the lower

bound and the upper bound overlap.

Table 9 is a summary of the failure data from this

study for selected systems and components. Only

the dominant failure causes (counts greater than

five) with their respective failure mode are itemized. The values in the total counts column refer to

the total number of failures for the system-specific

component and the specific failure mode listed.

The upper- and lower-bound aging fractions are

also indicated.

41
Table 9. Reported failure-cause identification summary

System/Comt~onents Failure Mode

Total

Counts

FailureCause

Fraction

LowerBound

Aging

Fraction

UpperBound

Aging

Dominant Failure Cause Fraction

Auxiliary Feedwater

Check valves

Hand control valves

Motor-driven pumps

Pneumatic-operated

valves

External leakage

Fails to operate

as required

Internal leakage

External leakage

External leakage

Fails to run

13

8

Wear

Design error

0.615

0.750

66 Wear

Human maintenance error

6

14

33

Wear

Wear

Wear

Water intrusion

0.697

0.106

1.000

1.000

0.212

0.212

0.875

0.615

0.750

0.697

0.000

1.000

1.000

0.212

0.000

0.875

0.615

0.750

0.697

0.015

1.000

1.000

0.212

0.000

0.875

.A.

External leakage 8 Wear

Fails to close

Fails to open

Fails to operate

as required

Fails to run

49 Wear

Binding/out of adjustment

Foreign material intrusion

20 Wear

10 Wear

39 Wear

Binding/out of adjustment

0.367

0.204

0.224

0.300

0.600

0.282

0.179

0.367

0.082

0.020

0.300

0.600

0.282

0.026

0.367

0.184

0.041

0.300

0.600

0.282

0.179

Turbine-driven pumps

Chemical and Volume Control

Motor-driven pumps External leakage

Fails to run

7

21

Wear 1.000

0.667

1.000

0.667

1.000

Wear 0.667
Table 9. (continued)

System/Components Failure Mode

Chemical and Volume Control (continued)

Motor-operated valves External leakage

Fails to close

Class I E Electrical Power Distribution

DC Power Supply Subsystem

Battery chargers Loss of function

Emergency Onsite Power Supply Subsystem

Diesel generator Fails to run

No failure

Total

Counts

9

22

FailureCause

Dominant Failure Cause Fraction

Wear

Wear

0.889

0.455

LowerBound

Aging

Fraction

0.889

0.455

0.400

0.326

0.041

0.122

0.102

UpperBound

Aging

Fraction

0.889

0.455

0.657

0.326

0.061

0.122

0.102

35 Faulty module 0.657

43

49

Wear

Water intrusion

Wear

Cyclic fatigue

0.326

0.184

0.122

0.102

Instrument and Uninterruptible Power Supply Subsystem

Inverters Loss of function 63 Design error or inadequacy

Wear

Electrical overload

Faulty module

Short circuit

0.079

0.079

0.143

0.286

0.127

0.000

0.079

0.000

0.079

0.016

0.016

0.076

0.016

0.222

0.079

High-Pressure Injection

Check valves

Motor-operated

valves

Internal leakage

External leakage

Fails to close

15

7

20

Wear

Wear

Binding/out of adjustment

0.600

0.857

0.300

0.600

0.857

0.100

0.600

0.857

0.250
Table 9. (continued)

System/Components Failure Mode

Total

Counts

FailureCause

Fraction

LowerBound

Aging

Fraction

UpperBound

Aging

Dominant Failure Cause Fraction

Service Water

Check valves

Motor-operated

valves

Internal leakage

External leakage

Fails to open

Fails to close

Fails to operate

as required

External leakage

Fails to close

Fails to operate

as required

Fails to run

External leakage

25 Wear

Corrosion

7 Wear

27 Binding/out of adjustment

43 Wear

Binding/out of adjustment

17 Binding/out of adjustment

0.480

0.240

0.714

0.296

0.140

0.535

0.294

0.480

0.240

0.714

0.037

0.140

0.000

0.059

0.480

0.240

0.714

0.222

0.140

0.488

0.235

Pnieumatic-operated,

. valves

- Motor-driven pumps

5

15

13

Wear

Wear

Wear

1.000

0.333

0.385

89 Wear . Binding/out of adjustment

Foreign material intrusion

64 Wear

Foreign material intrusion

0.326

0.112

0.258

0.703

0.141

0.615

0.750

1.000

0.333

0.385

0.326

0.011

0.180

0.703

0.125

0.615

0.500

1.000

0.333

0:-385.

0.326

0.067

0.180

0.703

0.125

0.615

0.500

Strainers Loss of function 13

8

Wear

Plugged Foreign material intrusion
4.2.1 Reported Failure-Cause Results for Auxiliary Feedwater System. Selected data for the

auxiliary feedwater system are illustrated in

Figures 28 through 30. The total number of component failures in Figure 28 and Table 8 indicates

that pneumatic-operated valves and check valves

are the two auxiliary feedwater components having

the highest potential impact on the system due to

aging. There were 100 failures examined for

pneumatic-operated valves and 90 failures for

check valves. The aging-related failure fraction (in

percent) for pneumatic-operated valves has a lower

bound of 635c and an upper bound of 79%. The

fraction for check valves ranges from 87% to 92%.

The dominant failure causes for pneumaticoperated valves were wear and binding/out of

adjustment which comprise 39% and 16%, respectively, of the total pneumatic-operated valve failures (see Table F-14). The dominant failure cause

for check valves was wear, which accounts for 60%

of the total check valve failures (see Table F-4).

Data, by selected failure modes, for pneumaticoperated valves in the auxiliary feedwater system

are shown in Figure 29. The dominant failure mode

for pneumatic-operated valves was fails to close

which accounted for 49% of the pneumaticoperated valve failures. As indicated by the data in

Figure 29 and Table 9, the dominant aging.related

failure causes for pneumatic-operated valve failures

for the failure mode fails to close were wear (37%e)

and binding/out of adjustment (20%4), The study

determined the subcomponents most affected -by

the wear mechanism were the valve operator and

the valve internals. Similarly, the piece parts

affected by the binding/out of adjustment mechanism were the limit and torque switches in the valve

operator. Failures due to foreign material Intrusion

accounted for 22% of the pneumatic-operated

valve fails to close failures. However, the majority

of these failures were nonaging-related, The failure

mode, fails to open, accounted for 20% of the

pneumatic-operated valve failures. The data shown

in Figure 29 and Table 9 indicate that the dominant

aging-related failure cause for pneumatic-operated

valve failures for the failure modefalls to open was

wear (30%). The study determined the subcomponents most affected by the wear mechanism were

piece parts of the valve operator such as air regulators, limit switches, and couplings.

Data, by selected failure modes, for check valves

in the auxiliary feedwater system are shown in Figure 30. The dominant failure mode for auxiliary

feedwater check valves was internal leakage, which

accounted for 73%o of the check valve failures. The

wear mechanism accounted for 70% of the check

valve failures for the failure mode internal leakage

(see Figure 30 and Table 9). The piece part most

affected by the wear mechanism in check valves for

the failure mode internal leakage was the valve seat.

The data in Figure 28 and Table 8 also indicate

that motor-driven pumps and turbine-driven

pumps in the auxiliary feedwater system have relatively significant impact on the system performance due to total number of failures for these

components (63 and 58, respectively). Aging

accounted for 48% of the motor-driven pump failures and 47% of the turbine-driven pump failures.

The dominant failure mode for both types of

pumps was fails to run, which accounted for 52 e

of the motor-driven pump failures and 67% of the

turbine-driven pump failures. The dominant agingrelated failure cause for thefails to run failure mode

for both types of pumps was wear. Wear accounted

for 21% of the fails to run failures for motor-driven

pumps and 28% of the fails to run failures for

turbine-driven pumps. For motor-driven pump

failures, the motor bearings were the dominant

piece part that failed due to the wear mechanism.

The study determined the turbine was the subcomponent most affected by the wear mechanism in the

turbine-driven pump failures. The dominant turbine piece parts that were affected included seals,

O-rings, packing, and governor valves.

4.2.2 Reported Failure-Cause Results for HighPressure Injection System. Selected data for

the high-pressure injection system are illustrated in

Figures 31 and 32. The total number of component

failures, as shown in Figure 31 and Table 8, indicates that the component in the high-pressure injection system with the highest potential impact on

system performance was the motor-operated valve.

There were 70 failures reported for motor-operated

valves. The dominant failure cause for motoroperated valves was wear. Wear accounted for

28,5%e of the total motor-operated valve failures in

the high-pressure injection system followed by

binding/out of adjustment (20%), human maintenance error (13 %), and foreign material intrusion

(11.55%) (see Table F-42). The subcomponent most

affected by the wear mechanism was the valve operator. Binding/out of adjustment affected the valve

operator's torque and limit switches, and foreign

material intrusion failed the valve operator's contacts.

Data, by selected failure modes, for motoroperated valves in the high-pressure injection system are illustrated in Figure 32. The dominant

45
a

0

C-)

Cu3

I-_

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Upper-bound aging S Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap

* Total failures per system-specific component

Figure 28. Component aging fractions for the auxiliary feedwater system.

M"16so

3 0 -3~~~~~~e

C .34 3E1~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ -,

.0a ~ ~ ~ a

co~ 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~ i$0g lei in

m Upper-bound aging m Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap CJ Non-aging

Total component failures per failure mode.

sOn6IS1O

Figure 29. Failure-cause and aging fractions for auxiliary feedwater pneumatic-operated valves for

selected failure modes.

46
m1 vpe-on agin CCpe-adoe-on an vrap O o-g

40

CO~~~~~~~~

U_ W~~~~~~~

C) 0~~~~~~~

S~~~~~~oO~~~C V WL

S 0 U

Upper-bound aging E Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap = o-gn

*Totalcopn failures t per failue mode.li omoet

Figure 30. Faiurecauean aging d fractions for auxiigh-ryfessure injectio valvesm. eete alr

90~~~~~o 0

co 4 0~t T

o~~~~~~~~

30 E~~~~

100

90

80 ~ ~ pe-on gn pe- n oe-on gn vra

70a alrspe ytmseifccmoet

Fiur 3. omonntagngfrcton orth hghprssreinecio sstm

47
40

0

C

0

4-W

0

L..

U30

20

101

EZ] Upper-bound aging M Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap = Non-aging

* Total component failures per failure mode. M"GNt6t2

Figure 32. Failure-cause and aging fractions for high-pressure injection system motor-operated valves for

selected failure modes.

failure modes for high-pressure injection motoroperated valves were fails to open/fails to close

(34%) and fails to close (29%). None of the failure

causes for the failure mode fails to open/fails to

close were determined to be significant because

their failure counts were not greater than five.

However, for the failure mode fails to close,

binding/out of adjustment was the dominant failure cause, having accounted for 30% of these failures (see Figure 32 and Table 9). The valve operator

dominated the binding/out of adjustment closure

failures with the piece parts affected being the

torque and limit switches.

For the chemical and volume control portion of

the high-pressure injection system, the component

with the highest potential for affecting system performance was also the motor-operated valve (see

Table 8). There were 46 reported failures associated

with the chemical and volume control system. The

dominant failure mode for these valves wasfails to

close (48% of total motor-operated valve failures),

which was the same as for the high-pressure injection system. These closure failures, however, were

dominated by wear. The wear mechanism

accounted for 45% of the closure failures (see

Table 9). The dominant piece part affected by the

wear mechanism was the valve seat.

4.2.3 Reported Failure-Cause Results for Service Water System. Selected data for the service

water system are illustrated in Figures 33

through 35. The total number of component failures in Figure 33 and Table 8 indicates that the service water component having the highest potential

impact on the system due to aging was the motordriven pump. There were 167 failures reported for

motor-driven pumps. The dominant failure causes

for motor-driven pumps were wear (45%0o) and foreign material intrusion (21 Be) (see Table F-52). The

subcomponents most affected by the wear mechanism were the pump seals and packing. The foreign

material intrusion failures were primarily due to

sand and other particulates sometimes found in

influent service water.

Data, by selected failure mode, for motor-driven

pumps in the service water system are illustrated in

Figure 34. The dominant failure modes for these

pumps werefails to run (53%) and external leakage

(38%). Wear andforeign material intrusion were the

dominant reported failure causes of these two failure modes. Data in Figure 34 and Table 9 indicate

that wear accounted for 32.6% of the fails to run

failures and 70.3% of the external leakage failures;

and foreign material intrusion accounted for 14%

of thefails to run failures and 25.8% of the external

leakage failures. Inspection of the failure records

48
0C

0

CO

0~

C.>

co

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

IM Upper-bound aging M Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap

* Total failures per system-specific component. 1>001105

Figure 33. Component aging fractions for the service water system.

80

Falls

External Leakage Fails to Run to Start

.64 .89 314

80 0

mode.C

20 ~~~~~~~~~C

E

Upper-bound aging Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap FJNon-aging

Total component failures per failure mode.

M0S160

Figure 34. Failure-cause and aging fractions for service water motor-driven pumps for selected failure

modes.

49
0

>ZP ,

0

Cu

LL

[=32 Upper-bound aging m Upper- and tower-bound aging overlap = Non-aging

* Total component failures per failure mode. MUI1608

Figure 35. Failure-cause and aging fractions for service water check valves for selected failure modes.

pertinent to service water system motor-driven

pumps shows that the failures for the failure mode

external leakage were caused by wear of the pump

seals and pump packing or foreign material intrusion into the pump seals. The wear mechanism

affecting the motor-driven pump failures for the

failure mode fails to run was associated with the

pump internals such as bearings, impeller, and

shaft. Many of these failures stated internal wear or

general pump wearout as the cause of failure. The

wear mechanism was also associated with the

motor of the motor-driven pump and usually

affected the motor bearings. As stated above, sand

and other particulates found in the influent water

were the dominant cause of the foreign material

intrusion failures.

The service water system components with the

second highest potential for aging impacts on system operation were motor-operated valves. There

were III failures reported for motor-operated

valves (see Figure 33 and Table 8). The resulting

potential aging fraction range (in percent) was 39%

to 84%. The largest number of failures occurred

for the failure modefails to close. Inspection of the

failure records indicates that wear is the dominant

aging failure cause. Wear, which accounted for

13% of the motor-operated valve failures (see

Table F-53), often caused the failure of the valve

stem connection to the valve operator. Data in

Table 9 further indicate that, for motor-operated

valves, the out of adjustment failure cause displays

a potentially high aging contribution for the failure

modes of fails to close, fails to open, and fails to

operate as required. Examination of the failure

records reveals that out of adjustment is associated

with the valve operator and the time requirement

for actuation of the valve movement.

Service water system check valves were significantly affected by aging. The aging fractions calculated for service water system check valves range

from 0.87 to 0.90 (see Figure 33 and Table 8). Data

for service water check valves by selected failure

modes are illustrated in Figure 35. The dominant

failure mode was internal leakage (81 %), with the

dominant aging failure causes having been wear

(48%) and corrosion (24%). Examination of the

failure records indicates that the piece parts most

affected by wear were the valve seat and valve disc,

as would be expected. Failures of the valve body

and the valve internals were attributable to corrosion.

Service water system strainers exhibited the second highest lower-bound aging-related failure fraction (see Figure 33 and Table 8). Inspection of the

failure records indicates that packing wear and

plugging due to particulate in the influent water

were the dominant contributors to failure of service

water strainers.

50
42.4 Reported Failure-Cause Results for Class 1E

Electrical Power Distribution System. Selected

data for the Class IE electrical power distribution

system are illustrated in Figures 36 and 37. The

total number of component failures in Figure 36

and Table 8 indicates that the diesel generators were

the largest single contributor of failures for the

Class IE subsystems. This was, in part, because of

the component boundaries developed for the diesel

generator for the failure-cause study (see

Appendix C). Aging-related failures comprised

58% to 76% of the total diesel generator failures

within the emergency onsite power supply subsystem. The largest single aging failure cause for diesel

generators was wear (19.5%) (see Table F-3 1).

Data, by selected failure modes, for diesel generators in the Class I E emergency power subsystem

are illustrated in Figure 37. The dominant failure

mode for diesel generators was fails to run (38%o).

The dominant failure cause for diesel generator

fails to run failures was wear (32.6%). The failure

records indicated that the wear failures were distributed over four diesel generator subsystems: diesel

cooling water, diesel fuel oil, diesel lube oil, and

diesel starting air. The components most affected

were valves and pumps.

Inverters in the instrumentation and uninterruptible

power supply subsystem of the Class IE system also

accounted for a relatively large failure count (63).

These failures were dominated by electrical failures.

Examination of the NPRDS failure records indicates

that the major contributors to these electrical failures

were blown fuses, defective fuses, and defective solidstate components. There were few aging-related failures found for this component.

4.2.5 Reported Failure-Cause Results at the

System Level. System-specific component fractions and aging fractions at the system level are

listed in Table 10; the dominant system-specific

components (component fraction greater than

0.05) with their associated upper- and lower-bound

aging fractions are illustrated in Figure 38. Inspection of Figure 38 and Table 10 indicates that, at the

system level, the components of importance in the

auxiliary feedwater system were pneumaticoperated valves, check valves, motor-driven

pumps, and turbine-driven pumps. Of these components, check valves had the highest aging percentage range of 14% to 15% (percentages

calculated at the system level). For the chemical and

volume control (not shown in Figure 38) and highpressure injection systems, the component of

importance, at the system level, was the motoroperated valve. The aging percentage range for

motor-operated valves in the chemical and volume

control system was 30% to 37% and in the highpressure injection system, 13% to 22%. The components in the service water system with the highest

system importance were motor-driven pumps,

motor-operated valves, and pneumatic-operated

valves. The motor-driven pumps had an aging percentage range of 30e to 32% at the system level,

motor-operated valves had a range of 10% to 21 %,

and pneumatic-operated valves had a range of 8%

to 10%. Furthermore, the data in Figure 38 and

Table 10 indicate that, for the Class IE electrical

power distribution subsystems, battery charging

units (40% to 76%) dominated the dc power supply

subsystem, diesel generators (56% to 73%) dominated the emergency power supply subsystem, and

inverters (26% to 56%) dominated the instrument

and uninterruptible power supply subsystem.

The failure-cause fractions by system regardless

of the component or failure mode are listed in

Table 11, and the dominant system-specific failure

causes (failure-cause fraction greater than 0.05)

with their associated upper- and lower-bound aging

fractions are illustrated in Figures 39 and 40. Data

in Figure 39 and Table 11 indicate that, at the system level, the wear failure cause dominated all the

fluid systems. Wear accounted for 30% of the failures in the auxiliary feedwater system, 38% in the

chemical and volume control system (not shown in

Figure 39), 21 % in the high-pressure injection system, and 32% in the service water system. Furthermore, the data in Figure 40 and Table II indicate

that, in the Class IE electrical power distribution

subsystem,faulty module dominated the failures in

the dc power subsystem and the instrumentation

and uninterruptible power supply subsystem and

wear dominated the failures in the emergency

onsite power supply subsystem.

51
>Z

40

4-0

C. CZ

LL.

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Mix Upper-bound aging H Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap

Total failures per system-specific component.

Figure 36. Component aging fractions for the Class IE electrical power distribution system.

C_ 0

4-,

O-#

LL

0

m Upper-bound aging m Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap JNon-aging

* Total component failures per failure mode.

M0S1614

Figure 37. Failure-cause and aging fractions for Class IE diesel generators for selected failure modes.

52
Table 10. System fractions for system-specific componentsa

LowerBound

Totalc Aging

Failures Total

UpperBound

Aging

System/Componentsb Total Componentd Fraction

Lower-d

Bound

Aging

Fraction

Upper-d

Bound

Aging

Fraction

Auxiliary Feedwater

Pneumatic-oper. valve 100

Check valve 90

Motor-driven pump 63

Turbine-driven pump 58

Motor-operated valve 43

Flow transmitter 27

Pressure switch 21

Level control indicator 20

Flow controller 19

Level controller 18

Pressure transmitter 17

Hand control valve 16

Relay 12

Flow control recorder 10

Circuit breaker 8

Relief valve 7

Snubber 7

Pressure controller 7

Support 5

Total 548

Chemical and Volume Control

63

78

30

27

22

14

9

7

8

8

5

12

5

5

5

7

3

3

0

313

79

83

42

38

36

22

18

14

13

17

12

15

9

9

7

7

5

5

4

0.182

0.164

0.115

0.106

0.078

0.049

0.038

0.036

0.035

0,033

0.031

0.029

0.022

0.018

0.015

0.013

0.013

0.013

0.009

0.115

0.142

0.055

0.049

0.040

0.026

0.016

0.013

0.015

0.015

0.009

0.022

0.009

0.009

0.009

0.013

0.009

0.005

0.000

0.144

0.151

0.077

0.069

0.066

0.040

0.033

0.026

0.024

0.031

0.022

0.027

0.016

0.016

0.013

0.013

0.009

0.009

0.007

435

Motor-operated valve

Motor-driven pump

Level transmitter

Heat tracing heater

Level controller

Circuit breaker

46 34

29 23

19 3

9 5

7 4

5 1

43

25

14

7

4

4

0.400

0.252

0.165

0.078

0.061

0.043

0.296

0.200

0.026

0.043

0.035

0.009

0.374

0.217

0.122

0.061

0.035

0.035

Total 115 70 97

Class I E Electrical Power Distribution

DC Power Supply Subsystem

Battery charging unit

Battery

35 18 34

10 5 10

0.778

0.222

0.400

0.111

0.756

0.222

Total 45 23 44

Emergency Onsite Power Supply Subsystem

Diesel generator

Circuit breaker

Total

113 66 86

5 2 5

118 68 91

0.958

0.042

0.559

0.017

0.729

0.042

53
Table 10. (continued)

Lower- UpperBound Bound

Totalc Aging Aging

System/Componentsb Failures Total Total

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution (continued)

Instrument and Uninterruptible Power Supply Subsystem

Inverter 63 18 38

Circuit breaker 5 1 1

Total

High-Pressure Injection

Motor-operated valve

Level transmitter

Heat tracing heater

Relief valve

Check valve

Motor-driven pump

Flow transmitter

Hand control valve

Circuit breaker

Load seq. controller

Pneumatic-oper. valve

Snubber

Pressure transmitter

Total

Service Water

Motor-driven pump

Motor-operated valve

Pneumatic-oper. valve

Check valve

Strainer

Circuit breaker

Hand control valve

Flow switch

Pressure indicator

Flow indicator

68 19 39

70

21

21

18

18

17

17

12

11

10

10

10

6

241

32

4

to

17

15

8

7

7

6

4

8

9

3

130

53

20

14

17

15

12

17

9

9

6

10

10

6

198

Componentd

Fraction

0.926

0.074

0.290

0.087

0.087

0.075

0.075

0.071

0.071

0.050

0.046

0.041

0.041

0.041

0.025

0.381

0.253

0.107

0.071

0.048

0.039

0.039

0.037

0.014

0.011

Lower-d

Bound

Aging

Fraction

0.265

0.015

0.133

0.017

0.041

0.071

0.062

0.033

0.029

0.029

0.025

0.017

0.033

0.037

0.012

0.295

0.098

0.082

0.062

0.039

0.021

0.025

0.037

0.009

0.007

Upper-d

Bound

Aging

Fraction

0.559

0.015

0.220

0.083

0.058

0.071

0.062

0.050

0.071

0.037

0.037

0.025

0.041

0.041

0.025

0.320

0.212

0.103

0.064

0.041

0.027

0.027

0.037

0.014

0.009

167

I1

47

31

21

17

17

16

6

5

129

43

36

27

17

9

II1

16

4

3

140

93

45

28

18

12

12

16

6

4

Total 438 295 374

a. Data have been listed by lower-bound aging fractions.

b. Datausedexcludefailurcrecordsin"whichfailurecatuscevasunclassilahiic.

c. Data used exclude components with <5 total lfailure counts.

d. Fraction denominator is total system lfailurcs.

54
C

0

C.)

U100

75

50

25

0

AuxiiaryF eedwat!r High-Pressure In action Service aterj Clss

6241 '4 438 F '231'

a. D U 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~3 E

0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . 2~~~~ E CL~~~~~~~a COL CL 3. . ~ CI C ~~~~~~~ V ~2 a IC * a a - - a~~~~~~

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3

* II~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-M 4 - - . 0R ,~~ * ; = * - UIz

3Uppor-bound aging ERUpper- and lower-bound aging overlap =Non-aging

* Total component failures per system.

Figure 38. System fractions for dominant system-specific components.

60

50

I Auxiliary Feedwater i High-Pressure InJection I J. Service Water I 6548 *241 *438

C

r

C

0

4-'

L.

40 L

30

20

t E C ~~~~~E

C E~UC

-

3 C C

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~

a. ~ ~ V

M Upper-bound aging EKUpper- and lower-bound aging overlap =I~Non-aging

11Total component failures per system. -- -

10

0

...........

Figure 39. System fractions for dominant system-specific failure causes in auxiliary feedwater,

high-pressure injection, and service water systems.

55
Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System

- DC Subsystem | Emergency On-Site Subsystem | PSystem

60 '1 88 !'118ll I *45 -

50

01140

0

Q 30

IU20

10

n

a 0

a0

0 - t

~~ . , I a U *;

0

*0

o 19

:- a

'3 31.

* a

~~.II~~'

MUpper-bound aging 5Upper- and lower-bound aging overlap =Non-aging

* Total component failures per subsystem. ,sulwN1

Figure 40. System fractions for dominant system-specific failure causes in Class IE electrical power

distribution subsystems.

.5,5.07

56
Table 11. System-specific failure-cause fractionsa

Lower- UpperFailure-C Failure-d Bound Bound

Cause Cause Aging Aging

System/Failure Causeb Total Fraction Fraction Fraction

Auxiliary Feedwatere

Wear (EBR) 166 0.303 0.303 0.303

Binding/out of adjustment (EDB) 60 0.109 0.020 0.097

Out of calibration (EDT) 56 0.102 0.044 0.100

Foreign material intrusion (EDI) 46 0.084 0.047 0.049

Faulty module (ELF) 28 0.051 0.020 0.051

Failure to follow procedure: maintenance activity (HPM) 25 0.046 0.002 0.004

Design error (DE) 19 0.035 0.015 0.018

Erosion (EBE) 15 0.027 0.027 0.027

Water intrusion (EMW) 14 0.026 0.002 0.002

Cyclic fatigue (EBF) 12 0.022 0.022 0.022

Set point drift (EDS) 11 0.020 0.020 0.020

Manufacturing error (DM) 8 0.015 0.000 0.007

Corrosion (ECC) 7 0.013 0.013 0.013

Improper lubrication (EDU) 6 0.011 0.007 0.011

Mechanical vibration (EVM) 6 0.011 0.011 0.011

Chemical and Volume Controlf

Wear (EBR) 44 0.383 0.383 0.383

Out of calibration (EDT) 14 0.122 0.043 0.122

Foreign materials intrusion (EDI) 14 0.122 0.043 0.043

Binding/out of adjustment (EDB) 14 0.122 0.009 0.104

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution

DC Power Subsystemg

Faulty module (ELF) 24 0.533 0.311 0.533

57
Table 11. (continued)

Lower- UpperFailure-C Failure-d Bound Bound

Cause Cause Aging Aging

System/Failure Causeb Total Fraction Fraction Fraction

Class I E Electrical Power Distribution (continued)

Emergency Onsite Power Subsystemh

Wear (EBR) 24 0.203 0.203 0.203

Binding/out of adjustment (EDB) 14 0.119 0.017 0.093

Water intrusion (EMW) 11 0.093 0.017 0.025

Foreign materials intrusion (EDI) 8 0.068 0.051 0.051

Cyclic fatigue (EBF) 6 0.051 0.051 0.051

Set point drift (ELD) 6 0.051 0.051 0.051

Instrumentation and Uninterruptible Power Supply Subsystemi

Faulty module (ELF) 18 0.265 0.074 0.206

Electrical overload (ELE) 10 0.147 0.000 0.015

Short circuit (ELS) 8 0.118 0.015 0.074

Wear (EBR) 6 0.088 0.088 0.088

High-Pressure Injectioni

Wear (EBR) 51 0.212 0.212 0.212

Out of calibration (EDT) 33 0.137 0.029 0.137

Binding/out of adjustment (EDB) 25 0.104 0.017 0.095

Foreign materials intrusion (EDI) 20 0.083 0.071 0.071

Failure to follow procedure:

maintenance activity (HPM) 18 0.075 0.017 0.017

Set point drift (EDS) 12 0.050 0.050 0.050

Design error (DE) 8 0.033 0.004 0.008

Cyclic fatigue (EBF) 7 0.029 0.029 0.029

Improper lubrication (EDU) 7 0.029 0.004 0.029

Service Waterk

Wear (EBR) 140 0.320 0.320 0.320

58
Table 11. (continued)

Lower- UpperFailure-C Failure-d Bound Bound

Cause Cause Aging Aging

System/Failure Causeb Total Fraction Fraction Fraction

Service Waterk (continued)

Binding/out of adjustment (EDB) 68 0.155 0.014 0.130

Foreign materials intrusion (EDI) 64 0.146 0.110 0.112

Corrosion (ECC) 26 0.059 0.059 0.059

Set point drift (ELD) 14 0.032 0.032 0.032

Mechanical vibration (EVM) 13 0.030 0.030 0.030

Erosion (EBE) 12 0.027 0.027 0.027

Improper lubrication (EDU) 7 0.016 0.007 0.011

Human error:

operation activity (HEO) 7 0.016 0.002 0.002

Open circuit (ELO) 6 0.014 0.002 0.014

Out of calibration (ELT) 6 0.014 0.011 0.014

Cyclic fatigue (EBF) 6 0.014 0.014 0.014

Human error:

maintenance error (HEM) 6 0.014 0.000 0.000

a. Data have been listed for system/failure-cause count > 5.

b. Data used exclude components with < 5 total failure counts.

c. Data used exclude failure records in which failure cause was unclassifiable.

d. Data have been listed by system/failure-cause fractions.

e. Denominator for AFW fractions is total AFW failures (548).

f. Denominator for CVCS fractions is total CVCS failures (I IS).

g. Denominator for dc power fractions is total dc power failures (45).

h. Denominator for emergency power fractions is total emergency power failures (118).

i. Denominator for UPS fractions is total UPS failures (68).

j. Denominator for HPIS fractions is total HPIS failures (241).

k. Denominator for SWS fractions is total SWS failures 1438).

59
5. SUMMARY

This section summarizes the aging survey analysis and reported failure-cause analysis.

5.1 Aging Survey Analysis

The purpose of the analysis is to identify light

water reactor safety and support systems and their

associated components that demonstrate a susceptibility to aging-related failures affecting system

performance. This has been accomplished through

the use of a data base constructed from operational

events recorded in the NPRDS. Analyses performed on the data provided several insights concerning the effect of aging failures on the selected

systems.

The NPRDS-reported failures were collected into

five generic failure categories. It was determined

that, for the systems analyzed, many nuclear power

plant component failures are due to aging (32%).

The other category is the largest failure category,

containing 49% of the failures. It consists of failures for which the cause either was not determined

or could not be assigned to another category. The

size of this category is indicative of the difficulties

encountered in determining the cause of failure for

certain components and the practice of replacing a

component or piece part without establishing the

reason for failure. The additional generic failure

categories of design and installation, testing and

maintenance, and human-related contained 10%,

7.5%, and 1.5% of the failures, respectively.

Evaluation of the data, at the system level, to determine system effects indicated that only a small fraction of the failures caused loss of system function.

There was no dominant system effect category.

The analysis established that, on the one hand,

normally operating fluid systems tend to exhibit

slightly higher proportions of aging-related failures

than normally standby systems; however, on the

other hand, system dependencies for component

aging were generally not statistically identifiable.

The exceptions to this finding were pumps in the

component cooling water system, valves in the containment isolation system, supports in the highpressure injection system, and switches in Class IE

electrical power supply and reactor protection systems. These were all identified as having statistically distinguishable aging impacts when compared

to similar components in other systems.

Analyses of the collected data indicate that

valves, valve operators, and pumps tended to have

the highest potential for aging impacts on system

operation based on their corresponding failure

population and aging fractions. In the componentlevel analysis, which determines the aging impacts

on the performance of the component, 50% to

60%70 of the reported valve failures were agingrelated failures. At the component level, the valves

contained in the containment isolation system were

the most affected by aging mechanisms. However,

care should be taken in drawing a conclusion concerning actual failure of the containment isolation

system valves due to the stringent surveillance

requirements on these valves. They may not have

actually failed but may instead have failed an operational specification when tested (which is reportable as a failure). In the system-level analysis,

which gives a representation of the component's

aging importance within the system, the average

aging fraction (in percent) for valves is 12.5%e. The

systems where the impact of valve aging (at the system level) is relatively important are containment

isolation (28%) and main feedwater (21 %), followed by auxiliary feedwater, component cooling

water, and service water to a lesser extent. Aging, at

the component level, in valve operators is also relatively constant between systems at approximately

25%. However, aging in valve operators does not

produce a significant failure contribution at the

system level (only 4%). Pumps are the second most

aging-impacted component. Pumps in the component cooling water system have the highest aging

fraction (in percent) at both the component level

(75%) and the system level (14%). At the component level, the average failure fraction (in percent)

for pumps is 45%; and, at the system level, the

average failure fraction (in percent) for pumps is

4%. Furthermore, the data for components such as

motors, heat exchangers, pipes, and circuit breakers indicate that these components are statistically

independent across systems and do not produce a

significant failure contribution at the system level

(less than 5%). The distribution of failures between

component types can be found in the discussion in

Section 4.1 and Appendix E.

The analysis has additionally identified the systems and their associated components that are

impacting system performance due to aging-related

failures. Table 6 in Section 4.1 depicts the relationship of aging-related component failures to the

total number of component failures in a specific

system. Once again, it is evident that valves and, to

60
some extent, pumps are dominating the aging

impacts on system performance. This analysis indicates that valves in the containment isolation system exhibit the highest aging-related fraction (0.28)

of all the system-specific components analyzed.

Aging-related failures of valves in main feedwater,

auxiliary feedwater, component cooling water, and

service water systems also rank with the top five

system-specific components. Pumps in the component cooling water system exhibit the highest agingrelated fraction for pumps, at the system level, and

rank sixth on the list of important system-specific

components. These results presented in Table 6 are

indicative of component aging importance within

its respective system. However, this should not be

confused with a risk importance obtained from a

probabilistic risk analysis.

The time-dependent aging analysis indicated the

potential for some definite time dependencies in

aging-related failures. Most of the data indicated

the potential for increasing aging fractions with

time. However, some of the data indicated the

potential for a constant trend in the aging fractions

with time. The data utilized in this study are

impacted by variables such as plant maintenance

practices, the age of the plant, and reporting practices. This information, needed to assess how these

variables impact aging, is not available from the

NPRDS source data.

In conclusion, the aging survey analysis has identified system and component aging effects that can

be used for guidance in selecting safety and support

system components for detailed engineering studies. The information presented in this report can be

combined with plant-specific risk information to

evaluate which components are most susceptible to

aging and then correlate that with their risk

importances.

5.2 Reported Failure-Cause

Analysis

The purpose of the analysis is to identify specific

aging failure causes for selected safety and support

systems. This has been accomplished through the

use of a data base constructed from operational

events recorded in the NPRDS. The data base has

been constructed using a failure-cause categorization and aging classification scheme. Analyses performed on the data provide detailed information

concerning the component failure modes and aging

mechanisms affecting the selected systems and

components. These data are intended to be used in

probabilistic risk analysis calculations to identify

the risk impacts of aging failures on these

components.

The failure-cause identification analysis has provided insights into the effects of aging-related failures in auxiliary feedwater, Class IE electrical

power distribution, high-pressure injection, and

service water systems. In general, the fluid systems

exhibit higher aging fractions than the electrical

power distribution systems. The components with

the most potential aging-related impacts on system

performance are valves and pumps in the fluid systems and diesel generators in the electrical power

distribution system. The dominant aging mechanism for the fluid systems is wear; whereas, the

dominant aging mechanism for the electrical power

distribution systems is faulty module, which is a

failure of a solid-state subcomponent.

Results of the analysis indicate that the auxiliary

feedwater system has a lower-bound fraction

(expressed in percent) of 57% and an upper bound

of 79% for aging-related failures, the chemical and

volume control system exhibited 61% to 84%

aging-related failures, the high-pressure injection

system exhibited 54% to 82°7 aging-related failures, and the service water system exhibited 67% to

85% aging-related failures. The subsystems of the

Class IE electrical power distribution system exhibited the following lower- and upper-bound aging

fractions (expressed in percent): dc power subsystem, 28% to 57010; emergency onsite power subsystem, 58% to 77%; and instrumentation and

uninterruptible power supply subsystem, 51 % to

98%.

The results also indicate that two components in

the auxiliary feedwater system, one component in

the high-pressure injection system, two components in the service water system, and one component in the Class IE electrical power distribution

system dominated the failure contributions.

The dominant components in the auxiliary feedwater system were pneumatic-operated valves (63%70

to 79%) and check valves (78% to 83%). Wear was

the significant aging mechanism affecting the

valves. The dominant failure mode for pneumaticoperated valves was fails to close. The failure mode

internal leakage accounted for the majority of the

check valve failures.

Motor-operated valve failures dominated the

high-pressure injection system (46°0% to 76%). The

dominant failure mode was fails to close, which

accounted for 29%70 of the valve failures. The dominant failure causes were wear (28.5%), binding/out

61
of adjustment (20%), human maintenance error

(13%0o), and foreign material intrusion (11.5 %).

For the chemical and volume control portion of the

high-pressure injection system, the component that

dominated the system failures is also the motoroperated valve. The dominant failure mode for these

valves is fails to close (4807 of total motor-operated

valve failures), which is the same as for the highpressure injection system. These closure failures, however, were dominated by wear. The wear mechanism

accounted for 45%o of the closure failures.

The specific service water system components

that exhibit significant aging-related failures are

check valves (870%o to 90qo), strainers (81% to

86%), motor-driven pumps (77% to 84%), and

motor-operated valves (39% to 84%). Wear was the

significant aging mechanism affecting the valves.

Motor-driven pump and strainer failures were

dominated by both wear and foreign material intrusion. These aging mechanisms are present in the

service water system due to sand and other particulates normally present in the influent water.

Failures of the diesel generators dominated the

Class IE electrical power distribution system and

exhibited an aging fraction of 0.58 to 0.76 within

the emergency onsite power supply subsystem. The

aging mechanism most prominent for the diesel

generator was wear, which was 300o of the agingrelated failures. The subcomponents failing due to

wear were the valves and pumps located in the cooling water, fuel oil, lube oil, and starting air subsystems of the diesel generator.

The results of the failure-cause study can be

incorporated in system-level aging evaluations that

use PRA techniques. The use of PRA techniques

provides a quantitative statement about risk and

safety. Therefore, the influence of an aging mechanism on plant risk can be determined.

62
6. REFERENCES

1. Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program Plan, NUREG-1 144, July 1985.

2. D. G. Satterwhite, L. C. Cadwallader, W. E. Vesely, and B. M. Meale, Root Causes of Component

Failures Program: Methods and Applications, NUREG/CR-4616, EGG-2455, December 1986.

3. W. L. Greenstreet, G. A. Murphy, and D. M. Eissenberg, Aging and Service Wear ofElectric MotorOperated Valves Used in Engineered Safety-Feature Systems of Nuclear Power Plants, 1, NUREG/

CR-4234, ORNL-6170-41, June 1985.

4. M. Subudhi, E. L. Burns, and J. H. Taylor, Operating Experience and Aging-Seismic Assessment of

Electric Motors, NUREG/CR-4156, BNL-NUREG-51861, June 1985.

5. J. C. Watkins et al., A Study of 73pical Nuclear Containment Purge Valves in an Accident Environment, NUREG/CR-4648, August 1986.

6. J. W. Vause et al., Aging of Nuclear Station Diesel Generators: Evaluation of Operating and Expert

Experience, NUREG/CR-4590, October 1986.

7. L. C. Meyer, Nuclear Plant Aging Research on Reactor Protection Systems (Draft), NUREG/

CR-4740, EGG-2467, January 1988.

8. B. S. Everitt, The Analysis of Contingency Tables, London: Chapman and Hall, 1977.

9. N. L. Johnson and S. Kotz, Discrete Distributions, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969,

p. 58.

10. NPRDS Reportable System and Component Scope Manuals, INPO 83-020B, INPO 83-020G, and

INPO 83-020W, September 1985.

63
APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS AND CODES

FOR THE AGING FAILURE SURVEY

A-l
APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS AND CODES

FOR THE AGING FAILURE SURVEY

Table A-1. Failure category assignments for NPRDS codes

Design and Installation (D)

NPRDS Cause Categories: A

C

D

NPRDS Causes: AB

AC

AF

AG

AY

AZ

BC

BE

BF

Engineering/Design

Manufacturing Defect

Installation Error

Foreign/incorrect Material

Particulate Contamination

Weld Related

Abnormal Stress

Electrical Overload

Material Defect

Out of Mechanical Adjustment

Dirty

Blocked/Obstructed

Aging and Service Wear (A)

NPRDS Cause Category: H Wearout

NPRDS Causes: AC

AD

AE

AG

AL

AR

AS

AT

AU

AV

AW

AX

AY

AZ

BB

BC

BD

BE

BF

BG

BH

Particulate Contamination

Normal/Abnormal Wear

Lubrication Problem

Abnormal Stress

Set Point Drift

Insulation Breakdown

Short/Grounded

Open Circuit

Contacts Burned/Pitted/Corroded

Connection Defective/Loose Parts

Circuit Defective

Burned/Burned Out

Electrical Overload

Material Defect

Mechanical Damage/Binding

Out of Mechanical Adjustment

Aging/Cyclic Fatigue

Dirty

Blocked/Obstructed

Corrosion

Out of Calibration

A-3
Table A-1. (continued)

Testing and Maintenance (T)

NPRDS Cause Category: F Maintenance/Testing

NPRDS Causes: AG

AN

AR

AW

AY

BC

Bi

Abnormal Stress

Incorrect Procedure

Insulation Breakdown

Circuit Defective

Electrical Overload

Out of Mechanical Adjustment

Incorrect Action

Human Related (H)

NPRDS Cause Categories: B

E

NPRDS Causes: AA

AE

AL

AM

AN

AV

AW

AY

BC

Bi

Incorrect Procedure

Operating Error

Foreign/Wrong Part

Lubrication Problem

Set Point Drift

Previous Repair/Installation Status

Incorrect Procedure

Connection Defective/Loose Parts

Circuit Defective

Electrical Overload

Out of Mechanical Adjustment

Incorrect Action

Other/Unknown (0)

NPRDS Cause Categories: K

K

Other

Unknown

NPRDS Causes: Any of the causes apply as long as the cause

categories are the two listed above.

A-4
Table A-2. NPRDS component acronyms

ACCUMU - Accumulators

AIRDRY - Air/Gas Dryers

ANNUNC - Annunciator Modules

BATTRY - Batteries and Chargers

BLOWER - Blowers (Compressors)

CKTBRK - Circuit Closers/Interrupters

ELECON - Electrical Conductors

ENGINE - Engines, Internal Combustion

FILTER - Filters/Strainers

GENERA - Generators/Inverters/Alternators

HEATER - Heaters, Electric

HTEXCH - Heat Exchangers

IBISSW - Instrumentation: Bistables/Switches

ICNTRL - Instrumentation: Controllers

INDREC - Instrumentation: Indicators/Recorders

INTCPM - Instrumentation: Integrator/Computation Modules

IPWSUP - Instrumentation: Electric Power Supplies

ISODEV - Instrumentation: Isolation Devices

IXMITR - Instrumentation: Transmitters/Elements

MECFUN - Mechanical Function Units

MOTOR - Motors

PENETR - Penetrations

PIPE - Pipes, Fittings

PUMP - Pumps

RELAY - Relays

SUPORT - Shock Suppressors and Supports

TRANSF - Transformers

TURBIN - Turbines

VALVE - Valves and Dampers

VALVOP - Valve Operators

VESSEL - Pressure Vessels

A-5
Table A-3. NPRDS system effect descriptions

A Loss of System Function - A component failure that, by itself, results in the system being

unable to perform its intended function (i.e., all trains, channels, etc., inoperable).

B - Degraded System Operation - The system is capable of fulfilling its intended function, but

some feature of the system is impaired.

C - Loss of Redundancy - Loss of one system functional path.

D - Loss of Subsystem/Channel - A partial loss of system functional path.

E - System Function Unaffected - Failure did not affect the operation of the system.

A-6
APPENDIX B

REPORTED FAIWRE-CAUSE IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION

B-1
APPENDIX B

REPORTED FAILURE-CAUSE IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION

Failure-Cause Coding

This appendix contains information concerning

the failure-cause coding form (Figure B-I) used to

compile the analysis data. The data fields of the

coding form were developed such that necessary

information could be gathered in a concise manner

amenable to constructing a failure-cause data base.

Many of the fields were obtained directly from the

Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS)

record format. Table B-I shows those fields having

one-to-one correspondence.

The failure-cause coding form used for this study

is a modification of the form used in the Root

Causes of Component Failures Program. The following new fields were added: System Initial Conditions, System Effect, Event Date, In-Service

Date, Age, and Out-of-Service Date. The latter

four fields are discussed in the footnotes of

Figure B-1. A field called Aging was also added to

indicate if the failure was considered to be agerelated. This was necessary to tabulate the aging

failures, since many causes of failure may or may

not be age-related. A field for the report number

was included to relate the coding form to the specific NPRDS record. Two fields (Secondary Failure

Mode - Component and Subcomponent) were also

added. These fields provide more detail about how

the component itself and its piece parts failed.

Additional information concerning the failure-cause

coding can be found in Root Causes of Component

Failures Program: Methods and Applications,

NUREG/CR-4616, EGG-2455, December 1986.

Failure-Cause/Aging

Categorization Scheme

The failure-cause categorization scheme and

guidelines for aging failure classification are presented in this appendix. This categorization scheme

is based upon the failure-cause categorization

developed for use in the Root Causes of Components Failures Program and provides a means of

identifying and collecting reportable mechanisms

of failure for components contained in reactor systems. For use in the NRC Nuclear Plant Aging

Research (NPAR) Program, the scheme has been

expanded to provide guidelines for identifying

aging-related failures to the degree of certainty

allowable by the event data source. This entails

identification of aging-related failures on the basis

of certain causes or effects described in the failure

record narratives.

The categorization scheme consists of three levels.

The first, and most general, level of failure-cause categorization is represented by a one-character code. It is

comprised of five categories: design/manufacturing/

construction/quality assurance inadequacy (D), environmental stress (E), human actions (H),

supervision/management inadequacy (S), and unclassifiable cause (U).

The second level of categorization is a further resolution of the first level. For example, supervision/

management inadequacy (S) is divided into the

following second-level headings: contractor/other

personnel inadequacy (SC), inadequate human environment (SH), procedures inadequacy (SP), and training inadequacy (ST). All second-level failure-causes

are designated by 2-character codes.

The third level of cause resolution is the finest available for use and is designated by a 3-character code. For

example, the second-level entry for procedures inadequacy (SP) is divided into the following third-level

causes: calibration procedures (SPC), maintenance

procedures (SPM), operational procedures (SPO),

quality assurance procedures (SPQ), and testing/

surveillance procedures (SPTI). It should be noted that

for the purpose of aging-related failure determination,

many of the third-level causes tend to be more related

to failure effect codes than true failure-causes that

would be determinable by component engineering

studies.

Although the unclassifiable cause (U) category is

broken down into second and third levels, the thirdlevel codes indicate the effect of the failure and are

not considered to be true failure-causes. These

third-level entries are used because the failurecauses are unidentifiable from the failure report.

Using the definition in Section 3. 1, the aging classification scheme was developed to allow a procedural

approach to be taken in the identification of aging failures. Each failure-cause code is assigned one of three

aging classifications: non-aging, conditional aging, or

aging. Aging-related failure-cause codes are codes that

always relate to time-dependent effects. Examples of

these time-dependent codes are erosion, corrosion, and

wear. Nonaging-related failure-cause codes are used

B-3
Plant ID:

Docket number:

Report type: NPRDS

Report number:

Plant type:

PC record number:

Person Date

Coding:

Quality assurance:

Failure sequences:

Sequences this page:

CCF:

Plant group:

Manufacturer:b

Model number:d

Util. component ID:

Safety class:

Event date:a

In-service date:C

Age:e

Out-of-service (replacement) date:f

Code Description

Root Cause

Supplemental cause

Agree w/NPROS YES/NO

Aging YES/NO/LuNK

Component

Subcomponent

Failure Mode: Component

Subcomponent

Secondary Failure Mode: Component

Subcomponent

System

System initial conditions

System effect

Interfacing System

Method of Discovery

Unit: Initial Conditions

Unit Effect

Testing Performed Frequency/Interval Hours OOS

Testing Check Testing

Interval Functional Testing

Calibration Testing

Reference Reports:g

Pertinent Information:

Comments:

Failure Cause Key Phrases:

Figure B-1. Failure-cause coding form.

B-4
EXPLANATION OF FOOTNOTES

a. Event date (or date failure occurred)--The date or estimated date that

the system or component first became unable to operate at an

acceptable level.

b. Manufacturer--The company that manufactured the component.

c. In-service date--The actual date the system or component went into

service.

d. Model number--The number used by the manufacturer to identify the

component.

e. Age--This is the time to failure based on elapsed time from in-service

date to event date.

f. Out-of-service date--(a) If the out-of-service date is given in the

NPRDS 2C-Component Engineering Report, use of this date as the

out-of-service date shows the date that the old component was replaced

with an identical component, or equivalent. (b) If no out-of-service

date is given in the 2C report, use the Event Date (EBATE) given in

the 4C-Component Failure Report if there was an indication that the

component was repaired.

g. Reference Reports--If a Licensee Event Report (LER) was indicated,

used the actual LER number. If the record stated that an LER was

submitted, the analyst stated ULER submitted." Also utility document

numbers concerning analysis of a failure were recorded.

Figure B-1. (continued).

B-5
Table B-1. Cross-reference fields between the NPRDS records and the failure-cause

coding form

NPRDS

Report Field Failure-Cause Coding Form Field

2C-Component Engineering Report

UNITID

SYSTEM

UTILITY COMPONENT ID

NSSS

ISDATEd

OSDATEd

SCLASSd

MFGd

MFG MODEL NOd

CTFRE d

CTHRSE

FFREGd

FCODEd

FHRSd

CALFREQd

CALCODEd

CALHRSd

Plant Identificationa

Docket Number

Report Type

Report Numberb

Plant Groupb

Systemb

Utility Component Identificationb

Plant Ilypec

Age

In-Service Date

Out-Of-Service Date (if specified)

Safety Class

Manufacturer

Model Number

Check-Testing Frequency

Check-Testing Out-Of-Service Hours

Functional Testing Frequency

Functional Testing Interval Code

Functional Testing Out-Of-Service Hours

Calibration Testing Frequency

Calibration Testing Interval Code

Calibration Testing Out-Of-Service Hours

Event Dateb

System Initial Conditionsd

Method of Discovery

Method of Discovery

Failure Mode-Component

Reference Reports

Root Cause

Root Cause

System Effectd

Unit Effectd

Subcomponent

Root Cause

Root Cause Key Phrases

Comments

4C-Component Failure Report SDATEd

STATUSd

DETECTd

FAILURE DESCRIPTION

CAUSE CAT

CAUSE

SYS EFFd

PL EFFd

CAUSE OF FAILURE

CORRECTIVE ACTION

a. Plant ID is the fourth to seventh digit from UNITID field.

b. Necessary fields to retrieve NPRDS records.

c. Plant group: A -B&W for PWRs and C - GE for BWRs.

d. Taken directly from the NPRDS records.

B-6
for random events that cause immediate failure of the

component. Examples of these types of failure-causes

are fie/smoke, impact loads, and electromagnetic interference. Conditional aging failures are classified as

aging-related if information in the failure report indicates some aging-related effect code (from the categorization scheme) or some keyword that indicates that a

time-dependent process is present. A failure categorized with a conditional aging code is classified nonaging if the failure description indicates that a random

event caused an immediate failure. In some instances, a

failure description contains enough information to

allow categorization with a conditional code but gives

no indication as to whether the failure was random or

aging-related in nature. In this latter case, the failure

will be assigned an unknown classification.

Table B-2 presents the failure-cause categorization and aging classification scheme. It is followed

by the definitions of the failure-causes and guidelines for establishing the aging classification.

Table B-2. Failure-cause categorization and aging classification scheme

D Design/manufacturing/construction/quality assurance inadequacy

DC Construction error or inadequacy - conditional aging-related

DCI Initial construction activity

DCR Retrofit construction activity

DE Design error or inadequacy - conditional aging-related

DEI Initial design activity

DER Retrofit design activity

DM Manufacturing error or inadequacy - conditional aging-related

DQ Quality assurance error or inadequacy - non-aging-related

DQD

DQE

DQI

DQM

DQR

Initial design quality assurance activity

Retrofit design quality assurance activity

Initial construction quality assurance activity

Manufacturer quality assurance activity

Retrofit construction quality assurance activity

DR Plant definition requirements inadequacy - conditional aging-related

DRI Initial definition activity

DRR Retrofit definition activity

E Environmental stress

EA Animate causes

EAB

EAE

EAO

Metal-sheathed bacteria - aging-related

Animal encroachment - conditional aging-related

Aquatic organisms - conditional aging-related

B-7
Table B-2. (continued)

EB Materials interaction

EBB Embrittlement - aging-related

EBC Cavitation - conditional aging-related

EBE Erosion - aging-related

EBF Cyclic fatigue - aging-related

EBM Materials defect - conditional aging-related

EBR Wear - aging-related

EBS Steam impingement - non-aging-related

EBW Weld-related flaw - conditional aging-related

EC Chemical reactions

ECC Corrosion - aging-related

ECE Electrolysis - aging-related

ECF Foaming - non-aging-related

ECS Stratification - conditional aging-related

ED Mechanical failure

EDB Binding/out of adjustment - conditional aging-related

EDF Friction - non-aging-related

EDI Foreign materials intrusion - conditional aging-related

EDL Improper level - non-aging-related

EDO Mechanical overload - conditional aging-related

EDS Set point drift - aging-related

EDT Out of calibration - conditional aging-related

EDU Improper lubrication - conditional aging-related

EDW Improper flow - non-aging-related

EE Electromagnetic interference - non-aging-related

EEI Inadvertent electrical energy exposure

EEM Magnetic field exposure

EEN Noise

EF Fire/smoke - non-aging-related

EH Human-caused event - non-aging-related

EHD Deliberate acts

EHU Unintentional acts

El Impact loads - non-aging-related

EL Electrical failure

ELA Arcing - conditional aging-related

ELC Over/under current - conditional aging-related

ELD Set point drift - aging-related

ELE Electrical overload - conditional aging-related

ELF Faulty module - conditional aging-related

ELG Abnormal specific gravity - conditional aging-related

ELH Abnormal resistance - aging-related

ELI Insulation breakdown - conditional aging-related

B-8
Table B-2. (continued)

ELK Contact failure - conditional aging-related

ELL End of life - aging-related

ELO Open circuit - conditional aging-related

ELR Erroneous/spurious signal - non-aging-related

ELS Short circuit - conditional aging-related

ELT Out of calibration - conditional aging-related

ELV Over/under voltage - conditional aging-related

ELW Winding/coil failure - conditional aging-related

EM Moisture

EMH High humidity - conditional aging-related

EMI Icing - non-aging-related

EML Low humidity - non-aging-related

EMW Water intrusion - conditional aging-related

EN Acts of nature

ENA Atmospheric conditions - conditional aging-related

ENG Geological/geographic conditions - non-aging-related

ENM Meteorological conditions - non-aging-related

EP Pressure - non-aging-related

EPF Fluctuating pressure

EPH High pressure

EPI Improper differential pressure

EPL Low pressure

ER Radiation - aging-related

ERH High - level radiation

ERL Low - level radiation

ET Temperature - conditional aging-related

ETF Fluctuating temperature

ETH High temperature

ETI Improper differential temperature

ETL Low temperature

EV Vibration loads - conditional aging-related

EVF Flow - induced vibration

EVM Mechanical vibration

B-9
Table B-2. (continued)

H Human actions

HA Accidental action - non-aging-related

HAC Calibration activity

HAM Maintenance activity

HAO Operations activity

HAQ Quality assurance activity

HAT Testing/surveillance activity

HC Communication problem - non-aging-related

HCC Calibration activity

HCM Maintenance activity

HCO Operations activity

HCQ Quality assurance activity

HCT Testing/surveillance activity

HE Human error (practices) - conditional aging-related

HEC Calibration activity

HEM Maintenance activity

HEO Operations activity

HEQ Quality assurance activity

HET Testing/surveillance activity

HM Misdiagnosis - conditional aging-related

HMC Calibration activity

HMM Maintenance activity

HMO Operations activity

HMQ Quality assurance activity

HMT Testing/surveillance activity

HP Failure to follow procedures - conditional aging-related

HPC Calibration activity

HPM Maintenance activity

HPO Operations activity

HPQ Quality assurance activity

HPT Testing/surveillance activity

S Supervision/management inadequacy

SC Contractor/other personnel inadequacy - non-aging-related

SH Inadequate human environment (hazardous) - non-aging-related

SHC Calibration activity

SHM Maintenance activity

SHO Operations activity

SHQ Quality assurance activity

SHT Testing/surveillance activity

B-10
Table B-2. (continued)

SP Procedures inadequacy - conditional aging-related

SPC Calibration procedures

SPM Maintenance procedures

SPO Operational procedures

SPQ Quality assurance procedures

SPT Testing/surveillance procedures

ST Training inadequacy - conditional aging-related

STC Calibration activity

STM Maintenance activity

STO Operations activity

STQ Quality assurance activity

STT Testing/surveillance activity

U Unclassifiable cause - conditional aging-related

UA Aging/wearout - aging-related

UE Effects displayed - conditional aging-related

UEB Burned out

UEC Closed

UEE Bent/overstressed

UEF Computer malfunction

UEK Broken

UEL Leakage

UEM Missing/misplaced

UEO Open

UES Loose

UET Tight

UN No effects displayed - conditional aging-related

B-I I
Definitions

The definitions for each of the entries in the

failure-cause categorization scheme are presented

in this section.

D Design/Manufacturing/Construction/Quality

Assurance Inadequacy

This is the group of causes associated with

decisions or events that generally take place

before the plant is operational. These causes

are usually outside the purview of operations

personnel.

DC Construction Error or Inadequacy

The DC code is used when the constructors do not follow instructions, abuse

equipment, or use poor practices in

matters normally left to the judgment

of the installers.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Errors or inadequacies associated with

these causes can cause accelerated aging.

In order for a failure to be classified as

aging-related when using one of these

codes, the failure description must also

contain an aging-related environmental

stress effect or failure-cause (described

under the environmental codes) resulting

from the error or inadequacy.

DCI Initial Construction Activity

DCR Retrofit Construction Activity

DE Design Error or Inadequacy

This code is applied where the designer

uses a wrong table or equation, errs in

making a calculation, allows inadequate margin, misapplies equipment,

or fails to provide error-free drawings

and specifications to manufacturing.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Errors or inadequacies associated with

these causes can cause accelerated aging.

In order for a failure to be classified as

aging-related when using one of these

codes, the failure description must also

contain an aging-related environmental

stress effect or failure-cause (described

under the environmental codes) resulting

from the error or inadequacy.

DEI Initial Design Activity

DER Retrofit Design Activity

DM Manufacturing Error or Inadequacy

The DM code is applied when manufacturing personnel do not follow the

designer's instructions, allow manufacturing processes to go out of control, or

allow damage to occur to the manufactured items while in storage.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Errors or inadequacies associated with

these causes can cause accelerated aging.

In order for a failure to be classified as

aging-related when using one of these

codes, the failure description must also

contain an aging-related environmental

stress effect or failure-cause (described

under the environmental codes) resulting

from the error or inadequacy.

DQ Quality Assurance Error or Inadequacy

This code is applied when design, construction, or manufacturing personnel

do not properly perform quality assurance on this work.

Aging Classification: Non-aging - failures resulting from accelerated aging

caused by design, construction, or manufacturing activities would be coded under

those failure codes, not quality assurance

codes.

DQD Initial Design Quality Assurance

Activity

DQE Retrofit Design Quality Assurance Activity

DQI Initial Construction Quality

Assurance Activity

DQM Manufacturer Quality Assurance

Activity

B-12
DQR Retrofit Construction Quality

Assurance Activity

DR Plant Definition Requirements Inadequacy

This is the most basic design-related

inadequacy-the failure to provide the

proper set of design requirements for

the component. For example, the design

requirements call for an ambient temperature of 1000F, whereas the actual

temperature frequently exceeds 1 150F.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Inadequacies associated with these causes

can cause accelerated aging. In order for a

failure to be classified as aging-related

when using one of these codes, the failure

description must also contain an agingrelated environmental stress effect or

failure-cause (described under the environmental codes) resulting from the inadequacy.

DRI Initial Definition Activity

DRR Retrofit Definition Activity

E Environmental Stress

The following cause codes represent actual

causes of failures. In many cases, the codes

stand for the effects produced by mechanisms

that may not be identified by the failure

descriptions. Therefore, for the purpose of categorization, the terms effect and cause can be

used interchangeably. These cause codes apply

to environmental stresses that may be either the

sole cause or one of two or more causes that

together are the cause of a component failure.

Generally, an abnormal stress may be a sole

cause, whereas an ambient stress usually acts in

conjunction with another cause. With the

exception of the acts of nature and humancaused events, the stresses are considered to be

induced by the plant environment.

EA Animate Causes

This cause code relates to failures

involving nonhuman animate causes.

EAB Metal-Sheathed Bacteria

This cause code refers to growth

of bacteria that attack pipe

walls.

Aging classification: Aging - The

process of bacterial attack on piping walls results in a degradation

that is time-dependent.

EAE Animal Encroachment

This cause code refers to invasion by animals, such as rats,

field mice, and birds.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - The occurrence of

animal encroachment is not generally considered aging-related, since

the action would result in an immediate equipment failure particularly in items such as electrical

cabinets. The gradual accumulation of animal debris, causing degradation of electrical equipment in

a panel, is considered to be agingrelated.

EAO Aquatic Organisms

This includes invasion by

aquatic organisms such as fish

and snails.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - In general, failures

resulting from the intrusion of

aquatic animals are not considered

aging-related. However, buildup of

organisms such as algae constitute

a time-dependent process and as

such are considered aging-related.

Failures resulting from the latter

would normally contain indications of foreign material intrusion

and gradual accumulation in the

failure description.

EB Materials Interaction

This category includes causes arising

from the interaction or interfacing of

B-13
materials in components, between components, or between solids and liquids.

EBB Embrittlement

The EBB code represents a materials problem brought about by

the environment a component is

in, such as high-temperature

effects on seals or high-level

radiation exposure. Embrittlement may lead to cracking.

Aging Classification: Aging -

Embrittlement is a time-dependent

degradation of material properties.

EBC Cavitation

Cavitation is a hydraulic phenomenon of a liquid changing

into a gaseous phase in a region

of low liquid pressure. The

vapor bubbles can later collapse,

causing shock waves and damage to chamber walls.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - Cavitation results

from system conditions resulting

from random events, poor design,

or misapplication of hydraulic

equipment. Cavitation will generally produce an immediate degradation of the system or equipment

such as pumps. In this situation,

cavitation is considered non-aging.

The code is considered to be agingrelated if the cavitation has caused

erosion, such as in thinning of pipe

walls or pitting and eroding pump

impellers.

EBE Erosion

Erosion refers to processes

where the surfaces of a component are gradually diminished.

These processes are caused by a

flowing medium, such as a liquid, gas, or slurry, impinging on

the component.

Aging Classification: Aging - Erosion is the time-dependent removal

of material by some active agent.

EBF Cyclic Fatigue

This is a failure-cause in metals

and some plastics where

repeated or cyclic loading yields

cracking or fracture.

Aging Classification: Aging -

Cyclic fatigue is a time-dependent

degradation of material properties.

EBM Materials Defect

This cause code includes pores

and voids.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - Defective or weakened materials can result in the

effective accelerated aging of a

component operating in its design

environment. In this situation, the

cause (or effect) is classified as

aging. Material defects can also

cause component failure once

placed in operation. In the latter

situation, the code is not considered aging because an immediate

failure occurs.

EBR Wear

This refers to the process of relative movement between parts of

a component gradually deteriorating the contact surfaces. The

EBR code includes abrasion,

galling, and fretting.

Aging Classification: Aging - Degradation from this cause (or effect)

is time-dependent in nature.

EBS Steam Impingement

This cause code refers to high

temperature and high humidity

events.

B-14
Aging Classification: Non-aging -

This cause (or effect) refers to

immediate failure due to a random

event causing high temperature or

humidity.

EBW Weld-Related Flaw

The EBW code includes any

materials problems, such as

cracking, which occur in welds

or in the heat-affected zone.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - Defective or weakened welds can result in the

effective accelerated aging of a

component operating in its design

environment. In this situation, the

cause (or effect) is classified as

aging. Weld defects can also cause

component failure when first

placed in operation. In the latter

situation, the code is not considered aging because the failure will

be immediate.

EC Chemical Reactions

This cause code applies to chemical

reactions between the component and

chemicals in the process or in the environment that cause corrosion, foaming,

or electrolysis.

ECC Corrosion

This cause has several forms:

corrosive agent exposure, galvanic corrosion, oxidation corrosion, stress corrosion/

intergranular stress corrosion

cracking (IGSCC).

Aging Classification: Aging - All

forms of corrosion entail the timedependent degradation by some

agent.

ECE Electrolysis

The ECE code refers to the

decomposition of a substance by

electric current.

Aging Classification: Aging - The

decomposition of a substance

through electrolysis is a timedependent process. Therefore, any

failures attributable to this cause

are considered aging-related.

ECF Foaming

This code refers to a frothing

that is caused by chemical impurities.

Aging Classification: Non-aging -

Chemical impurities entering a system in concentrations high enough

to cause frothing would result in

the immediate degradation of the

system or component performance.

ECS Stratification

The ECS code refers to a condition where a formerly mixed

chemical substance separates

and forms layers of constituent

elements.

Aging Classification: Ccnditional aging - Stratification of

chemicals is a time-dependent

process usually occurring in battery chemicals. Particularly in the

case of battery power degradation,

the cause (or effect) is considered

to be aging. This code is considered to be conditional aging so as

not to preclude immediate performance degradations in other

systems where chemicals are

mixed.

ED Mechanical Failures

This cause category applies to all failures found in mechanisms, machines,

and mechanical devices. This includes

valve operators and circuit breaker

mechanisms.

B-15
EDB Binding/Out of Adjustment

This applies mainly to shafts,

but can be used for other failures

as well. It should not be used for

a component that is out of calibration.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - Binding/out of

adjustment due to a maintenance

activity or thermal stress on the

system usually results in the immediate failure of the component and

is considered to be non-aging.

However, cases occur where the

problem is not serious enough to

cause immediate failure. In this situation, accelerated aging can

occur. The failure would be classified aging only if information

exists in the failure description

linking an aging failure-cause (or

effect) with the binding/out of

adjustment condition.

EDF Friction

The EDF code is mainly

intended to describe the process

where heat is produced by excessive contact of moving parts; but

it can have other applications,

such as flow friction.

Aging Classification: Non-aging -

This code is primarily an effect

code resulting from items such as

loss of or improper lubrication and

binding/out of adjustment. Therefore, the aging classification is

assigned to the cause of the friction.

EDI Foreign Materials Intrusion

This code includes blockage/

obstruction, dirt, and particulate contamination.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - Situations where

equipment failures occur due to

the buildup of some material

resulting from the action of a timedependent agent are classified as

aging. Blockages due to random

events are non-aging.

EDL Improper Level

The EDL cause code includes

high/low level and fluctuating

level.

Aging Classification: Non-aging -

This code represents an immediately detectable system condition

due to an event consisting of either

a random or aging-related failure

of some component. The aging

classification would be assigned to

the failure-cause of the component. This code should not be used

for lubrication incidents.

EDO Mechanical Overload

The EDO code refers to force or

stress greater than design capabilities, either demanded or

received from a machine or

mechanism.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - In general, this cause

(or effect) applies to events where

an overload condition caused by

some other event leads to an immediate failure. Since the continual

application of overload conditions

will lead to degradation of equipment, the cause (or effect) is considered to be aging-related if the

failure description indicates that

the condition has existed for some

period of time.

EDS Set Point Drift

This cause code refers to

mechanical set points that

change over time, such as spring

tension in relief valves.

Aging Classification: Aging - The

drift of mechanical set points

requires the time-dependent

change of material properties.

B-16
EDT Out of Calibration

The EDT cause code refers to

mechanical items that fall out of

calibration and do not perform

as required. This code should

only be used when no better

information is available. For

example: a cable drive slips on a

strip-chart recorder so the pen

does not mark at the true indication. Zero adjustment faults are

also included here.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - This cause (or effect)

code may be the result of random

actions that disturb the equipment.

A common example would be

maintenance errors. This code is

analogous to drift when a timedependent aging phenomenon is

involved. In order for this code to

be classified as aging, some indication of a time dependence must be

present in the failure description.

EDU Improper Lubrication

This cause code applies to lossof-lubrication incidents. Other

lubrication problems should be

covered by personnel codes.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - Improper lubrication

can cause accelerated aging when

not detected. To classify a failure,

using this code, as aging, there

must be an aging effect code identifiable in the failure description.

EDW Improper Flow

The EDW cause code includes

high/low flow, no flow, and pulsating flow.

Aging Classification: Non-aging -

This code represents an immediately detectable system condition

due to either a random or agingrelated failure of some component.

The aging classification would be

assigned to the failure-cause of the

component.

EE Electromagnetic Interference

This cause code applies to all electromagnetic interferences generated by

equipment in or around the plant. It

does not include lightning, an act of

nature.

Aging Classification: Non-aging - Electrical failures resulting from these causes (or

effects) are considered to be random.

EEI Inadvertent Electrical Energy

Exposure

The EEl code includes static

charge buildup.

EEM Magnetic Field Exposure

This cause code includes magnetization of ferric components.

EEN Noise

Noise is the generation of random electrical impulses that are

transmitted with signals.

EF Fire/Smoke

This cause code applies to fire or any

form of combustion. This stress may be

due to heat or the combustion products.

This could be inside or outside the

plant.

Aging Classification: Non-aging - Fires

result in immediate degradation of equipment performance.

EH Human-Caused Event

This code refers to human actions that

are outside normal operation of the

plant (i.e., the personnel involved, if

they are plant employees, caused a failure doing something other than the performance of their jobs). Nonplant

personnel may be antagonistic and/or

violent.

B-17
Aging Classification: Non-aging - Failures

resulting from human actions are random

events.

EHD Deliberate Acts

This code includes malicious

mischief.

EHU Unintentional Acts

The EHU code includes transportation accidents and industrial accidents.

El Impact Loads

This cause code applies to impact loads

imposed on a component. Examples are

component damage by a falling body or

distortion of a check valve caused by

water hammer. These could affect the

component either internally or externally.

Aging Classification: Non-aging - Failures

resulting from impacts are random events.

Events such as water hammer are precluded by operational procedures. Should

continuing water hammer events degrade a

system, the failure would be classified

aging under a procedural cause code.

EL Electrical Failure

This cause code is used for electrical

items where more detailed information

is not obtainable. These causes interfere

with the function of electrical components.

ELA Arcing

Arcing is a condition of electric

current breaking down air and

spanning a gap between open

contacts.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - In general, this cause

(or effect) would result in immediate failure of the electrical component. However, in the case of

contacts eroding or wearing via

multiple switch or relay opening

and closure, the cause would be

considered aging.

ELC Over/Under Current

This code refers to a condition of

too high or too low current.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - In general, this cause

(or effect) applies to events where

over/under current conditions

caused by some other event lead to

an immediate failure. Since the

continual application of over/

under current conditions will lead

to degradation of equipment, the

cause (or effect) is considered to be

aging-related if the failure description indicates that the condition

has existed for some period of

time, such as longer than a maintenance interval.

ELD Set Point Drift

This code refers to electrical

equipment varying from a fixed

setting for starting a process,

stopping a process, or modifying

a process.

Aging Classification: Aging - Set

point drift of electrical components requires the time-dependent

degradation of the material electrical properties.

ELE Electrical Overload

The ELE code refers to more

power demanded or delivered

than the component is designed

for.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - In general, this cause

(or effect) applies to events where

an overload condition caused by

some other event leads to an immediate failure. Since the continual

application of overload conditions

B-18
will lead to degradation of equipment, the cause (or effect) is considered to be aging-related if the

failure description indicates that

the condition has existed for some

period of time, such as longer than

a maintenance interval.

ELF Faulty Module

Faulty module refers to a condition where an electrical unit

composed of more than one

solid-state component (such as

an amplifier, circuit board, integrated circuit, etc.) does not perform its function. The cause for

failure to perform is likely to be

undetermined.

Aging Classification: Conditional

aging - In general, the cause will be

aging-related because a component in the module failed due to

continued operation at stressful

conditions, such as abnormal temperature, excessive vibration, or

electrical overload. Some cases will

exist where the failure is due to mishandling or a single event; in those

cases, the failure is non-aging.

ELG Abnormal Specific Gravity

Abnormal specific gravity refers

to a condition of the electrolyte

in a lead-acid storage battery.

Specific gravity is an indicator of

the charge of a battery. Low specific gravity indicates a low state

of charge. Abnormal specific

gravity is usually low, but some

situations can cause the measured specific gravity to be high.

Aging Classification: Conditional

aging - When the failure description indicates that the abnormal

specific gravity is related to an aged

battery that can no longer be successfully charged, the failure is

age-related. In some cases, the specific gravity will be low because the

battery had not been charged or

because water had been recently

added; the failure-cause is then

non-age-related. -

ELH Abnormal Resistance

Abnormal resistance refers to a

condition in which the resistance

is not within the specified range,

but is neither a short circuit nor

an open circuit. Windings, coils,

and contacts in switches, relays,

or connectors can have an

abnormal resistance that prevents proper operation.

Aging Classification: Agingrelated - Abnormal resistance is

caused by corrosion, insulation

breakdown, or other time-related

effects that either increase or

decrease the resistance of the circuit.

ELI insulation Breakdown

The ELI code refers to a

degraded condition of electrical

insulation that allows current to

seek a path through the insulation.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - In general, the cause

(or effect) will be aging-related

since the decomposition of insulation is a time-dependent process.

Cases will exist, however, where the

insulation was damaged by a random event, such as impact. In the

latter situation, the failure is nonaging.

ELK Contact Failure

Contact failure refers to a condition of a relay when the failure is

known to be at the contact rather

than the coil, but additional

information is not provided. The

event could be a failure of the

contact to close, to open, or to

make proper electrical contact

even though it is mechanically

B-19
operated, such as would happen

with corroded contacts.

Aging Classification: Conditional

aging - If the failure description

indicated the existence of timerelated factors, the failure is agerelated. If the failure is caused by a

single event, such as over-current

damaging the contacts, the failure

is non-age-related.

ELL End of Life

End of life is a condition in

which the failure is attributed to

the component being old or having reached its natural end of life

without providing more detailed

information.

Aging Classification: Agingrelated - The stated condition is

end of life.

ELO Open Circuit

Open circuit is a condition where

the resistance between two conductors of a electrical circuit is

very large. Examples include

broken wires, wires coming loose

from terminals, connectors

becoming loose, and excessive

corrosion at connections.

Aging Classification: Conditional

aging - In general, this condition

would result in immediate failure

of the circuit to perform its

intended function. However, in the

case of connections corroding or

wires breaking due to continual

flexing or frequent handling, the

cause would be considered aging.

ELR Erroneous/Spurious Signal

The ELR code refers to a signal

that is unwanted or unneeded,

sometimes generated by electrical noise.

Aging Classification: Non-aging -

This cause (or effect) is considered

a random event.

ELS Short Circuit

Short circuit refers to a condition in which the resistance

between two conductors or

between a conductor and ground

is very small and much less than

normal for that particular circuit.

Aging Classification: Conditional

aging - Often this condition will be

age-related, since short circuits

usually result from a breakdown in

insulation which is a timedependent process. Cases will exist

where the short circuit is a result of

damaged insulation or some event

that causes a mechanical connection of the two conductors. In the

latter situation, the failure is nonaging.

ELT Out of Calibration

The ELT code refers to a component being out of calibration and

not performing as required.

Sending a signal at an incorrect

voltage is an example of out of

calibration.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - This cause (or effect)

code may be the result of random

actions that disturb the equipment.

A common example would be

maintenance errors. This code is

analogous to drift when a timedependent aging phenomenon is

involved. In order for this code to

be classified as aging, some indication of a time dependence must be

present in the failure description.

ELV Over/lUnder Voltage

This code refers to a condition of

too high or too low voltage.

B-20
Aging Classification: Conditional aging - In general, this cause

(or effect) applies to events where

over/under voltage conditions

caused by some other event lead to

an immediate failure. But since the

continual application of over/

under voltage conditions will lead

to degradation of equipment, the

cause (or effect) is considered to be

aging-related if the failure description indicates that the condition

has existed for some period of

time, such as longer than a maintenance interval.

ELW Winding/Coil Failure

Winding/coil failure is a condition in which a winding/coil in a

motor, solenoid, relay, switch,

etc. has failed (often burned out)

but the cause of the failure is not

defined. Causes could be a result

of a failure within the winding/

coil or a result of some adverse

condition that was applied.

Aging Classification: Conditional

aging - Failures as a result of insulation breakdown or continued

operation at elevated temperature

or in a high humidity environment

would be aging-related. Failures as

a result of a single event would be

non-aging-related.

EM Moisture

This cause code is applied to ice, water,

or water vapor in the environment that

causes a component failure. Spray and

flood are two examples.

EMH High Humidity

The EMH code refers to high

humidity inside the power plant.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - The presence of

moisture in high concentrations

has degrading effects on equipment and is addressed by equipment qualification standards. A

failure that can be categorized

using this code is classified as

aging-related if the failure reports

contain indications of other agingrelated effects, such as corrosion.

EMI Icing

The EMI code refers to icing

inside the plant, such as in ice

condenser units.

Aging Classification: Non-aging -

Icing of equipment will result in

the immediate failure of the

affected equipment.

EML Low Humidity

This refers to lower-than-normal

humidity inside the power plant.

Aging Classification: Non-aging -

Equipment qualification standards

do not consider low humidity a

concern to component operational

life.

EMW Water Intrusion

The EMW code refers to water

entering the plant from outside

or water intruding from area to

area inside the plant.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - In general, the intrusion of water is a random event and

will cause immediate equipment

failure. Undetected and uncorrected water intrusion can cause

accelerated aging. For this situation, the failure description must

also identify aging-related effects

to be classified as aging.

EN Acts of Nature

This cause code applies very selectively

to those causes that are in no way

induced by the plant itself, such as

earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, lightning, and precipitation.

B-21
ENA Atmospheric Conditions

The ENA code is used for conditions that are more or less stable

and originate due to climate or

other location-dependent conditions. This includes high or low

barometric pressure, high or low

atmospheric temperature, and

saline atmosphere.

Aging Classification - Conditional

aging - Equipment failures attributable to atmospheric conditions

would be considered aging-related

if other effect or failure-causes

such as corrosion or foreign materials intrusion were present in the

failure description. These types of

effects could result from atmospheric conditions, such as high

saline content or winds with high

dust content.

ENG Geological/Geographic Conditions

This includes avalanche,

landslide/mudslide, and seismic

activity.

Aging Classification - Non-aging -

These types of conditions or events

result in immediate equipment failure.

ENM Meteorological Conditions

This includes weather conditions

such as electrical storm, high

wind, hurricane, lightning, tornado, tsunami, rain or freezing

rain, hail, and snow.

Aging Classification - Non-aging -

This code is used where these types

of conditions or events result in

immediate equipment failure.

EP Pressure

This code is applied to liquid and gas

system pressure problems. It does not

include barometric pressure (code

ENA).

Aging Classification: Non-aging - Plant

design and operations are established to

control pressure. Therefore, failures

related to pressure would result from procedural or equipment failures. Aging classification would be reserved for the failures

causing the pressure transient.

EPF Fluctuating Pressure

EPH High Pressure

EPI Improper Differential Pressure

EPL Low Pressure

ER Radiation

This cause code applies to damage due

to radiation (i.e., alpha, beta, gamma,

neutrons, or combinations thereof).

Aging Classification: Aging - Material

property degradation due to radiation is

considered to be aging-related.

ERH High Level Radiation

ERL Low Level Radiation

ET Temperature

The ET cause code applies to the stress

caused by abnormal temperatures

within the plant.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Temperature effects can cause embrittlement or other material degradation, such

as loss of plasticity or degradation of electrical equipment. Improper differential

temperatures can cause binding or wear so

as to eventually degrade a component.

These effects are time-dependent, and failures labeled with these codes are classified

as aging if the failure description identifies

the presence of aging-related effects.

ETF Fluctuating Temperature

ETH High Temperature

B-22
HAC Calibration Activity

ETI Improper Differential Temperature

ETL Low Temperature

EV Vibration Loads

This cause code applies to vibrationinduced loads imposed on a component

from sources within the plant. For

example, vibration from rotating

machinery causes the loosening of

screws within a circuit breaker.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Vibration will cause accelerated aging to

occur. The categorization of a failure using

these codes is classified aging if one of the

aging effect codes, such as cyclic fatigue or

wear, can be identified in the failure

description. Vibration would be considered non-aging if, for example, a pump

were out of adjustment and began vibrating to the point that it destroyed itself or a

piece part of the pump very quickly.

EVF Flow Induced Vibration

EVM Mechanical Vibration

H Human Actions

These are human errors of omission, commission, and accidental human actions committed

during plant operation and maintenance.

(Design inadequacies and procedure inadequacies are of human origin also but are remote

from the on-line decisions that must be made

by a plant operator.)

HA Accidental Action

The HA code is used when the human

action is purely accidental. For example, the plant operator is correctly following the appropriate calibration

procedure, but the screwdriver slips and

short-circuits the signal line.

Aging Classification: Non-aging - These

causes refer to immediate equipment failures resulting from accidental actions.

HAM Maintenance Activity

HAO Operations Activity

HAQ Quality Assurance Activity

HAT Testing/Surveillance Activity

HC Communication Problem

This cause code is used when personnel

encounter a communication discrepancy or problem, either written (such as

ambiguous plant orders or memos) or

oral (such as poor telephone connections or noise). This code is not used for

difficulties with procedures.

Aging Classification: Non-aging - These

causes refer to immediate events resulting

from poor communications.

HCC Calibration Activity

HCM Maintenance Activity

HCO Operations Activity

HCQ Quality Assurance Activity

HCT Testing/Surveillance Activity

HE Human Error

This HE code is used when personnel

perpetrate an error of commission by

exceeding an appropriate procedure.

An example is when an operator overtorques a valve when directed to close it.

These types of errors are usually termed

good practice errors.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Actions associated with these causes can

accelerate aging. In order for a failure to be

classified as aging-related when using one

of these codes, the failure description must

also contain an aging-related environmental stress effect or failure-cause (described

under the environmental codes) resulting

from the error.

B-23
HEC Calibration Activity

HEM MaintenanceActivity

HEO Operations Activity

HEQ Quality Assurance Activity

HET Testing/Surveillance Activity

HM Misdiagnosis (Followed Wrong Procedures)

The HM cause code applies when plant

personnel, through misdiagnosis,

choose the wrong procedure to follow.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Actions associated with these causes can

cause accelerated aging. In order for a failure to be classified as aging-related when

using one of these codes, the failure

description must also contain an agingrelated environmental stress effect or

failure-cause (described under the environmental codes) resulting from the error.

HMC Calibration Activity

HMM Maintenance Activity

HMO OperationsActivity

HMQ Quality Assurance Activity

HMT Testing/Surveillance Activity

HP Failure to Follow Procedures

This HP code is used when the procedures are correct but plant personnel

fail to follow the procedures.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Actions associated with these causes can

accelerate aging. In order for a failure to be

classified as aging-related when using one

of these codes, the failure description must

also contain an aging-related environmental stress effect or failure-cause (described

under the environmental codes) resulting

from the error.

HPC Calibration Activity

HPM Maintenance Activity

HPO Operations Activity

HPQ QualityAssuranceActivity

HPT Testing/Surveillance Activity

S Supervision/Management Inadequacy

This group of causes pertains to utility management. It includes failure areas of management or supervision. Management is

considered responsible for non-plant personnel

working within the plant. Inadequate procedures and inadequate training programs arise

from improper managerial control. It is considered an error in supervision to send personnel into a hazardous environment without

proper protective clothing.

SC Contractor/Other Personnel Activity

The SC code applies to contractors or

other non-plant personnel who are

working in the plant area but are not

plant employees. This code is used for

errors such as a contractor inadvertently tripping a circuit breaker in the

work location or incorrectly performing

a function so as to cause a component

to fail.

Aging Classification: Non-aging - The

cause refers to immediate failures resulting

from human interaction.

SH Inadequate Human Environment

The SH code is used when the working

environment is hazardous or extreme,

containing such factors as high heat,

excess noise, steam leakages, or high

radiation.

Aging Classification: Non-aging - These

causes refer to immediate failures resulting

from human interaction due to environmental stress.

SHC Calibration Activity

SHM Maintenance Activity

B-24
SHO Operations Activity SPO Operational Procedures

SHQ Quality Assurance Activity

SHT Testing/Surveillance Activity

SP Procedures Inadequacy

This is the group of causes associated

with procedures, written or not, that are

the prescribed way of operating and

maintaining the equipment. Inadequate

procedures include ambiguous, incomplete, or erroneous procedures. An

ambiguous procedure is one that lacks

clarity or one that can easily be misinterpreted. An incomplete procedure is

one that omits an important detail or

assumes the operator knows more than

is normally expected. An erroneous

procedure is one that, if followed

exactly, would lead to an undesirable

result.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Inadequacies associated with these causes

can cause accelerated aging. In order for a

failure to be classified as aging-related

when using one of these codes, the failure

description must also contain an, agingrelated environmental stress effect or

failure-cause (described under the environmental codes) resulting from the inadequacy.

SPC Calibration Procedures

The SPC code applies to procedures on when and how to check

for calibration error and how to

recalibrate.

SPM Maintenance Procedures

This code applies to procedures

on when and how to maintain

the plant equipment. It includes

schedules and procedures for

preventive maintenance, as well

as procedures for repairing

failed equipment.

The SPO code applies to procedures on how to operate the

plant, as well as procedures that

tell operators when and how to

start, stop, and make operating

adjustments in equipment.

SPQ Quality Assurance Procedures

SPQ applies to procedures on

how to check and ensure the

quality of plant equipment.

SPT Testing/Surveillance Procedures

SPT applies to procedures on

when and how to test plant

equipment and follow surveillance instructions.

ST Training Inadequacy

The ST cause codes are used to describe

personnel who fail to perform their

function properly because of poor or

improper training or because of unfamiliarity with the power plant.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging -

Inadequacies associated with these causes

can cause accelerated aging. In order for a

failure to be classified as aging-related

when using one of these codes, the failure

description must also contain an agingrelated environmental stress effect or

failure-cause (described under the environmental codes) resulting from the inadequacy.

STC Calibration Activity

STM Maintenance Activity

STO Operations Activity

STQ Quality Assurance Activity

STT Testing/Surveillance Activity

B-25
U Unclassirable Cause UEE Bent

This code should only be used as a last resort.

It is used when the cause is simply not stated

within the failure report. Often the effect is

stated, so the third level was generated to retain

and show the effect displayed by the component.

Aging Classification: Conditional aging - Failures

categorized with these codes are considered to be

conditional aging-related. If the failure description

indicates that an unidentifiable, time-dependent

process has occurred, the failure would be classified as unclassifiable aging/wearout. If the failure

description indicates an unidentifiable random

event or provides no indication of what caused the

failure, then the failure would be classified nonaging or unknown and one of the UE codes would

be used.

UA Unclassyfiable Aging/ Wearout

UE Effects Displayed

UEB Burned Out

The UEB cause code is used to

indicate a loss of function due to

adverse electrical energy exposure.

UEC Closed

UEF Computer Malfunction

UEF covers computer-oriented

problems whose nature is not

well explained. Resolution down

to hardware or software faults

should be covered with the other

cause categories (hardware

faults-E codes, software

faults-D or S codes).

UEK Broken

UEL Leakage

This code is used for between

systems leakage (internal) and

for out-of-system leakage (external).

UEM Missing/Misplaced

UEO Open

UES Loose

UET Tight

UN No Effect Displayed

B-26
APPENDIX C

COMPONENT BOUNDARIES FOR THE REPORTED

FAILURE-CAUSE ANALYSIS

C-l
APPENDIX C

COMPONENT BOUNDARIES FOR THE REPORTED

FAILURE-CAUSE ANALYSIS

This appendix describes the component boundaries used in the reported failure cause analysis.

Examples of subcomponents and piece parts are

also given for each of the components.

join cables to buses. The component boundary is

around the bar itself and the connectors. Cables are

considered separately. Circuit breakers or motor

starters that may have a direct mechanical connection are also considered separately.

Accumulators

Accumulators are units composed of pressured

vessels, valves, and piping. Accumulators are used

to store pressurized borated water for emergency

injection into the reactor core. The boundary is

considered to be the pressurized vessel and associated isolation valves and piping.

Battery Chargers

Battery chargers are units composed of transformers and rectifiers. The transformer converts

the alternating current (ac) input voltage to a lower

ac voltage, and the rectifier converts alternating

current to a direct current (dc) voltage which is filtered. Protection electrical devices and monitoring

instrumentation also exist to ensure adequate operation (no overcharging, for example). A cooling

system is likely to be internal to the battery charger

as well. The boundary includes the output breaker

between the charger and the battery.

Piece Parts:

Cables

Electrical cables consist of one or more conducting material(s), usually strands of copper or aluminum, surrounded by insulated materials. Multiple

conductors are individually insulated. Insulating

materials are generally rubber, asbestos, enamel

coatings, mineral oil impregnated paper, or various

plastics.

The boundary is around the cable perimeter. Terminals and connectors are considered separately.

Circuit Breakers

The component boundary is the breaker casing

itself, including the internals such as the mechanism that moves the contacts, power lead connectors, and circuitry (such as relays). The control

power and line power cables are not considered to

be part of the circuit breaker.

Transformer (with subcomponents)

Rectifiers (with subcomponents)

Circuit breaker (with subcomponents)

Protective electronics

Monitoring instrumentation

Wiring

Connectors

Switches

Filters

Cooling subsystem (fans, for example)

Buses

Buses are bars of conducting material, such as

copper or aluminum. These are generally located

inside switchgear cabinets. Connectors are used to

Piece Parts:

Arc suppressor

Bearing

Bushing

Cable

Casing

Circuit board

Coil

Connector

Contacts

Converter

Drive pawl

Fuse

Indicator

Lockout device

Latch

C-3
Circuit Breakers (continued)

Piece Parts (continued):

Motor

Plunger

Relays

Solenoid

Spring

Switch

Emergency Diesel Generators

The boundary for emergency diesel generators is

the diesel engine, generator, and associated subsystems. These subsystems include the lube oil system,

fuel system, starting air system, cooling system,

and engine exhaust system. The amount and type

of subcomponents are numerous. The output

power leads out of the generator, up to and including the output circuit breaker, are included in the

component boundary. The cooling systems include

heat exchangers that provide an interface to the

essential service water system, but not the piping

associated with the service water.

It should be noted that several types of valves,

such as gate or globe valves, may appear in failure

reports as part of emergency diesel generator subsystems. This will be treated as a subcomponent of

the diesel generator system, and the failure of the

diesel generator will be reported.

Components:

Principal System

Heat exchangers

Heaters

Motors

Pipes, supports, hangers

Pumps

Valves and valve operators

Dip stick

Fuel System

Filters

Gaskets

Motors

Pipes, supports, hangers

Pumps

Tanks

Valves and valve operators

Starting Air System

Air tank

Compressors

Filters

Gaskets

Piping, supports, hangers

Valves and valve operators

Cooling Systems

Heat exchangers

Heaters

Motors

Piping, supports, hangers

Pumps

Valves and valve operators

Tanks

Indicators (level, temperature, pressure)

Cables

Circuit breakers

Diesel engines (with associated components and piece parts)

Generator (with associated components

and piece parts)

Governors

Instrumentation and control circuits

Relays

Switches

Voltage regulator

Lube Oil System

Filters

Gaskets

Engine Exhaust System

Piping

Baffles

Gaskets

Covers

Filter/Strainer

A filter is a device containing a porous material

through which fluid is passed to remove suspended

impurities or to recover solids. The filter resides in a

housing, which holds and supports the filter material

and also provides a pressure boundary.

C-4
Filter/Strainer (continued)

Filters range in complexity from a filter material in a

housing to self-cleaning or traveling screens. The

boundary for the self-cleaning type includes spray nozzles, refuse troughs, a pump, motor, and sometimes a

space heater to ensure continuous operation during

subfreezing temperature conditions. The boundary for

the simple filter encloses the housing and the filter

material.

Piece Parts:

Filter material

Housing

Vent valves

Drain valves

Pump

Motor

Refuse troughs

Spray nozzles

Space heater

Piping from pump to nozzle

Heat Tracing Heaters

Heat tracing heaters are electrical cables surrounded by insulating materials. Heat tracing

heaters are wrapped around piping and components to regulate heating of the borated water

within the piping or components so that the boric

acid will not solidify. The boundary is considered

to be the cable, insulation, and regulating devices.

Inverters

Inverters convert dc power into ac power suitable for

use for instrumentation. The boundary around the

inverter encloses the casing but stops at the input and

output leads. An inverter is sometimes referred to as an

uninterruptible power supply.

Piece Parts:

Fuse

Inductor

Internal power supply

Oscillator

Protection card

Rectifier

Relay

Resistor

Switch

Transformer

Transistor

Undervoltage coil

Undervoltage trip

Voltage regulator

Measurement Systema

A measurement system or subsystem consists of one

or more measurement devices and any other necessary

subsystem elements interconnected to perform a complete measurement from the sensor to the output. A

measurement subsystem is divided into general functional groups consisting of a primary detector, intermediate means, and the end device. The definitions of

these functional groups are as follows:

Primary Detector (sensing element or initial

element)-The primary detector is the first subsystem

element or group of elements that responds quantitatively to the parameter being measured and performs

the initial measurement operation.

Intermediate Means-The intermediate means

includes all subsystem elements that are used to perform necessary and distinct operations in the measurement sequence between the primary detector and the

end device. It adapts the operational results of the primary detector to the input requirements of the end

device.

End Device-An end device is the final subsystem element that responds quantitatively to the

parameter being measured and performs the final

measurement operation. It performs the final conversion of measurement energy to an indication,

record, or the initiation of control.

f

1.v .,

Annunciator control card

Capacitor

Choke

Control card/module

Cooling fan

Diode

Driver board

Firing circuit

Frequency board

7 ?;

NP

The components of the measurement subsystem are:

Indicators

a. Strictly speaking, a measurement system is a purist concept.

In practice, it is altered to fit the conditions of the engineer. For

instance, root cause analysis deals with systems containing

mechanical subsystems and electrical subsystems. In this case, a

measurement system is considered a subsystem.

,. .

C-S
Measurement System

(continued)

Controllers

Transmitters

Switches

Timers

Thermowella

Cables

Pipes

Pipes include the following:

Elbows

Tees

Junctions

Unions (flanged or welded connection)

Tubing

Motor-Driven Pumps

For these pumps, the component boundary is

chosen to be the pump unit and the driver. The

pump unit description is the same as that for the

turbine driver. The pump motor driver boundary is

around the driver housing and shaft coupling.

Power failures are not considered. Some motordriven pumps may have a reducing gear for variable

speed of the pump shaft. This special coupling is

included within the boundary. Any lubrication systems are also included.

Piece Parts:

Electric motor with internals

Housing/stator

Stator windings

Rotor body

Rotor windings

Magnets

Bearings

Motor shaft

Coupling to pump unit

Pump unit

Casing/housing

Impeller

Shaft

Bearings

Seals (see information below)

Suction

Lubrication subsystem

Pipes and extruded tubing are in this category.

The component boundary is the outer wall of the

pipe or tubing. A junction is viewed as a small

diameter pipe welded to the side of a larger diameter pipe. In this case, the weld is considered as part

of the junction. A union is a connection between

two similar diameter pipes, either a flanged or

welded connection.

Piece Parts:

Pipes

Thbing

Pump Seals

Pump seal failures will generally be described in

pump reports; however, they can be considered separately. Some pumps have complicated seals. A seal

is defined as a material "packed" about a shaft (or

between metal parts by either compression or

mechanical action to hold it in place). Mechanical

seals use extremely close gaps so a fluid film forms

and keeps leakage acceptably low.

Packing Materials:

Asbestos

Carbon

Graphite

TFE (Tetrafluoroethylene compounds, i.e.

Teflons)

Glass fiber

Metals [aluminum, copper, or Babbitt (an

antifriction alloy of tin, copper, and antimony)]

0 and T rings of various elastomers

.;Y

Mechanical seals:

a. A piece of material (e.g., pipe) that protrudes into the system

boundary and forms a pressure boundary of the system. The

function of the thermowell is to measure the temperature inside

the system boundary.

Generally these are fine-tolerance metal

parts. Spring-loaded rings or injection fluids may be used.

C-6
Rectifiers Piece Parts:

Generally, a rectifier converts alternating current

to direct current. It is composed of diodes (usually

solid state but may be selenium or mercury valves)

that are connected to each other.

The boundary is around the rectifier casing.

Piece Parts:

Connectors

Casing

Cooling fan

Diodes

Bushings

Casing (perhaps an oil bath, too)

Coil windings

Connectors

Core

(some transformers may have a cooling

subsystem for an oil bath or cooling fans)

Valves, Air-Operated

Relays

The boundary around a relay includes the casing,

coil, and contacts. Control or line power faults are

outside the boundary.

Piece Parts:

Solenoid coil

Contacts

Wires

Springs

Connectors

Supports and Snubbers

These complex devices are used to accommodate

thermal movement, hydraulic transient loads, and

seismic event loads in piping and components in

accordance with American Society of Mechanical

Engineers (ASME) code requirements. They

include constant supports (CS), variable spring

supports (VSS), mechanical snubbers (MS), and

hydraulic snubbers (HS). The boundary encompasses the attachment to the pipe or component,

the attachment to the beam or other appurtenances, all external auxiliary systems that support

the device, and the device itself. The piece parts for

these devices are shown in the matrix presented in

Table C-I (see following page).

Transformers

The component boundary is the transformer casing itself, including the internals such as the core

and wire winding. Cables are not considered as part

of the boundary.

The air-operated valve boundary includes the

valve and the pneumatic operator. The valve is

defined as the valve body, all internals, and seals.

The pneumatic operator is defined as all components inside the operator housing that are necessary

to make the valve function correctly. Loss of air

pressure to the operator is not considered to be a

valve or operator fault.

Valve Piece Parts:

Valve stem

Yoke

Packing

Packing follower

Bonnet

Closure member

Flange

Valve body

Bolts, nuts

Valve seat

Seals

Air Operator Piece Parts:

Actuator housing

Air chamber

Diaphragm

Spring

Actuator shaft, coupling

Bolts

Linkages

Pneumatic positioner unit with internals

(This unit is not generic to all valve operator designs.)

Air flow control valve (solenoid operated)

C-7
Table C-1. Supports and snubbers piece parts

Device

CS

Housing/body/cylinder

Wiper

Thrnbuckle

Reservoir

Rod/Hanger

Bleed Plug

Welded Attachment

Clamp

Steel Beam

Filter

Valve

Travel Scale

Spring

Nut

Washer

Plate

Piston

Pivot

Shaft

Bearing

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

VSS

x

x

x

x

x

x

MS HS

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Inertia Mass

Torque Trans. Drum

Cylinder End Plug

Telescoping Cylinder

Paddle

Head

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Valves, Check Valves, Manual

Check valves are considered to be simpler than

air- or motor-operated valves. The check valve is

designed to permit only one-directional flow.

The boundary around a manual valve includes

the valve body and actuator. The valve body is

defined as including all internals and seals.

Piece Parts: Valve Piece Parts:

Valve body

Valve closure member

Hinge

Access panel

Bolts, seals

Valve stem

Valve stem connection

Yoke

Packing

Packing follower

C-8
Valves, Manual (continued)

Valve Piece Parts (continued):

Bonnet

Closure member

Flange

Valve body

Bolts, nuts

Valve seat

Seals

Mechanical stop

Valves, Motor-Operated

The boundary around a motor-operated valve

includes the valve and the motor operator. The

valve is defined as the valve body, all internals, and

seals. The motor operator is defined as all components inside the motor housing that are necessary to

make the valve function correctly. The control

power and main power cables are outside the

boundary.

Valve Piece Parts:

Valve stem

Yoke

Packing

Packing follower

Bonnet

Closure member

Flange

Valve body

Bolts, nuts

Valve seat

Seals

Motor Operator Piece Parts:

Valve stem connection

Housing assembly

Valves, Over-Pressure Protection

This category includes the following:

Code safety valves

Power-operated relief valves

Safety/relief valves

These are specific valves for safety applications.

Code safety valves are safety valves that meet the

requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code. This type of valve uses spring pressure

to hold the valve disc shut against the system pressure. It is totally self-activated and is used for quick

relief of excessive system pressure. The component

boundary is around the valve surface. The welds

that join the valve base and outlet to the associated

pipes are included with the pipe component.

Power-operated relief valves (PORVs) are controlled either automatically or manually. These

valves generally have a pilot tube and solenoid

plunger to control the valve disc (closure member)

motion. The component boundary is treated the

same as that for a code safety valve, with the inclusion of the solenoid and plunger. Power leads are

outside the boundary.

A safety/relief valve is another type of pressure

relief valve. This valve, like the PORV, can be operated automatically or manually. The component

boundary is treated the same as above, with the

boundary over the valve surface and welds included

in the piping system.

Piece Parts:

Code Safety Valve

Electric motor with internals

Housing/stator

Stator windings

Rotor body

Magnets

Bearings

Motor shaft

Gears

Limit switch

Torque switch

Manual operator

Adjusting screw

Base

Bonnet

Cap

Disc

Disc guide

Packing

Seat

Spindle

Spring

C-9
Valves, Over-Pressure Protection

(continued)

Piece Parts (continued):

Power-Operated Relief Valve

Body

Lever

Packing

Pilot valve disc

Pilot valve seat

Piston

Plunger

Solenoid or other operator

Spring

Switch

Valve disc

Valve seat

Safety/Relief Valve

Base

Compression screw

Disc

Drop lever

Lifting gear

Operator

Packing

Seat

Spindle

Spring

Yoke

Welds

A weld is the joint between two pipes, formed by

either heat or pressure or both, as well as the use of

a filler material for the gap between pipes. For this

definition, the heat-affected zone in the pipe material is included with the weld.

Piece Parts:

Welds

Filler material

Heat-affected zone of piping or tubing

C-10
APPENDIX D

FAIWRE MODE CODES AND DEFINITIONS

D-l
APPENDIX D

FAIWRE MODE CODES AND DEFINITIONS

Table D-1. Failure mode codes

Component

Accumulator

Battery/Battery Charging Unit

Bus

Cable

Circuit Breaker

Diesel Generator

Filter/Strainer

Hanger/Snubber/Support

Heat Tracing Heater

Instrumentation

Inverter

Motor

Pipe

Power Supply, Electric

Motor-Driven Pump

Thrbine-Driven Pump

Code

GLF

GLF

GLF

GLF

GFP

GSO

GFS

GFU

GNF

GLF

GPL

GLF

GLF

GFP

GEE

GLF

GFU

GRU

GPL

GLF

GFS

GFU

GEL

GFS

GFU

GEL

Description

Loss of function

Loss of function (no output)

Loss of function

Loss of function

Fails to operate Opens (premature)

Fails to start

Fails to run

No failure (only used when diesel

generator is still operable despite

subcomponent failure)

Loss of function

Plugged

Loss of function

Loss of function

Fails to operate

Erroneous/erratic signal

Loss of function

Fails to run

Rupture

Plugged

Loss of function

Fails to start

Fails to run

External leakage

Fails to start

Fails to run

External leakage

D-3
Table D-1. (continued)

Component Code Description

Relay GFC

GFO

GSH

GFP

Fails to close (normally open)

Fails to open (normally closed)

Short circuit

Fails to operate (energize)

Thermowell GLF Loss of function

Timer GLF

Transformer GLF

Valves (general) GFO

GFC

GEL

GFR

GOC

GPL

Check Valve GFO

GFR

GIL

GEL

Motor-Operated Valve GFO

GFC

GEL

GPL

GFR

GOC

Loss of function

Loss of function

Fails to open

Fails to close

External leakage

Fails to operate as required

Fails to open/fails to close

Plugged (fails to remain open)

Fails to open

Fails to operate as required

Internal leakage (reverse leakage)

External leakage

Fails to open

Fails to close

External leakage

Plugged (fails to remain open)

Fails to operate as required

Fails to open/fails to close

Fails to open

Fails to close

External leakage

Plugged (fails to remain open)

Fails to operate as required

Fails to open/fails to close

Fails to open

Opens (premature)

Fails to close (reseat)

Fails to open

Fails to close

External leakage

Fails to operate as required

Fails to open/fails to close

Plugged (fails to remain open)

Pneumatic Valve GFO

GFC

GEL

GPL

GFR

GOC

Relief/Safety Valve GFO

GSO

GFC

Vent Valve GFO

GFC

GEL

GFR

GOC

GPL

D-4
Table D-2. Failure mode descriptions

Accumulator

1. Loss of function-This failure mode is the inability of the accumulator to perform its intended

function.

Battery/Battery Charging Unit

1. Loss of function-This failure mode is the inability of the charging unit to perform its function to

specifications or the lack of specified output from the battery.

Bus

I. Loss of function-This failure mode is the inability of the bus to perform its intended function.

Cable

I. Loss of function-This failure mode is the inability of the cable to transmit the correct signals. An

example of this type of failure mode is insulation breakdown around the cable producing a short or

ground.

Circuit Breaker

1. Fails to operate-This failure mode describes the circuit breaker that does not function properly. It

can either fail to open or fail to close on demand.

2. Opens (Premature)-This failure mode is the opening of the circuit breaker prior to demand.

Diesel Generator

I. Fails to start-Fails to start encompasses diesel generator failures that resulted from the diesel

failing to start, failing to reach rated speed and voltage once a start sequence was initiated, and

failing to achieve expected loading (kW).

2. Fails to run-Failure to run mode is any failure of an operating diesel generator to supply power to

the emergency bus, given that the diesel generator had undergone a successful start. It also includes

the spurious stopping of the diesel generator and the inability of the diesel generator to continue to

run as demanded.

3. No failure-The diesel generator does not fail when the narrative states that the diesel generator is

still operable despite the failure of a subcomponent in one of the diesel generator's subsystems. An

example of this is when a cooling pump fails but a back-up pump is available for the diesel

generator involved.

Filter/Strainer

1. Loss of function-This is the inability of the filter/strainer to perform its intended function.

2. Plugged-This includes plugging of the filter/strainer.

Hanger/Snubber/Support

1. Loss of function-This is the failure of the component to provide the pipe with the necessary

support and it is the inability of a snubber to perform to seismic requirements.

D-5
Table D-2. (continued)

Heat Tracing Heater

1. Loss of function-This is the failure of the heat tracing heater to provide adequate heating function

to maintain boron in solution within the piping and components.

Instrumentation

1. Fails to operate-This failure mode is the inability of the instrument to perform its function.

2. Erroneous/Erratic signal-Erroneous or erratic signals are produced by the instrument.

Inverter

1. Loss of function-This is the failure of the inverter to perform its intended function to specified

requirements.

Motor

I. Fails to run-This failure mode is the inability of a motor to run as required.

Pipe

I. Rupture-Rupture of a pipe is a break in the pipe that can or does produce leakage of the

contained medium.

2. Plugged-Plugging of a pipe is a restriction of flow of the contained medium.

Power Supply, Electric

1. Loss of function-This is the failure of the power supply to provide the required amount of power

to the interfacing component.

Pump

1. Fails to start-This failure mode is used to describe faults involving pumps that did not start upon

demand or which started and only operated for a brief period of time before tripping off-line.

2. Fails to run-Fails to run indicates that an operating pump was automatically or manually tripped

off-line to prevent damage to the pump. It also includes pumps that fail to run to specifications.

3. External leakage-The leakage failure mode describes a fault in which the pump is operational but

is removed from service because of excessive leakage of the pumped medium. A common example

of this mode is a packing leak.

Relay

I. Fails to close-Fails to close is the failure of a normally open relay to close upon demand.

2. Fails to open-Fails to open is the failure of a normally closed relay to open upon demand.

3. Short circuit-This failure mode describes short circuit of either a normally open or normally

closed relay. This may include the improper operation of the relay.

D-6
Table D-2. (continued)

4. Fails to operate (energize)-This failure mode is the failure of the relay to operate due to lack of an

input signal.

Thermowell

1. Loss of function-This failure mode is the inability of the thermowell to perform its function. This

includes leaks around the thermowell.

Timer

1. Loss of function-This failure mode is the inability of the timer to perform its function.

Transformer

1. Loss of function-This failure mode is the inability of the transformer to continue to function

properly.

Valve

1. Fails to open-Valve fails to open fully when demanded.

2. Fails to close-Valve fails to close fully when demanded. This includes safety/relief valves failing to

reseat.

3. External leakage-A leak or rupture of the valve that would allow the contained medium to escape

from the component boundary. The most common example of this mode is a flange leak.

4. Plugged (fails to remain open)-This failure mode refers to any event that would stop or limit flow

through a normally open valve. Valves that fail to open or valves that are either intentionally or

unintentionally closed by human action when required open are not considered plugged valves. Two

examples of a plugging event are (a) a valve disc that separates from the stem and falls into the

closed position and (b) the air supply to an air-operated valve fails, allowing the valve to drift

closed.

5. Fails to operate as required-The fails-to-operate-as-required mode is to be used whenever (a) a

valve fails to meet specific requirements such as stroke time or (b) a valve loses the ability to control

system parameters.

6. Fails to open/fails to close-This failure mode is used when the narrative lacks specific information

on whether the valve failed to open or failed to close.

7. Internal leakage (reverse leakage)-Reverse leakage is a mode used to describe internal leakage

through a check valve.

8. Opens (premature)-This failure mode applies strictly to relief and safety valves. A relief or safety

valve opening prior to its pressure setting is a typical example of this mode; however, the cause of a

"premature open" is not always a pressure transient.

D-7
APPENDIX E

AGING FAIWRE SURVEY INFORMATION

E-1
APPENDIX E

AGING FAIWRE SURVEY INFORMATION

Appendix E is divided into 15 subsections. These

subsections contain information pertinent to the 15

systems analyzed and appear in the following order:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Class IE electrical power distribution (lE)

Auxiliary feedwater (AFW)

Component cooling water (CCW)

Containment fan (CTF)

Containment isolation (CTIS)

High-pressure injection (HPIS)

Low-pressure injection (LPIS)

Main feedwater (MFW)

Reactor building cooling (RBC)

Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)

Reactor protection trip (RPS)

Reactor coolant (RXC)

Residual heat removal (RHR)

Service water (SWS)

Standby liquid control (SBL).

3. A summary table indicating the total

counts for the NPRDS component divisions and the corresponding componentlevel fractions for the five generic failure

categories. These component fractions for

the failure categories were calculated by

dividing the total failure counts per failure

category for a particular component by the

total failure counts for that component

within the appropriate system.

4. A summary table listing component fractions at the system level for the five generic

failure categories. These fractions were

calculated by dividing the total failure

counts corresponding to a failure category

for a particular component by the total

failure counts for all components within

the appropriate system.

5. Detailed aging tallies tables (on microfiche

inside back cover). These tables display the

detailed breakdown for the data by component, system effect, failure category,

and age of component at time of failure.

The information is presented in these

tables by NSSS, system or subsystem, and

component. For each NSSS/system/

component combination, a failure total

and system effect breakdown is enumerated. The failure total indicates the total

failure counts for that particular NSSS/

system/component combination. The system effect number (sys. eff. no.) indicates

the total number of failures for that NSSS/

system/component that resulted in that

system effect.

The following tabular information is provided

for each subsection:

1. A listing of the NSSS, system, and component codes and descriptions present in the

data for that specific system. This listing is

provided for ease of interpreting the codes

used in the tables.

2. A table summarizing the total counts per

failure category and total counts per system effect category with the corresponding

overall fractions per category. These failure fractions were calculated by dividing

the total counts within a failure category or

system effect category by the total failure

counts for that system.

E-3
Table E-1. Class 1E electrical power distribution system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

EBE-PLANT AC POWER

EBG-INSTRUMENT AC POWER

ECD-DC POWER

EEC-EMERGENCY POWER

EECDAA-DIESEL STARTING AIR

EECDCA-DIESEL COOLING WATER

EECFOA-DIESEL FUEL OIL

EECLOA-DIESEL LUBE OIL

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

EBA-PLANT AC DISTRIBUTION

EBJ-INSTRUMENT AC POWER

ECB-DC POWER

EEA-EMERGENCY POWER

EEADAA-DIESEL STARTING AIR

EEADCA-DIESEL COOLING WATER

EEAFOA-DIESEL FUEL OIL

EEALOA-DIESEL LUBE OIL

E-WESTINGHOUSE

EBF-PLANT AC POWER

EBK-INSTRUMENT AC POWER

ECC-DC POWER

EEB-EMERGENCY POWER

EEBDAA-DIESEL STARTING AIR

EEBDCA-DIESEL COOLING WATER

EEBFOA-DIESEL FUEL OIL

EEBLOA-DIESEL LUBE OIL

COMPONENTS: ACCUMU INDREC

AIRDRY INTCPM

ANNUNC IPWSUP

BATTRY IXMITR

BLOWER MECFUN

CKTBRK MOTOR

ELECON PIPE

ENGINE PUMP

FILTER RELAY

GENERA TRANSF

HEATER TURBIN

HTEXCH VALVE

IBISSW VALVOP

ICNTRL

E-4
Table E-2. Class IE electrical power distribution system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 261

Aging Failures 741

Test and Maintenance Failures 153

Human Related Failures 46

Other Failures 1059

Total 2260

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.115

Aging Fraction 0.328

Test and Maintenance Fraction = 0.068

Human Related Fraction = 0.020

Other Fraction 0.469

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 51

Degraded System Operation 387

Loss of Redundancy 634

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 611

System Function Unaffected 577

Total 2260

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction * 0.023

Degraded System Operation Fraction e 0.171

Loss of Redundancy Fraction * 0,281

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction * 0.270

System Function Unaffected Fraction = 0.255

E-S
Table E-3. Class IE electrical power component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb

Blower

Motor

Pump

Valve

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Total

215

31

68

177

2

Design Aging

0.005 0.623

0.097 0.613

0.074 0.603

0.146 0.567

- 0.500

Testing

0.056

0.065

0.088

0.101

H

C

uman Other

1.005 0.312

- 0.226

- 0.235

1.006 0.180

- 0.500

a

Pipe

Airdry

Filter

Heat Exchanger

Heater

Valve Operator

Battery

Engine

Mechanical Function Unit

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Relay

Instrumentation:

Switch

4

4

13

14

11

14

242

496

55

8

88

93

- 0.500

- 0.500

0.308 0.462

- 0.429

0.182 0.364

0.143 0.357

0.107 0.326

0.131 0.256

0.109 0.255

- 0.250

0.154

0.091

0.071

0.045

0.099

0.091

0.125

0.045

0.065

- 0.500

- 0.500

_ 0.077

_ 0.571

- 0.364

- 0.429

0.025 0.496

0.028 0.486

0.055 0.491

- 0.625

0.125

0.065

0.250

0.237

0.034

0.011

0.545

0.624

Generator/lnverter/Alternator

Circuit Breaker

lbrbine

Transformer

Instrumentation:

TRansmitter

Electrical Conductor

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

390

243

S

30

24

24

1

0.115

0.144

0.200

0.233

0,042

0.542

0.236

0.214

0,200

0.133

0.125

0.083

0.033

0.058

0.015 0.600

0.045 0.539

- 0.600

- 0.600

- 0.708

- 0.250

0.033

0.125

0.125

1.000

E-6
Table E3. (continued)

Componentsb Total !Design Aging Testing

Accumulator 2

Annunciator I

Instrumentation: 4

X Controller

Total 2259

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

* Human Other

- 1.000

- 1.000

0.560 - 0.500

E-7
Table E-4. Class 1E electrical power component failure category system fractionsa

Componentsb

Blower

Engine

Valve

Generator/Alternator/Inverter

Battery

Circuit Breaker

Pump

Instrumentation:

Switch

Total

215

496

177

390

242

243

68

93

Design Aging

- 0.059

0.029 0.056

0.012 0.045

0.020 0.041

0.012 0.035

0.015 0.023

0.002 0.018

0.003 0.010

Testing

0.005

0.022

0.008

0.006

0.005

0.006

0.003

0.003

Human Other

- 0.030

0.006 0.107

- 0.014

0.003 0.104

0.003 0.053

0.005 0.058

- 0.007

- 0.026

Relay

Motor

Mechanical Function Unit

Heat Exchanger

Filter

Valve Operator

Heater

Transformer

Airdry

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Recorder

88

31

55

14

13

14

11

30

4

24

8

0.005 0.010

0.001 0.008

0.003 0.006

- 0.003

0.002 0.003

0.001 0.002

0.001 0.002

0.003 0.002

- 0.001

- 0.001

0.002

0.001

0.002

a).001 0.021

- 0.003

).001 0.012

- 0.004

0

0.001

0.003

0.002

0.008

- 0.001

0.001 - 0.008

- 0.001 - 0.002

Pipe

Electrical Conductor

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

4

24

1

- 0.001

0.006 0.001

- 0.001

0.001 - 0.003

Annunciator

Accumulator

Turbine

2

2

S

- 0.001

- 0.001

E-8
Table E4. (continued)

Componentsb

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Instrumentation:

Controller

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

Total Design Aging Testing Human Other

2 - - - - -

4 0.001 - 0.001

2259

E-9
-

Table E-5. Auxiliary feedwater system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

HHB-EMERGENCY FEEDWATER

E-WESTINGHOUSE

HHC-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER

COMPONENTS: ANNUNC

CKTBRK

ENGINE

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

CKTBRK

ENGINE

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IPWSUP

ISODEV

IXMITR

MECFUN

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

TURBIN

VALVE

VALVOP

E-10
Table E-6. Auxiliary feedwatet system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures = 85

Aging Failures = 258

Test and Maintenance Failures 73

Human Related Failures = IS

Other Failures = 398

'Ibtal 829

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.103

Aging Fraction 0.311

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.088

Human Related Fraction 0.018

Other Fraction = 0.480

System Effect Tbtals

Loss of System Function 5

Degraded System Operation 161

Loss of Redundancy = 153

Loss of Subsystem/Channel = 255

System Function Unaffected = 255

Total 829

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction = 0.006

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.194

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.185

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.308

System Function Unaffected Fraction = 0.308

E-1 I
Table E-7. Auxiliary feedwater component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb

Annunciator

Valve

Instrumentation:

Isolation Device

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Instrumentation:

Controller

Instrumentation:

Electronic Power Supply

Relay

Valve Operator

Instrumentation:

Switch

Pump

Pipe

Mechanical Function Unit

Motor

Circuit Breaker

Turbine

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Instrumentation:

Tfansmitter

Support

Engine

Total

1

267

2

26

Design Aging

- 1.000

0.097 0.521

- 0.500

- 0.385

47 0.043

3 0.333

12

103

24

110

5

16

7

22

60

19

0.250

0.078

0.042

0.091

0.400

0.062

0.136

0.150

0.340

0.333

0.333

0.252

0.250

0.245

0.200

0.188

0.143

0.136

0.133

0.105

0.104

Testing

0.082

0.115

0.021

0.167

0.107

0.091

0.250

0.227

0.100

0.105

0.026

Human

0.007

- 0.500

- 0.596

- 0.333

Other

0.292

0.500

0.019

0.250

0.544

0.708

0

0

.027 0.545

- 0.400

.125 0.375

- 0.857

- 0.500

.050 0.567

- 0.789

0

77 0.143 0.039 0.688

22

6

0.364 0.045 0.136

- 0.333

- 0.455

- 0.667

Total 829

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-12
Table E-8. Auxiliary feedwater component failure category system fractionsa

Componentsb I

Valve

Pump

Valve Operator

Instrumentation:

Controller

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Turbine

Instrumentation:

Switch

Relay

Mechanical Function Unit

Circuit Breaker

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Annunciator

instrumentation:

Isolation Device

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Support

Motor

Pipe

Engine

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

btal

267

110

103

47

26

Design

0.031

0.012

0.010

0.002

Aging

0.168

0.033

0.031

0.019

- 0.012

77 0.013 0.010

0.010

0.007

Testing

0.027

0.012

0.013

0.001

0.004

0.002

0.007

0.002

0.005

0.006

0.002

Human

0.002

0.004

0.002

0.004

0.004

0.064

0.041

0.021

Other

0.094

0.072

0.068

0.034

- 0.016

60

24

12

16

22

19

I

2

0.011

0.001

0.004 0.005

0.001 0.004

0.004 0.004

- 0.002

- 0.001

- 0.001

- 0.004

0.002 0.007

- 0.013

- 0.018

- 0.001

- 0.001

- 0.012

- 0.007

- 0.002

- 0.005

3 0.001 0.001

22

7

5

6

829

0.010

0.002

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.004

0.002

E-13
Table E-9. Component cooling water system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

WBB-COMPONENT COOLING WATER

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

WBA-REACTOR BLDG. CLOSED COOLING

E-WESTINGHOUSE

WBD-COMPONENT COOLING WATER

COMPONENTS: ACCUMU

CKTBRK

ELECON

HTEXCH

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IXMITR

MOTOR

PENETR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

VALVE

VALVOP

E-14
Table E-10. Component cooling water system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 65

Aging Failures 457

Test and Maintenance Failures 64

Human Related Failures 20

Other Failures 370

Total 976

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.067

Aging Fraction 0.468

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.066

Human Related Fraction 0.020

Other Fraction 0.379

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 3

Degraded System Operation 142

Loss of Redundancy 131

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 325

System Function Unaffected 375

Total 976

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.003

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.145

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.134

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.333

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.384

E-15
Table E-11. Component cooling water component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb Total Di

Pump 183

Pipe 3

Instrumentation: 7

Controller

Valve 276

Heat Exchanger 88

Relay 6

Support 17

Motor 29

Circuit Breaker 47

Instrumentation: 14

Computation Module

Valve Operator 186

Instrumentation: 27

Switch

Instrumentation: 28

Recorder

Instrumentation: 61

Transmitter

Penetration I

Accumulator I

Electrical Conductor 2

Total 976

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

0

esign Aging

.060 0.749

- 0.667

- 0.571

0.025

0.102

0.167

0.059

0.069

0.085

0.091

0.037

0.107

0.115

0.562

0.523

0.500

0.471

0.448

0.362

0.286

0.247

0.222

0.214

0.164

Testing

0.044

0.143

0.069

0.045

0.069

0.064

0.086

0.037

0.214

0.066

Human Other

- 0.148

- 0.333

- 0.286

0O

0.

0,

.029 0.315

.034 0.295

.167 0.167

- 0.471

.034 0.379

.021 0.468

- 0.714

0.

0.011 0.565

- 0.704

- 0.464

0.066 0.590

1.000

1.000

1.000

E-16
Table E-12. Component cooling water component failure category system fractions8

Componentsb

Valve

Pump

Valve Operator

Heat Exchanger

Circuit Breaker

Motor

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Total

276

183

186

88

47

29

61

Design

0.007

0.011

0.017

0.009

0.004

0.002

0.007

Aging

0.159

0.140

0.047

0.047

0.017

0.013

0.010

Testing

0.019

0.008

0.016

0.004

0.003

0.002

0.004

Human

0.008

0.002

0.003

0.001

0.001

0.004

Other

0.089

0.028

0.108

0.027

0.023

0.011

0.037

Support

Instrumentation:

Switch

Instrumentation:

Recorder

17

27

0.001

0.001

0.008

0.006

0.006

0.001

0.006

- 0.008

- 0.019

28 0.003 - 0.013

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Instrumentation:

Controller

14 - 0.004 - 0.010

7 - 0.004 0.001 - 0.002

Relay

Pipe

Penetration

6

3

0.001 0.003

- 0.002

0.001 0.001

- 0.001

- 0.001

Accumulator - 0.001

Electrical Conductor

Total

1

2

976

0.002

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-17
Table E-13. Containment fan system

NSSS:

SYSTEM:

COMPONENTS:

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SBG-CONTAINMENT FAN COOLING

BLOWER

CKTBRK

ELECON

FILTER

HTEXCH

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IXMITR

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

VALVE

VALVOP

E-18
Table E-14. Containment fan system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures = 25

Aging Failures - 84

Test and Maintenance Failures = 28

Human Related Failures = 6

Other Failures = 175

Total 318

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction = 0.079

Aging Fraction = 0.264

Test and Maintenance Fraction = 0.088

Human Related Fraction = 0.019

Other Fraction = 0.550

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function = 3

Degraded System Operation = 45

Loss of Redundancy = 82

Loss of Subsystem/Channel = 82

System Function Unaffected = 106

Total 318

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction = 0.009

Degraded System Operation Fraction = 0.142

Loss of Redundancy Fraction = 0.258

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction = 0.258

System Function Unaffected Fraction = 0.333

E-19
Table E-15. Containment fan component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb

Relay

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Pipe

Pump

Blower

Heat Exchanger

Instrumentation:

Controller

Circuit Breaker

Motor

Valve

Valve Operator

Instrumentation:

Switch

Filter

Electrical Conductor

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Total

3

2

4

3

28

27

5

49

30

65

51

1

1

I

43

5

Design Aging

- 1.000

- 1.000

- 0.750

- 0.667

0.071 0.464

0.037 0.444

- 0.400

Testing

0.037

0.061

0.067

0.200

0.118

Human Other

- 0.250

- 0.333

0.036 0.429

- 0.481

- 0.600

0.041

0.033

0.092

0.176

0.047

0.347

0.333

0.200

0.137

0.041

0.033

0.031

0.510

0.533

0.477

0.569

1.000

- 0.070

- 1.000

- 1.000

- 0.884

0.400 - 0.600

Total 318

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-20
Table E-16. Containment fan component failure category system fractions8

Componentsb

Circuit Breaker

Blower

Valve

Heat Exchanger

Motor

Valve Operator

Relay

Pipe

Instrumentation:

Controller

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Total

49

28

65

27

30

51

3

4

5

Design Aging

0.006 0.053

0.006 0.041

0.019 0.041

0.003 0.038

0.003 0.031

0.028 0.022

- 0.009

- '0.009

- 0.006

Testing

0.009

0.041

0.003

0.006

0.019

Hi

0,

0.

0.

iman Other

.006 0.079

.003 0.038

.006 0.097

- 0.041

.003 0.050

- 0.091

0.

- 0.003

- 0.009

2 - 0.006

Pump

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Electrical Conductor

Instrumentation:

Switch

Filter

Instrumentation:

Recorder

3

43

- 0.006 - 0.003

0.006 - 0.009 - 0.119

I

I

- 0.003

- 0.003

1

5 0.006

- 0.003

- 0.009

Tbtal

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

318

E-21
Table E-17. Containment isolation system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

SDA-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SDB-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

COMPONENTS: BLOWER

CKTBRK

ELECON

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IPWSUP

IXMITR

MOTOR

PENETR

PIPE

RELAY

SUPORT

VALVE

VALVOP

E-22
Table E-18. Containment isolation system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 40

Aging Failures 410

Test and Maintenance Failures 54

Human Related Failures 16

Other Failures 406

Total 926

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.043

Aging Fraction 0.443

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.058

Human Related Fraction 0.017

Other Fraction 0.438

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 2

Degraded System Operation 222

Loss of Redundancy 127

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 273

System Function Unaffected 302

Total 926

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.002

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.240

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.137

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.295

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.326

E-23
Table E-19. Containment isolation component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb Total I

Penetration 4

Valve 451

Blower 16

Pipe 2

Instrumentation: 2

Controllers

Motor 4

Instrumentation: 32

nTansmitters

Circuit Breaker 3

Valve Operator 354

Instrumentation: 5

Computation Modules

Instrumentation: 15

Electric Power Supply

Instrumentation: 11

Recorders

Relay 8

Support 10

Instrumentation: 8

Switch

Electrical Conductors I

Total 926

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

0

esign Aging

- 1.000

.040 0.581

- 0.562

- 0.500

- 0.500

Testing

0.053

0.062

Human Other

0.004 0.322

- 0.375

- 0.500

- 0.500

0.031

0.045

0.133

0.091

0.250

0.500

0.375

- 0.500

- 0.594

0.333

0.314

0.200

0.079

0.200

0.014

0.667

0.548

0.600

0.200 _ 0.667

0.182 - 0.727

0.125 - 0.625

0.900 0.100

- 1.000

- 1.000

E-24
Table E-20. Containment isolation component failure category system fractionsa

Componentsb

Valve

Valve Operator

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Blower

Penetration

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Motor

Circuit Breaker

Instrumentation:

Controller

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Pipe

Relay

Support

Electrical Conductor

Instrumentation:

Switch

Total

451

354

32

16

4

15

Design

0.019

0.017

0.001

Aging

0.283

0.120

0.013

Testing

0.026

0.030

0.001

Human Other

0.002 0.157

0.005 0.210

- 0.021

- 0.010

- 0.004

0.002 0.003

- 0.006

- 0.011

11 0.001 0.002 - 0.009

4

3

2

5

2

8

10

1

8

- 0.002

- 0.001

_ 0.001

- 0.002

- 0.002

_ 0.001

- 0.001

0.002

0.001

0.001

0.001 - 0.003

- - 0.001

- - 0.005

- 0.010 0.001

- - 0.001

- - 0.009

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

926

E-25
Table E-21. High-pressure injection system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

PCB-LETDOWN PURIFICATION AND MAKEUP

SFD-HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

SFB-HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY

SFC-HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SFK-HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION

SFKUHI-HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION - UPPER HEAD

SUBSYSTEM

COMPONENTS: ACCUMU

CKTBRK

ELECON

FILTER

GENERA

HEATER

HTEXCH

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IPWSUP

IXMITR

MECFUN

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

TURBIN

VALVE

VALVOP

E-26
Table E-22. High-pressure injection system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures - 244

Aging Failures = 493

Test and Maintenance Failures = 173

Human Related Failures - 51

Other Failures = 1068

Total 2029

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction = 0.120

Aging Fraction 0.243

Test and Maintenance Fraction = 0.085

Human Related Fraction = 0.025

Other Fraction 0.526

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function = 120

Degraded System Operation = 469

Loss of Redundancy 178

Loss of Subsystem/Channel - 417

System Function Unaffected = 845

Total 2029

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction = 0.059

Degraded System Operation Fraction = 0.231

Loss of Redundancy Fraction = 0.088

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction = 0.206

System Function Unaffected Fraction = 0.416

E-27
Table E-23. High-pressure Injection component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb

Valve

Support

Pump

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Heat Exchanger

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Total

544

84

103

3

19

55

Design Aging

0.103 0.430

0.167 0.369

0.107 0.350

- 0.333

Testing

0.077

0.024

0.097

Hi

0

0

0

iman Other

.020 0.369

.048 0.393

.039 0.408

- 0.667

.105 0.105

- 0.582

0.474 0.316

- 0.309

_ 0,

0.109

Filter

Mechanical Function Unit

Circuit Breaker

Valve Operator

Relay

Instrumentation:

Controller

7

23

74

312

12

44

0.143

0.087

0.162

0.099

0.333

0.091

0.286

0.261

0.243

0.218

0.167

0.159

0.429

0.261

0.095

0.125

0.068

- 0.143

- 0.391

0.041 0.460

0.022 0.535

0.083 0.417

- 0.682

Pipe

Turbine

Heater

Instrumentation:

nansmitter

Instrumentation:

Switch

Motor

Electrical Conductor

Generator/Inverter/Alternator

Accumulator

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Total

19

35

36

261

357

19

4

4

13

0.105

0.143

0.111

0.188

0.104

0.105

0.077

0.158

0.143

0.111

0.111

0.064

0.033

0.053

0.171

0.111

0.069

0.067

0.053

0.053

0.029

0.167

0.008

0.017

0.632

0.514

0.500

0.625

0.748

0.105 0.684

- 1.000

- 1.000

0.250 0.750

- 0.077 - 0.846

2029

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-28
Table E-24. High-pressure Injection component failure category system fractionsa

Componentsb

Valve

Valve Operator

Pump

Support

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Switch

Circuit Breaker

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Mechanical Function Unit

Total

544

312

103

84

261

357

74

55

23

44

19

36

35

19

7

12

3

4

19

Desion

0.028

0.015

0.005

0.007

0.024

0.018

Aging

0.115

0.034

0.018

0.015

0.014

0.011

ting

0.021

0.019

0.005

0.001

0.009

0.012

0.003

0.003

0.003

0.001

0.002

0.003

Human

0.005

0.003

0.002

0.002

0.001

0.003

0.001

Other

0.099

0.082

0.021

0.016

0.080

0.132

0.017

0.016

0.006 0.009

- 0.008

0.001

0.002

0.003

Instrumentation: 0.003

Controller

Heat Exchanger

Heater

Turbine

Pipe

Filter

Relay

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Goenerator/Alternator/lnverter

Electrical Conductor

Motor

Accumulator

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Total

0.004 0.003

0.002 0.002

0.002 0.002

0.001 0.001

- 0.001

0.002 0.001

- 0.004

- 0.015

0.001 0.001

0.003 0.009

- 0.009

- 0.006

0.001

- 0.002

_ 0.001

0.001

- 0.002

0.001 0.006

- 0.001

- 0.005

4

13

2029

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-29
Table E-25. Low-pressure injection system

NSSS:

SYSTEM:

COMPONENTS:

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

SFA-LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY

BATTRY

CKTBRK

ELECON

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

IPWSUP

IXMITR

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

VALVE

VALVOP

E-30
Table E-26. Low-pressure injection system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures . 57

Aging Failures 125

Test and Maintenance Failures 41

Human Related Failures 12

Other Failures 223

Total 458

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.124

Aging Fraction 0.273

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.090

Human Related Fraction 0.026

Other Fraction 0.487

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 11

Degraded System Operation 62

Loss of Redundancy 92

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 122

System Function Unaffected 171

Total 458

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.024

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.135

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.201

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.266

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.373

E-31
Table E-27. Low-pressure injection component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb

Electrical Conductor

Pump

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Motor

Valve

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Support

Circuit Breaker

Valve Operator

Instrumentation:

Switch

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Battery

Instrumentation:

Controller

Pipe

Relay

Total

1

21

2

13

102

8

54

58

75

63

Design Aging

- 1.000

- 0.571

- 0.500

0.077 0.462

0.020 0.412

- 0.375

Testing

0.154

0.098

0.056

0.138

0.120

0.079

Human

- 0.429

- 0.500

Other

0.039

0.019

0.052

0.027

0.032

0.259

0.103

0.120

0.048

0.296

0.293

0.213

0.159

0.091

0.308

0.431

0.625

0.370

0.414

0.520

0.683

11 0.091 0.273 0.545

4

8

1.000

1.000

20

18

0.850

0.222 - 0.056

- 0.150

_ 0.722

Total 458

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-32
Table E-28. Low-pressure injection component failure category system fractionsa

Componentsb

Valve

Circuit Breaker

Valve Operator

Support

Pump

Instrumentation:

Switch

Total

102

S8

75

54

21

63

Design

0.004

0.013

0.020

0.031

0.007

Aging

0.092

0.037

0.035

0.03S

0.026

0.022

Testing

0.022

0.017

0.020

0.007

0.011

Human

0.009

0.007

0.004

0.002

0.004

Other

0.096

0.052

0.085

0.044

0.020

0.094

Motor

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Electrical Conductor

Battery

Pipe

Relay

Instrumentation:

Controller

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

13

8

2

0.002 0.013

- 0.007

0.004 - 0.009

- 0.011

- 0.002 - 0.002

11 0.002 0.002 0.007

1

4

20

18

8

- 0.002

_ 0.013

- 0.009

- 0.007

- 0.028

- 0.017

0.037

0.009 - 0.002

458

E-33
Table E-29. Main feedwater system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

HHA-FEEDWATER

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

CHA-FEEDWATER

COMPONENTS: CKTBRK

FILTER

HTEXCH

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IPWSUP

ISODEV

IXMITR

MECFUN

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

TURBIN

VALVE

VALVOP

E-34
Table E-30. Main feedwater system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 94

Aging Failures = 310

Test and Maintenance Failures 49

Human Related Failures 2 6

Other Failures = 368

Total 827

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.114

Aging Fraction 0.375

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.059

Human Related Fraction 0,007

Other Fraction 0.445

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 9

Degraded System Operation =153

Loss of Redundancy 102

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 157

System Function Unaffected 406

Total 827

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.011

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.185

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.123

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction = 0.190

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.491

E-35
Table E-31. Main feedwater component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb

Relay

Heat Exchanger

Valve

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Instrumentation:

Switch

Pump

Circuit Breaker

Valve Operator

Mechanical Function Unit

Pipe

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Turbine

Motor

Instrumentation:

Controller

Instrumentation:

T1ansmitter

Support

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Instrumentation:

Isolation Device

Filter

Total

3

21

334

2

Design Aging

- 1.000

0.048 0.667

0.108 0.524

- 0.500

Testing Human Other

0.048

0.042 0.006

0.238

0.320

0.500

II 0.182 0.455 0.364

49

9

113

15

4

41

26

5

10

0.143

0.111

0.071

0.067

0.500

0.449

0.444

0.319

0.267

0.250

0.244

0.102

0.106

0.067

0.024

0.077

0.100

0.049

0.055

0.047

0.020 0.286

- 0.444

0.018 0.487

- 0.600

- 0.250

- 0.732

- 0.577

- 0.200

- 0.700

- 0.756

0.115 0.231

0.600 0.200

- 0.200

82 0.024 0.171

0.127

0.116

55

43

1

3

0.491

0.023

0.018 0.309

0.814

- 1.000

1.000

Total 827

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-36
Table E-32. Main feedwater component failure category system fractionsa

Componentsb

Valve

Valve Operator

Pump

Heat Exchanger

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Support

Turbine

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Instrumentation:

Switch

Circuit Breaker

Mechanical Function Unit

Relay

Instrumentation:

Controller

Pipe

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Motor

Instrumentation:

Isolation Device

Total

334

113

49

21

82

41

55

26

43

Design

0.044

0.010

0.008

0.001

0.002

Aging

0.212

0.044

0.027

0.017

0.017

_ 0.012

0.033

0.004

0.001

0.008

0.007

0.006

0.006

Testing

0.017

0.015

0.006

0.001

0.005

0.001

0.004

0.002

0.002

0.001

0.001

Human Other

0.002 0.129

0.002 0.067

0.001 0.017

- 0.006

- 0.075

:v

- 0.036

0.001 0.021

- 0.018

- 0.042

- 0.005

- 0.005

- 0.011

- 0.008

- 0.001

- 0.001

11 0.002

9

15

3

10

4

2

5

1

0.001 0.005

0.001 0.005

- 0.004

- 0.002

0.002

0.004

0.001

0.001

0.001 - 0.001

- 0.001

Filter

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

3

827

- 0.004

- - -

E-37
Table E-33. Reactor building cooling system

NSSS:

SYSTEM:

COMPONENTS:

A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

SBB-REACTOR BUILDING COOLING

BLOWER

CKTBRK

HTEXCH

INDREC

IXMITR

MOTOR

VALVE

VALVOP

E-38
Table E-34. Reactor building cooling system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 5

Aging Failures 19

Test and Maintenance Failures 6

Human Related Failures 4

Other Failures 31

Total 65

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.077

Aging Fraction 0.292

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.092

Human Related Fraction 0.062

Other Fraction 0.477

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 0

Degraded System Operation 12

Loss of Redundancy 16

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 21

System Function Unaffected 16

Total 65

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.000

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.185

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.246

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.323

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.246

E-39
Table E-35. Reactor building cooling component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb Total [

Valve Operator 2

Valve 10

Motor I I

Blower 7

Instrumentation: 12

Recorder

Circuit Breaker 18

Heat Exchanger 3

Instrumentation: 2

Transmitter

Total 65

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

0.

-sign Aging

- 1.000

.200 0.600

- 0.364

.143 0.286

- 0.250

0.

Testing

0.100

0.091

0.083

0.056

Human Other

- 0.100

- 0.545

0.286 0.286

0.083 0.583

0.056 0.667

- 1.000

0.111 0.111

_ 1.000

E-40
Table E-36. Reactor building cooling component failure category system fractionsa

Componentsb

Valve

Motor

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Blower

Circuit Breaker

Valve Operator

Heat Exchanger

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

Total

10

11

12

7

18

2

Design Aging

0.031 0.092

- 0.062

- 0.046

Testing

0.015

0.015

0.015

0.015

Human

0.015

Other

0.015

0.092

0.108

0.015 0.031

0.031 0.031

- 0.031

0.031 0.031

0.015 0.185

3 - 0.046

2 - 0.031

65

E-41
Table E-37. Reactor core isolation cooling system

NSSS:

SYSTEM:

COMPONENTS:

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

CEA-REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING

CKTBRK

ELECON

GENERA

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IXMITR

MECFUN

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

TURBIN

VALVE

VALVOP

E-42
Table E-38. Reactor core isolation cooling system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 70

Aging Failures 209

Test and Maintenance Failures 67

Human Related Failures 13

Other Failures 415

Total 774

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.090

Aging Fraction 0.270

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.087

Human Related Fraction 0.017

Other Fraction 0.536

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 88

Degraded System Operation 184

Loss of Redundancy 41

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 138

System Function Unaffected 323

Total 774

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.114

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.238

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.053

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.178

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.417

E-43
Table E-39. Reactor core isolation cooling component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb

Motor

Pipe

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Total

7

2

10

Di

0

esign Aging

.143 0.571

- 0.500

.100 0.500

Testing

0.143

0.100

Human Other

- 0.143

- 0.500

0 - 0.300

Valve

Instrumentation

Recorder

199

26

0.080

0.115

0.492

0.346

0.075 0.020

0.077

0.332

0.462

Support

Valve Operator

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Circuit Breaker

36

144

44

0.056

0.090

0.045

0.147

0.200

0.111

Pump

Instrumentation:

Controller

Mechanical Function

Unit

34

5

27

0.278

0.229

0.227

0.206

0.200

0.185

0.176

0.028

0.111

0.023

0.059

0.200

0.074

0.059

- 0.639

0.007 0.562

0.023 0.682

- 0.588

- 0.400

- 0.630

17 0.118 - 0.647

Turbine

Relay

Instrumentation:

Switch

Generator/Inverter/

Alternator

Electrical Conductor

Total

31

10

176

0.129

0.200

0.085

0.161

0.100

0.097

0.129

0.300

0.108

0.032

0.100

0.017

0.548

0.300

0.693

5 - 1.000

774

- 1.000

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-44
Table E40. Reactor core Isolation cooling component failure category system fractions8

Componentsb

Valve

Valve Operator

Instrumentation:

Switch

Total

199

144

176

-Design

0.021

0.017

0.019

Aging

0.127

0.043

0.022

Testing

0.019

0.021

0.025

Human

0.005

0.001

0.004

Other

0.085

0.105

0.158

Support

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Circuit Breaker

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Instrumentation:

Controller

36

44

0.003

0.003

0.013

0.013

0.001

0.001 0.001

0.030

0.039

26 . 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.016

34

10

0.006

0.001

0.009

0.006

0.006

0.003

0.001

0.003

- 0.026

- 0.004

27 0.004 - 0.022

Turbine

Motor

Mechanical Function Unit

Relay

Pump

Pipe

Generator/Inverter/Alternator

Electrical Conductor

Ibtal

31

7

17

10

5

2

5

I

774

0.005 0.006

0.001 0.005

0.003 0.004

0.003 0.001

0.001 0.001

- 0.001

0.005

0.001

0.001

0.004

0.001

0.001 0.022

- 0.001

- 0.014

0.001 0.004

- 0.003

- 0.001

- 0.006

- 0.001

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-45
Table E41. Reactor protection trip system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

IBB-REACTOR PROTECTION

IBC-(ENGINEERED) SAFETY FEATURE SUBSYSTEM

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

IBA-REACTOR PROTECTION

IBAIAA-REACTOR PROTECTION - NEUTRON LEVEL SUBSYSTEM

E-WESTINGHOUSE

IBG-REACTOR PROTECTION AND LOGIC

IBK-ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION

COMPONENTS: ANNUNC

CKTBRK

ELECON

GENERA

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IPWSUP

ISODEV

IXMITR

RELAY

E-46
Table E-42. Reactor protection trip system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 472

Aging Failures 829

Test and Maintenance Failures 214

Human Related Failures . 27

Other Failures 1985

Total 3533

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction- 0.134

Aging Fraction 0.235

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.061

Human Related Fraction 0.008

Other Fraction 0.562

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 6

Degraded System Operation 598

Loss of Redundancy 603

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 1384

System Function Unaffected 943

Total 3533

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.002

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.169

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.171

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.392

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.267

E-47
Table E-43. Reactor protection trip component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb _Ital Design

Instrumentation: 31 0.032

Isolation Device

Annunciator 3 0.333

Generator/Alternator/ 16 0.250

Inverter

Circuit Breaker 46 0.087

Instrumentation: 918 0.062

Computation Module

Instrumentation: 214 0.121

Recorder

Relay 377 0.265

Instrumentation: 268 0.071

Electric Power Supply

Instrumentation: 207 0.092

Controller

Instrumentation: 513 0.273

Switch

Instrumentation: 928 0.108

Tkansmitter

Electrical Conductor 12 0.083

Tbtal 3533

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

Aging

0.387

0.333

0.312

0.283

0.281

0.271

0.255

0.254

0.237

0.187

0.184

0.167

Testing

0.125

0.087

0.035

0.061

0.029

0.060

0.053

0.062

0.098

0.167

Human Other

- 0.581

- 0.333

- 0.312

- 0.543

0.009 0.613

0.005 0.542

0.016 0.435

- 0.616

- 0.618

0.010 0.468

0.008 0.596

- 0.583

E-48
Table E-44. Reactor protection trip component failure category system fractions8

Componentsb

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Relay

Instrumentation:

Switch

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Instrumentation:

Controller

Circuit Breaker

Instrumentation:

Isolation Device

Generator/Alternator/Inverter

Electrical Conductor

Annunciator

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

Total

918

928

377

513

268

214

207

46

31

16

12

3

3533

Design

0.016

0.028

0.028

0.040

0.005

0.007

0.005

Aging

0.073

0.048

0.027

0.027

0.019

0.016

0.014

Testing

0.009

0.026

0.003

0.009

0.005

0.004

0.003

0.001

0.001

0.001

Human

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.001

Other

0.159

0.157

0.046

0.068

0.047

0.033

0.036

0.007

0.005

0.001

0.002

0.001 0.004

- 0.003

0.001 0.001

- 0.001

E-49
Table E-45. Reactor coolant system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

CBD-REACTOR COOLANT

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

CBA-REACTOR RECIRCULATION

COMPONENTS: CKTBRK

ELECON

GENERA

HTEXCH

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IPWSUP

IXMITR

MECFUN

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

TRANSF

VALVE

VALVOP

VESSEL

E-50
Table E46. Reactor coolant system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures = 138

Aging Failures = 290

Test and Maintenance Failures = 53

Human Related Failures = 14

Other Failures 5 517

Total 1012

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.136

Aging Fraction = 0.287

Test and Maintenance Fraction = 0.052

Human Related Fraction = 0.014

Other Fraction = 0.511

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function = 9

Degraded System Operation = 222

Loss of Redundancy = 121

Loss of Subsystem/Channel = 248

System Function Unaffected = 412

Total 1012

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction = 0.009

Degraded System Operation Fraction = 0.219

Loss of Redundancy Fraction = 0.120

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction = 0.245

System Function Unaffected Fraction = 0.407

E-51
Table E47. Reactor coolant component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb Total

TJansformer 1

Instrumentation: 3

Electric Power Supply

Heat Exchanger 53

Mechanical Function Unit 20

Valve 118

Vessel 12

Circuit Breaker 28

Generator/Alternator/inverter 47

Pump 93

Support 87

Pipe 35

Motor 26

Instrumentation: 103

Recorder

Valve Operator 92

Relay 16

Instrumentation: 26

Controller

Instrumentation: 81

Switch

Instrumentation: 45

Computation Module

Instrumentation: 123

Transmitter

Electrical Conductor 3

Total 1012

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

Design Aging

- 1.000

- 0.667

Testing Human Other

- - 0.333

0.094

0.050

0.102

0.167

0.036

0.043

0.258

0.425

0.400

0.192

0.019

0.098

0.125

0.077

0.566

0.500

0.492

0.417

0.393

0.319

0.312

0.299

0.286

0.269

0.262

0.261

0.250

0.154

0.075

0.034

0.036

0.106

0.054

0.011

0.192

0.087

0.087

0.125

0.115

0.

0.

0.

0.

- 0.264

- 0.450

.017 0.356

- 0.417

- 0.536

.021 0.511

.022 0.355

.046 0.218

- 0.314

- 0.346

0.010 0.621

0.011 0.543

- 0.500

- 0.654

0.160 0.148 0.012 0.679

0.044 0.133 - 0.822

0.041 0.073 0.049 0.016 0.821

- 1.000

E-52
Table E-48. Reactor cooling component failure category system fractions8

Componentsb

Valve

Heat Exchanger

Pump

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Ibtal

118

53

93

103

Design

0.012

0.005

0.024

0.002

Aging

0.057

0.030

0.029

0.027

Testing

0.004

0.004

0.005

0.009

Human

0.002

0.002

0.001

Other

0.042

0.014

0.033

0.063

Support

Valve Operator

Generator/Alternator/Inverter

Instrumentation:

Switch

Circuit Breaker

Pipe

Mechanical Function Unit

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

87

92

47

81

28

35

20

123

0.037

0.009

0.002

0.013

0.001

0.014

0.001

0.005

0.026

0.024

0.015

0.012

0.011

0.010

0.010

0.009

0.001 0.004

0.008 0.001

0.005 0.001

- 0.001

0.019

0.049

0.024

0.054

0.001 _ 0.015

- 0.011

_ 0.009

0.006 0.002 0.100

Motor

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Vessel

Relay

Instrumentation:

Controller

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

26

45

0.005

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.007

0.006

0.005

0.004

0.004

0.005

0.002

0.003

12

16

26

- 0.009

- 0.037

- o.005

- 0.008

- 0.017

3 - 0.002 _ 0.001

Transformer I

Electrical Conductor 3

Tbtal 1012

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

- 0.001

- 0.003

E-53
Table E-49. Residual heat removal system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

CFC-DECAY HEAT REMOVAL/LOW PRESSURE INJECTION

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

CFA-RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL/LOW PRESSURE INJECTION

E-WESTINGHOUSE

CFF-RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL/LOW PRESSURE INJECTION

COMPONENTS: ACCUMU

ANNUNC

CKTBRK

ELECON

HEATER

HTEXCH

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IPWSUP

ISODEV

IXMITR

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

VALVE

VALVOP

E-54
Table E-50. Residual heat removal system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 216

Aging Failures 531

Test and Maintenance Failures 142

Human Related Failures 29

Other Failures 1050

Total 1968

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.110

Aging Fraction 0.270

Tbst and Maintenance Fraction 0.072

Human Related Fraction 0.015

Other Fraction 0.534

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 14

Degraded System Operation 311

Loss of Redundancy 303

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 470

System Function Unaffected 870

Total 1968

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.007

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.158

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.154

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.239

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.442

E-55
Table E-51. Residual heat removal component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb

Annunciator

Instrumentation:

Isolation Device

Heat Exchanger

Valve

Pump

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Instrumentation:

Controller

Circuit Breaker

Motor

Valve Operator

Relay

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Instrumentation:

lTansmitter

Instrumentation:

Switch

Tbtal

1

4

39

484

86

11

Design Aging

- 1.000

- 1.000

0.103 0.538

0.079 0.492

0.093 0.465

- 0.273

Thsting Human Other

27 0.037

24 0.083

99

21

446

27

78

182

203

0.152

0.190

0.096

0.074

0.051

0.099

0.099

0.259

0.250

0.242

0.238

0.215

0.185

0.167

0.121

0.118

0.026

0.058

0.070

0.037

0.083

0.091

0.048

0.096

0.111

0.064

0.099

0.059

- 0.333

0.012 0.360

0.035 0.337

- 0.727

- 0.667

- 0.583

- 0.515

- 0.524

0.025 0.567

- 0.630

- 0.718

0.011

0.015

0.670

0.709

Support

Heater

Accumulator

Electrical Conductor

Pipe

202

12

5

3

14

0.223

0.083

0.200

0.714

0.109 0.059

_ 0.333

0.020 0.589

- 0.917

- 0.800

- 0.667

- 0.286

Total 1968

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-56
Table E-52. Residual heat removal component failure category system fractions8

Componentsb 1

Valve

Valve Operator

Pump

Circuit Breaker

Instrumentation:

Switch

Support

Heat Exchanger

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Motor

Instrumentation:

Controller

Relay

Instrumentation:

Isolation Device

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Annunciator

Accumulator

Heater

Electrical Conductor

Pipe

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

Total

484

446

86

99

203

202

39

182

Design

0.019

0.022

0.004

0.008

0.010

0.023

0.002

0.009

Aging

0.121

0.049

0.020

0.012

0.012

0.011

0.011

0.011

0.007

0.004

0.003

0.003

Testing

0.014

0.022

0.003

0.005

0.006

0.006

0.001

0.009

0.003

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.002

Human

0.003

0.006

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.001

Other

0.088

0.129

0.015

0.026

0.073

0.060

0.007

0.062

78 0.002

27 0.001

21

24

27

4

11

1

5

12

3

14

1968

0.002

0.001

0.001 0.003

- 0.002

- 0.028

- 0.009

- 0.006

- 0.007

- 0.009

- 0.004

- 0.002

- 0.006

- 0.001

- 0.002

- 0.002

0.001

0.001

0.005

0.001

- 0.001

E-57
Table E-53. Service water system

NSSS: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

E-WESTINGHOUSE

SYSTEM: A-BABCOCK & WILCOX

WAB-LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

WAA-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER

E-WESTINGHOUSE

WAD-NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER

COMPONENTS: CKTBRK

ELECON

FILTER

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

INTCPM

IPWSUP

IXMITR

MOTOR

PIPE

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

VALVE

VALVOP

E-58
Table E-54. Service water system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 88

Aging Failures 570

Test and Maintenance Failures 83

Human Related Failures 16

Other Failures 515

Total 1272

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.069

Aging Fraction 0.448

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.065

Human Related Fraction 0.013

Other Fraction 0.405

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 3

Degraded System Operation 216

Loss of Redundancy 233

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 435

System Function Unaffected 385

Total 1272

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.002

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.170

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.183

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.342

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.303

E-59
Table E-55. Service water system failure category fractionsa

Componentsb Total I)esign Aging

- 1.000

Testing Human Other

Instrumentation: 2

Electric Power Supply

Filter 98

Pump 248

Pipe 18

Valve 362

Instrumentation: 17

Controller

Motor 64

Circuit Breaker 48

Valve Operator 307

Instrumentation: 38

Switch

Instrumentation: 22

Recorder

Instrumentation: 27

'1tansmitter

Support 10

Relay S

Electrical conductor 4

Instrumentation: 2

Computation Module

Total 1272

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

0.102

0.044

0.066

0.059

0.078

0.062

0.072

0.079

0.045

0.037

0.300

0.600

0.250

0.571

0.569

0.556

0.555

0.529

0.391

0.354

0.293

0.263

0.041

0.077

0.056

0.039

0.118

0.016

0.083

0.117

0.026

- 0.286

- 0.310

- 0.389

0.025 0.315

- 0.294

0.016 0.500

0.042 0.458

0.013 0.505

- 0.632

- 0.727

- 0.815

0.227

0.111 0.037

0.100 - 0.600

- 0.400

- 0.750

- 1.000

E-60
Table E-56. Service water component failure category system fractions8

Componentsb

Valve

Pump

Valve Operator

Filter

Motor

Circuit Breaker

Pipe

Instrumentation:

Switch

Total

362

248

307

98

64

48

18

38

Design Aging

0.019 0.158

0.009 0.111

0.017 0.071

0.008 0.044

0.004 0.020

0.002 0.013

- 0.008

0.002 0.008

Testing

0.011

0.015

0.028

0.003

0.001

0.003

0.001

0.001

Human Other

0.007 0.090

- 0.061

0.003 0.122

- 0.022

0.001 0.025

0.002 0.017

- 0.006

- 0.019

Instrumentation:

Controller

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

17 0.001

22 0.001

27 0.001

0.007 0.002 - 0.004

0.004 - 0.013

0.002 0.001 - 0.017

2 - 0.002

Support

Relay

Instrumentation:

Computation Module

Electrical Conductor

Total

10

5

2

4

1272

0.002

0.002

0.001 - 0.005

- 0.002

- 0.002

0.001 - 0.002

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

E-61
Table E-57. Standby liquid control system

NSSS:

SYSTEM:

COMPONENTS:

C-GENERAL ELECTRIC

PCA-STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL

ACCUMU

CKTBRK

HEATER

IBISSW

ICNTRL

INDREC

IPWSUP

IXMITR

PUMP

RELAY

SUPORT

VALVE

VALVOP

E-62
Table E-58. Standby liquid control system totals and fractions

Failure Category Totals

Design Failures 10

Aging Failures 49

Test and Maintenance Failures = 10

Human Related Failures I

Other Failures 103

Total 173

Failure Category Fractions

Design Fraction 0.058

Aging Fraction 0.283

Test and Maintenance Fraction 0.058

Human Related Fraction 0.006

Other Fraction 0.595

System Effect Totals

Loss of System Function 0

Degraded System Operation 39

Loss of Redundancy 24

Loss of Subsystem/Channel 34

System Function Unaffected 76

Total 173

System Effect Fractions

Loss of System Function Fraction 0.000

Degraded System Operation Fraction 0.225

Loss of Redundancy Fraction 0.139

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Fraction 0.197

System Function Unaffected Fraction 0.439

E-63
Table E-59. Standby liquid control component failure category fractionsa

Componentsb Total I

Pump 19

Relay 2

Accumulator 12

Instrumentation: 17

Transmitter

Instrumentation: 14

Recorder

Instrumentation: 4

Electric Power Supply

Valve 66

Instrumentation: 5

Controller

Heater 10

Support 6

Instrumentation: 14

Switch

Circuit Breaker 2

Valve Operator 2

Total 173

a. Denominator equals total component failures per system.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

)esign

D.053

0.083

0.118

Aging

0.632

0.500

0.333

0.294

Testing

0.167

- 0.286

- 0.250

Human Other

- 0.316

- 0.500

- 0.417

- 0.588

- 0.714

- 0.750

- 0.591

- 0.600

- 0.700

- 0.833

- 0.857

0.076 0.242

0.200

0.091

0.200

- 0.200 0.100

- 0.167

- 0.143

0.500

0.500 0.500

- 0.500

E-64
Table E-60. Standby liquid control component failure category system fractionsa

Componentsb

Valve

Pump

Instrumentation:

Transmitter

Instrumentation:

Recorder

Accumulator

Heater

Instrumentation:

Switch

Instrumentation:

Controller

Instrumentation:

Electric Power Supply

Relay

Support

Circuit Breaker

Valve Operator

Total

a. Denominator equals total system failures.

b. Components ordered by aging fractions.

Total

66

19

17

14

12

10

14

5

4

2

6

2

2

173

Design

0.029

0.006

0.012

Aging

0.092

0.069

0.029

Testing

0.035

Human Other

- 0.225

- 0.035

- 0.058

- 0.023 - 0.058

0.006 0.023

- 0.012

- 0.012

- 0.006

0.012

0.006

0.006

- 0.029

- 0.040

- 0.069

- 0.017

- 0.017

- 0.006

- 0.029

0.006 0.006

- 0.006

- 0.006

- 0.006

- 0.006

0.006 -

E-65
APPENDIX F

REPORTED FAIWRE-CAUSE DATA SUMMARIES

F-i
APPENDIX F

REPORTED FAILURE-CAUSE DATA SUMMARIES

Specific vendors and plant identifications are

maintained in the data base created during this

study. To preserve the proprietary nature of the

data and yet obtain acceptable data populations,

the failure-cause data presented in this report are

system-specific. Tables F-i and F-3 summarize the

failure-cause data. Table F-I lists components having five or more failure counts, and Table F-2 lists

those with less than five failure counts. Table F-3

summarizes the failure records that were categorized as unclassifiable. Tables F-4 through F-56

show the number of failure causes, the failurecause fractions, the upper-bound failure-cause fraction, and the lower-bound failure-cause fraction for

each failure mode of each component having five

or more failure counts, excluding the unclassified

causes. The failure causes are presented in alphabetical order in the tables. Table F-57 summarizes

the failure records by system effect, excluding the

unclassifiable failure records.

F-3
TABLE F-i. SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYZED DURING THE FAILURE CAUSE IDENTIFICATION ANALYSISa

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System

b

Components

Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Flow Controller

Flow Control Recorder

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

Level Control

Level Control Indicator

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Control

Failure Mode

External Leakage

Fails to Open

Failure to Operate as Required

Internal Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Falls to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

External Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Open

Failure to Operate as Required

Internal Leakage

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

External Leakage

Fails to Run

Fails to Start

External Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Open

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

External Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Open

Fails to Open/Falls to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Failure

Mode

Code

GEL

GFO

GFR

GIL

GFC

GFP

GEE

GFP

GEE

GFP

GEE

GFP

GEL

GFC

GFO

GFR

GIL

GEE

GFP

GEE

GFP

GEL

GFU

GFS

GEL

GFC

GFO

GOC

GFR

GEL

GFC

GFO

GOC

GFR

GEE

GFP

C

Counts

13

3

8

66

7

8

11

9

1

25

2

6

5

1

3

1

7

11

7

13

14

33

16

1

1 4

11

9

8

8

49

20

13

10

5

2
@ - |

TABLE F-1. (continued)

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System (continued)

Componentsb

Pressure Switch

Pressure Transmitter

Relay

Relief Valve

Snubber

Support

Turbine-Driven Pump

Failure Mode

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Fails to Open

Fails to Operate

Short Circuit

Fails to Close

Opens (Premature)

Loss of Function

Loss of Function

External Leakage

Fails to Run

Fails to Start

Fails to Operate

Loss of Function

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Falls to Operate

External Leakage

Fails to Run

Fails to Start

External Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Open

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

Internal Leakage

Failure

Mode

Code

GEE

GFP

GEE

GFP

GFO

GFP

GSN

GFC

GSO

GLF

GLF

GEL

GFU

GFS

GFP

GLF

GEE

GEE

GFP

GEL

GFU

GFS

GEL

GFC

GFO

GOC

GFR

GIL

CountsC

12

9

14

3

2

7

3

1

6

7

5

6

39

13

5

9

7

17

2

7

21

1

22

3

8

2

2

LIP

Chemical and Volume Control System Circuit Breaker, AC

Heat Tracing Heater

Level Control

Level Transmitter

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System

DC Power Subsystem

Emergency On-site Power Supply Subsystem

Battery

Battery Charger

Circuit Breaker, AC

Diesel Generator

Loss of Function

Loss of Function

Fails to Operate

Fails to Run

Fails to Start

No Failure

GLF

GLF

GFP

GFU

GFS

GNF

10

35

5

43

21

49
TABLE F-1. (continued)

'71

as

System Componentsb

Class lE Electrical Power Distribution System (continued)

Instrumentation & Uninterruptible Circuit Breaker, AC

Power Supply Subsystem Inverter

High Pressure Injection System Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

Heat Tracing Heater

Level Transmitter

Load Sequence Controller

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Transmitter

Relief Valve

Snubber

Failure Mode

Fails to Operate

Loss of Function

External Leakage Internal Leakage

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

External Leakage Falls to Close

Fails to Open Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

Loss of Function

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals Fails to Operate

External Leakage Fails to Run

Fails to Start

External Leakage Fails to Close

Fails to Open Fails to Open/Falls to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

External Leakage Fails to Close

FaIls to Open Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Internal Leakage

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Close

Falls to Open

Opens (Premature)

Loss of Function

GFP

GLF

GEL

GIL

GFP

GEE

GFP

GEL

GFC

GFO

GOC

GFR

GLF

GEE

GEE

GFP

GEL

GFU

GFS

GEL

GFC

GFO

GOC

GFR

GEL

GFC

GFO

GOC

GIL

GEE

GFC

GFO

GSO

GLF

Failure

Mode

Code Counts--

6

63

3

15

11

14

3

4

2

1

I

4

21

21

2

8

2

11

4

7

20

12

24

7

1

5

122

6

5

9

4

10
TABLE F-i. (continued)

System

Service Water System

Componentsb

Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Flow Indicator

Flow Switch

Hand Control Valve

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Pnuematic-Operated Valve

Pressure Indicator

Strainer

Failure Mode

External Leakage Fails to Open

Internal Leakage

Falls to Operate

Opens (Premature)

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

External Leakage Falls to Close

Fails to Open Fails to Open/Falls to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

External Leakage Falls to Run

Fails to Start

External Leakage

Falls to Close

Fails to Open

Falls to Open/Fails to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

External Leakage Fails to Close

Fails to Open Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Loss of Function

Plugged

Failure

Mode

Code

GEL

GFO

GIL

GFP

GSO

SEE

GFP

SEE

GEL

GFC

GFO

GOC

GFR

GEL

GFU

GFS

GEL

GFC

GFO

GOC

GFR

GEL

GFC

GFO

SOC

GFR

GEE

GFP

GLF

GPL

Counts2

4

25

11

6

1

4

16

2

7

1

1

6

64

89

14

7

43

27

17

17

5

is

9

5

13

5

1

13

8

-J

a. See Table F-3 for summary of data categorized as unclassifiable.

b. See Table F-2 for those components having less than 5 counts.

c. Total counts: 1573.
TABLE F-2. SUMMARY OF COMPONENTS HAVING LESS THAN 5 COUNTS EACHa

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System

Components

Annunciator

Controller (parameter not

specified)

Current Indicating Controller

Differential Pressure

Controller

Failure Mode

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Failure

Mode

Code

GEE

GFP

GEE

GEE

Countsb

1

1

3

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

GFP

GEE

3

Differential Pressure

Transmitter

Electically Operated

(Solenoid) Valve

0"1

Flow Indicating Controller

Flow Indicating Switch

Flow Switch

Hand Switch

Hydraulic Valve

Level Control Recorder

Level Recorder

Level Switch

Level Transmitter

Fails to Operate

Fails to Close

Fails to Open

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Plugged

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Fails to Operate

Failure to Operate as Required

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Falls to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

GFP

GFC

GFO

GOC

GPL

GEE

GEE

GFP

GFP

GFR

GOC

GFP

GEE

GFP

GEE
TABLE F-2. (continued)

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System (continued)

Chemical and Volume Control System

Components

Pipe

Pressure Control Recorder

Speed Controller

Switch (parameter not

specified)

Check Valve

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

Level Control Recorder

Level Switch

Mechanical Valve

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Switch

Relief Valve

Temperature Switch

Failure Mode

Plugged

Rupture

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Fails to Operate

Internal Leakage

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

External Leakage

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Falls to Close

External Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Operate

Opens (Premature)

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Failure

Mode

Code

GPL

GRU

GEE

GFP

GFP

Countsb

2

2

2

2

GIL

GEE

GEL

GEE

GEE

GFC

GEL

GFC

GFP

GSO

GEE

I

1

2

3

1

4

",

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System

DC Power Subsystem

Emergency On-Site Power Supply Subsystem

Low-Voltage Power Supply Subsystem

Circuit Breaker, AC

Temperature Indicator

Timer

Bus

Circuit Breaker, AC

Relay

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Loss of Function

Fails to Operate

Fails to Operate

Short Circuit

GFP

GEE

GEE

GLF

GFP

GFP

GSH

3

2
TABLE F-2. (continued)

Failure

Mode

System Comoonents Code

Class lE Electrical Power Distribution System (continued)

Medium-Voltage Power Supply Subsystem Cable

Circuit Breaker, AC

Failure Mode Countsb

High Pressure Injection System

I"I

0

Transformer

Current Switch

Flow Modifier

Hydraulic Valve

Mechanical Valve

Orifice

Pipe

Pressure Control Recorder

Pressure Controller

Pressure Modifier

Pressure Switch

DC Overcurrent Relay

Differential Pressure

Indicating Switch

Differential Pressure

Control Recorder

Electric Power Supply

Flow Modifier

Loss of Function

Fails to Operate

Opens (Premature)

Loss of Function

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

External Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Open

Fails to Close

Rupture

Rupture

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Loss of Function

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

GLF

6FP

GSO

GLF

GEE

GEE

GEL

GFC

GFO

GFC

GRU

GRU

GEE

GEE

GEE

GFP

6FP

GEE

Service Water System

GEE

GFP

GLF

GEE

I

I

I

I
TABLE F-2. (continued)

System

Service Water System (continued)

Components

Level Switch

Level Transmitter

Motor

Pipe

Position-Limit Switch

Pressure Switch

Relay

Relief Valve

Safety Relief Valve

Snubber

Support

Temperature Control

Indicator

Temperature Indicator

Temperature Switch

Thermowell

Vent Valve

Zone Modifier

Failure Mode

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Fails to Run

Plugged

Rupture

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Fails to Close

Falls to Open

Short Circuit

Fails to Close

Fails to Close

Loss of Function

Loss of Function

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Erroneous Output

Loss of Function

Fails to Close

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Failure

Mode

Code

GEE

GFP

GFU

GPL

GRU

GEE

GEE

GFP

GFC

GFO

GSH

GFC

GFC

GLF

GLF

GFP

GEE

GFP

GEO

GLF

GFC

GOC

GEE

Counts

I

1

3

3

1

3

1

3

1

1

1

a. Table summary does not contain data for any failure categorized unclassifiable (Table F-3).

b. Total counts: 140.
TABLE F-3. SUMMARY OF RECORDS IN WHICH THE FAILURE CAUSE WAS UNCLASSIFIABLE

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System

Comoonent

Check Valve

Failure Mode

Circuit Breaker, AC

Controller (parameter

not specified)

Flow Controller

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

Hand Switch

Level Controller

Motor-Driven Pump

External Leakage

Internal Leakage

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Falls to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Close

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Run

71

System Effect

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

System Function Unaffected

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Aging

YES

UNK

UNK

UNK

YES

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

YES

YES

UNK

UNK

YES

YES

UNK

YES

NO

UNK

UNK

UNK

NO

UNK

UNK

UNK

NO

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

YES

NO

Counts I121112122222332

Fails to Start

Motor-Operated Valve

Pneumatic-Operated

Valve

Fails to Close

Fails to Open Fails to Open/Fails to Close

External Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Open
TABLE F-3. (continued)

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System (continued)

Component

Pneumatic-Operated Valve (continued)

Pressure Control

Recorder

Pressure Switch

Pressure Transmitter

Relief Valve

Snubber

Turbine-Driven Pump

Failure Mode

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals Fails to Operate

Fails to Close

Opens (Premature)

Loss of Function

Fails to Run

System Effect

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of Redundancy Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Aging

UNK

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

NO

YES

UNK

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

YES

YES

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

YES

No

UNK

YES

UNK

YES

NO

UNK

YES

Counts

1

2

1

1

1

4

2

2

1

1

1

2

4

4

I

1

I

1

l

2

1

1

1

2

I 3

2

2

1 .

1

4

71

Oii

Fails to Start

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System

DC Power Subsystem Battery

Battery Charger

Emergency On-Site Power Diesel Generator

Subsystem

Loss of Function

Loss of Function

Fails to Run

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected
TABLE F-3. (continued)

System Component

Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System (continued)

Emergency On-Site Power Diesel Generator I

Subsystem (continued) (continued)

Failure Mode

'ails to Start

No Failure

System Effect

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

System Function Unaffected

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Instrumentation &

Uninterruptible Power Supply

Subsystem

Low-Voltage Power Subsystem

Aging Counts

Temperature Indicator

Inverter

Bus

IP Circuit Breaker. AC

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Loss of Function

Loss of Function

Fails to Operate

Loss of Function

External Leakage

NO

UNK

YES

NO

UNK

UNK

NO

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

YES

UNK

YES

YES

UNK

UNK

NO

UNK

UNK

NO

UNK

YES

UNK

Medium-Voltage Power Subsystem Transformer

Chemical and Volume Control

System

Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Motor-Driven Pump

Falls to operate

Fails to Run

Fails to Start

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

UNK

UNK

YES

YES

UNK

YES

YES

I

1

1

1

Motor-Operated Valve Fails to Open

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

UNK

NO

UNK

UNK

UNK

1

1

1

1

2
TABLE F-3. (continued)

System

Chemical and Volume Control

System (continued)

High Pressure Injection System

Component

ReTief Valve

Temperature Control

Recorder

Temperature

Transmitter

Accumulator

Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

Heat Tracing Heater

Load Sequence Controller

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Failure Mode

External Leakage Fails to Close

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Operate

Loss of Function

External Leakage

Fails to Operate

Fails to Operate

Fails to Close

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Loss of Function

Fails to Operate

External Leakage

Fails to Run

Fails to Start

Falls to Close

Fails to Open

LA

System Effect

Degraded System Operations Degraded System Operations

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of Redundancy

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy System Function Unaffected

Aging

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK I

YES

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

YES

UNK

YES

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

YES

YES

UNK

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

NO

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

YES

Counts 12
TABLE F-3. (continued)

System

High Pressure Injection System (continued)

Component

Motor-Operated Valve

(continued)

Failure Mode

Falls to Open/Falls to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

Snubber

Service Water System Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Flow Switch

Hand Control Valve

Hanger

Motor-Driven Pump

Loss of Function

Internal Leakage

Fails to Operate

Erroneous/Erratic Signals

Fails to Open

Failure to Operate as Requires

Loss of Function

External Leakage

System Effect

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Degraded System Operations Loss of Redundancy Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of System Function

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Redundancy

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations Loss of Redundancy

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel System Function Unaffected

Aging

NO

UNK

YES

UNK

NO

UNK

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

HO

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

UNK

NO

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

NO

UNK

YES

YES

UNK

UNK

UNK

UNK

Counts 51I91231213232

7'

Fails to Run

Motor-Operated Valve

Fails to Start

External Leakage

Fails to Close

Fails to Open
TABLE F-3. (continued)

System Component

Motor-Operated Valve

(continued)

Failure Mode

Service Water System Fails to Open/Fails to Close

(continued)

Failure to Operate as Required

Pneumatic-Operated

Valve

External Leakage

Fails to Close

System Effect

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Degraded System Operations

System Function Unaffected

Degraded System Operations

Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Fails to Open

Fails to Open/Fails to Close

Failure to Operate as Required

Aging Counts

UNK 1

UNK

NO

UNK

YES

UNK

YES

YES

YES

NO

UNK

YES

UNK

UNK

YES

UNK

YES

YES

UNK

UNK

UNK

NO

UNK

Pressure Switch

-7.1 Strainer

-J

Fails to Operate

Loss of Function
TABLE F-4. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW CHECK VALVES

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CHECK VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DR

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.07

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/81

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.07

Lower Bound 0.00

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBB

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.66'

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 2/10

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.66

Lower Bound 0.66

7

1

7

0

EBE

1

0.077

1/0/0

0.077

0.077

EBR

8

0.615

8/0/0

0.615

0.615

EBW

l

0.077

0/0/1

0.077

0.000

EVM

1

0.077

1/0/0

0.077

0.077

HPM

0.077

1/0/0

0.077

0.077

Totals

13

1.000

11/0/2

1.000

0.846

Totals

3

1.000

3/0/0

1 .000

1.000

7

/0

7

7

ED] -

1

0.333

1/0/0

0.333

0.333
TABLE F-4. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CHECK VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE EYM

Failure Cause Count 6 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.750 0.125

Totals

HPM

1 8

0.125 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

6/010 1/0/0 0/1/0 711/0

0.750

0.750

%0 Failure Mode: INTERNAL LEAKAGE - GIL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.030

0.125

0.125

EBE

4

0.061

0.000

0.000

0.875

0.875

Totals

EBR

46

0.697

ECC

2

0.030

EDB

1

0.015

EDI

4

0.061

HPM

7

0.106

66

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/1 4/0/0 46/0/0 2/0/0 0/0/1

0.015

0.000

4/0/0

0.061

0.061

0/6/1 57/6/3

0.030

0.015

0.061

0.061

0.597

0.697

0.030

0.030

0.015

0.000

0.909

0.864
TABLE F-S. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Aging

Totals

1

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

1.000

1.000

1/0/0

1.000

1.000 'TI1

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.429

Totals

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

EDU

1

0.143

0/0/1

0.143

0.000

EL

1

0.143

0/0/1

0.143

0.000

EVM

l

0.143

HPM _

1

0.143

7

1.000

3/0/0

0.429

0.429

1/0/0 0/1/0 4/1/2

0.143

0.143

0. 000

0.000

0.858

0.572 Lower Bound
TABLE F-6. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW FLOW CONTROLLERS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

FLOW CONTROLLERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDB EDI

Failure Cause Count 1 I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.125 0.125

Totals

EDT

3

0.375

ELF

2

0.250

HPM

1

0.125

8

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1

0.125

0.000

7i

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI

Failure Cause Count 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.273

1/0/0

0.125

0.125

EOS

1

0.091

1/0/2

0.375

0.125

EL

2

0.182

1/0/1

0.250 0.000

0.125 0.000

0.875

0.375

0/1/0 3/1/4

Totals

ELF

3

0.273

ELK

1

0.091

"PM

1

0.091

11

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/3/0

0.000

0.000

1/0/0 1/1/0 2/0/1 1/0/0

0.091

0.091

0/l/0 5/5/1

0.091

0.091

0.091

0.091

0.273

0.182

0.000

0.000

0.546

0.455
TABLE F-7. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW FLOW CONTROL RECORDERS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

FLOW CONTROL RECORDERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR EDI

Failure Cause Count 2 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.222 0.111

Totals

EDT _

6

0.667

9

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0 0/1/0 3/0/3

0.667

0.333

5/1/3

0.222

0.222

0.000

0.000

0.889

0.555 '7'

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELO

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1 0/0/1

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000
TABLE F-8. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW FLOW TRANSMITTERS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWTER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

FLOW TRANSMITTERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DM EDB

Failure Cause Count 4 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.160 0.040

Aqing

Totals

EDI

2

0.080

EDS

2

0.080

EDT

12

0.480

ELF

4

0.160

25

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/4/0 0/0/1 1/1/0

0.040

0.040

2/0/0

0.080

0.080

9/0/3

0.480

0.360

1/0/3 13/5/7

0.000

0.000

0.040

0.000

-0.160

0.040

0.800

0.520

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500

Aging

Totals

EDB

1

0.500

2

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

1/0/0 0/0/1

0.500 0.500

0.500 0.000

1/0/1

1.000

Lower Bound 0.500
TABLE F-9. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW HAND CONTROL VALVES

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 6

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

6

1.000

'Ti7

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 6/C

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 1.C

Lower Bound 1.0

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EB

Failure Cause Count 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.6

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 3/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.6

Lower Bound 0.6

'0/0

000

00

1.000

1.000

6/0/0

Totals

R

,00

ECC

1

0.200

HPM

1

0.200

5

1.000

0/0

.00

00

1/0/0

0.200

0.200

0/1/0 4/1/0

0.000

0.000

0.800

0.800
TABLE F-9. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FTlrXTER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: PAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDO

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Aing

Totals

1

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0O/Ol 0/0/1

t11J

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DM EBE

Failure Cause Count 2 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.667 0.333

Aging

Totals

3

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

010/2

0.667'

0.000

1/0/0

0.333

0.333

1/0/2

1.000

0.333
TABLE F-9. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: INTERNAL LEAKAGE - GIL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR _ _

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Aging

Totals

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

1.000

1.000

1/0/0

1.000

It1 1.000

bi
TABLE F-10. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW LEVEL CONTROL INDICATORS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

LEVEL CONTROL INDICATORS

1-" kt;

4

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDB E

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.143 0.

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/0/1 1

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.143 0.

Lower Bound 0.000 0.

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE I

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.077 0,

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/1/0 1,

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000 0

Lower Bound 0.000 0.

EDT

3

I429

I0/2

.429

.143

ELF

3

0.429

2/0/1

0.429

0.286

Totals

7

1.000

3/0/4

1.000

0.429

Totals

13

1.000

4/6/3

0.539

0.308

.BF

1

,077

o0/0

.077

.077

EBR

1

0.077

1/0/0

0.077

0.077

EDB

3

0.231

0/3/0

0.000

0.000

ELE

1

0.077

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

ELF

4

0.308

1/0/3

0.308

0.077

ELL

1

0.077

1/0/0

0.077

0.077

HPM

1

0.077

0/1/0

0. 000

0.000
TABLE F-1l. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW LEVEL CONTROLLERS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

LEVEL CONTROLLERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDT ELF

Failure Cause Count 3 4

Failure Cause Fraction 0.429 0.571

Aging

Totals

7

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/2

0.429

0.143

3/0/1

0.571

0.429

4/0/3

1.000

0.572

trj

00

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.091

Totals

EBF

3

0.273

EDB

1

0.091

ELF

4

0.364

ELO

1

0.091

ELS

1

0.091

11

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

3/0/0 0/0/1 1/0/3

0.364

0.091

0/0/1

0.091

0.000

0/0/1 4/1/6

0.273

0.273

0.091

0.000

0.091

0.000

0.910

Lower Bound 0.364
TABLE F-12. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DRIVEPUMPS

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 14

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

14

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

14/0/0

1.000

1.000

14/0/0

1.000

1.000 I'l

tN

Failure Mode: FAILS TO START - GFS

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count 4

Failure Cause Fraction 0.250

Totals

EBR

1

0.062

EDB

4

0.250

EDI

1

0.062

EDO

1

0.062

EDT

3

0.188

EMW

1

0.062

HPM

1

0.062

16

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

1/3/0

0.062

0.062

1/0/0 0/1/3 0/1/0 0/0/3 0/1/0

0.000

0.000

1/0/0 3/7/6

0.062

0.062

0.188

0.000

0.062

0.062

0.000

0.000

0.188

0.000

0. 000

0.000

0.562

Lower Bound 0.186
TABLE F-12. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.030

Totals

EBC

1

0.030

EBF

2

0.061

EBR

7

0.212

EDB

1

0.030

EDI

1

0.030

EDS

2

0.061

EDT

1

0.030

EDU

1

0.030

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

'I

2/0/0

0.061

0.061

ELA

3

0.091

7/0/0

0.212

0.212

ELS

1

0.030

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

EMW

7

0.212

1/0/0 2/0/0 0/0/1

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code El EL

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.030 0.030

0.030

0.030

EPL

1

0.030

0.061

0.061

HPC

1

0.030

1/0/0

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.000

Totals

HPM

1

0.030

33

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

0/1/0

0 .000

0.000

0/0/1

0.030

0.000

0/0/3 0/0/1 0/7/0 0/1/0 0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0/1/0 13/14/6

0.091

0.000

0.030

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.575

Lower Bound 0.394
TABLE F-13. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

1.000

1.000

1/0/0

1.000

I71 1.000

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.143

Aging

Totals

EBE

1

0.071

EBR

5

0.357

ECC

1

0.071

EDOB

2

0.143

EDI

1

0.071

EDU

1

0.071

HPM _

1

0.071

14

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/2/0

0.000

0.000

1/0/0

0.071

0.071

5/0/0

0.357

0.357

1/0/0

0.071

0.071

1/0/1

0.143

0.071

1/0/0

0.071

0.071

1/0/0 0/1/0 10/3/1

0.071

0.071

0.000

0.000

0.784

0.712
TABLE F-13. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDB

Failure Cause Count 5

Failure Cause Fraction 0.455

Totals

EDI

5

0.455

HAM

1

0.091

11

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/5

0.455

0.000

5/0/0 0/1/0 5/1/5

0.455

0.455

0.000

0.000

0.910

0.455

71

W~

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBE EBR

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.125 0.125

Aging

Totals

EDS

3

0.375

ELS

0.125

ELW

1

0.125

HPO

1

0.125

8

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

0.125

0.125

1/0/0

0.125

0.125

0/0/3

0.375

0.000

0/0/1

0.125

0.000

0/0/1

0.125

0.000

0/1/0 2/1/5

0.000

0.000

0.875

0.250
TABLE F-13. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR EDB

Failure Cause Count 2 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.222 0.333

Totals

EDI

1

0.111

ELE

1

0.111

ELW

I

0.111

HPM -

0.111

9

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0

0.222

0.222

1/0/2

0.333

0.111

1/0/0 0/1/0 0/0/1 0/1/0 4/2/3

0.111

0.111

0.000

0.000

0.111

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.777

0.444

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBB EDI

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.200 0.200

Aging

Totals

EDT

3

0.600

5

1.000

Yes/No /Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1 1/0/0 2/0/1 3/0/2

0.200

0.000

0.200

0.200

0.600

0.400

1.000

0.600
TABLE F-13. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPOkENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EMW _

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

2

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/2/0

I0.000

0.000

0/2/0

0.000

0.000
TABLE F-14. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW PNEUMATIC-OPERATED VALVES

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEUMATIC-OPERATED VALVES

'21

WJ

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 7

Failure Cause Fraction 0.875

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 7/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.875

Lower Bound 0.875

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBE

Failure Cause Count 5

Failure Cause Fraction 0.102

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 5/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.102

Lower Bound 0.102

_ __

1

0.125

ofn1o

0.000

0.000

Totals

8

1.000

7/1/0

0.875

0.875

Totals

49

1.000

32/10/7

0.794

0.652

EBF

1

0.020

1/0/0

0.020

0.020

EBR

18

0.367

18/0/0

0.367

0.367

EDB

10

0.204

5/1/4

0.184

0.082

EDI

11

0.224

1/9/1

0.041

0.020

ELF

1

0.020

0/0/1

0.020

0.000

ELS

1

0.020

0/0/1

0.020

0.000

HEO

2

0.041

2/0/0

0.041

0.041
TABLE F-14. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEUMATIC-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DM

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.050

Aging

Totals

EBF

3

0.150

EBR

6

EDB EDI

4 1

EMW HAM HPM

1 2 1

0.050 0.100 0.050

20

0.300 0.200 0.050 0.050 1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1

0.050

0.000

3/0/0 6/0/0 2/0/2 1/0/0 0/0/1 1/0/0 0/2/0 0/1/0 13/3/4

0.850

0.650

0.150

0.150

0.300

0.300

0.200

0.100

0.050

0.050

0.050

0.000

0.050

0.050

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000 oI

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR EDB

Failure Cause Count 6 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.600 0.200

Totals

EDU

2

0.200

10

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

6/0/0

0.600

0.600

0/0/2

0.200

0.000

2/0/0 8/0/2

0.200

0.200

1.000

0.800 Lower Bound
TABLE F-14. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEUMATIrUPrTED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause Totals

Failure Cause Code DE EBF EBR EDQ EDI EDT ELE EMK HPM

Failure Cause Count 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 13

Failure Cause Fraction 0.077 0.077 0.154 0.077 0.154 0.154 0.077 0.154 0.077 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/0/1 1/0/0 2/0/0 0/0/1 0/2/0 0/1/1 0/1/0 0/2/0 0/1/0 3/7/3

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.077 0.077 0.154 0.077 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.462

Lower Bound 0.000 0.077 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.231

'71

-4
TABLE F-15. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW PRESSURE SWITCHES

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PRESSURESWITCHES

o1q

00

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI I

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.083 O0

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 4,

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.083 0.

Lower Bound 0.083 0O

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR _

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.111 0.

A&ing

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 2,

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.111 O.

Lower Bound 0.111 0.

EDT

11

.917

(0/7

.917

.333

Totals

12

1.000

5/0/7

1.000

0.416

Totals

9

1.000

4/3/2

0.666

0.444

ECC

2

.222

!0/0

I222

,222

EDB

1

0.111

0/0/1

0.111

0.000

EDI

1

0.111

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

EL

1

0.111

0/0/1

0.111

0.000

ELA

1

0.111

1/0/0

0.111

0.111

HPC

1

0.111

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

HPO

1

0.111

011/o

0.000

0.000
TABLE F-16. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDT ELF

Failure Cause Count 9 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.643 0.071

Totals

"4PC

2

0.143

HPO

1

0.071

SPM

14

0.071 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

3/0/6

0.643

0.214

,?I

'.

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBM

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.333

0/0/1

0.071

0.000

EBR

1

0.333

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.714

0.214

0/2/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 3/4/7

Totals

ELO

1

0.333

3

1.000

Aginu

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

1/0/0 1/0/0 2/1/0

0.333

0.333

0.333

0.333

0.666

0.666
TABLE F-17. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW RELAYS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

aR WFailure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code E

Failure Cause Count

Failure Cause Fraction 0.

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.

Lower Bound 0.

Totals

BR

500

EDB

1

0.500

2

1.000

/0/0 0/0/1 1/0/1

500

500

0.500

0.000

1 .000

0.500

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.143

Aging

Totals

EDS

l

0.143

1/0/0

0.143

0.143

ELI

2

0.286

2/0/0

0.286

0.286

ELW

0.143

0/0/1

0.143

0.000

HPC

1

0.143

HPM

1

0.143

7

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0/1/0 0/1/0 3/3/1

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.572

0.429
TABLE F-17. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

RELAYS

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.333

Aging

Totals

ELW

2

0.667

3

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 0/0/2 1/0/2

0.333

0.333

0.667

0.000

1.000

0.333

I1T
TABLE F-18. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW RELIEF VALVES

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

RELIEF VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound.

Lower Bound

1/0/0

1.000

1.000

1/0/0

1.000

1.000 '71

Failure Mode: OPEN (PREMATURE) - GSO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.167

Totals

EDS

5

0.833

6

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 5/0/0 6/0/0

0.167

0.167

0.833

0.833

1.000

1.000
TABLE F-19. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW SNUBBERS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

TN*ER3

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code

Failure Cause Count

Failure Cause Fraction

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

Totals

EBR

5

0.714

El

1

0.143

Ii _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1

0.143

7

1.000

5/0/0 0/1/0 0/1/0

0.714 0.000 0.000

0.714 0.000 0.000

5/2/0

S."

0.714

0.714
TABLE F-20. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW SUPPORTS

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

SUPPORTS

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBW

Failure Cause Count 4

Failure Cause Fraction 0.800

Aging

Totals

El _ _ _ __ _ _ ._ _ -__ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _

.l

0.200

5

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/4 0/l/O 0/l/4

0.800

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.800

0.000 I7,
TABLE F-21. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR AFW TURBINE-DRIVEN PUMP

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FE-ETWAER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

TURBINIVENM PUMP

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.333

Totals

EPH

4 6

0.667 1.000

Agn

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0

0.333

0.333

0/4/0 2/4/0

0.000

0.000

0.333

0.333

Failure Mode: FAILS TO START - GFS

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.077

Totals

EBR

2

0.154

EDB

4

0.308

EDI

3

0.231

HAM

l

0.077

HPO

2

0.154

13

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 2/0/0 0/1/3 2/1/0 0/1/0 0/2/0 5/5/3

0.077

0.077

0.154

0.154

0.231

0.000

0.154

0.154

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.616

0.385
TABLE F-21. (continued)

SYSTEM

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

TURBINE-DRIVEN PUMP

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBE

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.051

Aging

Totals

EBM

1

0.026

EBR

11

0.282

ECC

1

0.026

EDB

7

0.179

EDI

3

0.077

ELF

2

0.051

EMW

1

0.026

EPH

1

0.026

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0

0*051

0.051

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

11/0/0 1/0/0 1/0/6 2/1/0 0/0/2

0.051

0.000

0/1/0 0/1/0

0.282

0.282

0.026

0.026

0.179

0.026

0.051

0.051

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EVM HAM

Failure Cause Count 3 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.077 0.026

Totals

HE

1

0.026

HPM

3

0.077

SPM

2

0.051

39

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

3/0/0 0/1/0

0.077 0.000

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0/3/0

0.000

0.000

0/2/0 20/11/8

0.000

0.000

0.717

Lower Bound 0.077 0.000 0.513
TABLE F-22. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CVCS CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME-CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CIRCUfBREAKS, AC

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.200

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.200

Lower Bound 0.200

EOB

2

0.400

0/0/2

0.400

0.000

EL

1

0.200

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

ELW

1

0.200

0/0/1

0.200

0.000

Totals

5

1.000

1/1/3

0.800

0.200 '7,

PJ
TABLE F-23. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CVCS HEAT TRACING HEATERS

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HEAT TRACING HEATERS

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ECC

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.111

Aging

Totals

ELD

0.111

ELH ELO HAM _

3 2 2

0.333 0.222 0.222

9

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 1/0/0 3/0/0 0/0/2 0/2/0 5/2/2

0.111

0.111

0.111

0.111

0.333

0.333

0.222

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.777

0.555

On
TABLE F-24. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CVCS LEVEL CONTROLLERS

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

LEVELCONTROLERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF EDI

Failure Cause Count 1 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.143 0.429

Aing

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 0/3/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.143 0.000

Lower Bound 0.143 0.000

EDT

3

0.429

3/0/0

0.429

0.429

Totals

7

1.000

4/3/0

0.572

0.572
TABLE F-25. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CVCS LEVEL TRANSMITTERS

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

LEVEL TRANSMITTERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI EDT

Failure Cause Count 4 11

Failure Cause Fraction 0.235 0.647

Totals

ELF

1

0.059

HPO

0.059

17

1.000

Agine

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/4/0 2/0/9 0/1/0

0.000

0.000

3/5/9

0.000

0.000

0.647

0.118

0.059

0.059

0.706

0.177

'TI (Aw

0

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELF _

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

2

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/2 0/0/2

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000
TABLE F-26. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CVCS MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 7

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Aqing

Yes/No/Unknown 7/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 1.000

Lower Bound 1.000

Totals

7

1.000

7/0/0

1.000

1.000 Vt

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.048

Totals

EBR

14

0.667

EDI

3

0.143

EVM

1

0.048

HPM

2

0.095

21

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 14/0/0 1/2/0 1/0/0 0/1/1 16/4/1

0.000

0.000

0.667

0.667

0.048

0.048

0.048

0.048

0.048

0.000

0.811

0.763
TABLE F-26. (continued)

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

Failure Mode: FAILS TO START - GFS

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code El

Failure Cause Count

Failure Cause Fraction 1.(

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/(

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound O-(

Lower Bound O.a

Totals

)UO

1.000

^0/1 O/O/1

)OO

)00

0.000

0.000 7,
TABLE F-27. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CYCS MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 8

Failure Cause Fraction 0.889

Totals

ECC

1 9

0.111 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

8/0/0

0.889

0.889

1/0/0 9/0/0

0.111

0.111

1.000

1.000

Ir

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBE

Failure Cause Count 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.136

Totals

EBR

10

0.455

EDB

5

0.227

EDI

3

0.136

HPM - -

1

0.045

22

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

3/0/0

0.136

0.136

10/0/0 0/0/5 3/0/0

0.136

0.136

0/1/0 16/1/5

0.455

0.455

0.227

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.954

0.727
TABLE F-27. (continued)

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDB _______

Failure Cause Count 3

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

3

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

O/1/2

0.667

0.000

0/1/2

0.667

0.000 "In

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ECC EDU

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500 0.500

Totals

2

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

1/0/0 1/0/0 2/0/0

0.500 0.500

0.500 0.500

1.000

Lower Bound 1.000
TABLE F-27. (continued)

SYSTEM

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: INTERNAL LEAKAGE - GIL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 2/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 1.000

Lower Bound 1.000

Totals

2

1.*000

2/0/0

1.000

1.000 7,

UrA

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR EDB

Failure Cause Count 3 4

Failure Cause Fraction 0.375 0.500

Totals

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

EDI

1

0.125

1/0/0

0.125

0.125

8

1.000

3/0/0 5/1/2

0.375

0.375

1/1/2

0.375

0.125

0.875

Lower Bound 0.625
TABLE F-28. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CLASS lE DC POWER BATTERIES

SYSTEM

DC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM - CLASS IE

COMPONENT

BA-T-TER

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DM

Failure Cause Count 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.300

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 3/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.300

Lower Bound 0.300

EBB

0.100

0/0/1

0.100

0.000

EL

0.100

0/0/1

0.100

0.000

ELF

0.100

0/0/1

0.100

0.000

ELG

0.100

1/0/0

0.100

0.100

ELL

0.100

1/0/0

0.100

0.100

ELS -

2

0.200

0/0/2

0.200

0.000

Totals

10

1.000

5/0/5

1.000

0.500 '7,

cis
TABLE F-29. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CLASS IE DC POWER BATTERY CHARGING UNIT

SYSTEM

DC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM - CLASS IE

COMPONENT

BATTERY CHARGIN UNITS

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 1

Totals

- EDB

2

0.057

EDI

1

0.029

EL

3

0.086

ELA

1

0.029

ELD

1

0.029

ELF

23

0.657

ELO

1

0.029

ELR

1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.029

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0.029

1/0/0 0/0/2 1/0/0

0.029

0.029

1/0/2 0/0/1 1/0/0

0.029

0.029

14/0/9 0/0/1 0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0.029

0.029

0.057

0.000

0.086

0.029

0.029

0.000

0.657

0.400

0.029

0.000

-J

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELS

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.029

Totals

35

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

0/0/1 18/1/16

0.029 0.974

Lower Bound 0.000 0.516
TABLE F-30. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURIE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CLASS IE E4ERGENCY POWER CIRCUIT BREAKERS

SYSTEM

EMERGENCY ON-SITE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.400

Totals

EDB,

3

0.600

5

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0 0/0/3 2/0/3

0.400

0.400

0.600

0.000

1.000

0.400 LA
TABLE F-31. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILtIRE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR CLASS IE EMERGENCY POWER DIESEL GENERATOR

SYSTEM

EMERGENCY ON-SITE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

COMPONENT

DIESEL GENERATORS

Failure Mode: FAILS TO START - GFS

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE1

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.095

Totals

EBR

2

0.095

EDB

4

0.190

EDI

3

0.143

EEN

1

0.048

EL ELD

2 1

0.095 0.048

ELE

1

0.048

ELF

1

0.048

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0 2/0/0 0/2/2 2/1/0 0/1/0 0/2/0 1/0/0 0/1/0 1/0/0

0.095

0.095

0.095

0.095

0.095

0.000

0.095

0.095

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.048

0.048

0.000

0.000

0.048

0.048

o0

Failure Mode: FAILS TO START - GFS(contimied)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELR ELS

Failure Cause Count 1 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.048 0.095

Totals

ELT _

1

0.048

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 2/0/0 0/1/0

21

1.000

10/9/2

0.571

0.476

0.000

0.000

0.095

0.095

0.000

0.000
TABLE F-31. (continued)

SYSTEM

EMERGENCY ON-SITE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

COMPONENT

DIESEL GENERATORS

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE1

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.023

Totals

EBB

2

0.047

EBF

1

0.023

EBM

1

0.023

EBR

14

0.326

EDB

3

0.070

EDI

3

0.070

EDU

2

0.047

EL

1

0.023

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 2/0/0 1/0/0 0/0/1 14/0/0 1/1/1 2/1/0 2/0/0 0/0/1

0.000

0.000

0.047

0.047 P11

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELD ELE

Failure Cause Count 4 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.093 0.023

0.023

0.023

ELF

3

0.070

0.023

0.000

ELO

0.023

0.326 0.047

0.326 0.023

0.047

0.047

0.047

0.047

0.023

0.000

Totals

ELS

1

0.023

EMW

2

0.047

EVM

1

0.023

HEM

1

0.023

SPC

I

0.023

43

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

4/0/0 0/1/0 2/0/1

0.070

0.047

0/0/1

0.023

0.000

0/0/1

0.023

0.000

0/2/0

0.000

0.000

1/0/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 29/8/6

0.815

0.676

0.093

0.093

0.000

0.000

0.023

0.023

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000
TABLE F-31. (continued)

SYSTEM

EMERGENCY ON-SITE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

COMPONENT

DIESEL GENERATORS

Failure Mode: NO FAILURE - GNF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE DM

Failure Cause Count 1 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.020 0.041

Aging

Totals

EBB

2

0.041

EBF

5

0.102

EBR

6

0.122

ECC

1

0.020

EDB

4

0.082

EDI

2

0.041

EDO

0.020

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 0/1/1 2/0/0 5/0/0 6/0/0

0.122

0.122

1/0/0

0.020

0.020

1/0/3

0.082

0.020

2/0/0

0.041

0.041

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.020

0.000

0%1

Failure Mode: NO FAILURE - GNF(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDS EDU

Failure Cause Count 1 I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.020 0.020

Aging

0.041

0.041

EL

2

0.041

0.102

0.102

ELD

1

0.020

Totals

ELF

0

0.020

ELO

1

0.020

ELT

3

0.061

ELW

1

0.020

EMW

9

0.184

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

0.020

0.020

1/0/0 0/0/2 1/0/0

0.020

0.020

0/0/1

0.020

0.000

1/0/0

0.020

0.020

1/0/2

0.061

0.020

0/0/1

0.020

0.000

2/6/1

0.061

0.041

0.020

0.020

0.041

0.000
TABLE F-31. (continued)

SYSTEM

EMERGENCY ON-SITE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

COMPONENT

DIESEL GENERATORS

Failure Mode: NO FAILURE - GNF(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EPL

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.020

Totals

EVM

3

0.06 1

HEM _

1

0.020

49

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

3/0/0 0/0/1 27/10/12

0.061

0.061

0.020

0.000

0.792

0.548 7%

m~
TABLE F-32. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR UPS CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

SYSTEM

INSTRUMENT & UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM - CLASS lE

COMPONENT

CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.200

AWing

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.200

Lower Bound 0.200

ELE

1

0.200

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

HE _

3

0.600

0/3/0

0.000

0.000

Totals

S

1.000

1/4/0

0.200

0.200
TABLE F-33. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR UPS INVERTERS

SYSTEM

INSTRUMENT & UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM - CLASS IE

COMPONENT

INVERTERS

IT,

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE DM

Failure Cause Count 5 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.079 0.032

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/4/1 0/2/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.016 0.000

Lower Bound 0.000 0.000

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELI ELO

Failure Cause Count 2 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.032 0.032

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 2/0/0 2/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.032 0.032

Lower Bound 0.032 0.032

EBR

5

0.079

5/0/0

0.079

0.079

ELS

8

0.127

1/3/4

0.079

0.016

EDB

2

0.032

0/0/2

0.032

0.000

ELT

1

0.016

0/0/1

0.016

0.000

EL

2

0.032

1/0/1

0.032

0.016

ELV

1

0.016

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

ELA

1

0.016

0/0/1

0.016

0.000

HE

1

0.016

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

ELD

2

0.032

2/0/0

0.032

0.032

ELE

9

0.143

0/8/1

0.016

0.000

ELF

18

0.286

5/4/9

0.222

0.079

Totals

HEM

2

0.032

0/2/0

0.000

0.000

Totals

63

1.000

18/25/20

0.604

0.286
TABLE F-34. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS CHECK VALVES

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CHETCKVALYES

710%tA

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.667

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 2/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.667

Lower Bound 0.667

Failure Mode: INTERNAL LEAKAGE - GIL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.200

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/2/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.067

Lower Bound 0.067

HPM _

1

0.333

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

Totals

3

1.000

2/1/0

0.667

0.667

Totals

15

1.000

13/2/0

0.867

0.867

EBR

9

0.600

9/0/0

0.600

0.600

EDB

1

0.067

1/0/0

0.067

0.067

EDI

2

0.133

2/0/0

0.133

0.133
TABLE F-35. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES. FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF

Failure Cause Count 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.273

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 3/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.273

Lower Bound 0.273

EBR

2

0.182

2/0/0

0.182

0.182

EDB

1

0.091

0/0/1

0.091

0.000

El

1

0.091

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

ELF

1

0.091

1/0/0

0.091

0.091

ELK

2

0.182

0/0/2

0.182

0.000

HPM _

0.091

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

Totals

11

1.000

6/2/3

0.819

0.546 71
TABLE F-36. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS FLOW TRANSMITTERS

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

FLOW TERSUMMIERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBM I

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.143 0.

Totals

EDB

I

EDT _

11 14

.071 0.786 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/1 010/1 3/0/8

0.786

0.214

4/0/10

0.143

0.071

0.071

0.000

1.000

0.285 7,

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.333

Totals

EBR

2

0.667

3

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 2/0/0 3/0/0

0.333

0.333

0.667

0.667

1.000

1.000
TABLE F-37. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS HAND CONTROL VALVES

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500

Totals

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

ECC

0.250

1/0/0

0.250

0.250

HPM

1

0.250

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

1.000

4

2/0/0

0.500

0.500

3/1/0

0.750

0.750 III

00

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500

Aging

Totals

EDU

1

0.500

2

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

0.500

0.500

1/0/0 2/0/0

0.500

0.500

1.000

1.000
TABLE F-37 (continued)

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI _

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Aging

Totals

I

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 1/0/0

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE DO

Failure Cause Count 1 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.250 0.500

Aging

Totals

EBR

1

0.250

1/0/0

0.250

0.250

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1

0.250

0.000

0/2/0

0.000

0.000

4

1.000

1/2/1

0.500

0.250
TABLE F-37. (continued)

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SMFt-INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDB

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1.000

Abing

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1

1.000

0.000

0/0/1

1.000

0.000 -J0
TABLE F-38. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS HEAT TRACING HEATERS

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HEAT TRACING HEATERS

-J

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ECC ED8

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.048 0.048

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 0/0/1

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.048 0.048

Lower Bound 0.048 0.000

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code SC

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.048

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/1/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000

Lower Bound 0.000

ELE

1

0.048

0/0/1

0.048

0.000

ELH

5

0.238

5/0/0

0.238

0.238

ELO

3

0.143

1/0/2

0.143

0.048

ELS

1

0.048

1/0/0

0.048

0.048

ELW

2

0.095

2/0/0

0.095

0.095

HAM

5

0.238

0/5/0

0.000

0.000

HPM

1

0.048

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

Totals

Totals

21

1.000

10/7/4

0.668

0.477
TABLE F-39. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES. FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS LOAD SEQUENCE CONTROLLERS

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETYFINJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

LOAD SEQUENCE CONTROLLERS

'71

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELF _

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500 0.

Agling

Yes/No/Unknown 0/1/0 11

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000 0.

Lower Bound 0.000 0.

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE_ _

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.125 0.

AgI ing

Yes/No/Unknown 0/1/0 2,

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000 0.

Lower Bound 0.000 0.

1

I0/0

.500

.500

Totals

2

1.000

1/1/0

0.500

0.500

Totals

8

1.000

3/3/2

0.625

0.375

0D1

2

250

/0/0

250

250

EL

1

0.125

0/0/1

0.125

0.000

ELF

2

0.250

1/0/1

0.250

0.125

HEM

1

0.125

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

HPM

1

0.125

0/1/0

0.000

0.000
TABLE F-40. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS LEVEL TRANSMITTERS

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETYINJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

LEVEL'TRANSMT4TERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDT _

Failure Cause Count 19

Totals

ELF

1

1048

HE -

1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.905 0. 0.048

21

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

4/0/15 0/0/1 0/1/0 4/1/16

0.905

0.190

0.048

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.953

0.190 117i

-I

WJ
TABLE F-41. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

a."

-4,

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 2/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 1.000

Lower Bound 1.000

Failure Mode: FAILS TO START - GFS

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDS

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.025

AWgn

Yet/No/Unknown 0/1/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000

Lower Bound 0.000

Totals

2

1.000

2/0/0

1.000

1.000

EDI

1

0.025

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

HP

1

0.025

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

SPO _

0.025

0/1/0

O.000

0.000

Totals

4

1.000

0/4/0

0.000

0.000
TABLE F-41. (continued)

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAETT-YINJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DPRIVEN PUMPS

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code _

Failure Cause Count

Failure Cause Fraction C

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 3

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0

Lower Bound C

-j

Lf'

EBR

3

0.273

1/0/0

1.273

1.273

EDB

2

0.182

0/0/2

0.182

0.000

EDI

1

0.091

1/0/0

0.091

0.091

EDO

2

0.182

0/0/2

0.182

0.000

HMM

1

0.091

O/lO

0.000

0.000

HPM

1

0.091

1/0/0

0.091

0.091

HPO

1

0.091

1/0/0

0.091

0.091

Totals

11

1.000

6/1/4

0.910

0.546
TABLE F-42. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAfTfTVNJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERTEO VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 6

Failure Cause Fraction 0.857

Totals

HPM

_ I

7

0.143 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

6/0/0

0.857

0.857

0/1/0 6/1/0

0.000

0.000

0.857

0.857

o1u -J

0%

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 4

Failure Cause Fraction 0.200

Aging

Totals

EDB

6

0.300

EDI

4

0.200

EDU

4

0.200

ELK

1

0.050

ELS , _

1

0.050

20

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

4/0/0

0.200

0.200

2/1/3 2/2/0 0/0/4 0/0/1

0.050

0.000

0/0/1 8/3/9

0.250

0.100

0.100

0.100

0.200

0.000

0.050

0.000

0.850

0.400
TABLE F-42. (continued)

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

-.1

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF EBR

Failure Cause Count 1 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.083 0.167

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 2/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.083 0.167

Lower Bound 0.083 0.167

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE EBR

Failure Cause Count 1 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.143 0.429

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/1/0 3/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000 0.429

Lower Bound 0.000 0.429

EDB

3

0.250

0/0/3

0.250

0.000

EDO

1

0.143

0/O/1

0.143

0.000

EDI

1

0.083

1/0/0

0.083

0.083

EVM

1

0.143

1/0/0

0.143

0.143

EDU

2

0.167

0/0/2

0.167

0.000

HPM -

3

0.250

0/3/0

0.000

0.000

Totals

12

1.000

4/3/5

0.750

0.333

Totals

7

1.000

4/2/1

0.715

0.572

HPM

1

0.143

0/1/0

0.000

0.000
TABLE F-42 (continued)

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE S FETYNJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause Totals

Failure Cause Code DE EBR ECC EDB EDI ELS HCO HPN SC

Failure Cause Count 2 5 1 5 3 2 1 4 1 24

Failure Cause Fraction 0.083 0.208 0.042 0.208 0.125 0.083 0.042 0.167 0.042 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/2/0 5/0/0 1/0/0 1/014 3/0/0 0/0/2 0/1/0 0/4/0 0/1/0 10/8/6

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000 0.208 0.042 0.208 0.125 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.666

Lower Bound 0.000 0.208 0.042 0.042 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.417

0o
TABLE F-43. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS PNEUMATIC-OPERATED VALVES

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SUETY1NJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEUMATIC-OPETfl VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

1.000

1.000

1/0/0

1.000

*11 1.000

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EE

Failure Cause Count

Failure Cause Fraction 0.6

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 3/C

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.6

Lower Bound 0.6

Totals

IR

600

EDB _

2

0.400

5

1.000

'0/0 0/0/2 3/0/2

600

600

0.400

0.000

1.000

0.600
TABLE F-43. (continued)

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEUMATIC-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause Totals

Failure Cause Code ELW

Failure Cause Count I I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 1/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 1.000 1.000

Lower Bound 1.000 1.000 00

Failure Mode: INTERNAL LEAKAGE - GIL

Failure Cause Totals

Failure Cause Code EBE

Failure Cause Count I 1

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/O/O 1/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 1.000 1.000

Lower Bound 1.000 1.000
TABLE F-43. (continued)

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEUMATINOTEUT VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF _

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

2

1.*000

Aglng

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0

1.000

1.000

2/0/0

1.000

1.000

I.'
TABLE F-44. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY NJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDS EDT _

Failure Cause Count 3 3

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500 0.500

Aging

Totals

6

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

3/0/0 0/0/3

0.500 0.500

0.500 0.000

3/0/3

1.000

*71 0.500

I0J
TABLE F-45. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS RELIEF VALVES

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

RELTEF-VXtS

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.400

Totals

ECC

1

0.200

EDI _

2

0.400

5

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0 1/0/0 2/0/0

0.400

0.400

5/0/0

0.400

0.400

0.200

0.200

1.000

1.000 o27

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.222

Aging

Totals

EDS _

7

0.778

9

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0 7/0/0 9/0/0

0.222

0.222

0.778

0.778

1 .000

1.000
TABLE F-45. (continued)

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETEMNJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

RELIEFVALVES

Failure Mode: OPEN (PREMATURE) - GSO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDS

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500

Aging

Totals

HPM

1

0.250

SPm

1

0.250

4

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0

0.500

0.500

1/0/0 0/1/0 3/l/0

0.250

0.250

0.000

0.000

0.750

0.750

71
TABLE F-46. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR HPIS SNUBBERS

SYSTEM

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

COMPONENT

3NUER7

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.200

Totals

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

EDB

.I1

0.100

0/0/1

0.100

0.000

ETH HPM

5 2

0.500 0.200

10

1.000

2/0/0

0.200

0.200

5/0/0

0.500

0.500

2/0/0

0.200

0.200

9/0/1

1.000

0071 0.900
TABLE F-47. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES. FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS CHECK VALVES

SYSTEM

SERVICE [TEArSYSTEM

COMPONENT

CHEtK VALVE

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500

Aging

Totals

HPM _

1

0.500

2

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 0/1/0 1/1/0

0.500

0.500

0.000

0.000

0.500

0.500 00

a,

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DCI

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.250

Totals

EBE

1

0.250

EBR

1

0.250

ECC _

1

0.250

4

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 1/0/0 1/0/0 1/0/0 3/1/0

0.000

0.000

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.750

0.750
TABLE F-47. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CHECKVALS

Failure Mode: INTERNAL LEAKAGE - GIL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DE

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.040

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.040

71 Lower Bound 0.040

-J

EBE

3

0.120

3/0/0

0.120

0.120

EBR

12

0.480

12/0/0

0.480

0.480

ECC

6

0.240

6/0/0

0.240

0.240

EDB

1

0.040

0/0/1

0.040

0.000

EDI

2

0.080

1/1/0

0.040

0.040

Totals

25

1.000

23/1/1

0.960

0.920
TABLE F-48. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AC

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF

Failure Cause Count 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.182

Aging

Totals

EBM

1

0.091

EBR

2

0.182

EDB

2

0.182

EDI

3

0.273

HEM _

1

0.091

11

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0 0/0/1 2/0/0 1/0/1 3/0/0 0/1/0 8/1/2

0.182

0.182

0.091

0.000

0.182

0.182

0.182

0.091

0.273

0.273

0.000

0.000

0.910

0.728

00

Failure Mode: OPEN (PREMATURE) - GSO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDB

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.167

Aging

Totals

EDI

1

0.167

ELE

1

0.167

ELW

2

0.333

SPC _

0.167

6

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 1/0/1 0/1/0 1/4/1

O,000

0.000

0.000 0.000 0.333

0.000 0.000 0.167

0.000

0.000

0.333

0.167
TABLE F-49. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS FLOW INDICATORS

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

FLOw iNTCTMRS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELF

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1

1.000

0.000

0/0/1

1.000

1" 0.000

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.250

Agn n

Totals

ELT

3

0.750

4

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 3/0/0 3/1/0

0. 000

0.000

0.750

0.750

0.750

0.750
TABLE F-50. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS FLOW SWITCHES

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

FLOW SWITCHES

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI I

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.062 0.

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 1'

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.062 0.

Lower Bound 0.062 0.

rLD

13

.812

3/0/0

.812

.812

ELI

l

0.062

1/0/0

0.062

0.062

ELT _

1

0.062

1/0/0

0.062

0.062

Totals

16

1.000

16/0/0

1.000

1.000
TABLE F-51. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS HAND CONTROL VALVES

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.500

Aging

Totals

ECC

I

0.500 1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

0.500

0.500

1/0/0

0.500

0.500

2/0/0

1.000

1.000 o0

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBE

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.143

Totals

EBR

2

0.286

ECC

3

0.429

EDI

1

0.143

7

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 2/0/0 3/0/0 1/0/0 7/0/0

0.143

0.143

0.286

0.286

0.429

0.429

0.143

0.143

1.000

1.000
TABLE F-51. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code HEO

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1.000

AWing

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0 0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000 71

%a

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ECC EDB

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.167 0.167

Totals

HEM

1

0.167

HEO

3

0.500

6

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

0.167

0.167

0/0/1

0.167

0.000

0/1/O 0/3/0 1/4/1

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.334

0.167
TABLE F-S1. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

HAND CONTROL VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDB . -

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 1/0/0

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000
TABLE F-52. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBB

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.016

Totals

EBF

1

0.016

EBR

45

0.703

EDB

1

0.016

EDI

9

0.141

EVM

2

0.031

HAM HEM HEO

1 1 1

0.016 0.016 0.016

AWing

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 1/0/0 45/0/0 0/0/1 8/1/0 2/0/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 1/0/0

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0.016

0.016

0.016

0.016

0.703

0.703

0.016

0.000

0.125

0.125

0.031

0.031

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.016

0.016

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code SPM SPO

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.016 0.016

Totals

64

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

1/0/0

0.016

0.016

1/0/0

0.016

0.016

60/3/1

0.955

Lower Bound 0.939
TABLE F-52. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DC

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.011

Totals

DCI

0.011

DM

2

0.022

EAO

0.011

EBE

2

0.022

EBR

29

0.326

ECC

4

0.045

EDB

10

0.112

EDI

23

0.258

Aging

Yes/No/UnIknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 1/0/0 0/2/0 l/0/0 2/0/0

0.022

0.022

29/0/0 4/0/0 1/4/5

0.067

0.011

1 6/7/0

0.180

0.180

0.011

0.011

0.011

0.011

0.000

0.000

0.011

0.011

0.326

0.326

0.045

0.045 ~0-

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDU ELI

Failure Cause Count 4 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.045 0.022

Totals

ELO

1

0.011

ELS

1

0.011

EMW

1

0.011

EVM

3

0.034

HAM

1

0.011

HEM

1

0.011

HPM

1

0.011

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

3/1/0

0.034

2/0/0

0.022

0.022

1/0/0 0/0/1 0/1/0

0.000

0.000

3/0/0 0/l/0 0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0.011

0.011

0.011

0.000

0.034

0.034

0.000

Lower Bound 0.034 0.000
TABLE F-52. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE-1Trg SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-DIVENPUMPS

Failure Mode: FAILS TO RUN - GFU(continued)

Failure Cause Totals

Failure Cause Code SPm __ _

Failure Cause Count 1 89

Failure Cause Fraction 0.011 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 1/0/0 65/18/6

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.011 0.796

Lower Bound 0.011 0.729

Failure Mode: FAILS TO START - GFS

Failure Cause Totals

Failure Cause Code DM EBF EBR EDB EDI El ELC ELF EMH

Failure Cause Count 1 1 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 14

Failure Cause Fraction 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.286 0.214 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/1/0 1/0/0 1/0/0 0/0/4 1/2/0 0/1/0 1/0/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 4/6/4

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000 0.071 0.071 0.286 0.071 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.570

Lower Bound 0.000 0.071 0.071 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.284
TABLE F-53. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DCI

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 0.023

Totals

EBE

3

0.070

EBR

6

0.140

ECC

2

0.047

EDB

23

0.535

EDI

3

0.070

ELO ELR ELS

1 1 1

0.023 0.023 0.023

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

3/0/0

0.070

0.070

6/0/0 2/0/0 0/2/21 3/0/0 0/0/1 1/0/0

0.023

0.023

0/O/l

0.023

0.000

0.140

0.140

0.047

0.047

0.488

0.000

0.070

0.070

0.023

'71 0.000

%0 -4

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC(continued)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code HEM HEO

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.023 0.023

Totals

43

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0/1/0 15/5/23

0.000

0.000

0.884

0.350
TABLE F-53. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code 0

Failure Cause Count

Failure Cause Fraction 0.

Totals

N EBF _

1 1

037 0.037

EBR

3

0.111

EDB

8

0.296

EDI

2

0.074

EDU

2

0.074

EL

2

0.074

ELK

1

0.037

ELO

3

0.111

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1

0.037

0.000

1/0/0

0.037

0.037

3/0/0

0.111

0.111

1/2/5

0.222

0.037

1/0/1

0.074

0.037

0/1/1

0.037

0.000

0/0/2 0/0/1 0/0/3

0.111

0.000 00

0.074

0.000

0.037

0.000

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO(contimaed)

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code ELS ELT

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.037 0.037

Totals

HEM

1

0.037

HEO _

I 27

0.037 1.000

Aging

Yes/Mo/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

0/0/1

0.037

0.000

1/0/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 7/5/15

0.037

0.037

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.814

Lower Bound 0.259
TABLE F-53. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE-RTEU SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code DEI EBE

Failure Cause Count 1 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.059 0.118

Totals

EBR

3

0.176

ECC

1

0.059

EDB

S

0.294

EL

1

0.059

ELO

1

0.059

EVM

2

0.118

HPM

1

0.059

17

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

011/0 2/0/0 3/0/0

0.176

0.176

1/0/0

0.059

0.059

1/1/3

0.235

0.059

0/0/1

0.059

0.000

0/0/1

0.059

0.000

2/0/0 0/1/0 9/3/5

0.824

0.530

0.000

0.000

0.118

0.118

0.118

0.118

0.000

0.000

IT* I

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 5

Failure Cause Fraction 0.714

Totals

ECC

2

0.286

7

1.000

7/0/0

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

5/0/0 2/0/0

0.714

0.714

0.286

0.286

1.000

1;000
TABLE F-53. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause Totals

Failure Cause Code DC DM EBR EDB ELE ELH ELK EMW EVM

Failure Cause Count 1 1 2 2 4 1 2 3 1 17

Failure Cause Fraction 0.059 0.059 0.118 0.118 0.235 O.059 0.118 0.176 0.059 1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 0/1/0 O/O/1 2/0/0 1/0/1 1/2/1 0/0/1 0/0/2 0/2/1 1/0/0 5/5/7

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0.000 0.059 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.059 0.118 0.059 0.059 0.708

72 Lower Bound 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.059 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.295
TABLE F-54. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS PNEUMATIC-OPERATED VALVES

SYSTEM

SERVICEWA-TER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEUMATIC-PERAED VALVES

Failure Mode: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - GEL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 5

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

5

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bouffd

Lower Bound

5/0/0

1.000

1.000

5/0/0

'TI

CD

1.000

1.000

Failure Mode: FAILS TO CLOSE - GFC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EE

Failure Cause Count

Failure Cause Fraction O.'

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown 5/S

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound 0

Totals

CR

333

ECC

1

0.067

EDB

4

0.267

EDI

4

0.267

EVM

1

0.067

15

1.000

3/0

,333

333

1/0/0

0.067

0.067

0/1/3

0.200

0.000

4/0/0

0.267

0.267

1/0/0 1/1/3

Lower Bound 0.:

0.067

0.067

0.934

0.734
TABLE F-54. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEUMATIC-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN - GFO

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBF

Failure Cause Count 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.111

Totals

EBR

3

0.333

EDB

2

0.222

EDI

2

0.222

EDU _

0.111

9

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0 3/0/0 0/0/2 2/0/0 0/0/1

0.111

0.000

6/0/3

0.111

0.111

0.333

21 0.333

0

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE AS REQUIRED - GFR

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBB EBR

Failure Cause Count 1 5

Failure Cause Fraction 0.077 0.385

Aging

0.222

0.000

EDB

2

0.154

0.222

0.222

EDI

1

0.077

1.000

0.666

Totals

ELD

1

0.077

EVM

2

0.154

HA

1

0.077

13

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

0.077

0.077

5/0/0 0/0/2 1/0/0

0.077

0.077

1/0/0

0.077

0.077

2/0/0

0.154

0.154

0/1/0 10/1/2

0.385

0.385

0.154

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.924

0.770
TABLE F-54. (continued)

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PNEULMATIC-OPERATED VALVES

Failure Mode: FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO CLOSE - GOC

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR ECC

Failure Cause Count 1 1

Failure Cause Fraction 0.200 0.200

Totals

EDP EVM _

1 2

0.200 0.400

5

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

1/0/0

0.200

0.200

1/0/0 0/0/1 2/0/0 4/0/l

"I

0

0.200

0.200

0.200

0.000

0.400

0.400

1.000

0.800
TABLE F-55. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS PRESSURE INDICATORS

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

PRESSURE rNDICATORS

Failure Mode: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC SIGNALS - GEE

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDI EDT

Failure Cause Count 2 2

Failure Cause Fraction 0.400 0.400

A8gln

Totals

ELT

1

0.200

5

1.000

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

2/0/0

0.400

0.400

2/0/0 0/0/1 4/0/1

0.400

7'1 0.400

0.200

0.000

1.000

0.800

Failure Mode: FAILURE TO OPERATE - GFP

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EDT

Failure Cause Count I

Failure Cause Fraction 1.000

Totals

1

1.000

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

0/0/1 0/0/1

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000
TABLE F-56. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES, FAILURE CAUSE FRACTIONS, AND AGING FRACTIONS FOR SWS STRAINERS

SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

COMPONENT

STTRAIER

Failure Mode: LOSS OF FUNCTION - GLF

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code EBR

Failure Cause Count 8

Failure Cause Fraction 0.615

Totals

ECC

3

0.231

HAM

1

0.077

HPM

0.077

13

1.000

T7

a

Aging

Yes/Mo/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

Failure Mode: PLUGGED - GPL

Failure Cause

Failure Cause Code

Failure Cause Count

Failure Cause Fraction

Aging

Yes/No/Unknown

Aging Fractions

Upper Bound

8/0/0 3/0/0

0.615 0.231

0.615 0.231

0/1/0

0.000

0.000

0/0/1

0.077

0.000

0.923

0.846

1/1/1

Totals

EAO

2

0.250

EDI

6

0.750

8

1.000

2/0/0

0.250

0.250

4/2/0 6/2/0

0.500

0.500

0.750

Lower Bound 0.750
TABLE F-57. FAILURE CAUSE TALLIES FOR SYSTEM EFFECT8

Failure

System Countb Cause

Auxiliary Feedwater System

System Effect Component

Degraded System Operations Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Flow Controller

Flow Control Recorder

Hand Switch

Hydraulic Valve

Level Control Indicator

Level Controller

Level Switch

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

EBE

EBR

EBW

EDB

EVM

ELF

ELO

ELK

ELW

ELE

ELF

ELL

EDB

ELF

EBC

EBF

EBR

ED8

EDI

EDS

EDT

ELA

ELS

EMW

EPL

HPC

DE

EBE

ESR

EDB

EDI

DE

EBE

EBR

EDB

EDI

ELE

ELF

HEO

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDT

EL

ELA

HPO

EBR

EDB

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Switch

Relay
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System

(continued)

System Effect Component

Degraded System Operations

(continued)

Relief Valve

Switch (Parameter not specified)

Turbine-Driven Pump

Countb 32252215112

Loss of Redundancy Check Valve

I.' 0

Circuit Breaker, AC

Differential Pressure Controller

Flow Controller

Flow Switch

Flow Transmitter

Hand Switch

Level Control Indicator

Level Controller

Motor-Driven Pump

Failure

Cause

EDS

ELK

EBR

EDB

EDI

ELF

EMW

EPH

EVM

HAM

HPM

DE

EBR

EDI

EBR

EDU

EL

ELO

EDI

EDI

EBR

EDB

EDI

EDS

ELF

DM

HPM

DE

EBF

EDB

EDT

ELF

HPM

DE

EBF

ELF

ELO

EBR

EDB

EDO

EDU

El

ELA

EMU

HPM
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System

(continued)

System Effect Component

Loss of Redundancy Motor-Operated Valve

(continued)

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Controller

Pressure Switch

Pressure Transmitter

Relay

Relief Valve

Solenoid Valve

Speed Controller

:8 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Turbine-Driven Pump

0

00

Countb

1

4

2

I

1

1

1

1

1

1

5

1

1

1

8

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

I

2

1

2

Failure

Cause

ECC

EDB

EDI

EDU

ELE

ELW

HPM

DM

EBF

EBR

EDO

EDT

EMW

EDI

EDT

HPC

EBR

ELO

DE

ELW

EDI

EDI

ELF

EBE

EBF

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

EVM

HAM

SPM

DE

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

HPM

EBR

EDI

HPM

ELF

ELF

EDT

EBM

EDI

EDT

EV

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Controller (Parameter not specified)

Current Control Indicator

Differential Pressure Controller

6

33

2

2

1

7

2

1

2

1

1
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System

(continued)

System Effect

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

(continued)

Component

Flow Control Indicator

Flow Control Recorder

Flow Controller

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

Hand Switch

Hydraulic Valve

Level Control Indicator

Level Controller

Level Recorder

Level Transmitter

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Control Recorder

Pressure Controller

Countb 1141132224I

10261211221111113211431113

1 75612221I21

Failure

Cause

HPM

EDI

EDT

EDI

EDS

EDT

EL

ELF

HPM

DM

EDS

EDT

ELF

EBR

EDI

EDB

EBR

EBF

EDT

ELF

ELS

EDT

ECC

EDT

ELO

DE

EBR

EDOB

EMW

HPM

EDB

EDI

ELW

HAM

HPM

EBE

EBF

EBR

EDB

EDI

EDT

EMW

HAM

HPM

EDT

EDB

EDT

EMw
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System

(continued)

System Effect

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

(continued)

Component

Pressure Switch

Pressure Transmitter

Relay

Relief Valve

Snubber

Solenoil Valve

Turbine-Driven Pump

Countb 161221I1121213421

Loss of System Function

System Function Unaffected 0-0

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Annunciator

Check Valve

Differential Pressure Controller

Flow Control Indicator

Flow Control Recorder

Flow Controller

Flow Switch Indicator

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

IIII13

12222112212111121214111

Failure

Cause

EDT

EDT

EBR

ELI

ELW

HPC

H1PM

EBR

EDS

EBR

EI

EDI

EDU

EBM

EBR

EOB

EDI

HE

EBF

EMW

EBE

ELF

DM

EBE

EBR

EDI

EVN

HPM

EDB

ELF

EBR

EDT

EDB

ELF

ELK

EDI

EDB

EDI

EDT

ELF

DM

EBE

EBR

ECC

EDB

HPH
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Chemical and Volume Control

System

System Effect

Degraded System Operations

Component

Heat Tracing Heater

Level Control Indicator

I21

Level Control Recorder

Level Controller

Level Transmitter

Mechanical Valve

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Pipe

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Control Recorder

Pressure Controller

Pressure Switch

Pressure Transmitter

Countb 23131

1351224

1331811113131121

1233311111111131211

Failure

Cause

ELH

EDB

EDT

ELF

ELF

EDT

ELF

EBF

ELF

EDB

DE

EBR

EDT

EL

EBR

EDB

EDI

ELS

HPO

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

HPM

EBE

EBW

EDB

EBE

EBF

EBR

EDB

EDI

EDU

ELS

EMW

HEO

HPM

EDT

EDI

EDT

EDI

EDT

EL

EBM

EDT

ELF

HPC

HPO

SPM
TABLE F-57; (continued)

System

Chemical and Volume Control

System (continued)

System Effect

Degraded System Operations

(continued)

Component

Relay

Relief Valve

Snubber

Countb l13l4182

Support

Turbine-Driven Pump

Loss of Redundancy Circuit Breaker, AC

Heat Tracing Heater

Level Controller

Level Transmitter

Motor-Driven Pump

'TI

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Loss of System Function

Motor-Operated Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Heat Tracing Heater

Level Controller

Level Transmitter

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Relief Valve

Temperature Switch

Motor-Driven Pump

II12112181321243332

Failure

Cause

EDS

EDS

EBR H

EBW

El

EBE

EBR

EDI

HPM

HPO

EL

ELW

ELH

ELO

HAM

EBF

EDI

ELF

DE

EBR

EDU

EBR

EDB

EBF

EDB

ECC

EDT

ED I

EDT

HPO

EBR

EDI

EDB

EDI

EBR

EDI

EDI
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Chemical and Volume Control

System (continued)

System Effect

System Function Unaffected

Component

Check Valve

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

Heat Tracing Heater

Level Control Recorder

Level Controller

Level Switch

Level Transmitter

Mechanical Valve

Motor-Driven Pump

Countb ll211l

162181

1023

1642113

Motor-Operated Valve

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Temperature Switch

Failure

Cause

EBR

EDT

EBR

ELD

HAM

EDT

EDI

EDT

EDT

EDT

EDB

EBR

EVM

HPM

EBE

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

EDU

EBR

HPM

EDT

HE

DE

EBR

ELD

ELE

ELF

ELO

ELS

HE

HEM

ELE

DE

DM

EBR

ELA

ELE

ELF

ELI

ELS

.1 W Class lE Electrical Power Distribution System

Instrument & Uninterruptible Degraded System Operations

Power Subsystem

Circuit Breaker, AC

Inverter

311132141112234

Loss of Redundancy Circuit Breaker, AC

Inverter
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System System Effect

Class lE Electrical Power Distribution System (continued)

Instrument & Uninterruptible Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Power Subsystem (continued)

Loss of System Function

System Function/Operations

Unaffected

Component Countb

Failure

Cause

**1q

Circuit Breaker, AC

Inverter

Inverter

Inverter

Battery

Battery Charger

Circuit Breaker, AC

Battery Charger

Battery

Battery Charger

Battery

DC Power Subsystem Degraded System Operations

I

I

1

2

4

2

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

3

7

1

2

1

6

1

1

2

1

1

1

*1

1

6

3

1

1

1

1

2

EBR

DE

EDO

EL

ELF

ELS

ELV

HEM

DE

ELF

EBR

EDB

ELD

ELE

ELF

ELI

ELO

ELS

ELT

ELL

EDI

EL

ELD

ELF

ELS

ELL

EBR

ELF

ELO

EBB

ELS

EDB

EL

ELF

DM

EL

ELF

ELG

ELS

EDB

ELA

ELF

ELR

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

Battery Charger
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System System Effect

Class lE Electrical Power Distribution System (continued)

Emergency On-Site Power Degraded System Operations

Supply Subsystem

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Component Count

Lf7

Circuit Breaker, AC

Diesel Generator

Circuit Breaker, AC

Diesel Generator

Diesel Generator

Timer

13216421112113151122611112114111S31231121221221

Failure

Cause

EBR

EDB

EBB

EBF

EBR

EDB

EDI

EDO

EDU

ELD

ELF

ELR

ELS

ELT

ELW

EMW

EPL

EBR

DEI

DM

EBR

EDB

EDI

EDU

EEN

EL

ELD

ELE

EMW

EVM

DEI

EBB

EBF

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

EDS

EL

ELD

ELE

ELO

ELS

ELT

EMW

HEM

EBR
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System System Effect

Class lE Electrical Power Distribution System (continued)

Emergency On-Site Power System Function Unaffected

Supply Subsystem

(continued)

Component Countb

Low-Voltage Power Subsystem Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Diesel Generator

Temperature Indicator

Circuit Breaker, AC

Bus

Relay

Circuit Breaker, AC

Relay

Cable

Circuit Breaker, AC

Transformer

Circuit Breaker, AC

Circuit Breaker, AC

Transformer

Circuit Breaker, AC

Transformer

Check Valve

I

1

7

4

2

2

2

3

3

3

1

1

2

1

'In

5%

System Function Unaffected

Failure

Cause

DE

EBB

EBM

EBR

EDB

EDI

EDU

EL

ELD

ELF

EVM

SPC

EDB

ELO

HEM

DEI

ELS

ELT

SPC

ELI

ELE

ELI

HPM

ELC

EMW

HEM

HPM

EBR

DE

EBR

EDB

HPM

EBR

ELK

EBM

EDB

EDT

DM

EBR

EDU

Medium-Voltage Power Subsystem Degraded System Operations

Loss of Redundancy

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

System Function Unaffected

High Pressure Injection System Degraded System Operations

Circuit Breaker, AC

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

I

3

7

1

1

2
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

High Pressure Injection System

(continued)

System Effect

Degraded System Operations

(continued)

Component

Heat Tracing Heater

* Level Transmitter

Load Sequence Controller

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Relief Valve

Loss of Redundancy Circuit Breaker, AC

'71

-J

Flow Transmitter

Heat Tracing Heater

Level Transmitter

Load Sequence Controller

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Pipe

Pressure Switch

Relief Valve

Countb I1147211111S11I15312316121111311242111

Failure

Cause

ELE

EDT

EDI

EBR

EDI

DE

EBR

EDB

EDI

EDU

ELK

ELS

SC

EBE

EDS

EBf

EDB

ELF

HPM

EDT

ECC

EDB

ELH

ELO

ELS

ELI

HAM

SC

EDT

DE

ELF

HPM

EDB

HMM

HPM

EBR

EDB

EDI

EDU

HPM

ECC

ELS

EBR

HPM
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

High Pressure Injection System

(continued)

System Effect

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

Component

Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Flow Modifier

Flow Transmitter

Hand Control Valve

Heat Tracing Heater

Load Sequence Controller

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Countb 1213I122242211111222213226

Failure

Cause

EBR

EBF

EBR

El

EDT

EBM

EDT

ECC

EDI

HPM

HAM

HPM

EDI

ELL

HEM

EDB

EDO

HPO

SPO

EBF

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

EDU

HCO

HPM

EDB

ELW

EDS

EDI

EDS

SPM

ETH

DE

EDI

EBR

EDI

ELK

EDS

EBF

EBR

EDT

qTi

~0

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Transmitter

Relief Valve

Loss of System Function

System Function Unaffected

Snubber

Hydraulic Valve

Motor-Driven Pump

Check Valve

Circuit Breaker. AC

Current Switch

Flow Transmitter
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

High Pressure Injection System

(continued)

System Effect

System Function Unaffected

(continued)

Component

Hand Control Valve

Hydraulic Valve

Level Transmitter

Load Sequence Controller

Mechanical Valve

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Orifice

Pipe

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Control Recorder

Pressure Controller

Pressure Modifier

Pressure Transmitter

Relief Valve

Snubber

0

Z;

Countb 12112

1 2112943224

231222311222121111

Failure

Cause

DE

EBR

EDB

EDI

EBR

EDT

ELF

HE

EL

ELF

EBE

EBR

HP

DE

EBR

EDB

EDl

EDO

EDU

ELS

EVM

HPM

ECC

EVM H

EBF

EBR

EDB

EDT

EDT

EDT

EDS

EDT

EBR

ECC

EDI

EDS

EBR

EDB

ETH

HPM

EBE

EBR

EBR

EDB

EDI

HEM

Service Water System Degraded System Operations Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Service Water System

(continued)

System Effect

Degraded System Operations

(continued)

Component

Differential Pressure Switch

Flow Indicator

Flow Switch

Hand Control Valve

Motor

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Countb 12312

10612272116423

Failure

Cause

EDI

ELT

ELD

ELI

ELT

EBR

ECC

HEM

HED

ELC

EBR

EDB

EDI

EI

EVM

HAM

HPM

SPM

SPO

DCI

DEI

DM

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

ELE

ELH

ELK

ELO

ELR

ELS

EMW

ELO

EBE

ECC

EBR

EDB

EDI

ELD

EVM

EDI

ELD

DE

EBE

EDI

HAM

EDB

71l

Overcurrent Relay (DC)

Pipe

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Switch

Relay

Relief Valve

Strainer

Temperature Control Indicator
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System System Effect Component

Check Valve

countb

Service Water System

(continued)

Loss of Redundancy

Circuit Breaker, AC

Differential Pressure Control Recorder

Electric Power Supply

Flow Indicator

Flow Modifier

Hand Control Valve

Motor

Motor-Driven Pump

t1J

Failure

Cause

DCI

DE

EBR

ECC

EBM

EDB

EDI

ELE

EDI

ELD

ECC

EDB

EDI

ELS

DM

EAO

EBF

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

EDU

ELF

ELI

ELS

EMH

EVM

EBR

EDB

EL

ELO

EMI

ECC

EOB

EDI

ECC

EL

ELC

EBR

EBR

ECC

EBF

EDI

ELW

SPC

EBR

EBR

EDI

Motor-Operated Valve

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Switch

Relay

Strainer

Loss of Subsystem/Channel Check Valve

Circuit Breaker, AC

Differential Pressure Control Recorder

Differential Pressure Switch

Flow Switch
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Service Water System

(continued)

System Effect

Loss of Subsystem/Channel

(continued)

Component

Hand Control Valve

Motor

Motor-Driven Pump

Motor-Operated Valve

Pipe

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Pressure Indicator

Relief Valve

Safety/Relief Valve

Snubber

Strainer

Support

Temperature Switch

Thermowell

Countb III1

252

1 5111333a2112I3114331121I12121I

Failure

Cause

ECC

EDB

EDI

DCI

EBE

EBR

ECC

EDI

ELI

ELO

EVM

HAM

HED

EBE

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

EDU

EL

ELO

ELS

EMW

EVM

HEM

HEO

ECC

EMI

EBR

EDB

EDI

EVM

EDI

EDT

EBR

EDI

EDB D

EDI

EAO

EBR

ECC

EDI

HPM

DEI

EBR

ELT

ECC
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System System Effect

System Function Unaffected

Component

Check Valve Service Water Systems

(continued)

Circuit Breaker, AC

Differential Pressure Switch

Flow Indicator

Flow Switch

Hand Control Valve

Level Switch

Level Transmitter

Motor-Driven Pump

71n

tN

2332121211

1012221111

241532112212

121

121

18211211

Failure

Cause

EBE

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

HPM

EBR

EDI

ELE

ELD

ELF

ELT

ELD

EBE

EBR

ECC

HEO

EMW

EDI

DC

EBB

EBE

EBF

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

EDU

ELC

EMW

EVM

HEM

SPM

DC

EBE

EBF

EBR

ECC

EDOB

EDI

EDU

EL

ELE

ELK

ELO

ELT

HEM

HEO

HPM

Motor-Operated Valve
TABLE F-57. (continued)

System

Service Water Systems

(continued)

System Effect

System Function Unaffected

(continued)

Component

Pneumatic-Operated Valve

Position-Limit Switch

Pressure Indicator

Relay

Snubber

Strainer

Temperature Indicator

Vent Valve

Zone Modifier

Countb

I

1

9

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

2

3

2

1

Failure

Cause

EBB

EBF

EBR

ECC

EDB

EDI

EDU

EVM

HA

EBR

EDI

EDT

ELT

EBR

DCI

ECC

EBR

ECC

EDI

ELT

EBE

EDB

EDB

a. Table summary does not contain data for any failure categorized unclassified (Table F-3).

b. Total counts: 1713
NRC FORM 335 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I REPORT NUMBER f~silead by IDC. add Vol Noo. danyl

12.641

3201N3202 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG/CR-4747, Vol. 2

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE EGG-2473

I TITLE AND SUBTITLE J LEAVE BLANK

An Aging Failure Survey of Light Water Reactor

Safety Systems and Components

4, DATE REPORT COMPLETED

MONTH YEAR

S. AUTHORIS) June 1988 6. DATE REPORT ISSUED

B.M. Meale, D.G. Satterwhite MONTH YE-AR

July 1988

7 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS VIncd Z* Cd)J S. PROJECT/TASK/WORK UNIT NUMBER

EG&G Idaho Inc.

Idaho Falls, ID 83415 S. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

A6389

10 SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS IfcIc# lZP C06I I1i TYPE OF REPORT

Division of Engineering Final, Technical

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Final Tcnica E 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission b PERIODC4VERED ,

Washington, DC 20555

12 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

13 ABSTRACT 2WaOld. Wo at

This report describes the methods, analyses, results, and conclusions of two different aging studies. The first study consists of a survey of light water reactor component

failures associated with 15 selected safety and support systems. Analysts used computerized sorting techniques to classify component failures into generic failure categories. The second study consists of careful examination of component failure records to

identify and categorize the reported cause of component failures. The systems evaluated in the failure-cause analysis were the auxiliary feedwater, Class IE electrical

power distribution, high-pressure injection, and service water. Tables and figures are

presented, indicating the systems and the components within those systems most

affected by aging. Also provided are engineering insights drawn from the data. This

report is the second of two volumes and presents all of the Volume I data from FY-86

combined with the data gathered in FY-87.

14 DOCUMBNT ANALVSIS . KE'.WOPOS'DESCRIPTORS AVAILABiLITV

STATEMENT

LWR component failures auxiliary feedwater

generic failure categories Class 1E electrical Unlimited

agiig effects high pressure injection 1. SECURITYCLASSIFICATION

safety and support systems service water frt &,

b IDENTO IEFSIOPEN ENDED TERMS Unclassified

Unclassified

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THIS PAGE CONTAINS MICROFICHE TITLED

"NUREG/CR-4747, EGG-2473, VOL. 11,

UNCLASSIFIED, AN AGING FAILURE SURVEY OF

LIGHT WATER REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEMS &

COMPONENTS, APPENDIX E, B. MEALE et.al."

-.Wft=ft.M6.- "IMON