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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DARNELL MOORE

(SC 19869)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Kahn, Js.

Argued January 18—officially released December 24, 2019

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New London, where the court,

Jongbloed, J., denied the defendant’s motions to strike

the jury panel and to suppress certain evidence; thereafter, the case was tried to the jury; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to

the Appellate Court, Beach, Keller and Norcott, Js.,

which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the

defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to

this court. Appeal dismissed.

Kenneth Rosenthal, with whom, on the brief, was

Allison M. Near, for the appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Michael L. Regan, state’s

attorney, and David J. Smith, supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Christine Perra Rapillo, chief public defender, and

Ann M. Parrent, assistant public defender, filed a brief

for the Office of the Chief Public Defender as amicus

curiae.
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, Darnell Moore,

appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification,1

from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his

conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. State v. Moore,

169 Conn. App. 470, 473, 151 A.3d 412 (2016). On appeal,

the defendant challenges the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied his motion to

strike the voir dire panel on the ground that he failed

to provide any statistical analysis or data to prove that

the lack of African-American males on that panel rendered it not a fair cross section of the New London

judicial district from which it was drawn, in violation

of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.

Ct. 664, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979); State v. Gibbs, 254

Conn. 578, 588, 758 A.2d 327 (2000). The defendant

contends specifically that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the census data he proffered

about the percentage of all African-Americans in the

population of both Connecticut as a whole and the New

London judicial district specifically did not constitute

probative evidence with respect to the inquiry at issue,

which was limited to the percentage of African-American males eligible for jury service, because, ‘‘[w]ithout

an ability to rely on census data, [he] had no recourse

as to how he might demonstrate a fair cross section

claim.’’ The defendant also argues that the Appellate

Court improperly declined to exercise its supervisory

power over the administration of justice to further the

purpose of General Statutes § 51-232 (c)2 by requiring

the jury administrator to collect and maintain racial

and demographic data for all jurors because, ‘‘without

that information, there is no mechanism by which . . .

any defendant can effectively present evidence of the

number of distinctive group members in the jury pool

for the pertinent judicial district.’’

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties,

we have determined that the appeal in this case should

be dismissed on the ground that certification was

improvidently granted.

Beyond dismissing the appeal, however, we offer an

additional observation with respect to the defendant’s

request, supported by the amicus curiae Office of the

Chief Public Defender, to exercise our supervisory

authority over the administration of justice to enhance

the diversity of our state’s juries by requiring the jury

administrator to collect racial and demographic information about prospective jurors, including by (1)

amending the juror questionnaire to mandate the inclusion of racial and ethnic background, rather than the

current practice under § 51-232 (c) of making the provision of such information voluntary, which might skew
the data collected, and (2) maintaining statistical information based on that data prior to the destruction of

the questionnaires in accordance with Judicial Branch

policy intended to protect juror confidentiality. See,

e.g., Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 328 Conn.

610, 612–15, 182 A.3d 78 (2018) (providing additional

explanation in dismissing appeal as improvidently

granted). As we noted in State v. Raynor, 334 Conn.

, , A.3d (2019), a companion case raising

similar issues in the context of claims under Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69

(1986), the fact that the legislature has acted in this

area by enacting § 51-232 (c)—which specifically makes

the provision of racial and ethnic data optional for the

juror—renders us reluctant to exercise our supervisory

authority in the sweeping manner sought by the defendant and the amicus curiae Office of the Chief Public

Defender. Instead, we anticipate these issues will be

considered by the Jury Selection Task Force, which the

Chief Justice will appoint pursuant to our decision in

State v. Holmes, 334 Conn. , , A.3d (2019),

to suggest those changes to court policies, rules, and

legislation necessary to ensure that our state court

juries are representative of Connecticut’s diverse population.

The appeal is dismissed.

1 We granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal, limited

to the following issues: ‘‘In concluding that the defendant could not prevail

on his motion to strike the voir dire panel on the ground that it failed to

constitute a fair cross section of the community:

‘‘1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that census data pertaining

to the entire African-American population in Connecticut and New London

county [did] not [constitute] probative evidence with respect to the claimed

underrepresentation of African-American males in the jury pool?

‘‘2. Did the Appellate Court properly decline, in light of the provisions of

General Statutes § 51-232 (c), to exercise its supervisory authority over the

administration of justice to enforce the collection of demographic data to

permit analysis of the diversity of jury panels in Connecticut?’’ State v.

Moore, 324 Conn. 915, 915–16, 153 A.3d 1289 (2017).

2 General Statutes § 51-232 (c) provides: ‘‘The Jury Administrator shall

send to a prospective juror a juror confirmation form and a confidential

juror questionnaire. Such questionnaire shall include questions eliciting the

juror’s name, age, race and ethnicity, occupation, education and information

usually raised in voir dire examination. The questionnaire shall inform the

prospective juror that information concerning race and ethnicity is required

solely to enforce nondiscrimination in jury selection, that the furnishing of

such information is not a prerequisite to being qualified for jury service and

that such information need not be furnished if the prospective juror finds

it objectionable to do so. Such juror confirmation form and confidential

juror questionnaire shall be signed by the prospective juror under penalty

of false statement. Copies of the completed questionnaires shall be provided

to the judge and counsel for use during voir dire or in preparation therefor.

Counsel shall be required to return such copies to the clerk of the court

upon completion of the voir dire. Except for disclosure made during voir

dire or unless the court orders otherwise, information inserted by jurors

shall be held in confidence by the court, the parties, counsel and their

authorized agents. Such completed questionnaires shall not constitute a

public record.’’