NRC NEWS

 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

 801 Warrenville Road

 Lisle IL 60532

 Web Site: http://www.nrc.gov E-mail: opa3@nrc.gov

No. III-04-011 March 8, 2004

CONTACT: Jan Strasma (630) 829-9663 

Viktoria Mitlyng (630) 829-9662 

NRC APPROVES DAVIS-BESSE RESTART

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has approved the restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear

Power Plant, which has been shut down since February 2002 for replacement of a damaged reactor

vessel head and other safety improvements. The plant near Oak Harbor, Ohio, is operated by

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company.

James Caldwell, Regional Administrator for the agency’s Region III office in Lisle, Illinois,

approved restart of the plant in a letter to the utility issued today, subject to the utility’s compliance

with its license requirements and NRC regulations. (The letter is attached to this news release.) The

letter and supporting documentation will also be available on the NRC web site: http://www.nrc.gov --

select “Davis-Besse” from the key topics menu.

Based on the findings of numerous NRC inspections and on the improvements made by

FirstEnergy, Mr. Caldwell told the utility, “ the NRC has reasonable assurance that the Davis-Besse

facility can be restarted and operated safely.”

During the startup, the NRC will maintain round the clock inspection coverage of plant

activities. Expanded inspection coverage at Davis-Besse will continue beyond startup. There are three

resident inspectors assigned to Davis-Besse, one more than the normal staffing.

With its restart decision, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to FirstEnergy requiring

independent assessments and inspections at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station to provide

reasonable assurance that the long-term corrective actions remain effective. (The Order is also

attached.)

On February 26, 2004, the NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panel recommended to Mr. Caldwell

that the plant be permitted to restart. The panel has coordinated the NRC’s regulatory activities for

Davis-Besse during the lengthy outage. Panel members include managers and staff from the Region III

Office, from NRC Headquarters, and from the NRC resident inspection staff at the plant.

Since February 12, when FirstEnergy submitted its restart request at a public meeting, the

Oversight Panel and Mr. Caldwell reviewed information provided by the utility, the NRC inspection

findings over the past two years, the assessments of NRC staff members who have been involved with

Davis-Besse, and questions and concerns raised by outside individuals and organizations. The

extensive inspections, conducted by the agency, have involved about 80 NRC inspectors and contract 
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experts.

The oversight panel will continue to coordinate the inspection and regulatory activities for

Davis-Besse until the agency determines that the plant’s performance warrants resumption of the

NRC’s normal reactor oversight program.

The panel will continue to hold periodic meetings in the vicinity of Davis-Besse with

FirstEnergy officials to review the status of ongoing activities at the plant. These meetings will be

open to public observation and participation.

During the past two years, the NRC staff has conducted some 75 public meetings on DavisBesse -- most in the vicinity of the plant -- and held 50 briefings for federal, state, and local

government officials. 

Shortly after the discovery of the reactor vessel head damage, the agency set up a web site for

information related to Davis-Besse. Numerous documents have been posted there as they were issued. 

In addition, the NRC issued monthly newsletters on the status of its regulatory activities for DavisBesse.

 # # # 

Attachments: 

Letter to FirstEnergy dated March 8, 2004

Confirmatory Order dated March 8, 2004
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March 8, 2004

CAL No. 3-02-001

EA-03-214

Mr. Lew W. Myers

Chief Operating Officer

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

5501 North State Route 2

Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: APPROVAL TO RESTART THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION,

CLOSURE OF CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER, AND ISSUANCE OF

CONFIRMATORY ORDER

Dear Mr. Myers:

This letter removes the restriction the NRC has placed on the restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power

Station. The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has completed the necessary

inspection, assessment, and licensing activities to resolve the issues identified as contributors to the

Davis-Besse reactor vessel head degradation event. This letter also confirms the commitments in the

November 23, 2003, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) “Integrated Report to Support

Restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and Request for Restart Approval,” and its

subsequent updates and transmits an immediately effective Confirmatory Order. That order requires

annual independent assessments for five years, in the areas of operations, engineering, corrective

actions and safety culture and requires inspection of key reactor coolant system pressure boundary

components during a mid-cycle outage to ensure effective assessment and sustained safe performance.

This letter specifically addresses the following areas: Confirmatory Action Letter closure, Restart

Checklist closure, confirmation of the commitments made to the NRC in the FENOC “Integrated

Report to Support Restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and Request for Restart

Approval,” coordination of the restart decision with other federal agencies, issuance of the

Confirmatory Order, and continuation of enhanced NRC regulatory oversight of Davis-Besse activities

after restart.

Confirmatory Action Letter Closure

On February 16, 2002, the Davis-Besse Station was shut down for its 13th refueling outage. One

activity to be accomplished during the outage was inspection of control rod drive penetrations through

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

801 WARRENVILLE ROAD

LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4351
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the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head pursuant to NRC Bulletin 2001-01. During outage activities,

the licensee identified significant wastage of the carbon steel RPV head material near Penetration No.

3. The NRC was notified of the condition and, on March 12, 2002, initiated an Augmented Inspection

Team (AIT) to review the facts surrounding the degraded vessel head. Also, on March 13, 2002, the

NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter Number 3-02-001 to Davis-Besse documenting six

commitments required to be accomplished prior to restarting the reactor. On May 15, 2002, the NRC

revised the Confirmatory Action Letter to address the option of replacing the RPV head.

The NRC letter dated December 24, 2002, documented the status of each item in the Confirmatory

Action Letter including closure of item 6. NRC letters dated January 21, 2003, and July 17, 2003,

clarified the status of Confirmatory Action Letter item 1. NRC letter dated September 19, 2003,

documented closure of Confirmatory Action Letter items 1 and 2. The basis for resolution of the

remaining Confirmatory Action Letter items not previously documented in public documents, items 3,

4, and 5, is included in Enclosure 1. The licensee requested closure of the Confirmatory Action Letter

in a letter to the NRC dated February 23, 2004. All commitments contained in Confirmatory Action

Letter No. 3-02-001 are closed.

Restart Checklist Closure

As a result of the findings from the AIT, on April 29, 2002, pursuant to NRC Inspection Manual

Chapter (IMC) 0350, “Oversight of Operating Reactor Facilities in an Extended Shutdown as a Result

of Significant Performance Problems,” the NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panel (Panel) was chartered to

coordinate and oversee NRC activities needed to verify proper licensee safety performance. The Panel

also ensured appropriate focus was provided and resources were allocated with regard to reviewing

Davis-Besse improvement initiatives. On August 16, 2002, the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel issued a

Restart Checklist, which was developed in accordance with NRC IMC 0350. This Checklist includes

issues that required resolution prior to NRC consideration of restart approval. These issues were

identified based on insights from routine inspections and performance indicators; results from the AIT

and AIT Follow-up inspections; insights gained from Panel evaluation of ongoing licensee

assessments; and items in the Return to Service Plan and subordinate Building Block Plans that the

licensee originally submitted to the NRC by letter dated May 21, 2002.

The Restart Checklist was updated on October 30, 2002, January 28, 2003, and July 2, 2003, in

response to NRC assessment of ongoing activities at the Davis-Besse Station. The updates addressed

issues that needed to be resolved prior to the NRC consideration of restart approval.

The NRC staff has completed its inspection, assessment and licensing activities and has evaluated the

effectiveness of the licensee’s actions to address the issues that resulted in the plant shutdown. These

items are listed in the Restart Checklist. The Panel’s assessment of the licensee’s actions was based on

resident and region-based inspections, NRR staff reviews, baseline inspections, and a number of

special inspections, including:
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• Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) of RPV Head Degradation Event and AIT Follow-Up

Inspections (Inspection Reports (IRs) 02-03 and 02-08)

• Boric Acid Corrosion Extent of Condition Inspection Parts I and II (IRs 02-09 and 02-12)

• Program Effectiveness Inspection Parts I and II (IRs 02-11 and 03-09)

• System Health Assurance Inspection, Safety System Design and Performance Capability

Inspection, and Design Issues Inspection - Paths A, B, and C (IRs 02-13, 02-14 and 03-03)

• Uncontrolled Radioactive Material Release and Substantial Potential for Overexposure Special

Inspections and Radiation Protection Supplemental (95002) Inspection (IRs 02-06, 02-16 and

03-08)

• Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Replacement Inspection (IR 02-07)

• Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test Inspection (IR 03-05)

• Emergency Core Cooling System and Containment Spray System Sump Inspection (IR 03-06)

• Completeness and Accuracy of Information Inspection (IR 03-19)

• Reactor Coolant System Integrity Inspection (IR 03-23)

• Corrective Action Team Inspection (IR 03-10)

• Engineering and Maintenance Backlog Assessment Inspection (IR 03-24)

• Management and Human Performance Inspection Phases I, II, and III and Management and

Human Performance Follow-Up Inspection (IRs 02-15, 02-18, 03-12, and IR 04-03)

• Restart Readiness Assessment Team and Restart Readiness Assessment Team Followup

Inspections (IRs 03-11 and 04-04)

Additional significant inspections accomplished during the outage included NRC evaluation of

licensee actions to implement security orders and NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise.

The Panel has also conducted frequent public meetings with the licensee to discuss licensee

performance and NRC inspection and assessment results. The results of these meetings were

documented in public meeting summaries and internal Panel meeting minutes, all of which have been

or will be placed in the NRC Public Electronic Reading Room.

Enclosure 2 to this letter documents the basis for resolution of all checklist items. In many instances,

the basis consists of a reference to a previous public document that closed the item. For those items

that have not been previously closed in public documents, the basis for resolution of those items is

described.

Confirmation of Commitments in the “Integrated Report to Support Restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear

Power Station and Request for Restart Approval”

FENOC submitted the “Integrated Report to Support Restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

and Request for Restart Approval” on November 23, 2003. The report was updated on February 6,

2004, and February 19, 2004. Appendices A and D of that report provide commitments to sustain

performance improvement at Davis-Besse. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires that

actions be taken to prevent recurrence of significant conditions adverse to quality. FENOC categorized

the occurrence of the RPV head degradation as a significant condition adverse to quality. The actions

described in Appendices A and D are intended by FENOC to ensure the improvements realized during

the extended outage remain in place. Please provide written notification to the NRC Regional III

Administrator should FENOC determine that any of those actions cannot be accomplished consistent

with the schedule in Appendices A and D, or should FENOC determine that revision to the

commitments in Appendices A and D is necessary.
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Coordination of Restart Authorization with other Federal Agencies

In accordance with IMC 0350, the NRC staff has coordinated with the Federal Emergency

Management Agency and determined that there are no offsite emergency preparedness issues that

would impact a decision to approve restart of the Davis-Besse facility.

In addition, the Panel and NRC management have been regularly briefed on the results of the NRC

Office of Investigations (OI) investigation. The federal investigation of possible wrongdoing is

continuing as a joint effort of the United States Attorneys Office, Cleveland, Ohio; U. S. Department

of Justice; and NRC’s OI. An NRC manager has been assigned to monitor the continuing federal

investigation and identify any emerging potential safety issues. In accordance with the NRC’s

Enforcement Manual, the NRC staff has reviewed the investigative results and concluded that no

immediate enforcement action is necessary at this time. These matters will continue to be monitored

and will be appropriately handled consistent with NRC policies for enforcement and interface with the

U.S. Department of Justice, and any enforcement related to the events surrounding the reactor head

degradation event will be issued in accordance with NRC policies.

Issuance of Confirmatory Order

To ensure effective assessment and sustained safe performance at Davis-Besse, the NRC has

determined that additional measures are needed. Therefore, the NRC is issuing a Confirmatory Order

to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company modifying License No. NPF-3 requiring annual

independent assessments for five years in the areas of operations, engineering, corrective actions and

safety culture and requiring inspections of key reactor coolant system pressure boundary components

during a mid-cycle outage. Enclosure 3 contains the Confirmatory Order.

Continuation of Oversight Panel after Restart Approval

As discussed during several public meetings, implementation of the routine reactor oversight and

assessment processes will continue to be suspended. The Davis-Besse Oversight Panel will continue

to provide NRC regulatory oversight at Davis-Besse until the Panel confirms sustained safe operating

performance at Davis-Besse. The Panel will continue to monitor licensee startup activities through

resident and region-based special inspections, including a period of continuous observation during

restart of the station. In addition, enhanced inspection oversight will be provided utilizing the

additional resident inspector at the station, and other focused special inspections of areas the Panel

determines warrant additional oversight. By separate correspondence the licensee will be provided a

copy of the NRC’s inspection plans for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station during the upcoming

18-month period.

In summary, the matters contained in the NRC’s Confirmatory Action Letter and Restart Checklist,

required to be addressed before NRC consideration of restart approval have been adequately resolved

and the NRC has reasonable assurance that the Davis-Besse facility can be restarted and operated

safely. Therefore, the NRC is removing the restriction placed on restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear

Power Station in the Confirmatory Action Letter. You remain accountable to comply with all

requirements in NRC regulations and the Davis-Besse operating license as applicable before the plant

can restart. Further, the NRC acknowledges your commitments to take action to prevent recurrence of

significant performance deficiencies at Davis-Besse and is issuing an immediately effective

Confirmatory Order requiring future assessments and inspections.
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC’s “Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its enclosures,

and your response if you choose to respond, will be placed in the NRC Public Electronic Reading

Room (PERR) link at the NRC website, namely 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Sincerely,

/signed/

James L. Caldwell

Regional Administrator

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Enclosures: 1. CAL Closure Summary [Available from NRC Office of Public Affairs]

2. Restart Checklist [Available from NRC Office of Public Affairs]

3. Order Modifying License [Attached to news release]

7590-01-P

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-346

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company ) License No. NPF-3

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ) EA-03-214

CONFIRMATORY ORDER MODIFYING LICENSE

(EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY)

I.
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC, or the Licensee) is the holder of Facility

Operating License No. NPF-3 issued on April 22, 1977, by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC

or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50. The license authorizes the operation of Davis-Besse

Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Davis-Besse), in accordance with conditions specified therein. The

facility is located on the Licensee’s site in Ottawa County, Ohio.

II.

The discovery of circumferential cracking in some of the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM)

nozzles that penetrate the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, in

February 2001, and Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, in April 2001, raised concerns about the potential

safety implications and prevalence of cracking in RPV head penetration nozzles in pressurized-water

reactors (PWRs). In response to these concerns, the NRC issued NRC Bulletin 2001-01 on August 3,

2001. The bulletin required all PWR operators to report to the NRC on the structural integrity of the

CRDM nozzles, including their plans to ensure that future inspections would verify structural integrity

of the reactor vessel boundary. Davis-Besse was shut down on February 16, 2002, when it began its

13th refueling outage, which included an inspection of CRDM nozzles. On March 6, 2002, FENOC

employees discovered a cavity in the RPV head. The cavity was the result of corrosion caused by longterm leakage of reactor coolant, which contains boric acid, from small cracks in one of the CRDM

nozzles. 

The NRC staff subsequently determined that FENOC’s failure to properly implement its boric

acid corrosion control and corrective action programs was a performance deficiency that allowed

reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage to occur undetected for a prolonged time, resulting in

RPV upper head degradation. The NRC determined that the Licensee’s performance deficiency had

high safety significance, in the Red range, as documented in a letter to the Licensee dated May 29,

2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031490778).

The NRC took a series of actions in response to the discovery of the cavity in the Davis-Besse

RPV head. An Augmented Inspection Team was sent to Davis-Besse on March 12, 2002, to collect

facts regarding the conditions that led to the head degradation. Additionally, the NRC issued a

Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) to the Licensee on March 13, 2002 (ML020730225), confirming the

Licensee’s agreement that NRC approval is required for restart of Davis-Besse. The CAL also

documented a number of actions that the Licensee must implement before restart. By letter dated

April 29, 2002 (ML021190661), the NRC informed FENOC that its corrective actions at Davis-Besse

would receive enhanced NRC oversight, as described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350,

“Oversight of Operating Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition With Performance Problems.”

That enhanced monitoring began on May 3, 2002, and included the creation of a panel to provide the

required oversight during the plant shutdown and during and after any future restart until a

determination is made that the plant is ready for return to the NRC’s normal reactor oversight process. 

By letter dated April 18, 2002 (ML021130029), “Confirmatory Action Letter Response - Root

Cause Analysis Report,” the Licensee submitted to the NRC its technical root cause analysis report for

the RPV head degradation, as revised by letter dated September 23, 2002 (ML022750125), “Revision 1

to Root Cause Analysis Report Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation.” The Licensee
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concluded that the probable cause of the degradation was primary water stress corrosion cracking of

the nozzle. The physical factors that caused corrosion of the RPV head were the CRDM nozzle

leakage associated with through-wall cracking, followed by boric acid corrosion of the RPV low-alloy

steel. The Licensee further concluded that the large-scale corrosion occurred as a result of a failure to

detect and arrest the leakage until advanced symptoms had appeared. 

The Licensee submitted to the NRC its nontechnical root cause analysis by letter dated August

21, 2002 (ML022750405), “Management and Human Performance Root Cause Analysis Report on

Failure to Identify Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation.” In this analysis, the Licensee

concluded that “there was a lack of sensitivity to nuclear safety and the focus was to justify existing

conditions. The overall conclusion is that Management ineffectively implemented processes and thus

failed to detect and address plant problems as opportunities arose.” The Licensee identified a number

of root causes for the failure to identify boric acid corrosion of the RPV head, including:

1. Less-than-adequate nuclear safety focus - A production focus established by management,

combined with minimum action to meet regulatory requirements, resulted in acceptance of

degraded conditions on the RPV head and other components affected by boric acid.

2. Less-than-adequate implementation of the corrective action program, as indicated by the

following:

a. Addressing symptoms rather than causes

b. Low categorization of conditions

c. Less-than-adequate cause determinations

d. Less-than-adequate corrective actions

e. Less-than-adequate trending

3. Less-than-adequate analyses of safety implications - Failure to integrate and apply key industry

information and site knowledge/experience, effectively use vendor expertise, and compare new

information to baseline knowledge led to less-than-adequate analyses and decisionmaking with

respect to the nuclear safety implications of boric acid on the reactor vessel head and in the

containment.

4. Less-than-adequate compliance with the boric acid corrosion control and inservice test

programs - Contrary to these programs, boric acid was not completely removed from the RPV

head. The affected areas were not inspected for corrosion and leakage from nozzles and the

sources of the leakage were not determined.

As documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/02-15 (ML030380037), dated February

6, 2003, the NRC concluded that the Licensee’s management and human performance initial root cause

analyses were not sufficiently broad to identify potential contributors in the engineering and corporate

support areas and were not developed in an integrated manner to identify potentially systemic issues. 

Additional analyses were performed by the Licensee, including assessments in the areas of operations,

engineering, oversight, and corporate support, and were evaluated by the NRC, as documented in NRC

Inspection Report No. 50-346/02-18 (ML032050528), dated July 24, 2003. Following review of the
additional FENOC analyses, the NRC concluded that the Licensee’s overall nontechnical root cause

assessment was of appropriate depth and breadth to develop actions to correct and prevent recurrence

of the management and human performance deficiencies associated with the RPV head degradation. 

Corrective actions taken by the Licensee included the development of a Return-to-Service Plan,

which described FENOC’s actions for Davis-Besse’s safe and reliable return to service. The Returnto-Service Plan was initially submitted to the NRC on May 21, 2002 (ML021430429), and has been

revised several times, most recently on April 6, 2003 (ML031000739).

The NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panel established a Restart Checklist, which lists the 

essential issues requiring disposition prior to restart. The Restart Checklist was originally issued on

August 16, 2002 (ML022310034), and has been revised as necessary by the Oversight Panel based on

the results of NRC inspections and the Licensee’s assessments. The Restart Checklist addresses those

issues necessary to resolve the causes of the RPV head degradation so that the Licensee can safely

restart and operate the plant. For example, issues requiring resolution before the Oversight Panel can

consider a recommendation for restart include (1) the adequacy of safety-significant structures,

systems, and components inside containment, (2) the adequacy of safety-significant programs, such as

the corrective action program, self-assessment programs, and the boric acid corrosion management

program, and (3) the adequacy of organizational effectiveness and human performance, including the

effectiveness of corrective actions.

While the Restart Checklist establishes those essential actions necessary for safe restart and

operation, a key element in preventing recurrence of a safety-significant event such as the RPV head

degradation is effective Licensee self-assessment. Given the magnitude, scope, and duration of

problems found at Davis-Besse, and that the Licensee’s own self-assessments were not effective in

preventing risk-significant performance deficiencies, additional assurance that the Licensee’s selfassessment programs remain effective is essential.

III.

To address the issues identified above and ensure sustained safe performance in plant

operation, the Licensee developed the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Operational Improvement

Plan - Operating Cycle 14, which was submitted to the NRC by letter dated November 23, 2003,

“Integrated Report to Support Restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and Request for

Restart Approval” (ML033360251) and most recently revised on January 27, 2004 (ML040280597). 

The Operational Improvement Plan provides for a managed transition from the Return-to-Service Plan

to normal plant operations and refueling outages. The purpose of the Operational Improvement Plan is

to ensure that improvements realized during the extended outage remain in place and are further built

upon to improve performance in the future. 

On November 12, December 3, and December 10, 2003, the Licensee met with the NRC staff

regarding the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Operational Improvement Plan for Operating Cycle

14. Among other long-term corrective actions, the Operational Improvement Plan focuses on Licensee

initiatives to measure and sustain achievements in the areas of management and human performance at

Davis-Besse. The Operational Improvement Plan contains a number of key improvement initiatives,
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including continuing actions in the areas of operations, engineering, safety culture, and corrective

actions.

As assurance that the Operational Improvement Plan initiatives are sufficient to ensure the

continued integrity of the reactor coolant system and correction of the underlying management and

organizational problems which led to the RPV head degradation, the Licensee also committed to the

following actions. By letters dated March 31 (ML030930451) and November 14, 2003

(ML033220323), FENOC committed to conduct certain inspections every refueling outage for leakage

from the RPV upper head and from pressure-retaining components above the RPV head. These

include the CRDM flanges. In addition, by letter dated July 30, 2003 (ML032160384), FENOC

committed to conduct similar inspections of the reactor vessel underside incore monitoring

instrumentation nozzles, including during the Cycle 14 midcycle outage. As noted in the NRC staff

assessment (ML032510339), the midcycle inspection will help to assure prompt identification of any

significant reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage should it develop. The midcycle outage

activities will provide additional confirmation of the material status of the reactor coolant system.

Notwithstanding the corrective actions completed to address the CAL and Restart Checklist and

planned by the Licensee in the Operational Improvement Plan, the NRC requires additional measures

with respect to independent assessments and midcycle inspections to provide reasonable assurance that

the long-term corrective actions remain effective for those conditions that resulted in risk-significant

performance deficiencies. During the course of the extended shutdown of Davis-Besse beginning in

February 2002, FENOC conducted a number of thorough evaluations and self-assessments. Examples

include the evaluation of system design, the assessment of the completeness and accuracy of docketed

information, the evaluation of operational performance deficiencies during the normal operating

pressure test, and the evaluation of the failure to comply with technical specification requirements

during testing of the steam and feedwater rupture control system. However, Licensee assessments of

operational performance prior to both the normal operating pressure test and the NRC’s Restart

Readiness Assessment Team Inspection in December 2003 failed to identify a number of deficiencies. 

NRC inspections also discovered problems that were not originally found by the Licensee, most

notably in safety culture, in the corrective action program, and in the quality of engineering

calculations and analyses. These issues indicated weaknesses in the Licensee’s ability to assess, find,

and correct conditions adverse to quality. In addition, on November 23, 2003, the Licensee concluded

that the plant, programs, and personnel were ready to support safe operation, subject to completion of a

few, well-defined work activities prior to restart, and requested the NRC schedule a meeting as stated

in the CAL, and then provide approval for restart. A meeting was originally scheduled for December

18, 2003, to discuss restart. However, due to self-revealing equipment and operational problems and

issues from the NRC Restart Readiness Assessment and the Management and Human Performance

inspection teams, the meeting was delayed. Given the Licensee’s previous conclusion that it was ready

to support safe operation, these problems were additional evidence of inadequate self-assessment. 

Since then, the NRC recognizes that FENOC has implemented significant corrective actions resulting

in improved performance and self-assessment capability. Nevertheless, considering the problems

noted above and going forward, the NRC requires independent outside assessments to ensure

continued effective Licensee self-assessments and sustained safe performance in the areas of

operations, engineering and corrective actions at Davis-Besse.
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On February 26, 2004, the Licensee executed a consent form in which it committed to

implement the conditions in Section IV below with respect to future independent assessments of

operations, safety culture, corrective actions, and engineering at Davis-Besse, and inspections of the

reactor coolant system pressure boundary during a midcycle outage. The independent assessments will

provide important confirmation of the effectiveness of the Licensee’s self-assessments and long-term

improvement actions. The reactor coolant system pressure boundary inspections will assure prompt

identification of any leakage should it develop. The Licensee further agreed that this Order would be

effective upon issuance and waived its right to a hearing. 

I find that the Licensee’s commitments, as set forth in Section IV, are acceptable and necessary

and conclude that with these commitments, plant safety is reasonably assured. In view of the

foregoing, I have determined that public health and safety require that the Licensee’s commitments be

confirmed by this Order. Based on the above, this Order is immediately effective upon issuance.

IV.

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 50, IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THAT LICENSE NO. NPF-3 IS

MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 

1. FENOC shall contract with independent outside organizations to conduct

comprehensive assessments of the Davis-Besse operations performance, organizational

safety culture, including safety conscious work environment, the corrective action

program implementation, and the engineering program effectiveness. Ninety days prior

to the assessments, FENOC shall inform the Regional Administrator, NRC Region III,

in writing, of the identity of its outside assessment organizations, including the

qualifications of the assessors, and the scope and depth of the assessment plans. These

outside independent assessments at Davis-Besse shall be completed before the end of

the 4th calendar quarter of 2004 and annually thereafter for 5 years. Within 45 days of

completion of the assessments, the Licensee shall submit by letter to the Regional

Administrator, NRC Region III, all assessment results and any action plans necessary to

address issues raised by the assessment results.

2. FENOC shall conduct a visual examination of the reactor pressure vessel

upper head bare metal surface, including the head-to-penetration interfaces; the reactor

pressure vessel lower head bare metal surface, including the head-to-penetration

interfaces; and the control rod drive mechanism flanges, using VT-2 qualified personnel

and procedures during the Cycle 14 midcycle outage. The results and evaluation of the

inspections will be reported by letter to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region III,

prior to restart from the midcycle outage, and any evidence of reactor coolant leakage

found during the inspections will be reported by telephone within 24 hours of discovery

to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, or designee.
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If the Licensee determines that submittals made in accordance with these conditions contain

proprietary information as defined by 10 CFR 2.390, the Licensee shall also provide a nonproprietary

version in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(b)(1)(ii). The Regional Administrator, NRC Region III,

may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of

good cause. 

V.

Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other than the Licensee, may request

a hearing within 20 days of its issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to

extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to request a hearing

must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and must include a statement of good cause for the

extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies of

the hearing request shall also be sent to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for

Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional Administrator for NRC

Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351, and to the Licensee. If a person requests

a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely

affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d). 

If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will

issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be

considered at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be sustained. AN

ANSWER OR A REQUEST FOR HEARING SHALL NOT STAY THE IMMEDIATE

EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORDER. 

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/signed/

J. E. Dyer, Director

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Dated this 8th day of March, 2004