OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

April 29, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

SUBJECT: Audit Report on U.S. Agency for International Development Management of 

the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR-06-007) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit in 

accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

requires that we provide for the independent and objective conduct of audits, as well as 

leadership and coordination of and recommendations on policies designed to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of Iraq relief and reconstruction 

programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

We considered management comments from the Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for 

International Development, on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott at (703) 343-7926, or by email at 

joseph.mcdermott@iraq.centcom.mil; or Mr. Clifton Spruill at (703) 343-9275, or by email 

at clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil. For the report distribution, see Appendix C. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: Distribution 
i

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SIGIR-06-007 April 29, 2006 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

Projects to the Iraqi Government 

Executive Summary 

This report is one of a series of reports addressing the management, by U.S. government 

organizations, of the transfer of completed Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) 

projects to the Iraqi government. 

Introduction. On April 16, 2003, the United States Congress appropriated $2.48 billion, 

through Public Law 108-11, commonly called IRRF I, to finance reconstruction in Iraq. 

On November 6, 2003, it appropriated an additional $18.4 billion, through Public Law 

108-106, to fund Iraq reconstruction requirements that had been identified by the 

Coalition Provisional Authority during the summer and fall of 2003. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided management 

support for 99 IRFF funded construction projects with an estimated completion cost of 

approximately $2.3 billion. It has completed 87 of these projects through February 23, 

2006 and the remaining 12 are expected to be finished by October 2006. These projects 

include over 1,600 facilities and subprojects located throughout Iraq. 

A formal asset recognition and transfer process is necessary to enable the Iraqi 

government to integrate the completed project assets into a nation-wide infrastructure 

management plan; adequately budget for sustaining the transferred project assets; account 

for the assets; and leverage the project assets to obtain financing for additional projects 

from world markets. The Calendar Year 2007 Iraqi budget cycle requires that the 

Ministry of Finance recognize assets transferred to Iraqi control by June 2006 so that 

adequate sustainment funds are provided in the budget. 

Objective. The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. 

government organizations responsible for managing IRRF projects have developed and 

approved policies and procedures for transferring the billions of dollars of assets 

purchased, renovated and constructed with IRRF funds to the Iraqi government and its 

citizens. This audit focused specifically on asset recognition and transfer policies and 

procedures used by the USAID. We previously reported on the asset recognition and 

transfer policies and procedures used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region 

Division-Project and Contracting Office.1

Limitation of Assessment. As part of our efforts to perform this review in accordance 

with government audit standards, we must report that during the course of this review we 

were denied access to USAID policies and procedures that were material to the audit 

objective announced in our memorandum of October 31, 2005. This limitation affected 

our ability to fully address the adequacy of USAID’s policies and procedures for 

 

1 GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR-05-028 

(January 24, 2006). 
ii 

transferring assets to the Iraqi government and its citizens. For a more detailed 

discussion of these limitations, see Appendix A. 

Results. The USAID has recognized the need for formal asset recognition and transfer 

policies and procedures, and is working, in coordination with the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office and others, to resolve the issue. Current USAID policies and 

procedures do not fully address the information needs of the Iraqi Ministries responsible 

for planning the integration and sustainment of completed projects. The USAID has 

acknowledged the issue and is participating in three working groups to develop a 

common policy and process for facilitating the legal, financial, and logistical transfer of 

assets to the Iraqi government. 

Management Actions. During the course of this audit, the USAID acknowledged the 

need to further address the asset recognition and transfer issue. USAID participates in 

three multi-agency working groups, the Information Technology Working Group, the 

Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group, and the Sustainability Working Group. 

All of the working groups include representatives from the principal U.S. government 

agencies charged with the relief and reconstruction effort in Iraq, including USAID, Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

Multi-National Force-Iraq, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region DivisionProject and Contracting Office. The Information Technology Working Group was 

formed to consolidate all U.S. government funded and managed relief and reconstruction 

project asset information across all infrastructure sectors and organizations throughout 

Iraq into one database. The Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group was 

established to develop a common policy and process for the represented agencies to 

facilitate the legal, financial and logistical transfer of assets to the Iraqi government. The 

Sustainability Working Group was formed to develop and implement a plan for the 

sustainment of IRRF Projects. 

Recommendations. We recommend that USAID, in coordination with the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office, complete the development of a common policy and 

process facilitating the transfer of completed project assets to the Iraqi government. That 

process should, at a minimum, provide formal notification of the project asset transfer to 

the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance, and the appropriate operating 

ministry central headquarters (Electricity, Water, Oil, Health, Education, Transportation, 

Roads, Communications, Justice, Interior and Defense). Notification should also include, 

at a minimum, relevant data such as operation start date, asset cost, estimated short-term 

and long-term sustainability costs, terms of warranties, and the location of maintenance 

and systems manuals and instructions. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. USAID did not concur with our 

recommendation that it complete the development of a common policy and process for 

transferring completed projects to the Iraqi government. USAID reports it has adapted its 

current policies for asset turnover and believes those policies will be sufficient. Further, 

USAID did not provide us with a copy of those policies. Although we were not provided 

the adapted policies, we did evaluate the practice currently being followed and 

determined this process did not meet the U.S. Embassy’s position that the Ministry of 

Finance and Ministry of Planning needed to be notified of assets being transferred. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objectives 2 

Finding 

 Asset Recognition and Policies and Procedures 3 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 6 

B. Acronyms 7 

C. Report Distribution 8 

D. Audit Team Members 10 

Management Comments 

 Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 11 
1

Introduction 

Background 

On April 16, 2003, the U.S. Congress appropriated $2.48 billion, through Public Law 

108-11, commonly called IRRF I, to finance reconstruction in Iraq. On November 6, 

2003, it appropriated an additional $18.4 billion, through Public Law 108-106, for the 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF II) to fund Iraq reconstruction requirements 

that had been identified by the Coalition Provisional Authority during the summer and 

fall of 2003. The Coalition Provisional Authority identified thousands of projects within 

various infrastructure sectors in Iraq, such as electricity, water, oil, health care, 

transportation, and education. This report refers to all projects funded under either 

appropriation as IRRF funded projects. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided management 

support for 99 IRRF funded construction projects with an estimated completion cost of 

approximately $2.3 billion. It has physically completed 87 of these projects through 

February 23, 2006 and the remaining 12 are expected to be finished by October 2006. 

These projects include over 1,600 facilities and subprojects located throughout Iraq. 

They include the repair or construction of power plants, water systems, sewage treatment 

plants, telecommunication facilities and others. The projects are all constructed through 

two prime contracts awarded to Bechtel National, Incorporated. As a result of these 

projects, $2.3 billion worth of assets will be transferred to the Iraqi government. 

It is imperative the asset and transfer process be accomplished in a manner that enables 

the Iraqi government to integrate the completed project assets into a nation-wide 

infrastructure plan for future capital projects, assure adequate budgeting for sustainability 

of the transferred project assets, and leverage those project assets to obtain financing for 

additional projects from world markets, including the International Monetary Fund, 

World Bank, non-governmental organizations and donor nations. 

Asset recognition and transfer completes a process which should begin with Iraqi 

government involvement in the programming and design of the project and continue 

through the inspection process and development and receipt of the contract deliverables 

necessary for operations and maintenance of the completed project. The final acceptance 

and transfer of the project assets should be the culmination of a collaborative process 

between the appropriate United States and Iraqi government representatives. 

Timely asset recognition and transfer is important because the Iraqi government needs to 

plan for and fund infrastructure and sustainment of completed project assets on a nationwide basis. This requires a comprehensive knowledge by all appropriate ministries of 

assets being transferred to its control. According to a senior Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office official, an effective asset recognition and transfer program in the 

current Iraqi political and security environment should include notification of the transfer 

to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, and appropriate operating ministry 

(Electricity, Water, Oil, Health, Education, Transportation, Roads, Communications, 

Justice, Interior and Defense) at the central government level in Baghdad. 
2

Responsibilities

The USAID mission in Iraq carries out programs in education, health care, food security, 

infrastructure reconstruction, airport and seaport management, economic growth, 

community development, local governance, and transition initiatives. These programs 

are implemented in coordination with the United Nations, World Bank, International 

Monetary Fund, Coalition country partners, nongovernmental organizations, private 

sector partners and others. This is accomplished through its Mission headquarters in 

Baghdad and five field offices located throughout Iraq. 

According to National Security Presidential Directive 36, entitled, “United States 

Government Operations in Iraq,” the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Iraq, under guidance 

from the Secretary of State, is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision 

of all United States government employees, policies, and activities in country, except 

those under the command of an area military commander. This includes the continuous 

supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. The Directive also creates a 

temporary organization within the Department of State, called the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office to facilitate the reconstruction in Iraq. 

The Iraqi Ministry of Planning has final planning responsibility for all capital assets. 

Recognition of transferred assets by the Ministry of Planning is necessary in order to 

integrate them into a nation-wide infrastructure plan for future capital projects that will 

best serve the people of Iraq. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the overall Iraqi 

government budget. Timely recognition by the Ministry of Finance is necessary to assure 

adequate budgeting for sustainability of the transferred assets. The Calendar Year 2007 

Iraqi budget cycle requires that the Ministry of Finance recognize assets transferred to 

Iraqi control by late summer 2006 in order to include adequate sustainment funds for 

them in the budget. In addition, proper recognition of the completed project assets will 

enable the Ministry of Finance to leverage those assets to obtain financing from world 

markets, including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, non-governmental 

organizations and donor nations. 

Objectives 

The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. government 

organizations responsible for managing IRRF projects have developed and approved 

policies and procedures for transferring the billions of dollars worth of assets purchased, 

renovated and constructed with IRRF funds to the Iraqi government and its citizens. This 

audit focused specifically on asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures used 

by the USAID for its construction projects. We have also reported on the asset 

recognition and transfer policies and procedures used by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office;2 and the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq3

For a discussion of the audit scope (including limitations), methodology, and a summary 

of prior coverage, see Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, 

see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix D. 

 

2 GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR-05-028 

(January 24, 2006). 

3 Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR-06-006 (April 2006). 
3

Asset Recognition and Transfer Policies and 

Procedures 

Effective asset recognition and transfer requires a three step process: the assets must be 

properly accepted by the U.S. government; custody and operational control of the assets 

must then be transferred to the appropriate Iraqi government entity; and finally, the assets 

must be formally recognized by the Iraqi government. USAID currently accomplishes 

the first two steps but does not have an approved policy or procedure that requires formal 

notification to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Planning of project assets 

transferred to Iraqi government control. This has resulted largely because neither USAID 

nor the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office has established a requirement to report 

completed projects to these Iraqi ministries. However, USAID, in coordination with the 

Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office and others, is participating in the 

development of a common process and policy facilitating the recognition and transfer of 

assets to the Iraqi government. 

According to USAID it provides developmental assistance to foreign countries and their 

citizens, which assistance is generally pursuant to government-to-government grant 

agreements. Such agreements outline the expected contributions from each government 

(e.g., cash or in-kind contributions from a host government) and the conditions precedent 

to the USAID contribution. USAID also has policies and procedures for providing assets 

to foreign governments. Those procedures generally require the execution of a bilateral 

grant agreement between the foreign government and USAID prior to the start of a 

project and before disbursement of any project funds. The grant agreement specifies 

various terms, requirements, and preconditions that must be met by the host government. 

They can include items such as the project dollar amount being granted, the host 

government’s contribution, the estimated project completion date, the ability to sustain 

the project after completion, and the expected results.4 However, USAID was unable to 

use their normal procedures in Iraq at the time most of the construction projects were 

started due to the absence of existing Iraqi governmental organizations with sufficient 

knowledge and capacity to implement the agreements. 

USAID officials accept completed construction projects from the prime contractor in 

accordance with standard contracting procedures. USAID then transfers responsibility 

for the security, control, operation and maintenance of the completed projects to the 

appropriate Iraqi operating ministry (Electricity, Water, Health, Education, 

Transportation, Roads, and Communications). This is accomplished through a “care and 

custody” letter provided to an operating ministry official. The letter also assigns all 

warranties to the operating ministry and provides contact points for warranty claims. 

USAID officials recognized the need to adapt their Automated Directives System No. 

350 (Grants to Foreign Governments) to better fit the circumstances in Iraq. A senior 

USAID official told us the Mission had developed draft procedures to assure that the 

appropriate Ministries recognized the assets transferred to Iraqi control. However, those 

procedures have not been formally approved. The senior USAID official stated they did 

not want to release their draft procedures at the present time because they had not been 

formally approved and because the Mission continues to work with the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office and other U.S. implementing agencies to develop a 

 

4

 These requirements are included in USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) No. 350-Grants to 

Foreign Governments. 
4

common policy and process that all U.S. agencies operating in Iraq can use to accomplish 

the successful recognition and transfer of assets to the Iraqi government. The Mission 

prefers to achieve consensus with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and other 

implementing agencies on a common policy and process but is prepared to finalize and 

use its own procedures should that consensus not be achieved in the near future. 

To help achieve that consensus, USAID participates in three multi-agency working 

groups, the Information Technology Working Group, the Asset Recognition and Transfer 

Team Working Group, Sustainability Working Group, comprised of representatives from 

the five principal agencies of the U.S. government charged with the relief and 

reconstruction effort in Iraq. These agencies include, in addition to USAID, the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region DivisionProject and Contracting Office. 

The Information Technology Working Group was formed in August 2005 to consolidate 

all U.S. government funded and managed relief and reconstruction project information 

across all sectors and organizations throughout Iraq into one database. The name for this 

consolidated database is the Iraq Reconstruction Management System. One of the 

intended goals for the Iraq Reconstruction Management System is the capability to turn 

over to the Iraqi government an archive of the U.S. government’s relief and 

reconstruction project information, which will help in its budgeting for sustainability of 

transferred facilities and future master planning. 

In addition, USAID is a member of the Asset Recognition and Transfer Team Working 

Group which held its first formal meeting in December 2005. This Working Group was 

started to build on earlier informal efforts by representatives from the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, and others to 

develop a common policy and process for all U.S. agencies to use in transferring assets to 

the Iraqi government. In September 2005, their effort resulted in an initial draft common 

policy and process for asset recognition and transfer, but further progress on the issue 

was limited until the formal working group began work in December 2005. 

The Asset Recognition and Transfer Team Working Group includes representatives from 

USAID, Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office, the U.S Army Corps of Engineers, 

Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office, Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, and Multi-National 

Force-Iraq. The purpose of the Working Group is to complete the development of a 

common policy and process for the represented agencies to facilitate the legal, financial 

and logistical transfer of assets to the Iraqi government. USAID representatives continue 

to participate in the Working Group and contribute their significant asset transfer 

expertise developed over the past 45 years. 

Finally, USAID is a member of the Sustainability Working Group. The Sustainability 

Working Group was established to develop and implement a plan for the sustainment of 

IRRF-funded projects. The group works with other IRRF program officials to determine 

the capacity of the Iraqi government to maintain the IRRF projects, and to develop 

supportable cost estimates. 
5

Conclusion

Although we were not provided USAID adapted policies as noted in their response to this 

draft request, our review of the agency wide policies provided to us determined that these 

policies and procedures do not fully address the successful recognition and transfer of 

IRRF funded assets to the Iraqi government because they do not require the provision for 

notification and sufficient information to the appropriate Iraqi Ministries to enable 

adequate long-term, nation-wide planning for the integration and sustainability of 

construction project assets. 

Recommendation, Management Comments and Audit 

Response

We recommend that USAID, in coordination with the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office, complete the development of a common policy and process facilitating the 

transfer of completed project assets to the Iraqi government. That process should, at a 

minimum, provide formal notification of the project asset transfer to the Iraqi Ministry of 

Finance, Ministry of Planning, and the appropriate operating ministry central 

headquarters (Electricity, Water, Oil, Health, Education, Transportation, Roads, 

Communications, Justice, Interior and Defense). Notification of completed assets should 

also include, at a minimum, relevant data such as operation start date, asset cost, 

estimated near and long-term sustainability costs, terms of warranties, and the location of 

maintenance and systems manuals and instructions. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. USAID did not concur with our 

recommendation that it complete the development of a common policy and process for 

transferring completed projects to the Iraqi government. USAID reports it has adapted its 

current policies for asset turnover and believes those policies will be sufficient. Further, 

USAID did not provide us with a copy of those policies so we could determine their 

adequacy. Although we were not provided the adapted policies USAID refers to in its 

response, we did evaluate the practices currently being followed and determined this 

process did not meet the U.S. Embassy’s position that the Ministry of Finance and 

Ministry of Planning needed to be notified of assets being transferred. 

Regardless of whether USAID has procedures or develops procedures, the IRRF program 

is not a USAID program. Rather it is the principle U.S. government program for the 

reconstruction of Iraq that has been put under the direction and supervision of the U.S. 

Ambassador to Iraq. We believe it is important to present the U.S. contribution as a 

unified donation on behalf of the American people rather than divide the U.S. 

contribution along agency lines. National Presidential Security Directive No. 36 gives 

the U.S. Ambassador the authority to direct how the turnover of completed projects will 

occur and through the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office a process is being put in 

place. We believe that it is important that all agencies follow this process. 
6

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology__________

We initiated this review in February 2006 (Project No. 2005-22) to determine if the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) had adequate policies and procedures in 

place to manage the transfer of construction project assets to the Iraqi government, we 

interviewed USAID representatives, including the Director, Office of Infrastructure, 

Mission Controller, Mission Contracting Officer, and Regional Legal Advisor. We also 

interviewed representatives from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office to gather 

information about how the asset transfer process affects planning and budgeting at the 

Iraqi central government level. 

We reviewed USAID policies and procedures regarding the contract close-out and asset 

transfer process. We did not review completed contract close-out and asset transfer 

documentation to determine if they were accomplished in accordance with USAID 

policies and procedures. We plan to address this issue in a future audit. 

We attended weekly meetings of the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group 

held during February and March 2006. 

We conducted this audit during February and March 2006, in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Audit Limitations. Our audit was limited because USAID denied us access to policies 

and procedures that were material to the audit objective. USAID’s response to this audit 

stated it has policies and procedures in place—adapted to administer their program in 

Iraq—that serve to document the formal grant or recognition of USAID-funded capital 

assets to the Iraqi government However, USAID denied us access to those policies and 

procedures. This limitation affected our ability to fully address the adequacy of USAID’s 

policies and procedures for transferring assets to the Iraqi government and its citizens. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to 

perform this audit. 

Prior Coverage. There have been no audits performed at USAID concerning the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund with the same or similar objectives as this audit. 
7

Appendix B. Acronyms 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 
8

Appendix C. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace
9

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 
10

Appendix D. Audit Team Members 

This audit report was prepared and the audit work was conducted under the 

direction of Joseph T. McDermott, the Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office 

of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. The staff members who 

contributed to the report include: 

Sandra Cross 

Glenn Furbish 

Robert Gabriel 
11

Management Comments 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for 

International Development 
12
13
14
15