U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

67–827 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

STATE DEPARTMENT DOMESTIC SECURITY LAPSES AND

STATUS OF OVERSEAS SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 11 AND MAY 17, 2000

Serial No. 106–162

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

KRISTEN GILLEY, Professional Staff Member

JILL N. QUINN, Staff Associate

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate

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C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2000

Page

The Honorable Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Inspector General, U.S. Department of State ................................................................................................. 6

The Honorable J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence

and Research, U.S. Department of State ........................................................... 8

The Honorable David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security and Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State on Security

Issues, U.S. Department of State ....................................................................... 12

Timothy D. Bereznay, Section Chief, Federal Bureau of Investigation .............. 16

WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2000

The Honorable Patrick F. Kennedy, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Administration, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 43

The Honorable David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 48

The Honorable Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Inspector General, U.S. Department of State ................................................................................................. 51

APPENDIX

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2000

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 74

The Honorable Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers ................................................... 77

The Honorable J. Stapleton Roy ............................................................................. 88

The Honorable David G. Carpenter ....................................................................... 93

Timothy D. Bereznay ............................................................................................... 99

WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2000

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 103

The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from Nebraska .. 105

The Honorable Patrick F. Kennedy ........................................................................ 107

The Honorable David G. Carpenter ....................................................................... 111

The Honorable Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers ................................................... 116

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CURRENT CHALLENGES TO STATE

DEPARTMENT SECURITY—PART I

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. In Room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The meeting will come to order. Good morning.

I regret that we are about to embark on a series of votes on the

floor. It may take as much as an hour, and it will delay our hearing, and they are 5-minute votes based on amendments that were

adopted last night. I will open the hearing, and then we will have

to recess until the votes are concluded. I regret the delay for our

witnesses.

Today our Committee examines current challenges to State Department security. The nature of these challenges is not a mystery.

Over the last 2 years, there have been numerous well-known serious security failures at the State Department.

In 1998, a person in a brown tweed coat grabbed highly classified

documents from an office in the Secretary of State’s suite. That

man and the documents have not been found.

Last year, a Russian spy was discovered outside the Main State

building listening to a bugging device planted in a seventh floor

conference room. Of course, last month saw the revelation of a

missing laptop computer that contained highly classified information. That laptop has not been found.

Again, in 1999, we were told that a computer software program

written by citizens of the former Soviet Union was purchased by

the State Department on a sole-source contract and installed in

posts throughout the world without the proper security and vetting

procedures. That program had to be removed from each and every

post. To this day, we have not received an explanation of just why

and how that happened.

The news media has extensively uncovered each of these events.

What is less known, however, is that the officials in the State department have known for years that security at the State Department was vulnerable to just these kinds of incidents.

In a March 1998, State ‘‘town hall meeting,’’ Under Secretary for

Political Affairs Thomas Pickering, called a department-wide wakeup call about security issues. Another top official noted that proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:45 Dec 11, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 67827.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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moting individual responsibility is going to require more security

training and rigorous followup; and, of course, that is very true.

Later that year, a report by the Inspector General highlighted

problems in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research [INR] and made recommendations to fix them. Today, INR

has not yet responded to that report.

Another report by the Inspector General in 1999 recommended

broader changes to the State’s security policy, including the transfer of authority over ‘‘codeword’’ level material from INR to the

Diplomatic Security Bureau; and although this report was issued

in September 1999, its recommendations were at first rejected by

the Department. They were not adopted until April 2000, well after

the celebrated laptop had been found to be missing.

On November 17, 1998, a new State policy requiring escorts for

all visitors was announced. It requires ‘‘all visitors with the exception of active U.S. Government agency personnel who display proper photo identification shall be escorted at all times.’’ Six days

later, that policy was rescinded. Nine months later, it was reimplemented.

Just last week the Secretary of State held another Departmentwide Town Hall Meeting on security matters; and while her tone

and words were appropriately tough, we cannot help but wonder if

they will have any more impact than those of Mr. Pickering and

other top officials at the 1998 Town Hall Meeting.

A few days before the most recent town meeting, the Secretary

issued a document that revealed, on close analysis, that it had decided not to measure its security performance on the basis of the

number of security compromises detected. In addition, the Department failed to make progress on reducing a scandalous backlog of

security investigations. It is now moving toward, in effect, a 15-

year cycle for security updates, rather than 5-year government

standard.

The Department did, however, manage to significantly exceed the

target it set for itself of reducing its inventory of overseas vehicles

over 5 years old. So we are left to ask: Are the Department’s priorities appropriate? Should we be surprised that a casual attitude toward security is part of the Department’s culture if its budget priorities practically shout that information security is not the Department’s major concern?

We have learned that despite recent changes in security policy,

reporters from foreign news media have access to many parts of the

State building without any supervision. Indeed, we are informed

that press personnel with identification cards have a 24-hour access to the building, including weekends and holidays.

In other words, the new escort policy has a big hole, a big gap.

You can lead an elephant through it. It is no secret that foreign

intelligence agencies do use reporters as agents. During the Cold

War, the KGB agents routinely used reporters’ credentials as cover

for many of their activities. The recent book entitled The Sword

and the Shield by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin details

numerous incidents of Soviet spies who have posed as reporters. It

is a safe bet that the KGB’s successor agencies in Russia today use

the very same techniques.

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No security policy at State will be adequate until foreign journalists are appropriately escorted, just like other visitors beyond the

normal press areas in the State Department.

A secure State Department, however, is not just a matter of

changing a few policies. It is the daily culture of our diplomats that

are going to have to change. Every person in the State Department

from maintenance personnel to Ambassadors to the Secretary of

State must reprioritize and make security their top concern.

This does not mean that policymakers in top jobs are off the

hook. Far from it. Leadership must come from the top, and the responsibility for the current, disastrous conditions of State Department security lies with the Secretary’s office and with her top

aides.

I want to quote from an anonymous letter received by this Committee just this week from a Foreign Service employee: ‘‘For the

poor security environment at the U.S. Department of State to improve only one thing is required, that being for State to seriously

and publicly punish several senior officials, including at least two

current Ambassadors, for security violations. The punishments

would have to be real and hurt, to include firings and criminal

prosecutions.’’ I trust that Department of State—and we have several of its top

officials here today—will give us advice and will consider these

thoughts that we just expressed. Our Nation must not tolerate any

further security violations at the State Department or at any agencies. Department officers need to realize that both the lives of innocent people and national security put at risk when they are haphazard in following elementary procedures.

The consequences for compromising national security secrets,

whether intentional or inadvertent, are great. They result in costly

investigations, damage relations with other Nations and, most

gravely, possible mortal danger for Americans serving our Nation

abroad.

In closing, I would like to quote a former Ambassador to the

United States from France, Jules Cambon, who said, ‘‘The day secrecy is abolished, negotiation of any kind will be impossible.’’

It is no exaggeration to say that the very mission of this State

Department, to carry out our Nation’s foreign policy, has been

placed in a perilous atmosphere at the present time.

Is there any other Member—Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

thank you for convening this very important hearing of the full

Committee on this very, very troubling issue.

Let me just say I want to welcome our very distinguished panel.

I see Ambassador Stapleton Roy, who many of us visited when he

was in China, then in Indonesia, a very accomplished diplomat. We

are very happy to have you here.

Secretary Carpenter—I would just note for the record, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Carpenter appeared before our Subcommittee, the

International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee, back

on March 12 of last year and gave compelling testimony, along with

Admiral Crowe, with regard to the growing threat to our embassies

and assets abroad. He pointed out at the time—and I would like

to quote him—because I think it is very timely and is a problem

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that still exists and has actually worsened—the terrorist threat is

global, lethal, multidimensional and growing.

Our analysts estimate that during the last 12 months, there were

2,400 threats against U.S. interests overseas. As you pointed out,

Mr. Secretary, that was a 100 percent increase. And for the record,

I think it is important to give credit where credit is due.

I used your compelling testimony of that day, over the course of

the next several weeks and months, in support of H.R. 3427, the

State Department Reauthorization Bill. This bill had a significant

plus-up for overseas embassy security, as a matter of fact, we provide in Section 1 and Section 6 $5.945 billion over 5 years. I have

to tell you, and I want to say this in gratitude, your testimony was

very effective and woke up a large number of people who perhaps

had not realized just how bad things had gotten and how much in

need we were of providing that important money. So I want to

thank you for that.

As you know, the President signed that legislation in November,

and it is law. It does authorize the money and I think in a bipartisan way we will continue to make that money available to do this.

And of course, Mr. Chairman, the issue at hand is the laptop

computer, the Inspector General’s report, and you have covered

most of the bases as was pointed out in the findings. The INR has

not effectively discharged its responsibilities for the protection of

sensitive compartmented information and is not well structured or

staffed to oversee the management of the ESI security.

I was particularly concerned, and you made note of it as well,

that on the issue of escorts inside the State’s building, that the

Under Secretary of State for Management, Tom Pickering, rescinded on November 23 a policy that was published about a week

before, on November 17 of 1998. That is very, very troubling, and

hopefully we can get to the bottom of that. It seems to me, if we

have people unescorted walking around the building that raises

very severe questions about who might have access to very sensitive information.

I think, Mr. Chairman, you have outlined the issue. During questions and testimony we will certainly delve into it further. But I

did want to publicly thank Secretary Carpenter for that testimony

and the good work that he and the others do. It did lead, as a consequence, to that legislation, so I want to thank him.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Congressman Smith.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend you for holding this hearing, and I want to

bring to my colleague’s attention a development that unfolded just

a few hours ago which makes security at the State Department and

throughout our government of extreme importance.

A few hours ago, in Moscow, agents of the KGB have raided the

headquarters of the one free media outlet in Russia. This should

not be surprising in view of the fact that the new Russian President Putin spent 15 years in the KGB and has surrounded himself

with KGB operatives and is singularly incapable of accepting criticism of either Russian policies in Chechnya or anywhere else.

5

I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses

and, having had a long-standing professional relationship with the

Secretary, I can only say that I know from my own personal knowledge that no Secretary of State has been more intent on maintaining maximum security with respect to all sensitive materials than

our current Secretary Madeline Albright.

It is always the head of the operation who is responsible for anything that goes wrong, and Secretary Albright has accepted that responsibility. But as we begin this hearing I think it is important

for us to realize that, given her background and her attitudes and

her experience, her own personal commitment to maintaining the

highest professional standards of security within the Department is

unquestioned; and I know that this hearing will unfold in the context of that knowledge.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Since we have a series of votes, the Committee will now stand

in recess until the votes are concluded. Thank you very much for

your patience and indulgence.

[Recess.]

Chairman GILMAN. Committee will come to order.

I want to apologize for the number of votes that were on the

floor, which necessitated the recess that we have just gone through.

We are pleased to have with us today a distinguished panel and

allow me to introduce them.

Before I introduce the panelists, our Ranking Minority Member,

the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson, has an opening

statement. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this hearing.

Obviously, it is always a difficult challenge in a democratic society to balance our needs for security and also have a society open

enough that we can operate in a democratic manner. But all of us

are alarmed by the disturbing lapses in security in the last several

years at the State Department, potentially compromising national

security—listening devices, individuals in unauthorized areas, a

laptop disappearance, workers given maybe too free access to areas

important to national security.

We need not simply to figure out there but elsewhere in the government, in the post-Soviet era, to recognize there is still an important need for security, and we have to make sure that we have the

resources and the structure in place to make sure that our national

secrets are protected and at the same time that we move forward

and make our systems of government accessible to the citizens, to

the press and to those who are authorized to have access.

I certainly hope that everybody took the Secretary of State’s

statement and her several comments in the town meeting with the

State Department officials to heart, that we all have to participate

in this process. She said that, unlike academia, a 99 percent success rate just isn’t acceptable here. It is a difficult challenge, but

I think we all recognize that we have to be successful 100 percent

of the time.

I thank the Chairman for calling the hearing and look forward

to hearing the witnesses.

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Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Now we will proceed with our panelists.

I am pleased that we have with us the Honorable Jacquelyn

Bridgers, Inspector General in the Department of State. Ms.

Bridgers was sworn in as the Inspector General in 1995. She has

been before this Committee many times, and we appreciate the valuable work of your good offices.

We will also hear from Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Stapleton Roy. Ambassador Roy has a distinguished 44-year history in the Foreign Service, having served as

Ambassador to Singapore, to China and to Indonesia before taking

over as Assistant Secretary for the Intelligence and Research Bureau.

We also welcome Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security

David Carpenter. Mr. Carpenter assumed his position as Assistant

Secretary in August 1998 following a 26-year career in the U.S. Secret Service. He is the first person to hold that position and has

a professional background in the protection and security fields.

Finally, we welcome as our fourth witness Timothy Bereznay, a

Section Chief in the National Security Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Bereznay has been with the Bureau for

24 years. In his current assignment he has management oversight

responsibilities for investigations related to counterintelligence and

espionage allegations that pertain to our Department of State.

We appreciate the willingness of our panelists to appear before

our Committee on this very important topic.

I will ask Ms. Williams-Bridgers to proceed with a summary of

your statement, and following the statements we will proceed to

questions. Any of the panelists who want to summarize, we will

make your full statement a part of the record. Ms. Bridgers.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMSBRIDGERS, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. It is indeed a pleasure to be before the

Committee again. Mr. Gejdenson, Mr. Chairman, thank you very

much for the opportunity to testify before the Committee on the

Department of State’s security programs as they relate to the protection of sensitive intelligence in national security information.

The Department has implemented a diligent effort to enhance

the physical security of our overseas missions. Today U.S. missions

are significantly more secure than they were 20 months ago. Based

on our overseas inspections we have found that our embassies generally do a good job of protecting classified information.

Recent lapses at Main State clearly demonstrate that attention

must now be given to address vulnerabilities in protecting sensitive

intelligence and national security information on the domestic

front.

The Secretary’s recent decision to transfer authority for protection of intelligence-related material from the Bureau of Intelligence

and Research to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security implements an

important corrective action that we recommended to ensure proper

safeguards for our most sensitive intelligence-related information.

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Mr. Chairman, in your invitation to this hearing you asked me

to discuss my office’s assessment of the security environment within INR and the Department overall, the division of security responsibilities between INR and DS, the Department’s security incident

disciplinary process, the effectiveness of the disciplinary process in

deterring poor security practices, and the Department’s responsiveness to OIG’s recommendations.

In brief, OIG has found significant deficiencies in the handling

of classified information that have perpetuated a lax security environment in the Main State headquarters building. Specifically, we

found that ineffective access controls in the Main State headquarters building left offices vulnerable to the loss or theft of sensitive intelligence information and equipment by unescorted,

uncleared visitors and contractors. A lack of adequate physical and

procedural security measures in offices resulted in classified documents not being properly controlled and accounted for. INR was

not fulfilling its security function and unit security officers in other

bureaus were not enforcing security requirements, leading us to

recommend a delegation of responsibility to DS for protecting highly classified information. Last, OIG found that disciplinary actions

for security violations did not serve as a deterrent for lapses in security practices.

Let me focus first on the key security deficiencies we identified.

Our review of the handling of classified information found that

uncleared maintenance and repair and cleaning contractors are not

always escorted when in offices where classified information is handled, processed and stored. This occurred even though there has

long been a Department policy that escorts are mandatory in controlled access areas. Very few contractor personnel have clearances.

We found that the vast majority of offices did not perform the escort function. In cases where escorting was performed, the degree

of vigilance was inconsistent.

We also found that INR had not complied with required routine

inspections of 140 Department offices where sensitive compartmented information was maintained or discussed. Also, none of the

offices had received technical surveillance countermeasure inspections to determine whether listening devices had been implanted.

Our review also found that while SCI documents were distributed to 46 offices each morning, controls or procedures were not in

place to ensure that all material was returned to an SCI facility

and properly secured at the close of business. In addition, INR was

not obtaining signed receipts to establish accountability for the documents and did not verify that all the documents were actually returned.

INR had also not complied with the Director of Central Intelligence directive regarding personnel security standards. Specifically, we found that INR had not complied with the requirements

that only individuals with a need to know had access to SCI materials and that the results of background investigations be considered in making that determination.

We found that unit security officer [USO] responsibilities were

not being performed because many USOs were not fully informed

of their security responsibilities, and they did not believe that they

had the authority to enforce security procedures. In 21 of 23 offices

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inspected, there was no assurance that after-hours checks were

performed or that classified documents were properly stored. Of 23

USOs we interviewed, 17 did not perform office security reviews.

Only 5 of 23 offices escorted their uncleared cleaning staff. Only 11

of 23 regularly briefed their employees on security.

INR has not effectively discharged its responsibility for the protection of SCI. In our view, INR is not well structured or staffed

to oversee the management of SCI’s security.

The primary function of DS, however, is to ensure that people

and information are properly protected. DS is already responsible

for overseeing Department procedures for protecting classified information up to the Top Secret level. Further, DS has a cadre of

trained security professionals. Therefore, the OIG recommended

that the duty of safeguarding SCI should be delegated to DS.

Mr. Chairman, my office will be conducting a followup review

later this year to determine the adequacy of the Department’s response to all of our recommendations.

The Department’s security incident program also has not been effective because security awareness and disciplinary actions have

not been sufficient. Repeat offenders receive letters of warning and,

depending on the gravity of the situation, they can continue to retain their security clearances allowing access to the most sensitive

information in the Department.

We recommended that the Department strengthen security training and the disciplinary actions associated with security incidents.

In summary, I am encouraged by the actions taken by the Department recently to correct the physical and procedural security

deficiencies at Main State that we have noted in our work. It is unfortunate, however, that lapses in security that were identified by

OIG last year were not addressed in a more timely fashion. This

delay no doubt may have contributed to an environment in which

the most recent highly publicized breeches occurred. At this juncture, however, it is essential that the Department exercise vigilance and commitment to maintain and enforce the highest level of

security awareness and compliance.

This concludes my short statement, and I would be glad to answer questions at the appropriate time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers appears in the

appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Inspector General Bridgers.

Assistant Secretary Roy, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,

please proceed.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. ROY. I am glad to have the opportunity to appear before you

today with my colleague, Assistant Secretary Carpenter. We will be

happy to discuss with you the Department’s response to the disappearance of an INR laptop computer and other important security matters.

Let me begin by briefly reviewing the basic facts regarding the

disappearance of the laptop computer. On January 31 of this year,

a laptop computer containing highly classified information was disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:45 Dec 11, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 67827.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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covered to be missing from a secure area controlled by the Bureau

of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, or INR,

which I head. This matter is under active criminal investigation by

the FBI and the Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, or

DS. I have asked all personnel of INR to cooperate fully with the

investigation. That is our sole role. We not privy to the investigation’s focus, its time line, or its findings, so I cannot speak to those

issues.

In my testimony today, I will focus on four subjects which the

Committee asked me to address in its invitation letter: First, the

disappearance of the laptop. The laptop had been purchased in

1996 for the exclusive use of officers from other bureaus engaged

in counterproliferation work who did not have access to classified

workstations within INR. It was used and stored in an INR secure

area because it contained highly classified information bearing on

the proliferation of weapons and technologies of mass destruction

and their associated delivery systems. Because of the sensitive information on it, the computer was not permitted to leave the INR

secure area where open storage was authorized under applicable

regulations.

On January 31, INR staff could not locate the laptop in response

to a request by a would-be user from outside the Bureau. When a

careful search of the office suite failed to locate the laptop, the office in question took immediate steps to interview all personnel in

the office as well as officers from outside the Bureau who had been

authorized to use the laptop.

Some of those approximately 40 officers were out of country on

official business. They were queried by phone or cable. When these

efforts failed to locate the laptop, INR’s security branch chief

launched a formal investigation and requested the office director to

respond to a detailed list of questions. He also interviewed key individuals and developed a summary of relevant circumstances.

When this internal investigative phase failed to locate the laptop,

the INR security branch chief reported the circumstances to me,

along with his recommendation that because of the potential compromise of classified information the matter be turned over to DS.

I immediately approved this recommendation, and on February 10

INR requested DS to commence an investigation and notified the

CIA Center for Security that a computer presumed to contain sensitive classified material could not be located.

All matters pertaining to the investigation are under the purview

of DS and the FBI, and I am not privy to the details. We do not

yet know how the laptop disappeared, whether it was removed by

an employee authorized to work in the office, whether it was stolen

for its material value or whether it was taken for the information

on its hard drive.

Regardless of the circumstances, the loss of the laptop is inexcusable. It should not have happened. As the Assistant Secretary for

Intelligence and Research, I am also the senior officer of the Intelligence Community in INR and in the Department of State. All personnel in INR from top to bottom have been indoctrinated and

trained to be aware of their responsibility to safeguard the Nation’s

most sensitive secrets. Whatever the results of the investigation, it

10

is clear that we failed to exercise our responsibility to safeguard

the computer and the classified information on it.

I particularly regret that Members of Congress first learned of

the incident from the pages of the Washington Post. This was

never our intention. That it happened is most unfortunate and is

being looked into as part of our effort to draw lessons from this unfortunate experience.

Second, the Secretary’s decisions in response to the loss. As a result of the circumstances I have just outlined, the Secretary took

a number of steps affecting the Bureau that I head:

First, after consulting the Director of Central Intelligence,

George Tenet, the Secretary decided that DS should take over from

INR the responsibility for protection of sensitive compartmented information. I support this decision and am confident that DS will do

the job well. We are working hand in glove with DS and the CIA

to effect this transfer. In addition to improving security, I believe

this will strengthen INR’s ability to concentrate on what we do

best, which is analysis and intelligence policy coordination.

In my view, this transfer of the SCI security function can be handled in a manner that will not conflict in any way with INR’s responsibilities as a statutory member of the Intelligence Community. Indeed, since before the discovery that the laptop was missing, we had been working closely with DS to identify and formalize

areas for enhanced cooperation.

Aside from the transfer of the SCI security function to DS, the

Secretary also asked that in the investigation of the disappearance

of the laptop, questions of accountability be examined carefully and

appropriate recommendations be made for decision. Meanwhile, to

enhance confidence in the review process, two INR office directors

have been temporarily transferred to other duties. This is not a

finding of fault. It is to ensure that as the investigation is conducted and remedial steps are taken there is full confidence in the

process.

In addition, the Secretary directed that a number of other steps

be taken to tighten security in the Department, which we can address at other points in our testimony here.

The security environment within INR. The Secretary held a town

meeting at the Department on May 4 to stress once again that all

Department employees must attach the highest priority to their security responsibilities. I had already reinforced this message in a

meeting with the entire INR staff on April 26, and I am confident

that everyone in the Bureau is conscious of the need to maintain

a high level of security awareness at all times and that security is

an inextricable and indispensable part of their jobs.

Mr. Chairman, you inquired in your invitation letter to me about

the day-to-day procedures of monitoring classified information

within INR. In accordance with the relevant directives, SCI security or control officers responsible for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities maintain records, manual or electronic, of external receipt and dispatch sufficient to investigate loss or compromise of SCI documents during transmittal.

Given the volume of classified and SCI material received daily in

INR, we and DS have recognized the need to strengthen procedures

for assuring document accountability. Earlier this year, we sought

11

and gained approval to hire additional document control specialists.

Upon their entry on duty, they will work to ensure that both the

theory and practice of document accountability within INR are

fully in accord with Intelligence Community standards and requirements.

Following recess of the OIG report last September, the DCI’s

Community Management Staff offered to make available to INR a

professional document control specialist to evaluate our existing

staffing and document control procedures and to make appropriate

recommendations. I understand the individual selected to assist us,

expected to arrive in INR very soon, will come from the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose operational milieu is in important respects similar to that at State.

In regard to the management of and security procedures for construction or renovation projects at Main State, in INR this relates

primarily to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, or

SCIFs. Here DCID 1/21 on Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities is the governing directive. The DCID requires that whenever a project is contemplated,

a construction plan balancing threats and vulnerabilities must be

reviewed and approved by the cognizant security authority. In my

view, these requirements are time tested and appropriate provided

they are, as they should be, rigorously observed.

The fourth subject you asked me to address was the INR Assistant Secretary’s role as senior official of the Intelligence Community.

First, let me affirm that I see no statutory, regulatory or procedural barriers that need interfere with the ability of the Bureau of

Diplomatic Security to carry out security responsibilities within

INR. There are some fine points now being addressed, but they

have not been implemented in any way within INR to the Bureau

of Diplomatic Security. Nor should this impede INR’s ability to perform its function as a member of the Intelligence Community.

As Members of this Committee may be aware, the Department

of State is not a member of the Intelligence Community. Rather,

it is INR within the Department that is a statutory member. As

Assistant Secretary of INR, I am the senior adviser to the Secretary of State on all intelligence matters and responsive to her direction. At the same time, I have certain responsibilities to the Director of Central Intelligence that derive from my status as the

Senior Official of the Intelligence Community within INR.

The authorities and responsibilities vested in SOICs, or Senior

Officials of the Intelligence Community, are detailed in DCID 1/

19—Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information and

Security Policy Manual. This directive states that intelligence organizations, as defined in Executive Order 12333, have the authority

and are responsible for all aspects of security program management with respect to the protection of intelligence sources and

methods and for implementation of the DCIDs for activities under

their purview.

Hence, INR had previously maintained its own security program

for intelligence sources and methods, while DS had developed and

implemented security procedures on a broad range of security responsibilities that fall within its purview. Pursuant to the SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:45 Dec 11, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 67827.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
12

retary’s decision to transfer SCI security protection to DS, we are

working with DS and CIA to develop the necessary procedures

within the framework of the DCID.

In conclusion, let me stress once again that the Department of

State is undertaking a top-to-bottom review of security procedures.

INR is a part of that process and, working closely with DS, we are

moving simultaneously on many fronts to ensure better security

throughout the Bureau. As the Secretary said, a 99 percent grade

on security is not a passing grade. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roy appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Secretary Roy.

We are now pleased to hear testimony by the Honorable David

Carpenter, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State.

You may summarize your statement, put the full statement in

the record, whatever you deem appropriate. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CARPENTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

AND SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON SECURITY ISSUES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

I am appearing before you today to answer questions about the recent laptop incident. I am also prepared to discuss other domestic

security issues affecting the Department of State.

I accepted the position of Assistant Secretary at the State Department with the full realization that the job would be challenging, but I could never have envisioned the enormity of that

challenge. I doubt that there are many outside the agency who appreciate the magnitude of the task thrust upon DS, the complexity

of the issues faced in managing a global security program responsible for the protection of so many lives, and the challenges in facing off against sophisticated espionage services as well as

transnational organizations focused on the destruction of American

interests around the world.

On a positive note, I was extraordinarily gratified by the capabilities and professionalism of the people working in the Bureau of

Diplomatic Security. They are clearly first rate. But I was shocked

to learn just how much the State Department’s budget had been

cut and, to my regret, how hard those budget and personnel cuts

had hit DS. I found that DS had people in all areas of its responsibilities who, in my experience, were second to none in other similar agencies, but it became painfully obvious that DS, although

challenged and dedicated, had far too few people to meet the challenges it was about to encounter.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, DS was authorized to hire

only a handful of agents, engineers and civil service security personnel. Twenty percent of DS positions worldwide were reduced.

The worldwide guard program was decreased by 5 percent. Rules

and regulations concerning security were loosened to the point that

holding employees accountable for serious security issues became

more difficult.

It is my assessment that the budget and personnel cuts had significantly eroded the Bureau’s ability to fulfill even its most basic

13

services. They had reached the point that when there were major

conferences in the United States requiring significant manpower to

staff protective details, numerous operational offices had to be shut

down to support this effort. In some respects, this type of scenario

continues to this day.

Let me give you a few examples of how DS’ programs were

streamlined during that period. Among the activities affected was

our office of counter intelligence. The number of positions was reduced from 41 to 26 and funding for the program was cut from

$225,000 to $65,000. Staffing for programs in the Department that

handle procedural and informational security issues was reduced

by more than 50 percent. Our technical countermeasures programs

suffered a similar fate as limited funding forced the Bureau to fund

only priority life safety programs rather than to invest in upgrading its antiquated countermeasures program. The Department’s reaction to imposed fiscal constraints and a popular opinion that the

Cold War had ended and now the world was a better place had

devastating consequences for DS programs.

In 1997, the Bureau’s hiring picked up considerably and while it

appeared that they were making strides in restaffing to the point

of making it ready to meet its existing challenges, the bombings in

East Africa occurred. Let me say that those bombings have dramatically changed the magnitude and intensity of our overseas security programs and the support of this Committee in regard to our

specific needs has been much appreciated. As you are aware, nearly

all of our new positions acquired since the bombings have been directed at overseas staffing or in support of our overseas operations,

chiefly with antiterrorism in mind.

The Department is currently reviewing staffing levels in other

areas that may have been neglected including counterintelligence,

dignitary protection, and domestic facility security which continue

to be significantly understaffed and underfunded.

Let me describe to you the universe of our efforts. We are in the

protection business. We protect people, facilities, and classified information. We do this at our posts throughout the world.

Let me give you some idea of the magnitude of our global life

safety responsibilities. We protect approximately 10,000 State Department employees in the United States. Overseas, we are accountable for the protection of an estimated 75,000 U.S. citizen employees and their families. Add to that number more than 37,000

Foreign Service employees working for our embassies and consulates. Each year we also protect approximately 130 distinguished

high profile foreign visitors to the United States and that is an encapsulated view of just our mission to protect people.

Mr. Chairman, in my view the breadth of this global mandate is

unique in the Federal Government.

Our missions for protecting facilities and information equally demanding. DS has designed programs to counter a global array of

security challenges presented by elements ranging from common

criminals to terrorists and spies. Our programs include safeguarding classified and national security information, personnel investigations, computer and information security awareness programs, and the conduct and coordination of espionage and counterintelligence investigations.

14

In the past year, much has been made of security incidents at

Main State. Providing security for that building is a problem, not

impossible but still very challenging.

The Department of State building is the second largest government building in the Nation’s Capital. It is occupied by 8500 employees and receives over 200,000 official visitors and tourists each

year. The Main State building covers two square blocks and has

eight stories and a basement. There are 2.6 million square feet of

space. It has 5 pedestrian entrances, 3 basement entrances to a 900

plus vehicle garage, 2 loading docks, 43 elevators, 5,400 windows,

9 acres of roof, and 13 emergency generators. The building has virtually no setback from the street thus affording little opportunity

to screen either visitors or vehicles at appropriate distances.

The building serves as the hub for American diplomacy. It hosts

numerous international conferences and major events involving

world leaders each year. The building is the platform for the Nation’s daily press briefing on events around the world. It houses the

Nation’s State dining rooms and unrivalled collection of colonial and early Federal decorative priceless art objects insured for $100

million.

The Department has in place procedures and safeguards to protect our facilities during construction and renovation. As this Committee is aware, Main State is currently undergoing a major 10-

year renovation project. Security measures such as the development of construction security plans, construction surveillance, vetting of workers, screening of materials, and other precautions are

integrated into this project. Other construction projects performed

within the building are routinely scrutinized by DS officers to determine the level of sensitivity and ensure that proper security

countermeasures are utilized.

In other words, the State Department building is a very large

and busy institution. Protecting it is an immense challenge.

Three incidents in the Main State building have brought home

to all of us the need to strengthen domestic information security.

In February 1998, an unknown male in a tweed coat carried away

classified documents from the Secretary’s suite of offices. That case,

which was investigated by the FBI, is in an inactive status at this

time.

The second incident came to light on December 8, 1999 when

Russian intelligence officer, Stanislav Gusev, was arrested on the

street outside the State Department as he listened in on a meeting

in the State Department’s Oceans and International Environmental

Scientific Affairs’ conference room via a bug planted in the chair

railing. Gusev, who had diplomatic immunity preventing his prosecution in the United States, was asked to leave the country. The

investigation by the FBI continues into, among other things how

the bug was planted. Spinning off the bugging case was an inquiry

into how a computer software contract was managed and whether

the systems on which the software was placed had been compromised. That inquiry is still ongoing.

The third incident is, of course, the laptop incident which is currently under investigation by the FBI and DS. Ambassador Roy has

already described for you how the laptop was used, the circumstances surrounding its disappearance, INR’s referral of this

15

matter to DS and the Secretary’s five point response to the incident.

Mr. Chairman, we have learned some very valuable lessons from

these incidents. The fundamental problem which has brought the

Department to the point at which it now finds itself is not an absence of proper policies and procedures, as those are and have been

in place. The problem is simply carelessness. That is, noncompliance and/or disregard for established regulations. These incidents

have prompted us to take measures which complement existing

regulations and procedures and are designed to change the lax attitude toward security at the State Department.

I believe that substantial progress has been made over the past

2 years. We have tightened security in the Secretary’s suite of offices. We have adopted a rigorous, comprehensive escort policy,

worked to strengthen computer safeguards, and assigned uniformed officers to floor specific patrols inside the building. At Main

State we have reinstated an after-hours inspection program of Department offices, and we continue a program of bringing Marine security guards in training into the Department 10 times a year to

conduct security sweeps. We have closed D Street outside the building to traffic and installed cement barriers around the entire building, thus lessening our physical vulnerability. We have provided security awareness briefings to over 4,000 Department personnel.

But these are only the first steps. Much more needs to be done.

In March, I convened an interagency review panel comprised of

senior security representatives from the FBI, the Department of

Defense, the U.S. Secret Service, the CIA, and the Diplomatic Security Service. The panel was asked to review the countermeasures

currently in place to protect against unauthorized access to the

Main State building and classified information. I also requested

that they make recommendations to improve security at the Main

State building.

On Monday of this week, I received the panel’s report. I plan to

present the report to the Secretary when she returns to Washington and intend to use it to correct systemic vulnerabilities at the

Department of State. Once the Administration has had an opportunity to review the report, I will be delighted to share it with you,

Mr. Chairman, as well as the Members of your Committee.

This panel confirmed our assessment of known weaknesses in

our programs and recommended both short and long term solutions

that it believes will enhance security at Main State. Their findings

center on Main State’s access controls, its physical security, information security, security awareness, our uniformed protective officer program, and the need to create a chemical/biological program.

I am convinced that the development of a strategic plan to fund

and implement these findings will result in significant improvements in our programs.

The Secretary’s leadership in raising security awareness has

been invaluable. She has personally emphasized security at every

opportunity for the purpose of strengthening the culture of security

at State. As you know, on May 3 she held a Department-wide town

meeting on security because of the laptop incident. In the course

of the meeting, she stressed that each of our employees must be

our neighbor’s keeper when it comes to security. The position that

16

she has taken with respect to individual responsibility among our

diplomats, that regardless of how skilled you may be as a diplomat,

if you are not professional about security—you are a failure—has

resonated throughout the Department. Further, when she told the

Department employees that the press reports were accurate; and

she was indeed furious about our security lapses, any misgiven belief anyone might have that the Secretary wanted simply to let this

blow over and be forgotten was forcefully corrected.

I believe that what we have done and are doing, combined with

the stark ugly reality of what security failures produce, have gone

a long way in raising awareness at the Department. I think that

we have reached the point that where the decided majority of State

Department employees has recognized that a threat exists; that

poor practices are unacceptable; that security is a high priority

with the Secretary, this Administration, and this Congress; and

that employees will be held accountable for lapses. I can assure you

that the Secretary and I will continue to drive home those points

as forcefully as possible.

As I said earlier, I believe that the lax attitude in the Department toward security is no longer tolerable. I fully expect that we

will see that the Department’s efforts aimed principally at better

education, at existing requirements, and designation of individual

responsibilities will bear fruit and there will be substantial and

voluntary adherence to security rules and procedures, but if I am

wrong, we are fully prepared to use enhanced disciplinary procedures to further underscore the seriousness with which we view

this issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to answer questions

at this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. Bereznay, section chief, National Security Division, Federal

Bureau of Investigation. You may summarize your statement, or

your full statement will be made a part of the record, as you deem

appropriate. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY D. BEREZNAY, SECTION CHIEF, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. BEREZNAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss State

Department security issues that are of concern to this Committee.

I will be as forthcoming as possible given the sensitive and classified nature related to the information requested by the Committee.

Concerning the missing State Department laptop computer, I

want to ensure the Committee that the FBI’s investigation of the

missing computer is being afforded the highest FBI priority. As you

are aware, I am prohibited from discussing the matter further as

it is the subject of a pending criminal investigation.

The Committee has asked that I comment on the sufficiency of

State Department security procedures in connection with the bugging of the 7th floor conference room by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The FBI was asked by State Department in late

17

August 1999 to conduct an environmental technical survey, in

other words a review of neighboring properties, to determine

whether a hostile intelligence service might have acquired such

property. This survey was specifically requested in connection with

pending renovations at the Department. In 1998, we were also

pleased to have our Washington field office work with the Office of

Diplomatic Security to survey access to State Department by Russian intelligence officers. Beyond these narrow surveys conducted

with or at the request of State Department, the FBI was not called

upon at that time to review physical security procedures at the Department. Those matters were, however, addressed by the Office of

the Inspector General as reported in its September 1999 report.

The FBI believes that the State Department acted swiftly during

August 1999 to limit the number of unescorted foreign nationals

visiting State Department following the discovery of the listening

device in the 7th floor State Department conference room. On August 23, 1999, the State Department implemented policy that requires all foreign nationals to be escorted within the building at all

times.

As noted by the Committee, there is an exception for foreign

media correspondents issued unique but permanent badges that

allow unescorted entry without passing through metal detectors.

There is an understanding that the media is not to go above the

second floor where the press office is located. This exception affords

unescorted access to the State Department by a number of known

foreign service intelligence officers. The FBI does not customarily

provide other agencies, to include State Department, with lists of

intelligence officers’ identities to protect both sensitive sources and

cases unless there is a specific reason or if asked. If asked, the FBI

would be willing to identify to the State Department permanent

media badge holders identified as hostile intelligence officers so

that their access could be restricted or their visits monitored.

Historically, hostile intelligence services have utilized media

cover for intelligence activities in the United States. However, because intelligence officers under media cover do not have diplomatic immunity, they normally perform in-depth but overt intelligence collection. Clandestine handling of agents or other covert

activity is usually assigned to intelligence officers under diplomatic

cover. In addition to the overt intelligence collection, intelligence officers under correspondent cover have been engaged in active measures campaigns designed to support their national interests and to

influence United States policymakers.

Active measures campaigns take the form of oral persuasions or

the dissemination of written information favorable to their national

policy, both of which are facilitated by intelligence officers under

media cover. Hostile intelligence services use active measures as an

inexpensive and relatively low-risk way to advance their international positions.

Over the last 15 years, no foreign intelligence service officer

under media cover has been declared persona non grata for engaging in espionage activities. This is attributed, as I previously noted,

to the fact that these officers are not accredited diplomatic immunity and thus normally do not engage in clandestine agent-handling activities subject to interdiction.

18

With respect to your inquiry regarding the use of laptop computers within the FBI, the FBI uses only specified laptop computers that carry appropriate safeguards for classified data, to include both the use of passwords and encryption. These laptops are

maintained by automation personnel and are available for short period loans to FBI employees. The laptop computers are periodically

examined and the stored information purged. When they are

turned in by one employee and before being issued or loaned to another individual, the hard drive is purged and reprogrammed. The

laptop computers are also subjected to an audit and forensic check

to ensure that they have not been compromised.

The FBI views the protection of classified information in a computer environment as a problem that is not unique to the State Department. It is a serious security issue that will continue to present

problems to all members of the intelligence community.

I welcome any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereznay appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bereznay, and I

want to thank our panelists for their testimony. We will now proceed with questions.

Ambassador Roy, in your statement, you note that there are appropriate procedures for management’s security of renovation

projects in secure areas of the Department. The question is, were

these procedures followed in the renovation project that took place

in the INR suite on the sixth floor?

Mr. ROY. Mr. Chairman, the investigation will determine the

exact circumstances relating to that. What I can do is share with

you my understanding of what happened.

Chairman GILMAN. Well as you share it, can you tell us, did the

construction plan permit uncleared workers to be in the classified

area and permit the door to the hallway be open during the work

day? Can you also note the dates of the renovation project for us?

Mr. ROY. Yes. The construction workers were expected to be escorted at all times and the appropriate instructions were given to

the office where the construction work was taking place. At no time

was there unsecured access by the workers to the controlled areas

of the SCIF. When the door was opened in areas of the office that

were being renovated, either access had not been broken through

the wall to make it part of the SCIF or there were people stationed

at the entrance in order to provide protection. The procedures were

expected to be followed and were consistent with our understanding of appropriate DCID directives.

Chairman GILMAN. Who is responsible for assuring that the repairmen were escorted at all times?

Mr. ROY. The office where the work was being undertaken were

charged with that responsibility.

Chairman GILMAN. So whoever was working there would have to

make certain they were escorted?

Mr. ROY. Yes.

Chairman GILMAN. And it is also our understanding that INR

employees were tasked with watching the workers. Did it make

sense to have employees who had their regular assignments also

have to watch these workers?

19

Mr. ROY. The workers had to be watched, and if INR employees

were charged with that responsibility it should have been carried

out. My personal view is that in situations like that you need dedicated people who have a 100 percent responsibility of monitoring

the uncleared workers. That is the ideal way to accomplish it.

Chairman GILMAN. How adequate was the oversight of the workers at the time of the renovation project?

Mr. ROY. Most of this occurred before I arrived in INR so I cannot speak from personal experience, but what I can share with you,

Mr. Chairman, is the fact that I have never been permitted access

to INR work spaces as an ambassador, as the executive secretary

of the Department responsible for document flow to the Secretary

of State, as a deputy assistant secretary of a geographic bureau in

any other way than an escorted manner.

Chairman GILMAN. And who did the escorting?

Mr. ROY. INR employees. Every time that I, as a foreign service

officer not working in INR, have been to INR spaces, I have been

escorted 100 percent of the time. So my expectation was that the

escort duties were taken seriously.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Carpenter, who is responsible for security of a renovation project at the Main State building particularly

with regard to projects that take place in classified areas?

Mr. CARPENTER. In our domestic operations section there is actually a differentiation between the rest of the building and INR

space. For anywhere else other than INR space and SCIFs and the

like, INR had that responsibility for the rest of the building, our

domestic office.

Chairman GILMAN. Who is in charge of the domestic operations

office?

Mr. CARPENTER. Don Blake.

Chairman GILMAN. Are there security-oriented regulations that

govern such construction of renovation projects at the Main State

building?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes there are.

Chairman GILMAN. Are the regulations different from the rules

followed for overseas construction for the protection of sensitive

areas?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes they do differ yes, sir.

Chairman GILMAN. In what manner?

Mr. CARPENTER. Overseas are much more stringent by virtue of

the potential for compromise as construction is going on. They are

also dramatically more stringent.

Chairman GILMAN. Do you think there should be more stringent

regulations here in the Main State building?

Mr. CARPENTER. Absolutely.

Chairman GILMAN. If work will occur in a classified area, can

uncleared workers be used?

Mr. CARPENTER. Uncleared yes, unescorted no.

Chairman GILMAN. Does diplomatic security provide security

technicians for such projects?

Mr. CARPENTER. Occasionally, depending on the amount of notice

we are given and the availability of our personnel.

Chairman GILMAN. And could INR have requested escorts from

DS who are trained to watch workers?

20

Mr. CARPENTER. I suppose they could have requested that. Again,

the security of their areas is largely—has previously been—their

responsibilities.

Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Roy, until the recent announcement—you were responsible for the directives governing the SCI

material, is that correct?

Mr. ROY. That is correct.

Chairman GILMAN. Have you been able to determine whether the

laptop computer was used in accordance with the Director of Central Intelligence directives?

Mr. ROY. Yes, sir. My understanding is that it was used and

stored in consistency with the pertinent directives.

Chairman GILMAN. Are there regulations governing labeling or

requiring encryption or even a password to protect information

stored on a laptop? Are there such regulations?

Mr. ROY. There are regulations concerning labeling. My understanding, and we have looked at this in retrospect, is we cannot

confirm with assurance that there were appropriate labels on the

laptop, although some people have told me that they recall seeing

such labels on it.

Chairman GILMAN. Are there now labels being required on a

laptop?

Mr. ROY. Yes, there are.

Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Roy, were your employees abiding by the proper visitor escort procedures in the INR office where

the laptop was lost?

Mr. ROY. Since the laptop is missing, there had to be a lapse

somewhere, but insofar as I was aware they were abiding by the

procedures and they were certainly informed of what the correct

procedures were.

Chairman GILMAN. And Ambassador Roy, has anyone been held

accountable for the loss of the laptop?

Mr. ROY. That is not possible, Mr. Chairman, until the investigation is concluded.

Chairman GILMAN. Any disciplinary action under way?

Mr. ROY. No disciplinary actions have been taken pending determination of responsibilities.

Chairman GILMAN. And, Mr. Carpenter, in November 1998, you

introduced, with the approval of the Under Secretary for Management, a policy requiring escorts for many State Department visitors. Within a week, that was rescinded; and later in August 1999,

following a discovery of a bug in a conference room at State, the

requirement for an escort was reintroduced. Can you tell us who

requested the rescission of that order?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir. As you properly stated—I answer to the

Under Secretary for Management. Almost immediately upon arriving at the State Department, realizing that there was no escort policy for anyone, quite frankly, to enter the building, we started to

put together a program. We briefed the Department as fully as we

could relative to how it would work. As you said, in November, I

submitted it to my under secretary.

Chairman GILMAN. November of what year?

Mr. CARPENTER. Of 1998.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes.

21

Mr. CARPENTER. My under secretary approved; we proceeded in

issuing fliers about this new program. I was called within hours of

it being distributed by Under Secretary Pickering. He asked me to

explain exactly what was going on. He had not been briefed on it.

A number of the people that answer to him in the geographic bureaus claimed not to have been briefed on it. It appeared to be that

it was a policy that had never been instituted at the Department

of State. People felt it would be too confining and it wasn’t doable

and asked me to withdraw it.

Chairman GILMAN. Who asked you to withdraw it?

Mr. CARPENTER. Under Secretary Pickering. We went back to the

drawing board. We conducted more briefings. We, quite frankly,

made the escort policy better. We did some marketing—people better understood what needed to be accomplished. We talked to those

people who were most concerned, people that would be entertaining

large groups, how that would work. Some of that work, quite frankly, had not been done.

Chairman GILMAN. When did you reintroduce that?

Mr. CARPENTER. In August 1999, less than 1 year ago.

Chairman GILMAN. And has it been in place since August 1999?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir, it has and working quite well.

Chairman GILMAN. And, Mr. Carpenter, one of the concerns in

the current escort policy is the exception for the press corps. Understanding they are supposed to be restricted to the first two

floors of the building, what is to prevent them from moving about

freely in the other floors?

Mr. CARPENTER. Currently, we realize that the press and their

ability—the answer to your question is nothing at the current time

prevents them from going to other floors.

Chairman GILMAN. So they have free access now.

Mr. CARPENTER. They do not have free access. They are instructed that they are not to go above the second floor. We have

guards patrolling the floors, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, etc.,

looking for not only press who are unescorted but other people who

may have left an office without escort.

Chairman GILMAN. Unless they are confronted by a guard, they

can wander around the building; is that correct?

Mr. CARPENTER. It would be possible. Yes, sir.

Chairman GILMAN. Can you tell us how you issue press credentials to the American/foreign press? Is there any distinguishing

process between the two?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes. There are checks that are made and probably this would not be the forum I would want to go into what

those checks are, but clearly there will be checks done on them.

Chairman GILMAN. As part of your new escort policy, are random

hallway checks done to identify persons not eligible to be wandering around a building?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir. They are.

Chairman GILMAN. I know I have exceeded my time but this is

such an important issue. To our FBI assistant, since the chair-rail

incident, has the State Department done everything it can to minimize security problems and threats, in your opinion, to the Main

State facility?

22

Mr. BEREZNAY. As I indicated in my statement, Mr. Chairman,

since that incident, there has been a tightening of the escort policy.

The only area where I see a need for improvement is one you have

already addressed, that being foreign media correspondents’ access

at State Department.

Chairman GILMAN. Does the gentleman’s agreement that badged

foreign press officials remain only on the first two floors of the

State Department unless they are escorted pose any serious security threat?

Mr. BEREZNAY. In my opinion, it poses a threat. Realizing that

those media representatives could be working in conjunction with

other visitors from foreign countries, I believe that there is a threat

there. As I indicated, we would be willing to work with State Department to identify those journalists—foreign journalists who we

know to be intelligence officers so they can be either more vigilant

during the visit or restrict those visits.

Chairman GILMAN. To your knowledge, are there foreign press

representatives who are intelligence officers now serving in the

State Department?

Mr. BEREZNAY. Mr. Chairman, yes, there are.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Ms. Bridgers, does the escort policy raise any concerns with your office.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the escort policy

does raise a number of concerns, specifically those that you have

just focused your attention on within the past few moments. We believe that the escort policy as written is an excellent first step in

controlling visitors to State Department, but it does leave a glaring

hole in allowing the press, members of the media, free access to the

building.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just start on

the computer. Do you need to have a laptop, I mean, was there a

reason for it to be a laptop.

Mr. ROY. Let me address that, Mr. Gejdenson. The laptop was

acquired through funds provided by the intelligence community because officers working on non-proliferation issues, outside of INR,

did not have secure computers within INR that they could do their

work on. The information had to be stored in INR. For that reason,

a laptop was purchased with intelligence community funds in order

to have a workstation available within INR that could be used by

cleared employees from outside of the Bureau who needed to work

on SCI material within INR.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Was there a need for the computer to be mobile

or could the same things have been accomplished by having a fullsize desktop?

Mr. ROY. In principle, it could have been accomplished by having

a full-size desktop and eventually——

Mr. GEJDENSON. Just because it is harder to steal and larger——

Mr. ROY. To be frank, the idea that either a laptop or dedicated

workstation could have been stolen was not driving the decision.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I understand that, but in the field which you

are, when we take a look at getting a system for outside people

who are coming to State, we could simply get a desktop instead of

a laptop. They could still steal the hard drive. There are lots of

23

ways to steal information. You can download it, send it over a

modem, but physically it will be harder to remove it if it is not a

laptop in the future. So that may be one of the things you ought

to look at is whether or not you need to get smaller systems or

whether you need to encase them in larger systems just as an additional security measure.

Mr. ROY. I agree with you entirely; and in practice, INR laptops

are only used for those mobile situations where only a laptop can

be used. In other cases, we use dedicated workstations.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Carpenter, do you have enough authority?

My sense from your answer on the escort issue is you had to learn

the politics of the State Department so you worked it through. Like

any institution, institutions don’t like new people who come in and

change the way they have lived. It has worked fine before you got

here. You tried something, you did a pretty good job, but obviously

then you had to sell it, refine it, as you said. You should be a diplomat, you are very good at these things, but basically putting

aside the need in any institution to learn how to move things

along, do we need to change the structure in any way so you have

the authority necessary to take the actions you consider important

in an expedited and timely manner?

Mr. CARPENTER. Well, they didn’t hire me to be a diplomat. I

think State hired me to look at the security issues with the eye

that needed to be focused on them. The Secretary has been incredibly supportive of the efforts that we have made to try to improve

the security at State. The issue that was addressed earlier about

the escort policy, we were clearly aware of a hole that is there.

There are steps that have been taken to mitigate those holes, and

I will be glad to discuss those again in another forum.

Your statements about the need to be diplomatic—we could not

be. The State Department had never had an escort policy, never or

anything close to it. It was very, very difficult to drop the curtain

on the Department. It had all sorts of ramifications—so we had to

do it in phases. This is simply the first one. Are there holes in it?

Absolutely. We are looking at such things as hiring permanent people that do nothing but escort. We are looking at converting different parts of the building to secure or nonsecure areas only, to

better facilitate the conduct of our foreign affairs. There are a number of things that need to be done. As the Inspector General mentioned, this escort policy was only a first step.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Do you have authority enough in the structure

of the State Department? This is an old system, a lot of people

around, lots of power centers under the present construct, whether

it is you or anybody else there. Do you have authority to move forward and do the things that need to be done at the Assistant Secretary level? Or do you need a different title or more staff? Are

there any of those things?

Mr. CARPENTER. I am glad you asked. The Secretary is working

with Congress to establish, as soon as possible, a new position for

Under Secretary for Security, Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement. The genesis of this concept was from the accountability review board following the East Africa bombings that suggested that

the Department of State needed to designate one person to be reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:45 Dec 11, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 67827.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
24

sponsible for all security issues at the Department of State. This

position clearly does not exist.

The question that was posed is—at what level does that person

have to be to function. Currently, I have what you would call an

informal reporting to the Secretary herself. I brief her every morning. That certainly gives me a certain profile, but I also answer to

the Under Secretary for Management. There are other elements in

the Department that from time to time address security issues. The

Department is full of security experts from time to time. I think it

is important that security issues be resident under one person so

that this body and the Department of State in total understand

who is responsible. I think this would be an excellent step.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Now, and you kind of mentioned this, but you

sense there is a need to change the operation of the physical plan

so some areas are basically sealed off to the public, no access unless you know a code or some kind of card entry. We are using all

the modern technology that is available today to both limit access

to rooms and to have a record of who enters and leaves a room.

For instance, where this computer was, do we know everybody who

entered and left that room.

Mr. ROY. Yes, we do.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And so somebody who entered and left that

room must have taken the computer, there is no one else that could

have done that.

Mr. ROY. No, sir.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Now let me ask the gentleman from the FBI.

My instincts are that State needs these internal services and somebody at a level appropriate to oversee them. Is there any argument

that says we should have the FBI do this? It might cause a little

interagency tension, not that that ever happens much in Washington, but maybe having an outside agency watching the security

on a regular basis might be more effective, is that your view?

Mr. BEREZNAY. I don’t believe that the FBI should be asked to

do that sort of function, for the State Department or for any other

agency. I think that State clearly has the ability through the Office

of the Inspector General and diplomatic security to undertake those

functions.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And Mr. Carpenter, if we know that some of the

foreign press that are at State are collecting information for governments, friendly or unfriendly, to the United States, wouldn’t it

make sense to immediately secure the other floors from their—I

mean, if I was a reporter for another country, is it possible for me

to walk in the elevator and push a button and go to a floor that

I shouldn’t be on or walk up a hallway that I shouldn’t be in.

Mr. CARPENTER. It has been made more difficult but clearly not

impossible.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And so shouldn’t we have some, again, system

by which they physically can’t get there? So it is not just their good

intentions and our, you know, people in the hallway spotting them

but that it is physically impossible for them to open doors they

shouldn’t open.

Mr. CARPENTER. Congressman, as I said previously, I am not a

diplomat. I was hired to be a security officer. If it was within my

25

power, I would not have the press actually in that building. I would

have them offsite somewhere we could more easily control.

Mr. GEJDENSON. That is not a bad idea actually. So you would

have the press outside the actual State Department building physically.

Mr. CARPENTER. It would be much easier, either outside the

building or confined to a lower floor area where they would have

access only, much less access.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So when they were invited in you could let them

in. The rest of the time you keep them corralled. I like that approach for here as well.

Now what about the report that the door was being propped open

while people were working there? Is that correct?

Mr. ROY. Let me give you my understanding of the circumstances.

The office in question was having an adjacent office altered to become part of the office. At the time that the alteration work began,

they were not connected. They were contiguous to each other, but

they were not connected. There were separate access doors to the

new office space. During the period that that new office space was

being renovated and before it had been added to the office in question, the door was sometimes propped open so that the workers

could gain access.

Mr. GEJDENSON. But at that point there was no entry from that

space to the secure space?

Mr. ROY. Correct.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And there was no secure information in that

space?

Mr. ROY. Correct. And following the knocking through of access

to the office in question, the passageway was monitored full time.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So what we have is we have a laptop missing

from a room. If you open that door and I walked in with you, where

would be the record that I was with you?

Mr. ROY. That particular office did not have a log-in/log-out procedure at the time, so that you would be under the responsibility

of the person escorting you.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So no one could enter the room without somebody authorized escorting them. But if somebody—if a friend of

mine worked there and I walked in with him and he didn’t note

that I was him at any point, then——

Mr. ROY. The procedures followed were that you had to be under

positive escort. I myself as Assistant Secretary could not gain access to the office because I did not know the door combination, and

you could not gain access without being either admitted by somebody from inside or knowing the combination.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So if somebody took you in there, was there a

record of your presence?

Mr. ROY. No, sir, not at the time.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So we have everybody who has entered, but not

everybody who accompanied them, and that is the rub.

Mr. ROY. Once you were inside, you had to be accompanied——

Mr. GEJDENSON. Right.

26

Mr. ROY [continuing]. And the personnel in the office were indoctrinated to determine whether you had an SCI clearance or not

when you were admitted to the space.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Now on the gentleman in the tweed jacket and

the question there is, whose responsibility is that? Mr. Carpenter,

you weren’t there yet, but that would go under your responsibility

now?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir, it would.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And basically what happened was there was a

file left out in the receiving room.

Mr. CARPENTER. There were a number of files set on a desk between two secretaries.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And a gentleman came up, looked at the files,

took some things. And that floor—was that a secure floor?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, it is. It is the Secretary’s suite. The Secretary was not in at the time, I might add.

Mr. GEJDENSON. If I come to the State Department, first I have

got to get past those lines. So if I am a reporter, I could get

through and go unescorted to my press area, but I could also go

up in the elevator to the Secretary’s floor.

Mr. CARPENTER. To the Secretary’s floor but not the Secretary’s

suite.

One of the things that probably will clarify some of this, the person that took these was believed to have a State Department pass,

wearing a State Department pass, which allowed them access

through their card swipe into her suite of offices. Unfortunately, as

Murphy’s law would take place, the day that this was done, the

system that read who came in was down.

Mr. GEJDENSON. That was a coincidence, you think, not intentionally done?

Mr. CARPENTER. We see no evidence that it was intentionally

done. Nothing to indicate that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So as one of the things—and my time’s up

here—do we need to look at something that, whether it uses, I

don’t know, the thumbprint, eye scan, I mean, this is the most important information we have as a country. It seems to me we have

to have much more positive information on who enters and leaves

rooms, and I shouldn’t just be able to give somebody else my card

to allow them access. Are you looking at all that?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir, we are. As a matter of fact, we are in

the process of purchasing a system for access, not only to Main

State but other critical areas, that is a combination of a card swipe

identifier as well as a redundant pin system like used in most

places throughout this city.

Mr. GEJDENSON. What I suggest is—and I know the Congress

has not been supportive of the President’s and the State Department’s request for funding and we have kept the pressure on you

in trying to cut—that incidents like this give you an opportunity

to get what you need. What I would suggest is that you ask for a

supplemental amount of money—segregated funds based on our security needs at State and other facilities around the country—and

that you get that up to us as soon as you have it.

You better be able to defend it. But it seems to me we have got

lots of crises to respond to—we have wars, we have got starvation.

27

We have had some trouble in this area in the past, but I think you

ought to hand up a supplemental request for security. Make sure

the systems we need are there, here and around the country. Obviously, that is going to include training personnel, because just having the system without changing culture and training isn’t going to

work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

You know, I have been trying to get some documents out of the

State Department for about 2 years. I must have been asking the

wrong guys to get it for me. Let me get this right. I really have.

I should have asked some of those intelligence officers over there.

Mr. Roy, let me get this straight. We have had a policy where

you have to be escorted, but we have the FBI telling the security

people here that we have got intelligence agents posing as members of the press who are running around the building unescorted.

Something’s screwy here. Am I missing something?

Mr. ROY. Let me just make a very quick response to that.

We have special additional procedures in INR required by the Director of Central Intelligence Directives. These procedures go beyond the general ones that apply to the State Department as a

whole which is under a different security regime.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I don’t know if that was an answer to my

question or not. It sounds like the answer to my question is that

you have testified here today that you can’t go unescorted and the

FBI’s already testified that they have complained that we have intelligence agents posing as reporters running around the building

unescorted.

Mr. ROY. Let me quickly clarify I am not escorted when I wander

around the State Department. When I was not working in INR, I

was escorted when I entered INR secure spaces.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. It sounds like, to me, that at times

you have had to have escorts and foreign intelligence agents

haven’t. But that is a matter of—I don’t know how important that

is, but it just seems to suggest that things are out of whack over

there.

By the way, when things are out of whack, there is always testimony by someone, let us just hire a czar. In this case, it is going

to be a new under secretary.

According to the reports that I have seen, the State Department

now has more money, taking inflation into account, than it has

ever had for internal operations which could have been directed by

the Secretary or the White House to be spent for these security

reasons. Isn’t that right? So we are not talking about lack of money

here. You have got more money than you have ever had before, but

yet we have these situations.

How is hiring on a couple new employees at very high prices

going to change that? This is an attitude problem. This isn’t a lack

of personnel. This is what I am hearing here, and it is real easy

to try to think that we are going to solve problems by creating a

new under secretary for this or that. It seems those problems never

get answered.

28

Let me put it this way. From an outsider—and I want to just

look at this from a broader perspective. I think this Administration

has had a lax view toward national security and toward these intelligence concerns from day one.

There was a book by Aldrich Ames called Unlimited Access about

the security violations that started almost immediately after this

President became President of the United States. If you have an

attitude from the White House which ends up permitting the transfer of massive amounts of technology to the Communist Chinese as

well as—obviously, an attitude in this White House, where you

have campaign contributions flowing into funds and then we find

out that—coming from the people who produce missiles and rockets

in Communist China, and we found out that there has been problems with a transfer of technology, of course people down the ladder are going to have a lax attitude toward national security matters.

Let me just get down to a specific, to our FBI man. The FBI complained that there was access to the State Department by foreign

intelligence officers posing as reporters. That is what you have testified today, is that correct?

Mr. BEREZNAY. That is correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. That was very clear in your testimony.

When that complaint was made, what was done to act upon that?

Was there something?

Let me ask Ms. Williams-Bridgers.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. In the course of our audit looking at the

handling of classified information, we asked to obtain a copy of the

FBI report that alluded to foreign intelligence officers operating

under cover of press, and we were denied access to that report. So

this is the first that I am hearing today a positive affirmation that

there are media who are, in fact, intelligence officers operating in

the Department.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, so we have got to find out what happened today. But, you actually in your job of trying to investigate

this didn’t have that information.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. We did not, sir. That is correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, this is—— Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I certainly will.

Chairman GILMAN. When did you learn about the report by the

FBI?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. We learned about it during the course

of our audit which was conducted between August 1998 and September 1999.

Chairman GILMAN. Who did you make the request to for that report?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. To the FBI. I am not certain of the

exact name of the individual or the unit, but our audit team did

request a copy of the report, and we were told that we would not

be allowed to see it.

Chairman GILMAN. Did you followup that report with the Secretary of State to make a request of the Secretary?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. No, we did not, sir.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

29

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me correct the record. It was Gary Aldrich who was the FBI agent who wrote Unlimited Access and not

Aldrich Ames, who was a spy who has probably applied for press

credentials over at the State Department.

Well, let’s hear about it. Why wasn’t this acted upon or was it

acted upon? And why is it that the person who is supposed to be

overseeing this, making sure problems don’t happen, was not given

a copy and even didn’t know that this report had been made and

this complaint by the FBI was present?

Mr. BEREZNAY. The report that is being referred to is a classified

report, and it basically entailed a survey, a joint survey, that was

done by the Bureau with Diplomatic Security. It was done in 1998,

and it was done specifically to address the issue of visits to State

Department by foreign intelligence officers.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And was it acted upon? What happened to

act upon this report? That is the question.

Mr. BEREZNAY. As a result of that I believe Mr. Carpenter has

testified to the implementation of escort policies and the attempt

to implement that and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the escort policies have nothing to do

with the media, right? I mean, is the media now—I thought what

we were hearing here is that we still have a problem. The media

still can go around that building unescorted.

Mr. CARPENTER. Let me try to clarify this. Can they—could they

be there right now? Yes, they could.

The program is designed so that they can’t—and, as I mentioned

earlier, this is a vulnerability that we are well aware of, and there

are things that we have done to mitigate that that I prefer not to

go into in this forum. I would be glad to discuss it later because

it does involve some other issues.

But the press, Congressman Rohrabacher, are not allowed unfettered access above the second floor. Since—in the last year since

the escort policy has been in place, we have had seven incidents— excuse me, one incident of a press person caught above the second

floor. It wasn’t a foreign press, but that individual was picked up

by our uniform people and promptly returned.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think the operative word there is ‘‘caught’’—you know, caught.

Let me just say again, I don’t think that we can, Mr. Chairman,

I don’t think that we can just wish and point our fingers and blame

people at lower levels for having a lax attitude, which is what you

have been describing today. There was been this lax attitude of security, and you are trying to do something about it. We can’t blame

that when we have got, at even the highest levels of this Administration, what I see as a totally lax attitude toward the national security and toward intelligence in the United States.

I mean, this Administration—considering all the transfer of technology and information that we have had to a potential enemy like

Communist China, this Administration looks like a spaghetti

strainer. When you go down—and the fact is they have known

about it, we have known about it, and they make light of it. How

can you expect people further down the line to take their job seriously when we have got this coming from above? I think that we

need to change the procedures.

30

My hat’s off to you for the serious way you are trying to do it.

But it is going to require more than just hiring another high-level

executive and putting another nameplate on the door. It requires

a change from top to bottom in terms of people’s attitude toward

this country’s national security.

One last statement, Mr. Chairman. That is, when we talk about

laptops and we talk about documents that are missing, what we

are really talking about here is the national security of our country

has been compromised. Let us not try to minimize how important

that is. People’s lives are at stake with these national security

issues. Whether or not in the long run people may lose their lives

we will never know if it was due to information on that laptop or

how the laptops work, getting into the hands of people who are enemies of our country. This is a very serious issue; and I appreciate

you, Mr. Chairman, trying to take the lead and get the word out

on this.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Rohrabacher.

Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you also for this

hearing.

Let me just ask first just a general question.

In terms of trends, have you seen, I guess, an increase in security breaches since the end of the Cold War. Did the State Department have more stringent security procedures in place during the

Cold War or how has our security sort of emerged or not emerged

since the Cold War or since the end of the Cold War?

Mr. CARPENTER. I will try to speak to my knowledge—to the best

of my knowledge since the end of the Cold War.

Clearly, during the Cold War and those periods prior to it, there

was a—the perception that the majority of danger of either threats

from espionage or some other type of penetration was primarily

overseas.

The Department of State, again, had no escort policy in place in

spite of the Cold War ending. The State Department has actually

gone the other direction. We have instituted an escort policy. It

makes no sense to have, whether they are Russians or other foreign visitors, visitors in the building unescorted. So we have taken

a very strong position on this, albeit a radical change from prior

periods of time.

Clearly, there is an upswing in the espionage activities. I don’t

know of any other Federal building that has been penetrated in recent memory by foreign agents in the way that the State Department was. I think that this clearly shows they have the capabilities, they have the will and the want.

Ms. LEE. So then would you say that security possibly has increased since the end of the Cold War but so have counterintelligence activities?

Mr. CARPENTER. Put another way I think I am saying that those

involved in the mitigation of counterintelligence activities have always understood the threat, have always been forward leaning on

this as well as people charged with the security of buildings, the

security of individuals and classified information. But, quite frankly, in the absence of the smoking gun, sometimes it is difficult to

get the funds that are required in order to do that promptly.

31

Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me just ask another very quick question.

Now, the loss of the laptop and the tweed jacket and listening

device incidents all reflect major failures in the security system,

but now do you think that—without breaching security, do you

think that these are isolated incidents or do you think that the dots

could be connected? I mean, do you think that there could be some

actual organized counterintelligence activities going on or, again,

are these isolated incidences unto themselves?

Mr. CARPENTER. At least two of the incidents, two of the three,

the tweed coat and the INR laptop, I would say to be examples of

individual failings, carelessness on the people’s part. The tweed

coat—the information taken by the gentleman in the tweed coat

was taken right out from between two individuals who did not report it in a timely fashion or this individual probably would have

been able to be apprehended. The accountability again, the carelessness, and the laptop is an individual failing. I don’t think security people are in the position of making judgments whether this

is—I think your word was a trend or a—I am sorry, Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Well, in terms of the second part of my question, are

there any type of organized counterintelligence activities going on

or are these isolated incidents as you see them.

Mr. CARPENTER. We don’t see these as isolated incidences. We

see these as ongoing problems with people intent on finding out our

secrets.

Ms. LEE. I think as we look at the structure and move toward

trying to make some major systemic questions, because that is

what it sounds like, I would hope that if we do have another office

or another unit responsible for and activities and security initiatives become part of the entire culture and that we don’t hone in

on just a few new departments or agencies or under secretaries isolated from the entire State Department. Because if that’s the case,

we will have really not done what I think we need to do.

Mr. CARPENTER. I couldn’t agree more. We are not trying to create something new here. We are trying to take advantage of the

synergies that are between existing bureaus within the Department of State and combine them under one person who can oversee

these issues. That way we gain the values and the efficiencies of

having, in this particular case, the diplomatic security bureau that

I represent, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and

the Office of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, combined under one. We are just trying to put together the organizations, bureaus, and offices that already exist and take advantage

of that.

We think that security has to be core to the Department of State

and, to that end, it is location, location, location. And as the security elements within the Department are currently positioned, we

are not gaining its full advantage. That is what this proposal for

an under secretary is geared to accomplish.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you Ms. Lee.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for missing

most of the testimony, although I have read some of it. We had

markup going on up in Veterans on the GI Bill of Rights, and I just

32

could not leave it until it was finished. Let me just ask a couple

of questions.

Obviously, it is the sensitive information in the laptop or perhaps

laptops that matter, although the financial loss of any Department

asset obviously should be something that concerns us. But obviously, again, the highly sensitive nature of the secrets, the fact

they can compromise our personnel overseas and do a whole host

of damage to our national and international interests makes that

information beyond the price—priceless, if you will.

I wonder if you can tell us what are the security procedures in

place and perhaps even contemplated to ensure that secret information isn’t compromised, for example, by downloading. It is one

thing to take a laptop. It is much easier to download the information and walk out of the building.

Are there random checks of personnel? Do our former U.S. Government employees who worked for State have access—we know

some of those folks go on to work for foreign governments, as do

Members of Congress, but we know that U.S. State Department

people, because of their knowledge, are probably very highly prized

by foreign governments. Do they have access? What are the penalties for security violations?

If a person is caught, what exactly is triggered in terms of investigation and penalty? And do you believe that those penalties are

sufficiently strong to deter security violations so that they don’t

occur?

Let me just ask a general question, because I know we only get

5 minutes. The culture of the Foreign Service, is it too lax, you

know, in an attempt to be open and reach out to governments? We

know that very often even their own physical security abroad is not

taken as seriously as some of us would like. Does that need to be

changed?

A question on the number of months. I believe it was 8 months

that lapsed between the time when the visitation policy was

changed again after Tom Pickering nixed it in December. I just ask

our distinguished friend from the FBI—did you advise Diplomatic

Security when you found that there were foreign intelligence officers with access to the State Department and what was their reaction?

I would like to yield for your answers.

Mr. BEREZNAY. As I indicated previously, the study that was

done was done in 1998. It was done in conjunction with Diplomatic

Security. I believe it was prompted by a report by a State Department employee of activity that came to her attention which she felt

indicated she may be being looked at by an intelligence service. So

that is what prompted this. It was a diligent State Department employee, reporting this activity to Diplomatic Security. It was Diplomatic Security working with us that surfaced the unescorted visitor

problem.

We did share the results of that survey. It was a very limited

survey, and those results were shared with Diplomatic Security. I

believe—and I will defer to Secretary Carpenter as to whether or

not that report prompted his review. The timing of it certainly

falls, but I don’t know how much impact that did have on internal

State Department policies.

33

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary Carpenter—and if you perhaps, Ambassador Roy, or Ms. Williams might want to touch on those other

questions as well.

Mr. CARPENTER. Clearly, as Tim has just said, we were aware of

this information. It did drive a need for immediacy on the escort

policy. I think this came, quite frankly, after our initial discussions

about the need for an escort policy.

I might add, although I am not sure how pertinent it is to this,

a lot of the focus that we had—Diplomatic Security had during the

period that was in question was overseas. We just had two embassies blown up. We were up here trying to get more money. We were

definitely focused in that area; and because of that, quite frankly,

we moved slower than I would have liked to have moved. This escort policy, because it was controversial, was something that had

never been done.

Let me correct that. In the early 1990’s there were three countries that when their diplomats came to the State Department,

were escorted. The decision was made, and I don’t know by whom

or based on what, to discontinue the escorts. So 1992 was the last

time anyone was escorted. But, again, it was only the diplomats

from three particular countries. Does that answer your question?

Mr. SMITH. It does in terms of the FBI, but in terms of the penalties—and maybe Ambassador Roy might be the pertinent person

to respond to that.

Mr. ROY. The penalties fall under DS. We have no ability to

apply penalties.

Mr. SMITH. How about random checks and the like and the access of former U.S. Government employees? Do they have access to

the building in an unfettered way or are there checks there as

well?

Mr. CARPENTER. They did. We are in the process of working with

the Director General’s Office to discontinue that practice and that

former employees need to be escorted. If you are not currently employed as a State Department employee, you need to be escorted in

the building. That process should—we have been yawing back and

forth for weeks now, but that should be in place very, very soon.

As far as your question on penalties, again, Diplomatic Security

doesn’t punish. Are the penalties severe enough to deter? It doesn’t

appear so, quite frankly. I would say that the number of violations

issued, and I can probably provide those to you at a later time, are

much too high. It would be an indicator to me that perhaps we

need to raise the bar as to what those penalties for security violations are.

Now, let me also clarify, a great number of these security violations are minor in nature. Quite frankly, no security violation—I

hate to classify as minor, but these are such things as leaving a

safe unlocked during a time with perhaps no secure information in

it. There are certain procedures that are prudent but, again, not

the crime of the century.

The more serious incidences, quite frankly, I think the Department has dealt with in a very stern manner. I would suggest it will

deal in a much more stern manner in the future as a result of this.

This is a very, very embarrassing situation for the Department;

and if the people in the Department don’t understand that, they

34

will obviously be made to understand it if they commit a security

violation.

Mr. SMITH. Excuse me, Ms. Williams. Not to belabor the point,

how hard is it to download the sensitive information to disk, which

obviously is a dime a dozen and can be transported out of the

building with considerable ease?

Mr. ROY. Let me comment on that briefly.

On our most secure computer systems, we do not have any

downloading capability. We do not even have a floppy drive on the

computers.

I would like to add a generic comment, however. If there is a culture of lax security in the State Department, I have never been

part of it, and it has not been part of my Foreign Service experience, in part because of what I consider to be the superb work that

DS has done at all the posts where I have served to maintain a

high standard of security awareness.

I served in Moscow during the height of the Cold War. I have

served in high-threat posts like Beijing and in Jakarta where the

physical threat was high. In Jakarta, the inspectors concluded a

year ago, after inspecting my post, that security is a dominant

theme at post and has become an integral part of life in Jakarta

for all mission employees.

That is the culture of security awareness that I have been part

of in the State Department and I think perhaps that needs to receive a little more attention.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Williams.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

I would like to add to the point that Ambassador Roy has just

made.

What OIG has found in the course of over 200 inspections that

we have done within the past 4 years is that the attention to security overseas and handling of classified information is generally

quite good. That is because when you have a chief of mission who

sets a tone for the mission that security is important and there is

a threat that is dominant, then people will pay attention to security.

When you have Marine security guards and regional security officers that make it their business to indoctrinate, to make people

aware of and to enforce security, then you have an environment

where security becomes something of importance to the people.

What we have found in the Department of State in the Main

State headquarters building is that the same environment does not

exist. Security was overall a very low concern for most people in

the Department of State.

Moving on to your question about the penalties and the type of

disciplinary action, what we found in the Department of State is

that discipline did not occur as it should when there were security

violations. The current policy at the Department of State is that

you must accumulate five violations or infractions over an 18-

month period before the situation is even referred to the Director

General to take disciplinary action.

When we looked at approximately 200 cases that had been referred to the Director General, we found that 20 percent of those

cases, as I understand, had at least five violations over an 18-

35

month period. In 20 percent of those cases, no disciplinary action

was taken. For an additional 40 percent of the cases, only a letter

of warning was issued to the individual. Letters of warning are

pulled out of staff’s personnel files after a 1-year period of time.

In the other cases that OIG reviewed, we found suspensions in

6 of the 218 cases we reviewed and 10 letters of reprimand. We do

not believe that that demonstrates a commitment to take very swift

and certain action against those people who have committed violations of the security policy.

Mr. SMITH. At what point does the information lead to a potential of a prosecution and how is that handled? I mean, is there a

referral to the Justice Department or how is that handled?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. In the Office of Inspector General, and

I will defer to the Assistant Secretary for how they handle cases

in DS, when allegations come to our attention that indicate a violation of law or a breach of a regulation governing security matters,

and if it is a part of a larger set of allegations of misconduct

against an individual, then OIG will investigate. We will certainly

inform Diplomatic Security about the allegation that exists concerning a breach of security.

If the allegation merely pertains to a breach of security, then we

would refer the matter entirely to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. If the allegation during the course of a preliminary inquiry indicates that there is some evidence that a law may have been violated, we will immediately inform the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice and coordinate with them. They

then become the supervisors, in essence, of any investigation that

we might undertake.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask one final question, Ms. Williams. Do

you feel institutionally the Department is sufficiently responsive to

your recommendations on security issues? Do you receive adequate

support from the top levels at the Department?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Mr. Smith, thank you for asking that

question.

The Office of Inspector General shares the very same goals of the

Department when it comes to security. Our goal, as is the Department’s, is the protection of information, protection of our people as

they work overseas and here on the domestic front, and the protection of our facilities. We work hand in hand with the Department.

That is why Congress established an Office of Inspector General,

to work inside the agency, to collaborate with the agency, to share

with them the deficiencies as we identify them, to identify who

should be held accountable for any misconduct, any abuse or mismanagement of the funds.

I am disappointed that the Department all too often responds

slowly or responds not at all to the recommendations that we

make. In large part I think our working relationship is very good,

but when we identify vulnerabilities in our systems that breach the

very goals that all of us are trying to obtain, it is disconcerting that

the Department’s non-compliance results in the continuation of

identified security vulnerabilities.

Mr. SMITH. Do you feel it is likely that, especially now in light

of this crisis, that your recommendations—and you might want to

articulate some of those, dealing with not only new procedures but

36

also penalties for those—I mean, nothing deters better than knowing that there is a sure and swift and certain punishment if one

acts in a certain way to compromise U.S. security interests. Do you

think it is likely that those recommendations will be adopted?

Perhaps anyone else on the panel might want to speak as to

what really is being contemplated in a top-to-bottom overhaul.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Of the key recommendations that we

have made, foremost is the transfer of responsibility to the Bureau

of Diplomatic Security. We consider that matter closed. The Secretary took action to first appoint Assistant Secretary Carpenter as

her senior adviser for security. That was a welcome move. I think

it places in very prominent view to all in the Department the importance that she places on security.

With regard to the escort policy, which we have discussed quite

a bit today, we consider the implementation of an escort policy and

all the variances that have been drafted over the course of the past

year to be good first steps. Even though there are holes, we commend the Department for taking the action to enhance escorts.

We are still waiting for a response and some resolution to many

of the other key recommendations that we have made regarding,

for example, the security incident program. We are not at all comfortable at this point that the Department has moved as quickly as

it should have in instituting stronger disciplinary actions to attend

to security violations.

We are pleased that the Department has taken action, that DS

is looking to enhance the card swiping, identification badge system

that we use, to further comply with the Director of Central Intelligence Directives that require some authentication of who is actually swiping the card.

The question was raised earlier of the Secretary’s suite—the access to the Secretary’s suite with the cards. Even if the system had

been working the day that the gentleman in the tweed coat took

the sensitive intelligence information out of the suite, that system

did not comply with DCIDs. The current badge system does not

allow verification that the person who is actually using the card is

a Department of State employee. DS is working to address this vulnerability, possibly by use of biometric systems, and we welcome

that attention.

We also understand that DS will be working with INR to attend

to other DCID directives involving attenuation and inspection accreditation of the temporary work spaces, but there are some other

long-standing recommendations that we have made about secure,

sensitive, compartmented information access that we have not yet

heard any response back to, recommendations that have been outstanding for a year now.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Smith.

Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman,

thank you for holding this hearing.

The limited time has been very candid and reflective and enlightening. I appreciate very much the witnesses being here, particularly Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I read all of your prepared statement,

and I think all of us on this Committee would be wise to become

37

adherents to following the kinds of clarity that you put forward in

that particular document.

You know something, Mr. Chairman, and all the rest of us, one

of the things about this great Nation of ours is our openness is a

blessing and a curse; and, when put in perspective, sometimes

those of us that must, because of our partisan concerns, try to

make political points, it doesn’t serve usefulness to take things out

of context.

For example, the problems that we are hearing about here today

are serious and obviously are being addressed. But my colleague

who isn’t here to defend himself, and I will tell him on the floor

during the next five votes that I talked about him, when Congressman Rohrabacher made the comment about there being no escort

policy and it happening because of the Clinton Administration and

this is like a spaghetti sieve or what have you, he ignores the fact

that he served in the Reagan Administration when Secretary

Shultz was in office and somebody carried a gun into the State Department and shot somebody. I mean, they didn’t have an escort

policy then, and they didn’t have an escort policy until just a little

while ago. I would just like to at least put the political ball in its

proper perspective.

All of us can do it and probably shouldn’t, especially when we

aren’t going to talk about all administrations.

What we have is a problem; and what I hear, particularly from

Mr. Roy, is that the problem is being addressed from top to bottom.

I guess, Mr. Roy, the key thing is—and I would urge you in order

to get us policymakers off your back—when you all have finished

whatever it is that you are doing, when you have responded to the

Inspector General’s—as rightly you should and better in a manner

that you have in the past—not you but your predecessors and those

who work with you—that you make that information available to

us as fast as possible as to how we can get on with our criticism

our oversight requires. But it is heartening at least to know that

we are in a position now that we have begun to do something about

it.

Also, Ms. Williams-Bridgers, as a counter thesis to your response

to Mr. Smith, I read your conclusion; and you say, I am encouraged

by the actions taken by Department management to correct physical—the physical and procedural security deficiencies at State. I

take that as a sign that there is progress, and I would hope that

that progress would continue.

I have one question; and it is directed to you, Mr. Bereznay,

Chief. Is there any evidence that sensitive, compartmentalized information has been compromised or revealed to a foreign nation

while under the Bureau of Intelligence and Research?

Mr. BEREZNAY. In view of the ongoing aspect of the investigation,

I respectfully request to decline answering that question.

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. I just wanted to get it out there. Because I can tell you this much also, based on Mr. Roy’s statement—

and I am not an investigator, but I can assure you that it is just

a matter of days before all of this will be put to rest, at least in

terms of who did it. Now what they did with it is yet another matter, but I will guarantee you and I will bet everybody on this ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:45 Dec 11, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 67827.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
38

mittee within a month somebody will be brought to the bar for this

particular activity.

Just as a matter of levity as I close, Mr. Chairman, and recognizing that we have votes coming up—Mr. Carpenter, I listened to

you very carefully. I don’t know you, first time I have ever seen you

in my life. But, I have listened to a lot of security people in my life.

I hear candor coming from you, and I want you to know I appreciate that very much, but I bet as you walk in and out of the Rayburn Building, off and on Capitol Hill, that you see things you

would certainly correct.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Judge Hastings, for your

nonpartisan——

Mr. HASTINGS. You can always count on that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. In closing, I ask Mr. Gejdenson for any closing remarks.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just ask two things. One is, I would like to see you gentlemen

in a closed session, either privately—maybe we do it in H139 and

invite other Members if they want to come. So we ask some questions I felt it wasn’t appropriate to ask here in a public session.

The last thing I would say is there are a lot of challenges this

country faces that are very tough decisions. You have the situation

in Sierra Leone, whether or not we put American personnel in

harm’s way, what role we are going to play.

This is actually somewhat simpler. This is—we have the resources. As a country, we ought to make sure that the national security issues that we have to keep secret are kept secret. You have

to come and tell us what we need to do, and we have to work together to accomplish this. Some of the things I have heard today

actually still leave me somewhat nervous about where we are in

the process of protecting our secrets.

Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Please be brief. I have a couple of closing remarks, and time is running. Go ahead, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I would just like to ask a very brief question. The

head of the Civil Service Union at State, Mr. Galloway, asserted at

the Secretary’s town meeting that low-level employees were subject

to retaliation for reporting security violations on the part of their

superiors. What measures are in place to assure that retaliation

does not take place?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Any employee who believes that they

have been retaliated against has the recourse of seeking assistance

from the Office of the Special Counsel.

Generally, the Office of Inspector General only investigates allegations of retaliation if the allegant is alleging retaliation as a result of having cooperated with the Office of Inspector General during the course of an investigation, but any other instances we

would refer the employee to the Office of the Special Counsel.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Smith.

39

Well, today we have heard about the serious security problems

at our State Department. We have discussed some of the proposed

fixes to help avoid future loss of national security information and

sources and methods and, in some instances, innocent lives as well.

I am calling upon our State Department to become serious and effective about security and to impose more discipline and adequate

punishment where the evidence clearly warrants it in cases of any

security breaches by Department personnel.

One easy, effective remedy before us is to promptly end the

unescorted access possibilities for foreign press and retired State

Department employees who no longer have security clearances.

There is no reason why they should be treated any different than

other ordinary American citizens.

I would also ask that our Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security promptly come up with a plan to end the current

practice and to inform the foreign media that their gentleman’s

agreement is over. If they are caught unescorted in the building,

their privileges should be ended.

In addition, I would like to ask Secretary Carpenter to take advantage of the FBI’s offer in its testimony today to identify those

hostile intelligence officers posing as media so that their access

could be further restricted and their visits monitored.

With regard to Secretary Carpenter’s security review I would like

to urge your attention to counterintelligence efforts, a basic element of security. The Department should be prepared to protect

itself.

I also urge an effective use of the possible new resources that

have been provided through the recent reprogramming for personnel to manage security procedures.

Those are just a few common-sense suggestions that will not cost

any funds and should have been undertaken long ago, budget cuts

or not; and there should be no more excuses that these simple reforms cannot and ought not be done.

I want to thank our panelists for your very frank and candid review of the problems, and we welcome any further comments you

might have or constructive suggestions as we further pursue these

security problems. Thank you.

The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(41)

STATUS OF EMBASSY SECURITY

ENHANCEMENTS—PART II

WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. In Room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. Committee will come to order. Members take

their seats.

Today the Committee on International Relations is holding its

second hearing of recommendations of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel. We will be reviewing the Panel’s recommendations to

create a new government corporation for overseas buildings which

would replace the Foreign Buildings Office in the State Department with an Overseas Facilities Authority.

This new authority will be responsible for building, renovating,

maintaining and managing the Federal Government’s civilian overseas office and residential facilities. In their November 1999, report

the Panel stressed that our overseas institutions are not equipped

to operate effectively in the 21st century, and they stated that our

overseas presence is crippled by insecure and decrepit facilities, by

obsolete information technology, by outdated human resources

practices and outmoded management and fiscal tools.

The Panel concluded that an overhaul of the large property management program requires more authority, more flexibility and increased participation by other U.S. Government agencies with a

significant overseas presence.

Presently, the Foreign Buildings Office manages 12,000 properties in more than 250 locations. With the infusion of the emergency supplemental appropriations and current increases in appropriated funds for embassy security enhancements, the task for the

Foreign Buildings Office has increased dramatically.

This hearing is an opportunity to discuss the proposal for a new

corporation that would operate under different rules and procedures and presumably would have greater flexibility in financing

and management practices. Our Committee has heard from members of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel. We will now hear

from the State Department on this proposal.

Additionally, this Committee has been closely following the

progress of enhancing the security of our overseas posts, including

buying land and initiating new construction. We appreciate the

staff-level briefings that have been provided since the emergency

42

supplemental funds were provided. We look forward to hearing

from the Department on the current standing of the facility enhancement plan.

Admittedly, the State Department has a tough job of quickly trying to harden the security vulnerabilities of overseas posts, while

also making certain that taxpayers’ dollars are going to be wisely

spent. Recognizing that fact, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel

proposed recommendations to leverage the overseas building program, which we will explore today.

Foremost, there should be no compromise when it comes to protecting our embassy employees and making certain it is going to be

a safe physical environment for them. Our Overseas Presence Advisory Panel accurately captures the security situation at the State

Department by emphasizing an integrated approach to security and

developing a culture of security.

Establishing this security mindset, as they call it, I think will

make the job before you, as the executors of the physical security

program, infinitely easier.

So we want to welcome our panelists, but before we do that let

me call on our Ranking Minority Member, the gentleman from

Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson, for any opening remarks.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of

quick things.

I think one is that we all agree that any commander——in-chief

that placed military in the field without adequate weaponry, protection or intelligence, we would be outraged. If you go to some of

our embassies around the world, essentially we have done the same

thing, the commander- in-chief and the Congress of the United

States placing American personnel, often military personnel in

those facilities as well, but nonmilitary people, we have put them

in dangerous situations with inadequate facilities, inadequate security. So we have got to fulfill our responsibilities if we want them

to do the job overseas.

The only thing I would like to kind of throw out there at the beginning of this is the possibility that we need to review what we

do in the field and whether it needs to be done there anymore.

You know, we all grow up with kind of a formative stage, and

in those years you kind of decide where everything belongs. But the

world has changed an awful lot, and I really question when I look

at a lot of these embassies whether we need the back office overseas at all. Maybe we need to do it overseas, but maybe we need

to do it like a lot of businesses, centralized, one in Asia, one in Africa, one in Europe, not that every embassy and every consulate

have a very large back office that does everything, payment, disbursements and other needs of an embassy, that it may make more

sense today with modern telecommunications, computer systems,

teleconferencing, e-mail, that we can get a lot of what we now do

in each of our embassies, where it may be difficult, we may be able

to do it someplace else.

Now one of the considerations may be, if you move it back to the

United States, it may be a lot more expensive. As we are all fighting over budgets, as Americans, we want to hire American nationals where we can. We don’t want to eat up our whole budget in the

process. Obviously, it is a lot less expensive to have the back office

43

in Africa or in China or in India than it is to have it in Washington, DC.

But it seems to me we have got to make some basic decisions.

You may want to have regional back offices. You may want to do

it in the country where there is the least threat and the most capability. You may want to take Africa and Asia and put it all in

India. It is a country that speaks English. You may be able to do

the same thing for Europe someplace, in Ireland or England or

Scotland, so that we concentrate, we take out the back office from

some of the more dangerous areas, and, you know, we are able to

save money at the same time.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

If there are no other Members seeking recognition, we will now

welcome our panelists who are here to discuss the overseas building program and related security matters this morning.

First, I introduce Mr. Patrick Kennedy, Assistant Secretary for

Administration at State. Mr. Kennedy has been with the Foreign

Service for 27 years, probably holds the record for the longest service as an assistant secretary for the Administration. He deserves

a tribute for his outstanding service to the Department and to this

Committee.

We again welcome Mr. David Carpenter, Assistant Secretary for

Diplomatic Security, who appeared in our hearing on State Department security just last week. Mr. Carpenter assumed the position

of Assistant Secretary in August 1998 following a 26-year career in

the Secret Service. He is the first person to hold this post who has

a professional background in the protection and security fields. He

assumed this responsibility at a very critical time for all elements

of security.

We are happy once again to hear from the Inspector General for

the Department of State and Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers. Ms. Williams-Bridgers was

sworn in as Inspector General in 1995. She has been with this

Committee many times, and we appreciate the valuable work of

her good offices.

Chairman GILMAN. So whoever would like to start—Mr. Kennedy, would you like to start off? You may summarize your statement. Your full statement will be made part of the record. Please

proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK F. KENNEDY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will submit my statement for the record; and, in fact, with your permission,

I will cover the highlights.

It is always a pleasure to appear before this Committee, and it

gives me a particular pleasure today to update you on the many

accomplishments the Department has made in improving our overseas security posture, facilities infrastructure and our worldwide

facilities operations.

Obviously, since the tragic bombings of our embassies in East Africa, the issues concerning our infrastructure and security of our

44

missions overseas have received great attention within the Administration and the Congress. We very much appreciate the support

of the Congress and particularly of this Committee for the Emergency Security Supplemental and the Administration’s proposals

for physical security upgrades at our overseas posts.

I would also like to say a few words today on the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel and its recommendations concerning our Office

of Foreign Buildings Operations.

As you know, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, which

issued its report last November, described many of our facilities

abroad as unacceptable in terms of security and condition. Fully 85

percent of our facilities do not meet optimum security standards.

Some are in need of extensive renovations. Some are seriously overcrowded. Most, however, simply have to be replaced.

To protect our employees overseas, our goal is to expeditiously

relocate into safe facilities more than 22,000 embassy staff in over

220 vulnerable buildings. This is a formidable task. Achievement

of this task will require an enormous initial and sustained level of

capital investment.

Mr. Chairman, quite frankly, during the past 10 years we have

neither requested nor received sufficient funding to allow us to

maintain our infrastructure base. Most recently, since the 1998

bombings, we are finally beginning to arrest that decline in resources, thanks to the support of the President and the Congress,

and have taken the first steps toward rebuilding our facilities infrastructure.

In fiscal year 1999 alone, the Office of Foreign Buildings obli- gated over $800 million, the most ever obligated in a fiscal year,

to replace unsafe facilities and improve our security at those posts

where facilities cannot be replaced for several years.

As part of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel’s overall charter

to evaluate the way the United States organizes its overseas activities, it made 44 recommendations. This morning I would like to

focus some of my remarks on the Panel’s recommendation to establish an Overseas Facilities Authority, as yourself have noted.

The Panel advocated replacing the Bureau of Administration’s

Office of Foreign Buildings with a federally chartered corporation,

an Overseas Facilities Authority. The issues that led to the Panel’s

proposal included the perception that A/FBO-managed construction

projects took longer and cost more than comparable private sector

projects, the timelines were not always met and that staffing levels

appeared to be too high. However, I believe that the staff work that

underpins these perceptions is faulty, as it fails to give due consideration to security requirements and special overseas needs.

The Panel proposed creating a government-financed corporation.

This new authority would exercise responsibility for building, renovation, maintaining our overseas civilian facilities. The Overseas

Facilities Authority, in addition to receiving annual appropriations,

would have features not currently available to us in the Department now, including receiving funds from other agencies, levying

capital charges, obtaining forward funding and loans from the Federal Treasury.

The Overseas Facilities Authority, again unlike the current FBO,

would have the ability to apply management techniques commonly

45

used in the private sector to include financial incentives and performance-based compensation standards. The Panel reasoned that

higher salaries and incentives would allow OFA to attract highly

qualified real estate and other professionals and further motivate

employees.

We are currently giving serious and careful consideration to the

Panel’s proposal. An Interagency group headed by the Director of

the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, Patsy Thomasson, is reviewing all aspects. Earlier this year, Ms. Thomasson formed six

teams to look in and analyze in depth five critical areas: organizational structure, financing, business process reengineering, customer focus and communications. A sixth team manages the overall

effort. Together, these teams will make recommendations on how

the Panel’s desired outcomes, which we all agree with, can best be

achieved. We have also contracted with a leading consulting firm

to examine various options and ways to make FBO a more performance-based organization.

While these efforts are continuing, I believe that creating an

independent OFA is not essential to accomplish the changes that

OPAP laid out and which we agree with. Most of the proposed attributes of the Overseas Facilities Authority could be assigned either administratively or legislatively to A/FBO without disrupting

or halting the very positive direction in which A/FBO is now headed.

Although we agree with the thrust of the Panel’s recommendations, we question whether the creation of an independently Federal chartered organization is necessarily the best approach to

meet our infrastructure challenges. Principally, we are concerned

that such an entity may compromise the vital link between foreign

policy and facility decisions. For example, there are foreign policy

issues such as reciprocity that are intricately intertwined with

overseas facilities programs, such as the case with China where we

are seeking a new site for our embassy in Beijing, and China is

seeking as a condition a site in Washington. Such is also the case

with the United Arab Emirates, where we are seeking to acquire

a parcel of land, and they wish to procure land in Washington.

These are classic examples where facility decisions are affected and

sometimes driven by foreign policy considerations.

The Panel also urged that we continue to implement the Accountability Review Board—the Crowe Commission proposals. We

are doing that, and I am pleased to report that Foreign Buildings

has been particularly successful in responding to the mandates of

the security supplemental. Interim facilities are fully operational in

Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and we are moving smartly toward

constructing permanent facilities in both locations.

Foreign Buildings Operations conducted a competition for its fast

track design/build contract and awarded this contract last September. The designs of these projects have now reached the point

where we anticipate giving the contract the green light to mobilize

onsite in Dar and Nairobi next month. We also opened temporary

buildings in Doha and are fitting out three buildings in Pristina to

serve as temporary facilities, and we have permanent construction

already under way in Doha and Kampala.

46

Currently, we have 14 new embassies of consulates in various

stages of development. We are also in the process of acquiring several additional new office building sites, and since the bombing

FBO has completed 15 major rehabilitation projects at overseas

posts with another 46 major rehabilitation projects ongoing at this

time.

We have also relocated many Department and other agency personnel to more secure facilities. For example, AID personnel have

been relocated to more secure facilities in some dozen locations

around the world.

Increasing setback from streets and other buildings is another

way of reducing this threat. During the past year and a half, FBO

has been extremely active in acquiring 87 properties in 25 posts

around the world to provide greater security. Negotiations and investigations are continuing for another 31 properties at 14 posts.

Worldwide security upgrade funding was appropriated and has

enabled us to approve over 1,000 security upgrade projects at overseas posts, and 34 have already been completed. Every project will

further protect our employees. This program includes projects such

as the installation of berms and bollards and access controls, is

being executed by FBO, the post itself or by American companies

under implementation or basic ordering agreements.

Other components include the installation of shatter-resistant

window film and the installation of ballistic-resistant doors and

windows. The bombings in Africa tragically demonstrated the

greatest threat to life and injury from a bomb is flying glass

shards. Since the bombings, we have purchased 5.5 million square

feet of window film. Nearly half has been installed, and the remainder is in the process of installation. We have also installed or

replaced over 500 security doors.

The FBO’s Asset Management Program, which essentially acquires properties by using proceeds of sale from excess or underutilized properties, has been very successful, purchasing 18 properties

last fiscal year, and in the first half of this fiscal year has already

disposed of 17 other properties.

These successes are the result of retorquing internal processes,

applying new initiatives and introducing innovative methodologies.

These have been the key factors in achieving FBO’s high level of

productivity. Today’s Office of Foreign Buildings is not the same as

in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s under the Inman program.

A 1991 GAO review of the management of the Security Construction Program revealed problems that FBO experienced during its

efforts to meet the challenges of the Inman buildup a decade ago.

The most significant difficulties relate to inadequate staffing, difficulties with overseas site acquisition, contractor performance and

the lack of an extensive strategic focus. Since those years, however,

FBO has implemented lessons learned throughout the organization

and is now well prepared to undertake a large construction program.

FBO has developed an improved strategy for effectively executing

a difficult, expanded construction program and has augmented its

staff to handle the workload. This strategy is derived from FBO’s

Inman experience with the simultaneous execution of large,

multiyear projects and for implementing private sector construction

47

industry best practices. These include design/build contracting

where you can cut time and effort off the project by working with

the private sector.

We are looking into other multiple projects that could be packaged into groups for an award to a single large design build American contractor as we have successfully done in Dar es Salaam and

Nairobi. Additional design build projects could be awarded for

groups of projects in the outyears. These efforts are managed by an

integrated project management team that provides effective controls and added expertise.

In the staffing area, FBO is much better positioned than in the

mid 1980’s when the Inman program began and its in-house work

force numbered less than 200. The professionalism and depth of the

work force has increased as its size has grown to over 760 today.

Eighty-four new staff members have been or are being brought on

board for the worldwide security upgrades alone. Additional real

estate professionals have been hired to find and acquire new buildings and sites, and more design, engineering, project management

and other professionals and specialists have been brought on to

execute construction projects.

Contract support has been increased, furthermore, by teaming

with two American companies, the Perini Corporation and Brown

and Root to assist in security upgrade work and with other indefinite quantity contractors that increase FBO’s capabilities, especially in design review.

The Accountability Review Board discussed our priority setting, and they recommended spending $14 billion on embassy construction in the next 10 years. Interagency Embassy Security Assessment Teams determined that most of our posts have compelling facilities needs such as inadequate setback, structural hardening, relocations and other security requirements.

All chanceries, consulates and multi-tenant buildings have been

evaluated. The analysis assessed the soundness of each building’s

structure and facade, the adequacy of the perimeter security, the

setback from adjacent properties, the political violence threat, and

additional security consideration that included the capability and

willingness of the host country to control its internal and border security. The resulting ranking was reviewed by stakeholders—regional bureaus, other government agencies, Diplomatic Security,

the ESA teams and FBO. They were also reviewed and concurred

in by the Under Secretaries for Political Affairs and Management.

These projects are then planned for different fiscal years based on

vulnerability, stakeholder input and consideration of other factors.

Other measures developed or enhanced since the 1998 bombings.

Time and space preclude me from a full explanation of all these

factors which I will submit for the record, but these best practices,

in their aggregate, add to the intense efforts by the Department

which have resulted in an outstanding record of achievement over

the past 18 months and clearly demonstrate that today’s FBO has

the ability to manage a large and complex building program.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the efforts that we have undertaken with your assistance over the past 18 months have led to a

new paradigm, and we are prepared and able to take the funding

that you have been so helpful in providing to us to expand security

48

of our employees and the employees of all U.S. Government agencies overseas.

I now turn to my colleague, Mr. Carpenter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy appears in the appendix.]

Mr. MANZULLO [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your

comments; and, as you know, Congress did not flinch at making

the funds available in order to provide for security.

Our next witness is Assistant Secretary David Carpenter with

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State.

Mr. Carpenter, if you could summarize your statements and keep

your talk to around 10 minutes or so, as did Mr. Kennedy, we

would appreciate it.

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir, I will.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CARPENTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CARPENTER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of

the Committee. I welcome this opportunity to testify before you on

the security profile of our facilities overseas.

On August 7, 1998, our embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,

and Nairobi, Kenya, were bombed simultaneously by extremists

bent on the destruction of American presence throughout the

world. These tragedies unleashed a massive and intense effort to

provide much-needed security improvements at all of our overseas

posts. Although much has been accomplished, more needs to be

done. Our overseas facilities are generally more secure now than

in August 1998, but the continuing threat environment worldwide

requires that we not lose focus, that we continue to explore new

ways of protecting ourselves and support a program for new embassy construction.

The Department has aggressively upgraded security at previously low and medium threat posts to standards that were formerly only applied at high or critical level embassies or consulates.

High and critical level posts also received significant upgrades of

equipment to better fortify their facilities. We no longer believe, in

an era of transnational terrorism, that we have low or medium

threat posts, nor do we believe that we will receive tactical intelligence of an imminent attack. Simply put, we must be prepared

for any eventuality that presents itself.

Our goal following the bombings was to immediately improve the

security of our threatened consulates and embassies, and we have

done so. But at the outset let me say that it is important for this

Committee to know that we still have a very basic problem that

cannot be fixed quickly. The vast majority of our diplomatic posts

fail to meet one of the most basic security standards, namely, the

hundred foot setback standard. Until we can build embassies meeting the setback and other security standards, our efforts cannot

provide the degree of security all of us want for our people and facilities.

Having recognized that we still have grave security concerns

overseas, it is also important for the Committee to know that we

have done a lot and that our embassies and consulates are more

49

secure now than ever before. In this regard, let me review for you

what we have done through our security upgrade program. Some

of these actions have been based solely on DS initiatives; others

were suggested by the Accountability Review Board chaired by Retired Admiral William Crowe, the report of the Overseas Presence

Advisory Panel and the Office of the Inspector General.

As previously stated, we are aggressively upgrading security at

low and medium threat level posts to standards that previously

only applied to high and critical rated posts. We have put in place

physical security upgrades at our embassies and consulates such as

reinforced perimeter walls, bollards, new guard booths, vehicle barriers and shatter- resistant window film. We are upgrading and deploying security equipment to include better lighting, cameras,

video recorders, bomb detection equipment, armored vehicles,

alarm and public address systems and X-ray equipment. Where

possible, we have mitigated the lack of sufficient setback by closing

streets and provided for mandatory vehicle inspections.

We have also expanded our antiterrorism assistance training to

aid foreign police in combating terrorism through appropriate programs as surveillance detection, border security, explosive detection, crisis management and maritime security.

In addition, we have installed alarm systems at embassies and

consulates to alert personnel to impending emergency situations

and have instituted a program for the employees to duck and cover

when the alarms are sounded.

We have also created a new security environment threat list with

a modified methodology and criteria for determining threat levels.

This process now addresses transnational terrorism as a distinct

category as well as the threats from indigenous terrorism and political violence and the threats from intelligence services, both technical and human, and, of course, crime.

DS has also changed the focus in training courses for regional security officers and special agents to give them greater training on

counterterrorism methodology, explosive ordinance recognition and

disposal, chemical/biological weapons threats and defenses, and

surveillance detection techniques.

In response to a specific recommendation from the Accountability

Review Board, we are also working with the FBI to better analyze

law enforcement information which might have a bearing on

threats to our missions overseas and to more quickly disseminate

that information to appropriate posts. To that end, a DS special

agent has been detailed to the International Terrorism Section at

FBI headquarters, and DS special agents are participating in the

FBI’s Terrorism Task Forces around the country.

DS has also established the office of The Coordinator for Chemical Biological Countermeasures. That office, which is conducting a

worldwide survey to determine vulnerabilities, has purchased and

is distributing chemical biological equipment to all posts. As part

of its educational program, it has distributed instructional materials, including pamphlets, videos and a series of cables, to alert all

posts to the nature of the threat and to provide defensive guidance.

It has also established a comprehensive training program for security professionals and first responders.

50

The newest addition to our program and of major significance

has been the establishment in less than 1 year of a surveillance detection program at almost all of our overseas posts. A critical lesson

learned from the bombings in East Africa is that there is an intense surveillance conducted against our facilities prior to an attack. Since going operational in January 1999, surveillance detection teams, most of which work with host government security

services, have observed over 700 suspected incidents of surveillance

against our personnel and facilities worldwide. It has in a sense expanded our security perimeter and zone of control beyond our previous limitations. The surveillance detection program is clearly a

work in progress, but we feel that it is destined to become a major

aspect of our overseas security defenses.

Finally, and I believe most importantly, DS has hired 234 new

special agents and 17 security engineering specialists, which has

allowed for the creation of 140 new security officer positions overseas. By the end of fiscal Year 2000, we will have 420 DS special

agents serving as security officers in 157 countries. DS has also

hired 20 additional diplomatic couriers, 34 maintenance technicians

and 46 civil servants in support of overseas security.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is National Police Week. On

Monday on the very grounds of this Capitol we paid tribute to this

country’s law enforcement heroes who gave their lives in the line

of duty in the past year. Over the years, Diplomatic Security has

had its own heroes, some who gave their lives and others who have

lived to continue the fight. I am positive out of this new cadre of

special agents and other security specialists we will have more heroes.

I thank this Committee for its support in hiring these new people

and hope that I can look to you for support as we seek additional

positions to strengthen our programs. It is people that will make

the difference, that is, trained, motivated and dedicated professionals with the single purpose of ensuring the safety of our overseas personnel and facilities.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to your request for my views regarding the creation of a new agency to replace FBO, let me assure you

that we have enjoyed a positive and close working relation with

FBO as is necessary to support our diplomatic personnel, to improve security and to upgrade our facilities worldwide. We have a

construction security management group working within FBO that

helps to strengthen this partnership. I do not believe that

distancing DS from FBO would enhance our security effort. Furthermore, I personally do not see how an independent entity would

be more capable of overcoming the challenges and obstacles that

FBO currently faces.

You have also asked for my views on the OPAP proposal to make

greater use of regionalization as a means to reduce the number of

personnel needed at posts and for my views on whether any posts

would be downsized or closed because of security threats.

OPAP recommended creating a process to right-size our overseas

presence, reduce the size of some posts, close others, reallocate staff

and resources and establish new posts where needed. State and

other agencies formed an interagency committee to review how to

implement the right-sizing recommendation in the OPAP report.

51

In early March, a pilot program began at a number of posts for

the purpose of developing recommendations for right-sizing at

these posts and to develop criteria that can be applied universally.

What I have seen thus far, Mr. Chairman, suggests that regionalization efforts could result in reducing the size of some posts but

would inevitably result in increasing the size of others. But from

a security standpoint, I doubt that there would be any measurable

savings in such an effort.

My concerns are primarily focused on decisions related to where

the regional posts are to be located and assurances that the prescribed security standards are in place. Certain countries present

particularly difficult environments in which to work. By that I

mean high crime, inadequate infrastructure, unstable governments,

poor police support and so on. Yet they may provide a geographical

advantage as they are centrally located as hubs for air transportation or viewed as gateway to a continent. Believing that security

is an important factor when entertaining ideas of regionalization,

it is critical that no decision be made without proper vetting of life

safety issues related to these regionalization issues.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. As I indicated at the

beginning, we have been diligent in our efforts to upgrade security

at our overseas posts, and we have been successful in making those

facilities safer now than ever before. Nevertheless, there is still

much that needs to be done, and until all of our facilities meet the

basic security requirements none of us will be satisfied with our security posture overseas.

I appreciate your interest and the Committee’s interest you have

taken in this topic and will be happy to answer any questions when

appropriate.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Carpenter.

We will now proceed with testimony by Ms. Williams-Bridgers,

and you may summarize your testimony, and we will make the full

statement a part of the record.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMSBRIDGERS, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of

the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity once again to testify

before this Committee on the Department of State’s efforts to manage the embassy security enhancement program. As demonstrated

by the terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es

Salaam in 1998, perhaps no greater challenge exists for the Department than providing adequate security to protect our people,

facilities and information.

As you requested in your invitation to this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I will review the work done by the Office of Inspector General

on the Department’s management of the embassy security enhancement program, its use of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and its compliance with overseas security standards.

Since the bombings of the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam security oversight has become an even more critical mission

52

for the Office of Inspector General. We now have multidisciplinary

teams in OIG to evaluate the implementation of physical security

initiatives and to monitor the expenditure of the $1.5 billion emergency supplemental.

In the 18 months immediately following the August bombings,

OIG evaluated the physical security and emergency preparedness

of 42 embassies.

The most significant security challenge for the Department is the

protection of overseas employees lives while at work and at their

residences. From a physical security standpoint, this means upgrading the perimeter security of buildings, especially chanceries;

building new chanceries to replace those that are clearly unsafe;

and collocating U.S. Government agencies overseas into protected

areas. Another significant challenge is the protection of classified

material, which is increasingly becoming electronic information,

both on the domestic front and overseas.

It is evident from our examinations of the various elements of

embassy protection that setback is the preeminent security concern

for our overseas posts. Setback provides the greatest protection

from vehicle bombs. The OIG has made recommendations that

could effectively increase setback, some at relatively low cost. For

example, we have recommended that embassy officials work with

the local government to alter traffic patterns around the mission,

and in other locations we proposed creating increased setback by

extending control over street parking spaces. However, at other

missions the only way to effectively increase setback is to purchase

adjoining properties, and at other missions we must move to a new

location to achieve a meaningful setback. Both options could cost

millions of dollars. To meet setback requirements and other security standards, 34 of the 42 embassies we inspected within the last

year would require new chanceries and compounds. However, only

five of the posts have a new chancery under construction or

planned in the next 5 years.

The ideal embassy would be protected by at least 100 feet of setback. It would be constructed to current security standards and

have a well-lit, well-constructed perimeter wall; and it would be

under constant surveillance by closed circuit television. Beyond the

wall, a surveillance detection unit would determine whether possible terrorists were surveilling the mission. A local guard force

would protect the perimeter. Entrance to the mission compound

would be well controlled. The chancery would incorporate a number

of physical security measures to protect against bomb blasts and

offer safe haven if the compound was breached.

Overseas Security Policy Board standards provided the framework for our security oversight inspections. Let me emphasize that

none of the 42 embassies the OIG inspected met all security standards. Incremental security improvements such as upgraded walls,

doors and windows cannot fully compensate for the lack of sufficient setback. In addition, over 50 percent of the posts we inspected

did not meet standards for window protection, perimeter wall, vehicle inspection areas, chancery wall and door construction or exterior lighting and closed circuit television.

At about one-third of all locations we reviewed, we recommended

measures to upgrade security barriers, exterior lighting and antiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:45 Dec 11, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 67827.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
53

climb fences. We recommended the installation of vehicle barriers

at entry gates. We recommended revised local guard vehicle access

control procedures and the upgrade of public access control. In addition, we reviewed local guard services and recommended program

improvements or greater post management supervision at about

one-third of all locations.

Further, to mitigate the effects of flying glass resulting from a

car bomb attack, the Department is replacing old and often defective 4-mil shatter-resistant window film with a higher standard of

protection. While the Department concurs with the Accountability

Review Board that ballistic laminated windows provide superior

protection against a car bomb attack, the majority of our overseas

facilities cannot structurally support this upgrade. A more practical

solution is to purchase and install 8-mil shatter-resistant film on

all windows. The Department plans to do this by July 1, 2000.

Our review of the interim office buildings for our embassies in

Dar es Salaam and Nairobi addressed the management challenges

to provide secure facilities and better protect employees of the

Agency for International Development [USAID]. Foremost among

our concerns for the interim office buildings is the lack of collocation and the imminent need for the Department to address the security concerns for those agencies that are not located on the interim compound. Similar collocation concerns have been raised for

the new embassy compounds in Luanda and Kampala.

In addition to the physical security initiatives, the Department

has implemented a number of initiatives that will enhance an embassy’s ability to handle a crisis situation, including emergency

alarms and drills, expanded emergency planning programs, and

emergency communications. In many cases, management-supported

procedural initiatives can improve embassy security without any

expenditure of funds. As an example, during our inspection of the

temporary embassy compound in Doha, Qatar in August 1999, we

cited the need for a post to establish a proactive working relation

with the host government’s protective service to ensure a cooperative and timely response to a terrorist threat.

The Department has also initiated a worldwide surveillance detection program to detect and deter potential terrorist attack. As

Assistant Secretary Carpenter suggested, it is a work in progress.

But it is a commendable effort. Preliminary results of our review

indicate a need for the Department to improve reporting criteria for

regional security officers and to make better use of information collected during surveillance.

Some of the most difficult security issues to correct both domestically and overseas deal with information security. OIG has completed over 20 audits identifying vulnerabilities in information resources and security management. In many ways, improving information security may be a bigger challenge than improving physical

security because of the many fixes that involve a change in employee behavior rather than the procurement of additional technical equipment.

In my statement before this Committee last week I discussed the

specific deficiencies that have perpetuated a lax security environment in the Department of State. Therefore, I will not belabor the

54

point today regarding the need to pay better attention to security

on the domestic front.

Overseas, there are many reasons for the vulnerable condition of

American posts. Lack of funding obviously plays a role. The Accountability Review Board estimated that $14 billion would be

needed over the next 10 years. However, as Mr. Gejdenson suggested in his opening remarks, the size of our presence overseas

must also be considered as we examine how to best protect U.S.

Government officials who reside and work abroad. The right answer to ‘‘right-sizing’’ lies in providing the staffing, the financial

support and security required to do the job that needs to be done.

Regionalization may sometimes make sense because of the economies, efficiencies and safety of operations that may result. However, regionalizing operations does not always make sense from a

security perspective. Such concentrations sometimes create larger,

more inviting targets for terrorism. Embassy Nairobi, for example,

hosted several regional offices.

Looking ahead. Mr. Chairman, in your invitation to testify this

morning you asked that I address the ability of the Department to

manage a security enhancement program and the status of various

initiatives. I focused my remarks on how the Department has responded over the last 18 months in its management of emergency

security initiatives. The tragedies in Africa have captured the attention of the Department, of this Congress and the American public. Meanwhile, recent security lapses at home have been a wakeup call that other aspects of security just as vital to the defense

of American interests as physical security also need attention.

The Department has responded well to the need to move quickly

in the aftermath of the bombings and to use emergency funding

provided by Congress. The Department’s continued success is dependent on how well and how long it exercises disciplined attention

to effective security practices and how long the U.S. Government

and the Congress remain committed to funding the construction,

maintenance and continual improvement of that infrastructure.

As we embark on this expensive commitment, the requirement

for the Office of Inspector General to provide specialized oversight

of the use of funds also increases. As the Department moves from

the emergency response to a longer term, more strategic approach

for the rebuilding of our foreign affairs infrastructure, so must the

OIG move forward with monitoring these initiatives.

With the exception of a small one-time emergency supplemental

appropriation in fiscal year 1999, funding for OIG has been

straightlined since fiscal year 1996. Increased funding for security

and for those charged with overseeing security improvements for

you and the Department is only one of the ingredients necessary

for rebuilding infrastructure and changing attitudes toward security, but it is a vital ingredient for all of us. As always, Mr. Chairman, the continued support of this Committee for OIG in this regard is much appreciated.

That concludes my summary. I will be glad to answer any questions you have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers appears in the

appendix.]

55

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you to all of our panelists for your

good testimony. We will now proceed with questions.

Mr. Kennedy, the General Accounting Office reported on the

Emergency Security Supplemental program in March pointing out

that, as of December 31, 1999, the FBO obligated $360 million out

of some $627 million, and actual expenditures were $83.6 million.

Have those figures changed much since December?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As of now, if you take the

funding that was made available and you combine, since this is a

moving target, the funding that was made available in both fiscal

year 1999 and fiscal year 2000, we have already obligated and committed almost 70 percent of the total funds that have been made

available to us.

Chairman GILMAN. Of the 70 percent, how much of that has actually been spent?

Mr. KENNEDY. Actual obligations are—of the $627 million, we

have obligated $379 million, and we have committed $62 million.

Under the arcane system that the Federal Government uses, when

I issue a purchase order or a contract to a vendor, I am committing

that money in full. I then only pay that contractor for the work

that is in progress. But the obligation rate is the rate that governs

exactly how many projects I have under way, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. We have only spent some $60 million?

Mr. KENNEDY. No, Mr. Chairman. We have obligated three

hundred—— Chairman GILMAN. I know what you obligated. I want to know

how much you have actually spent.

Mr. KENNEDY. I will have to get the liquidation—— Chairman GILMAN. Well, roughly what have you spent? What

have you spent so far? Forget the obligation. What has actually

been paid out?

Mr. KENNEDY. I will have to get that for the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Can you give me an estimate?

Mr. KENNEDY. I would say that we have probably liquidated on

the order of half of that amount.

Chairman GILMAN. Half of what amount?

Mr. KENNEDY. Half of the $379 million that we have obligated.

Chairman GILMAN. So you have spent about $150 million to date,

actually laid out?

Mr. KENNEDY. Cash out of the till, yes, sir, versus obligations,

yes, sir.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Would the Chairman yield for one moment?

Chairman GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Just so I understand this, so what you are saying is if you were to buy a new wall in front of an embassy and

that wall was to cost $5 million, that means you can’t spend that

$5 million again even though you haven’t actually handed it to

anybody. So now you have this $5 million that is obligated but not

spent. Then as the contractor finishes one-fifth of the wall, if you

were a prudent manager you would give him slightly less than onefifth of the money, is that correct?

So the process is what you would normally have in any construction project. If you build a house and you go to the bank and you

borrow $200,000, you don’t walk over and spend, Mr. Chairman,

56

$200,000 to the builder. You say, here’s $200,000 and say I hope

I have a house at the end. What you do is you obligate $200,000—

it is a very inexpensive house because I am a democrat—and then

when he finishes—you might give him some of it to begin with, and

when he finishes, say, half of it, you might give him $80,000.

Chairman GILMAN. If the gentleman would yield, I realize these

basic concepts, but what I am asking about——

Mr. GEJDENSON. It doesn’t allow them to——

Chairman GILMAN. If the gentleman will yield.

Mr. GEJDENSON. It is your time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. We approved all of this in October 1998. Here it is over 2 years later, 21⁄2 years later, and we still

have only spent about $150 million out of the $1.5 billion.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, for example, we

have executed large contracts for the constructions of the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Those are significant expenditures. Specifically, we asked for those moneys to build the new embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and you graciously assisted

us in getting those.

Chairman GILMAN. But—if I can interrupt you, Mr. Kennedy—

but the fact is your obligation is only $600 million. Where is the

rest of the money and why are we so slow in committing these

funds?

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, if you take the emergency appropriation, the money available to FBO for its part of the activity was

$627 million. Other parts of it were to pay the Defense Department

for services that were provided to us during and after the crisis,

were for medical expenses and other people injured in the crisis,

were for payments, almost ex gratia payments to the governments

of Kenya and Tanzania for damage done in those cities, funding as

Mr. Carpenter has outlined for all the new security agents that he

has brought into place. So the total package of $1.5 or so billion,

the amount of money that was given to me to expend on bricks and

mortar was $627 million, and so I am playing with $627 million on

the books, and that is what I have been working through, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Is that fully obligated, the $627 million?

Mr. KENNEDY. No, Mr. Chairman. Of the $627 million we have

obligated $379 million.

Chairman GILMAN. All right. So, again, Mr. Kennedy, I am asking you, you have had this since 1998. You have only obligated half

of it. Why has there been a delay in the rest of the funding?

Mr. KENNEDY. Because, Mr. Chairman, when we worked through

this effort, it is divided essentially into the bricks and mortar side,

which has three parts. The first part is buying adjacent properties.

Because we have learned, as both Mr. Carpenter and the Inspector

General has pointed out, one of the best things we can do is expand

the setback, the distance between our building and the nearest

point the terrorists can reach. So over this period of time we have

acquired 87 properties. We know that one of the major things we

need to do is buy more property. So in 31 other locations, we are

negotiating with the landlords right at this moment. So I have to

set aside money in order to complete those.

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The properties—in many cases, the landlord has let us put our

barriers around them, so we have achieved the setback already, but

the cash has not moved out of my hands on behalf of the U.S. Government to the landlord until title searches are complete. So I have

achieved the security purpose, but I will only spend the money

when he gives or she gives me clean title. That is an example in

that regard.

Chairman GILMAN. So it’s a balance of the unobligated funds virtually committed to your land purchases?

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir, part of it.

Chairman GILMAN. How much of it is for land purchases?

Mr. KENNEDY. A total of $41 million was set aside for land purchases. We have spent 27 out of the 41. So there is still $14 million. So I have spent about two-thirds of it on land purchases, and

the other third is pending on the process of negotiating with landlords in order to——

Chairman GILMAN. That is beyond money you are going to obligate for land purchases. What is the plan for the remainder of the

money?

Mr. KENNEDY. For example, the total price to stand up Nairobi

and Dar es Salaam is about $163 million. That is for those two

buildings there. We have obligated $115 million. There is another

$94 million yet to obligate. Why is that, Mr. Chairman? Because

we also furnish the building. We provide furniture, we provide generators, we provide telephone systems for those buildings. We only

buy that equipment at the point in time because I wouldn’t want

to buy a telephone——

Chairman GILMAN. In addition to the equipment and land purchases, money remaining for completing construction, where is the

rest of the money?

Mr. KENNEDY. Then there is the worldwide security upgrade

which is the berms, the bollards, the new perimeter walls, the new

security access points. Of the $212 million in that program level,

we have obligated or committed $159 million of that. They have

done the architectural engineering work; and they have now, for

example, submitted the bids which we are evaluating so they can

build these major additions.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Would the Chairman yield?

Chairman GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you. So let me ask you, your total is $627

million that you got to look at to spend for security.

Mr. KENNEDY. For bricks and mortar.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Bricks and mortar. How much of that do you

have a plan for?

Mr. KENNEDY. We have plans for all of it.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So basically the difference between what you

have been authorized to spend on bricks and mortar and what you

have obligated or spent is a function of process. It takes time to get

architectural drawings, and what we are talking about is you have

spent 2 years trying to spend this money. I guess my question is,

or my statement would be, is this Committee would cause you serious damage if you ran out and spent that money the first day without doing the title search, without getting the drawings, without

getting the bids.

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I think, Mr. Chairman, they are doing a pretty good job in spending money, generally Republicans aren’t in a hurry to spend

money, but I am glad to see we are both committed to fixing these

security issues. I don’t think there is an issue here. I think if you

look at the normal contracting process, if it was the House of Representatives or any other institution, that this 2-year period is not

an unreasonable length of time to go through the process of coming

up with plans, to doing the bidding, to doing the research on title

and to then executing contracts.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. You are welcome, Mr. Chairman. The clock

doesn’t seem to be running today. I thought I would get it in before

the evening news.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Mr. Chairman, may I also offer something here?

I think another reason for what appears to be a fairly low obligation and expenditure rate is that the Department did experience I

believe during the first three quarters of 1999 a fairly favorable exchange rate, which meant that the amount of funds that they actually had to obligate and expend were much less than what they

had anticipated.

Chairman GILMAN. So does that mean you have a surplus now?

I don’t think you have to respond to that.

Mr. Kennedy, before my time runs out, please update us on the

implementation of these construction projects. My understanding

was that 119 posts were to be surveyed for improvements, but in

September surveys were suspended with 75 posts, then reviewed

because of the cost of the project, and as of December 1999, only

one project had been completed and seven were in a construction

or design building stage. Have any more of the perimeter projects

been initiated?

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, the security improvement is a

four-part effort, and if I could take them in reverse order, the

fourth part is window improvements and door improvements. In

that case, 230 posts have already received their funding for the

window improvements, and all the new window improvements will

be completed by June of this year, and we have installed 160 new

security doors.

The second part of it is projects that are under way at post. Posts

have completed 272 projects at 178 posts. That includes examples

like closing of streets in Abidjan and building barriers in the

streets; in Cotonou, installation of barriers that push the setback

to a hundred feet. In Budapest, we leased a park with the concurrence of the local government and pushed our security perimeter

out, and so there are 272 projects now completed at 178 posts.

Then we move down into what we call the mega projects, the

projects that no post can complete on its own because they do not

have the architectural and engineering capabilities nor does the

host nation often have those abilities. So, we can’t safely turn them

over to the posts because you certainly don’t want to use firms that

fall below the level of providing good security. In those cases, we

do do the security projects. We turn to American contractors and

have an American architectural and engineering firm go to the post

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and develop the scope of work according to the standards that Mr.

Carpenter’s membership on the Overseas Security Policy Board

provides to us.

Those are the security surveys that are being done. We’ve done

72. We have awarded 18 construction contracts to American corporations, and we have also done eight additional projects, five of

which are in design and three are in the design/build process. So

when you say there is only one completed, there is one completed

out of one-fifth of all the efforts involved, the mega projects. The

others are the slides I showed during my testimony, which showed

that we are under way with the bulldozers, the backhoes——

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Kennedy, let me interrupt. Do you have

additional funds in your fiscal year 1999 slated for 2000 for continuing to work on these projects?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir, that is the money we have not yet spent.

Chairman GILMAN. I am going to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Gejdenson has to attend another meeting. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I would just like to say on this anybody who has built a

home, it takes 10 months once you have got plans, approval from

the zoning folks, if you have got your drawings in place. I think

what we want is a good quality project. At the end, we want to get

our money’s worth. I am sure you are getting bids that are off the

charts because they figure the U.S. Government, you have got unlimited money and so it takes some time to renegotiate these. I

want you to do a good job, I want you to do a careful job, and I

don’t want you to waste a lot of money. So don’t just rush and

dump these buckets out the window so you can come become here

and say, yes, we have spent all the money.

Let me ask you, Mr. Carpenter. There was a proposal to set up

a new government corporation to solve all of these problems. I am

a little skeptical of new corporations. I am like the 100-year-old

man. They told him, I bet you have seen a lot of changes in your

life. He said, and I have been against most of it. I think I am getting to that point. Because we move the chairs around, we create

a whole new set of bureaucracies, I am not sure we solve any problem.

Putting aside new government corporation, of the authorities

they say this corporation should have, do you not have any of those

now and do you need them? You get my question? Because it is

new corporation, here’s the authorities the corporation have. If we

got rid of the idea of a new corporation, we go to your organization

and we say, all right, here are the authorities we are going to give

them. Do you need any of those? Do you not have any of those now?

Mr. CARPENTER. I think, if this answers your question, the working relationship that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has with

the FBO has been extraordinary and, quite frankly, very constructive. If a new organization were created, that relationship would

have to be recreated. An understanding of the important elements,

ideas, and concepts we bring to the table would have to be transferred. Right now, we have a very smooth working machine. If you

were to create a new institution to deal with this, clearly authorities would have to be granted to ensure that this would continue.

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Mr. GEJDENSON. Let me ask you a question. Are you familiar

with the attack on the Ambassador’s residence in Syria some year

or so ago and the Ambassador’s wife bravely stood in a room there

calling people, telling them not to show up to work, and we finally

resolved that situation and the Syrians paid us for the damages?

How much of your focus is on that Ambassador’s residences, employees’ compounds? Is that a big challenge for you?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is clearly a challenge. In some parts of the

world it is more of a challenge than in others.

I happened to be in Syria 2 weeks after that particular attack,

and I saw firsthand the damage that was done, and it does give

you an appreciation of what can happen and how quickly it can

happen. We have not been of a closed mind or turned our attention

away from ambassador residences or the residences of our other

employees overseas. It is difficult, quite frankly, when they are dispersed throughout the cities. If they were collocated on a compound, it would be much easier to secure. However, the difficulties

in securing these residences vary from country to country.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Is there a balance between—I hear a kind of desire to put them in a compound, but a compound is a much bigger

target. You take all your employees, you spread them all over the

town, you know, you have got people living amongst the public.

That is some danger. On the other hand, there is no one place you

can go to get 200 Americans or 100 Americans. What is your estimate on the advantages, disadvantages, or is it country specific? In

some countries, it is better to disburse them; and, some countries,

it is better to keep them in a compound?

Mr. CARPENTER. I believe it is country specific. In areas where

crime is a larger threat than is a terrorist attack, I would suggest

keeping them on a compound would be preferable. When you are

looking at a terrorist attack, perhaps dispersal would be the better.

It is going to be country specific. Quite frankly, we are fully engaged in looking at this issue as we move down the road toward

building new facilities. Do we need to collocate on embassy compounds? Do we need to collocate all of our employees on compounds

separate from our embassies? Or is dispersal the proper way to go?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I think it is a tough call. I know you obviously

spent a lot of time—Mr. Kennedy, what do you think about the relationship between your two organizations?

Mr. KENNEDY. I think the relationship is very good. I think that

what we have done over the past few years, which is taking a unit

of professional security officers and placing them within the Bureau of Administration’s Office of Foreign Buildings where they

oversee, monitor and implement the security standards, has

worked exceedingly well. That close nexus where they are part of

the same organizations and we bring in the construction, the architectural and engineering expertise, and they bring security professionalism, is the way to go. We get fast turnaround. We always get

the professional advice we need on scene.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Let me close by saying two things.

Most of the embassies I have been to lately have done an excellent job showing me when I go there their security concerns, their

needs, the conditions they are operating under. But I would suggest that maybe one of the things you do is you send out a memo

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to our embassies around the world that when a congressional delegation shows up, if they already have it, they ought to put the security issues at the top of their explanation, what their problems

are, what changes they have made, so that every Member as they

go someplace gets a deeper understanding for this. Because I think

it is not just the White House’s responsibility, it is our responsibility to make sure we have got an adequate system of protection

for our employees, Americans, serving overseas.

Second, maybe the Chairman and I and other interested Members might take a tour of the State Department, take a look at

what you are doing there, things you can tell us, give us—some of

the stuff I think is better when you see it than just kind of talk

about it. Maybe the Chairman and I can get together and pick a

date.

I thank the Chairman for his indulgence.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for the good work

they are doing on embassy security. I think our Committee properly dispatched and fulfilled its responsibilities when we passed the

Embassy Security Act last year. It was signed by the President,

and it provided a 5-year predictable amount of authorized levels of

funding to ensure that there were no gaps, no years that might be

leapfrogged, which, unfortunately, look like might have been the

case for fiscal year 2000. So I am very glad to see our distinguished

witnesses here.

I think we have more in common than some of our Committee

hearings, Mr. Chairman, because I think the Administration and

these particular individuals are trying to really protect our embassies, to use all available resources to make a difference. So I would

like to ask just one or two questions.

Admiral Crowe had testified, and, Secretary Carpenter, you

might remember this, when he pointed out that, throughout the

proceedings, his Accountability Review Board was most disturbed

regarding two interconnected issues, the first the inadequacy of resources to provide security, which, hopefully, is being addressed;

and if it is not, if more resources are needed, perhaps you can tell

us today, notwithstanding OMB’s looking over your shoulder. Second, the relatively low priority accorded to security concerns

throughout the U.S. Government and the State Department.

The point was made by Admiral Crowe that there no longer are

any more low threat or missions abroad. You pointed this out, Secretary Carpenter, that because of the mobility—of the enhanced

mobility of terrorists that every site has to be seen as a potential

threat.

How are we addressing those issues? And, again, do you have

money—notwithstanding the amount of the request, and we all

have the request from the congressional presentation in front of us.

We know what we have authorized. Is more money needed or is

this the right amount? Is it too little? Please tell us.

Mr. CARPENTER. Shame on me if I came up here and didn’t say

we needed more money. But, really the answer to your question is

twofold.

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One, we have received a good injection of funds here, and we are

most appreciative of that. But in my professional expertise, if there

were an area where we are wanting, it is that we clearly do not

have enough personnel to support the mission at hand. And I have

testified before, sir, regarding lack of ‘‘bench strength’’ within my

Bureau to respond in the event of threats to our posts overseas, we

are using the same cadre of people to support every problem we

have. Whether it be domestic at the Department of State, whether

it be the protection of our foreign dignitaries, responding overseas

to emergency situations, it is the same people. And there are far

too few of them. This is a process that has been going on for over

2 years in a very, very intense way. I am burning up my people

as we go.

We will continue to do our jobs, but without more personnel, my

fear is that over the long haul we will fail. These people will wear

out and another shoe will drop in another area that is as yet unknown to us.

Mr. SMITH. On that point, if you could just suspend briefly, how

many personnel are we talking about and how much money are we

talking about? Do you have an estimate?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is difficult to quantify, but we are in the process of preparing, as a result of the top-down study that was done

that we discussed last Thursday at the hearing, a strategic plan

over a 3-year period asking for somewhere in the neighborhood of

about 900 people over a 3-year period. These people come in all disciplines, including special agents, engineers, civil servants, to address our shortfalls in a lot of projects in our counterintelligence

arena, our uniform guards program, etc.

Mr. SMITH. Will a request for that be forthcoming from the Department?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is our intention to have this prepared within

the next 30 days, and it would be my hope to get it here soon

thereafter.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again I want to congratulate you on an excellent job.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and we thank you for

being here. When I walked into the meeting earlier, I walked in

and said, gee, these are the same people who were testifying the

other day or is it just deja vu? But it is a slightly different topic,

but we are glad to have you back. We have gone from State Department to embassies.

I am on the transportation subcommittee that deals with public

buildings and domestic buildings in this country and know some of

the issues that have come up on our domestic buildings, not State

Department buildings, but some of the buildings in the Washington

area and around the country, and my line of questioning will reflect that background.

First, Mr. Kennedy, you said that of the contractors who there

have been 18 of these buildings or modifications of buildings that

have been done by American contractors. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. We have 18 major efforts overseas that we are

using American contractors. For certain small projects—for examVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:45 Dec 11, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 67827.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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ple, Dr. Cooksey, when you are just building iron beams around the

perimeter of the embassy, where the local labor and materials are

available, it is advantageous to the American taxpayer to use local

labor supervised by an American officer from the embassy, using

a standard that comes from the Overseas Security Policy Board. So

those small projects are done by local—— Mr. COOKSEY. So are any of the major projects done by local contractors or have they all been American contractors, United States?

Mr. KENNEDY. The majority of the major projects are done by

American contractors because we want to use American architectural standards, American engineering standards; and we use companies such as Brown and Root and Perini which are under contract to us, because we know the quality is there.

Mr. COOKSEY. What about Bechtel? Have they done any of these?

Mr. KENNEDY. They are not a part of this. Bechtel has worked

for us before, sir, but we put out for bid these indefinite quantity

efforts, and the two winning American companies were Brown and

Root and Perini.

Mr. COOKSEY. When I was in the Air Force many years ago

Brown and Root did a lot of construction then. Of course, that was

when Lyndon Johnson was President, which is another story.

Is there any consideration to using sort of a standardized, cookiecutter type of building construction, and is that done?

Mr. KENNEDY. Patsy Thomasson, who is my director of the Office

of Foreign Buildings, has a team that is working on that now.

There are a certain number of I guess you could say small- to medium-sized embassies around the world which do have almost a

standard pattern, sir, an ambassador, deputy chief of mission, security officer, consular section, etc. cetera. So we are looking at that

right now to find out if we can come up with an architectural and

engineering design that would be standard, and then we would

maybe have a different facade on the building, brick one place,

stone in another, in order to blend into the local environment. But

that is something we are looking at very, very closely because we

see advantages both in time and in cost.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, I think it is important to consider the local

environment. I would hate to have all of our embassies look like

McDonald’s hamburger places. I hate to go to another country and

see a McDonald’s because that is a sign that the ugly Americans

have gotten there before we have. I think that, too often, we go in

and try to impose our culture and standards on other countries,

and I warn them not to be inundated by Americans, but just so far

as the walls, the structure, the security—— Mr. KENNEDY. We have security standards. The walls must be so

thick, they must resist so many pounds per square inch. What we

do is engage a local architect to work with us on the facade, nothing inside, nothing of a security nature, so that we can blend into

the local environment, as you rightly point out.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Carpenter, would you agree that the emphasis

on physical security and counterintelligence is a change in the

basic RSOs, regional security officers, job or has their job description always been the same?

Mr. CARPENTER. I think that there has been expansion of their

duties and responsibilities. If I had to put it in one category, it

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would be ‘‘outside the walls.’’ We have always been focused on

counterintelligence issues. However, what we are involved in to a

much greater extent is relationships with host government officials,

local police authorities, and local military authorities.

An RSO under duress needs to be able to pick up the phone and

get the person that he knows can respond. In years gone by, the

RSOs’ responsibilities basically were confined ‘‘inside the walls.’’ We will lose if we don’t extend our reach outside those walls. The

countersurveillance program that we have talked about is a major

step in that direction. It gets ‘‘eyes and ears’’ outside the embassy,

one block, two blocks, or three blocks away and forces us to engage

more with local authorities. It forces an RSO to get out of an embassy and make these contacts that would be needed in the case

of an emergency.

Mr. COOKSEY. Good. Well, the State Department security people

that I have had some contact with on CODELs are professionals,

that I know are good people, but still they were apparently confined to the area within the walls. They need someone with your

background and your expertise, and I am encouraged to hear that.

With the increase in Diplomatic Security positions you have been

able to provide posts with assistant RSOs, but are you sending out

assistant RSOs with different skills to augment these people? And

are these RSOs former Secret Service personnel or are they former

State Department security personnel? For example, computer security, electronic security. Who has the most expertise and who is

doing that, Secret Service personnel or former State Department

security personnel?

Mr. CARPENTER. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has a mix of

special agents, engineers, technicians, and computer experts. We

have also used former Diplomatic Security agents temporarily.

Clearly, and coming from the Secret Service I can say this firsthand, Diplomatic Security has the most knowledge of how to work

in an overseas environment of any Federal law enforcement agency. None of the others are even close—and I think other agencies

would testify to that reality.

The agents that we have sent out come up through the system.

We have more senior agents at the larger posts where the programs are more demanding. They have assistants who work for

them. But all receive a substantial amount of training in the appropriate fields and disciplines that they will be required to use overseas.

Mr. COOKSEY. Good. I have been impressed with the professionalism of the people in the State Department and favorably impressed. I am concerned sometimes that the political appointees

don’t have the background, the expertise or the—they are good people, well-intentioned people, but are a little naive, somewhat naive

when it comes to these security considerations, and I hope that

they come up with some level of understanding there.

I used to work in Kenya and East Africa doing—quite frankly,

doing eye surgery. I am very sensitive to that issue. You know, as

you well know in Kenya, there was a small bomb detonated, the

people ran to the windows, looked, and most of the injuries that occurred were eye injuries. I know one surgeon that works at a Presbyterian hospital that I did 8 or 10 cornea transplants in about a

65

24-hour period 1 day, and he was involved in taking care of those,

and it is a very sophisticated hospital for that part of the world.

I gather from your comments that you are really taking major

measures to prevent flying glass and blinding injuries.

Mr. KENNEDY. If I might, that is one of the things that we are

most concerned about. We are pursuing this on two tracks. As Admiral Crowe’s report so rightly recommended and as the IG has

pointed out as well, if the structure of the building is sound enough

for us to put in laminated windows and heavier frames, we do that.

At the same time if the building structure isn’t good enough, when

the blast goes off what will happen is the entire window, the entire

big piece of laminate in the frame, will go flying through the room

like a sieve, wiping out the people in front of it.

Mr. COOKSEY. So it’s bad either way.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. But what we do is we have gone to laboratories like Sandia National Laboratories and to the private sector

and we have doubled the strength of what is called shatter-resistant window film. In fact, it is plastic wrap that is used now—we

used to use 4-millimeter thick. We have now doubled that to 8-millimeter strength. We are applying that to all the windows on all

of our facilities. We will have that done by June of this year. When

the blast goes off, the window shatters, but this 8-millimeter film

holds the glass shards together, and you get the whole window, the

glass part in effect, plopping down into the room without any damage.

In one of our posts in the newly independent States about 6

months ago a bomb went off, not directed at us but at a neighboring facility, and after the bomb went off many of our windows

shattered, but the entire window was still intact because the plastic had done exactly what it was supposed to do, not injure our personnel.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I had another committee so I apologize

for not being here, and you may have already answered my question. So I will apologize in advance for that if you already did.

My question is just about the overall—I know we have many embassies all over the world, and of course since the terrorist attacks

some time ago our concern about this has been elevated even higher than it always was about the safety of our people and the other

folks working there. How many of our embassies just—and you

don’t have to specifically name which ones—but how many of our

embassies still really need to be dramatically improved relative to

security measures? In other words, do we still have some that are

out there that may be fairly easily attacked or come under some

sort of successful terrorist attack? And, again, we don’t want to

broadcast which ones they might be, for obvious reasons, but either

a percentage or just some—without giving specific examples, could

you comment on that?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir, I would be glad to. About 85 percent

of our embassies still do not meet the 100 foot setback standard

that is critical for protection against a large vehicle bomb. Set back

is really the best protection, and we do not have that in 85 percent

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of our embassies on one or more sides of the building. They may

meet it on three sides, but one side remains vulnerable.

Mr. CHABOT. Can I followup on that then. How does one then go

about obtaining that goal? Do you have to buy up buildings around

there and literally tear them down? Is that what you do or what?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is a combination of those things. We have

bought and torn down buildings in some instances. We bought adjacent buildings when buildings were available. We have also

bought parks. We have bought gas stations. We have bought empty

lots in an attempt to obtain the setback. Long term, the solution

is to move the facility to a site large enough for the setback.

Mr. CHABOT. And then if you do move to another site—I mean,

at what point do you run into the problem where, you know, it is

more of a—some sort of fort as opposed to an embassy where people can easily come in and do business with the representatives of

the U.S. Government in that particular country? I presume that is

a fine line you are always walking in these matters.

Mr. CARPENTER. It is a fine line. But let me assure you, we have

no intention of building forts or prisons or military bases. We think

you can attain an aesthetically attractive building, and still have

it be secure.

Mr. KENNEDY. I would just say, sir, in response to your earlier

question, we have already acquired 87 properties around the world

at 25 posts, and we are now negotiating on 31 others at 14 posts.

So we need to push that back. I think that if you use clever design

work you can create a facility that is safe but inviting, and we are

partnering with a large number of American architectural firms,

some of the best, and are also engaging at every post where we are

doing this one local architect who knows the local culture and the

local environment, and he or she works on the outside of the building, never on the inside where there would be technical security

issues.

But I think there are cases such as Lima, Peru, for an example,

where we have built an inviting building, created the perimeter but

creating sort of controlled pathways for people to come in from the

walk to the consular section or the public diplomacy section. It is

not easy, but if you get the right architectural and engineering support we can do it.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. I have one or two

questions, and then I will call on Dr. Cooksey for a few more.

Mr. Kennedy, FBO is ready to begin construction on their new

embassy in Luanda, Angola. However, that will require waivers for

not meeting the 100 foot setback on all sides. That seems to be setting the wrong precedent for these important standards. Has the

FBO searched for a larger plot of land to allow for full setback?

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the knottiest conundrums. We have been searching for a larger part of land in

Luanda, Angola, for 5 years. We have simply not been able to find

a plot of land that would give us the full 100 foot setback on all

sides.

Our people in Luanda now, some of them are literally working

out of trailers where, you know, a firecracker might blast the walls

of the trailer down. So we, in full consultation with Diplomatic SeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:45 Dec 11, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 67827.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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curity, have been measuring this. Given that we have in effect an

F in security in Luanda and we can move—potentially move with

waivers to A minus or a B plus, we figure, though that does not

meet everything, the movement from F to A minus without regard

to any precedent it is setting would be in the interests of both the

U.S. Government on the whole and our people there in particular.

Chairman GILMAN. What kind of a setback would be available at

the land you are looking at?

Mr. KENNEDY. We would have a 100 foot or so on two sides and

over 65 foot on two sides. So it is significantly better than we have

now.

If I might add one other thing, Mr. Chairman, the standards that

come from the Overseas Security Policy Boards say a 100 foot setback and a concrete wall of so many inches thick for yield blast resistance, and that is a formula: 100 foot plus concrete equals safe

setback. What we would do on the two sides that are 65 foot is to

increase the thickness and the strength of the concrete wall. So

you, in effect, have exactly the same setback effect by simply increasing the thickness and the strength of the concrete.

Chairman GILMAN. You will be doing that in the front wall as

well?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. So we would achieve the same goal by

using more concrete and less footage.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Carpenter, there are incidents where

American government employees in Inman-qualified embassies are

being allowed to move off the embassy space, thereby creating new

security concerns and security challenges. What is your view on

permitting employees to leave the Inman embassies for less secure

facilities and who is granting waivers for that kind of movement?

Are you being consulted?

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of the specific facility to which you refer. I would, quite frankly, not want to hear

it in this hearing.

Chairman GILMAN. If I may, it is USAID in Bogota.

Mr. CARPENTER. USAID in Bogota? Unfortunately, the most I

can tell you is that proposal is under review. Quite frankly, I am

not aware of the specifics of that request on AID’s part.

Chairman GILMAN. We would hope you would take a look at that

and let our office know.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would be glad to.

Chairman GILMAN. Is that a generally good idea, when we are

being asked to fund so many security projects already, of allowing

the movement?

Mr. CARPENTER. Again, Mr. Chairman, that is a decision that is

country and post specific. In some places, dispersal of our employees is, in fact, a security enhancement. One of the realities, even

with an Inman building, is they may be limited in functionality,

and sometimes very hard decisions have to be made. However, let

me assure you, before we would move someone out of an Inmanstyle building, we would have to have reasonable assurances that

what they were moving to would provide them maximum security.

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. Williams-Bridgers, do you agree with

this proposition of allowing such movement?

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Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. I do agree with Assistant Secretary

Carpenter that it has to be a country specific decision.

But certainly one of the greatest challenges that FBO and the

Department have faced in building new embassies overseas or

making major renovations to accommodate increased staff is the accommodation of other agencies’ requests for either movement off

the compound or for increasing their staff.

We saw this in Moscow when other agencies throughout the

course of the construction decided on significant increases in their

staff and it made for major reconsideration of configuration of

space in the embassy. We shall see this in many other instances.

So whether or not FBO continues to maintain the functions as

presently structured or if those functions are assigned outside of

the Department of State, the ‘‘right sizing’’ of mission staffing is

going to have to be a primary consideration of the new unit held

responsible for designing and constructing new embassies. Interagency communication will be essential during the design phase of

future embassy facilities.

Chairman GILMAN. Madam Inspector General, your statement indicates that the Department spent $77 million in fiscal year 1999

on the surveillance detection program. Does your initial assessment

of the value of that program support that kind of an expenditure

and can that level or more be sustained over time when there are

so many demands for costly physical upgrades?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. I think it is important to note that as

we have focused our attention on the need for physical security improvements in our embassies overseas that there are a number of

other initiatives, including procedural security initiatives and information and intelligence gathering, that are as important in contributing to our ability to protect Americans overseas where they live

and work. The surveillance detection program improves our ability

to collect information about those who may potentially harm our

employees in the embassy. I think there are improvements that

need to be made in the surveillance detection program.

Currently, the principal objectives of the program are to collect

information about those that might be watching us in the embassy

and to engage local police services, local guard services to spread

our eyes and ears outside the embassy compound. I think it is most

important for us to now begin using that information more smartly,

sharing the information regionally with those that can better assist

us in identifying who the potential terrorists are and then identifying what kinds of assertive action we might take to pursue those

individuals, beyond just the mere photograph and the recording of

their name and a photograph.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Carpenter, I have got two questions I want to ask you and

would like you to answer them in 60 seconds or maybe give us a

written explanation, because I don’t want to totally ignore Ms. Williams-Bridgers.

It has been brought to my attention that there is an embassy

that was actually checking vehicles inside the embassy gates and

didn’t have any type of operational delta barriers to prevent this

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type of access to the compound. Is there a standard operating procedure for inspecting vehicles and has this been reiterated to the

basic security people?

To elaborate on that, I was at an embassy last year in a part of

Asia and—good people, but, I mean, the embassy is right out on

the street. There is no security, and there is really no way to check.

There is not even a perimeter there. I mean, it is on the main

street. That is one question.

No. 2, does DS believe that it can do most—should there be some

risk analysis made so you can make some informed judgments

about the spending priorities with this limited amount of money?

Mr. CARPENTER. With regard to vehicle inspection, yes, sir, there

is a standard procedure. I think I was just at that same embassy

2 weeks ago that you have had the occasion to visit and was appalled when I saw it.

The reality is that we have to play the hand we are dealt, and

we have had to do some things in nontraditional ways. Sometimes

that includes sweeping the vehicle after it is inside the gate. That

is not our SOP, but we felt it better to sweep it even though it is

inside the gate than not sweep it at all. We can’t close the necessary streets or obtain a location reasonably close by in which to

do these inspections.

Part of the reason for having a countersurveillance program is to

try to give us a virtual setback. That program gives us a span of

control outside the embassy. It gives us early warnings of impending problems and the ability to alert a facility that a problem is

coming.

We have been dealt a bad hand when it comes to setback. As I

said earlier, 85 percent of our facilities don’t have it. We are trying

to make adjustments and accommodations to the best of our ability.

We are going to have to continue to change the way we are doing

business out there.

What we have in place is good now. Next month, it is going to

be better and the next month even better; and certainly a year

from now, assuming we are still in those safe facilities, it is going

to be even better, still.

Mr. COOKSEY. Good.

Ms. Williams-Bridgers, I was on the IG team the last 6 months

I was in the Air Force so I know that all IG people aren’t terrible,

ruthless people, but the job has to be done. In my capacity on the

Public Buildings Subcommittee of Transportation we found that

there was some buildings in this country, domestic again—of

course, this is a domestic issue—that were built, one as many as

30 years ago or 27 years ago for probably 50 to 70 million dollars,

I forget the exact number, but over the years the lease payments

for that building are approaching $900 million and nearly a billion

dollar. Do we own all of these buildings abroad? Do we own all embassies or are, in fact, some of them leased out?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. I will defer to Assistant Secretary Kennedy. However, we do not own all of our overseas property holdings.

Mr. COOKSEY. There was some political patronage. Does it carry

over into our embassies? That is ultimately my question.

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Mr. KENNEDY. Dr. Cooksey, I don’t think it involves political patronage so much as the lack of a capital program. If you take—— Mr. COOKSEY. You remind me of Congress, for giving me your

money, should—I will quote Admiral Crowe who says, there’s

enough blame to go around between the Legislative and Executive

Branches. I will blame it on Congress.

Mr. KENNEDY. We have some 12,000 buildings overseas. We

probably own less than 2,000 of them.

Mr. COOKSEY. Really.

Mr. KENNEDY. Basically, we try to own wherever we can. But, in

many cases, because the funds available to us are simply enough

to pay the rent but not enough to make the up-front payment that

is needed to purchase, we are stuck—just as you pointed out from

your experience on your other committee, we are stuck paying the

rent every day.

That is something that the overseas presence panel pointed out.

It is something we are working with under Ms. Thomasson. We are

in constant consultation with OMB to see if there were some way

to move this along so that we could lease to own or do some new,

inventive, creative way of funding and financing which would not

be an immediate burden on American taxpayers but would put us

in a very different position 10 years down the line.

Mr. COOKSEY. From a total long-term cost standpoint, we would

be better off to own these buildings.

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. COOKSEY. I want to make one other closing comment. I made

this to a Republican colleague the other day, and I put him on the

spot, and I apologized to him, but it is a message that I still want

to put out, and it is marginally related to this Committee.

I think one of the most disgraceful, cowardly, despicable acts of

omission that is going on right now by members of both parties, the

Executive Branch, maybe the State Department, is the fact that we

are totally ignoring the human rights abuses that are going on in

Africa. I am talking about Rwanda, Burundi, today Sierra Leone.

A good friend of mine had a wonderful eye clinic with wonderful

equipment there that is destroyed. And Eritrea, Ethiopia and now

Zimbabwe, places where they are going in and slaughtering people,

cutting children’s hands and legs off. We are focused on human

rights abuses in China, and they have got abuses there but not on

this scale. I think that the politicians in this city who don’t have

the courage to stand up to these human rights abuses when they

are diverting attention to China should be held to account for it.

My question, in these countries I mentioned, Sierra Leone, where

they cut the children’s hands off and feet and legs, in Rwanda and

Burundi and more recently in Zimbabwe, where they are shooting

people, and today I read in the paper they are taking a lumber

company out, what kind of security do we have there for our embassies and are the embassies able to take a position there? Is the

fact that we have got a bunch of cowardly people in this city a reflection of the fact that we don’t have embassies there or security

there that could address this really despicable, cowardly act of

omission by the people in this city?

That would be a good one for you, Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I didn’t

mean to ignore you on the other questions, but I am concerned

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about this. Is it because we don’t have the embassy personnel, the

security in these countries?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. We do have an American presence in

the many of the places that you mentioned, and I couldn’t agree

with you more that there is no more despicable act than what we

see commissioned across too much of the globe as the abuses

against human beings, against women and children who are virtually defenseless.

The security of our embassies and our embassy personnel are established, first and foremost, to protect Americans who are working

and living to support the business of the American embassies

abroad. The mission of our embassies abroad is to advance human

rights issues in many of those locations, and I don’t believe that it

is being ignored at all by the Department of State, and its best efforts are being put forward.

That said, we haven’t looked specifically at the advancement of

human rights policies by any of those particular missions that you

have mentioned in the course of recent inspections.

Mr. COOKSEY. My question then, in summary and in closing, Mr.

Chairman, if in these countries we had a state-of-the-art embassy

in terms of construction security, could we have a more effective

presence in addressing these human rights abuses against women

and children? That is who the abuses are against. I have delivered

babies with women who have had female genital mutilation. I have

taken care of people with land mine injuries and AK–47 injuries,

some years ago, 8 or 10 years ago. But could we do a better job

of addressing these problems if we had this state-of-the-art security

in our embassies that you are talking about or could we not?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. There is absolutely no doubt that without the adequate facilities, without safe facilities to house U.S.

Government employees who are working overseas to advance issues

like human rights that we cannot effectively execute our mission.

I think that it is why it is one of the first and foremost priorities

of the Department to ensure that we have the commitment of funding, that we have all of the resources that are necessary to enhance

the security and, therefore, the viability of our missions overseas.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.

One last question, Mr. Carpenter. The case that Dr. Cooksey

mentioned in the South American embassy, that delta barrier, I

have been informed, in front of the vehicle being checked inside the

compound was not working. The next stop was the front door of the

Ambassador’s residence and the chance for a suicide bomber. Has

that delta barrier been fixed since that inspection?

Mr. CARPENTER. They are still working on it. Like a number of

other issues out there, we are aware of the problems that we have.

That clearly is one. Equipment is sometimes slow to be installed.

It is critical that it be installed. They have taken some other measures to mitigate the threat until it is installed; but unfortunately,

I have to report that it has yet to be completed.

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Chairman GILMAN. Our Committee called this to your attention

several months ago. We hoped that that would be taken care of

properly.

Mr. CARPENTER. I wish it had been. It should have been.

Chairman GILMAN. I want to thank the panelists for your time.

Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X

MAY 11 AND MAY 17, 2000

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICK F. KENNEDY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR ADMINISTRATION, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 17, 2000

Mr. Chairman: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your Committee. It

is always a pleasure for me to be able to update you on the many accomplishments

that the Department has made in improving our overseas security posture, facility

infrastructure, and our worldwide facility operations. Obviously, since the tragic

bombings of our embassies in East Africa, the issues concerning our infrastructure

and the security of our missions overseas have received great attention within the

Administration and the Congress. We very much appreciate the support of the Congress, and particularly of this Committee, for the Emergency Security Supplemental

and the Administration’s proposals for physical security upgrades at our overseas

posts. I would also like to say a few words today on the Overseas Presence Advisory

Panel (OPAP) and its recommendations concerning our Office of Foreign Buildings

Operations (A/FBO). Finally, I will give a brief report on what we are doing at the

Main State headquarters building here in Washington and the issue of security

clearances for custodial and operations and maintenance personnel.

As you know, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, which issued its report last

November, described many of our facilities abroad as unacceptable in terms of security and condition. Fully 85 percent of our facilities do not meet optimum security

standards. Some are in need of extensive renovation. Some are seriously overcrowded. Most, however, simply have to be replaced. To protect our employees overseas, our goal is to expeditiously locate into safe facilities more than 22,000 embassy

staff in over 220 vulnerable buildings. This is a formidable task. Achievement of this

task will require an enormous initial and sustained level of capital investment. Mr.

Chairman, quite frankly, during the past 10 years, we neither requested nor received sufficient funding to allow us to maintain our infrastructure base. Most recently, since the 1998 bombings, we are finally beginning to arrest that decline in

resources, thanks to the support of the President and the Congress, and have taken

the first steps toward rebuilding our facilities infrastructure. In fiscal year 1999

alone, A/FBO obligated over $800 million, the most ever obligated in a fiscal year,

to replace unsafe facilities and improve security at those posts whose facilities cannot be replaced for several years.

As part of OPAP’s overall charter to evaluate the way the United States organizes

its overseas activities, it made 44 recommendations in eight general areas. This

morning, I would like to focus some of my remarks on the Panel’s recommendation

to establish an Overseas Facilities Authority (OFA).

The Panel advocated replacing the Bureau of Administration’s Office of Foreign

Buildings Operations with a federally chartered government corporation—an Overseas Facilities Authority. The issues that led to the Panel’s proposal included the

perception that A/FBO-managed construction projects took longer and cost more

than comparable private sector projects, that timelines were not always met, and

that staffing levels appeared to be too high for the number of properties and projects

being handled. However, I believe that the staff work that underpins these perceptions is faulty, as it failed to give due consideration to security requirements and

special overseas needs.

The Panel proposed creating a government-chartered corporation that would allow

the use of management and financing techniques commonly found in the private

sector. This new authority—OFA—would exercise responsibility for building, renovating, maintaining, and managing the Federal Government’s civilian overseas facilities, including office and residential facilities. As envisaged by OPAP, the OFA,

in addition to receiving annual appropriations from Congress, would have features

not currently available to the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, including receiving funds from other agencies, levying capital charges for new facilities, obtaining forward funding commitments from the Federal Budget and loans from the U.S.

Treasury, as well as retaining service fees from sources approved by the Congress.

The OFA, again, unlike the current A/FBO, would have the ability to apply management techniques commonly used in the private sector to include using financial incentives and performance-based compensation standards. The Panel reasoned that

higher salaries and incentives would allow OFA to attract highly qualified real estate and other professionals and further motivate employees and contractors to better meet construction project schedules.

We are currently giving serious and careful consideration to the Panel’s proposals

to reinvent the method of funding and administration of our overseas facilities’ design and construction program. An interagency group headed by the Director of the

Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, Patsy Thomasson, is reviewing all aspects

of overseas facilities. Earlier this year, Ms. Thomasson formed six teams within A/

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FBO to look in to, and analyze in depth, five critical areas—organizational structure, financing alternatives, business process reengineering, customer focus, and

communications. A sixth team manages the overall effort. Together, these teams

will make recommendations on how the Panel’s desired outcomes can best be

achieved. We have also contracted with a leading consulting firm to examine various

funding options and ways to make A/FBO a more performance-based organization.

While these team efforts are still continuing, I believe that creating an independent

OFA is not essential to accomplish the changes that OPAP laid out. Most of the proposed attributes of the OFA could be assigned either administratively or legislatively to A/FBO without disrupting and halting the very positive direction in which

A/FBO is now headed.

Although we agree with the thrust of the Panel’s recommendations, we question

whether the creation of an independent, federally chartered organization, comprised

of both the public and private sectors, is necessarily the best approach to meet our

infrastructure challenges overseas. Principally, we are concerned that such an entity

may compromise the vital link between foreign policy and facility decisions. For example, there are foreign policy issues, such as reciprocity, that are intricately intertwined with overseas facility programs. Such is the case with China, where we are

seeking a site for a new embassy in Beijing and China is seeking, as a condition,

a site in Washington. Such is also the case with the United Arab Emirates, where

we are seeking to acquire a parcel of land adjacent to our embassy in Abu Dhabi,

and they want a new residence for their Ambassador here in Washington. These are

classic examples where facility decisions are affected and sometimes driven by foreign policy considerations.

The Panel also urged that we continue to implement the Accountability Review

Board’s (ARB) proposals providing for security upgrades at our overseas posts

throughout the world. We are doing that, and I am pleased to report that the Office

of Foreign Buildings Operations has been particularly successful in responding to

the mandates of the security supplemental that followed the 1998 bombings. Interim

facilities are fully operational in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and we are moving

smartly toward constructing permanent facilities in both locations. The Office of

Foreign Buildings Operations conducted a competition for a fast-track design/build

contract and awarded the contract last September. The designs of these projects

have now reached the point where we anticipate giving the contractor the green

light to mobilize onsite at Dar and Nairobi next month. We have also opened a temporary office building in Doha and are fitting out three buildings in Pristina to serve

as temporary facilities. We have permanent facilities under construction in Doha

and Kampala.

Currently we have 14 new embassies or consulates in various stages of development: Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Abu Dhabi, Abuja, Berlin, Doha, Istanbul, Kampala,

Luanda, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Seoul, Tunis, and Zagreb. We are also in the

process of acquiring several additional new office building sites. Also, since the

bombings, A/FBO has completed 15 major rehabilitation projects at overseas posts

with another 46 major rehab projects ongoing at this time.

Since the bombings we have also relocated many overseas Department and other

Agency personnel to more secure facilities. For example, AID personnel have been/

are being relocated to more secure facilities in Almaty, Antananarivo, Asuncion,

Ashgabat, Cairo, Kampala, Luanda, Manila, New Delhi, Rabat, Tel Aviv and other

locations around the world.

Increasing setback from streets and other buildings is another way of reducing

the threat to loss of life and injury. During the past year and a half A/FBO has

been extremely active in acquiring 87 setback properties at 25 posts around the

world to provide greater security to our personnel. Negotiations and investigations

are continuing on another 31 properties at 14 posts.

Worldwide Security Upgrade funding appropriated by the Congress has enabled

A/FBO to approve 1,051 security upgrade projects at overseas posts with 34 percent

of these projects having been completed. Every project will further protect our employees overseas. The Worldwide Security Upgrade Program which includes security

projects such as the installation of berms, bollards, and access controls, is being executed at each post by A/FBO, the post itself, and/or by an implementation contractor

or basic ordering agreement contractor. Other components of this program include

the installation of shatter resistant window film on all office windows and the installation of forced entry/ballistic resistant (FE/BR) doors and windows. The bombings in Africa demonstrated all too tragically that the greatest threat to life and injury from a bomb blast is from flying shards of glass. Since the bombings, we have

purchased 5.5 million square feet of window film. Nearly half has been installed,

with the remainder to be installed by the end of the summer. We have also installed

or replaced over 500 FE/BR doors and windows.

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A/FBO’s Asset Management Program, which acquires essential property by using

proceeds from the sales of excess or underutilized properties, has been very successful, purchasing 18 properties in fiscal year 1999 and the first half of FY2000, while

disposing of 17 properties.

These successes are the result of retorquing internal processes, applying new initiatives, and introducing innovative methodologies. These have all been key factors

in achieving A/FBO’s high level of productivity over the past 18 months. Today’s Office of Foreign Buildings Operations is not the A/FBO of the late 80’s and early 90’s under the Inman program.

A 1991 General Accounting Office review of the management of the Security Construction Program revealed problems that A/FBO experienced during its efforts to

meet the major challenges of the Inman buildup a decade ago. The most significant

difficulties were linked to inadequate staffing, difficulties with overseas site acquisition, contractor performance, and the lack of an effective strategic focus. Since those

years, however, A/FBO has implemented lessons learned throughout the organization and is now well prepared to undertake a large construction program.

A/FBO has developed an improved strategy for effectively executing a difficult, expanded construction program and has augmented its staff to handle the workload.

The strategy is derived from A/FBO’s Inman experience with the simultaneous execution of large, multi-year projects, and from implementing construction industry

best practices. Included in our strategy are a number of initiatives described below. • Design/build contracting. A/FBO is placing greater reliance on design/build (D/

B) contracting. This method has been demonstrated in both the public and private

sectors to reduce cost and save time in project delivery as compared with the more

traditional two-contract, design-bid-build procurement method. In addition, we are

looking at other multiple projects that could be packaged into groups for award to

a single, large D/B contractor, as we did with the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi

projects. Additional D/B contracts could be awarded for groups of projects in the out

years.

D/B contracts are being managed by integrated project management teams to provide effective controls and added expertise. From the start of a project, these crossdiscipline teams are accelerating project execution; controlling costs; clarifying lines

of authority; and carefully defining roles, responsibilities, procedures, project priorities, and milestones. Potential risks to project success are identified and mitigated

early. • Staffing. A/FBO is much better positioned than in the mid 1980’s when the

Inman program began, and its in-house work force numbered less than 200. The

professionalism and depth of the work force has increased as its size has grown to

over 760 today. Eighty-four new staff members have been, or are being, brought on

for worldwide security upgrades alone. Additional real estate professionals have

been hired to find and acquire new sites and buildings; more design, engineering,

project management, and other professionals and specialists have been brought on

to execute construction projects. Overall, since the bombings, A/FBO has increased

on board staffing by 17 percent.

Contract support has been increased, with Perini Corporation and Brown and

Root assisting with security upgrade work, and with indefinite quantity contractors

increasing A/FBO capabilities, especially in design-review services. • Priority setting. The Accountability Review Boards recommended spending $14

billion on embassy construction in the next 10 years to replace all facilities that do

not meet standards. Interagency Embassy Security Assessment Teams (ESATs) determined that most of our posts have compelling facility needs, such as for adequate

setback, structural hardening, relocations, and other security requirements.

All chanceries, consulates, and multi-tenant annex buildings have been evaluated

for security vulnerability. The analysis assessed the soundness of each building’s structure and facade, the adequacy of the building compound’s perimeter security,

the building’s setback from adjacent property, the post’s political violence security

threat, and additional security considerations that included the capability and willingness of the host country to control its internal and border security relative to external terrorists; as well as other factors. The resulting ranking was reviewed by

stakeholders, i.e., regional bureaus, other agencies, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Embassy Security Assessment Teams, and A/FBO managers. Projects were

then planned for different fiscal years based on vulnerability, stakeholder input, and

consideration of factors that will either inhibit or facilitate a project’s execution.

• Other measures developed or enhanced since the 1998 bombings. Time and

space preclude a full explanation of all the other industry best practices adopted by

A/FBO, however, a representative listing of these best practices follows:

• Industry Outreach

• Enhanced Partnering

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• Security and Blast Research

• Site Search Program

• Pre-qualified A/E Pool

• Generic Statement of Work

• A&E Design Guidelines

• Integrated Building Systems

• Information Technology

• Signage Program

• Standard Delivery Process

• Site Adapted Office Building

• Project Execution Support Contractors

• Reliability Centered Maintenance

• Serviceability Tools and Methods

• Post Occupancy Evaluation

These ‘‘best practices’’ or initiatives, added to intense efforts by the Department,

have resulted in the outstanding record of achievement over the past 18 months,

and clearly demonstrate that today’s A/FBO has the ability to manage a large and

complex building program.

Let me turn now to the Department’s buildings and facilities in Washington and

elsewhere in the United States and the issue of security clearances for custodial and

operations and maintenance personnel.

The Department of State occupies 58 buildings located throughout the United

States, totaling approximately 6 million square feet of space. The Main State building in Washington, the domestic building you are most interested in, comprises

roughly 2.5 million gross square feet and houses more than 8,000 employees. Given

that size and population, Main State is similar to a small city in the services that

are required. As you can imagine services to such a large population must include

electrical, heating, air conditioning, plumbing, painting, carpeting, furniture, communications, custodial services, and all other normal maintenance and repair specialties employed on a daily basis. There are two major contracts that supply the

majority of services in Main State, custodial and operations and maintenance

(O&M). Those contracts are competitively bid and the contractors have corporate

clearances at the appropriate level for their work; the custodial contractor has a corporate top secret clearance while the maintenance contractor has a corporate secret

clearance.

In addition each contractor has employees who are cleared at the appropriate

level in order to perform their jobs within the building. For example, the custodial

contractor has 20 custodial workers with top secret clearance to work in sensitive

and classified areas. Ten more have top secret security clearances pending. If a

maintenance or custodial worker must work in a classified area and the worker has

no clearance, that person is escorted by cleared Department of State personnel. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the occupant of any space classified or not, to

watch over custodial and maintenance workers in their area and protect all material

for which they are responsible.

The Department is currently undergoing extensive renovations to bring the building up to par. The overall Main State renovation project, primarily funded by GSA

is a multi-million dollar project. That work, which is in its early stages, is being

done with GSA contractors. GSA’s contractors have corporate clearances as well. In

addition, with the Congressionally mandated reorganization of the Foreign Affairs

agencies, State is in the process of absorbing the former USIA and ACDA staffs and

functions. This has led to further renovation and construction work in the Main

State building at a cost that will exceed $80 million and will involve probably 200

smaller construction projects, utilizing perhaps as many as 12 different contractors.

Those contractors will all have corporate security clearances and most of the workers will also have clearances. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is involved

in those projects as well. DS is a member of each project team in this process and

we work closely together to ensure that security requirements are met.

I would be pleased to answer any questions.

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