### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 22, 200 8 STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. SA RA H MIC HELLE VIN SON

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Lin coln County No. S0600167 Robert C rigler, Judge

No. M2007- 02346-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Augu st 1, 2008

The defenda

nt, Sarah Michelle Vins on, appea ls her L incoln County Circuit Court convictions of two counts of forg ery . I n this appeal, she c ontends that she wa s improperly denied a lternative se ntencing and that her

sentenc es ar e excessive. The judgme nts of the trial cour t are aff irmed. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nts of the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W ELLES and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.
Her shell D. Kog er, Pulaski, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Sara

h Michelle Vinson. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; L acy

Wilb e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C h ar l e s F r a n k C r aw f

o r d , J r . , D i s t r i c t A t t o r

n e y G e n e r a l ; an d A n n L

. F i l e r an d H o l l y n H e w g l e y, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee . OP IN ION On J anuar

y 23, 2007, the defe ndant was indicted by the L incoln County Gra nd J ury on four c ounts of forg ery . On April 24, 2007, t he defenda nt enter ed guilty pleas to two of the f org ery counts, and the othe r two counts we re dismissed.

At the g uilty

plea he aring , the following fac t rec itation was prese nted by the State: [O] n November 20th, 2006, [t he defe ndant] c ame into the cl erk’s of fi c e in t he mor nin g a t a bo ut 8 :30 to 9 a .m. and

wa s r e qu e sti ngto know wher e J udg e Russell wa s on that day to g et some pape rs sig ned. Af te r l oo kin g at th e ju dge ’s c a le nd e r i t a pp e are d th a t he mig ht b e in B e df or d Co un ty . M s. Cor de r cal led [the ] B e df or d Cl e rk ’s of

fi c e to inquire i f h e wa s there a

nd they informed he r no. She informe d [t he defe ndant] the judge wa s n o t i n court in B edfor d County and [the-2- d ef en d an t] reque sted his office number. Af ter re ceivingit [ the de fe nd ant] i mme diate ly

le ft

. At approximately

1 p.m. on the same da

y [t he def endant] came back to the office with the sam e paper s as the morning , which wa s two order s. They

purported to have Jud ge R ussell’s signature. She wa s asked how did y ou g et these sig ned and he r re sponse was “ Itook them to the courthouse” imply ing Be dford County . They called him down and [he ] sig ne d th e m. Th e se or de rs we re e nte re d. Th e or de rs we re to g et cour t funds for the defe ndant i n the amount of $3,007.24 [and an o r d e r g r an ti n g th e d e f

e n d an t’ s e ma

n c ip a ti o n ].
Acc ording to J udg e Russell, on Frida y , November 17, 2006, he wa s on the benc h in Shelby

ville han dling a

criminal docke t. [ The de fe nd ant ’ s ] a

tto rn e y on the juv e nil e ma tte r c a me in a nd pr e se nte d h im with an order for

disbursement of f

unds being held by

the circ uit court c le rk in L inc oln County

. He sig ne d the or de r t o e manc ipate he r. Th is is the only

one he sig ned. On Monday

morning , November

20th, shortly afte r 9 a.m. he r eturne d a telephone m essag e from J udy Rowe, circuit court cle rk’s off ice he re in Fay etteville, who re fer

red [him] to Ms. Corder, who indicated that Ms. Corder ha d declined to sig n t h e orders that he ha d signe d but didn’t specify

why except to indicate that ther e wa s an er ror. She a sk e d if

[the de fe nd ant] b ro ug ht t he or de r to him

in S he lby vil le if he would sig n them. He a dvised her t h at h e wo uld not do that. The matter should simply

be plac ed on his next docket in Shelby ville, which wa s scheduled f

or De cembe r 13th, 2006. He f urther indicated that the matter would simply

need to be on [t he] Dec ember

13th docket.
He did n’ t he ar a ny thi ngfu rt he r f ro m th e c le rk ’s of

fi c e ov e r h e re un til he was called in late afte rnoon to repor t a new or der f

or disbursement had bee n prese nted to this office by [t he defe ndant] and the signature on the orde r app ea re d t o be rather iff y . I t actually

appea red to be a t ra ci n g. I t w a s a lso no tic e d th at the or de r w a s n ot d a te d, wh ic h is c on tr ary to his usual prac tice.-3- He c onfirm ed wi t h the cler k’s offic e her e that he ha d not signe d a follow-up orde r. In fac t

. . . he had r efe rre d the matter to the Dec ember

13th docket. He asked that copies of the orde rs be F AXed to h im, wh ic h wa s do ne , and he re c og nize d im me diate ly tha t it wa s a f o r g e r y. Th e de fe nd ant s po ke to D e te c tiv e Ad a m E ub ank s o f t he F ay e tte vil le Police Depa

rtment. At that time [t he def endant] admitted to passing these instruments but claimed that someone else ha d act u ally forg ed the judg e’s sig nature . There are two differ ent orde rs. This happene d here in L incoln County

as to the passing

. At the sentenc ing he aring , the State introduce d the pre sent en ce repor t and two c e rt if ie d c op ie s o f t

he de fe nd ant’ s tw o p ri or

c on vic tio ns fo r p a ssi ngwo rt hle ss c he c ks

. J err y Grohowski testified that he was a probation and parole office r who pre pare d the prese ntence repor

t. Mr. Grohowski conf

irmed that the de fenda

nt was cur

rently enrolled at Motlow College and had a

work history

that included “H ug s Not Drug s,” Whitt ’s, Subway , and Kr y stal. The defe ndant testified that she was 17 y ear s old at the time of the hea ring . She had a sk e d f or he r c a se to b e tr ans fe rr e d f ro m juve nil e c ourt

to c ir c uit c ourt so sh e c ou ld p os t bo nd

in o rd er t o b e o u t o f j u v en i l e d et en t i o n fo r T h an k s gi v i n g. T h e d ef en d an t wa s t h en em p l o y edat “H u gs Not Drug s,” a non-prof

it business that service d vending machines. Prior to this job, she worke d at Sub wa y and Whitt’ s si mul tane ou sly

fo r t wo mon ths , at K

ry sta l f or thr e e or fo ur mon ths , a nd a t So nic fo r t hr e e mon ths

. Th e de fe nd ant t e sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s li vin g on he r o wn and pa y inghe r o wn

bil ls. Th e de fe nd a nt tes ti fi ed th a t sh e mov e d o ut o f h e r p are nts ’ h ome be c a us e of an a bu siv e fa mil y situation. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the de fenda nt to two y ear s on eac h count of for g ery , to be se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y , a nd or de re d th e de fe nd ant t o s e rv e 30 day s in ja il “ da y -f or -d ay a t 10 0% a s a condition of her probation.” The defenda nt filed a timely

appea l and alleg es that the trial c ourt err ed in d e nyinga lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing , a nd in i mpo sin g e xce ssi ve se nte nc e s. Whe n a de fe nd ant c ha lle ng e s the le ng th and mann e r of se rv ic e of a se nt ence, thi s court g ener ally

conducts a

de novo re view of the rec ord wit h a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations ma de by the tr ia l c ourt are c or re c t. T. C.A

. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 06 ). Th is p re su mpt ion , h ow e ve r, is conditioned upon the af

firmative showingin the rec ord that the trial c ourt considere d the sentenc ing p ri n ciples and a ll releva

nt fac ts and circ umstances. State v. Ashby , 8 2 3 S. W. 2 d 1 6 6 , 1 6 9 ( T enn. 1991). The burden of showing that the sentenc e is improper is upon the def endant. Id

. I f the re view re fl e c ts t he tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y

c on sid e re d a ll r e le va

nt f a c tor s and its fi nd ing s o f f

a c t are a de qu a te ly supported by

the re cord, this cour

t must affirm the sente nce, “ev en if we w ould have pr efe rre d a differ ent re sult.” State v. Fletc her , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In the eve nt the rec ord fa ils to demonstrate the re quired c onsideration by the trial cour

t, app el l at e review of the-4-

sentenc e is purely

de novo. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.
I n making its sentencing deter minatio n i n t h e p rese nt case , the trial cour t, at the conclusion of the se ntencinghear ing, w as oblig ed to deter mine the proprie ty

of sentenc ing alt ernatives by

considering(1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the sentenc ing he aring s, (2) the prese ntence repor

t, (3) the pr inciples of sente ncing and arg uments as t o sentenc ing alternatives, (4) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved, (5) e vidence and information offer ed by the pa rt ie s o n th e e nh anc e me nt and mit ig a tin g fa c tor s, (6 ) a

ny state me nts the de fe nd ant m a de in his behalf a

bout sentencing , and (7) th e p o t en t i al for rehabilitation or treatment. T.C.A. § 40-35- 21 0( b) ; - 10 3( 5) (2 00 6) ; State v. Holland , 860 S.W .2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. A. De nia l of A lt e r nat ive Se nt e nc ing
T h e d e f e n d an tf i r s ta l l e g e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u rt e r r e d i ns e n t e n c i n g h e r

t o s e r v e 3 0 d a ys of her sentenc e in confine ment and that, ins tead, the c ourt should have or dere d an entire ly suspended sentenc e. As our supre me cour t rec e ntl y r e c o gn ized, “the SentencingAct now pr ovides that ‘[a] de fe nd ant s ha ll b e e lig ibl e fo r p ro batio n und e r t he pr ov isi on s of this c ha

pte r, if the se nte nc e a c tua lly imposed upon the defendant is ten (10) y ear s or less.’” State v. Stacy Joe Carter , ___ S.W .3d ___, No. M2005-02784-SC-R11-CD, slip op. at 12 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting T.C.A. § 40-35-303( a ) (2006))

. Under this revision, def

endants no long er e njoy

a statutory

presumption of favorable candida cy for a lt e r native sente ncing

. See T. C. A. § 40 -35 -10 2(6 ) (p rov id in g that th os e def end ant s w ho meet c e rt a in statutory prer equisites “should b e co nsidered a s a fa vorable candidate for a lternative se ntencing op tio ns in t

he a bs e nc e of e vid e nc e to the c on tr ary . A c ourt sh a ll c on sid e r, bu t is no t bo un d b y , th is advi s o ry sentenc ing guideline.”) . The de fenda nt is, accor dingly , elig ible for, but not entitled to a presumption in favor of

, alternative sentenc ing. See id. “[T] he burde n of establishing suitabilit y for probation rests with the defe ndant.” Id. § 40-35-303( b). T his burden includes de monstrating that probation will “‘subser ve the e nds of justice and the be st interest of both the public and the defe ndant.’” State v. Dy kes , 803 S.W .2d 250, 2 5 9 (T en n . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 0 ) ( q u o t i n g Ho op e r v . S tat e , 297 S.W .2d 78, 81 (1956)) , overruled on other grounds by Hoope r , 29 S.W .3d at 9-10.

I n t hi s case, the c ourt

awa rd e d th e de fe nd ant a

n a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e of sp lit confine ment: 30 day s in ja il with the rema inder of the two-y ear sentenc e to be se rved on pr obation. S ee S t a t e v. Kenneth Jordan , N o . M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 0 1 0

- CC A

- R3

- CD , s li p o p . a t 6 ( T e n n . Cr im

. A p p ., Nashville, May

8, 2 0 0 3 ) (“ A s entence of split confine ment, as orde red he re, qua lifies as an a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e .” ); Sta te v . A da m S ho rt , N o. 03 C01 -9 70 3- CR- 00 09 0, sli p op . a t 3 (T e nn . Cr im. App

. , Kn o x v i l l e, J an . 2 8 , 1 9 9 8 ) ( p ro v i d i n g t h at t h e “ b en ef i tt h e d ef en d an ten j o y edi nb ei n g p re s umed a suitable c andidate f

or alter native s en t en ci n g had bee n depleted” by his rece iving a

n alternative se nte nc e of sp lit

c on fi ne me nt) ; see also State v. F ields , 40 S.W .3d 435 (Tenn. 2001) (obser ving that an alter native sente nce is a

ny sentenc e that does not involve total conf inement). F urthermor e, the-5-

defe ndant has failed to show how a sentenc e of f

ull probation would serve the ends of justice and the best intere st of the public and the de fenda nt. The t ri al cour

t did not err in sentenc ing the de fe nd ant t o s e rv e 30 da

y s in c on fi ne me nt. B. Length of

Sentence The de fenda

nt next challeng es the leng th of her se ntence s. The de fenda nt pleaded g uil ty to t wo c ounts of

fo rg e ry , a Cla ss E fe lony , whi c h ca

rr ie s a se nte nc e ra

ng e of on e to t wo y e a rs . See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-114, 40- 35-112(a ) (2006) . The trial c ourt found that one enhanc ement fa ctor applied because the defendant had two prior convic tions for passing worthless che cks. See id. § 40- 35-114(1) (providing for se ntence enhanc ement whe n “[t] he defenda nt has a pre vious history

of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or

c ri min a l be havio r, in a dd iti on to t ho se ne c e ssa

ry to e sta bli shthe a pp ro pr ia te rang e[.] ”). The trial court also found t hree mitigating fac tors: that the def endant’ s conduct did not cause or threaten serious bodily injury ; that the defe ndant lacke d substantial judgmen t b ec au se of her youth; and that, pursuant to the “c atch- all” fa ctor, she e x perie nced a difficult upbring ing. Id. § 40-35-113 ( 1), (6) , (13).

The defe ndant contends that the trial court f ailed to apply

cer tain mitigating fac tors and fa iled to properly

weig h other fa ctors. Specif ically , the defendant contends that the trial cour t err ed in not applying mitig ating fac tor (11), that the defe ndant “c ommitt ed the of fense under suc h unusual circ umstances that it i s u n l i k el y that a sustained intent to violate the law motivated the conduct,” and thre e “c atch a ll” fac tors; that the d efendant’s c ase c ould not have bee n transfe rre d from juvenile c ourt without the acquie scenc e of the defe ndant, that the defe ndant had a lawf ul rig ht to obtain the money

at the hea rt of the f org erie s, and that the defendant pursue d a colleg e educ ation and enjoy ed a f

avora ble work history

. See id. § 40-35-113 ( 11), (13)

. We a g re e wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on no t to a pp ly the a lle g e d mi tig a tin g fa c tor s in de te rm ini ngse nte nc ing

. We are un c on vin c e d that mit ig a tin g fa c tor (1 1) a pp lie s b e c a

us e the fa c ts in this case and the defe ndant’s conflicting , post-offe nse statements support the finding t h at the defe ndant ac ted with knowledg e of he r ac tions. The proposed “ca t ch -all” mit iga ting f actor s are simil arly unconvincing

. The decision to tr ansfe r a case to c ircuit court was initiated by the def endant in o rd e r t o b e ho me fo r Th ank sg ivi ng and is no t a mit ig a tin g fa c tor . T he de fe nd ant m ay ult imate ly have be en due the funds at issue, but by her a ctions, she tried to dupe th e co u rt into a premature pay ment. Finally , we a g ree with the trial court’s f inding that “ her e ducation and w ork, while that is all right, ther e is nothing e x ceptionally g ood or bad a

bout it, I don’t think it rises to the level of a mitigating f

actor .”
F ina lly , we rej ectth e def

end ant ’s c on ten ti on th at t he t ri al c ou rtfai led to give a de qu a te weig ht to the three a

pplicable mitigating f

actor s. “[T] he 2005 ame ndments deleted as g rounds for appea l a claim that the tria l court did not weig h proper ly the enha nceme nt and mitigatingfac tors.” Carter , _

__ S.W. 3d

__

_, sli p op . a t 9. Mo re ov e r, we re min d th e de fe nd ant t hat th e we ig ht g ive n to enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors has alwa y s been a matter e ntrusted to the sound di s cr et i o n of the trial cour

t. See, e .g. , State v. Palme r , 10 S.W .3d 638, 646 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

.-6- Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE