OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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Table of Contents 

Results 2

Background 2 

Numerical Reports of Assigned and Trained 

Forces Contain Limitations 5 

Substantial Numbers of Assigned and Trained 

Personnel Are Not Present for Duty 6 

Police Recruiting Exceeds Training Capacity 6 

Shortage of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers 

Remains a Long-Term Undertaking 7 

Deficiencies in Logistics and Combat Support Require 

Continued Coalition Assistance 8 

Additional Forces Needed by 2010 for Internal Security 8 

Transitioning to a Military Force for External Security 

Remains a Future Goal 9 

Methodology for Determining Numbers of Assigned and 

Trained Personnel is Evolving 10 

Management Comments and Audit Response 10 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 12 

B. Command Relationships in Establishing, Training, and Equipping the Iraqi Security 

Forces 14 

C. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Comments 15 

D. Acronyms 19 

E. Audit Team Members 20 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

April 25, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

JOINT SECRETARIAT 

OSD POLICY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND – IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

SUBJECT: Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department 

of Defense Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (SIGIR-08-015) 

Section 9010 of the Defense Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 109-289, requires the 

Secretary of Defense to submit a quarterly report to the Congress that presents a comprehensive 

set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward military and political stability in 

Iraq. One indicator being reported is information on the number of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 

authorized (required), assigned (on-the-payroll), and trained. The Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reviewed available information to assess the reliability and 

usefulness of the number of forces authorized, assigned, and trained, as reflected in the March 

2008 Department of Defense (DoD) Section 9010 report, Measuring Stability and Security in 

Iraq; and the methodology for gathering the information, including the extent to which DoD 

reviews and/or validates this information. 

To achieve our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed the most recent DoD March 2008 Section 

9010 quarterly report relating to the ISF and compared information in that report with earlier 

Section 9010 reports. We also reviewed prior reports by SIGIR, the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO), the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Jones Report), and 

others. We held discussions with officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Policy). Our audit plan called for us to hold discussions and obtain information from officials at 

the Multi National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I), and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). As a basis for these discussions, we 

provided written questions related to our objectives. We received a written response to our 

questions through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense late in our review cycle, and 

have incorporated this information in this report, as appropriate. We plan to conduct additional 

follow-on work with U.S. officials in Iraq to obtain a more complete understanding of data 

gathering and reporting methodologies, as well as efforts to strengthen related processes. 

Appendix A provides more information on our scope and methodology. 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Results 

The results of our work to this point show that efforts have been made to improve the 

information on the numbers of Iraqi Security Forces authorized, assigned, and trained included in 

DoD’s 9010 reports. However, the details included in the reports, and other available 

information suggests a continuing need for caution in relying on the accuracy and usefulness of 

the numbers. This is because: 

• There are continuing uncertainties about the true number of assigned and trained Iraqi 

personnel who are present for duty at any one time. A substantial number of personnel 

still on the payroll are not available for duty for various reasons, such as being on-leave, 

absent without leave, injured, or killed. 

• Evolving changes in reporting methodology make it difficult to compare information 

from one report to earlier reports. 

• The numbers of personnel reported as trained are not easily correlated with those 

assigned, the latter including persons not yet trained. Further, both assigned and trained 

numbers include persons no longer on duty, and the number of trained personnel, in and 

of itself, is widely recognized as an inadequate indicator of force capability. 

• The shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers in the Iraqi security forces 

remains a significant long-term shortfall that could take a decade to address. 

• There is a recognized need for additional Iraqi security forces by 2010 to field a 

counterinsurgency force capable of protecting the country against internal threats and 

insurgency. 

• Iraqi forces still rely on substantial logistical support of Coalition forces. 

• With a current focus is on addressing internal security needs, the longer-term focus on the 

force structure needed to counter external threats has yet to be addressed. 

Information on numbers of ISF personnel included in Section 9010 reports are reportedly derived 

from multiple sources within individual Iraqi ministries based on processes that continues to 

evolve. This includes ongoing efforts to develop an automated data system to manage Iraqi 

military manpower accountability and pay. DoD makes some efforts to determine and comment 

on the reliability of the data presented in the Section 9010 reports; however, as the Iraqi 

government assumes greater control over the forces trained and assigned, U.S. officials envision 

that they will have less visibility over data reliability. SIGIR’s follow-on work will further 

assess efforts to improve data collection and reliability. 

Background 

Since 2003, the Congress has appropriated $20.4 billion1 to support the development of the ISF. 

The ISF is comprised of the following elements: the Police Service, the National Police, and the 

 

1

 U.S appropriated funds include $5.0 billion in the FY 2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF); $5.4 

billion in the FY 2005 Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF); followed by increases of $3.0 billion (ISSF, FY 2006), 

$5.5 billion (ISSF, FY 2007); and $1.5 billion (ISSF, FY 2008). 

2
Directorate of Border Enforcement, under the Ministry of Interior; the Ground Forces (Army), 

Navy, and Air Force; and Support Forces, under the Ministry of Defense; and the Special 

Operations Forces under the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. According to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Government of Iraq (GoI) has now exceeded the U.S. in total 

funding for the ISF and this divergence is expected to increase. The recently passed 2008 Iraqi 

budget provides about $9 billion for the ISF. 

In May 2004, National Security Presidential Directive No. 36, “United States Government 

Operations in Iraq,” assigned responsibility for organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi 

security forces to the commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM’s 

subordinate command, the MNF-I, leads this effort and is authorized to do what it can to 

contribute to security and stability in Iraq. MNF-I’s major subordinate commands–MNSTC-I 

and the MNC-I–play integral roles in the development and training of the ISF. 

MNSTC-I assists the GoI in developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining the ISF. 

MNC-I is responsible for tactical command and control of MNF-I operations in Iraq and works 

with Iraq’s military at the division, brigade, and battalion levels, as well as with police forces at 

the provincial, district, and station levels. Appendix B shows U.S. command relationships in 

establishing, training, and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces. 

In 2005, Congress emphasized the need for a more comprehensive set of performance indicators 

and measures of stability and security in Iraq, and directed the Secretary of Defense to submit 

quarterly reports. These reports, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, focus on Iraq’s 

progress toward political and military stability. One measure of ISF development–the number of 

authorized, assigned, and trained forces–is shown in Section 2 of the report (Iraqi Security 

Forces Training and Performance). The 11th quarterly progress report was issued in March 2008. 

It included information on the number of ISF authorized, assigned, and trained, as of January 1, 

2008, by ministry and component (see Table 1). 

GAO and others have previously commented on issues related to ISF development and the 

limitations in reported authorized, assigned, and trained forces. For example, in a March 2007 

report, GAO stated that the high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an 

overstatement of the number of security forces present for duty.2

 A more complete listing of 

reports by GAO and others is shown in Appendix A. 

 

2 Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, GAO-07-612T, March 13, 

2007. 

3
Table 1—Iraqi Security Forces as of January 1, 2008 

COMPONENT AUTHORIZED ASSIGNED TRAINED

Ministry of Interior Forces 

Police 288,001 275,300 155,248

National Police 33,670 32,389 41,399

Border Enforcement 38,205 39,649 27,959

Total 359,876 347,338 224,606

Ministry of Defense Forces 

Army 186,352 159,938 174,940

Support Forces 17,369 18,794 19,750

Air Force 2,907 1,305 1,370

Navy 1,483 1,115 1,194

Total 208,111 181,152 197,254

Counter-Terrorism Bureau 

Special Operations 4,857 3,126 3,485

Total 572,844 531,616 425,345

Source: DoD report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, March 2008.

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials stated that the process of developing the 

quarterly report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, takes about two months and involves 

reviews by many entities inside and outside DoD. The process begins with OSD submitting a 

Request for Information to the Joint Staff, MNF-I, and CENTCOM. MNF-I relies on its 

subcommand, MNSTC-I, to obtain force strength data from Iraq’s Ministries of Defense and 

Interior. MNF-I’s initial draft then undergoes numerous revisions and redrafts, with input and 

review from various government organizations, before being submitted to the Secretary of 

Defense for final review and eventual delivery to Congress. Organizations involved in the 

process include the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Treasury; the Office of 

Management and Budget; National Security Council; and the Intelligence Community. Table 2 

shows the organizations providing input and/or reviewing the quarterly report. Although many 

organizations review the quarterly reports, OSD officials say, the GoI provides the number of 

authorized, assigned, and trained Iraqi security forces. 

4
Table 2—Organizations Providing Input and/or Review of Quarterly Reports 

• Secretary of Defense • Assistant Secretary of Defense (International 

Security Affairs) 

• Deputy Secretary of Defense • OSD (Policy)/International Security Affairs/Middle 

East -Iraq 

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Middle 

East) 

• Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) • Key General and Flag Officers 

• Undersecretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) • Department of State 

• OSD (Public Affairs) • Department of Justice 

• OSD (Legislative Affairs) • Department of the Treasury 

• DoD Office of General Counsel • Office of Management and Budget 

• Joint Staff • National Security Council 

• U.S. Central Command • Intelligence Community 

• Multi-National Force – Iraq 

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) 

Numerical Reports of Assigned and Trained Forces Contain 

Limitations 

Although the March 2008 Section 9010 report, as well as earlier ones, presents an array of 

numbers, other information in the 9010 reports and elsewhere indicates (1) uncertainty about the 

number of Iraqi personnel who are present for duty at any one time; and (2) uncertainty about the 

capabilities of the police force because the police have greater capacity to recruit than to trainthis limits the number of police on the rolls who have been trained. In addition, shortages of 

officers and/or non-commissioned officers in both the police and defense forces remain a 

significant long-term challenge that could take a decade to address. 

The number of Iraqi police trained, 155,248, as reported in March 2008, is a reduction from the 

December 2007 report of 174,025. According to the March report, this is due to an accounting 

error where basic-training graduates were inadvertently double-counted. There was also a 

reduction of about 3,500 in the border enforcement personnel trained, also said to be due to 

double-counting. 

Also, the number of assigned and trained defense personnel presented in the Section 9010 reports 

does not measure overall capabilities. For example, DoD noted that deficiencies in Iraqi Army 

logistics and combat support continue to require substantial Coalition assistance. According to 

OSD, the Coalition made a conscious decision to initially give priority to developing combat 

units. 

5
Substantial Numbers of Assigned and Trained Personnel Are Not 

Present for Duty 

According to the December 2007 report, the GoI uses data from its payroll system to ascertain 

the size of its security forces that is assigned (on-the-payroll). However, all of these individuals 

are not present-for-duty because many are absent without leave, on leave, or have been wounded 

or killed. In an earlier report, DoD stated that the actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is 

about one-half to two-thirds of those assigned. MNSTC-I, in commenting on a draft of this 

report, stated that those present-for-duty has increased, citing a snapshot, as of April 5, 2008, of 

70% of those assigned across the Iraqi Army. MNSTC-I also stated that when growth over time 

is being measured against a 2010 requirement of 600,000 – 646,000, recording present-for-duty 

on a specific day serves little relevant purpose, and could even be misleading. 

DoD stated that like the personnel killed in action, many of the wounded remain on the rolls in 

order for families to receive medical care and financial compensation. Further, according to both 

the March 2008 and December 2007 reports, there is no data on how many of the personnel 

trained are still actively serving in the ISF. 

Earlier reports reflected numbers of Iraqis trained through the primary U.S.-funded programs. 

But because the GoI is now responsible for determining force requirements and counting 

personnel, the December 2007 report marks the first time that GoI statistics have been used to 

report the number of trained and assigned security forces. Within the Ministry of Interior (MoI), 

trained forces include those personnel who have completed a MoI-sanctioned initial-entry 

training course. These courses include: the three-year, nine-month and six-month police college 

courses, Officer Candidate School and Officer Transition Integration Program for officers; 400-

hour Basic Recruit Training (BRT), Department of Border Enforcement BRT, Facilities 

Protection Service BRT, Emergency Response Unit BRT, the Baghdad Provincial Directorate of 

Police course, and the Transition Integration Program for policemen. OSD advises that those 

police who receive an abbreviated 80-hour training program versus the full 400-hour training are 

not counted as trained in the reporting statistics. 

Within the Ministry of Defense (MoD), trained forces include personnel who have completed: 

Basic Combat Training for enlisted, training at one of the military colleges for new officers or a 

“re-joiner” course for non-commissioned officers, and officers who completed this training under 

the former regime. 

Further, the number of trained personnel, in and of itself, is widely recognized as an inadequate 

indicator of force capability. MNSTC-I, in commenting on a draft of this report, agreed that 

trained personnel are not a useful indicator of capability. It added that the Operational Readiness 

Assessments of Units in being are a useful indicator of force capability, and are discussed 

extensively within the 9010 report. 

Police Recruiting Exceeds Training Capacity 

Police-force expansion continues, according to the March 2008 report. Table 1 above shows that 

the number of MoI police forces assigned (on-the-payroll) exceeds the number trained. 

According to the March report, this is because recruiting outstripped training capacity. One 

6
contributing factor for the rapid expansion of the police was Coalition Provisional Authority 

Order 71 (CPA 71), which reportedly diluted the MoI’s control over the police by giving the 

provincial governments the power to approve hiring and initiate firing of provincial chiefs of 

police. The practical effect of CPA 71, according to the December 2007 report, was to make 

provincial chiefs more vulnerable to local pressures without regard to MoI funding constraints. 

This process did not provide for matching requirements to recruiting. It also, according to the 

report, negatively affected force manning, undermined attempts to build a requirements-based 

force structure, and made it difficult to properly train and equip the police as well as to budget 

for their salaries. DoD reported that the possible addition to the Iraqi forces–mainly police–of 

more than 19,000 of the 91,000 Sons of Iraq (formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens) 

currently working with Coalition forces will exacerbate the challenge of training all police who 

are on the force. 

According to OSD, historically, Iraqi police training infrastructure capacity has been insufficient 

to match recruiting levels. As a result, there is a backlog in assigned police who have not yet 

been trained or have received abbreviated training. While construction of new or expanded 

police training facilities is on-going to provide minimum training, OSD states that the MoI, 

MNC-I and MNSTC-I are using a variety of expedient locations. The joint MNSTC-I and MoI 

training base expansion now in progress will accelerate police generation and should begin to 

eliminate the backlog, according to OSD. 

OSD acknowledges that untrained police forces actively serve while awaiting training. They 

state that these personnel serve in probationary roles under the supervision of trained police. 

Some of the tasks performed by these police include checkpoint manning, administrative and 

operational support at police stations, and patrolling. Further, according to OSD, police training 

provides the basic skills for the counterinsurgency fight. Subsequent training will still be needed 

as the security situation stabilizes and police assume greater responsibility for security and 

convert to traditional law-enforcement and criminal investigation roles. 

The September 2007 report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq 

concluded that, “The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as 

being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental 

flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness 

in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.” 

Shortage of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers Remains a 

Long-Term Undertaking 

An effective military force requires leadership from a well-trained and balanced officer and noncommissioned officer corps. This concern was noted in the September 2007, December 2007, 

and March 2008 DoD reports. The September 2007 report identified a shortage of officers and 

non-commissioned officers and stated that the increase in forces, a development positive at first 

glance, will further exacerbate the problem. The December and March reports also identified an 

officer shortage at all operational and tactical levels which, because of the long training cycle, 

will take years to address. The March 2008 report pointed to an inevitable conclusion: a 

7
shortage of leadership at all operational and tactical levels, in both the MoD and the MoI, will 

constrain the ISF’s ability to secure Iraq without Coalition support. 

OSD estimates that there is a shortage of 16,377 officers within the MoI and a shortage of 3,900 

officers in the Iraqi Army. In an attempt to reduce the shortage in defense officers, the MoD has 

brought about 10,100 “former officers” back into service. OSD, however, acknowledges that it 

will take years to fully address the officer shortfall. 

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in January 2008, the MNSTC-I 

commanding general stated that “...gaps in leadership represent a very real and very tangible 

hole in proficiency that cannot be easily filled and it will affect [the Iraqi Security Forces] for a 

least a decade.” 

Deficiencies in Logistics and Combat Support Require Continued 

Coalition Assistance 

The number of assigned and trained personnel presented in the Section 9010 reports does not 

present a complete picture of force capabilities. The March 2008 report points out deficiencies 

in logistics and combat support which require continued Coalition assistance. According to the 

March 2008 report, both ministries still receive substantial logistics support from the Coalition, 

mostly in the form of U.S.-funded contracts, and, to a lesser degree, as direct support. OSD 

advised that the Coalition made a conscious decision to give initial priority to developing combat 

units. This decision was necessitated by the security conditions on the ground and the need to 

get Iraqi battalions, brigades, and divisions into the battle-space to protect the population and 

hold more ground. In doing this, the Coalition was aware that the Iraqi force, because it was 

“unbalanced,” would be dependent on Coalition forces for logistics and enablers. According to 

OSD that approach is changing. 

While Coalition forces continue to train combat formations, the force generation of logistics 

units and key enablers is well underway, OSD stated. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

MNSTC-I stated that there has been progress in developing Iraqi logistics capability and the Iraqi 

Army’s ability to sustain itself is expected to be in place before September 2009. 

The September 2007 report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq 

concluded that, “Logistics remains the Achilles’ heel of the Iraqi ground forces. Although 

progress is being made, achieving an adequate forcewide logistics capability is at least 24 

months away.” 

Additional Forces Needed by 2010 for Internal Security 

The March 2008 report notes that since the September 2007 report, the GoI had increased its 

authorized force structure–the forces needed to protect against internal counterinsurgency 

threats–by 182,844 to 572,844. The larger number of authorized personnel3 represents an 

 

3

 “Authorized” MoD and Iraqi National Counter Terrorism Force (INCTF) forces means personnel strengths derived 

from Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment. This definition encompasses units that are generated, being 

8
increase of 17,055 from the December 2007 report and an increase of 182,844 from the 

September 2007 report (see Table 3). In addition, that report notes that the GoI reconfirms the 

previous projection of future force-structure requirements, stating that the total size of the Iraqi 

forces–military, police, and Special Operations–could grow to between 601,000 and 646,000 by 

2010.4 This requirement is based on an internal counterinsurgency requirement for the 2010 

timeframe, and it is not a forecast of the long-term external defense requirement. 

According to OSD, in mid-2007, four separate analyses were conducted to determine the 

required size of the ISF necessary to defeat anticipated internal counterinsurgency threats in the 

2010 timeframe. The first was a study by the Iraqi security ministries. The second was a bottomup review conducted by MNC-I, where subordinate commanders assessed the needs in their 

geographic areas of responsibility. The third analysis was conducted by the U.S. Army’s Center 

for Army Analysis. The fourth was the MNSTC-I assessment. These studies were largely in 

agreement, according to OSD, and a synthesis of the studies’ findings showed several common 

themes. The most significant theme was that, in order to overmatch internal security threats, the 

strength of the ISF should fall between approximately 601,000 to 646,000 authorized personnel. 

Table 3 shows the increase in authorized forces since the September 2007 report. 

Table 3—Increases in Authorized Force Structure from September 2007 

September 2007 December 2007 March 2008 Projected 2010 

Number Number % Increase Number % Increase Estimate % Increase

390,000 555,789 42.5 572,844 46.9 601,000 - 

646,000 

54.1% - 

65.6%

Source: SIGIR analysis of DoD’s September 2007, December 2007, and March 2008 reports, Measuring Stability and Security in 

Iraq. 

Transitioning to a Military Force for External Security Remains a 

Future Goal 

The difference between the ISF’s ability to meet internal threats and to defend against external 

aggression is an important distinction noted in the March 2008 report. Current efforts are in the 

first stage of force generation, which is focused on fielding a counterinsurgency force capable of 

protecting the country against internal threats. The second stage, which remains a future goal, 

will emphasize modernization and transition to capability against external threats. OSD officials 

acknowledge that this second stage force structure may or may not require additional forces, but 

will require additional capabilities. 

 generation, or planned plus those resulting from the prime minister’s initiative to man Iraqi Army units to 120% of 

authorized strength. The definition of “authorized” for MoI forces is based on Ministry of Interior hiring orders. 

4

 In the December 2007 report, an analysis of future force-structure requirements by the GoI projects that the size of 

the Iraqi Army in 2010 will expand to between 261,000 and 268,000 personnel; to 5,000 in the Air Force; to 1,500 

in the Navy; and to 4,000 in the Special Operations Forces. For the MoI, authorized forces should increase to 

between 307,000 and 347,000 personnel. 

9
Methodology for Determining Numbers of Assigned and Trained 

Personnel is Evolving 

It appears that a primary reason for the variances in numbers reported over time is because the 

methodological approach has changed from report to report. 

OSD provided us with information indicating that the source for reported assigned strength 

numbers differs based on the branch of the ISF providing those numbers. OSD also notes that as 

the ISF and the Iraqi security ministries developed, so did the reporting methodologies. 

Previously, only numbers that could be verified by Coalition personnel–those witnessed by 

training teams or Coalition commanders in the field–were reported. This was a satisfactory 

methodology when Coalition forces conducted all training. Importantly, OSD points out that 

there is no separate source against which the numbers can be checked. MNSTC-I, in 

commenting on a draft of this reported, noted that there was a change in accounting between the 

September and December 2007 9010 reports. However, except for an accounting error, there 

was no change in accounting procedures between the December 2007 and March 2008 9010 

reports 

OSD officials report that efforts are under way to improve the methodology and reliability of 

reported data though automated human resource management systems. Torres Advanced 

Enterprise Solutions, under contract with MNSTC-I, is completing a Human Resources 

Information Management System (HRIMS) which is expected to be the primary information 

system to manage Iraqi manpower accountability and pay. It is also anticipated that the system 

will be able to identify and remove “ghost soldiers” from the rolls. The system was originally 

expected to be completed in February 2008, but has been extended. In its September 2007 

report, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq concluded that, “Another 

positive development in the MoD’s administrative capacity is the rolling implementation of the 

HRIMS which links personnel and pay functions into a single automated system and database.” 

SIGIR’s follow-on review will assess the status of this effort and its potential for improving 

reporting accuracy. 

According to OSD, MNSTC-I Advisory and Training Team personnel, as well as the staff and 

command group, frequently review the assigned numbers reported by the Iraqis. Reports are 

cross-checked against each other for consistency. However, with the growth of the ISF, 

improvements in Iraqi ministerial capacity and reporting practices, and the withdrawal of 

Coalition forces from areas under Provincial Iraqi Control, Coalition verification of all numbers 

on the ground has, and will increasingly become, less feasible. OSD also believes that the 

improvement in Iraqi processes and bureaucracy allowed for sufficiently reliable source data to 

negate the requirement for 100% Coalition verification. At the same time, OSD acknowledges 

that they are not “error-free.” 

Management Comments and Audit Response

OSD provided informal comments on a draft of this report, and these comments were 

incorporated into this report, as appropriate. 

10
MNSTC-I provided comments on a draft of this report, which generally concurred with the 

report’s conclusions. MNSTC-I also provided specific comments on statements made in this 

report, which we incorporated as appropriate. MNSTC-I comments are presented in Appendix 

C. 

MNSTC-I commented that our discussions on (1) shortages of officers and non-commissioned 

officers, (2) additional forces needed by 2010 for internal security, (3) police recruiting 

exceeding training capacity, and (4) deficiencies in logistics and combat support were beyond the 

scope of our work. Although some information in this report goes beyond the specific objectives 

regarding the accuracy of the numbers, the information is relevant to the broader objectives 

because it provides important context for understanding the accuracy and usefulness of the 

information being reported. 

- - - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to all SIGIR staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Mr. Glenn Furbish, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits at (703) 

428-1058 or via email at glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. For a list of the audit team members, see 

Appendix E. 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

 

11
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

The objectives of this audit were to (1) assess the reliability and usefulness of information on the 

number of forces authorized, assigned, and trained, as reflected in the March 2008 Department of 

Defense (DoD) Section 9010 report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq; and (2) review the 

methodology for gathering the information, including the extent to which DoD reviews and/or 

validates this information. This assignment was conducted as SIGIR project 8011. This audit 

was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates 

the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

In addressing our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed the most recent DoD March 2008 

Section 9010 quarterly report relating to the ISF and compared information in that report with 

earlier Section 9010 reports. We also reviewed prior reports by SIGIR, the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO), the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq 

(Jones Report), and others. We held discussions with officials in the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Policy) and reviewed written answers to questions we provided and 

planned to use as a basis of further discussions. Our audit plan called for us to obtain 

information from discussions with officials at the Multi National Force-Iraq, the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq, and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As a basis for these 

discussions, we provided written questions related to our objectives. We received a written 

response to our questions through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense late in our review 

cycle, and have incorporated this information in this report, as appropriate. However, we plan to 

conduct additional follow-on work with U.S. officials in Iraq to obtain a more complete 

understanding of data gathering and reporting methodologies as well as efforts to strengthen 

related processes. 

We performed our work primarily in Arlington, Virginia. We conducted this performance audit 

from January through April 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our results based on our audit objectives. 

Based on those objectives, we believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 

our interim results. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We did not rely on data from computer-based systems to conduct our audit. Our audit focused 

on DoD published reports and discussions with responsible officials. 

Internal Controls 

Most of the data on Iraqi Security Forces authorized, assigned, and trained and included in the 

March 2008 DoD report was provided by the Government of Iraq. We did not assess the overall 

system of Iraqi management controls related to this data. However, we reviewed these reports 

and compared the information with prior reports to identify anomalies. We also obtained 

information on the extent to which DoD reviews the information for accuracy and consistency 

12
and their views as to data reliability. These steps provide reasonable confidence in our interim 

conclusions. 

Related Reports by SIGIR and Others 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not 

Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed, GAO-08-143R, November 

30, 2007. 

The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, 

Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO-07-1195, September 4, 2007. 

Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces. 

House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, June 27, 2007. 

Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, GAO-07-

612T, March 13, 2007. 

Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund, SIGIR-06-033, October 28, 2006. 

Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, SIGIR-06-032, 

October 28, 2006. 

Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T, September 11, 2006.

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Appendix B—Command Relationships in 

Establishing, Training, and Equipping the Iraqi 

Security Forces 

Multinational Corps–Iraq 

Multinational Force–Iraq 

Multinational Security 

Transition Command–Iraq 

U.S. Central Command 

Secretary of Defense 

Iraq Assistance Group 

Military and Police 

Transition Teams

Training and Transition 

Teams 

Major Subordinate 

Commands 

Source: Department of Defense, and U.S. Government Accountability Office 

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Appendix C—MNSTC-I Comments 

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16
17
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Appendix D—Acronyms 

BRT Basic Recruit Training 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DoD Department of Defense 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GoI Government of Iraq 

HRIMS Human Resources Information Management System 

ISF Iraqi Security Forces 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

MoD Ministry of Defense 

MoI Ministry of Interior 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

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Appendix E—Audit Team Members

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. Staff members who contributed to the report include: 

Tinh Nguyen 

Charles Thompson 

Roger M. Williams

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SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil) 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle 

Director for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

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