United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Public Affairs

Washington, DC 20555

Phone 301-415-8200 Fax 301-415-2234

Internet:opa@nrc.gov

No. 97-077 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

(Wednesday, May 14, 1997)

NOTE TO EDITORS:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received three reports

from its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The reports,

in the form of letters, provide comments on:

-- Design basis verification.

-- Proposed final policy on the restructuring and economic

deregulation of the electric utility industry.

-- Policy regarding stockpiling of potassium iodine.

Copies of the reports are available through the NRC's Office

of Public Affairs, the NRC's Internet Homepage and the Public

Document Room in Washington, D.C.

#
ACRSR-1697

May 7, 1997

The Honorable Shirley Ann Jackson

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jackson:

SUBJECT: DESIGN BASIS VERIFICATION

During the 441st meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards, May 1-3, 1997, we met with representatives of the NRC

staff and the Nuclear Energy Institute to discuss design basis

verification. We reviewed the staff criteria for evaluating

licensee responses to the NRC request for design basis information

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), staff initiatives to perform design

inspections, and related industry activities and initiatives. We

also had the benefit of the documents referenced.

Conclusions and Recommendations

ˇ We believe that the current four-phase approach is effective

in identifying those licensees that need to take action to

maintain their design basis. The staff review of licensee

responses appears to have been successful in identifying and

prioritizing follow-up inspection activities.

ˇ The design inspections conducted to date have shown that, in

some cases, the actual plant configuration and procedures do

not correspond to the design basis upon which the plant was

licensed. This illustrates the value of the design inspection

program and suggests that such a program be continued in some

form.
ˇ The NRC will be relying on the results of probabilistic risk

assessments (PRAs) to an ever-increasing extent as it embarks

on risk-informed, performance-based regulation. PRAs should

be based on the current configuration of the plant. Results

of the design basis inspections should, then, be shared

formally with the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and

the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data.

Where inconsistencies between PRA assumptions and design

inspection results are found, it may be of use to conduct

sensitivity studies to establish the risk significance of

these inconsistencies.

Sincerely,

/s/

R. L. Seale

Chairman

References:

1. Section (f) of 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of Licenses."

2. Memorandum dated March 19, 1997, from L. J. Callan, Executive

Director for Operations, NRC, to the Commissioners, Subject:

Update on 10 CFR 50.54(f) Response Review Efforts: Pilot

Process Results.

3. Memorandum dated February 25, 1997, from L. J. Callan,

Executive Director for Operations, NRC, to the Commissioners,

Subject: Review of Licensees' Responses to the 10 CFR

50.54(f) Letter of October 9, 1996, on the Adequacy and

Accuracy of Design Bases Information for Nuclear Power Plants.

4. Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 96-05, draft Revision D,

"Guidelines for Assessing Programs for Maintaining the

Licensing Basis," dated July 25, 1996.

5. Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc., NUMARC 90-12,

"Design Basis Program Guidelines," October 1990.
4

ACRSR-1698

May 8, 1997

Mr. L. Joseph Callan

Executive Director for Operations

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Mr. Callan:

SUBJECT: PROPOSED FINAL POLICY STATEMENT ON THE RESTRUCTURING AND

ECONOMIC DEREGULATION OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY

During the 441st meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards, May 1-3, 1997, we met with representatives of the NRC

staff to discuss the draft final version of the NRC Policy

Statement on the Restructuring and Economic Deregulation of the

Electric Utility Industry. We also had the benefit of the

documents referenced.

Conclusions and Recommendations

ˇ The Policy Statement is an important part of the NRC Action

Plan on Industry Deregulation and Utility Restructuring and

will help to ensure adequate funding for operations and

decommissioning of nuclear power plants.

ˇ The issues associated with ownership of a U.S. nuclear power

plant by a foreign entity should be reviewed so that the

Commission will be better prepared to advise on the need for

enabling legislation.

ˇ The language in the Policy Statement pertaining to the

assignment of financial liability for decommissioning costs

should be clarified.
ˇ The overall Action Plan should give consideration to the

following potential safety concerns:

(1) reductions in manpower and training expenditures that

could impact safe plant operations,

(2) cost-driven changes in plant operations that could

significantly reduce safe operating margins,

(3) inappropriate use of on-line maintenance that could

result in a reduction of safety margins, and

(4) undue erosion of fuel rod integrity margins as burnup

increases.

Discussion

As the electric utility industry moves toward deregulation, there

may be more premature shutdowns of nuclear power plants as

individual utilities seek to minimize costs and reduce financial

risk. Recent experience has shown that even some plants with good

operating records and in good materiel condition will be

permanently shut down if the owners believe that generating costs

exceed the projected market price of electricity.

The concerns regarding adequate funding for decommissioning and an

erosion of plant safety brought about by the market pressures of

reducing operational costs need to be addressed. There is little

experience with the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and the

costs associated with disposal of spent fuel and low-level waste

could have a significant impact on the total decommissioning costs.

Cost estimates for decommissioning should be revised as experience

is gained. It is encouraging that, as a few States have moved

toward some form of retail electric power deregulation, most Public

Utility Commissions have recognized that the issue of

decommissioning is a matter of public health and safety and have

allowed the recovery of decommissioning costs.

The policy of the NRC is to assign financial liability to licensees

for decommissioning prorated according to fractional ownership.

The NRC does reserve the right to impose "joint and several"

financial liability on co-owners of nuclear power plants. In the

Policy Statement, the NRC should make it clear that the agency will

resort to "joint and several" liability only in an extreme

situation where adequate protection of the public health and safety

would otherwise not be maintained.

We would like to be kept informed on the resolution of our concerns

associated with the NRC Action Plan pertaining to the restructuring

and deregulation of the electric utility industry.

Sincerely,
6

/s/

R. L. Seale

Chairman

References:

1. Memorandum dated April 3, 1997 from T. T. Martin, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC, to J. T. Larkins, ACRS,

transmitting Draft Final NRC Policy Statement on the

Restructuring and Economic Deregulation of the Electric

Utility Industry (Predecisional Draft).

2. Draft memorandum (undated) from L. J. Callan, Executive

Director for Operations, NRC, to the Commissioners, Subject:

Proposed Rule on Financial Assurance Requirements for

Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors.

3. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Excerpt from Director's

Bimonthly Status Report, March 1997, on Industry Deregulation

and Utility Restructuring Action Plan (NRC Internal Document).

4. Public Comments Received on draft Policy Statement on the

Restructuring and Economic Deregulation of the Electric

Utility Industry, undated.
ACRSR-1699

May 9, 1997

The Honorable Shirley Ann Jackson

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jackson:

SUBJECT: THE POLICY REGARDING STOCKPILING OF POTASSIUM IODIDE

During the 441st meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards, May 1-3, 1997, we completed our discussion of the bases

for the NRC staff's denial of a petition for rulemaking relating to

the reevaluation of the policy regarding the use of potassium

iodide (KI) after a severe accident at a nuclear power plant.

During our 440th meeting, April 3-4, 1997, we discussed this matter

with representatives of the NRC staff, the Nuclear Energy Institute

(NEI), and the State of Illinois. We also had the benefit of the

documents referenced.

Mr. Peter Crane, a member of the NRC staff in the Office of the

General Counsel, had previously filed a differing professional

opinion in 1989 requesting a reevaluation of the Commission's

policy on KI. Mr. Crane also filed a petition on September 9,

1995, as a private citizen requesting a rulemaking to implement the

recommendations of the Kemeny Commission that the United States

stockpile KI for protection of the thyroid following nuclear

accidents. Specifically, Mr. Crane requested that the Commission

amend its regulations (10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)) to specify that the

prophylactic use of KI for the general population within the plume

exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for each licensed

nuclear power plant be identified as one of the "range of

protective actions" required to be set forth in State and local

emergency plans.
8

There is no argument that KI can act as an effective radioiodine

blocker if administered in a timely manner. But in the supporting

documentation and presentations, the staff did not adequately

address several technical concerns that have been expressed

repeatedly when this issue has arisen in the past. These include

the spectrum of side effects that would be encountered in the

administration of KI to a large population or the identification of

the timing of KI administration to ensure effective blocking of

radioiodine released during nuclear accidents. We saw no

meaningful study of KI predistribution, nor did we see any

examination of limited KI shelf life.

Conclusion

We find the arguments for the stockpiling of KI to be unconvincing.

Therefore, we agree with the staff's position that a revision to

the regulations is unwarranted and that the petition should be

denied.

Discussion

In 1996, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating

Committee (FRPCC) had convened an ad hoc Subcommittee on Potassium

Iodide to review the public use of KI following a nuclear accident.

Based on its evaluation of new information and comments from

interested parties, the FRPCC Subcommittee concluded that "while

the viewpoints presented at the public meeting were compelling, the

1996 Subcommittee heard no new information that seriously

challenges the bases for the 1985 recommendation concerning public

use of KI." The 1985 policy did not recommend predistribution or

stockpiling of KI for the general public. Nonetheless, the FRPCC

Subcommittee made several recommendations including the following:

ˇ Without changing the Federal policy, and without interceding in

the State's prerogative to make its own decision on whether or

not to use KI, the Federal Government (NRC, or through FEMA,

etc.) should fund the purchase of a KI stockpile for any State

that, hereafter, decides to incorporate its use as a protective

measure for the general public.

ˇ Local jurisdictions, who have the option of incorporating the

use of KI in their protective measures independent of the

State's plan, consider, in consultation with the State, the use

of KI as a possible protective measure, and be aware that if

they choose to do so, they would then incur a responsibility to

develop plans for distribution or predistribution of the KI.

The full FRPCC endorsed the Subcommittee's recommendations and

plans to publish a revised Federal policy statement on the

distribution of KI. The staff's position is that a revision to the
9

regulations as requested by the petitioner is unnecessary because

the anticipated actions by the FRPCC will address substantially the

fundamental concerns of the petitioner without incurring the burden

of changing all State and local emergency plans. The actions

expected to be recommended by the FRPCC will ensure that, in

contrast to the inadequate supply situation which existed at the

time of the Three Mile Island accident, KI could be made available

if needed.

Representatives of NEI and the State of Illinois concurred with the

staff's recommendation that the petition be denied and that the

State and local governments be allowed to decide when to include KI

for general public use in emergency plans. They argued that

stockpiling or predistributing KI for the general public will not

add any significant public health and safety benefit beyond that

provided by existing emergency preparedness at commercial nuclear

power plants.

Additional comments by ACRS Member Dr. T. S. Kress are presented

below.

Sincerely,

/s/

R. L. Seale

Chairman

Additional Comments by ACRS Member Dr. T. S. Kress

I disagree with the Committee's position on this issue. It has

been recognized for more than 40 years that KI would be an

effective prophylaxis against fission-product-iodine-induced

thyroid cancer if taken on a timely basis before exposure. In the

face of this almost universally agreed upon knowledge, the longstanding policy of NRC of leaving the decision up to the States as

to whether or not to stockpile KI has resulted in only two States

adopting the strategy. It is obvious that the desired result of

having this remedy available if needed has not been achieved by

this policy and most likely never will be.

The major difficulties with KI stockpiling are "limited shelf life"

and "difficulty of distribution" (or whether or not to predistribute). The issue of limited shelf life essentially has been

resolved by new encapsulation technology. The distribution issue

just needs a real resolve on the part of NRC to address it. There

are a number of workable solutions. The oft-cited failed initial

attempt in Tennessee to predistribute should not be taken as an

absolute indicator of the potential for that strategy. There have
10

been no follow-up investigations as to why this attempt failed and

how to make it work.

The federally controlled stockpiling of KI cannot and should not be

justified on risk reduction or cost/benefit considerations. It

should be viewed as being strictly defense-in-depth (as are other

emergency response measures) and is justified purely on prudency

grounds. NRC should actively work with the States to set up an

effective system stockpiling and distributing KI.
11

References:

1. Memorandum dated March 26, 1997, from Peter Crane for the ACRS,

transmitting Rulemaking Petition dated September 1995 on

Potassium Iodide.

2. Memorandum dated February 13, 1997, from Bill M. Morris, Office

of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC, to John T. Larkins, ACRS,

Subject: ACRS Review of the Denial of Petition for Rulemaking

(PRM-50-63) Relating to a Re-Evaluation of the Policy Regarding

Use of Potassium Iodide after a Severe Accident at a Nuclear

Power Plant.