IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-0771

Filed April 27, 2022

ROBERT COONRADT,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winneshiek County, John J. 

Bauercamper, Judge.

Robert Coonradt appeals the denial of his application for postconviction 

relief. AFFIRMED.

Zeke R. McCartney of Reynolds & Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by May, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
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MAY, Presiding Judge.

Robert Coonradt appeals the denial of his application for postconviction 

relief (PCR). He argues the district court erred in rejecting his claim that criminal 

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to litigate a motion to suppress that was filed 

by prior counsel. We conclude counsel was not ineffective as alleged. So we 

affirm. 

I. Factual Background

Based on the results of a search warrant executed in December 2016, the 

State charged Coonradt with (1) possession of methamphetamine, (2) possession 

of a firearm by a felon, (3) possession of marijuana, (4) prohibited acts relating to 

maintaining a drug premises, and (5) child endangerment.1 In February 2017, 

defense counsel filed a generic, one-paragraph motion to suppress, alleging only 

that “[t]he [S]tate did not have probable cause for believing the existence of the 

grounds in which the warrant was issued and therefore all evidence as a result of 

said warrant should be suppressed.” See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.12(1)(d).

The court set the motion to suppress for hearing. Then counsel moved to 

withdraw, citing a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. The court granted 

this request and appointed new counsel. The suppression hearing and trial were 

then continued multiple times. Ultimately, Coonradt accepted the State’s plea 

offer. He pled guilty to counts one, three, four, and five; and the court imposed 

sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. On counts one and three, 

 

1 Coonradt was charged as a habitual offender in counts one through three, and 

the drug possession charges in counts one and three were charged as third or 

subsequent offenses. 
3

Coonradt was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment not to exceed

fifteen years. On counts four and five, he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment 

not to exceed two years, to be served concurrently with count three. The court 

suspended each term of imprisonment and placed Coonradt on probation for five 

years.

But Coonradt struggled with probation requirements. In January 2020, the 

local department of correctional services sought revocation of Coonradt’s 

probation. Coonradt admitted to violating his probation, and the court revoked his 

probation and committed him to prison.

One day before his probation was revoked, Coonradt filed a PCR 

application. In his amended application, Coonradt asserted his attorney was 

ineffective in failing to litigate the motion to suppress filed by prior counsel and 

instead recommending that he accept the State’s plea offer.

At the ensuing PCR trial, criminal counsel testified that he discussed the 

motion to suppress with Coonradt and advised that challenging the search warrant 

“would be a tough sell.” Counsel recalled Coonradt was “interested in obtaining a 

favorable plea offer that would avoid a prison term.” And, according to counsel, 

the reason the suppression hearing was continued several times was that any 

pending plea deals would be “off the table” if the suppression issue was submitted 

to the court—and then Coonradt would be looking at prison if the motion failed. 

However, while counsel believed the search warrant was supported by probable 

cause, he noted that he still had the option to pursue the motion to suppress if plea 

negotiations broke down. At the end of the day, though, defense counsel was able 
4

to broker a deal involving suspended prison and probation—which was what 

Coonradt wanted.

In his testimony, Coonradt explained why he believed the motion to 

suppress would have succeeded. While the charges were pending, however, 

Coonradt was already in prison on unrelated charges. He would not be granted 

parole or work release until the charges at issue here were resolved. And 

Coonradt “wanted to go home,” “wanted out.” So when the right plea deal came 

along, he decided to plead guilty, because he was “in fact” guilty. With the benefit 

of hindsight, though, he thought counsel was ineffective in not litigating the motion 

to suppress.2

In its ruling, the PCR court found the search warrant was supported by 

probable cause. And the court found counsel provided adequate representation 

in relation to the tactics and decisions concerning pursuing the motion to suppress 

or pleading guilty. So the court denied Coonradt’s PCR application. Coonradt now 

appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We ordinarily review the denial of a PCR application for legal error, but our 

review is de novo when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel come into play. 

Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021). Because Coonradt’s claim 

concerns the effectiveness of criminal trial counsel, he must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential 

 

2 As the State points out, it does not appear Coonradt was dissatisfied with the 

outcome of the criminal proceeding until he violated his probation and was facing 

prison.
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duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984); State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018). We “may consider 

either the prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and failure to find either one will 

preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State 

v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2015)). 

III. Analysis

Coonradt argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to litigate the motion 

to suppress. He claims the motion “was meritorious because the warrant 

application had problems with accuracy, and more importantly the nexus between 

the allegations and the information s[ought].” 

It is true that no warrants shall issue without probable cause. U.S. Const. 

amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8; see State v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 99 (Iowa 

2015). But in assessing the propriety of search warrants, “we do not make an 

independent determination of probable cause,” but instead merely determine 

“whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause 

existed.” McNeal, 867 N.W.2d at 99 (quoting State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 

(Iowa 1997)). “[W]e draw all reasonable inferences to support the judge’s finding 

of probable cause and give great deference to the judge’s finding”—“[c]lose cases 

are decided in favor of upholding the validity of the warrant.” Id. (first alteration in 

original) (quoting Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 364). The test for probable cause to issue 

a search warrant is: 

[W]hether a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime 

was committed on the premises to be searched or evidence of a 

crime could be located there. Probable cause to search requires a 

probability determination that (1) the items sought are connected to 
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criminal activity and (2) the items sought will be found in the place to 

be searched.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 363). We 

interpret warrant applications “in a common sense, rather than a hypertechnical,

manner.” See id. at 100 (quoting State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 132 (Iowa 

2006)). 

Coonradt argues the warrant application lacked accuracy because it was 

largely based on unreliable information from an identified informant that lacked 

corroboration. He also asserts the evidence the warrant application sought to 

obtain was overbroad as relating to anything that could be associated with drug 

use or trafficking. Also, he contends some of the allegations contained in the 

application were foreign to the residence to be searched. Ignoring the fact that, 

below, Coonradt only challenged one small component of the warrant 

application—whether a Jeep supposedly stolen by the informant was or was not 

located at the residence to be searched—we proceed to his claims. 

The application disclosed the named informant was arrested on 

December 13, 2016, while he was operating the Jeep that was reported as stolen. 

Two cell phones were found in the Jeep. The phones belonged to Daniel 

Anderson, a person who was known to share a residence with Coonradt. The 

informant reported he had been staying at that residence for a few days. During 

that stay, he repeatedly used methamphetamine with Andersen and Coonradt. 

The informant also reported that he had observed Coonradt sell the substance 

from the home, he had witnessed Andersen and Coonradt consume marijuana 

with two minors, and he had accompanied Andersen to buy and sell narcotics. The 
7

informant also observed Andersen in transactions involving both firearms and 

methamphetamine. Law enforcement also verified Andersen had active warrants 

for his arrest.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the probable-cause finding, 

we easily conclude the application would lead “a person of reasonable prudence 

[to] believe a crime was committed on the premises to be searched or evidence of 

a crime could be located there.” See id. at 99 (citation omitted). The available 

information showed Coonradt and Andersen resided in the home; frequently used 

drugs there; and were engaged in the drug trade, which involved a flavor of 

unlawful firearms transactions. While some of the reported trafficking actions were 

foreign to the home, it would be reasonable to assume evidence of those acts was 

kept in the residence. See State v. Godbersen, 493 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Iowa 1992). 

Because the warrant was supported by a substantial basis for concluding 

probable cause existed, pursuing the motion to suppress would have been futile.

So counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty, and Coonradt was not 

prejudiced.

Moreover, even if the suppression issue might have presented a “close call” 

for the district court, “counsel had a sound tactical reason to not pursue the motion 

to suppress that was objectively reasonable.” See Doornink v. State, No. 18-0429, 

2019 WL 1933991, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 1, 2019). Even on a close call, the 

risk in pursuing the motion was palpable. If unsuccessful, plea bargaining would 

be off the table, and any outlook for “the possibility of attaining [Coonradt’s] 

principal goal in these proceedings, staying out of prison,” would have significantly 

decreased in likelihood. See id. At the end of the day, “counsel’s decision to not 
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roll the dice on a risky motion to suppress under the unique circumstances of this 

case was a professional judgment call that was not objectively unreasonable. 

Because the decision was reasonable under the circumstances, we find counsel 

did not fail to perform an essential duty.” Id. 

IV. Conclusion

We agree with the district court that counsel was not ineffective as alleged, 

and we affirm the denial of Coonradt’s PCR application.

AFFIRMED.