November 26, 2002

EA-02-121

EA-02-142

Mr. John L. Skolds

President and CNO

Exelon Nuclear

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

4300 Winfield Road

5th Floor

Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR GREEN AND WHITE

FINDINGS AND A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AT PEACH BOTTOM

(NRC Inspection Report 50-277/02-07; 50-278/02-07)

Dear Mr. Skolds:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results of our significance

determination for two findings identified during an inspection completed on July 1, 2002. The

findings involved emergency preparedness activities at Peach Bottom. The inspection findings

were assessed using the significance determination process and were preliminarily

characterized as White, findings with low to moderate importance to safety, which may require

additional NRC inspections. The results of the inspection were discussed with Mr. Jay Doering

and other members of your staff at exit meetings on June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002.

The first finding involved an inadequate critique of a February 14, 2002 emergency

preparedness exercise. Specifically, the critique did not identify that key information needed by

the Emergency Director (ED) to classify the simulated event as a General Emergency was not

provided to the ED by members of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The finding

was preliminarily classified as White because the critique failed to identify a problem associated

with the implementation of a risk significant planning standard. The second finding involved an

undue delay by the shift manager in declaring an Alert on June 2, 2002, after carbon dioxide

discharged into an emergency diesel generator room. This finding was also preliminarily

classified as White because it involved a failure to implement a risk significant planning

standard. These preliminary White findings were also associated with apparent violations of

10 CFR 50 Appendix E and 10 CFR 50.47.

In a letter dated July 19, 2002, the NRC transmitted the inspection report and provided you an

opportunity to either request a regulatory conference to discuss these findings, or explain your

position in a written response. At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on

August 23, 2002, at the Region I Office in King of Prussia, PA. A copy of the handout you

provided at the conference has been entered in the NRC’s document system (ADAMS) and is

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, accession

number ML022680034. You also provided a written response dated September 4, 2002. 
Mr. John L. Skolds 2

During the conference and in your response, you did not agree with the NRC’s preliminary

assessment of these issues as White. Regarding the first finding (inadequate critique), you

contend that, while the exercise critique was inadequate in some respects, the risk significant

planning standard was met because the declaration of a General Emergency during the

exercise was timely and appropriate. We have carefully reviewed the information you provided

during the conference and in your response dated September 4, 2002. We have concluded

that the critique problems were more than minor but the issuance of a White finding is not

appropriate because the inadequate critique did not result in a failure to identify a risk

significant planning standard (RSPS) problem. The exercise was not adequately monitored and

consequently the critique did not identify all relevant weaknesses and performance lapses. In

that regard, the NRC continues to maintain, despite the views you have provided on this

specific point, that crew performance lapses in communicating reactor water level information to

the ED were relevant to the ED’s responsibilities in classifying the event. Specifically,

information that reactor water level had gone below the top of the fuel should have been

provided to shift management and the ED to be considered in conjunction with

contemporaneous changes in plant radiological conditions that were being interpreted. 

Nonetheless, the NRC concludes that, even without the reactor water level information, the ED

made a proper classification of General Emergency Conditions in an acceptable time frame. 

Hence, the critique inadequacies did not involve failures to identify problems with any RSPS

and are properly classified as a Green issue.

The Green finding is also a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F.2.g. However, because of

its very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program,

the NRC is treating it as a non-cited violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC’s

Enforcement Policy. The NRC expects that you would incorporate into your review of this

matter, the NRC feedback, as described above. If you deny the non-cited violation, you should

provide a written response with the basis for the denial, within 30 days of the date of this letter,

to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I, the Director, Office of

Enforcement, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Peach Bottom facility. 

With respect to the second issue (untimely declaration of an Alert, during an actual event), your

staff contended that the risk significant planning standard was met because your emergency

classification system was in use, the proper classification was made, and the delay by the shift

manager in declaring the Alert had no impact, noting that the delay did not significantly

compromise Exelon’s ability to notify State and local authorities and meet related regulatory

requirements. In addition, you noted that the delay was captured as an unsuccessful

opportunity by your drill and exercise performance indicator. Therefore, you contend that this

performance deficiency should be a Green finding. You further argued that even if this issue

did involve a failure to meet a risk significant planning standard, the finding should be

downgraded because: (1) there was no impact on public health and safety; (2) the carbon

dioxide was confined to one emergency diesel generator room; (3) safe plant operation was

maintained throughout the event; and (4) there was no increase in core damage frequency

because the event screened out of the mitigating system and fire protection significance

determination processes (SDPs). You also stated that the NRC’s preliminary assessment of

this finding as White is inconsistent with previous similar events at other facilities. 

The NRC acknowledges that: (1) the delay by the shift manager in properly classifying this

event as an Alert had no impact on actions to protect public health and safety; (2) the delay did
Mr. John L. Skolds 3

not significantly compromise your ability to notify State and local authorities and meet related

regulatory requirements once the declaration was made 31 minutes after the event; (3) no

regulatory requirement exists for Peach Bottom to classify within 15 minutes, and as such, we

are not imposing a new or different interpretation of regulatory requirements; and (4) the delay

was captured as an unsuccessful opportunity by your drill and exercise performance indicator. 

However, the NRC concludes that your emergency classification system was not properly used

during the event. After completing safety actions, as appropriate, (i.e., personnel accountability

and ensuring safe plant conditions), the shift manager did not carry out his responsibilities to

review emergency action levels, classify the event, and assume the duties of the ED. Rather,

for about 8 minutes, the shift manager was engaged in non-emergency response related issues

implementing an administrative procedure for calling your corporate duty officer in order to

inform licensee senior management of plant conditions. This administrative procedure is not a

part of the Emergency Plan or its implementing procedures. Furthermore, the sequence of

steps in this administrative procedure requires entry into the Emergency Plan and its

implementing procedures for applicable events prior to such notifications. Consequently, the

event classification system was not properly in use for a period of time, and the classification of

the event was unnecessarily delayed. It appears that a knowledge deficiency contributed to this

problem, in that personnel on shift were not sufficiently expert in the emergency action levels

(EALs) to quickly associate the event, a carbon dioxide discharge to the diesel generator

building, with the correct EAL Category (toxic gas). 

You also indicated at the conference that the shift manager’s notification to the corporate duty

officer can be a means for mobilizing corporate support. The NRC does not take issue with this

contention. However, as you stated at the conference, this method of amassing help should

not take precedence over response actions of your ERO, as required by NRC regulations and

your emergency plan.

With respect to your position that the core damage frequency did not increase or that the event

screened out of the mitigating system and fire protection SDPs, that contention has no bearing

on the emergency preparedness SDP. Per the emergency preparedness SDP (during an

actual event), significance is based on the event classification level, and whether or not there

was a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard. During the time period noted

above, the shift manager exhibited a performance deficiency that involved a failure to

implement a risk significant planning standard during an Alert condition. Such a finding is

considered White in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix B, and has low to moderate

importance to safety. 

We also reviewed the five cases that you referenced in your letter dated September 4, 2002,

concerning late declarations at other facilities. None of these examples were inconsistent with

NRC policy or the emergency preparedness SDP. For two of these cases, green non-cited

violations were issued because an Unusual Event was declared late in one case and not at all

in the second case, which is consistent with the emergency preparedness SDP. The third case

did not meet an Unusual Event EAL, and therefore, did not result in a violation. In the fourth

case, the fire lasted less than 10 minutes, which did not necessitate declaration of an Alert. In

the fifth case, an Alert declaration was made within the time allotted by the EALs after the

licensee recognized that a fire could not be extinguished. 

Accordingly, after careful consideration of the information provided during the Regulatory

Conference and in your response letter, the NRC concludes, based on the above, that this
Mr. John L. Skolds 4

inspection finding is appropriately characterized as White, an issue with low to moderate

importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections. You have 10 business

days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff’s determination of the significance for the

identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the

criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2. In addition, the White

finding is associated with a violation as cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation. While the

NRC agrees with your contention that your procedure does not specifically require you to

classify the event in 15 minutes, your procedures were nonetheless violated as described in the

enclosed Notice. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, this Notice of

Violation is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White

finding. 

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the

enclosed Notice of Violation when preparing your response. Because plant performance for

this issue has been determined to be in the regulatory response band, we will use the NRC

Action Matrix to determine the most appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify

you, by separate correspondence, of that determination.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC’s “Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter 

and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public

Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC’s

document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading- rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). 

Sincerely, 

/RA/

Hubert J. Miller

Regional Administrator

Docket No. 50-244

License No. DPR-18

Enclosure: Notice of Violation
Mr. John L. Skolds 5

cc w/encl: Senior Vice President, Mid-Atlantic Regional Operating Group

President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear

Vice President, Mid-Atlantic Operations Support

Senior Vice President, Nuclear Services

Site Vice President, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

Plant Manager, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs

Director, Licensing, Mid-Atlantic Regional Operating Group

Director, Nuclear Oversight

Regulatory Assurance Manager - Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Senior Vice President and General Counsel

D. Quinlan, Manager, Financial Control, PSEG

R. McLean, Power Plant Siting, Nuclear Evaluations

D. Levin, Acting Secretary of Harford County Council

R. Ochs, Maryland Safe Energy Coalition

Mr. & Mrs. Dennis Hiebert, Peach Bottom Alliance

Mr. & Mrs. Kip Adams

R. Janati, Chief, Division of Nuclear Safety

Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary

Correspondence Control Desk

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

State of Maryland

TMI - Alert (TMIA)

Peach Bottom Township Board of Supervisors

R. Fletcher, Department of Environment, Radiological Health Program

J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club

Public Service Commission of Maryland, Engineering Division

Manager, Licensing - Limerick and Peach Bottom
Mr. John L. Skolds 6

DISTRIBUTION (w/encl):

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DDambly, OGC

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SCollins, NRR

BBorchardt, NRR

LDudes, NRR

HNieh, OEDO

Enforcement Coordinators RII, RIII, RIV

SGagner, OPA

HBell, OIG

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DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML023300283.wpd

After declaring this document “An Official Agency Record” it will be released to the Public.

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE RI/ORA RI/ORA RI/ORA RI/DRS RI/DRS

NAME Rurban (RJU) Dholody (DJH) Bfewell Wlanning (WDL) Rblough (ARB)

DATE 11/06/02 11/07/02 11/ /02 11/07/02 11/14/02

OFFICE RI/RA HQ/OE NRR

NAME Hmiller (HJM) FCongel * CCarpenter *

DATE 11/18/02 11/ /02 11/ /02

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

* Concurrence received via e-mail from D. Nelson, OE on 11/21/02.
NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Exelon Generation Company, LLC Docket No. 50-277; 50-278

Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 License No. DPR-44, DPR-56

EA-02-142

During an NRC inspection conducted between April 1, 2002 and July 1, 2002, a violation of

NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the “General Statement of Policy and

Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,” (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, the violation is

listed below:

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power

reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in

Section 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) requires, in part, that on-shift facility licensee

responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, and adequate

staffing to provide initial facility accident response is maintained at all times. 10 CFR

50.47(b)(4) requires, in part, that a standard emergency classification and action level

scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee.

The Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Plan for Peach Bottom sets forth, among

other things, on-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response (in

accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)), and delineates the standard emergency

classification and action level scheme in use by the licensee (in accordance with 10 CFR

50.47(b)(4)). Section 2.0 of this Emergency Response Plan states, in part, that the

classification system provided in Emergency Response Procedure (ERP)-101, provides

for implementation of certain actions immediately applicable to a specific condition, and

indicates that the Emergency Director determines the emergency classification and the

actions to be taken. 

Emergency Response Procedure (ERP)-101, “Classification of Emergencies,”

delineates licensee emergency response responsibilities in accordance with 10 CFR

50.47(b)(2), as well the emergency action level scheme in accordance with 10 CFR

50.47(b)(4). Sections 1.0 and 2.0, require, in part, that shift management recognize and

classify an event or condition, and assume the duties of Emergency Director who shall:

(1) select categories appropriate for station events or conditions; (2) review emergency

action levels for categories selected; and (3) classify the event based on selected

categories and most severe emergency action levels. Section 8.2.2.b specifies that an

ALERT emergency action level is met when there is report or detection of: 1) toxic

gases within Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1) in concentrations that will be life

threatening to plant personnel; OR 2) flammable gases within Plant Vital Structures

(Table 8-1) in concentrations affecting the safe operation of the plant. Table 8-1 lists

the Diesel Generator Enclosure as a Plant Vital Structure.

Contrary to the above, on June 2, 2002, the standard emergency classification and

action level scheme was not properly used by the operations crew. Specifically, at

12:31 a.m., a condition occurred that warranted an ALERT declaration in accordance

with ERP-101 when the fire suppression system inadvertently discharged carbon

dioxide, a life threatening gas, into the No. 3 emergency diesel generator room, a plant

vital structure. After the shift manager completed actions to assure safe plant conditions

and personnel accountability, the shift manager did not then carry out his responsibility

to review emergency action levels, classify the event and assume the duties of
Notice of Violation 2

Emergency Director. In particular, between 12:39 a.m. and 12:47 a.m., the shift

manager was engaged in non-emergency response related activities implementing an

administrative procedure for calling the licensee’s corporate duty officer in order to

inform licensee senior management of plant conditions. As a result, there was an undue

delay in properly classifying the event and the ALERT classification was not made until

1:02 a.m.

This violation is associated with a WHITE significance determination process finding.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Exelon is hereby required to submit a written

statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document

Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and

a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice of Violation

(Notice), within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice. This reply should be

clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-02-142" and should include: (1) the

reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or significance,

(2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps

that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be

achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the

correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not

received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be

issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other

action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will

be given to extending the response time. 

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. 

Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC

Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC’s

document system (ADAMS), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy,

proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without

redaction. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). If personal privacy or proprietary

information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed

copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted

copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such

material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have

withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the

disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the

information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential

commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an

acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working

days.

Dated this 26th day of November 2002