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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re L. T. Mignot, Minor. February 12, 2015

No. 322392 Macomb Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2012-000033-NA

Before: C AVANAGH , P.J., and M ETER and S HAPIRO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent mother appeals as of right from an order terminatin g her parental rights to a child. See MCR 3.993(A)(2). We reve rse and remand for further proceedings.

In 2012, petitioner sought termination, at the initial disposi tion, of respondent’s parental rights to three children. 1 The Department of Human Services (DHS) revised its goal and s ought eventual reunification, but, i n 2014, again sought termination. On the date scheduled for the termination hearing, the hearing referee indicated that extensi ve discussions had taken place “this morning” and that a “resolution” had been reached. The prosecu tor (who was representing the DHS) indicated that the two olde r children would be placed into a guardianship and that respondent would release her pare ntal rights to the youngest ch ild.

The referee stated that “both the mother and the father have h ad an opportunity to speak with their attorneys and in order to execute voluntary releases of parental rights there’s some things that I have to place on the record.” The referee procee ded to examine respondent, who was incarcerated at the time but had been brought to the courth ouse for the hearing. Respondent agreed that nobody had pressured her into releasing her parenta l rights, and she signed a document releasing them. However, when the referee asked her, “Now, ma’am[,] have you counseled with anyone regarding this decision today or spoken t o anyone? I know you’ve spoken to your attorney,” respondent replied, “I have not talke d to my attorney yet.” She also answered “[n]o” when asked whether she had “discussed this with any friends or a counselor or parents or anything like that.” When the referee asked her whe ther she “had enough time to make this decision today,” respondent replied, “I wish I had mo re time to think about it, but I guess I don’t.” When the referee asked her, “now, ma’am[,] do you feel that signing these

1 Termination of the father’s pare ntal rights was also pursued, but he is not a part y to this appeal.-2- releases today are in the best interest of [the child],” she an swered, “[y]eah . . . [a]s long as he’s staying where he’s been.” Respondent later stated, “I just don ’t understand why he can’t be in the permanent guardians hip too along with [ the two other childr en].” She later reiterated that she “didn’t understand it.”

After respondent signed the rele ase, the lower court entered a n order terminating respondent’s parental r ights to the child.

Shortly after the release, respondent filed a letter with the court indicating that she had been falsely informed that her mother-in-law would be adopting the child and that if she had known that her brother-in-law was attempting to adopt she would not have signed the release. She filed a motion for reconsideration under MCR 2.992, stating that at the time of the release she was “under stress and unable to critically make a realistic decision concerning the termination of her parental rights . . . .” In the motion, she stated that she “stood alone and felt ‘pressured’ to agree to her r ights being terminated.”

There is no indication in the record that the court issued a r uling regarding the motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court failed to fo llow the requirements for a valid release. We review this issue for an abuse of discretion . See In re Blankenship , 165 Mich App 706, 711; 418 NW2d 919 (1988), and In re Burns , 236 Mich App 291, 292; 599 NW2d 783 (1999). A release of parental rights must be knowingly and vol untarily given. Id .; see also In re Blankenship , 165 Mich App at 711.

We are constrained to reverse and remand. First, respondent c learly indicated that she wished she had more time to think about her decision but believ ed that she did not. The referee failed to pursue this line of thought any further, simply stati ng, “Okay.” This is in stark contrast
to In re Blankenship
, id . at 712, wherein the court “orde red a special recess to give [ the mother] more time to think about her deci sion, after which she decided to sign the papers.” Respondent’s hesitation raises issues concer ning the voluntariness of the re lease. Second, when the referee asked respondent if she felt the release was in the best intere sts of the child, she gave a conditional response, indicating, “[y]eah . . . [a]s long as he ’s staying where he’s been.” However, the child’s “staying where he’s been” was not a provis ion in the release document that respondent ultimately signed. This, along with respondent’s ad mission that she did not understand how certain matters w ere being resolved, raises issu es concerning whether the release was “knowingly” made. Lastly, respondent filed a timely motion for reconsideration under MCR 3.992(A), raising new concerns (e.g., her assertion that sh e had been unable to make a realistic decision at the time of the release), yet there is no indication in the record that the court issued a decision on this motion.

The record fails to demonstrate that respondent released her p arental rights knowingly and voluntarily, and the court compounded the error by failing to issue any order regarding the motion for reconsideration. Under these circumstances, we must reverse.-3- Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not reta in jurisdiction.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro