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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

October 24, 2005 

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 

OFFICE 

SUBJECT: Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs – 

Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting (Report No. SIGIR-05-021) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed the audit in 

accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

mandates the independent and objective conduct of audits relating to the programs and 

operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund. Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that we provide for the 

independent and objective leadership and coordination of and recommendations on policies 

designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such 

programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

We considered comments from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office on a draft of this 

report when preparing the final report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott at joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil or at (703) 428-

1100, or Mr. James Carrera at james.carrera@sigir.mil or at (703) 428-1100. For the report 

distribution, see Appendix D. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
i 

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction 

Report Number SIGIR-05-021 October 24, 2005 

(Project No. SIGIR-2005-08.1) 

Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs – 

Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting 

Executive Summary 

This report discusses the ongoing process to develop procedures used to estimate and 

report the cost-to-complete projects funded with Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds 

(IRRF) as well as the progress made by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

(IRMO) to meet the requirements of Section 2207, Public Law 108-106. This law 

requires a quarterly report to Congress that includes estimates of the cost required to 

complete each IRRF project. 

Introduction. In November 2003, $18.6 billion was appropriated under the Emergency 

Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and 

Afghanistan (Public Law 108-106). The law created the IRRF and designated $18.4 

billion of the appropriation for Iraq reconstruction. Section 2207 requires a report to 

Congress every three months that provides updates on the use of all IRRF funds on a 

project by project basis, including estimates of the cost required to complete each project. 

The report, entitled “Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction,” is compiled 

by the Department of State’s Iraq Reconstruction Management Office from information 

provided by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development. 

Objective. The objective of this audit was to determine if procedures and processes used 

to estimate and report the costs to complete for projects funded with IRRF funds are 

adequate. 

Results. The three organizations responsible for IRRF projects—the Project and 

Contracting Office, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq—have been required, since January 2004, to 

report cost-to-complete information for their Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

projects in quarterly reports to the Congress. However, these organizations did not begin 

providing reasonably comprehensive cost-to-complete data to IRMO until recently. 

Since January 2005, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has raised 

concerns about the lack of accurate cost-to-complete data. The State Department shared 

this concern and deployed an interagency assessment team to Baghdad in March 2005 to 

address the information shortfall. The assessment team’s work resulted in an action-plan 

to provide cost-to-complete data, with data on all projects over $6.5 million, covering 151 

projects. That plan, however, was not efficiently tracked until recently, after a second 

assessment team traveled to Iraq in August to reenergize the data collection effort. 

IRMO’s recent efforts indicate that cost-to-complete data, effective as of September 30, 

2005, will be available on October 15, 2005. We hope that future reports will include 

information on changes in project baselines due to reprogrammings, deobligations, and 

transfers among projects. 
ii 

In sum, we are pleased that IRMO has made important progress in securing improved 

reporting on cost-to-complete data and has an action plan in place to provide such data on 

a continual basis. Finally, we hope that a formal cost-to-complete reporting policy will 

be in place soon. 

Management Actions. IRMO has taken corrective action to implement a more rigorous 

procedure to collect and compile the cost-to-complete information required by Section 

2207 of Public Law 108-106. The procedure is now in place and IRMO informed us that 

the first report would be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget by 

October 15, 2005. 

Recommendation. We recommend that the Director of the IRMO formalize its cost-tocomplete action plan by issuing a formal policy that finalizes consistent procedures 

across all supporting IRRF organizations for the collection and compilation of the costto-complete information required by Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. IRMO officials concurred with the 

recommendation, and provided more recent information on activities that had occurred 

since the preparation of a draft of this report. We agreed and changed our report 

accordingly.

We plan to perform a follow-up audit later this year to determine if the new IRMO 

procedure provides timely, accurate, and consistent cost-to-complete information. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objective 2 

Finding 

Cost-to-Complete Estimates for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects 3 

Appendixes 

A. Scope and Methodology 6 

B. Cost-to-Complete Data Fields and Definitions of Reporting Terms 7 

C. Acronyms 9 

D. Report Distribution 10 

E. Audit Team Members 12 
1 

Introduction 

Background 

In November 2003, $18.6 billion was appropriated under the Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan (Public 

Law 108-106). The law created the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) of 

which $18.4 billion of the appropriation was designated for Iraq. 

Section 2207 Report Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106 requires a report to Congress 

every three months that updates the proposed uses of all IRRF funds on a project by 

project basis, including estimates of the cost required to complete each project. 

Specifically, the law says the 2207 Report shall contain information “on the proposed 

uses of all funds under this heading on a project by project basis...including estimates by 

the CPA of the costs required to complete each such project.” The most recent report, 

titled Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (Section 2207 Report) was 

posted to its website by the Department of State on October 12, 2005. The information 

contained in the Section 2207 Report is collated by IRMO from data provided by the 

Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) National Security Presidential 

Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, delegated 

responsibility for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for 

Iraq to the Secretary of State. The Directive also authorized the U.S. Mission in Baghdad 

and an office in the Department of State to assume from the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, those authorities and responsibilities that continue after the Coalition 

Provisional Authority terminated on June 28, 2004. Parts of the Coalition Provisional 

Authority’s responsibilities were delegated to IRMO which was also established in 

Directive 36. IRMO is responsible for managing and reporting on the IRRF funds.

Project and Contracting Office (PCO) National Security Presidential Directive 36, 

“United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, established the PCO, 

assigned all PCO personnel to serve under the authority of the Chief of Mission, and 

directed the PCO to provide acquisition and project management support to the Chief of 

Mission for activities in Iraq. On June 22, 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

established the PCO within the Department of the Army and directed the PCO to provide 

support for all activities associated with financial, program, and project management for 

both construction and non-construction IRRF activities. 

Multi National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) MNSTC-I is a 

component of the US Central Command’s Multi National Force - Iraq Command. 

MNSTC-I’s general mission is to help Iraq organize, train, equip, and mentor Iraqi 

Security Forces in order to transition security tasks to Iraqi control. The Coalition 

Military Assistance Training Team trains and mentors the provision of garrison support 

services at eight major division and brigade bases throughout Iraq. Provision of services 

includes constructing/refurbishing facilities, life support, communications, force 

protection, and medical support. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team staffs, 

equips, organizes, trains, and mentors the Iraqi Police Service forces and Department of 

Border Enforcement forces. 
2 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) USAID assists Iraqis in 

reconstructing their country by working with Iraq's interim government. USAID 

programs are implemented in coordination with the United Nations, World Bank, 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), Coalition country partners, nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), and private sector partners. The USAID Mission in Iraq carries 

out programs in education, health care, food security, infrastructure reconstruction, 

airport and seaport management, economic growth, community development, local 

governance, and transition initiatives. 

Cost-to-Complete Estimates The cost to complete a project may be defined as the total 

estimated cost of the project less the total actual cost of work performed to date: 

• The estimated cost of a project is the actual direct cost, plus indirect costs or 

allocable costs to the contract, plus the estimate of costs (direct and indirect) for 

authorized work remaining. 

• The actual cost of work performed to date is the cost (direct and indirect) to date 

of completed work packages and the completed portion of work packages begun 

and not yet completed. 

A process for reporting cost-to-complete estimates is an essential component for 

managing contract performance. Cost-to-complete estimates should be developed as 

follows: 

• Determine the progress toward contract completion to date. 

• Determine the cost of the contract work completed to date. 

• Estimate the amount of work remaining to be completed. 

• Estimate the cost of the work remaining to be completed.

• Calculate variances between the estimated value of work remaining and the 

remaining budget. 

• Determine the reasons for variances from initial estimates and take appropriate 

action to correct the causes for the variances. 

Objective 

The objective of this audit was to determine if procedures and processes used to estimate 

and report the costs to complete for projects funded with Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Funds are adequate. 

 

For a discussion of the audit scope, methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix C. For a 

list of the audit team members, see Appendix E. 
3 

Cost-to-Complete Estimates for Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Projects 

Since January 2005, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has 

raised concerns about the lack of accurate cost-to-complete data. The State Department 

shared this concern and deployed an interagency assessment team to Baghdad in March 

2005 to address the information shortfall. The assessment team’s work resulted in an 

action-plan to provide cost-to-complete data, providing data on all projects over $6.5 

million which equaled 151 projects. That plan, however, was not efficiently tracked until 

recently, after a second assessment team traveled to Iraq in August to reenergize the data 

collection effort. IRMO’s recent efforts indicate that cost-to-complete data, effective as 

of September 30, 2005, will be available on October 15, 2005. To date, cost-to-complete 

data has not been reported in the Section 2207 Report, notwithstanding the statutory 

requirement to report such. IRMO has responded to SIGIR concerns about the lack of 

cost-to-complete data by developing a plan to provide it. This cost-to-complete data will 

provide important project visibility essential for reconstruction management to enhance 

project budgeting and will allow the assessment of the likelihood of cost-overruns. 

Availability of Cost-to-Complete Data and Status of Reports

Our review found that cost-to-complete data is readily available from the contract 

performance status reports, which are required in all cost type construction contracts. 

Information in these reports includes total project budget, total costs incurred to date, and 

the estimated costs at completion. A cost-to-complete estimate is the difference between 

the costs incurred to date and the estimate at completion. Variances between cost-tocomplete and remaining budget identify projected overruns/underruns for management 

action. 

Project and Contracting Office

In December 2004, IRMO contacted PCO about obtaining accurate cost-to-complete 

data. Concerns about obtaining complete cost-to-complete data reports prompted the 

Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on Iraq to deploy an assessment team to Iraq in 

February 2005 to assess availability of funds to complete projects. The Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction had raised concerns about the lack of cost-to-complete 

data in January 2005, and SIGIR subsequently initiated an audit in March 2005, with the 

results reported in our July 26, 2005 report, “Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial 

Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” Audit Report 

Number SIGIR-05-011. During that audit, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) 

maintained it could not provide meaningful cost-to-complete estimates because: (1) 

project data was not sufficiently mature to develop reasonable estimates at completion; 

and (2) they could not consolidate information from their management information 

systems because the systems were not integrated. These limitations have since been 

overcome and PCO provided an official cost-to-complete report to IRMO on July 19, 

2005. PCO is continuing to refine its cost-to-complete reporting processes to include 

non-construction projects in its August 2005 reporting. 

 

Multi National Security Transition Command - Iraq

On June 4, 2005, Multi National Security Transition Command -Iraq (MNSTC-I) 

informed us that they had a previous arrangement with the former IRMO Director 

exempting them from providing cost-to-complete data. MNSTC-I maintained that their 

total construction program required approximately $5.0 billion of funding, $3.7 billion in 
4 

excess of its IRRF construction apportionment. Since MNSTC-I would expend its entire 

IRRF apportionment and would address shortfalls with Department of Defense 

supplemental funding, they considered cost-to-complete reporting for IRRF funds 

meaningless. During our review, MNSTC-I agreed to provide IRMO with cost-tocomplete reports beginning in September 2005. 

U.S. Agency for International Development

U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) $2.9 billion apportionment 

provides $1.5 for construction and $1.4 for non-construction support to education, health 

care, food security, airport and seaport management, economic growth, community 

development, local governance, and transition initiatives. USAID’s Supervisory Program 

Officer informed us that detailed information required in the contract performance status 

reports from its contractor provides readily available cost-to-complete information that 

would be provided to IRMO if requested. 

Cost-To-Complete Report Data

Program managers and the Congress require accurate, timely, and comprehensive 

information in order to make informed decisions involving mid-course programmatic 

adjustments that will insure the most effective use of IRRF resources. We were advised 

by IRMO officials that they will provide cost-to-complete data to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) on October 15, 2005. 

Management Actions 

During the course of this review, we recommended to IRMO that it take action to develop 

procedures for eliciting cost-to-complete information. IRMO agreed and commenced a 

series of discussions with PCO, USAID, and MNSTC-I to develop a formal process that 

will provide the necessary cost-to-complete reports on a monthly basis. IRMO now has 

in place a process for reporting cost-to-complete data and, as reported in the latest 2207 

Report, IRMO stated that it would provide comprehensive cost-to-complete data by 

October 15, 2005. 

We also recommended and came to an agreement with IRMO that the reports be 

consistent in format and content. Appendix B contains the data fields IRMO intends to 

populate for cost-to-complete reporting purposes together with IRMO’s definitions for 

such data. These data fields were developed as a result of the discussions with officials 

from OMB, IRMO, and SIGIR during the course of this review. 

Conclusion

The three organizations responsible for IRRF projects—the Project and Contracting 

Office, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq—have been required, since January 2004, to report cost-tocomplete information for their Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects in quarterly 

reports to the Congress. However, these organizations did not begin providing 

reasonably comprehensive cost-to-complete data to IRMO until recently. IRMO’s recent 

efforts indicate that cost-to-complete data, effective as of September 30, 2005, will be 

available on October 15, 2005. We hope that future reports will include information on 

changes in project baselines due to reprogrammings, deobligations, and transfers among 

projects. 
5 

In sum, we are pleased that IRMO has made important progress in securing improved 

reporting on cost-to-complete data and has an action plan in place to provide such data on 

a continual basis. Finally, we hope that a formal cost-to-complete reporting policy will 

be in place soon. 

Recommendation, Management Comments, and Audit 

Response 

We recommend that the Director of the IRMO formalize its cost-to-complete action 

plan by issuing a formal policy that finalizes consistent procedures across all 

supporting IRRF organizations for the collection and compilation of the cost-tocomplete information required by Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106. 

Management Comments. IRMO officials concurred with the recommendation, and 

provided more recent information on activities that had occurred since the preparation of 

a draft of this report. 

Audit Response. We agreed and changed our report accordingly. 
6 

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

In March 2005, we initiated an audit to determine whether the information systems used 

by U.S. government organizations result in effective and reliable program management 

information. This audit report is the third in a series of these information systems 

reviews. It discusses procedures and processes used to develop and report cost-tocomplete estimates for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) projects. 

To gain an understanding of each entity’s operations and processes for developing and 

reporting cost-to-complete information, we interviewed management personnel from 

IRMO, PCO, MNSTC-I, and USAID. We also reviewed organization charts and 

websites to obtain background information and responsibilities. 

We met with IRMO management, PCO Project Management, USAID Directors, and 

MNSTC-I commanders to discuss the contractual requirements and agency 

methodologies used to determine project status and to calculate cost-to-complete 

estimates. We also held discussions with OMB and IRMO on management requirements 

of cost to complete. Appendix B represents the agreement of IRMO, OMB, and the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction as to the data fields needed to ensure 

complete and transparent reporting of cost to complete. 

We reviewed available procedures, both formal and in-progress, that described the 

processes, methodology, responsibilities, documentation standards, and formats for costto-complete reporting. 

We met with representatives from the Army Corps of Engineers-Gulf Region Division 

and the Air Force Center of Engineering Excellence to review contract management 

procedures. We also reviewed a judgmentally selected sample of contracts managed by 

each agency to understand cost-to-complete and earned value reporting processes. 

We performed this audit from May 14, 2005 through September 30, 2005, in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform 

this audit. 

Prior Coverage. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Audit Report 

Number SIGIR-05-011, dated July 26, 2005, “Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial 

Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund”, included a 

review of PCO’s input to the April 2005 Section 2207 Report and found that PCO did not 

provide cost-to-complete information to IRMO for the Section 2207 Report. PCO 

maintained that (1) project data was not sufficiently mature to develop reasonable 

estimates at completion; and (2) they could not consolidate information from their 

management information systems because they were not integrated. 

 
7 

Appendix B. Cost-to-Complete Data Fields and 

Definitions of Reporting Terms 

Data Element Data Element Definition 

URI Unique Requirements Code 

Project Number Assigned Project Number 

Project Name Name of Project 

Sector 2207 report sector 

Sub-Sector 2207 sub-sector 

Project Description Name of project and a short description of it, 

including goal where possible (ie. Add 20 

MWs, etc.) 

Original Start Date Original date when project was supposed to 

begin under the original PIF [project 

identification form] or original estimate 

Actual Start date Date by which project is currently scheduled 

to begin (the two different dates will help us 

to see schedule slips) 

Original Target completion date Original date by which project was to have 

been mechanically completed (when project 

was first designed) 

Current projected completion date Current date by which project is projected to 

be mechanically complete (the two different 

dates will help us to see schedule slips) 

Design % Complete Please specify the DESIGN % of the project 

complete, as measured against the baseline 

schedule, cost and scope 

Build % Complete Please specify the BUILD % of the project 

complete, as measured against the baseline 

schedule, cost and scope 

Original PIF Value Amount budgeted for project when the 

original PIF was completed (for the first 2207 

report) 

Most Recent Estimate Date The date of the most recent estimate 

$ Value of Most Recent Budget Estimate The dollar amount budgeted for the project, 

according to the most recent estimate (if no 

new estimate has been done from the original 

PIF, leave blank) 

Definitized Yes/No Date of Definitization Yes, if a project has been completely 

definitized 
8 

Data Element Data Element Definition 

Definitized Value The dollar amount budgeted for the project, 

according to the definitization of the project 

Estimate at completion An estimate of what the project is expected to 

cost when completed. 

Project Contingency $ Used 

Project Contingency $ Amount 

Contingency (Y/N): Please specify whether 

the current project estimate (PIF, revised 

estimate or definitized amount) includes builtin contingency amount. If so, please specify 

the amount or percent (if percent, percent of 

what?) 

Program Contingency $ Used Program Contingency: Specify any other 

program contingency (security, strategic, 

floating, etc.) that is not included in current 

project estimate but is allocated against each 

specific project. If such a contingency is not 

allocated by project, but by sector or 

administrative task order (ATO), add a 

separate line item to data call, labeling as a 

program contingency. 

Associated close-out costs Please give the current estimate of project 

close-out costs, or contract close-out costs that 

will be booked against each project. 

Demobilization costs Please give the current estimate of project 

demobilization costs, or contractor 

demobilization costs that will be booked 

against each project. 

Project O&M Costs ($ Amt) Operational and maintenance costs 

Committed to Date Amount committed to project. 

Obligated to Date Amount of all contracts awarded to date 

Disbursed to Date Amounts disbursed to date 
9 

Appendix C. Acronyms 

 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PCO Project and Contracting Office 

PIF Project Identification Form 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
10 

Appendix D. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commander, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq 

 Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq Commander, Joint Area Support Group – Central 

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 
11 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Mission Director – Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

 
12 

Appendix E. Audit Team Members 

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this draft report. The staff members 

who contributed to the report include: 

James Carrera 

Timothy Baum