September 2004 Defense Horizons 1

Defense

Overview

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 , NATO endorsed the further transformation of military capabilities to make them “more modern, more usable, 

and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions.” The 

Istanbul Communiqué especially called for continuing progress on the NATO 

Response Force and the Prague Capabilities Commitments. 

 To accomplish this, NATO needs a new initiative for its defense agenda: 

creation of better forces and capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction 

(S&R) operations outside Europe, including the greater Middle East. The real 

challenge is to reorganize, refocus, and rebalance current assets so that NATO 

can respond promptly and effectively to future contingencies. This challenge 

can be met by creating a NATO S&R Force (SRF). This force would be a logical 

complement to the NATO Response Force , but would be structured differently. 

Instead of a small standing joint force, the SRF would consist of flexible and 

modular national forces totaling one or two division-equivalents, mostly ground 

forces, that could be assembled to generate the necessary mix of capabilities 

for S&R operations. In this new NATO defense concept, the combination of the 

NATO Response Force for rapid, forcible-entry missions, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps or other High Readiness Forces for major combat operations under a 

combined joint task force, and an SRF would provide a full-spectrum capability 

for the new strategic environment. NATO adoption of this three-pillar posture 

will constitute a major step toward preparing for future responsibilities.

Emerging Strategic Requirement

NATO faces a permanent need for improved stabilization and 

reconstruction (S&R) military assets. To launch S&R operations in 

Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, NATO had to assemble forces on an 

ad-hoc basis. Improvisation worked in these cases because the operations made only modest demands on existing forces and because 

mobilization was not urgent. Future contingencies might not be so 

accommodating. Although many of the necessary S&R capabilities 

exist within NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) forces, they 

are not organized into deployable assets that can provide cohesive, 

effective response options. A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Needed—A NATO Stabilization

and Reconstruction Force

Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

Number 45

Horizons

S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4

Force (SRF) would transform these disparate and distributed capabilities into trained and ready assets for future S&R operations. 

 The Istanbul defense agenda was a logical continuation of 

decisions made at the Prague Summit of 2002, which launched the 

NATO Response Force (NRF), the Prague Capabilities Commitments 

(PCC), and a new Allied Command Transformation (ACT). At Istanbul, political leaders endorsed further progress on these measures. 

They adopted new force goals, reformed the NATO defense planning 

process, and urged an intensified focus by members and the Alliance as a whole on creating usable forces and capabilities. These 

measures were embedded in a communiqué that called attention to 

growing security involvements in the zone from the Balkans to Central Asia. The same communiqué also pledged to expand NATO-led 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, announced 

that NATO was prepared to help train Iraqi security forces, and 

offered the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to nations of the Greater 

Middle East. The effect was to make clear that NATO security and 

defense horizons will continue expanding outside Europe. 

 The Istanbul Summit set the stage for a focus on the next phase 

of NATO defense improvements. Requirements for S&R forces and 

capabilities are growing as NATO becomes more involved in military 

interventions requiring stabilization and reconstruction beyond 

Europe, especially in Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. In 

such contingencies, stabilization refers to the process of halting 

residual violence, suppressing remaining opposition, and bringing 

order and security to the occupied country. Reconstruction refers 

to early measures taken by occupying military forces to repair damage and restore such essentials as electrical power, medicine, and 

transportation before the arrival of civilian nation-building assets. 

Creating S&R forces requires focused effort because their capabilities and assets are different from those of standard ground combat 

formations. Although they incorporate some combat units for security missions, they rely heavily on combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units and must be designed with synergistic 

capabilities and cumulative effects in mind.
2 Defense Horizons September 2004

 An S&R operation can require as large a force as a major combat 

operation and involve such disparate capabilities as light infantry, 

military police, psychological operations, civil affairs, contract 

administrators, civil engineers, and medical teams. Often, combat 

and S&R forces will need to operate together. For example, combat 

medical units may have to care for wounded troops at the same time 

they are needed to restore hospital services to an occupied country or prevent the spread of infectious diseases. Similarly, combat 

engineers may be preoccupied with preparing defensive positions, 

removing mines, and keeping lines of communication open to 

military traffic at the same time they are needed to restore electrical power, sewage, and communications to occupied cities. S&R forces 

must be designed to perform such 

functions and be given the assets and 

staying power to perform them. Being 

prepared for S&R operations requires 

forces and capabilities in being, not a 

mobilization strategy to assemble S&R forces from scratch for each 

contingency.

 The U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003 shows the complications 

that can arise when major combat operations quickly give way to 

demanding S&R operations. The U.S. and British ground force of 

5 1/3 divisions, which swept over Iraq in six weeks, fielded about 

100,000 troops assigned to CS/CSS units. But most of these units 

were configured to support major combat activities, not S&R operations. Considerable time was lost as these forces tried to shift gears 

and as new CS/CSS forces were deployed from outside the theater. 

Had tailored S&R forces been available from the onset, the occupation of Iraq might have gotten off to a better start. NATO would do 

well to learn from such experiences. 

NATO S&R Experience

Recent NATO experience with S&R operations illustrates the 

difficulty of the mission.

Albania

 A successful S&R operation was conducted in 1997 when Italian 

forces intervened to stabilize a chaotic situation in Albania. Guided 

by a UN and Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) charter, the operation was launched with 8,000 troops after 

only 13 days of preparation. The Italians initially focused on reestablishing law and order through policing operations that restored 

stability and set the stage for elections. They also distributed foods 

and goods, provided tent housing and medical aid, and repaired 

some infrastructure. Within 6 months, the mission was successfully 

completed and the forces withdrawn.

Bosnia and Kosovo

 NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo have been more 

problematic. The missions broadly achieved the Alliance’s security 

goals but have been less effective at nation-building. After the Dayton Accord was signed in 1995, a large NATO Implementation Force 

(IFOR) of 60,000 troops was deployed to Bosnia to enforce the peace 

and help establish a foundation of security upon which a unified 

state could be built. Initially, heavy combat forces were needed, but 

soon lighter forces equipped for a wide spectrum of S&R missions 

were required. Over time, IFOR became the Stabilization Force 

(SFOR), which gradually declined to 7,000 troops. Over the past 9 

years, SFOR has succeeded in enforcing the peace, but has not been 

able to heal Bosnia’s ethnic wounds. 

 In 1999, NATO deployed the Kosovo Force (KFOR) after Serbian 

forces withdrew from the province. 

KFOR began with 50,000 troops, 

but has declined to 20,000 or fewer. 

KFOR was called upon to perform a 

similar spectrum of missions: deterrence of further ethnic warfare, law 

enforcement, and reconstruction 

missions. KFOR has largely kept the peace for 5 years, but Kosovo 

remains divided by serious ethnic tensions. The long-term prospects 

for democracy and peace in both countries are unclear.

Afghanistan

 Deployment of the all-European International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) into Afghanistan began in 2002, after the U.S. 

invasion and subsequent fall of the Taliban. NATO took command of 

ISAF in August 2003. Originally the 6,500 troops were to secure only 

Kabul, but the mission has expanded to include 5 of the country’s 32 

provinces. PRTs are being used to help carry out this larger agenda. 

Recently, NATO decided to reinforce ISAF with 2 rapid-reaction 

units of about 1,000 troops each for the Afghan elections. These 2 

units will be backed-up by another 2,000 troops in Europe that could 

be deployed rapidly, if necessary. Performing combat operations elsewhere against lingering Taliban and al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan remains the task of U.S. and other forces. While Afghanistan 

is vastly different from the Balkans, ISAF has been called upon to 

perform a similar wide spectrum of S&R missions, including security 

and reconstruction under a UN mandate. Since 2002, Afghanistan 

has made progress toward establishing a democracy, but the government remains weak, and local warlords and guerilla resistance mark 

the countryside and eastern provinces. Critics commonly charge 

that the European troop deployments in Afghanistan are too small to 

meet S&R requirements. A multiyear NATO deployment in Afghanistan seems likely, but again the prospects for a stable, democratic 

government are unclear. 

Iraq

 Whether NATO will become involved in Iraq remains to be 

seen, but a majority of NATO countries, led by Britain and Poland, 

are part of the coalition force, which today numbers about 150,000 

troops. NATO is providing support to the Polish-led multinational 

divisions and has agreed to help train Iraqi security forces. Thus far, 

peace enforcement and security have been more demanding than 

in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan. Coalition forces have been called 

upon to deal with guerilla warfare and violence while simultaneously 

performing a wide variety of reconstruction missions, including restoration of economic services, medical support, and infrastructure 

had tailored S&R forces been 

available from the onset, the 

occupation of Iraq might have 

gotten off to a better start

Dr. Hans Binnendijk (binnendijkh@ndu.edu) is Director of the 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP). Dr. 

Richard L. Kugler (kuglerr@ndu.edu) is a distinguished research 

professor at CTNSP.
September 2004 Defense Horizons 3

repair. A multiyear presence through 2005 is envisioned, but may 

need to be extended. Much will depend upon whether an effective 

democratic government emerges and if the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites can live together peacefully in one country.

Preparing for the Future

What lessons do recent S&R experiences hold for NATO? First, 

the requirement for S&R operations will continue, and the experience of NATO members in these types of operations needs to be 

institutionalized. Second, NATO may be required to perform several 

S&R operations simultaneously. Third, S&R operations likely will 

continue to be problematic and will require close collaboration of 

military and civilian organizations in the application of force, diplomacy, and economic aid. 

To date, NATO S&R operations have been reasonably successful, but only modestly demanding of forces and missions. What will 

happen if NATO accepts greater responsibility for Iraq or must deal 

with an even larger contingency? If more demanding situations arise, 

NATO shortcomings will be exposed. Virtually all European forces 

now assigned to NATO as readily available formations are configured 

for major combat operations. The manpower and ready formations 

to generate a sizable sustained S&R response are lacking, as are a 

common doctrine and interoperability. Additionally, NATO-assigned 

forces have capability shortfalls, including integrated logistics, 

modern C4ISR* networks, long-range strategic mobility, civil affairs, 

administrators, special operations forces, linguists, construction 

and civil engineers, medical units, and humanitarian assistance. 

Reducing these shortcomings and deficiencies is a key reason for 

creating improved NATO S&R forces and capabilities. 

Reorganizing for S&R

The American Model

 A framework for appraising European forces for S&R can be 

established by reviewing American forces and experience. Thus 

far, the U.S. military has chosen not to create specialized forces for 

S&R operations but to “re-role” combat forces for these operations. 

Since the invasion of Iraq, interest has grown in the idea of creating 

tailored S&R forces that can be deployed promptly as major combat 

operations subside. Such tailored forces have the potential to perform S&R operations effectively and efficiently, with perhaps half 

the manpower of a traditional combat force. To capitalize upon these 

advantages, a recent National Defense University study proposed 

creation of two S&R joint command organizations, one active and 

one reserve component.1

Roughly division-size, each joint formation would consist of 

a command staff and four subordinate or brigade-level staffs to 

provide command and control, including mission planning and 

execution. Each joint formation also would include S&R battalions 

in such areas as military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical support, and PSYOPs. When the situation merits, this joint formation of 

about 11,300 troops could be accompanied by a combat brigade and 

CS/CSS support command, raising the total to about 18,200 troops 

(table 1).

* command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance

Standard Formations Number Manpower

Headquarters Staff (5) 725

Military Police Battalions (4) 2164

Civil Affairs Battalions (4) 584

Construction/Civil Engineer Battalions (4) 2692

Area Medical Battalions (4) 1442

PSYOP Battalions (4) 1000

Other Battalions (6) 2707

 Sub-Total 11,314

 

Combat Reinforcements

CS/CSS Command (1) 2957

Stryker Combat Brigade (1) 3937

 Total 18,208 

 These two commands would provide modular capabilities that 

could be tailored to handle a wide range of situations. For example, 

two brigades could be dispatched to Central Command and two to 

Pacific Command. If necessary, the two commands could generate 

eight brigades that could be allocated to regional combatant commands. The effect would be to increase the U.S. military capacity 

to handle two medium-sized contingencies similar to Iraq. Alternatively, two such forces could be used on a rotational basis to provide 

an enduring presence for a single contingency. 

 A key of the National Defense University study is that NATO 

can create a viable S&R posture of two division-sized formations by 

organizing only 36,000 troops. This equates to only 2 to 3 percent of 

the 1.6 million active-duty troops now fielded by European armies 

in NATO. There is ample manpower to create such a force without 

drawing away from the NRF, the High Readiness Forces (HRF), or 

other priority forces for major combat operations. Such a posture 

would not meet all plausible S&R requirements, but it would enable 

NATO to meet most requirements. Multinational integration could 

be pursued at lower levels than commonly is the case for major combat operations as forces using lower technology can perform many 

S&R missions. Indeed, S&R operations provide lower-tech militaries a way to perform valuable missions for NATO. Militaries from 

the southern region and Eastern Europe thus could participate, as 

could PfP countries. A brief analysis of some of the forces available 

follows:

Italy

 Among the Europeans, Italy has been a leader in preparing for 

S&R missions. The future, all-professional Italian army will consist 

of 10 brigades: three heavy, four medium, and three light. These 

brigades will be designed to provide modularity and task-organization and will have attached CS/CSS units for dual use in combat 

support and S&R missions. Important units for S&R missions include 

an ISTAR-Electronic Warfare Brigade, Civil/Military Cooperation 

Group South, engineer units, a nuclear biological chemical regiment, 

and a PSYOP regiment. Italy has established a crisis response and 

S&R training center focused on doctrinal development, conceptual 

advancement and application, and lessons learned. 

Table 1: Illustrative U.S. S&R Joint Command
4 Defense Horizons September 2004

Germany and Poland

The German Bundeswehr is undergoing a major transformation 

to enable power projection. The future German military will consist 

of about 250,000 uniformed personnel, of which about 30,000 will 

be tasked to major combat units for assignment to the NRF, other 

NATO formations, and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). 

An additional 70,000 troops will be assigned to stability operations, 

thus providing a rotational capacity to support deployments of 14,000 

troops. Remaining personnel will be assigned to CS/CSS units, some of 

which could be employed for S&R operations. The Polish military also 

is well-suited to make contributions to NATO S&R missions. The Polish army has 120,300 personnel in 6 combat divisions and associated 

units. Poland currently maintains no forces exclusively designated for 

S&R missions, but it does field CS/CSS, CIMINC, humanitarian, and 

intelligence units that could be employed for this purpose.

Britain and France

 Both countries are NATO leaders in preparing their military 

forces for the information age and power-projection operations. 

Britain’s relatively small army of eight brigades will remain primarily configured for high-tech combat operations as part of the NRF 

and Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 

(ARRC) and in partnership with 

U.S. forces. Britain takes seriously 

the need to be prepared for peacekeeping and S&R operations, but it 

plans to rely on re-roleing and dual 

training of combat forces, because 

its small force does not permit specialization in S&R operations. The downsized French army of several 

maneuver brigades is intended mainly for major combat operations 

as part of NATO forces or the ERRF. France is transforming its military to achieve a high-tech combat force. It plans to rely primarily on 

re-roleing of combat formations for S&R missions.

Netherlands and Canada

Both of these countries have long-standing records of participation in NATO peacekeeping missions. The Netherlands military 

includes 55,000 active personnel, with a marine brigade and an army 

of 23,000 that fields 3 brigades, plus special operations units. The 

Netherlands military has relevant S&R capabilities in such areas as 

military police, intelligence, civil affairs, CIMIC, medical units, and 

transport. Because the Netherlands military is designed to provide 

a joint combat force, it has long resisted schemes for it to specialize in any niche area. It probably will make some contributions to 

NATO S&R forces and capabilities, but not at the expense of altering 

its basic structure or orientation. The Canadian army suffers from 

budgetary shortfalls that complicate the task of funding expensive 

international deployments. As a result, Canada will resist any specialization schemes that strip core military competency from its 

army of 19,000 troops. Still, Canada could contribute S&R assets in 

areas such as military police, judicial experts, and election monitors.

Spain and Sweden

 Although the recent changeover in Spain’s government clouds 

the situation, the Spanish military has a positive attitude about 

participating in S&R operations within the limits of its forces and 

budgets. The Spanish army of 92,000 troops is organized into traditional combat formations that include a rapid reaction division and 

a mechanized division. These formations have a standard allotment 

of CS/CSS units, some of which could be made available for S&R 

missions. Spain will need NATO guidance on how to prepare for S&R 

operations. While Sweden is not a member of NATO, it is a PfP member with a willingness to participate in some NATO missions. It possesses a small but modern and well-armed military that could take 

part in NATO or EU/ERRF military operations. Its army of 19,000 

active troops includes armored and infantry regiments supported by 

standard CS/CSS units.

 Other European militaries also possess assets and capabilities 

suited to S&R operations, but only a few have undertaken detailed 

analysis and planning of how they could best contribute. Some countries can provide a wide spectrum of units; others will be able to 

make only niche contributions. All will need guidance from NATO on 

strategic concepts, force-design standards, and programmatic priorities.

 Of the nations surveyed above, 

Italy, Germany, and Poland seem the 

best candidates for organizing dedicated and specialized S&R forces. 

All three countries possess relatively 

large armies with diminished border 

defense missions. Preparing for S&R 

missions appears to be a logical next 

step for them, while they continue to contribute to the NRF, ARRC, 

and other NATO combat formations. S&R contributions would enable 

them to preserve force structures and budgets as well as to contribute to NATO strategic preparedness. Italy already is moving in this 

direction, Germany is starting to do so, and the Polish military seems 

willing. Spain may fall into this category, depending on the strategic policies of its new government. The Netherlands, Canada, and 

Sweden provide examples of countries with small but well-prepared 

militaries that have a forthcoming attitude toward participation in 

traditional peacekeeping missions, but also must remain prepared 

for major combat operations. They likely will be willing and able to 

make limited contributions to S&R operations, but will resist specialization in this area.

 When this group of 9 NATO and PfP members is generalized 

across the Alliance, some judgments stand out. Beyond question, 

European countries as a whole possess considerable military manpower and relevant assets for creating S&R forces and capabilities, 

although constraints and impediments must be overcome. Because 

of the need to retain combat preparedness, many countries will be 

able to devote only a small portion of forces to S&R preparedness. 

Continued reliance by some countries upon conscription, coupled 

with the need to retain large rotational pools, also will limit the number of troops available for S&R deployments at any single time. Many 

European militaries judge that they already are being stretched by 

today’s relatively small NATO deployments in the Balkans, Afghanifortunately, many of the core 

European assets already 

exist scattered throughout 

European militaries in service 

of traditional combat forces
September 2004 Defense Horizons 5

Table 2: Illustrative NATO Force Capabilities for New 

Missions Outside Europe

stan, and Iraq. Management changes will be needed to enlarge on 

the pool of usable NATO military forces.

 Fortunately, many of the core European assets already exist. 

They are scattered throughout European militaries in service of 

traditional combat forces for border defense, many of which are not 

critical to NATO’s preparedness for major combat operations. The 

task is mainly one of reorganizing, refocusing, and rebalancing these 

assets so that they can be brought together and harnessed in service 

of S&R missions. Performing this task may take time, but it does not 

promise to be highly expensive because S&R is a low-cost enterprise. 

Some new equipment and training will be needed, but most changes 

likely can be accommodated within existing budgets if savings from 

ongoing manpower cuts are applied to investments. With top-down 

management guidance from NATO, considerable progress seems 

achievable over the course of a few years.

Launching S&R Force Development

 Some observers may judge that NATO can meet its emerging 

S&R needs merely by planning to re-role traditional combat forces for 

this mission and provide them extra training. A 

sense of perspective, however, is needed here. 

Re-roleing can be part of the solution, but it 

is not the solution. Traditional combat forces 

must remain focused on main war-fighting 

missions. Inevitably, they will be marginal and 

inefficient performers in large S&R operations, 

which are demanding and require unique skills of their own. NATO 

needs designated forces and capabilities for these operations that can 

be used alone or augmented by traditional combat forces. 

 If the strategic requirement for NATO S&R forces is clear-cut, 

what about the concerns posed by some observers? One concern is 

that an S&R force might interfere with progress on fielding the NRF. 

A second concern is that the United States might not participate 

adequately in NATO S&R missions. A third concern is that a NATO 

S&R force might drag the Europeans into Iraq and other conflicts 

from which they would prefer to remain aloof. All three concerns fade 

when stock is taken of the situation. NATO has the manpower and 

wealth to field an SRF as well as the NRF and should do so. Indeed, 

if an SRF is not fielded, pressures might arise to employ the NRF for 

S&R missions, thus detracting from its original purpose. Likewise, 

the United States will be able to contribute strongly to such missions 

if it creates S&R forces of its own. Creation of a NATO SRF does not 

mean that Europeans will be dragged into unwanted endeavors: their 

membership on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) will continue to 

provide them veto power over such commitments. The conclusion 

thus is that, although a NATO S&R Force gives rise to some issues of 

concern, these issues are resolvable through sensible coalition planning. 

Charting the future can begin by addressing four issues:

■ What operational concept should guide NATO planning for 

S&R operations?

■ How will NATO’s military command structure be affected by 

S&R operations?

■ What options does NATO have at its disposal to guide force 

preparations?

■ How should NATO act in the aftermath of the Istanbul Summit?

Flexibility, Modularity, and Capability 

 An initial step toward creating an operational concept can be 

taken by positing how S&R and major combat operations might work 

together in a scenario commonly used for NATO defense planning. 

Suppose a major crisis erupts outside Europe that requires NATO to 

deploy sizable combat forces rapidly to long distances for war-fighting. NATO likely would respond by first deploying the NRF to conduct initial strike operations. Then, it might 

deploy the ARRC, a corps-sized HRF that can 

operate four combat divisions, along with 

commensurate air and naval forces, under 

overall command of a Combined Joint Task 

Force (CJTF). If necessary, more HRF forces 

could be deployed. This joint force would be 

responsible for performing the major combat operations needed to 

achieve NATO’s wartime goals. As the combat operations approach 

completion, the next phase of the campaign begins: war-termination 

and occupation of enemy territory that requires S&R operations for 

several months. At this stage, NATO S&R forces enter the picture. 

Two division-sized formations might deploy into the occupation 

zone before combat operations are complete. As the transition from 

combat to S&R operations occurs, S&R forces might replace two of 

the original ARRC combat divisions, which would be withdrawn. The 

resulting force of 2 combat divisions and 2 S&R division-equivalents 

might remain in the occupation zone for 6 months or more. If a longer deployment is needed, other forces generated by NATO during 

this period could replace these S&R forces. 

The chart below portrays a notional NATO three-tier ground posture for a major operation outside Europe. This deployable posture is 

a small portion of the total posture endorsed by NATO military authorities for all missions, including in-place forces for border defense. 

Type of Force Size of Posture

NRF 1 brigade

HRF for Major Combat Operations (HRF/MCO) 4 to 8 divisions 

SRF 2 divisions

traditional combat 

forces must remain 

focused on main 

warfighting missions 
6 Defense Horizons September 2004

This operational concept, one of several different possibilities, 

helps illuminate strategic priorities for building and employing 

S&R forces. The key point is that S&R forces should not be viewed 

as separate from NATO warfighting forces. Rather, the two forces 

should be viewed in integrated terms, with warfighting operations 

taking place first and S&R operations following. S&R forces should 

be operationally capable of working closely with combat forces in 

situations where a mix of hostilities, war-termination, and peace 

establishment is taking place. This concept also indicates that readiness levels for S&R forces need not be as high as for the NRF, which 

is ready to deploy within 7 to 30 days. But S&R forces should be 

ready within 30 to 90 days, which is the readiness standard of normal 

HRF, rather than the 90 to 180 days of Forces of Lower Readiness 

(FLR). As for sustainment, S&R forces 

should have 6 to 12 months of staying power—long enough to provide a 

bridge to the NATO process for generating additional forces. 

 This operational concept, however, need not function as a straitjacket for designing S&R forces to fit 

only one contingency. In today’s world, 

S&R forces must be able to operate effectively across a wide range 

of contingencies. In one case, a brigade- or division-equivalent might 

be needed; in another, the entire S&R posture of two division-equivalents and eight brigades might deploy to a single crisis location. 

Indeed, three contingencies might erupt concurrently: one requiring 

a brigade-size force, another two or three brigades, and yet another 

four or five brigades. Or a single contingency might require one S&R 

division-size force for 6 months, followed by a second division-size force 

for another 6 months. 

 Ultimately, a NATO SRF must be flexible, adaptable, modular, 

and versatile: capable of being deployed in a variety of force packages designed to carry out the operations at hand. NATO should be 

able to draw upon the entire SRF posture to uniquely tailor each brigade. For example, one brigade might require a standard allotment 

of forces, another a large concentration of infantry forces and military police for security missions, and still another mostly engineers, 

medical units, and similar CS/CSS assets. Each of these brigades 

might require expertise in different areas, plus tailored assets. 

Command and C4ISR Architecture

 If NATO is to be serious about building S&R forces, a NATO SRF 

will need its own command structure. S&R missions require special 

leadership skills and many special, civil-oriented staff skills unique 

to stabilization and reconstruction. In most cases, S&R forces will 

deploy under command of a NATO CJTF, which will be directed by 

one of NATO’s Joint Force Commands under the overall control of 

Allied Command Operations (ACO). If this happens, S&R forces will 

not need to operate on their own. Yet situations could arise in which 

SRF forces are the only NATO forces deployed, and a CJTF is not 

available. Then, an SRF force will need a deployable headquarters 

of its own. Even in situations where SRF forces are commanded by 

a CJTF, they might be entrusted to operate autonomously, which 

will require an independent joint command structure. Similar to the 

NRF, the act of becoming capable for S&R operations requires not 

only commanding S&R forces in contingencies, but also developing 

them in peacetime. An SRF command structure will be needed to 

perform this critical function as well as be capable of working under 

the guidance of both ACO and ACT.

 A NATO SRF also will need a C4ISR information architecture 

to conduct demanding operations in distant locations. This architecture must be capable of operating with NATO forces and other 

international forces, civilian agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Such an architecture—composed of integrated 

information networks for communications, intelligence, force operations, and logistic support—will provide a central framework upon 

which to build a NATO SRF for the information age. The SRF C4ISR 

architecture must allow it to “plug and play” into a CJTF with its 

combat forces. It also should provide SRF commanders with assets 

for commanding multinational formations that may be integrated down to 

the battalion level or lower. Such a 

C4ISR architecture and its interactive 

networks will need to be designed with 

the multifaceted nature of S&R operations in mind, including security and 

reconstruction. Future systems and 

their technologies should be designed 

and upgraded with these performance 

parameters in mind. 

Three Options for NATO 

 If S&R forces and capabilities are to be built, key decisions 

on important choices will have to be made. The issue is more than 

how much is enough. A determination also must be made as to how 

responsive and effective S&R forces should be. The decision should 

be governed by four criteria:

■ Military effectiveness: ensuring that S&R forces can perform 

their missions. 

■ Feasibility and affordability: respecting what the traffic will 

bear.

 ■ Cost-effectiveness: pursuing measures with benefits that 

match or exceed costs. 

 ■ Tradeoffs and opportunity costs: not interfering with other 

priority programs.

With these criteria in mind, NATO has three strategic options:

Option 1: Minimal Preparedness: Identification of potentially 

available forces; no special command structures would be created 

or NATO-directed force preparations undertaken. A NATO center of 

excellence might be created to help orchestrate doctrine and policies, while ACO would conduct general S&R planning and exercise 

objectives. The forces would be expected to meet NATO readiness 

and performance standards for FLR, and force development would 

be entrusted to the participating members.

Option 2: ACO and Regional Command Operational Planning for Mission-Assigned S&R Forces: Identification of NATO 

commands to conduct planning and exercises for S&R operations 

and employment of NATO standard planning machinery to provide 

guidance for a posture of assigned forces whose readiness, training 

and force development would be the responsibility of individual 

a NATO SRF must be 

flexible, adaptable, modular, 

and versatile and capable of 

being deployed in a variety 

of force packages
September 2004 Defense Horizons 7

members, as with other NATO earmarked forces. These forces would 

be expected to meet the readiness standards and other performance 

characteristics of average HRF.

Option 3: NATO-Directed Creation of a Flexible, Modular S&R 

Force. Creation of a NATO command structure responsible for both 

operational planning and S&R force development, as in option 2, and 

an integrated, flexible, modular S&R force similar to the NRF, whose 

development would be proactively managed by ACO and ACT. These 

forces would be expected to meet the readiness standards and other 

performance characteristics of top-line HRF. 

 Option 1 outlines the minimum steps to enable NATO to assemble forces and capabilities for S&R missions. It would provide an S&R 

option, but with a capability that falls well short of the best NATO 

combat forces. Essentially, it aims for a third-tier force that can be 

activated over 3 to 6 months. As a 

result, this S&R force option does not 

rise to the readiness standards of an 

HRF. Member nations would nominate sufficient forces to meet or surpass S&R needs of one to two division 

equivalents. NATO would maintain 

the troop list, which NATO military 

commands could use in designing 

operational plans. This option would 

establish no new command structure 

to conduct operational planning or 

S&R force development. Subject to 

broad NATO strategic guidance, responsibility for force development 

would reside entirely with the member nations. During a crisis, these 

forces could be assigned to the NATO command, but NATO would 

have little to say about their training, equipment, doctrine, and other 

characteristics.

 Option 2 aspires to meet the standards now employed to maintain NATO’s average HRF at adequate preparedness levels. Its goal 

is to create S&R forces that could complement the NRF and ARRC, 

but would not match them in readiness or other performance characteristics. This second-tier force could be readied in 2 to 3 months. It 

establishes a special NATO S&R command structure that would work 

closely with combatant commands to develop operational plans, doctrines, C4ISR architectures, and interoperability standards. It would 

employ existing NATO planning mechanisms—ministerial guidance, 

force goals, and country plans—to assist member nations, who would 

be responsible for force development. A multinational force of sufficient 

size would be created and the assigned forces would retain this affiliation 

permanently unless changes were sought by member states. There would 

be no regular rotation of forces through the S&R force. 

 Option 3 aims to match the readiness standards of the top-line 

HRF. The goal would be to create a force that could operate alongside 

the NRF and ARRC as a comparable performer in readiness and other 

characteristics. In addition to a special S&R command structure, it 

would create an integrated but flexible and modular S&R force with 

high-level performance capabilities. ACO and ACT would work closely 

with the S&R command in developing schools, readiness, equipping, 

training, interoperability standards, transformation goals, doctrine, 

exercises, and sustainment for the SRF. NATO common investment 

funds would be allocated, and a rotational scheme would be used. 

National forces assigned to the force would remain on duty for 1 to 2 

years, and then be replaced by new forces.

 The benefits, limitations, and tradeoffs of these three options 

are apparent. Option 1 moves NATO into the S&R business with 

minimal disruption to existing defense arrangements and few costs 

in budgets and resources. However, the resulting forces would have 

relatively low readiness, multinational integration, and overall 

preparedness, unless individual members pursued improvement 

measures on their own. Option 2 takes significant steps to create a 

command structure and an S&R force similar to average HRF forces. 

Clearly it poses higher costs in budgets, resources, and commitments 

than option 1. Option 3 offers the highest level of preparedness, 

multinational integration, and capability: the S&R force would not 

match the NRF in readiness, but it would acquire a status equal to 

top ARRC units and would benefit from the types of attention now 

being given by ACO and ACT to the NRF. Of the three options, it poses 

the highest costs and would have 

the biggest impact on other NATO 

defense priorities.

 In essence, option 1 makes 

sense only if nothing better is realistically achievable. While better than 

nothing, it does not provide a way for 

NATO to meet its military requirements promptly. Option 2 offers an 

affordable alternative by providing 

NATO with an S&R force that might 

not be top-line, but could be drawn 

upon in a crisis when 2 to 3 months 

of warning and mobilization are available. Option three is a first-rate 

S&R force that can be drawn upon on relatively short notice. Judged 

on military merits, option 3 is clearly the most attractive option if 

political support and budgetary resources can be mobilized. 

 These options, however, are not mutually exclusive. Option 1 

can be pursued as a near-term expedient in the next 1 to 2 years. 

Option 2 can be pursued in the mid-term, 2 to 4 years—if nothing 

better is achievable. If option 2 is adopted for the mid-term, option 

3 can be pursued over a longer-term of 5 to 6 years. Such a timephased approach might enable NATO to create viable S&R forces and 

capabilities steadily while avoiding any interference with the NRF, 

top-line ARRC forces, and other high-priority defense initiatives. 

Conversely, if NATO is willing to cut back in some areas, option 3 can 

be pursued on a faster timeline, yielding a completed effort in 4 to 5 

years.

 Regardless of which option NATO chooses, leaders should 

concentrate equal energy on the creation of the civil capabilities 

essential to the prosecution of S&R operations. Basically, what NATO 

would create is a deployable operations cell of requisite civil reconstruction expertise to accompany its military headquarters. This 

civilian operations cell would be appended to the SRF Headquarters 

to provide the experts necessary to help rebuild civil government 

institutions and basic services and infrastructure. The longstanding Civil Emergency Planning Directorate of the International Staff 

is the appropriate agency to steer this undertaking. Skills such as 

agricultural and industrial planning, transport and civil aviation 

planning, medical and communications planning, and civil protection are examples of areas in which NATO has cultivated civil-sector 

expertise for decades. New areas that should be under study are 

global cultural, ethnic, religious, and legal specialties. The Cold War 

era Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee already has revitalregardless of which option 

NATO chooses, leaders 

should concentrate equal 

energy on the creation of the 

civil capabilities essential 

to the prosecution of S&R 

operations
8 Defense Horizons September 2004

ized its agenda and is in a strong position to steer this effort for the 

NAC. A deployable civil cell might come from the International Staff 

as well as from NATO members, or even in collaboration with the EU, 

which has longstanding civil expertise in many key areas, especially 

border and customs control, multinational legal institutions, and 

civil policing. 

Post-Istanbul Agenda

 In the coming months, NATO’s defense ministers and military 

leaders can undertake a study aimed at creating an S&R concept 

plan and implementation agenda for consideration at future ministerial session, perhaps in spring 2005. A 6-month study should perform 

these functions:

■ Assess current S&R forces and capabilities in the inventories 

of NATO members. Analyze current and future requirements for 

NATO S&R operations.

■ Analyze the capacity of NATO and its European members to 

strengthen S&R forces and capabilities without undermining the 

NRF.

■ Review alternative options for better organizing NATO S&R 

forces and capabilities and otherwise meeting future requirements. 

■ Provide recommendations for how NATO should act in the 

coming period.

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

 Hans Binnendijk

Director

This Defense Horizons draws upon a one-day conference recently 

held at the National Defense University that brought together 

participants from Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 

Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United States.

 Once this agenda is endorsed, programmatic implementation 

can get underway. As in the case of the NRF, membership in the 

SRF should be voluntary. Most likely, some NATO members will see 

advantages in participating in an SRF, especially those members 

who cannot provide top-line combat forces for the NRF and ARRC, 

but have the military assets to play meaningful roles in S&R. Viable 

S&R forces could have a major impact on NATO’s strategic effectiveness in the coming years.

Note 1

Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming for

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC: Center for

Technology and National Security Policy, 2004).