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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, 

BUREAU OF LIQUOR CONTROL 

ENFORCEMENT,

Appellant

v.

JET-SET RESTAURANT, LLC,

Appellee

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No. 61 MAP 2017

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court dated April 13, 

2017 at No. 575 CD 2016 Affirming 

the Order of the Berks County Court of 

Common Pleas, Civil Division, dated 

March 15, 2016, docketed March 16, 

2016, at No. 15-17486.

ARGUED: May 17, 2018

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: August 21, 2018

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that there was insufficient 

evidence to demonstrate that liquor licensee Jet-Set Restaurant (“Jet Set”) permitted 

minors to frequent its licensed premises when the record establishes that it admitted entry 

to four minors, three of whom presented identification confirming they were underage.

The majority bases its holding on this Court’s 1965 decision in Appeal of Speranza, 206 

A.2d 292 (Pa. 1965), which defined the term “frequenting” as “more than one or two visits.” 

Id. at 294. Because I find that Speranza is not dispositive of this appeal as it interpreted 

a statute different from the one at issue here, I would reverse the Commonwealth Court’s 

order, which upheld the dismissal of Jet Set’s frequenting charge.

As noted by the majority, while conducting an investigation at Jet-Set on November 

1, 2014, Bureau officers discovered four minors present on the licensed premises. JetSet was aware that most of these individuals were underage as Bureau officers observed 
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three of them gain entry by presenting identification to the doorman that revealed they 

were minors. Bureau officers further observed one minor purchase a bottle of beer inside 

the establishment and another minor consume two beers purchased by a patron of the 

bar. Finally, the officers learned that Jet-Set had permitted one of the minors to enter the 

premises on a prior occasion.

The Bureau subsequently issued a citation to Jet-Set, alleging that it permitted 

minors to frequent the premises in violation of Section 493(14) of the Liquor Code 

(“Code”), 47 P.S. §4-493(14), set forth in full infra at 4.1 Several months later, an 

administrative law judge issued an adjudication dismissing the frequenting count, and 

both the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board and the trial court affirmed this dismissal. 

The Commonwealth Court also affirmed, relying on Speranza’s definition of “frequent” as 

encompassing more than one or two visits to the licensed premises.

2

 

As explained by the majority, in Speranza, a hotel liquor licensee was charged with 

allowing minors to frequent its premises after ten individuals under the age of twenty-one

were present in the establishment, eating pizza and drinking soda without alcoholic 

beverages being requested or served. At issue on appeal to this Court was whether there 

was sufficient evidence to support the frequenting charge. Notably, at the time Speranza

was decided, Subsection 493(14), entitled, “Permitting undesirable persons or minors to 

frequent premises,” employed the term “frequent” once in the text of the provision and 

stated in its entirety: 

 

1 Jet Set was also cited for furnishing alcohol to minors, but that charge is not at issue in 

this appeal.

2 Judge Patricia McCullough dissented, opining, inter alia, that the profound change in 

statutory language in the 2003 amendments to Section 4-493(14) of the Code reflects a 

change in the General Assembly’s policy regarding the presence of minors in licensed 

establishments, thus, the Speranza definition of “frequent” did not apply. As explained 

infra, I agree with this position.
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It shall be unlawful --

* * *

(14) For any hotel, restaurant or club liquor licensee, or any retail dispenser, 

his servants, agents or employes, to permit persons of ill repute, known 

criminals, prostitutes or minors to frequent his licensed premises operated 

in connection therewith, except minors accompanied by parents, guardians, 

or under proper supervision.

Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, former 47 P.S. § 4-493(14).

The Speranza Court defined the term “frequent” in this context to mean “to visit 

often or to resort to habitually or to recur again and again, or more than one or two visits.” 

206 A.2d at 294. This Court explained in Speranza that “[w]e do not mean to say that it 

must be found that the same minor or minors come to the premises habitually. But it must 

be established by a fair preponderance of specific evidence that, as a course of conduct, 

licensees permit minors to come on the premises.” Id. (emphasis in original). Applying 

such law to the facts presented, the Speranza Court concluded that there was insufficient 

evidence to sustain a violation of Section 493(14).

The majority concludes that Speranza is dispositive of the instant appeal,

reasoning that the Legislature intended the term “frequent” in Section 493(14) of the 

current Code to mean the same as it did in the previous version of the statute, which we 

defined in Speranza. See Slip Op. at 9-10 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4) (providing “[t]hat 

when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General 

Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same 

construction to be placed upon such language”). Finding that the Bureau did not establish 

that Jet Set permitted minors on the licensed premises more than twice, the majority

concludes that there was insufficient evidence to support the frequenting count. 

Contrary to the majority, I would adopt the position of the Commonwealth Court 

dissent, set forth by Judge Patricia McCullough. The dissent opined that nearly forty 

years after Speranza was decided, the General Assembly enacted the 2003 amendments 
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to Section 493(14), which are dispositive of this appeal and state, in their entirety, as 

follows:

It shall be unlawful—

* * *

(14) PERMITTING UNDESIRABLE PERSONS OR MINORS TO 

FREQUENT PREMISES. For any hotel, restaurant or club liquor licensee, 

or any retail dispenser, his servants, agents or employes, to permit persons 

of ill repute or prostitutes to frequent his licensed premises or any premises 

operated in connection therewith.

Minors may only frequent licensed premises if: (a) they are 

accompanied by a parent; (b) they are accompanied by a legal guardian; 

(c) they are under proper supervision; (d) they are attending a social 

gathering; or (e) the hotel, restaurant or retail dispenser licensee has gross 

sales of food and nonalcoholic beverages equal to fifty per centum or more 

of its combined gross sale of both food and alcoholic beverages. If a minor 

is frequenting a hotel, restaurant or retail dispenser licensee under 

subsection (e), then the minor may not sit at the bar section of the premises, 

nor may any alcoholic beverages be served at the table or booth at which 

the said minor is seated unless said minor is with a parent, legal guardian 

or under proper supervision. Further, if a hotel, restaurant, club liquor 

licensee or retail dispenser is hosting a social gathering under subsection 

(d), then written notice at least forty-eight hours in advance of such 

gathering shall be given to the Bureau of Enforcement. If a minor is 

frequenting licensed premises with proper supervision under subsection (c), 

each supervisor can supervise up to twenty minors, except for premises 

located in cities of the first class, where each supervisor can supervise up 

to five minors. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, if the 

minors are on the premises as part of a school-endorsed function, then each 

supervisor can supervise fifty minors. Nothing in this clause shall be 

construed to make it unlawful for minors to frequent public venues, 

performing arts facilities or ski resorts.

Act of May 8, 2003, P.L. 1, 47 P.S. § 4-493(14).

The dissent agreed with the Bureau that the profound change in statutory language 

in the 2003 amendments reflected a change in the General Assembly’s policy regarding 

the presence of minors in licensed establishments. It emphasized that while the prior 

version of the statute generally prohibited licensees from permitting minors to frequent 
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licensed premises, the 2003 amendments, when read in their entirety, set forth detailed 

and exclusive circumstances under which minors could lawfully be present in a licensed 

establishment, i.e., when the minor is accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, is under 

proper supervision as defined by the Code, is attending a social gathering as defined by 

the Code, or where the establishment sells primarily food and incidentally alcohol. The 

dissent found that this comprehensive statutory language plainly suggests that if a 

licensee knowingly permits a minor to visit a licensed premises absent Section 493(14)’s 

protections, as occurred here, the licensee has permitted the minor to visit unlawfully or 

frequent the premises in violation of that statutory provision. To hold to the contrary, the 

dissent opined, absent any inquiry as to the number of minors present in the licensed 

establishment or the manner in which they gained entry, would be inconsistent with the 

General Assembly’s clearly expressed intent to restrict minors’ unsupervised presence in 

places where alcohol is served.

I agree with these sentiments. While there is facial appeal to the majority’s analysis 

due to the Legislature’s continued use of the word “frequent,” such construction ignores 

the substantial disparity between the text of the prior statute and that of the 2003

amendments and, most importantly, the context in which that term is employed in the 

current statutory provision when viewed in its entirety. Simply put, the Speranza Court 

interpreted different language than that at issue herein; thus, there should be no

presumption that the General Assembly intended for the word “frequent” to retain the 

same meaning as this Court afforded it in our 1965 decision in Speranza. 

To illustrate, the Speranza Court interpreted the word “frequent” as used once in 

the prior version of Section 493(14), while the current statute employs the term five times 

in the text of the provision. If one would insert the Speranza definition of “frequent” (i.e., 

visited more than once or twice) into each of the five instances where that term is 
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employed, Section 493(14) would make little sense. For example, Section 493(14) directs 

that if a minor is “frequenting” a licensed hotel or restaurant that sells primarily food and 

incidentally alcohol, “then the minor may not sit at the bar section of the premises, nor 

may any alcoholic beverages be served at the table or booth at which the said minor is 

seated unless said minor is with a parent, legal guardian or under proper supervision.” 

47 P.S. § 4-493(14). Utilizing the Speranza Court’s definition of “frequent,” a minor could 

arguably sit at the bar or have alcoholic beverages served at an unsupervised table so 

long as it was the minor’s first or second time in the licensed facility. Similarly, Section 

493(14) states, “[i]f a minor is frequenting licensed premises with proper supervision 

under subsection (c), each supervisor can supervise up to twenty minors. . . .” 47 P.S. 

§ 4-493(14). Employing the Speranza definition would leave unanswered the number of 

minors that a supervisor could oversee on the minor’s first or second visit to the

establishment. Finally, Section 493(14) states “[n]othing in this clause shall be construed 

to make it unlawful for minors to frequent public venues, performing arts facilities or ski 

resorts.” 47 P.S. § 4-493(14). Concluding that “frequent” denotes visiting more than twice 

would render the sentence nonsensical as it would suggest a potential illegality if the 

minor visited the particular venue on a single occasion.

When read in its entirety, it becomes clear that the Legislature did not intend to 

import into the 2003 amendments to Section 493(14) the meaning of “frequent” that this 

Court utilized when interpreting a different statute nearly forty years before. Giving effect 

to all of the provisions of Section 493(14), while avoiding an unreasonable or absurd 

result, I would conclude that the Legislature intended the term “frequent,” as used in the 

current version of Section 493(14), to mean “visit.” See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2) (presuming 

that the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain); id.

§ 1922(1) (presuming that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, 
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impossible of execution, or unreasonable). As noted, the evidence established that a JetSet employee permitted four minors to visit the licensed premises, three of whom had 

been permitted entry after Jet-Set confirmed they were underage and one of whom had 

been permitted entry on a prior occasion. Accordingly, I would find such evidence 

sufficient to establish a violation of Section 493(14).

I readily acknowledge that the case would be much simpler, in fact would not be 

before us, had the General Assembly employed a term other than “frequent” in the revised 

Section 493(14). The General Assembly may desire to revisit the statutory provision so 

that the Bureau will be able to carry out its obligations in this regard, unhampered by the

continued application of the Speranza decision.