OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

 

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 

July 25, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 

 U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

 U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS 

 MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

 DEVELOPMENT 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq 

 (SIGIR-07-014) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit 

in accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, 

which requires that we provide an independent and objective conduct of audits, as well as 

leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of programs and operations 

to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. This report provides the status of the 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) expansion, as well as an update on actions taken 

to recommendations we made in our earlier report, Status of Provincial Reconstruction 

Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, issued on October 29, 2006. 

We received and considered comments from the U.S. Department of Defense and the 

U.S. Embassy-Iraq on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. The 

comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and copies are included in the 

Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Walt R. Keays (walt.keays@iraq.centcom.mil / 914-822-2796) or 

Patrick A. Dickriede (patrick.dickriede@iraq.centcom.mil / 914-822-1967). For the 

report distribution, see Appendix D. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

cc: See Distribution 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

Program Expansion 4 

Program Assessment 9

Prior SIGIR Recommendations 11

Conclusion and Recommendations 12

Management Comments and Audit Response 12 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 14 

B. Prior SIGIR Recommendations 15 

C. Acronyms 19 

D. Report Distribution 20 

E. Audit Team Members 22 

Management Comments 

U.S. Embassy-Iraq 23 
i 

Status of the Provincial Reconstruction 

 Team Program Expansion in Iraq 

SIGIR-07-014 July 25, 2007

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced a “New Way Forward” to accelerate 

Iraq’s transition to self-reliance. The strategy called for a surge of civilian and military 

personnel into the provinces and a doubling of the number of provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRTs) and personnel to support and sustain the transition to Iraqi control. Though 

still evolving, plans as of the end of June called for the number of PRTs to grow from 10 

to 25 and the staff strength to double to 700. The original 10 PRTs will continue to 

operate at the provincial level, but an additional 15—called ePRTs—will embed directly 

into brigade combat teams (BCTs) to deploy in neighborhoods and work at the district 

and municipal levels. The goal is to create areas where moderates will have political 

space to operate and anti-Iraqi forces are brought under control. 

Objectives 

The objectives of this audit, the second of three in a series on PRTs,1 were to determine 

the status of the U.S. government’s plan to expand the number of PRTs and supporting 

staff in Iraq. Specifically, we addressed these questions: 

• What human resources and funding have U.S. government organizations 

identified to support the PRT expansion? 

• What performance measures or metrics are used to evaluate the effectiveness of 

PRTs? 

• What actions were taken to address previous recommendations made in SIGIR’s 

October 2006 report? 

We are in the process of conducting fieldwork for the third audit, examining the 

effectiveness of the PRT Program and will report the findings in September 2007. 

 

1

 For a detailed discussion of the startup of the PRT Program in Iraq, see Status of Provincial 

Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 2006. 
ii 

Results 

The PRT Program is currently in phase two of a three-phase expansion program and is on 

course to meet the Administration’s goal of doubling the number of PRTs and supporting 

staff in Iraq: 

• Phase I (January-March 2007): ten 4-person ePRT core members were 

successfully embedded with BCTs in the strategically important provinces of 

Baghdad, Al Anbar, and northern Babil. 

• Phase II (April-August 2007): 136 specialists will join the advance ePRT teams 

and several priority PRTs. These specialists will work in city management, 

business development, agribusiness, and other areas. As of July 20, 2007, the 

Department of Defense (DoD) had deployed 70 of 104 specialists committed to 

the program and expects to have the remaining 34 in place by the end of August 

2007. The Department of State (DoS), Department of Agriculture and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) are expected to provide the 

remaining 32 specialists. These specialists have been identified and will begin 

training on August 27, 2007, in the Washington, D.C. area and are expected to be 

in Iraq in September. 

• Phase III (September-December 2007): an additional 142 specialists are to be 

deployed to support the work plans of all of the existing PRTs and the new 

ePRTs. Specialists from DoS, USAID, and the Departments of Justice, 

Agriculture, and Commerce will deploy to all PRTs and backfill DoD specialists 

whose one-year deployment terms conclude in February 2008. Full 

implementation of Phase III depends on the release of the FY 2007 Iraq 

emergency supplemental appropriations. 

As of June 2007, the United States has provided $1,924 million to support the Iraq PRT 

Program, and DoS has requested additional funding of $937 million in FY 2008. 

The Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) is a key component of the program that requires 

additional development and support. In May 2007, the Chief of Mission established OPA 

at the minister-counselor level to support the PRT Program. Under the leadership of an 

ambassador-level coordinator, OPA is charged with synchronizing governance, 

reconstruction, security, and economic development assistance to the PRTs. Despite the 

importance of this new office, however, the Embassy has not been able to fill critical staff 

vacancies to establish continuity of leadership and experience in managing the PRT 

program. 

In October 2006, SIGIR recommended that the Secretaries of State and Defense take 

action to define PRT objectives and performance measures and to develop milestones for 

achieving program objectives. To date, OPA and the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 

have not clearly defined PRT objectives and performance measures. Therefore, we 

cannot easily report on what the PRTs and ePRTs are accomplishing, individually or 

collectively. In late May 2007, DoS officials told SIGIR that, in response to the new 
iii 

strategy and surge in Iraq, OPA was reassessing performance indicators with an 

interagency team in Washington. 

 

In addition to the recommendation to define the PRT objectives and performance 

measures, SIGIR’s October 2006 report made six other recommendations. Most notably, 

SIGIR recommended that the Secretaries of State and Defense issue a joint statement 

reaffirming that the PRT initiative is a DoS/DoD priority, clearly defining the mission, 

and delineating the lines of authority and coordination between civilian and military 

personnel. The remaining recommendations called for specifying the skill-set needed for 

civil affairs personnel, which will enable better training, selection, and assignment. Also, 

SIGIR recommended improved reporting of attack incident data for PRTs located at 

military forward-operating bases to better maintain visibility over civilian personnel and 

provide PRTs with critical intelligence. We found that actions were taken to address the 

intent of these recommendations and consider the recommendations closed. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, MNF-I, 

take these actions: 

1. Develop a performance monitoring system to determine what the PRTs are 

accomplishing, including clearly defined objectives and performance measures, 

and milestones for achieving stated objectives. 

2. Require PRTs to submit work plans for accomplishing objectives within 

established milestones. 

3. Develop a workforce plan for OPA to fill critical staff vacancies and ensure 

continuity in leadership and experience managing the PRT Program. 

Management Comments and Audit Response

DoD and the U.S. Embassy-Iraq provided written comments on a draft of this report, 

generally concurring with our recommendations, and MNF-I responded in an e-mail that 

it concurred with the recommendations. We adjusted our conclusion and recommendation 

1 based on new input and technical comments received. 

We fully understand the fluid nature of present-day Iraq and the difficulty of planning for 

future programs. DoD in its response stated that the DoD and DoS PRT teams are 

developing Joint Action Plans which incorporate clearly defined objectives against 

established milestones. As these are developed and approved, they could become the 

baseline for measuring progress until a clear vision can be established as to the longer 

term strategy of the individual PRTs and the overall program. 

We understand that the PRTs are ideally suited for post-conflict engagement at the 

province and local levels, and that this environment has not been achieved. As a result, 
iv 

we also understand the Embassy’s discussion that some PRTs may convert into 

Consulates General or others may be led by a senior USAID officer, depending on the 

situation at an individual PRT or ePRT. We agree with and encourage DoD and the 

Embassy to implement an improved performance monitoring system based on objectives, 

milestones, and performance metrics. 

We consider that all comments received are responsive to the intent of the 

recommendations and that technical corrections, as applicable, have been made. The 

comments received from the Embassy are included in the Management Comments 

section of the report. 
1 

Introduction

Background

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program for Iraq is a U.S.-led, civil-military 

effort to assist Iraq’s provincial and local governments to govern effectively and deliver 

essential services. Though referred to under the umbrella term, reconstruction, the PRT 

mission encompasses not only capacity development but also counterinsurgency and 

stability operations. Program funding comes primarily from U.S. sources, including the 

Economic Support Fund, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program, and new funding targeted specifically for focused 

stabilization, community action, local governance, and PRT expansion. Other funding has 

come from the Iraqis (Development Fund for Iraq), coalition partners, nongovernmental 

organizations, and donor nations. 

Originally conceived in October 2005 as a two-phase program over four years, the 

initiative has evolved since the opening of the first PRTs in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hillah in 

November 2005. Throughout 2006 and early 2007, the program expanded to seven U.S.-

led PRTs and three coalition-led PRTs, along with seven provincial support teams 

(PSTs)—small cells of 1 to 6 advisers. PSTs provide capacity development advice to 

provincial officials and receive technical support and oversight from U.S. and coalition 

personnel assigned to the PRTs at Erbil, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Basrah. 

In mid-April 2007, an additional 10—called ePRTs—were deployed (with 5 more being 

formed); those in the Al Anbar, Baghdad, and northern Babil provinces are now 

operational. (For locations, see the map below.) Embedded with the brigade combat 

teams (BCTs),2

 the ePRTs have the primary mission of supporting counterinsurgency 

operations. They also work with the established PRTs to expand engagement and 

interaction with Iraqis in neighborhoods and at the district and municipal levels. 

Additional ePRTs may be requested as new BCTs arrive in Iraq in support of the surge. 

PRT staffing depends on the needs and circumstances of each province and its districts. A 

PRT team may have up to 100 members, including approximately 30 locally employed 

staff. An ePRT has only four core members—team leader, senior development specialist, 

civil affairs officer, and bilingual-bicultural adviser. Staffing at the ePRT may be 

enhanced with other experts when requested by the team leader. The PRTs and ePRTs 

comprise personnel from the Departments of State (DoS), Defense (DoD), Justice, 

Agriculture, and Commerce; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

and its Local Governance Program contractor, RTI International; the Multi-National 

Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate command, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNCI); and the Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; as well as Iraqiborn expatriates (often holding U.S. citizenship). 

 

2

 The U.S. Army’s brigade combat team, or BCT, is the basic deployable unit of maneuver, with attached 

support and fire units necessary to sustain operations separate from the parent division. 
2 

 Map–PRT Program Expansion in Iraq

 Source: SIGIR analysis of MNC–I data, July 2007 
3 

The U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) provides overall guidance, 

coordination, and support to the PRTs and ePRTs, whereas MNF-I leads coalition 

military efforts in establishing the PRTs. MNC-I, currently staffed by the U.S. Army’s III 

Corps, provides support capability to the PRTs, including deputy team leaders, liaison 

officers with the major subordinate commands in the field, and movement and other 

logistical assets. MNC-I oversees the major subordinate commands that work alongside 

and support the PRTs and ePRTs in the provinces. The mission of PRTs is seen as a fouryear effort; the first two years are devoted to supporting provincial government capacity 

development. As the provincial governments demonstrate increased capability to govern 

and manage their security environment, the role of coalition forces in the provinces will 

be reduced. Each PRT was expected to transition into a traditional USAID training 

program to develop local governance capacity for the remaining two years. However, 

ongoing security concerns in the provinces have led planners to extend the first phase of 

the PRT program into 2008. 

Objectives 

The objectives of this audit, the second of three covering PRTs,3 were to determine the 

status of the U.S. government’s plan to expand the number of PRTs and supporting staff 

in Iraq. Specifically we addressed these questions: 

• What human resources and funding have U.S. government organizations 

identified to support the PRT expansion? 

• What performance measures or metrics are used to evaluate PRT effectiveness? 

• What actions have been taken to address previous recommendations made in 

SIGIR’s October 2006 report? 

We are conducting fieldwork for the third audit, which examines the effectiveness of the 

PRT Program, and we will report the findings in September 2007. 

Further Reference 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. 

For a detailed discussion of the status of prior SIGIR recommendations, see Appendix B. 

For acronyms used in this report, see Appendix C. 

For the report distribution, see Appendix D. 

For the audit team members, see Appendix E. 

 

3

 For a detailed discussion of the startup of the PRT Program in Iraq, see Status of Provincial 

Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 2006. 
4 

Program Expansion

Human Resources 

In early 2007, the PRT Program expansion began a three-phase rollout of personnel into 

Iraq. Phase I called for ten 4-person ePRT advance teams to embed with BCTs and to 

conduct assessments and develop plans for future operations. Phase II called for 136 

specialists to join these advance ePRTs and also several priority PRTs, working in such 

functional areas as city management, business development, and agribusiness. Phase III 

called for bringing in an additional 142 specialists to support the work plans of all the 

existing PRTs and the new ePRTs. However, during the course of our audit, PRT 

expansion planning continued to evolve. 

Phase I: January-March 2007

 

In early 2007, ten 4-person ePRT advance teams were recruited. After completing a PRTspecific training course at the DoS Foreign Service Institute, these core members traveled 

to Iraq for additional training and familiarization meetings with Embassy and military 

staff. In April and May these ePRT core members—a DoS senior Foreign Service 

officer/team leader, a DoD civil affairs officer, a USAID senior development specialist, 

and a bilingual-bicultural adviser—embedded into their partner BCTs. The ePRTs were 

assigned to some of Iraq’s most volatile and strategically important provinces to support 

the counterinsurgency: six ePRTs in Baghdad, three in Al Anbar, and one in northern 

Babil (see Table 1). Because the implementing agencies received no new funding, the 

agencies are supporting the expansion from their existing operating appropriations. 

Phase II: April-August 2007 

In June 2007, the decision was made to create four additional ePRTs to support new 

BCTs arriving in Iraq—three in Baghdad and one in southern Diyala.4

 Plans were also in 

progress to move the Wasit PST members, currently stationed in Hillah, to a brigade 

headquarters in Al Kut, embedded with the BCT. Their staff numbers were also to be 

augmented. SIGIR was told that active consideration was being given to providing 

dedicated military movement teams to the Karbala and Najaf PSTs, also based in Hillah.5

Critical to this phase is the arrival of 136 personnel to augment the embedded and several 

of the existing PRTs. As of July 20, 2007, DoD had deployed 70 of 104 specialists 

committed to the program, and DoD expects to complete its rollout by the end of August 

2007. 

 

4

 According to a senior Embassy official, DoS has not formally authorized the four new ePRTs as of July 

20, 2007; however, their creation has been fully vetted through the interagency process, staff is being 

identified, and official notification is expected shortly. 

5

 According to OPA and MNC-I officials, DoS security travel restrictions and the inability to routinely 

engage with provincial officials significantly limited the effectiveness of the PSTs. It is believed that 

embedding the Wasit PST with the Multi-National Division-Central and providing dedicated military 

movement team support to the Karbala and Najaf PSTs should increase mission accomplishment. 
5 

Table 1—Location of PRTs/Partner Military Units 

Source: SIGIR analysis of OPA and MNC-I data

AbnD Airborne Division 

BCT Brigade Combat Team 

Bde Brigade 

CavD Cavalry Division 

ePRT embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 

FOB Forward Operating Base 

InfD Infantry Division 

MtnD Mountain Division 

MND Multi-National Division 

PST Provincial Support Team 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

RCT Regimental Combat Team 

REO Regional Embassy Office 

RRT Regional Reconstruction Team

Province Team Nearest City Encampment/Base Military Unit 

RRT Erbil Erbil Camp Zaytun Coalition (Korea) 

PST Dahuk Dahuk Camp Zaytun Coalition (Korea) 

PST Al Sulaymaniyah As Sulaymaniyah Camp Zaytun Coalition (Korea) 

PRT Ninawa Mosul FOB Marez 4th BCT, 1st InfD 

PRT Ta’mim Kirkuk FOB Warrior 3d BCT, 25th InfD 

PRT Salah ad Din Tikrit FOB Speicher 3d BCT, 82d AbnD 

PRT Diyala Baqubah FOB Warhorse 3d BCT, 1st InfD 

 ePRT (1) Southern Diyala Camp Taji 4th BCT, 2d InfD 

PRT Baghdad Baghdad International Zone MND-Baghdad 

 ePRT (2) Southern Baghdad Camp Falcon 4th BCT, 1st InfD 

 ePRT (3) Northern Baghdad Camp Taji 2d BCT, 82d AbnD 

 ePRT (4) Northern Baghdad Camp Taji 1st BCT, 1st CavD 

 ePRT (5) Central Baghdad Camp Liberty 2d BCT, 1st InfD 

 ePRT (6) Western Baghdad Camp Striker 2d BCT, 10th MtnD

 ePRT (7) Eastern Baghdad Camp Loyalty 2d BCT, 2d InfD 

 ePRT (8) Central Baghdad Camp Prosperity 2d BCT, 1st CavD 

 ePRT (9) Eastern Baghdad Butler range complex 3d BCT, 3d InfD 

 ePRT (10) Southern Baghdad Camp Victory 2d BCT, 3d InfD 

PRT Anbar Ramadi Camp Blue Diamond 1st BCT, 3d InfD 

 ePRT (11) Fallujah Camp Fallujah RCT-6 

 ePRT (12) Al Asad Camp Ripper RCT-2 

 ePRT (13) Ramadi Camp Ramadi 1st BCT, 3d InfD 

PRT Babil Hillah REO Hillah n/a 

 ePRT (14) Northern Babil Camp Kalsu 4th BCT, 25th InfD

PST Karbala Karbala REO Hillah n/a 

PST Najaf Najaf REO Hillah n/a 

PST Qadisiyah Diwaniyah REO Hillah n/a 

ePRT Wasit (15) Al Kut Camp Delta 214th Fires Bde 

PRT Dhi Qar Tallil Camp Adder Coalition (Italy) 

PST Muthanna As Samawah Camp Adder Coalition (Italy) 

PRT Basrah Basrah Basrah Air Station Coalition (UK) 

PST Maysan Al Amarah Camp Adder Coalition (UK) 
6 

DoS, USAID and the Department of Agriculture are providing the remaining 32 

specialists and expect to deploy these specialists by September. For staff arriving during 

this phase, priority will be given to the ePRTs and the PRTs in Baghdad, Al Anbar, 

Diyala, and Salah ad Din. The agencies will continue to fund PRT efforts from existing 

appropriations. 

Phase III: September-December 2007 

DoS, USAID, and the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and Commerce will deploy 

additional specialists for all PRTs and will backfill DoD specialists whose one-year 

deployment terms conclude in February 2008. Full implementation of Phase III depends 

on the release of the FY 2007 Iraq emergency supplemental appropriations. DoS will use 

those funds to recruit and employ contractors with specialized expertise or to reimburse 

other civilian agencies for their personnel. Supplemental funding will also be used to 

reimburse DoD for facility and operational costs for PRT personnel located on military 

facilities. 

Embassy Staffing 

Although progress has been made in staffing the PRTs and ePRTs, the Embassy has had 

difficulty filling critical staff vacancies and ensuring continuity in leadership in OPA. 

On May 8, 2007, with the sunset of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

(IRMO),6 the Chief of Mission established OPA at the minister-counselor level to 

support the PRT Program. Under the leadership of an ambassador-level coordinator, OPA 

is charged with synchronizing governance, reconstruction, security, and economic 

development assistance to the PRTs. Despite the long-scheduled termination of IRMO, 

the transition to OPA management has been difficult. According to Embassy, MNF-I, and 

MNC-I officials: 

• Changeover occurred amid the PRT surge and the establishment of the first 10 

ePRTs, including the influx of several hundred personnel. 

• A significant number of civilian and military staff members finished their 

employment contracts or their tours of duty before replacements had arrived, 

taking with them valuable experience and knowledge about the PRT Program. 

The result was that most OPA staff, including its leadership, never had a chance 

to capitalize on that experience. 

• Several senior OPA positions—including the Director and Chief of Staff—were 

filled with staff on short-term, temporary-duty orders until permanent 

replacements could be identified and sent to Baghdad. Other positions, including 

program assessment and provincial desk officers, were vacant. Several of the 

 

6

 IRMO was established as a temporary organization under National Security Presidential Directive 36 and 

was responsible for providing operational guidance and direction to the PRTs. U.S. Code Title 5, § 3161, 

states that temporary organizations have a life span not to exceed three years. IRMO was established on 

May 11, 2004 and was dissolved on May 8, 2007. 
7 

remaining longer-serving staff members were approaching the end of their tours 

of service. The OPA Coordinator, a retired Ambassador, had less than three 

weeks in Baghdad before having to return to Washington for several weeks to 

fulfill pre-deployment training requirements. 

• After a number of iterations, OPA did not finalize its organizational chart until 

more than a month after its establishment. According to OPA staff, job 

assignments during this transition phase were frequently changed, and guidance 

on job descriptions and individual performance expectations was nonexistent. 

Despite these problems, we note that the difficult transition from IRMO to OPA did not 

delay or hinder the surge of personnel into Iraq, largely because of the laudable efforts of 

Embassy, USAID, MNF-I, and MNC-I staff. At staff meetings, training sessions, and 

conferences, and through extensive interviewing, we observed a focused staff, exerting 

great time and energy in support of the surge. However, according to senior OPA staff 

and PRT staff currently serving in the provinces, the focus on implementing the surge 

and the standing up of the new ePRTs came at the expense of fully supporting the 

existing ten PRTs. One of the justifications for creating OPA was to better respond to 

requests from the field for more policy and programmatic support, in addition to logistics 

and operational support. We will continue to assess the level of support by OPA to 

provincial teams and its impact on PRT effectiveness in our trips to the PRTs and ePRTs 

over the next few months. 

Funding 

As of June 2007, the United States has provided $1,924 billion to support the Iraq PRT 

Program; $700 million from the FY 2006 supplemental and $1,224 billion from the FY 

2007 supplemental. This figure does not include funding provided by agencies from their 

operating appropriations, such as funding for personnel. The FY 2007 supplemental 

appropriation funding has not yet been released. According to PRT Program managers, 

the PRT Program will have enough financial resources to support the mission through FY 

2007 with the release of FY 2007 supplemental. DoS has requested $937 million in its 

FY 2008 budget (Table 2). 

 
8 

 Table 2: U.S. Support for the PRT Program, Fiscal Years 2006-2008 

PRT Funding Category 

($ in millions) 

FY 2006 

Supplemental 

Enacted 

FY 2007 

Supplemental 

Enacted 

FY 2008 

 Budget 

Requested Total 

Operational Funding $230a $ 414 $679 $1,323

Program Funding

● Provincial Reconstruction 

Development Council 

Projectsb 

 315 720 160 1,195

● Local Governance Programc 155 90 98 343

 Program Subtotal 470 810 258d 1,538

 Grand Total $700 $1,224 $937 $2,861

 Source: Department of State 

Notes: 

a

 None of the operating funds from the FY 2006 supplemental (Public Law 109-234) were obligated or 

expended in FY 2006 and were carried forward into FY 2007. 

b The Economic Support Fund is used for local reconstruction projects coordinated by the PRTs through 

Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils. The main thrust of this effort is to build capacity at 

the provincial level by teaching local officials how to prioritize projects and manage infrastructure 

development and sustainment. 

c Since 2003 USAID has supported, through its Local Governance Program (LGP), the establishment of 

local government structures to increase Iraqi capacity to deliver basic services. LGP supports the PRT 

Program by providing competency-based mentoring and technical assistance to local councils, 

committees, and departments. 

d Includes $93 million in base agency funding and $165 million in Global War on Terror (GWOT) funding. 

GWOT, also known as Title IX, has funds available for military and diplomatic operations overseas, 

especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations may include a wide variety of activities, such as 

combating insurgents, civil affairs, capacity building, and infrastructure reconstruction.
9 

Program Assessment 

Measuring Performance 

In October 2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) first 

reported on the status of the PRT Program.7 We noted that the PRT Program had 

completed its first year and that it was time to record any lessons learned about what 

worked and what needed improvement in the implementation of the Iraq PRT model. We 

also recommended that the Secretaries of State and Defense take action to clearly define 

the PRT objectives and performance measures and to develop milestones for achieving 

the stated objectives. However, in the seven months since these recommendations were 

made, we observe that their in-theater organizations, MNF-I and the newly created OPA, 

are still not in a position to assess what the PRTs and ePRTs are individually or 

collectively accomplishing.8

 

In response to SIGIR’s query about actions taken to address recommendations in our 

October 2006 report, DoS indicated that a reassessment of performance indicators had 

begun in late May, which would determine the impact of the new strategy and surge. In 

consultation with an interagency team in Washington, OPA is exploring ways to combine 

civil-military objectives into a single performance metric to reflect the PRTs’ impact—

not only on the daily life of Iraqi society and politics but also on the GOI capacity to 

perform and carry out its responsibility for governing the country. 

 

Although the ongoing reassessment of the performance indicators is an important first 

step, we believe that OPA will need to revamp its performance monitoring system, 

especially how it is used by both management and the provincial teams. The current 

system, which has been in place in the Embassy since 2003, produces a monthly 

document designed to assess the progress or regress of the 18 Iraqi provinces and 

strategic cities in governance, economy, rule of law, and essential services.9

 It employs a 

color-coded “traffic light” model to evaluate performance, based on a complicated 

process of assigning value to specific performance indicators, such as the number of 

provincial council members working or the percentage of police who follow the orders of 

judges.10 These are the four colors and their meanings: 

 

7

 See Status of Provincial Reconstruction Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 2006. 8

 The PRTs submit a weekly situation report to OPA that contains information on their activities, as well as 

observations and views of the political, economic, infrastructure, reconstruction and security situation 

relating to the province during the week. However, based on our analysis of the reports since January 2007, 

while useful in providing a snapshot of what the PRTs are working on and the situation in their provinces, 

the reports are not meant to measure results or effectiveness. 9

 The strategic cities are Baghdad, Mosul, northern Babil, Ramadi, Baqubah, Samarra, Fallujah, Najaf, 

Kirkuk, Tal Afar, and Basra. 

10 For example, for indicators with multiple metrics, the indicator is the weighted sum of the metrics for 

that indicator rounded to the nearest whole number. 
10 

• Red = declined 

• Orange = constant 

• Amber = slight improvement 

• Green = significant improvement 

According to current and former officials responsible for managing the assessment 

program for OPA, there is no linkage between the monthly reports generated by the PRTs 

and what the PRTs are expected to accomplish in their work plans, such as assisting the 

provincial governments in planning, developing, and implementing a provincial 

development strategy and executing their budgets. The current performance-monitoring 

system was not designed to provide information on what was being accomplished by the 

PRTs. Furthermore, PRT officials told us that OPA has not provided them any feedback 

on their monthly assessment reports or guidance on whether to modify or adjust their 

work plans. According to PRT officials and managers, a successful performance 

monitoring system must allow for assessing PRTs individually, not collectively, because 

each function in unique economic and political environments. 

Finally, we found that of the ten PRTs in operation, only two—Mosul and Baghdad—had 

submitted work plans to OPA, making it difficult for managers to determine, on an 

individual basis, what each PRT is attempting to accomplish. We also discovered that the 

OPA did not retain an assessment officer position in its new organizational structure, and 

it is unclear how it will review and evaluate the PRTs. 
11 

Prior SIGIR Recommendations

In October 2006, we recommended seven actions to the Secretaries of State and Defense, 

the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and the Commanding General, MNF-I, to improve the 

implementation of the Iraq PRT program. Several of the recommendations called for 

reaffirmation that the PRT initiative was a policy priority of DoS and DoD, spelling out 

the shared approach to funding operating costs and delineating lines of authority and 

coordination to achieve better civil-military integration. These recommendations were 

aimed at addressing what we found to be poor working relationships between U.S. 

Embassy and MNF-I/MNC-I elements and the lack of support for PRT mission by 

military headquarter staff and brigade commanders at some of the military’s forward 

operating bases. Many of these officers viewed the mission of capacity development in 

provincial governments as too vague. 

Based on our observations at PRTs and numerous interviews with both current and 

former officials and officers, the PRT initiative is now clearly perceived as a U.S. 

government policy priority, and the important role of the PRTs supporting the 

counterinsurgency and the transition to Iraqi self-reliance is better understood. While 

attending weekly staff meetings, workshops, and training sessions for new arrivals, we 

observed civilian and military officials working closely together to find solutions and to 

implement actions in support of the surge of PRT personnel into Iraq. In meetings at the 

end of May with officials from nine of the ten ePRTs that deployed in mid-April, we 

were told that there is full buy-in to the ePRT mission by the BCTs and that the civilians 

are integral members of the commanders’ teams. 

Additionally, in May 2007, we visited PRT Salah ad Din, which as we noted in our 

October 2006 report, had struggled to carry out its work plan because it lacked 

operational support from its colocated brigade commander. During our visit, PRT 

officials told us that these operational support issues have been resolved and that they are 

able to devote 100% of their time to the PRT mission. We noted that the PRT office 

space, which previously was a shell of a building—lacking furniture, desks, 

communications equipment, computers, and basic office supplies—was now a fully 

functioning operation. The PRT officials also told us that they are supported in their 

security movement requests and that their governance and economic development 

activities are fully integrated with the brigade commander’s battle plan. 

In our October 2006 report, we also made several technical recommendations, such as 

specifying the skill set for civil affairs personnel to enable better training, selection, and 

assignment. We also recommended better reporting of attack incident data for PRTs 

located at military forward operating bases to better maintain visibility of civilian 

personnel by providing PRTs with critical intelligence. We found that actions were taken 

to address the intent of these recommendations, and we consider them closed. However, 

we found that steps are still needed to address our recommendation to clearly define the 

PRT objectives and performance measures and to develop milestones for achieving the 

stated objectives. We consider this recommendation open. For a summary of the prior 

SIGIR recommendations, the MNF-I and DoS responses to our recommendations, and 

the corrective actions taken to date, see Appendix B. 
12 

Conclusion and Recommendations 

Conclusion 

The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq appears to be a good venue for U.S. 

government experts to provide grassroots support for Iraq’s transition to self-reliance. 

The effort of embedding civilian and military development specialists into 15 BCTs 

extends the reach of existing PRTs into volatile districts and neighborhoods that are 

critical to the success of the U.S. government’s counterinsurgency and stabilization 

mission. Since our October 2006 report, the PRT Program has made strides in 

overcoming problems with civil-military integration, operational support issues, and 

resource and staffing shortfalls. The deployment of several hundred personnel to carry 

out the PRT mission has strained staffing and support capabilities, but the PRT Program 

expansion is on course—in large measure because of the laudable efforts of Embassy, 

USAID, MNF-I, and MNC-I staff. 

Over the course of six to twenty months, the 10 original PRTs have been operating in the 

provinces—training, coaching, and mentoring provincial government personnel. Now 

that most of the surge PRT personnel are in place or have been identified and are making 

their way to Iraq, the Embassy and MNF-I need to clearly define objectives, milestones, 

and performance metrics for each PRT and the overall program to provide confidence 

that the PRTs are achieving desired outcomes. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, MNF-I 

take these actions: 

1. Develop a performance monitoring system to determine what is being 

accomplished by the PRTs, including clearly defined objectives and performance 

measures, and milestones for achieving stated objectives. 

2. Require PRTs to submit work plans for accomplishing objectives within 

established milestones. 

3. Develop a workforce plan for the Office of Provincial Affairs to fill critical staff 

vacancies and ensure continuity in leadership and experience managing the PRT 

Program. 

Management Comments and Audit Response

DoD and the U.S. Embassy-Iraq provided written comments on a draft of this report, 

generally concurring with our recommendations, and MNF-I responded in an e-mail that 

it concurred with the recommendations. We adjusted our conclusion and recommendation 

1 based on new input and technical comments received. 
13 

We fully understand the fluid nature of present-day Iraq and the difficulty of planning for 

future programs. DoD in its response stated that the DoD and DoS PRT teams are 

developing Joint Action Plans which incorporate clearly defined objectives against 

established milestones. As these are developed and approved, they can become the 

baseline for measuring progress until a clear vision can be established as to the longer 

term strategy of the individual PRTs and the overall program. 

We understand that the PRTs are ideally suited for post-conflict engagement at the 

province and local levels, and that this environment has not been achieved. As a result, 

we also understand the Embassy’s discussion that some PRTs may convert into 

Consulates General or others may be led by a senior USAID officer, depending on the 

situation at an individual PRT or ePRT. We agree with and encourage DoD and the 

Embassy to implement an improved performance monitoring system based on objectives, 

milestones, and performance metrics. 

We consider that all comments received are responsive to the intent of the 

recommendations and that technical corrections, as applicable, have been made. The 

comments received from the Embassy are included in the Management Comments 

section of the report. 
14 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

On May 1, 2007, SIGIR initiated this audit on the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 

Program expansion in Iraq (Project no. 7015). Specifically, our objectives were to answer 

three questions: 

1. What human resources and funding have U.S. government organizations 

identified to support the PRT expansion? 

2. What performance measures or metrics are used to evaluate PRT effectiveness? 

3. What actions were taken to address previous recommendations made in SIGIR’s 

October 2006 report? 

To determine if sufficient human resources and funding are available to support the PRT 

expansion, we examined OPA and MNF-I documents that established the framework and 

requirements for the PRT expansion. We obtained OPA staffing data and crossreferenced it with our first-hand observation of PRT personnel. We obtained actual and 

requested funding data and discussed it with OPA officials. While conducting fieldwork 

at four PRTs and three ePRTs, we observed actual infrastructure, logistical, and staffing 

conditions and interviewed numerous PRT members about these issues. 

To identify the performance measures or metrics used to evaluate PRT effectiveness, we 

analyzed OPA’s monthly PRT assessment tool and submissions by PRTs. We obtained 

copies and analyzed the PRT’s weekly situation reports submitted since the beginning of 

2007. In addition, we met with officials and officers of OPA, MNF-I, and MNC-I, who 

are responsible for reporting on the progress of the PRT Program. We also met with PRT 

and ePRT officials in Baghdad, Al Anbar, Ninawa, and Al Ta’mim provinces to learn 

how they measure and report on their progress in carrying out the PRT mission. 

To determine the status of actions taken in responding to implementing prior SIGIR 

recommendations on the PRT program, we requested, received, and reviewed written 

comments from DoS and MNF-I on their actions to implement the recommendations. 

We conducted this audit in Iraq from May 2007 through June 2007. The audit was 

conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit. 

Prior Coverage

Status of Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 

2006. 
15 

Appendix B—Prior SIGIR Recommendations 

SIGIR’s report, Status of Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-

034, issued on October 29, 2006, included seven recommendations on the Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program in Iraq. DoS and MNF-I took sufficient actions to 

resolve six of the recommendations, leaving one—the establishment of performance 

measures and milestones—still open. Each recommendation and the actions taken to 

resolve it are detailed below. 

Recommendation 1: The Secretaries of State and Defense issue a joint statement 

reaffirming that the PRT initiative is a DoS-DoD priority, clearly defining the mission, 

and delineating the lines of authority and coordination between civilian and military 

personnel. 

Actions Taken: Both DoS and MNF-I concurred with this recommendation, taking these 

actions: 

• The Deputy Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a 

Memorandum of Agreement (MoA), effective February 22, 2007. 

• The MoA announced the PRT Program as a priority, joint DoS-DoD initiative 

aimed at bolstering moderates, supporting U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, 

promoting reconciliation and shaping the political environment, supporting 

economic development, and building the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments 

to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency. 

• The MoA specified operational requirements, authorities, and responsibilities 

shared between the U.S. Mission-Iraq and MNF-I for provincial reconstruction 

teams in Iraq. 

Status: Closed 

Recommendation 2: The Secretaries of State and Defense finalize a memorandum of 

agreement that spells out the shared approach of funding infrastructure, life support, and 

operating costs of the PRTs at DoS and DoD sites. 

Action Taken: Both DoS and MNF-I concurred with this recommendation. The Deputy 

Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a Memorandum of Agreement 

(MoA), effective February 22, 2007, that specifies funding arrangements for PRT 

infrastructure, life support, and operating costs. 

Status: Closed

Recommendation 3: The Secretaries of State and Defense develop detailed plans for 

completing and sustaining the PRTs, including clearly defined objectives and 
16 

performance measures, milestones for achieving stated objectives, future funding 

requirements, and strategy for sustaining results and successfully transitioning the 

program to USAID. 

Actions Taken: Both DoS and MNF-I concurred with this recommendation. Since our 

report was issued in October 2006, however, there has been no substantial progress on the 

specific issue of performance measures and milestones for achieving stated objectives. 

The current performance monitoring system has been in place at the U.S. Embassy since 

2003 and is designed to assess the progress of the 18 Iraqi provinces and strategic cities 

in governance, economics, rule of law, and essential services. It was not designed to 

provide information on what the PRTs are accomplishing. 

DoS responded to our questions on this matter, stating that the new Office of Provincial 

Affairs is reassessing performance indicators, in consultation with an interagency team in 

Washington. It is exploring ways in which to combine civil-military objectives of the 

surge into one set of reporting data tied directly to the goals of the joint mission and 

reflecting an outcome-oriented impact of the PRTs on the daily life of Iraqi society and 

on Iraqi capacity to govern the country. 

Status: Open, actions in progress

Recommendation 4: The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, MNFI, issue a joint statement reaffirming the lines of authority and coordination to achieve 

effective civilian and military integration in the PRT program 

Actions Taken: Both DoS and MNF-I concurred with this recommendation. The Deputy 

Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a Memorandum of Agreement 

(MoA), effective February 22, 2007, that specified operational requirements, authorities, 

and responsibilities shared between the U.S. Mission-Iraq and MNF-I for PRTs in Iraq. In 

addition, DoS issued a classified cable in April 2007 that also specified authorities and 

responsibilities shared between the two organizations. The cable was acknowledged by 

the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, MNF-I. 

Status: Closed 

Recommendation 5: The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, MNFI, assign responsibility for reporting attack incidents to one individual at each regional 

Embassy office and military forward operating base and coordinate closely with the U.S. 

Embassy’s Tactical Operations Center. 

Actions Taken: Both DoS and MNF-I concurred with this recommendation. The DoS 

response stated that at the PRTs located at regional Embassy offices (REOs), the 

Assistant Regional Security Officer reports through the Tactical Operations Center 

(TOC) all attacks on the REO and on PRT convoys or personnel. At PRTs located on 
17 

forward operating bases (FOBs), the Deputy Team Leader fills the role of PRT Security 

Officer and reports to the TOC using the spot report format for all attack incidents that 

affect PRT operations and personnel. The Embassy TOC consolidates and tracks all 

attack incidents, and the Regional Security Officer for Iraq told SIGIR that he was 

confident his office was informed of all attack incidents involving PRTs located at both 

REOs and FOBs. 

Status: Closed 

Recommendation 6: The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, MNFI, specify skill-set requirements for civil affairs personnel at PRTs to enable better 

training, selection, and assignment. 

Actions Taken: MNF-I concurred, and DoS nonconcurred with this recommendation. 

Although DoS disagreed with this recommendation, it has taken several actions to better 

prepare both military and civilian personnel to perform PRT work in Iraq. 

In early 2007, DoS established the first specialized PRT training program at the Foreign 

Service Institute. Four training sessions have been held, and 129 PRT personnel 

representing DoS, DoD, and USAID have completed the program. Additional sessions 

have been scheduled. In addition, the U.S. Mission-Iraq Office of Provincial Affairs has 

been revising the position descriptions for each of the PRT specialists. Personnel to fill 

specialist positions are selected on the basis of the position descriptions so that skills 

match requirements. 

Status: Closed 

Recommendation 7: The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, MNFI, consider temporarily assigning the PRT personnel identified for Al Anbar and Al 

Basrah, as well as the local governance satellite offices in south central Iraq, to 

functioning PRTs until the security environment improves. 

Actions Taken: Both DoS and MNF-I nonconcurred with this recommendation. DoS 

responded that the PRT leaders at the Al Anbar and Al Basrah locations felt the positive 

effects of their presence outweighed the security risks and that they were able to employ 

engagement strategies to maintain a constructive dialogue despite the restrictive security 

environment. According to DoS, staffing levels would be adjusted to minimize the 

number of personnel exposed to this additional risk. Except in extreme circumstances, 

some personnel would be retained to support required functions of the PRT. MNF-I 

responded that there is progress to be gained by having active PRTs in Al Anbar and Al 

Basrah despite security issues. 

We consider these comments fully responsive to recommendation 7 and note that PRTs 

are currently operating in both Al Anbar and Al Basrah provinces. We further note that 
18 

although the Al Anbar province currently includes three new ePRTs, as well as the 

regular PRT, the Al Basrah PRT is under constant bombardment and has great difficulty 

operating more than a limited range of programs with its Iraqi counterparts. 

Status: Closed 
19 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

BCT brigade combat team 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

ePRT embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 

FOB forward operating base 

FY fiscal year 

GWOT Global War on Terror 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

LGP Local Governance Program 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

MoA memorandum of agreement 

OPA Office of Provincial Affairs 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

PST Provincial Support Team 

REO Regional Embassy Office 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

TOC Tactical Operation Center 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
20 

Appendix D—Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State* 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq* 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for 

International Development 

 Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction 

 Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer, 

 Bureau of Resource Management 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq* 

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

Coordinator, Office of Provincial Affairs* 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development* 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Regional Inspector General-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense* 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International 

Security Affairs* 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq* 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq* 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

*Recipient of the draft audit report 
21 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic 

Affairs, and International Environmental Protection 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and 

Human Rights 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, 

Federal Services, and International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia 
22 

Appendix E—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. 

McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report included: 

Karen D. Bell 

Joanne M. Brignolo 

Patrick A. Dickriede 

Glenn D. Furbish 

Robert B. Gabriel 

Walt A. Keays 
23 

Management Comments 

U.S. Embassy-Iraq
24 
25 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Denise Burgess 

Assistant Inspector General for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil