PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4205

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HINDA OSMAN DHIRANE, a/k/a Nicmatu Rabbi,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 17-4226

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MUNA OSMAN JAMA, a/k/a Asha Ali Amin, a/k/a Umu Luqmaan, a/k/a 

Taaibah,

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00230-AJT-1; 1:14-cr00230-AJT-2)

Argued: May 10, 2018 Decided: July 16, 2018
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Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge 

Keenan and Judge Harris joined.

ARGUED: Geremy C. Kamens, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellants. Jonathan Y. Ellis, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Whitney 

E.C. Minter, First Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia; Alan H. Yamamoto, LAW OFFICE OF 

ALAN YAMAMOTO, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellants. Dana J. Boente, United 

States Attorney, James P. Gillis, Assistant United States Attorney, Danya E. Atiyeh, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Joseph S. Attias, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellee.
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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

Following a bench trial, the district court found Muna Osman Jama and Hinda 

Osman Dhirane guilty of conspiracy to provide and of providing on numerous occasions 

material support to al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The defendants, naturalized American citizens who were born in 

Somalia, collected money from members of online chat rooms and transmitted the funds

to coconspirators in Somalia and Kenya to assist al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities in the 

Horn of Africa. The district court sentenced Jama to 144 months’ imprisonment and 

Dhirane to 132 months’ imprisonment. 

On appeal, the defendants contend (1) that the district court erred in denying their 

motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to warrants issued under the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), arguing that the evidence was obtained 

unconstitutionally in light of FISA’s ex parte and in camera judicial review process; 

(2) that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to conclude that two 

coconspirators in Somalia and Kenya, to whom the defendants transmitted monies, were 

“part of” al-Shabaab; and (3) that the district court erred in applying sentencing 

enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2M5.3(b)(1)(E) (providing for a two-level enhancement 

when the support to a foreign terrorist organization was provided with the intent, 

knowledge, or reason to believe it would be used to assist in the commission of a violent 

act).

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
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I

In 2008, the U.S. Department of State designated al-Shabaab a foreign terrorist 

organization under § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189. At 

that time and continuing through the events of this case, al-Shabaab was engaged in 

terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa region, principally in Somalia. 

In the period from 2011 to 2013, the defendants participated in an online chat 

room composed of members of the Somali diaspora in the United States and around the 

world. Participants generally discussed current events concerning Somalia, including

al-Shabaab’s activities there, and, on various occasions, al-Shabaab leaders and

representatives would speak to the group and solicit support, including financial support, 

for their terrorist activities. During that time, the defendants also participated in a 

smaller, private chat room known as the “Group of Fifteen.” Only those participants 

from the larger chat room who had been or who could be persuaded to become 

committed supporters of al-Shabaab were invited to join. The Group of Fifteen

conversed confidentially approximately once or twice a month, where members pledged 

to make periodic payments ranging from $50 to $200 in support of al-Shabaab’s 

operations. The defendants kept track of those commitments and contributed money 

themselves. They also arranged for representatives or persons associated with al-Shabaab 

to speak to the Group of Fifteen and solicit support, including financial resources, for

al-Shabaab’s activities. 

As the money was collected, the defendants transmitted it to persons involved with

al-Shabaab either on “the Nairobi side,” referring to the geographical area around 
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Nairobi, Kenya, or “the Hargeisa side,” referring to the geographical area around 

Hargeisa, Somalia. Defendant Jama “personally solicited contributions” from the Group 

of Fifteen, “monitored whether the individual members had satisfied their monthly 

commitments,” and saw to it that the sums were “successfully transmitted to and received 

by [al-Shabaab] contacts,” both on the Nairobi side and the Hargeisa side. And defendant 

Dhirane played a similar role, mostly for the Hargeisa side. The monies sent to the 

Nairobi side were transmitted principally to a woman named Fardowsa Jama Mohamed, 

who used the funds to operate two safehouses in Nairobi for al-Shabaab fighters. The 

monies sent to the Hargeisa side were transmitted principally to a woman named Barira 

Hassan Abdullahi, described as a financial organizer on behalf of al-Shabaab, who used

the funds to purchase vehicles and other supplies for al-Shabaab fighters in the Golis 

Mountains just north of Hargeisa.

The government gathered evidence of the defendants’ activities through electronic 

surveillance authorized under FISA. Transcripts of conversations collected during this

surveillance showed the defendants and their coconspirators using coded language and 

sharing advice about how to avoid being caught and what to say if questioned. They also

showed the defendants discussing instances where their financial help had assisted 

fighters in the field. On one occasion, Dhirane described a news report of an attack by

al-Shabaab on Somali government troops as an ambush “by our forces,” stating, “Thanks 

to God; let him die. . . . Yes, wonderful; that one will benefit us.” 

In June 2014, the defendants, along with others — including Mohamed and 

Abdullahi — were indicted and charged with one count of conspiracy to provide material 
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support to al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization, and both defendants

were charged with 20 substantive counts of providing material support in the form of 

money to al-Shabaab — one count for each transmission of money — all in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).

Prior to trial, the government filed a notice of its intent to present evidence 

gathered during the surveillance that was conducted pursuant to warrants issued under 

FISA. The defendants filed a joint motion to suppress the evidence, even though they 

had not reviewed the warrant application and supporting materials due to the fact that

they were classified, contending that the information was unlawfully acquired or the 

surveillance was not made in conformity with an order of authorization or approval, 

citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(e) and 1825(f). They also requested that their counsel, who 

possessed a security clearance, be given access to the classified FISA materials. While 

the district court denied their counsel access to the FISA materials, it nonetheless 

conducted an in camera and ex parte review of the materials and thereafter denied the 

defendants’ motion to suppress. The court concluded that there was probable cause to 

issue the warrants; that the surveillance complied with all applicable procedures; and that 

nothing in the materials suggested that a false statement or misleading omission had been 

made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that issued the warrants authorizing

the surveillance. 

The defendants waived their right to a jury trial, and the district court conducted a 

bench trial beginning in July 2016. During trial, the defendants argued that they provided 

monies exclusively for the purpose of procuring medicine and medical services for 
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al-Shabaab members, which they claimed fell within the “medicine” exception to 

“material support” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. See id. § 2339A(b)(1). At the 

conclusion of trial, the court found both defendants guilty of conspiracy, Jama guilty of 

all substantive counts, and Dhirane guilty of those substantive counts covering conduct 

that occurred after she joined the conspiracy, acquitting her on the remaining counts. The 

court issued a written opinion dated November 4, 2016, providing its findings of fact and 

addressing the various legal issues that had been presented at trial. 

The court found as facts that the defendants were “ardent, committed, and active 

supporters of [al-Shabaab]”; that they knew that al-Shabaab was a designated foreign 

terrorist organization and was engaging in terrorist activities; and that they knew that it 

was unlawful to provide support to that organization. The court found further that the 

defendants played a prominent role in the Group of Fifteen chat room, arranging for 

representatives of or persons associated with al-Shabaab to solicit funds from members of 

the chat room and then organizing the collection of those funds and their transmission to 

Kenya and Somalia. It found that the defendants transmitted the funds mostly to 

coconspirator Mohamed on the Nairobi side and coconspirator Abdullahi on the Hargeisa 

side for the specific purpose of supporting al-Shabaab’s activities in those areas. 

Mohamed, it found, operated two safehouses in Nairobi, one for providing medical care 

and treatment to injured al-Shabaab soldiers and the other as a staging ground for 

al-Shabaab’s military operations. Abdullahi, it found, received the monies in Hargeisa

and used them to provide transportation, trucks, and other support services to al-Shabaab 

soldiers. The court found generally that the defendants, as part of their fundraising 
8

activities, had access to al-Shabaab leaders and to nonpublic information pertaining to 

al-Shabaab’s financial needs, including for its military activities. In this regard, the court 

found specifically that these defendants coordinated “to some degree their fundraising” 

with respect to the specific military activities of al-Shabaab. In sum, the court found that 

the defendants “understood, intended, and planned that, when they provided money to 

[Mohamed, Abdullahi, and others], they provided money to [al-Shabaab].”

The district court sentenced Jama to 144 months’ imprisonment and Dhirane to 

132 months’ imprisonment, applying sentencing enhancements to their Guidelines ranges

under U.S.S.G. § 2M5.3(b)(1)(E) (providing for a two-level enhancement when the 

support to a foreign terrorist organization was provided with the intent, knowledge, or 

reason to believe it would be used to assist in the commission of a violent act).

From the district court’s judgments, the defendants filed these appeals.

II

The defendants contend first that the statutory framework that allowed the district 

court to determine ex parte and in camera the legality of the government’s surveillance of 

them pursuant to the FISA warrants was “fundamentally at odds with our adversary 

system.” They argue that it was contrary to our constitutionally established adversary 

system to deny their counsel, who possessed the requisite security clearance, access to the 

warrant applications and supporting materials to assess whether they met statutory 

requirements and were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Such a review on behalf 

of any defendant, they assert, should only be made by the defendant’s counsel as an 
9

advocate, not by the court. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966)

(recognizing, in the context of a trial witness’s grand jury testimony, that “[t]he 

determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly and effectively be made 

only by an advocate”). Moreover, they contend that by refusing to allow defense counsel 

to review the materials, the district court effectively precluded counsel from obtaining a 

Franks hearing. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978) (authorizing an 

adversarial hearing on the validity of a warrant upon a showing of an intentional or 

reckless falsehood in a warrant affidavit). The defendants make clear, however, that they 

do not challenge on appeal the conclusions reached by the district court, only the 

statutory framework that allowed the court to reach those conclusions without the 

participation of counsel.

The defendants filed a motion to suppress the surveillance evidence before trial, 

and because the Attorney General filed an affidavit stating that disclosure of the 

classified materials involved in obtaining the warrants would harm national security, the 

district court conducted an ex parte and in camera review of the warrant applications and 

underlying materials, as provided by FISA. The court found that it was able to adjudicate 

the legality of the FISA surveillance without the assistance of defense counsel, although 

the statute provided it with discretion to seek that assistance, and it concluded that the 

surveillance was properly authorized and lawfully conducted.

In enacting FISA, Congress intended that the procedures provided strike a 

reasonable balance between the competing interests in protecting individuals’ 

constitutional guarantees and in protecting matters involving national security. The Act
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provides that when a defendant files a motion to suppress and the Attorney General files 

“an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national 

security of the United States,” the court must review the materials ex parte and in camera 

“to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized 

and conducted.” 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f); see also id. § 1825(g). The Act gives the court 

authority to disclose the materials to the party moving to suppress, but “only where such 

disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the 

surveillance.” Id. § 1806(f); see also id. § 1825(g)

The government notes that every federal court to have considered the 

constitutionality of these procedures has concluded that FISA reached a reasonable and 

therefore constitutional balance of competing interests. See, e.g., United States v. Pelton, 

835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 

567–68 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2005); 

United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 148–49 (D.C. Cir. 1982). And we share that 

view. It is consistent with the general notion, even in the criminal context, that the right 

to an adversarial proceeding to determine disputes of fact is not absolute. See Kaley v. 

United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014) (“This Court has repeatedly declined to require 

the use of adversarial procedures to make probable cause determinations”); Taglianetti v. 

United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317 (1969) (noting that “an adversary proceeding and full 

disclosure” is not required for “resolution of every issue raised by an electronic 

surveillance”); United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 482 (7th Cir. 2014) (similar). 
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Nonetheless, the defendants contend that the FISA structure denied them their 

constitutionally established right to a Franks hearing. In Franks, the Supreme Court 

recognized that a defendant has the right to challenge the veracity of an affidavit made in 

support of a warrant, but in order to procure an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the 

defendant must first specifically identify what aspect of the affidavit used by the judicial 

officer to issue the warrant was allegedly false and must accompany that allegation with 

an offer of proof. 438 U.S. at 167, 171. FISA similarly provides for court review of a 

warrant application’s veracity and legality and, if the court finds it necessary, a hearing. 

In conducting its review, however, the court relies on the input of various executive 

officers and its own review of the relevant materials to decide whether a hearing is 

necessary. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e)–(g); see also Daoud, 755 F.3d at 484 (“[T]he judge 

makes the additional determination, based on full access to all classified materials and the 

defense’s proffer of its version of the events, of whether it’s possible to determine the 

validity of the Franks challenge without disclosure of any of the classified materials to 

the defense”). 

We recognize the benefit that an open, adversarial proceeding could provide, 

particularly in cases where a falsehood in the affidavit could be more readily identified by 

the defendant or his counsel than by a court perhaps less familiar with the subject matter. 

But Congress did not run afoul of the Constitution when it reasoned that the additional 

benefit of an unconditional adversarial process was outweighed by the Nation’s interest 

in protecting itself from foreign threats. And even then, it took care to mitigate the loss 

of any such benefit by requiring the involvement of a number of high-ranking executive 
12

officials who, subject to additional oversight by the Attorney General, must participate in 

the FISA-warrant application process. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (requiring, inter alia, 

(1) that the application be made by a federal officer upon oath or affirmation, (2) that the 

Attorney General personally approve the application, (3) that a high-ranking executive 

official certify the application, and (4) that other affidavits or certifications be provided as

the judge or Attorney General may demand). 

At bottom, we reject the defendants’ challenge to the FISA framework and thus to 

the district court’s decision not to disclose the classified FISA materials to the 

defendants’ counsel under that framework, even though, as the defendants repeatedly 

noted, their counsel had the requisite security clearance. 

III

For their main argument on appeal, the defendants contend that the district court, 

in the course of its opinion after trial, erred by “redefin[ing] an element of § 2339B,” 

without any legal support, when it defined “a foreign terrorist organization” as used in the 

statute to include any person “engaged in significant activity on behalf of [a foreign 

terrorist organization] relative to [its] goals and objectives” and developed a list of nonexclusive factors to determine if someone met that definition. They argue that with this

broadened definition of “organization,” the court concluded that coconspirators 

Mohamed and Abdullahi, to whom the defendants sent money, were part of al-Shabaab. 

This was, the defendants maintain, critical to the finding of guilt, because they claimed at 

trial that Mohamed and Abdullahi were independent of any foreign terrorist organization
13

and that therefore the defendants’ transmission of funds to them was not “to a foreign 

terrorist organization.” They then elaborate on the consequences of the court’s error:

Federal courts have no power to invent their own definitions of the 

elements of federal criminal offenses. Doing so violates the fundamental 

principle that Congress, not courts, defines the elements of a federal crime. 

Devising a novel and unforeseeable construction of an element of a federal 

crime at the end of a criminal case, and then applying that construction 

retroactively, violates the Due Process Clause. And devising a novel nonexclusive seven-factor test to define an element of a federal offense violates 

the void-for-vagueness doctrine. At bottom, the district court’s common 

law construction of the “foreign terrorist organization” element of § 2339B 

reconfigured an element of a federal crime into something that was 

previously unknown to the law.

In its written opinion finding the defendants guilty, the district court began with its

factual findings. It then applied § 2339B to the facts. In applying the statute, however, 

the court seemed to assume, as the defendants had argued, that the transmission of 

monies by the defendants for use by al-Shabaab could only satisfy the elements of the 

statute if the monies were transmitted to persons — here, Mohamed and Abdullahi —

who were “part of al-Shabaab.” (Emphasis added). The court’s discussion was in 

response to the defendants’ particular argument for acquittal — that Mohamed and 

Abdullahi, to whom the defendants transmitted the monies, were “independent of”

al-Shabaab and that the monies paid to them were “for purposes the Defendants believed 

were lawful,” thus insulating them from criminal liability as they “did not intend to 

deliver these funds to [al-Shabaab] or anyone who could be considered part of 

[al-Shabaab].” As the court thus understood its task, it was looking for a standard “to 

determine whether someone [was] sufficiently acting for or on behalf of [a foreign 

terrorist organization] to be deemed a part of the [foreign terrorist organization].” 
14

(Emphasis added). When looking for the substance of that standard, however, the court 

observed: 

There is surprisingly little case law concerning by what standard to 

determine whether a particular individual is sufficiently associated with [a 

foreign terrorist organization] to constitute the organization itself.

Therefore, the court, on its own, developed a seven-part balancing test from analogous 

sources to determine whether Mohamed and Abdullahi, “to whom the defendants 

delivered their funds[,] were part of [al-Shabaab].” (Emphasis added). The court then 

applied the test to the facts and concluded that both Mohamed and Abdullahi, as well as 

the defendants, were indeed part of al-Shabaab. 

The defendants on appeal now seize on this portion of the court’s analysis, arguing 

that the district court had no legal justification to create and apply a new standard under 

the statute during the course of a criminal prosecution and that, in doing so, the court not 

only erred but also acted unconstitutionally by introducing a new element into the crime.

The district court’s adoption of a test to determine whether someone was part of a 

foreign terrorist organization for purposes of § 2339B was, we conclude, unnecessary and 

resulted from a misunderstanding of what § 2339B required in the context of this case. 

Section 2339B does not require that persons such as Mohamed and Abdullahi be part of a 

foreign terrorist organization, nor does it require that the defendants themselves be part of

the organization. The statute prohibits anyone from knowingly providing or attempting 

to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization. As § 2339B 

provides:
15

Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign 

terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be [punished]. 

. . . To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the 

organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . has engaged or 

engages in terrorist activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or 

engages in terrorism.

The statute defines “material support or resources” to include, among other things, “any 

property,” “currency,” “safehouses,” “facilities,” or “transportation,” but it excludes 

“medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(1), 2339B(g)(4), 2339A(b)(1). 

Accordingly, to prove a violation, the government must establish that a defendant 

(1) knowingly provided or attempted or conspired to provide material support (2) to a 

foreign terrorist organization (3) that the defendant knew had been designated a foreign 

terrorist organization or had engaged in terrorism. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law 

Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2010) (clarifying that the requisite “mental state” required to 

violate § 2339B is “knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not 

specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist activities”).

Thus, determining that Mohamed and Abdullahi, to whom monies were 

transmitted, were part of al-Shabaab was not necessary to finding that the defendants had

provided or attempted to provide material support to al-Shabaab. Soliciting money to 

satisfy al-Shabaab’s expressed needs, collecting that money, and then transmitting it to 

individuals in Africa who were associated with al-Shabaab for the sole purpose of 

funding al-Shabaab’s activities violated § 2339B. And while such an attempt alone is all 

that is necessary — see Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 30 (noting that even

“working in coordination with” a designated terrorist organization “serves to legitimize 
16

and further their terrorist means”) — in this case the monies actually went to maintain 

safehouses for al-Shabaab militants and to acquire trucks, transportation, and other 

support services for the militants. As the court found, the monies reached the defendants’ 

intended objects and accomplished the intended purpose of assisting al-Shabaab. That 

undoubtedly fulfills the elements of the prohibited conduct. 

The defendants’ argument that support given to assist a terrorist organization 

might thereafter have been used to purchase medical equipment or supplies was therefore

irrelevant. The defendants were charged with providing money, not medical supplies, 

and in particular money that they had solicited and collected with the stated purpose that 

it would be sent to support al-Shabaab and its various activities. As the Supreme Court 

has observed in this context, even material support given to a terrorist organization to 

promote “peaceable” or “lawful” conduct furthers terrorism as it “frees up other resources 

within the organization that may be put to violent ends.” Humanitarian Law Project, 561 

U.S. at 30; see also id. at 32 (noting that providing material support to terrorist groups in 

any form “also furthers terrorism by straining the United States’ relationship with its 

allies and undermining cooperative efforts between nations to prevent terrorist attacks”). 

“Money,” the Court observed, “is fungible.” Id. at 31. There was thus no need for the 

district court to respond to the defendants’ assertion that at least some of the money they 

sent was used for medical supplies.

Yet, while the district court’s development and application of its multi-factor test

was unnecessary, its factual findings nonetheless amply satisfied each element of the 

offense. The court began by finding that al-Shabaab was designated as a foreign terrorist 
17

organization, that it “had engaged and was engaging in terrorist activities at the time of 

the events involved in this case,” and that the defendants knew of these facts. It also 

found that the defendants were “ardent, committed, and active supporters of 

[al-Shabaab].” Indeed, it found that the defendants were “involved in arranging for 

representatives or persons associated with [al-Shabaab] to speak to [their] chat room . . . 

during which time these [al-Shabaab] members solicited support, including financial 

resources.” The court found further that the defendants, as members of the chat room, 

were “committed to providing financial contributions approximately monthly for the 

benefit of [al-Shabaab]” and that “[t]his money was delivered to persons involved in 

[al-Shabaab’s] operations.” In particular, it found that Jama “personally solicited 

contributions,” “monitored whether the individual members had satisfied their monthly 

commitments and whether those sums had been successfully transmitted to and received 

by [al-Shabaab] contacts,” and served “in the nature of an enforcer by following up with 

those . . . who had not paid their monthly commitments.” Dhirane, the court found, came 

to play a similar role. The court found that the defendants “associated and coordinated 

with other supporters of [al-Shabaab], including Codefendant Mohamed . . . and 

Codefendant Abdullahi.” “All of these other individuals,” it found, “were actively 

involved in arranging for and facilitating support for [al-Shabaab].” Finally, the court 

found that neither Mohamed nor Abdullahi was involved with or was using the money for 

any entity other than al-Shabaab and that the defendants knew this. 

In short, the defendants engaged, over a lengthy period of time, in collecting

monies for the purpose of providing material support to al-Shabaab, which they knew 
18

was a terrorist group engaged in military activities, and then in sending those monies to 

individuals they knew were associated with al-Shabaab and involved in providing it with 

various resources and support. That conduct constitutes the provision of or at least the 

attempt to provide material support to al-Shabaab in the form of money. And these facts, 

which the defendants do not challenge on appeal, amply satisfy each of the elements for a

conviction under § 2339B. Thus, while we do not subscribe to the analysis conducted by 

the district court in response to the defendants’ position that the court had to find the 

coconspirators to be part of the subject terrorist organization, we conclude that the court

appropriately found both defendants guilty of violating § 2339B. We therefore affirm. 

IV

Finally, the defendants contend that the district court erred in calculating their 

sentencing ranges under the Sentencing Guidelines by applying a two-level enhancement 

for providing material support or resources to a terrorist organization “with the intent, 

knowledge, or reason to believe they are to be used to commit or assist in the commission 

of a violent act.” U.S.S.G. § 2M5.3(b)(1)(E) (emphasis added). They argue that the 

enhancement requires a showing of the defendants’ intent or knowledge that “the specific 

support [they] provide[] is to be used in the commission of a violent act.” (Quotation 

marks omitted). According to the defendants, the district court’s findings do not 

sufficiently specify the linkage between their support and a violent act.

Section 2M5.3(b)(1)(E), however, does not require, as the defendants seem to be

suggesting, that support be traced to or be designed to lead to a specific act of violence.
19

What it does require is that the defendants be shown to have intended, known, or had

reason to believe that their support would be used to assist in acts of violence by the 

terrorist organization. 

In this case, the district court expressly found that al-Shabaab was engaged in 

terrorist activities in fighting wars in Somalia and in Kenya and that the defendants 

engaged the leaders of al-Shabaab to learn of and respond to specific needs arising “as a 

result of [al-Shabaab] military operations.” And the court found that the defendants 

“coordinated to some degree their fundraising” with those specific needs. Because the 

defendants’ financial support was directed at and designed to support al-Shabaab’s 

military operations in fighting a war of terrorism in Somalia and Kenya, we conclude that 

the district court had sufficient evidence with which to apply the enhancement under 

§ 2M5.3(b)(1)(E).

* * *

The judgments of the district court in convicting and sentencing the defendants are 

accordingly affirmed.

AFFIRMED