OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 

 April 25, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT OFFICE 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

 TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING 

 COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

SUBJECT: Status of the Advanced First Responder Network (SIGIR-07-002) 

The Advanced First Responder Network (AFRN) project is intended to address the limited 

communications capabilities of Iraq’s emergency first responders—police, firefighters, and 

emergency medical personnel—by enabling interoperable communications for the Iraqi Ministry 

of Interior security and safety forces throughout Iraq. The AFRN project was managed, funded, 

and maintained by U.S. government organizations pending the assumption of those 

responsibilities by the Government of Iraq. The AFRN system was transferred to full 

Government of Iraq ownership and control on June 26, 2006. As of March 28, 2007, U.S. 

government organizations had expended $200.4 million in U.S. funds and $16 million in 

Development Funds for Iraq money for AFRN development, operations, and maintenance. 

Summary 

The objective of this review was to assess the management actions taken by the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to correct the AFRN communications 

deficiencies and property accountability conditions, as well as the progress made by the Ministry 

of Interior to sustain the system, since our previous report, Review of the Advanced First 

Responder Network, (SIGIR-06-020, July 28, 2006). We found: 

 MNSTC-I has taken effective corrective actions for the five recommendations made in the 

previous report. 

 Operational effectiveness of the AFRN system has improved, as demonstrated by increased 

usage by both the first responders and Iraqi citizens.

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
 After the turnover of AFRN to the Government of Iraq, a sustainment contract managed by 

the U.S. government and funded by the Government of Iraq was in place until it expired on 

December 31, 2006. Since then, MNSTC-I has provided about $2.5 million from the Iraqi 

Security Forces Fund to continue the sustainment of AFRN while the Ministry of Interior is 

in the process of solicitation and award of its own sustainment contract. The temporary 

bridging contract will end on March 31, 2007, and the Ministry of Interior may not have 

completed an award for a follow-on sustainment contract. Without a timely award of their 

contract for sustainment, the Government of Iraq jeopardizes the gains that the AFRN system 

has already made and the AFRN system itself. However, this is an action that must be taken 

by the Government of Iraq, and therefore this report contains no recommendation on this 

matter for U.S. government action. 

This report contains no recommendations. On March 30, 2007, we thoroughly discussed and 

coordinated the content and facts in this report with the Office of the Commanding General, 

MNSTC-I. As agreed at this meeting, management comments are not required or expected. 

Background

In April 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority initiated the AFRN project to improve public 

safety by deploying a first responder network that would increase the limited communications 

capabilities among the Ministry of Interior’s first responders and the Iraqi citizens. For a 

depiction of the AFRN infrastructure and communications flow, see Enclosure 1. In general, first 

responder networks have three main elements: (1) a communication, command, and control 

system; (2) the radios used by first responders and their parent organizations, such as police 

stations and fire departments; and (3) the public telephone system. The most critical components 

of the AFRN are the Governorate Dispatch Centers (GDCs), radio transmission towers, Mobile 

Switching Offices, and the Network Operations Center.1 These components are necessary to 

receive emergency requests from the public, dispatch first responder resources, and manage and 

monitor the network. 

The AFRN project provided the infrastructure and equipment for the communication, command, 

and control system and the first responder radios. AFRN makes use of the public phone system 

and fiber-optic network infrastructure that is under the responsibility of the Ministry of 

Communication’s Iraq Telephone and Postal Company (ITPC). By May 2006, when the AFRN 

project ended, the first responder network spanned through three zones: from Basrah in the south 

zone, through the Baghdad metropolitan area in the central zone, to Mosul in the north zone. 

The cost of the AFRN project was $214 million by the end of calendar year 2006. Funding came 

from three sources–$178.8 million from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; $19.2 million 

from the Iraq Security Support Fund; and $16 million from the Development Fund for Iraq. 

 

1

 Previously termed the “Communications Center” during design and deployment, common usage and current 

contracts now refer to this component as the “Network Operations Center.” 

2
Prior Findings 

Our July 2006 report found that because of deficiencies in connectivity and operational 

effectiveness, the AFRN project had not yet produced: 

• an effective nationwide first responder communication, command, and control system 

• an efficient means to dispatch and direct first responders at the governorate level 

• the ability to escalate incidents to the national level 

We also found insufficient property controls: there was no assurance that all first responder 

radios purchased were accounted for, controlled, or properly transferred to the Government of 

Iraq by MNSTC-I’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team personnel. 

Connectivity. Inter-zone connectivity that would allow system surveillance and monitoring did 

not exist because only 33 of the required 84 E12 circuits that provide transmission capacity for 

the ITPC fiber-optic network had been installed and commissioned. As a consequence, the 

Communications Center could monitor AFRN system performance for only the central zone 

(Baghdad). The E1 capacity development rested primarily with the Ministry of Communications 

ITPC, which had to furnish the hardware required to provide the transmission capacity; however, 

actual integration of the ITPC transmission capacity required complementary actions by the 

Ministry of Interior as the AFRN owner/operator. Because the connectivity problem continued to 

exist, we recommended that the Commanding General, MNSTC-I, require the contractor 

obtained in June 2006 for operations and maintenance (O&M) services, to obtain both Ministry 

of Interior and Ministry of Communications’ ITPC assistance to diagnose the cause of 

insufficient connectivity and to implement a solution. 

Operational Effectiveness. Several conditions degraded the operational effectiveness of the 

AFRN system: 

• Only two of the nine GDCs could receive emergency phone calls from the public. 

• None of the nine GDC dispatcher consoles provide the intended computer assisted 

dispatch function, because the software was not installed. 

• A sufficient number of trained personnel were not available to fully staff eight GDCs. 

• Seven GDCs could not monitor radio network talk groups, such as for a police 

jurisdiction. 

• Reduced and unstable commercial electrical supply caused a higher-than-anticipated 

usage and failure of backup generators and associated automatic transfer switches. Only 

12 of the 22 additional generators intended to ensure uninterrupted electrical power to 

AFRN were installed by the end of May 2006. 

 

2

 An E1 is a communications circuit that provides 30 megabits of transmission capacity and delivers 28 voice 

channels (with an additional two channels for transmission control). 

3 
Property Accountability. MNSTC-I had written procedures to control and account for more than 

30,000 first responder radios; however, we found that accountability was deficient because the 

total number of radios recorded as issued or in inventory exceeded the number purchased and 

received.

Prior Recommendations 

Because of these deficiencies, we recommended that the MNSTC-I Commanding General take 

these actions: 

1. Ensure that the contractor conducting the AFRN assessment coordinate with the Iraqi 

Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Communications, which controls the ITPC, to 

diagnose and resolve the specific technical reason or reasons why connectivity between the 

three AFRN zones did not exist. 

2. Direct the appropriate command organization to: 

a. Request the Ministry of Interior to provide current inventory information, by model type, 

for the first responder radios in their possession. 

b. Direct Civilian Police Assistance Training Team personnel to conduct a physical 

 inventory, by model type, of any radios not yet transferred to the Ministry of Interior. 

c. Reconcile the Ministry of Interior and Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 

inventories with the record of all radios purchased and document the results. 

d. Initiate actions in accordance with applicable U.S. government property management 

 policies to properly account for and control all radios. 

Results 

Since we reported in July 2006, MNSTC-I has corrected the previously reported deficiencies 

regarding connectivity of the AFRN system and accountability of first responder radio inventory. 

Specifically, MNSTC-I took effective corrective actions for the five recommendations in the 

prior report. Further, we noted the increased effectiveness of the system, as well as increased 

AFRN usage by first responders and Iraqi citizens. In addition, the Ministry of Interior is in the 

process of awarding a contract for the sustainment of AFRN. 

Connectivity. MNSTC-I and the O&M contractor, as well as the appropriate Ministry of Interior 

and Communications representatives, assessed the AFRN and ITPC E1 capacity issue. As a 

result, an additional 51 E1s were commissioned. However, for reasons beyond the control of 

MNSTC-I, the O&M contractor, or the Ministry of Interior, inter-zone connectivity will be 

sporadic at best, primarily because of breaks in the fiber-optic cable. Usually located in close 

proximity of roads, fiber-optic cables are often damaged by the detonation of improvised 

explosive devices hidden along the roads. In addition, because the lines are not clearly marked, 

inadvertent breaks in connectivity occur when unrelated construction activities cut through the 

cable or when Iraqi citizens mistake the conduit containing the cable for a water supply line and 

then attempt to tap the conduit for unauthorized access to water. Compounding the problem are 

the security conditions that prevent or delay ITPC work crews from repairing damaged cable. 

4 
However, the MNSTC-I Communications Division’s mentoring and liaison activities have 

resulted in the Ministry of Interior leasing satellite transmission capacity rather than relying 

solely on the ITPC fiber-optic network between the Baghdad and Basrah zones. Consequently, 

AFRN’s Network Operations Center can now monitor two of the three zones, which include the 

more robust central and south zones. 

Operational Effectiveness. The number of operational GDCs grew from two to six; a seventh is 

expected to reach operational status by the end of April 2007. This threefold increase is the direct 

result of concerted efforts by MNSTC-I, the O&M contractor, and the Ministry of Interior to 

resolve 28 of the 31 GDC deficiencies noted in our July 2006 report—a 90% improvement: 

• All nine GDCs are compatible with the ITPC public phone system and are capable of 

receiving emergency phone calls. 

• All nine have installed computer assisted dispatch software. 

• Seven of the nine have sufficient the number of trained staff to begin operations. 

• Eight of the nine have the technical capability to monitor network talk groups. 

Because of these improvements, from July 2006 through February 2007: 

• The number of emergency phone calls received from Iraqi citizens increased 

significantly—from 1,813 in July 2006 to more than 120,000 in December 2006. The 

average monthly call rate was over 65,000 from July 2006 through February 2007. 

• AFRN radio usage by first responder personnel rose from an average of 37,000 

transmissions daily in July 2006 to over 87,000 in February 2007. 

Further, an additional three backup generators have been installed, and a decision was made to 

retain the remaining seven uninstalled backup generators as temporary replacements. We believe 

that this is a prudent course of action because power from the national electrical grid is often 

disrupted, resulting in increased use of the backup generators and accelerating the requirement to 

overhaul the generators. The availability of commercial electrical supply remains a concern 

throughout Iraq in general. 

Senior Ministry of Interior officials note a growing positive acceptance and endorsement of the 

AFRN system by the Iraqi government, first responder organizations, other ministries, and 

provincial governments seems to be growing. For example, provincial governments and 

additional ministries have expressed interest in expanding the system and a willingness to share 

in the associated costs. In effect, AFRN is proving its utility to the Iraqi government and the 

public it serves. 

Property Accountability. MNSTC-I effectively implemented all four of our recommendations to 

resolve the accountability issues for 30,297 Sepura radios. Specifically, MNSTC-I personnel 

searched all warehouses used to store the Sepura radios, requested the Ministry of Interior to 

conduct an inventory of radios, and reconciled the results of these two actions to the quantity 

purchased. The reconciliation determined that not all radios could be accounted for and that full 

5 
accountability could not be established. As a result, MNSTC-I initiated an administrative 

investigation under the provisions of the U.S. Army policy governing property accountability.3

Sustainment. When the Development Fund for Iraq-funded O&M contract expired on December 

31, 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not yet awarded the follow-on contract. MNSTC-I 

obligated an additional $3.1 million from the Iraq Security Forces Fund to continue AFRN 

sustainment while the Ministry of Interior-funded contract was in the process of solicitation and 

award. By March 28, 2007, MNSTC-I had expended $2.5 million of the $3.1 million obligated 

on the contract. This temporary bridging contract will end on March 31, 2007, and the Ministry 

of Interior may not have completed an award of a follow-on contract. Without a timely award of 

the follow-on sustainment contract, the Government of Iraq jeopardizes the gains already made 

with the AFRN system and, in fact, the AFRN system itself. However, this is an action for the 

Government of Iraq to take; therefore, this report contains no further recommendation for U.S. 

government action. 

Scope and Methodology 

This review began in November 2006 (Project 6039) with the objective to assess the 

management actions taken by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) 

to correct the AFRN communications deficiencies and property accountability conditions, as 

well as the progress made by the Ministry of Interior to sustain the system, since our previous 

report, Review of the Advanced First Responder Network, (SIGIR-06-020, July 28, 2006). 

To evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken to resolve AFRN connectivity issues, we reviewed 

assessment reports prepared by the O&M contractor in July and August, 2006; reviewed E1 

capacity data for January 2007; and interviewed both contractor personnel and MNSTC-I’s 

Communications Division personnel with firsthand knowledge of the E1 capacity issues. 

To determine the number of GDCs in operational status, we reviewed system data obtained from 

the O&M contractor, interviewed Ministry of Interior representatives, and obtained assessments 

from MNSTC-I’s Communications Division personnel with firsthand knowledge of GDC 

operations status. We also obtained assessments from senior officials in the Ministry of Interior 

regarding AFRN usage, value to the Iraqi people, and acceptance of the system by the 

Government of Iraq. 

To evaluate MNSTC-I’s actions to resolve AFRN radio accountability, we reviewed documents 

evidencing MNSTC-I inventory of Sepura radios and review of radio issue documents; Sepura 

radio inventory submitted by the Ministry of Interior to MNSTC-I in January 2007; and the 

MNSTC-I reconciliation of Sepura radios in inventory, issued, and reported by the Ministry of 

Interior to documents supporting the number of radios purchased. Finally, we obtained and 

reviewed the March 15, 2007, MNSTC-I memo that appointed, in accordance with governing 

U.S. Army policy, an investigating officer and associated actions regarding radio accountability 

discrepancies. 

 

3 Army Regulation 735-5: Polices and Procedures for Property Accountability, February 28, 2005. 

6 
To evaluate AFRN sustainment, we reviewed the MNSTC-I contract that provided O&M support 

for the period January 1, 2007, through March 31, 2007, and interviewed MNSTC-I officials, in 

their capacity as observers of the Ministry of Interior’s contracting efforts, to determine the 

Ministry of Interior’s progress to independently sustain the AFRN system. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 7, 2006, through March 30, 2007, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

- - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott (703-428-1100 / joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil) or 

Mr. Clifton Spruill (703-343-9275 / clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.com). For the report 

distribution, see Enclosure 2. For a list of the audit team members, see Enclosure 3. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

cc: See Distribution 

7 
Enclosure 1. AFRN Primary Infrastructure and Communication Flow 

Governorate 

Dispatch 

Center 

(9)

Mobile 

Switching 

Office 

(3)

Fiber-optic Network 

Radio Transmission 

Radio 

Transmission 

Tower 

 (66) 

Iraq Telephone 

and Postal 

Company 

(ITPC) 

Network 

Operations 

 Center 

(1)

National 

Coordination 

Center 

(1)

Telephone Lines 

Legend: Emergency phone 

calls 

Various components comprise AFRN’s communication/command/control system. Governorate 

Dispatch Center (GDC) personnel receive emergency phone calls from the public, dispatch first 

responders, and monitor the emergency response. The radio transmission towers receive a radio 

signal from a first responder and then route that signal through the fiber-optic network to the Mobile 

Switching Office where it is routed to the applicable GDC. GDC contact with first responders is the 

reverse; the signal goes from the GDC to the Mobile Switching Office and from there is routed to 

the appropriate transmission tower where it is broadcast to the applicable first responder radios. In 

cases where the fiber-optic network is not close to a transmission tower a microwave antenna on the 

tower transmits the signal to a microwave receiver on the nearest tower that is connected to the 

fiber-optic network. The AFRN project also established the National Coordination Center for 

significant events warranting the notification of higher authorities and the Network Operations 

Center for monitoring the overall health of the system and identifying network faults.

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Enclosure 2. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for International 

Development 

 Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction 

 Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer, 

 Bureau of Resource Management 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International 

Security Affairs 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, 

and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

9 
Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and 

Human Rights 

Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic 

Affairs and International Environmental Protection 

Subcommittee on Near East and South and Central Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal 

Services and International Security 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, 

and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 

10 
Enclosure 3. Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit work was conducted under the direction of 

Joseph T. McDermott, the Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Karen D. Bell 

Larry Monson 

Clifton Spruill 

11 
SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Marthena Cowart 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-604-0368 

Email: marthena.cowart@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Denise Burgess 

Assistant Inspector General for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

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