II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 604 

To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership among 

democratic countries, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 4, 2021 

Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. 

CORNYN, Mr. SASSE, Mr. RUBIO, and Mr. BENNET) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership 

among democratic countries, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Democracy Technology 

5 Partnership Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 

8 (1) The 21st century will increasingly be de9 fined by economic competition rooted in technoVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 604 IS

1 logical advances. Leaders in adopting emerging tech2 nologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum 

3 computing, biotechnology, and next-generation tele4 communications, and those who shape the use of 

5 such technologies, will garner economic, military, 

6 and political strength for decades. 

7 (2) These technologies offer opportunities for 

8 the empowerment of citizens, but also and challenges 

9 to basic norms of democratic governance and inter10 nationally recognized human rights. The collection 

11 and analysis of data from individuals allows govern12 ments to know more about their residents’ behaviors, 

13 preferences, interests, and activities than was pos14 sible years ago. The concentration of this data in 

15 key technologies, such as smart phones, search data16 bases, and facial recognition databases, along with 

17 the sharing of data among governments, creates 

18 pressing concerns about individuals’ scope to exer19 cise their fundamental political and social rights. 

20 (3) This challenge arises as the integrity and 

21 efficacy of post-World War II international institu22 tions are increasingly challenged. New approaches to 

23 multilateral cooperation and arrangements are need24 ed to tackle the challenges ahead to ensure that the 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 604 IS

1 United States continues to lead in critical tech2 nologies. 

3 (4) As information and communications tech4 nologies have matured and increasingly mediate 

5 large swathes of social, political and economic activ6 ity, it is incumbent on democratic governments to 

7 address the ways in which these technologies have 

8 undermined democratic values, consumer protec9 tions, and social cohesion. Moreover, as authori10 tarian regimes increasingly shape and deploy tech11 nologies to bolster repression, stifle free expression, 

12 and interfere with free and fair elections in other 

13 countries, the world’s advanced democracies will 

14 need to shape technology standards so that emerging 

15 and critical technologies reflect democratic values, 

16 including freedom of expression and privacy. 

17 (5) Technological leadership by the world’s 

18 major liberal-democratic nations collectively will be 

19 essential to safeguarding democratic institutions, 

20 norms, and values, and contributing to global peace 

21 and prosperity, especially as authoritarian govern22 ments seek to promote closed information systems 

23 and technology that is not interoperable, often 

24 through trade and investment practices that are in25 compatible with global norms. A unified approach by 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
4 

•S 604 IS

1 like-minded nations is needed to counteract growing 

2 investments in, and deployments of, emerging tech3 nologies by authoritarian powers. 

4 (6) In addition to the development of emerging 

5 technologies, democratic nations must lead in shap6 ing expectations for the responsible use of such tech7 nologies and push back against laissez faire ap8 proaches and authoritarian interests on internet gov9 ernance advanced in multilateral forums by— 

10 (A) advocating against efforts to crim11 inalize or limit political dissent and freedom of 

12 speech online, such as those spearheaded by the 

13 Russian Federation, which seek to undermine 

14 the Council of Europe’s Convention on 

15 Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 23, 

16 2001, in favor of a statist alternative; and 

17 (B) prioritizing protections for elections, 

18 and other processes essential for healthy democ19 racies, from cyber-attack. 

20 (7) The world’s leading democracies must also 

21 confront new challenges to their market-driven eco22 nomic systems to ensure their continued leadership 

23 in technology and innovation. The People’s Republic 

24 of China (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘PRC’’) is 

25 pursuing an industrial policy to achieve dominance 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
5 

•S 604 IS

1 in key technologies, including 5G, artificial intel2 ligence (referred to in this section as ‘‘AI’’), quan3 tum computing, hypersonics, biotechnology, space 

4 capabilities, and autonomous vehicles. 

5 (8) The PRC seeks to use technological superi6 ority for national security, military-civil fusion, and 

7 economic gains, according to its strategic plans, in8 cluding— 

9 (A) the Made in China 2025 strategy; 

10 (B) the Five-Year Plan for Standardiza11 tion and China Standards 2035; 

12 (C) the 2006 Medium-to-Long Term S&T 

13 Plan; 

14 (D) the 2010 State Council Decision on 

15 Accelerating the Development of Strategic 

16 Emerging Industries; and 

17 (E) the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Devel18 opment of Strategic Emerging Industries. 

19 (9) The PRC seeks to advance in areas in 

20 which democratic countries currently have a techno21 logical advantage and move ahead in emerging tech22 nologies where China seeks a unique opportunity to 

23 overtake such countries. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
6 

•S 604 IS

1 (10) For many years, the PRC has pursued in2 dustrial policies and discriminatory trade practices 

3 that include— 

4 (A) heavily subsidizing Chinese companies, 

5 restricting foreign competition, conducting 

6 forced technology transfers, and using both licit 

7 and illicit means to access research and devel8 opment around technologies in order to advan9 tage Chinese companies in specific technology 

10 fields; 

11 (B) providing significant government fund12 ing for research and development in the PRC in 

13 specific technologies to build future competitive14 ness; 

15 (C) seeking to ensure global adoption of 

16 Chinese technologies, and the success of Chi17 nese firms, especially in emerging and strategic 

18 markets, through significant foreign direct in19 vestment, low-cost financing and comprehensive 

20 services for foreign development projects, 

21 through initiatives such as the Belt and Road 

22 Initiative, which includes the Digital Silk Road 

23 and the Health Silk Road, as well as the Smart 

24 City Initiative, efforts centered on promoting 

25 the use of Chinese exports by offering far 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
7 

•S 604 IS

1 cheaper rates and bundling these deals into 

2 larger development and aid packages; 

3 (D) aiding the adoption of Chinese-led 

4 standards for digital technologies and products 

5 through compensating Chinese firms that sub6 mit standards and flooding forums with tech7 nical experts; and 

8 (E) leveraging the international standard 

9 setting bodies to advance the vision of the PRC 

10 regarding standards and technologies. 

11 (11) As a result of these practices in support of 

12 Chinese companies, the PRC is increasing its influ13 ence in AI, 5G, and a wide range of other science 

14 and technology disciplines that constitute long-term 

15 economic and security threats to the United States, 

16 its allies, and like-minded partners. According to 

17 market research firm Dell’Oro Group, Huawei’s 

18 share of worldwide telecommunications revenue 

19 equipment grew from 20 percent in 2014 to 31 per20 cent in 2020. 

21 (12) While the United States semiconductor in22 dustry is the worldwide industry leader with approxi23 mately 50 percent of global market share and sales 

24 of $193,000,000,000 in 2019, the situation may be 

25 changing. In 2019, all 6 of the new semiconductor 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
8 

•S 604 IS

1 fabrication plants that opened worldwide were lo2 cated outside of the United States, with 4 of these 

3 plants built in China. The Government of the PRC 

4 plans to spend $150,000,000,000 on its computer 

5 chip industry during the next 10 years. 

6 (13) The PRC uses technologies, such as AI, 

7 facial recognition, and biometrics, to increase control 

8 over its population, facilitating mass surveillance, 

9 scalable censorship, and technology-enabled social 

10 control, including against ethnic and religious mi11 norities including Tibetans, Uyghurs, ethnic 

12 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim mi13 nority groups. 

14 (14) The PRC uses its economic power to co15 erce and censor companies, individuals, and coun16 tries. 

17 (15) In the past decade, the Government of the 

18 PRC— 

19 (A) blocked exports of rare earth elements 

20 to Japan; 

21 (B) threatened to curtail domestic sales of 

22 German cars; 

23 (C) cut off tourism to South Korea; 

24 (D) restricted banana imports from the 

25 Philippines; and 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
9 

•S 604 IS

1 (E) imposed large tariffs on Australian 

2 barley exports. 

3 (16) The Government of the PRC— 

4 (A) has banned United States technology 

5 companies, including Facebook, Google, and 

6 Twitter; 

7 (B) has pressured movie studios based in 

8 the United States to alter content in movies 

9 that it deemed objectionable; and 

10 (C) has retaliated against a range of 

11 American companies for actual or perceived 

12 support for a range of political positions, in13 cluding recognizing territorial claims of coun14 tries in border disputes with China, recognizing 

15 Tibet, and more. 

16 (17) Third countries have become particular 

17 targets of Chinese investments in technology. These 

18 third-country investments provide access to innova19 tion, data that allows Chinese companies to refine 

20 their own systems, and influence over the policies of 

21 these governments. The terms on which Chinese in22 vestments are made often are attractive in the short23 term but create conditions for Chinese ownership of, 

24 or influence over, major industries in those coun25 tries. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
10 

•S 604 IS

1 (18) After decades of being the world leader in 

2 key technologies, the United States is at risk of fall3 ing behind the PRC in key technologies of the fu4 ture. While private-sector research and development 

5 investments have steadily increased in the United 

6 States, Federal Government spending has declined 

7 as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product from ap8 proximately 1.2 percent in 1976 to approximately 

9 0.7 percent in 2018. The decline has been even 

10 steeper in the physical sciences. The Federal Gov11 ernment plays a unique and critical role in Amer12 ica’s innovation ecosystem. Government research and 

13 development spending spurs private-sector invest14 ments, and the United States Government remains 

15 the largest source of basic research funding, which 

16 is foundational to game-changing technological 

17 achievements. 

18 (19) During the past several years, the PRC 

19 has quadrupled its research and development spend20 ing and is on the brink of surpassing the United 

21 States in total investments in key technologies, with 

22 its growth in research and development spending 

23 doubling the United States Government’s spending 

24 increase in this area. Chinese patent publications 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
11 

•S 604 IS

1 have surged in the fields of artificial intelligence, 

2 machine learning, and deep learning. 

3 (20) The United States is highly dependent on 

4 China for key components of critical technologies in 

5 its supply chains, such as rare earths. 

6 (21) The United States remains a leader in the 

7 science and technology areas of engineering and biol8 ogy as well as key components, including tele9 communications equipment and semiconductors. The 

10 United States does not have a domestic manufac11 turer of radio access network equipment for 5G net12 works, but is well-positioned to lead in 6G tele13 communications, which depend on software and 

14 semiconductors, areas of United States strength. 

15 (22) Other countries have unique knowledge, 

16 expertise, and capabilities in numerous cutting edge 

17 technologies, including semiconductor manufacturing 

18 equipment, such as extreme ultraviolet lithography 

19 machines for semiconductor fabrication and machine 

20 tools for fabrication of custom components. In order 

21 to successfully compete against the PRC, the United 

22 States must partner with such countries. 

23 (23) The private sector in the United States 

24 and partner countries, including Japan, Korea, Aus25 tralia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
12 

•S 604 IS

1 European Union has considerable expertise in both 

2 technology and in standard setting, given the role of 

3 the private sector in international standard setting 

4 bodies, but this expertise can be better leveraged in 

5 shaping United States technology policy. 

6 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

7 It is the sense of Congress that— 

8 (1) emerging technology governance regimes 

9 driven by undemocratic governments that do not re10 flect democratic values are gaining traction inter11 nationally through coercive, diplomatic, and unfair 

12 economic, trade, and development practices; 

13 (2) the United States is failing to lead inter14 national efforts or prioritize multilateral coordina15 tion, institutions, and legal compatibility in the area 

16 of technology governance, ceding leadership to au17 thoritarian regimes and risking the growth of anti18 democratic norms and standards around tech19 nologies; and 

20 (3) promoting greater coordination, common 

21 functional problem-solving institutional mechanisms, 

22 and more compatible legal regimes among demo23 cratic nations is essential to create an international 

24 technology governance architecture that benefits all 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
13 

•S 604 IS

1 nations and effectively counters and contains non2 democratic governance regimes. 

3 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

4 It shall be the policy of the United States to lead in 

5 the creation of a new multilateral diplomatic architecture 

6 for technology policy composed of the world’s tech-leading 

7 democracies. 

8 SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OF9 FICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 

10 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall 

11 establish an interagency-staffed International Technology 

12 Partnership Office (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Of13 fice’’), which shall be housed in the Department of State. 

14 (b) LEADERSHIP.— 

15 (1) SPECIAL AMBASSADOR.—The Office shall be 

16 headed by the Special Ambassador for Technology, 

17 who shall— 

18 (A) be appointed by the President, by and 

19 with the advice and consent of the Senate; 

20 (B) have the rank and status of ambas21 sador; and 

22 (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless 

23 otherwise directed by the Secretary of State. 

24 (2) DIRECTORS.—The Secretary of Commerce 

25 and the Secretary of the Treasury shall each apVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
14 

•S 604 IS

1 point, from within their respective departments, di2 rectors for International Technology Partnership, 

3 who also shall serve as liaisons between the Office 

4 and the Department of Commerce or the Depart5 ment of the Treasury, as applicable. 

6 (c) MEMBERSHIP.—In addition to the leaders re7 ferred to in subsection (b), the Office shall include a rep8 resentative or expert detailee from key Federal agencies, 

9 as determined by the Special Ambassador for Technology. 

10 (d) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office shall in11 clude— 

12 (1) creating an international technology part13 nership of democratic countries to develop har14 monized technology governance regimes and to fill 

15 gaps where United States capabilities are currently 

16 insufficient, with a specific focus on key tech17 nologies, including— 

18 (A) artificial intelligence and machine 

19 learning; 

20 (B) 5G telecommunications and other ad21 vanced wireless networking technologies; 

22 (C) semiconductor chip manufacturing; 

23 (D) biotechnology; 

24 (E) quantum computing; 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
15 

•S 604 IS

1 (F) surveillance technologies, including fa2 cial recognition technologies and censorship 

3 software; and 

4 (G) fiber optic cables; 

5 (2) vigorously identifying existing and, as need6 ed, new multilateral mechanisms to advance the ob7 jectives of the International Technology Partnership 

8 around technology governance that advances demo9 cratic values; 

10 (3) coordinating with such countries regarding 

11 shared technology strategies, including technology 

12 controls and standards, as informed by the reports 

13 required under section 8; and 

14 (4) developing strategies with partner countries 

15 for coordinated, development and financial support 

16 for the acquisition by key countries of the tech17 nologies listed in paragraph (1), or comparable tech18 nologies, in order to provide alternatives for those 

19 countries to systems supported by authoritarian re20 gimes. 

21 (e) SPECIAL HIRING AUTHORITIES.—The Secretary 

22 of State may— 

23 (1) hire support staff for the Office, in accord24 ance with section 303 of the Foreign Service Act of 

25 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3943); and 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
16 

•S 604 IS

1 (2) hire individuals to serve as experts or con2 sultants for the Office, in accordance with section 

3 3109 of title 5, United States Code. 

4 SEC. 6. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP. 

5 (a) PARTNERSHIP CRITERIA.—The Special Ambas6 sador for Technology (referred to in this section as the 

7 ‘‘Special Ambassador’’) shall seek to establish an Inter8 national Technology Partnership with foreign countries 

9 that have— 

10 (1) democratic national government and a 

11 strong commitment to democratic values, including 

12 an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech, 

13 and respect for and promotion of human rights, in14 cluding the right to privacy; 

15 (2) an economy with advanced technology sec16 tors; and 

17 (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an ex18 pressed interest in international cooperation and co19 ordination with the United States on important de20 fense and intelligence issues. 

21 (b) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNIONS.—The Inter22 national Technology Partnership may include relevant po23 litical and economic unions. 

24 (c) OBJECTIVES.—The Special Ambassador, in co25 operation with International Technology Partnership parVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
17 

•S 604 IS

1 ticipants, shall pursue, as appropriate, through memo2 randa of understanding, executive agreements, free trade 

3 agreements, and existing multilateral channels— 

4 (1) coordination of technology policies and 

5 standards among International Technology Partner6 ship countries through participation in international 

7 standard setting bodies, such as the United Nations 

8 Group of Governmental Experts, World Trade Orga9 nization, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project, 

10 and the International Telecommunications Union, 

11 including pre-attendance meetings, education, and 

12 panels to report on issues; 

13 (2) coordination of policies with the private sec14 tor to ensure private sector led, politically neutral, 

15 standards processes; 

16 (3) the adoption of shared data privacy, data 

17 sharing, and data archiving standards among the 

18 United States and partner countries and relevant 

19 economic and political unions, including harmonized 

20 data protection regulations; 

21 (4) the creation of coordinated policies for the 

22 use and control of emerging and foundational tech23 nologies through— 

24 (A) use restrictions and export controls; 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
18 

•S 604 IS

1 (B) investment screening coordination, in2 cluding the harmonization of technology-trans3 fer laws, regulations, policies, and practices; 

4 and 

5 (C) the development of other arrangements 

6 to regulate and control technology transfer; 

7 (5) coordination around the resiliency of supply 

8 chains in critical technology areas, with possible di9 versification of supply chain components among the 

10 group, while— 

11 (A) abiding by transparency obligations re12 lated to subsidies and product origin; 

13 (B) conducting risk analyses of products 

14 manufactured in third party nations that fail to 

15 meet established standards similarly; 

16 (C) coordinating subsidy policies; and 

17 (D) limiting preferential trade agreements 

18 between member countries; 

19 (6) the coordination of supply chains regarding 

20 semiconductor fabrication through a fabrication re21 search consortium for the semiconductor industry; 

22 (7) the facilitation of partnerships and coopera23 tion among and between research universities, start24 up companies, and other businesses in member coun25 tries regarding key technologies, including the creVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
19 

•S 604 IS

1 ation of memoranda of understanding regarding 

2 science and technology collaboration with member 

3 countries and coordinated incentives and subsidies; 

4 (8) the coordination of investments and co-fi5 nancing in targeted countries with the goal of— 

6 (A) promoting secure and resilient digital 

7 infrastructure and privacy-enhancing tech8 nologies that protect democratic values and cre9 ate a clear contrast and alternative to the PRC 

10 through the United States International Devel11 opment Finance Corporation, the Export-Im12 port Bank of the United States, foreign devel13 opment finance institutions (including the 

14 World Bank and the International Monetary 

15 Fund), the European Bank for Reconstruction 

16 and Development, the European Investment 

17 Bank, partner country development institutions, 

18 regional banks, other lending institutions, or 

19 new investment mechanisms; and 

20 (B) seeking to ensure that all funding pro21 vided by those institutions, for any purpose, 

22 should be conditioned upon the protection of 

23 democratic values, and that financing is forbid24 den to companies involved in the international 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
20 

•S 604 IS

1 investment programs of authoritarian or 

2 illiberal governments; and 

3 (9) information sharing among partner coun4 tries to raise awareness of— 

5 (A) the technology transfer threat posed by 

6 authoritarian governments; and 

7 (B) ways in which autocratic regimes are 

8 utilizing technology to erode democracies. 

9 (d) WORKING GROUPS.—In carrying out the objec10 tives described in subsection (c) with respect to particular 

11 technology areas, the Special Ambassador may establish 

12 working groups within the International Technology Part13 nership, composed of representatives from partner coun14 tries, including relevant political and economic unions, to 

15 coordinate on discrete strategies and policies related to 

16 specific technologies. 

17 SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP 

18 FUND. 

19 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the 

20 Treasury of the United States a trust fund, which shall 

21 be known as the ‘‘International Technology Partnership 

22 Fund’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Fund’’). 

23 (b) DEPOSITS.— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
21 

•S 604 IS

1 (1) FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS.—There is au2 thorized to be appropriated $5,000,000,000 for the 

3 Fund. 

4 (2) DONATIONS.—In addition to amounts ap5 propriated for the Fund pursuant to paragraph (1), 

6 the Secretary of the Treasury may accept donations 

7 from International Technology Partnership member 

8 countries. 

9 (c) USE OF FUNDS.—Subject to subsection (d), 

10 amounts deposited into the Fund may be used by the Sec11 retary of State, in consultation with the International 

12 Technology Partnership and other relevant Federal agen13 cies, to support— 

14 (1) joint research projects between government 

15 research agencies, universities, technology compa16 nies, and other businesses from International Tech17 nology Partnership member countries; and 

18 (2) technology investments in third-country 

19 markets. 

20 (d) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The obligation 

21 of funds under subsection (c) is subject to the notification 

22 requirement set forth in section 634A of the Foreign As23 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1). 

24 (e) PUBLIC-PRIVATE BOARD.— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
22 

•S 604 IS

1 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is hereby estab2 lished an International Technology Partnership Ad3 visory Board (referred to in this subsection as the 

4 ‘‘Board’’), which shall provide the International 

5 Technology Partnership Office with advice and rec6 ommendations concerning the implementation of this 

7 Act. 

8 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Board shall be com9 posed of individuals— 

10 (A) with demonstrated expertise in the 

11 fields of emerging technologies and inter12 national trade; and 

13 (B) come from the private sector, academic 

14 institutions, national and international human 

15 rights organizations, and technology research 

16 institutions. 

17 SEC. 8. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORTING REQUIRE18 MENTS. 

19 (a) NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TECHNOLOGY AND

20 NATIONAL SECURITY.—Not later than 1 year after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

22 in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, shall 

23 submit an unclassified report to the Committee on Foreign 

24 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 

25 Affairs of the House of Representatives, with a classified 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
23 

•S 604 IS

1 index, if necessary, that outlines a national strategy for 

2 technology and national security, which— 

3 (1) assesses the emerging and foundational 

4 technologies of the future; 

5 (2) identifies the current capabilities of the 

6 United States in critical technologies and its compo7 nents, including any gaps in such capabilities; 

8 (3) identifies the technology capabilities (hori9 zon scanning and technology forecasting) among al10 lied and partner countries; 

11 (4) identifies governance models for emerging 

12 and foundational technologies being adopted by 

13 other countries and other areas of global policy con14 vergence where the United States should better pur15 sue multilateralism or coordination; 

16 (5) identifies a preliminary set of priority tech17 nology areas on which the International Technology 

18 Partnership should be focused; 

19 (6) analyzes the current capabilities of the PRC 

20 in critical technologies and components, including 

21 any gaps in such capabilities; and 

22 (7) includes a set of recommendations for— 

23 (A) rapidly enhancing United States tech24 nological capabilities; 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
24 

•S 604 IS

1 (B) how the United States should collabo2 rate with allied or like-minded countries, identi3 fying existing and, as needed, new multilateral 

4 mechanisms to fill capability gaps and areas for 

5 the United States to advance democratic values; 

6 and 

7 (C) the criteria for determining which 

8 countries should be included in the Inter9 national Technology Partnership, including a 

10 strong commitment to democratic values and a 

11 history of working closely with the United 

12 States, as reflected in Department of State re13 ports regarding human rights and media free14 dom. 

15 (b) STANDARDS AND GOVERNANCE REGIMES.—Not 

16 later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 

17 Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the 

18 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 

19 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa20 tives that assesses other countries’ standards and govern21 ance regimes for privacy, human rights, consumer protec22 tion, and free expression to supplement the criteria rec23 ommended pursuant to subsection (a)(7)(C). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS