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CHINA’S ANTI–SECESSION LAW AND

DEVELOPMENTS ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 6, 2005

Serial No. 109–30

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Vice Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

JAMES W. MCCORMICK, Subcommittee Staff Director 

LISA M. WILLIAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS ANDERSON, Professional Staff Member & Counsel 

TIERNEN M. DONALD, Staff Associate 

JANE QIN, Intern 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Randall G. Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................... 9

Shelley Rigger, Ph.D., Brown Associate Professor of East Asian Politics, Department of Political Science, Davidson College ............................................... 20

Thomas J. Christensen, Ph.D., Professor of Political and International Affairs, 

Princeton University ............................................................................................ 25

Mr. John J. Tkacik, Jr., Research Fellow in China Policy, Asian Studies 

Center, The Heritage Foundation ....................................................................... 33

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

Mr. Randall G. Schriver: Prepared statement ...................................................... 11

Shelley Rigger, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 23

Thomas J. Christensen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................. 28

Mr. John J. Tkacik, Jr.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 36

APPENDIX 

Response from Mr. Randall G. Schriver to question submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress 

from American Samoa ......................................................................................... 47

Responses from Mr. Randall G. Schriver to questions submitted for the record 

by the Honorable James A. Leach ...................................................................... 47

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 49

(1)

CHINA’S ANTI–SECESSION LAW AND 

DEVELOPMENTS ACROSS THE 

TAIWAN STRAIT 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:06 a.m., room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Leach (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LEACH. The Subcommittee will come to order and on behalf 

of the Subcommittee, I would like to welcome our distinguished 

witnesses to the hearing today. I particularly want to thank Deputy Assistant Secretary Schriver and our panel of private experts 

for accommodating the change in time for proceedings this morning. 

By way of explanation, we are obligated to begin a bit early because Victor Yushchenko, the newly-elected President of the 

Ukraine, will be speaking in a few hours before a joint session of 

Congress. In addition, I am obligated to attend a memorial service 

this morning for George F. Kennon, a mentor and, indeed hero, of 

mine. I can think of no greater public service role model. 

The subject matter of our hearing this morning, relations across 

the Taiwan Strait and their implications for United States policy, 

involves a set of enormously complex and intertwined problems, the 

management of which is central to the preservation of peace and 

stability in Asia and the Pacific. 

Here, it is critical to review the history both of the breakthrough 

in United States-China relations that occurred during the Nixon 

Administration and the philosophical aspects of American history 

which relate to issues of a nature similar to mainland Taiwan divisions today. 

United States’ recognition of China was formally ensconced in a 

carefully negotiated communique and two subsequent understandings. The United States accepted a one-China framework for 

our relations with the most populous country in the world. At the 

same time, the three Executive Branch initiatives were complimented by the Taiwan Relations Act, which establishes a commitment of the United States that no change in the status of Taiwan be coercively accomplished through the use of force. 

While anti-Communist, the party of Chaing Kai-shek in Taiwan 

had certain organizational attributes similar to the Communist 

2

party on the mainland. And in one circumstance of philosophical 

consistency, both the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek and the 

Communist party of Mao Zedons claimed to be the governing party 

of all of China, including Taiwan. Hence, the Nixon one-China approach did not contradict the Nationalist positions of the old Kuomintang or the old and new Communist party on the mainland. 

The dilemma which comes to be accentuated with the passage of 

time is the question of whether Taiwan can legally seek today de 

jure independence on the basis of a referendum of the people. Here 

there are contrasting models and American philosophy in history, 

as well as security concerns for all parties to a potential rupture 

that must be prudently thought through. 

Philosophically, Americans respect Jeffersonian individual rights 

approaches, which may implicitly countenance revolutionary societal objectives. We also respect Lincolnesque concerns for national 

unity. A house divided, he noted from Scripture, cannot stand. It 

is in this context that America delivered a split judgement. The 

three Executive initiatives affirmed one-China and the Taiwan Relations Act affirms de facto, but not de jure, relations with the government of a non-state, one which was authoritarian in the 1970s, 

but democratic today. 

From the perspective of the American Government, there should 

be no doubt of the consistency of American policy. Under this President, as each of his predecessors—Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, 

Reagan, Bush and Clinton—the governing American position is the 

acknowledgement of the Chinese position that there is but one 

China of which Taiwan is a part. For United States or Taiwanese 

leaders to assert any other position would create an earthquake in 

world affairs. 

The issue of Taiwan is unique but anything except abstract. It 

is conceivable that missteps in political judgment could, more readily than many suppose, lead to a catastrophe for Asia, the United 

States and the world. 

The precepts of self-determination and independence may, in 

most political and historical contexts be conceptually almost synonymous. But these two precepts are juxtaposed on one place on 

the planet. Taiwan can have de facto self-determination—meaning 

the ability of a people to maintain a government accountable to its 

populace—only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure 

sovereignty by the international community. To be precise, the Taiwanese people can have self-determination as long as they do not 

seek independence. If they assert independence, their capacity for 

self-determination will collapse, with hundreds of thousands if not 

millions of lives becoming jeopardized. Hence, for the sake of peace 

and security for peoples on the island and the broader Asia-Pacific 

region, there is no credible option except to emphasize restraint. 

Any unilateral attempt by either side to change the status quo 

across the Taiwan Strait is fraught with danger of the highest 

order. 

As we make it clear to China that the United States is steadfastly committed to ensuring that the status of Taiwan not be altered by force, we also have an obligation not to entice Taiwan 

through ill-chosen rhetoric of ‘‘ours’’ on Capitol Hill or elsewhere in 

government into a sovereignty clash with China. Substantial TaiVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

wanese self-determination can be maintained only if sovereign national abstentity is not trumpeted. The ambiguous, non-state status 

of Taiwan may be psychologically and aspirationally awkward for 

Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but ambiguity is preferable to sovereign clarity, if the former implies peace and prosperity and the latter a ruinous war. 

In this regard, there should be no doubt that Congress stands 

with the Administration in a common determination to fulfill our 

obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act. However, these obligations presuppose that Taiwanese leaders must understand the realities of mainland resolve and refrain from capricious actions that 

invite conflict or make constructive dialogue impossible. Just as a 

military effort by Beijing to unilaterally alter the status quo would 

necessarily precipitate an American reaction, a unilateral political 

effort by Taiwan to seek independence and dissolve all bonds with 

China would cause America’s commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to become inoperable. 

Unusually but profoundly, foreign policy options for the two great 

powers whose inter-relationship will disproportionately determine 

the shape of the 21st century are constrained by discretionary statutes rather than negotiated treaties. That is why it is so imperative 

that we clarify our commitments and do nothing to invite decisions 

on Taiwan which may contribute to a societal suicide. Leaders in 

Taipei have heavy responsibilities to international order as well as 

their own people. 

Beijing also has implicit obligations to world order, yet it is 

amazing how so-called realists in government circles and so many 

capitals underestimate the soft power of people-to-people and cultural relations. 

While recent years have witnessed a new maturity and sophistication in many elements of Chinese foreign policy, more nuanced 

and pragmatic policy approaches have not generally been applied 

to Taiwan. For whatever reasons, perceptions of importance of the 

Taiwan issue to leadership legitimacy, growing Chinese nationalism, the role of the military in policymaking and internal Communist party politics, Beijing appears to be wedded to an uncompromising policy toward Taiwan, even though that approach has 

been demonstrably unproductive. 

The passage last month by the National People’s Congress of an 

anti-secession law, which, among other things, codifies China’s 

threat to use force against Taiwan, is universally viewed in the island as a hostile, counterproductive act. 

Instead of seeking to intimidate and isolate Taiwan, isn’t it in 

Beijing’s interest to be magnanimous toward the people of the island? 

Should it not, for instance, shepherd Taiwanese membership in 

international organizations that do not imply sovereignty, such as 

helping Taiwan gain observer status in the World Health Organization? 

Rather than setting deadlines for unification or continuing a 

counterproductive military buildup, would not Beijing be well-advised to emphasize culture and economics in its relations with Taipei? 

4

And, on the military front, would it not be in both sides’ interest 

to upgrade communications, widen professional exchanges and engage in confidence-building measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental conflict? 

There is an assumption among students of Beijing politics that 

no one in or aspiring to power in China can afford to be ‘‘soft’’ on 

Taiwan. Hence, given the proclivity for independence rhetoric within the governing DPP party in Taiwan, the risk that an escalation 

of rhetoric could trigger an irrational confrontation is high. Likewise, mainland leadership may choose to precipitate a crisis. Singapore’s leaders, who follow trends in Beijing, even suggest that 

China may be prepared to precipitate conflict over Taiwan in the 

next several years. 

The greatest geo-strategic irony in world affairs is that the 

United States and China have a commonality of interest and are 

working well together to resolve or at least constrain challenges associated with North Korea, where the economics and politics of an 

isolated rogue regime may ultimately deteriorate to the point of potential implosion. By contrast, it is Taiwan, a severely isolated island in which economics and politics have conjoined to allow more 

progressive strides to take place than any place on earth over the 

past generation, where the greatest prospect of great power conflict 

may exist in Asia. 

At the risk of overstatement, an alarming build-up of polarizing 

attitudes is occurring on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Whether 

prospects of conflict are 50 percent or only 5 percent, they are too 

high. The human toll could be great, the rupture in trade and cultural relations devastating, causing impacts that could last decades 

after any conflict concluded. 

In the final measure, all of us are acutely conscious that the 20th 

century was the bloodiest century in world history. It was marred 

by wars, ethnic hatreds, clashes of idealogy and desire for conquest. 

Compounding these antagonisms have been the prideful miscalculation of various parties. Hence, it is in the vital interest of 

potential antagonists in the world, in this case those on each side 

of the Taiwan Strait, to recognize that caution must be the watchword in today’s turbulent times. Political pride and philosophical 

passion must not blind peoples to the necessity of rational restraint. An emphasis on peaceful solutions to political differences 

is the only reasonable basis for future discourse between the mainland and the people of Taiwan. 

Mr. Faleomavaega? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND

THE PACIFIC

On behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses to our hearing today. I particularly want to thank Deputy Assistant Secretary Schriver and our panel of private experts for accommodating the change in 

time for our proceedings this morning. 

By way of explanation, we were obligated to begin this hearing at an unusually 

early hour because Viktor Yushchenko, the newly elected President of Ukraine, will 

be speaking in a few hours before a Joint Session of Congress. In addition, I am 

obligated to attend a memorial service later this morning for George F. Kennan, a 

mentor, indeed hero, of mine. I can think of no greater public service role model. 

5

The subject matter of our hearing this morning, relations across the Taiwan Strait 

and their implications for United States policy, involves a set of enormously complex 

and intertwined problems, the management of which is central to the preservation 

of peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific. 

Here, it is critical to review the history both of the breakthrough in U.S.-China 

relations that occurred during the Nixon Administration and the philosophical aspects of American history which relate to issues of a nature similar to mainlandTaiwan divisions today. 

United States recognition of China was formally ensconced in a carefully negotiated communique ́ and two subsequent understandings. The U.S. accepted a ‘‘One 

China’’ framework for our relations with the most populous country in the world. 

At the same time, the three Executive Branch initiatives were complemented by the 

Taiwan Relations Act, which establishes a commitment of the United States that 

no change in the status of Taiwan be coercively accomplished through the use of 

force. 

While anti-communist, the party of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan had certain organizational attributes similar to the Communist Party on the mainland. And in one 

circumstance of philosophical consistency, both the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek 

and the Communist Party of Mao Zedong claimed to be the governing party of all 

of China, including Taiwan. Hence, the Nixon ‘‘one China’’ approach did not contradict the nationalist positions of the old Kuomintang or the old and new Communist Party on the mainland. 

The dilemma which comes to be accentuated with the passage of time is the question of whether Taiwan can legally seek today de jure independence on the basis 

of a referendum of the people. Here, there are contrasting models in American philosophy and history as well as security concerns for all parties to a potential rupture 

that must be prudently thought through. 

Philosophically, Americans respect Jeffersonian individual rights approaches 

which may implicitly countenance revolutionary societal objectives. We also respect 

Lincolnesque concerns for national unity: a house divided, he noted from Scripture, 

cannot stand. It is in this context that America delivered a split judgment. The 

three Executive initiatives affirmed ‘‘one China’’ and the Taiwan Relations Act affirmed de facto, but not de jure, relations with a government of a non-state, one 

which was authoritarian in the 1970’s but democratic today. 

From the perspective of the American government, there should be no doubt of 

the consistency of American policy. Under this President, as each of his predecessors—Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton—the governing 

American position is the acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is but 

one China of which Taiwan is a part. For U.S. or Taiwanese leaders to assert any 

other position would create an earthquake in world affairs. 

The issue of Taiwan is unique but anything except abstract. It is conceivable that 

missteps of political judgment could, more readily than many suppose, lead to a catastrophe for Asia, the United States, and the world. 

The precepts of ‘‘self-determination’’ and ‘‘independence’’ may in most political and 

historical contexts be conceptually almost synonymous. But these two precepts are 

juxtaposed on one place on the planet. Taiwan can have de facto self-determination—meaning the ability of a people to maintain a government accountable to its 

populace—only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty by 

the international community. To be precise, the Taiwanese people can have self-determination as long as they do not seek independence; if they assert independence, 

their capacity for self-determination will collapse with hundreds of thousand if not 

millions of lives becoming jeopardized. Hence, for the sake of peace and security for 

peoples of the island and the broader Asia-Pacific region, there is no credible option 

except to emphasize restraint. 

Any unilateral attempt by either side to change the status quo across the Taiwan 

Strait is fraught with danger of the highest order. 

As we make it clear to China that the U.S. is steadfastly committed to ensuring 

that the status of Taiwan not be altered by force, we also have an obligation not 

to entice Taiwan through ill-chosen rhetoric of ‘‘ours’’ on Capitol Hill or elsewhere 

in government into a sovereignty clash with China. Substantial Taiwanese self-determination can be maintained only if sovereign nationalist identity is not 

trumpeted. The ambiguous non-state status of Taiwan may be psychologically and 

aspirationally awkward for Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but ambiguity is preferable to sovereign clarity if the former implies peace and prosperity 

and the latter a ruinous war. 

In this regard, there should be no doubt that Congress stands with the Administration in a common determination to fulfill obligations under the Taiwan Relations 

Act. However, these obligations presuppose that Taiwanese leaders must underVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

stand the realities of mainland resolve and refrain from capricious actions that invite conflict or make constructive dialogue impossible. Just as a military effort by 

Beijing to unilaterally alter the status quo would necessarily precipitate an American reaction, a unilateral political effort by Taiwan to seek independence and dissolve all bonds with China would cause America’s commitments under the Taiwan 

Relations Act to become inoperable. 

Unusually, but profoundly, foreign policy options for the two great powers whose 

interrelationship will disproportionately determine the shape of the twenty-first century are constrained by discretionary statutes rather than negotiated treaties. That 

is why it is so imperative that we clarify our commitments and do nothing to invite 

decisions on Taiwan which may contribute to a societal suicide. Leaders in Taipei 

have heavy responsibilities to international order as well as their own people. 

Beijing also has implicit obligations to world order. Yet it is amazing how socalled realists in government circles in so many capitals underestimate the ‘‘soft 

power’’ of people-to-people and cultural relations. 

While recent years have witnessed a new maturity and sophistication in many 

elements of Chinese foreign policy, more nuanced and pragmatic policy approaches 

have not generally been applied to Taiwan. For whatever reasons—perceptions of 

the importance of the Taiwan issue to leadership legitimacy, growing Chinese nationalism, the role of the military in policymaking and internal communist party 

politics—Beijing appears to be wedded to an uncompromising policy toward Taiwan, 

even though that approach has been demonstrably unproductive. 

Passage last month by the National People’s Congress of an anti-secession law, 

which among other things codifies China’s threat to use force against Taiwan, is 

universally viewed on the island as a hostile, counterproductive act. 

Instead of seeking to intimidate and isolate Taiwan, isn’t it in Beijing’s interest 

to be magnanimous toward the people of the island? 

Shouldn’t it, for instance, shepherd Taiwanese membership in international organizations that do not imply sovereignty—such as helping Taiwan gain observer status in the World Health Organization? 

Rather than setting deadlines for unification or continuing a counterproductive 

military buildup, wouldn’t Beijing be well-advised to emphasize culture and economics in its relations with Taipei? 

And, on the military front, wouldn’t it be in both side’s interests to upgrade communications, widen professional exchanges, and engage in confidence building measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental conflict? 

There is an assumption among students of Beijing politics that no one in or aspiring to power in China can afford to be ‘‘soft’’ on Taiwan. Hence, given the proclivity 

for independence rhetoric within the governing DPP party on Taiwan, the risk that 

an escalation of rhetoric could trigger an irrational confrontation is high. Likewise, 

mainland leadership may choose to precipitate a crisis. Singapore’s leaders, who follow trends closely in Beijing, even suggest that China may be prepared to precipitate conflict over Taiwan in the next several years. 

The greatest geo-strategic irony in world affairs is that the U.S. and China have 

a commonality of interest and are working well together to resolve or at least constrain challenges associated with North Korea where the economics and politics of 

an isolated, rogue regime may ultimately deteriorate to the point of potential implosion. By contrast, it is Taiwan, a severely isolated island on which economics and 

politics have conjoined to allow more progressive strides to take place than any 

place on earth over the past generation, where the greatest prospect of great power 

conflict may exist in Asia. 

At the risk of over-statement, an alarming build-up of polarizing attitudes is occurring on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Whether prospects of conflict are 50% 

or only 5%, they are too high. The human toll could be great; the rupture in trade 

and cultural relations devastating, causing impacts that could last decades after any 

conflict concluded. 

In the final measure, all of us are acutely conscious that the 20th Century was 

the bloodiest century in world history. It was marred by wars, ethnic hatreds, clashes of ideology, and desire for conquest. Compounding these antagonisms has been 

the prideful miscalculation of various parties. Hence it is in the vital interests of 

potential antagonists in the world, in this case those on each side of the Taiwan 

Strait, to recognize that caution must be the watchword in today’s turbulent times. 

Political pride and philosophical passion must not blind peoples to the necessity of 

rational restraint. An emphasis on peaceful solutions to political differences is the 

only reasonable basis of future discourse between the mainland and the people of 

Taiwan.

7

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

calling this hearing this morning. Not only is the subject matter 

timely, but certainly in the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee. 

More importantly, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership 

and commitment to see that the Subcommittee and its Members 

become proactive in making sure that relevant issues that impact 

upon our diplomatic and strategic security interests in this important region of the world be given careful and appropriate attention. 

In recent years, our Nation’s policy toward Taiwan Straits has 

been at least consistent to the extent that we have adhered to the 

one-China, two-systems policy, with the expectation that China and 

the People’s Republic of China worked out their differences. And 

that the question of Taiwan’s future status again is a matter to be 

resolved peacefully between Taiwan and China. 

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, it is in only recent years that 

Taiwan has become a more pluralistic society, with a democratic 

form of Government since the passing of General Chaing Kai-shek, 

who ruled then Formosa Island for many years after the defeat of 

his army by the military forces of his arch enemy and rival, Mao 

Tse Tung. 

It is within this newly found status as a democracy that certain 

top officials have advocated good or independence. There is seemingly also the idea that separation from mainland China is the best 

option to pursue, despite the understanding of the one-China, twosystems policy still in place, and especially as it is understood between China and our country. 

I believe we should not be so presumptuous to suggest that we 

understand the mentality of the Chinese people and their leaders. 

So China passes an anti-secession law. President Chen of Taiwan 

suggested that a million Taiwanese should go to the streets and 

demonstrate against such a law, but at the same time, say nothing 

during the demonstration, which actually turned out to be only 

about 300,000 people. 

But at the same time, Taiwan and China continues to conduct, 

as I speak, an unofficial $100 billion trade relationship and just 

weeks ago allowed both their national airline carriers to operate 

freely between Taipei and Beijing. The Taiwan Straits issue is not 

as simple as some may think, Mr. Chairman. There is constant 

movement on events in recent pronouncements from leaders of 

other countries that have made the issue more complicated and 

certainly not easy to resolve. 

Secretary Rice’s recent trip to Asia reflects that. Her description 

of North Korea as an outpost of tyranny has not been a positive 

point, obviously, from the North Korean leadership. And our pressure on China to get the North Koreans to come back to the sixnation negotiation table puts China in the more difficult position 

to convince North Korea that it is in their best interest to do so. 

Allies everywhere have decided to rescind its current policy of 

not selling arms to China, which we obviously objected to. And now 

with China passing an anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan and in 

no uncertain terms ruling the Taiwan leadership not able to push 

for separation and independence. Secretary Rice made an excellent 

presentation to our European allies on the consequences of their intention to sell arms to China and the potential problem that may 

8

follow, as far as maintaining the strategic balance of power in this 

region of the world and the fact that it is the United States and 

not Europe that has defended the Pacific. It has now been a reason 

to our European allies to think again before selling arms to China. 

But in a recent twist to all this, Mr. Chairman, appears to note 

from Secretary Schriver and our distinguished members of the 

panel of witnesses that will testify this morning, what is our justification now in our intention to conduct presumably a multi-billion dollar sales contract of United States jet fighters to Pakistan? 

I wonder what the reaction might be now from China, India and 

our European allies? 

With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, the United States is not about 

to send another 2 million battle groups to Taiwan Straits to cause 

a lot of strain and tension between our two countries in recent 

years. I am looking forward to hearing from our Secretary Schriver 

and also our distinguished witnesses to hear about some of the 

issues that we discussed earlier today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much. Did you have an opening 

statement, Mr. Ackerman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I have a brief statement. 

Mr. LEACH. Yes, please, you are recognized. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There 

can be absolutely no doubt that the intent of the anti-secession law 

was to create the legal justification for military attack against Taiwan. The law spelled out a range of activities which, if taken by 

the Taiwanese people and their democratically-elected leaders, 

would legally constitute secession to the Chinese mainland. 

Many of these activities, such as constitutional reform and popular referenda, are the mainstay of any democracy, yet the Chinese 

would see them as an excuse for military attack on the 21 million 

freedom loving people on Taiwan. The United States fully understands Taiwan is in a very difficult bind. It is a flourishing democracy, one of the most vibrant in Asia, with freedoms of speech, the 

press and assembly, and intensely competitive free political parties. 

Yet it is claimed as a sovereign territory by the People’s Republic 

of China, which is not a democracy, has no freedom of the press, 

speech, or assembly. And this neighbor now threatens to annex 

Taiwan by force. 

Under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, which is the legal 

bedrock of our policy, the United States insists that the future of 

Taiwan must be determined by peaceful means. And we have stated that no action should be taken by either Taiwan or the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) that endangers the peace and stability 

that now exists across the Taiwan Strait. 

During the past year, the Bush Administration cautioned Taiwan 

about actions which might appear to challenge this status quo. 

Now the PRC, through this provocative legislation, is challenging 

the status quo in a very big way. The State Department has previously said that this legislation is highly unhelpful. I strongly 

agree with that position and register my great concern over the enactment of the anti-secession law and look forward to hearing from 

our distinguished witnesses. 

Mr. LEACH. Before turning to Secretary Schriver, let me note 

that there is a very high-ranking delegation of Taiwanese legislaVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
9

tors with us today, led by C. Charles Chiang. I might ask you to 

stand. Also in this group is Mr. Trong-Rong Chai, Mr. Chung-mo 

Lin, Mr. Shui-Sheng Hou, Mr. Winston Dang, Ms. Sandy Ho Tzu 

Yen, Ms. Shun-Ni Hsieh, Mr. Wei-Cher Huang, Mr. Shih-Cho 

Huang and Mr. George K. Liu and we are honored with your presence. We appreciate your attendance. Thank you very much. 

At this point, let me turn to Randall G. Schriver, who is Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the 

United States Department of State. Mr. Schriver? 

STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND 

PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and 

good morning, Congressman Faleomavaega and Congressman Ackerman and thank you for your statements. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here this morning and to discuss the anti-secession law and the impact on the cross-Strait environment. 

Since the 17th of December, when the Chinese first began to 

publicly discuss their intention to move forward with such legislation, we have been very clear in registering our concern about 

these actions. We have been clear at the highest levels of our Administration, calling this an unhelpful step and a step in the wrong 

direction. 

As an alternative, we counsel that China take advantage of other 

trends in the cross-Strait environment that are more positive and 

to try to promote peaceful steps and dialogue. To briefly review 

some of the major elements of our response to the anti-secession 

law, first of all, in January, China sent the Director of the Taiwan 

Affairs Office, Chen Yunlin, to Washington to explain the law to 

us. He had meetings that included then Deputy Secretary of State 

Rich Armitage and then Deputy National Security Advisor, Steve 

Hadley. In both those meetings, Mr. Armitage and Mr. Hadley respectively registered our strong concern and reservations about 

Chinese intentions. 

In February, I accompanied the Senior Director for Asian Affairs 

of the National Security Council, Dr. Michael Green, to Beijing, 

where we met again with Mr. Chen Yunlin and other Chinese leaders and at that time, Dr. Green clearly stated to our Chinese interlocutors that this legislation would undermine cross-Strait stability. 

In a letter to then Ambassador to the United States, Yang Jiechi, 

our then Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, 

urged China to ‘‘not complicate the cross-Strait relationship and, 

rather than proceed with the law, to consider instead ways to resume dialogue with Taiwan.’’

And on the eve of the ratification vote within the NPC, our highest representative in Beijing made a very urgent demarche, urging 

the Chinese not to proceed with enactment of this law. 

In addition to these private messages conveyed in our bilateral 

meetings with Chinese officials, we have also been very clear in our 

public statements registering concern and cautioning against any 

hardening of positions on either side, but in particular, the Chinese 

side, given their stated intent. 

10

Beijing’s leaders have claimed that this law is simply an enactment of longstanding policy. That said, we have deep concerns 

about this and we are particularly concerned about article 8, which 

makes explicit reference that China ‘‘shall employ non-peaceful 

means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty 

and territorial integrity’’ under certain conditions. This statement, 

which is now, of course, codified in law, about non-peaceful response, raises questions and concerns about how China may respond to perceived provocations from the Taiwan side. And given 

the very aggressive military buildup opposite Taiwan and, in particular, the massive numbers of short-range ballistic missiles deployed and aimed at Taiwan, we have cause to register strong concern. 

This legislation does run counter to some concurrent positive 

trends in the cross-Strait environment. These include the temporary resumption of direct charter flights across the Strait during 

the Chinese New Year period. Also, the Chinese decision to send 

a delegation to a memorial service for Mr. Ku Chen-foo. We regarded these as positive steps and we encourage such steps, and 

we welcome any measures that promote confidence and trust. 

We have also seen some statements by China’s senior leaders 

which appear designed to create room for political maneuver for 

both sides. However, this law, and particularly article 8 that I mentioned, is certainly not in the spirit of those statements and the 

other trends that we have seen unfold. 

Upon the passage of the legislation and when we finally had the 

opportunity to review the actual text, we were unequivocal in expressing our concern. Our spokesman, Assistant Secretary Boucher, 

stated that the law was ‘‘unfortunate and did not serve the cause 

of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.’’ And he reiterated our 

opposition to any attempt to determine the future of Taiwan by 

anything other than peaceful means. 

At the White House, our spokesman there, Scott McClellan, said, 

‘‘We don’t want to see any unilateral attempt that would increase 

tensions in the region.’’ And he went on to point out that, according 

to the Taiwan Relations Act, any effort to determine the future of 

Taiwan by anything other than peaceful means, is viewed by the 

United States as a threat to peace and security in the region. 

And Secretary Rice, during her recent travels to Beijing, underscored our public disappointment that China had taken this 

unhelpful step and noted that it had raised tensions. And she 

called on Beijing to take positive steps to reassure Taiwan of its desire to engage in a peaceful dialogue. 

In our view, the Chinese Government did have other options and 

they could have chosen another path and not proceeded with this 

legislation in the NPC. Despite the very best efforts of our Administration, despite the strong expressions of concern among Members of Congress and in the international press, they did proceed, 

of course, with enactment of this law. Passage of the legislation has 

undermined rather than raised confidence and trust across the 

Strait. It is a unilateral measure that has soured the atmosphere 

in the Taiwan Strait and, as Secretary Rice stated, ‘‘We are not 

pleased when either side does anything to change the status quo 

11

or to increase tensions,’’ and it is in that context that we commented on the anti-secession law. 

The Taiwan public and the Taiwan authorities have understandably focused on the legislation’s provisions for the use of non-peaceful means. We certainly understand and note Taiwan’s concerns. 

Nonetheless, we want both sides to seek affirmative means to rebuild trust. No one would be well served at this juncture by an 

enaction, reaction cycle that could lead to an increase in tensions. 

Although the passage of this law is, of course, a new challenge 

for us in trying to manage the cross-Strait environment in our efforts to promote a peaceful resolution, we do not feel that it requires a major shift in our longstanding policy that you noted in 

your statement, Mr. Chairman. We oppose any unilateral attempts 

by either side to change the status quo, particularly with respect 

to the use of force. And we abide by our commitments under the 

joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. We continue to 

urge both sides to seek all opportunities for dialogue to contribute 

to a peaceful resolution of their differences and we also continue 

to make explicit our fundamental opposition to China’s acquisition 

of military capabilities and deployments targeted against Taiwan. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Faleomavaega and Ackerman, and I look forward to any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before you and other 

members of the Committee today to address the recent passage of anti-secession legislation by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China and its 

impact on cross-Strait and U.S.-China relations. 

Since December 17 last year, when the Chinese began publicly discussing the likelihood that the legislation would be brought to the National People’s Congress for 

consideration at its annual March session, we have been very clear, including at the 

highest levels of the Administration—Secretary Rice and former Secretary Powell—

that we believed such legislation would be unhelpful, and a step in the wrong direction. Instead, we have counseled taking advantage of warming trends in the crossStrait relationship to further peaceful dialogue that would be in the interests of the 

people on both sides of the Strait. 

Let me be a bit more specific about our efforts to let China know our views of 

the legislation:

• In January, former Deputy Secretary Armitage and then Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley met with State Council Taiwan Affairs Office 

Director Chen Yunlin, who was in Washington to convey China’s intentions 

with regard to the anti-secession Act, and expressed our reservations.

• In a February visit to Beijing, National Security Council Senior Director for 

Asian Affairs Michael Green told senior Chinese leaders that passage of the 

legislation would undermine cross-Strait stability.

• In a letter to former Chinese Ambassador Yang Jiechi, former Under Secretary for Political Affairs Marc Grossman urged China not to complicate the 

cross-Strait relationship and, rather than proceed with the law, to consider 

instead ways to resume dialogue with Taiwan.

• On the eve of the ratification vote by the National People’s Congress, the 

Charge at our Embassy in Beijing urged China not to pass the legislation.

• In our public statements as well we have also cautioned against any hardening of positions and urged instead that the two sides look to resume their 

dialogue.

12

While Beijing’s leaders claim the law simply restates China’s long-standing policy, 

we are deeply concerned about Article 8 of the legislation which states : ‘‘In the 

event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name 

or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major 

incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities 

for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ 

non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty 

and territorial integrity.’’

This statement, now codified in law, about a non-peaceful response raises additional questions regarding how China will respond to what it perceives as ongoing 

efforts in Taiwan to define itself with a separate identity, including steps that fall 

short of declaring de jure independence. Given the aggressive military build-up opposite Taiwan—particularly the deployment of massive numbers of short-range ballistic missiles—we have cause to register strong concern. 

As I said, passage of the legislation clearly runs counter to concurrent positive 

trends in cross-Strait relations including the temporary implementation of direct 

charter flights, for the first time since 1949, between Taiwan and the mainland during Chinese New Year, and the mainland delegation that traveled to Taiwan for the 

funeral of former Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Ku Chen-foo. We strongly 

encourage such steps and welcome any measures that promote greater confidence 

such as the above mentioned cross-Strait contacts and discussions. 

We have been encouraged by some statements made by China’s senior-most leaders that appear designed to allow room for maneuver on both sides. However, some 

elements of the law, particularly Article 8, are not in the spirit of these more hopeful signs. 

Consequently, upon the passage of the legislation and on our finally having an 

opportunity to review the actual text passed by the NPC, we were unequivocal in 

our expression of concern.

• Assistant Secretary Boucher made clear that the law was unfortunate, did not 

serve the cause of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and he reiterated 

our opposition to any attempt to determine the future of Taiwan by other 

than peaceful means.

• At the White House, press spokesman Scott McClellan said that ‘‘we don’t 

want to see a unilateral attempt that would increase tensions in the region’’ 

and pointed out that according to the Taiwan Relations Act any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means is viewed by the 

U.S. as a threat to peace and security in the region.

• Secretary Rice, traveling to Beijing shortly after the legislation was passed, 

underscored our public disappointment that China had taken this unhelpful 

step, noted that it had raised tensions, and called on Beijing to take positive 

steps to reassure Taiwan of its desire to engage in peaceful dialogue.

In our view, the Chinese government clearly had options other than moving this 

legislation to the NPC for consideration. But it would seem that a combination of 

domestic political factors, an approval process too far advanced to allow the leadership to pull it back, and an urgency about the direction of a democratic Taiwan 

would take in the next few years led to the law’s passage. 

That’s the situation we have to deal with now, despite the very best efforts of the 

Administration and the concerns that have been expressed by members of Congress 

in resolutions and by the American press. 

Passage of the legislation has undermined, rather than raised, confidence and 

trust across the Strait. We continue to be concerned about an unhelpful cycle of action and reaction. The Taiwan public and Taiwan authorities have understandably 

focused on the legislation’s provisions for the use of non-peaceful means. Statements 

by Taiwan leaders equating the legislation to a unilateral change of the status quo 

and the March 26 demonstration in Taipei reflect the perception by both Taiwan 

authorities and private citizens that the law does not serve the interests of the Taiwan people. We note those concerns, but urge both sides to exercise restraint and 

seek affirmative means to rebuild trust. 

Although passage of the ‘‘anti-secession’’ law has brought a new challenge to our 

efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to cross-Strait differences, we do not believe 

it requires a shift in our approach to the issue.

• We remain committed to our longstanding one China policy, which has helped 

both sides to prosper and contributes to the peace. We are making clear that 

we do not support Taiwan independence, oppose unilateral changes by either 

side to the status quo—particularly with respect to the use of force—and 

13

abide by our commitments under the joint communique ́s and the Taiwan Relations Act.

• We continue to urge both sides to seek all opportunities for dialogue that contribute to a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences.

• And we will also continue to make explicit our fundamental opposition to China’s acquisition of military capabilities and deployments targeted against Taiwan.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the 

Committee may have.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me stress that I am 

in full agreement with the thrust of your comments and I think 

they are thoughtful in balance. I think what Mr. Faleomavaega 

and Mr. Ackerman mentioned on Taiwan reflect very much the 

feelings of many of us on the Hill. 

Let me ask you from a perspective less of precision of events, but 

from the temper of the times, what you sense in Beijing as attitudes on this issue? Is there any sense that there is exclusively an 

attitude of hardening or is there any sense that there can be a 

more reasonable flexibility in Beijing today? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned, this 

decision to proceed with the law did come at a time when there 

were other actions taken that were more positive. The charter 

flights and the visit to the Ku Chen-foo memorial. I think at this 

juncture, Beijing is beginning to understand—if they have not fully 

understood already—that the decision to proceed with the law was 

a mistake. And that there is some burden on them now to try to 

improve the environment and improve the atmosphere. 

We believe there is some consideration to steps that they could 

take to do so. Their traditional routes include courting the business 

community in Taiwan. We have seen them reach out to the opposition party, of course, and I think there are complications associated 

with that in terms of how that plays into Taiwan’s domestic politics. But, nonetheless, it is a step in the direction of dialogue 

which, on the margins, is better than no dialogue. 

So I think there is some thinking in leadership circles in Beijing 

as to what positive elements of a cross-Strait policy could look like. 

But I would add, just in closing, these remarks: That is drowned 

out by the very negative action of this law and by other statements 

from leaders in Beijing and by the very aggressive military posture 

that they have continued to take opposite Taiwan. So much more 

work needs to be done on the positive side of the ledger. 

Mr. LEACH. The Economist, which is a very respected publication, 

has suggested that we have a fast evolving situation on Taiwan 

psychologically, in terms of the ways that people are identifying 

themselves with their island. And then China, economically, as 

well as a hardening politically, that could lead to attitudinal ruptures of a profound nature. Do you agree with this assessment or 

do you think that there is a steady pragmatism that can become 

the order of the day? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you. It is a difficult question, because I 

think there are different views and different ways that people identify themselves, think of themselves within Taiwan. But I think the 

trend line of a separate identity among the people of Taiwan and 

desire for some separate status is a trend line that is unfolding for 

quite some time and, I think, will be a permanent feature of doVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

mestic politics in Taiwan and, of course, that plays out into the 

international arena as well. 

So I think this will be a complicating factor in how the crossStrait environment is managed for the foreseeable future. The 

counter trends are the growing economic ties and the commercial 

relations which continue to grow at very robust rates. The trade 

across the Strait continues to go in a positive direction and the 

interrelations between members of the commercial communities are 

stronger and stronger. 

So I think when we look at the environment, it can be a complicated picture. There are trends that suggest we have complications and challenges such as the one you mentioned, sir, but also 

other trends that suggest there are opportunities if seized upon by 

the political leadership on both sides. And that requires the political will, but there are opportunities, nonetheless, to try to be on 

a more positive path and exploit things like the commercial contacts for the betterment of the political environment. 

Mr. LEACH. Let me just ask one concluding assessment and let 

me ask if I am not defining Administration policy. It is my view 

that this Administration is consistent with past Administrations 

since President Nixon in upholding the precept that we do not 

want any change in the status of Taiwan, based on threat or use 

of force. Likewise, this Administration is not encouraging an independence move on Taiwan, is that correct? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. Mr. Faleomavaega? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Schriver. You mentioned earlier that the People’s Republic 

of China should have used other options. Could you elaborate a little bit in terms of what those options may be? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes, sir, thank you. I think what Beijing has 

lacked in its approach to Taiwan is a more positive agenda that 

could, in fact, make the right kind of impression on the 24 million 

of Taiwan. I think the face of China to too many people on Taiwan 

is harsh rhetoric, missiles, military posture, aggressive military 

posture. And what Beijing has lacked is the positive agenda. 

I did mention a couple of the steps in my statement, the charter 

flights, the visit to the Ku memorial. There are a number of things 

we could imagine Beijing could do to try to make the right kind of 

impression on the people of Taiwan. I will mention one. We would 

like to see Beijing take a more compassionate view of Taiwan’s interest in observorship in the World Health Organization. We think 

that Taiwan and the people of Taiwan deserve to be beneficiaries 

of the work of the WHO. We believe that Taiwan’s medical and scientific communities could make contributions to the WHO. We 

have supported for quite some time Taiwan’s observorship in that 

organization and we, along with other friends, have been unsuccessful in our attempt to promote Taiwan’s candidacy, primarily because of Beijing’s aggressive lobbying against Taiwan. I think this 

would be an excellent time for Beijing to try to facilitate some 

meaningful participation in the WHO for Taiwan. That is just one 

step, but you could imagine a whole range of things that could create a more positive impression among the people in Taiwan. 

15

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You mentioned that Taiwan is to be affiliated with WHO in the other aspects such as Taiwan’s need to be 

a member of this international Civil Aviation Organization that 

provides for aircraft safety and travels in airports. And I sincerely 

hope that the State Department is pursuing that. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Our friends from Taiwan have given me indication that they really would appreciate any support from our 

country in doing that. 

Do you think that perhaps the connection for this whole anti-secession law had anything to do with China’s own political movements in terms of the newly-elected President, the Premier that 

now have consolidated their leadership roles, that this anti-secession law may have had some connection to China’s own political developments within itself? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes, sir. I think that is a very reasonable theory. 

It is always difficult to speculate on what happens inside a political 

system that still remains very opaque to outside observers, but I 

think there probably was some pressure on the new leadership to 

do something, demonstrate leadership on an issue that is important and the issue of Taiwan is within their domestic circles. This 

certainly has the appearance of an attempt to do that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You indicated also that we have a fundamental concerted opposition to China’s recent military buildup in 

recent years. How does China’s military buildup compare to Japan’s military buildup? Can you provide for the record in terms of 

the budgetary allocations that these countries now have? Because 

I understand Japan is one of the highest budgetary allocations 

given for its defense system. Of course, if I were Chinese, I would 

be very concerned, too. So we are concerned about Chinese buildup, 

military buildup. Chinese are concerned about Japanese buildup, 

so how do we justify ourselves in telling China not to do this if it 

is okay with other countries to do otherwise? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Sir, while we can make the data available for the 

record, I would make just one brief comment. Japan is an important and strong ally of the United States and through its own constitution and its own policies, it is more oriented toward the selfdefense of Japan. 

China, on the other hand, while we have never questioned their 

desire or their right to arm themselves for self-defense, has adopted a very aggressive posture toward Taiwan, has never renounced 

the use of force and, worse than that, has used harsh rhetoric in 

this anti-secession law. So it is the combination of the military 

buildup and what is their own stated intent to preserve a military 

option over the democratic people of Taiwan that concerns us. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. As it is our concern about providing regional 

stability of the region, both in Southeast Asia as well as South 

Asia, could you tell us, I am curious, how we are able to tell the 

Europeans not to sell arms to China, and yet, just within the last 

week and a half, we are about to provide a multi-billion dollar contract to sell jet fighter planes to Pakistan? Is that going to provide 

stability in the region? I just want to get a sense of consistency 

from the Administration. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Sir. 

16

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. How we justify telling others not to do it 

and yet, on the left hand, we are doing just the opposite? It seems 

to me that we are giving Pakistan just the trigger that will cause 

a lot of instability, in my humble opinion, in this region. So can you 

give us a comparison of what our policy is and why we are telling 

others not to do one thing and yet we are doing it on the other 

hand? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, let me first say the region of South Asia 

does fall outside my purview. So let me give a partial answer to 

a very good question and that is why we were concerned so much 

about the European consideration of lifting the embargo. Because 

its regional stability is certainly one factor that we looked at, but 

we remain very concerned about the human rights situation in 

China. The embargo was put in place after the crackdown in 

Tienanman Square in 1989. China has not made sufficient progress 

in the area of human rights to merit this kind of step in our view 

on the part of the Europeans or anyone else. 

In fact, their recent performance indicates that they have in no 

way addressed those events in 1989. They are still imprisoning people who come out publicly about Tienanman Square. On the 15th 

anniversary of the Tienanman crackdown, they detained and 

locked up Tienanman mothers who were simply seeking an accounting of their children who were killed in the incident. So it is 

regional stability. It is also human rights. It is also a very poor 

record on proliferation—perhaps improving, we hope—but a poor 

record on proliferation among the Chinese. 

So I take your point on regional stability, but I would only add 

that there are other factors that we presented to the Europeans 

and we felt made a very compelling case for them. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I appreciate your comment on human rights 

and even though not related, I am very concerned about the human 

rights of the West Papuan people in Indonesia. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, sir. Mr. Ackerman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Early in his first 

Presidency, President Bush, instead of reiterating what has been 

and remains United States policy, that we will do what is necessary to provide for the defense of Taiwan, mismassaged that policy and stated with a different nuance, unfortunately, that we will 

do everything necessary to provide for the defense of Taiwan. 

Did that misstatement embolden the Taiwanese to advance their 

desire to proceed along with the natural progression of how democracies usually progress, and that is, revise and amend their Constitution and do all those things that real democracies are genuinely entitled to do? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you. That is, perhaps, a matter of some debate. I suspect that the decisions that are made on Taiwan are 

made not out of a reflection on what the United States is saying 

about their domestic politics, but they are made as a result of internal debate and very intense debate on such issues as constitutional reform and how to continue to perfect Taiwan’s democracy. 

The question of United States commitment to Taiwan and our 

support for Taiwan, I think, has never been in question. You correctly point out that the President had a different formulation from 

17

the traditional formulation at that time, but the fundamental commitment has always been there and, I think, understood in Taiwan. 

So I think the decisions on constitutional reform and other measures to assure the strength of Taiwan’s democracy are less to do 

with what we say and more to do with what people in Taiwan 

genuinely feel and the outcome of their own internal debates. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In your judgment, but pro-independent steps 

that Taipei might take would cross the red lines that Beijing has 

set? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. That is a question I cannot answer. Beijing has 

the ability to set their own red lines for themselves and sometimes 

that is opaque to us. One of the things we are concerned about 

with this law in article 8 is they started to be more explicit about 

some of the kinds of things that might lead them to employ nonpeaceful means. 

But this is subject to the interpretation in Beijing, behind closed 

doors among leaders, and it is difficult for us to speculate. We are 

much better off if the two sides are talking to one another and then 

there is an understanding between the two of them as to what kind 

of behaviors contribute to peace and what kind of behaviors are of 

concern, rather than for outside parties to try to pin that on Beijing. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would assume that if Taiwan out and out declared its independence, that would be the most provocative step. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Traditionally, Beijing has talked about certain 

conditions in which they would use force. They made it explicit in 

their law, as well, and that is certainly a condition that they have 

identified. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In article 8 of the anti-secession law, does that 

also include changing the name of Taiwan? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. It is less specific on that, but there is catchall language about any measures which move in the direction—I do not 

have it in front of me, so please do not take this as an exact quote. 

But very broad language about any steps or measures that move 

in the direction of independence. So there is a catchall that I think 

would give Beijing the latitude to interpret the main change in that 

matter if they chose to do so. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In article 9, they take great pains to specifically 

say that if they were required to invade Taiwan, that they would 

attempt to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. That is pretty 

provocative and basically totally unnecessary to state that, unless 

you were trying to impress somebody as to the seriousness of your 

intent, should you feel that you were going to take such action. 

Some people would read that as to underscore the warning and 

others might read it as to just give additional voice to a bellicose 

situation. How do we read that? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, Beijing has always, in their public statements, gone to lengths to say that there are compatriots change, 

compatriots on Taiwan and those that support the reunification 

and those are their sort of natural allies and compatriots. And then 

there are those that are splitist and troublemakers, who have other 

views about Taiwan’s future. 

And they address this bifurcation in policy ways through a number of means. I think this legislation is probably trying to make 

18

that kind of statement. But I will add, my understanding of the 

PLA deployments opposite Taiwan, particularly with the heavy emphasis on short-range ballistic missiles, it is very difficult to imagine being able to minimize civilian casualties or being able to discriminate against those loyal compatriots and others on Taiwan. It 

is almost like they were expecting different people to wear different 

uniforms on Taiwan the day that they might decide to do something, so they know who are the people who are friendly to them 

and who are not. You do not have to answer that. 

To what extent does Beijing either implicitly or explicitly link its 

cooperation with the United States on North Korea with Washington’s posture toward Taiwan? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. In our official communications with Beijing leaders, they have never drawn an explicit linkage. And, in fact, our 

belief is that they have very strong interests in seeing North 

Korea, the nuclear issue, resolved there for their own reasons and 

have an interest in seeing a nuclear-free peninsula. We have heard 

speculation among Chinese academics and non-officials that perhaps Beijing should consider the leverage that may come from their 

cooperation on North Korea to try to promote a different set of actions or policies from the United States on Taiwan. We have not 

seen it in the official channels at all. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. I thank the Chairman for 

his generosity with the time. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, Mr. Ackerman. Your great Chairmanship was one I appreciated serving under. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is a mutual admiration society, I assure you, 

although I appreciated the former much more. [Laughter.] 

Mr. LEACH. Let me assert, the only part of that observation I 

would like to make, I think, on the Taiwan issue: The Administration is proceeding quite thoughtfully and impressively in concert 

with past Administrations, so there is great consistency and likewise on this Committee on this issue, I think there is a great consistency. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would concur with that, certainly, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Would the Chairman yield? 

Mr. LEACH. Yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would also suggest that perhaps if our 

leaders would stop making any more name calling, it might be 

helpful in that cultural realm of misunderstandings and a mutual 

friendship that could be better created. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, not being at all interested in having a 

cultural understanding with a bunch of gangsters who are threatening to kill innocent human beings on Taiwan, I guess I will just 

have to resort to name calling. 

What we got out of this is the Administration has made it clear 

through this testimony today that the United States will militarily 

defend Taiwan if it is attacked militarily by the Government on the 

mainland? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Sir, we will obviously stand by the Taiwan Relations Act and the military commitments that are addressed in the 

act, absolutely. 

19

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. If Taiwan were to be attacked and 

missiles were to be launched, it would not be just a military response, but there would be a huge economic consequence to this, 

would there not be? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Obviously, it would depend on the scenario, but 

it is hard to imagine a military response that would not result in 

severe economic repercussions for China. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. So Beijing should fully understand that 

if military force is used, they are facing military force in response 

and that they are also pushing the economic doomsday button for 

their whole economic prosperity? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I think a military move against Taiwan would 

come at tremendous cost for China, including economic costs, and 

their status in the international community, which I think they 

have worked hard to promote over the last couple of decades, I 

think they would risk near pariah status if they took aggressive action against Taiwan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right, well, let us note that those of us who 

have a feel about what is going on in Congress would suggest that 

if military force is used by the unelected Government in Beijing 

against the democratic people of Taiwan, that there would be a 

huge economic backlash or counterattack that would be sanctioned 

by votes of this Congress. There would be a huge economic price 

to pay that would destabilize all of the mainland, so they would not 

be just attacking Taiwan, they would be attacking their own country in a big way. 

Do we in any way expect the people of Taiwan, who have elected 

their free Government, to follow edicts issued by the Government 

in Beijing? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, I think the response to the anti-secession 

law is a good example, where it was universally received negatively 

by all parties. People took to the streets in large numbers on March 

26th and people voiced their views on this very clearly. So I expect 

that the people of Taiwan will be more interested in what their 

leadership and what their elected legislature will have to say on 

these matters. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the United States is not suggesting that 

the people of Taiwan have any responsibility to follow an edict that 

is issued to direct their actions, if that edict is issued in Beijing 

and not by their own elected representatives? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. We are more interested in what the President of 

Taiwan and what the legislature there have to say on these matters. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, so Beijing should understand that it 

can issue all of its edicts and it can talk about anti-secession laws 

all they want, but they are free to follow those laws themselves, 

but they cannot expect us to seriously think that the people of Taiwan or the people anywhere else in the world have to follow their 

dictates. 

If that is the case, is not declaring independence on the part of 

Taiwan nothing more than ink on a piece of paper or sound flowing 

through the air? Is it not the fact that the people of Taiwan are 

already acting as an independent entity? 

20

Mr. SCHRIVER. There is certainly a de facto status in Taiwan. 

They are self governing. They are a free people, a democracy, a free 

economy, free press, free religion, etc. There is certainly a de facto 

status that the people of Taiwan should be proud of and that we 

support in the United States and we are proud of what they have 

accomplished. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. There are political implications, of course, of the 

formal de jure declaration of independence and that is why the 

President and the Secretary and others have said we do not support the formal independence of Taiwan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, declaring something and making it 

other than—if all we are talking about is writing pieces of paper 

that say certain words or say things that send sounds through the 

air as compared to setting up a policy in which people must base 

their actions on edicts or decisions or laws that are passed on the 

mainland, I would say that there is no doubt in my mind that Taiwan is already independent and I do not know what the big hoopla 

is all about. 

I mean all we are talking about is what is going to be on a piece 

of paper, not the way people live their lives. And I would hate to 

think that the Government of Beijing, which is a non-elected Government run by people who are willing to suppress their opposition 

and throw Christians and felon gung members in jail, even when 

they are being raped and brutalized, not to step in to have a humane standard of activity there, that these same individuals have 

to understand that the people of Taiwan are not taking their orders 

now and are not going to take their orders in the future. And that 

instead, the people on the mainland should be pushing for democracy there, rather than trying to have the Beijing Government 

push the people of Taiwan into subjugation. Thank you very much, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much. We are finished with 

questions. Do you have any closing comments you would like to 

make, Secretary Schriver? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. No, sir. Thank you again for the opportunity to 

talk about these issues this morning. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, sir. We appreciate your service. 

Our next panel will be Dr. Shelley Rigger, who is the Brown Associate Professor of East Asian Politics, Department of Political 

Science, Davidson College; Dr. Thomas J. Christensen, who is Professor of Political and International Affairs at Princeton University; 

and Mr. John J. Tkacik, Jr., who is a Research Fellow in China 

Policy at the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation. 

We will hold a minute for the sounds to cease. We will begin with 

you, Dr. Rigger. Let me say first, without objection, all of your testimony will be placed fully in the record. You may proceed informally or formally. If possible, we would like to limit statements to 

5 minutes. Dr. Rigger. 

STATEMENT OF SHELLEY RIGGER, PH.D., BROWN ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR OF EAST ASIAN POLITICS, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE 

Ms. RIGGER. Thank you very much. It is——

21

Mr. LEACH. Excuse me, if I could ask you to pull the microphone 

a bit closer? 

Ms. RIGGER. Now it is activated. That should work better. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

Ms. RIGGER. Thanks. It is a great honor and pleasure to be here. 

As a number of speakers have already pointed out, just a few 

weeks ago relations between Taipei and Beijing seemed to be improving, with direct flights and a number of other positive developments. And therefore it was doubly disappointing when cross-Strait 

relations took this sharp turn for the worse in March, with the passage of the anti-secession law. As I think also has been pointed out 

very successfully in the first panel, the destructive consequences of 

the law are obvious, but I do not think that the anti-secession law 

necessarily will signal a return of cross-Strait tension. If the two 

sides handle the issue wisely, it may be possible to set aside this 

unhappy episode and move forward in a more positive and constructive direction. 

Still, reactions to the anti-secession law make it hard to avoid 

the judgment which also has been set forth already that the passage of this law was counterproductive. In Taiwan, it unified the 

public and political leaders across the spectrum in opposition to 

Beijing. On March 26th, hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese demonstrated for peace and against the law and pretty much all of Taiwan’s political leaders have spoken out against the law. 

So the anti-secession law, I think ultimately in Taiwan, fuels the 

perception that the PRC is hostile to the Government and to the 

people of Taiwan. And this will make it harder than ever for political leaders there to argue in favor of trusting Beijing and moving 

toward better cross-Strait relations, much less political unification. 

Given that the anti-secession law damaged relations between 

Beijing and Taipei and also between Beijing and Washington and 

Beijing and Brussels, one might well ask why did the PRC take 

this action? And I think there are three reasons and I am going 

to allude to two quickly and then go into more detail on the third 

one, since that is my area of expertise. 

The first reason for Beijing’s decision to proceed with the antisecession law was international politics. The anti-secession law underscores Beijing’s determination to prevent Taiwan from giving up 

on unification. And it puts the international community on notice 

that any country that encourages Taiwan to pursue a more independent course is taking a heavy risk. 

The second reason for the anti-secession law is PRC domestic 

politics. Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and other CCP leaders, see the 

anti-secession law as a way to demonstrate to the Chinese people 

and to their colleagues in the leadership of the Communist Party 

that this generation of leaders will take a hard line on Taiwan. 

The third reason for passing the anti-secession law was to send 

a message to Taiwan. And I think the message that was intended 

was a message of intimidation. Chinese leaders feel a need to intensify the pressure on Taiwan, both for long term and for short 

term reasons. In the long run, there is a perception in mainland 

China that Taiwan is moving away and the chances of unification 

are becoming slimmer all the time. 

22

President Chen Shui-bian’s re-election in March, 2004 quashed 

Beijing’s hope that his victory in 2000 was merely a fluke and did 

not necessarily represent a sort of irreversible trend in Taiwan’s 

public opinion. 

Then, more recently, the retreat from a strong pro-unification 

stance by the conservative parties in Taiwan, the Kuomintang and 

the People First Party, reinforced Beijing’s anxiety about where 

public opinion and state policy are headed. This anxiety, I think, 

to some extent is justified. Taiwan residents’ desire for unification 

is at a very low ebb. Surveys consistently show that fewer than 5 

percent of Taiwanese support immediate unification, but an even 

more worrying trend for Beijing is declining support for unification 

even in the distant future, a position that is now embraced by 

about 10 percent of Taiwanese. 

But this is not to say that a conflict between Taiwan and the 

PRC is inevitable. Most Taiwanese are actually agnostic on the 

question of the island’s long term future and ultimate relationship 

with mainland China. The percentage supporting independence in 

the short term is only a few percentage points higher than the percentage who support unification immediately, and only about 20 

percent say they want independence in the long run. So most people in Taiwan are still open to a variety of possibilities in terms 

of the long term outcome. 

However, Beijing’s repeated threats against Taiwan are eroding 

support for eventual unification and support for improved crossStrait relations. In the short run, I think Beijing’s leaders were motivated by concern that the December legislative elections in Taiwan would give President Chen a legislative majority to implement 

his platform, which Chinese Communist Party leaders firmly believe is a platform that would ideally move Taiwan quickly toward 

formal independence. So the timing of the anti-secession law is best 

explained by Beijing’s desire to have a weapon in place to use to 

prevent Chen from moving toward Taiwan independence, assuming 

he had gotten a legislative majority. 

But Beijing’s prediction turned out to be wrong. Not only did 

President Chen not get a majority, his opponents managed to hold 

onto their majority in the legislature. So instead of freeing Chen 

to act on his alleged radical ideas, which was what Beijing was 

worried about, the election actually forced President Chen to enter 

into a dialogue with his opponent. Chen’s behavior immediately 

after the election—including reaching out to James Soong, the leader of one of the opposition parties, and appointing a moderate from 

within his own party, the Democratic Progressive Party, Frank 

Hsieh, as Premier—suggests that Chen interpreted the election result as a rejection of political polarization and antagonism, both in 

the domestic round and in cross-Strait relations. 

So in view of these developments, the passage of the anti-secession law seems especially unnecessary and harmful. But the antisecession law need not be the beginning of the end in cross-Strait 

relations. If Taiwan’s Government handles this issue skillfully—

and to date, I think it has—the law could become an opportunity 

to strengthen relations with the PRC. The key will be for Taiwan’s 

leaders to resist the temptation to retaliate, while at the same time 

allowing Taiwan’s citizens to vent their emotions of fear, anger and 

23

injured pride. Resisting that temptation will require Taiwan’s politicians to forego an opportunity to use the anti-secession law to 

drum up political support, so it is a good thing there is not another 

major election in Taiwan for another several years. 

A second cause for cautious optimism, in my view, is the possibility that leaders in Beijing may be using the anti-secession law 

to pacify hardliners in their own Government in the hope of opening a space for a more relaxed approach to dialogue in negotiation 

with Taiwan. If the law buys the acquiescence of China’s hardliners 

in a more relaxed strategy for cross-Strait dialogue, it could end up 

being the groundwork for a new dialogue in the Taiwan Strait. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rigger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHELLEY RIGGER, PH.D., BROWN ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF

EAST ASIAN POLITICS, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE

Just a few weeks ago, in February 2005, relations between Taipei and Beijing 

seemed to be improving rapidly. China-watchers in the US saw evidence of progress 

unmatched since the early 1990s. Direct flights across the Taiwan Strait during the 

Chinese New Year holiday were the most visible of a number of positive developments in the Taiwan Strait. Other important events included the attendance of officials from the People’s Republic of China at the funeral of Taiwan’s long-time crossstrait negotiator, Koo Chen-fu, and a joint statement issued by Taiwan’s president, 

Chen Shui-bian, and a leading pro-unification politician, James Soong (Soong Chuyu), in which Chen reiterated a promise to eschew moves toward formal independence. Given these encouraging signs, observers in the US were disappointed when 

cross-strait relations took a sharp turn for the worse in March, after China’s National People’s Congress passed an anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan. 

The destructive consequences of the anti-secession law are obvious; however, the 

law need not signal a permanent return of cross-strait tensions. Although signs of 

improvement may be hard to see in the next few weeks, especially given the strong 

emotions the law has unleashed in Taiwan, if the two sides handle the issue wisely, 

it may be possible to set aside this unhappy episode and move relations in a more 

positive direction. As of early April, there is some evidence to suggest that both 

sides will, in fact, strive to transcend the damage wrought by the anti-secession law 

and return to a more positive mode of interaction. 

The reactions the anti-secession law has provoked outside the People’s Republic 

of China make it hard to avoid the judgment that the law was counterproductive:

• In Taiwan, it has unified the public and political leaders in opposition to Beijing. On March 26, hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese demonstrated for 

peace and against the law—including many who had never participated in 

such protests before. All of Taiwan’s leading politicians have criticized the 

law. In the long run, the anti-secession law will fuel the perception that 

China is hostile to Taiwan, which may make it harder than ever for leaders 

to argue in favor of trusting Beijing and moving toward better cross-strait relations—much less unification.

• In the US, the anti-secession law undermined Beijing’s claim that it is Taiwan—not the PRC—that seeks to change unilaterally the status quo in the 

Strait.

• Even in Europe, where defending Taiwan has less political currency than in 

the US, the anti-secession law turned an almost-certain PRC victory into an 

embarrassing defeat. Before the law was passed, the European Union was 

poised to lift its arms sales embargo—in place since the Tiananmen Crisis of 

1989—and begin allowing European weapons sales to the PRC. But the antisecession law played into the hands of the embargo’s defenders, who wondered how the EU could justify arming a country that was openly threatening 

to initiate military conflict against a neighbor. At least for the moment, opponents of weapons sales have won the day; further discussion of lifting the embargo has been postponed.

Given that the anti-secession law has damaged Beijing’s relations with Taipei, the 

Washington and Brussels, one might well ask, why did the PRC take this action? 

24

US analysts have suggested a number of explanations, each of which probably contributed to PRC leaders’ decision to some degree:

• International politics: The anti-secession law underscores Beijing’s determination to prevent Taiwan from giving up on unification entirely. In so doing, it 

indicates to the international community that any countries that encourage 

Taiwan to pursue a more independent course are taking a heavy risk. The 

world is put on notice that any government that assists Taiwan in improving 

its international status is encouraging a dangerous trend. Beijing also hopes 

that by using a legalistic process to signal its intentions, foreign governments—many of which have been urging China to pay more attention to 

law—will be compelled to respect its position.

• PRC domestic politics: Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and other top leaders in the 

Chinese Communist Party see the anti-secession law as a way to demonstrate 

to the Chinese people and to the rest of the political elite that this generation 

of leaders will take a hard line on the Taiwan issue. Among the CCP leadership, it is risky to appear too ‘‘soft’’ or flexible toward Taiwan. PRC politicians’ credibility depends on showing their comrades and compatriots that 

they are resolved never to ‘‘lose’’ Taiwan. The anti-secession law is a concrete 

action that Hu’s government can point to as proof that it is doing something 

about the issue.

• Cross-strait politics: Clearly, a central goal of the anti-secession law is to intimidate Taiwan. Chinese leaders feel a need to intensify the pressure on Taiwan for both short and long-term reasons: 

In the long run, there is a perception in mainland China that Taiwan is 

moving away, and the chances of unification are becoming slimmer. President 

Chen Shui-bian’s reelection quashed Beijing’s hope that his victory in the 

2000 election was a fluke. The result forced the mainland leadership to consider the possibility that Chen represented real and perhaps dominant preferences on the island. The retreat from a strong pro-unification stance by the 

Blue parties (the Kuomintang and People First Party) reinforced Beijing’s 

anxiety about where public opinion and state policy are heading in Taiwan. 

This anxiety is justified. Taiwan residents’ desire for unification is at a low 

ebb. Surveys conducted over the past five years consistently show that fewer 

than five percent of Taiwanese support immediate unification. A more worrying trend for Beijing is the declining support for unification in the distant 

future—a position embraced by barely ten percent of Taiwanese. This is not 

to say that a conflict between Taiwan and the PRC is inevitable. Most Taiwanese are agnostic on the question of the island’s long term future; the percentage supporting independence in the short term is only slightly higher 

than the percentage who support unification, and only about twenty percent 

say they want independence in the long term. However, Beijing’s repeated 

threats against Taiwan are helping to erode support for eventual unification. 

In the short run, Beijing’s leaders were worried about the December legislative elections in Taiwan. Their greatest fear was that the Green parties—

President Chen’s Democratic Progressive Party and former President Lee 

Teng-hui’s Taiwan Solidarity Union—would capture a legislative majority. 

That would give Chen legislative support to implement his preferred platform—which CCP leaders firmly believe includes strong action toward independence. Thus, the timing of the anti-secession law is best explained by Beijing’s desire to have a weapon in place that would be able to prevent Chen 

and the Greens from taking Taiwan toward independence immediately after 

the election. 

Beijing’s predictions turned out to be wrong. Not only did the Greens not 

get a majority, they were not even able to deny the Blue parties a majority. 

Instead of freeing Chen to act on his (alleged) radical ideas, the election 

forced the president to enter into a dialogue with the Blues. Chen’s behavior 

immediately after the election—including reaching out to appointing DPP 

moderate Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting) as his premier and encouraging direct New Year flights—suggests that he interpreted the election as a rejection 

of political polarization and antagonism, both domestically and in the crossstrait realm. In view of these developments, which ultimately led Chen to 

work toward bridging the gaps between political parties in Taiwan and between Taiwan and the PRC in January and February, the passage of the 

anti-secession law in March seems especially unnecessary and injurious.

Reviewing this history, it is easy to conclude that passage of the anti-secession 

law is a wholly negative event. Some have suggested that cross-strait relations can 

25

never recover from this blow. Is the anti-secession law another step on a downward 

spiral, leading inexorably toward military conflict? Or can something positive be 

salvaged from this episode? 

The anti-secession law need not be ‘‘the beginning of the end’’ in cross-strait relations. First, if Taiwan’s government handles the issue skillfully—and to date, it 

has—the anti-secession law could become an opportunity to strengthen relations 

with the PRC and with the international community. The key will be for Taiwan’s 

leaders to resist the temptation to retaliate in ways that escalate the conflict, while 

at the same time allowing Taiwanese citizens to vent their feelings of fear, anger 

and injured pride. Resisting that temptation will require Taiwan’s politicians to set 

aside the opportunity to use the anti-secession law to drum up political support. 

Fortunately, there are no major elections in Taiwan for three years, which diminishes the likelihood that the anti-secession law will become a political football. 

A second cause for cautious optimism is the possibility that leaders in Beijing may 

be using the anti-secession law to pacify hardliners in the PRC in the hope of opening a space for negotiations with Taiwan. For the past several years, cross-strait relations have been stymied by Beijing’s imposition of preconditions that President 

Chen refuses to meet—above all, the demand that Chen accept the ‘‘One China 

Principle.’’ Dialogue will begin when the two sides find a way to circumvent that 

roadblock. It may be that the anti-secession law is a fierce mask behind which a 

gentler face is lurking. If the law buys the acquiescence of China’s hardliners in a 

more relaxed strategy for cross-strait dialogue, it could go down in history as laying 

the groundwork for a new era in the Taiwan Strait.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. Dr. Christensen? 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, PH.D., PROFESSOR 

OF POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON 

UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today. It is an honor to speak with you today about Beijing’s adoption in March, 2005 of an anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan and 

the implications of that law for relations across the Taiwan Strait. 

My remarks today are based in part on my discussions with government officials and experts in Taipei, Shanghai and Beijing in 

January of this year. In my remarks, I will try to explain why Beijing adopted this law, a law which threatens Taiwan with ‘‘nonpeaceful’’ measures if Taiwan takes actions that seem to permanently preclude the prospect of unification between mainland 

China and Taiwan. 

Adoption of this law was understandably viewed as threatening 

and counterproductive in Taiwan, in the United States, and even 

in the European Union. What seems most puzzling about the law 

is its timing. The law occurred at a time when arguably Beijing’s 

diplomacy on issues related to Taiwan seemed relatively successful. 

For example, Beijing was satisfied with the results of Taiwan’s December, 2004 legislative elections. In those elections, traditionally 

pro-independence pan-Green candidates failed to achieve a majority 

in the legislature. 

Beijing was also generally satisfied with United States policy on 

the Taiwan issue in the months before passing the anti-secession 

law. During the election campaign in Taiwan, the Bush Administration publicly and consistently distanced itself from campaign 

rhetoric and policy proposals that seemed to support Taiwan independence. Mainland analysts actually believed this had an impact 

on the election and helped prevent the pan-Green candidates from 

achieving a majority. 

26

Finally, in cross-Strait relations, things seemed to be improving 

in the weeks after the Legislative Yuan elections in Taiwan. In 

January, the mainland and Taiwan were able to establish direct 

charter flights for celebration of the Chinese Lunar New Year. So 

why, at a time of reduced tension and relative success in Beijing’s 

diplomacy, did Beijing pass a law that threatened the use of force 

against Taiwan? The answer to this puzzle apparently lies in two 

key factors. 

One is long term strategic thinking in Beijing about trends in 

cross-Strait relations, dating back to late 2003 during President 

Chen’s re-election campaign. The second factor is domestic politics 

on Taiwan policy within China, and within the Chinese Communist 

Party in particular. 

In the year before the Legislative Yuan elections, there was severe pessimism in Beijing and growing pessimism in Beijing about 

political trends in Taiwan. In the eyes of mainland analysts, support for independence on the island seemed to be growing and 

President Chen Shui-bian seemed to have been re-elected on a platform that supported Taiwan independence. Mainland analysts 

feared that pro-independence parties would gain control of the legislature in the December, 2004 election. In a nutshell, existing 

mainland policy toward Taiwan seemed to be failing in China. 

Chinese Communist Party elites fear failure on Taiwan policy for 

straightforward reasons of national security and national prestige, 

but they also fear such a failure in Taiwan policy for reasons of domestic stability and regime stability in China. In the reform era, 

nationalism is more important to the legitimacy of the Chinese 

Communist Party than ever before. And the Chinese Communist 

Party elites fear that failure on emotional nationalist policies like 

policies toward Taiwan or policies toward Japan could lead to domestic criticism of the State and protest against the State that the 

leadership would have difficulty controlling. 

In this political atmosphere, individuals in the Chinese Communist Party, like President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, 

place a premium on protecting their image as defenders of Chinese 

national sovereignty and as tough proponents of effective policies 

toward Taiwan. 

The push for an anti-secession law then occurred at a time when 

pessimism was growing on the mainland and momentum for that 

law increased in the year 2004 as that pessimism about trends in 

Taiwan grew. In the lead up to the Legislative Yuan election, according to my interlocutors, the idea of an anti-secession law was 

first proposed to the National People’s Congress and some draft 

outline was distributed to the members of the National People’s 

Congress in preparation for their March, 2005 session. 

The expectation of many at the time in Beijing was that the panGreen alliance would win a majority in the legislative election. In 

what was a surprise to many in Beijing, the pan-Green alliance 

failed to gain such a majority, failed to get major gains in the December, 2004 election. And given this welcome outcome in Beijing, 

some in Beijing recognized that the time did not seem right for 

raising and reiterating threats against Taiwan, threats of military 

force, in particular. 

27

But all of my interlocutors in China, to a person, predicted that 

the law would pass in any case, regardless of the results of the 

Legislative Yuan elections in Taiwan. Their logic seemed to be that 

once the notion of an anti-secession law was floated in the National 

People’s Congress, no individual leader would risk his reputation 

as a strong nationalist by proposing withdrawal of the bill from the 

desks of the legislators. So, as they predicted, in March, 2005, the 

National People’s Congress passed the anti-secession law. 

What are the implications of the anti-secession law? Well, first 

of all, I think the law does not say anything fundamentally new 

about mainland policy toward Taiwan. The law does not raise any 

fundamentally new threats against Taiwan that have not been 

raised by the Beijing leadership in the past, and the National People’s Congress, the body that passed the law, lacks authority to 

make decisions about the use of force against Taiwan. 

The law includes more than just threats. It also includes several 

moderate and constructive elements about increasing contacts 

across the Taiwan Strait and about promising equal status for Taiwan in political negotiations across the Taiwan Strait. Those constructive and moderate elements themselves are not particularly 

new. 

Moreover, despite these moderate passages, it was natural for 

people in Taiwan and Washington and the European Union to 

focus on the threatening aspects of the law. Adoption of the law 

certainly put an end to a recent warming of relations across the 

Taiwan Strait in the period between the legislative elections and 

passage of the law but, as Dr. Rigger pointed out, adoption of the 

law has not yet led to a spiral in relations across the Taiwan 

Strait. 

The large protest rally on March 26 in Taiwan, protesting the existence of the anti-secession law, was relatively low-key and very 

peaceful. At the rally, President Chen wisely resisted making public speeches that might increase tensions across the Taiwan Strait. 

I personally believe the United States has played an important role 

in preventing a downward spiral in relations across the Taiwan 

Strait, following the adoption of the anti-secession law. 

Washington has appropriately criticized the law as unhelpful and 

as a source of tensions across the Strait. It has also encouraged 

Beijing to show more flexibility and accommodation toward Taiwan’s Government in order to encourage cross-Strait dialogue and 

exchanges. But the Bush Administration was wise, in my opinion, 

to avoid exaggerating the novelty or the importance of the law 

itself. For example, to my knowledge, United States officials have 

avoided labelling the law itself as a ‘‘unilateral change in the status quo’’ across the Taiwan Strait. Such a label would be inaccurate in my opinion, but more important, it might be seen as a 

green light for people in Taiwan who wanted to use the anti-secession law as an opportunity to adopt provocative countermeasures 

such as an anti-annexation law proposed by certain government officials in Taiwan before the anti-secession law was passed. 

Such countermeasures could increase tensions across the Taiwan 

Strait and could even spark a military conflict across the Taiwan 

Strait. So in my opinion, especially since Spring, 2002, the Bush 

Administration has consistently adopted a balanced approach toVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
28

1 Article eight of the law offers three rather vaguely specified conditions that might trigger 

‘‘non-peaceful measures’’ toward Taiwan. Those conditions all refer to pro-independence political 

activities on the island that would seem to create legal independence from China for the island, 

move Taiwan sharply in the direction of such legal independence, or permanently preclude any 

prospect of peaceful unification between the mainland and Taiwan. 2 A full English translation of the law can be found in the March 14, 2005 edition of China 

Daily. 

ward relations across the Taiwan Strait that has enhanced peace 

and stability. It has actively opposed the mainland’s threat of force 

against Taiwan through offers of arms sales and increased defense 

coordination with the Taiwan military. At the same time, it has 

consistently opposed provocative policies on Taiwan that threaten 

the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. 

In my opinion, this balanced approach serves United States interests in both Taiwan and the mainland. Thank you again, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much. Mr. Tkacik is a Research Fellow in China Policy, Asian Studies Center and the Heritage Foundation. Mr. Tkacik, you may proceed. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christensen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL

AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for inviting me to testify today. I am honored to have the opportunity to speak to 

you about Beijing’s adoption of an anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan. 

In my remarks I will offer my analysis of why the law was adopted in March 2005 

despite recent improvements in relations across the Taiwan Strait. I will also discuss how the law might affect relations across the Taiwan Strait, and what challenges lie ahead for U.S. policy toward Taiwan and mainland China. Some of my 

comments will be based on interviews with government and academic experts on a 

research trip to Taiwan, Shanghai, and Beijing in January of this year. 

A PUZZLE: WHY DID BEIJING ADOPT THE ANTI-SECESSION LAW WHEN RELATIONS ACROSS

THE TAIWAN STRAIT APPEARED TO BE IMPROVING?

The adoption of the Anti-Secession law in March 2005, particularly its timing, 

provides a puzzle for analysis of relations between Taiwan and mainland China. The 

law added very little, if anything, new to Beijing’s publicly stated policies toward 

Taiwan. So, it is not entirely clear what exactly Beijing gains by its passage. Moreover, passage of the law carried costs. The law created negative reactions in Taiwan, 

the United States, and the European Union, where observers understandably focused on the portions of the law that threatened Taiwan with ‘‘non-peaceful’’ measures if the government in Taipei were to move the island toward permanent political 

separation from the Chinese mainland. What is most puzzling of all, the law was 

passed at a time when Beijing seemed to be making some progress in its diplomacy 

toward Taiwan, the United States, and the European Union on issues related to 

cross-Strait relations. The law then seemed like the wrong measure at the wrong 

time. 

The Law Offers Little that Is Fundamentally New 

The anti-secession law threatens Taiwan with ‘‘non-peaceful’’ measures if Taipei 

takes actions that create either the trappings of legal independence or conditions 

that would permanently preclude peaceful unification across the Taiwan Strait. On 

this score, the anti-secession law says nothing new. Beijing has long held out the 

prospect of the use of force against Taiwan for these reasons. The Anti-Secession 

Law merely repeats these threats, albeit in a high profile manner.1 The law, which 

was passed by the National People’s Congress (NPC), explicitly states that decisions 

for the use of force will ultimately be made by the State Council and Central Military Commission.2 So it is not clear how passage of the law in the NPC really 

makes the threat of force seem any more compelling than it would have been without the passage of such a law. 

The law is not simply a series of threats. Indeed the law contains several moderate and potentially positive elements. These more accommodating sections themVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
29

3 According to pan-Blue and pan-Green members alike in Taiwan, Washington’s cold response 

to Chen’s rhetoric from October through December 2004 dissuaded swing voters from supporting 

pan-Green candidates at the polls. Many, it is believed, simply refused to vote. Turnout was 6–

7% lower than pan-Green campaign managers had anticipated. 4The PRC floated the idea of an anti-secession law with Bush Administration leaders in early 

January 2005 during a trip by Director Chen Yunlin of the PRC State Council’s Taiwan Affairs 

Office. 

selves, however, are not fundamentally new. Rather, they repeat Beijing’s oft-stated 

goal of ‘‘peaceful unification’’ across the Taiwan Strait. As Beijing has done in the 

past, the law encourages increased economic, cultural, and social contacts with Taiwan for the purpose of promoting such an outcome. Beijing continues to hold out 

the prospect of political talks across the Taiwan Strait but reiterates that peaceful 

unification is Beijing’s ultimate goal in such talks and that this goal can only be 

accomplished through Taiwan’s acceptance of the ‘‘one China’’ principle. In what 

might be its most moderate passage, the anti-secession law promises equal status 

for the mainland and Taiwan in negotiations. This promise reiterates a relatively 

flexible formulation offered by Vice-Premier Qian Qichen three years ago. Treating 

Taiwan and the mainland as equal parts of one China is preferred by many in Taiwan to the PRC’s traditional ‘‘one country, two systems’’ formula. That formula is 

rejected across the political spectrum in Taiwan and is conspicuous in its absence 

in the anti-secession law. 

Why the Anti-Secession Law is a source of tension, not stability 

Regardless of these more moderate sections of the law, it is natural for people on 

Taiwan and elsewhere to focus on the threatening aspects of the law. This is particularly true given the apparent relaxation in cross-Strait relations in the weeks 

before the law’s passage. In this sense, perhaps the most negative aspect of the antisecession law is simply its adoption at a time when cross-Strait relations seemed 

to be thawing and political trend lines on the island seemed to be moving in the 

mainland’s favor. 

In the Legislative elections in Taiwan in December 2004 traditionally pro-independence or ‘‘pan-Green’’ parties failed to gain a majority in the Legislative Yuan. 

Many in Taiwan, the United States, and Beijing had predicted that the pan-Green 

alliance would prevail over the ‘‘pan-Blue’’ parties, who are proponents of more accommodating policies toward the mainland and who generally oppose constitutional 

changes that touch upon sovereignty issues. So the maintenance of a pan-Blue majority in the Legislative Yuan was a pleasant surprise for Beijing. The election results were considered particularly important in Beijing because constitutional revisions are scheduled for Taiwan in 2005–2008. Moreover, following the elections in 

Taiwan, in January 2005 the mainland and Taiwan reached agreement on direct 

cross-Strait charter flights for the Chinese New Year. So, it seemed that there was 

somewhat of a thaw in cross-Strait relations precisely when the offending law was 

passed. 

The law was also passed at a time when it appeared that Washington was acting 

to restrain pro-independence forces on Taiwan. The United States had publicly 

distanced itself from various statements and actions of President Chen Shui-bian 

during the legislative election campaign in late 2004. This policy was apparently 

quite effective. One popular explanation in both Taiwan and the mainland for the 

pan-Green parties’ difficulties in the Legislative Yuan election was that the Bush 

Administration publicly critiqued President Chen’s actions during the campaign. 

The strain that President Chen’s campaign rhetoric was putting on U.S.-Taiwan relations apparently alienated moderate swing voters in Taiwan from pan-Green candidates.3 So, Beijing had real reason to be pleased with recent developments not 

only in Taiwan politics but also in U.S.–PRC relations on the Taiwan issue. Despite 

these developments, Beijing adopted a law that CCP elites knew in advance would 

be seen in a very negative light in Washington and Taipei.4

Finally, before the anti-secession law was passed, the European Union seemed 

poised to end its embargo on arms sales to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

Lifting of the embargo was already a controversial issue inside Europe, especially 

because of pressure by the Bush Administration and the United States Congress to 

maintain the embargo. Some Europeans apparently were prepared to lift the embargo in part because they did not treat seriously the prospect of cross-Strait military 

conflict. By publicly reminding the world of the PRC’s willingness to adopt ‘‘nonpeaceful’’ measures to prevent Taiwan’s permanent separation from the mainland, 

Beijing tipped the political balance in Europe on the question of the embargo, thereby keeping it in place at least for the time being. 

For all of these reasons, then, the anti-secession law seems like the wrong measure at the wrong time. This is true regardless of whether or not one finds the docuVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
30

ment to be relatively moderate compared to previous threats against Taiwan. Why, 

then, did the Chinese Communists insist on adopting the law in March 2005? 

SOLVING THE PUZZLE: BEIJING’S LONG-TERM STRATEGIC THINKING, DOMESTIC POLITICS, 

AND THE UNSTOPPABLE MOMENTUM BEHIND THE ANTI-SECESSION LAW IN EARLY 2005

Since late 2003 the new PRC leadership under President Hu Jintao has been 

searching for a more effective way to halt or reverse what they believed were longterm political trends on Taiwan moving in the direction of Taiwan independence. 

There was frustration in Beijing that President Chen Shui-bian, former President 

Lee Teng-hui, and their respective pro-independence parties seemed to be gaining 

in popularity in Taiwan despite an increase in cross-Strait economic interdependence and a fast-paced build-up in the coercive military options available to the PRC. 

It was feared that many in Taiwan saw the mainland as a ‘‘paper tiger’’ and that 

one reason was that the mainland under President Jiang Zemin had been insufficiently pro-active in trying to shape the political environment in cross-Strait relations. Since he accepted the Presidency in March 2003 President Hu Jintao has fostered an image of pragmatism and effectiveness. His lack of experience on national 

security issues and his weak links to the military make it all the more important 

that he appear pro-active and relatively tough on Taiwan policy. 

Avoiding failure on the Taiwan issue is considered critically important in Beijing 

not only for reasons of straightforward national security but also for the domestic 

political stability of the regime. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the CCP 

has portrayed itself as the only modern government that has enabled China to stand 

up to both external invaders and domestic forces bent on dividing the nation. The 

relative importance of this nationalist message grew in the 1980s and 1990s as 

other ideological messages about Maoist class struggle fell by the wayside in the reform era. In China no one seems to believe in communism any longer. Problems of 

corruption, income gaps between rich and poor, and environmental degradation all 

exacerbate the CCP elites’ concerns about domestic stability and regime legitimacy. 

In such a domestic environment, one major concern of top leaders in China is the 

potentially explosive nature of Chinese nationalism on certain emotional issues related to China’s ‘‘century of humiliation.’’ At the top of this list of emotional issues 

are the PRC’s relations with Taiwan and Japan, two policy issues on which Chinese 

elites are loath to appear weak and overly accommodating. 

The fear within the CCP is not simply of inciting a spontaneous nationalist outburst against the government if Taiwan policy fails, but also of providing a highprofile political opportunity to segments of society already upset with the government for purely domestic reasons. Perceived failure on Taiwan policy could allow 

such groups to mobilize themselves against the government for allegedly patriotic 

reasons. Such protests could provide real challenges to the government, especially 

if elements of the civilian and military leadership were sympathetic to the 

protestors and angry at the top leaders for failing to defend national sovereignty 

and honor. The government does not want to find itself cracking down on explicitly 

patriotic movements that employ nationalistic slogans originally fostered by the government itself. Having attended the Asian Cup Soccer Final between Japan and 

China in Beijing in August 2004 and having witnessed the incredibly large number 

of police and paramilitary forces sent preemptively to the stadium to keep the peace, 

I believe the stated concerns of Chinese elites regarding fears of popular nationalism 

are likely sincere. They are probably not just arguments tactically deployed for foreign consumption. 

The political transition in China may only intensify the perceived need for a tough 

policy toward Taiwan. Since maintaining domestic stability and improving China’s 

image abroad are core security goals of the Chinese Communist Party as a corporate 

whole, individual leaders will likely try to protect their reputations for vigilance and 

toughness on these issues within the Party, especially during the transition. Since 

Hu Jintao does not have a proven track record of dealing with national security 

issues, it is particularly important for him to demonstrate strength and effectiveness 

on this issue as he consolidates his power. 

According to my Chinese interlocutors in my January 2005 interviews, the idea 

of passing an anti-secession Law or a pro-unification law first gained real momentum in late 2003, during President Chen Shui-bian’s re-election campaign in Taiwan. During that campaign President Chen suggested that he would rewrite the Republic of China’s constitution in his second term, perhaps gaining approval for the 

new constitution by popular referendum. Especially given President Chen’s statements regarding Taiwan’s sovereign independence from mainland China, there was 

concern in Beijing (and in Washington) that the constitutional revision process and 

31

5See ‘‘Daily Press Briefing,’’ U.S. State Department, December 6, 2004, at http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/39460.htm. 

future referenda might touch upon issues related to Taiwan’s sovereign status in relation to the mainland and, thereby, spark a cross-Strait conflict. 

Mainland analysts became even more concerned when President Chen prevailed 

with just over 50% of the vote in that controversial March 2004 election. Although 

his majority was razor thin, it was still an improvement over the plurality that won 

him election in 2000 in a three-way race. Chen seemed to be getting more popular 

even as his platform seemingly became more oriented toward Taiwan independence. 

Despite a rather moderate and conciliatory inaugural speech in May, mainland analysts remained very wary of President Chen during summer 2004. Their concern 

would only grow later in the year when he seemed again to promote sovereign independence from mainland China in his public statements on the Republic of China’s 

National Day (October 10). President Chen’s statements in the weeks leading up to 

the December 11, 2004 Legislative Yuan elections were more pointed still. By stating energetically that ‘‘Taiwan is Taiwan’’ and proposing name changes for stateowned enterprises and Taipei’s representative offices abroad, President Chen 

seemed dedicated to winning a ‘‘pan-Green’’ majority in the Legislative Yuan by appealing to pro-independence sentiments. 

What was worse from their perspective, mainland analysts expected Chen to succeed in this campaign. The expectation of many analysts in Beijing in late 2004 was 

that the pan-Green candidates would likely gain many seats in the Legislative Yuan 

elections. It appeared that pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan was gaining momentum just as Taiwan moved into the process of revising the constitution in the 

period 2005–2008. Elites in Beijing believed, therefore, that they would need to 

make a political statement about their dedication to deterring Taiwan independence 

and promoting peaceful unification. According to my mainland interlocutors, it was 

in this strategic and domestic context in autumn 2004 that CCP leaders first circulated a draft outline for an anti-secession law to the thousands of National People’s Congress (NPC) representatives. 

The outcome of the December Legislative Yuan elections was a pleasant surprise 

for many PRC analysts. The Taiwan public showed more caution about President 

Chen’s agenda than they had expected. As did many of their counterparts in Taiwan, mainland analysts credited as a major contributor to the electoral outcome the 

Bush Administration’s public distancing of itself from President Chen’s campaign 

rhetoric and policy proposals. For example, just days before the Legislative Yuan 

elections, the Bush Administration criticized the proposals for ‘‘rectifying’’ the 

names of Taipei’s representative offices and state-owned enterprises as unwelcome 

‘‘unilateral changes to the status quo.’’ 5 That term has become the Administration’s 

catch-phrase for destabilizing provocations in cross-Strait relations. 

Given the results of the Legislative Yuan elections and the perceived U.S. role in 

bringing that result to fruition, some Chinese interlocutors in January seemed to 

recognize that the situation across the Taiwan Strait was more relaxed and that the 

timing for an anti-secession Law was no longer right. In fact, some recognized that 

the law might prove to be counterproductive if adopted this year. To a person, however, the mainland analysts predicted correctly that a law would be passed anyway. 

Because the draft outlines had been distributed before the Legislative Yuan elections, for domestic political reasons, the anti-secession law’s train had left the station. Mainland interlocutors posited that no CCP leader would want to be the one 

who proposed pulling the bill off the legislators’ desks, regardless of the Taiwan 

election’s outcome. Such a person would risk being seen as ineffective and weak on 

the Taiwan issue. 

HOW WILL THE LAW AFFECT CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS AND CHINA’S FOREIGN

RELATIONS?

In addition to encouraging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on 

China, the adoption of the law created negative reactions for Beijing in both the 

United States and Taiwan. The brief progress in relations between Taipei and Beijing symbolized by the direct charter flights for Spring Festival has apparently been 

halted. To date, however, there has been no intense spiral of tensions resulting from 

adoption of the law. In my opinion this is due in large part to the restraint shown 

by Washington and the moderation of President Chen himself in the face of domestic and international pressure to avoid escalating the conflict. 

Washington was publicly quite critical of the law but remained relatively measured in its response. To the best of my knowledge, Bush Administration officials 

have avoided calling the passage of the law a ‘‘unilateral change in the status quo’’ 

32

across the Taiwan Strait. Instead the Administration criticized Beijing for raising 

tensions and for failing to seize on clear near-term opportunities to deepen crossStrait cooperation and contacts. By criticizing the law, Washington expressed its 

disappointment in what was clearly a setback in cross-Strait relations. It also made 

clear its hope that Beijing might adopt more positive actions to improve cross-Strait 

relations. By eschewing overly dramatic language in response to the law the Bush 

Administration avoided sending signals of encouragement to those on Taiwan who 

saw the passage of the anti-secession law as an opportunity to adopt provocative 

counter-measures that could ratchet up cross-Strait tensions. For example, in January and February some elites in Taipei had floated the idea of responding to an 

anti-secession law by adopting an ‘‘anti-annexation’’ law passed by popular referendum. Depending on its wording and the political context in which it was passed, 

an anti-annexation law might cross a mainland red-line regarding legal manifestations of independence or permanent legal impediments to peaceful unification. In my 

opinion, Washington was wise to avoid words and actions that might encourage such 

a response in Taipei. 

To his own credit, President Chen has shown real moderation and leadership in 

his measured response to the law. Although Beijing predictably expressed its annoyance about the event, the protest march against the Anti-secession law in Taiwan 

on March 26 was peaceful and relatively low-key. Although he participated in the 

protest march, President Chen made no speech. He thereby resisted the temptation 

to make high-profile statements regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty that might have exacerbated cross-Strait tensions further. 

Challenges remain on the near-term horizon, however. The visit to Beijing of a 

high-level entourage of the opposition KMT in the past week might seem a positive 

gesture toward Taiwan on Beijing’s part. However, the selective reaching out to one 

of the pan-Blue opposition parties and not to the members of President Chen’s government or his party might only increase tensions between Taipei and Beijing. Such 

an approach by Beijing might only further polarize Taiwan politics by encouraging 

President Chen and other members of the pan-Green parties to attack the KMT for 

selling out the country by appeasing the Chinese Communists. Such attacks could 

easily intensify as we approach the election of the National Assembly on May 14. 

At this early date it is still too soon to judge how the KMT–CCP meetings will affect 

politics in Taiwan and across the Taiwan Strait. 

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE

Especially since early 2002 Washington’s policies toward cross-Strait relations 

have been quite constructive and quite successful in limiting the likelihood of conflict across the Taiwan Strait. The Bush Administration has found a balanced approach between deterring mainland aggression against Taiwan on the one hand and 

dissuading Taiwan’s leaders from adopting policies that might provoke an otherwise 

avoidable conflict on the other. Washington’s policies have apparently not only affected the thinking of elites in Beijing and Taipei, but also the domestic context in 

which leaders in Taiwan must operate. 

Finding this balance in U.S. foreign policy is not always easy and there will likely 

be many new challenges in the near future. In my opinion, in response to the recent 

KMT–CCP meetings, the United States should encourage Beijing to expand its outreach to the Taiwan government and to the ruling party in Taiwan, rather than just 

opposition parties. At the same time, the United States should discourage President 

Chen from responding to the meetings between KMT and CCP officials by promoting provocative policies toward the mainland. 

In deterring the PRC from the use of force against Taiwan, Washington faces a 

challenge in balancing the two necessary aspects of any deterrence policy: credible 

threats of effective intervention if the target of the deterrent threat acts belligerently and credible assurances that the target’s core interests will not be harmed 

if it refrains from belligerence. With a fast-paced increase in the military capacity 

of the PRC to coerce Taiwan, the United States has responded with offers of arms 

sales to Taiwan and increased defense coordination with the military in Taiwan. 

Such policies are generally appropriate, but they carry an unintended cost, especially given trends in Taiwan politics in the past several years. Many elites in Beijing tend to view these U.S. policies, especially increased defense coordination, as 

political signals that promote Taiwan independence by suggesting unconditional 

U.S. support to Taiwan. In other words these policies undercut the assurance part 

of the deterrence equation even as they bolster the credibility of threats of intervention. By publicly and repeatedly stating that the United States does not support Taiwan independence and by criticizing certain proposals by Taipei as unilateral 

changes in the status quo that are unwelcome in Washington, the United States 

33

helps reduce the political controversy regarding its defense policies toward Taiwan 

and thereby bolsters assurances that the goal of those defense policies is not to promote Taiwan independence. By balancing threats and assurances as part of its deterrence policy, Washington helps enhance Taiwan’s security, avoids an unnecessary 

and avoidable great power conflict in the Asia-Pacific, and furthers American interests in peace, stability, and democracy in East Asia.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN J. TKACIK, JR., RESEARCH FELLOW 

IN CHINA POLICY, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE 

FOUNDATION 

Mr. TKACIK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of 

the Committee. It is an honor and a privilege to be here. My name 

is John Tkacik and I am a former foreign service officer with 24 

years in the government serving in Taipei, Peking, Hong Kong and 

Guanzhou. 

I have been watching Taiwan affairs and China affairs for the 

last 30 years pretty consistently and this anti-secession law, I 

would say, it was a shock but it was more than that. It was, to me, 

proof positive that the Chinese Government is abandoning its socalled fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification. Article 8, in particular, simply outlines a vague ‘‘casus belli’’ for taking ‘‘non-peaceful’’ action against Taiwan. It does not define any of 

the red lines to me, and I think to anybody that looks at the text 

of the law, it fails to define for anybody what the red lines are for 

Taiwan. 

In effect, this means that the Chinese Government reserves unto 

itself the privilege of deciding when and where it should attack 

Taiwan without notification, without any warning, without provocation. To me, the anti-secession law also reveals a dangerous 

weakness in our current China policy in America’s China policy. 

The reason is because our policy is based on a pretense. Very early 

in the United States-China relationship, both sides realized that 

they could not sustain a cooperative strategic partnership against 

the Soviet Union if each side insisted that the other side foreswear 

core tenets of its foreign policy. 

From 1971 through 1989, United States-China relations had 

been built on an unspoken but very real understanding that enabled both sides to ignore the paramount conflict in their essential 

interests. 

And it was an understanding based on pretense: China pretends 

to have a policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan, and in return, the United States pretends to have a one-China policy. 

Since 1989, however, the Chinese have steadily dropped their 

pretense, but have suffered no consequences. The lack of a substantial reaction from the United States commensurate with China’s 

behavior, I think, has encouraged China to continue and, indeed, 

ratchet up both military preparations, their bellicose rhetoric and 

their political, economic and social pressures against Taiwan. 

The Congress of the United States, I think, was clearly frustrated early on by the fact that this understanding was unspoken, 

and Congress insisted in a very profound and direct way in the Taiwan Relations Act that it be clarified. Section 2b, subsection 3 says:

‘‘It is the policy of the United States to make clear that the 

United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with 

34

the People’s Republic of China rests on the expectation that 

the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.’’

President Reagan was equally perplexed by the bureaucracy’s 

aversion to spelling out this linkage and, in August 1982, he issued 

a confidential Presidential Directive to the bureaucracy which stated, and I quote:

‘‘The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan’’—

that is, under the terms of the August 1982 communique—‘‘is 

conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of 

China to a peaceful solution of Taiwan PRC differences. It 

should be clearly understood that the linkage between these 

two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.’’

Mr. Chairman, let me spell out here one of the problems that I 

have with our policy. For the 20 years from 1972 to 1992, the 

grand organizing principle of the United States-China relationship 

had been an alignment against the Soviet Union and basically 

nothing more. Unfortunately, our China policy since 1993 has not 

reflected the reality of the collapse of the Soviet Union, nor has 

anyone attempted to insist that it be based on at least some kind 

of definable core elements. 

Let me repeat to you the core elements of U.S. foreign policy that 

Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly presented to this House 

a year ago on April 21, 2004. Three of his core elements were ‘‘our 

one-China policy,’’ and I put that in quotes, ‘‘our one-China policy.’’ 

The second one was our opposition to unilateral change in the Taiwan Strait, ‘‘the status quo as we define it.’’ And finally, our nonsupport of Taiwan independence. 

Unfortunately, these three core elements have literally no substance in the sense that none of them is defined. Let me read to 

you how Secretary Kelly defined our one-China policy last year. He 

said:

‘‘The definition of one-China is something that we could go on 

for much too long for this event. In my testimony, I made the 

point of our one-China and I did not really define it. I am not 

sure I could easily define it.’’

But then he went on to say:

‘‘I will tell you what it is not. It is not the one-China principle 

that Beijing suggests.’’

The second core element is ‘‘the status quo as we define it.’’ Well, 

the fact is that we have never defined the status quo in the Taiwan 

Strait. 

And finally, the third core element is our non-support for Taiwan 

independence. Well, I am not sure exactly what that means, but for 

33 years, since 1972, the United States has sold tens of billions of 

dollars in defense articles and services to Taiwan. And if it is not 

for helping Taiwan maintain its separation from Communist 

China, I do not know what it is. 

Unfortunately, if you have a policy that is based on no substance, 

you do not have a policy that can work. It is to the Bush Administration’s credit, however, that it is finally doing something to confront the challenge of the anti-secession law. 

35

I will not go into my whole presentation on this. Let me just say 

that there are several ways that Congress could remedy the flaws 

in our U.S. policy. 

One, I think, is to require our policy to be defined, recognizing 

that a problem exists, that we do not have a defined policy, is a 

first step toward finding a solution. I think in its oversight role, 

Congress should insist that the Administration actually define its 

Taiwan policy. This does not necessarily mean that Congress 

should force the Administration into a public enuciation of the policy toward Taiwan that directly antagonizes Beijing. But at the 

very least, the Administration should be required to develop internal terms of reference for Taiwan. 

For instance, what exactly is the ‘‘status quo’’ in the Taiwan 

Strait that we do not want changed? What is ‘‘our one-China policy’’? And again, if we do not support Taiwan’s continued separation from China, a separation that has already lasted for 107 of the 

last 110 years, then why has Congress mandated in the Taiwan 

Relations Act that it is our policy to maintain the capacity of the 

United States to resist the use of force against Taiwan? 

The second thing that Congress should do is insist that the linkage be maintained. President Ronald Reagan’s ‘‘permanent imperative’’ of a linkage between China’s peaceful policy toward Taiwan 

and our support for Taiwan’s defense, and hence, its continued separation from China, is clearly in America’s interest. Therefore, any 

step Beijing takes that casts a cloud over its so-called peaceful policy must be matched by a concomitant United States step in support of Taiwan’s democracy. 

I agree with my colleagues here that it probably makes little 

sense for Taiwan to overreact to China’s anti-separation law. But 

it certainly makes eminent sense for the United States to react to 

it. 

The Congress itself could take some action. How many of you 

have heard Chinese diplomats say, ‘‘Don’t worry about the anti-secession law, because it only spells out existing policy’’? Well, perhaps the time has come to resurrect the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act which passed this House 341 to 70 on February 1, 2000. 

Because, after all, that law only ‘‘summarized existing policy.’’ I, 

myself, am personally fond of President Ronald Reagan’s ‘‘Six Assurances’’ to Taiwan in 1982, because they were already a part of 

existing United States policy. I think a future House Resolution 

would be very effective in countering future Chinese actions that 

might challenge the stability and peace of the Taiwan Strait, a 

House Resolution that would enshrine the six assurances. 

And finally, I think the House must demand a strategy from the 

Administration. It is the Cheshire Cat’s first dictum that if you do 

not know where you are going, then any road will take you there. 

And if the United States has no idea what it wants from China or 

Taiwan or what kind of China or Taiwan it wants to see in 5 or 

10 or 25 years, let alone 50 years, then it does not matter what 

policies the United States applies today. 

But as Dr. Condoleezza Rice wrote in Foreign Affairs over 5 

years ago, ‘‘China is not a status quo power, but one that would 

like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor.’’ This assessment, I think, is valid today and it makes it absolutely essential 

36

1See Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio [378 US 184 (1964)] 

that the United States understand what its own strategic interests, 

goals and objectives are in Asia and define the strategy and a path 

on how to get there. 

In 1946, President Truman instructed General Marshall that a 

strong, stable, unified and democratic China is in the interests of 

the United States and in the utmost interest of world peace. And 

I would submit that we now have three out of four. A strong, stable 

and unified China, but three out of four is not good enough. Thank 

you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tkacik follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN J. TKACIK, JR., RESEARCH FELLOW IN CHINA

POLICY, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

CHINA’S ANTI-SECESSION LAW AND DEVELOPMENTS ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is an honor and privilege to appear 

before you today to discuss China’s recently-enacted ‘‘Anti-Separation Law’’ (also 

called the ‘‘Anti-Secession Law’’), its impact on relations between China and Taiwan, 

and implications for the United States. I apologize that my prepared remarks are 

so lengthy. I will try to keep my oral presentation short, but I ask that the written 

presentation be entered in the record. 

I am testifying here today as an individual scholar and citizen, and my views do 

not necessarily reflect the views of my employer, The Heritage Foundation. 

Introduction: Slogans of China Policy 

The sudden emergence of China’s ‘‘Anti-Separation Law’’ this past December was 

a surprise because, even by Chinese standards, it was unnecessary. Just six days 

before its announcement, legislative elections in Taiwan reflected waning political 

sentiment on the island for constitutional reforms affecting Taiwan’s de jure status 

as the Republic of China. That China went ahead and initiated a ‘‘legislative’’ process to put this law on the books was a clear indication that China has moved away 

from its ‘‘fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification’’ and toward a posture of military threat to Taiwan. It is a development that reveals a dangerous 

weakness in our current China policy—it rests on slogans that have no substance. 

Let me explain. Three core elements of America’s China policy are:

1) ‘‘Our One China Policy’’;

2) our opposition to unilateral change in Taiwan Strait’s ‘‘status quo as we define it;’’ and

3) our ‘‘non-support’’ of Taiwan independence.

These three core elements literally have no substance in the sense that none of 

them is defined anywhere in the official lexicon of American diplomacy. And insofar 

as anyone has any idea about what they really mean—their meaning has no relationship to the actual words that U.S. policy-makers use to describe those elements. 

Consequently, when confronted by actions, either by China or Taiwan that tend 

to annoy or upset the other, no American Administration has possessed a coherent 

policy framework within which to manage the controversy. Over the years, this lack 

of coherence has had the unfortunate effect of confusing both the President and the 

Congress. Our China policy has become an impressionistic fabric similar to Justice 

Potter Stewart’s view of pornography, that is, ‘‘. . . I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly 

doing so. But I know it when I see it...1

In my testimony today, let me focus on the vaporous nature of our China policy, 

if one can indeed call it a ‘‘policy’’, for to do so would invest it with a level of thought 

that is entirely absent. And then let me discuss the reasons most people are upset 

by Beijing’s Anti-Separation Law. Finally, let me propose some remedies to the situation that Congress might wish to pursue. 

A Policy of Non-definition 

Since the end of the Second World War, it has been the official policy of the 

United States Government that the post-World War II status of Taiwan is ‘‘an unsettled question subject to future international resolution’’. Taiwan was a former colVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
37

2See Memorandum from the Department of State Legal Advisor [L/EA—Robert I. Starr] to 

the Director of the Office of Republic of China Affairs [Charles T. Sylvester], dated July 13, 

1971, Subject: Legal Status of Taiwan. This memorandum is reprinted in John J. Tkacik, ed. 

Rethinking One China, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. November 2004, page 181. 3 James Kelly, ‘‘The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next Twenty-Five Years,’’ testimony before the 

Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 40, at 

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa93229.000/hfa93229l0f.htm. 4 Randy Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Briefing for 

the Foreign Press Center, U.S. State Department, Washington, DC, November 20, 2003, at 

http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/26534.htm.

ony of the Empire of Japan to which Japan abjured in the document of surrender 

all ‘‘right, title and claim’’ in perpetuity.2 This remains the policy of the United 

States Government to this day, except that constant repetition of the phrase ‘‘one 

China policy’’ has given America’s political leaders, in both the Congress and the 

Executive, the vague impression that somehow the United States formally recognizes that Taiwan is a part of China. 

Compounding the confusion is the Administration’s resolute refusal to be clear on 

the matter (and this is not just a problem with the present Administration, but with 

all previous ones dating back to President Nixon’s first term). For example, just one 

year ago, before this same committee, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs James Kelly had the following exchange, redolent of a certain 

Stewartesque syntax, with Representative Napolitano:

REP. NAPOLITANO: The next question, then, is can the evolution of fullfledged democracy on Taiwan and the clear emergence of a sense of Taiwanese 

identity meld with the principle of One China, or are they in stark contrast 

with each other? 

MR. KELLY: There certainly is a degree of contrast. The definition of One 

China is something that we could go on for much too long for this event. In my 

testimony, I made the point ‘‘our One China,’’ and I didn’t really define it, and 

I’m not sure I very easily could define it. 

I can tell you what it is not. It is not the One-China policy or the One-China 

principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some 

would have in Taiwan. But it does convey a meaning of solidarity of a kind 

among the people on both sides of the straits that has been our policy for a very 

long time.3

Indeed, Secretary Kelly was one of the few diplomats in the State Department 

who actually understood what our position on ‘‘One China’’ really was, and tried his 

best to differentiate it from Beijing’s ‘‘One China Principle’’ by calling it ‘‘Our One 

China’’. But the net effect at the end of that day was to leave Rep. Napolitano and 

everyone else on the committee, I suspect, just as uninformed about U.S. policy as 

they were at the start of testimony. 

In his testimony of April 21 last year, Secretary Kelly also listed another core element of our China policy—‘‘The U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan or 

unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it.’’ No one on the 

committee had the presence of mind to ask Secretary Kelly just how the Administration defined the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, but six months later members of 

the press engaged his deputy, Randall G. Schriver, in the following exchange.

QUESTION: Randy, how do you define Taiwan independence? Would a 

change of the name of the country be—or change the national flag—be considered as independence? Thank you. 

MR. SCHRIVER: I don’t think it’s useful for me to get into a variety of 

hypotheticals, and I think, actually, it’s fairly obvious and fairly clear what we 

mean by our non-support for Taiwan independence. I mean, you could throw out 

a range of things, and I just don’t want to address them one at a time about 

the implications, and ‘‘is this independence or is that independence?’’ I think the 

statement, and our intent behind it, is quite clear.4

In fact, it was not ‘‘quite clear.’’ Clarity was precisely the quality that Secretary 

Schriver hoped to avoid when he answered the question. 

In general, a democracy cannot have a coherent foreign policy if it refuses to define the core elements of that policy. These two core elements—‘‘One China’’ and 

‘‘status quo in the Taiwan Strait’’—are central to America’s China policy, yet they 

are undefined and internally contradictory. I consider our China Policy to be fatally 

flawed in the sense that the key terms used to describe it are precisely the opposite 

of what the words mean on their face. That is—‘‘one China’’ does not mean that the 

United States recognizes that Taiwan is part of China, but only that the United 

States only recognizes one government of China at a time. And ‘‘status quo as we 

38

5See Kissinger’s record of his conversation with Premier Zhou of October 21, 1971, classified 

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY. White House, ‘‘Memorandum of Conversation,’’ October 21, 1971, p. 27. 6During remarks on trade policy, President Bush said ‘‘And that’s good, that’s important to 

recognize and to welcome both countries, both the Republic of Taiwan, and of course China, into 

the World Trade Organization.’’ See ‘‘President Calls on Senate to Pass Trade Promotion Authority’’, Remarks by the President on Trade Promotion Authority, Benjamin Franklin Room, 

the Department of State, April 4, 2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/

20020404–4.html 7Secretary Colin L. Powell, Interview With Mike Chinoy of CNN International TV, China 

World Hotel, Beijing, China, October 25, 2004, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37366.htm. 8See Presidential Statement on Issuance of Communique ́, August 17, 1982, in China-Taiwan: 

United States Policy, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, August 18, 1982, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. Page 33. Emphasis added.

define it’’ is nowhere defined either in public or within the confidential proceedings 

of the Executive Branch. 

A third misconceived element of our China Policy, which Secretary James Kelly 

enumerated at his testimony here last year, is that ‘‘the U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan.’’ There is an obvious incongruity between this ‘‘non-support’’ 

for Taiwan’s independence and America’s devotion to the ‘‘expansion of democracy’’ 

in Taiwan and our sales of hundreds of millions, indeed billions of dollars in defense 

articles and services to Taiwan each year since 1979. What, pray tell, are we selling 

Taiwan the instruments to defend themselves with, if we do not support Taiwan’s 

continued separation from China—and hence Taiwan’s independence? 

The reasons for this are historical but, truth be told, they are simply force of 

habit. Dr. Henry Kissinger apparently gave a secret assurance to Chinese Premier 

Zhou Enlai in 1971 that the State Department would no longer refer in public to 

the status of Taiwan as undetermined.5 Apparently through some misplaced loyalty 

to Dr. Kissinger’s secret assurances to Beijing 34 year ago, State Department officials still refuse to say in public that U.S. policy is that Taiwan’s legal status remains ‘‘unsettled.’’ Over the decades, on occasion, the State Department has actually 

hinted at this unsettled state of affairs on Taiwan’s legal status in its correspondence and responses to the Congress. However, rather than adhere to a rigorous and 

precise vagueness, executive branch spokesmen, and indeed the President himself, 

betray constant and pervasive befuddlement when it comes to matters of Taiwan 

and China. The President has on occasion referred to Taiwan as both a country in 

its own right 6 and the Secretary of State has called Taiwan a ‘‘part of China’’ 7. A 

scandalous lack of precision in our policy terminology has led to the confusion of 

otherwise intelligent policy-makers. 

Policy of Pretense 

Very early in the US-China relationship, both sides realized that they could not 

sustain a cooperative strategic partnership against the Soviet Union if each insisted 

that the other side foreswear core tenets of its foreign policy. From 1971 through 

1989, US-China relations were been built on an unspoken but very real understanding that enabled both sides to ignore the paramount conflict in their essential 

interests. 

It was an understanding based on pretense: China pretends to have a ‘‘policy of 

peaceful unification with Taiwan’’, in return for which the United States pretends

to have a ‘‘one China policy.’’

The Congress of the United States was clearly frustrated by the fact that this understanding was unspoken and insisted that it be made explicit. It did so in a profound and direct way in the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96–8 of April 10, 1979) 

which declared it the ‘‘policy of the United States—. . .(3) to make clear that the 

United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic 

of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined 

by peaceful means.’’

President Ronald Reagan was equally perplexed by the bureaucracy’s aversion to 

spelling out this linkage. In August 1982, coincident with the announcement of the 

US-China Joint Communique ́ of August 17, 1982 on the question of Taiwan Arms 

Sales, President Reagan issued a presidential statement that declared ‘‘the Taiwan 

question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to 

resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put 

pressure on, the people of Taiwan in this matter.8 But President Reagan went one 

step beyond this public statement to mandate this linkage a confidential presidential directive designed to guide executive branch dealings with China and TaiVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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9 Emphasis added. For the full text of this short memo, see James R. Lilley and Jeff Lilley, 

China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia (New York: 

PublicAffairs Books, 2004), p. 248. See also Jim Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 127. 10 Beijing’s August 30, 1993, white paper on The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of 

China reiterated that the PRC ‘‘is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of 

China’’; declared that the United States was responsible for the ‘‘Taiwan Question’’; and stated 

flatly that Taiwan membership in the United Nations was ‘‘out of the question.’’ 11 China State Council, Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office, ‘‘The One-China 

Principle and the Taiwan Issue,’’ February 21, 2000, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwana.html. The white paper declared, among other things, that the ‘‘government of the ‘Republic of China’ . . . has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise 

state sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has always remained only a local authority 

in Chinese territory,’’ and ‘‘if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement 

of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be 

forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to . . . fulfill the great 

cause of reunification.’’

wan. Indeed, President Reagan declared this linkage was to be a ‘‘permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.’’

As you know, I have agreed to the issuance of a joint communique ́ with the 

People’s Republic of China in which we express United States policy toward the 

matter of continuing arms sales to Taiwan. 

The talks leading up to the signing of the communique ́ were premised on the 

clear understanding that any reduction of such arms sales depends upon peace 

in the Taiwan Strait and the continuity of China’s declared ‘‘fundamental policy’’ of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. 

In short, the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the 

linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign 

policy. 

In addition, it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided 

Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of the 

PRC will be maintained.9

The Challenge of the Anti-Separation Law 

China’s its pretense of a ‘‘peaceful policy’’ toward Taiwan has eroded significantly 

since 1993. In August 1993, with the issuance of a ‘‘white paper’’ on Taiwan relations, reiterated that ‘‘any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity’’ 

and asserted flatly that ‘‘the Chinese Government is under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or people intending to split China as 

to what means it might use to handle its own domestic affairs.’’ 10 From 1992 to the 

present, China’s military spending has increased at double-digit rates, something 

one might not have expected following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Virtually 

every other country threatened by Soviet expansion cut its defense spending significantly in an effort to reap a ‘‘peace dividend.’’

In July 1995, China’s hostile intentions toward Taiwan were manifest when Beijing closed the heavily-trafficked Taiwan Strait to commercial shipping for several 

days while it conducted unprecedented ‘‘missile tests’’, generally viewed as an expression of anger at efforts by Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui to improve his country’s international standing. In March 1996, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

tested nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Strait, again closing that important sea-lane to international traffic, in an effort to intimidate Taiwan’s voters during their first-ever presidential elections. In August 1999, Chinese 

high-performance jet fighters, for the first time, began to patrol the Taiwan Strait 

at the ‘‘center line’’ challenging Taiwan jet fighters and raising tensions. And in 

February 2000, China issued another white paper which called for the use of ‘‘all 

drastic measures possible including the use of force’’ if Taiwan did not declare itself 

part of China and agree to negotiations by a certain date.11

If the United States had possessed a coherent and consistent China policy, these 

separate Chinese challenges to the status quo would have been countered by calibrated ‘‘restatements’’ from Washington about our ‘‘one China’’ policy. But they were 

not. 

China’s Anti-Separation Law and the U.S. Reaction 

It is to the Bush Administration’s credit that it is finally doing so as it confronts 

the Anti-Separation Law. The ASL is a convincing indicator that China’s commitVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
40

12Department of State Daily Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington, DC, February 15, 2005, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/42316.htm. Emphasis added. 13See John J. Tkacik, ‘‘Secession Law Strains Ties’’, Asian Wall Street Journal, March 9, 

2005, p. 10, at http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111031906988273848,00.html 14Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks to the Press in China, China World Hotel, Beijing, 

China, March 21, 2005, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43678.htm 15The text of the ‘‘Anti-Separation Law’’ (ASL) neither defines how China’s leadership would 

determine when ‘‘all possibilities’’ have been exhausted, nor defines a ‘‘major incident’’ that 

would ‘‘entail’’ Taiwan’s separation from China. See Article 8: In the event that the ‘‘Taiwan 

independence’’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact 

of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from 

China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect 

China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The English text of the ASL is available at the 

website of the official ‘‘Xinhua’’ news agency at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005–03/

14/contentl2694180.htm, ‘‘Full text of Anti-Secession Law’’; the Chinese text is at http://

news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005–03/14/contentl2694168.htm 16Guanyu ‘fan fenlie guojia fa (cao’an)’ de shuoming [Explication regarding the ‘Law Against 

the Separation of the Nation (Draft)’, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, March 8, 2005, at http:/

/news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005–03/08/contentl2666011.htm 

ment to peace in the Taiwan Strait is weak at best. Early unofficial draft iterations 

of the ASL—which had initially been referred to as the ‘‘National Unification 

Law’’—had been floating around on the internet at least since 2002, and included 

all sorts of strange stipulations. Dr. Yu Yuanzhou of Wuhan University, proposed 

legislation that would require the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to attack Taiwan as soon as it is able (no need to await any Taiwanese indendence), beginning 

with bombardments of Quemoy and Matsu which—according to Article 27 of his 

draft—‘‘would not be limited to conventional weapons.’’

Understandably, the Bush Administration was dismayed when the ASL was announced on December 17, 2004. The Administration’s perplexity was heightened because if followed hard on elections in Taiwan that indicated sentiment for new constitutional revisions had cooled, and hence Beijing had no justification for stirring 

the pot with this new legislation. 

At first, the Administration’s major worry was that China would try to ‘‘define’’ 

the status quo in the Strait beyond its existing vague guideline. State Department 

spokesman Richard Boucher told the press on February 15 that the ‘‘U.S. Government has been quite clear that we don’t think either side should take unilateral 

steps that try to define the situation further or push it in one direction or another.’’ 12

For consistency’s sake, the Department of State doesn’t want to confine just itself 

to avoiding definitions, but seems to extend its aversion to defining the status quo

to all the players. Again, to the Administration’s credit, U.S. officials have maintained a consistent and tough line with all their Chinese interlocutors on the ASL.13

When the Chinese went ahead and passed the law on March 14, the week prior 

to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Beijing, the Secretary was even 

tougher. ‘‘We’ve made very clear that the anti-secession law was not a welcome development because anything that is unilateral in this and that increases tensions, 

which clearly the anti-secession law did increase tensions, is not good.’’ 14 I have 

been told that Secretary Rice was even more blunt in her private meetings with 

Chinese leaders. 

The reason for her unhappiness is clear. The central mandate of Beijing’s new 

‘‘Anti-National Separation Law’’ (Fan Fenlie Guojia Fa, or literally, ‘‘Law against 

Splitting the Nation’’) is the declaration that that China ‘‘shall’’ use military force 

against Taiwan whenever the Chinese leadership decides that all possibilities for 

‘‘peaceful reunification’’ with Taiwan have been exhausted.15 But the ‘‘Anti-Separation Law’’ (ASL) makes no pretense of defining either what would constitute an act 

‘‘entailing’’ secession or what it might mean to exhaust ‘‘all possibilities’’ for peaceful 

reunification. 

As such, the ASL serves as a free-standing, permanent casus belli against Taiwan 

and the United States. In short, the ASL is an open-ended declaration of war 

against Taiwan in which the Beijing authorities reserve the right to launch ‘‘nonpeaceful’’ actions against the people of Taiwan whenever they wish and without 

forewarning. 

This pre-legitimization of war is a very real change in China’s stance toward Taiwan—and indeed toward the United States which sees the preservation of Taiwan’s 

democracy and autonomy from Beijing as in both its political and strategic interests. 

In presenting the draft ASL to the National People’s Congress on March 8, 2005, 

NPC Vice Chairman Wang Zhaoguo asserted that China’s constitution stipulates 

that ‘‘Taiwan is an unalienable part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic 

of China.’’ 16 In this context, it is ironic to note that the only piece of the world’s 

41

17 John H. Holdridge, ‘‘China-Taiwan: United States Policy,’’ testimony before the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, August 18, 1982, pp. 15–16. Holdridge described the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ in his memoir, Crossing the Divide, p. 232. John H. Holdridge, 

Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (Lanham, 

Md.: Rowan and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 184–185. 18 Condoleezza Rice, ‘‘Promoting the National Interest’’, Foreign Affairs, January February 

2000, p. 56. 

geography that the Chinese constitution declares is an unalienable part of the PRC 

is Taiwan. Not Beijing or Shanghai or Xinjiang or Tibet. It is also ironic that the 

Chinese government insists that the English-language rendering of fan fenlie guojia 

fa is ‘‘Anti Secession Law.’’ Of course, Taiwan has never been administered by the 

People’s Republic of China, and it seems an oxymoron to suggest that Taiwan could 

secede from a country to which it has never belonged in the first place. 

How the U.S. Should React to the ASL 

Let me suggest a few ways in which the Congress might remedy the flaws in U.S. 

policy. 

Define our policy. Recognizing that a problem exists is the first step to finding a 

solution. In its oversight role, Congress should insist that the Administration actually define its Taiwan policy. 

This does not necessarily mean that the Congress should force the Administration 

into a public enunciation of a policy toward Taiwan that directly antagonizes Beijing. But at the very least, the Administration should be required to develop internal ‘‘terms of reference’’ for Taiwan. What exactly is the ‘‘status quo’’ in the Taiwan 

Strait? What is ‘‘Our’’ one China policy? If we don’t support Taiwan’s continued separation from China, a separation that has already lasted for 107 of the last 110 

years, then why has the Congress mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act that national policy is ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort 

to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social 

or economic system, of the people of Taiwan’’? 

Maintain the Linkage. President Reagan’s ‘‘permanent imperative’’ of a linkage between China’s peaceful policy toward Taiwan and our support for Taiwan’s defense, 

and hence its continued separation from China, is clearly in America’s interests. 

Therefore, any step Beijing takes that casts a cloud over its so-called ‘‘peaceful policy’’ must be matched by a concomitant U.S. step in support of Taiwan’s democracy. 

If the Administration finds it diplomatically inopportune to react to some act of Chinese bellicosity in the Taiwan Strait, there may well be instances where a Congressional reaction would give the Administration leverage with Beijing. Beijing’s Anti 

Separation Law, which Chinese diplomats insist is merely a restatement of existing 

Chinese law and policy, could be balanced by new U.S. legislation—perhaps along 

the lines of the ‘‘Taiwan Security Enhancement Act’’ (HR 1838) which passed the 

House of Representatives with a veto-proof margin of 341–70 on February 1, 2000. 

The TSEA, after all, was also a restatement of existing U.S. policies toward Taiwan. 

I myself am personally fond of President Reagan’s 1982 commitments to Taiwan’s 

President known as the ‘‘Six Assurances’’.17 Because they are already a part of existing U.S. policy, enshrining the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ in a future House Resolution 

would also be a very effective counter to future Chinese actions that might challenge 

the stability and peace of the Taiwan Strait. 

Demand a Strategy. The Cheshire Cat’s first dictum is that if you don’t know 

where you’re going, any road will get you there. If the United States has no idea 

what it wants China or Taiwan to look like in five years (let alone ten or twenty), 

then it doesn’t matter what policies it adopts. As Dr. Condoleezza Rice wrote in Foreign Affairs five years ago, ‘‘China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would 

like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor.’’ 18 This assessment makes it 

absolutely essential that the United States understand what its own strategic interests, goals and objectives are in Asia. 

Sadly, there is no such vision guiding U.S. policy toward China or Taiwan. The 

Congress should therefore require one. In particular, the Administration must be attentive to America’s interests in Taiwan. Not only is Taiwan a thriving democracy, 

and not only is it America’s tenth largest export market, but Taiwan has also been 

an important security partner for the United States. The Executive branch must be 

required to conduct a strategic survey—confidential if necessary—of U.S. interests 

in the region, and to consider the possible ramifications to America’s strategic posture in the Western Pacific should Taiwan be forced into a relationship with China 

that would preclude continued U.S. strategic cooperation with Taiwan. Thereafter, 

policy decisions regarding China and Taiwan must be made to conform with U.S. 

goals. 

42

In conclusion, let me thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my 

views. I hope that they prove useful, or at the very least, thought-provoking.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Well, thank you very much. I am 

very happy to hear those many quotes from Ronald Reagan in your 

testimony, having worked with him in the White House at that 

time. 

We are going to pay Mr. Faleomavaega his due here in holding 

down the fort on the Democratic side. We will have to adjourn in 

a few minutes because of the speech that is coming to the joint session, Mr. Yushchenko from the Ukraine. Mr. Faleomavaega, do you 

have some points you would like to bring out? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I just want to compliment our witnesses this 

morning for their presentations that I felt were very thought provoking. I certainly appreciate the insights that you raised about 

what are some of the motivating factors that cause the Chinese 

leadership to pass the anti-secession law. 

I am very curious about Mr. Tkacik’s observations. He suggests 

that our current policy was vague. But I suppose the bottomline is, 

it has helped us not to go to war with China or against China in 

that respect, over Taiwan. If there was anything that I would describe as a success of the current policy it is that it has prevented 

a serious conflict between our two countries, even though it may 

be undefined, as you had described it, Mr. Tkacik. But sometimes 

things that appear vague and ambiguous might do us more good 

than being too specific and cause us not to be flexible, as well as 

meeting the realities of the day. And I think the situation as it was 

in 50 years has changed, in terms of what we are now faced with 

today. 

But the bottomline, in my humble opinion, is that I do not think 

there was ever any question about our commitment in defending 

Taiwan. The question here is, has the policy worked? In my opinion, it has worked so far. And with that observation, Mr. Chairman, I thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega. Then we have Mr. 

Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I will be brief, because I know time is running out here. Mr. Tkacik, it is good to 

see you again. I know you are one of the leading scholars in this 

area and we are glad to have you, as well as our other witnesses 

here. 

I think a quote that you stated in the past is the United States’ 

one-China policy and this is maybe following a little of what my 

friend, Mr. Faleomavaega said, although I might differ with his 

opinion on this matter. But I think you said that the United States’ 

one-China policy is dangerous. Could you elaborate on that a bit as 

to why you believe that, which I tend to agree with, but I would 

like to hear what you have to say? 

Mr. TKACIK. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. The reason is because 

it gives, it sends a wrong message. I do not want to go all the way 

back into history, but suffice it to say that it is now, in 2005, the 

policy of the United States that the sovereignty issue, the question 

of sovereignty and the status of Taiwan is unsettled. It is an unsettled question left over from World War II. 

43

The United States has never recognized China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and has never accepted it. In 1976, and I 

think you yourself have alluded to Henry Kissinger’s meeting with 

his top foreign policy aides in the White House in October 1976, 

where he looked at his top aides and said if we recognize China’s 

claim to Taiwan, there will be nothing to stop China. They can go 

ahead and use force and we cannot say anything about it. What 

will we do? 

It is interesting that Secretary Kissinger’s top East Asia hand, 

Arthur Hummel, piped up at that point and said: ‘‘Perhaps down 

the road, the only solution is an independent Taiwan.’’ I happen to 

think that that may well be the only solution. 

And I respectfully disagree with Mr. Faleomavaega’s observation 

that the pretense is what has stopped a war from breaking out in 

the Taiwan Strait. In fact, what has stopped a war is Congress’ 

Taiwan Relations Act, the expression of the people of the United 

States that defending a free and democratic nation in Taiwan is in 

the United States’ interest and it is enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act. It is that commitment that has prevented the Chinese 

from going to war. When that commitment slips, China will go to 

war, there is no question in my mind. Or if they do not go to war, 

they will force, through non-military means, Taiwan to join China. 

This is what I mean about the one-China policy being dangerous. 

If you say Taiwan is part of China, if we recognize that, at the end 

of the day it means you have convinced the people of the United 

States, the leaders of the United States, the Congress of the United 

States, that China’s claim to Taiwan is valid and that we support 

it. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Before my time runs out, I have two 

other quick questions and I will put them as quickly as I can. Our 

colleague, Mr. Brown from Ohio, has been a leader on trying to get 

observer status at the WHO for some time now. We have joined 

with him on that, a number of us have. China has been able to 

block this and has been pretty intransigent about it. Do you think 

there is any chance that, in light of the anti-secession legislation 

that they recently passed, that the PLC leadership might want to 

look at spreading a little goodwill by backing off its longstanding 

abstinence on this issue? And the other question, yesterday the 

Taiwan delegation was their hope that we could finally get the legislation to improve Taiwan’s military. The defense package that 

has been bandied about for years now was 20 billion and 18 billion. 

Now I think it is 13 billion or so. 

And Trang Chai, yesterday, when I asked the question, said that 

he thought this week or next week should come up in committee 

and should be passed at that time. If there is any comment that 

any of the panel members might have on the need for Taiwan to 

make sure that it has modernized its forces so that it is not such 

an inviting target to the PRC, especially in light of 600 missiles 

being pointed in its direction. So the WHO and then the defense 

package. 

Mr. TKACIK. Well, in the WHO, I think that the Chinese are continuing in their insistence that any Taiwan membership observership be under the name of China. I am not sure that that, I mean, 

I think that Taiwan could have done that a long time ago. If it 

44

wanted China to run its public health policy, it could have joined 

as Taiwan China under the sponsorship of China a long time ago. 

I am not sure that that is in our interest. 

Number two, the issue Mr. Ackerman referred to earlier: What 

was the United States commitment to the defense of Taiwan when 

President Bush said we will do all it takes, we will do whatever 

it takes? What President Bush said on April 25 was, we will do 

whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself. This means that 

we do expect Taiwan to defend itself. The leader of the third largest party in the Legislative Yuan, James Soong, was here in Washington earlier this year and met with people in the Defense Department. My understanding from people at the Defense Department 

was that he had committed his party’s support for the special budget, the special defense budget. But it remains to be seen, I think, 

in legislative activity next week whether that takes place. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We actually have about 2 minutes left before 

we have to go over to Yushchenko’s speech. So, Mr. Paul, do you 

have a couple of questions? 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Barely. Can I get a question in in 2 minutes? But I will try. I found the statement by Dr. 

Rigger very fascinating and that is the fact that half the people in 

Taiwan may well be supportive of unification with China and that 

sort of suggests that more consideration should be given to a more 

balanced approach to China, and that is one with less intervention 

rather than more intervention. 

I cannot see how anybody can claim that our relationship with 

China makes any sense at all. First we have a one-China policy. 

At the same time, we have a military commitment to Taiwan that 

may one day secede. I mean, the two are incompatible. 

But instead of demanding that we either have a total commitment to a one-China policy or a total military commitment and go 

one way or the other, why is it that we could not consider a less 

intervention, say, you know, self-determination is good, trade with 

China is good. A lot of trade is going on between Taiwan and 

China. Half the people there possibly are supportive of unification. 

Why can we not say we are not smart enough to know what is best 

for China? Why do we not let them sort this out? 

One thing I would strongly suggest for us to butt out on is tremendous subsidies to China through the Export Import Bank. Why 

do we subsidize them at the same time we claim we are going to 

help Taiwan if they decide to secede? So I see that there is room, 

especially right now, where we could be friends with China and 

friends with Taiwan and trade with China and say, you know, selfdetermination is great and trade is great. Maybe, maybe our interference was making things worse rather than better. 

Ms. RIGGER. May I respond? I think that the fact that a lot of 

Taiwanese are agnostic about the long term outcome suggests that 

they agree with you that, you know, we are not smart enough to 

resolve this right now and that they would prefer to sort of maintain the situation that they have until sometime in the future. 

Smarter people or younger people or future generations can figure 

out a solution. 

The problem is that there are for many actors in the region feelings of urgency and necessity to do something now and that is true 

45

in Taiwan of those who wish for, you know, immediate or near 

term independence. It is also true in Taiwan of people who fear 

that the trends are working against Taiwan. So to wait is to sort 

of play into Beijing’s hand, to ripen and eventually fall. 

So there are people in Taiwan who want to stabilize the current 

situation in more formal ways in order to prevent future developments from drifting against their preferences. But I think the bigger problem, frankly, is a sense of urgency in Beijing to do something about the Taiwan issue. For awhile, it seemed that Chinese 

leaders were more confident that the long term economic and political and social trends were in their favor. But now they seem once 

again to be kind of not panicking, but more intensely anxious about 

the possibility that Taiwan may pull up some kind of escape trick 

and that the current Chinese leadership will then face a huge crisis 

of legitimacy and credibility. 

Mr. PAUL. May I interrupt you? Is there any room for consideration for us to do less? 

Ms. RIGGER. Well, the most interesting proposal that has come 

forth recently is another in a series of proposals that Professor Ken 

Leiberthal has made for interim agreement, something that would 

sort of freeze the current situation for 50 years and China would 

promise no use of force and Taiwan would promise no declaration 

of independence. 

In the past, Taiwanese leaders have rejected those interim agreement suggestions, but the most recent one was sort of endorsed or 

accepted as an interesting idea to think about by both the outgoing 

and the incoming mainland affairs counsel Chairs in Taiwan. So 

senior policy makers about cross-Strait policy have said maybe 

there is something to be said for just asking for the U.S. to assist 

us in stabilizing and bounding this problem, rather than trying to 

work it out on our own. 

So in a way, that is both a more interventionist but also a less 

interventionist solution, because it does not seek to impose a solution simply to bounce the problem and create an opportunity for 

these long term trends to do their thing. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Thank you very much. I would like to thank 

the panel today. Just a few notes that we should always remember 

the wonderful way, just the pleasantries and all of the, you know, 

all the goodwill and pleasant treatment that the people of Tibet 

have been experiencing while submitting themselves to Beijing, 

which we know is not. That was a joke, obviously. 

The fact is that the people of Tibet are experiencing near genocide, cultural genocide, in their country. And the people of Taiwan 

should note very carefully what is going on in Tibet and other 

places in China with the Government in Beijing. 

Let us also note, Mr. Paul, that the people of the United States, 

officially, we believe that government is legitimate if it has the consent of the governed. And in this situation, we are dealing with the 

people of Taiwan who have a legitimate Government and we have 

a group of thugs who hold power by violence and force on the mainland. It does not seem to be any question in my mind who the 

United States should be considering legitimate and who we should 

be siding with. 

46

And finally, strategic ambiguity, Mr. Tkacik, I am sorry. Ronald 

Reagan is gone, he ended the Cold War. He defined things by tearing down the wall, which all of his senior advisors told him not to 

do. The policies he put in place he made the world a safer place, 

but he is gone and we cannot expect as much from a lot of other 

people, although that would be the right path. 

Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:46 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(47)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

RESPONSE FROM MR. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. 

FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

Question: 

Please provide for the record information on Japan’s military build up versus 

PRC’s build up. 

Response: 

For FY2005 Japan’s defense budget is 4.86 trillion yen, about $45 billion at today’s exchange rate. That is down in yen terms by 1% from the previous year—and 

is the fourth straight year of declining defense budgets. That is just above 1.0% of 

GDP (using World Bank GDP figures for 2003). Much of this spending, however, 

goes to support U.S. facilities in Japan in defense of our own regional interests. 

On March 4, 2005 a PRC National People’s Congress Spokesman announced that China would increase its annual defense spending by 12.6 percent to a total of $29.9 

billion. This followed a real increase of 11.6 percent in defense spending for 2004. 

However, the official budget figure does not include off-budget funding, notably for 

purchases of foreign technology. Current total spending for 2005 is estimated to be 

$60–80 billion annually. 

RESPONSES FROM MR. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUB- COMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Question: 

To the best of your knowledge, is there any desire on the part of either Beijing or 

Taipei for Washington to play a ‘‘facilitator’’ role that would be acceptable to both 

sides? 

Response: 

In addition to the three U.S.-China joint communiques, U.S. cross-Strait policy is 

also informed by President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan. The fourth of the 

six assurances states that the United States will not mediate between Taiwan and 

China. The United States is not a direct participant in the dispute between the PRC 

and Taiwan, but we have a strong interest in doing all we can to create an environment that is conducive to a peaceful resolution. Resuming the dialogue between the 

two sides is an important first step. A large part of that effort consists of our promoting a strong bilateral relationship between the United States and the PRC, and 

a strong unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan. We desire 

and need good relations with both, and believe this positions us best to assist the 

two sides in getting to the negotiating table on mutually agreeable terms. Indeed, 

we believe both sides desire and need good relations with one another. 

Question: 

Are there any provisions of the new law which suggest flexibility? For example, Article 6 of the law lays out a series of ‘‘measures to maintain peace and stability in 

the Taiwan Straits and promote cross-Strait relations.’’ And Article 7 affirms that 

China seeks ‘‘the achievement of peaceful reunification through consultations and neVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:48 Jun 30, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\040605\20403.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
48

gotiations on an equal footing’’ between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.’’ Please 

comment. 

Similarly, does the law specify that Taipei accept the one-China principle as a precondition for starting the process of consultations and negotiations? If not, have authoritative PRC comments about the bill been consistent with its precise wording? 

Please comment. 

Response: 

The text of the law contains many elements of longstanding PRC cross-Strait policy including the goals of achieving ‘‘peaceful national reunification’’ and promotion 

of cross-Strait cultural and economic exchanges. These proposals are not new and 

have been articulated for some time by Chinese leaders, including by President Hu 

Jintao in his New Year address. However, the provisions of Article 8 of the law cannot be reconciled with these more conciliatory aspects of PRC policy and, given the 

aggressive military build-up opposite Taiwan, we remain very concerned. 

Article 5 of the law states that ‘‘upholding the principle of one China is the basis 

of peaceful reunification of the country.’’ Although China has publicly stated it 

would be willing to engage in dialogue if Taiwan accepts Beijing’s interpretation of 

the ‘‘1992 Consensus,’’ there have been no authoritative comments from Chinese 

leaders regarding the conception of the one-China principle as specified in Article 

5. 

Question: 

Let me turn for a moment to Taiwan’s threat perceptions and its arms procurement policy. Between 1995 and 2002, Taipei imported more than $20 billion worth of foreign weaponry, making it the world’s second largest arms importer (after Saudi Arabia). In recent years, however, Taiwan’s arms purchases have fallen off sharply, and 

new orders for arms fell to less than $2 billion over the past five years. How do you 

explain this trend? What does it mean for cross-Strait stability and U.S. policy? 

Response: 

Taiwan’s defense budget has declined to about 2.6% of GDP over the past ten 

years. A number of systems which represent key defense capabilities for Taiwan 

were approved for release in 2001 and continue to be unfunded. We urge Taiwan 

to acquire priority defensive capabilities in the areas of missile defense, Command/

Control/Communication Systems, and Anti-Submarine Warfare. We will abide by 

our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to make available defense articles 

and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 

Question: 

Many U.S. observers are disappointed that Taiwan’s government has moved slowly 

to purchase the weapons systems the U.S. began offering in 2001. What are the prospects that Taipei will approve a special budget of more than $15 billion to purchase 

the weapons systems the U.S. recommended in 2001? 

Response: 

Taiwan’s legislature continues to fail to pass an $ (US) 18 billion special defense 

budget package to purchase a number of systems approved in 2001. These systems 

represent priority defensive capabilities for Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of National 

Defense has resubmitted the package to the Legislature for reconsideration. The 

Legislature may approve a reduced amount, but the prospects for passage remain 

uncertain as the special budget is under intense domestic political debate. We urge 

Taiwan to pass this special budget to acquire the capabilities it needs for its own 

self-defense. 

Question: 

During the last few weeks of the Parliamentary election campaign in Taiwan President Chen played up some of the most controversial issues on the so-called ‘‘panGreen’’ agenda, including asserting Taiwan’s identity is separate from China, reiterating the need for a radically new constitution, and calling for rectification of Taiwan’s name on the international stage. What has become of this proposed action 

agenda? 

Please describe the likely agenda, process, and timetable for constitutional reform 

in Taiwan. 

Response: 

President Chen’s ‘‘action agenda.’’ Since the December 2004 Legislative Yuan election, in which the DPP and its Pan-Green allies failed to win a majority, President 

Chen Shui-bian has appeared to adjust course and move towards the Taiwan political center. President Chen and his government seldom raise constitutional reform 

49

or the ‘‘pan-Green agenda’’ that were highlighted in the 2004 legislative campaign. 

When they do, it is in very general terms instead of the specific constitutional revision schedule Chen promised in his campaign speeches in late 2004. The issue of 

Taiwan name changes has also been de-emphasized. President Chen has been silent 

on the issue and the new Premier, Frank Hsieh, specifically pledged that the government would not push name change, but would leave this to the discretion of the 

affected organizations. However, President Chen and members of his government do 

continue to state that the ‘‘Republic of China’’ is a ‘‘sovereign, independent state’’ 

and has an identity separate from the Beijing government. 

Agenda, Process and timetable for constitutional reform. The agenda for constitutional reform was decided by the Legislative Yuan in August 2004. The Legislative 

Yuan passed four proposed constitutional revisions, which will be voted on by a ‘‘National Assembly’’ to be chosen in 2005. The National Assembly will have only one 

clearly defined task: to approve or reject the legislature’s proposed revisions to the 

Constitution. The proposed changes, which the National Assembly reportedly will 

not be able to amend, are:

• Cut the number of Legislative Yuan seats from 225 to 113;

• Create a mixed single-member district/proportional list electoral system for 

the Legislative Yuan to replace the present multi-member district system;

• Extend the term of office for Legislative Yuan members from three to four 

years;

• Eliminate the National Assembly, which currently is the body empowered to 

approve changes to the Constitution approved by the Legislative Yuan and replace it with a constitutional process requiring the public, through referenda, 

to approve or reject changes to the Constitution approved by the legislature.

The process for constitutional change requires that the Legislative Yuan, in addition to approving an agenda of constitutional revisions, to pass implementing legislation for the selection of the members of National Assembly and a procedural law 

for National Assembly’s deliberations. In 2000, the law requiring the election of National Assembly members was replaced. Under current law, the National Assembly 

members are to be chosen by party and in proportion to party representation in the 

Legislative Yuan. 

The Legislative Yuan has set the election of the National Assembly for May 14, 

but has not passed a procedural law for the National Assembly as yet. Political infighting between the Pan-Blue majority and the Pan-Green minority in the Legislative Yuan could delay approval of legislation on National Assembly procedure. There 

are different legal interpretations over whether the National Assembly can draft its 

own procedures if the Legislative Yuan fails to do so before May 14. Since Article 

34 of the constitution gives the Legislative Yuan responsibility for creating procedural rules for the National Assembly, a political deadlock over the issue may require a formal interpretation by the Council of Grand Justices. In any case, if the 

National Assembly is selected as scheduled on May 14 and the problem of procedure 

for the National Assembly is worked out, it is likely its deliberations and the final 

decisions on revisions to Taiwan’s present constitution will be complete before the 

end of 2005. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely and important hearing regarding 

the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) blatant and unilateral move to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Straits through the passage of its new Anti-Secession Law. 

For the past several months the PRC has taken a series of steps apparently designed to leave its ‘‘Good Neighbor’’ policy by the wayside and position itself to embark on a new campaign to promote it’s economic and military ambitions across the 

Straits and throughout the region. 

Of course saber rattling by the PRC is nothing new, but the new Anti-Secession 

Law represents a dangerous dimension when put into the context of approximately 

500 short-range ballistic missiles already aimed at Taiwan with more missiles and 

other offensive weapons being deployed by the PRC in areas adjacent to the Taiwan 

Strait on an almost daily basis. 

The translations that I have read indicate that the new Law states: ‘‘Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people including the Taiwan compatriots.’’ In short, the Anti-Secession Law obligates—and it’s important to stress that word—that the People’s Liberation Army 

50

use military force to annex Taiwan if Beijing believes Taiwanese rhetoric or actions 

are moving the Island towards independence or if China considers Taiwanese leaders are engaging in so-called separatist activities. 

In addition, the law creates the legal grounds for Beijing to punish anyone speaking or acting against reunification of Taiwan and China. So this law not only threatens the status quo in the Taiwan Straits, but it represents a broad new instrument 

of oppression; the same kind of blunt instrument Beijing has resorted to in the past, 

and with grave consequences. 

Even before China publicly unveiled this law, many of us in the Congress as well 

as State Department and the White House officials had warned our Chinese friends 

that this new law, and its hardened militaristic approach to future dealings with 

Taiwan, would undermine the progress and goodwill that has spread across the 

Straits in recent years. Unfortunately, our warnings went unheeded and the predictable result has been an escalation in military tensions in the Taiwan Straits. 

Chinese President Hu Jintao must believe that our need for Beijing’s cooperation 

on the North Korean Nuclear threat outweighs our commitment to defend the 23 

million inhabitants of democratic Taiwan. However, with American soldiers dying 

overseas in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to bring democracy and freedom to people 

who have long suffered under tyranny, to assume that the United States cares so 

little about Taiwan—a vibrant and pluralistic democracy that respects human rights 

and the rule of law, and has been an important ally of the United States for over 

half a century—is a grave miscalculation in my opinion, but perhaps part of Beijing’s larger strategy to increasingly test the boundaries of America’s power and influence throughout the Pacific. 

Regarding China’s influence throughout the World, later today Congressman 

Menendez and I will be convening a Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

hearing to examine the opportunities and threats posed by China in the Western 

Hemisphere. Over the last few years, the PRC has been moving aggressively into 

Latin America with billions of dollars of investments, trade agreements and massive 

infrastructure development in the name of economic development. We intend to utilize the example of China’s activities in the Hemisphere to highlight the fundamental debate over Beijing’s official foreign policy. 

If China’s number-one priority is truly economic development, when push comes 

to shove, will Beijing pursue a policy that places an emphasis on stabilizing the 

international environment or will it seek to offset the status quo, and displace traditional trade frameworks and alliances, in order to create strategic openings for 

itself? 

Should the stand-off over Taiwan flare into open violence, it will undoubtedly 

have repercussions far beyond the Taiwan Straits. So, I believe that we need to send 

a strong message to the People’s Republic of China that a return to the status quo 

in Taiwan and the ‘‘Good Neighbor’’ policy, which has worked so effectively for so 

long, is in the best interests of all parties. 

To that end, I was pleased to see Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice raise this 

issue and register our serious concerns in Beijing last month, and I was also pleased 

to co-sponsor Chairman Hyde’s Concurrent Resolution 98 denouncing the Anti-Secession Law, which passed the House by a strong bipartisan vote of 424–4. 

I was also heartened by the news that the European Union will likely choose not 

to lift the arms embargo imposed after the Tiananmen Square slaughter of thousands of students and freedom activists in 1989. Although the EU has not tied the 

issue of the Anti-Secession Law to the lifting of the arms embargo, I am skeptical 

that it is mere coincidence that the EU was considering the idea before the adoption 

of the Anti-Secession Law, yet it firmly rejected the notion after it was adopted. 

We must not forget the sacrifices of those who died in Tiananmen Square and the 

freedoms they died for. Likewise, we must not let Beijing ratchet up tensions across 

the Taiwan Straits and intimidate into submission the free people of Taiwan. If we 

are serious about enhancing the spread of human rights, democracy and freedom 

across the globe, we must stand up for the rights of the people of Taiwan. 

Thank you.

Æ