Audit 

 Report 

Oil for Food Cash Controls for the 

Office of Project Coordination in Erbil, Iraq 

Report Number 04-007 July 26, 2004 

Office of the Inspector General 

Coalition Provisional Authority
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

July 26, 2004 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Oil for Food Cash Controls for the Office of Project Coordination in 

Erbil, Iraq 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed 

the audit in accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106 which 

mandates the conduct of audits relating to the treatment, handling, and expenditure of 

funds by the Coalition Provisional Authority or its successor entities on Iraq 

reconstruction, and of the programs, operations, and contracts carried out in utilizing such 

funds. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the 

final report. 

Comments on the draft of this report were not responsive to our 

recommendations. However, because the transition to Iraqi sovereignty has been 

completed, any corrective action is now an Iraqi Interim Government responsibility. 

Therefore, no additional comments are required. Further, due to the transition, audit 

follow-up will not be performed. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed 

to Mr. Brian Flynn at (703) 343-9230 or Mr. William Whitehead at (703) 343-9229. 

Management may request a formal briefing on the results of this audit. See Appendix D 

for the report distribution.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

 Inspector General 

 Coalition Provisional Authority 
i

Office of the Inspector General 

Coalition Provisional Authority 

Report Number 04-007 July 26, 2004 

Oil for Food Cash Controls for the 

Office of Project Coordination in Erbil, Iraq 

Executive Summary 

Introduction. United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (Resolution 687) was 

issued April 3, 1991, after the conclusion of the first Gulf War. Resolution 687 

established the cease fire in Iraq and also established an oil embargo on the country. It 

prevented Iraq from legally selling any oil until August 1991. United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 706 (Resolution 706) was issued August 15, 1991. The purpose of 

Resolution 706 was to allow Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase goods and services for 

essential human needs. This became known as the Oil for Food (OFF) program. 

In November 2003, the United Nations officially withdrew from operating the OFF 

program and the management of the program transitioned to the Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA). To do so, the Office of Project Coordination located in Erbil, Iraq, 

needed to obtain funds from the CPA in order to complete the planned and in-progress 

projects. Approximately $1.5 billion was needed to complete those planned and inprogress projects. 

However, the funds had to be transferred in cash from one bank to another for use by the 

Kurdish Regional Government because the banks in Iraq are not electronically connected. 

Due to the amounts of those cash transfers, the CPA requested that the Office of the 

Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority to perform a review. 

Objective. The objective of the audit was to determine whether the CPA had established 

and implemented appropriate policies and procedures for the accounting, controlling, and 

monitoring of the transfer of approximately $1.5 billion in cash to the Kurdish Regional 

Government as part of the OFF program. 

Conclusion. We determined that the CPA had established and implemented appropriate 

policies and procedures for the accounting, controlling, and monitoring of the transfer of 

approximately $1.5 billion in cash to the Kurdish Regional Government as part of the 

OFF program. We also determined that the process to make payments satisfied 

Government Accountability Office standards. We commend the Office of Project 

Coordination management for their attention to this area. 

However, the Office of Project Coordination did not obtain, review, validate, and approve 

cash transfer procedures for using foreign-national couriers to transfer cash within Erbil, 

Iraq. As a result, there was an increased risk for the loss or theft of the cash. 

Recommendations. We recommend that the Deputy General of the Office of Project 

Coordination obtain, review, validate, and approve cash transfer procedures for the use of 

local foreign-national couriers before contracting for those types of services. 
ii

Management Comments. The Chief Financial Officer of the Office of Project 

Coordination Erbil, Iraq did not concur with the recommendation because no problems 

were incurred with the two couriers that had been previously used by the UN and the 

Kurdistan Regional Government. The management comments are shown at Appendix B. 

Audit Response. We continue to believe that it would have been prudent to review, 

validate, and approve cash transfer procedures for the use of local foreign-national 

couriers before contracting for those types of services. However, because the transition 

to Iraqi sovereignty has been completed, any corrective action is now an Iraqi Interim 

Government responsibility. Therefore, this report makes no further recommendations. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction

Background 1 

Objectives 2 

Findings 

A. Cash Transfer Procedures in Erbil, Iraq 3 

B. Internal Controls Over Cash Management 5 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 9 

B. Management Comments 10 

C. Acronyms 12 

D. Report Distribution 13 

E. Audit Team 14 
1 

Background 

United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 687 (Resolution 687) was issued 

April 3, 1991, after the conclusion of the first Gulf War. Resolution 687 established the 

cease fire in Iraq and also established an oil embargo on the country. It prevented Iraq 

from legally selling any oil until August 1991. The scope and methodology used to 

perform this audit are discussed at Appendix A. The acronyms used in this report are 

shown at Appendix C and the audit team members are shown at Appendix E. 

Oil for Food Program. UN Security Council Resolution 706 (Resolution 706) was 

issued August 15, 1991. The purpose of Resolution 706 was to allow Iraq to sell oil in 

order to purchase goods and services for essential human needs. This became known as 

the Oil for Food (OFF) program. This UN managed program continued to operate in 

accordance with Resolution 706 until November 2003. UN Security Council Resolution 

1483 (Resolution 1483) was issued May 22, 2003, and lifted the sanctions previously 

imposed against Iraq. Resolution 1483 also called for an end of the UN-managed OFF 

program in November 2003. However, it gave the occupying countries the opportunity to 

continue the OFF program. 

Transition from the United Nations to the Coalition Provisional Authority. In 

November 2003, the UN officially withdrew from operating the OFF program and the 

management of the program transitioned to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). 

However, although the UN withdrew from operating the program, it had not completed 

many of the contracts, projects, and purchases that had been started. Further, the UN 

departed without providing all documentation as to the contracts issued, projects 

completed, and warehouse locations of items purchased using OFF funds. 

The OFF program had been divided into two regions, the northern and southern, and 

those regions were known as OFF North and OFF South. The Office of Project 

Coordination (OPC) located in Erbil, Iraq, was formed by CPA to ensure the completion 

of all projects left uncompleted by the UN in the northern section of Iraq. 

OFF North. The UN operated the OFF program in the northern regions of Iraq. 

The Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan requested projects for 

the UN to complete through the program. If a project was one that could not be 

completed by the UN, then the UN would contract others to complete the project. 

According to the OFF Administrator, the program in the north appeared to have been 

managed without any signs of corruption. 

OFF South. Various ministries in Baghdad operated the OFF program in the 

southern regions of Iraq but let contracts under the supervision of the UN. Those 

contracts were to be for the purchase of goods and services as outlined in the OFF 

program. The Offices of the United Nations Under Secretary General for Internal 

Oversight Services and the Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit have opened investigations due 

to allegations of widespread corruption throughout the southern region. 

Office of Project Coordination. The first issue for the OPC was to inventory the 

warehouses utilized by the UN and disburse as much of the perishable items as possible. 

Once the OPC disbursed the perishable items, the OPC began an inventory of the 

remaining assets in OFF warehouses. The next task for OPC was to oversee completion 

of all projects in the north, both in-process and planned. The estimated cost to complete 

all projects in the three northern governorates of Iraq, according to the Counselor for the 

Ministry of Trade and Standards, was approximately $1.5 billion. 
2 

The OPC first estimated that were approximately 30 warehouses, but the final count 

increased to 57 warehouses by February 2004. The warehouses were built on six acre 

compounds. Personnel at OPC found various items from medicine to bulldozers in each 

compound. Many items were intended for projects that were either in the planning or 

execution phase. 

Funding OFF North. According to the OFF Administrator, the CPA wanted to 

complete the OFF program. To do so, the OPC needed to obtain funds from the CPA in 

order to complete the planned and in-progress projects. According to the Counselor for 

the Ministry of Trade and Standards, approximately $1.5 billion was needed to complete 

those planned and in-progress projects. 

Transfers of Funds. However, the funds had to be transferred in cash from one bank to 

another for use by the Kurdish Regional Government because the banks in Iraq are not 

electronically connected. Due to the amounts of those cash transfers, the CPA requested 

that the Office of the Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority review the 

policies and procedures for controlling, handling, and monitoring the transfer of cash. 

Objective 

The objective of the audit was to determine whether the CPA had established and 

implemented appropriate policies and procedures for the accounting, controlling, and 

monitoring of the transfer of approximately $1.5 billion in cash to the Kurdish Regional 

Government as part of the OFF program. 
3 

Finding A. Cash Transfer Procedures in 

Erbil, Iraq 

OPC did not obtain, review, validate, and approve cash transfer procedures for using 

foreign-national couriers to transfer cash within Erbil, Iraq. This occurred because OPC 

changed part of its procedures from using its own staff for the transfer of cash within 

Erbil to using a local courier to transfer the cash before obtaining, reviewing, validating, 

and approving cash transfer procedures for using foreign-national couriers. As a result, 

there was an increased risk for the loss or theft of the cash. 

Government Accountability Office Standards 

Guidance for internal control standards are contained in the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) publication, “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,” 

November 1999. We used the GAO standards because CPA had no internal control 

guidance. The GAO sets forth five main areas within its standards. The five areas are: 

(1) the Control Environment, (2) Risk Assessment, (3) Control Activities, (4) Information 

and Communication, and (5) Monitoring. 

Management of Cash Transfers 

Although overall sufficient controls were in place to handle cash without a high risk of 

loss (see Finding B), OPC did not obtain, review, validate, and approve cash transfer 

procedures for using foreign-national couriers to transfer cash within Erbil, Iraq. 

Transfer of Cash. The cash available in Erbil for OFF projects had been transported 

from the Central Bank of Baghdad to the Kurdistan Regional Bank. The transfers of cash 

to pay for projects were then executed from the Kurdistan Regional Bank. We reviewed 

the written procedures for cash transfers made by OPC personnel in Erbil. 

Local Courier. OPC changed part of its procedures from using its own staff for the 

transfer of cash within Erbil to using a local courier to transfer the cash before obtaining, 

reviewing, validating, and approving cash transfer procedures for using foreign-national 

couriers. After the initiation of our audit work to review procedures for the transfer of 

cash by OPC personnel, we were informed that the procedures had changed. No longer 

were OPC personnel transporting cash within Erbil, instead, a local courier was being 

used. 

After developing acceptable procedures, in our opinion, for the transfer of cash by its 

own personnel, OPC contracted with a local courier to perform the transfer of cash on its 

behalf. The cash was transported by a professional local courier and OPC believed that 

this method would be more secure. OPC personnel counted and signed for all funds 

transferred from the CPA comptroller and also had a second employee at the bank 

recount the cash once it arrived. 

Conclusion 

We believe that the use of a foreign-national courier without appropriate procedures in 

place before the initiation of service resulted in an increased risk for the loss or theft of 

the cash. 
4 

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit 

Response 

We recommend that the Deputy General of the Office of Project Coordination obtain, 

review, validate, and approve cash transfer procedures for the use of local foreignnational couriers before contracting for those types of services. 

Management Comments. The Chief Financial Officer, OPC, stated that OPC takes 

issue with the recommendation since the two couriers were previously used by the UN 

and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Since both couriers were recommended by the 

Kurdistan Regional Government and had reliable and satisfactory records, OPC felt it 

unnecessary to review the policies and procedures that will be used by the courier. 

 

Audit Response. We continue to believe that it would have been prudent to review, 

validate, and approve cash transfer procedures for the use of local foreign-national 

couriers before contracting for those types of services. However, because the transition 

to Iraqi sovereignty has been completed, any corrective action is now an Iraqi Interim 

Government responsibility. Therefore, this report makes no further recommendations. 

In response to management comments, we should note that the numbers used in the draft 

report have been changed. Originally the funds to be transferred were expected to be as 

much as $1.9 billion, but the amount of the funds that were actually transferred was 

$1.545 billion. The amounts in the report were changed from the $1.9 to $1.5 billion. 

In addition, comments on the report from OPC asked that paragraphs be changed to 

provide better clarity. The “Transition from the United Nations to Coalition Provisional 

Authority” paragraph in background was changed from “not leaving any documentation” 

to “the UN departed without providing all documentation.” 

The final clarification requested by OPC was the wording of a transition paragraph that 

talked of Oil-for-Food North and Oil-for-Food South. OPC felt it was confusing since 

the two area situations were not similar. We deleted the sentence “The south had signs of 

corruption and north had inadequate records of what was scheduled to be completed, 

what was due in, or where items were stored.” from the background in order to clarify the 

paragraph. 
5 

Finding B. Internal Controls over Cash 

Management 

We determined that the CPA had established and implemented appropriate policies and 

procedures for the accounting, controlling, and monitoring of the transfer of 

approximately $1.5 billion in cash to the Kurdish Regional Government as part of the 

OFF program. We also determined that the process to make payments satisfied GAO 

standards. 

Government Accountability Office Standards 

Guidance for internal control standards are contained in the GAO publication, “Standards 

for Internal Control in the Federal Government,” November 1999. We used the GAO 

standards because CPA had no internal control guidance. The GAO sets forth five main 

areas within its standards. The five areas are: (1) the Control Environment, (2) Risk 

Assessment, (3) Control Activities, (4) Information and Communication, and (5) 

Monitoring. 

Internal Controls over Cash Management 

OPC established written policies and procedures for four types of payments or transfers 

made in Erbil, Iraq. Those consisted of cash transfers, check payments, petty cash 

payments, and wire transfers. We evaluated the four types of payments or transfers using 

the five main areas of the GAO standards as those pertained to cash management. 

Control Environment. The GAO standards concerning the control environment state 

“Management and employees should establish and maintain an environment throughout 

the organization that sets a positive and supportive attitude toward internal control and 

conscientious management.” The standards also explain that having appraisals, 

competent employees, counseling, established goals, and regular training are ways of 

establishing a good control environment. 

OPC staff had attended higher education institutions and had either received degrees in 

accounting or similar areas such as finance or business. The Chief Financial Officer was 

responsible for counseling and reviewing the performance of OPC accounting staff and 

all OPC personnel had received counseling and reviews both formal and informal. The 

Chief Financial Officer also provided training to the OPC accounting staff so that the 

individuals remained current on policies and issues relating to their positions. In our 

opinion, the actions taken within OPC were conducive to ensuring a beneficial control 

environment. 

Risk Assessment. The GAO standards concerning risk assessment state “Internal 

controls should provide for an assessment of the risks the agency faces from both external 

and internal sources.” The standards also explain that the risks both internal and external 

should be evaluated. Although no formal qualitative or quantitative risk assessments 

were performed, the evaluations made by OPC staff were helpful in identifying and 

determining the types of procedures to utilize to minimize risks. 

Control Activities. The GAO standards concerning control activities state “Internal 

control activities help ensure that management’s directives are carried out. The control 

activities should be effective and efficient in accomplishing the agency’s control 

objectives.” Control activities include the approvals and authorizations, physical 

controls, policies and procedures, separation of duties, verifications, and other aspects 
6 

associated with decreasing the risk of loss of funds. The standards pertaining to 

information systems were not discussed because OPC did not use any information 

systems in the cash management processes. The strengths of the control activities at OPC 

and examples of the controls in place and functioning include: 

Authority and Approval. A strength of the OPC internal control system was the 

authority and approval process for cash payments. We reviewed transactions and 

interviewed OPC staff in order to ensure that transactions were supported as well as being 

approved for payment prior to the release of funds regardless of the method of payment. 

All payments selected for review had satisfactory support. 

For example, disbursement CD #00099, a wire transfer, included the invoice from the 

company stamped for review by the Accounts Payable Manager to ensure that the 

payment did not exceed the contract price. The package also included payment approvals 

from the Chief Financial Officer and the Deputy Director General. The Chief Financial 

Officer’s signature indicated the funds were available for the payment and the Deputy 

Director General’s signature signified the authority to make the payment. We found that 

similar procedures were followed for making check payments with only a minor 

deviation. The only difference was that a check had to be dually signed by the Chief 

Financial Officer and the Deputy Director General to be valid. The approval process for 

petty cash payments (payments under $200) were approved by the Chief Financial 

Officer and certified by the Accounts Payable Manager. 

Physical Controls. Physical controls over cash and blank checks reduce the risk 

of the loss of funds. Specifically, the petty cash and blank check stocks maintained 

within OPC were properly safeguarded. Those items were maintained in a two-key safe 

and the keys were kept by two different individuals. Additionally, the office had 

controlled entry. Guards controlled personnel entering the OPC compound and it was 

surrounded by a fence. The OPC physical controls were satisfactory. 

We also reviewed the security controls over OPC funds held in the Kurdistan Regional 

Bank. Based on our review of security procedures at OPC and the Kurdistan Regional 

Bank, physical controls appeared to be satisfactory and minimized the risk of funds loss. 

We considered the bank’s security to be satisfactory. 

Policies and Procedures. Written policies and procedures are management 

directives addressing how functions should be performed. The four written policies 

provided to the auditors were for cash transfers, check payments, petty cash payments, 

and wire transfers. Each procedure explained the process to be performed by each 

member of the OPC staff involved. 

Separation of Duties. Separation of duties is critical in the reduction of funds 

lost due to theft. If one individual has the sole function to approve and disburse funds, 

the risk of loss increases. In each of the payment areas, at least three individuals were 

involved in the payment process and no one individual was able to process a payment 

alone. For example, for payment CD #00162, the payment invoice was paid with the 

approval of the Accounts Payable Manager. He ensured that the payment did not exceed 

the contract price. The disbursing voucher was then prepared by the Financial Reporting 

Manager and approved by the Chief Financial Officer. Once the package was approved 

and the Chief Financial Officer had signed the check, the Deputy Director General signed 

the check to make it valid. Once the check was completed, the cashier mailed the check, 

and the Financial Reporting Manager recorded the transaction in the accounting system 

and filed the voucher. The duties of preparing, authorizing, approving, mailing, and 

recording the funds were all handled by different members of OPC. We found the 

separation of duties within OPC were sufficient. 
7 

Information and Communication. The GAO standards concerning information and 

communication state “Information should be recorded and communicated to management 

and others within the entity who need it and in a form and within a time frame that 

enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities.” The staff 

understood their chain-of-command and how to contact their supervisor if there were any 

problems that needed to be addressed. The communication lines within the OPC were 

satisfactory. 

Monitoring. The GAO standards concerning monitoring state “Internal control 

monitoring should assess the quality of performance over time and ensure that the 

findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved.” The OPC monitoring was 

two fold. First, there was management supervision of the employees, as discussed earlier 

under Control Environment. Second, there was the internal auditing performed by OPC 

staff in order to minimize the possibility of funds loss due to theft. 

Cash Count. The ability to detect misplaced funds and calculation errors falls 

under the internal control area of monitoring. In order to detect missing funds, OPC 

personnel performed two key internal control functions. The first was the daily cash 

count that was performed at the end of the business day at OPC in Erbil, Iraq. The petty 

cash funds were counted and reconciled with the morning petty cash fund balance by 

using paid invoices. The cash count was performed in tandem by the Accounts Payable 

Manager and the cashier, and it was balanced prior to the close of business. 

Bank Reconciliation. The bank reconciliation was performed by the Financial 

Reporting Manager on the actual bank statement. The Financial Reporting Manager 

attached copies of outstanding checks to the bank statement to support the reconciliation. 

After the Financial Reporting Manager completed the bank reconciliation, it was given to 

the Chief Financial Officer for verification. The Chief Financial Officer reviewed, 

verified and signed the bank reconciliation. Our review of the process showed it to be 

adequate. 

Conclusion 

We believe that authority and approval, internal auditing, physical control, and separation 

of duties are integral parts of an internal control system and vital to help reduce the risk 

of funds loss. In our review of those attributes, we determined that the CPA had 

established and implemented appropriate policies and procedures for the accounting, 

controlling, and monitoring of the transfer of approximately $1.5 billion in cash to the 

Kurdish Regional Government as part of the OFF program. We also determined that the 

process to make payments satisfied GAO standards. Therefore, we have no 

recommendations for improving internal controls over cash management and commend 

OPC management for their attention to this area. 
8 

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

We performed this audit from March 2004 through May 2004 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We reviewed cash transfer procedures at the Office of Project Coordination (OPC), 

located in Erbil, Iraq. Erbil is located in the northern portion of Iraq. We reviewed the 

following OPC policies: 

• 04-01.01 “Check Preparation Procedures,” March 31, 2004 

• 04-02.01 “Wire Transfer Procedures,” March 31, 2004 

• 04-07.01 “Petty Cash Procedures,” March 31, 2004 

• 04-10.01 “Cash Transfer Procedures,” April 12, 2004 

We reviewed each type of payment or transfer for the following four aspects: authority 

and approval, internal auditing, physical control, and separation of duties. We also 

evaluated the four types of payments or transfers using the five main areas of the 

Government Accountability Office standards as those pertained to cash management. 

We interviewed OPC staff responsible for conducting the cash transactions. We asked 

questions pertaining to their levels of continued training, counseling, and education. We 

judgmentally selected samples of payments to ensure that the written procedures had 

been implemented and were being followed. We also interviewed personnel at OPC and 

the Kurdistan Regional Bank to ensure that the procedures were understood and 

followed. We also interviewed the bank manager at the Kurdistan Regional Bank to 

review the security procedures. 

Scope Limitation. Our scope was limited due to time and resource constraints. 

Specifically, the lack of security prevented us from meeting with personnel from the OPC 

located in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, to observe and review the office procedures. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform 

this audit. 
9 

Appendix B. Management Comments from the 

Chief Financial Officer, Office of Project 

Coordination 
10 
11 
12 

Appendix C. Acronyms

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

OFF Oil for Food 

OPC Office of Project Coordination 

UN United Nations 
13 

Appendix D. Report Distribution 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 

Office of the Secretary of State 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics & Technology 

 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement 

Auditor General, Department of the Army 

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Iraq Project and Contracting Office 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Office of Management and Budget 

Government Accountability Office 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

House Committee on Appropriations 

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Committee 

on Government Reform 

House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations, Committee on Government Reform 

House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, 

and the Census, Committee on Government Reform 
14 

Appendix E: Audit Team Members 

The Financial Management Division, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for 

Auditing, Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared this report. Personnel of the Office 

of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Coalition Provisional Authority, who 

contributed to the report are listed below. 

John Betar 

Brian Flynn 

Robert Murrell 

William Whitehead 

Jeff Marshall 

Ramon B. Miller Jr.