Enclosure

NRC RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL LETTERS TO NRC CHAIRMAN, NILS J. DIAZ 

FROM READERS OF EYE ON WACKENHUT 

(A Web site hosted by the Service Employees International Union) 

REGARDING SECURITY ISSUES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 

INTRODUCTION

In mid-November, 2003, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) received a large number of

electronic mail messages and facsimiles containing a letter addressed to NRC Chairman Nils J.

Diaz. The letter raised concerns about security at nuclear power plants. In general, the issues

raised in the letter involved events that occurred several years ago. The NRC posted its

response to those issues on its website at www.nrc.gov. The NRC also wrote to “Eye-onWackenhut” requesting a link to NRC’s response to allow interested persons to have easy

access to the NRC’s response.

Recently, NRC has received another letter from Eye-on-Wackenhut forwarded to Chairman

Diaz with similar concerns. The concerns related to Indian Point 2 have been addressed in

NRC’s previous response. However, additional concerns were expressed regarding the Salem

and Callaway Nuclear Power Plants dealing in part with discrimination against security officers

who raised concerns. The NRC has determined that the most efficient means to respond

publicly to these mass mailings about safety and security at NRC-licensed facilities is to post

our detailed response on NRC’s website and to request the organization hosting the e-mail

campaign to provide a link to our response on its website, as well. Additional concerns related

to security at certain Department of Energy (DOE) facilities are also included in the Eye-onWackenhut letter. As a general matter, the NRC does not comment on concerns which are

outside of the its jurisdiction.

The following comments respond to the general concerns raised about nuclear power plant

security and to the specific security officer concerns raised at the Salem Nuclear plant in

southern New Jersey in 1996 and the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant in Missouri in 1999. 

GENERAL RESPONSE

For over 25 years, the NRC has required certain categories of NRC licensees to maintain

robust security programs. As a result of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the NRC

launched a comprehensive evaluation of the security and safeguards programs at nuclear

power plants, nuclear materials and waste facilities, and radioactive material transportation

activities. 

The NRC has issued orders to licensees requiring enhancements designed to raise the level of

security at nuclear power reactors by upgrading security in the areas of physical protection,

access authorization (including improved background checks), security force training and

qualification, security force work hours (fitness for duty), and protection against a revised

design basis threat (DBT). The DBT is characterized by the type, composition, and capabilities

of an adversary. The DBT is used to design safeguards systems to protect against acts of

radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft and diversion of special nuclear material. Many

of these enhancements had already been put in place voluntarily by licensees; however, the
orders provided the means to make them legally binding and to ensure consistent

implementation.

Force-on-force exercises (simulated commando-style attacks on nuclear power plants) are

conducted to assess and improve, as necessary, performance of defensive strategies at

licensed facilities. These exercises were temporarily suspended immediately following the

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, because such exercises would have been a significant

distraction to licensee security forces which were at the highest level of security alert. In

February 2003, the NRC decided to establish an expanded force-on-force exercise pilot

program. The pilot force-on-force exercises are aimed at reducing artificialities, thereby

increasing the realism of the exercises and improving NRC’s processes for assessing the

licensees’ readiness to respond to the DBT. In resuming these exercises, the NRC also

increased the exercise frequency at nuclear power reactor facilities from once every eight years

to once every three years.

Licensees are required to meet the safety and security requirements stipulated in the

regulations. The NRC inspection program is designed to verify compliance with the regulatory

requirements, regardless of whether the security force is composed of licensee employees or 

contractor employees. The NRC conducts inspections that evaluate the effectiveness of the

security program and include observations of the guard force members and their supervisors. 

Although the NRC interacts with contractor personnel, the NRC holds licensees accountable for

security performance.

NRC regulations prohibit discrimination against employees or contract workers who raise safety

concerns, including security concerns with safety implications. The NRC has an established

process for reviewing cases where discrimination is alleged. When NRC receives information

indicating that an individual may have been harassed or intimidated due to raising safety

concerns, or about any potential security vulnerabilities, the NRC evaluates the circumstances

in accordance with established procedures. Additional information on NRC sanctions for

discrimination against employees who raise safety concerns can be found on the NRC Website

at http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/regulatory/enforcement/sanctions.html.

In the cases cited, NRC thoroughly investigated the circumstances surrounding the alleged

discrimination against the security officers, as well as the specific concerns raised by the

officers. In both cases, NRC found that the security officers had been discriminated against for

raising concerns and took enforcement action against the licensee and, as appropriate, the

contractor in accordance with NRC’s enforcement policy. The NRC also confirmed that the

specific security issues raised by the officers were resolved. Information on the specific cases

is provided below.

SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO SECURITY ISSUES

Issue 1) Salem Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey

NRC Response:

The Eye-on-Wackenhut website states that Salem Nuclear Power plant in southern New Jersey

has lax security. Based on the description on the website, the NRC understands that Eye-onWackenhut is referring to the following case: Years ago the NRC determined that Public

Service Electric and Gas (the licensee) and Wackenhut Corporation violated the requirements
of 10CFR 50.7 for employee protection when, in August 1996, Wackenhut suspended a

security officer for raising a security concern. Specifically, the security officer was suspended

without pay when she expressed concern regarding a supervisor’s failure to perform a required

security alarm test. After the issue was raised by other individuals, the security alarm test was

completed. Further information on this case can be found through NRC’s on-line Agency

Document Management System (ADAMs) under the docket for Salem at: ML003719200.

Issue 2) Callaway Nuclear Power Plant in Missouri

NRC Response:

The Eye-on-Wackenhut website states that there is shoddy employee screening at the

Callaway Nuclear Power plant in Missouri. Based on the description on the website, the NRC

understands that Eye-on-Wackenhut is referring to the following case: The NRC determined

that Union Electric (the licensee) and The Wackenhut Corporation violated the requirements of

10CFR 50.7 for employee protection when, in November 1999, Wackenhut unfavorably

terminated the employment of a security officer and reprimanded a training instructor. Union

Electric also revoked the security officer’s unescorted access authorization after the officer and

training instructor identified a violation of NRC requirements. Specifically, the security officer

and training instructor identified that an individual who did not have a high school diploma or

equivalent was hired as a temporary watchman in violation of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B,

Section I.A.1.a. After the violation was identified, The Wackenhut Corporation terminated the

employment of the temporary watchman and Union Electric revoked his unescorted access

authorization. Further information on this case can be viewed on NRC’s public Web site at the

following address:

 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/ea01005.html.