### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
NO. 03-0 6 -00 598 -CV

Cl iffor d Z e ifm an , A ppe lla nt

v. Sheryl Diane Michels and Au stin In dependent S chool District , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-06- 0029 30 , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM E. BENDER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
We w ith dr aw o ur

op ini on iss ue d M ay

11 , 2 00 7, and

su bs tit ut e the fo llo wi ngin i ts p l ac e. T h e C o u rt h as o v erru l edM i ch el s ’s m o t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g.

This appea l arises within a statutory scheme intended to e nsure the be st interests of children f ollowing their

pare nts’ divorce
. I t also implicates the princ iples underlying our adver sarial sy stem, which we trust to ensure justice a nd truth u n d er o u r l aw through the ref ining of issues
a c hie ve d w he n p art ie s and the ir a ble a dv oc a te s r e c e ive the ir “ da y in c ourt ” un de r f

a ir pr oc e dure s. Ex -spouses Shery

l Michels and C lifford Z eifman, a ided by their re spective le g al teams, ar e embr oiled in a controve rsy conce rning the best intere sts of their t wo children, A.A. and G.L . The backg round of this controve rsy is detailed in our opinions in prior proce eding s that haveSe e Ze ifm an v . M ic he ls , 212 S.W .3d 582 (Tex. App.—Austin 2 0 0 6 , pet. denied) ; 1 see also In reZeifman , No. 03-06-00601- CV, slip op. at 1-2 (Tex
. Ap p . —Austin Nov. 22, 20 06 ) ( orig. p ro c e e din g ) ( me m. o p. ); In re Zeifman , N o. 03 -0 7- 00 07 5- CV , s lip op . at 1 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 16, 2007, orig. procee ding) (mem. op.). We have taken judi cial noti ce of our f ile s f ro m th e se pr ior

re la te d p ro c e e din g s. In re Zeifman , No. 03-06-00601- CV, slip op. at 2. 2 In re Zeifman , No. 03-07-00075- CV, slip op. at 1. 3 In re Zeifman , No. 03-06-601- CV, slip op. at 2. W e also obser v ed that “A.A.’s 4 pare nts—not the courts or other third parties—a

re in the be st positi on, perha ps with the assistance of a c ompetent mediator, to make that deter mination in A.A.’s best interests, ther eby avoiding extensive a

nd acr imonious litigation that c ould adver sely impact A.A., their

other c hild, each othe r, and possibly

others.” 2 ari se n fr om it in re c e nt m on ths
. To summarize, Mic hels and Z eifman “ have pur sued extensive and 1

acr imonious l itigation over which [elementar

y ] school A.A. should attend,” a c on fl ic t th a t e vid e ntl y 2 h a s s p r e a d t o o t h e r i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g b o t h A
. A
. an d a s e c o n d c h i l d , G
. L. I nformed by

the har sh tenor 3 of the litigation and leg al expenses that, the re cord of these proce eding s reve al, ar e spiralinginto the hundreds of

thousands of dollars, we have pr eviously sug g ested that “ the adve rsar ial proce sses of
our cour t sy stem,” at lea st when utiliz ed in this manner, “ m ay n o t b e the best mea ns” of e ither de c idi ngwh ic h s c ho ol A .A . s ho uld a tte nd or of e ns ur ingthi s y oungc hil d’ s b e st i nte re sts
. 4 This latest appea l involves a contention by Z eifman that M ichels and he r lawy ers
s oug ht to advance their intere sts by unethically

circ umventing the proce dural prote ctions that our adver sarial ju s ti c e s y s te m p r o v id e s h im
. T h e c o n d u c t h e a ll e g e s is in d e e d d is tu r b in g . I nour Aug ust 4, 2006 opinion i n Cause No. 03- 05-0053 3 -C V, we he ld that, on the rec ord bef ore us, the district court had a

bused its discretion in modify ing the compre hensive ter ms of the par

ties’ orig inal ag ree d divorce decr ee to g ive Michels sole powe r to make e ducational de cisions on behalf of A.A.Th is s tand ingor de r, a pp lic a ble to “ e ve ry

div or c e su it a

nd e ve ry su it a ff e c tin g the pa

re nt- 5 c hil d r e la tio ns hip fi le d in Tr a vis County” a ft e r Janu ary 1, 20 05 , p ro hib its pa

rt ie s, “ wh ile the laws uit is pending befor e the c ourt,” fr om actions including “[d] isrupting or withdrawingthe childre n from the school or da

y -ca re f acility wher e the childre n are prese ntly enrolled, w ithout the written ag ree ment of both pare nts or an o rd er of this Court.” See Travis Co. Standing O rder Reg arding Children, Property

and C o nduct of the Par ties (Travis Co. Dist . Clerk’s F ile No. 121,012 (L ocal Rules and O rder s)) (e ffe ctive Jan. 1, 2005). Although the parties’ 1997 divorce decr ee predated the standing order , Michels alleg ed that Z eifman had made himself subject to the order by f i l i n g a c r o s s - p e t i t i o ni na

s e c o n d m o d i f i c a t i o np r o c e e d i n g s h e h a d i n i t i a t e d i n2 0 0 5 c o n c e r

n i n g G
. L. 3 Se e Ze ifm an v . M

ic he ls , 2 12 S.W. 3d

582, 59 6 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 06 , p e t. d e nie d) ; id . at 59 6 (P e mbe rt on , J., c on c ur ri ng ). Duri ng the pe ri od in w hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r w a s in e ff e c t, Michels had ex erc ised her authority to withdraw A.A . from the Austin Independe nt School District’s (AI SD) Br

y ker Woods Elementa

ry , the school in w hich the orig inal ag ree d divorce decr ee h ad require d the child to be enr olled, and enr olled her in St. Andrew s. Zeifman , 212 S.W
. 3 d at 586. After we had rele ased our opinion but before mandate issued, Mic hels sued AI SD seeking injunctive relief to preve nt the district from per mitti ng Z eifman to e nroll A.A. at B ry ker W oods or any

other AI SD s c ho ol a s th e 20 06 sc ho ol y e ar b e g an. Mic he ls a lle g e d th a t pe rm itt ingsu c h e nr oll me nt w ou ld (1) violate Michels’s exclusive pa renta l r ights (at least until the mandate in No. 05-533-CV issued) to ma k e e d u c a ti o n a l d e c is io n s o n b e h a lf o f A
. A
. an d ( 2 ) “ a c ti v e ly a s s is t[ ] . . . an d a id [] a n d a b e t[ ] Clifford Z eifman in the violation of a valid co u rt o rd er , ” a D ece mber 17, 2004, standingorder g ov e rn ingTr a vis County

fa mil y law c a se s. 5 Whil e Miche ls’s new law suit was direc ted at co ntrolling Z eifman’ s actions—and de sp ite the fa c t th a t he wa s A .A .’ s f a the r, joi nt- manag ingc on se rv a tor , a nd he r o pp os ingpa

rt y in ong oing litig ation conce rning A.A.’s e ducation—Miche ls did not name Z eifman a s a par ty . Z eifman repr esents that, eve n worse, Mic hels soug ht to avoid his notice or dete ction by deliberately

filing he rThe publicly available State Ba

r of Te x as publications from this course state that it was 6 held betwe en August 14-17, 2006. Th is da te c or

re sp on ds to the da

y a ft e r the 20 06 State B ar Adva nc e d Famil y

L aw C ours e 7 was sche duled to end. 4 laws uit on a da y —M on da y , A ugus t 14 —o n whi ch “S hery l and he r atto rn e y s w e re awa

re ” fr om a
vacation letter and prior

corr espondenc e “that Cl i ff o rd ’s attorne y

was out of town attending the Advanc ed F amily

L aw Course in San Antonio.” 6 At 2:48 p.m. on August 14, Miche ls obtained an e x parte temporar y restra ining or der ag ainst AI SD. On the following Fr iday , Aug ust 18, Z eifman f iled a petition in intervention, motion 7 to dismiss, and motion for sanctions. Z eifman ple aded that he had a justiciable interest in Michels’s new law suit as A.A.’s father and co-ma nag ing conser

vator, and as re spondent and c ounter-pe titioner in t he on g oin g lit ig a tio n. Z e if man mo ve d to dis mis s Mi c he ls’ s su it a s an im pr op e r atte mpt

to circ umvent the district court’s jurisdiction over the divorce decr ee and this Court’s jurisdiction over “the issue of [A.A.’s] education.” Z eifman also urg ed that Michels’s attempt to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction was inconsistent with the pos ition she had taken only a few months ear lier in a
se c on d mo dif

ic a tio n p ro c e e din g sh e ha d in iti a te d und e r t he div or c e de c re e in 2 00 5. Spe c if ic a lly , in response to a counter -petition from Ze ifman t o modify the educational-c hoice portions of t he dec ree , Michels had fi l ed a p l ea to the jurisdiction asserting that the district court lac ked subjec t matter jurisdiction over the counter- petition while the appea l of the dec ree modifications in No. 05-533 wa s pending . The district cour t then “ag ree [d] that it ha s no jurisdiction to m odify the orde r addr essing the education of [ A.A.] beca use of the cur

rent a ppeal of that matter” but overrule d Michels’s pleaOr de r o n Pl e a to t he Juri sd ic tio n o f S hery l Di ane Mic he ls, Ma y 24 , 2 00 6. On

a pp e a l, 8 Z eifman points out that Michels subsequently made similar ar g uments in the district court, af ter she fi le d a pe tit ion fo r re vie w of thi s Cour t’ s judg me nt in the su

pr e me c ourt , in

re sis tin g his e ff

or ts t o enfor ce his rig hts under the or igina l divorce de cre e. 5 be c a us e it “ re ta ins jur isd ic tio n w ith re sp e c t to a ll o the r a sp e c ts o f t he pa re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip a s to both children unde r Chapter s 155 and 156 of the T exas Family Code.” 8 Z eifman soug ht sanctions under r ule 13 of the Te x as Rules of Civil P ro cedur e, chapte rs 9 and 10 of

the civil prac tice and r emedies c ode, and the distric t co urt’s inhere nt power. He c omp la ine d ch ief

ly tha t Mi c he ls h a d f

ile d a “ fr ivo lou s a

nd g ro un dle ss” se pa

ra te su it a g a ins t AI SD, rather

than see king r elief in the divorc e and custody case , to circumve nt the jurisdiction of the district court and this Court, and in a manner deliberately calc ulated to avoid his knowledg e or pa rt ic ipatio n f

or a sh or t, b ut c ri tic a l, p e ri od

of tim e . Z e if

man argue s that the se ta c tic s, c ou ple d w ith subsequent eve nts, revea l Michels’s sole desig n to ha ve been delay
. He r epre sents that he had be en schedule d to have c ustody of A.A. dur ing the wee k of August 14, that classes at Br y ker Woods wer e to beg in on Aug ust 15, and that custody was sc h ed u l ed to re turn to Michels the following wee k. Thus, Z eifman ma intains, Michels filed what pr oved to be a “one- wee k lawsuit” sol ely to preve nt hi m fro m enr oll ingA. A. duri nghis c us tod y we e k a nd to “ buy tim e ” un til c us tod

y re tur ne d to Mic he ls the fo llo wi ngwe e k a nd sh e c ou ld e nr oll A. A. in S t. A nd re ws . A hea ring on Z eifman’ s intervention, motion to d is mi s s , a n d mo ti o n f o r s a n c tions was
se t on the thi rd bu sin e ss day the re a ft e r, Wed ne sd ay , Augus t 23 . O n M on da y , A ugus t 21 , M ic he ls filed a rule 11 ag ree ment with A I SD, dated Aug ust 18, wher eby the district a g ree d not to permit A.A. to be enr olled at or attend B ry ker Woods “until such time as [AI SD] is presente d with a final, non-6

appea lable orde r exp ressly authorizing such e nrollment and attenda nce,” in return f

or Michels’s ag ree ment to dismi ss her pe nding suit. Michels filed a notice of non-suit on Aug ust 22 and, on the da y of the he ari ng , f

ile d a mot ion to st ri ke Zeif

man’ s in te rv e nti on . A ft e r a he ari ngin w hic h o nly
argume nt w a s p re se nte d, the dis tr ic t c ourt sig ne d a n “ Or de r Con fi rm ing No ns uit ” and , b y se pa rate
or de r, g ra nte d M ic he ls’ s mo tio n to str ike int e rv e nti on , d ism iss ed as moo t Z e if man’ s mo tio n to dis mis s, and

de nie d Z e if

man’ s mo tio n f

or sa nc tio ns . Z e if man b ri ng s tw o is su e s, c on te nd ing that the dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d its dis c re tio n in striking his interve ntion and in denying his sanc tions mot ion. We ag ree that the district court a bused its dis c re tio n in

str iki ng Z e if

man’ s inte rv e nti on . F ur

the rm or e , be c a

us e thi s r uli ngwa s und isp ute dly a p r e d ic a te f

o r th e d is tr ic t c o u r

t’ s r u li n g o nZ e if

ma n ’ s s an c ti o n s mo ti o n , w e r e ma n d Z e if ma n’s
sanc tio ns mot ion

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. As thi s Co ur

t ha s p re vio us ly

ob se rv e d, the ri g ht o f i nte rv e nti on is ult imate ly
r o o te d in e qu ity
. Hi

g h lands Ins. Co. v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. , 794 S.W .2d 600, 601 (T ex . Ap p .—Austin 1990, no pet.) (“ The rig ht of intervention is an e quitable rig ht. I t does not dep en d up o n a ru l e or statute for its ex istence.” ). This rig ht is recog nized in rule 60 of the Te x as R u l e s o f C i v i l P ro ce d

u re , wh i ch p ro v i d es t h at “[ a] n y p ar t y m ay i n t er v en e b y

fi l i n g a p l ea d i n g, subject to being stricken by t h e co u rt for suf ficient c ause on the motion of any party .” Te x. R. C iv. P. 6 0; see H ighlands Ins. Co. , 794 S.W .2d at 601-02. Sufficient ca

use exists for striking an intervention when a would-be inter

venor f ace d with a mot ion to strike cannot demonstrate a j usticiable intere st in the lawsuit. Mende z v. Brewer , 62 6 S. W.2 d 4 98 , 4 99 -5 00 (T e x. 19 82 ); see Law Offices of W indle Turle

y, P.C. v. Ghiasinejad ,7

109 S.W .3d 68, 70 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003, no pet.); Mc Cor d v . W att s , 777 S.W .2d 809, 812 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

19 89 , n o w ri t) . T his jus tic ia bl e inte re st m ay

be e ith e r l e g a l or

e qu ita ble in nature b u t m u s t b e prese nt and not mere ly remote or

conting ent. Mende

z , 626 S.W .2d at 499; Mc Cor d , 7 77 S.W. 2d

a t 81 1- 12 (“ An int e rv e no r mus t show so me pr e se nt l e g a l or e qu ita ble int e re st in t he su bje c t matt e r wh ic h mak e s it pr op e r fo r h im t o p art ic ipate in t he pr oc e e din g s. ” ). Th is i nte re st is “ana logous to that essential for a par ty to maintain or defe nd an ac tion.” Mc Cor d , 777 S.W .2d at 81 1- 12 (c iti ng 1 M c Do na ld, Te xas C ivi l Pr a c tic e § 3 .4 7 ( 19 81 e d. )) ; se e als o La w O ffi c es o f W ind le Turley , 1 09 S.W. 3d

a t 70 (“ A p art

y ha s a jus tic ia ble int eres t in a law su it, and thu s a ri g ht t o intervene , when his inter ests will be aff ecte d by the litigation.”) . Whether an inter venor posse sses a present j usticiable i ntere st is deter mined, in the first instance, by the fa cts alleg ed in the petition in in t er v en t i o n, which “a lso should be construed a long w ith the alleg ations of fa ct set for th in the pleading s of the other

parties.” Mc Cor

d , 777 S.W .2d at 812. W h i l e t h e d et ermination of whe t h er a j u s t i ci ab l e i n t er es tex i s t s b as edo nt h e p l ea d i n gs would appea

r to prese nt a pure question of law, cf. Texas Park s & W ildlif e De pt. v. Miranda , 13 3 S. W.3 d 2 17 , 2 26 -2 7 (T e x. 20 04 ), the ult imate de te rm inatio n of wh e the r a n in te rv e nti on

sh ou ld be struck, e ven if a

justiciable interest is shown, has longbeen he ld to be vested in th e sound discretion of the trial court. Mende z , 626 S.W .2d at 499 (“It is settled law that a motion to strike an int e rv e nti on is a dd

re sse d to the so un d d isc re tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt .” ); Law Off

ices of W indle Turley , 10 9 S. W.3 d at 70 ; Mc Cor d , 777 S.W .2d at 812. We acc ording ly revie w a trial court’ s decision on a motion to strike an interve ntion for abuse of discre tion. See I n re Lu mb erme ns Mut. Cas. Co. , 184 S.W .3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2006) (citing Guaranty Fed. Sav . Bank v . Horseshoe O perating Co. ,8

79 3 S. W.2 d 6 52 , 6 57 (T e x. 19 90 ))
. An a bu se of dis c re tio n d e no te s “ a c t[in g ] wit ho ut r e fe re nc e to g uiding r ules or princ iples; in o t her w ords . . . the ac t was ar bitrary or unre asonable .” W

or for d v. Stamper , 801 S.W .2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).

Du ri ng or a l a rg ument, Mi chel s co nced ed t hat Zeifm an had sh ow n a jus tic ia ble int e re st in her suit ag ainst AI SD, at l east at its inception. Ze ifman’s justiciable inter est is obvious from the fac e of his petition, if not from Michels’s own pe tition. M ichels’s suit soug ht to prevent Z eifman from enr olling A.A. in B ry ker W oods or ot her AI SD schools. Both Z eifman a nd Michels pleade d that Z e if man is A. A. ’s fa

the r. Z e if man p le a de d th a t he was jo in t ma na g ingc on se rv a tor ; Mi c he ls reque sted the district court to take judicial notice of the file in their divorce case , which demonstrated Z e if man’ s jo int

mana g ingc on se rv a tor sh ip. B oth Z e if man and Mic he ls re c ounte d th e his tor y of the ir litigation conc erningwher e A.A. should attend elementa ry school, in c lu d in g

th e opinion of this court
re ve rs ingthe dis tr ic t court ’s or de r g ra nti ng Mic he ls sol e c on tr ol o ve r A .A .’ s e du c a tio na l de c isi on s. Michels furthe r alleg ed that she a nd Z eifman ha d eac h filed additional motions to modi fy the divorce de c re e and

we re c ur re ntl y lit ig a tin g the se iss ue s. Ev e n if Z e if man d e mon str a te d a

jus tic ia ble int e re st i n h e r s uit , M ic he ls c on tend s, he has not de monstrated that the dis trict court a bused its discretion in striking his interve ntion. She relies on the pr oposition t hat “[i] t is only an abuse of the trial c ourt’s discre tion to st rike a pe tit ion in i nte rv e nti on if the int e rv e no r: (1 ) c ou ld have br ou g ht the same a c tio n, or any pa rt of it, in its own name; (2) the inter vention would not c omplicate the case by excessively

multipl y ing the issues; and (3) the intervention is almost essential to eff ec t i v ely protec t the intervenor ’s intere st.” Michels der ives these pr inci p l es fr o m the Texas Supreme Court’s dec ision in Guaranty Fede ral
.9

See 79 3 S. W.2 d at 65 7; see also Inte rmarque Auto Prod., Inc . v. Fe ldman , 21 S.W
. 3 d 5 4 4, 549 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2000, no pet.). Applying he r cha rac terization of the Guaranty Fede ral ho ldi ng , M ic he ls c on te nd s th a t “ Z e if man c ou ld n ot have br ou g ht the same a c tio n ag a ins t th e Au sti n I ndepende nt School District that [ she] filed,” which she depicts as seekingto protect he r per sonal rig hts as a par ent to solely

control A.A.’ s educational decisions (which she could continue to enf orce , in her view , until this Court’s mandate issued in the previously pending litigation) and rig hts unique to her unde r the Tr avis County standing o rd er . Michels adds that Z eifman’ s suit would have “complicated” he r ca se by i n t er j ectingissues—specific ally , a motion to dism iss and a motion for sanctions—that wer e not raised by the orig inal parties. She further emphasizes that Z eifman did not make a rec ord of the district c ourt’s proc eeding s, nor re quest finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, requiringus to assume that the di strict court found all fac tual issues in support of any leg al g round t h at could have supported its order
. See F eldman v. M

arks , 9 6 0 S. W. 2 d 6 1 3 , 6 1 4 ( T e x. 1996); Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc. , 947 S.W .2d 665, 668 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied).

Michels misconstrues the Gu aran ty Fe de ra l holding in seve ra l way s. I n that case , the Texas Supreme Court first held that a trial court a

bused its discretion in striking a n intervention sua sponte, as r

ule 60 presumptively permitted an inter vention unless a motion to strike was filed. 793 S.W .2d at 657 (c iting Te x . R. Civ. P . 60). The supr eme c ourt went on to obser ve:
Fur thermore , under Rule 60, a person o r en t i t y

has the rig ht to intervene if the intervenor

could have broug ht the same a ction, or any part ther eof, in his own name , o r , i f t h e a c t i o n h a d b e e nb r o u g h ta g a i n s t h i m , h e w o u l d

b e a b l e t o d e f e a tr e c o v e r

y, or some par

t thereof . The intere st asserted by the interve nor may b e leg al or equitable. Althoug h the trial cour t has broad discr etion in determining whether an int e rv e nti on

sh ou ld b e str ic ke n, it i s an a bu se of dis c re tio n to st ri ke a

ple a in intervention if (1) the interve nor mee ts the abo v e t es t, (2) the inter vention will notLumbermens M utual involved the appe llate interve ntion of an ins urer afte r i ts insured, for 9 wh om i t had pa id the a

pp e a l bo nd , a

ba nd on e d p ote nti a lly

dis po sit ive iss ue s im

pa c tin g c la ims wi thi n the scope of cove rag e. See In re Lumberm ens Mutual ,184 S.W .3d 718, 720-21 (Te x . 2006). The supreme c ourt d et er m i n ed that the insurer had invoked “ the equitable doc trine” of virtual repr esentation, and then considered “othe r fa ctors [that] may weig h ag ainst allowing intervention a ft e r f ina l ju dg me nt h a s b e e n r e nd e re d, inc ludin g t he len gth of tim e the ins ur e r h a d k

no wn of its interest in the case befor e attempting to intervene , the extent of prejudice the exist ing pa rties may su ff e r f ro m th e wo uld -b e int erve no r’ s d e lay , th e e xten t of pr e jud ic e to t

he wo uld -b e int e rv e no r i f int e rv e nti on is de nie d, a nd the e xiste nc e of

unus ua l c ir c ums tanc e s mi lit a tin g fo r o r a g a ins t a deter mination that the application is timely .” Id . at 726. The supr eme court held t hat t he court of appea ls abused its discretion in ref using to a llow the intervention. Id . at 729.

10 complicate the case by

an excessive multiplication o f t h e issues, and ( 3) the int e rv e nti on

is a lmo st e sse nti a l to e ff

e c tiv e ly pr ote c t th e int e rv e no r’ s in te re st.
Id
. (intern a l c it a ti o n s o mi tt e d )
. T h e s u p r e me c o u rt h e ld

th a t t h e s e c o n d it io n s w e r e me t i nthat
case and that, ac cording ly , the district court ha d abused its discre tion in st riking the intervention. Id. at 757-58.

Whil e Gu aran ty

Fe de ra l does identify

a set of e quitable conditions under which the striking of an intervention would be a n abuse of

discretion, it does not, contra ry to Michels’s
asser tion, establish the “only ” or e x cl u s ive circ umstances in which that would be so. See In re Lumberm ens Mutual , 1 84 S.W. 3d a t 72 2- 29 (b a se d o n b a lanc ingof dif fe re nt e qu ita

ble considerations, concluding that court of a ppeals ha d abused its discre tion in barring intervention on
a pp e a l) ; see also In re Es tat e of York , 95 1 S
. W
. 2d 122, 126 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, 9

n o p et.) (“[W ]e question whether the g ener al rule of Guaranty Fede ral , w h i c h a l l ow s so me discretion to strike the inter vention, even a

pplies to a probate proce eding in which intere sted parties attempt to assert c laims which will otherwise be adjudicate d ag ainst them in their absenc e.”)
.We th u s re j ec t Michels’s contention that “[a] proper inter vention require s that the 10 intervenor

be see king some sort of af firmative r elief f

rom the cour

t.” 11 F u rth e r mo r e , M ic h e ls b o th

mi s s tate s th e f

ir s t e le me n t o f

the Gu a r anty Fede ral fr a me wo rk and mis a

pp lie s it. Th is e le me nt is n ot l imi te d to wh e the r t he wo uld -b e int e rv e no r “ c ou ld have br ou g ht t

he same a c tio n, or

any pa rt of it, in i ts o wn

name ,” a s Mi c hel s st ate s, bu t a lso is
satis fi e d “ if

the a c tio n h a d b e e n b ro ug ht a g a ins t hi m, h e wo uld be a ble to de fe a t re c ov e ry , or

so me part ther eof.” Moreove r, the first ele ment of the Guaranty Fede ral framework is not as re strictive 10

a s Mi c he ls s ug g e sts :
The require ment [for intervention] has been state d, not exhausti vely , to demand that “the inter venor’ s interest . . . be such, that if the orig inal action had ne ver be en commence d, and he had first broug ht it as the sole plaintiff, he would have b een e nti tle d to re c ov e r i n h is o wn name to the e xten t at lea st of a pa rt of the re lie f s ou g ht; or if the a ction had first be en broug ht a g ainst him, he would have be en able to defe at a re cover y , in part at lea st.” Thesta te me nt, a u se ful gu ide , do es not r e ac h a ll situati ons. I t does not cover , for ex ample, the case in whic h the interve nor-de fenda nt could not have be en sued directly , y et a judgme nt for plaintiff ma y lead to an a ction over a g ainst the intervenor or otherw ise seriously

prejudice the interve nor, and the intervenor ’s interve ntion is necessar y to assure proper defe nse of the claim. Nor doe s it m e e t th e sit

uatio n in wh ic h th e int e rv e no r a sse rt s a c la im a dv e rs e to b oth pa rt ie s, though in spe cial cir cumstance s such an inter vention may

be prope r . . . . 1 Roy W. McDonald & Elaine A. G raf ton Carl s o n , T exas Civi l Practice § 5.80, at 967-68 (2 d e d. 20 04 ) (c itatio ns omi tte d) (e mph a sis a dd e d)
. Citi ngthi s c omm e nta ry wi th a pp ro va l, w e he ld in M c Cord th at wh ile a

c hil d’ s g ra

nd pa re nts in t hat c a se c ou ld n ot h a ve ini tiate d a n o ri g ina l su it
a ff e c ti ng th e par ent -chi ldrel ati on sh ip , t hey di d p os ses s a j us ti cia bl e in ter est in th eir grandchi ld’ s b e st interests that could support intervention in the divorce and custody suit initiated by t h e c h ild’s pare nts. Mc Cor

d , 7 77 S.W. 2d

a t 81 1- 13 ; se e als o J

e nk ins v . E nte rg yCor p ., 187 S.W .3d 785, 797W e fi n d i t i n t er es t i n g t h at M i ch el s wo u l d d ec ry Zei fm an ’s i n t er v en t i o nas “c o mp l i ca t i n g” 11 thei r l i t i gat ion by

“multiplication” of issues wher e she ha s done pre cisely that by fore g oing the pa rt ie s’ on g oin g pr oc e e din g s und e r t he div or c e de c re e and

fi lin g a re la te d b ut s e pa

rate laws uit (lea ding to a

separ ate a

ppeal) , ensnar ing a

third party in her domestic dispute, y et oddly not naming Z e if man a s a pa rt y in t hat se pa rate pr oc e e din g—w ho , s he a c kn ow le dg e d a t or a l argume nt, c le a rl y had a justiciable interest. I f interve ntion is ul timately an equi table conc ept, Highlands Ins. Co. v. Lumberman’

s Mut. Cas. Co. , 7 94 S.W. 2d 60 0, 60 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 90 , n o p e t.) , M ic he ls arguably would be estopped from arg uing that Z eifman’ s intervention would have complicated or excessively

multipl ied the issues in litigation. 12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denie d) (“Eve n wher e an intervenor has not or could not have b e e n s u e d d ir e c tl y , if a ju d g me n t f o r th e p la in ti f

f ma y le a d to an a c ti o n a g a in s t th e in te r v e n o r or oth e rw ise se ri ou sly

pr e jud ic e the int e rv e no r, the int e rv e nti on is n e c e ssa

ry to a ssu re a pr op e r d e fe ns e
a g a ins t th e c la im. ” ). We co nc lud e that eve n if Z e if man c ou ld n ot a sse rt

pr e c ise ly the same c la ims
or de fe ns e s a s Mic he ls an d A I SD, he po sse sse d a jus tic ia ble int e re st i n th e su it, and wa s p ote nti a lly prejudice d by

it, in a manner that satisfies the equitable considerations unde rlying the first eleme nt of the Gu aran ty

Fe de ra l analy sis. W e likewise r ejec t Michels’s contenti o n s that Z eifman’ s intervention to protec t his interests and join issue with Mic hels would “complicate” the litigation or “e x ce s s i v el y

multipl y ” the issues re lative to the bene fits his participation would y ield. Mc Cor d , 777 S.W .2d at 812 (trial c ourt had discr etion to determ i n e that g randpa rents’ inter

vention “may enhanc e [its] ability

to ad j u d i ca t e wh at is in the best interest of the child.”). The district cour t 11

wo uld have a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

str iki nghis int e rv e nti on

on the se g ro un ds
. Mic he ls u lti mate ly

re lie s o n th e fa c t th a t sh e su bs e qu e ntl y

no n- su ite d h e r c la ims ag ainst AI SD, sugg esting that this tactic exti ng u i s h ed any justiciable interest Z eifman mig ht h av e p ossessed in the ac tion at its i nception, s e e P o ta s h Co r p . o f S a s k a tc h e wa n , I

n c . v . M a n cias , 942 S.W .2d 61, 63-65 (Te x . App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ), or otherw i s e d i v es ted him of13

his right to interve ne. Michels over looks the fac t that Z eifman f iled his intervention on Aug ust 18, wh ile sh e did

no t f ile he r n on -s uit un til the fo llo wi ngwe e k. As of the tim e of

Mic he ls’ s n on -s uit , Z eifman, a s w e h a v e d e te r mi n e d , w a s a p r o p e r p arty
. M ic h e ls ’ s n o n - s u it th u s c o u ld n o t d e f

e a t or rende r moot his claims for sanc tions and for attorney ’s fe es under rule of c ivil pr o cedure 1 3 , an d s e c ti o n s 9 an d 1 0 o f th e c iv il p r a c ti c e an d r e me d ie s code. A llstat e Ins. Co. v. H ellman , 159 S.W .3d 640, 642-43 (Te x . 2005) (whe re m erits of UDJ A claim we re r ender ed moot, claim for attorne y ’s fe es “‘ breathes life’ into this appea l and pre vents it from being
m o o t
. ”) (q u o t i n g Camerena v . Texas Employm ent Comm’n , 75 4 S.W. 2d 14 9, 15 1 ( Te x. 19 88 )) ; TriM Erectors, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructor s , I n c. , 788 S.W .2d 906, 907-08 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

19 90 , w ri t de nie d) ; see Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 62 (“ Any dis mis sa l pu

rs ua nt t o th is r ule shall not prejudice the rig ht of an adver se party to be hear d on a pending claim for a ffirmative relief
or excuse the pay

ment of all costs taxed by the cler k. A dismiss al under this rule shall have no e ffe ct on any motion for sanctions, attorney ’s fee s or other costs pending at the time of dismissal . . . .”).

For these re asons, we hold that the district c ourt abused its d i s cretion in striki ng Z ei f ma n ’ s in te r v e n ti o n , a c c o r d in g ly

s u s ta in Z e if ma n ’ s f ir s t i s s u e , an d

r e v e r s e th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’s striking of the intervention. During oral argument, Michels conce ded that the district c ourt’s orde r de nying sanc tio ns wa s ne c e ssa ri ly pr e dic a te d u

po n it s o rd e r s tr iki ngZ e if man’ s in te rv e nti on . T hu s,
we a lso re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r d e nyingsa nc tio ns and

re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. Reg ardingsanctions, rule 13 of the Te xa s Ru le s of Civil P roce dure a llows a trial cour t t o i mp o s e s an ct i o n s aga i n s tan at t o rn ey , a re p re s en t ed p ar t y , o r bo t h , wh o fi l e gro u n d l es s p l ea d i n gs b r o u g h ti nb a d

f a i t h o r b r o u g h tf

o r t h e p u r p o s e o f h ar a s s m e n t
. T e x . R
. C i v . P
. 1 3
. A d d i t i o n a l l y,We note that Z eifman did not obta in a repor ter’s r ecor d below, nor r equests finding s of 12 fac t a nd conclusions of law. As Michels observe s, such device s enable an appe llate cour t to review a tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g s to awa rd (o r n ot a wa rd ) s anc tio ns . 14 c ha pte r 1 0 o f t

he Civ il Pr a c tic e s and Re me die s Cod e a llo ws a tr ia l c ourt

to i mpo se sa

nc tio ns a g a ins t a pe r s o n , p arty , o r b o th f o r a d v an c in g f

r iv o lo u s p le a d in g s o r mo ti o n s . T e x. Civ. Prac . & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 10.001(1), .004( a) ( West 2002). I n ligh t o f o u r observation that Michels’s
c on du c t a s a lle g e d b y

Z e if man “ is i nd e e d d ist

ur bin g ,” the dis tr ic t c ourt on re mand sh ou ld c are fu lly consi d e r th e f a c ts kn o w nb y

M ic h e ls a t t

h e ti me s h e f

il e d s u it a g a in s t A I SD w h e nd e te r mi ning whether sanctions are appropr iate. See Law Offices of W indle Turley, P.C. v. Frenc h , 164 S.W .3d 48 7, 49 0- 94 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 5, no pe t.) (u ph old ingsa

nc tio ns or de r w he re law f

ir m f ile d s uit
a g a ins t f or me r c li ents fo r i mpr op e r p ur po se ); Martin v. Zieba , No. 03-03-00584- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 3742, at *9-*13 (Te x . App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) ( m em . op.) (upholding
sanc tio ns or de r wh e re hu sb and fi le d ple a din g s in c hil d c us tod y c a se fo r imp ro pe r p ur

po se ); se e als o Low v . H e nr y , 50 Tex. S up. J . 606, 2007 Tex. L EXI S 320, *6-*17 (Tex. Apr. 20, 2007). 12

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Reverse d and Remande d on Motion for Rehea ring Filed: June 20, 2007