OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

July 28, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR FOR IRAQ 

 DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 

 OFFICE 

SUBJECT: Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi 

Government (SIGIR-06-017) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit 

in accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, 

which requires that we provide for the independent and objective conduct of audits, as 

well as leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs 

and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

We considered management comments from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. Their comments are addressed in 

the report where applicable, and a copy of their comments is included in the Management 

Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott at (703) 343-7926, or by email at 

joseph.mcdermott@iraq.centcom.mil; or Mr. Clifton Spruill at (703) 343-9275, or by 

email at clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil; or Mr. Glenn Furbish at (703) 343-7921, or by 

email at glenn.furbish@iraq.centcom.mil. For the report distribution, see Appendix C. 

 

 Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

 Inspector General 

cc: Distribution 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SIGIR-06-017 July 28, 2006 

Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi 

Government 

Executive Summary 

Introduction. This report discusses the transition of completed projects funded by the 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to the Iraqi government. In January 2006, 

the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reported that 2006 would 

be a year of transition for the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq. This focus on 

transition followed SIGIR’s October 2005 Report1

 on the issue of sustainment programs 

for IRRF assets. SIGIR noted that progress had been hampered by the absence of a 

centralized sustainment office with the authority and responsibility to manage the effort 

across the jurisdictional boundaries of the operating agencies. In response, the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) established a coordinating sustainment 

office. 

By September 30, 2006, all IRRF funds will either be obligated to a contract or they will 

no longer be available to support relief and reconstruction projects in Iraq. As more 

projects are completed, the U.S. agencies and organizations that currently manage and 

implement the U.S. reconstruction effort should prepare to implement strategies for 

transitioning assets, projects and programs to the Iraqi government.2 A critical element 

of attaining end-state objectives for U.S. funded projects is a strategic plan to ensure that 

(1) completed projects and related assets are turned over to the appropriate Iraqi officials 

and (2) the Iraqi government has the capacity and resources necessary to sustain them. 

IRMO and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) are the two principal organizations 

that are managing, overseeing and implementing the IRRF. Established as temporary 

organizations under National Security Presidential Directive No. 36 (May 11, 2004), 

IRMO’s principal responsibility was “to facilitate the transition in Iraq,” while PCO was 

established to provide acquisition and project management support. Both organizations 

are scheduled to sunset on May 10, 2007. 

 

1 Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs, Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR-05-022, October 24, 2005. 

2

 U.S. agencies and organizations include the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO); the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office (GRD-PCO); the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID); and the Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq (MNSTC-I). In December 2005, the Project and Contracting Office was folded into the Gulf Region 

Division to form GRD-PCO. 

i
This review looked narrowly at IRRF-funded assets including their transfer and shortterm sustainment. It also looked at the support provided to the Iraqi government to 

enhance its capacity to manage and operate the assets (through capacity development 

level 5).3 Agencies that will remain in Iraq after the completion of IRRF-funded work 

will have a longer-term role in capacity-development and infrastructure sustainability as 

U.S. support of reconstruction efforts in Iraq shifts from grants to foreign assistance 

programs managed by the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID). This report discusses U.S. plans to accomplish this 

transition. 

Objectives. The objectives of this audit were to answer these questions: 

1. Do each of the U.S. government management offices in Iraq have a strategic plan in 

place for transitioning their respective reconstruction programs and projects? 

2. Are sufficient resources to operate and maintain new U.S. provided plants and 

equipment are available? 

3. Has the Iraqi government sufficiently planned and budgeted for essential operations 

and maintenance of the U.S.-provided infrastructure? 

4. How will the pace of reconstruction and project completion affect transition planning 

and completion? 

Results. As of July 16, 2006, approximately 579 projects valued at $765 million have 

been transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. According to an IRMO official, this 

represents about 18% of the total number of completed IRRF construction projects. 

Generally, our review indicated that while IRRF implementing organizations have 

formed a number of working groups that are addressing key transaction issues, 

coordinated processes for the transfer of IRRF assets to the Iraqi government, including 

sustainment and capacity-building, have not been finalized. Until these plans are 

completed it is uncertain if sufficient resources exist to support the assets. We estimate 

that the Iraqi government would need approximately $828 million to fund its share of the 

sustainment costs for U.S. projects in calendar year 2007. The Iraqi government’s 

commitment to supporting the assets also remains uncertain heightening the risk that the 

end-state objectives will not be met. Specifically: 

(1) There is no overall strategic plan for transitioning IRRF-funded reconstruction 

projects and assets to the Iraqi government. An asset transfer process has been 

developed, but plans for sustainment and capacity-development activities remain in 

draft and provide few details to guide agencies. Additionally, USAID has chosen not 

to participate in the DoS-led asset transfer process creating additional risk that assets 

will not be turned over in time for the Iraqis to plan for their support. 

(2) Available U.S. resources for supporting the short-term operation and 

maintenance of IRRF-funded plant assets after transition to Iraqi authority may be 

insufficient to meet requirements, particularly if delays occur in the receipt and 

recognition of assets by the Iraqi government. Sustainment funding must also be 

 

3

 We did not examine sustainment where capacity development in programs was the objective of IRRF and 

other U.S. funds. We also did not examine the sustainment budget for Iraqi armed forces, police and other 

security-related personnel. However, we believe the cost to sustain the employment and equipment of the 

Iraqi Security Forces will be a large part of the new Iraqi budget. 

ii
linked to capacity-development activities to ensure funds are available to support the 

projects until the Iraqi ministries are prepared to fund and assume this role. 

(3) The adequacy of U.S. resources for Iraqi government capacity-development 

activities remains uncertain until IRMO completes its ongoing assessment of the 

Iraqi ministries’ capabilities. The resources required will be determined by the scope 

of programs required to develop ministerial capacity. 

(4) The Iraqi government’s commitment to sustaining IRRF-funded assets remains 

uncertain because the Iraqi government has not finalized its calendar year 2007 budget. 

Finalizing a budget is difficult because of the absence of a comprehensive understanding 

of the operations and maintenance requirements associated with the assets. 

(5) A completion schedule for remaining projects has not been established, and DoS is 

considering extending the life of the organizations currently managing, overseeing, and 

implementing the IRRF. Information on project completion and the agencies that will be 

responsible for transition is needed to fully assess transition plans and resources. 

Through 2006 and 2007, the majority of remaining IRRF projects are expected to be 

completed and transitioned to the Iraqi government. The number of remaining projects, 

however, is unknown. The final tally may extend beyond 2007 because non-IRRF funds 

may be used to augment IRRF-related projects. After completion of the IRRF 

infrastructure projects, U.S. reconstruction agencies will be either closing or transitioning 

to new responsibilities: 

• USAID’s infrastructure program will be reorganized under a new Strategic Objective, 

“Improve the Capacity of National Government Institutions.” 

• MNSTC-I will transition into an Office of Security Cooperation. 

• GRD-PCO’s mission will gradually draw down and shift from IRRF projects to 

military construction and Commanders Emergency Response Program activities. The 

PCO portion of GRD will close out its office and transition its work to other 

organizations. In March 2006, GRD-PCO issued a strategic plan to guide this effort, 

and our review found it thorough and flexible, allowing for mission changes and the 

possibility of program slippage. 

• IRMO will close out its office and transition its work to other organizations. IRMO 

has not prepared a transition plan. 

The status of the temporary organizations IRMO and PCO—while defined in National 

Security Presidential Directive No. 36 as terminating in May 2007—may be extended for 

up to an additional two years (2009). 

Recommendations. We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq direct the Director 

of IRMO to: 

1. Develop a single, uniform process for asset recognition and transfer of all 

completed projects to the Iraqi government. This process should be followed by 

all of the IRRF-implementing agencies, and sufficient resources should be made 

available to implement the process in time for the Iraqi government’s use in 

budget planning. 

2. Provide a bi-weekly report to the Deputy Chief of Mission on the progress and 

impediments to the implementation of the asset recognition and transfer process. 

iii
3. Develop a sustainment plan to guide U.S. activities past June 2007 emphasizing 

capacity-development activities to ensure that established infrastructure 

management processes are in place in the Iraqi ministries. 

4. Complete an assessment to determine the capacity of the Iraqi government for 

maintaining the IRRF projects. 

5. Formulate and implement a plan as part of the Joint Campaign Plan, with clear 

goals and objectives for developing the capacity of the Iraqi ministries. 

6. Ensure the capacity-development plan is linked to and supported by the necessary 

sustainment funding to ensure the viability of all IRRF-funded projects. This plan 

should include the $134 million requested for this purpose in the U.S. budget for 

fiscal year 2007. It should also identify any shortfalls and the impacts of the 

shortfalls on the IRRF investment. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. We received written comments on a 

draft of this report from IRMO officials who concurred with our findings and 

recommendations. Actions are planned or underway to implement the recommendations. 

The comments received were fully responsive. IRMO also provided technical comments 

which we have incorporated in the report where appropriate. 

iv
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objectives 3 

Findings 

 A Strategic Plan for Transitioning IRRF Projects and Programs Has 

 Not Been Developed 4 

 Resources to Sustain U.S.-Provided Infrastructure 10 

 Iraqi Government Sustainment Plans and Funding 12 

 Pace of Reconstruction and Transition Support 13 

Conclusion and Recommendations 14 

Appendices 

 A. Scope and Methodology 16 

 B. Acronyms 18 

 C. Report Distribution 19 

 D. Audit Team Members 21 

Management Comments 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 22 
Introduction 

Background 

As of June 30, 2006, more than $16.7 billion of the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) has been obligated for reconstruction activities and over 

2,100 projects have been completed. The United States expected that the Iraqis would be 

able to run the newly constructed facilities and provide for their long-term operation and 

funding. However, some early projects failed at handover, or shortly thereafter, creating 

a growing concern that the Iraqis may lack the resources or skills to sustain the long-term 

operation of complex facilities.4 As a result, most projects now provide funding for some 

level of operations and maintenance training, as well as the supplies sufficient to maintain 

projects for approximately 90 days. 

This review discusses transition, or those actions necessary to ensure that completed 

projects are turned over to the appropriate Iraqi officials who have the training and 

budgetary resources necessary to sustain them. It looks at three planning steps in the 

transition process: (1) asset recognition and transfer, (2) sustainment, and (3) capacitydevelopment. 

Asset Recognition and Transfer. According to the asset recognition and transfer 

procedures, each executing agency or department will hand over control of capital assets 

to the responsible Iraqi government entity for its beneficial use, operation, management, 

control, and protection using its own policies and procedures.5 The executing agency or 

department will also formally transfer capital assets to the Iraqi government, as 

represented by the Ministry of Finance and the relevant line ministry (e.g. electricity). 

Such transfers will be conducted in coordination with the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office (IRMO). 

Planning the transfer process is essential to both the United States and the Iraqi 

government. First, it allows the Iraqi government to recognize its ownership of the 

project. Secondly, it leads to the recognition that the Iraqi government is now responsible 

for project operation and maintenance and any capital replacement. Recognition of the 

transfer process is also the point at which the Iraqi government officials agree that the 

project is complete and that all the necessary project-specific documentation is in place.6

 

The transfer process should also serve as Iraq’s concurrence that the U.S. government has 

provided the necessary training and orientation to the local Iraqi staff that will have 

responsibility to manage, operate, and maintain the new or refurbished facility. 

Sustainment. In this report, “sustainment” refers to the operations and maintenance 

drivers, at the facility level, that contribute to sustaining operations. It includes such 

things as spare parts, consumables, and training. Identifiable budgetary outlays provide 

evidence of sustainment programs. 

 

4

 Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs; SIGIR 05-022, Oct. 24, 2005. 

5

 Procedure for the Transfer and Recognition of the USG Funded Capital Assets to the Government of the 

Republic of Iraq; IRMO, Mar. 1, 2006. 

6

 Documentation includes items such as facility as-built drawings, preventive maintenance plans, spare 

parts lists, operations and maintenance plans, and cost estimates for annual operations and maintenance 

costs. 

1
Capacity Development. Capacity development is a prerequisite for sustainment, 

enabling individuals, organizations, or groups of individuals to perform functions 

efficiently and in a manner that leads to sustainable operations. Capacity development is 

an activity or multiple activities that lead to the transfer knowledge, skills, and abilities 

across a range of functions. From enabling sustainment mores at the highest level of 

government (e.g. understanding the requirement of O&M budgeting) to providing 

technical expertise to operators (e.g. training maintenance staff), capacity development is 

a critical component in assuring life-cycle maximization of the U.S. investment in Iraq. 

IRMO has defined five levels of sustainable capacity development for IRRFimplementing organizations7

: 

Level 5 - Infrastructure: Providing targeted training and mentoring to Iraqis at 

the plant or facility level to enable them to operate and maintain new or renovated 

facilities, systems, and processes in accordance with design requirements. 

Contractors lead Level 5 capacity development activities under the supervision 

and direction of the contract customer (GRD-PCO, USAID, or MNSTC-I8). 

Level 4 - Iraqi Ministries: Establishing functional business and organizational 

systems within each ministry/sector necessary to support a sustainable 

infrastructure. USAID, with the support of DoS would have the lead for Level 4 

capacity development actions since many of the Level 4 activities are longer-term 

actions. 

Level 3 - Inter-Organizational: Developing and instituting the systems and 

processes by which all public and private sector Iraqi stakeholders work toward 

the common goal of creating a sustainable infrastructure. DoS with the support of 

USAID, would take the lead for Level 3 actions. 

Level 2 - Laws and Regulations: Establishing drivers and requirements that 

support a sustainable infrastructure. Organizations can function effectively only 

if the appropriate laws, regulations, and policies are in place at the appropriate 

level of government. DoS with the support of USAID, would take the lead for 

Level 2 actions. 

Level 1 - Policy: Establishing the strategic policy, vision and commitment at the 

highest levels of the Iraqi government structure to enable, facilitate, and promote 

sustainable capacity development frameworks and activities at the implementation 

level. The lead for this level of intervention would come primarily from DoS. 

Responsibilities. National Security Presidential Directive No. 36, (United States 

Government Operations in Iraq, May 11, 2004), provides the Chief of the U.S. Mission 

in Iraq, under guidance from the Secretary of State, responsibility for the direction, 

coordination, and supervision of all United States government employees, policies, and 

activities in country, except those under the command of an area military commander. 

This responsibility includes the continuous supervision and general direction of all 

assistance for Iraq. The directive also created the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

 

7

 Iraq Reconstruction Program: a Framework for Sustainable Operations, Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office, Strategic Sector Programs, May 21, 2005. 

8

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office (GRD-PCO), U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I). 

2
Office (IRMO), a temporary organization within DoS, “to facilitate the transition in 

Iraq.” 

Three IRRF-implementing agencies—GRD-PCO, MNSTC-I and USAID—are described 

below: 

• GRD-PCO is a Department of Army activity that reports to both the MultiNational Force-Iraq and the Chief of Mission. The PCO was created by the same 

Presidential directive that assigned responsibility for IRRF projects to DoS. The 

PCO is a temporary Department of Defense (DoD) agency with staff assigned 

under Chief of Mission authority. The PCO provides engineering and contractrelated services for DoD contracts and for contracts managed by the DoS and 

other departments and agencies. In December 2005, PCO merged with the Gulf 

Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

• MNSTC-I is a DoD operation reporting through Multi-National Force-Iraq to the 

U.S. Central Command. Along with DoD, DoS, and other U.S. agencies, 

MNSTC-I provides support in training police and other security forces. The 

MNSTC-I mission is to organize, equip, and mentor Iraqi security forces to 

support Iraq’s ultimate goal of a unified, stable, and democratic Iraq that provides 

a representative government for its people. 

• USAID, under the direction of DoS, undertakes projects to restore Iraq’s vital 

infrastructure and provide technical assistance and training in the areas of 

electricity, water/sewage, hospitals/health care, education, communications, and 

transportation. 

Objectives

The objectives of this audit were to answer these questions: 

1. Do each of the U.S. government management offices in Iraq have a strategic plan 

in place for transitioning their respective reconstruction programs and projects? 

2. Are sufficient resources to operate and maintain new U.S. provided plants and 

equipment are available? 

3. Has the Iraqi government sufficiently planned and budgeted for essential 

operations and maintenance of the U.S.-provided infrastructure? 

4. How will the pace of reconstruction and project completion affect transition 

planning and completion? 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, 

see Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix B. 

For a distribution list for this report, see Appendix C. For a list of the audit team 

members, see Appendix D. 

3
A Strategic Plan for Transitioning IRRF Projects 

and Programs Has Not Been Developed 

There is no overall strategic plan for transitioning IRRF funded reconstruction programs 

and projects to the Iraqi government. IRRF-implementing organizations, however, have 

formed a number of working groups that are individually addressing the key transition 

issues, including (1) an asset recognition and transfer working group, (2) a sustainment 

working group, and (3) a capacity-development working group. 

Overall our assessment found that the asset recognition and transfer working group has 

developed an adequate process with the Iraqi Minister of Finance for formally 

transferring completed IRRF projects. Plans for sustainment and capacity-development 

activities, however, remain in draft. These works-in-progress provide few details to 

guide agency operational goals and objectives in developing short-term capacitydevelopment activities, metrics for measuring progress against goals, or budgets that 

match planned activities. 

Coordination of effort between the organizations participating in the transition of IRRF 

assets is essential to avoid duplication of effort, conflicting strategies, and gaps. In prior 

reports we have discussed the management of transition activities and the need for 

explicit centralized leadership to provide a common vision and approach. For example, 

in April 2006, we reported on USAID’s management of the transfer of IRRF projects and 

stated that USAID was participating in three working groups to develop a common policy 

and process for facilitating the legal, financial, and logistical transfer of assets to the Iraqi 

government.9 However, after six months the working groups have been unable to 

achieve a consensus. 

The Iraqi Ministry of Finance’s recognition of U.S.-funded IRRF projects is an essential 

step before budgeting and planning for their long-term support can be ensured. Most 

agencies, with the assistance of IRMO and the U.S. Treasury Attaché’s office, have 

worked with the Ministry to develop an asset recognition process that is currently being 

used to successfully transfer assets. However, it has become increasingly clear that 

USAID will not be participating in these processes and no USAID projects have been 

recognized by the Ministry. The inability to achieve consensus among the IRRFimplementing agencies on the transition of capital assets to Iraq’s control does not bode 

well for the coordination of other transition activities. 

An Asset Transfer Process Is In Place but Other Transition Plans Are 

Still Evolving 

No strategic plan for transitioning assets has been written. However, our review of the 

asset transfer process procedures and the sustainment and capacity-development draft 

plans, together with interviews with knowledgeable officials, generally shows that the 

plan in the essential services sectors is to provide financial sustainment support for select 

critical infrastructure projects for up to one year, while conducting capacity-development 

initiatives to enhance the Iraqi’s capability to sustain the projects themselves.10 In the 

 

9 U.S. Agency for International Development’s Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Projects to the Iraqi Government; Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 

SIGIR 06-007, Apr. 29, 2006. 

10 The essential services sectors are electricity, oil, water, transportation, communication, and health care. 

4
security and law enforcement sectors the plan is to work with the Iraqis to develop an 

infrastructure management process. Senior officials at MNSTC-I told us that they do not 

intend to provide direct financial support for security or law enforcement sector projects. 

Asset Transfer. On April 23, 2006, the Asset Transfer Working Group issued a 

procedure for transferring U.S.-built assets to the Iraqi government. The “Procedure for 

the Transfer and Recognition of USG (U.S. government)-Funded Assets to the 

Government of the Republic of Iraq,” set forth uniformly agreed-upon guidance for use 

by all executing agencies and departments that complete projects in Iraq” for transferring 

capital assets. The procedure laid out a three-step process for transferring assets: 

1. The executing agency or department that finances a project involving production 

or improvement of a capital asset will utilize its own rules, policies, and 

procedures to complete such project. 

2. Using its own policies and procedures, each executing agency or department will 

hand over control of capital assets to the responsible Iraqi government entity for 

its beneficial use, operation, management, control, and protection. 

Documentation of this turnover will include, where applicable, all designs, 

drawings, operations and maintenance manuals, warranty information, and other 

information in the executing agency’s possession and transmitted to IRMO where 

feasible. 

3. The executing agency or department will formally transfer capital assets to the 

Iraqi government, as represented by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 

Planning, and the relevant line ministry (e.g., electricity). Such transfers will be 

conducted in coordination with IRMO and will be documented using a 

standardized transfer letter. Each executing agency or department will forward 

copies of the transfer document to IRMO. 

According to the U.S. Embassy’s Treasury Attaché, the significance of this process is the 

involvement of the Iraqi government in its development. He stated that recognition of 

IRRF assets by the Iraqi Ministry of Finance is a prerequisite before planning and 

budgeting for their support. Consequently, the process was developed with senior 

officials in the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, and the asset transfer office is staffed by 

Ministry of Finance personnel. 

As of July 16, 2006, approximately 579 projects valued at $765 million have been 

transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. According to an IRMO official, this 

represents about 18% of the total number of completed IRRF construction projects. All 

of the IRRF-implementing agencies are participating in the asset transfer process except 

USAID. 

Sustainment. As discussed here, “sustainment” refers to the direct operations and 

maintenance support the United States is providing for IRRF projects. It is a necessary 

component of Iraqi government sustainability and capacity-development. IRMO and 

MNSTC-I have taken several actions to address this issue: 

IRMO 

On March 14, 2006, the IRMO Director issued a memorandum identifying the U.S. 

government plan for providing short-term support for projects funded by the IRRF in the 

essential services sectors. The memo directed several immediate actions to implement 

the plan. In summary, the plan is to provide limited operations and maintenance support 

for select critical infrastructure, provide the Iraqi government with funding estimates to 

5
sustain the remainder of the infrastructure being handed over, and garner support from 

the Iraqi government to fund the sustainment of all remaining assets funded by the IRRF. 

This plan covers the selected critical infrastructure assets through mid-2007. Additional 

funding has been requested in DoS fiscal year 2007 budget that will be used to provide 

targeted assistance past mid-2007. 

The concept of select sustainment means that the U.S. government will fund the 

operations and maintenance and capacity-development costs for only certain projects. 

According to a briefing report on select sustainment, the projects to be sustained will be 

selected by sector experts based on their knowledge of Iraqi capabilities and 

determination of key, yet vulnerable, infrastructure. Each sector’s program will include 

an operations and maintenance component, and a technical capacity-development 

component. 

Sustainment estimates will be based on the original equipment manufacturer 

recommendations, operating history, past experience, and fuel type (where applicable). 

The briefing report provided the following information about possible selected projects: 

• Electricity. Selected projects in the electric sector would be generation focused, 

and include 9 gas turbines and 3 thermal units. Projects selected would not 

include transmission and distribution infrastructure because substantial spares and 

technical capacity building would be included in ongoing projects. 

• Water and Sanitation. Selected projects in the water and sanitation sector would 

focus on 95 water treatment plans, 10 wastewater treatment plants, and 8 pumping 

stations. Projects selected would not include over 1,500 smaller compact water 

treatment units. 

• Health. Selected projects in the health care sector would focus on facilities’ 

mechanical systems, and would include health care clinics and hospitals. It would 

not include the operations and maintenance costs of medical equipment inside the 

facilities. 

• Transportation. Selected projects in the transportation sector would focus on 

ports and aviation sub-sectors. It would not include sustainment of railways and 

some aviation and ports because substantial spares, training, and technical 

capacity are included in on-going projects for 2006. 

• Communications. Selected projects in the communication sector would be 

focused on 23 postal facilities, the wireless broadband network, and technical 

capacity-development for telecommunication and postal operations. 

MNSTC-I 

MNSTC-I11 has taken a different approach to sustaining its projects. MNSTC-I does not 

intend to provide direct financial assistance to its Iraqi counterparts in support of U.S.-

constructed defense- and police-related projects. Rather, it is working with the Iraqi 

Minister of Defense to develop an infrastructure-management process. Based on our 

limited review of the MNSTC-I’s infrastructure management assistance program in the 

Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we believe this could serve as a “leading practice” for 

sustainment in other ministries. However, MNSTC-I has experienced problems working 

with the Ministry of Interior and as a result a system and process for managing 

infrastructure for that ministry is not in place. 

 

11 MNSTC-I is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and mentoring Iraqi Security Forces, 

including the defense force and the police force. 

6
MNSTC-I’s infrastructure management assistance program in the Ministry of Defense 

has four objectives: 

1. Identify the facilities and infrastructure on-hand. 

2. Develop a Ministry infrastructure master plan. 

3. Develop an infrastructure management program budget with a multi-year forecast. 

4. Maximize funds to sustain and modernize existing facilities and restore damaged 

infrastructure. 

To establish the infrastructure management assistance program, MNSTC-I is working 

with the Ministry of Defense to develop a real property management program. MNSTC-I 

is taking these key steps: 

1. Help the Ministry define its authorized installation facilities. 

2. Document major changes in facilities and facility use through a recurring facilityinspection and capitalization program. 

3. Identifying facility deficiencies or excesses to what is authorized. 

4. Manage real property transactions, such as land acquisitions or disposals, to 

maintain authorized facility levels. 

MNSTC-I is also helping the Ministry develop a Capital Investment Plan (CIP) that 

identifies key infrastructure requirements needed by each installation or base to support 

future assigned units or missions. The plan is managed by the Ministry of Defense’s 

Infrastructure Directorate, with strategic guidance from the Ministry’s Joint 

Headquarters. Finally, key requirements are also forecasted into a long-range CIP for 

Ministry of Defense budget programming. 

In addition to helping the Ministry of Defense understand and prioritize its needs, 

MNSTC-I is supporting the Ministry’s advocacy of a healthy, multi-year budget for 

infrastructure management. Processes for identifying and budgeting for the sustainment 

needs of each base or facility have been developed based on age, condition, and value. 

By helping Ministry officials understand the importance of facility operations and 

maintenance on mission capability and performance, they advance the prospects that 

fiscal year budgets will include sufficient sustainment funding. 

The final step in MNSTC-I’s program is establishing a facility management structure 

within the Ministry of Defense’s Base Management Directorate. This office will review 

operations and maintenance budget execution reports, rewarding excellent management 

of sustainment funds at the base level. 

MNSTC-I has not been able to replicate this process with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. 

According to a senior MNSTC-I official, the Ministry does not have a complete inventory 

list of its infrastructure, and systems and processes for managing infrastructure are not in 

place. MNSTC-I has made developing a process for Ministry of Interior as one of its 

priorities. It expects to have one in place by September 2007. However, there is also 

recognition that uncertainty of property ownership and insurgency (the constant 

rebuilding of projects due to damage and destruction caused by insurgents) are obstacles. 

Further, we believe the lack of progress may be rooted in the Ministry’s political 

difficulties—not a lack of effort by MNSTC-I. 

7
Capacity Development Efforts Need Improvement 

Capacity Development at Level-5. This report discusses capacity-development 

activities of the IRRF implementing agencies, primarily at level 5. Activities at this level 

provide training and mentoring to workers at the plant or facility level. Level 5 capacity 

development would enable the Iraqis to operate and maintain new or renovated facilities, 

systems, and processes in accordance with design requirements. IRMO and the other 

IRRF-implementing agencies have been working on the development of a sustainment 

and capacity-development plan since late 2005 and are currently vetting two draft 

documents intended to guide the implementing agencies. However, our review of these 

draft documents found that they would not meet their intended expectation, raising 

questions about their usefulness as guidelines. 

As of June 11, 2006, IRMO was reviewing a draft document entitled, “Framework for 

Iraq Infrastructure Sustainability.” According to the draft, “the framework guides the 

capacity-development and sustainability-related activities as the parties work toward 

completion of the IRRF projects.” It also states that the framework provides the methods 

and processes under which these U.S. government organizations cooperate, interface, and 

combine their efforts to prepare and equip the Iraqi government and its ministries to 

assume responsibility for management, operation, and maintenance of the infrastructure 

facilities, systems, and equipment constructed or refurbished under the IRRF. The 

framework states that it is only intended to guide the agencies until May 2007 when 

IRMO and PCO are slated to sunset. Organizations remaining past that point are 

expected to continue their work under a separate plan or guidelines that may be 

developed. The second draft, dated May 8, 2006, titled “Consolidated Implementation 

Plans to Ensure Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Asset Sustainment,” contains plans 

that address how each of the organizations will ensure sustainment of IRRF assets as they 

are transferred to the Iraqi government. 

Our review of these documents shows that they identify capacity-development principles 

and discuss the importance of ensuring that the Iraqis obtain the knowledge, skills, and 

abilities necessary to sustain the IRRF-funded projects. The two documents focus on 

broad principles without providing guidance or direction on what the implementing 

agencies are expected to do. To illustrate, the documents do not define or identify the 

level-5 activities that the agencies are to implement, the goal or objectives for the 

activities, the amount of time the activities are to run, or the metrics that are to be used to 

measure progress against the goal. Instead, each organization is left to define for itself 

what it wants its activities to accomplish. Only one organization, GRD/PCO, provided 

any metrics or timelines for measuring or evaluating progress. 

Although we believe the IRRF-implementing agencies could improve their capacitydevelopment efforts by sharpening the focus of individual activities, they are conducting 

a wide range of noteworthy level-5 capacity development projects: 

• Since May 2005, USAID has a water sector institutional-strengthening program 

that provides operating supplies, materials, and support services to promote water 

and sewage sustainability at seven water treatment plants and four sewage 

treatment plants. 

• USAID has a power plant maintenance program in the electric sector since March 

2004. This program provides operations and maintenance support for the 19 

major electric power generation plants, including training and spare parts 

provision. It is scheduled to end in September 2006. 

8
• Sustainment programs are also ongoing in the health care and communications 

sectors. 

• MNSTC-I also has noteworthy capacity-development activities ongoing, with 

these expected outcomes: (1) an inventory of all ministerial capital assets; (2) an 

assessment of the age and condition of each asset; and (3) a process for 

calculating operating and maintenance expenses. 

These types of clearly focused activities and measurable outcomes provide a solid basis 

for guiding the implementing agencies and measuring their progress. 

In another example, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) provides 

training for management techniques for business processes (which includes 

anticorruption training), technical concepts, and human resources development. This 

program, which began in December 2004, is funded by $2 million of the IRRF, as well as 

an additional $500,000 from USTDA core funding. USTDA reported to SIGIR that this 

training program was developed based on energy sector discussions during the second 

U.S.-Iraq Joint Economic Consortium meeting in December 2004. This is how funding 

was distributed for the three groupings: 

• $1 million of the IRRF for management training, including 

management/leadership skills, financial management and commercial operations, 

and legal/regulatory compliance.

• $1 million of the IRRF funding for technical training, including drilling/pipeline 

operations and maintenance, well logging, and environmental control/mitigation.

• $500,000 in USTDA core funds for human resources development/management, 

including change management, workforce productivity, and professional 

development.

Capacity Development at Levels 1 – 4. Although this report focuses mainly on the 

IRRF-implementing agencies’ activities at level 5, there are a large number of activities 

ongoing at capacity development levels 1 through 4. DoS has established Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams to help Iraq’s provincial governments develop the capability to 

govern properly and respond to its citizens.12 The provincial teams are intended to work 

with the provincial governments to build governance structures enabling effective 

interaction with the Baghdad central government and develop confidence among the 

Iraqis that their local government is responsive to local needs. Provincial teams will 

complement ongoing engagement with the Provincial Reconstruction and Development 

Councils, which are now active in 17 of 18 governorates. Also, DoS has established a 

Ministerial Coordination Team, and a National Coordination team to synchronize 

governance, reconstruction, and economic development assistance.13 Further, IRMO 

briefed us on its plans for the use of Ministerial Advisory Teams at 10 key ministries. 

Other organizations are working on long-term capacity-development issues, but we could 

not clearly determine how the entire effort is coordinated. 

 

12 Provincial Reconstruction Teams facilitate achievement of coalition goals in Iraq by enhancing the 

capabilities of provincial governments, with emphasis on capacity building and sustainability. 

13 The Ministerial Coordination Team assists both the short-term Ministerial Advisory Team initiatives and 

the longer-term National Capacity Development initiative by serving as a central coordination point. The 

National Coordination Team synchronizes governance, reconstruction, and economic development 

assistance, and provides coordination and de-confliction of provincial efforts with efforts of the U.S. 

Mission, coalition partners, and the Iraqi government. 

9
Resources to Sustain U.S.-Provided Infrastructure 

IRMO estimates that the sustainment cost for all IRRF-funded assets is approximately 

$1.2 billion annually. At present, IRMO has about $372 million available for 

sustainment support in calendar year 2007, leaving about $828 million to be funded by 

the Iraqi government. The $372 million of identified U.S. resources would fund the 

short-term operations and maintenance costs for spare parts, consumables, and contracted 

support. It will also fund other activities related to the performance of routine, 

preventive, predictive, scheduled, and unscheduled actions aimed at preventing 

equipment failure or decline. This would include training and other capacity 

development activities at levels 4 and 5. 

Our calculation of $372 million for calendar year 2007 sustainment is based on an IRMO 

analysis conducted by the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. The analysis showed 

that approximately $181 million was already included in the IRRF program for 

sustainment activities. Additionally, DoS received $295 million in its Fiscal Year 2006 

Supplemental. This gave DoS a total of $476 million to fund sustainment for the 

remainder of Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 2007. We assumed that half of this 

money ($238 million) would be available for calendar year 2007 activities. DoS has also 

requested $134 million in Fiscal Year 2007 sustainment funds, which would give it a 

total of $372 million for calendar year 2007 activities. Table 1 shows DoS’s planned 

sustainment funding. 

Table 1: Estimated annual operations and maintenance costs for IRRF projects 

 by sector as of April 2006 

Sector Already included 

in IRRF program 

Fiscal Year 2006 

Supplemental

Total Available 

for Sustainment 

(2006 & 2007) 

Estimated 

Amount of Total 

Available for 

Calendar Year 

2007 

Electricity Sector* $61,445,000 $288,555,000 $350,000,000 $175,000,000 

Health Care 7,222,000 7,222,000 3,611,000 

Transportation 1,625,000 1,625,000 812,500 

Communications 2,300,000 4,820,000 7,120,000 3,560,000 

Water Resources and 

Sanitation** 110,000,000 110,000,000 55,000,000 

TOTAL $180,967,000 $295,000,000 $475,967,000 $237,983,500 

Fiscal Year 2007 

Funding Request $134,000,000 

TOTAL $371,983,500 

Source: IRMO, Office of the Chief Financial Officer 

* Electricity Includes IRRF I & II 

** Water includes Fuels & Employee Costs 

10
MNSTC-I is actively participating in each of the IRMO-led working groups, but has 

planned for sustainment and capacity-development separately from IRMO. MNSTC-I 

does not intend to provide direct financial assistance to their Iraqi counterparts to support 

U.S.-constructed projects. Rather, it is working with its Iraqi counterparts to develop an 

infrastructure management process. As noted earlier, the process involves helping the 

Iraqis develop facilities and infrastructure inventory, a base master plan, operations and 

maintenance budgeting and forecasting processes, and budget prioritization processes. 

MNSTC-I’s efforts with the Ministry of Defense provide an excellent model for making 

the Iraqis self sufficient in supporting their infrastructure. However, MNSTC-I has been 

less successful working with the Ministry of Interior. 

11
Iraqi Government Sustainment Plans and 

Funding 

The Iraqi government’s calendar year 2007 budget has not been developed. 

Consequently, its plans and commitment to support U.S.-transferred assets remains 

unknown. In cases where IRRF-implementing agencies have not participated in joint 

asset transfer processes, Iraqi government budgeting for any sustainment resources is 

unlikely to occur. 

As discussed, we estimate that the Iraqi government would need approximately 

$828 million to fund its share of the sustainment costs for U.S. projects in calendar year 

2007. Iraq’s ability to support the U.S.-provided infrastructure is almost totally 

dependent on the oil sector. According to the U.S. Embassy’s Treasury Attaché, oil 

accounts for about 90% of Iraq’s exports and government revenues. Revenues associated 

with the country’s oil exports remain volatile as a result of uneven production and 

international oil prices. 

Even if anticipated revenues were realized, the commitment of the Iraqi government to 

sustainment is questionable.14 According to the senior U.S. advisor to one of the 

ministries, help was provided in preparing the operations and maintenance budget for the 

ministry in 2006. However, the ministry received only 20% of what had been requested. 

Similarly, a senior U.S. advisor to another key ministry stated that the ministry does not 

support operations and maintenance funding and that calendar year 2006 funding was 

one-third of what was required. Another Embassy official also expressed reservations 

about the Iraqi’s ability to execute a sustainment program, even if funds were available. 

He stated that most of the ministries lack the capacity and the international contacts to 

contract for services. The prior regime did not have a need for contract support or any 

expertise as the regime provided everything without regard to contract administration. As 

a result, the ability to contract for services is likely to vary by ministry. 

 

14 The GAO reports that U.S. reconstruction effort has encountered difficulties in maintaining new and 

rehabilitated infrastructure, resulting in some U.S.-funded projects becoming damaged or inoperable after 

being turned over to the Iraqis. Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help 

Achieve U.S. Goals (GAO-06-788, July 11, 2006) 

12
Pace of Reconstruction and Transition Support 

Our analysis of transition planning focused on GRD-PCO and IRMO because both 

organizations are scheduled to sunset on May 10, 2007. USAID and MNSTC-I will 

have a continuing presence in Iraq beyond the completion and transfer of projects funded 

with IRRF. 

The exact date that GRD-PCO will cease operations in Iraq is uncertain. GRD-PCO 

manages projects funded with IRRF and projects funded through other sources, such as 

the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. GRD-PCO’s funding is drawn from 

the contracts it manages, so its presence and the size of its presence is dependent on the 

number of projects it manages. According to a senior GRD-PCO official, the division 

has a plan to gradually draw down its staff based on its workload. GRD-PCO also has 

the following draft plans currently under management review: a contract and financial 

close-out plan; a capacity-development and sustainment plan; and, a logistics close-out 

plan. According to the December 31, 2005, Project Acquisition Report, the GRD-PCO 

has 122 projects scheduled for completion past December 31, 2006, of which 75 are 

scheduled for completion by June 2007. Only 47 projects will continue past June, with 20 

of those scheduled for completion in July and August 2007. 

IRMO is funded by IRRF and Economic Support Funds and its directed authority is 

scheduled to end on May 11, 2007, once all IRRF and Economic Support Funds are 

expended. According to a senior IRMO official, DoS was to take over liaison 

responsibilities with the Iraqi ministries and IRMO had a plan to gradually draw down its 

staff. However, the official said that a transition to DoS may be delayed. IRMO has 

recently been assigned a number of long-range projects, such as Ministerial Capacity 

Development, and DoS has requested funding for IRMO in its fiscal year 2007 budget. 

Consequently, the exact date that IRMO will cease operations remains uncertain. Once 

clearer direction is provided, the IRMO official stated that a transition plan would be 

developed. 

Through 2006 and 2007, the majority of remaining IRRF projects are expected to be 

completed and transitioned to the Iraqi government. The number of remaining projects, 

however, is unknown. The final tally may extend beyond 2007 because non-IRRF funds 

may be used to augment IRRF-related projects. After completion of the IRRF 

infrastructure projects, U.S. reconstruction agencies will be either closing or transitioning 

to new responsibilities: 

• USAID’s infrastructure program will be reorganized under a new Strategic Objective, 

“Improve the Capacity of National Government Institutions.” 

• MNSTC-I will transition into an Office of Security Cooperation. 

• GRD-PCO’s mission will gradually draw down and shift from IRRF projects to 

military construction and Commanders Emergency Response Program activities. The 

PCO portion of GRD will close out its office and transition its work to other 

organizations. In March 2006, GRD-PCO issued a strategic plan to guide this effort, 

and our review found it thorough and flexible, allowing for mission changes and the 

possibility of program slippage. 

• IRMO will close out its office and transition its work to other organizations. IRMO 

has not prepared a transition plan. 

The status of the temporary organizations IRMO and PCO—while defined in National 

Security Presidential Directive No. 36 as terminating in May 2007—may be extended for 

up to an additional two years (2009). 

13
Conclusion and Recommendations 

Conclusion

Successfully transitioning completed IRRF-funded projects to an Iraqi government that is 

prepared to accept the assets and provide for their long-term management and use is a 

complex effort that requires close coordination between all of the participating agencies. 

DoS, through IRMO and the Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office, has 

done a good job of pulling the agencies together into working groups to coordinate the 

issues involved. These individual working groups now need to resolve the remaining 

coordination issues and ensure that the end state objectives are achieved. 

However, regardless of the best U.S. efforts, the transition of completed assets to the Iraqi 

government is and will remain at risk until the Iraqi government’s capabilities mature to 

the point that the individual ministries can budget, manage, and direct the operations and 

maintenance of the projects. IRMO is assessing the basic needs of each ministry. Once 

finished, a clearer picture of what it will take in time and effort to develop self-supporting 

ministries should be the outcome. Further, given the pace of transition so far, we believe 

that a successful transition process will involve a multi-year effort that will most likely 

require continuing U.S., Iraqi, and other resources to accomplish. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq direct the Director of IRMO to: 

1. Develop a single, uniform process for asset recognition and transfer of all 

completed projects to the Iraqi government. This process should be followed 

by all of the IRRF-implementing agencies, and sufficient resources should be 

made available to implement the process in time for the Iraqi government’s 

use in budget planning. 

2. Provide a bi-weekly report to the Deputy Chief of Mission on the progress and 

impediments to the implementation of the asset recognition and transfer 

process. 

3. Develop a sustainment plan to guide U.S. activities past June 2007 

emphasizing capacity-development activities to ensure that established 

infrastructure management processes are in place in the Iraqi ministries. 

4. Complete an assessment to determine the capacity of the Iraqi government for 

maintaining the IRRF projects. 

5. Formulate and implement a plan as part of the Joint Campaign Plan, with clear 

goals and objectives for developing the capacity of the Iraqi ministries. 

6. Ensure the capacity-development plan is linked to and supported by the 

necessary sustainment funding to ensure the viability of all IRRF-funded 

projects. This plan should include the $134 million requested for this purpose 

in the U.S. budget for fiscal year 2007. It should also identify any shortfalls 

and the impacts of the shortfalls on the IRRF investment. 

14
Management Comments and Audit Response 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from IRMO officials who 

concurred with the findings and recommendations. Actions are planned or underway to 

address the recommendations. The comments received were fully responsive. IRMO 

also provided technical comments which we have incorporated in the report where 

appropriate. IRMO’s comments are included in their entirety in the Management 

Comments Section of this report. 

15
Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

We initiated this audit in January 2006 (Project No. 6003), to determine (1) if each of the 

U.S. government management offices in Iraq has a strategic plan in place for 

transitioning their respective reconstruction programs and projects; (2) if sufficient 

resources to operate and maintain new U.S.-provided plants and equipment are available; 

and (3) if the Iraqi government has sufficiently planned and budgeted for the essential 

operations and maintenance of the new U.S.-provided infrastructure. 

To determine if the U.S. government management offices in Iraq have strategic plans in 

place for transitioning their respective reconstruction programs and projects, we 

interviewed representatives from all the implementing agencies including DoS’s Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region 

Division-Project and Contracting Office; the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID); and, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq to determine the 

status of their planning. At each of these offices we discussed their plans, the guidance 

they received (if any), and their current transition activities. The Iraq Reconstruction and 

Management Office had established working groups to address key transition issues 

including an asset recognition and transfer working group, a sustainment working group, 

and a capacity-development working group. We also attended numerous meetings of 

these working groups to ascertain progress towards achieving a unified plan of action. 

To determine if sufficient resources to operate and maintain new U.S.-provided facilities 

are available we researched reports submitted to meet the requirements of Section 2207 

of Public Law 108-106. Specifically, we looked at Project Assessment Reports, which 

identify the sustainment costs for each IRRF-funded project. We also obtained 

information from IRMO officials working on sustainment and reviewed sustainment 

estimates they had developed in conjunction with their senior ministers. Finally, we met 

with the Senior U.S. Advisors to the Iraqi Ministries of Electricity, Water Resources, and 

Oil to determine the sustainment costs for their respective sectors. We then compared 

these estimates to numbers developed by the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) in October 2005 to determine if there were variances. 

To determine if the Iraqi government has sufficiently planned and budgeted for the 

essential operations and maintenance of the new U.S.-provided infrastructure we 

interviewed the U.S. Embassy Iraq’s Treasury Attaché, and reviewed assessments from 

the World Bank, and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis. 

We conducted this audit from January 2006 through June 2006, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform 

this audit. 

16
Prior Coverage.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). 

SIGIR reported on January 24, 2006, in “GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of 

IRRF Funded Assets to the Government of Iraq” (SIGIR-05-028), that the GRD-PCO has 

recognized the need for formal asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures, and 

is working to resolve the issue. The GRD-PCO is participating in two working groups to 

develop a common policy and process for facilitating the legal, financial, and logistical 

transfer of assets to the Iraqi government. 

On October 24, 2005, SIGIR reported in “Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Programs” (SIGIR-05-022), progress has been made in identifying 

the challenges of sustaining the IRRF projects, which directly affects the larger 

challenges of sustaining a democratic and viable government in Iraq. There is a growing 

recognition that the Iraqi government is not prepared to take over the near- or long-term 

management and funding of the infrastructure developed through IRRF projects and that 

a potential gap exists between the funding necessary to provide adequate sustainment and 

the amounts available. Further, we also believe that progress has been hampered by the 

absence of a centralized office with the authority and responsibility to manage this effort, 

we identified the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) as the primary 

Department of State and Embassy entity involved in managing IRRF projects and 

deemed it responsible for coordinating sustainment. 

17
Appendix B. Acronyms 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

GRD-PCO Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USTDA U.S. Trade and Development Agency 

18
Appendix C. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

19
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

 

20
Appendix D. Audit Team Members 

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this audit report. The staff 

members who contributed to the report include: 

Karen Bell 

Glenn D. Furbish 

Frank Gulla 

21
Management Comments 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

22
23