Audit 

 Report 

Management of Personnel Assigned to the 

Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, Iraq 

Report Number 04-002 June 25, 2004 

Office of the Inspector General 

Coalition Provisional Authority 
Acronyms 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DoD Department of Defense 

HRM Human Resource Management 

NGO Non-Government Organization 

TDY Temporary Duty Travel 
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

June 25, 2004 

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 

SUBJECT: Report on Management of Personnel Assigned to the Coalition Provisional 

Authority in Baghdad (Report No.04-002) 

 We are providing this report for your information and use. We undertook this review in 

response to concerns about the apparent lack of controls over the identification and tracking of 

personnel being deployed to CPA Baghdad. 

Comments on the draft of this report were not required. Therefore, no additional 

comments are necessary. 

 We appreciate the assistance extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to 

Mr. Brian Flynn, (703) 343-8953 or Mr. Douglas Ickes, (703) 343-8954. Management may 

request a formal briefing on the results of this review. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

Coalition Provisional Authority 
i

Office of the Inspector General 

Coalition Provisional Authority 

Report Number 04-002 June 25, 2004 

 (Project No. D2004-DCPAAO-0027) 

Management of Personnel Assigned to the 

Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad 

Executive Summary

Introduction: The deployment of civilian and military personnel to support the 

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in the post-war environment in Iraq began in 

April 2003. To date, a host of Federal agencies, multiple military organizations, and 

many non-government organizations (NGOs) have operated in the CPA area of 

responsibility. Until February 2004, the Military Personnel Center tracked all 

government personnel (military and civilian). However, by the end of January 2004, 

many distinct personnel tracking mechanisms appeared that were intended to provide 

accountability for select groups of individuals. In addition, contractors were tracking 

their own employees. As of March 8, 2004, the CPA believed it had a total of 1,196 

personnel assigned to CPA operations in Baghdad. The CPA had been authorized 2,117 

positions. The 1,196 included all military and civilian personnel assigned to CPA 

operations in Baghdad (including contractors who are working within the Presidential 

Palace on infrastructure contracts). 

Objective: The objectives of this review were to determine whether CPA had control 

over and insight into the number of civilians assigned to CPA in Baghdad, including both 

U.S. Government and contractor personnel and whether there were lessons to be learned 

from CPA’s management of civilian personnel in a post-war coalition environment. 

Conclusion: The CPA did not have an accurate count of civilian personnel assigned to 

the CPA operations in Baghdad. In March 2004, CPA officials believe that their rosters 

were between 90 and 95 percent accurate. With an estimated population of 1,196 

government and contractor personnel assigned to the CPA Baghdad, there could be more 

than 100 individuals not properly accounted for. Several factors have contributed to this 

condition. First, individuals were able to enter Iraq several different ways, some of 

which circumvent a primary control established to identify and track new people 

reporting to CPA Baghdad. Second, components within CPA Baghdad did not adhere to 

the policies and procedures established by CPA officials when deploying civilians to 

Baghdad. Third, the short-term nature of assignments, generally 4 to 6 months, presented 

a management challenge. Lastly, the absence of an interlinked civilian personnel 

database hindered the efficient management of the rapid deployment of civilians from 

various agencies and contractors that were needed to meet the CPA mission. As a result, 

CPA Baghdad may not confidently predict the resources that were needed to support the 

actual CPA Baghdad workforce, especially in an emergency or contingency operation. 

This report is being prepared to alert officials to the need for capturing the several 

important lessons learned from this situation that can be applied to future multi-agency 

coalitions. There are no recommendations. 
ii

Lessons Learned. CPA Inspector General understands that working groups have been 

established to explore potential lessons learned from the operations of the CPA during its 

relatively brief existence. We are providing this assessment to those groups for their 

consideration. Additionally, we believe that the working groups should look to the 

Modern Defense Civilian Personnel Data System of the Department of Defense as a way 

of better supporting future joint contingency operations like the Coalition Provisional 

Authority. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Background 1 

Objective 2 

Finding 

 Accuracy of the Number of Personnel Assigned 3 

Appendixes 

 A. Scope and Methodology 7 

 B. Report Distribution 8 

 C. Team Members 9 
1

Background 

Reason for Review. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Inspector General was 

created to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of CPA 

programs and operations; to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and 

operations; and to keep the head of the CPA fully and currently informed about problems 

and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations. We 

undertook this review in response to concerns about the apparent lack of controls over the 

identification and tracking of personnel being deployed to CPA Baghdad. 

Chronology of Personnel Identification and Tracking. The deployment of civilian and 

military personnel to support the CPA in the post-war environment began in April 2003. 

To date, a host of Federal agencies, multiple military organizations, and many nongovernment organizations (NGOs) have operated in the CPA area of responsibility. Until 

February 2004, the Military Personnel Center tracked all government personnel (military 

and civilian). However, by the end of January 2004, many distinct personnel tracking 

mechanisms appeared that were intended to provide accountability for select groups of 

individuals. In addition, contractors were tracking their own employees. 

Personnel Authorized and Assigned. As of March 8, 2004, the CPA believed it had a 

total of 1,196 personnel assigned to CPA operations in Baghdad. The CPA had been 

authorized 2,117 positions. The 1,196 included all military and civilian personnel 

assigned to CPA operations in Baghdad (including contractors working within the 

Presidential Palace in Baghdad on infrastructure contracts). This total did not include 

contractors working in Iraq on individual construction projects or military organizations 

conducting operations under Combined Joint Task Force 7 control. 

Factors Effecting Ability to Control Assigned Personnel. At the initial formation and 

staffing of the Baghdad portion of the CPA (CPA Baghdad), the CPA Baghdad’s 

personnel office, the Human Resources Management office (HRM Forward) was manned 

by one individual who was on a 3 month assignment and then replaced. CPA officials 

stated that CPA senior advisors were responsible for determining their staffing needs for 

their offices and providing those requirements to HRM Forward, who in turn 

consolidated the staffing needs and sent them to CPA Washington for action. HRM 

representatives in Washington contacted agencies throughout the Government and began 

the process of recruiting personnel to fill CPA positions. However, throughout this 

process, CPA staffing needs changed constantly in terms of the number of required 

personnel. There was no known ceiling to the number of civilians authorized to support 

the CPA. 
2

Objective 

The objectives of this review were to determine whether CPA had control over and 

insight into the number of civilian personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad, both US 

Government and contractor personnel, and whether there were lessons to be learned from 

CPA’s management of civilian personnel in a post-war coalition environment. 
3

Finding: Accuracy of the Number of Personnel 

Assigned 

The CPA did not have an accurate count of civilian personnel assigned to its operations 

in Baghdad. In March 2004, CPA officials believe that their rosters are between 90 and 

95 percent accurate. With an estimated population of 1,196 government and contractor 

personnel assigned to the CPA Baghdad, there could be more than 100 individuals not 

properly accounted for. Several factors have contributed to this condition. First, 

individuals were able to enter Iraq several different ways, some of which circumvent a 

primary control established to identify and track new people reporting to CPA Baghdad. 

Second, components within CPA Baghdad did not adhere to the policies and procedures 

established by CPA officials when deploying civilians to Baghdad. Third, the short-term 

nature of assignments, generally 4 to 6 months, presented a management challenge. 

Lastly, the absence of an interlinked civilian personnel database hindered the efficient 

management of the rapid deployment of civilians from various agencies and contractors 

that were needed to meet the CPA mission. As a result, CPA Baghdad may not 

confidently predict the resources that were needed to support the actual CPA Baghdad 

workforce, especially in an emergency or contingency operation. This report is being 

prepared to alert officials to the need for capturing the several important lessons learned 

from this situation that can be applied to future multi-agency coalitions. 

Concerns About Management and Control of Personnel. We undertook this review 

based on concerns that CPA Baghdad did not have adequate control and visibility over 

the number of people assigned to activities in Iraq. In discussions with HRM Forward, it 

was apparent that an accurate count of personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad was not 

available. HRM Forward officials estimate that 1,196 personnel are permanently 

assigned to CPA Baghdad, but they are only 90 to 95 percent confident of this estimate. 

HRM Forward had recognized that this issue was problematic in January 2004 and hired 

a full-time civilian Human Resources Manager. Additionally, two Department of State 

Human Resource specialists arrived in Iraq in March to work the issue and prepare for 

the transition from CPA to Department of State. 

Factors Inhibiting Control. In discussing the situation with CPA officials, we 

determined several factors that inhibited maintaining accurate information on the number 

of personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad. These factors involved the existence of multiple 

points of entry into CPA Baghdad, the failure of organizations within CPA Baghdad to 

follow published procedures with regard to in-processing and out-processing of 

individuals at CPA Forward locations, the short term nature of the assignments, and the 

absence of an interlinked civilian personnel database to manage a joint combined civilian 

force coming from multiple agencies across government and contractors. 

Due to a lack of a controlled, centralized entry point into the CPA area of responsibility, 

civilian personnel were deploying forward in support of the CPA operations from 

multiple locations. CPA officials stated that if personnel departed Kuwait or other rear 

area to a forward site, other than Baghdad, such as Al Hilla, Basrah, or Erbil, in support 
4

of CPA Operations there were no reliable procedures to identify and account for these 

individuals. Additionally, personnel hired to work directly for Iraq Ministries in Baghdad 

provide limited, if any, information to the CPA in Baghdad or Washington, D.C. For 

example, during our review we found that an individual can fly from the United States 

into Jordan and drive across the border without ever reporting his presence to the CPA in 

Baghdad or Washington, D.C. To exacerbate the situation, those that were coming to the 

CPA Presidential Palace in Baghdad did not always follow the controls that were in 

place. The system was circumvented at all levels. 

Many CPA personnel and organizations fail to comply with policies and procedures set 

forth for processing in and out of the CPA Baghdad area of responsibility. Most 

personnel arriving at CPA Baghdad came through Baghdad International Airport and 

were bussed to the Palace. A Military Personnel Center representative met the personnel 

arriving from the airport. The representative explained the check-in process, issued each 

person a temporary ID, assigned transit billeting, and provided each individual with a 

copy of a checklist. Further instructions were available on the CPA Intranet. While these 

procedures were clearly defined and documented, we observed instances where 

organizations circumvented the process. 

Most personnel were detailed to Baghdad in a temporary duty status for a period of 4 to 6 

months, rarely was someone assigned for a year or more. Another contributing factor to 

the situation was the fact that personnel were not formally assigned to a particular 

location. This together with the large number of transient staff who arrives TDY for as 

little as 2 days and as many as 45 days further inhibited accountability. 

Attempts to Validate Assigned Personnel through Alternative Means. We attempted 

to validate the accuracy of the number of personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad through 

alternative means. We spoke with CPA contracting officials responsible for food service 

to obtain a count of the average number of meals served daily. CPA officials stated that 

all personnel, military, civilian, and local national would be served meals. Because of 

this, use of the number of meals served daily would have greatly inflated the estimate of 

the number of people assigned to CPA Baghdad. 

In addition, we learned that the CPA Security Pass and Identification Office had issued 

over 10,000 CPA security badges and the office did not differentiate between badges 

provided to permanently assigned personnel and those on temporary duty to CPA 

Baghdad. Lastly, we determined that the CPA Baghdad network administrator had issued 

over 3,500 user accounts to individuals to access the system. Although, not everyone 

assigned to CPA Baghdad was issued an account to access the network, there is no 

assurance that individuals leaving the country had their account terminated. The network 

administrator of those assigned permanently did not differentiate temporary personnel to 

CPA Baghdad. 

Impact on Support. The existing infrastructure within the CPA area of operation is 

straining to support the current workforce. Without an accurate accounting of civilian 

personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad, senior officials cannot confidently estimate the cost 
5

to support ongoing CPA operations, predict the transition costs associated with the 

Department of State taking responsibility for operation in July, or anticipate the 

requirements to care for personnel in an emergency situation. 

Increased Need for Accurate Personnel Data. As the CPA begins the transition to the 

Department of State on July 1, 2004, there should be a heightened urgency and increased 

priority to gain control over the number of civilian personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad 

and, more importantly, knowing who will remain or be assigned here under the new 

organization. Strict adherence to Department of State regulations for U.S. personnel 

deployed to a foreign country in support of a U.S. Government mission must occur. 

Transition planning has begun. A draft official manning document with the assignment 

of individuals to specific positions in the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office 

(IRMO), which will succeed CPA, has been established. 

Limitations of Corrective Actions Identified to Date. The CPA HRM activity in 

Washington, DC has developed the “CPA Coalition Provisional Government Human 

Resources Management Personnel Database.” This database is maintained in 

Washington, D.C. and can be accessed in CPA Baghdad to record the arrival of new 

civilian employees and produce management reports. Conceptually this database was to 

be used to account for all the personnel assigned to CPA and capture general information 

on all the personnel deployed. This database will not, nor was it initially designed for, 

replacing the deploying individual’s organizations personnel system. (The deployed 

individual’s agency still has the responsibility for maintaining the records for career 

management, pay, and benefits.) However, there are no plans to verify the accuracy of 

the information in the database. The CPA plans to turn the database over to the 

Department of State for tracking personnel assigned to the successor organization; it will 

supplement the database maintained by the Department of State and provide the basis to 

establish a manning document of the Department of State and other federal civilian 

employees. 

Because of the complexities of activities such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the 

possibility that conflicts in the future will be manned in similar fashions, there is no easy 

solution or recommendation that will fix the problem of managing human resources in a 

dynamic, volatile environment. It is in the best interest of the Department of Defense 

(DoD) to further study and learn from the many challenges faced by CPA and develop 

procedures to avoid the same pitfalls in future conflicts. Future contingency operations 

will be more dependent on civilians to provide support as the military transitions its 

personnel to focus on war fighting capabilities. The lessons learned from the civilian 

deployment to support Operation Iraqi Freedom should be captured and acted upon with 

the utmost diligence. The need for interlinked civilian personnel databases for managing 

a joint combined deployment force composed of all civilian agencies with the capability 

of uploading a contractor contingent is something to be considered. Additionally, an 

appropriate process that serves, as a single entry point for all deployed and re-deployed 

staff should be created, and a greater accountability for compliance with the established 

procedures should be built into the process. The necessity for an HRM system to be inplace prior to the next such endeavor is warranted. 
6

Lessons Learned. CPA Inspector General understands that working groups exist to 

further research lessons learned from the operations of the CPA during its relatively brief 

existence. We are providing this assessment to those groups for their consideration. 

Additionally, we believe that consideration should be given to the Modern Defense 

Civilian Personnel Data System of the DoD to better support future joint contingency 

operations like the CPA. 
7

Appendix A: Scope and Methodology 

We performed this review in March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Our scope was limited to reviewing procedures and 

processes related to the management of personnel assigned to the CPA in Baghdad, Iraq. 

To determine whether the CPA had control over and insight into the number of civilian 

personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad, both U.S. Government and contractor personnel, 

and whether there are lessons to be learned from CPA’s management of civilian 

personnel in a post-war coalition environment. We visited the CPA’s HRM office, 

contracting personnel responsible for foodservice, Security Pass and Identification 

Office, and Network Administrator. At each entity, we interviewed personnel to 

determine the policies and procedures for management of personnel assigned to the CPA 

in Baghdad and to determine how those policies and procedures could be improved. 

Additionally, we corresponded with personnel from the DoD. 
8

Appendix B: Report Distribution 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics & Technology 

Auditor General, Department of the Army 

Other Defense Organizations

Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority 

Director, Coalition Provisional Authority Program Management Office 

Department of Defense Inspector General 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Non-Defense Federal Organization 

Office of Management and Budget 

General Accounting Office 

Department of State 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Department of Health and Human Services Inspector General 

Department of Commerce Inspector General 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

House Committee on Appropriations 

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Committee 

on Government Reform 

House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations, Committee on Government Reform 

House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, 

and the Census, Committee on Government Reform 

House International Relations Committee 
9

Appendix C: Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared by the Financial Management Division, Office of the Assistant 

Inspector General for Auditing, Coalition Provisional Authority. 

John Betar 

Brian Flynn 

Douglas Ickes