United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Catalin Aionesei-Lupu, Petitioner,

v.

U.S. Attorney General William 

Barr, and others, Respondents.

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Civil Action No. 20-23141-Civ-Scola

Order

This matter is before the Court upon Petitioner Catalin Aionesei-Lupu’s 

pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 

challenging her continued detention by the Department of Homeland Security, 

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and seeking release 

from custody. (ECF No. 1.) Although this matter was automatically referred to 

United States Magistrate Judge Lisette M. Reid pursuant to Administrative Order 

2019-2, the Court sua sponte withdrew the referral on September 4, 2020.

Having reviewed the record, the petition, the Respondents’ motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 9), the notice accompanying the motion to dismiss indicating that the

Petitioner has been removed from the United States to Romania (ECF No. 9-1), 

and the relevant legal authorities, the Court grants the motion to dismiss (ECF 

No. 9) and dismisses the petition.

I. Background

At the time the petition was filed, the Petitioner was in custody of ICE at 

the Krome Processing Center, in Miami, Florida. (ECF No. 1.) The Petitioner was 

ordered removed on March 27, 2014 and alleges that she has been in the custody 

of ICE since January 31, 2020. (Id. at 2.) She claims to have cooperated with ICE 

efforts to have her removed to her home country. (Id. at 3.)

II. Discussion

Liberally construed, it appears that the Petitioner is arguing that she is

entitled to relief based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held 

that while a legally admitted alien can be detained during the 90-day “removal 

period” contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the alien can be held after that 

period for only a “reasonable period,” which is presumed to be six months, unless 

the INS can show that there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the 

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reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 698-701. She claims she 

is entitled to be released from custody because she has been held for longer than 

the presumptively reasonable six months recognized in Zadvydas.

For a federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a habeas 

proceeding, the petitioner must be “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 

laws or treaties of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); accord Maleng 

v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). The “in custody” determination is made at 

the time the § 2241 petition is filed. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 

(1968). Once the jurisdictional prerequisite of custody is met at the time of filing, 

jurisdiction is not defeated by the petitioner’s subsequent release from custody 

while the petition is pending. Carafas at 234.

On July 30, 2020, after filing this petition, the Petitioner was removed from

the United States. (ECF No. 9-1.) Although the Petitioner is no longer confined, 

she has satisfied the in-custody requirement based on her status at the time of 

filing. However, although the in-custody requirement has been met, this Court 

still lacks jurisdiction in this case. “Article III of the Constitution limits federal 

‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to “‘Cases’ and 

>Controversies.’” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 

(1980); Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted). “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all 

stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Lewis v. Continental 

Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). The parties must continue to have a 

“personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. Id. at 478 (citation omitted). In 

other words, a petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual 

injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.

A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the 

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 

395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). The doctrine of mootness derives “directly from the 

case or controversy limitation because ‘an action that is moot cannot be 

characterized as an active case or controversy.’” Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1242. 

Thus, a case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect 

to which the court can give meaningful relief. Therefore, if events that occur 

subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability 

to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must 

be dismissed. In fact, dismissal is required because mootness is jurisdictional.

The Eleventh Circuit recognizes an exception to the mootness doctrine 

when the action being challenged by the lawsuit is capable of being repeated and 

evading review, but the exception is narrow and applies only in exceptional 

situations. See Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242-43 (11th 

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Cir. 2002). The Court finds that the exception is not applicable here. AIn 

particular, the exception can be invoked only when (1) there [is] a reasonable 

expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur 

involving the same complaining party, and (2) the challenged action is in its 

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.@ Id. 

(internal citation omitted; emphasis in original). Simply put, A[t]he remote 

possibility that an event might recur is not enough to overcome mootness, and 

even a likely recurrence is insufficient if there would be ample opportunity for 

review at that time.@Id. 296 F.3d at 1242-1243 (internal citation omitted).

Because a habeas petition challenges prison officials’ authority to keep a 

prisoner in custody, in general, the petitioner’s release moots a habeas petition. 

See generally Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 (1982). In the instant 

proceeding, the Petitioner challenged her prolonged detention in ICE custody. 

Because the Petitioner has now been released from custody and removed from 

the United States, her detention has terminated. The Petitioner did not allege 

that collateral consequences exist to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of 

Article III and there is nothing to suggest that the Petitioner will be returned to 

the custody of ICE. Accordingly, no exception to the mootness doctrine is 

applicable here.

Since this Court can no longer order the Respondent to release the 

Petitioner, there is Anothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.=@

Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1243 (citation omitted). This action no longer presents a 

justiciable case or controversy within the meaning of Article III. Accordingly, the

petition must be dismissed as moot. Id. 

III. Certificate of Appealability

A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order denying her

petition for writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal but must 

obtain a certificate of appealability (‟COA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Harbison 

v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009). Courts should issue a certificate of appealability 

only if the petitioner makes ‟a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where a district court has 

rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment 

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000). However, when the district court has rejected a claim on 

procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that ‟jurists of reason would find 

it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether 

the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.

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Upon consideration of the record as a whole, the Court declines to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) for lack 

of jurisdiction and dismisses the petition (ECF No. 1) as moot. The Court further 

declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on September 22, 

2020.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Copies, via U.S. Mail, to:

Catalin Aionesei-Lupu

087-417-960

Krome Service Processing Center

Inmate Mail/Parcels

18201 SW 12th Street

Miami, FL 33194

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