United States Department of Agriculture

for the greatest good

Narrative Timeline of the

Pacific Northwest

2015 Fire Season

The First Creek FiUe burns towards residences 

Canyon Creek Complex from Indian Creek 5RDG

Structure protection on the Okanogan Complex

Firefighter on the

Wolverine Fire
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 2

In Memory of

Richard Wheeler, Andrew Zajac, and Tom Zbyszewski

Members of Engine 642 on the Methow Ranger District,

Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest

Who lost their lives during Initial Attack Operations

on the Twisp River Fire on August 19, 2015

 

Richard Wheeler

Age 31

Andrew Zajac

Age 26

Tom Zbyszewski

Age 20
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 3

Report Purpose

This report provides a narrative timeline of key events that occurred during the 2015 wildfire season 

across the U.S. Forest Service’s Pacific Northwest Region. National context is provided to explain when 

and why firefighting resources were limited—as well as the impacts of those limitations. Preparedness

and other preseason activities which increased firefighting capabilities within the Pacific Northwest

Region are also outlined. In addition, the coordination and cooperation among the various wildland fire 

agencies within the Region is detailed and the resultant improved outcomes are described.

Contents

An Important Note to Our Readers................................................. 6

I. Summary

A. Most Severe Fire Season in Modern History.............................. 7

B. Tragedy Strikes................................................................................ 8

C. 2015 Fire Season Milestones........................................................ 8

D. 2015 Wildfire Management Successes....................................... 9

Map of 2015 Pacific Northwest Region High Profile Fires............ 11

II. Preseason: Actions Taken from January Through May.................. 12

III. The 2015 Fire Season

A. Introduction.................................................................................... 14

B. Weather........................................................................................... 15

C. Interagency Coordination and Cooperation................................ 16

D. Protecting Sage-Grouse Habitat................................................... 17

E. Fire Prevention and Mitigation .................................................... 18

F. Using the Best Available Science to Forecast Fire Behavior

 and Threats to Values.................................................................... 20

G. Air Quality....................................................................................... 20

 Interactive Story Journal

An Interactive Story Journal is also available to accompany this report.

This story journal provides summary information from the main report as well as 

interactive web maps, photos, videos, 3D views for some fires as well as timeenabled fire progression maps for selected fire incidents.

You can view the story journal by scanning the code (on the left) or going to:

 http://arcg.is/1MWXG4A
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 4

IV. The 2015 Fire Season Timeline............................................................................ 22

A. June

1. Buckskin Fire................................................................................... 23

2. Leslie Gulch Fire.............................................................................. 25

3. Wolverine Fire................................................................................. 27

4. Corner Creek Fire............................................................................ 28

B. July

5. Newby Lake Fire.............................................................................. 29

6. Horseshoe Fire................................................................................ 30

7. Blankenship Fire............................................................................. 32

8. Stouts Creek Fire............................................................................. 32

C. August

9. National Creek Complex................................................................ 33

10. Baldy Fire Fire............................................................................... 34

11. Collier Butte Fire........................................................................... 35

12. Cougar Creek Fire..........................................................................37

13. Stickpin Fire...................................................................................39

14. Bendire Complex...........................................................................39

15. Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire..............................................................40

16. Canyon Creek Complex................................................................ 42

17. County Line 2 Fire........................................................................ 44

18. Carpenter Road Fire..................................................................... 46

19. North Star Fire.............................................................................. 46

20. Grizzly Bear Complex................................................................... 47

21. Eldorado Fire................................................................................ 48

22. Kettle Complex............................................................................. 49

While we mourn the loss of our 

firefighters and are dismayed at 

the losses of residences and 

other important values, there is 

no doubt that the many actions 

taken in advance of the 2015 fire 

season and during this severe 

fire season by the interagency 

wildland fire agencies—at the 

Regional, State and Local 

levels—protected vast numbers 

of citizens and prevented huge 

losses of property and

natural resources.

Structure Protection Task Force assembles on the Okanogan Complex

on August 28. Photo by Jeremiah Mushen.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 5

23. Chelan Complex........................................................................... 51

24. Beaver Lake Fire........................................................................... 54

25. Lime Belt Fire................................................................................ 54

26. Tunk Block Fire.............................................................................. 55

27. Okanogan Complex...................................................................... 56

28. Twisp River Fire.............................................................................56

V. Glossary

A. Acronyms...................................................................................................... 61

B. Definition of Terms.......................................................................................62

VI. Acknowledgements........................................................................................ 74

VII. Appendices

Appendix A – Sage-Grouse Habitat and Rangeland Fires............................ 76

Appendix B – Fire Prevention and Mitigation............................................... 79

Appendix C – The Use of Technology in Support

 of the 2015 Pacific Northwest Fires....................................... 86

Appendix D – Air Quality and Smoke Response............................................ 96

Appendix E – Four Potential Long-Duration Fires......................................... 102

Appendix F – Wolverine Fire............................................................................109

Appendix G – Corner Creek Fire...................................................................... 132

Appendix H – Newby Lake Fire........................................................................137

Appendix I – Stouts Creek Fire........................................................................ 144

Appendix J – National Creek Complex........................................................... 148

Appendix K – Cougar Creek Fire..................................................................... 160

Appendix L – Kettle Complex...........................................................................171

Appendix M – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires

Bendire Complex.................................................................... 180

Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire....................................................... 184

Eldorado Fire...........................................................................192

Leslie Gulch Fire................................................................ 196

Appendix N – Canyon Creek Complex......................................................... 201

Appendix O – County Line 2 Fire.................................................................. 225

Appendix P – Carpenter Road Fire.................................................................235

Appendix Q – North Star Fire.........................................................................243

Appendix R – Grizzly Bear Complex.............................................................. 249

Appendix S – Chelan Complex....................................................................... 257

Appendix T – Okanogan Complex................................................................. 270
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 6

An Important Note to Our Readers

The information in this report was gathered through a variety of means.

Information was obtained from the following sources: 

The National Wildfire Coordinating Group’s “InciWeb” incident information system, Incident Status 

Summary (ICS) 209s, Situation Reports, Incident Action Plans, Dispatch logs, National Wildfire 

Coordinating Group (NWCG) reports, the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS), Northwest 

Coordination Center Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) decision logs, Resource Ordering and Status 

System (ROSS) reports, media (including social media), as well as several other sources. (For more 

information on the various technologies that were used to support the 2015 fires that also helped to 

inform this report, see Appendix C – The Use of Technology in Support of the 2015 Fires.) Northwest 

Coordination Center staff members were instrumental in collecting this information and providing 

overall perspectives.

Also critical to the information in this report were the various personal interviews conducted with 

Incident Commanders, fire leadership, firefighters, Agency Administrators, and others. It must be 

recognized that not all personal interviews were consistent with each other. This report’s authors did 

their best to reconcile differences while striving to objectively honor the perspective of each individual

source. 

Left: An Incident Meteorologist assists fire managers on the Canyon Creek Complex.

Right: Interagency Hotshot Crew members work on the Stouts Creek Fire.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 7

I. Summary

A. Most Severe Fire Season in Modern History

The 2015 fire season in the Pacific Northwest was the most severe in modern history from a variety of 

standpoints. Oregon and Washington experienced more than 3,800 wildfires (almost 2,300 in Oregon 

and more than 1,500 in Washington) that burned more than 1,600,000 acres (more than 630,000 acres 

in Oregon and more than 1,000,000 acres in Washington)—including 1,325 fires representing 507,000 

acres on U.S. Forest Service lands (information as of September 30, 2015).

Initial Attack was successful in rapidly containing all but about 119 of these fires. This response 

represents an almost 97 percent Initial Attack success rate.

Approximately 50 of these fire escapes occurred during a ten-day period in mid-August when numerous 

Large Fires (a wildfire of 100 acres or more in timber or 300 acres or more in grass/sage) were already 

burning in the Pacific Northwest. During this time, the Northern Rockies and Northern California were 

also experiencing unusually high numbers of wildfires. This situation limited the ability to rapidly obtain 

Initial Attack reinforcements as well as almost all types of firefighting resources needed for Large Fires.

Initial Attack was successful in rapidly containing all but about 119 of these fires.

This response represents an almost 97 percent Initial Attack success rate.

Fires on National Forest Lands Given Lower Priority for Resources

During the peak of the fire season, wildfires occurring on national forest lands were often given the 

lowest priority for resources because they were farthest from communities and represented lower 

threats to life. Some of these fires grew to become large and ultimately burned onto private lands. 

When this occurred, it was due to severe fire weather (strong winds, high temperature, and low 

humidity) which caused all fires to burn more intensely and rapidly.

Protecting Specific High-Value Locations

Those fires with few firefighting resources often grew very large very quickly. Because of the insufficient 

resources available to construct fire lines around these rapidly growing fires, the standard strategy of 

full perimeter containment was often abandoned in favor of “point protection”. “Point protection”

consisted of placing engines and crews at specific high-value locations (individual or clusters of 

structures, power and communication infrastructure, etc.), building fire line around these locations or 

implementing hose lays to prevent fire from damaging these locations as it burned past them. Only 

later, when additional resources became available, would full perimeter containment lines be 

constructed.

Photo of the Grizzly Bear Complex Fire taken from the community of Troy

in Oregon’s Wallowa County.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 8

B. Tragedy Strikes

Tragedy struck on August 19 when three U.S. Forest Service firefighters were killed while 

attacking a fire on private lands near Twisp, Washington.

During this severe fire season, approximately 675 structures were lost. While well over 

16,000 structures were threatened, most were saved from loss by aggressive suppression 

actions. The Pacific Northwest Region was listed as the first or second priority for 

national resources on the National Interagency Coordination Center’s Situation Report

for 82 days (of 122) between June 1 and September 30. During the entire month of 

August, the Pacific Northwest Region was ranked Number #1 (18 days) or Number #2 (13 days) in the National 

Priority.

At the peak of the season’s fire activity, the following resources were assigned to wildfires burning in the Region: 1 

Area Command, 21 Incident Management Teams, and more than 11,450 personnel. Firefighters were mobilized to 

attack the Pacific Northwest Region’s fires from most of the 50 states as well as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 

In addition, the Oregon National Guard, Washington National Guard, and the United States Army were all dispatched 

to help with suppression efforts here.

C. 2015 Fire Season Milestones

 In August, to help support Washington State’s fires, the Emergency Support Function 4 (ESF4) was activated 

by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

 The Emergency Conflagration Act—that authorizes the Oregon Office of the State Fire Marshal to mobilize 

structural firefighters and equipment to assist local resources battling fires—was invoked by the Governor 

of Oregon on July 30 in response to the Stouts Creek Fire, on August 13 for the Cornet Fire and Windy Ridge 

Fires, on August 14 for the Canyon Creek Fire, and on August 20 for the Grizzly Bear Complex.

 The Washington State Fire Service Mobilization Plan is implemented to provide personnel, equipment, and 

other logistical resources from around the state when a wildland fire or other emergency exceeds the 

capacity of local jurisdictions. In mid-August, the Chief of the Washington State Patrol authorized such a 

state-declared mobilization on the Carpenter Road Fire, the Kettle Complex, and the Okanogan Complex.

 The Pacific Northwest Region had the highest priority in the nation for firefighting resources during these 

dates: July 25 and 26, August 14-31, and September 8-13.

 The Pacific Northwest Region was under a Preparedness Level 5 (the highest, most severe level) from 

August 13 through September 4.

 The greatest number of uncontained fires occurred on August 18: 25 Large Fires totaling 822,512 acres in 

the Pacific Northwest Region (105 Large Fires totaling 2.2 million acres nationally).

 Oregon and Washington National Guard supported firefighting efforts throughout August and into 

September, mobilizing a medevac extraction helicopter, heavy helicopters to perform bucket work, and 

hundreds of line personnel organized into 20-person crews deployed on fires in both states.

 In August, one half-battalion of active military personnel—approximately 200 people organized into 20-

person crews and support personnel, including a medical unit—mobilized to the Kaniksu Complex in 

northeast Washington.

 A total of 68 fire line management personnel from New Zealand and Australia were assigned to support 

Large Fire suppression in the Pacific Northwest. This mobilization helped to ensure that the U.S. Forest 

Service and other agencies were able to maintain Initial Attack capability.

 Estimates indicate that more than $560 million was spent suppressing fires in the Pacific Northwest Region

in 2015.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 9

D. 2015 Wildfire Management Successes

Several key points regarding the management of wildfires during the severe 2015 fire season in the 

Pacific Northwest deserve special recognition.

Outstanding Interagency Cooperation

There was outstanding interagency cooperation among the nine agencies (Bureau of Land 

Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service, Oregon Department of Forestry, Washington State Department of Natural 

Resources, and Oregon and Washington’s State Fire Marshal offices) responsible for wildland fire 

protection and management. These agencies provided an excellent foundation for Initial Attack and 

Large Fire management.

Tribal Nations Support

Tribal Nations provided many resources in support of wildfire management on their lands and 

adjacent lands.

Excellent International Cooperation and Coordination

Several fires spanned the Canadian-U.S. boundary. Cooperation and coordination between the two 

countries was excellent. 

Members of the Oregon National Guard help suppression efforts on the Canyon Creek Complex on August 27.

Photo by Lori Iverson, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 10

Local Fire District Support

Local fire districts—comprised mostly of volunteers—provided substantial resources, especially in 

Initial and Extended Attack, as well as assisting with evacuations. This local support contributed to 

the overall success that occurred during the 2015 fire season.

Significant Contribution from Law Enforcement

Law enforcement at both the local and state levels contributed significantly in keeping the public out 

of harm’s way through timely evacuations and closures.

Early Recognition of Fire Season’s Potential Severity

Early recognition of the potential severity of the 2015 fire season proved to be instrumental in

developing strategies for augmenting local Initial Attack resources and interagency partnering which 

improved the successes that occurred during this fire season.

Preseason Actions and Collaborations

The actions and activities that were implemented prior to the onset of the 2015 fire season were 

significant. These key collaborations included: preseason planning, simulations, and public outreach.

Prepositioning Firefighting Resources

The early decision to bring additional firefighting resources into the Region prior to the onset of 

heavy fire activity proved to be an essential component to successful fire suppression.

The Multi-Agency Coordination Group and Strategic Adjustment of Priorities

Early establishment of the Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group and the strategic adjustment of 

priorities as the demand for firefighting resources exceeded supply proved to be another 

management action that contributed to success.

Actions Taken Prior to and During the 2015 Fire Season

Protected Citizens and Prevented Huge Losses

While we mourn the loss of our firefighters and are dismayed at the losses of residences and other 

important values, there is no doubt that the many actions taken in advance of the 2015 fire season and 

during this severe fire season by the interagency wildland fire agencies—at the Regional, State and Local 

levels—protected vast numbers of citizens and prevented huge losses of property and natural resources.

Residents’ Input

Firefighters on the Canyon 

Creek Complex receive 

thanks and support from 

community members.

Photos by Gert Zoutendijk, 

Oregon State Fire Marshal’s 

Office.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 11

For Interactive Regional Map: http://arcg.is/1ToKx78
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 12

II. Preseason: Actions Taken from January through May

January through March

 Predictive Services Forecasts and actual conditions 

 Snow pack and precipitation.

 Local Interagency Preseason Meetings. Each local Forest, Bureau of Land Management Unit, and 

State Unit conducted preseason meetings to better prepare for the upcoming fire season.

 Planning for the Fire Season:

Date: January 28, 2015

Subject: Chief’s Letter of Intent – 2015 Fire Management

To: Regional Foresters, Station Directors, Area Director, IITF Director

and Deputy Chiefs

We anticipate 2015 to be another challenging year to manage fire. It is our intention to successfully 

manage fire on the landscape, while considering land management objectives, the Forest Service mission 

and the Federal Fire Policy.

We fully evaluate risks with a broad perspective for both planned and unplanned ignitions while 

considering the people we serve and landscapes we protect. In accordance with the goals of the Cohesive 

Strategy, we seek to create resilient landscapes, fire-adapted communities and provide safe, efficient 

wildfire response. This connects with our five broad focus areas of Safety: Inclusiveness, Ecological 

Restoration, Fire, and Communities.

Success continues to be defined as safely achieving reasonable objectives with the least firefighter 

exposure necessary, while enhancing stakeholder support for our management efforts. The fundamental 

principles we continue to embrace for success:

• Everyone, every day, returns home safely.

• Safety is not just a consideration in how we do our work; it is the essence of how we make 

decisions. 

• We assess, analyze, communicate, and share risk before, during, and after incidents. 

• We do not accept unnecessary risk or transfer it to our partners or future generations.

• Every fire is managed with strategy and tactical decisions driven by the probability of success to 

meet reasonable objectives, and receives a safe, effective, and efficient response.

• Before, during, and after every fire, we enhance relationships.

• We create a respectful work environment for everyone involved in fire. 

• We learn from every experience and use that knowledge to improve.

Implementing the Forest Service 2015 Wildland Fire Risk Management Protocols will help us achieve 

success. We have outstanding employees who support wildland fire management. I am encouraged and 

committed to the continuous improvements we are making; these improvements will provide value to the 

people we serve. Thank you for your commitment and service towards making 2015 a safe and successful 

fire season.

/s/ Thomas L. Tidwell

THOMAS L. TIDWELL

Chief
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 13

 Extreme fire activity simulation:

Simulation Exercise

Preparing to Respond to a ‘Worst-Case’ Scenario

In February, the U.S. Forest Service Pacific Northwest Regional office hosted a workshop designed to 

simulate extremely high-volume fire activity.

This simulation exercise engaged Pacific Northwest Region executives and Pacific Northwest Wildfire 

Coordinating Group (PNWCG) representatives, along with their staffs, in a realistic multi-agency 

coordination training that replicated fire conditions over and above what was experienced during the 

2014 fire season.

This simulation’s goal was to improve: Communications, Decision-Making on incident prioritization, and 

Interagency Coordination and Cooperation necessary for effective management of multiple Large Fire 

scenarios.

Participating in this exercise carried the additional benefit of gaining an increased understanding of all 

Pacific Northwest agencies’ missions and priorities. In addition, the simulation helped model the highstress environment when extreme burning conditions and critical resource shortages simultaneously 

exist over a prolonged period of time.

Federal, State, and Local Agency Administrators and Fire Managers believe that such “real world” 

practicing helps everyone perform better when the actual situations occur. 

April through May

 Predictive Services Update and actual conditions.

 Long-term outlook (central Washington highlighted); continued low levels of 

precipitation with high temperatures.

 Some National Forests cancelled planned prescribed burns due to the severity of fire conditions.

 Regional-level preparedness reviews on all National Forests and Bureau of Land Management

Units.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 14

III. The 2015 Fire Season

A. Introduction

The 2015 fire season in the Pacific Northwest was 

predicted to be very severe as early as February 

when snowpack levels were reviewed throughout 

the region and found to be only a fraction of 

normal.

During the winter and spring, the interagency 

wildland fire community convened numerous 

meetings and workshops to enhance readiness 

for the expected higher volume of fire activity.

Long-Term Drought

The major predisposing factor for predicting a 

severe fire season was the continuation of a longterm drought. The unusually dry dead fuels, as 

well as very low moisture content in live fuels,

contributed to greater fire intensity and rates of 

spread.

Early season fires grew larger and lasted longer 

than under less severe conditions. The Peavine 

Fire occurred in Oregon’s Douglas County in May. 

This fire was discovered on May 5 and burned 

approximately 150 acres before it was contained 

the following week.

Prioritizing Fires and Distributing Resources

When demand exceeds supply of firefighting resources (Engines, Crews, Air Tankers, Helicopters, etc.) 

interagency groups (Multi-Agency Coordination Groups known as “MACs”) are convened to prioritize fires 

and distribute resources as they become available. (“MAC Group” is a generalized term which describes the 

functions and activities of representatives of involved agencies and jurisdictions who come together to 

make decisions regarding the prioritizing of incidents and the sharing and use of critical resources. The MAC 

organization is not a part of the on-scene Incident Command System and is not involved in developing 

incident strategy or tactics.)

In most cases, Initial Attack is prioritized over fires which have already escaped initial attack. Local units 

reserve a portion of their total firefighting force (drawdown level) to be available for the Initial Attack of 

new fires. This Initial Attack priority seeks to prevent new fire starts from becoming Large Fires and, thus, 

encumbering even more firefighting resources.

Priority for sending resources to Large Fires first considers threats to life. In addition, the MAC Groups 

consider threats to other values such as communities, telecommunication infrastructure, individual 

residences, power transmission lines, and other values important to the local community, the region, and 

the nation. In implementing this process, the MAC Groups agree on priorities for resource allocation.

This graphic displays the amount of water contained within the 

snowpack (Snow Water Equivalent).

The graphic was prepared by the U.S. Forest Service/Natural 

Resources Conservation Service’s National Water and Climate 

Center in Portland, Oregon. http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 15

B. Weather

Background

The first six months of 2015 were the 

warmest first six months of any year over 

much of Oregon and Washington since 

record keeping began in 1895.

These record-warm temperatures 

observed during the winter and spring,

coupled with below-average precipitation,

led to an exceptionally poor snowpack 

throughout the winter and spring. (See 

top graphic on right.)

Temperature and precipitation outlooks 

for the 2015 summer indicated above 

normal temperatures and below normal 

precipitation represented the most likely 

scenario for the Pacific Northwest.

Furthermore, this outlook was interpreted 

to pose an above-average potential for 

multiple large and costly wildfires in 

Oregon and Washington. (See bottom 

graphic on right.)

Trends in Fire Danger

Fire danger indices (Energy Release 

Component [ERC]) remained at or above 

average from early June through the end 

of August in 10 of 12 Predictive Service 

Rating areas encompassing Oregon and 

Washington.

Southeast and south central Oregon were 

the only regions which underwent 

extended periods of below average fire 

danger during 2015.

At some point during the 2015 fire season,

the record values of dryness that were 

being recorded were the driest values 

recorded during the last 15 years.

Seasonal Lightning Statistics

From June 1 through September 15, a total of 51,019 lightning strikes were recorded over Oregon and 

Washington. The average for fire seasons from 2000-2014 through September 15 is 78,775 strikes. While 

the number of the 2015 strikes was below this average, the background of drought in 2015 enhanced the 

ability for lightning strikes to ignite multiple fires in short periods of time.

Graphic above illustrates the poor snow accumulation

that occurred through the spring of 2015.

Graphic above illustrates the high potential for Large Fires that was 

forecasted on May 1, 2015.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 16

C. Interagency Coordination and Cooperation

Throughout the Pacific Northwest’s 2015 fire season, the interagency coordination and cooperation enabled all 

nine agencies to leverage their capabilities and capacity to successfully respond to the collectively determined 

highest priorities. (These nine agencies are: Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park 

Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Oregon Department of Forestry, Washington 

State Department of Natural Resources, and Oregon and Washington’s State Fire Marshal offices.)

Although individual agency missions and priorities differed, the agency administrators and MAC Group were 

able to collaboratively determine highest priorities and focus scarce resources where they were needed most.

Interagency conference calls were conducted throughout the 2015 fire season to share information, agree on 

priorities, and to develop aligned internal direction and public information messages.

These conference calls also occurred prior to the fire season. As the fire season progressed, they became much 

more regular. During Preparedness Level 3, they occurred twice weekly. By Preparedness Level 4 they occurred 

daily—including weekends.

Conference call participants included the U.S. Forest Service Regional Forester, the Bureau of Land Management 

State Director, the Oregon State Forester, the Washington State Forester, and various agency fire directors. The 

executives reviewed and validated MAC Group priorities and decisions, discussed and resolved socio-political 

issues, and provided direction on safe practices and priorities given the large number of fires and scarcity of 

resources.

Firefighters on a “point protection” assignment defend homes from the 2015 Chelan Complex.

Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 17

2015 Wildland Fire Preparedness Forces*

Firefighters

USFS

Total 

Personnel

BLM

Total 

Personnel

Hotshots and other crews (total personnel) 213 220

Smokejumpers 78

Engine Crews and others 1,455 325

Total personnel 1,746 545

Equipment and Aviation

Engines 133 59

Helicopters – Type 1 15

Helicopters – Type 2&3 10

Air Tankers – (Single Engine Air Tanker) 1

Dozers 2 3

Water Tenders 3 4

U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management firefighting resources assigned to 

the Pacific Northwest Region for the 2015 fire season.

In addition, the MAC Group met daily from June 30 to September 12 (with a gap due to decreased activity 

from July 12 to August 2) to prioritize large wildfires and assign—and, in some cases, reassign—resources

to meet the collective highest priorities. 

Starting in June, most of the Forests and Bureau of Land Management Units in the Pacific Northwest Region 

requested and received additional firefighting resources each month through severity requests. 

D. Protecting Sage-Grouse Habitat

Greatest Threat to Sagebrush Habitat: Fire

Experts have identified fire as one of the greatest threats to sagebrush habitat. In response to this threat, 

on January 5, 2015, the Department of the Interior Secretary Sally Jewell signed Secretarial Order 3336 on 

Rangeland Fire Prevention, Management, and Restoration.

This Secretarial Order calls for a comprehensive, science-based strategy to reduce the threat of large-scale 

rangeland fire to habitat for the greater sage-grouse and the sagebrush-steppe ecosystem.

Implementation of Strategy Called for by the Secretarial Order

Many elements of this strategy are implemented through Bureau of Land Management/U.S. Forest Service 

plans, including:

 Interagency, landscape-scale assessments to prioritize at-risk habitat and identify priorities for 

fuels management, preparedness, suppression and restoration based on the quality of habitat at 

risk from loss to fire;

2015 Wildland Fire Preparedness Forces
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 18

Several 2015 Wildfires

Impacted Sage-Grouse Habitat

The 2015 wildfires in the Pacific Northwest Region contributed to the further degradation and 

fragmentation of sage-grouse habitat. 

In Oregon, fires impacted a total of 153,142 acres of sage-grouse habitat. These acres included the 

following habitat management areas:

Very High Priority Habitat – Less than 1 acre

High Priority Habitat – 74,343 acres

General Priority Habitat – 78,798 acres

The 2015 incidents that impacted this habitat included the Bendire Complex, Eldorado, Leslie Gulch, and 

Cornet-Windy Ridge fires.

The Corner Creek Fire interacted with several fuel treatments that aided in the control of this wildfire 

and helped prevent it from burning into sage-grouse habitat. 

 Annual treatment and fire management programs to be developed in coordination with 

interagency partners, states and other partners across jurisdictional and ownership boundaries 

based on priorities identified in the landscape-scale assessments; and

 Development of strategies to check the spread of rangeland fires where they occur to protect 

larger, intact blocks of habitat.

(For more information on Sage-Grouse habitat, see Appendix A – Sage-Grouse Habitat and Rangeland Fire.)

E. Fire Prevention and Mitigation

The fire prevention effort put forth across the Pacific 

Northwest in 2015 by the Bureau of Land 

Management and U.S. Forest Service was 

unprecedented.

Seven Fire Prevention and Education Teams were 

brought in to augment the base fire prevention 

program. These teams provided information and 

education to raise awareness of wildfire issues by 

enlisting the public’s support and actions for creating 

safer communities.

One key objective of this effort was to mass market 

awareness of drought conditions and high fire danger. 

The teams’ strategy focused on radio, television and 

newspapers. Four audio and three video Public 

Service Announcements that highlighted drought and 

campfire awareness were distributed to more than 

200 media contacts.

Several Fire Prevention and Education Teams worked on 

the “Steppe Up – Protect Our Sage Community” 

campaign, designed to raise awareness about the 

critical loss of habitat by human-caused fires in 

sagebrush ecosystems.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 19

In addition, 150 tweets were developed with a focus on 

human-caused wildfires and protecting sage-grouse habitat.

Key Messages Delivered in a Variety of Ways

During 2015, fire prevention experts attended numerous 

public events to deliver key messages to prevent humancaused fires.

A wide variety of graphics were also created on prevention 

messaging, including: vehicle-caused fires, campfires, 

shooting fires, sagebrush habitat effects, fireworks, burn 

piles, field burning, fire restrictions, and home 

preparedness. These graphics included posters, fliers,

banners, billboards, electronic messages, a coloring book,

and trading cards. A select few were translated from English 

to Spanish.

These graphics can be downloaded and customized for 

partner agencies at: http://ftp.nifc.gov/incident_specific_data/pacific_nw/!SORO/Prevention/

Firewise Program

Helps to Save Homes

The national Firewise Program 

(Firewise.org) encourages local 

solutions for safety by involving 

homeowners in taking individual 

responsibility for preparing their 

homes from the risk of wildfire.

This program is cosponsored by the 

U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. 

Department of the Interior, and the 

National Association of State 

Foresters.

In 2013, members of the small 

community of Pine Creek, Oregon,

came together to make their 

community “Firewise”. Using the 

Firewise Program as a guide, these 

Pine Creek neighbors began making 

their homes and property more defensible to the impacts of wildfire. This work included pruning, mowing, 

thinning trees, clearing flammable materials away from homes, and improving access routes by clearing 

away dense vegetation.

On August 26, 2015, the Canyon Creek Complex Fire burned into the Pine Creek drainage on the north flank 

of the Strawberry Wilderness. Fire officials credit this preparation by homeowners and fire crews in advance 

of the fire for saving all the homes (approximately 50) in the Pine Creek community area.

(For a full report on the 2015 Fire Prevention efforts, see Appendix B – Fire Prevention and Mitigation.)

Beginning in 2013, the Pine Creek, Oregon, residents came together to 

undertake a variety of efforts to help make their homes more 

defensible to wildfire. Due to this “Firewise” community’s actions, 

none of its homes were lost to the Canyon Creek Complex Fire.

One of the many fire prevention graphics created by 

Fire Prevention and Education Teams.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 20

F. Using the Best Available Science to Forecast Fire Behavior and Threats to Values

Numerous technologies and resources were used in support of fire management efforts during the 2015 

fire season. This included using the best available science to provide timely forecasts of fire behavior and 

threats to values.

The Pacific Northwest Region maintains a high level of qualified analysts and planners, including: Long Term 

Analysts, Fire Behavior Analysts, Geospatial Analysts, Strategic Operational Planners, and Wildland Fire 

Decision Support System Technical Specialists.

During the 2015 fire season, the Region was able to place analysts on site at all of the regionally significant 

fires and complexes. At the height of the fire season, the Regional Fire Analyst remained at regional 

headquarters to provide briefings to the Multi-Agency Coordination Group and agency executives regarding 

weather, potential fire behavior, and threats to values.

The Regional Fire Analyst also hosted conference calls and disseminated information with on-scene 

analysts to understand concerns/needs and exchange information. In addition, the Northwest Geographic 

Area Coordination Center provided critical situation awareness to the Region regarding fire/fuels analyses 

and weather/climate outlooks. (Examples of these products are available in Appendix C – The Use of 

Technology in Support of the 2015 Pacific Northwest Fires.)

G. Air Quality

This satellite image, taken on August 22, shows the smoke impacts across the Pacific Northwest Region

generated from several large fires.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 21

Extensive areas of wildfire in Oregon and 

Washington resulted in widespread public 

exposure to smoke, as well as extended

episodes of unhealthy air quality for many 

people in communities and rural areas.

For nearly six weeks—beginning at the end of 

July through the first weeks of September—

smoke from wildfires caused significant air 

quality concerns in Oregon and Washington,

as well as adjacent states and Canada.

Special “Air Resource Advisors”

Deployed to Multiple Incidents

The U.S. Forest Service Washington Office 

Fire and Aviation Management staff is 

developing the Wildland Fire Air Quality 

Response Program which deploys specially 

trained technical specialists—known as Air 

Resource Advisors (ARA)—and a national 

cache of smoke monitors available by 

request.

During the 2015 fire season, these Air Resource Advisors were deployed to multiple incidents across the 

Pacific Northwest Region. The Air Resource Advisors produced a standard, daily product of predicted air 

quality conditions to provide smoke impact forecasts to county health departments and local communities. 

These special air quality forecasts then enabled precautions to be taken to limit health impacts from 

smoke.

In addition, impacts to transportation corridors, airports and other smoke-sensitive sites were evaluated 

and made known to agencies responsible for their management. The Oregon and Washington “smoke 

blogs”—oregonsmoke.blogspot.com and wasmoke.blogspot.com—also provided a primary venue for 

communicating with the public and air quality partners.

(For more air quality and smoke management information, see Appendix D – Air Quality and Smoke 

Response.)

Smoke obscures the atmosphere on the 2015 Grizzly Bear 

Complex. Photo by Washington Incident Management Team #4.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 22

A. June

IV. The 2015 Fire Season Timeline

Predictive Services Update

The weather and long-term forecast (for June, July, and August) was for hotter and drier conditions than 

normal. The “Seven-Day Fire Potential” forecasts were provided daily. (See graphic below.)

The U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management augmented preparedness forces by obtaining 

emergency fire funds to preposition (bring firefighting resources into the Pacific Northwest Region from 

other Regions) and to contract call-when-needed resources.

Based on extremely dry conditions and the potential for numerous large wildfires, these funds were 

obtained in June, July, August, and September.

During the month of June, the following resource requests were filled in support of the Pacific Northwest’s

Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management base organizations: 

• 53 Crews 

• 164 Engines

• 24 Water Tenders

• 14 Dozers and other heavy equipment

• 55 Helicopters

• 30 Air Tankers

• 46 Tactical and Recon Airplanes

Every day during the 2015 fire 

season, the Northwest 

Coordination Center’s (NWCC)

Predictive Services Unit issued 

a “7 Day Significant Fire 

Potential Forecast” (shown on 

left).

A color-coded rating shows 

the likelihood of significant 

wildfires occurring—fires 

requiring the management 

efforts of large numbers of 

firefighting resource.

The risk increases from green 

(low risk) to yellow to brown 

(high risk) and finally to the 

very high rating/risk of red.

Specific forecasts focus on 

different sub-regions of the 

Northwest.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 23

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1XxBBwz

Many regional firefighting resources 

were pre-positioned within the 

Region to address forecasted shortterm increases in fire activity to

supplement local resources. (These 

internal pre-positioning actions are 

not included in the resource bullets 

on the previous page.)

Critical Fire Weather: June 9-11

On June 9, an upper low pressure 

system offshore from Northern 

California caused lightning which 

resulted in 1,639 lightning strikes,

mainly over eastern Oregon. Nine of 

these strikes were recorded in 

southwest Oregon.

During June 10-11, the passage of a 

dry cold front over central Oregon 

and Washington created very strong 

sustained winds over much of the Pacific Northwest.

During these three days—June 9 through June 11—the Pacific Northwest Region experienced 112 new 

wildfires. Three of these fires escaped Initial Attack (the Buckskin, Long Lake, and Ceremonial Pit fires). 

On June 10, the National Preparedness Level was 1. Only approximately 600 firefighters were assigned 

to Large Fires throughout the U.S.

1. Buckskin Fire

 

On June 11, the Buckskin Fire was detected on the eastern edge of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area on

the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest. This same area had burned in the 2002 Biscuit Fire. Therefore, 

the Buckskin Fire area contained a heavy concentration of snags from this previous 2002 fire. The 

number of snags was a safety concern for fire managers and limited the ability of firefighters to engage 

in direct suppression.

Even through this area had burned only 13 years prior, fire was actively spreading—driven by weather 

conditions that had triggered a Red Flag Warning for low humidity and strong winds for the incident’s 

first two days.

Early Suppression Strategy Decision Made

An early decision was made by Forest Service fire managers to utilize a suppression strategy. A Type 2 

Incident Management Team from Oregon was ordered to manage the fire. This team took command of 

the fire at 6 a.m. on June 13.

The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest and the Incident Management Team developed an indirect 

strategy which involved the reinforcement of existing roads and trails that encircled the fire area. With 

fire activity increasing in Alaska and in Northern California, engaging in aggressive suppression actions to 

rapidly contain the Buckskin Fire was deemed necessary in order to assure that firefighting resources 

were available to safely implement this indirect strategy.

The Buckskin Fire on June 11. Photo by Brandon Colville.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 24

Furthermore, allowing the fire to burn 

deeper into the Kalmiopsis Wilderness 

Area would make it more difficult to 

contain due to lack of access. This could 

potentially encumber firefighting 

resources for the duration of the fire 

season. In addition, a large fire in the 

Kalmiopsis Wilderness would pose 

periodic threats of fire runs to the east 

toward Cave Junction and other small 

communities.

Appropriate Response

While this aggressive suppression action 

may have driven costs higher than 

average for an early-season fire in 

Oregon, considering that the observed 

fire behavior and measured fire danger 

indices greatly exceeded seasonal norms 

for the area, it was deemed an

appropriate response.

At its peak, the Buckskin Fire was staffed with 590 firefighters, including 12 Crews and 11 Helicopters. 

Air Tankers were utilized on June 17 to pre-treat fuels along an indirect fire line to limit the potential of 

spot fires developing during burning operations.

Both aerial ignition and ground firing operations were required to eventually contain the fire. On July 17, 

the Buckskin Fire was staffed by a Type 4 organization and listed as 60 percent contained. The fire was 

declared contained and controlled on October 21.

(For a complete report on the Buckskin Fire, see Four Potential Long-Duration Fires Report in Appendix E.)

June 16

Three Large Fires

On June 16, three Large Fires (a wildfire of 100 acres or more in timber or 300 acres or more in 

grass/sage) were listed on the National Situation Report: the Paradise Fire (Olympic National Park), the 

Corn Creek Fire (Oregon Department of Forestry, Douglas County, Oregon), and the Little Basin Fire 

(Wallowa-Whitman National Forest).

June 27-July 1

Widespread Lightning Produces 222 Wildfires

From June 27 through July 1, widely scattered lightning occurred throughout the Pacific Northwest 

Region igniting 222 wildfires. Eighteen of these fires escaped Initial Attack and became Large Fires.

At this same time, other Geographic Areas in the United States were also experiencing very active fire 

incidents. The National Preparedness Level was 3. Thirteen Incident Management Teams and 

A portion of the Buckskin Fire burning on June 26.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 25

2. Leslie Gulch Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1Nlw62T

approximately 8,200 firefighters were assigned to Large Fires in four other Geographic Areas. Alaska,

alone, had 64 uncontained Large Fires burning.

Increase in “Unable to Fill” Resource Orders

From June 27 through July 1, the Northwest Coordination Center (NWCC) observed an increase in “UTF”

(unable to fill) responses to their resource orders for: Smokejumpers, Rappellers, Hotshot Crews, and 

other resources.

On the morning of June 27, there were eight Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATS) available—three of these

were already committed to the Wenaha (Umatilla National Forest) and Bunker Hill (Umpqua National 

Forest) fires.

Three Type 1, one Type 2, and one Very Large Air Tanker were available at tanker bases in the Pacific 

Northwest Region. Five Type 1 Helicopters were available—two of which were assigned to the Buckskin 

and Bessie fires.

June 28

67 New Fires and Five Large Fires Burning

Both the National and Regional Preparedness Levels are now 3.

There are 67 new fires burning. Two Incident Management Teams are committed—a Type 2 Team on 

the Bunker Hill Fire on the Umpqua National Forest and the Portland NIMO (National Incident 

Management Organization) Team on the Paradise Fire in Olympic National Park.

On June 28, three other fires were listed on the National Situation Report: the Sugar Loaf Fire on the 

Bureau of Land Management’s Prineville District, the Buckskin Fire on the Rogue River-Siskiyou National 

Forest, and the SE Benton Complex on Washington State Fire Marshal Protection lands.

In addition, there were two Large Fires burning in Washington—one on National Park Service lands and 

the other on local government protection lands. There were three Large Fires burning in Oregon—two 

on U.S. Forest Service lands and one on Bureau of Land Management lands.

The Leslie Gulch Fire was started by lightning on the evening of June 28 on the Bureau of Land 

Management’s Vale District east of the Owyhee River, approximately 13 miles west of the Idaho-Oregon 

state line.

This fire received a robust Initial Attack response that included a Type 1 and Type 3 Helicopter and one

Air Tanker. A decision was quickly made to fully suppress this fire. A Type 3 organization was placed in 

command of the incident. This full suppression response to the Leslie Gulch Fire was based on: elevated

fire danger in that area, the need to provide protection for the community of Jordan Valley, Oregon, and 

the protection of sage-grouse habitat.

Once the fire escaped Initial Attack, the strategy involved a combination of direct attack and burning 

from indirect dozer lines. Firefighting resources—including aviation assets—were not in competition at 

this early date of the fire season. Both Single Engine and Heavy Air Tankers were effective in supporting 

ground operations with rapid turnaround times from reload bases in Ontario, Oregon and Boise, Idaho.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 26

The Type 3 Incident Management Team ultimately burned out a mid-slope road that followed a 

retardant line built by the Single Engine Air Tankers, while Heavy Air Tankers dropped on the head of the 

fire. These suppression actions successfully slowed the fire’s forward movement to the south.

In addition, a dozer line was constructed, burned out, and held from the mid-slope Leslie Gulch Road 

toward the Owyhee River to the west. Three Helicopters supported these efforts. 

The final size of the Leslie Gulch Fire was 8,688 acres with 100 percent containment achieved on July 4.

Protecting Rare Environmental Attributes and Threatened Wildlife

The relatively large commitment of personnel to this fire was in support of protecting an “Area of 

Critical Environmental Concern” known for rare plants, rock formations, and a population of California 

bighorn sheep. Additionally, “General” and “High Priority” habitat for sage-grouse was protected 

through the sustained commitment of firefighting resources.

(For a complete report on the Leslie Gulch Fire, see Appendix M – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires.)

June 30

MAC Group Emphasizes Initial Attack

From June 27 through June 29, the Pacific Northwest Region experienced 165 new fire starts. Nine Large 

Fires were already burning here. Nationally, there were 45 Large Fires burning and more than 500 new 

fire starts. 

On June 30, the Pacific Northwest Coordination Group activated a Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) 

Group to prioritize fires and address the current scarcity of firefighting resources.

The strategic intent for MAC Group decisions:

1. Reallocate resources—as needed—within the Northwest Geographic Area because no additional 

resources are expected from outside the area;

2. To prepare for a potential lightning event this weekend, rest/recycle resources. 

It must be recognized that firefighting resources within the Pacific Northwest Region and nation are now 

limited. During periods of high new fire ignitions with ongoing Large Fires, competition for resources 

becomes intense.

One of the key strategies the MAC Group used as a basis for resource allocation was to emphasize Initial 

Attack on new fires to avoid having additional Large Fires occur—which encumber even more 

firefighting resources.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 27

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1Nly0R3

3. Wolverine Fire

On June 29, a lightning storm ignites five fires 

near Lake Chelan on the Okanogan-Wenatchee 

National Forest and North Cascades National 

Park. All five fires were considered suppression 

fires. The Wolverine Fire was the only one of 

these five incidents that became a long-term,

“problem” fire.

Initial reports indicated the Wolverine Fire was 

in the upper third of the slope above Riddle 

Creek at 5,800 feet. A spot fire was also 

burning 1,000 feet downslope from the 

Wolverine Fire.

From the fire’s first day, fire managers 

recognized that this incident had the potential to threaten the communities of Lucerne, Holden, 

Stehekin, and Domke Lake. Rappellers, supported by a Type 1 Helicopter, were inserted to evaluate 

suppression options. They reported that continued direct attack posed a great risk to firefighters.

For the next 27 days, the Wolverine Fire was monitored. Intermittent bucket drops were applied to slow 

fire movement while crews prepared indirect fire line.

People Evacuated – Type 2 IMT Ordered

On July 30, the fire crossed Wolverine Creek and grew to 1,500 acres, resulting in the evacuation of 

approximately 240 people from Holden Village and Lucerne. This prompted the order for a Type 2 

Incident Management Team.

On July 31, a spot fire crossed Lightning Creek and grew rapidly. Two Heavy Helicopters dropped water 

on the spot fire. Due to the fire’s intensity, this aerial suppression action proved to be ineffective. The 

fire rapidly spread beyond the Management Action Points identified for burning out the indirect fire line 

from Lucerne to Holden Village.

The Wolverine Fire continued to spread and move toward Lucerne. At 8:15 p.m., the fire spotted across 

Railroad Creek and rapidly ran uphill to Domke Mountain. The Entiat Interagency Hotshot Crew and 

other firefighters performed burn out operations around Lucerne to protect 30 structures—none of 

which were lost.

However, five structures at Domke Lake were destroyed when an intense crown fire moved across the 

lake’s north shore. A Type 1 Incident Management Team took command of the Wolverine Fire on July 4.

New Fires Impact Wolverine Fire Resources

On the morning of August 14, new fires in the Chelan area rapidly threatened structures in Chelan and 

the surrounding communities. Resources from the Wolverine Fire were heavily committed to Initial and 

Extended Attack on these new priority fires.

The Pacific Northwest Incident Management Team #2 managed both the Wolverine Fire and what 

eventually became the Chelan Complex until August 22 when a Southwest Area Incident Management 

Team transitioned into both fires along with the Pacific Northwest Incident Management Team #2.

Washington National Guard firefighters wrap cabins in the 

Pope Creek area in the Entiat Valley on the Wolverine Fire. 

Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 28

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1XxBLEh

4. Corner Creek Fire

The Wolverine Fire remained active through September 1, requiring the construction of indirect 

“Community Protection Lines” in the lower Entiat Valley. While these lines were never utilized, they 

represented the last line of defense for the communities of Plain and Leavenworth.

While five structures were lost on the Wolverine Fire at Domke Lake, many more structures were saved 

in Lucerne, Holden Village, and Lightning Creek due to the early development of structure protection 

equipment and hazard mitigation work performed by firefighting resources. (For a complete report on 

the Wolverine Fire, see Appendix F.)

On June 29, the Corner Creek Fire

started in a remote portion of 

Oregon’s Ochoco National Forest just 

south of the Black Canyon Wilderness 

Area. This fire threatened sage-grouse 

habitat.

A wind-driven fire, it burned 26,000 

acres in just six days. Key management 

objectives were to prevent damage to 

private property—both ranches and 

residences—while preventing the fire 

from extending into “High Priority” 

sage-grouse habitat.

“Fuel treatments allowed for direct attack in some areas. In other areas 

they allowed us to pick-up spots easier. Places that were treated had 

better fire effects, mostly low-intensity and just burning grass and dead 

stuff below the timber. These treated areas also helped our holding 

efforts while the untreated areas caused us more control problems.”

Initial Attack Incident Commander

Corner Creek Fire

Incident Commanders were successful in preventing the Corner Creek Fire from entering the “High 

Priority” sage-grouse habitat. Only one trailer was destroyed. (For a complete report on the Corner 

Creek Fire, see Appendix G.)

The Corner Creek Fire moved from the previously untreated 

area (left) into a prescribed fire area (right) that had been

implemented earlier in the year. As you can see by the burned 

and unburned trees, the fire intensity was significantly reduced 

when the fire entered this treated area—allowing for direct 

control of the Corner Creek Fire’s edge.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 29

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlylmN

B. July

5. Newby Lake Fire

Firefighting Resources Becoming Scarce

On July 1, the National Preparedness Level was 3 (95 Large Fires were burning in Alaska, 17 Large Fires 

were burning in the Pacific Northwest Region, and another 62 Large Fires were burning in other 

Regions). On this day, approximately 10,000 firefighters were assigned to Large Fires. Firefighting 

resources were becoming scarce.

During the month of July, the following severity and prepositioning resource requests were filled in 

support of the Forest Service’s Pacific Northwest Region and Bureau of Land Management base 

organizations:

• 92 Crews 

• 322 Engines

• 35 Dozers and other heavy equipment

• 45 Water Tenders

• 73 Helicopters

• 80 Tactical and Recon Airplanes

• 28 Air Tankers

The Newby Lake Fire (originally named the Arnold Peak Fire)

was ignited by lightning and detected on July 2 at 

approximately 3 p.m. The fire was burning into the United 

States from British Columbia, Canada. It was originally reported 

as “no threat” with approximately 125 acres burning within the 

United States. However, by July 4 the fire had become active 

and was in excess of 1,200 acres. A Type 2 Incident 

Management Team in-briefed on July 5—to assume command 

the next day.

While initial action reported by the British Columbia Wildfire 

Service included Air Tankers and an Initial Attack Crew, no 

action was taken as the Wildfire Service reported that:

“behavior, crew safety, and the lack of achievable objectives”

precluded suppression actions. Similarly, the OkanoganWenatchee National Forest Fire Staff did not immediately staff 

the fire, with only monitoring planned.

The July 2 Incident Summary (ICS) 209 indicated a Red Flag Warning for the fire for the next several 

days, with the possibility of moderate fire growth.

On July 4, the Newby Lake Fire became active with warm and dry conditions lingering over the fire area.

Between July 4-5, the fire grew to 1,200 acres. Washington State Department of Natural Resources 

personnel expressed concern regarding the fire threatening the Loomis State Forest and critical lynx 

habitat.

Photo taken from an aerial 

reconnaissance flight over the Newby 

Lake Fire on July 4.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 30

6. Horseshoe Fire

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1NlyA17

Resources assigned now included: 4 Type 2 Hand Crews, 7 Helicopters, 2 Engines, 4 Dozers, and 1 Water

Tender. A total of 250 personnel were assigned to the fire.

By the evening of July 10, the Newby Lake Fire had grown to 5,065 acres (in the U.S.). The weather 

forecast called for cooler, moister conditions, including afternoon showers becoming a wetting rain.

An in-briefing for the incoming Type 1 Incident Management Team was scheduled for July 11. This team 

took command of the fire on July 13. They employed a direct attack strategy to secure the fire—taking 

advantage of the favorable change in weather conditions. (For a complete report on the Newby Lake 

Fire, see Appendix H.)

On July 3, the Horseshoe Fire started on 

the Gifford Pinchot National Forest in a 

remote portion of the Mt. Adams 

Wilderness Area approximately 15 miles 

north/northwest of Trout Lake, 

Washington.

Due to aggressive fire behavior, difficult 

terrain, lack of access, inadequate safety 

zones and logistical support, local resources 

were unable to staff and contain the fire 

during Initial Attack.

On July 6, the Washington Incident 

Management Team #4, a Type 2 Incident 

Management Team, took command of the fire. The team was briefed on the decision to stop fire growth 

to the smallest footprint and mop-up the perimeter to check fire spread. This strategy was to mitigate a 

greater long-term risk to firefighters associated with a potential long-term fire.

On July 7, once a risk analysis was conducted, Type 2 Crews and Type 2 Initial Attack Crews were utilized 

to begin control efforts. This control plan included perimeter containment fire lines on two-thirds of the 

fire and a confine strategy using the 2012 Cascade Creek Fire scar on the other one-third of the fire’s 

perimeter. Type 1 Crews were later added to suppression efforts on the Horseshoe Fire.

On July 9, a thunderstorm produced an additional fire which quickly spread to 60 acres and became the 

Riley Fire. This fire was also managed by the Incident Management Team assigned to the Horseshoe 

Fire. These two fires became the Mt. Adams Complex.

Work on the Horseshoe Fire continued until July 12, when it was placed in patrol-only status. The Horseshoe 

Fire was contained at 340 acres. (For a complete report on the Horseshoe Fire, see Four Potential LongDuration Fires Report in Appendix E.)

Fire crews work to contain the spread of the Horseshoe Fire. 

Photo by Tony Woods, Washington Incident

Management Team #4.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 31

July 4-July 11

In a Six-Day Period:

239 New Fires—9 New Large Fires

On July 4, the Pacific Northwest Region raised its Preparedness Level to 4. The Region was managing 24 

active fires with more than 3,000 firefighters assigned. The Predictive Services Unit issued a “Fire Potential” 

forecast indicating high likelihood for Large Fires in five Predictive Service Areas during the next seven days.

From July 6 through July 11, the Region experienced 239 new fires that resulted in nine Large Fires. Note 

that Initial Attack was successful in containing 230 fires during this six-day period. Much of this success 

can be attributed to the additional resources obtained and pre-positioned in advance of the fires. During 

the month of July, the Pacific Northwest standard complement of Engines was doubled, Helicopters 

tripled and Crews increased by almost tenfold.

On July 11, the National Preparedness Level was 3. Alaska was in Preparedness Level 5 with 16 Large 

Fires. The Pacific Northwest Region was in Preparedness Level 4 with 11 Large Fires. Nationally, there 

were a total of 8,954 firefighters assigned to fires.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 32

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1lPmzqt

8. Stouts Creek Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1QqMDSY

7. Blankenship Fire

The Blankenship Fire was a lightning-caused fire that began on July 13 on the Okanogan-Wenatchee 

National Forest. Located approximately 13 miles northwest of the Wolverine Fire in the middle of the 

Glacier Peak Wilderness Area, the Blankenship Fire was delegated to the various Incident Management 

Teams that were assigned to the Wolverine Fire.

Located in the Glacier Peak Wilderness and accessible only by air, the fire was confined by natural 

barriers that included a riparian drainage on the south and a significant rock component on the fire’s 

other flanks.

The Blankenship Fire spread minimally during the course of the summer. On August 5, the fire was 

accessed by a Hotshot Superintendent. The Superintendent’s assessment was that heavy-handed 

suppression actions—including a significant falling of trees—would be required to safely attack this fire 

with ground personnel.

Because of the fire’s minimal spread and a desire to support wilderness values, the decision was made 

by the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest and the Pacific Northwest Incident Management Team #2 

not to staff this fire. By September 16, it was reported at 212 acres in size. (For more information on the 

Blankenship Fire, see the Wolverine Fire report, Appendix F.)

On the early afternoon of July 30, 11 miles east of Canyonville near the community of Milo in southern 

Oregon, an individual using a lawn mower allegedly ignited the Stouts Creek Fire on private lands 

protected by the Douglas Forest Protective Association.

Within this fire’s first 12 hours, it burned more than 5,000 acres and spread onto Umpqua National 

Forest lands. Initial Attack efforts were hindered by extreme weather (Haines 6, low humidity, 

temperatures more than 100 degrees) and fire behavior associated with plume-dominated fires that 

included crown fire, rapid/intense fire runs, and long-range spotting. Steep terrain and very dry fuels

added to this fire’s suppression complexity.

Throughout the Stouts Creek Fire’s early duration, 640 residences and five commercial properties were 

threatened in the communities of Milo, Tiller, Azalea, Drew and Upper Cow Creek.

Fire Transferred to a Joint Unified Command

With the challenging fire weather and fire behavior quickly resulting in a fire that grew to more than

5,000 acres and is threatening structures, the Stouts Creek Fire was quickly transferred from a local Type 

3 Incident Management Team to a Joint Unified Command between the Oregon Department of Forestry

Incident Management Team #1 and the Oregon Office of State Fire Marshal Team. This transfer of 

command occurred on the fire’s second day, July 31.

On July 30, the Emergency Conflagration Act for this incident had been requested by Douglas County 

and was invoked by the Governor of Oregon. (This act enables the Office of the State Fire Marshal to 

assist and support the Oregon fire service during major emergency operations.)
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 33

9. National Creek Complex For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1QqMsap

C. August

On August 3, the Unified Command was expanded to include the Incident Commander of the Portland 

National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) Team to address a more significant involvement of 

federal lands on this incident.

On August 10, sole command of the fire was taken by the Oregon Department of Forestry Incident 

Management Team #1. On August 13, the fire was transferred to a Unified Command of Oregon 

Department of Forestry Incident Management Team #2 and Incident Commander, U.S. Forest Service.

At this time, with three of the four western regional Geographic Area Coordination Centers (GACCs) at

Preparedness Level 5, many resources were pulled from the Stouts Creek Fire and reassigned to other 

fires in the Region that posed greater risks to life and communities. On August 16, 16 Contract Crews 

were pulled from the Stouts Creek Fire and reassigned to higher priority fires in the Pacific Northwest.

Fire lines continued to be secured and mop-up proceeded, resulting in total containment of the Stouts 

Creek Fire on September 23. (For a complete report on the Stouts Creek Fire, see Appendix I.)

During the month of August, the following severity and prepositioning resource requests were filled in 

support of the Forest Service’s Pacific Northwest Region and Bureau of Land Management base 

organizations:

• 106 Crews 

• 334 Engines

• 65 Water Tenders

• 60 Dozers and other heavy equipment

• 61 Helicopters

• 91 Tactical and Recon Airplanes

• 56 Air Tankers (Note: some of these 

were ordered and released and then 

ordered again.)

• 21 Smokejumper and Rappeller Loads

August 1-6

231 New Fires Occur

in the Pacific Northwest Region

From August 1 through August 6, 231 new fires occurred across the Pacific Northwest Region.

On August 1, a lightning storm passed through southwestern Oregon igniting the National Fire on the 

Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest and the Crescent and Crescent 2 fires in Crater Lake National Park,

approximately one mile east of the National Fire. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 34

10. Baldy Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1lPm2oi

The Crescent and Crescent 2 fires were 

located in close proximity and burned 

together within the first operational period. 

The Crescent 2 Fire was five acres when it 

was overtaken by the larger Crescent Fire the 

evening of August 1.

All three fires were determined to be full 

suppression incidents. These three fires 

comprised the National Creek Complex.

The fires experienced delays in staffing. This 

same lightning storm ignited numerous other

fires which placed demands on Initial Attack 

resources. Other ongoing and emerging 

incidents within this same Geographic Area 

were deemed a higher priority. Fire Danger 

Indices were at 90th percentile levels—with 

associated fire behavior challenges.

The fire area within Crater Lake National Park 

is located within the Park’s “Recommended 

Wilderness” that is characterized by 

continuous fuels with limited road and trail 

access. Resource management objectives and 

fire suppression tactics inside the Park are 

aligned with protecting wilderness values and 

natural and cultural resources. The most 

resource-intensive containment actions were 

accomplished along roads and in locations 

where suppression tactics were less 

constrained.

Fire managers contained the fire within areas where natural barriers and roads facilitated the safe and effective 

halt of fire spread. This achieved the fire management goals of providing for firefighter safety along with abiding 

by management policies of the National Park Service. 

During the next two months, the National Creek Complex was managed by a series of Incident Commanders and 

Incident Management Teams. The complex became the largest fire in the recorded history of Crater Lake 

National Park. (For a complete report on the National Creek Complex, see Appendix J.)

Like the National Creek Complex, the Baldy Fire also started on August 1. It was located on the Colville 

National Forest in Washington. Due to significant hazards and access issues, Initial Attack efforts on the 

Baldy Fire were largely limited to air resources. With the intense fire behavior and lack of safety zones 

and egress, no crews were engaged in direct attack during this fire’s first two days.

National Creek Complex firing operations along the north 

entrance road within Crater Lake National Park.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 35

11. Collier Butte Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1QqMn6z

On August 2, the Washington Interagency Management Team #4 was ordered for the Baldy Fire. This 

team took command of the fire at 8 p.m. on August 3. Fellers were assigned to cut hazardous snags 

along potential containment line locations.

On August 5, smoke plumes reduced solar heating. This caused a reduction in temperature and an 

increase in humidity which moderated fire behavior. Crews were able to engage the fire directly and 

made good progress in constructing containment lines.

On August 18, the fire’s command transitioned to an Alaska Type 2 Incident Management Team and was 

included in a complex with nearby fires. Most objectives associated with containing the fire had been 

met when it transitioned to the Alaska Team. The Baldy Fire was contained at 515 acres. (For a complete 

report on the Baldy Fire, see Four Potential Long-Duration Fires Report in Appendix E.)

August 2

On August 2, the Collier Butte Fire started on the west side of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area in 

southwest Oregon on the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest. This fire, located within the footprint of 

the 2002 Biscuit Fire, was started from of a lightning storm that produced more than 900 strikes across 

the Pacific Northwest Region on August 2. More than 12 other additional wildfires were ignited within 

the Collier Butte Fire’s Gold Beach/Powers Zone during that lightning storm.

Additional Staffing was Pre-Positioned

In anticipation of probable starts across this Zone, additional staffing well above the “normal” number of 

firefighters on this Forest had been pre-positioned at the Gold Beach Ranger District.

This fire’s remote location posed difficult access for firefighters. Values at risk included wilderness as 

well as both cultural and natural resources. The Agency Administrator’s Leader’s Intent included 

containing the fire quickly at a 

small size.

A Type 2 Team, Oregon 

Interagency Incident 

Management Team #3, was 

ordered and took command of 

the Collier Butte Fire on 

August 6 at 6 a.m.

A Combination of Direct

and Indirect Strategies 

Implemented

The Forest and Incident 

Management Team selected a 

combination of direct and 

indirect strategies to protect 

values at risk and form a 

“catcher’s mitt” of north, west 

and south containment lines to 

stop fire spread in all those 

Burn out operation on the Collier Butte Fire on August 17.

Photo by Josh O’Conner.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 36

directions. The Collier Butte Fire’s spread was successfully halted on August 24 at 11,800 acres.

(For a complete report on the Collier Butte Fire, see the

Four Potential Long-Duration Fires Report in Appendix E.)

August 9

On August 9, in anticipation of large numbers of new ignitions, the Pacific Northwest Region MultiAgency Coordination (MAC) Group adjusted its strategy for prioritizing firefighting resources to include 

ensuring that firefighters were able to get a break for rest, as well as shifting some resources from Large 

Fires to be available for Initial Attack.

August 9 MAC Group Strategic Intent

1. Continue to fully utilize all available resources while identifying a ready reserve to 

staff another Incident Management Team deployment. 

2. Maintain crew capability by managing days off and length of assignment. 

3. Realign some Initial Attack resources currently supporting large fires in anticipation 

of increased Initial Attack activity. 

August 10-20

415 New Fires – 50 New Large Fires

From August 10-20, The Pacific Northwest Region experienced 415 new wildfires. A total of 50 of these 

fires escaped Initial Attack.

On August 10, a total of 19, 000 firefighters were assigned to fires nationally.

From August 10-15, yet another upper low pressure system traversed over Oregon and Washington. 

This storm resulted in 3,617 lightning strikes distributed across much of both states, including a dense 

number of strikes over western Washington. On August 11, three fires occurred that would become 

Large Fires.

On August 14, this dry cold front that swept across eastern Oregon and Washington brought the 

strongest general winds of the fire season east of the Cascades. These winds fanned both the new fire 

starts as well as the ongoing fires, exacerbating an already busy fire situation.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 37

12. Cougar Creek Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1QqdTRL

The Cougar Creek Fire was first reported shortly after its ignition at 9:20 p.m. on August 10 on the 

eastern slopes of Mount Adams, Washington. The fire, accessed at 4 a.m. the following morning by an 

Initial Attack Crew, was reported at 40 acres in size with long-range spotting and short crown runs 

occurring.

Surface fuel loads in the fire area were heavy dead and down with pockets of lodgepole pine and spruce 

mortality. 

A full suppression strategy—using a combination of direct and indirect attack—was initiated by a Type 3 

organization. The objective was to minimize acres burned while also providing protection to the 

communities of Glenwood and Trout Lake. Both Large and Very Large Air Tankers and a Type I and Type 

3 Helicopter were unsuccessful in stopping fire spread. On August 12, a Type 2 Incident Management 

Team was ordered to take command of the fire.

Fire Spreads into Tribal Commercial Timber Lands

By August 19, both westward and southern fire expansion had been stopped and the threat to the 

communities of Glenwood and Trout Lake had been minimized by using a series of unmaintained logging 

roads and natural barriers, including lava flows and old fire scars. However, the fire continued to spread 

into the commercial timber stands of the Yakama Nation Tribal lands to the north and east.

Because the Cougar Creek Fire was a relatively low-priority fire for the Geographic Area, the Incident 

Management Team had difficulty obtaining the resources necessary to undertake direct suppression 

actions. The team therefore opted to use a series of existing roads to contain the fire. This strategy led 

to an increased loss of economically important timber for the Yakama Nation.

This indirect strategy continued with limited resources until August 29, when a widespread rain fell on 

the fire area. This change in weather allowed the replacement Incident Management Team to 

successfully implement a direct attack strategy, including using smokejumpers to complete an important 

segment of fire line which protected approximately 2,800 acres of commercial timber.

The Cougar Creek Fire was eventually turned back to a Type 3 organization on September 9. Final fire 

size was 53,534 acres. More than 88,000 gallons of retardant had been delivered to the fire since Initial 

Attack, while an additional one million gallons of water had been dropped by helicopters in support of 

fire operations.

(For a complete report on the Cougar Creek Fire, see Appendix K.)
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 38

August 14 MAC Group Revised Operating Strategy

On August 14, recognizing the need to be nimble with firefighting resources and move them in 

anticipation of threats to life and communities, the Pacific Northwest Region MAC Group revised its

operating strategy to:

1. Continue to fully utilize all available resources while identifying ready reserve 

resources to staff any new Type 1 or Type 2 Incident Management Team deployments. 

2. Build a surge Task Force of crews to rotate between incidents to accomplish missioncritical operations. Timetables for use will be negotiated between affected incidents. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 39

14. Bendire Complex 

13. Stickpin Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1Tov6vx

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1lPmmU6

In the early morning hours of August 11, a lightning storm that passed through the greater Kettle Falls, 

Washington area started 16 new fires. The Stickpin Fire, discovered in mid-afternoon on the Colville 

National Forest, started in an Inventoried Roadless Area on lands suitable for inclusion in the National 

Wilderness Preservation System.

Aerial reconnaissance determined that there were no good aerial firefighter delivery opportunities, no 

available safety zones, and that resources would be dependent on aerial support for safety.

On August 11 and 12, Helicopters were the primary Initial Attack resource. The fire was 30 to 50 acres at 

this point with a high Haines Index—indicating significant instability in the atmosphere and a high fire 

growth potential.

The potential for the Stickpin Fire to continue this rapid spread prompted the Colville National Forest to 

order an Incident Management Team for this incident. The Washington Incident Management Team #1 

was assigned. By the time this team takes command at 6 p.m. on August 14, the Stickpin Fire is more 

than 35,000 acres in size. (For a complete report on the Stickpin Fire, see the Kettle Complex report in 

Appendix L.)

On August 11, the Pole Creek and Bully Creek fires

were ignited by lightning. Initial acreage for both 

fires was reported at 500 acres each. These fires 

eventually merged into the Bendire Complex.

The Bendire Complex burned within the Bully Creek 

Sage-Grouse High Priority Management Areas north 

of Juntura, Oregon. Bully Creek provides critical 

connectivity to adjacent Priority Management Areas

and is managed as “High-Priority” habitat for sagegrouse.

Winds proved to be a constant problem on this incident that encouraged extreme fire behavior—with 

running, spotting, and torching in juniper stands. Fuels were extremely dry with entire juniper boles

(trunks) completely consumed by the fire. There were patches of old-growth sagebrush up to eight feet 

in height.

Due to gusty winds and very dry fuel conditions, and despite the aggressiveness of initial attack forces,

the fire made significant runs—resulting in the degradation of more than 40,000 acres of “High Priority” 

sage-grouse habitat.The Bendire Complex burned 44,397 acres.

(For a complete report on the Bendire Complex, see Appendix 9 – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires.)

A Dozer works the Bendire Complex Fire. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 40

15. Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1XxBUYj

When the Cornet and Windy Ridge fires ignited on August 10, the fire danger rating was extreme. Public 

use restrictions for campfires and chainsaws were in effect. On August 10-11, a Red Flag Warning was 

issued for “thunderstorms producing abundant lightning”. In northeast Oregon, this lightning storm 

ignited 31 fires that were detected by lookouts and aircraft across the Blue Mountain Interagency 

Dispatch Center’s area of responsibility.

The Cornet Fire started at 3:58 p.m. on August 10 approximately seven miles east of Hereford, Oregon. 

The fire burned on private lands which were protected by the Oregon Department of Forestry, WallowaWhitman National Forest, and the Bureau of Land Management’s Vale District. The fire’s southern 

portion was located in “Preliminary General Habitat” for sage-grouse. 

To the northeast, the Windy Ridge Fire also started on August 10 at approximately 9:56 a.m. in rugged, 

steep terrain in the Burnt River Canyon. Thirteen Engines responded. Hand Crews were needed for this 

terrain, but were unavailable. Fire managers attempted to halt fire spread with retardant drops. Eight 

Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATs) and an unknown number of Heavy Air Tankers worked the fire. Two 

Helicopters also responded. By the end of the day, the Windy Ridge Fire had burned 1,200 acres.

High temperatures, low relative humidity, and a Haines Index of 5-6 encouraged rapid fire growth. The 

Cornet Fire burned actively through the night of August 10 with crown fire runs and long-range spotting. 

By the end of the day on August 11, it had burned 2,000 acres. Initial Attack forces consisted of 6 Crews, 

4 Engines, 4 Dozers, and 2 Water Tenders.

At 6 p.m. on August 12, the Oregon Type 2 Incident Management Team #4 assumed command of the 

Cornet Fire.

Scarce Resources and Imminent Threat to Structures –

Oregon Governor Invokes Emergency Conflagration Act

On Thursday, August 13, the national Preparedness Level was 5. Resources were scarce both in the 

Northwest and nationally. However, because of the imminent threat to structures, personnel on the 

Cornet Fire more than doubled to 457 people. Overnight, the fire spotted into Stices Gulch. Two 

threatened structures were protected.

In response to the Cornet Fire, Oregon Governor Kate Brown invoked the Emergency Conflagration Act.

This declaration authorized the Oregon Office of the State Fire Marshal to mobilize structure firefighters 

and equipment from throughout Oregon to assist local fire resources. Baker County protected structures 

and additional structure firefighting resources arrived.

The objectives were: Stop fire progression into areas with residences; Minimize acres burned on private 

land and sage-grouse habitat; and Protect communication infrastructure, mines, and cattle ranches.

The Baker County Sheriff’s Office issued a Level 3 Evacuation Order (“Evacuate immediately: GO”) for 

Stices Gulch and a Level 2 Evacuation Order (“Be Set to Evacuate—You Must Prepare to Leave at a 

Moment’s Notice”) for Rancheria Creek, Black Mountain, and Denny Creek. An area closure on the 

Wallowa-Whitman National Forest was also enacted. A total of 112 residences and 150 out-buildings 

were threatened. Two residences were destroyed with another 17 threatened. A total of 51 people 

were evacuated.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 41

Fire Closes Interstate 84 Two Times

Initially, the Windy Ridge Fire moved out of the Burnt River Canyon toward the northwest. By 11 p.m. on 

August 12, the fire had consumed 10,300 acres. A south wind was pushing the fire toward Interstate 84.

By 10:40 p.m. on August 13 the fire is 22,347 acres and had reached Interstate 84 just northwest of 

Durkee. The Oregon Department of Transportation closed Interstate 84 in both directions twice.

Fire managers were concerned with impacts to pipelines and the Union Pacific transcontinental mainline 

train tracks that parallel Interstate 84. The Union Pacific continued to operate during the fire and 

pipeline operations were not interrupted. 

The combined Cornet-Windy Ridge fire is now 88,433 acres with 5 percent containment. Firefighting 

resources include:

• 628 personnel

• 16 Crews

• 34 Engines

• 4 Helicopters

• 12 Dozers

• 9 Water Tenders

Firefighters conducted burnout operations in the evening of August 12 on the northern portion of the 

fire. Crews continued to patrol and hold lines while mopping-up around structures. As of August 15, a 

total of 413 people had been evacuated, with six residences destroyed and 187 threatened. One minor 

injury to a firefighter had been reported. 

On August 24, command of the fire was transferred to the Oregon Department of Forestry Type 1 

Incident Management Team. On August 26, command of the fire was transferred back to the local unit 

under a Type 4 Incident Commander. As of September 3, fire acreage was 102,089 acres. (For a 

complete report on the Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire, see Appendix 9 – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires.)

August 13

Several Large, High-Profile Fires Burning

On August 13, the National Preparedness Level was raised to 5. In the Pacific Northwest Region, several 

fires that would become large, high-profile fires were discovered on this date. These fires included:

• Berry Creek and Mason Springs fires on the Malheur National Forest,

• Nine Mile Fire on the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest, and

• Bear Ridge Fire and numerous other fires that would merge into the Grizzly Bear Fire on the 

Umatilla National Forest.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 42

14. Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire

16. Canyon Creek Complex For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1XxAWeM

The Canyon Creek Complex, consisting of the Berry Creek and Mason Springs fires, was likely ignited by 

the thunderstorm activity on August 12. However, this area had been experiencing lightning activity 

since August 9. On the afternoon of August 13, the area experienced strong winds.

The Berry Creek and Mason Springs fires were two of 14 fires that ignited on the Malheur National 

Forest on August 12. 

The Berry Creek and Mason Springs incidents received the following Initial Attack resources: 1 Heavy Air 

Tanker, 3 Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATS), 2 Helicopters with buckets, Smokejumpers, Rappellers, 3

Engines, 1 20-Person Hand Crew, 1 Dozer, and 2 Water Tenders.

An Initial Attack response from the volunteer fire departments in Grant County included 12 Engines and 

32 Firefighters with structure protection the highest priority for all resources. The Berry Creek and 

Mason Springs fires were encircled by retardant lines prior to the winds surfacing on these fires—

leading to their eventual escape.

On August 14, the National Interagency Situation Report stated that the growth of the Berry Creek and 

Mason Springs fires was reported to be in excess of 20,000 acres.

On August 15, 39 residences were destroyed. A Type 1 Incident Management Team was ordered to 

establish a Unified Command with the Oregon State Fire Marshal.

On August 17, the Canyon Creek Complex became the Number #1 priority fire in the nation and was 

receiving critical resources as they became available in the resource mobilization system.

Fire crews implement a burn out operation on the west side of the Canyon Creek Complex. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 43

On August 17 the Canyon Creek Complex became the Number #1 priority fire in the nation.

Photo by Grant County Undersheriff Todd McKinley.

The complex remained active for the next three weeks. By September 4, the fire had increased to more 

than 110,000 acres.

Canyon Creek Complex Statistics as of September 4

• Structures Damaged: 50

• Residences Destroyed: 43

• Percent Containment: 66 percent

• Number of Personnel: 951

• Types of resources: 1 Type 1 Crew, 24 

Type 2 Crews, 5 Helicopters, 38 Engines, 

13 Dozers, 18 Water Tenders, 

9 Skidgines, 1 Masticator

Fire growth moderated after September 4. The last reported fire size was 110,422 acres. (For a complete 

report on the Canyon Creek Complex, see Appendix N.)
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 44

17. County Line 2 Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1QqdeQ7

The County Line 2 Fire started at approximately 1:36 p.m. on August 12. The cause of the fire is under 

investigation. News reports indicate that a vehicle in tow on Oregon State Highway 26 was producing 

sparks from either a tow chain or a lost tire with the rim sparking on the asphalt. This mishap ignited

seven fires along Highway 26, causing the closure of this main travel way from western to eastern 

Oregon.

During the Initial Attack period, the fire grew rapidly through light flashy fuel under the influence of 

strong winds (8 to 13 mph, gusting to 22 mph).

Initial Attack resources quickly responded to these multi-fire starts. But extremely dry fuel and wind 

pushed the fire beyond Initial Attack suppression capabilities.

Due to the fire’s proximity to the community of Warm Springs and rural residents, the Warm Springs 

Agency requested state assistance. Oregon Governor Kate Brown invoked the Emergency Conflagration 

Act, which allowed state officials to send an Oregon State Fire Marshal Incident Management Team and 

several Engine Strike Teams to the incident.

At 6 p.m. on the County Line 2 Fire’s first day, an additional Type 2 Incident Management Team was 

ordered. The fire grew to more than 9,000 acres on that first day.

By Second Day, Fire Spreads to 35,000 Acres

Extended Attack operations continued the following day with the fire expanding in all directions under 

Red Flag Warning weather conditions. The August 13 evening Incident Status Report ICS 209 estimated 

the fire size at 35,000 acres.

Tactical efforts were focused on burning and holding existing roads, establishing direct fire line with 

Dozers, while Engines were assigned to protect residences in the Warm Springs, Sunnyside, and Upper 

Dry Creek residential areas.

According to the ICS 209, aerial firefighting resources were limited with only a single Type 3 Helicopter 

assigned to the fire. Due to the high winds and rapid fire spread, the effectiveness of the Single Engine 

Air Tankers assigned to the fire was also limited, while firefighting support from the DC-8 Very large Air 

Tanker was sporadic due to its use on other evolving wildfires in this Geographic Area.

Number #1 Priority Incident for Geographic Area

By August 15 the fire was 55,200 acres and 20 percent contained. Fire staffing had increased 

dramatically from Extended Attack. The County Line 2 Fire was currently the number #1 priority incident 

for the Geographic Area.

A structure damage assessment released by the Oregon State Fire Marshal’s Office on August 15 

indicated that two residences were totally destroyed. In addition, four residences were damaged. Of 

these six structures, only two were currently being lived in at the time of the fire.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 45

By August 18, the County Line 2 Fire dropped to the number #15 priority fire for the Geographic Area as 

new fires near Lake Chelan became the priority incidents.

Fire spread had now been stopped in most areas of the fire with the exception of Shitike Canyon on the 

fire’s southwest flank. For the next 10 days, this canyon provided significant tactical challenges to the 

Incident Management Team as heavy fuel, strong winds, and steep canyon walls limited fire suppression 

options.

On August 30, spotty light rain fell on the fire area. The Mutton Mountain Remote Automated Weather 

Station (RAWS) located northeast of the fire and the Hehe #1 RAWS, located northwest of the fire area, 

both recorded 0.02 to 0.03 inches of precipitation. This change in weather was enough to moderate fire 

activity and allowed crews to access the fire edge using a combination of direct hand line and dozer line 

supported by hose lays and a sprinkler system to finally complete fire line across Shitike Canyon.

On September 3, the County Line 2 Fire was transitioned back to the local unit and a Type 3 

organization. Final total fire size was 67,207 acres. (For a complete report on the County Line 2 Fire, see 

Appendix O.)

Firefighters implement burn out operation on the County Line 2 Fire on August 16. Photo by Randy Green.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 46

18. Carpenter Road Fire

19. North Star Fire

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1XxAZqK

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlyZk6

The Carpenter Road Fire (Rocky Fire as it was first named) started on August 13 on the Spokane Indian 

Reservation. Tribal firefighting resources were dispatched from the Spokane Indian Reservation’s own 

dispatching facility in Wellpinit, Washington. Concurrently, volunteers from Stevens County Fire District 

#2 were dispatched by the Stevens County 911 Center. The fire was approximately one acre in size when 

reported. It was contained at 6.4 acres. 

At approximately 7 p.m. on August 14, Tribal Law Enforcement informed the Spokane Tribe Fire 

Management Officer that there was a fire burning in the vicinity of the previous day’s Rocky Fire. Tribal 

resources were again mobilized. Simultaneously, the County 911 Center dispatched the volunteers of 

Stevens County Fire District #2. The Northeast Washington Interagency Communication Center,

informed by the County 911 Center of the fire, logged the incident as Carpenter Road. 

Arriving on scene the night of August 14, the Spokane Tribe of Indians Fire Management Officer made 

the call for a Type 2 Incident Management Team. 

Shortly after midnight, with the fire at approximately 1,000 acres in size, the Chief of the Stevens County 

Fire Protection District #2 reports a civilian fatality (apparently a heart attack) in the fire area. Six homes 

are also reported lost.

A Department of Natural Resources Type 4 Incident Commander assumes command of the fire the 

morning of August 15. By midmorning, limited visibility is hampering air support. The Incident 

Commander reported the fire to be plume-dominated. All primary agencies report that Unified 

Command is established by 11 am. 

On August 15, the Carpenter Road Fire could be described as an explosive, plume-dominated fire that 

presented a fast-changing situation with many simultaneous efforts underway, including: structure 

protection under the guidance of the Stevens County Fire Protection District #2, non-Tribal lands 

wildland effort under the command of a Washington Department of Natural Resources Type 4 Incident 

Management Team, and the Spokane Tribal Wildland Firefighters continuing their response on Spokane 

Tribe of Indians lands. A Forest Service Contract CL-415 water scooper aircraft is made available, as well 

as a DC-10 jet Very Large Air Tanker (VLAT) to support structure protection and suppression activities.

The Carpenter Road Fire continued to expand through August 30, when it approached its final size of 

63,975 acres. (For a complete report on the Carpenter Road Fire, see Appendix P.)

The North Star Fire started on the afternoon of August 13 on the Colville Indian Reservation in 

Washington. This human-caused fire grew quickly in logging slash and heavy timber fuels, exhibiting 

active crown fire behavior. Initial Attack with Engines, Dozers, one Hand Crew and one Helicopter 

proved unsuccessful.

Critical firefighting resources necessary to implement the required tactical suppression actions on the 

North Star Fire were limited due to competition for firefighting resources with other fires in the Pacific 

Northwest closer to and threatening communities.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 47

20. Grizzly Bear Complex

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlA2R5

Over the next ten days, the fire grew to 170,000 acres with resources slowly arriving. Weather 

confounded suppression operations with varying wind direction and periods of inversions that limited

air operations.

Incident Management Teams assigned to this incident were challenged by having to manage both the 

North Star and Tunk Block fires. During the fire’s first two weeks, limited firefighting resources 

necessitated point protection (placing suppression resources at high-value locations such as homes) as 

the primary strategy.

By September 12,the North Star Fire was 211,356 acres and the neighboring Tunk Block Fire was 

162,693 acres.

The North Star Fire occurred during the peak of the 2015 wildfire season in the Pacific Northwest.

Regional and National Preparedness Levels were both at 5 with resources at and below drawdown 

levels. The coordination of scant resources with a variety of cooperators was therefore a significant 

challenge.

Fire behavior exceeded the threshold for safe and effective engagement of all types of firefighting 

resources. However, even with the challenging fire behavior and limited resources, no loss of life 

occurred and only one structure was reported as being destroyed. (For a complete report on the North 

Star Fire, see Appendix Q.)

On August 13, a dry lightning storm triggered 

22 individual fire starts within and adjacent to 

the Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness of the 

Umatilla National Forest.

While Initial Attack occurred on the five nonwilderness fires, the 17 wilderness fires were 

initially unstaffed due to their remote location 

and the higher suppression priority for fires

positioned closer to communities.

The wilderness fires eventually merged into

the Butte Creek or Bear Ridge fires, which later 

became the Grizzly Bear Complex.

The Grizzly Bear Complex was located 20 miles southeast of Dayton, Washington. The fire threatened 

several critical values, including: private property, residences, power lines, the Bluewood Ski Area, active 

timber sales, and the Mill Creek Municipal Watershed.

A confine and contain strategy was developed after evaluating risks to values, firefighter exposure, 

and—given the limited resources available—the likelihood of success of any actions. A National Incident 

Management Organization (NIMO) Team was assigned the task of developing a long-term strategic plan 

for managing all of the fires within the Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness.

Between August 13 and August 18, Air Attack reported increasing fire behavior on the wilderness fires. 

A member of the Washington National Guard helps 

suppression efforts on the Grizzly Bear Complex.

Photo by Lori Kimbel. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 48

21. Eldorado Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1XxC0zf

On August 18, the combined fires ran six miles and grew from 2,000 to 12,000 acres. Four Heavy Air 

Tankers and a Lead Plane were ordered, but all Air Tankers were committed to other incidents.

On August 19, a Level 1 Evacuation (“Be aware of the situation: BE READY”) was issued for the 

communities of Eden Bench, Grouse Flat, and Troy. The next day, this notice was upgraded to a Level 3 

Evacuation (“Evacuate immediately: GO”). On other fires in Oregon and Washington, more than 250 

structures had burned between August 13 and August 20. 

Five Primary Residences and 28 Outbuildings Lost

By the evening of August 20, the Washington State Department of Natural Resources and Oregon 

Department of Forestry Engines were engaged in point protection of structures and the Emergency 

Conflagration Act was enacted for Wallowa County. While firefighting efforts saved many of the 300-400 

homes and outbuildings in the area, five primary residences and 28 

outbuildings were lost on August 20 when the fire grew to more than 

30,000 acres.

A Type 2 Incident Management Team took command at 6 a.m. on August 

21, relieving the local Type 3 organization which had managed the 

complex to this point. The fire was reported at 48,000 acres—with a Red 

Flag Warning in place for the incident. Resource orders started to be 

filled. Aircraft were used to slow fire spread.

By August 25, while the threat to the local communities had been abated, 

the fire continued to expand until rain and snow were received across the 

complex on September 5. Command of the complex was transitioned 

back to the Forest on September 18—after burning more than 75,000 

acres. (For a complete report on the Grizzly Bear Complex, see Appendix 

R.)

The Eldorado Fire was discovered on the morning of August 14. The fire started approximately five 

miles south of Unity on Oregon Department of Forestry-protected lands near the Oregon state 

administered Eldorado Campground.

The fire involved multiple jurisdictions: Baker County, Oregon Department of Forestry, Bureau of Land 

Management Vale District, U.S. Forest Service Wallowa-Whitman National Forest, Ironside Range 

Protection Association, and private ranch lands.

Fire managers were concerned about impacts to grazing from the loss of grass and range improvements.

The Eldorado Fire was positioned just north of the Bendire Complex, which started on August 11. Similar 

to the Bendire Complex, the Eldorado Fire was burning on critical “High Priority” sage-grouse habitat.

Initial Attack resources included 12 Engines, several Dozers as well as air resources. Hand Crews were 

not available. A Type 3 Incident Commander took command of the fire with a total of 50 firefighters on 

the fire lines.

At 10 a.m. on August 15, the Type 1 Oregon Department of Forestry Team #3 took command of the fire. 

Two Hand Crews were deployed along with the 12 Engines and 1 Helicopter already on the fire. Fire 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 49

22. Kettle Complex For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlyQ00

managers expected continued spread to the south/southwest. By the end of the day, the fire had grown

an additional 5,137 acres—for a total of 18,600 acres.

Over the next several days, firefighting resources continued to increase with 492 firefighters, 15 Crews, 

27 Engines, and 4 Helicopters assigned on August 20. On August 26, the final fire size was 20,635 acres 

and the Oregon Department of Forestry Type 1 Incident Management Team returned the fire to the 

local unit.

(For a complete report on the Eldorado Fire, see Appendix M – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires.)

The Graves Mountain Fire

At 9 a.m. on the morning of August 14, the Graves Mountain Fire is reported on the Colville National 

Forest. Initial aerial response included the possibility of rappellers. However, due to poor visibility 

caused by the smoke from the nearby Stickpin Fire, this tactic was cancelled. Eventually, the Graves 

Mountain Fire could not even be seen due to heavy smoke. Other fires threatening communities 

required the attention of the available resources.

Late in the morning of August 15, the Graves Mountain Fire had burned under Bonneville Power 

Authority (BPA) power transmission lines—cutting off all power to the community of Republic, 

Washington. The Washington Incident Management Team #1, assigned to the nearby Stickpin Fire, was 

requested to make resources available to assist on the Graves Mountain Fire.

The Renner Fire

On August 14, the Renner Fire is detected. Initially reported at 0.25 acres, within two hours this fire had 

grown to five acres and was “quite a ways up the slope”.

A Type 1 Heavy Helicopter was requested to support the fire. A Hand Crew arrives on scene. At 

approximately 2:30 p.m. its Crew Leader becomes this fire’s Incident Commander. There is a sense that 

this fire “can be managed”. A request is made for a Dozer to assist operations.

By 11 p.m., with the Renner Fire at approximately 20 acres, the resources pull out as the fire is in check. 

There are no resources to replace these existing resources. The Renner Fire is a low-priority fire due to 

its remote location. Other firefighting resources are assigned to neighboring fires. The following day, all 

resources are diverted to the nearby Carpenter Road, Marble Valley, and Gold Hill fires to support the 

threats to life and property and to assist in evacuations.

Local fire managers continued to have resources monitor the Renner Fire daily to help determine its 

priority. During its first few days, this fire was spreading away from critical values.

The Roy Fire

On August 14-15, the Roy Fire was successfully Initial Attacked by the Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources. Available resources—coupled with aggressive initial actions and precipitation—

supported this successful outcome.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 50

The Washington State Department of Natural 

Resources had gone into a Unified Command 

with the local volunteer fire department. By 6 

p.m. on August 15, the 120-acre Roy Fire was 

100 percent lined. Rain had helped to hold this

fire. On the morning of August 17, command of 

the fire was given to the Washington Incident 

Management Team #1 to monitor, mop-up, and 

perform suppression repair work.

The Kettle Complex

On the morning of August 17, the Stickpin, 

Graves Mountain, Renner, and Roy fires were 

grouped under one command as the Kettle 

Complex. Containment of the Roy Fire freed the 

Washington State Department of Natural 

Resources’ fire managers to focus on new 

incidents. The Kettle Complex would complete 

mop-up and suppression repair.

Initially, this complex experienced many days of extreme fire growth. On August 21, the three fires in 

the Kettle Complex had approximately 100 miles of fire perimeter surrounding more than 48, 000 acres 

with 18 Crews, 41 Engines, and 2 Helicopters assigned.

The Kettle Complex was listed as 8th highest priority for fires within the state of Washington and 10th

overall in the Pacific Northwest Region. Fire managers were confronted with extreme fire behavior and 

fire weather, as well as determining where to prioritize assignment of their few firefighting resources—

based on fire spread and proximity to values at risk (life and communities). Only one structure was 

reported lost on the Kettle Complex, reported on August 22.

The Stickpin Fire was the primary focus the first two days of Washington Team #1’s command.

This team had only 4 Crews, 2 Engines, 1 Dozer, and Air Support. Lack of available resources and 

extremely dry conditions led to the fire moving upslope, where it was influenced by ridgetop winds 

coupled with a Haines Index of 5. These fire behavior elements resulted in a plume-dominated fire with 

significant spotting, torching, and crown runs.

Significant Effort to Keep Fire from Crossing into Canada

There was a significant effort to keep the fire from crossing the border into Canada. Resources from 

Canada were working the north end of this fire. These Canadian resources were part of the overall 

Kettle Complex under the Unified Command with the British Columbia Wildfire Service. The fire never 

crossed into Canada.

On August 24, Area Command assigned the Graves Mountain Fire to the Oregon Incident Management 

Team #2. This team had command responsibility for the Colville Complex which included the Marble 

Valley and Gold Hill incidents, both Washington State Department of Natural Resources fires.

Management of the Graves Mountain Fire was returned to the Kettle Complex on August 31.

On August 27, when the Incident Management Teams transitioned, the Stickpin Fire was over 48,000 

acres in size—representing more than 90 percent of the fire’s ultimate growth. The Stickpin Fire 

accounted for more than 70 percent of the Kettle Complex’s total acres burned.

Photo of the Kettle Complex fire taken from Boulder Road 

east of the community of Curlew, Washington.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 51

23. Chelan Complex

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1XxB6CQ

On August 29, a strong cold front ushered in a major change in the weather. During a two-day period, 

the Kettle Complex received below normal temperatures coupled with rain totals that measured from 

0.25 inches to more than 0.5 inches. This weather event changed the incident’s entire focus. (For a 

complete report on the Kettle Complex, see Appendix L.)

A lightning storm that moved 

through Washington State’s Chelan 

Valley early on the morning of 

August 14 ignited multiple fires,

including: the Reach, Cagle, Black 

Canyon, Squaw Creek (later renamed 

McFarland), Antoine, and First Creek 

(eventually combined into the Chelan 

Complex) fires.

All of these fires—driven by steady 

30 mph winds—spread rapidly.

The Type 1 Incident Management 

Team assigned to the Wolverine and 

Blankenship fires, located to the 

north of these new starts, provided 

Initial Attack support with resources 

originally planned for use on the 

contingency line of the Wolverine 

Fire.

All aircraft assigned to the Wolverine 

Fire were also diverted to support 

these new fires. Even so, a total of 18 

structures were lost on the First 

Creek Fire during the first operational 

period.

By the morning of August 15, the 

Antoine, Cagle and Reach fires had 

merged and were being managed as a single incident 

referred to as the Reach Fire. The fire had crossed 

the Columbia River and was well established in 

Douglas County, Washington.

Firefighters protect homes on the Chelan Complex. 

Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 52

The Type 1 Incident Management Team continued to commit resources from the Wolverine Fire to 

support these new fires, with the exception of a limited number of resources needed to secure the 

improvements at Holden Village.

The fires remained active over the next several days as the first reports of structure losses were

reported on the Incident Status Reports (ICS 209s). The Reach Fire indicated 29 structures destroyed. 

The First Creek Fire listed more than 500 structures of various types threatened, but only two were 

burned.

By August 19, the McFarland and Black Canyon fires burn together, threatening approximately 462 

structures in the Alta Lake and Goat Mountain areas, including a radio transmission tower. Resource

sharing between the Wolverine and Chelan Complex fires addresses the short term need with critical 

resources that include: Helicopters, Type 1 Crews, and mid-level fire line overhead positions. 

While good progress is made on the east side of the Columbia River on the Reach Fire, the Reach and 

Black Canyon fires merge on August 20. On this day, Red Flag Warning conditions affect the entire fire 

area, leading to significant fire spread on all the Chelan Complex fires. Even so, these fires remain a 

relatively low priority on the National Incident Management Situation Report. Resources reported from 

the ICS 209s indicate the following (however the sharing of resources between these two fires is a 

Level 3 Evacuations (“Evacuate immediately: GO”) remain in place on the Chelan Complex through August 

28 with threatened infrastructure—including the communication towers that provide cellular service for the 

region. Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 53

common practice to address the short term need as a transfer of command occurs to a second Type 1 

Incident Management Team):

Black Canyon Fire – 2 Crews (all types), 8 Engines (all types), 1 Helicopter, 2 Dozers, 3 Water Tenders

Reach Fire – 18 Crews (all types), 60 Engines (all types), 6 Helicopters, 1 Dozer, 12 Air Tankers

As of August 21, the five original fires that now comprise the Chelan Complex have all burned together 

into a single fire that, from this point forward, will be referred to as the Chelan Complex. The First Creek 

Fire remains a stand-alone fire. Incoming Incident Commander Templin states that any one of the fires 

under his command has enough complexity to be managed by a National Incident Management Team.

On August 23, another Red Flag Warning is issued for the Chelan Complex area as damage assessments 

continue to catch up with fire spread. The current totals indicate that 44 structures have been destroyed

on the Chelan Complex. The First Creek Fire reports 19 structures destroyed and 22 structures damaged.

As the western side of the Chelan Complex is contained, the threat to structures on the eastern flank of 

the fire continues in the Alta Lake area. According to the August 26 ICS 209 report, resources assigned to 

the Chelan Complex include: 8 Crews (all types), 62 Engines (all types), 8 Helicopters, and 10 Dozers.

Level 3 Evacuations (“Evacuate immediately: GO”) remain in place on the Complex through August 28

with threatened infrastructure—including the communication towers that provide cellular service for 

the region. On August 29, precipitation is received that allows some Level 3 Evacuations to be reduced. 

Fire size at the time of the precipitation was 93,079 acres.

On August 31, a third Type 1 Incident Management Team transition occurs on the Chelan Complex. It is 

now being managed in conjunction with the Okanogan Complex. Minimal fire activity occurs on the 

Chelan Complex from this time forward. Due to improved mapping of the fire perimeter, a reduction of 

acreage burned occurs.

(For a complete report on the Chelan Complex, see Appendix S.)

August 14

Several More Large Fires Occur

On August 14, several more Large Fires occurred: the Lime Belt, Tunk Block, Beaver Lake, and First 

Creek fires on the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest; Graves Mountain, Renner, and Roy fires on 

the Colville National Forest; and the Eldorado Fire on Oregon’s Bureau of Land Management’s Vale 

District.

Beginning on the evening of August 13 through the early morning hours of August 14, the Tonasket 

Ranger District of the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest experienced numerous lightning-caused 

wildfires. During this time period, the Forest Service responded to 10 new fires, successfully suppressing 

seven of these new ignitions at less than one acre in size.

The Northeast Region of the Washington State Department of Natural Resources was also heavily 

committed to Initial Attack during this time, placing a strain on resource availability to support Initial 

Attack actions.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 54

24. Beaver Lake Fire

25. Lime Belt Fire

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1Towoqt

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1MZWFXL

At approximately 2:40 p.m. on August 14 when Initial Attack crews arrived on the Beaver Lake Fire, it 

was approximately 20 acres with two to four-foot flame lengths in heavy fuels, burning on a steep slope. 

Initial Attack resources were limited to two Short Squad Hand Crews (eight people total) and one Type 4 

Engine.

Without a solid anchor point and with no available air resources to support ground tactics, the initial 

strategy was to contain the fire within a series of existing roads and force its spread toward the 2006 

Tripod Fire area.

While successful with this strategy, over the next two burn periods, the Beaver Lake Fire grew to 400 

acres and was combined with other evolving fires in the local area into the Okanogan Complex.

At 6:59 a.m. on August 14, dispatch received a call of smoke (later named the Lime Belt Fire) on the 

west side of the Okanogan River near Conconully, Washington. The Initial Attack Incident Commander 

reported there were two fires actively burning in grass and scattered timber totaling 10-15 acres. The 

initial dispatch for these fires was one Rappel Type 2 Helicopter. 

This Helicopter with five crew members was dispatched at 1 p.m. By 2 p.m. the Incident Commander

had placed orders for two Heavy Air Tankers, two Helicopters, one Strike Team of Type 3 or Type 6 

Engines, three Type 2 Initial Attack Hand Crews, and three Dozers. None of these resource orders, 

however, were able to be filled. 

The initial strategy involved point protection with the limited Initial Attack personnel. By 4:30 p.m., the 

fire was reported to be 800 acres. Given the limited number of available resources, an indirect strategy 

using roads with point protection of values at risk became this incident’s primary tactic.

The incoming Type 3 Incident Commander placed additional orders for Crews, Heavy Equipment, and 

Division Supervisors/Task Force Leaders to provide span of control on this rapidly spreading fire. 

By midnight, the Lime Belt Fire was 2,560 acres and was threatening the community of Conconully, 

which was under a Level 3 Evacuation Order (“Evacuate immediately: GO”) from the Okanogan County 

Sheriff’s Office.

Over the next 24 hours, the fire remained active, making a three-mile run to the south in light fuels. 

Given the scope of the fire and threat to local communities, on the morning of August 17, the fire was 

transitioned into the Okanogan Complex under the management of a Type 2 Incident Management 

Team. (For a complete report on the Lime Belt Fire, see the Okanogan Complex Report in Appendix 16.)
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 55

26. Tunk Block Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1OAkata

The Tunk Block Fire was reported at approximately 2 p.m. on August 14. The initial response to this fire 

included an Engine from the local fire department and several units from the Okanogan County Sheriff’s 

Department. Less than one hour into the fire, the Initial Attack Incident Commander requested Air 

tankers for structure protection. However, with winds in excess of 45 mph, all aircraft were grounded. 

By 6 p.m. that evening, a Level 3 Evacuation Order (“Evacuate immediately: GO”) was in place for 

McLaughlin Canyon. At this time, the fire was spreading rapidly through grass and scattered timber 

fuels. Once again, Air Tankers were requested by the Incident Commander to address structure concerns 

ahead of the fire.

Less than two hours later, the local fire department reported that they had been burned over. Several 

firefighters were taken to local hospitals for symptoms associated with smoke inhalation. No serious 

injuries occurred with this burn over incident. 

On August 17, the Tunk Block Fire was reported at 2,000 acres with 65 total personnel assigned. Some 

fire line had been constructed that had successfully contained the fire’s spread. However, as winds 

increased and warming and drying occurred over the next two days, the fire escaped this limited 

containment, burning across Highway 97 and the Okanogan River on August 19. A second significant fire 

run of 36,000 acres occurred on August 21 as the fire burned onto the Colville Reservation. 

On August 21, the Tunk Block Fire was delegated to a Type I Incident Management Team as part of the 

Okanogan Complex. Damage assessment as of August 31 indicated that 24 residences and 45 cabins had 

been damaged or destroyed, with an additional 35 structures also reported as damaged or destroyed.

(For a complete report on the Tunk Block Fire, see the Okanogan Complex Report in Appendix T.)

This home on

Highway 97 was 

successfully saved due 

to suppression efforts 

by Engine Crews.

Photo by Jean 

Hawthorne.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 56

27. Okanogan Complex

28. Twisp River Fire

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlApes

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1OAjuE4

The Okanogan Complex is first indicated on the National Incident Management Situation Report on 

August 16 at 2,000 acres with only three Engines assigned. By August 17, a Type 2 Incident Management 

Team had been assigned. Five existing fires were consolidated under the command of this team.

These fires included:

Lime Belt Fire – 4,000 acres

Blue Lake Fire – 800 acres

Tunk Block Fire – 2,000 acres

Beaver Lake Fire – 400 acres

Nine Mile Fire – 4,704 acres (80 percent

contained, staffed by Okanagan Fire District 

#11)

According to the August 18 National Incident Management Situation Report, the Okanogan Complex

was staffed with a total of 8 Crews, 19 Engines, and 2 Helicopters. As of this date, ten structures had 

been lost on this incident.

Responding to this Rapidly Evolving Fire Situation

With several new starts associated with the August 15 lightning event, realignment of fires and 

resources were required to address the management of this rapidly evolving fire situation.

The Washington State Department of Natural Resources placed a Short Type 2 Incident Management 

Team on the Nine Mile Fire. In addition, the Washington State Department of Natural Resources was 

also taking action on other small fires, including: the Shadow Lake, Paradise, and Happy Hills fires. 

(For a complete report on the Okanogan Complex, see Appendix T.)

At 12:38 p.m. on August 19, the initial incident report call came in to the Okanogan County Sheriff’s 

Office of a two-acre fire which would become known as the Twisp River Fire. This fire started about five 

miles west of the town of Twisp, Washington in the vicinity of mixed ownership fire protection lands. As 

a result, multiple agencies were responsible for managing the fire.

The Rural District 6 Fire Department received a dispatch at 12:42 p.m. The fire chief deployed two Type 

3 Engines, two Type 2 Tactical Tenders, three Type 5 Engines, and three Type 1 Engines.

The Initial Attack Incident Commander requested a Heavy Air Tanker, a Helicopter, and Air Attack.

The first firefighters on scene stated they saw three- to four-foot flame lengths at the head of the fire. 

The fire was terrain driven; the wind was light out of the southeast; and the fire was roughly two to 

three acres in size.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 57

By 12:55 p.m., 20 homes were threatened and evacuations had occurred. Four minutes later, at 12:59, 

the fire chief requested a Helicopter ASAP.

At 1 p.m., the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest responded by dispatching four overhead (including 

a Type 3 Incident Commander Trainee), four Engines, and one Crew. The Forest Service Battalion Chief 

was informed that this was a Washington State Department of Natural Resources fire.

By 1:14 p.m., the fire was running, spotting, and torching with more than 20 structures threatened. 

At 1:17 p.m., a Washington DNR Type 3 Incident Commander was on scene. Shortly thereafter, Unified 

Command had been established with the Forest Service, Washington DNR, and Okanogan Fire District 6. 

The fire was reported to be approximately 20 acres.

By almost 3 p.m., the Forest Service Incident Commander Trainee sized-up the fire:

“At this time at least 50-plus acres with running, torching, spotting. There are 20-plus homes 

directly threatened in imminent danger at head of fire. Need fixed-wing heavy aircraft for added 

structure protection. If no heavy aircraft are available, we will have another 100-plus 

structures/homes in imminent danger in a box canyon. Rotors and Air Attack are currently 

working the left flank to keep the fire from progressing up Twisp River. We have multiple crews 

and engines working at structure protection at this time. We would like a second heavy aircraft.”

Shortly after this size-up, there was a report of an entrapment on the fire’s east flank. Actions occurred 

quickly over the next hour. 

At 3:08 p.m., the Forest Service Incident Commander Trainee ordered all resources to disengage from 

the fire and head to the staging area. The Incident Commanders alerted dispatch that they had an 

entrapment on the fire.

The fire continued to move with heavy use of Aircraft and assignment/reassignment of Engines.

Later that afternoon, it was confirmed that three firefighters had perished.

A Type 1 Incident Management Team was ordered to take command of the fire.

[Additional official information on the Twisp River Fire can be found at the Wildland Fire Lessons 

Learned Center Incident Review Database: “Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review 

Status Report” http://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/?DocumentKey=c221a055-a972-478cbe5c-9a16c2d5929c .]

(For a complete report on the Twisp River Fire, see the Okanogan Complex in Appendix T.)
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 58

August 18-20

Okanogan and Chelan Complexes

Share Resources

Between August 18-20, the Okanogan Complex’s fires had expanded greatly, now covering more than 

200,000 acres. Additional structure losses were also reported during this time period.

Over the next 10-day period, a series of Red Flag Warning weather events affect the fire area. Except for 

the Nine Mile Fire, rapid fire spread occurs on all of the Okanogan Complex’s incidents. To more 

effectively assign resources to their expanding geographic reach, the Okanogan Complex and Chelan 

Complex to the south begin to share firefighting resources.

During this time period, fires transition in and out of the Okanogan Complex, including the North Star 

Fire. Incident Management Teams continue to be transitioned between the multiple fires within north 

central Washington with teams being realigned to best meet incident command complexities and 

objectives. 

On September 1, as the Okanogan Complex approached 50 percent containment, this incident was near 

its maximum total number of resources. The September 1 InciWeb evening update for the Okanogan 

Complex reported:

• Size: 147,979 acres

• Containment: 45 percent

• Estimated Cost to Date: $16.4 million

• Injuries: 6

• Residences Burned: 123

• Total Personnel: 1,253

• Committed Resources: 20 Crews, 103 

Engines, 16 Dozers, 27 Water Tenders, 

4 Helicopters

Fire activity dropped off substantially after September 1. In addition, the reported fire sizes were 

reduced due to the ability to perform more accurate mapping of the fires’ perimeters.

As the damage assessment became more refined, the total number of structures damaged or destroyed 

was reduced to 120. Incident Management Team oversight of the Okanogan Complex continued until 

September 21. (For a complete report on the Okanogan Complex, see Appendix T.)

August 20-21

Critical Fire Weather

Encourages Rapid Spread of Ongoing Fires

During August 20-21, yet another dry, classic cold front moved across the Pacific Northwest Region from 

northwest to southeast. While this system was not accompanied or preceded by lightning, it brought 

strong and gusty winds that encouraged the rapid spread of ongoing fires.

By August 20, the National Preparedness Level was at 5. (The Pacific Northwest, Northern Rockies, and 

Northern California Geographic Area Coordination Centers [GAACs] were at 5 and the Great Basin GAAC 

was at 4.) There were 29,500 firefighters assigned and 48 Incident Management Teams deployed.

The National Incident Management Situation Report for Large Fires listed 63 incidents nationwide. On 

August 20, the Okanogan Complex reported 23 structures burned.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 59

On August 21, the cold front winds caused many Large Fires to increase substantially, some running 

more than ten miles to the south. Despite these severe burning conditions, no firefighters or members 

of the public were severely injured.

While more than 200 structures were most likely lost on this day, many were not reported until being 

discovered on succeeding days.

August 27

The peak for resource mobilization for the 2015 fire season in the Pacific Northwest Region occurred on 

August 27 with 256 Hand Crews, 877 Engines, and at least 11,450 firefighters assigned to wildfires. 

August 29

On August 29, a strong low pressure system and associated cold front moved across the Region bringing

generally little rain but included wind gusts over 70 mph on the Oregon coast and 60 mph winds in 

sections of eastern Oregon and Washington. Rapid fire spread on numerous ongoing incidents was 

observed with large acreage increases.

 -

 50,000

 100,000

 150,000

 200,000

5/6/2015

5/13/20155/20/20155/27/2015

6/3/2015

6/10/20156/17/20156/24/2015

7/1/20157/8/2015

7/15/20157/22/20157/29/2015

8/5/2015

8/12/20158/19/20158/26/2015

9/2/20159/9/2015

9/16/20159/23/20159/30/201510/7/2015

10/14/2015

Acres Growth on Large Fires

Acres Growth on

Large Fires

 -

 2,000

 4,000

 6,000

 8,000

 10,000

 12,000

 14,000

5/6/2015

5/13/20155/20/20155/27/2015

6/3/2015

6/10/20156/17/20156/24/2015

7/1/20157/8/2015

7/15/20157/22/20157/29/2015

8/5/2015

8/12/20158/19/20158/26/2015

9/2/20159/9/2015

9/16/20159/23/20159/30/201510/7/2015

10/14/2015

Personnel Assigned to Large Fires

Personnel Assigned

to Large Fires
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 60

D. September

During the month of September, the following resources were added to the Forest Service’s Pacific 

Northwest Region and Bureau of Land Management base organizations:

• 6 Crews 

• 20 Engines

• 2 Dozers and other heavy equipment

• 1 Water Tender

• 13 Helicopters

• 4 Air Tankers and 11 Tactical and 

Recon Airplanes

Season Slowing Events

Additional cold fronts and associated cool, damp weather started to occur the first week of September 

and continued throughout the middle of the month.

Precipitation was received on both sides of the Cascades. Fire danger indices were pushed dramatically 

downward. This resulted in few new Large Fires and significantly diminished fire spread on ongoing 

incidents.

 -

 10

 20

 30

 40

 50

 60

5/6/2015

5/13/20...5/20/20...5/27/20...

6/3/2015

6/10/20...6/17/20...6/24/20...

7/1/20157/8/2015

7/15/20...7/22/20...7/29/20...

8/5/2015

8/12/20...8/19/20...8/26/20...

9/2/20159/9/2015

9/16/20...9/23/20...9/30/20...10/7/20...10/14/2...

Number of Large Fires

Number of Large

Fires
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 61

V. Glossary

A. Acronyms

ERC

Energy Release Component. This is measurement of fire danger indices. Specifically, it is the computed total heat 

released per unit area (British thermal units per square foot) within the fire front at the head of a moving fire.

GACC

Geographic Area Coordination Center. A political boundary, designated by the wildland fire protection agencies, where 

these agencies work together in the coordination and effective utilization of fire management resources. Each 

Geographic Area includes a Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) that handles fire intelligence, information, 

ordering, and dispatch.

GeoMAC

Geospatial Multi-Agency Coordination. To provide fire managers near real-time information, fire perimeter data is 

updated daily based on input from incident intelligence sources such as GPS data and infrared imagery from fixed-wing 

and satellite platforms. Thus, the GeoMAC website allows users in remote locations to manipulate map information 

displays, zoom in and out to display fire information at various scales and detail, and print hard copy maps for use in fire 

information and media briefings, dispatch offices, and coordination centers.

IA

Initial Attack. The actions taken by the first resources on arrival at a wildfire to protect lives and property and prevent 

further expansion of the fire.

IAP

Incident Action Plan. The plan that contains objectives reflecting the overall incident strategy and specific tactical actions 

and supporting information for the next operational period on an incident. The plan may be oral or written. When 

written, the plan may have a number of attachments, including incident objectives, organization assignment list, division 

assignment, incident radio communication plan, medical plan, traffic plan, safety plan, fire weather, and incident maps.

IC

Incident Commander. The individual responsible for the management of all operations at the incident site. The IC is 

usually in charge of an incident management team, which may be national (Type 1) or regional or local (Type 2 or 3) and 

which includes a wide variety of resources and personnel.

ICS 209

The Incident Status Summary Report.

IMT

Incident Management Team. The Incident Commander and appropriate general staff or command staff personnel 

assigned to manage an incident. Teams vary in size and experience and are assigned based on availability of the teams 

and complexity of the incident.

MAC

Multi-Agency Coordination. Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group is a generalized term which describes the functions 

and activities of representatives of involved agencies and jurisdictions who come together to make decisions regarding 

the prioritizing of incidents and the sharing and use of critical resources. The MAC organization is not a part of the onscene Incident Command System and is not involved in developing incident strategy or tactics.

MIST

Minimum Impact Suppression Tactics. The application of strategy and tactics that effectively meet suppression and 

resource objectives with the least environmental, cultural, and social impacts.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 62

NIMO

The National Incident Management Organization is composed of four Incident Management Teams. Each team consists 

of seven members who are assigned fulltime to Command and General Staff positions. The primary focus of this program 

is the management of complex wildland fire.

NWCC

The Northwest Interagency Coordination Center is the Geographic Area Coordination Center for the Pacific Northwest 

Region which includes the states of Oregon and Washington.

PNWCG

The Pacific Northwest Wildfire Coordinating Group includes these 11 partner agencies that collaborate on wildland fire 

management issues: U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Park Service,

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Oregon Department of Forestry, Washington State Department of Natural Resources, 

Washington Association of Fire Chiefs, the Oregon Fire Chiefs Association, the Oregon State Fire Marshal and the 

Washington State Fire Marshal.

ROSS

Resource Ordering and Status System. The National Wildfire Coordinating Group operates this web-based database 

system for managing wildland firefighting resources. This system improves efficiency of borrowing and sending home fire

equipment in a large, campaign-type fire. It coordinates equipment movements across bureaucratic lines, making state 

and federal resources look more like a single pool of equipment and staff.

VLAT

Very Large Air Tanker. These very large capacity air tankers include DC-10 jets.

WFDSS

The Wildland Fire Decision Support System assists fire managers and analysts in making strategic and tactical decisions 

for fire incidents. It has replaced the WFSA (Wildland Fire Situation Analysis), Wildland Fire Implementation Plan (WFIP), 

and Long-Term Implementation Plan (LTIP) processes with a single process that is easier to use, more intuitive, linear, 

scalable, and progressively responsive to changing fire complexity. Thus, WFDSS integrates the various applications used 

to manage incidents into a single system, which streamlines the analysis and reporting processes.

B. Definition of Terms

Aerial Fuels

All live and dead vegetation in the forest canopy or above surface fuels, including tree branches, twigs 

and cones, snags, moss, and high brush.

Aerial Ignition

Ignition of fuels by dropping incendiary devices or materials from aircraft.

Aerial Reconnaissance

Use of aircraft for detecting and observing fire behavior, values at risk, suppression activity, and other 

critical factors to assist command decisions on strategy and tactics needed for fire suppression. Often 

called “aerial recon” or just “recon”.

Agency

Any federal, state, or county government organization with jurisdictional responsibilities.

Air Attack

The deployment of fixed-wing or rotary aircraft on a wildland fire to drop retardant or suppressant, 

shuttle and deploy crews and supplies, or perform aerial reconnaissance of the overall fire situation. Can 

also refer to the person functioning as air attack officer and directing aerial operations.

Air Tanker

A fixed-wing aircraft equipped to drop fire retardant or suppressant.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 63

Anchor Point

An advantageous location, usually a barrier to fire spread, from which to start building a fire line. An 

anchor point is used to reduce the chance of firefighters being flanked by fire.

Area Command

An organization established to: 1) oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being 

handled by an Incident Management Team organization; or 2) to oversee the management of a very 

large incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams assigned to it. Area Command has the 

responsibility to set overall strategy and priorities, allocate critical resources based on priorities, ensure 

that incidents are properly managed, and that objectives are met and strategies followed.

Backfire

A fire set along the inner edge of a fire line to consume the fuels in the path of a wildfire or to change 

the direction of force of the fire's convection column.

Blowdown

Trees that are knocked down during a wind throw. There is controversy about what action should be 

taken when blowdown occurs on forested lands, because some people want the blowdown trees to be 

left on the ground, but when these trees are not removed from the forests many times there is an 

infestation of beetles and other unwanted insect species that can weaken the surrounding forests.

Blow-up

A sudden increase in fire intensity or rate of spread strong enough to prevent direct control or to upset 

control plans. Blow-ups are often accompanied by violent convection and may have other characteristics 

of a fire storm. (See “Flare-up”.)

Brush

A collective term that refers to stands of vegetation dominated by shrubby, woody plants or lowgrowing trees, usually of a type undesirable for livestock or timber management.

Bucket Drops

The dropping of fire retardant or suppressant from a specially designed bucket slung beneath a 

helicopter.

Burn Out

Setting fire inside a control line to widen it or to consume fuels between the edge of the fire and the

control line. 

Burning Period

That part of each 24-hour period when fires spread most rapidly, typically from 10 a.m. to sundown.

Chain

A unit of linear measurement equal to 66 feet, often used in describing the length of fire line built or yet 

to be built.

Cold Front

The leading edge of a relatively cold air mass that displaces warmer air. The heavier cold air may cause 

some of the warm air to be lifted. If the lifted air contains enough moisture, the result may be 

cloudiness, precipitation, and thunderstorms. If both air masses are dry, no clouds may form. Following 

the passage of a cold front in the Northern Hemisphere, westerly or northwesterly winds of 15 to 30 

mph or more often continue for 12 to 24 hours.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 64

Command Staff

The command staff consists of the information officer, safety officer, and liaison officer. They report 

directly to the incident commander (IC) and may also have assistant staff.

Complex

Two or more individual fire incidents located in the same general area which are assigned to a single 

incident commander or unified command.

Confinement

The strategy employed in appropriate management responses where a fire perimeter is managed by a 

combination of direct and indirect actions and use of natural topographic features, fuel, and weather 

factors.

Contain a Fire

A fuel break around the fire has been completed. This break may include natural barriers such as a river 

or road, or fire line built by hand, or fire line constructed mechanically.

Control a Fire

The complete extinguishment of a fire, including spot fires. Fire line has been strengthened to help 

ensure that flare-ups from within the perimeter of the fire will not break through the line.

Control Line

All built or natural fire barriers and treated fire edge used to control a fire.

Cooperating Agency

An agency supplying assistance other than direct suppression, rescue, support, or service functions to 

the incident’s control effort (such as the Red Cross, law enforcement agency, telephone company, etc.).

Crew Boss

A person in supervisory charge of a crew—usually 16 to 21 firefighters—who is responsible for their 

performance, safety, and welfare.

Crown Fire

The movement of fire through the crowns or tops of trees or shrubs more or less independently of the 

surface fire. A fire is said to be “crowning” when the flames get up into the tops of trees and spreads.

Defensible Space

An area—either natural or human-made—where material capable of causing a fire to spread has been 

treated, cleared, reduced, or changed to act as a barrier between an advancing wildland fire and 

resources or lives at risk. In practice, defensible space is generally defined as an area of 30 feet or more 

around a structure that is cleared of flammable brush or vegetation or other fuels.

Direct Attack

Any treatment of burning fuels, such as by wetting, smothering, or chemically extinguishing the fire—or 

by physically separating burning fuels from unburned fuels.

Dispatch

The implementation of a command decision to move a resource or resources—such as crews, dozers, 

engines, or aircraft—from one place to another.

Dispatch Center

A facility from which resources are directly assigned to an incident.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 65

Dispatcher

A staff person who receives reports of discovery and status of fires, confirms their locations, receives 

orders for resources and takes action to provide people and equipment needed for control, and sends 

them to the designated locations.

Division

Divisions are used to divide an incident into geographical areas of operation. Divisions are established 

when the number of resources exceeds the span-of-control of the operations chief. In the Incident 

Command System organization, a Division is located between the Branch and the Task Force or Strike 

Team.

Dozer

Any tracked vehicle with a front-mounted blade used for exposing mineral soil or constructing fire line 

or safety zones.

Dozer Line

Fire line constructed by a dozer.

Drought Index

A number representing the net effect of evaporation, transpiration, and precipitation in producing 

cumulative moisture depletion in deep duff or upper soil layers.

Dry Lightning Storm

Thunderstorm in which negligible precipitation reaches the ground. Also called a “dry storm”.

Emergency Conflagration Act

The Oregon Office of the State Fire Marshal assists and supports the Oregon fire service during major 

emergency operations through the Emergency Conflagration Act. This act can only be authorized by the 

Governor and is only used for fires that involve or threaten life and structures.

http://www.oregon.gov/osp/sfm/pages/conflagration_information_2007.aspx

Energy Release Component (ERC)

This is measurement of fire danger indices. Specifically, it is the computed total heat released per unit 

area (British thermal units per square foot) within the fire front at the head of a moving fire.

Engine

A ground vehicle providing specified levels of pumping, water, and hose capacity.

Engine Crew

Firefighters assigned to an engine. The Fire Line Handbook defines the minimum crew makeup by engine 

type.

Escape Route

A pre-planned and understood route firefighters can take to move to a safety zone or other low-risk 

area, such as an already burned area (commonly called "the black"), a previously constructed safety 

area, a meadow that won't burn, or a natural rocky area that is large enough to provide refuge without 

being burned.

Extended Attack Incident

A fire which has exceeded or is expected to exceed Initial Attack capabilities or prescription.

Extreme Fire Behavior

“Extreme” implies a level of fire behavior characteristics that ordinarily precludes methods of direct 

control action. One or more of the following are usually involved: high rate of spread, prolific crowning 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 66

or spotting, presence of fire whirls, a strong convection column. Predictability is difficult because such 

fires often exercise influence on their environment and behave erratically, sometimes dangerously.

Evacuation Orders

Level 1 Evacuation Order: “Be Aware of the Situation—BE READY”. Level 2 Evacuation Order: “Be Set to 

Evacuate—You Must Prepare to Leave at a Moment’s Notice”. Level 3 Evacuation Order: “Evacuate 

Immediately—GO”.

Fire Behavior

The manner in which a fire reacts to the influences of fuels, weather, and topography.

Fire-Adapted Ecosystem

An ecosystem with the ability to survive and regenerate in a fire-prone environment.

Fire Behavior Forecast

A prediction of probable fire behavior, usually prepared by a Fire Behavior Analyst, in support of fire

suppression or prescribed burning operations.

Fire Behavior Specialist

A person responsible to the Planning Section Chief for establishing a weather data collection system and 

for developing fire behavior predictions based on fire history, fuels, weather, and topography. (Also 

called “Fire Behavior Analyst”.)

Fire Break

A natural or constructed barrier used to stop or check fires, or to provide a control line from which to 

work.

Fire Front

The part of a wildland fire in which continuous flaming combustion is taking place. Unless otherwise 

specified, the fire front is assumed to be the leading edge of the fire perimeter. In ground fires, the fire 

front may be mainly smoldering combustion.

Fire Intensity

A general term relating to the heat energy released by a fire.

Fire Line

A linear fire barrier that is scraped or dug to mineral soil after being cleared of all vegetation.

Fire Perimeter

The entire outer edge or boundary of a fire, which may contain within it substantial areas of unburned 

fuels.

Fire Storm

Violent convection caused by a large continuous area of intense fire. Often characterized by 

destructively violent surface in-drafts near and beyond the perimeter and sometimes by tornado-like 

whirls.

Fire Weather

Weather conditions that influence fire ignition, fire behavior, and suppression.

Flanks of a Fire

The parts of a fire's perimeter that are roughly parallel to the main direction of spread.

Flare-up

Any sudden acceleration of fire spread or intensification of a fire. Unlike a “blow-up”, a flare-up lasts a 

relatively short time and does not radically change control plans.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 67

Fuel

Combustible material. Includes vegetation such as grass, leaves, ground litter, plants, shrubs, and trees 

that feed a fire. (“Dead Fuel”: typically consists of small to large diameter down and dead woody fuels, 

dead grasses and forbs, frost-killed leaves still attached to live stems, and surface litter such as fallen 

leaves and needles. The moisture content of dead organic fuels, expressed as a percentage of the oven 

dry weight of the sample, is controlled entirely by exposure to environmental conditions. “Live Fuel”: 

consists of conifer needles, the twigs and leaves of shrubs [evergreen and deciduous], and green [live]

grasses and forbs.)

Fuel Moisture

The quantity of moisture in fuels expressed as a percentage of the weight when thoroughly dried at 212 

degrees Fahrenheit.

Fuels Reduction

Manipulation, including combustion or removal of fuels, to reduce the likelihood of ignition or to lessen 

potential damage and resistance to control. Often includes thinning or prescribed burning.

Geographic Area

A political boundary, designated by the wildland fire protection agencies, where these agencies work 

together in the coordination and effective utilization of fire management resources. Each Geographic 

Area includes a Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) that handles fire intelligence, information, 

ordering, and dispatch.

Haines Index

An atmospheric index used to indicate the potential for wildfire growth by measuring the stability and 

dryness of the air over a fire.

Hand Line

A fire line built with hand tools.

Head of a Fire

The portion of the fire having the fastest rate of spread.

Heavy Fuels

Fuels of large diameter—such as snags, logs, and large limb wood—that ignite and are consumed more 

slowly than flashy fuels.

Helibase

The main location within the general incident area for parking, fueling, maintaining, and loading 

helicopters. The helibase is usually located at or near the incident base.

Helispot

A temporary landing spot for helicopters.

Helitack

The use of helicopters to transport crews, equipment, and fire retardant or suppressant to the fire line 

during the initial stages of a fire. Helitack can also refer to personnel, as in “helitack crews”.

Helitack Crew

A group of firefighters trained in the technical and logistical use of helicopters for fire suppression.

Holding Actions

Planned suppression actions required to achieve wildland fire management objectives.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 68

Holding Resources

Firefighting personnel and equipment assigned to do all required fire suppression work following fire

line construction but generally not including extensive mop-up.

Hose Lay

Arrangement of connected lengths of fire hose and accessories on the ground, beginning at the first 

pumping unit and ending at the point of water delivery.

Hotshot Crew

A highly trained and experienced fire crew used mainly to build fire line by hand. Hotshots—also called 

“Interagency Hotshot Crews” or “IHCs”—are national resources, also known as “Type 1 Crews”.

Hotspot

A particular active part of a fire.

Hotspotting

Reducing or stopping the spread of fire at points of particularly rapid rate of spread or special threat, 

generally the first step in prompt control, with emphasis on first priorities.

Incident

A human-caused or natural occurrence, such as a wildland fire, tornado, hurricane, or major flood that 

requires emergency service action to prevent or reduce the loss of life or damage to property or natural 

resources.

Incident Action Plan (IAP)

The plan that contains objectives reflecting the overall incident strategy and specific tactical actions and 

supporting information for the next operational period on an incident. The plan may be oral or written. 

When written, the plan may have a number of attachments, including incident objectives, organization 

assignment list, division assignment, incident radio communication plan, medical plan, traffic plan, 

safety plan, fire weather, and incident maps.

Incident Command Post (ICP)

Location at which primary command functions are executed. The ICP is often co-located with the 

incident base or other incident facilities.

Incident Command System (ICS)

The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within 

a common organizational structure, with responsibility for the management of assigned resources to 

effectively accomplish stated objectives on an incident.

Incident Commander (IC)

The individual responsible for the management of all operations at the incident site. The IC is usually in 

charge of an incident management team, which may be national (Type 1) or regional or local (Type 2 or 

3) and which includes a wide variety of resources and personnel.

Incident Management Team

The Incident Commander and appropriate general staff or command staff personnel assigned to manage 

an incident. Teams vary in size and experience and are assigned based on availability of the teams and 

complexity of the incident.

Incident Objectives

Statements of guidance and direction necessary for selection of appropriate strategy or strategies, and 

the tactical direction of assigned resources. Incident objectives are based on realistic expectations of 

what can be accomplished when all allocated resources have been effectively deployed.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 69

InciWeb

The interagency all-risk incident web information management system provided by the U.S. Forest 

Service: http://inciweb.nwcg.gov/ .

Infrared Detection

The use of heat sensing equipment, known as “Infrared Scanners”, for detection of heat sources that are 

not visually detectable by the normal surveillance methods of either ground or air patrols.

Initial Attack

The actions taken by the first resources on arrival at a wildfire to protect lives and property and prevent 

further expansion of the fire.

Large Fire

To be considered a “Large Fire”, a wildfire must be at least 100 acres in timber or 300 acres in grass or 

brush.

Lead Plane

Aircraft used to make dry runs over a target area to check wind and smoke conditions and topography 

and to lead Air Tankers to targets and supervise their drops.

Mobilization

The process and procedures used by all organizations—federal, state, and local—for activating, 

assembling, and transporting all resources requested to respond to or support an incident.

Mop-Up

To make a fire safe or reduce residual smoke after the fire has been contained by extinguishing or 

removing burning material along or near the control line, including felling snags, or moving logs and 

large rocks so they won't roll downhill. Mop-up work is usually (but not always) handled by hand crews.

Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC)

MAC Group is a generalized term which describes the functions and activities of representatives of 

involved agencies and jurisdictions who come together to make decisions regarding the prioritizing of 

incidents and the sharing and use of critical resources. The MAC organization is not a part of the onscene Incident Command System and is not involved in developing incident strategy or tactics.

Mutual Aid Agreement

Written agreement between agencies or jurisdictions in which they agree to assist one another upon 

request by furnishing personnel and equipment.

National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS)

A uniform fire danger rating system that focuses on the environmental factors that control the moisture 

content of fuels.

National Multi-Agency Coordinating Group (NMAC)

Through intergovernmental coordination, this group provides national wildland fire operations 

direction, prioritization, allocation, and oversight. NMAC roles and responsibilities include: Establishes 

national priorities among the Geographic Areas; directs, allocates or reallocates resources among or 

between Geographic Areas to meet national priorities; attempts to anticipate and identify future 

national fire management resource requirements; provides oversight of general business practices 

between NMAC and the Geographic Multi-Agency Coordination (GMAC) groups. NMAC membership: 

Bureau of Indian Affairs Fire Director; Bureau of Land Management Fire Operations Manager; U.S. Fish 

and Wildlife Service Fire Director; U.S. Forest Service Assistant Director, Operations; National 

Association of State Foresters’ Fire Director; National Park Service Fire Director; U.S. Fire Administration 

Program Specialist.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 70

National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)

A group formed under the direction of the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior that includes 

representatives of the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 

National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Association of State Foresters. The 

group's purpose is to handle coordination and effectiveness of wildland fire activities and provide a 

forum to discuss and resolve issues and problems of substantive nature. NWCG is the certifying body for 

all courses in the National Fire Curriculum.

Operational Period

The period of time scheduled for execution of a given set of tactical actions as specified in the Incident 

Action Plan. Operational periods can be of various lengths, although usually are not more than 24 hours.

Overhead

People assigned to supervisory positions, including Incident Commanders, command staff, general staff, 

directors, supervisors, and unit leaders.

Plume-Dominated

A wildland fire whose activity is determined by its convection column.

Point Protection

Placing Engines and Crews at specific high-value locations (individual or clusters of structures, power and 

communication infrastructure, etc.).

Preparedness Levels

The National Multi-Agency Coordination Group (NMAC) establishes “Preparedness Levels” throughout 

the calendar year to help ensure that firefighting resources are ready to respond to new incidents. 

These Preparedness Levels are dictated by fuel and weather conditions, fire activity, and resource 

availability. The five Preparedness Levels range from “I” to “V”, with “V” being the highest level. Each 

Preparedness Level has specific management directions. As the Preparedness Levels rise, more federal 

and state employees become available for fire mobilization if needed.

 Preparedness Level I

Minimal large fire activity is occurring nationally. Most Geographic Areas have low to moderate fire 

danger. There is little or no commitment of national resources.

 Preparedness Level II

Several Geographic Areas are experiencing high to extreme fire danger. Wildland fire activity is 

increasing and large fires are occurring in one or more Geographic Areas. Minimal mobilization of 

resources from other Geographic Areas is occurring. There is moderate commitment of national 

resources with the potential to mobilize additional resources from other Geographic Areas.

 Preparedness Level III

Two or more Geographic Areas are experiencing wildland or prescribed fire activities requiring a 

major commitment of national resources. Additional resources are being ordered and mobilized 

through the National Interagency Coordination Center. Type 1 and Type 2 Incident Management 

Teams are committed in two or more Geographic Areas and crew commitment nationally is at 50 

percent.

 Preparedness Level IV

Three or more Geographic Areas are experiencing incidents requiring Type 1 and 2 Incident 

Management Teams. Competition exists between Geographic Areas. Nationally, 60 percent of Type 

1 and 2 IMTs and crews are committed.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 71

 Preparedness Level V

Geographic Areas are experiencing major incidents which have the potential to exhaust all agency 

fire resources. Eighty percent of Type 1 and Type 2 Incident Management Teams and crews are 

committed, as well as the majority of other national resources. 

Prevention

Activities directed at reducing the incidence of fires, including public education, law enforcement, 

personal contact, and reduction of fuels hazards.

Rappelling

The technique of landing specially trained firefighters from hovering helicopters; involves sliding down 

ropes with the aid of hand-held friction-producing devices called "Genies." Rappellers are often 

deployed into remote areas where access is difficult (such as areas without roads or helicopter landing 

spots)—or too remote to allow effective deployment of firefighters without extended hiking time.

Rate of Spread

The relative activity of a fire in extending its horizontal dimensions—expressed as: a rate of increase of 

the total perimeter of the fire, as rate of forward spread of the fire front, or as rate of increase in area—

depending on the intended use of the information. Rate of Spread is usually expressed in “chains” or 

acres per hour for a specific period in the fire's history.

Red Flag Warning

Alert issued by fire weather forecasters to warn personnel about an ongoing or imminent critical fire 

weather situation.

Relative Humidity (RH)

The ratio of the amount of moisture in the air to the maximum amount of moisture that the air would 

contain if it were saturated—the ratio of the actual vapor pressure to the saturated vapor pressure.

Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS)

There are nearly 1,500 interagency RAWS strategically located throughout the United States. Their 

weather data assists land management agencies with monitoring air quality, rating fire danger, and 

providing information for research applications. Most of the stations owned by the wildland fire 

agencies are located where they can monitor fire danger. RAWS units collect, store, and forward data to 

a computer system at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho via the Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES).

Resource Order

An order placed with Dispatch for firefighting or support resources, often initiated by the Incident 

Management Team on a fire.

Resources

1) Personnel, equipment, services, and supplies available, or potentially available, for assignment to fires 

or other incidents. 2) The natural resources of an area, such as timber, wildlife habitat, grasslands, 

watershed values, and recreational and other values.

Retardant

A substance or chemical agent that reduces the flammability of combustibles. Retardant application is 

generally via fixed-wing air tankers or helicopters, and is used to slow or retard the flames, often for pretreatment of fuels prior to ground attack or other suppression activities or for slowing the spread or 

potential for spread of the fire.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 72

Safety Zone

An area cleared of flammable materials used for escape in the event the fire line is outflanked or in case 

a spot fire causes fuels outside the control line to render the line unsafe. In firing operations, crews 

maintain a safety zone close at hand. Safety zones may also be constructed as integral parts of fuel 

breaks. They are greatly enlarged areas which can be used with relative safety by firefighters and their 

equipment in the event of a blow-up in the vicinity.

Severity Funding

Severity funding may be used to: temporarily increase or extend seasonal firefighting staff and 

resources; provide for extended use of aircraft or additional aircraft and resources; pay for standby and 

increased fire prevention activities. Regardless of the length of the severity authorization, funding 

activities shall be terminated when abnormal conditions no longer exist. 

Single Resource

An individual, a piece of equipment (such as an engine) and its staff, or a crew or team of persons with 

an identified work supervisor.

Situation “Sit” Report

The daily “National Interagency Coordination Center Incident Management Situation Report” that 

details the national incident activity including Incident Management Teams, personnel and resources 

assigned to specific incidents.

Size Up

To evaluate a fire to determine a course of action for suppression.

Slash

Debris left after logging, pruning, thinning, or brush cutting. This can include logs, chips, bark, branches, 

stumps and broken understory trees or brush.

Slop-over

A fire edge that crosses a control line or natural barrier intended to contain the fire.

Smokejumper

A firefighter who travels to fires by aircraft and parachutes into the fire area.

Snag

A standing dead tree or part of a dead tree from which at least the smaller branches have fallen.

Spot Fire

A fire ignited outside the perimeter of the main fire by flying sparks or embers.

Spot Weather Forecast

A special forecast issued to fit the time, topography, and weather of a specific fire. These forecasts are issued 

upon request of the user agency and are more detailed, timely, and specific than regular zone forecasts.

Spotting:

Behavior of a fire producing sparks or embers that are carried by the wind and start new fires beyond the 

zone of direct ignition by the main fire.

Staging Area

Locations set up at an incident where resources can be placed while awaiting a tactical assignment on an 

available basis. Staging areas are managed by the operations section.

Strike Team

Specified combinations of the same kind and type of resources—such as a group of staffed engines—with 

common communications and a leader.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 73

Torching

The ignition and flare-up of a tree or small group of trees, usually from bottom to top.

Type (Type 1, Type 2 etc.)

The capability of a firefighting resource in comparison to another type. Type 1 usually means a greater 

capability in power, size, or capacity. This can refer to type of engine, crew, or team.

Washington State Fire Service Mobilization Plan

The Washington State Fire Service Mobilization Plan is implemented to provide personnel, equipment, 

and other logistical resources from around the state when a wildland fire or other emergency exceeds 

the capacity of local jurisdictions. Only the fire chief of the local fire protection jurisdiction or fire chief's 

authorized representative has the authority to request this state fire services resource mobilization. The 

Washington State Patrol Fire Protection Bureau Office of the State Fire Marshal coordinates statewide 

fire service resources to support local firefighting efforts. http://www.wsp.wa.gov/fire/mobilization.htm

Water Tender

A ground vehicle capable of transporting water in the field, generally used to supply engines.

WildCAD

A GIS-based Computer-Aided Dispatch [CAD] system.

Wildland Fire

Any non-structure fire, other than prescribed fire, that occurs in a wildland area.

Wildland-Urban Interface

The line, area, or zone where structures and other human development meet or intermingle with 

undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 74

VI. Acknowledgements

We wish to extend a sincere thank you to the many authors and others who contributed information, data, 

photos, maps, and graphics for this report. Their efforts and professionalism are truly appreciated.

Report Authors and Editors

Lead Author

Tim Sexton, Manager

Wildand Fire Management Research Development and Applications Program

U.S. Forest Service – Rocky Mountain Research Station

National Interagency Fire Center

Executive Editor

Kathy Murphy

U.S. Forest Service, Retired

Editor

Paul Keller, Technical Writer-Editor

Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center

Contributing Authors

Jay Perkins, U.S. Forest Service, Retired

Kettle Complex, Carpenter Road Fire, Okanogan Complex,

Potential Long-Duration Fires (the Baldy, Buckskin,

Collier Butte, and Horseshoe fires)

Gene Rogers, U.S. Forest Service, Retired

Newby Lake Fire, North Star Fire, National Creek Complex

David Kerr, U.S. Forest Service, Retired

Chelan Complex, Wolverine Fire, County Line 2 Fire, Cougar Creek Fire

Deanna Engleman, Forester, U.S. Forest Service

Grizzly Bear Complex

Deana Wall, Forest Fuels Program Leader, U.S. Forest Service

Stouts Creek Fire
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 75

Tim Swedberg, U.S. Forest Service, Retired

Canyon Creek Complex and the “sage-grouse fires” – the Bendire, Corner Creek,

Cornet-Windy, Eldorado, and Leslie Gulch fires

Morgan Pence, Fire Application Specialist, U.S. Forest Service

Use of Technology

Janice Peterson, Air Resource Specialist, U.S. Forest Service

Rick Graw, Air Quality Program Manager, U.S. Forest Service

Air Quality

Kathy Murphy, U.S. Forest Service, Retired

Sage-Grouse Habitat and Rangeland Fires, Fire Prevention and Mitigation

Kathryn Strawn, GIS Analyst, U.S. Forest Service

Digital Resource Products

Additional Support

U.S. Forest Service

Phil Barricklow, Willie Begay, Ben Butler, Dana Carter, Zahid Chaudhry, Mary 

Chislock, Karen Curtiss, C.C. Chitwood, Seward Hamilton III, Brenda Johnson, Pete 

Lahm, Lawrence Lujan, Amy Mathie, Andrea Nick, Ted Pierce, Steve Rawlings, 

Dana Reid, Aaron Schoolcraft, Dana Skelly, Brant Stanger, Rick Stratton, Tara 

Umphries, Roy Walker, Sara White

Bureau of Land Management

Isaiah Hirschfield, Joe Krish, Lauren Maloney, Dan O’Brien, John Saltenberger, Bobbie Scopa

National Park Service

Mike Powell

U.S. Department of the Interior

Office of Wildland Fire

Andrew Bailey
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 76

VII. Appendices

Appendix A – Sage-Grouse Habitat and Rangeland Fires

“These actions are essential for conserving habitat for the greater sage-grouse as well as other 

wildlife species and economic activity, such as ranching and recreation, associated with the 

sagebrush-steppe ecosystem in the Great Basin region. This effort will build upon the experience 

and success of addressing rangeland fire and broader wildland fire prevention, suppression and 

restoration efforts to date, including the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, 

and ensure improved coordination with local, state, tribal, and regional efforts to address the 

threat of rangeland fire at a landscape-level.”

Section 1: Purpose

Secretarial Order 3336 on

Rangeland Fire Prevention, Management,

and Restoration

Department of the Interior Order 

Addresses Rangeland Fire

and Sagebrush Landscapes

Because public lands make up roughly half of the

remaining sage-grouse habitat,

management decisions by the Bureau of Land 

Management and the U.S. Forest Service are critical.

On January 5, 2015, the Department of the Interior 

Secretary Sally Jewell signed Secretarial Order 3336 

on Rangeland Fire Prevention, Management, and 

Restoration.

The purpose of this Secretarial Order was to set 

forth enhanced policies and strategies for 

preventing and suppressing rangeland fire and for 

restoring sagebrush landscapes impacted by fire 

across the West.

The Secretarial Order sets in motion actions to:

 Enhance the protection, conservation, and restoration of a healthy sagebrush-steppe 

ecosystem, and

 Address important public safety, economic, cultural, and social concerns.

Specifically, Secretarial Order 3336 required agencies to develop short-term plans to address fire 

mitigations before the 2015 fire season.

Implementing Sage-Grouse Conservation Actions

Greater sage-grouse habitat covers 165 million acres across 11 states in the West—representing a 56 

percent loss in habitat from the species’ historic range. At one time, the greater sage-grouse population 

Wildland fire represents the greatest threat to sage-grouse 

habitat across the West. Secretarial Order 3336 calls for the 

implementation of a comprehensive strategy to maintain this 

species and its habitat.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 77

likely numbered in the millions, but is estimated to have now dwindled to 200,000 to 500,000 

individuals range-wide.

Because public lands make up roughly half of the remaining sage-grouse habitat, management decisions 

by the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service are critical.

The Bureau of Land Management, in cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service and its partners, has 

finalized and approved a series of land use plans for the areas they manage. These plans all anticipate 

ongoing relationships with cooperators and partners in designing and implementing greater sage-grouse 

conservation actions.

Habitat Management Areas

The plans focus on conserving “Priority Habitat Management Areas” that have been identified as having 

the highest value for maintaining the sage-grouse species and its habitat. Land use measures in Priority 

Habitat are designed to minimize or avoid habitat disturbance. These plans also designate “General 

Habitat Management Areas”. These lands, located outside of Priority Habitat Management Areas, 

require special management to protect and sustain greater sage-grouse populations—but permit more 

flexible management and resource development. 

Greatest Threat to Sagebrush Habitat: Fire

Experts have identified fire as one of the greatest threats to sagebrush habitat. In response to this 

threat, the Secretarial Order calls for a comprehensive, science-based strategy to reduce the threat of 

large-scale rangeland fire to habitat for the greater sage-grouse and the sagebrush-steppe ecosystem.

This would occur through effective rangeland management (including the appropriate use of livestock), 

fire prevention, fire suppression, and post-fire restoration efforts at a landscape scale.

In addition, this strategy will fight the spread of cheatgrass and other invasive species that exacerbate 

fire risk and intensity, position wildland fire management resources for more effective initial attack, and 

accelerate the restoration of fire-impacted landscapes to native grasses and sagebrush.

The strategy, which is already being implemented, also includes training for local volunteers and 

Rangeland Fire Protection Associations, increased recruitment of veterans for fire crews, improving 

dispatch plans and the positioning of firefighting assets, as well as other operational elements intended 

to better protect and conserve crucial habitat.

Implementation of Strategy Called for by the Secretarial Order

Many elements of this strategy are implemented through the Bureau of Land Management/U.S. Forest 

Service plans, including:

 Interagency, landscape-scale assessments to prioritize at-risk habitat and identify priorities for 

fuels management, preparedness, suppression and restoration based on the quality of habitat at 

risk from loss to fire;

 Annual treatment and fire management programs to be developed in coordination with 

interagency partners, states and other partners across jurisdictional and ownership boundaries 

based on priorities identified in the landscape-scale assessments; and

 Development of strategies to check the spread of rangeland fires where they occur to protect 

larger, intact blocks of habitat.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 78

Cooperative Implementation

The plans will now be implemented by the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Forest Service in close 

coordination with state and local partners, as well as through the continued collaboration with local 

working groups and the Sage-Grouse Taskforce.

The Sage-Grouse Taskforce works to identify and implement high-priority conservation actions. Formed 

by the Western Governors Association, it includes designees from the 11 western states as well as 

representatives from: the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, Natural Resources 

Conservation Service, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Geological Survey, and the Department of the Interior. 

2015 Wildfires Impacted Sage-Grouse Habitat

The 2015 wildfires in the Pacific Northwest Region contributed to the further degradation and 

fragmentation of sage-grouse habitat. 

In Oregon, fires impacted a total of 153,142 acres of sage-grouse habitat. These acres included the 

following habitat management areas:

Very High Priority Habitat – Less than 1 acre

High Priority Habitat – 74,343 acres

General Priority Habitat – 78,798 acres

The incidents that impacted this habitat included the Bendire Complex, Eldorado, Leslie Gulch, and 

Cornet-Windy Ridge fires. The Corner Creek Fire interacted with several fuel treatments that aided in 

control of this wildfire and helped prevent it from burning into sage-grouse habitat. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 79

Appendix B – Fire Prevention and Mitigation

“There is an old adage that the best way to stop a wildfire is to 

make sure it never starts. Wildfire prevention programs form 

an important component of any comprehensive wildfire 

management strategy. Ranging from the familiar Smokey Bear 

public education campaign to focused law enforcement, 

prevention efforts target those sources of human ignitions that 

can be avoided, including arson, debris burning, campfires, 

smoking, off-road vehicle use, and others. The degree to which 

human-caused ignitions contribute to wildfire is substantial. 

Nationwide, human ignitions (everything except lightning) 

accounted for nearly 75 percent of all wildfires starts.”

The 2015 National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy

Preventing Human-Caused Wildfires in the Pacific Northwest Region

Throughout the winter of 2014-2015, drought conditions worsened in many areas in the Pacific 

Northwest Region. Fuel conditions in general around the Region were well ahead of historical trends. 

The Northwest Coordination Center’s Predictive Services Unit indicated that these conditions would 

extend throughout the summer and likely into the fall. These predictions helped to elevate the emphasis 

on preventing human-caused wildfires in the Pacific Northwest Region.

The Fire Prevention effort put forth in 2015 by the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Forest Service 

in the Pacific Northwest was unprecedented. In addition, individuals and communities took 

responsibility for their properties and provided fire prevention messaging through the Firewise program 

(Firewise.org).

The Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management augmented their existing Fire Prevention programs 

by bringing in Fire Prevention and Education Teams. This effort extended to include guidance and input 

from the Pacific Northwest Wildfire Coordinating Group (PNWCG) Communication Prevention and 

Investigation Committee (CPIC). The PNWCG includes eleven partner agencies that collaborate on 

wildland fire management issues.

Between June 2015 and the end of September 2015, seven Fire Prevention and Education Teams 

successfully implemented a combination of strategies and tactics, providing information to raise 

awareness of wildfire issues by enlisting the public’s support and actions for creating safer communities.

These efforts focused on analyzing the existing Fire Prevention program and identifying needs to better 

serve partner agencies and the public. One component identified early on was a need to provide the 

best “fire cause” data available. The Fire Prevention and Education Teams facilitated the development of 

fire-cause data into maps and tables to identify patterns in specific areas and to aid in the overall 

planning strategy for the Region. Such key analysis of when and where fires occurred helped planners 

and partners efficiently focus their fire prevention efforts.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 80

A. Fire-Adapted Communities

Beginning with the 2014 fire season, Fire 

Prevention and Education Teams worked to 

help the State Office/Regional Office (Bureau of 

Land Management/U.S. Forest Service) prevent 

human-caused fires in the Pacific Northwest 

under the umbrella of the National Cohesive 

Wildland Fire Management Strategy’s emphasis 

on Fire-Adapted Communities (FAC). This effort 

was “branded” for the Pacific Northwest using 

the “PNWFAC” logo (see image below), as well 

as through the PNWFAC website that provided 

resources to help support and maintain FireAdapted Communities across the Pacific Northwest.

Opening a Vital Conversation

Building on last year’s efforts, the 2015 fire season’s Fire 

Prevention and Education Teams continued to incorporate 

community fire adaptation into their work.

In July, a national team worked in Wenatchee with the new 

Washington Fire-Adapted Community Learning Network to 

incorporate and embrace the network’s efforts, building a 

strong link between FAC concepts and activities to target 

specific human fire causes.

These efforts have opened a conversation about the 

community cycle of “Prevent, Prepare, Respond and Recover” 

and resulted in recommendations from the national team on 

future messaging and collaboration.

B. Media Outreach

One key objective of the Fire Prevention and Education Teams was to “mass market” the awareness of 

drought conditions and high fire danger. The various teams’ media strategy focused on radio, television, 

and newspapers. Four audio and three video Public Service Announcements (PSAs) that underscored the 

drought conditions and campfire awareness were scripted and professionally recorded. These PSAs were 

distributed to more than 200 media contacts.

On July 24, a “Media Day” was arranged that focused on drought conditions and clarified fire restrictions 

in dispersed versus developed campsites. Reporters from two television stations (King 5 and Fox 13) and 

one newspaper (Mason County Journal) covered this event, held in Washington’s Olympic National 

Forest. 

A social media strategy was developed to increase awareness of Fire-Adapted Community issues. A total 

of 150 tweets were developed on human-caused wildfires in the Pacific Northwest and on protecting 

sage-grouse habitat. Fifty-one twitter graphics were created to help spotlight these twitter messages. 

Analytics have demonstrated that such images increase social engagements.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 81

A Campaign of Custom Flyers

During the fall mushroom seasons on the Deschutes, 

Fremont-Winema, Umpqua, and Willamette national 

forests, a history of smoking and campfire-caused 

wildfires was identified.

Therefore, in 2015, these Forests received custom 

flyers that incorporated specially designed and 

translated materials.

Using a national translation service, the Fire Prevention 

and Education Team was able to produce flyers in six 

languages. These products were provided to the 

aforementioned national forests to be further 

distributed by this effort’s key partner, the Alliance of 

Forest Workers.

This custom flyer (on right)

was written in Lao to best connect

with this key audience.

C. Training and Development

An important emphasis of the Regional Fire Prevention program is building Fire Education and 

Prevention capacity across all agencies and regions in both Oregon and Washington.

This effort’s main conceptual intention is to: 1) Generate interest and participation through training and 

field experience; 2) Build a larger pool of qualified members and leaders to utilize within the Region; 

while 3) Simultaneously building skills and contacts to help with local, year-round fire prevention 

programs.

In 2015, the Pacific Northwest Region supported individuals with formal training in Fire Prevention as 

well as on-the-job training opportunities with Fire Prevention Teams.

D. Protecting Sage-Grouse Habitat

Several of the Pacific Northwest Region’s Fire Prevention and Education 

Teams have helped develop the “Steppe Up – Protect Our Sage 

Community” campaign. This awareness campaign is designed to inspire 

action through raising awareness on the critical loss of this significant 

habitat that is attributed to human-caused wildfires in sagebrush 

ecosystems.

Public Service Announcements aired in Oregon’s Bend, Klamath Falls, 

Lakeview, and Umatilla media markets. Approximately 80 sagebrush 

ecosystem educational tweets were prepared for year-round release.

Pictures, links and #hashtags have been developed to generate 

interest and direct followers to resources for learning more about how 

they can become part of the solution.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 82

A 12-page coloring book (see cover on right) has been developed 

to stimulate young elementary school minds and provoke a 

desire to learn. In addition, this book is designed to generate 

family conversation about the sagebrush community and how 

human-caused wildfires can quickly destroy animal habitats. 

A set of 14 trading cards has also been crafted that features 

photographs and illustrations of the wide spectrum of animals 

that depend on the sagebrush community. Each card has a 

unique fire prevention tip on the back.

E. Drones

A regional drone 

awareness campaign—

targeted at drone 

users—was launched in 

July 2015.

Drones have become a serious safety concern for wildfire 

incidents. These objects have compromised firefighter safety 

and shut down wildfire air operations.

The Fire Prevention and Education Teams coordinated with Fire 

and Aviation Management staff on specific needs. Four new 

display banners (see image on left) were designed and featured 

at three Oregon events: the Madras Air show, the Prospect 

Search and Rescue Fly-In, and the Merlin Airport Days. Fire 

prevention and Education Teams had the potential to reach 

12,000 people at these events. 

F. Updated, Featured Graphics

The PNWCG Communication Prevention and Investigation Committee recognized the need to update 

existing graphics and develop new graphic products to help support ongoing fire prevention efforts. 

More than 15 product themes were created, covering prevention messaging on vehicle-caused fires, 

campfires, shooting fires, sagebrush habitat effects, fireworks, burn piles, field burning, drones, and 

home preparedness. These graphics are featured in a variety of file formats and resolutions for different 

product applications (from billboards to newsletters). A select few have been translated from English to 

Spanish (see below).
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 83

These graphics and more can be downloaded and customized for Forests and partner agencies at:

http://ftp.nifc.gov/incident_specific_data/pacific_nw/!SORO/Prevention/

G. Fire Restrictions Messaging

During the 2015 fire season, one Fire Prevention and 

Education Team focused on effective outreach messaging 

to reduce confusion regarding the restriction of activities 

in high fire-prone areas, while allowing these same 

activities in less fire-prone or hazardous areas.

The team’s goal was for agencies and internal audiences to 

interpret and deliver messaging to the public in easily 

understandable language. An outreach toolbox was 

developed that defines the process of establishing and 

implementing fire restrictions and closures through 

graphic products, templates, and examples.

This outreach toolbox can easily be reconfigured to 

effectively promote any Forest’s fire restriction and 

closure messaging.

The toolbox includes tips and tools for creating awareness, 

educating specific audiences, and motivating positive 

behavior change. An array of materials has been designed, 

including:

• Graphics (posters, flyers, and handouts)

• Outreach tools (press releases, Public Service 

Announcements, talking points)

• Sample templates of Fire Restriction Orders, Delegations, and Authority-Mandates

(A variety of these resources can be found on the electronic 

graphics warehouse website link [provided above].)
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 84

“The Fire Prevention and Education Teams were a great 

addition to our program this year. Their accomplishments 

were remarkable. I’m looking forward to having them 

back next season.”

Denise Blankenship, Assistant Director

Fire Integration, Pacific Northwest Region

U.S. Forest Service

H. Firewise Communities

The Firewise program (Firewise.org), co-sponsored by the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Department of 

the Interior, and the National Association of State Foresters, encourages local solutions for fire safety by 

involving homeowners in taking individual responsibility for preparing their homes from the risk of 

wildfire.

In 2013, the small community of Pine Creek, Oregon, came together to make their community 

“Firewise.” Using “Firewise” components as a guide, the Pine Creek neighbors began making their 

homes and property more defensible from the impacts of wildfire. This work included pruning, mowing, 

thinning trees, clearing flammable materials away from homes and improving access routes by clearing 

away dense vegetation.

Pine Creek residents even built a bridge to provide an emergency ATV route across a creek. In addition, 

they located water sources and set up sprinklers where it made sense.

Preplanning By Pine Creek 

Residents Saves Homes from 

Canyon Creek Complex Fire

On August 26, 2015, gusty 

southwest winds pushed the Canyon 

Creek Complex Fire out of the 

Strawberry Mountain Wilderness 

toward the small, dispersed 

community of Pine Creek.

The Grant County Sheriff’s Office 

made the call in the early afternoon 

to evacuate residents.

Pine Creek residents organized to 

prepare and implement the Firewise

plan. Together, they learned fire 

behavior, fire-proofing techniques

and evacuation tips. They also 

became familiar with the different 

evacuation levels to help them be 

prepared to evacuate—not just for 

themselves, but also for pets and 

livestock.

On August 26, 2015, the Canyon Creek Complex Fire burns into the Pine Creek 

drainage on the north flank of the Strawberry Wilderness. Fire officials credit 

preparation by homeowners and fire crews in advance of the fire for saving many of 

the homes in the Pine Creek community area. The home of Tye and Jenny Rookstool—

shown here—was among these homes that were spared from the approaching fire 

front due to their previous efforts to fireproof their homes in this fire-prone area.

Photo by Todd McKinley/Grant County Sheriff’s Office.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 85

“The work homeowners did to make their community “Firewise” 

helped the survivability of the homes. It was the combination of fuel 

treatments around homes and fire resistant building materials (metal 

roofs, concrete plank siding, composite decking etc.) that contributed 

to saving many homes in this community.”

Roy Walker 

Fire Management Officer 

Malheur National Forest

V I D E O

Grant County, Oregon also 

contracted with local 

filmmakers to make a video to 

help residents prepare for 

wildfire. The video highlights 

the five seasons: Fall, Winter, 

Spring, Summer and Fire 

Season.

http://www.livingwithwildfire

.com/Video.html
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 86

Appendix C – The Use of Technology in Support of the 2015 Pacific Northwest Fires

Numerous technologies and resources were used in support of fire management efforts during the 2015 

fire season. This section describes the approach and use of these beneficial tools and products. 

The Pacific Northwest Region maintains a high level of qualified analysts and planners. These individuals 

function as Long Term Analysts (LTAN), Fire Behavior Analysts (FBAN), Geospatial Analysts (GSAN), 

Strategic Operational Planners, and Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) Technical 

Specialists. During the 2015 fire season, the Region was able to place analysts on site at all of the 

regionally significant fires and complexes. 

At the height of the fire season, the Regional Fire Analyst remained at regional headquarters to provide 

information and briefings to the Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) group and agency executives 

regarding needs, priorities, weather, and threats to values as the situation evolved and changed. As 

needed, the Regional Fire Analyst also hosted conference calls and disseminated information with onscene analysts to understand concerns/needs and exchange information. In addition, this information 

sharing provided the opportunity to discuss the status of the current situation regarding weather, fire 

behavior/safety alerts, and useful tools/resources. 

The Northwest Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) provided critical situation awareness to the 

Region regarding fire/fuels analyses and weather/climate outlooks. The GACC fire analyst and 

meteorologists communicated with Incident Commanders daily to support their efforts. In addition, 

GACC meteorologists communicated daily with the National Weather Service forecast offices and 

Incident Meteorologists, ensuring knowledge sharing and communication. The GACC fire analyst also 

supported the network of FBANs/LTANs/GSANs on incidents regarding incident needs, pertinent fire 

behavior, and weather information. An example of the products that were provided include:

http://gacc.nifc.gov/nwcc/content/pdfs/FBOutlook.pdf

http://gacc.nifc.gov/nwcc/content/products/fwx/guidance/DL.pdf

Tools and Products

• Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS):

http://wfdss.usgs.gov/wfdss/WFDSS_Home.shtml

o Utilized to assess risk and values, create incident objectives and courses of action 

consistent with land management plans, model fire behavior, and create decisions to 

provide direction to fire managers/Incident Management Teams. (See computer screen 

capture on next page showing the Relative Risk Assessment within the Wildland Fire 

Decision Support System on the Tower Fire.)
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 87

o Fire modeling in the Pacific Northwest Region was used during the 2015 fire season (see 

table below). From June 1 through September 30, a total of 509 analyses were 

completed in the Northwest Geographic Area (includes all agencies and partner use). 

Model Used # of runs completed

Fire Spread Probability (FSPro) 254

Near Term Fire Behavior (NTFB) 147

Short Term Fire Behavior (STFB) 82

Basic Fire Behavior 7

Total 490

o Fire Spread Probability (FSPro) simulates thousands of fires using forecasted and 

historical weather. The output shows the probability of fire growth for a given period of 

time, often 7, 14, or 21 days. It is often used to assess risk of impacts to values at risk.

o Near Term Fire Behavior (NTFB) simulates fire growth using a predicted weather 

forecast, typically for a 3-5 day period. Output is useful for assessing potential fire 

impacts in the near term as well as some fire behavior characteristics such as flame 

length and rate of spread. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 88

o Short Term Fire Behavior (STFB) simulates fire behavior and growth under one weather 

and fuel scenario. Output is useful for assessing possible spread under a specific 

weather condition and the associated fire behavior (such as a cold front).

o Basic Fire Behavior provides the fire behavior characteristics for an area under one 

weather and fuel scenario. Output is useful for assessing the fire behavior (flame 

length, rate of spread, crown fire, 1-hour fuel moisture, etc.) under a specific weather 

condition. 

• PNW Long Term Analysis Library: http://maple.ordvac.com/event/map/

o Created to provide a spatial display of current and historical regional resources for:

Long Term Assessments, Season-Ending Analysis, Fire Danger & Pocketcards, Fire 

Progressions, Case Studies, and Gridded Wind KML Library. (“KML” is “Keyhole Markup 

Language” which is a file type used by Google Earth.)

• Fire Spread Probability (FSPro) and associated Values at Risk (VAR). 

o Created to provide assessment and situation in a consistent manner for area fires 

(including visual map and VAR [Values at Risk] tables shown on next page). Provided as 

a PDF and Google Earth KMZ.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 89

• Assessment of PNW Communities and Major Travel Corridors at Risk.

o A rapid assessment of the threats to communities and major travel corridors in the 

Pacific Northwest given predicted weather. Created and updated to inform priorities 

for MAC and agency executives. Product displayed Google Earth backdrop with 

current VIIRs/MODIS heat signature overlay of area fires. (“VIIRs” is “Visible Infrared 

Imaging Radiometer Suite”. “MODIS” is “Moderate-Resolution Imaging 

These two screen captures 

show the Fire Spread 

Probability output for 

multiple fires and the table 

shows the Values at Risk and 

how likely they will be 

affected by the fire.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 90

Spectroradiometer”. Both are instruments on a satellite, indicating that this is 

satellite-detected data.) Projected wind and resultant fire behavior/spread potential 

indicated with arrows with distances to communities and corridors. 

This screen capture shows detected heat via satellite (yellow, orange, and red dots) with red arrows depicting 

projected wind and resultant fire behavior/spread. Blue arrows show distance between fires.

• PNW Long-Term Outlook for Fire Season 2015 (dated 8/26/15).

o Created to provide information about the potential duration of the fire season by 

predictive service area (PSA), short-, mid-, and long-term. This product contained 

numerous resources/information (shown on the following pages).
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 91

Map of current large fire footprints by PSA (Predictive Service Area).

Fire Danger demonstrated through Pocketcards*.

1,000 hour fuels conditions.

*(“Fire Danger Pocketcards” are 

handheld cards produced by fire 

planners and analysts that depict the 

fire danger for a specific area and often 

reference past historical years of 

significant fire danger and activity as a 

reference point. The objective of these 

cards is to lead to greater awareness 

and, subsequently, increased firefighter 

safety. Additionally, the cards provide a 

description of seasonal changes in fire 

danger and are therefore useful to local 

as well as out-of-area firefighters.)
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 92

Energy Release Component (ERC) graphs.

Short-term (7 day) Weather Outlook including Predictive Services 7 Day 

Significant Fire Potential.

Mid-term (1 month) Weather Outlook including National Weather 

Service (NWS) Climate Graphs of precipitation and temperature.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 93

Long-term (3 month) Weather Outlook including NWS Climate Graphs of 

precipitation and temperature.

Narrative and graphical assessment and summary of probability of Large 

Fires, Fire slowing, and Season-ending events by PSA.

Visual map of probability of season 

end date by PSA, discussion and 

implications. 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 94

• Assessment of Large Fires That May Extend into the Fall. 

o Created to give a specific look at fires that may extend into fall due to heavy fuels, 

minimal precipitation, remoteness, and accessibility. Provides a table displaying fire 

with location of greatest heat, recent precipitation, percentile season end date, 

uncontrolled line, likelihood of extending into fall and precipitation. Includes a National 

Weather Service 3-day precipitation map and 10 mph wind gusts for the Northwest.

Image on the left shows predicted rain over a 3 day period in inches. Image on the right shows 

predicted 10-mile an hour wind gusts (red arrows) for the Northwest.

• Assessment of Current and Predicted Precipitation and Resultant Fire Potential as the Area 

Began to Receive Precipitation to Some Areas. 

Predicted precipitation for Washington and Oregon.
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 95

National Weather Service-observed 

precipitation in the last 7 days with large 

fire polygon overlay.

Predictive Services 7 day Fire Potential Outlook.

 
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 96

Regional Air Quality Program and Smoke Program Staff

Actively Engaged in Addressing Various Smoke Impacts

Appendix D – Air Quality and Smoke Response

During the 2015 fire season, extensive areas of wildfire in Oregon and Washington resulted in 

widespread public exposure to smoke as well as extended episodes of unhealthy air quality for many 

people in communities and rural areas.

Exposure to smoke can impact public health, especially to sensitive individuals, including people with 

heart or lung disease, people with asthma, infants and children, adults older than 65, and pregnant 

women.

Serious smoke episodes disrupt lives and can cause cancellation of outdoor activities, festivals, school 

events, and tourism. Thus, these impacts from smoke to local and regional economies can be very 

significant.

The Regional Air Quality Program and Smoke Program staff have been actively engaged to address three 

components of smoke impacts: community health, transportation safety, and personal exposure for 

firefighters. This response is focused on monitoring, forecasting, and public messaging in a collaborative 

effort with all of our agency partners. 

The 2015 Pacific Northwest Region

Wildfire Smoke Response

In Late June Regional Staff Begins to Watch for Smoke Impacts

When the first significant wildfires occurred in late June, the Pacific Northwest Region’s Regional Air 

Quality Program and Smoke Program staff began watching for smoke impacts to air quality.

The Pacific Northwest Region sponsors and maintains working partnerships in Oregon and 

Washington with state air quality agencies, state health agencies, local public health departments, 

the Environmental Protection Agency, tribes, and state emergency management.

When smoke causes serious impacts, frequent coordination conference calls among this partnership 

group occur. 

For Six Weeks—Starting at the End of July—Wildfire Smoke Causes Significant Air Quality Concerns

For nearly six weeks—beginning at the end of July through the first weeks of September—smoke 

from the 2015 wildfires caused significant air quality concerns in Oregon and Washington as well as 

adjacent states and Canada. (See graph on next page.)

Air Resource Advisors contribute almost 200 days of air quality support

to the Pacific Northwest Region’s wildfire air quality response effort.

Special “Air Resource Advisors” Deployed to Multiple Incidents

The U.S. Forest Service Washington Office Fire and Aviation Management (FAM) staff is developing 

the Wildland Fire Air Quality Response Program which deploys specially trained technical 

specialists—known as Air Resource Advisors (ARA)—and a national cache of smoke monitors 

available by request.

These Air Resource Advisors assisted the Pacific Northwest Region by supporting the air quality 

needs of communities and fire personnel during the 2015 wildfire smoke episodes. These specialists
Narrative Timeline of the Pacific Northwest 2015 Fire Season 97

Communities in Washington State experienced many days of “Unhealthy” and even “Hazardous”

air quality conditions on the EPA Air Quality Index scale from smoke impacts during 2015 wildfire season.
98

“Air Resource Advisors provide an air quality presence at public meetings 

and can provide the necessary information to local health experts who make 

important decisions about limiting student athletes’ exposure and cancelling 

outdoor events based on sound science rather than just economics.”

Sean M. Hopkins, Air Quality Specialist

Washington State Department of Ecology

were deployed to multiple incidents (with a total of 16 dispatches). They contributed a total of 

nearly 200 days of air quality support to the Pacific Northwest Region’s wildfire air quality response 

effort. Specifically, these Air Resource Advisors produce a standard, daily product of predicted air 

quality conditions that is circulated by Public Information Officers and posted to online 

communication tools. Air Resource Advisors were deployed to Agency Administrators on the 

Colville, Rogue-Siskiyou, Umpqua, Malheur, and Wallow-Whitman national forests as well as the 

Colville Area Command. In addition, Air Resource Advisors were deployed directly to Incident 

Management Teams on the Buckskin, National Creek, Canyon Creek, Chelan Complex, and 

Wolverine fires.

The Air Resource Advisors also attend community meetings, install monitors, confer with fire safety 

officers about smoke impacts, and coordinate with agency administrators and air quality and public 

health partner agencies.

Through these efforts, along with those of our agency partners, a coordinated response to wildfire

smoke is occurring across the Region. The public has received daily smoke forecasts as well as the 

recommended actions to take to protect themselves. In Washington, communities have responded 

through the use of clean air shelters, appropriate use of respirators, home filtration systems, and 

personal decisions to leave the area. Community response has been very supportive and 

appreciative.

For three days when smoke blanketed much of the Pacific Northwest Region,

each blog received more than 50,000 views a day.

Smoke Blogs Prove to be a Successful Source for Communicating with Public and Air Quality Partners

A primary venue for communicating with the public and air quality partners are the Oregon and 

Washington “smoke blogs”: oregonsmoke.blogspot.com 

and wasmoke.blogspot.com.

By mid-September 2015, a total of 277 posts had been 

made to these blogs by interagency partners and the Air 

Resource Advisors. The Washington blog received 550,000 

page views. The Oregon blog received 320,000 page views. 

When smoke blanketed much of the Pacific Northwest 

Region from August 21 through August 23, each blog 

received more than 50,000 views a day.

Small, Rural Communities Helped

Supplemental air quality monitoring was provided by the 

Forest Service to small, rural communities with no state air 

quality monitors. Temporary monitors were deployed from 

the national monitoring cache—part of the WO FAM 

Wildland Fire Air Quality Response Program (see photo on 

right).

To supplement state networks, temporary air 

quality monitors were installed by the Air 

Resource Advisors and regional Forest Service 

staff in 13 small, rural communities across the 

Region that were impacted by smoke during the 

2015 season.
99

Example of an Air Resource Advisor’s air quality forecast.
100

Predicting Smoke Dispersion and Accumulation

AirFire Team Provides Critical Support to Air Resource Advisors

The Wildland Fire Air Quality Response Program also supports the Forest Service Pacific Wildland 

Fire Sciences Lab’s Atmosphere and Fire Interactions Research “AirFire” Team.

This special team is integral to the operational efforts of the Air Resource Advisors as well as state 

and local agencies during wildfire smoke episodes.

AirFire developed and maintains BlueSky, the primary tool used by the Air Resource Advisors for 

predicting smoke dispersion and accumulation. (See visual example above.)

The AirFire team works diligently during wildfires to ensure the model is providing the critical 

support on which the Air Resource Advisors depend.

As an example, this is the 24-hour average smoke model prediction for August 24, 2015 in 

Washington that was produced by the AirFire BlueSky model.
101

More AirFire Air Quality Tools Used During the 2015 Fire Season

In addition, AirFire developed new tools for 2015 to quickly analyze and summarize air quality data 

from state and national cache monitoring instruments.

AirFire also developed a new map layer used by the smoke blogs to show fire locations as well as

state and temporary air quality monitoring locations that are color-coded by EPA Air Quality Index 

levels for air quality conditions. These efforts include working to monitor and reduce firefighter 

exposure to smoke.
102

Appendix E – Four Potential Long-Duration Fires

Four Potential Long-Duration Fires

That were Limited in Size and Duration

Due to Successful Strategic Management

Strategy:

Apply Aggressive Suppression Actions

to Limit Fire Duration and Impacts

to Regional Firefighting Resource Availability

In the spring of 2015, the Pacific Northwest 

Region was predicted to experience a long, dry 

fire season with a high potential for firefighting 

resource shortages.

Therefore, several wildfires that started in areas 

deemed to have high potential for longduration events (limited access, steep slopes 

and large amounts of extremely dry fuel) were 

given similar management strategies.

Specifically, these strategies were to apply 

aggressive suppression actions intended to limit 

the duration of the fire and associated longterm commitment of regional firefighting 

resources.

Implementing this strategic fire management 

approach early in the fire season in remote 

locations would best enable the Pacific 

Northwest Region to minimize the chance of 

having long-duration fires that would commit 

resources for significant periods of time. 

This overall strategy provided for the 

assignment of large numbers of firefighting 

resources in order to contain the fires in a short 

amount of time—accepting the potential for 

these fires to cost more per acre as a result.

Generally, this strategy was successful in 

limiting the duration of these early season wildfires during low wildfire activity and freeing-up the 

firefighting resources from those fires before the most active part of the summer fire season began.

Four Potential Long-Duration Fires

Buckskin Fire – 5,345 Acres

Started June 11 adjacent to the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area 

in the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest. By June 24, the 

fire’s growth was stopped at a total of 5,345 acres burned.

Horseshoe Fire – 340 Acres

The fire was detected July 3 in the Mt. Adams Wilderness 

on the Gifford Pinchot National Forest. Direct attack was 

implemented on two-thirds of the fire’s perimeter. On the 

other one-third of the perimeter, the fire was confined in a 

previous fire scar. On July 12, the Horseshoe Fire was 

contained at a total of 340 acres.

Baldy Fire – 515 Acres

Started August 1 in the Abercrombie-Hooknose Inventoried 

Roadless Area on the Colville National Forest. An effective 

combination of natural barriers, hand line, and firing 

operations successfully halted the fire’s spread by August 8. 

Total fire size was 515 acres.

Collier Butte Fire – 11,800 Acres

Started August 2 in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness on the Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest. Initially, due to this fire’s 

remoteness and low fire behavior, it was the lowest priority 

fire among many new fire starts. Increased fire activity 

spurred aggressive suppression utilizing fire lines from the 

2002 Biscuit Fire, natural barriers, and hand lines that 

successfully halted the fire’s growth on August 24. Total fire 

size was 11,800 acres.
103

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1XxBBwz

The Buckskin Fire

During June 8-9, more than 2,000 lightning 

strikes occurred in the Pacific Northwest 

Region under unseasonably dry conditions. 

Many of these lightning strikes hit isolated 

parts of the Rogue River-Siskiyou National 

Forest in southwestern Oregon.

This lightning forecast was predicted and 

communicated with adequate time to prepare 

for expected Initial Attack activity.

The Buckskin Fire was reported on June 11. It 

was located adjacent to the Kalmiopsis 

Wilderness in the Rogue River-Siskiyou 

National Forest. When the fire was reported, 

the National and Regional Preparedness Levels 

were at 2. There were 24 active fires nationally, 

with 586 personnel assigned to incidents.

In anticipation of this forecasted lightning 

storm, additional resources—well above the 

“normal” Rogue River-Siskiyou firefighting 

staffing—had been ordered and were prepositioned ready for work. Those resources 

included five Interagency Hotshot Crews, 

Engines, Overhead, and miscellaneous 

Equipment.

Due to Several Factors, This Fire Could Be

a Long-Duration Event

At 12:18 p.m. the same day, the Buckskin Fire 

was reported to have moved into the footprint 

of the 2002 Biscuit Fire. Values at risk from this 

fire included private land, coho salmon habitat 

and stands of disease-free Port Orford cedar. It 

was recognized that due to the early season 

start, the hot and dry conditions on top of a 

persistent drought coupled with a heavy 

accumulation of large, dead logs and the fire’s location on the edge of the vast Kalmiopsis Wilderness, 

this fire could be a long-duration event.

Initial response to the Buckskin Fire was aggressive direct attack. Initial Attack resources were ordered 

while fire spread was concurrently slowed by Air Tankers and Helicopters. However, due to the influence 

of Red Flag conditions which brought high temperatures, low relative humidity and strong, dry 

north/northeast winds, coupled with the high accumulation of dry fuels from the pervasive drought, 

aircraft were not fully effective.

Notable Successes

From the various host National Forests’ perspective, the 

strategy to contain these fires at the smallest footprint 

possible to quickly free-up resources was an overall 

success.

All four of these fires were contained at a small acreage 

relative to their potential. In addition, just as importantly, 

the management of these fires was transitioned back to the 

Forests in a way that ensured that the fires could continue 

to be held and suppressed until the end of fire season.

Regional Interaction

The Forests also highlighted the level of Regional 

interaction in decision-making. It was a consensus that this 

“Short Duration” strategy was a shared strategy between 

the Region and the individual Forests.

Cost Analysis

While it was recognized that this strategy would likely 

cause an increased cost per acre, analysis (using tools in the 

Wildland Fire Decision Support System) indicates the costs 

per acre for each of these four fires—although on the 

higher end of the spectrum—are not precedent-setting 

costs.

Furthermore, the overall cost for these fires would likely 

have been much greater if they had grown to their 

predicted sizes and duration.

Forest Preparedness with Severity Funding

Although these fires still required Type 2 Incident 

Management Teams, it was noted by multiple Forests that, 

due to severity funding, preparedness staffing was higher in 

anticipation of the events that ignited these fires.

Without these resources, response to these fires as well as 

other fires would have been slower and would have 

certainly resulted in additional acres burned.
104

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1NlyA17

This weather event lasted more than 12 hours. Its impact was illustrated by a spot fire that ignited 1.5 

miles away from the main fire. Fire growth exceeded containment efforts. A Type 2 Incident 

Management Team was ordered.

Hazards to firefighter safety that inhibited direct attack 

included: concentrations of large snags from the 2002 

Biscuit fire; lack of safety zones; and difficult access 

associated with steep, rough terrain.

At 6 a.m. on June 13, the Oregon Interagency Incident 

Management Team #3, a Type 2 team, assumed 

command. Tactics were developed using previously 

constructed Dozer lines from the 2002 Biscuit Fire, as 

well as existing roads and trails and two miles of new 

hand line.

All fire spread was successfully halted by June 24 at 

5,345 acres.

The Horseshoe Fire

The Horseshoe Fire 

was detected on July 3 at 4:13 p.m. in the Mt. Adams 

Wilderness of the Gifford Pinchot National Forest in 

south-central Washington.

When first reported, the fire was estimated to be 

greater than 50 acres in size. This fire was discovered in 

an area of heavy concentrations of dead, down timber 

near the 2012 Cascade Creek Fire area. Shortly after its 

discovery, the fire was reported to be “torching” that 

resulted in short-range spotting into easily ignitable 

heavy fuels and grass.

All Local Firefighting Resources in Place

When the Horseshoe Fire ignited, the National 

Preparedness Level was 3. The Pacific Northwest was at 

a Preparedness Level 4.

There were a total of 28 uncontained large fires nationally with 9,395 firefighting resources assigned. In addition, 

12 Large Fires were burning within the Pacific Northwest Region—which 

also had another 13 new fire starts. 

All local firefighting resources were still positioned on the Gifford 

Pinchot National Forest.

Drought Conditions, Difficult Terrain, Lack of Access

Drought conditions persisted due to prolonged hot, dry weather and the 

record-low snow pack. Dead fuel conditions were similar to peak fire 

season conditions typically experienced in August and September.

Due to fire size and behavior, difficult terrain, lack of access, 

lack of potential safety zones, and difficult logistical support, 

Top – This photo, taken on June 11 when the Buckskin Fire was 

first reported, occurred shortly after the Siskiyou Rappel Crew 

arrived for Initial Attack. Photo by Michael Bolic. Bottom – The 

Buckskin Fire on June 16. Photo by Kris Sherman.

The Horseshoe Fire on July 3, the day it is 

detected, as seen from Mt. Adams.
105

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1QqMn6z

local resources were unable to staff and 

contain the fire during Initial Attack.

Two local Engines and a Type 2 Helicopter 

pre-positioned at the nearby Heliport in The 

Dalles, Oregon responded. However, they 

were unable to safely engage the fire on the 

ground. A Type 3 organization managed the 

fire with reconnaissance from one squad 

from a local crew.

On July 6, a Type 2 Team, Washington 

Interagency Incident Management Team #4, 

took command of the Horseshoe Fire. The 

team was briefed on the decision to stop fire 

growth rapidly and contain the fire at the 

smallest size safely possible.

This strategy was intended to mitigate a higher long-term risk to firefighters associated with the 

potential for a long-term fire. The following day, after a risk analysis was conducted, Type 2 Crews and 

Type 2 Initial Attack Crews were utilized to begin control efforts.

The control plan included direct attack on two-thirds of the fire’s perimeter and a confine strategy using 

the Cascade Creek Fire scar on the other one-third of the perimeter.

Type 1 Crews were later added to the fire suppression efforts on the Horseshoe Fire.

On July 9, a thunderstorm produced an additional ignition which quickly spread to 60 acres and became 

the Riley Fire. This fire was also managed by the Incident Management Team assigned to the Horseshoe 

Fire. The two fires became the Mt. Adams Complex.

Work on the Horseshoe Fire continued until July 12, when it was put into patrol status. The Horseshoe 

Fire was successfully contained at 340 acres.

Collier Butte Fire

The Collier Butte Fire ignited 

inside the Kalmiopsis 

Wilderness on the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest 

within the footprint of the 2002 Biscuit fire. This fire was 

started from of a lightning storm that produced more than 

900 strikes across the Pacific Northwest Region on August 2. 

More than 12 other additional wildfires were ignited within 

the Collier Butte Fire’s Gold Beach/Powers Zone during that 

lightning storm.

Over the next 10 days, at least 70 more fires were discovered 

on the Forest. At the time, National and Regional 

Preparedness levels were both at 3. There were 10 

uncontained Large Fires in the Pacific Northwest Region and 

another 20 in other regions of the country, with 14,683 

The Type 1 Prineville Interagency Hotshot Crew firefighting resources assigned.

members cutting fire line on Division Y

of the Collier Butte Fire.

Initial Attack – An Air Tanker drops retardant on the Riley Fire on July 9, 

when a new thunderstorm produced this fire near the Horseshoe Fire. Both 

incidents were managed by the same Incident Management Team.
106

Additional Staffing

was Pre-Positioned

In anticipation of probable starts across the 

Zone, additional staffing well above the 

“normal” number of firefighters on this Forest 

had been pre-positioned at the Gold Beach 

Ranger District.

The Collier Butte Fire was initially burning 

within the 2002 Biscuit Fire perimeter in the 

Kalmiopsis Wilderness. Hazards to firefighters 

included: steep terrain, numerous snags, and 

few safety zones. This fire’s remote location 

posed difficult access for firefighters. Values at 

risk included wilderness and cultural and 

natural resources. The Agency Administrator’s 

Leader’s Intent included containing the fire 

quickly at a small size.

Fire Grows Rapidly

Due to this fire’s location in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness and its relatively low values at risk, other fires 

located closer to communities were given priority for firefighting resources. The Rogue River-Siskiyou 

National Forest made rapid progress in containing these other fires. 

During the second burn period on the Collier Butte Fire, it grew rapidly inside the footprint of the 2002 

Biscuit Fire.

A Type 2 Team, the Oregon Interagency Incident Management Team #3, was ordered and took 

command of the Collier Butte Fire on August 6 at 6 a.m.

A Combination of Direct and Indirect Strategies Implemented

The Forest and the Incident Management Team selected a combination of direct and indirect strategies 

to protect values at risk and form a “catcher’s mitt” of north, west and south containment lines to stop 

fire spread in all of those directions.

The eastern portion of the fire, in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area, was also scouted for opportunities to 

establish containment lines. Indirect tactics were utilized, using—where feasible—previously 

constructed Biscuit Fire dozer lines and roads. Control lines were hand-fired and supplemented with 

aerial ignition to burn out fuels in unburned islands on the north, west and south portions of the fire.

Fuels on the east flank were pretreated and the fire’s spread was stopped with aerial retardant. 

Minimum Impact Suppression Tactics (MIST) were applied on the north, west and south flanks, as well 

as on contingency lines.

The Collier Butte Fire’s spread was successfully halted on August 24 at 11,800 acres.

Fire managers suggest that without rapid aggressive attack, the Collier Butte Fire would have continued 

burning for several more weeks—potentially doubling or tripling in size.

Burn out operation on the Collier Butte Fire on August 17.

Fire modeling suggests that without rapid aggressive attack, this fire would 

have continued burning for several more weeks—potentially doubling or 

tripling in size. Photo by Josh O’Conner. .
107

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1lPm2oi

Baldy Fire

On Saturday, August 1 at 5:19 p.m., the Baldy Fire was 

detected on the southwest flank of Mt. Baldy in the 

Abercrombie-Hooknose Inventoried Roadless Area on the 

Colville National Forest near Ione, Washington. While the fire’s 

ignition source remains unknown at this time, records indicate 

that the fire could be a “holdover” from storms that passed 

through the area in previous weeks. 

Values at risk on this fire included private lands; land managed 

by the Washington State Department of Natural Resources; 

Bonneville Power Administration transmission lines; a 

communication site; and threatened, endangered and sensitive 

species (bull and westslope cutthroat trout).

The Forest was under extended drought conditions and 

unseasonably warm weather was predicted for the next six 

weeks. Nationally, as well as in the Pacific Northwest Region, 

the Preparedness Level was 3. Locally, however, the Colville 

National Forest was at Preparedness Level 5. The Forest had 

just closed out the North Boulder 2 Fire which burned 232 

acres.

At the time the Baldy Fire was detected, the Colville National 

Forest had numerous small fires receiving Initial Attack. Numerous severity resources were in place to 

meet most of the local fire suppression needs. The Baldy Fire, however, was going to become 

problematic.

Potential to Become a Long-Duration Fire

Suppression efforts on these numerous small fires were challenged by steep terrain, limited access, lack 

of safety zones, heavy dead and down fuels, and a high Haines Index (unstable atmospheric conditions 

supporting large fire growth potential). With limited firefighting resources, a high reliance on aerial 

resources and difficult logistical challenges in supporting firefighting efforts, the Baldy Fire had the 

potential for becoming a long-duration fire.

The strategy and course of action sought to quickly contain the Baldy Fire at a small size to avert a 

potential two-month-long event that would likely grow to more than 17,000 acres—as modeled by Fire 

Behavior Analysts.

Due to significant hazards and access issues, Initial Attack efforts were largely limited to air resources—

which were unable to contain the fire. On August 2, the Washington Interagency Management Team #4 

was ordered. This team took command of the Baldy Fire the next day at 8 p.m.

With the aggressive fire activity and lack of safety zones and egress, no crews were engaged on August 

1-2 for direct attack. With the Incident Management Team transition, Type 1 and Type 2 Initial Attack 

Crews continued building contingency lines and scouting for direct attack opportunities.

Beginning on August 5, with smoke covering the area moderating fire conditions and snagging 

operations in place, direct attack tactics became feasible. The fire was successfully contained at 515 

acres with no additional fire spread occurring after August 8.

The Baldy Fire on August 1, the afternoon

it was detected.
108

Strategies were therefore employed

using relatively large numbers of firefighting 

resources for short periods of time

to halt fire spread, minimizing the potential 

impact on firefighting resource availability 

later in the fire season.

Summary

To avert long-duration fires, several of the 2015 

wildfires located in or adjacent to wilderness or 

roadless areas received aggressive suppression 

responses. The long-term drought and exceptionally 

hot dry summer created the concern in fire 

managers that these fires could be expected to burn 

deep into the wilderness areas and have the

potential to exit later in the summer and threaten 

adjacent communities.

These fires were also expected to require large 

numbers of firefighting resources for long periods of 

time, potentially exacerbating an expected shortage 

at the peak of the fire season.

Strategies were therefore employed which used relatively large numbers of firefighting resources for 

short periods of time to halt fire spread and then make those resources available for other new fires.

The peak mobilization for the 2015 fire season in the Pacific Northwest occurred on August 27. At this 

time, the following resources were assigned to wildfires in this Region: 256 Hand Crews and 877 Engines 

for a total of 12,468 firefighters assigned to wildfires.

Long before this peak in the need for firefighting resources occurred, all four fires discussed here—the 

Buckskin, Horseshoe, Baldy, and Collier Butte fires—had all been successfully turned back to local unit 

patrol status.

Fire Name Ignition 

Date

Preparedness

Levels

Cause Total Acres Ownership

at Origin

Location

Buckskin June 11 2, 2 Lightning 5,345 Forest Service Wilderness

Horseshoe July 3 3, 3 Lightning 340 Forest Service Wilderness

Baldy August 1 3, 3 Undetermined 515 Forest Service Potential 

Wilderness

Collier Butte August 2 3, 3 Lightning 9,105 Forest Service Wilderness

Addressing

Issues, Concerns, and Challenges

Competition for Resources

as the Season Continued

The strategies employed on these fires sought to 

rapidly contain the fires and then make firefighting 

resources available for new fires. 

Safety Hazards Associated with Wilderness

and Old Fire Scars

Snags and inaccessible, steep terrain were the 

common hazards needing mitigation in order to 

ensure safe suppression actions.

Unseasonable Weather/Drought Conditions

For most of these fires, the Forests were 

experiencing fire behavior uncharacteristic for the 

season. All four of these fires started in or adjacent 

to large, inaccessible wilderness areas with histories 

of long-duration wildfires. Many of the previous 

fires had encumbered large numbers of firefighting 

resources for weeks.
109

Appendix F – Wolverine Fire For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1Nly0R3

Due to Steep and Inaccessible Terrain, Initially,

the Wolverine Fire is Unsafe to Staff

June 29

Wenatchee Valley Rappellers

Inserted to Evaluate Fire

The Wolverine Fire, located in Washington State, is discovered near 

a ridgetop on a southwest facing slope in the Wolverine Creek 

drainage, south of Riddle Creek in the immediate proximity of the 

Glacier Peak Wilderness on the Okanogan-Wenatchee National 

Forest.

This lightning-caused fire is associated with thunderstorm activity 

that passed through the area the day before. Initial reports indicate 

that the fire is approximately one acre.

A member of the Columbia River Fire Crew wraps a structure in the Cottonwood 

Guard Station to protect it from the approaching Wolverine Fire. Photo by Kari 

Greer, U.S. Forest Service.

[Timeline narrative continues

on page 112.]

Wolverine Fire

Date of Ignition

June 29, 2015

Cause

 Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest

Responding Initial Attack Resources

One Type 1 Helicopter, One Rappel 

Crew

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 3

Local: PL 3

Acres Burned

72,123 Acres (as of 10/09/15)

Estimated Cost

$35,000,000 (as of 10/09/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest

Resources at Incident Peak

Crews: 26

Engines: 104

Water Tenders: 39

Helicopters: 7 Type 1, 5 Type 3

Structures Destroyed

4

Cooperators

National Park Service, Chelan County 

Sheriff's Office, Chelan County Fire 

Districts, Chelan County Public Works, 

Chelan County PUD, Chelan Fire and 

Rescue, Lake Wenatchee Fire and 

Rescue, Chelan County Public Lands, 

EMS Chelan Hospital, City of Entiat, 

City of Chelan, City of Leavenworth, 

Chelan County Commissioners, 

Washington State DOT, Washington 

State Department of Natural 

Resources, Washington State Patrol, 

Washington State EOC, Washington 

State Parks, Washington State Fire 

Marshal, Chelan Chamber of 

Commerce, Leavenworth Chamber of 

Commerce, Wenatchee Chamber of 

Commerce, American Red Cross
110
111
112

Initial Attack actions are initiated and access is made into the fire by the Wenatchee Valley Rappellers. A 

helispot is established and the rappellers are inserted to evaluate the potential for ensuring safe fire 

suppression actions. In addition, the rappel crew is supporting a Type 1 Helicopter making water drops.

June 30

Two Fires: Both Unsafe to Staff

The District Type 3 Incident Management Team takes command of the fire. Fire activity had begun to 

increase in the morning. The evaluation from the rappel crew to District Fire Staff and Line Officers was 

that the fire was unsafe to staff. There were two fires. Only the upper fire was accessible. The lower fire 

may have been a second lightning fire—or caused by roll-out from the upper fire. 

With fire below the rappel crew and no escape route or safety zones available from which crews could 

establish an anchor point, the decision is made to extract the crew and begin to monitor the fire—

looking for opportunities to safely engage in suppression operations. Additional water drops made by 

the Type 1 Helicopter had proved ineffective in suppressing the lower of the two fires. 

This Google Earth image shows why the location of the Wolverine Fire—on such extremely steep terrain—initially made 

it difficult and unsafe to staff with suppression resources.
113

July 1

Forest Service Road 3801 Identified

as Potential Indirect Fire Line

The District meets to start the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) process. Forest Service 

Road (FR) 3801 (also known as Railroad Creek Road) is identified as a potential holding feature for 

indirect fire line options for future use.

This road provides the only access to Holden Village and the Holden Mine Remediation Site.

The Zigzag Interagency Hotshot Crew and the Vale Interagency Hotshot Crew begin to prepare the road 

for possible firing or holding operations at a later date. 

July 2

Four Management Action Points Identified

The first WFDSS decision is published. (The WFDSS system assists fire managers and fire analysts in 

making strategic and tactical decisions for fire incidents.)

This initial WFDSS decision identifies four Management Action Points (MAP). These are clearly specified 

incident conditions that, when reached, prompt a predefined modification to existing fire management 

actions, or trigger the implementation of new strategies and/or tactics.
114

The Four Identified Management Action Points:

MAP 1

Lightning Creek – Action: Initiate structure protection at Lightning Creek Cabin.

MAP 2

Aerial Ignitions – Action: Initiate ignitions using Plastic Sphere Dispensers on the north aspect of Lightning 

Creek to maximize low and moderate intensity fire effects within the incident perimeter. (Definition: A 

Plastic Sphere Dispenser (PSD) is installed in the passenger compartment of a helicopter and dispenses 

plastic spheres out the door opening of the aircraft. The ingredients of these plastic spheres cause them to 

ignite approximately 20 to 30 seconds after dispensation. An operator controls the PSD from the back seat 

of the aircraft. A burn boss oversees burning operations from the front seat.)

MAP 3

Evacuation – Action: Initiate evacuation of the Holden Mine Remediation personnel, Holden Village 

personnel, and community of Lucerne. Prepare for ground firing operation along Railroad Creek Road (FR 

3801).

MAP 4

Holden Village – Action: Evacuate Holden Mine Remediation personnel and Holden Village personnel. 

Initiate structure protection plan for Holden Village and remediation assets.
115

July 3

Level 2 Evacuation

for Holden Village and Lucerne;

Level 3 evacuation for

Lightning Creek

The Chelan County Sherriff’s Office and 

the National Park Service’s North 

Cascades Unit issue a Level 2 Evacuation 

Notice (“Be Set to Evacuate”) for the 

communities of Holden Village, the 

Holden Mine Remediation Project Site, 

and Lucerne due to the potential threat 

to Lucerne and Forest Road 3801—

which is the evacuation route for 

Holden Village. Additionally, a Level 3 

Evacuation Notice (“Evacuate 

Immediately: Go”) was issued for the 

Lightning Creek Cabin and for three 

cabins at Riddle Creek.

In the days following these evacuation 

notices, practice evacuation drills are performed by both Holden Village and the Holden Mine 

Remediation Project employees. Coordination with the Lake Chelan Boat Company assists in developing 

the evacuation plan.

Wolverine Fire blow up. Photo by Steven Mortensen.

Holden Mine Remediation Site.
116

The Wolverine Fire was evaluated daily

for opportunities to safely engage

in suppression operations under conditions

which could lead to firefighting success.

July 4 through July 14

Arizona Type 3 IMT

Takes Command of Fire

The Arizona Type 3 Incident Management 

Team (AZ IMT) who was staged in the area 

takes command of the fire from the District 

Type 3 organization. The District Assistant 

Fire Management Officer for operations 

remains in contact with the Arizona team as 

a liaison/fire facilitator. 

The AZ IMT completed the preparation of 

Forest Road 3801 and established structure 

protection equipment and planning for the 

lakeside improvements, including: Riddle 

Creek cabins (National Park Service), 

Lightning Creek Cabin (private), and community of Lucerne (Lucerne Landing and Holden Village), as well 

as the mine Remediation Site and equipment.

This preplanning included the placement of pumps and hose, fuel mitigation, and the development of 

structure protection plans for these various locations.

Two additional lightning fires, Lightning Ridge and Tin Pan, were suppressed during the AZ IMT’s tenure. 

Additionally, the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest was engaged in active suppression of the 5,000+ 

acre Newby Lake Fire.

Discussion Held on Aerial Ignition and Firing Operation

Discussions with the District Line Officer and District Fire Staff were ongoing regarding the possibility of 

using aerial ignition on Lightning Ridge and holding the firing operation along Forest Road 3801. A joint 

decision was made that this was not the correct time to initiate this action and that the hand line from 

Lightning Ridge to Lake Chelan had a 50/50 chance of holding during an operation of this type.

Based on the July 12 perimeter mapping, the fire was located approximately 1.25 miles north of the 

MAP that would have triggered this action. Fire growth during the time period when the AZ IMT was in 

command was limited, averaging less than five acres per day (source: Fire Progression Map).

If successful, firing Lightning Ridge would have secured the southern perimeter of the fire from the 

community of Lucerne to Holden Village, but would have also required closing Forest Road 3801. This is 

the only road access into Holden Village and the Holden Mine Remediation Site. Such a closure would 

therefore have a negative impact on the operations at Holden Village and would have forced an 

evacuation of Holden Village and the Holden Mine Remediation Site, causing the remediation work to 

stop.

Sprinkler system established for structure protection at Holden Village.
117

July 13

The Blankenship Fire is detected and placed into monitoring status. (For Blankenship Fire location, see 

map on page 110.)

July 15 through July 26

The Arizona Type 3 organization times out and the District Type 3 organization once again takes 

command of the Wolverine Fire, monitoring this incident utilizing an aerial observer and both helicopter 

and boat reconnaissance.

Management Action Points were developed and actions continued to improve structure protection and 

prepare Forest Road 3801 for any future firing operations. The Wolverine Fire was evaluated daily for 

opportunities to safely engage in suppression operations under conditions which could lead to 

firefighting success.

July 27

Fire Activity Increases;

Potential for Uphill Run in Riddle Creek

Fire activity begins to increase as the weather begins to turn warmer and drier. The District’s 

Interagency Hotshot Crew and two Type 2 Initial Attack Crews were ordered for the fire.

Fire perimeters indicate that the fire had spread downslope into the headwaters of Wolverine Creek—a 

MAP for initiating structure protection for the Lightning Creek Cabin. The fire had also spread to the 

north and positioned itself into the bottom of Riddle Creek, setting the stage for a possible uphill run to 

the north.

July 27-29

Smoke Impairs Observation

of the Fire

Between July 27-29, smoke impairs 

observation of the Wolverine Fire. 

Due to this smoke, it was difficult to 

conduct aerial or boat-based 

observations of the fire. Infrared (IR) 

(a heat detection system used for fire 

detection, mapping, and hotspot 

identification) imagery was therefore 

used to provide the intelligence 

regarding the Wolverine Fire’s 

location.

Discussion between the Type 3 

Incident Management Team, District 

Line Officer, and Forest Supervisor 

led to the decision to notify personnel 

at Holden Village and Rio Tinto, the 

mine remediation contractor company, of a Level 3 Evacuation (“Evacuate Immediately: Go”). This 

decision was relayed via phone by the District’s Line Officer to the points of contact for the various 

affected organizations.

Rio Tinto had earlier requested that they be provided 48-hour notice regarding an evacuation to assure 

that it could be conducted in an orderly fashion. Personnel being evacuated from the Holden Village 

Aerial view of the Wolverine Fire on July 27. Photo by EvergreenSoaring.com.
118

area needed to be transported down-lake by boat. This logistical requirement would slow the final 

evacuation of personnel from the area.

While the Level 3 Evacuation Notice was made on the evening of July 29, the actual evacuation of 

personnel did not begin until the following day.

Wolverine Fire Size

(Source: Wolverine Fire Progression Map, August 18, 2015)

Date

Fire Size 

(acres)

Fire Growth 

(acres)

June 29 1

July 5 176 175

July 7 184 8

July 10 203 19

July 11 209 6

July 16 229 20

July 18 253 24

July 20 304 51

July 26 432 128

July 29 580 148

Between July 31 and August 1,

approximately 30 structures were saved

between Lightning Creek, Riddle Creek, and Lucerne.

Wolverine Resource Status

Incident Status Summary (ICS) 209 information was sporadic during the tenure of the Arizona Type 3 

Incident Management Team and the local District Type 3 organization. The ICS 209 reports indicate a 

total of 117 personnel assigned from July 4 through July 9 associated with four crews, one Type 3 

Helicopter, and miscellaneous overhead.

These ICS 209 reports indicate that critical resources were identified by the Type 3 organizations on the 

Wolverine Fire, including:

July 6 to July 7

2 Type 1 Crews, 2 Type 1 Helicopters, 1 Air Attack Platform for potential firing operations.

July 5 to July 6

(Same critical resources as previously assigned from July 6-7.)

July 4 to July 5

Type 1 Crews and 2 Type 1 Helicopters.

July 4

Type 1 Crews due to steep terrain and remote location.

[Note: While these resources were ordered, the orders were not filled due to local, 

regional, and national resource shortages during July and August 2015.]
119

Wolverine Fire Evolution

July 30 through August 3

July 30

Holden Village Evacuation Begins

The evacuation of Holden Village and Rio Tinto, the mine company contractor, personnel began with the 

extraction of 240 people. The remaining personnel would need to be removed from the fire area the 

next day. 

The Northern Rockies Type 2 Wildland Fire Management Team (WFMT) is ordered to the fire. The intent 

of this order was to complete a long-range management plan for the incident by providing expertise in 

strategic planning and obtaining enhanced expertise in firing operations. These skill sets were available 

to the Forest through this team. They assembled in Missoula with a report date of August 1.

July 31

Fire Activity Increases;

Spotting Distances Reported at One Mile

The remainder of the evacuation of Holden Village personnel is completed. Forest Service trail crew 

personnel and Rio Tinto personnel who had originally planned to remain in the community had a change 

of heart and were evacuated from Holden Village using an agency helicopter.

Photo taken on August 1 from Holden Village shows the approaching Wolverine Fire.

Photo by Mario Isaias-Vera.
120

Fire activity increased substantially in the afternoon and remained active into the night. Spotting 

distances were reported up to one mile. A spot fire was observed in Lightning Creek.

Two Type 1 Helicopters were ordered in an attempt to check the spread of these spot fires—thus, 

providing time to complete evacuations at Holden Village. By 8 p.m., a spot fire was reported on the 

south side of Forest Road 3801, spreading toward Domke Lake. 

Successful Burn Out Operation Saves Community of Lucerne

As the fire approached Lucerne, structure protection equipment established by the Arizona Type 3 

Incident Management Team was staffed by crews in the Lucerne area. A burn out operation led by 

Forest Service crews and supported by six fire line-qualified personnel from Pool Engineering were 

successful in protecting all structures in the community. The pre-positioning of equipment and 

personnel in Lucerne was critical to the overall success of this portion of the operation.

In the Domke Lake area, five structures were lost. Structure protection had not been established prior to 

July 31. The limited access into the Domke Lake area precluded the rapid deployment of firefighting 

resources. The caretaker at the Domke Lake Resort took refuge in a boat on the lake. (This individual 

also did so during the 2007 Domke Lake Fire.) The caretaker had previously evacuated his guests and 

was the only person present at the resort.
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For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1lPmzqt

August 1

Fire’s Rapid Growth Requires a Level 1 Complexity

The Wolverine Fire made a substantial run today—growing by more than 12,000 acres. The Northern 

Rockies Type 2 Wildland Fire Management Team was in-briefed. At the same time, the Forest 

recognized that—with this fire’s rapid escalation—it was now an incident of (increased) Type 1 

complexity.

The Northern Rockies Type 2 Wildland Fire Management Team received a Delegation of Authority from 

the Forest and was able to support the Type 3 organization by inserting a Division Supervisor into 

Holden to facilitate structure protection needs. This action provided operational support for the “point 

protection” of values along the shores of Lake Chelan. It also facilitated the development of two incident 

bases to support the perceived needs of the incoming Type 1 Incident Management Team.

Between July 31 and August 1, approximately 30 structures were saved between Lightning Creek, Riddle 

Creek, and Lucerne.

August 2

Focus Remains on Protection of Homes 

The Northern Rockies Type 2 Wildland Fire Management Team was in command of the incident with 

members of Pacific Northwest Team #2, and the incoming Type 1 Incident Management Team.

Focus remained on point protection and development of the logistical support structure needed for a 

large-scale fire suppression operation. The Type 3 organization had transitioned out of any management 

role.

A contentious public meeting is held in Chelan with the public questioning why the Wolverine Fire had 

not been suppressed weeks earlier. The general feeling from those in attendance was that the Forest 

Service had been negligent in its response to the fire.

The incoming Type 1 Incident Commander informed that the fire had a potential of spreading south as 

far as 25 Mile Creek, 15 miles from the fire’s current location.

August 3

PNW Team #2 to Manage

Wolverine and Blankenship Fires

The Northern Rockies Type 2 Wildland Fire Management Team remains in command.

The Pacific Northwest Team #2 is in-briefed and begins “shadowing” this team. Their comprehensive inbrief package from the Forest included a Delegation of Authority to manage the Wolverine and 

Blankenship fires.

The Blankenship Fire started on July 13 and was in monitoring status at approximately 170 acres.
122

Wolverine Fire Size

(Source: Wolverine Fire Progression Map, August 18, 2015)

Date

Fire Size 

(acres)

Fire Growth 

(acres)

July 30 1,526 946

July 31 3,714 2,188

August 1 15,760 12,046

August 2 - -

August 3 24,480 8,720

Resource Status

Resources assigned for this time period are not indicated on the available ICS 209s.

Common critical resource needs identified were: Type 1 Crews (2), Type 2 Initial Attack Crews (2), and a 

Wildland Fire Module.

Wolverine Fire Evolution

August 4 through August 20

August 4

Wolverine Fire Now Threatens

Community of Stehekin

When the Pacific Northwest Team #2 takes command, the Wolverine Fire is rapidly growing in different 

directions with limited control on any portion of the incident.

Point protection was in place for values at risk along the shore of Lake Chelan and for the communities 

of Holden Village, Lucerne, and the Holden Mine Remediation Site.

The current Wolverine Fire threat was to the community of Stehekin, located to the north of the current 

fire perimeter. Stehekin is accessible by aircraft or boat only from the Lucerne landing on Lake Chelan.

Two natural features were identified as partial barriers to the fire to prevent spread to the north. The 

Operations Section Chief selected the Castle Creek drainage and committed crews to construct indirect 

fire line and a firing operation to secure the Wolverine Fire’s north flank.

Additionally, the Type 1 Incident Management Team began operations to open fuel breaks that were 

established during the 2004 Deep Harbor Fire. While these control features were approximately 13 to 14 

miles south of the current Wolverine Fire perimeter, they were deemed necessary to protect 25 Mile 

State Park as well as 40 to 50 structures located along South Shore Drive near the community of Chelan.

August 5

Type 1 IMT also Takes Command of the Goode Fire

The second WFDSS Decision is published. The Type 1 Incident Management Team takes command of the 

Goode Fire in North Cascades National Park. This was an inactive fire that had been staffed and 

contained by eight smokejumpers and a Type 4 Incident Commander.
123

Potential conflicts with aviation management between the Goode Fire and Wolverine Fire at Stehekin 

Airport were identified as the rationale to include the Goode Fire under the management of the Type 1 

IMT.

August 6

Incident Command Post Moves from 25 Mile Location to Chelan Falls

Because communications, crew movement, and general logistical support proved to be ongoing issues at 

the 25 Mile Incident Command Post (ICP), the Pacific Northwest Team #2 makes the decision to move 

the incident base from 25 Mile south to Chelan Falls.

This move to Chelan Falls removed the ICP from any hazard associated with the fire moving to the south 

and also enhanced transportation routes and general logistics on the fire. The Incident Management 

Team also had been delegated Initial Attack responsibilities from the Forest. The new Chelan ICP 

location better supported the need to redeem this Initial Attack responsibility.

August 7

Development of Strategic Plan for Firing

to Protect Holden Village and Remediation Site

Planning begins for a multiday firing operation in the Railroad Creek drainage to secure the structures, 

equipment, and infrastructure in Holden Village and at the Remediation Site. Based on observed and 

predicted fire behavior, the use of direct suppression actions were considered—but determined to be of 

high-risk to firefighter safety.

The use of retardant and water was also evaluated, but was considered to have a low probability of 

success. Therefore, the decision to implement a strategic firing operation was considered the option 

with the greatest probability of success and was vetted with Forest staff and involved stakeholders.

Successful completion of this firing operation expedited the strategic objectives of securing Holden 

Village and the Remediation Site and also facilitated the reentry of the residents of Holden Village and 

the Rio Tinto mine company staff. 

August 8-11

Community of Stehekin is Protected;

Fire Spreads to West; Lightning Forecasted Later in Week

Indirect fire line, completed and fired out from Castle Creek, secures the northern portion of the 

incident and provides protection to the community of Stehekin. However, during this time period, the 

fire finds a pathway to spread westerly, burning approximately 7,300 acres. While there were no values 

at risk immediately identified to the west, this expansion repositioned the fire to allow for movement to 

the south, eventually threatening the communities of Plain and Leavenworth.

On August 10, the North Cascades National Park takes the Goode Fire back from the Type 1 IMT. The 

Blankenship Fire remains in monitor status after being evaluated by a Forest Service Hotshot 

Superintendent who reported that only through the use of “heavy-handed” suppression tactics could 

the Blankenship Fire be contained. Because the fire had not displayed significant movement and was 

primarily contained in rock scree and riparian drainages, the decision was made to not undertake such a 

tactic.

On August 11, the Fire Weather Forecast calls for lightning later in the week. No formal preplanning for 

this weather event is undertaken by the IMT at this time.
124

August 14

Thunderstorm Starts New Fires

At approximately 5:30 a.m., a thunderstorm begins to impact the Wolverine Fire area. While this storm 

produced minimal effect on the Wolverine Fire, it proved to highly impact the Type 1 IMT with Initial 

Attack fires in the Chelan area. From the Incident Command Post, two fires could be seen. The smoke 

column from the Antoine Fire was also visible over a ridge.

That morning, an estimated 600 firefighting personnel were mobilized from the Wolverine Fire to 

support new fires on Bureau of Land Management and Chelan County jurisdictions. The fires supported 

included: First Creek, Antoine, McFarland Creek (originally Squaw Creek), Black Canyon, Reach and 

Cagle.

Operations personnel took the lead on Initial Attack suppression command working with the Chelan Fire 

District and Chelan Sheriff’s Department to provide structure protection, perimeter control, and 

evacuation support.
125

August 15

Pacific Northwest Team #2 Manages New Fires—

Along with the Wolverine and Blankenship Fires

The Pacific Northwest Team #2 receives a multi-agency delegation to manage the new fires in the 

Chelan area. This delegation covered the Reach, Antoine, Cagle, First Creek, McFarland, and Black 

Canyon fires—while also retaining command of the Wolverine and Blankenship fires.

August 16-20

Suppression Actions Focus On

Securing Holden Village and Forest Road 3801

The Pacific Northwest Team #2 was required to split its team attention between the new fires that 

eventually became the Chelan Complex and command of the Wolverine Fire.

Actions were focused on securing Holden Village and Forest Road 3801 to ensure that access could be 

provided to the Holden Mine Remediation Site and the Level 3 Evacuation could be lifted.

The Wolverine Fire burns toward Lake Chelan on August 12. Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service.
126

Work also continued to secure improvements along the shoreline of Lake Chelan. However, because the 

fire was not able to be stabilized to the point where public safety could be assured, the evacuations and 

closures remained in place. 

Transfer of command to the Southwest Area Incident Management Team #1 occurred at 6 a.m. the 

following morning, August 21.

Wolverine Fire Size

(Source: Wolverine Fire Progression Map, August 18, 2015, ICS 209s)

Date

Fire Size 

(acres)

Fire Growth 

(acres)

August 4 25,635 1,155

August 5 - -

August 6 26,614 979

August 7 27,400 786

August 8 28,725 1,325

August 9 - -

August 10 - -

August 11 36,030 7,305

August 12 37,010 1,093

August 13 37,792 782

August 14 38,793 1,001

August 15 39,989 1,196

August 16 40,357 368

August 17 40470 113

August 18 40,904 434

August 19 42,876 1,972

August 20 45,929 3,053

Resource Status

Resources assigned to the incident varied during this time period with lend/lease of resources occurring 

with the Chelan Complex and other fires managed by this Incident Management Team.

At the peak of activity, the maximum number of resources assigned included:

 16 Crews (all types)

 20 Engines

 4 Dozers

 7 Water Tenders

 571 Overhead

Ten aircraft were assigned to the fire including 2 Air Attack Platforms, 4 Type 1 Helicopters, 1 Type 2 

Helicopter, and 3 Type 3 Helicopters.

No fire retardant was used on either the Wolverine or Blankenship fires as steep slopes and dense canopy 

prevented retardant from being effective unless ground personnel could be deployed to support the drops.
127

August 21

Transfer of Command

Occurs on Wolverine and Blankenship Fires

Transfer of command of the Wolverine and 

Blankenship fires occurred on the morning of 

August 21 to Templin’s Southwest Area Type 1 

Incident Management Team.

This IMT was also delegated command of the 

Chelan Complex. The Wolverine Fire was just 

coming out of a Red Flag Warning for strong winds 

the previous night. The fire, once again, was 

actively spreading.

On August 21, the fire enters the headwaters of the 

Entiat River. This requires a strategic multi-agency 

planning effort for the protection of improvements 

in the Entiat Valley (see photo on next page). This 

planning effort was evaluating communities as far 

south as Leavenworth and Plain.

The Southwest Area IMT was also managing the 

active First Creek Fire and Chelan Complex while 

fire activity was also increasing on the Wolverine 

Fire.

August 22

Fire Spreads into Entiat Valley; Structure Protection 

Actions Implemented in Stehekin

The fire spreads into the Entiat Valley. There is a 

need to contain a fire “slop-over” in the Castle 

Creek area on the north end of the fire that has a 

potential to impact the community of Stehekin. 

Structure protection preparation actions were 

ongoing in Stehekin.

Critical resource needs begin to appear on the 

IMT’s Incident Status Summary (ICS) 209 reports, 

which—at this point in time—was: “Type 1 and 

Type 2 Initial Attack Crews and Overhead”.

Completed segment of Community Protection Line along Chiwawa 

Road near Twin Lakes, Washington. Photo by 

Lakewenatcheeinfo.com.

The Wolverine Fire is actively spreading on August 24.

Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service.
128

This photo, taken on August 31, shows Entiat Valley homes saved from the Wolverine Fire.

Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service.

August 23-24

Fire Places New Communities

and Infrastructure at Risk

Fire continues to spread down the Entiat Valley—moving as far as 1.5 to 2 miles during an operational 

period—placing new communities and infrastructure at risk.

An evacuation and closure plan is in the development stage for the Entiat Valley. The Forest expands its 

closure area. Structure protection is established at Silver Falls. In addition, structure protection 

actions/mop-up continues to finally secure the communities of Holden Village and Lucerne.

August 25-26

Community Protection Begins for Plain and Entiat Valley

Action begins on the development of Community Protection Lines for Plain and the Entiat Valley. This 

work is south of the main fire and required the coordination of District and Forest Resource Specialists 

as substantial “logging” practices needed to be implemented to create the shaded fuel break that would 

serve as a potential fire control feature for these communities.

Level 1 Evacuations—“Be aware of the situation: BE READY”—were in place for the Potato Creek area 

and Level 2 Evacuations—“Be Set to Evacuate”—were in place for Plain to Preston Creek, representing 

approximately 209 structures.
129

Critical needs on the ICS 209s begin to list specialized equipment to conduct this operation, including: 

feller-bunchers, processors, various masticators, as well as Heavy Equipment Bosses and other mid-level 

overhead positions.

August 27

Still Need Specialized Equipment

to Conduct Necessary Suppression Operations

Efforts remained focused on construction of the Community Protection Lines and with staffing the point 

protection needs at various locations along the Wolverine Fire’s perimeter.

The critical needs list from the ICS 209 still indicates the need for specialized equipment to complete the 

work associated with these lines. While the fire remained active again during this day, a weather 

forecast for rain was issued.

August 28 – September 7

Residents Return to Lucerne and Holden Village;

Rain and Snow Occurs on September 6

A significant weather change influenced the fire area during this time period. The first measurable rain 

for the fire area was reported on August 28. While this rain slowed fire spread, it was not deemed to be 

a season-ending event. Work therefore continued to construct indirect and Community Protection Lines 

to ensure that if the warmer/drier conditions returned, these strategic control features would be 

complete.

Planning for the repopulation of Lucerne and Holden Village began during this time period. Employees 

of Rio Tinto, the mine company contractor, and Holden Village were allowed back into the area for 

assessment of their property and equipment while a greater area closure remained in effect.

On September 1, the California Type 1 Incident Management Team #5 takes command of the Chelan 

Complex.

A reduction in the evacuation levels occurred on September 2 in the Potato Creek and Plain areas. Work 

continued on the development of the Community Protection Lines, with specialized equipment 

remaining a “Critical Need” identified on the ICS 209s.

Additional rain and snow influenced the fire area on September 6. The Entiat to Sugarloaf portion of the 

Community Protection Line was complete while operations on the Sugarloaf to Twin Lakes area were 

ongoing.

On September 8, the Rabe Type 2 Incident Management Team assumed command of the fire.
130

Wolverine Fire Size

(Source: ICS 209s)

Date

Fire Size 

(acres)

Fire Growth 

(acres)

August 21 49,570 3,641

August 22 52,001 2,431

August 23 53,571 1,570

August 24 59,956 6,385

August 25 61,069 1,110

August 26 62,167 1,098

August 27 64,776 2,609

August 28 64,940 164

August 29 64,940 -

August 30 64,940 -

August 31 64,940 -

September 1 65,275 335

September 2 65,275 -

September 3 65,275 -

September 4 65,275 -

September 5 65,275 -

September 6 65,275 -

September 7 65,275 -

[Note: Fire size on October 6, 2015 was 

listed as 65,512 acres and was not 

expected to grow any larger.]

This photo, taken on 

August 31, shows 

how suppression 

protection efforts 

helped to save the 

community of 

Holden Village from 

the Wolverine Fire. 

Photo by Kari Greer, 

U.S. Forest Service.
131

Resource Status

Resources assigned to the Wolverine Fire varied during this time period with lend/lease of resources 

occurring with the Chelan and Okanagan Complexes.

At the peak of fire activity, the maximum number of resources assigned included:

 26 Crews (all types)

 104 Engines

 23 Dozers

 39 Water Tenders

 7 Type 1 Helicopters

 5 Type 3 Helicopters
132

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1XxBLEh Appendix G – Corner Creek Fire 

Aggressive Initial Attack Actions

The Corner Creek Fire was ignited by 

lightning on Monday June 29, at 

approximately 3:17 p.m. near the 

Black Canyon Wilderness Area 

border on the Ochoco National 

Forest. The fire was located 

approximately 11 miles south of the 

community of Dayville, Oregon. 

Two days prior, the nearby Sugarloaf 

Fire had ignited. On the same day 

that the Corner Creek Fire started, 

the Blue Basin Fire also ignited to the 

west inside the John Day Fossil Beds 

National Monument and the 

Schoolhouse Gulch Fire started on 

private land to the north.

By July 1, these three fires—the Sugarloaf, Schoolhouse Gulch, and 

Blue Basin—totaled approximately 5,200 acres. All three fires were 

managed by the Oregon Department of Forestry Type 1 Incident 

Management Team #1. Their Incident Command Post was located in 

Dayville.

The Corner Creek Fire, now 6,000 acres in size, was added to this 

IMT’s workload on July 1.

Suppression Actions and Challenges

The Initial Attack was aggressive on the Corner Creek Fire with a Type 

3 Incident Commander, 2 Interagency Hotshot Crews, 1 Type 2 Crew, 

1 Dozer, 3 Engines, 3 Helicopters, 1 Very Large Air Tanker, and 3 

Heavy Air Tankers. 

While Air Attack was not immediately available, Corner Creek Fire 

incident reports indicate the deployment of 1 Very Large Air Tanker 

(shown in photo above), 3 Heavy Air Tankers, 3 Single Engine Air 

Tankers, and 3 Helicopters through July 1.

Key Objective: Prevent Damage to Private Property

The fire exhibited notable wind-driven runs to the south and west.

A key management objective was to prevent damage to private 

property, both ranches and residences.

Initial Attack resources completed a dozer line around the private Rock Pile Ranch—which was located 

directly in the fire’s path. Initially, a total of four residences and their outbuildings were threatened. 

Ranchers had already turned out their livestock onto their summer range allotments. They now had to 

move their animals out of the approaching fire’s path.

Corner Creek Fire

Date of Ignition

June 29, 2015

Cause

 Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

U.S. Forest Service

Responding Initial Attack Resources

2 Type 1 Hotshot Crews, 1 Type 2 

Crew, 1 Dozer, 3 Type 6 Engines, 3 

Helicopters, 1 Very Large Air Tanker,

3 Heavy Air Tankers,

1 Type 3 Incident Commander

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 3

Local: PL 3

Acres Burned

29,660 Acres 

Estimated Cost

$12,800,000

Land Jurisdictions

Ochoco National Forest, Bureau of 

Land Management, private

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 999

Crews: 34

Engines: 47

Helicopters: 17

Structures Destroyed

1 Trailer

Cooperators

Oregon Department of Forestry, 

Bureau of Land Management, Crook 

County, Grant County, U.S. Forest 

Service

A Very Large Air Tanker (a DC-10 

jet) prepares to drop a load of 

retardant on the Corner Creek Fire 

on June 30, the fire’s second day. 

Photo by Todd McKinley.
133
134

Management Objectives

The Corner Creek Fire was 

managed as a 100 percent 

suppression operation.

Incident managers focused on 

keeping the fire west of the 

South Fork of the John Day 

River (a designated Wild and 

Scenic River). Their objective 

was to prevent the fire from 

entering the “High Priority” 

sage-grouse habitat to the 

southwest.

The John Day watershed 

contains bull trout and 

anadromous fish that required 

caution when using retardant 

near waterways.

The fire also spread into the 

Black Canyon Wilderness, 

requiring Hotshot Crews to 

perform suppression actions.

Red Flag Warnings

and Inversions

The weather was not 

favorable for early 

containment of the Corner 

Creek Fire. The July 2 weather 

forecast predicted thunderstorms and winds out of the north at 12 mph, with gusts up to 25 mph.

Firefighters faced hot temperatures, low 

relative humidity, very dry fuels, and gusty 

winds that often led to Red Flag Watches 

as well as Red Flag Warnings.

When the inversion (shown on left) lifted, 

a pyrocumulus cloud developed that 

resulted in wind/terrain-driven fire runs. 

(A pyrocumulus cloud, also known as a 

“fire cloud”, can produce dry lightning 

and, with its strong winds, can function as 

a firestorm.)

The Corner Creek Fire continues to burn under an inversion. Photo 

taken on July 3 by the Oregon Department of Forestry.

Recent Fuel Treatment Areas

Helped Firefighters Control

the Corner Creek Fire Growth

Recent fuel treatments on the Ochoco National Forest and Prineville Bureau of Land 

Management District likely helped prevent the Corner Creek Fire’s spread.

“Places that were treated had better fire effects, mostly low intensity and just 

burning grass and dead stuff below the timber,” explained Type 3 Incident

Commander Jeff Priest. “These treated areas also helped our holding efforts—while 

the untreated areas caused us more control problems.” 

A recent U.S. Forest Service briefing paper helped to confirm that these previous 

fuel treatments were very effective in helping firefighters control the growth of the 

Corner Creek Fire.

“It really reduced the amount of fuel that the fire had to burn,” said Patrick Lair, 

Public Affairs Specialist with the Ochoco National Forest. “The intensity of that fire 

dropped way down in those places. That really gives firefighters the ability to go in 

and put in a direct line. In other words, they can get in front of it.”

The paper “Fuel Treatment Effectiveness on the Corner Creek Fire” (Hallmark and 

Romero 2015) concluded that prior fuel treatments contributed to the safer, more 

effective control of the fire. The report also confirmed that these prior fuel 

treatments minimized damage to natural resources and improved ecological 

outcomes. 

The suppression efforts on the Corner Creek Fire exemplify the effort required to 

prevent a wildfire from entering “High Priority” sage-grouse habitat.

While 89 percent of the acreage burned on this fire occurred during the fire’s first 

six days, these existing fuel treatments—in combination with aggressive fire 

suppression, sufficient resources, and moderating weather—contributed to the 

containment of the fire outside critical sage-grouse habitat.
135

This image shows the change in the Corner Creek Fire perimeter over the 

course of six days—burning more than 26,000 acres.

The Black Canyon Wilderness is the high ground to the north.

The South Fork of the John Day River is the valley to the right.

The “High Priority” sage-grouse habitat is located to the left of this image.

This image of the landscape shows the Corner Creek Fire perimeter (in red) at 1 a.m. on July 5

compared to the fire’s perimeter approximately 48 hours earlier (in white).

Image courtesy of Bill Gabbert, Wildfire Today.
136

Corner Creek Fire Resources

Date Acres

Percent

Contained Personnel Crews Engines Helicopters

Cost to

Date

Jul. 1 6,000 0 75 3 3 0 $100K

Jul. 2 7,500 0 168 7 3 0 $600K

Jul. 3 14,500 0 434 18 16 0 $1.1 

Million

Jul. 4 19,232 5 621 26 24 0 $1.7

Million

Jul. 5 19,450 10 779 30 34 0 $2.0

Million

Jul. 6 26,414 15 796 30 41 1 $3.1

Million

Jul. 7 26,517 15 845 32 43 0 $4.3

Million

Jul. 8 27,166 40 866 32 47 7 $6.4

Million

Jul. 9 27,166 40 866 32 47 7 $6.4

Million

Jul. 10 29,407 60 999 34 38 12 $10.6

Million

Jul. 11 29,407 70 804 26 25 17 No data

Jul. 12 29,407 75 510 14 15 17 $11.2

Million

Jul. 13 29,407 80 334 8 11 2 $12.0

Million

Jul. 14 29,407 80 334 8 11 2 $12.0

Million

Jul. 15 29,407 85 120 0 9 2 $12.4 

Million

Jul. 16 29,407 85 101 0 9 2 $12.1

Million

Jul. 17 29,407 90 97 0 9 2 $12.0 

Million

Jul. 18 29,407 90 124 1 9 2 $12.2

Million

Jul. 19 29,657 90 168 3 9 2 $12.3

Million

Jul. 20 29,657 90 160 3 7 2 $12.4

Million

Jul. 21 29,660 90 160 3 7 2 $12.6

Million

Jul. 22 29,660 95 104 2 3 0 $12.8

Million

Areas shaded in green represent the highest resource numbers.

(Note: Air Tanker resources are not mentioned in the ICS 209 daily reports.)
137

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlylmN Appendix H – Newby Lake Fire 

The lightning-caused Newby Lake Fire (named Arnold Peak on the 

original Incident Status Summary [ICS 209]) started on July 2 at 

approximately 3 p.m.

The fire originated in Canada and burned into the United States 

onto Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest lands.

A British Columbia Wildfire Service release issued at 7 p.m. on the 

fire’s first day stated: “B.C. Wildfire Service initially sent Air 

Tankers and an Initial Attack Crew by helicopter, but 

unfortunately, neither were able to action the fire due to fire 

behavior, crew safety, and the lack of achievable objectives.”

If Fire Managers Decide to Suppress Fire – Could Need Type 1 Crew

The ICS 209 on July 2 showed 115 acres (one-half of the total 

acres, split between the U.S. and Canada). It further stated: “Fire 

managers are discussing whether to monitor or suppress this fire 

at this time.” Weather Concerns noted on this ICS 209: “Red Flag 

Warnings for winds and low relative humidity for the next several 

days . . . Moderate fire spread is possible with current weather 

pattern.”

Additional ICS 209 notes included: “No threats at this time due to 

remote location. Could potentially need Type 1 Crew if fire 

managers choose the suppression route. No resources assigned at 

this time.”

Newby Lake Fire

(Originally known as the “Arnold 

Peak Fire” from 7/2-7/4. On 7/21 

renamed “Newby Lake Long Draw 

Fire”.)

Date of Ignition

July 2, 2015

Cause

Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

British Columbia, Canada

Responding Initial Attack

2 Air Tankers and Initial Attack 

Crew with Helicopter

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 3

Local: PL 3

Acres Burned

“Newby Lake Fire”: 5,065 Acres

“Newby Lake Long Draw Fire”: No 

additional Acres

Estimated Cost

“Newby Lake Fire”: $7,282,432

(as of 7/19/15)

“Newby Lake Long Draw Fire”: 

Projected Final Estimate: $500,000

(as of 7/26/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Okanogan-Wenatchee National 

Forest; Washington State 

Department of Natural Resources; 

British Columbia, Canada

Resources at Incident Peak

Crews: 12

Engines: 17

Helicopters: 13

Structures Destroyed

0

Cooperators

U.S. Forest Service, Washington 

State Department of Natural 

Resources, British Columbia’s 

Ministry of Forest Lands and 

Natural Resources Operations, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, 

Canada’s Border Services Agency

The Newby Lake Fire on July 2, the day it is reported.

Photo taken from a British Columbia Air Tanker.
138
139
140

July 3

The Friday July 3 ICS 209 showed the fire’s 

acreage had increased by 10 acres. Similar

notes about Red Flag Warnings were included 

in this ICS 209.

A conference call was held on this day hosted 

by British Columbia Fire Management 

regarding the management of the Newby Lake 

Fire. Representatives from the OkanoganWenatchee National Forest’s Fire Management 

Staff and the Washington State Department of 

Natural Resource’s Northeast Region were on

this call.

It was agreed that the U.S. Forest Service 

would take no action and the Canadians would 

engage in suppression and monitoring to 

prevent fire spread that would further 

threaten United States’ lands.

Also on July 3, the U.S. Forest Service 

completed a FSPro run and a Near Term Fire 

Behavior run. The FSPro output demonstrated 

a less than 20 percent probability of the fire 

spreading to the south. The Near Term Fire 

Behavior model output showed the potential 

for fire spread into Long Draw and the next 

drainage to the east—considering the 

forecasted wind.

That evening, an email from the British 

Columbia Wildfire Service provided an update 

and indication that while resources working 

the fire had been reassigned, plans were to 

continue suppression the next day.

This email also indicated no fire movement to 

the south or east.

July 4

Fire Becomes Active

The next day, July 4, the Tonasket Ranger 

District assigned three fire personnel to hike 

into and recon the area south of the fire.

On this day, the fire became active. (The fire 

also became known as the Newby Lake Fire.)

Notable Successes

No Injuries

No lost-time injuries occurred on this incident. 

Coordination Between Air and Ground Resources

Excellent coordination occurred on this fire between air 

and ground resources to check fire spread and allow fire

line construction to progress safely. 

Coordination Between DNR and USFS

Communications and coordination between the 

Washington State Department of Natural Resources and 

U.S. Forest Service Resource Advisors was effective in 

meeting overall objectives. 

Successful Operational Planning

Operations resources continually evaluated their PACE 

(Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) model and 

were therefore prepared to take advantage of favorable 

weather conditions which presented on July 10-11. 

Successful Cross-Border Coordination

Aircraft and line personnel crossing the Canadian border 

went remarkably well—validating the wisdom of the 

Northwest Compact Agreement and British Columbia and 

Northwest United States Wildfire Response Border 

Arrangement. 

The Incident Management Team was able to establish

operations within Canada on short notice and worked with 

B.C. Forestry and Border Officials, which allowed for 

smooth international operations. 

Throughout the fire, there were successful cross-border 

flights of cargo, crews, communication equipment, and 

recon. This was largely due to the agreements and 

processes already in place by the Okanogan-Wenatchee 

National Forest, Washington DNR, and other federal 

agencies, along with their Canadian counterparts. 

New Technology

The increased use of new technology (iPad visual displays, 

Dropbox file sharing, Collector GIS inputs, E I-Suite and 

visual projections for meetings) proved to help and 

enhance the overall management of this fire. 
141

Also on this day, July 4, the National Weather Service in Spokane issued a Red Flag Warning for strong 

northerly winds associated with a dry cold front. At 11:58 a.m., the Canadians sent an update via email 

advising that the fire was being staffed and indicated no threat of fire spread to the east or south.

Based on the Red Flag Warning and 

potential safety concerns, the three

Tonasket Ranger District personnel 

discontinued their ground recon and 

returned to the trailhead at 5 p.m.

The ICS 209 submitted that evening 

noted: “Red Flag Warnings for winds 

and low relative humidity for the next 

several days. Warm and dry conditions 

lingering over area well into next week. 

Cold front and subtle winds peaking 

overnight. North component winds for 

the next several days.”

July 5

Fire Enters United States’ Lands

The next day, Sunday July 5, "MODIS”

detection indicated possible fire spread to the south and east, outside of the Arnold Peak Basin area. 

(“MODIS” “Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer” is satellite-detected data.) MODIS also 

indicated that there was much fire activity in Canada.

At 1 p.m. during a recon flight, the Tonasket District Fire Management Officer confirmed that the fire 

had escaped the Arnold Peak Basin and was established in upper Long Draw.

Canadians Unable to Staff Fire

At 4:11 p.m., the Canadians sent an email advising that the fire had moved south. Due to other higher 

priority fire activity they were experiencing, they said that they were unable to staff the Newby Lake 

Fire.

At this time, the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) decision was completed (not published 

until 7/6/15 1 p.m. CST). A discussion about incident complexity and management direction occurred 

with: the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest Duty Officer, the acting Tonasket District Ranger, the 

District Fire Management Officer, and the Washington State Department of Natural Resources’ 

Northeast Highlands District Manager.

U.S. Fire Managers Order a Type 2 IMT

The recommendation was made to order a Type 2 Incident Management Team. Washington Team #2, 

on standby in Cashmere, Wash., was assigned. They took command of the fire at 6 p.m. the next day. 

The Newby Lake Fire on July 4.
142

July 6

Fire is Torching and Spotting –

Threatening Loomis State Forest

The first ICS 209 filed by Washington Team #2 

the evening of July 6 noted: “Fire spread by 

group torching and spotting. Also, lateral 

spread down Long Draw when wind and slope 

align.”

The fire had spotted in or near the Loomis State 

Forest. Concerns for potential revenue losses 

were noted. Scouting and establishment of 

primary control lines were a strategic objective. 

Resources assigned to the fire included: 1 Type 

2 Hand Crew, 5 Helicopters, and 45 Overhead—

for a total of 173 personnel.

July 7

By the evening of July 7 the fire had covered 

1,347 acres. Some progress with direct line 

construction had been accomplished. Threats 

to critical lynx habitat in the Loomis State 

Forest were a major concern. Replacement 

commercial timber acreage would have to be 

designated to replace any damaged by the fire 

to ensure preservation of adequate lynx 

habitat. Resources assigned now included: 4 

Type 2 Hand Crews, 7 Helicopters, 2 Engines, 4 

Dozers and 1 Water Tender—for a total of 250 

personnel.

July 8

Forecast Calls for Hot, Dry Weather

and “Abundant” Lightning

The July 8 ICS 209 reported the fire at 2,510

acres. Active fire behavior—with 3⁄4 mile 

spotting—was occurring in heavy, downed 

fuels. The weather forecast called for hot, dry 

weather (20 degrees above normal) the next 

day, with a Fire Weather Watch for abundant 

lightning the day after that.

Active fire suppression actions now included 

the utilization of old fire lines from the 2006 

Tripod Fire area, along with indirect hand line, dozer line construction, and use of helicopter buckets to 

slow fire spread. Resources included: 4 Type 1 Hand Crews, 4 Type 2 Hand Crews, 11 Helicopters, 2 

Engines, 4 Dozers, 3 Water Tenders, and 125 overhead—for a total of 367 personnel.

By the evening of July 10, the fire was at 5,065 acres in the United States. Forecasted weather called for 

cooler, moister conditions including afternoon showers becoming wetting rain. 

Issues, Concerns, and Challenges

International Border Issues – Success Story

Dealing with the issues related to an international border 

were noted in ICS 209s and the Executive Summaries by 

both IMTs who managed the Newby Lake Fire. Crossing an 

international border increases complexity on an incident,

adding additional processes and procedures with U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection and Canada Border 

Services. The Team Liaison Officer established relationships 

with the agencies and all worked cooperatively to resolve 

these challenges. Once the process was established, fire 

personnel flew back and forth without issue and the Team 

considered it a success story.

Wilderness Fire Challenges and Concerns

The fire included wilderness “Minimum Impact Suppression 

Tactics” (MIST) in some areas and full suppression tactics in 

other areas. Wilderness fire suppression creates a variety 

of issues and concerns for firefighter safety. In some places, 

steep ground with limited access and beetle-killed standing 

and downed fuel made direct fire line construction difficult 

and unsafe. Establishing adequate EMS staffing and support 

(including extrication) in large roadless areas creates 

logistical challenges for an IMT. 

Safety Zones

Significant fire behavior and limited early access in 

Extended Attack reduced the resources’ ability to rapidly 

establish safety zones for short periods. Ground resources 

made effective use of “the black” (previously burned areas)

for safety. 

Problems with Communications

Communications were limited due to poor reception 

associated with steep, dissected terrain. This situation 

made contact between the Incident Command Post and the 

fire lines difficult—including during periods of high fire 

activity. Satellite phones were few and their reception was 

spotty due to topography. 
143

Resources now included: 6 Type 1 Hand Crews, 4 Type 2 Hand Crews, 5 Helicopters, 12 Engines, 5 

Dozers, and 7 Water Tenders—for a total of 544 personnel.

As Washington Team #2 timed out, Pacific Northwest Team #3, a Type 1 Incident Management Team, 

assumed command of the fire at 6 a.m. on July 13. Reduced fire behavior due to the wet weather 

allowed the team to focus on direct attack tactics—which proved to be successful. The fire size did not 

change on subsequent updates and ICS 209s.

On July 21, the fire was renamed the Newby Lake Long Draw Fire and was assigned a Washington State 

Department of Natural Resources incident number. The fire size did not change on subsequent updates 

and ICS 209s.The final InciWeb update on August 7 noted that aerial ignition of an interior island of 

unburned fuel was to be implemented.

Summary

The Newby Lake Fire managers experienced international and interagency decision challenges during its 

initial few days.

Canadian officials communicated that no response was needed from the United States, but were unable

to staff the fire as intended.

A forecasted cold front caused the fire to become active and enter the United States. Once an Incident 

Management Team was assigned, the incident was managed with well-defined objectives.

Washington Team #2 was pre-positioned which led to a smooth and efficient transition to command. 

The incident command transitioned to a Type 1 IMT. Weather played a significant role in the mitigation 

of this wildfire.
144

Appendix I For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1QqMDSY – Stouts Creek Fire

The Stouts Creek Fire burning on July 30, the day it was first reported. Within its first 12 

hours, the fire burned more than 5,000 acres.

On the early afternoon of July 30, 11 miles east of Canyonville near 

the community of Milo in southern Oregon, an individual using a 

lawn mower allegedly ignited a fire on private lands protected by the 

Douglas Forest Protective Association.

Within the first 12 hours, the fire had burned more than 5,000 acres 

and spread onto Umpqua National Forest lands. Initial Attack efforts 

were hindered by extreme weather (Haines 6, low humidity, 

temperatures more than 100 degrees) and fire behavior associated 

with plume-dominated fires that included crown fire, rapid/intense 

fire runs, and long-range spotting. Steep terrain and very dry fuels

added to this fire’s suppression complexity.

Throughout the Stout Creek Fire’s early duration, 640 residences and 

five commercial properties were threatened in the communities of 

Milo, Tiller, Azalea, Drew and Upper Cow Creek. A total of 120 people

were either evacuated or placed into temporary shelters. Other 

values threatened by the fire included important infrastructure 

(communication towers, transmission lines) as well as forest and 

natural resources (U.S. Forest Service buildings and one campground,

northern spotted owl habitat and coho salmon habitat). 

Stouts Creek Fire

Date of Ignition

July 30, 2015

Cause

 Human

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Private

Responding Initial Attack Resources

7 Crews, 17 Engines, 4 Helicopters

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 2

Local: PL 2 

Acres Burned

26,452 Acres (as of Sept. 23)

Estimated Cost

$38,000,000 (as of Sept. 23)

Land Jurisdictions

Oregon Department of Forestry, 

Bureau of Land Management, U.S. 

Forest Service

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 1,900

Crews: 66

Engines: 53

Helicopters: 16

Structures Damaged or Destroyed

None

Cooperators

Bureau of Land Management, Oregon 

Department of Forestry, U.S. Forest 

Service, Douglas Forest Protective 

Association, American Red Cross, Days 

Creek Rural Fire Department, Douglas 

County Public Works, Oregon National 

Guard, Douglas County Sheriff’s Office,

Government of The Northwest 

Territories, Government of The Yukon, 

local timber companies, Milo Rural 

Fire Department, National Weather 

Service, Office of the State Fire 

Marshal, Oregon Department of 

Corrections, Tiller Rural Fire 

Department.
145
146

When the Stouts Creek Fire ignited, the National 

and Local Preparedness Levels were both at 

Level 2. At this same time, 104 active fires were 

burning across the nation with 10,541 

firefighting resources assigned. Within the 

Stouts Creek Fire’s local Geographic Area 

Coordination Center’s domain, 15 fires were 

active—with three large fires burning 

uncontained.

Fire Transferred to a Joint Command

With the challenging fire weather and fire 

behavior quickly resulting in a fire that grew to 

more than 5,000 acres in size that is threatening 

structures, the Stouts Creek Fire was quickly 

transferred from a local Type 3 Incident 

Management Team to a Joint Command 

between the Oregon Department of Forestry 

(ODF) Incident Management Team #1 and the 

Oregon Office of State Fire Marshal (OSFM) 

Team. This transfer of command occurred on 

the fire’s second day, July 31.

The Emergency Conflagration Act for this 

incident had been requested by Douglas County 

and was invoked by the Governor of Oregon.

(This Act enables the Office of the State Fire 

Marshal to assist and support the Oregon fire 

service during major emergency operations.) 

The OSFM Team operated under an agreement

from the Oregon State Fire Marshal for structures within rural fire districts and Douglas County for 

unprotected structures. The ODF Team #1 operated under an agreement from the Forest Supervisor, 

Umpqua National Forest, along with a Letter of Direction from the Bureau of Land Management District 

Manager, Roseburg District.

Initial Attack Actions

The Initial Attack actions on the fire’s first afternoon included 7 crews, 17 engines, and 4 helicopters. In 

addition, local industry equipment was utilized under an equipment group. The plan was to establish 

anchor points at the fire’s heel and begin flanking operations. At the same time, residents were being 

evacuated and mapping and structure protection with structural task forces and sheriffs were being 

implemented.

On August 3 the Unified Command was expanded to include the Incident Commander of the Portland 

National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) Team to address a more significant involvement of 

federal lands on this incident.

Control lines continued to be built and burn out operations were implemented as needed. Twice, 

control lines were breached with fire running upslope from below. While these events required 

additional suppression work and new fire lines, both times these “slop-overs” were successfully 

contained.

Issues, Concerns, and Challenges

Haines 6 at Fire’s Peak

Significant Uphill Fire Runs – Topography and weather 

events aligned that resulted in fast, intense uphill fire runs 

that challenged fire suppression efforts.

Steep Terrain

Abundant, Dry Fuel 

Structures Threatened – 640 residences and five 

commercial properties.

Number of Agencies Involved – Multiple land 

owners/managers and various involved agencies added to 

this fire’s complexity. Good communication and support 

from the agencies and industry was invaluable.

Resources Reassigned to Other Priority Fires – 16 Hand 

Crews were reassigned to other fires with greater threats 

to life and communities by the Pacific Northwest MAC 

Group on August 16.

Opportunities for the Oregon Department of Forestry to 

Integrate Incident Management Teams – The Oregon State 

Fire Marshal Team and a U.S. Forest Service NIMO Team 

Incident Commander joined with the ODF Team to address 

all jurisdictional issues. 
147

Successful Structure Protection

On August 8, after determining that 

structure protection benchmarks had been 

successfully met, the State Fire Marshal’s 

Team was demobilized. Incident 

management continued with mitigation 

and various defensible space activities 

completed. In addition, a structure 

protection plan was implemented for both 

the assigned wildland resources and 

county fire agencies, with two Structure Task Forces available from Douglas County if needed.

On August 10, sole command of the fire was taken by the Oregon Department of Forestry Incident 

Management Team #1. On August 13, the fire was transferred to a Unified Command of Oregon 

Department of Forestry Incident Management Team #2 and Incident Commander, U.S. Forest Service.

During this command, a very difficult 3,500-acre burn out operation was conducted. The entire 51 miles 

of the fire’s control lines were strengthened and held. At this time, with three of the four western 

regional Geographic Area Coordination Centers (GACCs) at Preparedness Level 5, resources were pulled 

from the Stouts Creek Fire. On August 16, 16 Contract Crews were pulled from the Stouts Creek Fire and 

reassigned to higher priority fires in the Pacific Northwest. Despite the reduction of more than 300 

firefighters, the Incident Management Team adjusted and was successful in completing these difficult 

firing operations.

On August 24 at 6 p.m., command of the Stouts Creek Fire was transferred to a Florida U.S. Forest 

Service Type 3 Incident Management Team. Fire lines continued to be secured and mop-up proceeded,

resulting in containment on September 23.

Notable Successes

Agency Administrators and Representative Involvement –

Agency Administrators made themselves available and 

provided excellent assistance.

Utilization of Resources Advisors – The use of Resource 

Advisors (READS) up front on this fire that ensured the 

early identification and protection of various sensitive 

resources was key to this incident’s success.
148

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1QqMsap Appendix J – National Creek Complex

Introduction

A lightning storm that passed to the north through southwestern 

Oregon on August 1 ignited the three fires that would become 

the National Creek Complex.

The National Fire started on the Rogue River-Siskiyou National 

Forest. The Crescent and Crescent 2 fires, located approximately 

one mile east of the National Fire, started in Crater Lake National 

Park. All three fires were designated full suppression incidents—

100 percent containment was the management objective.

The fires also received Initial Attack suppression responses by 

their respective jurisdictional agencies. The initial Incident Status 

Summary, ICS 209, on August 4 noted: “Fires expected to burn 

together due to limited containment, steep terrain, and 

continuous fuels.”

Initial and Extended Attack – August 1-6

National Fire

On August 1, the smoke from the National Fire was seen and 

reported by personnel on another fire in Crater Lake National 

Park.

That evening, two overhead and one 10-person Hand Crew 

responded to the fire’s reported location. They were unable to 

locate the fire. The following day, a Type 4 Incident Commander 

and a contract Type 6 Engine returned to the area.

The Incident Commander hiked into the fire from below and 

observed 12-15 acres with an active perimeter burning. Due to 

the lack of safety zones, escape routes, and lookout locations in 

rugged terrain, the Incident Commander did not engage his 

resources.

Trees and rocks were rolling off cliffs making it hazardous to work 

below the fire. The objective, therefore, became to locate and 

open a road to provide access to the fire.

A request was made to the Medford Interagency Communication 

Center (MICC) for five crews: 2 Type 1 Crews, 1 Type 2 Initial 

Attack Crew, and 2 Type 2 Crews. However, resource availability 

was limited due to the many other lightning fires that were also 

burning in the area (82 new fires in the Pacific Northwest—60 of 

them in Oregon) on the first two days of August.

On August 4, the National Fire’s third day, a Type 1 Helicopter 

was used to drop water to help check the fire’s growth. On this 

day, an Interagency Hotshot Crew was inserted into the National 

Fire and began line construction to contain the fire. 

National Creek Complex

(Three Fires: National Fire, Crescent 

Fire, and Crescent 2 Fire)

Date of Ignition

August 1, 2015

Cause

Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Crater Lake National Park, Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest

Responding Initial Attack Resources:

National Fire – Type 4 Incident 

Commander, Type 6 Engine,

10 Firefighters

Crescent and Crescent 2 Fires – Type 

4 Incident Commander, Type 2 Initial 

Attack Hand Crew

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 3

Local: PL 3

Acres Burned

20,960 Acres (as of 9/30/15)

Estimated Cost

$22 million (as of 9/30/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Crater Lake National Park, Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest, 

Umpqua National Forest

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 1,041

Crews: 17

Engines: 28

Helicopters: 8

Structures Destroyed

0

Cooperators

Crater Lake National Park, Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest, 

Umpqua National Forest, FremontWinema National Forest, Oregon 

Department of Transportation, 

Jackson County Sheriff's Office, 

Douglas County Sheriff’s Office, 

Douglas County Emergency Services, 

and Diamond Lake Homeowners 

Association
149
150
151

Lightning strikes that occurred from August 1 through August 2 in the vicinity

of the Crescent and National fire origins are in shown in the red box.

Crescent Fire

During the August 1 lightning storm, the Crater Lake National Park 

Fire Management Officer observed nine fire ignitions—including the 

Crescent and Crescent 2 fires.

A Type 4 Incident Commander and a Type 2 Firefighter hiked into the 

Crescent fires and completed a partial recon of the incident before 

dark (see photo on next page).

A Type 2 Initial Attack Hand Crew was requested, but was not

available until the next day. Smokejumpers were ordered and were 

over the fire at 5:31 p.m. They reported that the Crescent Fire was 20 

acres and had combined with the adjacent Crescent 2 Fire. Due to 

fire behavior and size relative to the capacity of six smokejumpers, 

they did not jump the fire and were reassigned to another fire. 

Additional resources that were ordered by the end of this shift: 2 

Type 2 Initial Attack Crews, 1 Base Camp Manager, 1 Falling Module, 

and 1 Long Term Analyst. A Helicopter and Crew and Water Tender 

would be shared with other fires in the Park. National Fire on August 5. Photo by the 

Type 4 Incident Commander.
152

The Crescent Fire on August 1, approximately two hours after ignition.

Photo taken by the Type 4 Incident Commander during his hike into the fire.

August 2

On August 2, the Type 4 Incident Commander returned to the fire. He reported 27 acres of active fire 

with group tree torching and one-quarter mile spotting in heavy fuels in and adjacent to the fire.

At 1:37 p.m. the fire’s command was transferred to a Type 3 Incident Commander, who arrived with the 

Type 2 Initial Attack Hand Crew. The Hand Crew engaged the fire until dark and remained on the fire

overnight.

The Type 3 Incident Commander stated that fire behavior was the most severe he had observed in 

Crater Lake National Park. All airborne embers were igniting spot fires with lichen/moss embers from 

torching tree canopies being a specific problem.

August 3

On August 3, during a helicopter recon flight, the Type 3 Incident Commander shoots a short video of 

the National and Crescent fires (see photo on next page). Early that afternoon, the Crescent Fire was 

reported as 38 acres, 10 percent lined with the following resources engaged: 1 Type 2 Initial Attack Hand 

Crew, 1 set of Fallers, and 1 Type 3 Incident Commander Trainee. The last report that day stated the fire 

was 43 acres and 15 percent contained.

August 4

On August 4, a Type 3 Helicopter was used to make bucket drops to support suppression efforts. 

By that evening the Crescent Fire was 50 acres and 50 percent lined. 
153

Image from the video taken by the Crescent Fire’s Type 3 Incident Commander

during the August 3 recon flight.

August 5

At 7:34 p.m. on August 5, it was reported that a 25 percent increase in the fire’s size occurred on the 

fire’s south flank.

August 6 – Command of the Two Fires Joined Together

The command of the Crescent Fire and the National Fire was now joined together. Command of the 

Complex was transferred to the Type 2 Northern Rockies Wildland Fire Incident Management Team, 

who in-briefed at 9 p.m.

August 6-12

The National Fire, located below the Crescent Fire, was aligned with a drainage that made it a threat to 

burn into the Crescent Fire. This potential created a concern for firefighter safety and prompted a 

prioritization for containment of the National Fire. This containment was accomplished on August 9, 

with the National Fire at approximately 120 acres. Hand line, supplemented by a hose lay, had been 

successfully implemented on most of the fire’s perimeter.

Crescent Fire Behavior Remains Active

Meanwhile, fire behavior remained active on the Crescent Fire. The ICS 209 submitted the evening of 

August 8 noted: This afternoon the fire spotted across the completed line on the north side of the 

Crescent Fire, then made a run to the east/northeast compromising the previously completed line and 

percent of containment.
154

Fire size grew steadily from 145 acres on August 6 to 1,216 acres on August 11. The fire was approaching 

Highway 230 north of Crater Lake National Park. The Oregon Department of Transportation closed the 

highway due to smoke.

Extremely dry fuels made prolific spotting a significant factor in fire spread and suppression difficulty. 

The incident’s Fire Behavior Analyst noted a maximum spotting distance of 1.5 miles. Airborne embers 

of lichen/moss from torching and crowning trees were a significant contributor to this problem. Litter 

and duff would burn between jackpots of dead and down larger fuels with enough intensity to cause reburns of scorched canopy. This resulted in pockets of crown fire in the interior of the fire area.

Type 1 Incident Management Team Takes Command

On August 9, with fire behavior remaining active and fire growth continuing, an order was placed for a 

Type 1 Incident Management Team. By that evening, the National Creek Complex had burned 515 acres.

Over the next three days, it would grow another 1,500 acres. 

On August 12 at 6:30 a.m., Pacific Northwest Team #3, a Type 1 Incident Management Team, took

command of the National Creek Complex. By that evening, the Complex had grown to 2,020 acres. 

Infrared perimeter images on August 6 at 7:32 p.m.

The National Fire (on left) is 74 acres.The Crescent Fire (on right) is 132 acres.
155

The Crescent Fire on August 8.

August 13

Successful Firing Operation

By mid-day on August 13, successful suppression actions were taken on the spot fires that crossed Highway 

230. A 2.3-mile burn out operation was completed. 

This firing operation was supported in the evening using a swing shift of resources to take advantage of night 

conditions. The operation made good daily progress, moving along Highway 230 to a constructed dozer line 

that connected to Highway 138, then south on the Crater Lake National Park north entrance road through the 

Park to the Pumice Desert. The operation was completed on August 21.

Spot fires across this Park entrance road were aggressively suppressed; the largest one burned one-half acre.

These actions put the spread of the fire to the north in check.

Limited Suppression Options Inside Crater Lake National Park

The National Park is managed to protect wilderness values and natural and cultural resources. Minimum 

Impact Suppression Techniques (MIST) were required. This limited suppression options within the Park 

boundary. The chosen control route for the north control line was based on the probability of success, coupled 

with a shortage of needed resources to achieve fire management objectives.

To the north, control lines utilized Highway 230 and dozer lines on the Umpqua National Forest. Lack of 

resources, specifically Type 1 and Type 2 Initial Attack Crews, hindered direct containment actions on the fire’s 

southern perimeter. Indirect line was prepared using roads, dozer and hand line on the west perimeter in 

preparation of burning—when conditions allowed.
156

August 23-September 2

Oregon Team #4, a Type 2 Incident Management 

Team, received a transition order to the National 

Creek Complex at noon on August 21. 

They shadowed Pacific Northwest Team #3 on 

August 23 and took command of the Complex at 

6 p.m. that evening. At this time, the Complex 

had burned a total of 10,883 acres. Due to the 

regional and national demand for resources and 

the successful mitigation of threats to high 

values (Diamond Lake Resort Lodge and facilities, 

private cabins and federal campgrounds) on the 

National Creek Complex, the Complex was now 

at a lower priority in the Pacific Northwest 

Region. 

Theater of Operations Approach

In response to the reduced resource allocation 

priority, a Theater of Operations approach was in place for the southwest Oregon area. The concept was 

a lend/lease arrangement to utilize adjacent Initial Attack resources for staffing operations on the 

National Creek Complex. These resources would be released for higher priority missions, specifically 

Initial Attack. An estimated 75 percent of the resources working on the National Creek Complex were 

obtained through this lend/lease arrangement.

Moderating weather allowed for the reconsideration and implementation of indirect contingency lines 

on the National Creek Complex’s west flank. Over the next several shifts, a combination of roads, 

direct/indirect dozer line and hand line allowed burn out operations to secure the west fire perimeter.

During this period, the original National and Crescent fires were connected by fire.

Further discussions between Agency Administrators and the Incident Commander occurred to validate 

strategies and tactics and priorities for the Complex’s south flank. Strategy and tactics shifted to a direct 

approach, utilizing a combination of natural barriers and Minimum Impact Suppression Tactics (MIST) to 

secure the fire perimeter from the southwest corner near National Creek to the Bald Crater Loop Trail. 

Rain and strong winds delayed continued efforts from the Bald Crater Loop Trail to the Boundary Springs 

Trail.

Another Transfer of Command

Oregon Team #4 managed the National Creek Complex until the morning of September 2 when the 

South Central Oregon Fire Management Partnership Type 3 Team took command. The Complex now 

covered 15,458 acres.

September 2-22

On September 2 when the Type 3 IMT took command, The National Creek Complex was still active in all 

seven divisions, including a significant amount of interior burning. Incident objectives were unchanged. 

Indirect fire line options were developed for the Minnehaha Drainage on the northwest corner of the 

fire. This line was completed and interior perimeters of fire edge were engaged with engines and 

helicopter drops. The rest of the western perimeter was contained with direct and indirect line from the 

previous IMT. No additional firing operations were done by the Type 3 IMT.

Firing operation conducted by the Pacific Northwest Team #3.
157

Suppression Actions Inside Crater Lake National Park

Approximately 95 percent of the fire’s southern perimeter was located inside the Park. Minimum Impact 

Suppression Tactics (MIST) continued to be utilized on these lands. Some discussion and debate

occurred between the Agency Administrator and the IMT regarding the degree of suppression action 

needed.

The Type 3 IMT established “trigger points” for action if the fire became more active. 

Southern Flank Becomes Active

On September 9, the southern flank became active. The Type 3 IMT established an Air Operations 

position and ordered Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATs) to make water drops. The next day, additional 

resources included a full load of Smokejumpers, Air Attack, six Helicopters, and three SEATs with 

“fugitive retardant”. (“Fugitive retardant” is designed to fade, losing the dye color and, thus, is used in 

wilderness and sensitive viewsheds). The Smokejumpers were added to a Wildland Fire Module on the 

southwest perimeter to secure Helispot H-25 and hot spot to the west to tie-in with fire line at the Park 

boundary.

At 7 a.m. on September 22, the command of the National Creek Complex transferred to a Crater Lake 

National Park Type 4 Incident Commander.

September 29-October 21

A Type 3 Helicopter and two Wildland Fire Modules remained on the Complex to support suppression 

activities. On September 29, this staffing was reduced to one Wildland Fire Module to monitor and

patrol the fire. This Module remained engaged on the fire through October 4 when the staffing was 

reduced to local resources.

Interior burning was still occurring when the final ICS 209 was submitted on September 30. This last ICS 

209 reported the National Creek Complex at 20,960 acres. The fire was declared contained on October 

21.
158

Observations by

Initial and Extended Attack Incident Commanders

• Large number of ignitions for limited resources. Most fires were successfully suppressed.

• Containment of National Fire mitigated concerns for firefighter safety on Crescent Fire.

• There were no reportable injuries.

• Good interaction with Park Superintendent. Agency Administrator/Representative interaction 

was a key to success.

• Swing shift was used effectively for ignition and holding of indirect perimeter lines. 

• Dropping back to significant road systems facilitated rapid and effective containment line 

development.

• Being allowed to construct a dozer line on national forest land between Highways 230 and 138 

reduced fire footprint, the risk to Diamond Lake, and provided a fallback should firing operations 

have failed. 

• Air Operations had two notable successes. The first was the outstanding lend/lease cooperation 

of aviation resources that developed among different administrative units. The second was—at 

a critical period—the Fremont-Winema National Forest was able to provide a Helicopter and an 

aerial Plastic Sphere Dispenser machine (aerial firing equipment) and operator. Additionally, an 

Air Tactical Group Supervisor was available for assignment when needed. 

• Incorporated a “Theater of Operations” approach to conducting business where sharing of 

resources was a common theme. 

Observations by

Oregon Team #4, Type 2 Incident Management Team 

• Approximately 75 percent of the resources available to work on the Complex’s objectives were 

utilized on a lend/lease basis. Coordination with adjacent agencies in a “Theater of Operations”

approach.

• A daily Agency Administrator/Representative face-to-face meeting with the Incident 

Commander provided a good forum to bring up any emerging issues and to discuss future plans 

and options.

• Agency representatives for Crater Lake National Park and the High Cascades Ranger District of 

the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest were readily accessible and responsive. Good working 

relationship with Crater Lake National Park Superintendent.

Observations by

South Central Oregon Fire Management Partnership, Type 3 Incident Management Team

• 100 percent containment of the Complex was an objective from the start. The public had been 

told all along that was an incident objective—and it was accomplished.

• Use of aerial delivered firefighters—Smokejumpers—was a key tactic to containing the south

perimeter. That resource kept an important Helispot from being burned over and lost. Use of 

two Interagency Hotshot Crews completed the southeast indirect containment.

• Coordination and cooperation with other ongoing fires allowed for the lend/lease of resources. 

This increased efficiency and made resources available that were not coming from resource 

orders. 

Notable Successes
159

• Use of Single Engine Air Tankers with water and fugitive retardant contributed to containment 

objectives.

• For future reference, the Broken Arrow Campground at Diamond Lake is a good Incident 

Command Post facility for incidents in this area. 

• Rotation of Incident Management Team personnel through days-off worked well as the Team’s

assignment exceeded 14 days. 

Observations by

Initial and Extended Attack Incident Commanders

• Crescent Fire: Had to hold up operations over safety concern of National Fire moving toward 

Crescent Fire. This contributed to the loss of containment on the Crescent Fire.

• National Fire: Steep, rugged terrain, lack of access and limited resource availability due to 

numerous new fires delayed containment of this fire.

Observations by other National Creek Complex Incident Commanders

• Difficulty mitigating safety issues, specifically medevac capacity.

• Availability of resources was an issue. Priority work on the fire’s north and west sides (threats to 

structures at Diamond Lake) tied-up available resources, which were mostly via lend/lease.

National Creek Complex Summary

• The National Creek Complex became the largest fire in the recorded history of Crater Lake 

National Park.

• Record low snowfall accumulation preceded the fire season. Fire Danger Indices were at the 90th

percentile levels with associated fire behavior challenges.

• Initially, the two primary fires experienced delays in staffing. The lightning storm of August 1 

ignited numerous other fires which placed demands on Initial Attack resources. Other ongoing 

and emerging incidents in the Pacific Northwest Region were a higher priority.

• The National Creek Complex was managed by a series Incident Commanders and Incident 

Management Teams over a two-month period.

• Resource Advisors were assigned, present, and engaged. 

• Firing operations utilizing two state highways, a dozer line constructed on the Umpqua National 

Forest to connect the highways and the north entrance road to Crater Lake National Park 

completed indirect containment of the Complex on the north and east perimeters. Threats to 

the highest priority values at risk were mitigated by this indirect line construction and firing 

operation on the north. These values included the Diamond Lake resort and related businesses, 

Diamond Lake RV Park, private cabins, several federal campgrounds, and other buildings.

• A combination of roads, direct and indirect dozer and hand line with firing secured containment 

on the west perimeter. The south perimeter was contained in the Park with mostly hand line 

using MIST tactics. The containment efforts followed the order of priorities set in the incident 

objectives for the duration of the incident.

Issues, Concerns and Challenges 
160

For Interactive Map:

Appendix K – Cougar Creek Fire http://arcg.is/1QqdTRL

Fire Danger Indices at Historic High Levels

When Cougar Creek Fire Ignites

The lightning-caused Cougar Creek Fire is reported shortly after its 

ignition at 9:20 p.m. on August 10, 2015 on the eastern slopes of 

Mount Adams near Cougar Creek in Washington.

Based on initial reports, it is not certain if the fire is located on Yakama 

Nation Tribal lands or Washington State Department of Natural 

Resources lands. Both agencies mobilize personnel and equipment in 

an attempt to locate and access the fire utilizing a series of 

unmaintained timber sale roads.

The Energy Release Component (ERC)—a measurement of fire danger 

indices—at the time of ignition is at or near historic high levels based 

on the Signal Peak Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS) which 

is located 12 miles east of the fire’s point of origin. (See graph above.) 

During the previous week, the daytime temperatures had been in the 

low to mid 90s at the fire location.

August 11

Initially, Crews Not Able to Engage the Fire

The Cougar Creek Fire is finally accessed the next day at 4 a.m. It is 

reported by the Initial Attack Crew as being 40 acres in size with longrange spotting and short crown runs occurring.

Cougar Creek Fire

Date of Ignition

August 10, 2015

Cause

Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Yakama Agency

Responding Initial Attack Resources:

1 Crew, 3 Engines, 1 Dozer, 2 

Helicopters. Resources were available 

for extended attack beginning Aug. 

12, including: 7 Crews, 11 Engines, 1 

Dozer, and 2 Helicopters.

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 4

Local: PL 4

Acres Burned

53,539 Acres (as of 11/17/15)

Estimated Cost

$23,500,000 (as of 11/17/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Yakama Agency

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 568

Crews: 14

Engines: 26

Helicopters: 6

Structures Destroyed

0

Cooperators

Bureau of Indian Affairs, Yakama 

Fire, U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of 

Land Management, National Park 

Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service, Washington State 

Department of Natural Resources

This graph from the Signal Peak Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS) 

shows how the Energy Release Component (ERC)—a measurement of fire danger 

indices—is at near historic high levels when the Cougar Creek Fire ignites.
161
162

The fire is burning at 6,200 feet in a very dense stand of non-commercial timber. Pockets of lodgepole 

pine and spruce mortality, along with heavy dead and down, are providing fuel for the fire.

While the Type 2 Hand Crew is able to access the fire location that morning, they are not able to engage 

the fire as no solid anchor point can be established and fire behavior easily exceeds the threshold of 

control for an unsupported hand crew.

Type 3 Incident Command Structure Established – Protection of Communities Top Priority

As daylight allows for an improved fire assessment, it is determined that the fire is located exclusively on 

Yakama Nation Tribal lands. Yakama Fire establishes a Type 3 Incident Command structure for the fire.

Working with their partners on the Gifford Pinchot National Forest and the Washington State 

Department of Natural Resources (DNR), a full fire suppression strategy—using a combination of direct 

and indirect attack to minimize fire size—is initiated. The protection of the communities of Glenwood 

and Trout Lake is established as the highest suppression priority as northerly winds drove the fire 

toward these communities.
163

Extensive Economic Loss to the Yakama Tribe

Westward expansion of the Cougar Creek Fire 

is expected to be limited by natural barriers 

including lava flows, the 2012 Cascade Creek 

Fire’s burned area, and the slopes of Mount 

Adams. 

However, fire expansion to the north and east 

would threaten and eventually damage 

commercial timber on Yakama Nation Tribal 

lands, leading to extensive economic loss for 

the tribe.

Fire Outpaces Capabilities of Firefighters

On August 11, a Red Flag Warning is issued for 

the fire area until 11 p.m. for abundant 

thunderstorms and potentially strong down 

drafts. Between 5 a.m. and 4 p.m., strong 

north to northeast winds gusting between 10 

to 18 mph are recorded at the nearby Signal 

Peak RAWS as the fire continues to outpace 

the capabilities of firefighters. 

On August 11, both Large and Very Large Air 

Tankers as well as a Type I and Type 3 

Helicopter are utilized in an attempt to halt 

fire spread. However, active fire behavior and 

a dense canopy cover limits the success of these aerial firefighting resources.

Engine resources are assigned to the communities of Glenwood and Trout Lake while a DNR Dozer and a 

Type 2 Crew attempt to establish fire line on the fire’s south flank using a series of existing 

unmaintained roads.

By late afternoon, the decision is made to order a Type 2 Incident Management Team—requested to 

take command of the Cougar Creek Fire the next day at 6 a.m.

August 12

Fire Behavior Still Prevents Direct Attack – Suppression Strategy

Focuses on Saving the Glenwood and Trout Lake Communities

The Washington Incident Management Team #5 takes command of the fire at 0600 hours.

Direction from the decision published in the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) is to keep 

the Cougar Creek Fire at the smallest possible size while considering firefighter and public safety and to 

utilize natural barriers, old fire scars, and existing road systems to assist with fire containment. The 

Incident Management Team is directed to use direct attack where safe and possible. However, fire 

continues to threaten local communities and fire behavior continues to exceed the threshold in which a 

direct attack strategy can be successful.

Washington State DNR Ahtanum Hand Crew member during night 

operations on the Cougar Creek Fire outside of Glenwood, 

Washington shortly after the fire began. Photo by Amber Arbanas.
164

Therefore, the Incident Management 

Team focuses on securing the fire’s 

southern perimeter to isolate the 

communities of Glenwood and Trout 

Lake, located approximately six miles 

south of the fire. A Level 1 Evacuation 

notice (“Be aware of the situation: BE 

READY”) is issued for the area north of 

the community of Glenwood.

West winds and a Haines Index 5 (indicating 

significant instability in the atmosphere and a 

high fire growth potential) are encouraging 

large fire growth. By early afternoon, the 

Cougar Creek Fire has spotted across the Aiken 

Lava Bed into the 2012 Cascade Creek Fire

area.

An imminent threat exists to the historic 

Gotchen Cabin, a Gifford Pinchot 

National Forest guard station that was built in 1909 (see photo above). By the end of the day shift on 

August 12, the cabin had not been affected by the fire.

Fire Grows to 9,400 Acres with No Containment Date

The Cougar Creek Fire continues to burn westward through grasses and heavy downed fuels, including 

through large piles of fuels from previous timber harvests and untreated residue from suppression 

actions on the 2009 Cold Springs Fire. These jackpots of fuel contribute to the ongoing spotting issue. 

At the end of this day, August 12, the fire is 9,400 acres with no containment shown on the incident 

briefing map for the August 13 day shift. Hazardous snag conditions and the lack of appropriate 

resources, in particular Type 1 and Type 2 Initial Attack crews, preclude the Incident Management Team 

from staffing a night shift for the duration of their assignment. The evening Incident Status Summary ICS 

209 indicates a critical need for one Type 1 Crew and one Air Attack Platform.

August 13 and 14

Fire Grows to 21,800 Acres

By 8 a.m. on August 14, the Cougar Creek Fire has grown to 21,800 acres. While the southern expansion 

of the fire has slowed, reducing the threat to the local communities, a Level 1 Evacuation remains in 

place for the structures located north of Glenwood.

Westward fire spread has been stopped by natural barriers including the slopes of Mount Adams, lava 

flows, and both the 2012 Cascade Creek and 2009 Cold Springs fire’s previously burned areas.

However, the fire has started to spread to the north into commercial timber lands of the Yakama Nation.

While the WFDSS management direction speaks to minimizing fire size, the Incident Management Team 

is unable to engage in direct attack due to intense active fire spread and the lack of appropriate 

resources.

Firefighters wrap the historic Gotchen Cabin, built in 1909 on the Gifford Pinchot 

National Forest, to protect this structure from the approaching Cougar Creek 

Fire. This protective material is special aluminized structure wrap.

Photo courtesy U.S. Forest Service.
165

Indirect Tactical Approach Leads to Timber Loss on Yakama Tribal Lands

The indirect tactical approach used by the Incident Management Team is focused on improving existing 

roads and implementing firing operations. This strategy, while appropriate for the resources assigned, 

leads to the loss of commercial timber on Yakama Tribal lands. 

Even though the Cougar Creek Fire is the #4 Priority Fire in Entire

Geographic Area – Resources Still Scarce on this Incident

As published in the August 14 National Incident Situation Report, the Pacific Northwest is now the 

Number #1 priority Geographic Area in the country and the Cougar Creek Fire is the Number #4 priority 

fire within this Geographic Area.

Yet, even as the Number #4 priority, firefighting resources remain limited due to all of the other activity 

in the region. On August 14, there were more than 23,000 firefighters assigned to fires with more than 

7,100 firefighters on 38 active fires in the Pacific Northwest Region.

The evening ICS 209 for August 14 shows only four Type 1 or Type 2 Initial Attack Crews assigned. 

However, Dozer staffing has increased to 10 total pieces of equipment. Critical needs listed by the 

Incident Management Team include two Type 1 Crews and six Heavy Equipment Bosses.

Cougar Creek Fire activity on August 12. Photo by Jerry Messinger.
166

‘Consumptive Strategy’ Employed to Help Contain Fire Growth

Given the limited firefighting resources and the amount of uncontained fire, the Incident Management 

Team begins to employ a strategy that limits mop-up on portions of contained fire line and moves the 

fire suppression resources ahead to the more active portions of the fire.

This strategy becomes known locally as a “consumptive strategy”—where fuels are allowed to burn out 

with minimal fire line patrol or mop-up. (This strategy was documented in the August 19 Cougar Creek 

Fire WFDSS.)

The Incident Management Team is still unable to safely staff a night shift. Often times, it has to delay 

perimeter containment efforts during the early part of the day shifts to contain spot fires which occurred 

during the overnight hours.

August 15-19

Fire Activity Slows

Fire activity slows considerably during this time period. Over five days—from August 15-19—the fire 

grows 1,300 acres. This represents an average daily fire size increase of 260 acres. In addition, resource 

staffing stabilized during this time period, with the incident fielding an average of 11 Type 1 or Type 2 

Crews, 16 Engines, 10 Dozers, and 6 Helicopters.

Cougar Creek Fire burning near Mt. Adams on August 12. Photo by Jerry Messinger.
167

Fire Line Successfully 

Contains Fire on 

Southern End

The westward and 

southern spread of the 

fire has now been 

stopped using natural 

barriers and constructed 

dozer line. The August 19 

briefing map shows the 

fire line successfully 

contained the Cougar 

Creek Fire across its 

entire southern end.

Northern and eastern 

fire expansion continues 

as the fire spreads 

through the major 

Hellroaring Creek 

drainage.

Yakama Nation

commercial timber lands 

continue to be impacted 

on the north and east 

sides of the fire.

Cougar Creek Fire Drops 

to Geographic Area’s #18 

Priority Fire

By August 19, the Cougar Creek Fire has dropped to the #18 priority fire in the Pacific Northwest Region. 

New incidents, particularly new fires near Lake Chelan and Omak, have been elevated in priority due to 

threats to communities and actual home destruction.

Crews (Type 1, Type 2 Initial Attack, and Type 2) as well as Engine and mid-level Overhead are listed on 

the August 19 evening ICS 209 as critical resource needs by the Cougar Creek Fire Incident Management 

Team.

Computer Modeling Predicts Fire Spread to South

A new WFDSS decision is published on August 19. Management direction remains consistent with 

previous decisions.

The most recent FSPro simulation (see image above) indicates a reasonable probability for the fire to 

spread to the south. (FSPro is a computer model program that provides fire spread probability.) 

Therefore, a series of Management Action Points (MAPs) are established for evacuations along the fire’s 

south side. The WFDSS also establishes four MAPs for “Primary”, “Alternative”, “Contingency” and 

“Emergency” fire lines to the north and east of the existing fire perimeter.

This image from the August 19 FSPro computer modeling run—that predicts fire 

spread probability to the south—helped to inform that day’s decision

published in WFDSS. 
168

August 20-22

Fire is Now 25,000 Acres

with 50 Percent Containment

Fire growth continues to be relatively

benign. The August 22 briefing map 

indicates the Cougar Creek Fire is now

25,000 acres with 50 percent 

containment.

The Incident Management Team has 

successfully prevented the spread of the 

fire along its southeast corner by using a 

combination of direct dozer line and firing 

operations from improved roads.

Fire line progress on the fire’s east flank 

has now reached Hellroaring Creek. In 

addition, to the north of the fire, pieces of 

indirect fire line are indicated on the 

briefing map. Even though the fire’s spread 

to the south and west has been halted, a Level 1 Evacuation remains in place for the scattered 

residences located north of Glenwood.

A Red Flag Warning is issued for the fire area for hot, dry, and unstable conditions through August 24.

August 23-28

Fire Doubles in Size to 49,200 Acres

From August 23 through August 28, a series of large 

fire growth days occur under hot and unstable

weather conditions.

By August 28, the Cougar Creek Fire has nearly 

doubled in size to 49,200 acres. The vast majority of 

this growth occurs on Yakama Nation Tribal lands 

and has a significant impact on the commercial 

timber on tribal lands. This loss of sustainable timber 

production lands will have a significant negative 

economic impact on the tribe.

While the fire doubled in size during this time period, 

resource staffing remained static and was unable to 

address the escalating fire situation.

During this time period, the Cougar Creek Fire never rises 

above the #13th priority fire for the Geographic Area. 

Resources remain at levels which cannot meet the 

management direction of minimizing acres burned.

Firing operation performed off of an established road

on the Cougar Creek Fire on August 25.

Engine Crews helped hold the fire lines

on the Cougar Creek Fire.
169

Cougar Creek Fire Size, Geographic Area Priority Ranking, and Staffing Levels

Date Fire Size

Geographic 

Area 

Priority

Staffing*

Crews Engines Dozers Helicopters

8/23 29,000 17 13 26 10 6

8/24 30,400 13 14 27 10 6

8/25 35,000 16 13 26 10 6

8/26 37,900 16 11 27 10 6

8/27 40,200 16 11 26 10 6

8/28 49,200 16 9 26 10 6

[Source: National Incident Situation Report (crews, engines, helicopters), ICS-209 (dozers)]

[Note: All crews listed above were Type 2. Two of the above crews were local

Native American crews.]

August 29-30

Precipitation Event Ends Active Burning and Allows for More Direct Fire Line Control Strategy

During August 29-30, a widespread wetting rain occurs over the Cougar Creek Fire area. Rainfall 

amounts are variable across the fire, with the Signal Peak RAWS on the east side of the fire recording 

0.27 inches of rain. At the Buck Creek RAWS, located west of the fire, 0.53 inches are recorded.

This rain event coincides with the planned transfer of command from the Washington Incident 

Management Team #5 to the Southern California Incident Management Team #3. This new Incident 

Management Team is in-briefed by the agency administrators on August 29 and has a “shadow day” 

with the outgoing Washington team on August 30.

While rainfall totals are not significant, the precipitation ends the active burning on the fire and leads to 

a more direct fire line control strategy which becomes operational when the Southern California 

Incident Management Team #3 takes command of the fire on August 31.

August 31-September 4

Direct Attack Strategy is Implemented

Fire activity is greatly reduced in all areas of the fire. Beginning August 31, a direct attack strategy is 

implemented to minimize acres burned and to isolate green islands within existing indirect fire lines.

The Cougar Creek Fire is reported at 52,700 acres on August 29 and grows to 53,162 on September 4. 

(Minor fluctuations in acreages occur during this time period as improved mapping of the incident 

becomes possible due to the reduced fire activity.)

On September 2, North Cascades Smokejumpers jump to an area on the northeast corner of the fire to 

complete a section of direct fire line which is beyond the capabilities of the Type 2 Hand Crews assigned 

to the incident.

This section of fire line (see map on next page) ties into existing direct dozer line to the Potato Hill Road. 

It allows the Incident Management Team to eliminate the need to burn out from the Potato Hill Road to 

contain the northern portion of the fire. This operation protects an estimated 2,800 acres of land, some 

of which contain high-value timber.
170

Smokejumper constructed hand line is shown from the division break (the 

two black curved hash marks on right) east to the completed dozer line. 

On September 4 more precipitation (0.23 inches at the Signal Peak RAWS) is received on the fire. This 

weather event effectively closes out tactical operations. Fire line repair becomes the Incident 

Management Team’s primary focus.

September 5-9

Fire line repair continues with a transfer of command back to the home unit on September 9.

Aerial Fire Suppression Activities August 12 through September 8*

• Retardant delivered to the fire line – 88,410 gallons

• Helicopter delivered water in support of fire suppression – 1,109,335 gallons

*Source: Fire Narrative from the Southern California Incident Management Team #3
171

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1Tov6vx

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlyQ00 Appendix L – Kettle Complex Kettle Complex

Lightning Storm Ignites

16 New Fires 

The lightning storm that passed 

through the greater Kettle Falls, 

Washington area in the early 

morning hours of August 11 starts 

16 new fires.

The Stickpin Fire

The Stickpin Fire, discovered in midafternoon on the Colville National 

Forest, started in an Inventoried 

Roadless Area on lands suitable for 

inclusion in the National 

Wilderness Preservation System.

Aerial reconnaissance stated that 

there were no good aerial 

firefighter delivery opportunities, 

no safety zones, and firefighters 

would be dependent on aerial 

support for safety.

The local and National 

Preparedness Level is 5, meaning Geographic Areas are experiencing 

major incidents which have the potential to exhaust all agency fire 

resources. The only crew immediately available was a Job Corps Crew

composed of mostly relatively inexperienced firefighters. Therefore, 

the decision was made to not insert ground resources at this time. 

Helicopters were ordered for dropping water to hold the fire in 

check.

On August 11 and 12, helicopters were the primary Initial Attack resource while the District considered placing 

its pre-positioned out-of-Region Type 3 Organization from New Mexico on this incident.The fire was 30 to 50 

acres at this point with a high Haines Index, indicating significant instability in the atmosphere and a high fire 

growth potential. An out-of-area Incident Commander was assigned to the fire while the New Mexico Type 3

Kettle Complex

Date of Ignition

Aug. 17, 2015 – Four fires placed into a 

Complex

Land Ownership at Fire Origins

Washington State Department of Natural 

Resources, Colville National Forest 

Responding Initial Attack Resources

Roy Fire: 1 20-person Hand Crew, 1 

Helicopter w/crew, 1 Dozer; Stickpin 

Fire: 2 Helicopters; Renner Fire: 2 

Hand Crews, 1 Helicopter; Graves 

Mountain Fire: 1 15-person Hand 

Crew

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 5

Local: PL 5

(For Stickpin Fire these were both PL 4)

Acres Burned

76,512 Acres (as of 9/26/15)

Estimated Cost

$37,557,000 (as of 9/26/15)

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 1,122

Crews: 24

Engines: 66

Helicopters: 5

Structures Destroyed

1 Outbuilding

Cooperators

Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources, Colville National 

Forest, Ferry County Fire Districts 13 &

14, Joint Ferry-Stevens Fire District 3 & 

8, Ferry County Sheriff, City of 

Republic, Washington State Patrol, 

Washington State Fire Marshal, U.S. 

Border Patrol, British Columbia 

Wildfire Service

Key Successes on the Kettle Complex

Excellent interagency/international cooperation was illustrated on 

managing the Kettle Complex fires.

Incident Commanders understood the urgency and magnitude of the 

fire situation that confronted them.

Their subsequent sharing of resources—to help prioritize 

suppression efforts and response—was another key to successful 

outcomes on the Kettle Complex.

Top Photo: The Stickpin Fire burning on August 

13. Bottom Photo: The Stickpin Fire moving 

across the landscape on August 15.
172
173
174
175
176

organization was demobilizing off another fire on the east side of 

the Forest and preparing for reassignment to this incident. 

In the early morning hours of August 13, the fire is reported to be 

200 acres. Two heavy Helicopters work the fire during the day. By 

9 p.m., aerial reconnaissance had sized-up the fire at 3,500 acres. 

There were no resources on the ground at this time.

The potential for the Stickpin Fire to continue this rapid spread 

prompts the Colville National Forest to order an Incident 

Management Team (IMT) for this incident. Washington IMT #1, a 

Type 2 Team, is assigned. By the time they take command at 6 

p.m. the next day, the Stickpin Fire is more than 35,000 acres in 

size.

Graves Mountain Fire

Another dry lightning event occurred between 11 p.m. to 

midnight on August 13. At 9 a.m. the following morning, the 

Graves Mountain Fire is reported. Initial aerial response included the possibility of Initial Attack with Rappellers. However, 

due to poor visibility caused by the smoke from the nearby Stickpin Fire, this was cancelled. Eventually, the Graves 

Mountain Fire could not even be seen due to heavy smoke.

Renner Fire

On August 14, another new fire near Renner Lake is also 

detected. Initially reported at 0.25 acres, within two hours,

this fire had grown to five acres and was “quite a ways up 

the slope”.

A Type 1 heavy Helicopter was requested to support the 

fire. A Hand Crew arrives on scene. At approximately 2:30 

p.m. its Crew Leader becomes this fire’s Incident 

Commander. There is a sense that this “fire can be 

managed” using indirect tactics. A request is made for a 

Dozer to assist operations.

By 11 p.m., with the fire at approximately 20 acres, the 

resources 

pull out due to work/rest considerations. There are no resources to 

replace the existing resources. It is a low-priority fire due to its remote 

location. The following day, all resources are diverted to the nearby 

Carpenter Road, Marble Valley and Gold Hill fires to support the threats 

to life and property on these incidents.

Local fire managers continued to have resources monitor the Renner Fire 

daily to help determine its priority. The fire was spreading away from 

critical values the first few days. It was assigned to the Kettle Complex on August 17.

The Few Scattered Available Resources Would Need to Focus on Life and Property

By the morning of August 15, it is apparent that the overall fire situation in the greater Colville, Washington area is 

rapidly deteriorating.Extreme fire behavior throughout the West has depleted firefighting resources. The local agencies 

convene in Colville to triage the existing fires. To the south, the Marble Valley, Gold Hill and Carpenter Road fires were 

all experiencing evacuations and the loss of structures. The few scattered available resources would need to focus on 

life and property. The Graves Mountain and Renner fires would have to wait their turn.

August 14 photo on the Stickpin Fire shows a fire-whirl,

an indicator of extreme fire conditions.

Photo by John Foster-Fanning.

Severe to Extreme Drought

During the 2014/2015 winter, northern portions of the 

Colville National Forest recorded approximately half the total 

normal precipitation. Because of warm winter temperatures, 

snow amounts were well below average, amounting to only 

one-half of a normal winter season snow. These warm and 

dry conditions continued into mid-summer. June and July 

experienced temperatures 10-20 degrees above normal. 

These high readings led to numerous new records, which in 

some cases were not only broken, but shattered. By midAugust, the U.S. Drought Monitor showed this region in the 

midst of “Severe” to “Extreme” drought.

At 9 p.m. on August 13, the Stickpin 

Fire is 3,500 acres.

By 6 p.m. the next day, it is more 

than 35,000 acres.
177

Graves Mountain Fire Knocks Out BPA Power

Late on the morning of August 15, a call from the Ferry County 

Sheriff’s Office informs the Kettle Falls Ranger District’s Fire 

Management Officer that the Graves Mountain Fire had burned 

under Bonneville Power Authority (BPA) power transmission 

lines—cutting off all power to the Republic community.

Due to smoke, the Graves Mountain Fire has not been visible.

The one Engine available to be dispatched was sent to size-up 

the situation.

Washington Incident Management Team #1, assigned to the 

nearby Stickpin Fire, is requested to make resources available to 

assist.

As there was still not a good fire size-up due to lack of visibility, 

the focus on the threat to the BPA power transmission line was 

hot-spotting and suppressing the fires in and around the BPA 

right-of-way as needed.

Washington Team #1 continues to support the local District by 

sending resources to assist on the Graves Mountain Fire before 

it is formally assigned to this team on August 17.

The Roy Fire

On August 14-15, the Roy Fire was successfully Initial Attacked by 

the Washington State Department of Natural Resources. Available 

resources—coupled with aggressive initial actions and 

precipitation—supported this successful outcome.

The Washington State Department of Natural Resources had gone into a Unified Command with the local 

Volunteer Fire Department. This command had the following resources: one 20-person Hand Crew, two Dozers, 

one Helicopter and Helitack Crew, and support from the Volunteer Fire Department.

By 6 p.m. on August 15, the 120-acre Roy Fire was 100 percent lined. Rain had helped to hold the fire.

On August 15 the Northeast Area of the Washington State Department of Natural Resources and the Colville 

National Forest ordered an Area Command Team to manage several of the large fires and complexes and their 

respective incident management teams. Area Command Teams are national interagency teams that work for 

agency administrators to prioritize scarce resources and resolve any conflicts between agency missions and 

objectives for wildfire management.

On the morning of August 17, command of the Roy Fire was given to the Washington Team #1 Incident 

Management Team to monitor, mop-up, and perform suppression repair work.

The Kettle Complex

On the morning of August 17, the Stickpin, Graves Mountain, Renner, and Roy fires were grouped under one 

command as the Kettle Complex.

Initially, the Kettle Complex experienced many days of extreme fire growth. Fire managers were confronted with 

extreme fire behavior and fire weather, as well as determining that delicate balance of what resources to send—

where and when.

The north end of the Stickpin Fire

on August 16.
178

Lack of Available Resources on the Stickpin Fire

The Stickpin Fire was the primary focus the first two days of 

Washington Team #1’s command.

All the other fires in their area—and throughout the Region—

prevented them from getting the resources they had requested. 

Additionally, with the threat to the BPA power transmission lines on 

the Graves Mountain Fire—coupled with the loss of power—they 

were requested to also supply resources to that incident.

Washington Team #1 had only four Crews, two Engines, one Dozer 

and Air Support when they took command. Lack of available 

resources and extremely dry conditions led to the fire moving 

upslope, where it was influenced by ridgetop winds coupled with a 

Haines Index of 5. These fire behavior elements resulted in a plumedominated fire with significant spotting, torching, and crown runs.

There was a significant effort to keep the Stickpin Fire from crossing the border into Canada. Resources from Canada 

were working the north end of this fire. These Canadian resources were part of the overall Kettle Complex under the 

Unified Command with the British Columbia Wildfire Service. The fire never crossed into Canada.

By August 21, the three fires in the Kettle Complex had approximately 100 miles of fire perimeter surrounding 

more than 48, 000 acres with 18 Crews, 41 Engines and 2 Helicopters. The Complex was listed as the 8th highest 

priority for fires within the State of Washington and 10th overall in the Pacific Northwest Region. Fire managers 

were confronted with extreme fire behavior and fire weather, as well as determining where to prioritize 

assignments of their few firefighting resources based on fire spread and proximity to values at risk (life and 

communities).

On August 27, when the Incident Management Teams transitioned, the Stickpin Fire was more than 48,000 

acres—representing more than 90 percent of the fire’s ultimate growth. There were a total of five Wildland Fire 

Decision Support System (WFDSS) decisions published for the Stickpin Fire. 

The Stickpin Fire accounted for more than 70 percent of the Kettle Complex’s total acres burned.

Graves Mountain Fire Threatens 100 Structures and BPA Lines

The Graves Mountain Fire was approximately 1,300 acres when assigned to Washington Incident Management Team #1. 

The team’s primary focus was the threat to approximately 100 structures as well as the BPA power lines that serviced 

Ferry County. 

Red Flag Warnings and various threats—coupled with the Stickpin Fire size being in excess of 41,000 acres—encouraged 

the decision to reconsider the management of the Graves Mountain Fire.

The rapidly growing Stickpin Fire—with its limited resources and extreme fire behavior—was challenging Washington 

Team #1.

On August 24, Area Command assigned the Graves Mountain Fire to the Oregon Incident Management Team #2, a Type 

2 Team. This team also had command responsibility for the Colville Complex which included the Marble Valley and Gold 

Hill incidents, both Washington State Department of Natural Resources fires.

Management of the Graves Mountain Fire was returned to the Kettle Complex on August 31.

Community meeting held by the Washington Team #1 

Incident Management Team on August 26 in Orient.
179

Roy Fire Becomes Part of Kettle Complex, Freeing-Up Initial Attack Resources

On August 17, management of the Roy Fire, which started on Washington State Department of Natural Resource 

protected lands, was given to the Kettle Complex for monitoring, mop-up and fire suppression repair work.

This enabled the Washington State Department of Natural Resources’ Initial Attack resources to finally rest and prepare 

for any future events that might occur. Conditions were still conducive for new fire starts to quickly become large fires.

Renner Fire Threatens Homes, but None Lost on this Fire

The Renner Fire started on National Forest System lands approximately one mile and a half from the nearest private land 

boundary. By the end of this fire’s second day, the local Volunteer Fire District (Joint Fire District 3 & 8 with Stevens and

Ferry Counties) considered the fire a threat.

This “threat” was not necessarily based on fire behavior or fire spread toward private land, but on the fact that they

didn’t have any firefighters on the ground to staff the Renner Fire.

While the Renner Fire’s initial spread was not threatening homes, by August 17 it became a more imminent threat to 

nearby communities. Even though it took several days to receive a request for resources via the Washington State Fire 

Service Mobilization Plan, no homes were destroyed and only one outbuilding was lost on the Renner Fire.

Finally: Cold Front and Rain

On August 29, a strong cold front ushered in a major change in the weather. During a two-day period, the Kettle 

Complex received below normal temperatures coupled with rain totals that measured from 0.25 inches to more 

than 0.5 inches. This weather event changed the incident’s entire focus.

On September 8, the Kettle Complex transitioned back again to the Type 2 Washington Team #1 Incident Management 

Team. On September 20, a fourth Incident Management Team, the Oregon IMT #1, another Type 2 Team, took 

command of the Kettle Complex. Their focus was on monitoring, mop-up, and fire suppression repair work.

Fire Sizes in Acres

Stickpin Renner Graves 

Mountain

Roy North Boulder 

2

Start of Complex August 17 35,000 1,300 120

Washington IMT #1 (Type 2) to 

Pacific Northwest IMT #2

(Type 1) August 27

48,885 11,200

Graves to 

Colville

Complex

120

Pacific Northwest IMT #2 (Type 

2) to Washington IMT #1 (Type 

2) September 8

54,278 13,524 8,587 120 232

Washington IMT #1 (Type 2) to 

Oregon IMT #1 (Type 2)

September 20

53,925 13,799 8,593 120 232
180

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1lPmmU6

Appendix M – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires

Bendire Complex 

Heavy Air Tankers and Dozers build fire line on the Bendire Complex.

Photo courtesy of the Bureau of Land Management.

Suppression Actions

and Challenges

On August 11, the Pole Creek and Bully Creek fires were ignited by 

lightning. Initial acreage for both fires was reported at 500 acres 

each. These fires eventually merged into the Bendire Complex. Initial 

Attack forces provided by the Bureau of Land Management’s Vale 

District included: 20 Engines, 4 Dozers, 1 Crew, 1 Helitack Crew, 5 

Water Tenders, and 2 Road Graders. At this time, the nearby Windy 

Ridge Fire was the priority for air resources.

On this same day, three other major fires started on or in the vicinity 

of the Vale District: Windy Ridge, Cornet, and Soda fires. The 

National Preparedness Level was 4.

On the evening of August 11, the Type 3 High Desert Incident 

Management Team took command of the fire.

. 

Helicopter

on the Bendire 

Complex.

Bendire Complex

Date of Ignition

August 11, 2015

Cause

Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Bureau of Land Management 

Responding Initial Attack Resources

1 Helicopter, 20 Engines, 1 Hotshot 

Crew, 1 Helitack Crew, 4 Dozers, 5 

Water Tenders, 2 Road Graders 

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 4

Local: PL 4

Acres Burned

49,628 Acres (as of 9/15/15)

Estimated Cost

$4,820,000 (as of 9/15/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Primarily Bureau of Land Management 

with scattered private ranches and 

nearby community of Westfall

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 513

Crews: 13

Engines: 50

Helicopters: 3

Structures Destroyed

None

Cooperators

Bureau of Land Management, U.S. 

Forest Service, Malheur County 

Sheriff, Ironside Rangeland Fire 

Protection Association
181
182

Residences Threatened

The next day, on August 12, 

nine residences were 

threatened. The Incident 

Management Team requested 

heavy Air Tankers, Single 

Engine Air Tankers (SEATs), 

Type 1 and Type 2 Helicopters, 

and additional overhead—

particularly Division 

Supervisors and Heavy 

Equipment Bosses. 

Incident objectives were to 

drop retardant primarily on the 

fire’s eastern flank with heavy 

Air Tankers and hold the fire on 

the western flank along 

Bendire Road. Dozer lines 

would be constructed and 

burned out throughout the fire 

perimeter. 

Extreme Fire Behavior

Winds were a continual problem on this incident that resulted in extreme 

fire behavior—running and spotting with torching in juniper stands. 

Initially, Hotshots, Engines, and Dozers attempted to hold the fire’s north 

side at about 200 acres—until it spotted in gusty winds.

The northeast part of the fire grew to 8,000 acres on August 12 and to 

30,700 acres by August 13. The fire ran into Bully Creek’s green vegetation 

which temporarily stopped its forward spread. 

Fuels were extremely dry with entire 

juniper boles (trunks) completely 

consumed by the fire. Some crowning 

occurred in old-growth juniper stands. 

There were patches of old-growth 

sagebrush that were eight-feet tall.

Fire Jumps Bully Creek

On August 14, a frontal passage 

produced consistent winds at 25 miles 

per hour, gusting to 30 mph.

The fire jumped Bully Creek and ran to 

the northeast for another 10,000 acres. 

Residences in the community of 

Westfall and ranches in Bully Creek 

were threatened. Resources were 

Despite Strong Initial Attack,

Sage-Grouse Habitat Degraded

The Vale District of the Bureau of Land 

Management dispatched a very strong 

assemblage of personnel and 

equipment during Initial Attack. Due to 

gusty winds and very dry fuel 

conditions, the fire made significant 

runs—resulting in the degradation of 

more than 40,000 acres of “High 

Priority” sage-grouse habitat. 

Critical Sage-Grouse Habitat

The Bendire Complex Fire burned within the Bully Creek Priority Management Area 

located north of Juntura, Oregon. The entire fire was within “High Priority Habitat” 

for sage-grouse which provides critical connectivity to adjacent Priority 

Management Areas.

In addition, the Castle Rock Area of Critical Environmental Concern (ACEC), located 

west of the fire, partially burned. To the north, the two additional Research Natural 

Areas (RNA)—also designated as ACECs—North Ridge Bully Creek and South Ridge 

Bully Creek, did not burn. The Air Tankers were able to slow the spread of the fire,

preventing further fire growth to the east.

In April 2015, the Vale District of the Bureau of Land Management invited public 

comment on a “multi-year, multi-phase project that would use a combination of 

prescribed fire, silvicultural thinning, and herbicide and mechanical invasive species 

treatments that include western juniper removal to maintain and restore habitat for 

greater sage-grouse and other sagebrush species in the Malheur Resource Area in 

eastern Oregon.” The Bendire Complex Fire burned much of this proposed 15-year 

project area.

Because of this critical habitat, a Department of the Interior review was conducted. 

As of late October, this report has not been released.

Pushed by winds, the Bendire Complex Fire makes another run.

Photo courtesy of the Bureau of Land Management.
183

assigned for structure protection.

Despite Return of Winds, Fire Lines Held at 44,000 Acres

On August 16, the Type 2 Oregon Incident Management Team #4 took command of the fire.

On this day, even though winds and frontal passages were again a concern, the fire lines held at 44,000 

acres. To protect critical habitat, an effort was made to construct fire line around the approximately 

1,500 acres of large sagebrush islands.

On August 21, transfer of command went to a Type 3 Incident Commander.

Bendire Complex Resources

Date Acres

Percent 

Contained Personnel Crews Engines Helicopters

Cost

To Date

Aug. 11

Type 3

500 BC

500 PG

0 1 20 $200K

Aug. 12 8,000 10 160 1 19 3 $950K

Aug. 13 30,700 10 272 5 35 0 $1.0 

Million

Aug. 14 34,774 40 364 6 46 1 $1.4

Million

Aug. 15 42,708 25 405 7 50 1 $2.0

Million

Aug. 16

Type 2

44,267 30 360 7 30 1 $2.5

Million

Aug. 17 44,397 35 455 11 32 1 $2.8

Million

Aug. 18 44,397 50 513 13 31 1 $3.1

Million

Aug. 19 44,397 75 500 13 25 1 $3.4

Million

Aug. 20 44,397 85 255 4 15 1 $3.9

Million

Aug. 21

Type 3

44,397 95 72 1 9 0 $4.1

Million

Aug. 22 44,397 95 72 1 9 0 $4.1

Million

Aug. 23 44,397 95 72 1 9 0 $4.8

Million

Aug. 24 44,397 95 72 1 9 0 $4.8

Million

Aug. 25 44,397 100 72 1 9 0 Last 

report

 Green shading represents the greatest number of that type of resource on the fire.
184

For Interactive Map:

Appendix M – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires (cont.) Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire http://arcg.is/1XxBUYj

Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire

The Cornet Fire burning on August 11. Photo by Tricia Price.

When the Cornet and Windy Ridge fires ignited, the fire danger rating 

was extreme. Public use restrictions for campfires and chainsaws were in 

effect. On August 10-11, a Red Flag Warning was issued for 

“thunderstorms producing abundant lightning”.

In northeast Oregon, this lightning storm ignited 31 fires that were 

detected by lookouts and aircraft across the Blue Mountain Interagency 

Dispatch Center’s area of responsibility.

Monday and Tuesday, August 10 and 11

The Cornet Fire started at 3:58 p.m. on August 10 approximately seven 

miles east of Hereford, Oregon. The fire burned on private lands which 

were protected by the Oregon Department of Forestry, WallowaWhitman National Forest, and the Bureau of Land Management’s Vale

District.

The fire’s southern portion was located in “Preliminary General Habitat”

for sage-grouse. 

The Cornet Fire was initially managed by a Type 3 Incident Commander.

To the northeast, the Windy Ridge Fire also started on August 10 at 

approximately 9:56 a.m. in rugged, steep terrain in Burnt River Canyon. 

Thirteen engines responded. Hand crews were needed for this terrain, 

but were unavailable. Fire managers attempted to contain the fire with 

retardant drops. Eight Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATs) and an 

unknown number of heavy Air Tankers worked the fire. Two Helicopters 

also responded. By the end of the day, the Windy Ridge Fire burned 

1,200 acres.

High temperatures, low relative humidity, and a Haines Index of 5-6 

encouraged rapid fire growth.

Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire

Date of Ignition

Cornet - August 10, 2015

Windy Ridge - August 11, 2015

Cause

Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Cornet – Private lands protected 

by Oregon Department of Forestry

Windy Ridge – Bureau of Land 

Management

Responding Initial Attack

Resources

Cornet – 6 Crews, 4 Engines, 4 

Dozers, 2 Water Tenders

Windy Ridge – 13 Engines, 8 Single 

Engine Air Tankers, 2 Helicopters, 

an unknown number of heavy Air 

Tankers 

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 4

Local: PL 4

Acres Burned

102,089 acres (as of 9/3/15)

Estimated Cost

$6.0 million (as of 9/3/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Private lands, Bureau of Land 

Management, Wallowa-Whitman 

National Forest

Resources at Incident Peak

Personnel: 677

Crews: 16

Engines: 34

Helicopters: 19

Structures Destroyed

25

Cooperators

Oregon Department of Forestry, 

Bureau of Land Management, U.S. 

Forest Service, Baker County, 

Oregon Department of 

Transportation
185
186

The Cornet Fire burned actively through the 

night of August 10 with crown fire runs and 

long-range spotting. By the end of the day on 

August 11, it had burned 2,000 acres. Initial 

Attack forces consisted of 6 Crews, 4 Engines, 4 

Dozers, and 2 Water Tenders.

The Baker County Sheriff issued a Level 1 

Evacuation Notice—“Be aware of the situation: 

BE READY”—to residents in the Stices Gulch 

and Black Mountain areas. A total of 112 

residences and 150 out-buildings were 

threatened.

Wednesday, August 12

At 6 p.m. on August 12, the Oregon Type 2 

Incident Management Team #4 took command 

of the Cornet Fire.

Fire managers predict continued fire perimeter growth—especially uphill. The Spot Weather Forecast 

noted: “Deep mixing height of around 10,000 feet this afternoon could allow plume development and 

more plume-dominated winds in the afternoon.”

Firefighters held the south and west flanks and line construction continued to the northeast.

A Level 3 Evacuation Order—“EVACUATE IMMEDIATELY: GO”—is issued by the Baker County Sheriff’s 

Office for the Stices Gulch Road area. A Level 2 Evacuation Order—“YOU MUST PREPARE TO LEAVE AT A 

MOMENT’S NOTICE”—is issued for the Denny Creek and the Black Mountain areas.

Thursday, August 13

The national Preparedness Level is 5. Resources are scarce both in the Northwest and nationally. 

However, personnel on the Cornet Fire more than doubled to 457 people.

The wind was from the south to southwest at 9 to 15 mph with gusts to 20 mph. Temperatures were 95 

to 100 degrees with relative humidity in the teens. Fire behavior forecasts anticipated winds to increase 

after 2 p.m.

The fire burned grass/shrubs in the valleys, juniper and pine farther upslope, and mixed conifer at higher 

elevations and ridges. Line construction continued to the northeast. Overnight, the fire spotted into 

Stices Gulch. Two threatened structures were protected.

In response to the Cornet Fire, Oregon Governor Kate Brown invoked the Emergency Conflagration Act. 

This declaration authorized the Oregon Office of the State Fire Marshal to mobilize structure firefighters 

and equipment from throughout Oregon to assist local fire resources. Baker County protected structures 

and additional structure firefighting resources arrived.

The Cornet Fire on August 12.
187

The Cornet Fire and Windy Ridge Fire burning side-by-side on August 13.

Photo by Bureau of Land Management.

The objectives were: stop fire progression into areas with residences; minimize acres burned on private 

land and sage-grouse habitat; protect communication infrastructure, mines, and cattle ranches.

The Baker County Sheriff’s Office issued a Level 3 Evacuation Order for Stices Gulch and a Level 2 

Evacuation Order for Rancheria Creek, Black Mountain, and Denny Creek. An area closure on the 

Wallowa-Whitman National Forest was also enacted.

Two residences were destroyed with another 17 threatened. A total of 51 people were evacuated.

As high winds and atmospheric instability continued to affect fire behavior, it appeared that the two 

fires would merge into one large fire.

The Windy Ridge Fire Closes Interstate 84

Initially, the Windy Ridge Fire moved out of the Burnt River Canyon toward the northwest. By 11 p.m. on 

August 11, the Fire Progression Map estimated the fire size at 3,759 acres. Twenty four hours later on

August 12, the fire had consumed 10,300 acres. A south wind was pushing the fire toward Interstate 84.

By 10:40 p.m. on August 13, the fire is 22,347 acres and had reached Interstate 84 just northwest of 

Durkee. (See fire progression map on next page.)
188

The Oregon Department of Transportation closed Interstate 84 in both directions twice. The first 

occurrence was at 3:29 p.m. between Baker City and Ontario, Oregon. At 6:25 p.m., this closure was 

extended to Pendleton and Ontario—a distance of 170 miles. The freeway was reopened at 8 p.m. 

Friday, August 14

On August 14, a second closure of Interstate 84 was issued at 3:12 p.m. between Baker City and Ontario. 

At 4:51 p.m., this closure was extended to La Grande as Baker City filled up with trucks. The freeway was 

reopened at 7:39 p.m.

Fire managers were concerned with impacts to pipelines and the Union Pacific transcontinental mainline 

train tracks that parallel Interstate 84. The Union Pacific continued to operate during the fire and 

pipeline operations were not interrupted.

On August 14, strong winds are forecasted in the central Blue Mountains from noon to 11 p.m.

Southwest Incident Management Team #2, a Type 1 IMT, took command of both the Cornet and Windy 

Ridge fires. A Unified Command was established with the Oregon State Fire Marshal’s Incident 

Management Green Team. This state team prioritized structure protection on both fires.

The Cornet Fire is now 26,000 acres, 5 percent contained, with a total of 457 personnel.

The Windy Ridge Fire is 22,862 acres, 5 percent contained, with a total of 181 personnel.
189

Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire

Saturday, August 15

The combined fires are 88,433 acres with 5 percent containment. Firefighting resources now include:

• 628 Personnel

• 16 Crews

• 34 Engines

• 4 Helicopters

• 12 Dozers

• 9 Water Tenders

Firefighters conduct burn out operations in the evening on the northern portion of the fire. Crews 

continue to patrol and hold fire lines while mopping-up around structures.

Highway 245 was closed but Highway 7 remains open. A total of 413 people have been evacuated with 

six residences destroyed and 187 threatened.

Sunday, August 16

The Cornet and Windy Ridge fires merge into one fire and are now called the Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire. 

Crews continue to build containment lines around the fire’s perimeter while patrolling and mopping-up 

around structures and the perimeter.

The Cornet Fire on August 12.
190

Monday, August 17

On this day, the forecasted weather was sunny with west to northwest winds up to 7 mph and 

afternoon gusts of 15 mph. Incident Commanders planned to implement burn out operations on Woods 

Gulch Road and Burnt Canyon Road to prevent the fire from spreading to the east. 

Tuesday, August 18

Burn out operations continued with aerial ignition. Crews built containment lines around the fire’s 

perimeter and mopped-up around structures and the perimeter. Eight structural Engines worked in 

Stices Gulch. Highway 245 remained closed 11 miles north of Hereford while the Oregon Department of 

Transportation continued to fell trees on the road’s shoulders. Forecasted weather called for winds out 

of the north/northwest to 9 mph with afternoon gusts to 18 mph. 

There are now three areas of active fire:

• Denny Creek – On the west side of the fire. Hose lays are in place.

• Sutton Creek – North side, large unburned island.

• Burnt River Canyon Road and Woods Gulch Road – On the east side, fire backed off of ridgetops.

Wednesday, August 19

The weather remained favorable with light winds.

Thursday, August 20

Highway 245 will be reopened today for through-traffic to Unity.

Personnel and equipment resources are slowly being released from this incident for reassignment to 

other wildfires in the Pacific Northwest Region. Currently, 589 personnel are on the Cornet-Windy Ridge 

Fire.

Gusty winds are forecasted for tonight into Friday.

To date, 187 single residences and 275 minor structures have been threatened. Four residences and 21 

minor structures have been lost. A total of 413 people were evacuated during the fire. One minor injury 

to a firefighter has been reported. 

August 21-26

Strong gusty winds are forecasted. Firefighters continue to mop-up and patrol the fire perimeter.

Rehabilitation and erosion prevention activities have been initiated.

On August 24, command of the fire was transferred to the Oregon Department of Forestry Type 1 

Incident Management Team. On August 26, command of the fire was transferred back to the local unit 

under a Type 4 Incident Commander.

As of September 3, fire acreage is 102,089 acres.
191

Key Dates

• August 10: Cornet Fire ignition

• August 11: Windy Ridge Fire ignition

• August 12: Oregon Incident Management Team 4 (Type 2 IMT) takes command of Cornet Fire

• August 14: Southwest Incident Management Team 2 (Type 1 IMT) takes command of both the 

Cornet and Windy Ridge fires

• August 24: Command of the Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire transferred to the Oregon Department of 

Forestry Incident Management Team #3 (Type 1 IMT)

• August 26: Command of the fire transferred to the local unit under a Type 4 Incident 

Commander

Resources on the Cornet-Windy Ridge Fire

Date Acres 

Burned

%

CTN* Crews Helicopters Engines Dozers

Water 

Tenders People

Aug. 15 88,433 5 16 4 34 12 9 628

Aug. 16 96,762 30 13 9 28 6 9 618

Aug. 17 No Report

Aug. 18 99,270 35 15 10 30 6 8 677

Aug. 19 103,540 45 14 16 30 9 9 675

Aug. 20 103,540 70 10 16 19 8 9 589

Aug. 21 103,887 75 9 19 22 10 6 482

Aug. 22 103,887 75 6 19 10 10 6 375

Aug. 23 103,887 80 5 4 10 8 6 351

Aug. 24 103,887 80 6 5 2 37

Aug. 25 103,887 85 6 5 2 37

Aug. 26 103,887 85 1 4 33

*“% CTN” is: Percent Contained
192

For Interactive Map:

Appendix M – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires (cont.) Eldorado Fire http://arcg.is/1XxC0zf

The Eldorado Fire was discovered on the morning of Friday August 14. 

The fire started approximately five miles south of Unity on Oregon 

Department of Forestry-protected lands near the Oregon State 

administered Eldorado Campground.

The fire involved multiple jurisdictions: Baker County, the Bureau of 

Land Management Vale District, U.S. Forest Service Walla-Whitman 

National Forest, Ironside Range Protection Association, and private 

ranch lands.

Fire managers were concerned about impacts to grazing from the loss 

of grass and range improvements.

Private structures were also threatened with Level 3 Evacuations 

“EVACUATE IMMEDIATELY—GO” ordered for 125 residences in these 

communities:

• Beam Creek Area

• Eldorado Ditch Area

• Long Creek Area (Baker County)

• Long Creek Reservoir

• Camp Creek South of Highway 26

Owners of an additional 36 homes were under Level 2 Evacuation 

orders: “YOU MUST PREPARE TO LEAVE AT A MOMENT’S NOTICE”.

U.S. Highway 26 was closed between Unity and Ironside. 

Critical High Priority Sage-Grouse Habitat Burning

The Eldorado Fire was positioned just north of the Bendire Complex, 

which started on August 11. Like the Bendire Complex, the Eldorado 

Fire was burning on critical “High Priority” sage-grouse habitat.

The Energy Release Component (ERC), an indicator of overall fuel 

dryness and potential for large fire development, was at 97 percent. 

The entire area was in a prolonged and severe drought.

The fire Preparedness Level was at 5, both nationally and in the Pacific 

Northwest—indicating firefighting resources were extremely scarce.

As of October 18, 2015 the cause of the fire is unknown.

Initial Attack

Several Dozers and 12 Engines responded as well as air resources. Hand 

Crews were not available. A Type 3 Incident Commander was assigned 

command of the fire.

On the fire’s second day—August 15—a Type 1 Oregon Department of 

Forestry Incident Management Team is ordered to take command of the 

fire. A total of 50 firefighters are now on the line. On this second day, 

aircraft attacked the fire—but were pulled off in the afternoon due to

Eldorado Fire

Date of Ignition

August 14, 2015

Cause

Unknown

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Oregon Department of Forestry

Responding Initial Attack

Resources

12 Engines, several Dozers and Air 

Resources

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 5

Local: PL 5

Acres Burned

20,635 acres (as of 10/2/15)

Estimated Cost

$5,400,000 (as of 10/2/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Baker County, the Bureau of Land 

Management Vale District, U.S. 

Forest Service Walla-Whitman 

National Forest, Ironside Range 

Protection Association, and private 

ranch lands

Resources at Incident Peak

Personnel: 412

Crews: 15

Engines: 27

Helicopters: 4

Structures Destroyed

4

Cooperators

Baker County, the Bureau of Land 

Management Vale District, U.S. 

Forest Service Walla-Whitman 

National Forest, Ironside Range 

Protection Association, and private 

ranchers
193
194

high winds.

By 9 p.m. the second day, the fire progression map (see previous page) indicates that the Eldorado Fire 

grew to 13,563 acres.

By the end of this day, August 15, the fire grows an additional 5,100 acres—for a total of 18,600 acres.

Sunday Aug. 16

On this day, the wind pushes the fire’s west and south sides. Weather forecasts predict a dry cold front 

coming through the area early the next day with 10-15 mile per hour winds.

By 9 p.m. the fire has grown to 20,601 acres. (Final fire size on August 29, when its management is 

turned over to local agencies, will be 20,635 acres.)

Engine crews work throughout the night to extinguish hot spots along the fire’s edge and strengthen 

containment lines. Resources on the fire now include 4 20-Person Crews, 7 Dozers, 12 Engines, and 1 

Helicopter. A total of 201 firefighters are assigned.

Level 1 Evacuation notifications—“Be aware of the situation: BE READY”—remain in effect for Shirts 

Creek, Job Creek and south of Job Creek Road, east of Bull Run Road, and south of Campbell Lane.

The Eldorado Fire on August 16.
195

Eldorado Fire Resources

Date

Total 

Acres

Burned

Percent

CTN* People Crews Engines Helicopters

Aug. 14 12,000 0 50 0 12 1

Aug. 15 18,600 0 161 2 12 1

Aug. 16 20,070 10 201 4 12 1

Aug. 17 20,500 30 285 9 14 4

Aug. 18 20,611 35 348 11 20 4

Aug. 19 20,611 40 435 14 26 4

Aug. 20 20,611 50 492 15 27 4

Aug. 21 20,611 55 450 13 27 4

Aug. 22 20,611 65 358 10 23 2

Aug. 23 20,611 70 315 9 17 4

Aug. 24 20,611 75 256 7 17 4

Aug. 25 20,611 80 170 6 11 0

Aug. 26 20,635 80 32 1 4 0

*“Percent CTN” is: Percent Contained.

The greatest number of resources assigned during the course of the fire—that 

occurred on Aug. 20—is highlighted in green.

Eldorado Fire Key Dates and Events

August 14-16 – The days in which the fire exhibited the most growth.

August 19 – At approximately 7:15 p.m. on August 19, a Croman S-61A helicopter working on the 

Eldorado Fire eight miles southeast of Unity, experienced a “hard landing”. The incident occurred on the 

west portion of the fire near King Creek in the vicinity of a medical unit serving firefighters on the line. 

According to the Oregon Department of Forestry, two persons were on board. Both exited the 

helicopter and signaled to medical unit personnel that they were unhurt. While no significant injuries 

were apparent, both individuals were transported by ambulance to a local medical center for further 

evaluation.

August 20 – The most resources are assigned to the fire (see table above).

August 26 – The Oregon Department of Forestry Type 1 Incident Management Team returns the fire to 

the local units. 
196

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1Nlw62T

Appendix M – Sage-Grouse Habitat Fires (cont.) – Leslie Gulch Fire

Leslie Gulch Fire

Initial Fire Suppression Actions

Lightning ignited the Leslie Gulch Fire on the remote east side of the 

Bureau of Land Management’s Vale District on June 28 at 

approximately 10:50 p.m.

Road and area closures were quickly put into effect. The fire was 

managed as 100 percent full suppression by a Type 3 Incident 

Commander. Because of the limited access, there was potential for 

the fire to spread south toward the city of Jordan Valley, Oregon. 

V I D E O

Watch this video of the fire conditions during Initial Attack on the 

Leslie Gulch Fire.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HEqrDEDl2ME

Note the steep terrain and windy conditions, and how the fire is 

burning on both sides of Leslie Gulch Road.

Fire Escapes Initial Attack

Once the fire escaped Initial Attack, the objective was to go direct 

where possible and burn out from dozer lines. The initial Incident 

Status Summary (ICS) 209 report the morning of June 30 stated the 

fire had reached 4,000 acres in the first eight hours.

At that time, because both the local and National Preparedness Level 

was 3, available fire suppression resources were not constrained. Air 

support was available and used effectively with Heavy Air Tankers 

and Single Engine Air Tankers loading nearby in Ontario and Boise.

June 29 Forecast 

Weather conditions on the Leslie Gulch Fire were a concern because 

of the wind, low relative humidity, and high temperatures.

At approximately 3:30 p.m. on June 29, fire managers asked the 

National Weather Service for a Spot Weather Forecast. At that time, 

observations on the fire, at an elevation of 4,800 feet, included: 

temperature 99 degrees Fahrenheit; winds southeasterly 8-10 mph; 

and relative humidity of 18 percent with 50 percent cloud cover.

The subsequent National Weather Service forecast stated: “Hot with 

a slight chance of thunderstorms, moist southerly flow aloft. Slight 

chance of a shower or thunderstorm this evening. Thunderstorms will be high-based, so outflow winds 

will be the main concern...with gusts to 50 mph possible.”

On July 1, an additional request for a Spot Weather Forecast recorded a 106 degree Fahrenheit 

temperature and 12 percent relative humidity.

Leslie Gulch Fire

Date of Ignition

June 28, 2015

Cause

 Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Bureau of Land Management

Responding Initial Attack Resources

1 Type 3 Incident Commander, 1 Type 

1 Crew, 1 Type 2 Initial Attack Crew, 2 

Dozers, 2 Water Tenders, 5 Type 4 

Engines, and 1 Air Tanker

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 3

Local: PL 3

Acres Burned

8,688 Acres (as of 7/2/15)

Estimated Cost

Original estimate

$850,000 (as of 7/2/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Primarily Bureau of Land Management 

with scattered private ranches

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 165

Overhead: 1 Type 3 Incident 

Commander

Crews: 3

Engines: 18

Helicopters: 3

Heavy Air Tankers and

Single Engine Air Tankers

Structures Destroyed

None

Cooperators

Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of 

Land Management, U.S. Forest Service
197
198

The Leslie Gulch Fire Environment

The remote Owyhee Canyonlands area in which the Leslie 

Gulch Fire occurred is known for its steep and rugged 

terrain. There is only one access road into this area.

In 1983, more than 11,000 acres were designated by the 

BLM as an Area of Critical Environmental Concern (ACEC) 

for this area’s rare plants, rock formations, and California 

bighorn sheep population. Five plants are unique and 

found only in Leslie Gulch.

Three wilderness study areas are also located within the 

Owyhee Canyonlands. In addition, a wild horse 

management area is nearby. While most of the area is 

designated as “General Priority Habitat” for sage-grouse, 

the Leslie Gulch Fire did burn into some “High Priority” 

sage-grouse habitat on the extreme southern portion of 

the fire.

The Owyhee Reservoir is positioned at the bottom of the 

canyon on the west. A boat ramp provides access to the 

reservoir at Leslie Gulch Campground. At the time of the 

Leslie Gulch Fire, livestock were on the range.

Ironically, Leslie Gulch was named for local rancher Hiram 

E. Leslie, who was struck by lightning here in 1882.

7 Day Significant Fire Potential

The lightning that ignited the Leslie Gulch Fire was 

predicted in the “7 Day Significant Fire Potential” report

(shown on right) that was released on June 27.

This report indicated:

“The combination of instability, dry fuels, and lightning 

starts will create heavy Initial Attack activity across the 

region today and Sunday before conditions moderate on 

Monday.”

Large Fire Potential

In the Leslie Gulch area, cheatgrass was abundant due to 

May precipitation followed by warm temperatures.

See graph on next page that indicates this Large Fire 

potential on the Energy Release Component graphic for the 

Predictive Services Area 12 Southeastern Oregon 

Sagebrush-Steppe.

The Leslie Gulch area in the spring. Photo 

courtesy of the Bureau of Land Management.
199

Note how this graphic indicates that at the end of June the fire area

was well above the threshold for Large Fire development.

Critically Dry Fuels

The graph on right depicts the 

extremely dry condition of 

1,000 hour fuels (3 to 6-inch 

size) in the southeastern Oregon 

Predictive Services Area 12 

Sagebrush-Steppe.

Even early in the 2015 fire 

season, at the end of June, 

these fuels were well below 

historical averages and primed 

for potentially Large Fire 

development.
200

Effective Attack

The Type 3 Incident Management Team ultimately burned out a mid-slope road following a retardant 

line built by Single Engine Air Tankers while Heavy Air Tankers dropped retardant on the head of the 

fire—successfully slowing its forward movement toward the south.

A dozer line was then constructed, burned-out, and held from the mid-slope road toward the Owyhee 

River to the west. Three helicopters supported these efforts. 

No injuries were reported at any time during the course of this fire.

On July 4, the Leslie Gulch Fire was 100 percent contained. Its final size was 8,688 acres.

Leslie Gulch Resources

Date Acres

Percent 

Contained Personnel Crews Engines Helos Dozers

Water 

Tenders

Cost to

Date

Jun.30 4,000 0 65 2 5 2 2 2 $500K

Jul. 1 9,000 30 100 1 13 4 3 3 $700K

Jul. 2 8,688 70 165 3 18 3 2 4 $750K

Jul. 3 8,688 90 103 1 14 2 ? ? $800K

Jul. 4 8,688 100 62 1 7 0 0 3 $850K

Shaded boxes denote highest resource totals on the fire.

No structures were lost. (Four structures were located within three miles of the fire.)
201

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1XxAWeM Appendix N – Canyon Creek Complex 

Regional Overview

Northwest Coordination Center Outlook:

July through September 2015 – “Above Average Risk for 

Large Costly Fires is Expected”

The three-month forecast outlook for the Pacific Northwest 

Region that was distributed on June 1 from the Northwest 

Coordination Center informed:

“The risk of large, costly fires (mainly from lightning) is expected to 

increase dramatically in July and continue into August as 

temperatures increase with summer heat in fire season. Above 

average risk for large, costly fires is expected across the entire 

northwest geographic area due to drought, warm temperatures, and 

low snowpack. Even typical amounts of lightning in July and August 

could prove problematic.”

Red Flag Warning for Abundant Lightning

On August 8, 2015 the Pendleton, Oregon National Weather 

Service Forecast Office issues a Red Flag Warning for: 

“Thunderstorms producing abundant lightning from 11 a.m. on 

Sunday, August 9 through 11 p.m. on Tuesday, August 11.”

Starting on August 10, for three consecutive days, lightning storms 

impact the Malheur National Forest—as well as all of eastern 

Oregon. Beginning at 4 a.m. on Wednesday, August 12, another 

new lightning storm passes over the Malheur National Forest.

August 10 and 11

The Monday morning August 10 National Weather Forecast states:

“Red Flag Warning in effect until 11 p.m. Tuesday for 

thunderstorms producing abundant lightning in all fire weather 

zones.” The Red Flag Warning is implemented on Tuesday, August 

11 with “a Red Flag Warning in effect until 11 p.m. for 

thunderstorms producing abundant lightning in all fire weather 

zones. “There is also acknowledgement that this warning might 

have to be extended. 

August 12

Prepared for the Worst

Lightning continues into Wednesday morning. Forecasted 

temperatures were 87-94 degrees with relative humidity of 9 to 14 

percent. The Malheur National Forest Fire Management Officer is prepared for the worst.

On August 12—in anticipation of new fire starts—the Malheur National Forest Fire Management Officer 

reports for duty at 5:30 a.m. As expected, new fire starts are reported from the Forest’s five staffed fire 

lookouts. The phones at the John Day Interagency Dispatch Center are lighting up.

(This Canyon Creek Complex Fire Narrative Timeline Continued on Page 205)

Canyon Creek Complex

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

U.S. Forest Service

Ignition Date

August 12, 2015

Cause

Lightning

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 4

Local: PL 4

Acres Burned

110,422 acres (as of 10/8/15)

Estimated Cost

$31,192,000 (as of 10/8/15)

Land Jurisdictions

U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land 

Management, Oregon Department 

of Forestry

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 1,026

Crews: 26

Engines: 82

Helicopters: 9

Structures Destroyed

54

Cooperators

U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land 

Management, Oregon Department 

of Forestry, Oregon State Fire 

Marshal, Grant County Sheriff, Grant 

County Road Department, Oregon 

Department of Transportation, 

Oregon National Guard, several rural 

fire departments
202

B A C K G R O U N D

Large Fires in the Southern Blue Mountains – the Canyon Creek Complex Fire Area

Portland, Oregon is home to the Northwest Coordination Center for wildfires in Oregon and 

Washington. It is one of 10 centers nationwide. Each center has a Predictive Services Unit that provides 

daily products to alert field managers of fire potential and 7-day as well as monthly prediction outlooks. 

The Predictive Services Team also analyzes data to discern trends for each of the 12 Predictive Service 

Zones in Oregon and nine zones in Washington.

An analysis of fires was conducted by the Northwest Coordination Center for the Blue Mountains and 

Strawberry Mountains (area NW11, the Canyon Creek Complex Fire area) from 2004 through 2011.

During this eight-year period, there were 2,640 fires with 29 becoming Large Fires. (For the purposes of 

this analysis, they defined Large Fires as 1,200 acres and larger.) Twenty-two of these Large Fires were 

started by lightning. Overall, 1.1 percent of all fires during this period became Large Fires (see table 

below).

June 15-30 July August September October 1-15

Large 

Fires

0 10 14 5 0

Total Fires 138 738 1,215 401 148

The earliest Large Fire occurred on July 13 and the latest was on September 16—both in 2007. In 2015, 

the Corner Creek Fire (29,660 acres south of Dayville) ignited on June 29—two weeks earlier than the 

fires examined from 2004 through 2011.

What are the Conditions 

that Promote Large Fire 

Development?

This 2004-2011 

Predictive Services 

Analysis Report states:

“High ERC values and 

prolonged drying is the 

best indicator of Large 

Fire growth.”

The Energy Release 

Component (ERC) is a 

measure of potential 

energy available to a fire 

and serves as an 

indicator of longer-term 

fuel dryness, especially 

large fuels and live fuels.

The graph on right 

shows the ERC in Predictive Services Area NW11 (Blue Mountains) for 2015. This is the Canyon Creek 

Complex Fire area. Notice that from mid-June to early July—and again in August—the ERC was well 

above historical averages and the Large Fire threshold level.

Lightning

This analysis report continues: “Lightning episodes that produce Large Fires [in NW11] occur, on 

average, 2-3 times per year. There is a strong correlation between Large Fires and lightning amount in 

conjunction with fuel moisture. “The entire area was in a severe and prolonged drought.”
203
204
205

12 New Fire Starts

(Continued from Page 201)

By the afternoon of August 12, local firefighting resources have responded to 12 new fire starts across the 

Malheur National Forest—stretching from south of Seneca to Indian Rock, located on the Forest’s north 

side.

The Mason Springs Fire, located north of the community of Seneca, and the Berry Creek Fire, located south 

of the town of John Day in the Strawberry Mountain Wilderness near private lands, are two of these 12 new 

fire starts that receive aggressive Initial Attack response.

Barrage of Aerial and Ground Resources Attack Fires

Immediate initial suppression response to the Berry Creek and Mason Springs fires include both aerial 

and ground resources:

 One Heavy Air Tanker 

 Three Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATS),

 Two Helicopters with buckets,

 Smokejumpers,

 Rappellers,

 Three Engines,

 One 20-Person Hand Crew,

 One Dozer,

 Two Water Tenders.

This barrage of resources—immediately on scene—requires and receives a Type 4 Incident Commander. 

Wednesday Aug. 12

10:06 a.m.

Expedited Approval Allows Chainsaws, Helicopters, and Air Tankers

to Help Suppression Efforts Inside Strawberry Mountain Wilderness

At 10:06 a.m., smokejumpers confirm that the Berry Creek Fire is 

located within the Strawberry Mountain Wilderness Area. They 

request special permission to use chainsaws for fire suppression. 

Twelve minutes later, the Malheur National Forest Supervisor has 

officially approved this use of chainsaws. Eight minutes later, aerial 

retardant use and helicopter water bucket drops are also approved 

to be used within the Wilderness area boundaries to help 

suppression efforts on the Berry Creek Fire.

11 a.m.

Air Tankers Working Both Fires

A total of three Single Engine Air Tankers are now dropping 

retardant on both the Berry Creek and Mason Springs fires. 

At 11:12 a.m., a Heavy Air Tanker is supporting suppression efforts with retardant drops on the Berry

Creek Fire.

2:06 p.m.

Mason Springs Fire Surrounded by Retardant and Dozer Line

The Mason Springs Fire is now completely surrounded by both retardant and dozer lines. A Helicopter 

with bucket is working to cool down the fire’s interior.

Pacific Northwest and Nation

at Second-Highest Severity Level

On August 12, both the Pacific Northwest 

Region and National fire Preparedness 

Levels are both at Level 4—the second 

highest severity level. In Oregon and 

Washington, 15 Large Fires (a wildfire of 

100 acres or more in timber or 300 acres 

or more in grass/sage) are active with

5,947 firefighters assigned. Across the 

nation, 62 active Large Fires are burning 

with 20,747 firefighting resources 

assigned. The severe lightning storm that 

impacted the Malheur National Forest 

area, also establishes new fire starts 

throughout the region—creating an 

additional draw of firefighting resources.
206

5:41 p.m.

Helicopter Reassigned to Berry Creek Fire

At 5:41 p.m.—because the situation and status is looking good on the Mason Springs Fire—the 

Helicopter is reassigned to help with suppression efforts on the nearby Berry Creek Fire.

9:10 p.m.

Aggressive Fire Behavior Jumps Containment Lines;

Additional Resources and Type 3 Incident Management Team Ordered

A spot fire on the Berry Creek Fire flares up into the tree crowns and jumps the retardant and control 

lines. During this critical time—due to this aggressive fire behavior that exceeds established 

containment lines—all resources on the fire are forced to pull off. In addition, a firefighter suffering from 

heat exhaustion is transported by ground ambulance to a hospital.

Additional aircraft support is ordered for the following morning. The Type 4 Incident Commander also 

requests a Type 3 Incident Management Team to manage this escalating situation.

A Very Large Air Tanker (VLAT) drops retardant in the Pine Creek drainage on August 26.

Photo by Traci Weaver, National Park Service.
207

Thursday Aug. 13

8:28 a.m.

Additional Resources Arrive;

Strong Winds Could Create Critical Fire Conditions

The National and Northwest Preparedness Level moves to 5—the 

highest severity level. Firefighting resources are scarce.

The National Weather Service forecast states: “Fire weather 

watch for strong winds and low relative humidity Friday morning 

through Friday evening.” “Hot and dry conditions expected again 

today.” “The strong winds will create possible critical fire 

conditions and a Fire Weather Watch has been issued...”

In the afternoon, winds are measured as high as 43 mph. The 

Berry Creek Fire, now estimated to be 50 acres in size, is 

actively burning on its west flank. The Mason Springs Fire is 

now approximately 10 acres in size.

Once the Type 3 Incident Management Team is ordered for the Berry Creek Fire, Oregon Department of 

Forestry resources respond. This immediate response includes: an Operations Section Chief, two 

Structure Protection Engines, one Dozer, and a five-person Hand Crew Squad.

10:30 a.m.

Air Tankers and Ground Crews Continue

Their Suppression Assignments

By 10:30 a.m., a Very Large Air Tanker (VLAT) and Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATs) are providing aerial 

support to the Berry Creek Fire.

In addition, hand crews continue with line construction on the Berry Creek Fire and are also reinforcing 

fire lines on the Mason Springs Fire.

2:04 p.m.

Resources Respond to Spot Fire on Mason Springs Fire;

the Type 3 IMT Now Managing Both Fires

At 2:04 p.m. on the Mason Springs Fire, a spot fire is found 400 feet from the containment line. (See 

photo at top of next page.)

Preparedness Level Upgraded

to Most Severe Rating 

Due to extreme fire activity that is 

depleting fire suppression resources in 

the Pacific Northwest, as well as 

throughout the West, on August 13 the 

National Preparedness Level is 

upgraded to the most severe rating: a 

Level 5. 

Preparedness Level 5: “Geographic Areas are 

experiencing major incidents which have the potential 

to exhaust all agency fire resources. Eighty percent of 

Type 1 and Type 2 Incident Management Teams and 

crews are committed, as well as the majority of other 

National Resources.”

Canyon 

Mountain as 

seen from John 

Day at 6:15 p.m. 

on August 14.
208

Thirty-six minutes later, a

Helicopter equipped with a 

bucket is dropping water on 

this spot fire.

Within 24 minutes—at 3:04 

p.m.—two Single Engine Air 

Tankers are also dropping 

retardant on this spot fire. 

One Dozer from John Day has 

also responded.

The determination is made 

that the local Type 3 Incident 

Management Team that has

assumed command of the 

Berry Creek Fire will also be 

responsible for managing the 

Mason Springs Fire.

Air resources continue to be 

shared between these two 

fires.

5:32 p.m.

Extreme Fire Activity; Level 2 Evacuations Recommended;

Winds Push Mason Springs Fire to 500 acres; Fire Jumps Highway 395

The Dry Soda Lookout is now reporting winds with gusts up to 26 mph. Fire activity is becoming extreme. Eight 

minutes after this announcement, the fire lookout reports: “Winds 5-10 mph out of the SSW with 85 degree 

temperature, and relative humidity 9 percent.”

The Berry Creek Fire is now 60 acres and the Mason Springs Fire is generating multiple spots that have moved 

across the ridge.

Level 2 Evacuations are recommended for residences in the Canyon Creek area.

(A “Level 2 Evacuation” order—as determined by the Oregon State Sheriffs’ Association, Oregon State 

Fire Marshal’s Office, Oregon Office of Emergency Management, Oregon Fire Chief’s Association, and 

Oregon Department of Forestry—means “BE SET” to evacuate: “YOU MUST PREPARE TO LEAVE AT A 

MOMENT’S NOTICE. This level indicates there is significant danger to your area and residents should 

either voluntarily relocate to a shelter or with family/friends outside of the affected area, or if choosing 

to remain, be ready to evacuate at a moment’s notice.” Evacuation Level 1: Be aware of the situation—

BE READY; Evacuation Level 3: Evacuate immediately—GO.)
209

The Grant County Sheriff is notified and deputies immediately respond. But, at the same time, the 

Mason Springs Fire is already moving very rapidly toward Highway 395.

By the end of the day, the Mason Springs Fire has escalated to 500 acres in size and jumps Highway 

395—moving toward the residences in the Canyon Creek area. A Type 2 Incident Management Team is 

ordered to manage both fires.

Friday Aug. 14

10:35 a.m.

Fire Runs Down Canyon Creek;

Main Priority: Structure Protection;

Type 1 Incident Management Team Ordered

National Weather Service forecasters predict: “Red Flag 

Warning in effect from noon today to 11 p.m. for strong 

winds and low relative humidity... A strong cold front 

bringing windy conditions to most of the forecast area...

On August 13, a Very Large Air Tanker (DC-10 jet) helps suppression efforts with a retardant drop on what 

will become known as the Canyon Creek Complex.

“I believe we did everything we 

could with the resources we had 

available to put those two fires 

out. Sometimes Mother Nature 

has other plans.”

Steve Beverlin, Forest Supervisor

Malheur National Forest

In the East Oregonian newspaper

on Sept. 16

The Canyon Creek Complex Fire burns on 

Sugarloaf Peak west of Dry Soda Lookout on 

August 14. Photo by Dave Hannibal.
210

Firestorm moving down Canyon Creek along both sides of U.S. Highway 395 toward Canyon City.

Photo by Grant County Undersheriff Todd McKinley.

Sudden wind shifts are possible with cold front passage.”

By mid-morning, winds are from the south and southwest up 

to 30 mph—with 43 mph winds recorded in the afternoon.

That afternoon, the fire spreads down Canyon Creek and 

U.S. Highway 395 into Canyon City where more than 500 

residences are threatened. A total of 39 residences are 

destroyed and 50 are damaged.

At this time, the State Fire Marshal arrives on the fire. A 

Type 1 Incident Management Team is ordered.

Level 3 Evacuations are ordered for Adams Drive, Dog Creek, 

Marysville, and Pine Creek.

The Red Cross establishes a shelter in Mt. Vernon. Highway 

395 is closed.

A Joint Information Center is established at the Malheur 

National Forest main office.

V I D E O S 

Three Videos

of Canyon Creek

Fire Column

https://drive.google.com/a/firenet.go

v/folderview?id=0B4w6Si7DPJludTN6

OHBFU1R3UnM&usp=sharing

Watch the column building and 

moving on August 14 as captured by a 

camera attached to the tower at the 

Grant County Regional Airport

in John Day.
211

Volunteer Firefighters 

Answer the Call

On August 14, Oregon 

Governor Kate Brown 

invokes the Emergency 

Conflagration Act which 

provides the State Fire 

Marshal the authority to 

request firefighting 

resources from cities, 

counties, and fire 

protection districts 

throughout Oregon. 

The south/southwest 

winds have increased 

significantly, up to 

approximately 30 mph. 

Extreme fire behavior is

exhibited throughout the 

day on both the Mason 

Springs and Berry Creek 

fires.

Fire managers and firefighters continue to do everything they can to stop both fires. These resources 

now include: Heavy Air Tankers, an additional 20-Person Hand Crew, and two additional Oregon 

Department of Forestry Division Supervisors.

The main priority on both fires is now Structure Protection. 

12:02 p.m.

12 Engines with 32 Firefighters Respond

By 12:02 p.m., the City of John Day’s Dispatch Office is notified. All Grant County fire departments are 

paged to respond. This response includes: 12 Engines and 32 Volunteer Firefighters.

Between noon and 1 p.m., the following fire departments are responding to help the Canyon City Fire 

Department: John Day, Dayville, Mt. Vernon, Prairie City, Monument, and Long Creek.

As these resources arrive, these structure fire responders are stationed starting at Mile Marker 7—the 

center of John Day—and are staggered north toward Canyon City.

12:45 p.m.

Structure Protection on South End of Fire

Around 12:45 p.m., the Mt. Vernon Fire Department Chief arrives with two Engines.

They are sent to the south end of the Mason Springs Fire for structure protection up Corral Gulch Road 

and the J-Bar-L Ranch, located just south of Canyon City.

The Black Mesa Interagency Hotshot Crew burns out along roads to reduce 

fuels and increase the width of the fire control line. Photo by Traci Weaver, 

National Park Service.
212

Canyon Creek Fire photos by Grant County Undersheriff Todd McKinley.
213

“The mutual aid agreement with the ODF [Oregon 

Department of Forestry] that allows local fire departments 

to utilize U.S. Forest Service resources was invaluable. 

Without support from that helicopter, I believe that all of 

Canyon City would have been lost.”

Matt Turner

Canyon City Fire Chief and Acting John Day Fire Chief

1:30 p.m.

500 Canyon City Residences Threatened; 39 Destroyed

Around 1:30 p.m., a spot fire at Eagle Peak prompts the Mt. Vernon Fire Chief to assign two Engines and 

one 20-Person Hand Crew. The Chief also requests a Helicopter with water bucket for air support.

Matt Turner, Canyon City Fire Chief and Acting John Day Fire Chief, believes that preplanning with a 

mutual aid agreement helped save Canyon City.

Chief Turner explains: “The mutual aid agreement with the ODF [Oregon Department of Forestry] that 

allows local fire departments to utilize U.S. Forest Service resources was invaluable. Without support 

from that helicopter, I believe that all of Canyon City would have been lost.”

Despite these efforts, however, due to the extreme fire activity that occurs over the course of this 

afternoon, 39 residences are destroyed. The two fires burn together, representing an estimated total of 

22,000 acres.

“We are saddened by this huge loss to the community,” said Steve Beverlin, Forest Supervisor of the 

Malheur National Forest. “Our hearts go out to all the families and friends. When things like this happen 

to our neighbors and our community, it’s a loss that everybody feels.”

Seamless Coordination Between Different Agencies

“All of the firefighters who were on the fire that day feel terrible about the loss of homes. We all took 

that news very hard,” assures Dave Hannibal, Base Manager with Grayback Forestry, a wildfire and 

emergency services contractor. “The seamless coordination between the different agencies all working 

as one was better than I have ever seen. The amount of radio traffic was fast-paced and professionally 

done. I was left very impressed by all of our local resources’ quick actions.”

“If we’d had 1,000 extra firefighters,” Hannibal said, “we’d have only been more likely to have some 

serious injuries, or worse. The fire still would have claimed what it did. Our hearts go out to all who lost 

their homes in this fire.”

11 p.m.

Around 11:00 p.m., local resources are released for the night.
214

“We are truly saddened by this event and the loss that the 

community has endured. Many have come forward to help and 

provide assistance. We are grateful for the incredible efforts 

made by the firefighters, as well as contributions from the 

community and the amazing support offered by the Red Cross 

and others who care.

The Forest Service is fully committed to moving forward with 

rehabilitation efforts that will contribute to the healing of the 

forest and, hopefully, the people.” 

Steve Beverlin, Forest Supervisor

Malheur National Forest

Saturday Aug. 15

The local Type 3 Incident Management Team is still in command. The priority for all firefighting efforts is

to provide structure protection.

Forecasters predict light winds with mostly sunny skies, but smoky conditions with temperatures up to 

84 degrees and relative humidity at 13-18 percent occur during this day. 

Once again, extreme fire behavior is exhibited throughout the day.

The Engines and units from the Canyon City, John Day, Mt. Vernon, Prairie City and Long Creek fire 

departments return for patrol and standby duties.

At 8 p.m. that evening, these fire departments are released for local fire protection and response.

Dozer lines are advanced and strengthened south of Canyon City, with other resources focused on 

flanking the fire. A helitorch burning operation was planned, but cancelled due to the inversion. 

Level 3 Evacuations are in effect for Dog Creek, Marysville South, Pine Creek, Canyon Creek, and 

Edgewood Drive.

Level 2 Evacuations are in effect for Laycock Creek, Nans Rock Road, Marysville North, Adams Drive, and 

West Bench Road.

An emergency closure is issued for the Strawberry Mountain Wilderness. 

An infrared flight overnight determined that the fire had grown to 34,000 acres the previous day.
215

Nothing Left

“Nationally, there are no more trained fire crews in the system that are 

shown as available. That’s true of Air Tankers and Engines as well.”

Koshare Eagle, Spokesperson

Northwest Coordination Center,

speaking to Oregon Public Broadcasting on August 15

Sunday Aug. 16

6 a.m.

Type 1 Incident Management Team and State Fire Marshal Team

Assumes Unified Command

This is another day of sunny and smoky skies with winds less than 5 mph and temperatures of 83 

degrees, with humidity at 15 percent with good recovery overnight.

The fire has grown to 37,119 acres. The Canyon Creek Complex is now the highest priority fire in the 

nation. (It will maintain that distinction for a total of 12 days.) Resources are increasing on the fire with: 

493 Personnel, 10 Crews, and 35 Engines. (Dozers, Water Tenders, and Air Tankers are not reported in 

daily 209 Situation Reports.)

The fire is transferred to a Type 1 Incident Management Team, the Great Basin Team #1. (Dispatchers

diverted this team to the Canyon Creek Complex when it was enroute to another Large Fire assignment

in Washington.) A Unified Command was established with the Oregon State Fire Marshal Red Team and 

Oregon Department of Forestry.

Over the next four days, due to dry fuels and difficult terrain, the fire grows an average of 6,500 acres 

each day—moving to the east/southeast.

Monday Aug. 17

Nationally, fire managers are now assigned to 105 Large Fires. Thirty-five of these fires are located in 

Oregon and Washington. At this time, the Canyon Creek Complex has burned 40,132 acres.

The weather today is similar to yesterday. Winds are forecasted to be from the northwest at 3-7 mph. 

Temperatures are 85 degrees with relative humidity at 8-13 percent.

The terrain is limiting the use of Dozers. Crews are being supported by Helicopters. Fire activity 

increased today on the south flank near Dry Soda Lookout. Crews worked through the night 

strengthening fire lines and implementing structure protection measures on the fire’s north flank. 

Aircraft continue to be used aggressively.

Two community meetings are held at the high school for those who lost their homes. Another meeting is 

held for the general public.

Level 3 Evacuation orders—“Evacuate immediately: GO”—are in effect for Dog Creek south of 

Marysville, Marysville South, Pine Creek-Gravel Pit South, Canyon Creek, and Edgewood Drive.
216

Level 2 Evacuation 

orders—“BE SET: YOU 

MUST PREPARE TO 

LEAVE AT A MOMENT’S 

NOTICE”—are in effect 

for Laycock Creek, 

Adams Drive, Nans Rock 

Road, West Bench Road, 

Luce Creek Marysville 

North, Pine Creek–Gravel 

Pit, North Dog Creek 

North of Marysville

Tuesday Aug. 18

Once again, the weather 

is similar to the previous 

day with winds out of the 

north to 6 mph with a 

light inversion layer in 

the morning hours. With 

winds from the north, 

the focus is on the fire’s 

southern flank.

Several homes are saved due to the direct action by fire crews in the Canyon Creek area.

Evacuation Levels were upgraded from a 1 to a 2 in the following areas: Adam, Eagle Peak, Pineview, 

Edgewood, Marysville, Gardner Ranch, Buckhorn, and Little Pine. 

The fire is burning actively in Vance Creek.

Wednesday Aug. 19

Firefighters concentrate efforts to check fire expansion and protect houses and private lands. Priority 

areas are identified around the Wickiup Campground and Forest Road 3925 areas on the fire’s south 

side as well as the Fall Mountain area to the west.

Oregon Governor Kate Brown meets with firefighters in the afternoon and announces that the Oregon 

National Guard is being called-up to help.

The upper end of Pine Creek from the road closure near the rock pit remains under a Level 3 Evacuation.

Thursday Aug. 20

A Red Flag Warning is issued for gusty westerly winds and low humidity from noon until the next day at 

11 p.m.

Successful Initial Attack on New Fire

At 4:45 p.m. on August 20, air and ground resources respond to a new fire, the Jerry’s Draw Fire. This

fire started near the community of Prairie City, located northeast of the Canyon Creek Complex. Due to 

aggressive Initial Attack, the fire is successfully contained at 161 acres.

An Engine works along Canyon Creek Road on August 18. The southern end of 

the fire, including the vicinity of the Wickiup Campground and Forest Road 

3925, is a priority today for limiting fire growth and protecting structures.

Photo by Lori Iverson, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
217

On the Canyon Creek Complex, fire activity is greatest—driven by the west winds—on the southeast 

portion of the fire. The fire remains north of Highway 16. Fire managers expect the fire to slow when it 

reaches the 2012 Parrish Cabin Fire footpint—due to reduced fuels in that area.

Firefighters prepped structures and identified water sources in and around the Lake Creek Organization 

Camp.

The fire is now 53,900 acres. Resources on the fire: 939 Personnel, 24 Crews, 66 Engines, and 4 

Helicopters.

Friday Aug. 21

The Red Flag Warning for gusty west winds and low humidity from yesterday remains in effect until 11 

p.m. today. The fire has grown approximately 8,000 acres from the previous day. 

The Level 1 Evacuation alert is lifted for the Seneca area, as well as other areas. However, the area 

around the Jerry’s Draw Fire is under Level 1 and 2 Evacuation notices.

The fire laid down as it encountered the area of the 2012 Parrish Cabin Fire. Firefighters utilized existing 

roads and burned out fuels to strengthen lines and slow the main fire’s progress. They kept the fire west 

of Forest Road 1530 near Parrish Cabin and expect to connect to existing fire lines along Forest Road 15 

in the evening.

The southeastern corner of the fire is once again the suppression priority with the gusty winds from the 

west.

The eastern flank of the fire continues to burn into the Strawberry Mountain Wilderness and remains

largely unstaffed.

The fire’s northern flank is prepared with structure protection and contingency lines—should they be 

needed.

On August 20, a large smoke column generated from active fire behavior in the southeast portion of the 

Canyon Creek Complex was visible throughout the area.
218

The fire’s west and southwest flanks are in mop-up status. Crews here have been gridding for hotspots 

to strengthen fire lines. U.S. Highway 395 remains closed to traffic.

Saturday Aug. 22

Today, weather forecasters from the National Weather Service, Pendleton Office noted: “An upper level

trough will be offshore Sunday through most of next week. This will result in a southwest flow aloft. This 

change in wind direction may impact fires at the mid and higher elevations and will direct smoke back to 

a northerly direction.”

Firefighters completed a line around the Jerry’s Draw Fire and several spot fires. No structures were lost.

In spite of the forecast, fire activity is limited to creeping, smoldering, and some individual and group 

tree torching. The Canyon Creek Complex is currently estimated at 68,545 acres with approximately 832 

personnel assigned to this incident.

Firefighters make excellent progress on the Canyon Creek and Jerry’s Draw fires today by taking 

advantage of the change in weather, which brought cooler temperatures and reduced winds throughout 

the area.

Crews continue to patrol and secure hand and dozer lines and mop-up along the fire’s western and 

northern perimeters. Structure protection is in place near the fire’s northeastern flank and firefighters 

continue to watch that area closely.

Sunday Aug. 23

There is a Red Flag Warning in effect until 9 p.m. Monday. Warm, dry, unstable conditions will likely 

cause increased activity on existing fires. As this weather influence moves off to the east on Monday, an 

increase in westerly surface winds is expected.

U.S. Highway 395 opened to traffic from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. with a pilot car providing an escort for vehicles.

Burn out operations on the fire’s southeast corner are successful and tied the fire into the wilderness. 

Successful containment also continues on the north and northwest fire perimeters. Crews secure hand

lines to Mud Springs. Despite smoky conditions, night operations continue.

Monday Aug. 24

Red Flag Warnings remain in effect until 9 p.m. this evening for warm, dry and unstable conditions with 

a Haines Index of 5.

The fire’s highest suppression priority is now its northeast portion. Firefighters are pre-positioned along 

the fire’s northern section and inside the residential areas of Upper Pine Creek and Upper Dog Creek. 

They spend the day patrolling, improving and holding contingency lines and closely monitoring these 

areas. 

Fire size is estimated at 73,210 acres, 29 percent contained, with 665 personnel assigned.

An advance party for the Oregon National Guard arrives and coordinates with the Great Basin Incident 

Management Team to ensure a smooth and efficient integration of military personnel into suppression 

efforts.

Prairie City receives steady smoke throughout the day. Areas south and west of the fire had less smoke.
219

Tuesday Aug. 25

The weather today is moderate with temperatures in the 80s and winds less than 8 mph. But, as 

indicated in the quote below, there is clear direction on anticipated resource needs on the northeastern 

section of line:

“Operations shifted pre-identified resources to the Pine Creek area from areas of the fire 

with less activity in order to bolster suppression capabilities. Operations established a 

staging area for those resources to be poised along contingency lines for structure 

protection. Sunday’s significant fire run that progressed into the Norton Fork drainage 

stalled after reaching the Bear Skull Ridge area, which allowed Hotshots to improve 

indirect contingency lines toward Dog Creek. This is our highest priority area.”

Taken from Inciweb: Canyon Creek Complex Morning Fact Sheet for Tuesday, August 25

The Office of State Fire Marshal redeployed two Task Forces (10 Engines) from Umatilla and Deschutes 

counties to provide structural protection near John Day.

These Task Forces are managed by a limited Incident Management Team. Crews are prepared to remain 

on scene until the structural threat is mitigated.

An Air Attack plane monitors the Canyon Creek Complex's progress in the Pine Creek

community area on August 26. Photo by Lori Iverson, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
220

Wednesday Aug. 26

While there are no “official” watches or warnings for today, the forecast calls for: “Southwest transport 

winds to 20 mph”. Indian and Pine Creek drainages are affected. By the afternoon, long-range spotting is 

occurring. Ten Air Tankers are supporting Ground Crews, Engines, and Dozers.

Firefighters successfully stop the fire spread from reaching Prairie City.

From the “Canyon Creek Complex Evening Update for Wed. Aug. 26”:

“In anticipation of today’s conditions—high winds, low humidity, and high temperatures—firefighters 

focused their efforts on the northeast corner of the fire. Firefighters remained stationed in strategic 

locations along the northern section of the fire and in the residential areas of Upper Pine Creek and 

Upper Dog Creek. They spent the day improving and connecting contingency

lines and monitoring the area closely.”

Late afternoon winds, along with dry conditions, caused long-range spotting north of Indian Creek. The 

fire moved down Pine Creek, triggering evacuations. Resources responded quickly and additional aircraft 

arrived on scene.

Fire activity also became very active in the Indian Creek Butte area, adding to the large smoke column 

that appeared in the afternoon. Another large column is anticipated tomorrow. No burn out operations 

are conducted today.

After the fire made a push to the north/northeast, the following areas were raised to a Level 3 

Evacuation: Upper Pine Creek, Upper Dog Creek south of Little Dog Creek, and Gardiner Ranch Lane. 

Lower Dog Creek, Lower Pine, and Lower Indian Creek are in a Level 2 Evacuation status.

Tonight, night crews will continue suppression activities in the northeast area of the fire.

Troops from the Oregon National Guard arrived today and will begin supporting the fire suppression 

efforts tomorrow. The Guard is stationed at the Lake Creek Organizational Camp. 

The 165-acre Jerry’s Draw Fire is 100 percent contained and will be in a patrol status-only tomorrow. 

Resources are reassigned to assist with suppression activities on the northeast corner of the Canyon 

Creek Complex. 

On August 26, the Canyon Creek Complex grows an additional 11,000 acres.

Thursday Aug. 27

From the “Canyon Creek Complex Evening Update for Thursday Aug. 27”:

Hot, Dry Weather and Winds Increase Fire Activity, Similar Conditions Today

Current Size: 85,960 acres

Percent Containment: 44%

Number of Personnel: 715

Types of resources: 2 Type 1 Crews, 8 Type 2 Crews, 7 Helicopters, 67 Engines, 14 Dozers,

21 Water Tenders, 11 Skidgines

Canyon Creek Complex Recent Activities:

Canyon Creek

• Afternoon winds coupled with hot and dry conditions fanned the eastern portion down from 

Norton Fork to Pine Creek, triggering evacuations. Five Heavy Air Tankers responded quickly and 

dropped seven to ten loads of retardant near residential areas. The initial large column of 
221

smoke, which was visible from John Day and Prairie City, was generated by heavy fire activity 

and long-range spotting north of Indian Creek Butte and then moving down into Pine Creek. 

Later, southwest winds in the valley pushed the fire around the slope to the east and toward

Indian Creek. Weather conditions kept the fire very active into the night and early morning, 

when it finally moderated.

• The small communities of Upper Pine Creek, Gardner Ranch Lane, and Upper Dog Creek south of 

Little Dog Creek were raised to a Level 3 Evacuation. Lower Pine Creek and Dog Creek are in a 

Level 2 Evacuation.

• In anticipation of the unstable conditions, firefighters were pre-positioned in strategic locations 

along the northern section of the fire and in the residential areas of Upper Pine Creek and Upper 

Dog Creek. They spent the day improving and connecting contingency lines and monitoring the 

area closely. In the early evening—when work conditions were safe—they provided critical 

structure protection needs. 

• Southwest winds along the western and southern fire perimeter the last several days enabled 

firefighters to locate and extinguish hot spots. That hard work resulted in 44 percent 

containment and more control lines along the southern and western sides of the fire. 

• Night operations worked to secure the fire line and structures on the northeast flank of the fire.

Jerry’s Draw Fire

This fire, now 100 percent contained, is in patrol status. It has been turned back over to the 

responsible agency, the Oregon Department of Forestry. 

Planned Actions Include:

Canyon Creek

• The fire will be tested again today due to a local Red Flag Warning for hot and dry conditions 

and southwest winds up to 20 mph and an unstable air mass. Anticipate smoke columns and 

active fire movement.

• Fire managers intend to be flexible and strategic, using the right resources at the right time and 

in the right locations. 

• Crews will continue to improve and hold dozer and hand lines along the Malheur National 

Forest’s northern border and provide protection to residences.

• Air Tankers will be used as soon as possible to pre-treat structures in the Indian Creek area. Air 

Tankers will also apply retardant along dozer lines for reinforcement in the Dog Creek area. 

• Crews will do fire suppression repair on the western side of the fire, rehabilitating dozer lines, 

fixing fences, and building water bars to reduce erosion. 

• The Oregon Trails Electric Coop continues to restore power to residences along Highway 395.

From the Evening Briefing:

“The Oregon Fire Marshal’s Team returned with five Task Forces (50 Engines total) to assist with 

structural protection. Firefighters and other resources worked throughout the day constructing fire line 

to protect structures in the Upper Pine Creek and Indian Creek areas.”
222

Friday Aug. 28

Fire managers brace for strong winds forecast for the next day. Fire activity in the Road’s End area 

causes the fire to spot into the Lake Creek drainage near Indian Butte. Firefighters conduct small burn

out operations to hold the fire’s eastern flank.

Level 3 Evacuations are in place at the following locations:

• Upper Pine Creek from Berry Ranch 

Lane and Dean Creek/Baldy Mountain.

• Upper Indian Creek Road from the “Y” 

south (including both Forest Roads 55

and 71).

• Upper Dog Creek, south of Little Dog 

Creek.

• The area west of County Road 62, south 

of the Forest boundary (MP 12) and 

north of Forest Road 16 to the junction 

of Forest Road 15/16. County Road 62 

and Forest Road 16 are open at this 

time.

Saturday Aug. 29

The forecast released today indicates: “Red Flag Warning in effect until 7 p.m. Valleys and lower slopes: 

southwest winds 12 to 18 mph with gusts up to 35 mph (20-foot winds). Transport winds southwest 10 to 

35 mph increasing to 25 to 45 mph in the afternoon.” 

Excerpt from the article “Trial by Fire” by Sean Ellis and Nancy McCarthy that 

appeared in the Blue Mountain Eagle newspaper on Sept 2, 2015:

“Southwest winds began to pick up at 2:30 a.m., pushing the Canyon Creek Fire toward Prairie 

City. By 5 a.m. resources were rushing toward Prairie City—11 Dozers, Water Tenders and 

Engines, 3 Hotshot and 6 other Hand Crews. Mutual aid sirens went off in adjacent communities. 

By 5:30 a.m. the fire was in the grass of the valley. Mandatory evacuations for residences and 

ranches south of U.S. Highway 26 were ordered. An evacuation center was established in Mt. 

Vernon. The advancing fire was stopped by 10 a.m. about 1.5 miles from Prairie City. The 

evacuation order was lifted by 4 p.m.”

Sunday August 30

through Saturday September 5

The weather turned favorable over the next week with cooler temperatures and higher relative 

humidity. Scattered showers began on September 2 with a wetting rain on September 5.

Ultimately, the fire would grow another 9,000 acres to a final size of 110,422 acres. About 91,000 acres 

were on U.S. Forest Service lands with another 17,000 acres of private lands burned. The fire burned 

approximately 48,000 acres in the Strawberry Mountain Wilderness Area.

The Great Basin Type 1 Incident Management Team transferred command to a Type 2 Team on 

September 5.
223

Canyon Creek Complex Resources by Day

This table provides a daily glimpse of fire growth, resources on the fire, and any critical fire weather forecasts 

from the National Weather Service. The greatest number of a resource (during the course of the fire) is 

highlighted in green.

Date

Active

Large

Fires

NWCC

Committed

Fire Teams

In NWCC

Type 1 & 2

Total

Burned

Acres*

Percent

CTN* People Crews Engines

HelicoptersCritical Fire

Weather

Aug. 13 18 5 (T1) & 7 (T2) 500+ 0 82 1 14 0 Strong Winds 

Critical Fire 

Conditions

Aug. 14 24 6 (T1) & 10 (T2) 22,10

0

0 225 5 28 1 Red Flag Warning: 

Strong Winds 

(40+)

Aug. 15 33 6 (T1) & 10 (T2) 34,100 0 225 5 28 1

Aug. 16 30 6 (T1) & 10 (T2) 37,119 0 493 10 35 1

Aug. 17 35 7 (T1) & 12 (T2) 40,132 0 561 13 61 3

Aug. 18 34 8 (T1) & 11 (T2) 43,738 0 649 15 73 6

Aug. 19 33 8 (T1) & 11 (T2) 48,201 10 915 21 82 3

Aug. 20 30 8 (T1) & 12 (T2) 53,900 13 939 24 66 4 Red Flag Warning:

Gusty Winds Low 

RH

Aug. 21 31 7 (T1) & 13 (T2) 61,792 17 902 23 64 4 Red Flag Warning:

Gusty Winds Low 

RH

Aug. 22 30 7 (T1) & 13 (T2) 68,545 23 832 20 56 4 SW flow may 

impact fires on 

mid and higher 

slopes

Aug. 23 34 7 (T1) & 13 (T2) 69,771 29 665 12 53 4 Red Flag Warning:

Warm, Dry,

Unstable Air, 

Wind

Aug. 24 32 6 (T1) & 13 (T2) 73,060 37 707 15 59 4 Red Flag Warning:

Dry, Unstable Air –

SW Wind

Aug. 25 32 8 (T1) & 13 (T2) 74,649 42 699 9 70 4

Aug. 26 32 6 (T1) & 10 (T2) 85,960 44 715 10 67 7

Aug. 27 32 6 (T1) & 11 (T2) 86,199 44 759 14 67 9

Aug. 28 31 6 (T1) & 11 (T2) 87,145 44 853 16 74 9

Aug. 29 31 5 (T1) & 10 (T2) 101,465 49 952 18 82 5 Red Flag Warning: 

SW45,Cold Front

Aug. 30 28 5 (T1) & 11 (T2) 104,741 49 1,026 23 69 5 Isolated showers 

with wind, cooler

Aug.31 28 5 (T1) & 9 (T2) 105,171 49 966 23 54 5

Sep. 1 26 5 (T1) & 7 (T2) 105,684 52 1,014 25 54 5

Sep. 2 26 5 (T1) & 5 (T2) 105,684 57 1,016 25 42 5 Cooler, higher RHs

Sep. 3 23 5 (T1) & 4 (T2) 109,876 66 951 25 38 5

Sep. 4 21 5 (T1) & 5 (T2) 110,383 83 964 26 36 5 50% chance of 

showers

Sep. 5 21 5 (T1) & 5 (T2) 110,383 83 761 18 39 5 Wetting rains

Data sources: daily Situation Reports (209), National Weather Service forecasts, fire progression maps,

and daily briefings.

*“Total Burned Acres” was derived mostly from 209 reports rather than the fire progression map.

*“Percent CTN” is Percent Contained.
224

Key Dates on the Canyon Creek Complex

August 12– Berry Creek and Mason Springs fires 

start; Type 4 Incident Commander assigned.

August 13 – Type 3 Incident Commander

assigned.

August 14 – Strong southerly winds push fire 

down Canyon Creek toward Canyon City.

August 15 – The local Type 3 IMT still has 

command of the fire.

August 16 – Great Basin Type 1 Incident 

Management Team takes command.

September 5 – Rain arrives.

September 6 – Oregon Type 2 Incident 

Management Team takes command.

September 9 – Transfer of command back to 

Malheur National Forest.

Firing operations on the Canyon Creek Complex included protecting a strategic powerline on the fire’s 

west side to avoid damage and interruptions to service.

Photo by Gert Zoutendijk, Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office.
225

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1QqdeQ7 Appendix O – County Line 2 Fire 

Sparks from a Vehicle Ignite Seven Fires

that become the County Line 2 Fire

The County Line 2 Fire started on August 12, 2015 at 

approximately 1:36 p.m. The cause of the fire is under 

investigation. News reports indicate that a vehicle in tow on 

Oregon State Highway 26 produced sparks from either the tow 

chain or the vehicle had lost a tire and its rim was sparking on the 

asphalt.

Before this vehicle can be stopped, this mishap ignites seven fires 

along Highway 26—causing the closure of this primary travel route 

between Portland and Bend, Oregon. 

The County Line 2 Fire grows rapidly through light flashy fuels 

under the influence of strong winds. During Initial Attack on the 

fire, winds recorded at the nearby Warm Springs Base Remote 

Automated Weather Station (RAWS) are between 8 and 13 mph—with gusts up to 22 mph. Prior to 

these fire ignitions, fire danger measured by the Energy Release Component (ERC) for the local area had 

been at or near historic high levels for early August (see graph at top of this page).

This graph from the Warm Springs Base Remote Automated Weather Station 

(RAWS) shows how the Energy Release Component (ERC)—a measurement of 

fire danger indices—is at near historic high levels when the

County Line 2 Fire ignites.

County Line 2 Fire

Ignition Date

August 12, 2015

Cause

Under Investigation

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Warm Springs Agency

Responding Initial Attack Resources

One Type 2 Crew, Six Engines,

Two Dozers

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 4

Local: PL 4

Acres Burned

67,207 acres (as of Oct. 19, 2015)

Estimated Cost 

$16,700,000 (as of Oct. 19, 2015)

Land Jurisdictions

Warm Springs Agency

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 604

Crews: 17

Engines: 18

Helicopters: 3

Structures Destroyed

7

Cooperators

Warm Springs Fire and Safety Rural, 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, National 

Park Service, Bureau of Land 

Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service, State of Oregon Fire 

Marshal’s Office, Oregon 

Department of Transportation 
226
227

Dry Fuels and Winds Push the Fire Beyond Initial Attack Capabilities

While Initial Attack resources quickly respond to these multi-fire starts, wind pushes the fire in 

extremely dry fuels beyond Initial Attack suppression capabilities. Rates of fire spread are reported as 

great as 2.5 miles per hour.

The initial Incident Status Summary report ICS 209 indicates the following resources were assigned to 

this fire: 1 Type 2 Crew, 6 Engines, and 2 Dozers. Severity firefighting resources which had been sent to 

the Cougar Creek Fire in Washington State are recalled by the Warm Springs Agency.

During Initial Attack, two unoccupied homes are destroyed as the fire spreads on both sides of Highway 

26. Later that evening, the highway is reopened. However, a Level 1 Evacuation notice (“Be aware of the 

situation: BE READY”) remains in effect for the many scattered homes located north of the community 

of Warm Springs. 

By late that first evening, the County Line 2 Fire size is estimated at 9,000 acres.

Governor Invokes the Emergency Conflagration Act

At 6 p.m., an order is placed for the Type 2 Oregon Interagency Incident Management Team #1. In 

addition, the Warm Springs Agency requests state assistance due to all local firefighting resources 

having been committed and the proximity of the fire to the Warm Springs community and rural 

residents. (The Warm Springs community had a population of 2,945 in the 2010 U.S. Census.)
228

Oregon Governor Kate Brown invokes the 

Emergency Conflagration Act which allows

state officials to send an Oregon State Fire 

Marshal Team and several Engine Strike 

Teams to the County Line 2 Fire. The 

Oregon State Fire Marshal Team will

eventually enter into a Unified Command 

with the Oregon Interagency Incident 

Management Team #1.

August 13

Strong Winds and Low Humidity

Push the Fire to 35,000 Acres

On August 13, the County Line 2 Fire’s 

second day, Extended Attack operations 

continue. The fire is expanding in all 

directions.

Driven by strong winds, the fire continues

to grow rapidly. The National Weather 

Service issues a Red Flag Warning for these strong winds and low humidity through August 15. Between 

3-6 p.m. on August 13, the Warm Springs Base RAWS records average winds at 12-18 mph, gusting to 29 

mph.

The evening ICS 209 estimates the fire size at 35,000 acres.

A total of 75 overhead and fire line personnel from the Oregon Fire Marshal’s two Task Forces—with 

approximately 10 Structure Engines—arrive and augment a small Extended Attack force consisting of 5 

Crews, 10 Engines, and 3 Dozers.

Fire Spread Requires the Widespread Evacuation of Residents and the Kah-Nee-Ta Resort

Tactical efforts are focused on burning and holding existing roads as well as building direct fire line with 

Dozers. Engines are primarily assigned to protect residences in the communities of Miller Heights, Warm 

Springs, Sunnyside, Upper Dry Creek, and along Tenino Road. Level 3 Evacuations (“EVACUATE 

IMMEDIATELY: GO”) are issued for the Kah-Nee-Ta High Desert Resort and Casino, Tenino Road, Wolf 

Point Subdivision, and Schoolie Flat residences.

According to the ICS 209, aerial firefighting resources are limited with only a single Type 3 Helicopter 

assigned to the fire. More than 115 new fires had started on the previous two days in the Pacific 

Northwest which created severe competition for firefighting resources. Due to the high winds and rapid 

fire spread, the effectiveness of the Single Engine Air Tankers assigned to the fire is also limited, while 

firefighting support from the DC-8 Very large Air Tanker is sporadic due to its use on other evolving 

wildfires in this Geographic Area.

The Oregon Interagency Incident Management Team #1 is in-briefed by the Warm Springs Agency at 5 

p.m. on August 13 and takes command of the fire beginning at 6 a.m. the following morning.

August 14-15

Management Direction: Implement a Full Suppression Strategy

A new Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) process decision is published early on August 14 

that defines the course of action for the fire. Specifically, it tasks the Incident Management Team to

On August 13, tactical efforts on the County Line 2 Fire focus on 

burning out from and holding existing roads as well as building direct 

fire line with Dozers. Photo by Sam Swetland.
229

keep the fire west of the Deschutes River, south of Schoolie Flat Road, east of the powerline across Mill 

Creek Flats, and north of Dry Hollow Road. Management direction is to implement a full-suppression 

strategy using a combination of direct and indirect line. The County Line 2 Fire continues to be 

influenced by high winds. These winds and the flashy nature of the fuel lead to the fire’s continued rapid 

expansion.

The Incident Management Team is able to begin opening old dozer lines from recent fires adjacent to 

the existing County Line 2 Fire perimeter, including the 2011 West Hills and Powerline fires and the 2013 

Sunnyside Turnoff Fire (see map above).

Crews are able to contain the fire along portions of Highway 26. The rapid burn out time of the light 

fuels allows the highway to be reopened on August 15.

A structure damage assessment released by the Oregon State Fire Marshal’s Office on August 15 

indicates that two residences were totally destroyed. In addition, four residences were damaged. Of 

these six structures, only two were currently being lived in at the time of the fire.

The red line above shows the County Line 2 Fire perimeter on the afternoon of August 15. The yellow areas outline the 

proximity of past fires, with the fire name and date. Old dozer lines from these fires were utilized to help suppress the 

County Line 2 Fire.
230

Number #1 Priority Fire for this 

Geographic Area

The August 15 ICS 209 reports the 

fire is now 55,200 acres with 20 

percent containment, primarily 

along portions of Highway 26 and 

on the fire’s southeast flank 

adjacent to the Warm Springs 

community. During the past two 

days, fire staffing has increased 

dramatically. The fire is currently 

the number #1 priority fire for this 

Geographic Area.

As of August 15, the County Line 2 

Fire is supported by 24 Crews (19 

Type 2 Crews), 60 Engines, 6 Dozers 

and 2 Helicopters, including a Type 

1 Helicopter.

No critical resource needs are 

indicated on the ICS 209.

August 16-18

Fire Grows an Additional 11,000 Acres,

Threatens Kah-Nee-Ta Resort

On August 16 the County Line 2 Fire grows in excess of 11,000 acres, spreading into Shitike Canyon to

the southeast.

The fire is threatening the Kah-Nee-Ta High Desert Resort and Casino.

Winds remain strong, gusting between 10 to 16 mph most of the day. Wind direction is highly variable,

causing the fire to be active on both its west and east flanks.

As the fire spreads into and adjacent to Shitike Canyon, the representative “fuel” becomes timber. Thus, 

the loss of commercial timber begins to occur on tribal lands. Due to the heavy fuel loads and Shitike 

Canyon’s steep sidewalls, tactical suppression options are constrained.

Warm Springs Fire Management indicates that Shitike Canyon is classified as “Conditional Use” lands 

with land management constraints similar to “Wilderness” restrictions. Portions of the area where the 

County Line 2 Fire burned had not been logged or received fuel treatments in more than 50 years.

Fire activity leads to the deactivation of the main 230 kilovolt powerline that services the local area. 

However, Portland General Electric is able to reroute power and no long-term impacts to the community 

of Warm Springs occurs.

On August 17 a new WFDSS decision is published that reaffirms the current overall strategy. It defines

four tactical Management Action Points (MAP). These MAPs establish trigger points for firing operations 

on the fire’s south and west sides. However, by the time the decision is published, fire spread had been 

stopped in all areas of the fire—with the exception of Shitike Creek.

Firefighters implement burn out operation on the County Line 2 Fire on August 16.

Photo by Randy Green.
231

TOP: Image is looking northwest up Shitike Canyon. The County Line 2 Fire forced the evacuation of the Kah-Nee-Ta 

Resort. The fire burned on both sides of Oregon State Highway 26 (pictured on left) and forced the temporary closure of 

this significant travel way. BOTTOM: More close-up image of Shitike Canyon west of Kah-Nee-Ta Resort.
232

Intense fire behavior, the steep sloped-terrain, and 

the lack of Type 1 Crews are all limiting the Incident 

Management Team from implementing direct fire line

operations in Shitike Canyon.

Fire Continues to be Active in Shitike Canyon

By August 18, a combination of direct and indirect fire

line has been completed that successfully holds fire 

spread on the fire’s east and north flanks.

New fires near Lake Chelan in Washington have

dropped the County Line 2 Fire to the 15th priority fire 

for this Geographic Area. While minimal fire spread is 

now occurring on the majority of the fire—even 

where fire line had yet to be constructed—Shitike 

Canyon remains active.

The evening ICS 209 now reports the fire at 62,000 

acres. It is 43 percent contained.

August 19

No More Threat to Structures

Because the threat to structures has now been 

mitigated, the Oregon State Fire Marshal’s Office 

resources are released today. With the release of 

their equipment, the State Fire Marshal’s Office is also 

removed from the Unified Command.

In the afternoon, a minor fire slop-over on the fire’s 

northeast corner is contained by the end of the night 

shift.

Shitike Canyon remains the only active portion of the fire. On this day, this is the only area in which the 

County Line 2 Fire grows.

August 20-29

Despite Red Flag Weather Events – Fire Activity is Confined to Shitike Canyon

During this 10-day period, a series of Red Flag weather events challenge suppression efforts on the fire. 

However, fire activity continues to be confined only to Shitike Canyon.

During this time, crews are able to suppress several small (6 to 10 acres) spot fires. But they are unable 

to keep the fire from spreading within the confines of the Shitike Canyon.

In addition, Single Engine Air Tankers are used for operational support on August 21 and August 28. A 

Large Air Tanker is also used in the vicinity of Shitike Canyon on August 28. 

The Fire Entering Shitike Canyon

Imposes a Variety of Negative Impacts

Shitike Canyon is a unique geologic feature consisting 

of bare or talus-covered bedrock; landslide debris; and 

locally, thick colluvial aprons that descend in long 

sweeping slopes down to Shitike Creek.

Alluvial terraces up to 40 meters above the river level 

exist in wider portions of the canyon. Thick vegetation 

exists within the canyon walls.

In 2015, the canyon had been set aside by the 

Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs as a “carbon 

sequestration site”. (“Carbon sequestration” describes 

the long-term storage of carbon dioxide—trees store 

large amounts of carbon—to help reduce global 

warming). Agreements had also been signed with 

industry in 2015 to retain these lands as a carbon 

offset.

Shitike Canyon serves not only as a carbon 

sequestration area, but also as an important habitat 

for Threatened and Endangered species. In addition, it 

provides the water source for the Confederated Tribes 

of Warm Springs Reservation.

The County Line 2 Fire’s spread into Shitike Canyon

caused both economic losses for the Warm Springs 

Tribe as well as imposing negative impacts to the 

various significant resources associated with this

canyon.
233

Despite Strong Southwest Winds

Minimal Fire Growth Occurs

On August 29 a frontal passage with strong 

southwest winds impacts the County Line 2 Fire. 

While these winds are strong enough to ground all 

aviation resources for the day, they blow the fire 

back onto itself, limiting the fire’s forward spread 

and allowing crews the opportunity to reengage in 

direct suppression actions as well as scouting for a 

way across Shitike Canyon.

As shown in the table below, fire growth from 

August 20 through August 29 is minimal.

Fire Growth – August 20 through August 29

Date Acres Change (acres) Date Acres Change (acres)

8/20 64,450 - 8/25 65,300 100

8/21 64,950 500 8/26 65,800 500

8/22 65,155 205 8/27 65,800 0

8/23 65,155 0 8/28 66,433 633

8/24 65,200 45 8/29 66,496 63

August 30-31

Fire Line Completed

Across Shitike Canyon

On August 30 spotty light rain affects

the County Line 2 Fire area.

The Warm Springs Base RAWS on the

eastern portion of the fire does not 

record measurable rain. The Mutton 

Mountain RAWS, located northeast 

of the fire, and the Hehe #1 RAWS, 

located northwest of the fire, both 

record from 0.02 to 0.03 inches of 

rain.

This change in the weather is enough 

to moderate fire activity and allow

crews to access the fire edge using a 

combination of direct hand line and 

dozer line supported by hose lays to 

complete fire line across Shitike 

Canyon.

To protect it from the approaching County Line 2 Fire, 

firefighters wrap Shitike Butte Lookout on August 22.

Photo by Peter Reinhardt.

Burn out operation on the County Line 2 Fire on August 22.

Photo by Randy Green.
234

In addition, on August 30, no new spot fires 

occur. This allows suppression resources to 

remain focused on completing this final 

segment of fire line in Shitike Canyon.

August 30 is also the last time crews work a 

night shift on the fire. During this final night 

shift, two small spot fires are reported and

are successfully contained. 

September 1-3

Fire Management Transitions

Back to the Local Unit

Fire line repair and mop-up continues for 

three days under moderate weather 

conditions.

On September 3 at 7 a.m., management of the County Line 2 Fire is transitioned back to the local unit 

and a Type 3 organization.

The fire’s final size is 67,207 acres.

Fire behavior on the County Line 2 Fire on August 15. Photo courtesy of the 

Oregon Department of Transportation.
235

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1XxAZqK Appendix P – Carpenter Road Fire (Originally known as the Rocky Fire) 

Initial Attack/Extended Attack August 13

Through August 16

Fire Contained at 6.4 Acres

The Carpenter Road Fire started on August 13 on the Spokane Indian 

Reservation.

(The fire’s cause was investigated and determined to be an arson fire 

as announced by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and reported in a 

September 14, 2015 Spokane Spokesman-Review newspaper article. 

At this time, because there is an ongoing investigation, information is 

limited.)

Tribal firefighting resources were dispatched from the Spokane Indian 

Reservation’s own dispatching facility in Wellpinit, Washington.

Concurrently, the volunteers from Stevens County Fire District #2

were dispatched by the Stevens County Emergency Operations Center. 

Stevens County Fire District #2 was first on scene and took command. 

The fire was initially named the Rocky Fire. As Tribal firefighting 

resources arrived on scene, they assumed command and the local 

Stevens County Fire District #2 departed from the incident.

The fire was lined and mopped-up to 50 feet inside the fire perimeter. 

No open flame was present or large smokes near the fire perimeter. 

The fire was considered contained at this point. Resources were 

released and returned to quarters. (These resources are identified in 

the informational box to the left.)

Carpenter Road Fire

Date of Ignition

August 13, 2015

Cause

Arson

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Spokane Indian Reservation,

Spokane Tribe of Indians

Responding Initial Attack Resources

Day 1 Rocky Fire – Bureau of Indian 

Affairs: 3 Type 6 Engines, 1 Type 3 Dozer. 

Stevens County: 5 Brush Trucks, 1 Water 

Tender

Day 2 Carpenter Road Fire: Bureau of 

Indian Affairs: (same resources as 

above). Department of Natural 

Resources, Colville National Forest and 

Stevens County Fire Protection 

Resources

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 5

Local: PL 5

Acres Burned

63,972 Acres

Estimated Cost

$22,528,000

Land Jurisdictions

Bureau of Indian Affairs Spokane 

Agency, Spokane Reservation, 

Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources; Bureau of Land 

Management

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 1,041

Crews: 30

Engines: 67

Helicopters: 5

Structures Destroyed

18 residences

14 other

Cooperators

Stevens County Sheriff, Stevens County

Commissioners, Spokane Tribal Police, 

Washington State Emergency 

Management Department, Washington 

State Department Of Correction, 

Fruitland Bible Camp, Stevens County 

Fire District #2, Washington State Fire 

Marshal Service

Key Successes on the Carpenter Road Fire

The work of individuals with the Stevens County Volunteer Fire Department—

along with other fire resources—to successfully evacuate residents was key on 

this incident. With limited resources available and winds exceeding 40 miles 

per hour pushing the fire, this evacuation operation was a true success.

“We got people out alive” summarized the Duty Officer with the Washington 

State Department of Natural Resources.

The Fire Chief for the Stevens County Fire District #2, stated that although 18 

homes were lost, successful structure protection—the evacuation of 200 

children and adults coupled with the protection of the Fruitland Bible Camp—

are significant accomplishments on this fire.

Special Issues, Concerns, and Challenges Surrounding this Incident

As the fire unfolded, boundaries between jurisdictions presented problems. 

There were three dispatch centers involved with the initial call-out. During the 

initial evacuations and structure protection, there was minimal crossjurisdictional communication.
236
237
238

August 14

Fire Burning in Same Area—

Threatening Homes

At approximately 7 p.m. the next day, 

Tribal Law Enforcement informed the 

Spokane Tribe Fire Management Officer 

that there was a fire burning in the 

vicinity of the previous day’s Rocky Fire. 

Tribal resources were again mobilized.

Simultaneously, the County 911 Center 

dispatched the volunteers of Stevens 

County Fire District #2. There was 

smoke reported north of the 

Reservation boundary. Upon arriving on 

scene, it was noticed that to the south a 

column of smoke was rapidly 

developing. 

The fire was reported to have moved one-half to one-third of a mile in a very short time. It was 

threatening homes. The Northeast Washington Interagency Communication Center (NEWICC) was 

informed by the County 911 Center of the fire and NEWICC logged the incident as Carpenter Road. The 

Carpenter Road Fire was the name used for mobilizing regional and national resources and remained the 

name of record.

Responding resources reported that the fire was “raging” and threatening homes. These suppression 

resources included the Spokane Tribal Volunteer Fire Department and Stevens County Fire District #2. 

Primary consideration was for the welfare of the nearby residents. Structure protection and evacuations 

were the focus of the initial efforts. The Stevens County Fire District #2 Chief was the Incident 

Commander for the structural protection for unfolding events north of the boundary. The Spokane Tribal 

Fire Management Wildland Firefighters were continuing to fight the wildland fire on the Spokane Indian 

Reservation.

When arriving on scene the night of August 14, the Spokane Tribe of Indians Fire Management Officer

recognized that the fire was growing at an alarming rate. The currently assigned resources would not be 

enough to contain the fire. He therefore made the call for a Type 2 Incident Management Team.

August 15

Evacuation Operations Remove Threatened Residents

While no specific resources were officially recorded in the WildCAD log (WildCAD is a GIS-based 

Computer-Aided Dispatch [CAD] system) as being on scene until the early morning hours of August 15, 

the Spokane Tribal Police and Stevens County Fire District #2 were conducting evacuations of threatened 

residents.

Shortly after midnight, with the fire at approximately 1,000 acres, the WildCAD log indicates that Stevens 

County Fire District #2 reported there was a civilian fatality. As the fire approached and this resident was 

attempting to move his equipment to a safe place, he reportedly suffered a heart attack. His wife and 

daughter were unable to revive him and had to escape from the flames. (Due to roads being impassable, 

the deceased individual could not be retrieved until the following day.)
239

During this same timeframe, Stevens County Fire District #2 also requested Type 1 and Type 6 Engines for 

structure protection via the Washington State Fire Service Mobilization Plan.

Six homes were reported lost. 

Early in the morning of August 15, suppression activity picks up. At 9 a.m., WildCAD indicates a 

Department of Natural Resources Type 4 Incident Commander took command of the fire. WildCAD also 

shows Type 5 and Type 6 Engines are requested to support structure protection in addition to the 

requested Engines through the Washington State Fire Service Mobilization Plan.

A Type 4 incident management organization engage the fire with line scouting, fire engines, mechanical 

and hand line construction, and helicopter bucket drops. The primary focus is on structure protection and 

evacuations. Though not documented in WildCAD, Washington State Department of Natural Resources 

personnel reported that a Unified Command structure was in place between the State and the Fire 

District at 8:55am. By 11 a.m., the Spokane Agency was included.

By midmorning, limited visibility is hampering air support.

The Incident Commander reports the fire to be a plume-dominated fire, which is an indicator of extreme 

atmospheric instability with extreme fire behavior potential. WildCAD reports support the Department of 

Natural Resources response that there were myriad resources requested and responding. 

Multiple Fires, Resources Stretched Thin 

Across the Pacific Northwest

At this same time, the entire Pacific 

Northwest area—across Washington and 

Oregon—was experiencing a severe fire 

threat with multiple fires, extreme fire 

behavior with rapid growth, and 

resources stretched beyond capacity. On 

the morning of August 15, there were 29 

uncontained “Large Fires” (a wildfire of 

100 acres or more in timber or 300 acres 

or more in grass/sage) with nine new 

Large Fires aggravating an already 

tenuous fire situation. From August 14 

to August 15, there had been an 

increase in acres burned across the 

Region with 101,410 acres of existing 

fires and more than 20,000 acres of new 

fire growth—a strong indicator that 

near-term containment would be 

elusive.

The Carpenter Road Fire had not yet made the regional Large Fire list. 

Simultaneous Efforts Underway on the Carpenter Road Fire

On August 15, the Carpenter Road Fire could be categorized as an explosive, plume-dominated fire that 

presented a fast-changing situation with many simultaneous efforts underway from at least three points:

 Structure protection priorities are reportedly under the guidance of the Stevens County Fire 

District #2.

A CL-415 “Super Scooper” aircraft supports firefighting efforts on the 

Carpenter Road Fire. Photo from the August 25 InciWeb.
240

 The non-Tribal lands wildland effort is under the command of a Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources employee.

 The Spokane Tribe of Indians Wildland Firefighters are continuing their response on Reservation 

lands.

 As reported above, by late morning the three entities had established a Unified Command 

structure.

Focus is Now on Structure Protection and Evacuations

Late during the morning of August 15, the Incident Commander made contact with the Spokane Tribe of 

Indians Fire Management Officer.

Because the fire is headed northward off the Reservation toward Coyote Canyon, their focus is on 

structure protection and evacuations. The fire is now reported to be more than three miles long and is 

actively growing. At some point during the midmorning, it is learned that an order for a Type 2 Incident 

Management Team had been placed the night before. 

Carpenter Road Fire August 15 Summary

 Reports of many downed power poles 

with lines arcing.

 Type 5 and Type 6 Engines ordered for 

both structure protection and 

suppression.

 Fire crosses into Coyote Canyon. More 

homes are threatened.

 A Forest Service Contract CL-415 water 

scooper is made available. A Very Large 

Air Tanker (a DC-10) is used to support 

structure protection and suppression 

activities.

 Insufficient ground resources are 

available to support the aerial delivery of 

retardant and suppressants.

 At mid-afternoon, the Incident 

Commander reports the fire at 

approximately 5,000 acres.

 In the late afternoon, Stevens County 

Fire District #2 personnel are sent home 

after a 30-hour shift when Washington 

State Fire Service Mobilization Plan 

Engines begin arriving.

 The Incident Commander states that he 

needs 30 to 40 Type 3 Engines because 

current resources are inadequate.

 Spokane Tribe of Indians resources are 

released as they have worked more than 

two shifts.

Carpenter Road Fire August 16 Summary

 The Incident Commander is on duty until 

the Type 2 Rocky Mountain Blue Team 

takes command of the fire at 6 p.m.

 There are a myriad of references to air 

tankers and helicopters on scene in 

support of ground operations.

 At 4 p.m., the fire is estimated to be 

8,000 to 9,000 acres. The operational

focus is on structure protection in

Coyote Canyon. A WildCAD reference 

from the Incident Commander states 

that 22 buildings are lost—a mix of 

residences and outbuildings mostly along 

Carpenter Road and Titus Canyon. He 

further states that most of the homes in 

Titus Canyon are gone.

 Spokane Tribe of Indians firefighting 

resources are made available and used 

the next four days until more out-of-area 

resources become available.
241

Major Fire Expansion—Limited Availability of Resources

The Type 2 Rocky Mountain Blue Team was on 

the incident for 16 days. 

During this two-week period, significant fire 

growth and extreme fire behavior occurred—

coupled with limited availability of resources.

Due to resources already being assigned to 

other major fire incidents, it would be well 

over a week before sufficient resources could 

be made available to the Carpenter Road Fire. 

The peak number of firefighting resources 

occurred the third week of the fire. The Type 2 

Rocky Mountain Blue Team’s Incident 

Commander indicated that it took 

approximately 10 days to receive adequate 

resources. The Incident Status Summary (ICS 

209) reports support this contention.

Nine New Large Fires and 37 Uncontained Large Fires Burning Across the Region

On August 16, the Carpenter Road Fire had burned 5,000 acres. This fire made the new Large Fire 

category and inclusion into the regional incident priorities. At this time, across Washington and Oregon,

there was an increase of 142,291 acres from the previous burning period. There were nine new Large 

Fires and 37 uncontained Large Fires. 

By the time the Rocky Mountain Blue Team was assigned, the Carpenter Road Fire was a late entry into 

the resource request process. (The team was enroute to the Canyon Creek Fire in Oregon when they 

were informed it had become a Type 1 incident. They were then directed to go to Redmond, Oregon and 

stand by for an assignment. While passing through Spokane, the Incident Commander was 

communicating with a dispatcher at the Northeast Washington Interagency Communication Center

when the need for an Incident Management Team on the Carpenter Road Fire was realized. The Rocky 

Mountain Blue Team was assigned to the Carpenter Road Fire. Because team members were scattered 

across the west—enroute to Redmond, Oregon—they needed time to reassemble for their assignment 

on the Carpenter Road Fire.)

The next 10 days were extremely challenging as there were limited resources available to be assigned to 

the Carpenter Road Fire. The fire experienced most of its expansion during this time.

The Spokane Tribe of Indians provided approximately 55 firefighters. While they were not officially 

assigned to the fire, they were used for both day and night shifts. The Spokane Tribe Fire Management 

Officer wanted to have them available for Initial Attack if needed.

Fire personnel peaked on September 6—five days after the transfer of command to the Oregon Team #3

Incident Management Team.
242

Highlights During the Fire Expansion Period

Extreme Fire Spread Days

Between August 18 and 19 the fire grew 10,000 

acres. From August 20 -21, the fire grew another 

10,000 acres. The next big growth days occurred 

from August 25 through August 28when 18,000 

acres were added to the Carpenter Road Fire’s total 

acreage. The last day of considerable fire growth 

was August 29 when another 5,000 acres burned. 

For those days when there were no major 

expansions of the fire perimeter due to Red Flag

conditions, exceptionally dry fuels and steep slopes 

still supported fire growth of several thousand acres 

to burn almost daily.

Interference by Private Citizens

Early in this incident, there was a local private individual who owned a Type 6 Engine who was taking 

independent action in support of local residents on the fire. A Division Supervisor noticed this engine was 

not on the official list of resources. Next, this individual set a back fire around a home that interrupted 

other operations. Law enforcement was called and the following day, this individual was arrested for 

unrelated charges. The Incident Commander reported that this individual had been “Red Card” rated 

(approved to engage in fire suppression activities) but this certification had expired five years previously.

There were two “near misses” by individuals who wanted to protect their own property. Even though 

these people were informed there were evacuations and closures in place, they wanted to protect their

structures. They ultimately experienced a “Near Miss” by the fire—but safely evacuated the next day. In 

another incident, two land owners were concerned about their timber lands. They were told not to 

access their properties—but did so regardless. The rapidly approaching fire front forced these residents 

to make an emergency evacuation on an ATV. The ATV and a pickup were lost and these individuals

barely made it out.

Post Major Fire Expansion Days

On September 2 at 6 a.m., the Oregon Incident Management Team #3 took command of the Carpenter 

Road Fire. While this team certainly had their work cut out for them, their focus was to hold on to all the 

gains previously made.

Though there were small changes in the fire size during this period, the challenge continued to be getting 

the right resources in the right place to construct fire line and strengthen the defenses in place. This was 

all to be done while still protecting homes and reducing the evacuation and closure levels. While fire 

behavior early in the period had moderated to a creeping and smoldering fire, due to dry fuels and 

predicted weather, the potential for more severe fire activity was extreme.

On September 4-5, 0.6 to 1.0 inch of rain fell across the fire area, followed by a few lingering showers 

during the subsequent days. This weather event effectively stopped the short-term concerns for fire 

spread and ultimately provided the opportunity to finish line construction and perform mop-up 100 feet 

inside the fire perimeter, as well as perform repair work on control lines. The percent of fire containment 

rapidly increased. By September 8, the fire was 90 percent contained.

On September 15 at 6 a.m., the Carpenter Road Fire was turned back to local management with a Type 3 

Organization. The fire was declared controlled by the three jurisdictions on September 24.
243

Appendix Q For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlyZk6 – North Star Fire 

By Evening of Second Day

Fire Grows to 10,000 Acres

The North Star Fire started on 

the afternoon of August 13. 

This fire grew quickly in logging 

slash and heavy timber fuels, 

exhibiting active crown fire 

behavior.

When the North Star Fire was 

reported, many of the Colville 

Agency’s Initial Attack 

resources were already 

engaged in suppression 

activities on other fires on 

Tribal lands.

In the North Star Fire area, the 

Industrial Fire Precaution Level 

(IFPL) was III (partial shutdown; 

power saws and other 

equipment can be used from 8 

p.m. to 1 p.m.; fire watch 

required for one hour after 

operations cease). The morning 

of the fire, both the National 

and Northwest Preparedness Levels had been upgraded to 5. Fire 

danger on the Colville Agency was Very High.

The fire was reported at 3:28 p.m. The Initial Attack Incident 

Commander responded at 3:30 p.m. and was on scene by 4:05 p.m.

The fire was already approximately 200-300 acres. The temperature 

was 95 degrees Fahrenheit; relative humidity was 21 percent. Slash 

and heavy dead fuels were contributing to rapid fire spread and 

intensity.

Type 2 IMT Requested During Initial Attack

The fire’s potential for large growth and increasing complexity 

prompted the Initial Attack Incident Commander to order a Type 2

Incident Management Team.

The fire posed a threat to residential structures that prompted the 

request for evacuation of residents in the Gold Lake Road and North 

Star Loop areas.

The Initial Attack Incident Commander organized an Operations 

group and assigned Divisions. (See box on left for specifics on Initial 

Attack forces.)

North Star Fire

Date of Ignition

August 13, 2015

Cause

Human

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Colville Agency, Confederated 

Colville Tribes

Responding Initial Attack 

Resources

30 personnel, including: 1 Type 3

Helicopter with Initial Attack

Module; 2 Type 2 Dozers, 4 Type 6 

Engines, 1 10-Person Hand Crew, 2 

Task Force Leaders-Dozer, 2 Heavy 

Equipment Bosses, 1 Type 3 

Incident Commander, and EMS 

structure protection

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 5

Local: PL 5

Acres Burned

218,138 Acres (as of 9/29/15)

Estimated Cost

$44,501,000 (as of 9/29/15)

Land Jurisdictions

Colville Agency, Okanogan-Wenatchee 

National Forest, Washington State 

Department of Natural Resources, 

rural fire districts

Resources at Incident Peak

Crews: 20

Engines: 79

Helicopters: 15

Structures Destroyed

1

Cooperators

Colville Agency, Colville Bureau of 

Indian Affairs, Colville Police 

Department, Colville Emergency 

Management, Rural Fire District 13 

and 14, Okanogan County, Ferry 

County, U.S. Forest Service, 

Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources, Washington State 

Department of Transportation, 

Washington State National Guard, and 

Coulee Dam Fire Department

These two images were taken from a video made by 

the Initial Attack Incident Commander during an Initial 

Attack recon via helicopter at 7:50 p.m. The flanks and 

head of the fire were exhibiting active crowning and 

spotting up to 1⁄2 mile or more. Top – Running crown 

fire at head of the North Star Fire during Initial Attack. 

Bottom – Prolific spotting on east flank of North Star 

Fire during Initial Attack.
244
245

The plan was to anchor and hold the fire’s 

east flank at Stepstone Road.

By that evening, the fire was still exhibiting 

running crown fire behavior. The first night’s 

Incident Commander said the fire exhibited 

crown fire behavior throughout the night, 

occasionally dropping to surface fuels, then 

transitioning back to crown fire. Slash and 

heavy downed fuel continued to contribute

to the fire’s intensity. The fire had multiple 

heads. That first evening, the North Star Fire 

was estimated at 1,200 acres.

Additional Resources Unavailable

For several days, the unavailability of 

additional resources limited the suppression 

organization to an anchor-and-flank 

strategy.

At this same time, several Large Fires were 

burning across the Pacific Northwest—many 

in the state of Washington. These fires had a 

higher priority for firefighting resources.

By the evening of the fire’s second day it had 

grown to 10,000 acres.

A Type 2 Incident Management Team from 

the Southwest Region, SW #5, was mobilized 

and arrived on the fire the evening of August 

16. By that time, the fire had covered 25,000 acres.

While some ordered resources were now arriving, the majority of orders were not being filled. Point 

protection strategy and tactics were utilized to protect values, prioritized by: 1) life; 2) property; and 3) 

natural resources.

Resources Still Lacking; Weather Disrupts Suppression Tactics

Over the next ten days, the fire grew to 170,000 acres.

Resources were slowly arriving. Changing wind directions and periods of visibility problems due to 

inversions confounded suppression tactics.

The Tunk Block fire, managed by the Okanogan Complex, would soon be managed with the North Star 

Fire.

On August 26, the Pacific Northwest Type 1 Incident Management Team #3 received an in-briefing on 

the North Star Fire from SW Team #5 and an in-briefing on the Tunk Block Fire from the Rocky Basin 

Type 1 IMT #1.

On August 31, the Pacific Northwest Incident Management Team #3 transitioned onto both fires, taking 

command of the North Star Fire—now 200,953 acres, and the Tunk Block Fire—now 161,440 acres. 

Limited resources necessitated continued point protection strategy and tactics.

Notable Successes

Successful Initial Attack

The Colville Agency continued to initiate successful Initial 

Attack actions even after the North Star Fire was under 

command of The Type 2 Southwest Incident Management 

Team #5, beginning on the fire’s third day.

Firefighter and Public Safety

Another noteworthy success was the safety record from 

Initial Attack through Type 1 IMT management. Firefighter 

and public safety remained a primary—successfully 

achieved—objective throughout the course of this fire.

Successful Structure Protection

Successful structure protection actions are also to be 

commended in the management of the North Star Fire. The 

only losses were unoccupied cabin sites.

Clear Leader’s Intent

The Incident Commander for the Southwest Team #5 noted 

how the direct involvement with Agency Administrators led 

to clear Leader’s Intent and well-defined values at risk.

Increased Productivity

Travel times were reduced and productivity increased by 

establishing an Incident Command Post in Omak, Base 

Camp in Nespelem, and various spike camps. 
246

Type 1 IMTs Managing Two Fires

PNW Team #3 continued point protection, direct 

and indirect line construction, and firing 

operations on both the North Star and Tunk 

Block fires through September 9.

That day, the PNW Team #3 transferred 

command to the Type 1 California Incident 

Management Team #5. Three days later, on 

September 12, command of the North Star 

Fire—now 211,356 acres, and the Tunk Block 

Fire—now 162,693 acres—was transferred to 

the Type 1 California Incident Management

Team #1.

Tunk Block Fire Makes Significant Runs

The Tunk Block Fire was part of the Okanogan 

Complex and later assigned to PNW Team #3. 

Located between Omak and the North Star Fire, 

from August 20-23, it made significant runs—

growing from 13,337 acres to 119,114 acres.

Over the next few days, the Tunk Block Fire 

continued to make substantial runs, including a 

push from its southeast flank that spotted over 

Highway 155 toward the North Star Fire.

Fire activity was mostly limited to the eastern 

flank. Suppression actions were managed by the 

PNW Team #3 from August 31 until this team’s

departure on September 9. At that time, the 

Tunk Block Fire remained under the 

management of California Team #1, who also 

had command of the North Star Fire.

Significant Daily Fire Growth Continues

Daily fire growth on both the North Star and 

Tunk fires was significant from August 14

through August 21.

The North Star Fire gained 33,000 acres on 

August 18. By August 24, it covered more than

155,000 acres.

Each successive Incident Management Team had 

to prioritize portions of the fire to focus the 

efforts of very limited resources. 

Issues, Concerns, and Challenges

Lack of Aviation Assets

A significant issue for the Initial Attack Incident 

Commander was lack of aviation assets, particularly Air 

Tankers.

For several days, the Colville Agency had to continue 

Extended Attack suppression actions with no significant 

increase in resource numbers. (It wasn’t until day five that 

Single Engine Air Tankers arrived.)

Fire Behavior Exceeds Suppression Capacity

Fire behavior vastly exceeded suppression capacity on the 

North Star Fire. Frustration was felt by overhead that no 

significant assistance was forthcoming. They realized only a 

change in the weather was going to assist their efforts.

Colville Agency Issues include

Cultural Sites, Timber Values

The Colville Agency has many issues, concerns, and 

challenges related to natural resources and sites of cultural 

significance.

Economic impacts of damage to or loss of timber values is a 

significant concern to the Tribal community. They now face 

many challenges in the coming years to manage forest 

resources impacted by the North Star Fire.

Management Challenge:

Huge Scale of Fires and Lack of Available Resources

Two of the Incident Management Teams were challenged 

by the scale of the fires. When the fire was 75,000 acres, 

one of these IMTs had only 150 personnel assigned. An 

Incident Commander also noted an issue with ordered 

resources going to the Okanogan Complex.

By the time the Tunk Block Fire was assigned to PNW Team 

#3, the two fires covered 1,000 square miles and ranged 

from 900 to 6,600 feet-plus in elevation. The North Star 

Fire, alone, had 360 miles of fire line perimeter.

Divisions were many miles in length over terrain not 

accessible by vehicle.

Resource numbers on the incident were equal to numbers 

typically seen on fires of a few thousand acres. Travel times 

were extensive.

Due to the immense geographical scale of the two fires, 

field reconnaissance efforts could only address specific 

priority areas.
247

Photos of the North Star Fire taken on August 15.
248

North Star Fire (on right) and Tunk Block Fire Progression Map.

Summary

The North Star Fire occurred during the peak of the 2015 wildfire season in the Pacific Northwest. 

Regional and National preparedness levels were at 5. Because resources were at draw-down levels, a 

significant number of resource orders were not filled. Lend/lease agreements with adjacent jurisdictions 

and agencies provided suppression resources when resource orders were not being filled.

Although these resources remained available for Initial Attack, this arrangement enabled point 

protection on threatened structures. While this provided some help, the incident was still significantly 

understaffed for the fire management’s stated objectives. 

Fire behavior was significant and it is notable that firefighter and public safety was prioritized under 

these conditions.

In addition, it should be noted that as the scale of the operational area exceeded the design capabilities 

of radio systems, communication issues emerged. 
249

Appendix R – Grizzly Bear Complex For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1NlA2R5

Dry Lightning Storm Triggers 22 New Fire Starts

On Tuesday August 13, a dry lightning storm that produced nearly 50 downstrikes passed over the Umatilla National Forest, triggering 22 individual fire 

starts (117 new fires occurred in the Pacific Northwest on August 12-13).

Seventeen of these new fire starts were located within the WenahaTucannon Wilderness; the other five were outside this wilderness area. 

Aggressive suppression was implemented on all five non-wilderness fires, all 

of which were in a “patrol” status within four operational shifts. Many of the 

17 wilderness fires went unstaffed and—because forecasted high winds 

prompted the removal of firefighters engaged in suppression—the 

remainder of these fires exceeded Initial Attack efforts.

Grizzly Bear Complex

Ignition Date

August 13, 2015

Cause

Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Umatilla National Forest

Responding Initial Attack Resources

to 22 New Fire Starts

Two Helitack, Six Smokejumpers,

Six Engines

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 5

Local: PL 5

Acres Burned

82,659 Acres (as of 10/15/15)

Estimated Cost

$21,517,287 (as 10/15/15)

Land Jurisdictions

U.S. Forest Service, Washington State 

Department of Natural Resources, 

Oregon Department of Forestry 

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 1,116

Crews: 35

Engines: 43

Helicopters: 5

Structures Destroyed

35

Cooperators

Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources, Oregon 

Department of Forestry, Oregon 

National Guard

Counties

Columbia, Wallowa, Garfield, Asotin

States

Alaska, Colorado, Florida, North 

Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, 

Wyoming

Other Countries

Canada and Australia

Key Successes on the Grizzly Bear Complex

Existing Relationships – Preseason communications with cooperators and 

recent interagency efforts on Extended Attack fires allowed for good 

communication and coordination between agencies. Initially, the fires were a 

low priority for resources due to being in the wilderness. As the fires merged 

and exhibited explosive fire behavior and moved out of the wilderness, this 

Complex became a higher priority for resources. The positive relationships 

among the local wildland fire agencies facilitated access to firefighting 

resources. Additionally, interagency cooperation enabled the use of multiple 

avenues for acquiring equipment needed to construct containment lines and 

support burn out operations and mop-up activities. The value of these existing 

relationships in securing resources was critical to the successful outcome of 

the Grizzly Bear Complex. 

Unified Command – Assistance to firefighting efforts to maintain 24-hour 

structure protection within the communities was maintained for several days 

through Unified Command with the Oregon State Fire Marshal’s Office and 

three Task Forces of structure Engines. 

Community Engagement – The area surrounding the Grizzly Bear Complex 

experienced multiple fire events in the preceding weeks, including: the Table 

Rock Complex (June 28); Blue Creek Fire (July 20); and the Phillips Creek Fire 

(August 1).

Soon after the Blue Creek Fire, the Umatilla National Forest participated with 

Walla Walla and Columbia County Emergency Management Services to 

promote and encourage “Firewise” communities at a local public meeting.

Through this effort, valuable communication with the community had been 

established prior to the start of the Grizzly Bear Complex.

The Umatilla National Forest sent out news releases and fire summary 

updates twice a day to a large contact list and local media outlets. The 

Incident Management Team continued this practice when it took command. 

In addition, the Incident Management Team managed a Facebook page that

experienced high visitation and helped guide interested parties to the 

InciWeb page. Several public meetings were also held during the fire in 

surrounding communities, allowing the IMT members and various agency 

personnel to speak “in person” to affected communities.
250
251

The 17 wilderness fires merged 

into either the Butte Creek or

Bear Ridge fires, which later 

became the Grizzly Bear 

Complex.

The day these numerous starts 

occurred, the National and 

Pacific Northwest Region 

Preparedness Levels were both 

raised to the maximum 

severity of 5. According to the 

National Situation Report, at 

this same time, 73 active 

“Large Fires” (a wildfire of 100 

acres or more in timber or 300 

acres or more in grass/sage) 

were burning across the nation 

with 21,714 firefighting 

resources assigned. A total of 

18 Large Fires were active in 

Oregon and Washington with 

6,523 firefighters assigned.

The storm system that ignited the Grizzly Bear Complex passed through much of the Pacific Northwest, 

causing many new fire starts and a corresponding surge in demand for firefighting resources throughout 

the Pacific Northwest Region.

Communities and Watersheds

among the Values at Risk Threatened

by the Grizzly Bear Complex

The numerous fires which grew together to form the Grizzly Bear Complex started southeast of Dayton, 

Washington. The fire threatened several critical values within the area including: private property, 

residences, seasonal cabins; and significant infrastructure that included power lines, the Bluewood Ski 

Area, historic buildings, Forest Service special use cabins, campgrounds, fire lookouts, guard stations, 

commercial hunting sites, and active timber sales.

The Grizzly Bear Complex also threatened the Mill Creek Municipal Watershed and private water 

systems; Threatened and Endangered bull trout and salmon species; and the communities of Troy, 

Anatone, Flora, Grouse Flats, and Eden Flats.

Confine and Contain Strategy Selected

Umatilla National Forest leadership completed a strategic risk assessment as well as a Wildland Fire 

Decision Support System (WFDSS). Due to the fire’s location (distance from commercial resources and 

private property), the scarcity of firefighting resources, and the higher priority fires locally, regionally, 

and nationally, a confine and contain strategy within the Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness boundary was 

selected.

Special Issues, Concerns, and Challenges

Surrounding the Grizzly Bear Complex

Available Resources – The unavailability of resources precluded the ability to 

keep wilderness fires small during Initial Attack. As higher-priority fires across 

the Pacific Northwest drew available resources, there was a lack of aviation 

assets and aerial delivered firefighters. This situation presented limited 

opportunities to check fire spread with aviation assets. 

Above Average Fire Activity – A dry winter resulted in the higher elevations—

normally under snow—to be exposed to solar radiation and the long-duration 

drying of fuels of all sizes. Many fire starts occurred earlier than a normal fire 

season and proved to be challenging to contain and control. 

Hot, Dry Weather – From mid-June through mid-July, daily tracking of the 

Energy Release Component (ERC) showed values trending well above average

and occasionally setting new historic maximums. After mid-July, wetting rains 

from thunderstorms decreased these ERC trends. Even though these periodic 

rain events slowed the fire season’s intensity, more hot and dry weather 

caused ERC values to quickly rebound. 

Wilderness – There is a perception that indirect suppression efforts on 

wilderness fires are not sufficient and that more direct actions should/could 

have been taken. 
252

Fire progression map of the Grizzly Bear Complex.

Long-Term Strategic Plan

A long-term strategic plan for managing the fire was developed with the assistance of a National 

Incident Management Organization (NIMO) Team.

A Type 2 Incident Management Team assumed command of the fire on August 21, replacing the local 

Type 3 Incident Management Team that had been in command since the fire’s August 13 start date.
253

Suppression Response Summary

Seventeen New Fires Burning Inside the Steep, Difficult Terrain

of the Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness

“Firefighter and public safety are our top priority. We pulled 

our firefighters back to a safe location. We didn’t have the 

aerial resources to support them on the ground and no way 

to extract them with the predicted wind event. We’ll reassess 

our suppression strategy once the fire behavior allows.”

Deputy Fire Staff Officer

Umatilla National Forest

on August 14

Within four operational shifts, local Initial Attack resources were successful in suppressing five of the

non-wilderness fires to a “patrol” status. The Forest had insufficient firefighting resources to fully staff 

the 17 other fires ignited by the same lightning storm. These fires were located within the steep, difficult 

terrain of the Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness.

Because of the severity of the fire season and potential for the fires to move outside the wilderness, the 

Line Officer quickly approved the use of chainsaws in wilderness to assist in suppression activities. All 

firefighters on the wilderness fires were ordered to disengage after a couple of days due to strong gusty 

winds (up to 35 mph), intense fire behavior, steep slopes, and lack of effective escape routes and safety 

zones. 

“Firefighter and public safety are our top priority,” explained the Deputy Fire Staff Officer, Umatilla 

National Forest, on August 14. “We pulled our firefighters back to a safe location. We didn’t have the 

aerial resources to support them on the ground and no way to extract them with the predicted wind 

event. We’ll reassess our suppression strategy once the fire behavior allows.”

Increased Fire Behavior and Spotting Create Two Fires—Managed as the Grizzly Bear Complex

The 17 wilderness fires continued to burn and required Extended Attack as increased fire behavior and 

spotting caused fires to grow together, merging into the Butte Creek and Bear Ridge fires. These two 

incidents were then managed as the Grizzly Bear Complex.

August 15

A Type 2 Incident Management Team was ordered on August 15—but none was available. The next day,

a new fire—the West Butte Fire—was reported within the Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness, burning inside 

the wilderness near the wilderness boundary.

It was identified as a priority for suppression and staffed with rappellers and a helicopter to do bucket 

work due to small fire size and its proximity to the wilderness boundary. Three days later, this fire was 

reported as “Secure”.
254

Fire Runs Six Miles—Grows

from 2,000 to 12,000 Acres

For five straight days—from August 13 

through August 18—Air Attack confirmed 

increasing fire behavior within the wilderness 

fires. On August 18, the fire ran six miles and

grew from 2,000 to 12,000 acres. Four Heavy 

Air Tankers and one Lead Plane were 

ordered—but all such resources were already 

committed to other incidents.

August 19

On August 19, a National Incident 

Management Organization (NIMO) Team was 

poised to assist the local Type 3 Incident 

Management Team. However, shortly after 

the in-brief, it was diverted to manage a 

wildland fire fatality event elsewhere in the 

Pacific Northwest Region.

Also on 

August 

19, a “Level 1 Evacuation” (“BE READY” for potential evacuation) 

was issued for the following communities: Eden Bench, Grouse 

Flat, and Troy. 

The order for a Type 2 Incident Management Team was filled. This 

team would assume command on August 21.

August 20

On August 20, a Red Flag Warning is in effect as low humidity, 

high winds, and hot rising temperatures—with no chance of 

rain—were forecasted over the fire area.

Fire behavior increases significantly on this day due to sustained 

winds of 10 mph with gusts up to 25 mph. The fire is pushing east 

toward several communities.

Residents Evacuate; Conflagration Act Enacted

Level 3 Evacuation notices (“GO” Evacuate NOW. LEAVE 

IMMEDIATELY) were issued for Eden Bench, Grouse Flat, and Troy. 

At this time, very few resource orders have been filled and local 

Engine Modules were supporting Extended Attack.

By the evening of August 20, Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources and Oregon Department of Forestry Engines 

were engaged in the point protection of structures. 

On August 20, the fire grows to 30,000 acres. The Grizzly Bear Complex’s 

smoke plume could be seen for more than 100 miles away.

Residents of the town of Troy, located 

at the bottom of this steep, rugged 

Wenaha River Canyon, were forced to 

evacuate by the fast-approaching 

Grizzly Bear Complex Fire on August 20.

Photo by Bill Swartley.
255

On August 20, the Governor of Oregon invoked 

the Emergency Conflagration Act which can be

invoked if there is a threat to life, safety, and 

property due to fire and the threat exceeds the 

firefighting capabilities of local firefighting 

personnel and equipment. The Oregon State Fire 

Marshal’s Office Green Team was ordered to Troy 

for structure protection.

While firefighting efforts saved many of the 300-

400 homes and outbuildings in the area, five

primary residences and 28 outbuildings were lost.

On this day, the fire ran approximately 11 miles, 

adding an additional 37,602 acres—for a total of 

48,000 acres. The Grizzly Bear Complex’s smoke 

plume could be seen more than 100 miles away.

August 21

The Type 2 Incident Management Team takes

command at 6 a.m. The fire is at 48,000 acres, a 

Red Flag Warning is in place, and there is very little containment.

Resource orders started to fill and crews quickly engaged in structure protection, prepping containment 

lines, and completing burn out operations. At this same time, aircraft are used to slow the fire and 

suppress spots near strategic containment lines.

More than 600 Firefighting Resources Make Suppression Progress

Forecasted hot, dry weather was a concern as the fire remained at 0 percent containment for many 

days. Direct and indirect fire lines were constructed using dozers and logging equipment. More than 600 

firefighting resources made progress as fire lines held and fire growth slowed to between 2,000 and 

6,000 acres a day.

August 25

By August 25, five percent containment was achieved. The majority of the Grizzly Bear Complex was no 

longer a threat to communities as mop-up continued near structures.

August 27

The southeast fire perimeter remained active and jumped containment lines, creating a 260-acre spot 

fire that crews quickly contained.

August 29

Another Red Flag Warning was issued for strong winds. No significant fire growth occurred on those 

portions of the fire where containment lines had been constructed.

The Oregon Department of Forestry was able to secure the National 

Guard to support Grizzly Bear Complex fire line activities, increasing 

the number of fire line personnel by 250.
256

“It’s been a long, exhausting month. Getting from A to Z was hard at 

times. But, in the end, the outcome feels like success. We had few 

accidents—given the size and scale of this incident—and our 

relationships with our partners and communities are now stronger.”

Fire Management Officer

Pomeroy Ranger District

Umatilla National Forest

September 3

More than 1,100 resources were assigned, 

performing mostly mop-up.

September 5

Portions of the Grizzly Bear Complex receive 

rain and snow.

September 6

Command of the Grizzly Bear Complex is 

transferred to a Type 3 Incident Management 

Team. The fire, now 75,530 acres in size, is 30 

percent contained. 

September 18

On September 18, the Grizzly Bear Complex is 

transferred to the local unit as a Type 4 incident 

for continued suppression and rehab work. 

Isolated heat still remains in the fire’s interior. 

The fire is estimated to reach 80,000 acres by its 

projected containment date of October 21.

Conclusion

The lack of available aerial and ground resources during this fire’s critical Initial Attack timeframe 

impaired suppression efforts. This situation prevented fire managers from keeping new fire starts small 

and confined to the prescribed wilderness containment boundary.

Fire activity in the Pacific Northwest was at its peak. A wilderness fire with initially low values at risk was 

a lower priority for receiving scarce resources. While the local Incident Management Team made the 

most of available resources, it was unable to overcome a high-wind event and dry fuel conditions on a 

landscape primed to burn as the fire made a run of more than 37,000 acres in a single day, destroying 33 

structures in its wake.

As priorities shifted in the Region, the Grizzly Bear Complex was adequately staffed and positioned to 

handle hot, dry conditions with high winds that threatened critical roads, trails, and ridges identified in 

the containment strategy as the fire remained entirely uncontained.

Coordination with cooperators and local entities proved key in the successful management of this 

incident. Effective community communication and engagement led to fulfilling one of the primary 

objectives of wildland firefighting: Ensuring Firefighter and Public Safety. 
257

For Interactive Map: Appendix S http://arcg.is/1XxB6CQ – Chelan Complex

Lightning Ignites Multiple Fast-Spreading Fires

Background

Early on the morning of August 14, 

a lightning storm moved through 

Washington’s Chelan Valley, 

igniting multiple fires which 

eventually were grouped into the 

Chelan Complex. The fires that 

started on National Forest System 

Lands that morning included the

Reach, Cagle, Black Canyon, Squaw 

Creek (eventually renamed 

McFarland), Antoine, and First 

Creek. 

These fires spread rapidly. They 

were driven by steady 30 mph 

winds, with reports of stronger 

gusts.

The Reach, Cagle and Antoine fires 

burned together and were 

renamed the Reach Fire. The First 

Creek Fire, located on the west 

shore of Lake Chelan, was 

geographically isolated from these 

other fires.

Firefighters Mobilized from the Nearby Wolverine Fire

to Help with Suppression Efforts

The Pacific Northwest Incident Management Team #2, a Type 1 Incident 

Management Team, was assigned to the Wolverine and Blankenship fires 

the morning of August 14. However, when the Incident Commander first 

awoke, he was able to see two fires from the Incident Command Post 

(ICP) located in Chelan Falls and he could also see the smoke column 

from the Antoine Fire.

Given that day shift had yet to be briefed or deployed to their shift 

assignments on the nearby Wolverine Fire, the Incident Commander was 

able to mobilize—using firefighters from the Wolverine Fire—

approximately 600 firefighters to Initial Attack actions on these new fires.

Chelan Complex

Ignition Date

August 14, 2015

Cause

Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest

Responding Initial Attack Resources

8 Crews (Type 1 and Type 2 Initial 

Attack), 3 Type 1 and 2 Type 2 

Helicopters, 19 Engines (all types), and 

2 Dozers (primarily reassigned from the 

Wolverine Fire)

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 5

Local: PL 5

Acres Burned

88,985 Acres (as of 9/23/15)

Estimated Cost

$10,000,000 (as 9/23/15)

Land Jurisdictions

U.S. Forest Service, Chelan Fire 

District, Bureau of Land Management, 

Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources 

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 1,249

Crews: 26

Engines: 104

Helicopters: 12

Structures Destroyed

25

Cooperators

Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources, Chelan Fire District, 

Chelan County Sheriffs, Okanagan 

Sheriffs, Washington National Guard, 

American Red Cross, Washington State 

Patrol, Washington State Fire 

Marshal’s Office, Washington 

Department of Fish and Wildlife, 

Washington Department of 

Transportation, National Park Service, 

Lake Wenatchee Fire and Rescue, 

Chelan County Public Works

Successes

Insights Shared by Incident Commanders

Chris Schulte and Clay Templin

1. The Chelan County Sheriffs were 

outstanding in all facets of their job.

2. The lack of a Unified Command was not 

seen as an issue as the agencies provided 

Agency Administrators to the incidents with 

the authority to speak for their agency. These 

individuals were readily available when 

required to make decisions or implement 

actions.

3. The lend/lease of resources between the 

Okanogan Complex and the Chelan Complex 

was important for the efficient management 

of both of these complexes.

4. Community Response Teams, working far 

ahead of the fire on education with local 

communities worked well. When longduration fires seem likely, it is recommended 

that these special teams be used even 

sooner.
258
259

These efforts were in conjunction with the suppression 

efforts coming from the Chelan Fire District and the 

Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest. While no formal 

Initial Attack plan had been developed by the Incident 

Command Team and no specific geographic area had been 

delegated to this team for Initial Attack fire support, point 

protection and perimeter control actions were occurring. 

These actions were being coordinated from the Chelan Fire 

District Headquarters station. 

Chelan Complex Evolution

August 14 through September 9

August 14

Wolverine Fire Resources Recruited to Help Initial Attack Efforts

During this day, multiple new fire starts grew rapidly on Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, and 

Chelan County land jurisdictions. In the original delegation to the Incident Management Team, Initial Attack 

support for new starts had been identified as a responsibility. With new fires visible from the Incident 

Command Post, resources originally planned for use on the 25-mile contingency line of the Wolverine Fire

V I D E O

See Deputy Incident Commander Rob Allen 

explain how and why firefighting resources 

were moved from the Wolverine Fire to the 

Chelan Complex fires.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nl

Pja3j09-I
260

Protecting Homes

from the First Creek Fire

A special water-scooping aircraft

drops its loads on the approaching

First Creek Fire to protect homes and 

private lands on August 15.

Photos by Kari Greer,

U.S. Forest Service
261

were made available for Initial Attack on these new fires. All aircraft assigned to the Wolverine Fire were 

also diverted to support operations on these new fires.

The initial Incident Status Summary (ICS) 209 indicated that the First Creek and Antione fires had Level 3 

evacuations (“Evacuate Now – Leave Immediately”) in place. In addition, the Antoine Fire had a high 

probability of burning into the Reach and Cagle fires. On the original ICS 209, only six engines were 

indicated as assigned to the Antoine Fire. This number of engines was augmented by an unknown 

number of resources from the Wolverine Fire.

The Wolverine Fire ICS 209—developed in support of the August 14 day shift—indicates that this 

incident had 8 Crews (Type 1 and Type 2 Initial Attack); 3 Type 1 and 2 Type 3 Helicopters; 19 Engines 

(all types); and 2 Dozers available for Initial Attack support. 

18 Structures Lost on First Creek Fire

The Type 1 Incident Management Team’s Incident Commander stated that the Operation Section Chiefs 

assigned to the IMT took the lead in coordinating the actions of the resources from the Wolverine Fire. 

As new fires were assessed for needs, resources were committed to these fires through the use of the 

existing communications structure for the Wolverine Fire.

During the first operational period on the First Creek Fire, a total of 18 structures were lost.

By mid-day, to better organize their forces and to understand the scope of their authority to act, the 

Operations overhead, in conjunction with the Incident Commander, asked for a Delegation of Authority 

from the multiple jurisdictions involved with the new fires.

An agreement was reached that the Type 1 IMT would assume formal command of the Reach, Antoine, 

Cagle, McFarland, Black Canyon, and First Creek fires on August 15 at 6 a.m. A decision was also made 

that a Unified Command would not be used and that the supporting agencies would provide Agency 

Representatives (Agency Administrators) to the Incident Management Team.

August 15

Fire Crosses Columbia River; Crews, Engines, Aircraft Requested

By the morning of August 15, the Antoine, Cagle and Reach fires had merged and were being managed 

as a single incident referred to as the Reach Fire. The fire had crossed the Columbia River and was well 

established in Douglas County.

The National Incident Situation Report for this day indicates that only four Engines were assigned to the 

Reach Fire. The ICS 209 for the Black Canyon Fire, another of the fires that started on August 14, 

indicates a total of 10 Engines and 2 Dozers were assigned. The resource tracking and reporting systems 

had yet to catch up with the rapidly expanding fire situation. After the first three fires had combined 

into the single Reach Fire, the Black Canyon and McFarland fires eventually were added to the Chelan 

Complex.

The Incident Management Team had committed resources from the Wolverine Fire to support these 

new fires. A limited number of firefighting resources were left behind to secure the improvements at 

Holden Village and Stehekin.

The First Creek Fire’s ICS 209 identifies Crews, Engines and Aircraft as critical resource needs.
262

While available ICS 209s for the various fires do not indicate any structure loss as of this date, this is 

most likely because an official Damage Assessment Team from Chelan County was unable to access 

many areas of the fire due to personnel safety concerns.

The Incident Management Team’s Incident Commander requests and receives an extension to continue 

the combined management of the Chelan Complex and Wolverine Fire.

August 16

Reach Fire is 55,000 Acres; No Contained Fire Line on Squaw or Black Canyon Fires

The Reach Fire—now combined as a single incident with the Cagle and Antoine fires—is an estimated 

55,000 acres.

The Black Canyon and Squaw Creek (renamed McFarland) fires remain separate incidents. The Black 

Canyon ICS 209 shows 1 Crew, 1 Engine, 3 Dozers and 3 Water Tenders assigned. The Operations map 

shows no contained fire line on either the Squaw or Black Canyon fires.

All fires remain active. Resources activated by the Washington State Fire Service Mobilization Plan begin 

to arrive on these incidents. 

August 17

For the First Time in Three Days, Fires Decrease Somewhat in Activity;

Structure Losses Reported; 500 Structures Still Threatened

All fires remain active today but to a lesser degree than the first three days.

The first reports of structure losses begin to be identified on the ICS 209s. The Reach Fire has now 

destroyed 29 structures. The First Creek Fire reports more than 500 structures of various types 

threatened—but none damaged or destroyed. 

Resource sharing between the fires was common as the Incident Management Team had command of 

all incidents and was able to shift suppression resources to the highest priority protection needs among 

all fires. Because of this, ICS 209 resource reporting should not be considered fully accurate.

Air Tanker makes a 

drop to help protect 

homes near Lake 

Chelan on the first day 

of the Reach Fire.

Photo courtesy 

YouTube.com.
263

August 17 ICS 209 Resources Assigned (where information is available)

McFarland (formerly Squaw Creek) – 1 Engine, 

1 Crew

Black Canyon – 1 Engine, 1 Crew, 1 Dozer, 2 

Water Tenders

Reach – 76 Engines, 11 Crews, 10 Dozers, 14 

Water Tenders, 6 Helicopters, 1 Air Tanker

First Creek – No information

The Incident Management Team was approaching 21 days assigned to these fires and the Wolverine 

Fire. An order for the replacement IMT was placed today.

August 18

Level 2 and Level 3 Evacuation Orders

Still in Place for Chelan Area;

Resources Still Scarce on All Fires;

Red Flag Warning Forecast

Contained fire line begins to be recorded on the northeast 

corner of the Reach Fire. The First Creek, McFarland and Black 

Canyon fires are still rapidly expanding with no containment 

identified. The ICS 209s as of this date do not indicate any 

containment.

While fire activity moderated some today, a Red Flag Warning is forecast for tomorrow. Both Level 2 

(“Be Set to Evacuate”) and Level 3 (“Evacuate Now”) evacuation orders are still in place for the Chelan 

area.

Two homes are reported destroyed on the First Creek Fire ICS 209.

Resources continue to be scarce on all fires with critical needs identified on all ICS 209s associated with 

these fires. The greatest needs are for Type 1 Crews, Engine Strike Teams, Aviation resources and MidLevel Supervision—especially Division Supervisors and Task Force Leaders. Resources assigned per the 

209s:

August 18 ICS 209 Resources Assigned

McFarland – 4 Crews, 3 Engines (all types), 1 

Dozer, 2 Water Tenders

Black Canyon – 2 Engines, 1 Dozer, 1 Water 

Tender

Reach – 15 Crews (all types), 73 Engines (all 

types), 10 Dozers, 6 Helicopters (all types), 2 Air 

Tankers

First Creek – No information

The Templin Type 1 Incident Management Team is in-briefed and begins to acquire intelligence on the 

incidents.

August 19

800 Residents Remain Evacuated; 462 Structures Threatened

Strong winds—as predicted by the previous day’s Red Flag Warning—impacted the fire area today.

The 6 a.m. August 19 Chelan Complex “Briefing Map” (see next page) shows the progress that had been 

made to date on the containment of the Chelan Complex, McFarland, Black Canyon, and First Creek 

fires.

While evacuation notices have been lifted in some areas—including Union Valley—approximately 800 

residents remain evacuated.

V I D E O

See the Incident Commander’s August 18 

update and current status of the many 

active fires in the Chelan area.

https://wolverinefireinfo.wordpress.co

m/2015/08/16/video-update-by-icchris-schulte-sunday-aug-16th-2015/
264

This map shows the various fires’ status as of 6 a.m. on August 19.

The black lines represent completed fire line.

The red lines represent the uncontrolled fire edge.
265

McFarland and Black Canyon Fires Threaten 462 Structures

The McFarland and Black Canyon fires—anticipated to burn together today—are threatening

approximately 462 structures. The Alta Lake and Goat Mountain area, including a radio transmission 

tower, are also threatened. A Level 3 (“Evacuate Now”) evacuation remains in place in these areas.

Critical resource needs between all fires remains constant. To address short-term needs, the sharing of 

resources continues to be a common practice. Keeping this practice in mind, here is the information 

from the ICS 209s for this day:

McFarland – No information

Black Canyon – 2 Crews (all types), 8 Engines 

(all types), 1 Helicopter, 2 Dozers, 3 Water 

Tenders

Reach – 18 Crews (all types), 60 Engines (all 

types), 1 Dozer, 6 Helicopters (all types), 12 Air 

Tankers

First Creek – No information

August 20

Extreme Fire Behavior Still Anticipated;

Level 3 Evacuations in Place throughout the Chelan Area

Good progress is made on the Reach Fire on the east side of the Columbia River. While crews continue 

working to secure the fire’s west side, the Reach and Black Canyon fires joined today—creating one 

Large Fire.

Red Flag Warning weather conditions impacted the fire area today, causing significant fire spread. 

However, even with the anticipated extreme fire behavior and Level 3 Evacuations in place throughout 

the Chelan area, the Chelan Complex fires are the Pacific Northwest Region’s number 20 through 24 

priority fires—based on the August 20 National Incident Situation Report.

While the number of commercial properties that have been damaged or destroyed are not yet available, 

residences and other structures along Highway 97, infrastructure (power, water, communication), and 

businesses remain threatened. 

Resources reported from the 209s are indicated below. However, as previously stated, the sharing of 

resources between fires is a common practice to address short term need. Critical resource needs 

between all fires remains constant:

McFarland – (Combined with the Black Canyon 

Fire.)

Black Canyon – 2 Crews (all types), 8 Engines 

(all types), 1 Helicopter, 2 Dozers, 3 Water 

Tenders

Reach – 18 Crews (all types), 60 Engines (all 

types), 6 Helicopters (all types), 1 Dozer, 12 Air 

Tankers

First Creek – No information

Transfer of command to the Southwest Area Type 1 Incident Management Team is scheduled tomorrow 

for both the Chelan Complex and Wolverine/Blankenship fires.

August 21

The Five Original Fires Burn Together into the “Chelan Complex”;

Critical Resource Need: Protecting Structures on the First Creek Fire

Transfer of command to the Southwest Area Type 1 Incident Management Team occurs this morning.

This area’s five original fires have all burned together into a single fire that—from this point forward—

will be referred to as the Chelan Complex.
266

The incoming Incident Commander states that any one of the fires under his command has enough 

complexity to be managed by a National Incident Management Team.

The First Creek Fire remains a stand-alone fire. Receiving the services of a Very Large Air Tanker (VLAT) is 

identified as a need to protect structures on this fire.Critical resource needs also begin to focus on Type 

1 Crews to support burning around structures associated with the First Creek Fire. Containment is 

identified at only two percent on this stand-alone fire.

The Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) decision is published for the Reach Fire. During this 

day, progress continues on the Reach Fire with both direct and indirect dozer line construction 

continuing. Lake Chelan State Park is added to the values at risk on the Reach Fire.

Resources Committed to the Chelan Complex and First Creek Fire per the ICS 209s:

Chelan Complex – 16 Crews (all types), 53 Engines (all types), 6 Helicopters, 14 Dozers

First Creek – No information

Firefighters protecting homes in the Morning Sun Estates from the Chelan Complex on August 22.

Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service
267

August 22

Hotshot Crews and Type 1 Helicopter Needed to Help Save Residences

The ICS 209 indicates that Interagency Hotshot Crews (IHC) are needed for seven days along with an 

additional Type 1 Helicopter as a window of opportunity exists in the next 24-48 hours to implement a 

strategy to contain and control the First Creek Fire.

Discussions between Operations and two IHC Superintendents indicate that—with these two additional 

suppression resources—terrain features would allow for successful line construction, burning and 

holding. (These crews were eventually received. By August 28, the indirect fire line from Lake Chelan 

west to the Shady Pass Road had been completed.)

On the Chelan Complex, indirect fire line is completed northwest from the Columbia River to Alta Lake 

and beyond. This fire line now serves as the primary future control point to check the fire’s spread to the 

northeast.

Resources assigned per the ICS 209s (sharing of resources continues between all three fires currently 

managed by the Southwest Area Type 1 Incident Management Team):

Chelan Complex – 16 Crews (all types), 53 Engines (all types), 6 Helicopters, 11 Dozers

First Creek – No information

August 23

Number of Destroyed and Damaged Homes Identified

The Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) decision is published for the First Creek Fire.

While a Red Flag Warning continues to influence the fire area, damage assessment personnel are able to 

access portions of the Chelan Complex and First Creek Fire.

Numbers of Damaged and Destroyed Structures are Updated on Both Fires:

Chelan Complex – 44 structures (all types) destroyed; 0 damaged

First Creek Fire – 19 structures (all types) destroyed, 22 damaged.

Resource needs and assignments remain constant with previous ICS 209s.

August 24-26

Fire Lines Help to Halt Spread of First Creek Fire;

Chelan Complex Threatening Alta Lake Area

A series of indirect and contingency lines are under construction on the First Creek Fire.

Work on opening the Shady Ridge fuel break nears completion. This ridge serves as a contingency line to 

keep the First Creek Fire south of 25 Mile Camp—the last viable option for halting fire spread south of 

the Wolverine Fire.

An indirect line now successfully ties Forest Service Road 125 down to Lake Chelan. This indirect line 

uses a series of other roads to connect the primary ridge west of the fire to Lake Chelan. 

On August 26, a Water Tender rollover with an associated minor injury is reported on the First Creek 

Fire.

As the fire edge is secured on the western side of the Chelan Complex, the threat to structures in the 

Chelan area continues to be reduced. However, on August 25, fire activity increases on this fire’s eastern 
268

flank, threatening the Alta Lake area—as well as the areas north of the head of the fire where other

structures are located.

Resource sharing continues between all fires under the command of Southwest Area Type 1 Incident 

Management Team. Mid-level overhead positions, Division Supervisors, and Safety Officers remain 

difficult to fill.

Current Resource Assignments as of the August 26 ICS 209

Chelan Complex – 8 Crews (all types), 62 Engines (all types), 8 Helicopters, 10 Dozers

First Creek – No information

August 27-28

“Evacuate Now” Order Given for People in the Gold Creek and McFarland Creek Areas;

First Creek Fire Continues Spreading West Toward Slide Ridge Road

On the Chelan Complex, a Level 3 (“Evacuate Now”) evacuation order is posted August 28 for the Gold 

Creek and McFarland Creek areas. Evacuations are also in place for the Alta Lake and Chelan areas.

Infrastructure threatened by the fire includes communication towers that provide service for the region.

The Washington Incident Management Team #3, who has been serving as a “Branch” Incident 

Management Team in the Alta Lake area will time out on August 28. The California Type 1 Incident 

Management Team #5 has arrived at the incident, with a planned transition to the Chelan Complex on 

August 30.

The First Creek Fire continues to spread west toward Slide Ridge Road. However, the easterly 

progression to the shore of Lake Chelan has been minimal for several days. 

Resources assigned to the Chelan Complex remain consistent with previous ICS 209 reports. Critical 

resource needs also remain consistent with past ICS 209s.

August 29

Both Fires Receive Precipitation

Precipitation is received today on the Chelan Complex. (Fire size at the time of the precipitation is 

93,079 acres.)

This precipitation allows the Level 3 Evacuation for Gold Creek to be reduced to a Level 2 (“Be Set to 

Evacuate”). However, a new Level 2 Evacuation order is initiated for the Methow Valley area, including 

Alta Lake and Carlton.

Precipitation is also received on the First Creek Fire. Objectives for the day are to hold and secure all 

existing control lines.

Staffing on the Chelan Complex is comparable with previous days. For the first time, the First Creek Fire 

indicated specific resources on its ICS 209 report:

First Creek Fire – 6 Crews (all types), 19 Engines, Miscellaneous Equipment
269

August 30

Fire Behavior is Moderating;

Minimal Fire Activity Reported on First Creek Fire

Moderating fire behavior has led to more accurate mapping of 

the Chelan Complex that indicates a reduction in the number 

of acres previously reported.

A transition of the Chelan Complex to California Incident 

Management Team #5 is scheduled for August 31. This team 

will also be managing the Okanogan Complex.

The Southwest Area Incident Management Team #1 will retain 

command of the Wolverine and First Creek fires. Resources 

assigned to the Chelan Complex remain consistent with 

previous ICS 209s.

Minimal fire activity is reported on the First Creek Fire. Holding 

and securing existing portions of fire line are the operational 

objectives. 

August 31-September 9

Minimal Fire Activity on Both Fires;

Updated Mapping Shows a Reduction in Actual Fire Sizes

Transition of command on the Chelan Complex to California 

Incident Management Team #5 occurs on August 31.

Minimal fire activity occurs on both the Chelan Complex and the First Creek Fire.

Because the reduced fire activity allows for improved mapping, both fires now report a reduction of 

acreage.

Firefighters conduct a firing operation to protect homes from the Chelan Complex.

Photo by Kari Greer, U.S. Forest Service.

Lessons Learned

Insights Voiced

by Incident Commanders

1. Creating a “complex” earlier in the fire’s 

evolution would have avoided a multitude of 

administrative impacts on the Incident 

Management Teams.

The teams were required to complete 

multiple ICS 209s, track multiple fire codes, 

and track resources individually by individual 

incidents.

2. The use of a Type 2 Incident Management 

Team without its Incident Commander—who 

was assigned as a “Branch” on the Chelan 

Complex—did not work well.

It would be more effective to have the IMT in 

command establish a Branch with direct lines 

of supervision back to the IC in command 

rather than establishing a separate IMT as a 

Branch. 
270

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1NlApes Appendix T – Okanogan Complex

Lightning Starts Eight Fires

On the evening of August 13 and early morning August 14, a

lightning event started a number of fires. There were at least 

eight named fires that were originally part of the Okanogan 

Complex. 

August 13

The Nine Mile Fire, located three miles northeast of 

the town of Oroville, Washington, started on August 

13. The fire had fire line constructed all around it by 

the time the Washington Interagency Incident 

Management Team #2 took command on August 15. It 

had burned 4,673 acres and was 30 percent contained.

The fire moved beyond the United States border into 

British Columbia, burning 120 acres (48.5 hectares). 

Approximately 130 fire personnel were assigned to 

this fire with additional resources ordered. A shower 

from a thunderstorm the evening of the August 15 

diminished activity and aided containment of the fire.

Okanogan Complex

Date of Ignition

[Note: Fires within this complex started on August 13 

and 14 and were placed in a complex on August 17.]

Cause

Lightning

Land Ownership at Fire Origin

Nine Mile – Private/Washington DNR

Beaver Lake – Okanogan-Wenatchee NF

Lime Belt – Private/DNR

Tunk Block – Private/Washington DNR and

Colville Agency

Twisp – Private/Washington DNR 

Responding Initial Attack Resources

Lime Belt – T2 helicopter, 3 rappellers and an IC

Tunk Block – 2 T6 engines, 1 T2 helicopter, 1 IC

Beaver Lake – 1 IC, 3 T6 engines

(IA resources are approximate as there were many fire 

starts and movement of resources.)

Preparedness Level at

Time of Ignition

National: PL 5

Local: PL 5

Acres Burned

304,782*

Estimated Cost 

(Late September)

$62,500,000*

Beaver Lake/Lime Belt: $40,800,000

Tunk Block: $11,350,000

Twisp River: $4,100,00

Land Jurisdictions

U.S. Forest Service, Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources, Colville Agency

Resources at Incident Peak

Total Personnel: 1,918, 

Crews: 37

Engines: 184, 

Helicopters: 7

Structures Destroyed

195 Total

(Residences: 123 Others: 72)

Cooperators

Washington State

Department of Natural Resources, OkanoganWenatchee National Forest, Spokane District BLM, 

Colville Agency, Okanogan Fire Districts 3, 4,

6, 7, 8, 9, 16, and Conconully Fire Department

* Costs and acres are for the individual fires compiled 

for this report. Fires moved in and out of complexes 

during their management.

Notable Successes

Primary Residences Saved

No structures were lost during the Lime Belt Fire’s 

Initial Attack and first 48 hours.

Once the Type 2 Incident Management Team had 

taken command, the fire made a very active run. An 

old historic barn was lost. However, dozens of primary 

residences were saved through the use of retardant.

Effective Communications

There were effective communications and sharing of 

critical firefighting resources between the Okanogan 

Complex and Chelan Complex throughout the August 

20 Okanogan Complex Incident Management Team 

transition between the incoming T1 IMT and the 

outgoing T2 IMT. 

Local Fire Department Collaboration

Local fire departments provided Initial Attack 

resources for the Nine Mile Fire and stayed on this fire

under the Okanogan Complex oversight until it was 

contained. This allowed critical resources to be 

available to respond to the Okanogan Complex.
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272
273

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1MZWFXL

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1OAkata

August 14

Lime Belt 

Fire

At 6:59 a.m. on August 14, Dispatch 

received a report of smoke on Schalow 

Road near Conconully, Washington. The 

local Initial Attack Incident Commander

discovered two fires within one-half mile of 

each other. Located along the same 

ridgeline, they totaled approximately 10-15 

acres.

The larger of the two fires, the Lime Belt 

Fire, was burning actively on all flanks. The 

head of the fire was exhibiting group 

torching and spotting 100 to 300 feet 

toward the smaller fire.

The initial dispatch for the fires was 1 

Rappel Type 2 Helicopter. This Helicopter 

with five crew members was dispatched at 

1 p.m. 

The Initial Attack involved anchoring and 

flanking the fire, but the Initial Attack 

Incident Commander said he soon realized 

“that with only the five of us and 1 Type 2 helicopter with bucket, we were not going to be very successful—so 

we dropped back to point protection”. After the first hour, it was apparent that the Initial Attack efforts would 

not contain the fires. By mid-afternoon, for safety concerns, erratic fire behavior forced the rappellers “intothe-black”, a safe already burned out area. Firefighters were removed and regrouped at the heel of the fire. By 

the end of the day the fire was estimated at 700 acres.

Tunk Block Fire

At 2:03 p.m., the Tunk Block Fire was started by lightning near a populated area located just outside the 

Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation. By August 21, weather conditions had pushed the Tunk 

Block Fire onto the Reservation.

The Initial Attack was staffed by local fire department crews who took the lead on the ground—

attempting to locate and control the fire with no available air support. All aircraft were grounded due to 

high winds. 

By mid-afternoon, Air Tankers were requested to protect structures. However, no Air Tankers were 

available as winds in excess of 45 mph had grounded all aircraft. At 4:02 p.m. the fire was 25 acres and 

was torching, smoldering, and creeping. More Hand Crews and air support were still needed. 

By late afternoon, critical concerns arose about the fire threatening structures in populated areas. Mass 

notifications of evacuations went out to the McLaughlin Canyon area. Heavy Air Tankers were again 

requested to support these evacuations. The fire was expected to arrive at the structures in 11⁄2 hours. 

The Initial Attack Incident Commander requested two more Dozers. He was attempting to keep the fire 

away from structures. For the night shift, the IC put new operators on the Dozers. The fire was now 

within a few miles of Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation lands.

Tunk Block Fire Summary

 Local Fire District manages Initial Attack and calls for 

critical resources.

 Both human life and structures are at imminent risk.

 During the Tunk Block Fire Initial Attack burn over, 

several crew members receive minor injuries.

 Type 3 Incident Commander transitions in and calls in 

additional resources.

 Three days later, a Type 1 Incident Management Team 

takes command.

 Numerous communities are evacuated at peak of 

incident.

 3,000 residences are threatened at peak of incident 

and for the next two weeks.

 Numerous structures are damaged or destroyed.

 Initially, the Tunk Block Fire becomes part of the 

Okanogan Complex, then becomes part of the North 

Star Fire.
274

For Interactive Map: http://arcg.is/1Towoqt Beaver Lake Fire 

The Beaver Lake Fire was discovered at 3:36 p.m. on August 14 on Okanogan National Forest lands. At 

the time of the initiation of the first ICS 209 report, the fire was 800 acres. There were 3 T6 engines 

assigned to the fire with a Type 3 IC. Some precipitation from a thunder cell dampened fire spread for a 

very short time. By morning the following day, the fire was estimated at over 1,000 acres. 

August 15 

Just past midnight on August 15, the Tunk Block Incident Commander indicated no needs at that time. 

At 8:44 a.m., the fire transitioned to a Type 3 Incident Management Team. 

The Washington Interagency Incident Management Team #2 (IMT2) shadowed the Type 3 Incident 

Management Team for eventual assumption of command for the Okanogan Complex. When this team 

took command, the combined acreage of Blue Lake and Tunk Block fires was 2,805 acres. Fire behavior 

was erratic and extreme with great potential for substantial runs. Evacuations were in progress.

Daybreak brought a very slight rain but it did not impede the spread of the Lime Belt Fire. The Initial Attack IC 

called for Level 1 evacuations—“Be aware of the situation: BE READY”. 

At 4:30 p.m. when the IMT2 Incident Commander in-briefed at the Tonasket District Office, the fire was already 

at 800 acres. This Incident Commander’s objectives were to see what opportunities existed to contain/control 

the fire, attempt to minimize structure damage, and provide leadership.

At 5:30 p.m. when he arrived on scene, the fire had grown to 1,200 

acres. They were in Extended Attack. An indirect suppression 

strategy had been established. Because of a shortage of 

firefighting resources, point protection (rather than full perimeter 

containment) was the initial strategy implemented by the IMT2. 

The fire was burning very actively on all flanks in light flashy 

fuels—burning toward heavier fuels. The Incident Commander 

requested more Hand Crews (for a total of eight), Division 

Supervisors, Task Force Leaders, Heavy Equipment, Heavy 

Equipment Bosses, Engines, and a Type 2 Safety Officer. 

The initial threats were determined to be target at natural 

resources and firefighter safety. Trigger points were set for 

notifications to the Okanogan County Sheriff’s department for evacuations for most communities 

adjacent to the area of the fire. The first evacuations—for the community of Conconully—were 

identified by the Initial Attack Incident Commander to extend into adjacent subdivisions. 

Threats Exist to All Conconully Residences

The fire was reported at 2,560 acres by 7:20 pm. The fire made an approximate thee-mile run under 

northwest winds coupled with gusty downdrafts from thunderstorms. Threats existed to all residences 

in and around Conconully. 

Over the next 24 hours, the Lime Belt Fire remained active. At this point, the Lime Belt Fire was added to the 

Okanogan Complex of fires. 

A “point protection” strategy 

identifies highest values and 

protects them as the fire 

moves past. This was used 

frequently on fires in August 

because there were 

insufficient firefighting 

resources to stop the spread 

of many of the fast moving 

fires.
275

Optimum Strategy

At 6 a.m. on August 15, the Washington Incident Management Team #2 took command of the Nine Mile Fire. 

Before taking command of the Okanogan Complex, the IC met with the Washington State Department of 

Natural Resources, the Complex’s Initial Attack Incident Commander, representatives from the Bureau of Land 

Management, Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest, and others to engage in strategy discussions. 

It was agreed that an optimum strategy would be to move a Type 3 Incident Management Team into Black 

Canyon and re-allocate personnel and resources throughout the area by dividing-up the individual fires and 

their personnel.

Managing agencies included the Washington State Department of Natural Resource, Okanogan Fire District 11, 

Okanogan County Sheriff’s Office, and Okanogan County Emergency Management. (The cause of Nine Mile Fire

is under investigation by the Washington State Department of Natural Resources. The fire was not caused by a 

plane crash, as was initially reported.)

Local Initial Attack resources diligently worked 

to gain access into the fire area and were 

successful in establishing a line around the

entire fire perimeter.

On the night of August 15, showers and 

thunderstorms diminished over the fire. Two 

days later, another weak cold front moved in 

from the northwest. This front is expected to be 

dry and will produce breezy northerly winds for 

the afternoon. Above normal temperatures and 

dry conditions will return during the middle of 

next week.

A new Washington State Department of Natural 

Resources Incident Commander and a Short 

Type 2 Incident Management Team (with 27 

personnel) were left to manage the Nine Mile

Fire on the Canadian border. The DNR 

redirected one Incident Commander to the Chelan Complex and another assumed command of the Black 

Canyon Fire, part of the Chelan Complex.

The U.S. Forest Service was simultaneously engaged in wildfires including the Beaver Lake and the rapidly 

expanding Lime Belt and Tunk Block fires. All of these fires eventually became part of the Okanogan Complex. 

August 16

By August 16, the Beaver Lake Fire was 971 acres with the addition of a Dozer to the resource mix.

August 17

Complex Management Expands, Type 2 Incident Management Team Assumes Command

The Washington Interagency Incident Management Team #2 took command of the Okanogan Complex at
276

For Interactive Map:

http://arcg.is/1OAjuE4

“Although the fire was 6,500 acres at transition on August 17, 

we were successful in keeping both firefighters and the public 

safe while we managed this incident.”

Lime Belt Fire Type 3 Incident Commander

6 a.m. on August 17. When they assumed 

command they had the following incidents 

under their management: 

Nine Mile Fire: 4,704 acres—90% contained

Lime Belt Fire: 3,443 acres—25% contained

Beaver Lake Fire: 723 acres—0% contained

Tunk Block Fire: 2,744 acres—20% contained

Blue Lake Fire: 823 acres—40%

Although considered part of the Okanogan Complex, several fires were either consumed by another of the 

Okanogan Complex’s fires or put out before the Okanogan Complex was named (such as the Dunn and Paradise 

fires).

August 17 and 18

The Beaver Lake Fire was placed into the Okanogan Complex the morning of August 17.

The Washington Incident Management Team #2 Incident Commander assumed command of the 

Okanogan Complex at 6 a.m. on August 17.

The situation with the five fires was rapidly deteriorating with homes threatened and evacuation 

requirements expanding. Both of these days experienced Red Flag conditions of low relative humidity 

and high winds. The Washington State Fire Service Mobilization Plan was requested for support to 

structure protection on August 18. In 

addition, by August 18, the Blue Lake Fire 

merged with the Lime Belt Fire.

August 19

Twisp River Fire

At 12:38 p.m. on 

August 19, the

initial incident report call came in to the 

Okanogan County Sheriff’s Office of a twoacre fire which would become known as the 

Twisp River Fire. The Twisp River Fire started 

about five miles west of the town of Twisp in 

the vicinity of mixed fire protection lands. As 

a result, multiple agencies were responsible 

for managing the fire.

Twisp River Fire by Katie Swanson. Twispofate Blog.

Issues, Concerns, and Challenges

Critically needed resources were not available throughout 

the Region.

Hot, dry weather and high winds allowed several fires to 

grow.
277

The Rural District 6 Fire Department received a dispatch at 12:42 p.m. The fire chief deployed two Type 

3 Engines, two Type 2 Tactical Tenders, three Type 5 Engines, and three Type 1 Engines.

The Initial Attack Incident Commander requested a Heavy Air Tanker, a Helicopter, and Air Attack.

The first firefighters on scene stated they saw three- to four-foot flame lengths at the head of the fire. 

The fire was terrain driven; the wind was light out of the southeast; and the fire was roughly two to 

three acres in size.

By 12:55 p.m., 20 homes were threatened and evacuations had occurred. Four minutes later, at 12:59, 

the fire chief requested a Helicopter ASAP.

At 1 p.m., the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest responded by dispatching four overhead (including 

a Type 3 Incident Commander Trainee), four Engines, and one Crew. The Forest Service Battalion Chief 

was informed that this was a Washington State Department of Natural Resources fire.

By 1:14 p.m., the fire was running, spotting, and torching with more than 20 structures threatened. 

At 1:17 p.m., a Washington DNR Type 3 Incident Commander was on scene. Shortly thereafter, Unified 

Command had been established with the Forest Service, Washington DNR, and Okanogan Fire District 6. 

The fire was reported to be approximately 20 acres.

According to the “Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Status Report” released 

November 18, 2015 [http://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/?DocumentKey=c221a055-a972-

478c-be5c-9a16c2d5929c ], the following Initial and Extended Attack resources were being managed by 

the three Incident Commanders:

• 3 structure (Type 1) Engines 

• 2 medium (Type 3) structure/wildland 

Engines 

• 9 light (Type 6) wildland Engines 

• 2 Water Tenders 

• 2 Fire District 6 Division Chiefs 

• 2 Dozers with crew (a crew of 2 for 1 

Dozer; a crew of 3 for the other 

Dozer) 

• 1 Hand Crew (16 people) 

• 1 4-person Helitack Crew 

• 1 Light Helicopter 

• 2 Medium Helicopters (one did not 

arrive on scene until after the 

entrapment) 

• 1 Heavy Helicopter 

• 1 Air Attack (to provide eyes over the 

fire) 

• 3 Heavy Air Tankers (carrying 

retardant) 

• 1 Lead Plane (to help guide the 

retardant tankers)

By almost 3 p.m. the Forest Service Incident Commander Trainee sized-up the fire:

“At this time at least 50-plus acres with running, torching, spotting. There are 20-plus homes 

directly threatened in imminent danger at head of fire. Need fixed-wing heavy aircraft for added 

structure protection. If no heavy aircraft are available, we will have another 100-plus 

structures/homes in imminent danger in a box canyon. Rotors and AA are currently working the 

left flank to keep the fire from progressing up Twisp River. We have multiple crews and engines 

working at structure protection at this time. We would like a second heavy aircraft.”

Shortly after this size-up, there was a report of an entrapment on the fire’s east flank. Actions occurred 

quickly over the next hour.
278

At 3:08 p.m. the Forest Service Incident Commander Trainee ordered all resources to disengage from 

the fire and head to the staging area. The Incident Commanders alerted dispatch that they had an 

entrapment on the fire.

The fire continued to move with heavy use of aircraft and assignment/reassignment of Engines.

Later that afternoon, it was confirmed that three firefighters had perished.

A Type 1 Incident Management Team was ordered to take command of the fire.

August 19 and 20

The Twisp River Fire was added to the Okanogan Complex..

By August 19, there had been general disengagement from 

most of the fires. Containment lines had been breached 

except for on the Nine Mile Fire. The Nine Mile Fire was 

holding in place and would mainly be managed for mop-up 

and suppression repair operations.

By the evening of August 19, more than 54,000 acres had been 

burned. By the next evening, the number more than doubled 

to 124,000 acres. There were not enough firefighters to do 

any direct or indirect perimeter control. All efforts were 

focused on evacuation and point protection (residences, 

commercial buildings, and infrastructure). 

Recap of information from the Incident Status Summary ICS209 as posted on August 20:

• Tunk Block Fire – Long-range spotting from wind-driven runs 2 miles to south and 7 miles to 

north. Fire crossed Hwy 20 up to Havilland Road in Tonasket.

• Lime Belt/Blue Lake Fire – Wind-driven fire moved southeast and crossed Salmon Creek Road. 

Point protection of structures in rural areas of Omak.

• Beaver Lake Fire – Significant overnight growth to the southeast from spotting and high winds. 

Fire is currently at Hwy 20.

• Twisp River Fire – Fire developed rapidly in windy conditions and light fuels yesterday. Working 

structure protection along the Twisp River Road. Fire is moving down valley.

• Homes Threatened – Approximately 5,140 primary 

residences are within two miles of current fire 

perimeters (unknown number of outbuildings).

The situation by August 20:

Nine Mile Fire: 4,720 acres – 95% contained

Lime Belt Fire: 52,903 acres – 28% contained

Beaver Lake Fire: 12,617 acres – 0% contained

Tunk Block Fire: 45,337 acres – 30% contained

Twisp River Fire: would be adding an additional 7,868 acres

August 21 to August 28

The effects of the prolonged drought and the series of Red Flag Warning days played significantly into 

the explosive growth of the Okanogan Complex. Total acreage at the beginning of this time period on 

August 20 was 124,083 acres. By the close of business on August 28, 302,225 acres had been officially 

On August 19, the Okanogan 

Complex is 54,838 acres.

By August 22, it is more than 

227,000 acres.

The extent of the Red Flag Warning for 

dangerous fire weather conditions on August 19.
279

reported. Cold front passages and/or Red Flag Warnings for low relative humidity, high winds and 

instability were reported for six of these eight days. The final wind event in front of a system that 

brought rain also had strong gusty winds.

The ongoing severe wildfire 

event of the Pacific Northwest 

challenged managers with 

getting the right number of 

resources at the right place at 

the right time. As there were 

not enough firefighters and fire 

apparatus for making a major 

effect on the expanding 

perimeter, all efforts for the 

first several days were on 

structure protection. By August 

23, containment lines were 

again breached due to low 

relative humidity and high 

winds.

Summary Facts

August 19

• Three firefighters perish.

August 21

• 162,315 acres burned.

• Transfer of command to a Type 1 Incident Management Team.

• 18 homes reported lost (but numbers hard to determine as it is too dangerous to get an appropriate 

assessment).

• Spotting two miles ahead of the fire.

• Widespread power outages.

• Tunk Block Fire spreads 7 miles to the south and 2 miles to the north.

August 22

• 227,206 acres burned.

• Road closures throughout the complex.

• 3,800 residences reported without power.

• Continued rapid fire spread and spotting.

• Structure loss and evacuations continue.

August 23

• 244,570 acres burned.

• High probability of ignition leads to spot fires starting new fires with widespread spotting across 

containment lines.

Fire progression map produced August 23. Note the red and purple that displays the rapid 

spread on August 21 and 22.
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August 24

• 258,339 acres burned.

• 7,000 structures evacuated.

• Lime Belt and Beaver Lake fires merge.

• More formal structure loss assessment 

underway with Okanogan County 

Assessor’s Office.

• Concerns for North Star Fire, located to the 

east of Tunk Block Fire, and Tunk Block Fire 

burning together. IMTs coordinate their 

efforts.

August 25

• 261,650 acres burned.

• 39 homes accounted for as being lost to 

fire.

• Spotting over containment lines still occurring.

August 26

• 280,267 acres burned.

• Twisp River Fire completely lined, 85% contained.

• Another Red Flag Warning for low relative humidity high, gusty winds.

• Assessment of structure loss continues. 68 homes accounted for as being lost to fire.

August 27

• 292,512 acres burned.

• Fire spread slows down due to heavy inversion of smoke but gusty winds accompanied the lifting of 

the inversion. Red Flag Warning again for gusty winds.

• 94 homes and 63 out-buildings reported lost to fires.

August 28

• 302,225 acres burned.

• Increased relative humidity with dim cloud cover significantly moderating fire behavior. Rain in the 

forecast in two days.

• 123 homes and 72 out-buildings reported as lost to fires.

• Complex reaches the maximum number of resources it will have. There are 1,918 personnel 

assigned.

August 30

Transition and Slowed Fire Growth

The days of tremendous fire growth end as rain falls on August 30. California Incident Management 

Team #5 takes command of the Okanogan and Chelan complexes. The Tunk Block Fire is removed from 

the Okanogan Complex and assigned to the North Star Fire. Focus continues to be on protection of 

infrastructure and residences and control objectives.

The Tunk Block Fire on August 27. Photo by Dave Fauss.
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Life, Property, and Structure Protection

By August 31, the protection of life, property, and structures continues to be the primary objective of 

this incident.

Fire suppression resources continue to provide point protection for a multitude of communities and 

residences. There were a total of 1,912 residential homes that had received Level 3 Evacuation notices—

“Evacuate immediately: GO”. Evacuation shelters had been established in Omak, Tunk Valley, and 

Tonasket.

In addition, closure orders were in place for a number of Tribal Forest lands and primary roads. 

Numerous evacuations occurred. Over the next two weeks, evacuation notices remained posted for four

communities and their surrounding residences. 

The Twisp River Fire was returned to local control on September 8. The fire was 11,222 acres and 98 

percent contained.

The remaining fires were returned to their local units on September 26 at 97 percent containment. 

Sufficient rain and work provided the opportunity to return them to their local units with minimal 

opportunity for further spread or significant amounts of work to accomplish.